VOLUME 279 JANUARY 1952

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political
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SOCIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE AGING


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
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Washington, D. C.

with the assistance of the Committee

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1952





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Introduction: A Philosophy of Aging

By CLARK TIBBITTS and HENRY D. SHELDON

THIS volume has a purpose. The purpose is to present an inventory of the characteristics of aging people, to assess their potentialities for further integration in community life, and to examine the conditions essential to maintaining such integration.

The title of the volume is "Social Contribution by the Aging." The underlying philosophy of all the contributors is (*a*) that there are positive roles for aging and aged people through which they can make valuable contributions to American society and (*b*) that these roles offer opportunity for continuing, if not increased, individual satisfaction in the later years. A corollary of this point of view is that assignment of active roles to our older citizens will resolve many of the individual, family, and community problems that have arisen out of the growing number and proportion of older people.

OUR AGING POPULATION

The presentation of statistics on the aging population poses something of a dilemma. On the one hand, it is insisted, with a good deal of justification, that there is no single chronological age above which the population may be regarded as elderly; on the other hand, the specification of such a lower limit is a necessary condition for statistical analysis. This situation is met in part, at least, by the presentation of figures for several age levels.

Preliminary sample data from the 1950 Census indicate that approximately 12 million persons, or about 8 per cent of the total population, were 65 years old and over. The corresponding figures for persons 60 and over were about 18 million, or 12 per cent; for persons 55 and over, 25.5 million, or 17 per cent; and for persons 50 and over, 34 million, or 23 per cent of the total population.

The older population, defined in terms of any of these various levels, is not evenly distributed among all segments of the population. There were, for example, relatively more elderly persons among whites than among nonwhites in 1950. Thus, persons 55 years old and over constituted about 17.5 per cent of the total white population but only 11.5 per cent of the nonwhite population; and for persons 65 and over, the corresponding figures were 8.5 per cent and 5.7 per cent respectively.

The difference in age between whites and nonwhites is reflected in the figures on the geographic distribution of the aging population. In the Northeast, the North Central States, and the West the proportions of persons 55 and over, and 65 and over closely approached the national percentages for these age groups. In the South, where about one-fifth of the population is nonwhite, these proportions were somewhat lower. It was not, however, purely a matter of color. The proportions of persons 55 and over, and 65 and over in the white population of the South were 14.5 per cent and 7.0 per cent respectively, as compared with 17.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent for the total white population.

Variations in the relative number of elderly persons among the states were somewhat greater than among regions. In states such as Iowa and New Hampshire more than 10 per cent of the

population were 65 years old and over, and more than 20 per cent were 55 and over. At the other end of the scale, less than 6 per cent of the population in New Mexico, South Carolina, and North Carolina were 65 and over, and less than 12 per cent were 55 years old and over. In the absence of migration, the older population would be expected to be a relatively small proportion of the population of those states characterized by high fertility and mortality, and a relatively high proportion in those states in which fertility and mortality are low. Such expectations of course must be modified in terms of historical trends in the volume and age distribution of both in-migrants and out-migrants. Since these trends tend to be unique from state to state, there is no general formula for explaining specific differences. It may be noted in passing that in general, elderly persons move less frequently than young adults. Thus, even for states such as Florida and California, which are the most widely recognized destinations for elderly migrants, the impact of large numbers of migrants at the upper age levels on the total age distribution is cushioned by the simultaneous in-migration of larger numbers of young adults.

Among persons 65 and over, the number of women exceeds the number of men by somewhat more than half a million. For every 100 women in this age group there were fewer than 90 men. These figures reflect the fact that death rates, throughout the age scale but particularly at the upper age levels, are higher for males than for females. This higher mortality among males, combined with the tendency of women to marry, on the average, about three years earlier than men, makes widowhood the most characteristic marital status of women 65 and over. In March 1950, slightly more than one-half of the women in this age group were widowed, whereas less than one-fourth of the men were widowers.

The demographic revolution

The American population of 1950 was a considerably older population than that of 1850. In this hundred-year period the median age increased from 18.9 years to 30.1 years. As the accompanying table indicates, for ages 30 and over, the proportion of persons in the total population at each ten-year interval was greater in 1950 than in 1850, and the relative gain increased progressively with age. Thus, the proportion of persons 40 to 49 years of age in 1950 was about one and one-half times as great as in 1850; the proportion 50 to 59 years, more than twice as great as in 1850; and the proportion 70 years and over, more than three times as great.

The contrast between the age structure of the current population and that of 1850 is apparent from the accompanying chart which presents in graphic form percentage distributions of the population in 1850, 1940, and 1950 by age and sex. The shaded areas in the age intervals for the population 30 and over in the "age pyramids" for 1940 and 1950 represent the relative increases in these intervals over 1850.

This shift in age composition is the result of what has been called the demographic revolution which followed closely upon the heels of the industrial revolution in western Europe and in the United States. The demographic changes involved are revolutionary in the sense that there were unprecedented declines in mortality and in fertility.

In the United States the declining fertility is clearly evidenced by changes in the ratio of children under 5 years of age to women of childbearing age. For the white population, this ratio, adjusted for the underenumeration of children and for shifts in the age distribution of females, dropped from 892 children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women 20 to 44 years old in 1850, to 419 in 1940.[1] This decline was generally continuous, decade by decade, throughout the period. The culmination of this trend is reflected in the census figures for 1930 and 1940; in both of these years the absolute number of children under 5 was less than it had been in the immediately preceding census.

The decline in mortality is reflected in the increasing expectation of life at birth. The available evidence indicates an expectation of life in the neighborhood of 40 years during the middle of the nineteenth century, whereas by 1949 this figure had increased to 67.6 years. Although a large part of the increase in the expectation of life can be attributed to the reduction in the mortality of children, there has also been an appreciable decrease in the mortality of older persons.

[1] P. K. Whelpton, *Forecasts of the Population of the United States, 1945–1975* (U. S. Bureau of the Census, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 16.


POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE AND SEX: 1950 AND 1850

Age and sex	Number		Per Cent	
	1950	1850[a]	1950	1850
Total	150,697,000	23,191,876	100.0	100.0
Under 10 years	29,565,000	6,743,185	19.6	29.1
10 to 19 years	22,094,000	5,423,744	14.7	23.4
20 to 29 years	23,420,000	4,279,958	15.5	18.5
30 to 39 years	22,794,000	2,827,577	15.1	12.2
40 to 49 years	19,048,000	1,847,806	12.6	8.0
50 to 59 years	15,504,000	1,110,226	10.3	4.8
60 to 69 years	11,010,000	610,301	7.3	2.6
70 years and over	7,262,000	349,079	4.8	1.5
Male	74,633,000	11,837,660	100.0	100.0
Under 10 years	15,126,000	3,412,511	20.3	28.8
10 to 19 years	10,982,000	2,712,898	14.7	22.9
20 to 29 years	11,381,000	2,196,171	15.2	18.6
30 to 39 years	11,211,000	1,491,291	15.0	12.6
40 to 49 years	9,549,000	968,323	12.8	8.2
50 to 59 years	7,644,000	576,131	10.2	4.9
60 to 69 years	5,393,000	309,755	7.2	2.6
70 years and over	3,347,000	170,580	4.5	1.4
Female	76,064,000	11,354,216	100.0	100.0
Under 10 years	14,439,000	3,330,674	19.0	29.3
10 to 19 years	11,112,000	2,710,846	14.6	23.9
20 to 29 years	12,039,000	2,083,787	15.8	18.4
30 to 39 years	11,583,000	1,336,286	15.2	11.8
40 to 49 years	9,499,000	879,483	12.5	7.7
50 to 59 years	7,860,000	534,095	10.3	4.7
60 to 69 years	5,617,000	300,546	7.4	2.6
70 years and over	3,915,000	178,499	5.1	1.6

[a] Figures include adjustments for age not reported.

Effect of fertility and mortality changes

The net effect of these changes in fertility and mortality has been to increase the proportion of the total population at the upper age levels. As the birth rate continued to decline, the pro-



POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE AND SEX: 1850, 1940 AND 1950

portion of younger persons decreased and, by default, so to speak, the proportion of older persons increased. The decline in mortality reinforced this trend, not only because of the modest reduction of mortality at the upper age levels, but also because the reduction in mortality at the lower age levels permitted an increasing proportion of persons to survive to the upper age levels. According to mortality rates at the beginning of the century less than 60 per cent of the children born would live to reach the age of 50; whereas by 1948, almost 86 per cent would reach this age.

The increase in the proportion of older persons was augmented by the addition of about 27 million immigrants to the population in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. These immigrants entered the population in large part as young adults, but with the passage of time have moved into the older ages. The effect is particularly marked because immigration has been relatively negligible since 1925, and thus this group has not been replaced at the young adult level.

If the trends in mortality and fertility characteristic of the period prior to 1940 are projected into the future, the proportion of aging persons in the population will continue to increase. The fertility experience of the decade 1940 to 1950, however, raises some questions as to whether a pattern of declining fertility should be projected into the future. During that decade the birth rate rose to about the level of the early twenties, and at the present writing there is no evidence that a return to the low levels of the thirties is imminent. If this pattern of low mortality and high fertility were to continue through the next several decades, it seems probable that the proportion of aging persons would remain roughly at its present level. It may be noted in this connection that even with the increasing number of births within the past decade, the median age of the population rose from 29.0 years to 30.1 years, and the percentage of persons 60 years old and over rose from 10.4 to 12.1.

Current projections of the population under the assumptions of "high" fertility and "low" mortality indicate for 1960 a population 60 years old and over of 23.5 million or 13.1 per cent of the total population.[2] Assumptions of "low" fertility and "high" mortality indicate corresponding figures of 22.1 million and 13.7 per cent. What will happen, of course, will depend on the relative magnitude of changes in fertility and mortality, particularly as the latter is related to age. If, for example, real progress is made in reducing mortality from those diseases characteristic of later and middle life, such as heart disease and cancer (and there is evidence in support of this supposition), then substantial increases in the aging population are to be expected both as a proportion of the total population and in absolute numbers.

In view of the fact that elderly persons have become an increasingly large segment of our population, and the probability that their numerical importance will increase, it is particularly fitting at this time to give serious consideration to the development of positive philosophy as to their role in the larger society.

THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF AGING

The point of view expressed at the beginning of this introduction calls for a new concept of aging—a concept that

[2] Jacob S. Siegel and Helen L. White, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 43, "Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United States 1950 to 1960," U. S. Bureau of the Census, August 11, 1950 (processed).

gives recognition to the positive as well as the negative aspects of maturation. More and more of us are living beyond the period of reproduction and nurture of children and beyond the conventionally defined period of economic usefulness. Hopefully, we have begun to arrest and reverse the attitudes and social practices that have tended to ignore the needs of older individuals and the potentialities for social contribution that lie in these new, later years.

The concept we are outgrowing

The concept of aging which we are outgrowing is based on an assumption of general organic, functional, and psychological deterioration beginning in middle life and proceeding rather rapidly until it becomes disabling and finally incapacitating. Cosmetic changes, deliberation in thought and action, attainment of the status of grandparent, have been taken as signs of advanced age and as indication that the period of usefulness is drawing to a close. Consistent with these beliefs, little or nothing has been expected of older people, and many of them do little or nothing.

Looking back, it is not difficult to see the origin of the attitudes that have tended toward regard of older people as superfluous. The country was shifting to an industrial economy in a period when youth was plentiful and when comparatively few people lived beyond the 50's or early 60's. Industry required great strength and long hours of work. Young, strong bodies were needed and were available. There were relatively few old people because childhood diseases, the infectious diseases of early adulthood, and the accidents of childbirth took off a good many before middle age.

Increasing application of machines and power produced more goods than purchasing power could absorb, and simultaneously shortened the work week. The birth rate continued to decline and operate as a further check on the total capacity of the country to consume the industrial output. Thus, when a plethora of workers developed in the 1930's it was the older ones (along with the very young) whose services were eschewed.[3]

With industrialization has come urbanization and other new ways of life. Oriented toward work outside of the home and toward educational and social activities provided by community agencies, the large, self-sufficient, consanguineal type of family has begun to give way to the two-generation, conjugal group in which grandparents have no positive role.[4] As one consequence, most urban housing has been designed for two generations and does not meet either the space or psychological needs of children, middle-aged, and grandparents trying to continue on in the family group.

The mobility of the American people has furthered the separation of the adult generations. Likewise, fewer children per family and longer-lived parents in the new type of economy have made it more difficult for the middle generation to provide for both their own young children and their aging parents. Faced with the necessity of choosing, it has favored the children and left it to the community to look after the parents.

Our first attempt at adaptation to aging, then, was to set older people

[3] E. W. Burgess, "The Growing Problem of Aging," in *Living Through the Older Years* (C. Tibbitts, Ed.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1949; and Philip M. Hauser, "Social Implications of an Aging Population," presented at the Northwestern University Fourth Centennial Conference, Chicago, June 7, 1951.

[4] Wilbert E. Moore, "The Aged in Industrial Societies," in *The Aged and Society*, Champaign, Ill.: Industrial Relations Research Association.

aside as no longer useful but, having made their contributions, as entitled to withdraw and enjoy the leisure of their declining years. Private and public pension systems and grants-in-aid appeared and tended to formalize retirement in the seventh decade of life. We even talked of lowering the age when it should become financially feasible to do so.

In voluntary activities, too, we frequently encouraged older people to give way to an oncoming generation eager for advancement and for opportunity to try out new ideas. In consequence, although with tongue in cheek, we undertook to establish behavior patterns for older people, organized around hobbies, fishing, and reflection. Lacking suitable housing facilities, we consigned the older generation to corner rocking chairs, to lifeless rooming houses, and even to mental hospitals.

To a degree, older people have accepted the concept of limited usefulness, but they have not been satisfied. There is, in fact, evidence of a good deal of dissatisfaction.[5] There is ample evidence of their bewilderment and feeling of insecurity in a fast-moving world that has failed to provide assurance of income and opportunity for obtaining normal satisfactions and for making continuing contributions to community life.[6]

We are now beginning to question the validity of earlier assumptions and the attitudes and practices they led us into. In two nation-wide meetings within recent months—the National Conference on Aging called by the Federal Security Agency, and the Second International Gerontological Congress—along with scores of state and local meetings, hundreds of people have begun to explore the nature and the implications of both individual and population aging and are reaching new understanding. This volume, in a fairly real sense, presents the status of current thinking on the subject.

The nature of aging

The aging process is now under intensive study in the laboratory, in the clinic, and in the field. Enough is known to characterize it as a process involving numerous interrelated elements, biological, psychological, and sociological in nature. Aging per se is so complicated with disease processes on the one hand and with the restrictions of culturally assigned roles on the other that it is difficult as yet to describe or measure it with any degree of confidence.

Biological aging is described by Dr. Carlson and Dr. Stieglitz in this volume and by Shock and others, largely in terms of tissue desiccation and lowered rate of oxidation, cellular atrophy, and decrease in elasticity and strength of tissue and muscle. It has been shown, also, that the process is a very gradual one, that it differs widely among individuals, and that there are variations in the rate of aging of different organ systems within the same individual.[7]

It appears on the basis of recent research that the rate of biological aging may be subject to some control through reduction of the insults of disease, through nutrition, and through modification of endocrine function. Thus the period of vigor may be extended into the period now regarded as old age. Indeed it has probably already been

[5] John Frank Schmidt, "Patterns of Poor Adjustment in Old Age," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 1, July 1951.

[6] Robert T. Monroe, *Diseases in Old Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), Chap. 14.

[7] Nathan W. Shock, "Biology of Aging," in *Problems of America's Aging Population*, a report of the First Annual Southern Conference on Gerontology, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1951.

extended. Furthermore, since most human tasks are being lightened, it is virtually certain that, in biological terms, potential usefulness is being prolonged. A good deal of physiological decline, in fact, may have very little significance in the light of our ability to match individual traits with job requirements and to adjust requirements to specific capacities.

Psychological aging is being studied with reference to sensory and perceptual processes, motor ability, general intelligence, learning and memory, vocabulary, personality, and adjustment. Studies reveal measurable declines in the capacities that have a clear organic base, as is indicated in Dr. Kaplan's article. It is too early to come to definite conclusions regarding traits such as intelligence, learning, and vocabulary, because of their relationship to other factors, including occupation, education, and extent of activity or use. One specialist in the field, Dr. Donahue, has made the cogent suggestion that it may be impossible to measure changes in certain of the mental characteristics until a sizable group in the population is able to experience normal, active aging.[8] Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that mental functioning can persist into advanced years. The variations and differentials found in biological traits are present also in the psychological sphere.[9]

Sociologically, aging is partly a function of one's situation and partly of the attitudes and folkways of the society in which one lives, as is clearly shown in the article by Professor Simmons. Socially defined roles that encourage the individual to withdraw from participation and to submit his affairs to the management of others make him aware that he has entered a new phase of life.

[8] Wilma T. Donahue, "Psychological Aspects of Aging," *ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*

Situationally, aging has its onset during the 40's and 50's when offspring begin to fend for themselves and to require less parental attention. The problem (or opportunity) of utilizing leisure time is increased when children leave home altogether. Similarly, as Professor Burgess shows, the need for companionship or close ties becomes still more acute with the passing of husband or wife, relatives, and close friends.

Sociological and psychological aging advance still further when retirement from work comes and when infirmity or long-term illness reduces mobility. Here needs for useful activity and social participation assert themselves, along with problems of financial security, medical care, and suitable living arrangements.

Despite the variety of factors involved, it must be apparent that the possibilities of arresting the sociological aging process are at least as great as those in the biological and psychological areas. Social attitudes that define aging are clearly susceptible of change, and healthy adjustment can be made to some of the events or crises of the later years.

The new concept

Here, then, lies the challenge of aging, both individually and socially. There are organic and mental changes characteristic of aging. They are gradual, however, and need constitute little or no serious impairment until much later than has been commonly supposed. There are situational changes to which adjustment can be made and some of which offer new opportunities.

Attainment of middle age may be viewed as bringing us to the threshold of a new phase of life—a phase that can represent a new stage of development, growth, maturity, and social contribution. Freed to an increasing extent from the responsibilities of early adulthood, we find ourselves ready to make further and broader contributions to the social welfare, effective because they grow out of half a century of experience gained through living. And this, we submit, is the role older people would choose for themselves. Dr. Havighurst shows, beyond question, that older people want activity, friendships, emotional security, a sense of usefulness. Socially, our aging people constitute a huge natural resource eager to be exploited.

AREAS OF CONTRIBUTION

Part II of the present volume discusses the question of continued participation in gainful employment. Miss Bancroft describes the current situation and discusses trends and prospects, after which Mr. Abrams analyzes existing barriers to increased participation. The views of management, labor, and the farmer are given in a series of shorter essays under the general title "Should There be a Fixed Retirement Age?"

Part III is concerned with potentialities for contributions in other spheres. Mr. Wheeler, an older man himself, discusses the desire for continued contributory status and the creative potential behind it. Miss Bunker outlines the opportunities and satisfactions in creative handcrafts. The Ogdens describe the potential roles of older people in community life. Professor Burgess considers the older person as a family member and points out that we need much more information in this area.

THE ENVIRONMENT OF AGING

The reader who has come this far and who traverses the first three sections of this volume will recognize that the environment of aging has a good deal to do with the aging process itself and with the extent to which the aging person may remain an active member of society.

Section IV is devoted to consideration of the conditions that need to be provided for maintenance of function and contributory status. The point of view of the several contributors, Dr. Wilma Donahue, Dr. Hertha Kraus, Miss Dorothea Ramsey, Miss Mary Switzer and Dr. Howard Rusk, Mr. Wilbur Cohen, Mr. Harry Levine, and Mr. Charles Odell, is that most older people can and will maintain themselves as self-sufficient members of society once they are given the opportunity. Thus, education, housing, community services, health promotion and rehabilitation, income maintenance, activity programs, and employment counseling are seen as just normal community facilities, as are elementary, secondary, and college education, pediatric clinics, vocational counseling, playgrounds, and clubs for children and young adults. They are not to be regarded primarily as welfare services in the sense of ministering to psychologically, medically, and financially dependent old people, but rather as part of the environment through which we make normal adjustments to the changes and circumstances of the later years.

This is not to say that health, welfare, and custodial facilities will not be required for the sizable number of people who have reached and will reach the later stages of infirmity or disease. While, under the new concept, increasing numbers will die in harness, there will still be need for infirmaries, nursing homes, long-stay hospital annexes, and other forms of intensive assistance. But even these facilities are now recognizing the contributory potential of older people and are beginning to develop sheltered workshops, community activity centers, and programs for the homebound.

There is one final thought. Tradition-

ally, families and employers have tried to assume direct responsibility for the well-being of the older population. The new concept, which makes functional citizens of the aging, places responsibility for provision of the environment and services on the entire community. Increasingly, the middle generation will discharge its responsibilities to the older generation through support of community services. When those of us in the middle generation, who are also aging, see ourselves and our parents as satisfied, useful members of society, self-managing and self-sufficient, we shall lose the bewilderment, the fear, and the feelings of guilt that characterize the older members of an aging population. Our attitudes and our culture are now in a stage of transition. In developing the programs for financial security, for independent living and activity, for service to society, as outlined in Section IV, we are adopting the new philosophy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The plans for this issue of THE ANNALS were developed with the assistance of the members of the Federal Security Agency's Committee on Aging and Geriatrics. The committee is an advisory body designed to assist and to promote co-operative activities among federal agencies that have programs that affect the well-being of the aging. It seeks to develop a keener recognition by government and by the public of the special needs and problems of the aging, and to foster the development of programs for their solution.

The Special Editor wishes to acknowledge the help given by Dr. Lewis Rohrbaugh, Dr. Carl C. Taylor, Dr. Esther Phipard, Mrs. Lydia Lynde of the Department of Agriculture; Dr. Henry Sheldon, Department of Commerce; Dr. Leonard Silk, Housing and Home Finance Agency; Mr. Charles Odell, Mrs. Pearl Ravner, Miss Helen Ringe of the Department of Labor; and from the Federal Security Agency the help of Dr. Homer Kempfer, Office of Education; Mr. Irving Ladimer, Dr. J. W. Mountin, Dr. Benjamin Shimberg, and Dr. C. J. Van Slyke, Public Health Service; Mr. Jacob Fisher, Miss Rose McHugh, and Miss Naomi Riches, Social Security Administration; and Mrs. Phyllis Frances and Mr. Donald Dabelstein, Office of Vocational Rehabilitation.

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Social and Psychological Needs of the Aging

By ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST

IN considering the needs of older people it is well, first, to remember that older people have the needs that are common to all people, and, second, that they have special needs due to the fact that they are old people.

The needs which are common to all people are: (1) emotional security and affection, met by receiving love and by living in a world where things are predictable and come out usually in a favorable or at least tolerable way; (2) social recognition and status, met by receiving respect from people who count in one's world; (3) a sense of worth and self-respect, met by living up to one's ideals; (4) adequate food, clothing, shelter, and health.

Whenever these common needs are not met as well as people have grown accustomed to expect, there is a social problem. If we have a social problem of old age today, it is because these needs are not being met adequately in the lives of many older people.

Why are these needs not met as well for older people as they are for middle-aged people in our society? The reasons lie in the fact that both the human body and the human society systematically "insult" the person as he grows older and make it difficult for him to meet his needs.

HOW OLD AGE INSULTS THE PERSON [1]

Loss of physical attractiveness. Most of us, men as well as women, learn to place a high value upon our beauty and our strength. At the very least, we value highly our physical and mental vigor, our ability to do a hard day's work. In addition, most of us value our manliness or womanliness—the things that make us attractive to the other sex. Against these values the advancing years wage war. They rob a woman of her ability to have children, usually before she is fifty. Many women interpret this as a sign that they have lost much of their worth as women. Men do not fare much better. Already in the forties most of them lose much of their hair, grow fat in awkward places, and have to wear bifocal glasses. Both sexes lose the smooth skin that they value highly as a sign of youth. Then as the years go on, there is a real decrease of enjoyment of the physical aspects of love between the sexes, and finally the external sense organs of hearing and sight begin to lose their acuity.

These insults to the self usually strike us in vulnerable places. We express it by saying that we do not like to grow older—but what we really mean is that we have invested a great deal of emotional capital in our physical attractiveness, and this investment is going bad on us.

Loss of supporting persons. As if this were not enough to do to us, advancing years also rob us of the people who could best reassure us that we are still attractive people, worthy to be loved. Death of husband or wife, and loss of old friends, leave us without emotional support just when we most need it.

Loss of status. In spite of inevitable loss of physical attractiveness due to middle age, most of us get along very

[1] The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Dr. Jack Weinberg for this concept of the insults due to aging. See Weinberg's "Mental Health Needs of the Aged" in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, 1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 403–409.

well with the status and prestige and power of middle age. At this age we are usually at the peak of our ability to work, we are as well off financially as we shall ever be. More people look up to us than ever before. Then we begin to lose these things. Younger people come along and take the lead away from us in our social and civic organizations. We are no longer in line for promotion in our business. And the crowning blow of all may come in the form of forced retirement from work at a time when we need more than ever to have the assurance that we still count for something in the world. In addition, to some people old age means economic dependency. They are no longer able to support themselves, and must take a status of old-age pensioner which many of them have thought to be an unworthy status.

Loss of useful and respected roles. The status-giving roles begin to disappear. We lose our hold on work, the principal status-giving role for men in middle age. A woman who has become the mother of an attractive group of sons and daughters sees them depart from the home, and one day she finds that people have forgotten what a fine mother she has been. Leadership roles in civic and political and social life are taken over by younger people. There is left the custom of respecting older people for what they once were, not for what they are. A few specific roles of older people become available, and have some value, such as those of grandparent, world traveler, village sage. But these are usually poor substitutes for the roles we have lost.

Lessening of physical health and vigor. When we have asked people in their sixties what they feared most about old age, a great many of them have said they were afraid their bodies would fail them and they would become helpless. At the very least they must anticipate a decreased physical vigor, but this could be tolerable if it were a slow, predictable change. What undermines emotional security is the fear that one may suffer a heart attack which will leave one an invalid, or that a crippling arthritis may come on, or that cancer may develop insidiously.

DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE

The aging body conspires with society's youth-favoring attitudes and practices to create a set of special needs of older people. Because these needs are part of the process of human development, it is well to call them "developmental needs" and to regard them in somewhat the same positive light with which we regard the developmental needs of youth and middle adulthood.

These developmental needs pose learning problems that are fully as complex as any problems faced during a lifetime. In fact, later maturity requires more learning of most people than they have had to achieve since their early adulthood. They meet more new and strange and difficult situations as older people than they have met as middle-aged people.

Later maturity is, then, a period of learning, rather than a period when learning is past. It is a period of facing new and unsolved problems, rather than a period of floating gently on the surface of familiar solutions to familiar problems. Everybody during the age period from 60 to 75 experiences several of the following developmental needs:

Adjustment to death of spouse

Often in our research we hear a man or woman say, "I hope when my wife (husband) dies I can go too. Life won't be worth while after that." This expresses the fear that a man or woman has, after living forty or fifty years with a marital partner, of having to face life without the partner. A man and wife become so thoroughly wedded that they work out a single life pattern which cannot go on when one of them drops out.

Getting along without one's spouse is usually a woman's task in the United States, because men die younger than women, and women tend to marry older men. The average woman becomes a widow before she is 70. The average man does not lose his wife until he is 85.

If a woman loses her husband, she may have to move from her house to a smaller place, she may have to learn about business matters, and, above all, she has to learn to be alone. A man has the same adjustment to make to loneliness, and he may have to learn to cook, to keep house, and to keep his clothes in order.

The solutions of this task run through the range of living on alone in the old home, moving into a small home, living in a rooming house, moving in with brothers or sisters, living with children, remarrying, going to an old people's home. Every solution requires unlearning of old ways and learning of new ways, at a time when learning comes harder than it did in earlier years.

Adjustment to loss of employment and reduced income

In the American society a job is the axis of life for most men and for many women. If the occupation goes, the individual feels that he does not count, that he is not a worthy member of society. Yet the occupation must be abandoned by the great majority of people, whether they be professional or manual workers, sometime between 60 and 70. Half of American men quit work by the age of 65.

Some people fill up the vacuum created by retirement in their lives with a useful and interesting leisure-time activity; others find a part-time job which keeps them busy and happy; too many fret and mope over their forced inactivity.

When retirement also means a serious reduction in income, another adjustment problem appears—that of reducing expenditures—which often means a narrowing of contacts. For instance, an elderly lady feels that she must drop out of the church ladies' circle because she cannot pay her dues. An old man must drop out of his lodge just at a time when he has increased leisure.

Affiliation with the age group of elders

Try as one may to keep young and to avoid being classed with the "elders," the day must come to everyone when he says to himself, "I'm not as young as I used to be. I'd better *be* my age." This day is brought on by the fact that the costs of continued participation in the middle-age group rise more rapidly than the gains. The costs consist of fatigue due to the too rapid tempo of middle life; embarrassment at being unable to keep up, physically and financially and vocationally, with the middle-age group; and a feeling of being ignored or pushed aside by younger people.

Over against these costs are the rewards of participation in the older-age group, such as a more comfortable tempo of life; ease of finding companionship among other people who have leisure time; availability of positions of prestige and leadership in organizations of older people.

Adjustment to decrease of physical vigor

The human body ages in almost every one of its cells and cellular systems. The cells gradually lose their self-repairing properties. They slow

down in their nutritional processes. The senses lose their acuity. In at least a third of the people, heart disease comes on slowly and cuts down their ability to do hard work. The individual must learn a new way of life that is in harmony with his decreased strength and health.

Making satisfactory physical living arrangements

The high incidence of heart disease and "rheumatism" in older people makes physical exertion difficult or dangerous for many of them, and argues against stair climbing and heavy housework. There is increasing danger from falls, due to the increasing brittleness of bones and their slow mending rates. A decreasing ability to masticate foods, with an increasing need for a good diet, makes good selection and preparation of food necessary. Decreasing metabolic ability of the body makes it difficult for older people to keep warm, and requires good heating facilities.

The principal values that older people look for in housing, according to studies of this matter, are: quiet, privacy, independence of action, nearness to relatives and friends, residence among own cultural group, cheapness, closeness to transportation lines and communal institutions—libraries, shops, motion pictures, churches, and so forth.

These values vary for different people. Most older people tend to cling to established housing arrangements until they become very unsatisfactory. Yet residential mobility is high, especially among the very old. Thus, living on in the familiar quarters one has known for years is not the most common solution of the problem. The older person has to decide whether to: live on in a large and increasingly burdensome house or find a smaller and more manageable place; live on alone in the old house after death of the spouse or find smaller and more convenient quarters; live alone or with one or more other people; stay in the community where he has lived as an adult or move to a place with a better climate.

GROUP NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE

If older people are to meet their developmental needs in satisfying ways, they must have a certain minimum of help, in the form of attitudes and services, from the community in which they live. As a group, older people have the following needs:

Satisfactory social roles, which bring social recognition and self-respect. It lies within the power of the individual to create for himself some of the satisfying social roles, such as those of friend, member of a social clique, constructive user of leisure time, informed citizen, active church member; and therefore the individual is responsible to that degree for his own happiness. But some significant social roles are denied to many older people by the community. For example, the role of worker may be denied through the practice of arbitrary retirement or prejudice against hiring older workers. Since to most people work has certain personal satisfactions as well as the purely economic meaning, the assurance of economic security does not take the place of the worker's role.

A chance to earn a living, or economic security. Older people need economic security, but under existing conditions relatively few of them can live in reasonable comfort on their own lifetime savings. Hence they need work, if they are able to work, or a system of pensions which gives them reasonable economic security.

Social and recreational facilities. Just as the community provides recreational facilities and leadership to meet the needs of youth, so it should meet the needs of older people with analogous facilities through municipal recreation departments, churches, schools, and clubs. At a minimum, the older people require meeting places, equipment for games, leadership for group recreation, and instructions in arts and crafts.

Health services. The one set of eventualities that few older people can prepare for is the chance of ill health with need for expensive medical services. This need is not met by a comfortable pension or modest savings or the willingness of grown children to help when they have families of their own to support. For older people there should be a guaranteed health service to which they can turn as a matter of right. Whether this is financed through an insurance company or through a public-supported fund is not here an issue.

WAYS OF MEETING PERSONAL NEEDS

When the community has done its share toward meeting the needs of older people, the main burden still falls upon the individual himself. He must learn a way of life appropriate to his years and his strength. He must erect his own defenses against the insults of aging.

In general, the individual has a choice of two kinds of defense—the irrational and the rational.

Irrational defenses

If one has great difficulty in meeting one's developmental needs due to the insults and deprivations of aging, one is quite likely to adopt certain defenses which seem to other people to be irrational. There are several types:

Memories and fantasies. Since the present is uncomfortable and the future does not seem to promise much, it is natural for the self to turn to the past and dwell on the pleasures and triumphs of bygone days. Why think about today's fading beauty when one can live over in retrospect the parties and the dances when one was the most beautiful, the most charming of persons? Why worry about the complaints that are being made about one's work today when one can remember the days when one was the most productive and successful of workers? And if the reality of yesterday was not rosy enough, one can add color in one's fantasies. One can imagine that one had a dozen beaux and all handsome and dashing, instead of the one or two plain and conservative boys that came around for Saturday night dates. One can imagine that one had a fine, profitable business and many civic responsibilities, instead of the struggling little shop that was always on the verge of bankruptcy.

Regression to infancy. When the present reality becomes very unpleasant, one can rediscover a long-forgotten solace—that of becoming an infant again. Usually this is outgrown about the age of eight or ten, when a boy or girl becomes independent enough and mature enough to take the bad things of life without crying in mother's lap. Then, fifty or sixty years later, the long-forgotten way of escaping from hard reality may come back to one. As an elderly person one may revert to infantile behavior. One may become dependent for feeding and dressing upon another person. One may go to bed and stay there as much as possible. If one is denied the normal adult sexual outlets, particularly if one is a man, one may revert to infantile sexual behavior.

Loss of hearing, sight, and memory. Since the present is becoming uncomfortable, one may commence to shut it out by becoming "hard of hearing," "forgetful," and dim-sighted. This is not to say that people do not actually

suffer a decrease of hearing and of visual acuity, and brain damage which possibly results in forgetfulness. But the actual biological changes of aging are not always responsible for the changes in older people in the behavior of hearing, seeing, and remembering. Sometimes an older person gets a reputation for being hard of hearing, and people converse in his presence in ordinary tones about things they do not want this person to hear. Just then the elderly person is likely to hear what is being said, and people complain, "He hears what he shouldn't hear." If it is convenient to forget an appointment or to overlook a task one does not wish to do, an older person may forget such things and yet remember events of yesteryear with clear fidelity.

Hallucinations. Sometimes a woman who has lost her husband or a man who has lost his wife will go on talking to the absent loved one. Why not? It is a pleasure to have someone to talk to. So why not go on talking to the people one loved? If one listens carefully, one may hear them reply; and so a person living alone may converse a great deal with absent persons. Then when someone—a son or daughter—notices this, that person becomes disturbed and goes to a doctor and says, "My old mother (father) is having hallucinations." Yet when a child discovers what we call an imaginary playmate, which often happens with only children or first children, and carries on long conversations with that imaginary person, the parents are often quite proud, and they say, "My, what a good imagination that child has!"

These are some of the irrational but natural defenses that a self may muster to meet the insults of old age. They are not morally wrong, but they are not particularly useful. At best, they tend to be an escape from reality.

Rational defenses

On the other hand, there are some rational, or positive, defenses, which actually make for a happier and more highly approved life.

Good care of one's body. It is possible for most people to retain a good proportion of their adult vigor and physical attractiveness if they make an effort. A person can see his doctor for a medical examination once or twice a year. He can eat a balanced diet containing adequate amounts of protein and plenty of minerals and vitamins. It seems possible that older people will more and more take medicines of certain hormones, to keep themselves vigorous and alert.

A man as well as a woman can pay attention to grooming. Older people should dress more carefully than younger ones, because they can thereby make better use of their physical attractiveness. There are few women, for example, who do not have the possibility of attractive hair as they grow older. Few men have the advantage of a magnificent head of white or gray hair, but they can dress carefully, select neckties with care, and perhaps add little affectations such as pocket handkerchiefs and gaily colored socks.

New friends. When one's old friends disappear, one can find new ones. One can join new social groups. If husband or wife dies, one can marry again.

Interests in civic and community affairs. Who can make a better citizen, ideally, than a man or woman with time for study of civic problems and for community service, and with the wisdom of maturity? Older persons can read more thoroughly, can explore into complex political and economic problems more clearly, and should vote more intelligently than younger people.

New leisure-time activities and hobbies. When the extra time gained from retirement or reduction of hours at work gives the opportunity, a person can do things which he wanted to do during middle age but for which he could not find the time. Travel is one possibility, arts and crafts are another, so are gardening, reading, collecting, and other pursuits.

Release of one's children. Sometime during middle age, parents should set their children free and expect that henceforth their relations will be on the basis of mutual respect and mutual consideration, and no longer on the emotional basis of a dominant parent and a dependent child. Once this has been accomplished, a parent is in a position to make whatever arrangements are appropriate for living with or not living with grown children, for supporting grown children or being supported by them or being financially independent of them. Too many parents go into their later years quite unprepared to meet their grown children on a grown-up basis.

Avoidance of reminiscence. An insidious habit is that of telling stories about the olden days as a means of "entertaining" younger people. It is so obviously enjoyable to an old-timer to recall and recount events of great importance that occurred before his listeners were born that he must be warned against and almost prohibited from engaging in this pleasant vice. Young people simply are not interested, unless they are very young. A good rule to follow is to tell stories of the past only to people under eight years old or to people one's own age. Another good rule is to listen to other people's reminiscences two hours for every hour one asks them to listen.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion is inescapable that the individual, if he is to be reasonably happy and secure in his later years, must himself find rational and practicable ways of meeting his needs. No one else can do it for him. One's old age is what one makes it. But in modern America the community must carry the responsibility of creating conditions that make it possible for the great majority of older people to lead the independent and emotionally satisfying lives of which they are capable.

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Physiological Changes in Aging

By Anton J. Carlson and Edward J. Stieglitz

THE sciences of biology and medicine have not yet reached the stage when a comprehensive factual chapter on the physiology of aging can be written. At the end of an excellent review of the biochemical aspects of aging, McCay concluded that "almost nothing is known of the biochemistry of aging."[1] The physiologist and clinician need not be quite so pessimistic.

Aging Defined

Aging may be defined briefly as that element in life pertaining to the passage of time. Thus, living is inseparable from aging. Aging begins with conception and terminates only with death. As aging is a part of living, it can never be arrested without ending life. However, this does not imply that the complex and interrelated changes which are consequent to the passage of time in the living organism are not amenable to alteration. There is hope that in the future medical science may be able to retard the rate of aging change and/or alter its consequences.

It must be emphasized that although aging is a continuous process, beginning with the onset of a new organism, the rate of change is not uniform throughout the life span. Changes occur much more rapidly early in life, and as the organism grows older the rate of change declines. Furthermore, there is great variation in the rate of aging change and in the character of aging between different species of organisms. It is well known that the white rat at 300 days of life is the biological equivalent of a human being at 30 years of life; a 600-day-old white rat is the biological equivalent of a 60-year-old man.

Even within the same species there is considerable variation in the rate of aging change between different individuals. All of us are aware of the fact that we know people who are biologically, mentally, and functionally relatively young at 70 and others who are relatively senile in their early 50's.

Most interesting of all is the extraordinary asymmetry which takes place within the individual organism as to the rate of aging change. It can be said that none of us are of the same age throughout the organism. Different structures age at different rates at different times in the life span. This is beautifully illustrated by the accelerated changes which take place in the organs of reproduction at the time of puberty and at the time of climacteric, although the rest of the individual does not show parallel accentuation of change in other structures, functions, and capacities.

Aging involves two essentially antagonistic processes. As aging begins with conception, growth or evolution is included, as well as atrophy or involution. These two phenomena take place simultaneously throughout life. In youth growth and development predominate, but even as early as within embryonic life atrophic changes occur. The atrophy and involution of gill clefts in the mammalian embryo is an example in point. Similarly, growth continues until the end of life, though in the senescent period atrophy or involution predominates. The hair, the jaw, and all cellular replacements are examples of continued growth up to the moment of death. With the exception of a few cells of the central nervous system, none of the cells of our body are so old as the whole organism. The tissue cells are being constantly replaced by new cell growth. The ultimate understanding of aging must wait upon such a time as we comprehend fully the forces which accelerate and/or retard growth in contrast to atrophy.

[1] From Clive McKay in *Problems of Aging*, edited by E. V. Cowdry, 2d ed., 1942.

Constitutional and Environmental Factors Blended

Many age changes in the animal body have been clearly established. The genesis of these age changes in structure and function is still obscure. We are not yet in position to determine, with the certainty of science, to what degree the changes in the machinery of the body which parallel advancing age are due to the genetic constitution of the individual and of the species—or, to state it differently, the aging process per se—and how much they are due to the vicissitudes of living, such as faulty diets, infections, intoxications, traumata, emotional stresses, overwork, laziness, or gluttony. As regards determination of the typical life span of a species, plant or animal, the genetic constitution undoubtedly plays a primary role, for on no other basis can we account for the fact that some species of plants live only one year or less, and other species live several thousand years. Disease and other exigencies of living cannot account for such great differences in life span in plants, nor can they account, in our judgment, for similar differences in animals.

Certainly, as regards the study of the aging processes in human beings it is impossible, now and in the future, completely to separate the consequences of aging, as defined as due purely to the passage of time, from the results of various accumulative insults which are part of living. An attempt to do so would involve complete isolation of an individual from all sources of injury, infections, intercourse with other human beings, and the like. Such a dreadfully specialized, sheltered, laboratory-controlled type of environment would not represent what we think of as living, but merely existing. Under these circumstances the psychological elements of extreme loneliness, isolation, and purposelessness would create an individual by no means normal. Therefore, it is to some degree academic and theoretical to attempt to distinguish between the changes in structure and function which occur as a result of aging per se and those which occur as a result of the experiences characteristic and inevitable in a so-called normal life.

It is notable that no two individuals undergo identical experiences during the course of their lives. Not only are their experiences, in the form of infections, fatigue and intoxications, emotional battles within themselves and in interpersonal relationships, different in character, but they differ in severity and in sequence. Even if we had two individuals who had suffered from identical diseases, let us say measles, scarlet fever, chicken pox, lobar pneumonia in the right lower lobe of the lung, these would not necessarily have occurred in the identical sequence or in the same severity, and thus their effects upon the organism would differ. The significant conclusion is that we are what we are today, to a great degree, because of what happened to us in our yesterdays, and no two people have had identical sequences of yesterdays. Furthermore, the effect of all these experiences increases with age, because they accumulate.

Importance of constitutional factor

There is growing evidence that hereditary constitution is also a factor in the life span of specific individuals

within a given species, irrespective of ignorance, faulty diets, and other accidents in the life of the individual. This appears also to be true in the life span of individual organs or systems within the unitary organism. For while it is true that faulty diets, infections, and other factors may hasten the atrophy of the ovaries in primates and thus bring on premature menopause, and that similar accidents and diseases may hasten the loss of elasticity in the lens of the eye, it is nevertheless true that these changes occur so consistently at fairly well demarcated periods in the life span that these typically early involutions can hardly be accounted for solely by the accidents and stress in the life of an individual. The relative and typical life spans of these two organ systems must be determined by some peculiar and obscure physiological time clock inherent within some particular genes of the hereditary constitution.

Other organ systems of the body reveal impairment of function so insidiously and gradually (at least in all cases where the life of the individual is not specifically altered or terminated by overwhelming accidents to individual organs such as malignant growths, peptic ulcer, pneumonia, tuberculosis, nephritis, or arteriosclerosis) that it is practically impossible to separate the consequences of aging per se from the result of accumulated injury due to accidents or disease. Of course, germ cells themselves may be acted upon unfavorably by these accidents and strains and the poisons to which we are exposed during life, and may thereby perhaps alter the character of aging in individuals of succeeding generations. However, this is highly unlikely, for if it were true we should have evidence of progressive degeneration of the species as a whole, and gradual shortening of the life span of typical individuals within the species. We know that this is the exception rather than the rule.

The relative importance of the genetic constitution in the processes of senescence as opposed to the environment is illustrated by experiments on the fruit fly, where, with identical environment but with experimentally modified genetic constitution, the life span may be made to vary as much as 400 per cent. To be sure, it is a long distance from the fruit fly to man, and by and large science has as yet been able only to degrade rather than to strengthen the genetic constitution by experimental means. Nevertheless, similar factors probably play a role in the phenomena dimly foreshadowed in the life of men —in the relatively long-lived and relatively short-lived human families. As once wisely said by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the physician and poet, "one of the best ways to insure a long life span is to make a careful and wise selection of grandparents."

The life of cells

If further justification of our primary thesis, namely the practical impossibility of separating the factors of aging per se from the effects of the accidents of living, is needed, we may cite the case of many plants in which tissue degenerations once thought to be due solely to aging seem now to be due to virus diseases, of which we have at present only the scantiest of information. And in plant seeds, age degeneration seems to be due to progressive chemical changes in the cell nuclei, changes which in turn interfere with later cell division and growth.

Unicellular animals are commonly said to be immortal. Nevertheless, these lowly cousins do seem to degenerate with age. This degeneration appears to be in the physiologically active nucleus, and unless this aged nuclear tissue is replaced by the reserve micronucleus, as occurs in conjugation and endomixis, decline and death of these unicellular organisms appear to be inevitable. This is, in principle, not so different from sexual reproduction and death of the soma or body in the higher plants and animals. It is further confirmed by the fact that an annual plant may be made to survive for two years, if it is prevented from going on to bearing seeds in the first year of its existence.

On the other hand, the *potential* immortality of cells cannot be denied. The classic experiments of Carrell in maintaining a tissue culture of chick embryo heart cells over a period of thirty-six years (many times the normal life span of the chicken) is evidence in point. At the end of this long time interval the cells within the tissue culture were growing with the same rapidity, vigor, and enthusiasm that they had at the beginning of the experiment. The experiment was finally discontinued because it appeared that it would yield no further significant results. Carrell concluded that with the ideal environment which was maintained within the tissue culture chambers, the cells were actually immortal. The most significant part of this conclusion, however, is the fact that this immortality exists only if the environment in which these cells live is maintained at an optimum or nearly ideal condition.

Inadequate nutrients, undesirable chemical reactions, acidity and/or alkalinity, any accumulation of the chemical debris of metabolism, quickly retard the development of tissue culture cells and lead to their rapid senescence and death. In attempting an interpretation of these experimental studies as they apply to multicellular and complicated organisms, such as man, we must comprehend that in all probability the major factor which leads to aging per se exists in changes in the intercellular environment within the organism, rather than within the cells themselves. Structural changes occurring in tissues due to aging in the absence of known disease (which does not imply that there may have been unknown, unidentified, or unrecognized disease processes going on) consist largely of changes in that part of tissue which we call the matrix. The body matrix is actually not a living tissue, but consists of fibers and fluids through which nutrients are brought to the living cells and waste products are removed. The changes in the matrix which gradually accumulate with advancing age are of such nature as to interfere insidiously with the nutrition of the cells in the broadest sense of nutrition. Nutrition must be defined not as being limited to the ingestion of food, but as involving also its absorption, its transport, and its utilization by the billions of individual cells which make up the composite organism.

To debate further the question as to the relative importance of heredity versus the strains and accidents of living as cause of aging change is a waste of time and paper. It is not a question of one *or* the other. Evidence now at hand shows conclusively that both forces play roles in the aging process. If a longer life span or a longer abundant life, with vim, vigor, and continued enthusiasm, is the desired goal, both biologically and socially, we must obviously reduce the production of those with less than optimum hereditary potential, and simultaneously provide optimum environment for the most fit.

AGE CHANGES IN THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MAN

The following principal changes due to age in the physiology of man and other animals can be listed, though

they appear at different age levels in the individual and at different age levels in the organ systems of the total organism. The universality of these age changes, even in the exceptional persons whose hereditary constitutions and fortunate experiences have been able to meet the accidents of living for one hundred or more years, renders it highly probable that we are here dealing with changes inherent in the constitution of living matter, no matter how greatly these changes may be accelerated or altered by the vicissitudes of existence.

Progressive age changes, not as yet shown to be due to specific diseases, are:

1. Gradual tissue desiccation. Recent studies of electrolyte (salt) concentrations in the tissue cells have cast some doubt as to the reliability of older experiments which formerly appeared to have established gradual tissue drying as part of the aging process.

2. Gradual retardation of cell division, capacity of cell growth, and tissue repair. This involves also a decline in capacity to produce the products of secretion, whether they be known substances such as pepsin or thyroxine or the less well identified antibodies involved in immunity.

3. Gradual retardation of the rate of tissue oxidation (lowering of the speed of living, or, in technical terms, the metabolic rate).

4. Cellular atrophy, degeneration, increased cell pigmentation, and fatty infiltration.

5. Gradual decrease in tissue elasticity, and degenerative changes in the elastic connective tissues of the body.

6. Decreased speed, strength, and endurance of skeletal neuromuscular reactions.

7. Progressive degeneration and atrophy of the nervous system, impairment of vision, of hearing, of attention, of memory, and of mental endurance.

8. Gradual impairment of the mechanisms which maintain a fairly constant internal environment for the cells and tissues (a process known as homeostasis). It is evident that sufficient weakening of any one of the numerous links in the complex processes of homeostasis produces deterioration.

These changes are not listed in the order of their primary significance, for this is as yet unknown. Nor do we imply that the list includes all the changes of senescence. It is evident that aging is a continuous and complex series of processes, some of the changes starting early, others later in life, and proceeding at variable rates.

Compensation

It must be emphasized that all changes are not necessarily in the direction of decline, as regards the competent operation of the organism in the complex social environment in which we must exist. For example, although muscular strength, vigor, and speed of reaction decline with advancing years, skills tend to increase with long practice. Though there may be less intense emotional drive, often labeled ambition, there occurs an increase in loyalty and calmness, with clearer definition of purpose in living, with further maturation. These compensate for the restless drive of ambition in youth.

Similarly, there develops an immensely significant compensation in relation to the loss of acuity in vision: though the older eye may not see as clearly in the strictly somatic and physical sense as that eye of the youngster with a perfect 20/20 vision, what is seen is comprehended much more fully. The child sees a page of printed type such as this, and it is utterly meaningless. The older individual, plagued with the infernal nuisance of spectacles, which are always somewhat dirty and blurring, comprehends what all these hieroglyphics mean, as long as he can see sufficiently to identify words.

As speed declines, our physiological endurance increases in certain areas. It is notable that while the records for all the sprint races, such as the hundred-yard dash or 220 run, are held by youngsters from 18 to 22, the records for the long grind of the marathon race are held by men between 38 and 45.

Similarly, intellectual and emotional endurance gradually increases with advancing age up to a given point. When this endurance finally breaks, the failure is more often associated with the accumulative consequences of disease than it is with aging per se. The aging individual requires less sleep, though the capacity to call upon reserves and fall back on "second wind" is lost. Thus, when the need for sleep arises, it becomes an imperative requirement, which can no longer be postponed by stimuli such as love, patriotism, ambition, dexedrine, coffee, or fear.

Ability to learn

We should not be depressed and feel hopeless over the decline in certain capacities, for the diminution is an extremely gradual one. Let us take, for example, diminution in the ability to learn rapidly. Very carefully controlled experimental studies have indicated that the maximum speed and rate of learning occurs at age 22. At age 80 the rate of learning is practically the same as at age 12. Thus, the decline from the maximum requires nearly sixty years to reach the level from which it rose over a period of ten years. In other words, the diminution in the ability to learn rapidly progresses at about one-sixth the rate of the evolutional growth in this functional capacity.

Furthermore, there are qualitative as well as quantitative differences in the ability to learn. It has been demonstrated that though it takes older individuals longer to memorize a given paragraph than it does younger persons, their recitations are usually more accurate. Though speed is lost, accuracy is increased. This change in the qualitative nature of memory is most important in relation to employment of older individuals, because there are many positions requiring accuracy, persistence, and endurance in the long, steady grind of competitive existence, rather than the brilliant, gazelle-like speed characteristic of younger persons.

Two environments

Item number 8 of those listed above is of extreme importance to the maintenance of good health. It must be emphasized that we actually live in two environments: (1) the obvious, visible, external one, the atmosphere about us, full of smoke, turmoil, politics, competition, noise, and dust, and (2) the internal milieu which intimately surrounds the living cells of our bodies. The survival of any cell depends upon its continuing existence in an environment which will supply it adequately with the chemical substances necessary for its metabolism and which is free of such substances as will seriously poison or injure it. Not only is the chemical constitution of the cellular environment essential to life and health, but its physical properties, such as temperature, are important. Life is incompatible with any gross deviation from an average condition in either one of these two environments. Physiologists have long been aware that the constancy of the internal environment is requisite to health. That the majority of organisms manage to maintain a reasonable level of health and live as long

as they do is the result of many extraordinarily effective mechanisms operating to maintain the necessary high degree of uniformity in the internal environment. The phenomenon of maintaining such equilibria is known as homeostasis.

With the development of more complex organisms from the simple, primitive, single-cell amoeba, some of the cells of the new forms of life became separated from the sea-water environment in which their ancestral forms had been bathed on all sides. Therefore, these organisms had to create means of bathing the internal cells in fluid similar to sea water. It is not accidental that the internal tissue fluids of all animal forms are extraordinarily similar in saltiness and chemical balance to the conditions which obtained in ocean depths millions of years ago. Today we are still amphibious, externally living on the land and in the air, but internally in a sea of our own making. When we consider the violence and the multitude of forces operating to throw the internal environment out of balance, it is truly extraordinary that such constancy has been maintained, not only in a single individual but throughout the ages.

Maintenance of balance

The constant effort to maintain balance within the permissible ranges of change in the internal environment may be compared to the tight-rope walker's efforts to retain his equilibrium with the aid of a pole. It is true that the acrobat sways slightly from one side to the other, just as the chemical balances of the body fluctuate within a relatively narrow range; but if these swings exceed a certain limit, the acrobat will fall, and so will health. The great difference between the acrobat and what occurs in the body is that the organism must maintain equilibrium in a great many different categories simultaneously, whereas the performer is consciously concerned only with his physical balance at the moment.

To mention but a few of the multitude of balances which must be maintained, we may say that we cannot tolerate much deviation of the normal body temperature, or the concentration of sugar in the blood, or of calcium, chloride, phosphate, or many other chemical constituents in the blood stream or tissue fluids. The acid-alkaline balance must be maintained despite great variations in supply or intake. For example, we ingest food at irregular intervals through the day and often undergo relatively long periods of starvation. Also, our expenditures of energy are likewise variable. During sleep we burn far less fuel than when actively exercising.

Lowered homeostatic efficiency

As these balancing mechanisms become less vigorous with advancing age, the ability to withstand stresses from without is diminished. This is beautifully illustrated by the fact that the older individual cannot tolerate extremes of temperature. Witness the annual trek to the warmer climes during the winter by older persons, and the resulting accumulation of the aged in the balmy sun of Florida. Likewise, they cannot tolerate extremes of heat. It is well known to industry that older men cannot take what are known as "hot jobs," such as those in a steel rolling mill or a stoke room. This impairment of the ability to withstand extremes of external temperature is due to many factors, among which are a decreased vascularity of the skin so that heat is radiated less readily, a diminution in the ability of the skin to perspire and thus cool the organism, and a lessening ability to generate more heat when the external environment is cold.

Similarly, the aging organism cannot well tolerate long periods of starvation, because the blood sugar falls to undesirably low levels. Gluttony, or excessive ingestion of sugar or other substances, is likewise less well tolerated, for the reason that the ability to withdraw glucose from the blood stream and store it in the tissues is less competent.

These changes in homeostatic efficiency have very significant implications to us as individuals and to physicians dealing with older patients. For example, because the reaction to stresses —whether they be intoxication, fatigue, or physical stresses—is less violent, *the symptoms of illness are much less conspicuous in the older person.* It is well known that an old individual may be walking around with a temperature of 99.5° F. and still show the physical signs and other evidences of an extensive lobar pneumonia. In a child or young person the infection in the lung would be associated with fever of 103° F. to 104° F. and other very acute, dramatic, and conspicuous symptoms and signs of disease. Consequently we must be extremely alert to minor and subtile symptoms. The reason why the evidences of disordered functioning are less conspicuous in age than in youth is that symptoms are not directly consequent to injury, but represent reactions of the organism to the injury. It is the *reaction* that becomes less vigorous, violent, and evident in the aging person.

Likewise associated with the lowering of the vigor of homeostasis is the fact that it takes the body tissues longer to repair following a given injury. This demands that there be a longer convalescence following an infection or trauma of any sort. Third, it must be recognized that when stress is unavoidable, the margin of safety is reduced and other compensatory mechanisms must be assisted to maintain that level of internal balance which constitutes health.

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

The picture of aging is in fact not so depressing as it may appear at first glance, and it is becoming brighter as medical science and practice are learning how to anticipate and prevent many unnecessary sources of injury. Most of the detriment, most of the depreciation, which occurs in later years is unquestionably due to the cumulative injuries of chronic and progressive disease rather than to aging per se.

An efficient mental life is possible even with reduced factors of safety, well into the seventh, eighth, and perhaps the ninth decade. Moderation in all things, together with competent medical guidance in regard to the avoidance of accidents and diseases to which we are all vulnerable, tends to prevent undue corrosion of specific life links, so that all of them proceed gradually and in step. A man or woman who has passed the first sixty or seventy years in honest toil and persistent efforts at understanding man and nature and the phenomena of interpersonal relationships has, or should have, accumulated a vast reserve of wisdom and self-discipline which should be made available to the younger generation. This reserve of wisdom and quiet inner strength learned by long practice in adaptation is an immensely significant antidote to the stresses and strains induced by the fears, the vanities, the greeds, and the ignorance of earlier years.

It is now known that many of the

chronic and progressive disorders which are so prone to beset us in later maturity, particularly such diseases as arteriosclerosis, high blood pressure, diabetes, and the like, are potentially amenable to prevention with proper guidance and proper acceptance of the guidance during the years of youth and young maturity. These are not disorders which arise from without, such as the acute infections, which can be prevented by control of the external environment. Their control, retardation, or even complete prevention, involves effort and self-discipline on the part of the individual. These disorders arise from within; they are silent, sneaking, fifth-columnist type of saboteurs.

To illustrate this, it is well known that obesity is a most significant element in the genesis, progression, and severity of diabetes mellitus late in life. Obesity is invariably due to eating more food than is required by the individual. Control of obesity is impossible without the acquisition and application of self-discipline on the part of the obese.

Similarly, the phenomenon popularly called "second childhood," which is likely to occur in the truly aged, is actually not a "second childhood" due solely to the depreciations of senility, but a continuation of the first childhood in individuals who have never actually matured emotionally or intellectually. When it is no longer necessary for them to make an impression upon those about them, they revert to their behavior pattern of childhood and infancy.

In the clinical experience of one of us it has been demonstrated repeatedly that those old people whose behavior becomes increasingly childish have lived lives so extremely conventional, so strictly patterned after the opinion of others, so rigidly conforming to the attitude of the herd, that it is quite obvious that they have never grown up or developed an idea or conviction of their own. We have even come to the point of considering an excessive conventionality as an a priori reason for suspicion of emotional and intellectual immaturity. However, deliberate and equally rigid unorthodox smug superiority and/or negativism may be likewise evidence of arrest in maturation. The truly mature can be original and yet conform to the broad patterns of their cultural environment.

Areas of prevention

In the last five to ten years research studies have yielded evidence indicating that arteriosclerosis may be amenable to preventive procedures. It is highly doubtful whether we can reverse the pathological process significantly once it has been fully established, but there is considerable hope that with proper nutritional balance and proper control of metabolic activity during the years of young maturity, much of arteriosclerotic change is open to prevention or at least definite retardation. This hope is most significant, because approximately two-thirds of the disabilities, both mental and physical, which incapacitate older individuals are secondary to arteriosclerotic or vascular disease.

Further intensive research into the many unknowns of the aging processes may some day enable the science and practice of medicine to delay involution. This must not be confused with "rejuvenation," either in the popular or in the quack medical sense. What we have in mind is a much more extensive application of what may be called anticipatory medicine, or constructive medicine, where the objective is to increase the degree of health rather than merely assist repair of injury after it has occurred. Constructive medicine involves periodic guidance, early discovery of disorders or of the changes contributing to the development of disease, and their immediate treatment. It involves also self-discipline and effort on the part of the individual. Health is always relative. There is always room for improvement.

Objectives of geriatric medicine

There exists considerable confusion as to the objectives of geriatric medicine, or that part of medical science and practice concerned with the care of the aging and the aged. There are those who resent the implication that geriatric medicine should attempt to prolong life. Many among the aged, and even more among the young, feel that most of the older members of our population are living too long as it is, and that the vastly increasing numbers of the old are becoming naught but a burden on the community. But the primary objective of geriatric medicine is not merely to prolong life. It is to modify the abnormalities characteristic of senescence and to control the progressive disorders of later years, thus adding to the health and usefulness of those who are aging. There can be no better definition of the major objectives of geriatrics than that given by Piersol and Bortz: "The society which fosters research to save human life cannot escape responsibility for the life thus extended. It is for science not only to add to the years of life but more important to add life to the years."[2] The core of geriatric medicine is in prevention and anticipation.

Preventive medicine for mature adults as a part of geriatric medicine is in its early infancy. Until recently there was little need for preventive activity in this area. But the proportionate increase in the numbers of elderly persons in our population makes the menace of chronic and progressive disease characteristic of the senescent period of life a problem equally as urgent as the hazards of infections. In the future, preventive medicine must add individual personal health construction to the practice of environment control, or else fail.

The full potentialities of personal health guidance cannot be realized until research has illuminated the etiology of degenerative disorders. But even with our present and admittedly extremely incomplete knowledge, much unnecessary illness of the later years can be prevented by more thorough and more widespread application of existing information. Reawakening of a sense of individual responsibility is essential to this accomplishment. Mature adults must realize that longevity and health are privileges, and not inherent rights. As privileges, they carry the inescapable obligations of effort to maintain health.

As all the so-called degenerative disorders begin long before symptoms become apparent, preventive geriatric medicine must begin long before senility. Prevention must precede. More can be accomplished for the aging than for the aged. Therefore, the two decades from age 40 to age 60 constitute the critical periods in geriatric medicine. There are many reasons to hope that the next fifty years will permit of progress in this field comparable to the advances made in the last half-century in the control of infectious diseases, subsequent to the birth of bacteriology. Longevity with vigor and usefulness retained until true senility creates infirmity is an objective worthy of the best and most energetic efforts. There

[2] G. M. Piersol and E. L. Bortz, *Annals of Internal Medicine*, Vol. 12 (Jan. 1939), p. 964.

is no greater tragedy for the aged than the sense of uselessness that is so often imposed upon them both by their own disabilities and by society's rejection of those prematurely shelved.

NUTRITION AND THE LIFE SPAN

Since scientific information on the kinds and quantities of foods required for optimum growth, health, and maximum longevity is as yet extremely incomplete in relation to the history of the human race, it is evident that man's diet, both as to kind and as to quantity, was in the past determined by appetite, hunger, and availability of foods. We may therefore assume that both underconsumption and excess consumption of foods, and alternation between starvation and gluttony, between emaciation and obesity, are phenomena as ancient as man himself.

Life insurance statistics show clearly that marked underweight, as well as obesity, tends to shorten the life span of man. The studies of McCay with experimental rats reveal that a diet adequate in quality but so reduced in caloric quantity that the growth of the animal is retarded, increases the life span most significantly. In these experiments the control group of rats was fed the same kind of foods ad libitum. This group may have had its life span shortened by excessive eating—by physiological obesity.

It is well established that most, if not all, persons showing marked and persistent underweight or emaciation are underweight by reason of functional disorders interfering with digestion, absorption, or metabolism of foodstuffs. Chronic disturbances of appetite are commonly of emotional origin. Thus most individuals are underweight by reason of illness.

That such persons die prematurely is not particularly puzzling to us, for they die of disease which creates an early corrosion of some essential links in the life chain. But why does the overweight person, who seems otherwise healthy, die prematurely? This is a fundamental problem in geriatric medicine, for in the absence of specific disease, overweight tends to increase in men and women past 40 years of age. Is obesity itself a disease? Or is the shortening of the life span merely a consequence of obesity, as implied in the popular saying that "fat people dig their graves with their teeth"?

Food intake and the life span

The profoundly significant studies of McCay on the increased longevity of animals whose growth rate has been retarded by lowered caloric intake have recently been confirmed by other studies of a somewhat different nature carried out by Carlson and Hoelzel. Littermate rats on the same diet given no food at all every second, every third, and every fourth day from the day of weaning until the day of death, lived significantly longer than their sibling rats eating the same diet ad libitum every day. This amount of fasting did not retard body growth and size, as measured by tibia length, but the rats on this type of fasting did not become obese. On days when these rats had no food they were usually more active and restless than their litter mates on the same food without limit.

It seems probable that the rats given all the food they chose to eat *every* day shortened their life span by overeating, rather than that the fasting and greater physical activity of their litter-mates actually lengthened their genetic life span; for when considerable indigestible bulk was added to the same diet and the rats were allowed to eat this every day, the life span of these rats also was lengthened. The rats on indigestible bulk in the diet, or those fed only every other day, had fewer tumors and smaller tumors and less gastro-intestinal pathology at the time of death than had the rats on the concentrated diet eating every day.

Food intake and obesity

During the last twenty-five years considerable, though relatively superficial, attention has been given to the possible relation of thyroid, gonad, and pituitary disorders to human and animal obesity. It now seems established, or at least highly probable, that there is no such thing as a primary endocrine obesity, apart from endocrine influences on appetite, hunger, and physical activity. The marked obesity that follows destructive injuries at the base of the brain seems to be largely due to an increased food consumption because of increased appetite. Endocrine therapy of obesity has been disappointing except in the case of thyroid extract, and that has to be administered to the point of inducing symptoms of the disease hyperthyroidism before weight reduction is secured in the absence of reduced food intake.

On the basis of present information it seems likely that the development of obesity in people past 40 years of age is primarily due to the persistence of the habit of eating excessively, and to the satisfaction of specific appetites for foods at a time in life when the rates of tissue oxidation and general motor activity are both on the decline.

It is not difficult to understand why ingestion of food to the point of obesity is injurious to people whose factor of safety is reduced because of a gradual decline in their production of insulin, which significantly affects sugar and fat combustion. Such dietary excesses damage by overworking an already impaired mechanism. But in the absence of diabetes, actual or incipient, why does obesity, maintained for years, initiate or aggravate cardiovascular, kidney, and other disorders that shorten the life span? The answer to this question is being sought by experiments and accurate observation on both mice and men, but in the meantime the prevention of obesity in all people past age 30 appears to be a prophylactic imperative in preventive geriatrics.

Dietary elements

Aging and the metabolic changes which go therewith raise many other problems in the whole field of nutrition. Diet and nutrition are not concerned only with intake of calories and vitamins, and balance between protein, fat, and carbohydrates. Impairment of the efficiency of digestion, difficulties encountered in chewing, and the problem of constipation demand attention to the physical characteristics of the foods which are ingested. Likewise, there arises an increasing need for certain substances. This is particularly applicable to the requirements for calcium. It is characteristic of aging tissues and particularly of aging bones, that calcium is withdrawn and lost from the organism. There occurs a gradual demineralization of the osseous structures in aging individuals. This can be prevented to a great degree by a deliberate and intentional increase in calcium intake. However, this intake must begin long before the great depreciations have occurred. Similarly, there is an increased need for certain vitamins and for iron to maintain a normal metabolism.

One of the most significant discrepancies in most dietary studies and advice arises from the fact that the role which

water plays in the maintenance of good health is too often ignored. Water is a dietary factor secondary to none in importance. In the elderly individual water is significant not only from the point of view of nutrition, but also because of its importance to the kidneys' function of getting rid of the accumulated debris of metabolism, to the flow of digestive juices essential to adequate digestion, and in the avoidance of constipation.

Essentials of good nutrition

In the light of present knowledge, the essentials of good nutrition in geriatric medicine must include consideration of the following principles:

1. Moderation. Excesses are as undesirable as deficiencies. Both induce malnutrition. It is often most helpful for older persons to eat small quantities frequently rather than to attempt large meals.

2. Individualization. Individual variation increases with advancing years. Generalizations and routine dietary programs are often unsatisfactory. Many variable factors, such as digestive and circulatory efficiency, habits, and dentures, affect the prescription of diet in the elderly.

3. Water. The importance of an adequate fluid intake must never be forgotten.

4. Maintenance of hemoglobin content. Anemia, even if minor, is immensely more significant in later years than in youth, for the ability to compensate for inadequacy declines. In the presence of any circulatory handicap (arteriosclerosis, hypertension, or cardiac impairment) the quality of the circulating medium assumes a role of major importance. Optimum hemoglobin concentrations should be the objective; the average does not suffice.

5. Balance in dietary is as important here as at any age. Asymmetry in utilization, however, may alter the optimum proportions of various elements in contrast to the usual standards of young adults. Protein, iron, and calcium are the elements apparently most likely to be inadequate in spontaneously selected dietaries among the aged.

6. The focus of attention must be on the person rather than on his disease or diseases. The human being is indivisible; psyche and soma are one. Insulin does not suffice for the anxious diabetic patient, nor does equanimity come to the exhausted anemia patient. An attitude of constructive prophylaxis is essential to effective geriatric medicine. The primary objective is the construction of health to as near the optimum as possible. Wise nutrition is a most powerful tool for the attainment of vigor in later years.

SUMMARY

Herein we have attempted merely to point out some of the problems inherent in the processes of aging in the living organism. They are many and complex, and inter-react one upon the other. It must be emphasized that though a considerable mass of knowledge is accumulating, those who are concerned with either research or clinical application in this area are at the same time becoming more and more aware of the inadequacy and incompleteness of our knowledge. As has been said by an ancient and very wise Chinese, "He who knows, knows that he does not know."

There is reason to hope that with continuing study and better application of what knowledge does exist, not only can the life span be somewhat further extended, but the period of usefulness to the community can be prolonged. Longevity without continued health and usefulness is not a blessing. Long disablement from chronic illness is a greater tragedy than rapid death from acute illness.

In closing, let us remind ourselves that though it is the young scientists whose brilliant researches have revealed so much about the physical world (even to the fission of the atom), it is only mature adults who can reveal all the immense and significant potentialities of mankind. At last we are approaching an era in which man lives long enough to have time to think. In thinking he grows, and in growing, lives.

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Psychological Aspects of Aging

By Oscar J. Kaplan

A STRIKING characteristic of the literature on the psychology of later maturity is the almost complete absence of systematic investigations. Some of the most widely quoted studies in this field were developed with other problems in mind, the age data being incidental to research beamed at other areas. Many of the widely publicized investigations are based on small and often not very carefully selected samples. The methodological tools used have frequently been inappropriate. The literature suffers from a lack of stimulating hypotheses and theories. Description rather than explanation is the objective of most of the published work in this field.

Under such circumstances the wise reviewer approaches his assignment with humility, realizing that he may live to regret some of the more positive statements that he makes. This article does not pretend to cover its topic thoroughly, seeking merely to list the major achievements and methodological difficulties that now exist. The reader in search of details is referred to the more comprehensive reviews of N. Shock,[1] S. Granick,[2] H. Jones and O. Kaplan,[3] W. Donahue,[4] and R. Kuhlen.[5]

Older persons living in 1952 are persons whose tissues have weathered the storms of sixty or seventy winters; they are equally the products of a long cultural experience. Most of these men and women grew up in a period when education beyond grade school was the privilege of a few and when educational methods were less efficient that they are today. They grew up in a period when mental testing in schools was just beginning to show its head. The intellectual climate in which they have spent most of their lives probably differs markedly from that which awaits older persons in the next half-century. Later-maturity studies conducted in the year 2000 may yield results on many problems which will part sharply with present findings. The role of culture in the psychology of aging remains to be delineated.

Sensory and Motor Functions

The incidence of hearing difficulties increases with age, particularly in relation to higher tones. At low illumination levels, older persons with adequate acuity are visually inferior to the young and middle aged. There is a tendency for visual acuity impairments to be more common in the elderly. Quickness of visual perception begins to decline soon after adulthood is reached.

Using subjects of different ages matched for visual acuity on unspeeded ophthalmological tests, H. C. Weston[6] has demonstrated that a speed emphasis leads to a sharp drop in scores on a task demanding fine visual discrimination. The drop was sharp even between the twenties and the forties, being particularly pronounced under conditions of poor contrast or dim illumination. Results obtained in many physiological stress tests also indicate that often changes are taking place which ordinary tests may not reveal.

Motor response speed declines gradually in many task situations, the rate of decline and the age of onset varying with the task and with the individual being studied. Decline is most pronounced in tasks demanding speed and strength of response, and is especially evident in activities or abilities which have not been appreciably exercised. Soon after maturity is reached, the efficiency of many simple performances begins to drop; for example, swiftness of blow, simple reaction time, strength of grip.

A number of investigations have shown that older persons are more comfortable and proficient at tasks which stress accuracy above speed. Typical of these studies is one by R. A. Brown[7] in which subjects were asked to trace digits with emphasis on both speed and accuracy. Time scores remained fairly constant from the twenties into the thirties, but errors increased markedly during this period. Beyond age 40 speed dropped steadily, but errors decreased to a level considerably below that achieved by subjects in their twenties. It is of interest that in the group of sixty-five subjects, the two quickest ones were in their twenties, but the third-best time performance was turned in by a subject aged 74!

According to one study, at age 65 the average man requires 0.06 second more time to apply his brake than he needed at age 23. If the car moved at the rate of fifty miles per hour, it would travel five additional feet during the 0.06 second period. On the basis of this finding, one might expect older drivers to be involved in a disproportionately large percentage of accidents. This is not the case. Older persons are less likely to be involved in serious accidents than young persons at the very summit of their physiological prowess. Older individuals, cognizant of their limitations, are less likely to expose themselves when driving conditions are hazardous, and also are more safety-minded than their juniors. These two factors more than compensate for the sensory and motor losses which afflict many persons of advanced years. Personality and experience factors are important in determining the practical significance of age changes in biological functions.

An indication that practice plays a significant part in the preservation of manual abilities is provided by the work of W. Miles.[8] He found that mechanically trained older men retained the ability to work on a mechanical assembly test at young adult speed levels, surpassing untrained men aged 50–69 who were equal to them in intelligence and formal schooling.

It would be enlightening to repeat the Miles study just referred to, providing additional training for the inexperienced older men. Would practice lift the untrained men to the level of the trained ones? Does disuse or lack of training lead to an irreversible loss? These are questions with many practical implications.

The role of experience was even more

[1] N. Shock, "Gerontology (Later Maturity)," *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 2 (1951), pp. 353–70.

[2] S. Granick, "Studies in the Psychology of Senility," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 5 (1950), pp. 44–58.

[3] H. E. Jones and O. J. Kaplan, "Psychological Aspects of Mental Disorders in Later Life," Ch. 4 in O. J. Kaplan (editor), *Mental Disorders in Later Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), pp. 69–115.

[4] W. Donahue, "Psychological Aspects of Aging," in T. L. Smith (editor), *Problems of America's Aging Population* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1951), pp. 47–65.

[5] R. Kuhlen, "Age Differences in Personality During Adult Years," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 42 (1945), pp. 333–58.

[6] H. C. Weston, "On Age and Illumination in Relation to Visual Performance," *Transactions of the Illuminating Engineering Society of London*, Vol. 14 (1949), p. 281.

[7] R. A. Brown, mentioned by A. T. Welford and D. Speakman, "The Employability of Older People," in M. Derber (editor), *The Aged and Society* (Industrial Relations Research Association, 1950), p. 184.

[8] W. Miles, "Age and Human Society," Ch. 15 in C. Murchison (editor), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press, 1935), pp. 596–683.

dramatically illustrated in the performance of men and women of different ages on the McFarlane Coat Assembly Test, a test of manual skill. On this test the average 20-year-old man was found to be inferior to the average 70-year-old woman.

It has been pointed out that laboratory research, based on short time periods, may not be representative of performance under everyday conditions over long periods. Support for this position comes from the investigations of K. Smith,[9] who found that an eight-hour work period accentuated differences in performance between men in their thirties and those in their fifties. The task involved assembly of bolts and nuts.

Compensations

Since workers seldom operate at the peak of their capabilities, loss in sensory and motor functions is not necessarily reflected in lowered output. The older worker may be more conscientious, more dependable, and more capable of meeting emergencies than his juniors. In complex tasks he may maintain his performance level in the face of sensory and motor decline by developing new methods of work which circumvent the losses experienced.

It seems reasonable to suppose that engineers working with psychologists could redesign many industrial machines in such a way as to compensate for sensory and motor losses. One of the mainsprings of human progress has been the ability of man to extend the range of his senses and to multiply his strength by mechanical means. The new science of human engineering, in which the characteristics of men and machines are reconciled, can contribute immeasurably to the adjustment of the older worker to his industrial task. Even if it be acknowledged that many older persons cannot succeed in industry as now operated, it does not follow that they cannot be salvaged for useful work. We must support research designed to promote the preservation of psychological and physical competence, but we must also try to adapt jobs to the abilities of older workers. It is probable that human engineering can do more in the next two decades to maintain the employability of persons over 40 than can medical science.

[9] K. Smith, "Age and Performance on a Repetitive Manual Task," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 22 (1938), p. 295.

LEARNING ABILITY

The fate of learning ability in the adult years has been the subject of a number of inquiries, chief among which have been those of E. L. Thorndike *et al.*[10] and F. L. Ruch.[11] It is clear from these studies that the products of early adult learning may survive the ability to learn skills of equal difficulty. The man of 80 may be able to speak a language which he could not easily master for the first time at his age.

One of the earliest and most comprehensive studies of adult learning was undertaken by E. L. Thorndike and his associates. They found only a slight decline in learning competence from the peak age of 22 to age 45; beyond age 45 the rate of loss was accelerated. The investigators reported that tasks which measured "simple modifiability," such as learning a letter code, drawing lines of specified length while blindfolded, learning to write with the nonpreferred hand, and associating numbers with nonsense syllables, exhibited the largest age decrement. Material based on elementary school subjects

[10] E. L. Thorndike, E. O. Bregman, J. Tilton, and E. Woodyard, *Adult Learning* (New York: Macmillan, 1928).

[11] F. L. Ruch, "The Differentiative Effects of Age upon Human Learning," *Journal of General Psychology*, Vol. 11 (1934), p. 261.

seemed equally easy to the young and old subjects in this experiment. Summarizing their findings, the Thorndike group claimed an over-all loss of about 15 per cent in learning efficiency between ages 22 and 45. They were quick to point out that greater motivation and improved work methods may easily compensate for loss in learning ability.

F. L. Ruch, on the basis of a survey of the literature and his own investigations, concluded that learning ability diminishes soon after adulthood is reached. Nonsense material and motor skills are more difficult to learn than meaningful verbal material. Reorganization of practiced habits was particularly difficult for the older subjects in the Ruch studies. Assignments which permitted older subjects to profit directly from their previous experiences were the most favorable to proficiency in learning.

There is experimental evidence to support the claim that those who continue to apply themselves to the learning of verbal materials all through life are able to maintain their efficiency as learners better than those who do not have such a history. This fits in very well with the observation that aged persons who have practiced motor skills for many decades often surpass young persons at these skills.

B. M. Bernardelli[12] has examined the effects of various types of instruction on acquisition of ability to deal with electrical problems. Persons over age 30 tended to learn more readily if the instructions were in written form and to profit less by demonstration than those under 30. This has been interpreted to mean that older persons are slower in comprehending new material; written instructions afford more opportunity for review. There is a tendency for people at all ages to be reluctant to ask that demonstrations be repeated. If it is true that efficiency of learning varies with different methods at different ages, we may be able to accelerate the learning of persons of advanced age by using methods more appropriate for them.

Writers on later maturity have not given sufficient attention to the possibility that older people may become very competent at tasks with which they have more initial difficulty than the young. A. B. Cherns[13] reports an experiment in which subjects were asked to reject aluminum blocks which were below standard. Although the older subjects were much slower in arriving at judgments on the first few blocks, they approximated the speed of the younger subjects as the experiment progressed.

Many of the learning experiments centered on older persons have been very artificial. It seems reasonable to suppose that in certain types of learning situations the older person may actually have an advantage. For example, if we were to compare the performance of a 25-year-old chemist with that of a colleague aged 50 in digesting and comprehending the content of an article in a professional journal, it is quite possible that the older man would win out because of his greater familiarity with the field. Although it is entertaining and informative to study learning ability "in the raw," in a large number of occupational situations it is impossible to divorce experience and apperceptive mass from other factors in learning.

MEMORY

Since memory is the keystone of intelligence, binding us to our past and enabling us to exploit our experiences

[12] B. M. Bernardelli, mentioned by A. T. Welford and D. Speakman, *op. cit.* note 7 *supra*, p. 191.

[13] A. B. Cherns, mentioned by Welford and Speakman, *op. cit.* note 7 *supra*, p. 188.

in the solution of current problems, the fate of this function in the later years is a matter of much importance. Regrettably, much of the research on this topic has been very superficial. It does appear, however, that memory changes vary with the complexity of the task, loss being smallest on simple memory tests, such as one dealing with visual memory for digits. There is a tendency for those of superior intelligence to sustain less memory loss than those who are mentally dull.

Much of the data on memory has been collected in the course of intelligence studies. The dynamic nature of memory and its relationship to personality and motivation have been largely neglected in most of the published work. Although marked individual differences in memory ability have been described, no serious effort has been made to account for these differences in psychobiological terms.

INTELLIGENCE


Those who write confidently about the relationship between age and intelligence may some day have a rude awakening. The studies thus far undertaken have been so limited in terms of sampling and so inadequate in terms of experimental control that it would be foolhardy to assume that we have a solid basis for discussing this subject. Although the work of Jones and Conrad, Miles, Wechsler, and others points to a lowered average performance at higher chronological ages, these findings do not dispose of such possibilities as the following: (1) some maintain their mental abilities into advanced later maturity without appreciable loss; (2) losses that occur are due largely to disuse or lack of appropriate training; (3) the test instruments and procedures are unsuited to older persons; (4) motivational factors differ at various ages.

Our so-called tests of intelligence are instruments for the assessment of mental abilities rather than capacities. At the present time there is no accurate way of gauging mental capacities directly. This requires that we exercise caution in interpreting test results relating to older persons.

It is conceivable, for example, that a person who has the capacity to do problems in differential calculus may lack the ability to solve such problems because he has never been instructed in the subject. Another possibility is that the ability to work problems was once in the possession of the subject and has atrophied because of disuse. In such a case the possibility exists that the ability may be rewon by additional study. Still another possibility is that the subject may be able to solve readily problems in differential calculus, but may be incapable of acquiring easily other abilities of comparable difficulty. In short, abilities may survive the capacities which permitted the acquisition of the abilities. Unquestionably, this accounts for the vocabularly levels of deteriorated senile psychotics, their knowledge of words being unattainable on the basis of present capacities.

The accompanying chart [14] presents smoothed age curves based on three of the best-known investigations, by Wechsler, Miles and Miles, and Jones and Conrad. Age means derived from raw scores have been transformed into T scores in terms of the average mean and average standard deviation of the age groups 25–40. The three curves concur in showing rapid gains in test intelligence during adolescence, with a peak around age 20, after which decline begins.

[14] Fig. 6.—Mental test scores as related to age: a comparison of results from three investigations. From H. E. Jones and O. J. Kaplan, *op. cit.*, note 3 *supra*, p. 72.



Findings on superior men

Recent studies on superior men present a somewhat different picture. W. A. Owens [15] has reported what is in effect a longitudinal study of the mental abilities of a group of college men. Retesting his middle-aged subjects with the same instrument used with them when they were college students, he found no appreciable change in their scores after an interval of thirty-two years. As a matter of fact, there were significant increases on items based on general information, verbal opposites, disarranged sentences, and common sense. Ability to handle items dealing with arithmetical computation, digit symbols, block designs, number series, and analogies did not fare as well, presumably because they were more culture-free.

Another study that fits into this same pattern has been reported by K. Sward.[16] He gave a diversified and difficult mental test to a group of forty-five professors aged 60–80 and to a control group of forty-five colleagues aged 25–35. Sward feels that the two groups were roughly comparable in terms of motivation and initial ability. He found individual differences far more impressive than age differences. Although there was a significant difference in favor of the younger men on six of the eight subtests, the losses appeared to be largely a by-product of disuse and an artifact of the particular test employed. The older men did better than the younger ones on the subtest dealing with vocabulary. Sward concludes that age has the effect of slowing the rate of mental operations far more than of impairing their quality or accuracy.

It is of some theoretical and practical interest that those who do well on intelligence tests are less subject to loss

[15] W. A. Owens, article in *1950 Newsletter*, Division of Maturity and Old Age of the American Psychological Association.

[16] K. Sward, "Age and Mental Ability in Superior Men," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 58 (1945), pp. 443–79.

of the abilities measured than are those who make mediocre or inferior scores. It is not clear at the present time whether this is due primarily to biological or to environmental factors, although it appears likely that the latter are primary.

Differential decline

Older subjects are not greatly handicapped on test items which permit solutions to be reached in terms of past experience. Unfamiliar tasks and problems which require reorganization of data are much more difficult for the average older person than for the average young adult. "Test intelligence" is a composite made up of a number of related but somewhat distinct abilities. It is worthy of note that most studies show that vocabulary and general information items hold up much better with age than items that are more novel for the subject. Of both theoretical and practical importance is a sound explanation for the finding that mental abilities decline differentially. Why do general information and vocabulary items hold up so much better than those dealing with number series, completion, and reasoning? What are the relative roles of practice and biological change?

Relevance of tests

It is generally agreed that speed tests of intelligence discriminate against older persons. Some have argued that it is unfair to administer speed tests to such persons. Although it must be admitted that older individuals may be excessively penalized, it seems that a reasonable solution calls for de-emphasis or isolation of this factor rather than for its elimination. It is important to know the speed with which a person works at intellectual tasks. Research is needed on the causes which underlie the drop in speed which is so commonly observed. It may be due in some cases mainly to lack of familiarity with or practice of the task. It may have a neurological basis in other instances.

Loss in speed is not necessarily disastrous, and often is more than compensated for by experience. The top executive may have a week in which to arrive at a major decision. It is far more important that he arrive at a correct decision than that he be able to make it quickly.

It remains to be established that the functions measured by existing mental ability tests are significant in the lives of older persons. These tests have not yet been validated against acceptable later-maturity criteria. A test may be useful in a school situation but may have little value in appraising the fitness of an older person for a specialized job. It cannot be denied that profound memory loss will disable an individual, or that certain other abilities featured in our tests are important to successful adjustment. However, if our present tests continue in use, subscores rather than global scores should be emphasized.

Most psychologists now recognize that our intelligence tests do not sample all the higher mental abilities. The tests provide little opportunity for the measurement of such functions as creativity and judgment, which assuredly deserve to rank at the very top of the mental ability hierarchy. It is conceivable that some persons add all through life to their ability to arrive at sound decisions in complex problems and to the ability to think independently.

Various measurement problems

A major measurement problem derives from the fact that the same intelligence test may be assessing different mental abilities at different ages. For example, B. Balinsky [17] made a factor analysis on Wechsler-Bellevue test scores achieved by subjects ranging in age from 9 to 59. Using the Thurstone centroid method with axis rotation, he isolated factors from the intercorrelation of scores on subtests for each of six age groups. He obtained different factor groupings for the six age groups. Specificity of performance increased with age, and mental organization varied in the groups studied. The Wechsler-Bellevue test apparently measures somewhat different functions at different adult ages.

The possibility that motor and sensory changes may partly explain the drop in test scores with age has occurred to several workers in the later-maturity field. J. Birren and J. Botwinick [18] have demonstrated loss of writing speed in later life, in "normal" subjects, and a more pronounced reduction of speed in those diagnosed as suffering from senile psychoses. These investigators conclude that tests of writing speed may profitably be added to the psychological examination of the older person.

Verbal intelligence tests proceed on the assumption that those being examined have had comparable intellectual backgrounds. Unless this condition is met, scores have no meaning. Since intellectual histories become increasingly unique as persons age, the condition of comparability of background becomes progressively more difficult to attain. One possible solution is the development of a number of different tests for people of various backgrounds.

Motivation is acknowledged to be an important factor in test performance, and one whose role is very difficult to evaluate. Cumulative experience, biological change, and many other variables surely intervene to influence the attitude that the subject adopts toward the test situation. Adult life rarely provides the type of competitive challenge represented by a mental ability test. The school, on the other hand, constantly provides experiences which prepare the student for the test situation, giving an advantage to the young.

The Wechsler-Bellevue intelligence scale has been very widely used in the measurement of the intelligence of older persons. This test is one of the few psychological instruments that has taken cognizance of the problem of age change. Age decrements are eliminated by adding a fixed number of points to each score on an age basis. This mechanical solution to a difficult problem is not entirely adequate. N. Shock [19] points out that the test procedure would give an 85-year-old cadaver 22 points on an age basis, enabling him to score as a "borderline defective." Here we have a good example of the lack of tools appropriate for the study of aging persons.

It is regrettable that we know almost nothing about the role of race in connection with psychological change with age. The Stanford-Binet, Wechsler-Bellevue, and most of the other widely used tests were standardized on white Americans.

[17] B. Balinsky, "Genetic Psychology Monographs," Vol. 23 (1941), pp. 191–234.

[18] J. E. Birren and J. Botwinick, "The Relation of Writing Speed to Age and to the Senile Psychoses," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, Vol. 15 (1951), pp. 243–49.

[19] N. Shock, "Psychology and Gerontology," in W. Dennis (editor), *Current Trends in the Relation of Psychology to Medicine* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1950), pp. 1055–56.

Need for longitudinal studies

Although longitudinal studies of test intelligence are beset by many methodological problems, they eventually must be undertaken if we are to gain insight into the fate of mental abilities in the later years of life. Such studies may direct us to many individuals whose performance undergoes no decline. If such studies could be linked with thorough research on the biological and social progress of these individuals through life, we might emerge with some challenging hypotheses.

Even if it be convincingly demonstrated that the average person experiences decline in the abilities measured by our tests with advancing chronological age, we must still decide whether environmental factors or the aging process is primarily responsible. It is well within the realm of possibility that the decline between ages 20 and 50 is determined mainly by lack of exercise or poverty of the intellectual environment, and that only in the closing decades of life does biological aging become an important factor in test performance. If the writer were compelled to cling to a single hypothesis, he would risk the guess that this is the more correct explanation.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Insufficient emphasis has been placed on individual differences in aging, and little attention has been given to persons retaining their physical and mental abilities to advanced years. The latter provide living proof that frailty of body and mind is not the inevitable lot of men and women in the closing decades. It is reasonable to hope that an intensive study of these fortunate people will teach us how to spread the blessings of physical and mental vigor more widely among the elderly.

Summarizing the literature on individual differences in aging, R. Kuhlen points out:

> In Jones and Conrad's study of adult intelligence only 10 people out of a total of 1,191 exceeded the score interval occupied by the brightest 55 to 59-year-olds. In Galton's data on adults the strongest man in the 60 to 70 year age group was exceeded by only two per cent of the 20 to 29-year-old males. A report by Misiak dealing with age trends in critical flicker frequency, a phenomenon of some interest to students of aging, states "that there were critical flicker frequencies at age 82 as high as at age 7, and . . . critical flicker frequencies at age 7 as low as at age 80." [20]

A Edwards [21] has supplied data on body sway which indicate that many 70-year-olds are as steady as or steadier than many young subjects. In the matter of finger tremor, the oldsters did not differ greatly from college students. Individual differences were striking at all ages.

A man of 106 with an intelligence quotient of 126, who is active in organizations and keeps abreast with world events, has been described recently by D. Schuster.[22] The literature contains references to a number of other persons who have distinguished themselves on intelligence tests at very advanced ages. The average college graduate at age 60 does better on an intelligent test than the average high school graduate at age 18. It is reasonable to assume that a person's test performance in the later decades may be predicted roughly on the basis of early adult scores, barring neurological or psychiatric disease.

[20] R. Kuhlen, "Individual Differences in Aging," Presidential Address, Division of Maturity and Old Age, American Psychological Association, September 1951.

[21] A. Edwards, "The Myth of Chronological Age," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 34 (1950), pp. 316–18.

[22] D. Schuster, "A Psychologic Study of a 106 Year Old Man: Contribution to Dynamic Concepts of Aging and Dementia," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 6 (1951), p. 147.

CURRENT RESEARCH

Although interest in the field is growing, relatively little research is being done on the psychology of aging. Many of the projects now operating are modest in scope and handicapped by insufficient funds. Some graduate students and psychologists with the doctorate who have worked in the field have been wooed away by offers promising greater security and opportunity for advancement. This is particularly depressing when one considers the importance of the problem of an aging population and the fact that only the surface has been scratched in the areas that have received the most attention, such as the relation of age to intelligence. We know very little about the etiology of the sensory and motor changes which apparently occur in a very large percentage of older people. We are almost wholly ignorant of the factors responsible for the major mental disorders of later life. There are wide areas in the psychology of later maturity where not a single study has been undertaken.

Polling the Fellows and Associates of the Division of Maturity and Old Age of the American Psychological Association in the summer of 1949, Shock found that forty projects were being actively prosecuted in the field of aging. A large percentage of the projects centered on attitudes and personal adjustment of the aged. Interviews, questionnaires, and rating scales were the instruments most frequently employed. Three-quarters of the projects were based at Baltimore, Chicago, and Syracuse.

Repeating the Shock study in the summer of 1951 on the same group, Kaplan found that an increase had taken place in work on the psychology of aging during the two-year interval. Fifty distinct projects were being investigated at twenty-two centers. Particularly impressive were the appearance of many new faces among the researchers and the spreading of activity over the country. There was proportionately less emphasis on personal adjustment and the tools usually employed in assessing it. The diversification of research activity is an encouraging development. It is probable that the Shock and Kaplan surveys do not fully represent the extent of American effort in the later-maturity field. Many psychologists who are interested in aging are not members of the Division of Maturity and Old Age, and many data on aging are obtained as by-products of research which has some other focus.

Titles of current research projects include the following: The Mental Health of the Centenarian; Evaluation of an Educational Program for Vassar Graduates over Sixty Five; Psychological Factors in the Development of Heart Diseases; Evaluation of Sex Hormone Therapy in Aged Women; Processes of Aging in Chimpanzees; Employment Potentialities of Older People; and A Study of Strength of Grip in Senescence. There are at least a dozen studies in progress on the intellectual aspects of aging. One of the most important investigations now underway is one on the role of heredity which is being carried forward by Kallmann and his associates.

The science of gerontology is in its infancy. Few of the scientific giants of our time have been attracted to its service. Many who profess interest in its problems are concerned with them only in a peripheral way. Gerontology

is the stepchild of public and private agencies that support research in the social and life sciences. Some even question its right to a separate existence. Understaffed, neglected, at the very beginning of its career as a science, it stands at the threshold of a long and brilliant history.

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Social Participation of the Aged in Different Cultures

By LEO WILLIAM SIMMONS

A PROMINENT physician recently remarked that pediatrics is essentially a medical matter, but that geriatrics is, after all, a sociological problem. However much one may choose to qualify such a statement, there will remain some pertinent and provocative truth in it; for in the course of human experience it is apparent that the initial priority of biological forces in life becomes profoundly affected by the superimposed sociological factors. This is especially true with respect to aging, and provides a source of insight both into the evolution of human societies capable of carrying large numbers of old people and also into the life cycle of the individuals who manage to reach and to face a ripe old age.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF AGING

The farther back one goes into primitive and rudimentary forms of association the fewer old people are to be found, and those, quite generally, with old age attributed to them at a much earlier chronological date than in advanced societies. It is reported, for example, that the Arawak of British Guiana, under native conditions, seldom attained more than fifty years. "Between the thirtieth and the fortieth years, in the case of men, and even earlier in the case of women, the rest of the body, except the stomach, shrinks, the fat disappears, and the skin hangs in hideous folds." Arunta women of Australia were regarded as very fortunate if they reached fifty, and it is said of the Bontok Igorot in the Philippines that a woman reached "her prime" at twenty-three, at thirty she was "getting old," before forty-five she *was* "old," and by fifty, if she was so fortunate as to see fifty, she was a "mass of wrinkles from foot to forehead." Among the Bushmen of South Africa it it is reported that "really old people are rare." The Creeks of North America had a saying that parents were lucky whenever they lived to see gray hairs on the heads of their children.[1]

It is of further note that human societies met the problems of a fruitful and satisfying old age for *some* individuals long before there was any opportunity for many people even to grow old. Indeed, in certain quite primitive groups the aging years of life have been actually regarded as the best. Probably nowhere, for instance, has age been viewed in a more favorable light or accorded greater homage than among the Palaung of North Burma, who attribute their longevity to virtue in a previous existence. In anthropological perspective it is literally true that societies achieved a very good old age for a few long before there could be any substantial age at all for the many. But modern civilization has reversed the process and the problems.

Another interesting contrast is portrayed in the relative uniformity of the patterns of adjustment to birth and childhood and the very much greater diversity of socially prescribed ways of coping with the problems of age and death.

Some of the extremes in cultural variations with respect to aging can be sketched offhand: Old age has been

[1] Leo W. Simmons, *The Role of the Aged in Primitive Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 17. Cites original references.

said to begin quite early or rather late in life, and it may last a very long or a short time. By conventional norms, its coming may be resented and discounted or welcomed and treasured. It may be considered an idle and useless period in life or an active and fruitful one. It may bring promotions in position and homage or demotions in both. It may be expected to drag itself out in dull, tedious boredom or to go by quickly with interest and zest. Thus, the onset of aging may be viewed as a curse on the one hand or as a challenge on the other. But most peoples meet it somewhere between these two extremes.

The liability phase

A stage is reached, however, in the experience of aging where one finds almost everywhere a surprising degree of uniformity in attitude and social response. Although there is wide range of socially sanctioned adaptations in different societies, a point comes in senescence where any fruitful participation is regarded as past, and the incumbent is looked upon as a definite liability. Senility may be a suitable label for this phase of life; but it is not entirely apt in that it implies extreme physical weakness and/or mental infirmity, while the main idea conveyed is that of being regarded by members of the group as inconsequential and a hopeless burden. This is a status which may be attained under various degrees of physical and mental debility in different societies. Some primitive folk use a term which implies "overaged," "useless," or the "sleeping" stage in life. And everywhere for the aged in this state, unless death provides an early release, the prospects for further aging, and the attitudes toward it, tend to be uniformly dismal. Apparently all societies differentiate between old age in general and this pathetic plight in which the individual is regarded merely as a long-sufferer and a social obligation.

Of particular pertinence in the evolution of the social dynamics of aging is the observation that the overaged, useless, or liability phase of senescence actually has had little significance for the simple societies which were never able to sustain more than a few really old people anyway, and those under conditions in which the very helpless could not long survive. But this helpless and hopeless period in life takes on paramount importance in our modern times and in complex civilizations which are so successfully solving the physical problems of a potential old age for the multitudes. When we envisage the possibilities of sustaining and prolonging life far into this phase, perhaps even with eliminations and substitutions for all but the more vital organs and elements of the human body, the emerging problems of overaging are greatly magnified. If we add to this the recognized fact that the "useless" period in life is socially and culturally determined and may be moved up as well as pushed back in years, the potential problems of anything like successful aging become staggering. The societal fates can become most unfortunate for aging in our times, of course, if so many old people are made to feel useless much too early in life and find the twilight years empty, lonely, and too long-lasting. Thus can civilization create more problems of aging than it has yet solved.

INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE IN AGING

We have stressed the conditioning impact of society upon the experience of aging in general. But this is not the whole story. The initial and basic biological forces in life are no less critically affected by sociological factors in the life history of every person who lives

to be old. Anyone's success in aging will depend measurably upon facing up to these factors in an active and participating way. And while society sets the stage, sketches out the plot of the play, and provides the conditions for more or less successful aging, the initiative must spring substantially from the individual. And where many fail, some will always succeed.

It would appear that any sustaining group support for aging comes primarily through the adaptive behavior of the individual to group life. There are tremendous possibilities for a ripe and rewarding old age in some societies, but only in those that have *acquired* the norms, attitudes, and patterns of reciprocal response between youth and age which provide group support, and then mainly by personal participation and adaptation thereto. Thus, successful aging is something to be achieved both by society and by the individual.

In sum, then, the opportunities to grow old and to participate effectively in group life stem very largely from social rather than innate factors and from acquiring individual skill and initiative instead of, or in addition to, biological endowments. These same opportunities may be won or lost by pressures or changes in the social milieu, or by the apt or inept attempts at adaptation by the particular individual. It takes the two parts, neatly fitted, to make for wholesome and prolonged participation. The secret of success for anyone facing a long life, therefore, is to find for himself a suitable place in his society in which to age with grace and usefulness, and to participate tactfully and fully up to the very end if at all possible.

MANIPULATION OF DEPENDENCY

It is perhaps a truism that everywhere in the human cycle life begins with the dependency of the young on those who are older, and it generally ends with the dependency of the old on those who are younger. But while there is no way to escape a set period of dependency in youth, there can be much or little dependency in old age, conditioned in part by how long a person may live and also by how well he is able to participate in the affairs of the group.

It is also easy to see that protective care is more firmly assured for dependency at the beginning than at the end of life. Whatever there may be of a protective parental "instinct" is certainly not matched with as strong filial tendencies. A good old age for almost anyone anywhere depends essentially upon the amount of persuasion or enforcement which can be brought to bear upon the young and the strong to respect and provide for the interests of the old and the feeble who are no longer able to provide for themselves. In personal relationships this will depend largely, as always, upon the homage which can be inspired, the contributions which still can be made, and the rights and prerogatives which can be manipulated by the aged. Even in the most favorable societies for aging, it is still mainly up to the old to elicit and secure the kind of respect and support which the culture dictates as rightfully due them. Any aging that is worth the effort is rarely a passive and withdrawing role; and as the situation becomes more desperate the interpersonal relationships become more vital, and the participation must needs remain active and effective, however veiled and subtle.

Indeed, the degree and the quality of the participation may constitute the measure of success in aging even when the individual is finally confined to his room and bed. Anyone observant of these last days and years of aging can note a very significant lapse of group interest and supportive care when an aged sufferer has reached a state of

being "comatose" and without further powers to respond. Perhaps it should be no surprise that success here correlates so closely with the degree and quality of sustained participation. It would seem that just to remain in touch, "gamy," and responsive to the end helps out in aging, at least if one wishes "to make it good" to the very last.

AREAS AND FORMS OF PARTICIPATION

In addition to ensuring opportunities for longevity, we have seen that society provides the framework for the participation of at least some of its aging members, and it also assigns, as well as defines, the positions and functions which they are to perform. In relatively simple and static societies the statuses and roles of participation are sex typed, and sometimes aptitude rated, as well as age graded. Everyone belonging to a society of this kind comes to know approximately where he stands and how he may participate at a particular period in his life span, and this is especially true of the older members of the group. But in complex and fluid social systems with rapid change and recurrent confusion over status and role, no one's position is so well fixed —least of all that of the aging. Thus, a general principle is that in the long and steady strides of a social order the aged find themselves fixed and favored in position and performance, but when conditions become unstable and the rate of change reaches a galloping pace the more youthful find opportunities in their favor and may become much earlier seated in the saddle.

With such qualifications regarding social change, it is reasonable to forecast, roughly, that an aging person's opportunities to participate successfully in his social milieu will depend largely upon the structure and the development of such major social institutions as the economic order, the forms of family life, the types of recreational and educational facilities, the religio-magical rites and functions, and the political system. Within these five institutional configurations, old people are found participating everywhere, with various degrees of success, in at least the following five distinguishable forms of activity: the performance of auxiliary services, the pursuit of specialized skills, the exercise of established rights and prerogatives, the dispensation of knowledge and wisdom in decision-making, and the administration of rites and rituals related to the crises and mysteries of life.

AUXILIARY SERVICES

By all odds, the most basic and widespread form of participation for aging persons with waning physical powers is to be found in assisting others with economic enterprises and household chores —essentially simple and routine work with the hands. Indeed, the *hands* of the aged, as adaptive and surviving organs of participation, grow in significance along with the years. Everywhere in human societies the aged are found helping out with the lighter tasks on the trail, in the field, the camp site, the shop, the office, and the household, and at almost any jobs that they can find to do. By these activities they retain a sense of place and performance in the group, and gain thereby a little more consideration and security.

An example may be drawn from a contemporary aboriginal group, the Hopi in northeastern Arizona, a herding and farming people.

> Old men among the Hopi tend their flocks until feeble and nearly blind. When they can no longer follow the herd, they work on in their fields and orchards, frequently lying down on the ground to rest. They also make shorter and shorter trips to gather herbs, roots, and fuel. When unable to go to the fields any longer they sit in the house or kiva where they card and spin, knit, weave blankets, carve wood, or make sandals. Some continue to spin when they are blind or unable to walk, and it is a common saying that "An old man can spin to the end of his life." Corn shelling is women's work but men will do it, especially in their dotage. Old women will cultivate their garden patches until very feeble and "carry wood and water as long as they are able to move their legs." They prepare milling stones, weave baskets and plaques out of rabbit weed, make pots and bowls from clay, grind corn, darn old clothes, care for children, and guard the house; and when there is nothing else to do, they will sit out in the sun and watch the drying fruit. The old frequently express the desire to "keep on working" until they die.[2]

Although opportunities for participation differ greatly under various social systems, they have tended to increase with cultural advances, especially up to and including agricultural economies, and have proved to be great assets to the aging. In modern industrialized societies the opportunities for such labor of the hands may be greatly multiplied, but the competition of younger persons for the same tasks may simultaneously become so intensified as to rule out any extended participation of the aged. Therefore, retirement from even the simpler tasks may come earlier and more abruptly for the aging. It is not enough that there are a multiplicity of these tasks for aging hands; the continued services of the aged must be needed and appreciated by those in the society who are in a position to make the decisions.

It is also true that such labors of necessity often ensure little more than a bare subsistence, for the menial and humdrum tasks which not infrequently fall to the lot of old people may sometimes become little more than demotions into drudgery, and they can constitute something like the last feeble attempts at participation and survival. A satisfactory relationship for the aged generally requires additional and more effective adjustments.

[2] Leo W. Simmons, "Attitudes Toward Aging and the Aged: Primitive Societies," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. I (Jan. 1946), p. 79.

SPECIALIZED SKILLS

In most societies, however primitive, the more gifted and diligent among the aged generally possess some expert skills which enable them to monopolize, or at least to supervise, certain specialized tasks or functions. Not infrequently, they are experts in the arts and crafts, such as pottery, basketry, housebuilding, boat construction, metal work, and the manufacture of clothing, tools, weapons, and other implements. They may also excel in the decorative arts. Moreover, they are often in demand as directors of hazardous projects, of complicated techniques and procedures, and as specialists in the performance of such personal services as operations to enhance physical charm or the treatment and relief of physical ailments. In the course of a long life they can and do take advantage of the opportunity to acquire superiority in practical and esthetic skills that stand them in good stead during the years of declining physical prowess.

But again, in our complex civilization, where the range and the number of specialities are so vastly magnified, the aging really find fewer opportunities to compete successfully with more youthful experts. Indeed, except for a very few highly gifted persons, the organization and the professionalization of the specialities have reached such high development, and the training of youth in these skills is accomplished so early in life, that a capable young person may reasonably expect to overtake or surpass a parent or grandparent long before he himself begins to age.

Probably never in the history of man have the skills of the aged become so

effectively shelved by the trained aptitudes of youth. Unless the aged are very gifted, their chances now for prolonged participation, except as a pastime, are better in the esoteric or "fringe" specialties, where competition is light, than in the skills which are in common demand. Relatively few really old people are regarded as indispensable any more because of their specialized capabilities. And perhaps it is chiefly this fact that calls for and justifies in our culture the rise of the modern hobby interests, which provide at best a kind of playful participation.

RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES

One of the most important areas for prolonged and effective participation is in the exercise of rights and prerogatives. Long lives have afforded the aged ample opportunities to fix their claims in close accord with the cultural codes; and as their days shorten and their physical powers wane, these established prerogatives become for them like long arms for extended participation in the daily affairs of life. In many societies the effects of these prerogatives are felt long after death has claimed their possessors, as, for example, in the last testaments respecting property and in the late admonitions of departing patriarchs.

Property rights are excellent examples of these prerogatives. They are among the most flexible, impersonal, and effective means of obligating others to do one's biddings. Generally, where such rights are firmly entrenched in a society, they enable the possessors to accumulate and to store up credits against the hard days ahead; and since the enforcement of property rights rests upon the social codes and the surveillance of appointed agents, empowered with group sanctions, all that an aging possessor needs to do is to meet the terms of the code. He does not have to defend these rights by his own strength. Thus with a backlog or a bank roll of established claims, he is in a position to manipulate other people into obeying his orders long after he is too feeble to do much himself. It is certainly true that wherever these rights are well developed in a society, there is a marked difference in the participation of aging persons with and without property. Indeed, few contrasts are more pronounced in the status and role of the aged.

In an over-all survey, it would appear that property rights as a means of participation by aging persons had a very simple beginning and have increased in importance with the development of more complex social systems and advanced cultures. Of course, wherever the existing property of a group becomes concentrated in the hands of a very small proportion of the population, its effectiveness as a means of participation for the majority of the aged is greatly diminished. Under such circumstances it is possible for large numbers of old people to become very dependent in a land of plenty.

Another way in which the aging may exercise their rights and prerogatives to very good effect is in family relationships. Within the ties of kith and kin, the obligations of youth to age are so nearly universal that they cut across most cultural traits and trends and are not greatly hindered by varied combinations of them. Not infrequently aging persons manipulate such bonds to great advantage, finding in these relationships opportunities for participation which reach far into senility and sometimes past it, as by the last wishes and testaments.

One means by which the aging hold onto effective family ties is by marriage to younger mates—a rather widespread practice, especially among men. Aged

women who wish to extend their influence through family life more often find themselves unable to marry younger men, but in some societies they encourage their husbands to take younger spouses whom they may be able to manage.

But a more extensive right than marriage is the rank and authority which aging persons hold in the family, and these powers and vested interests often affect a wide circle of relatives. A relationship of special interest here is the close association of the old with the very young. Frequently they are left together while the able-bodied of both sexes go forth to secure the family fare. These older people protect and instruct the children, who, in turn, are as "eyes, ears, hands, and feet" to their enfeebled old friends. In a social sense, the aged thus return to childhood, finding therein a useful occupation and an active interest for the long, dull days of their dotage.

But as the old people suffer increasing loss of both physical and mental powers, without prospects of regaining them, they differ significantly from the young, the sick, and the temporarily disabled. They have to retreat permanently from the rigors of life and seek their refuge in the bosom of the family, there to take up a kind of last stand and to rely more and more upon their kinsmen. Such a retreat to domestic shelter, however, does not imply a passive existence. Success up to the end requires that participation continue, however restrained and subtle it may become.

KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM

In primitive societies an aged man or woman has a distinct advantage in knowledge, wisdom, and good judgment in decision-making. Without written records, where all that is known must be retained by memory, old people are repositories of valuable information and are in a favored position to make seasoned judgments. Such powers accumulate with age, and outlast physical stamina. The possessors of these qualifications are in constant demand for imparting general information, interpreting strange and mysterious phenomena, pronouncing upon ethical standards, diagnosing personal ailments, and providing comfort and guidance to the distraught and bereaved. Seers, magicians, medicine men, and priests are frequently old people. They serve as mediators between man and the great unknown, the imaginary environment which is believed to be peopled with unfriendly spirits and devils as well as benevolent beings and gods. When faced with common perplexities and personal crises of every kind, primitive people generally turn to their "old wise ones" for help and counsel; and the aging individual with enough experience, insight, and gumption to suggest or do something, or even make it appear that something can be done in the hour of human need, usually reaps a reward. The Hebrew axiom that "with the ancient is wisdom; and in length of days understanding" is practically universal among primitive peoples.

Political, judicial, and civil preferments and positions are often, also, the normal outcome of such personal growth in the lifetime acquirements of knowledge, wisdom, and sound judgment. The titles and often the offices tend to be lifelong. Old men may serve long and well as lawmakers, judges, and administrators of justice. Moreover, as leaders in exclusive societies and in initiatory rites, the aging quite generally exercise the powers of discrimination and receive considerable deference.

Positions of influence in decision-making, which depend little upon the

manipulation of things and greatly upon the manipulation of people, constitute perhaps the peak of power in participation. Thus the influence gained from the strain and toil of physical activity rarely matches the power exercised by knowledge, wisdom, and skill in social relationships. In other words, it is the exercise of brain more than brawn, of wits more than works, that sets and maintains the highest levels of participation by old people.

In old age, such opportunities and powers appear to depend mainly on three factors: individual ability and initiative, sex, and a favorable combination of social and cultural conditions. Age alone rarely qualifies one here. There must also be individual ability, and growth in experience, wit, and tact. Even then, however, a point is reached in aging where these may disappear.

RITES AND RITUALS

Aging persons with special qualifications in knowledge, wisdom, and experience also find many opportunities to exercise their influence in the more formalized ceremonies, magical rites, and religious practices. They often become the officiating agents in the critical events of the life cycle, such as childbirth, child naming, initiations, weddings, funerals, and memorial ceremonies.

There is usually an element of mystery and chance associated with these emergencies and critical events of life. It is generally believed that it is not always strength of brawn or practical work that staves off bad luck, that wins the maiden's hand, that brings children to bless a family, that drives out or heals disease, that controls the weather, divines omens, casts out evil influences, and placates angry gods. It is a special power, strange, mysterious, often ritualistic, and most potent, as well as safest, when guided by the wisdom and experience of the aged and wise ones.

Here, also, the aged possess a further advantage, for should a charm or rite or ceremony miscarry, they can with their superior knowledge and experience explain away the failure. They can confidently affirm in the face of mischance that had it not been for the additional rite of performance, matters could have turned out far worse. Thus in many societies the wise old people are able to serve on into their late years by a ritualization of their experience of the past, by tempering the ill luck of the present, and by cushioning the hard fate of the future—and this is often an indispensable contribution to the younger members of the group.

DISCUSSION

This summary exploration of attitudes toward the participation of aging persons in the affairs of life reinforces the idea recurring from varied approaches, namely, that while modern civilization has greatly progressed in the promise of longer life for larger proportions of the population, it has disrupted many of the time-tested adaptations of the aged, and perhaps even regressed in its solution of the problem of successful aging. Probably the most important lesson to gain from a broad coverage of different peoples is that the basic qualities of successful aging rest, after all, upon the capacity of individuals to fit well into the social framework of their own times, to win their rights to prolonged participation and recognition, and to know when they are through. Apparently there are no equally successful substitutes for this, the functional rights and the appropriate behavior in aging.

There are grounds to believe that while we have made much ado over the discovery of adolescence as a unique stage in life experience, and recognized it as quite different from adulthood, we are continuing—mistakenly—to regard aging as little more than a somewhat discredited extension of mid-adulthood. This conception of old age as a hang-over of mid-life implies a pattern of adjustment which may be characterized as holding on and/or trying to beat a slow and often resentful retreat from the norms and standards of mid-life, rather than a challenge for a different kind of life with new horizons. A "holding-the-line" pattern, while good strategy for some, may be much less than the best course of adjustment for others, especially for those who are still forward-looking, capable, and resourceful.

There are some quite justifiable reasons to assume that a shift from mid-life to old age can be as significant a change as that from adolescence to adulthood, and the range of variations in the successful fruition of life in old age may really be much wider than it is for youth. We may find it very profitable, in short, to explore the possibilities inherent in the idea that old age in our modern civilization constitutes what may be quite properly regarded as a new lease on life which, in optimum fulfillment, calls for new ways of living, ways possibly as different from those of mid-life as adolescence is from adulthood.

We are accustomed to hear a great deal about the *problems*, and little about the *opportunities*, of old age, almost as if aging were to be regarded as a curse, after all our efforts to attain it. We often seem to forget that the prospect that so many of us will reach old age is a most remarkable achievement and known only to recent times. Likewise, we stress what society may do for the aged, instead of what the aged may discover in themselves and for the rest of society. We need to heed the principle that people have aged most successfully when they have discovered or created for themselves effective positions and roles in the very societies of which they are a part. It is possible that these potentialities wait to be rediscovered, developed, and refitted into our own times. This may, indeed, be an old frontier that calls for new pioneering.

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Older Persons in the Labor Force

By Gertrude Bancroft

THE position of older persons in the labor force today and their probable status during the next few decades should be of absorbing interest to all adults. Among population groups subject to possible disadvantage or discrimination in the labor market, the older group is the most universally vulnerable. Many persons can live out their working lives untouched directly by the factors that adversely affect the employment of women, of Negroes, of the foreign-born or other minority groups, but none can escape the effects of age—as it influences both his own employment and that of someone to whom he is closely related.

It is hardly a revelation to point out that with the advancing age of the population, the number of workers who are retired or facing retirement or striving to remain in the labor force for economic or emotional reasons will be growing every year. Likewise the number of families using part of their income to help support older persons, whether in the labor force or not, may be expected to become ever larger. Hence, it is important to examine what can be anticipated in the way of opportunities for older persons to continue to keep their place in the productive economy and to contribute rather than to become wholly dependent on their families or on society.

Attitudes Toward Retirement

Much of the current discussion on the problems of the aging assumes at the start that it is socially and economically desirable for older people to remain employed on some basis as long as they wish to and are able to. Furthermore, most older workers are assumed to want to remain in the labor force. This latter is probably a valid assumption, although it has not had statistical verification except on a limited basis. One piece of evidence is that by no means all workers eligible for old-age and survivors insurance benefits are receiving them. At the beginning of 1951, about two-fifths of the persons 65 and over who were fully insured were not drawing payments, most of them, presumably, because of employment. It may be inferred that they chose to remain at work.

Other evidence derives from studies of old-age insurance beneficiary "retirements" between 1940 and 1947 [1] made in twenty middle-sized and large cities. These suggest that in those areas retirement of the beneficiaries studied had not been voluntary. Only one in twenty had been able to quit work voluntarily and in good health. After retirement many had again sought and found employment. The compelling reason for return to the labor force seemed to be not a desire to be busy and useful, however, but need for additional income to maintain anything like the previous standard of living. These studies were made in fairly large urban centers. In smaller communities or in rural areas, where living costs tend to be lower, the findings might differ. Fortunately, a similar survey on a nation-wide basis by the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance is in prospect which should give more conclusive answers.

It is possible that if retirement did not bring financial hardship for most people, attitudes might differ sharply as to the desirability of retaining a place in the labor force. There was some evidence of a temporary reduction in labor force activity of men 65 and over following the 1950 liberalization of the Social Security Act, despite the new provision that a person could earn as much as $50 a month in covered employment and still draw benefits. This suggests that some older workers believed that employment was no longer necessary and perhaps welcomed the chance to enjoy a more leisurely life. The average size of monthly benefit ($42 for a retired worker, or $72 for a retired worker and his wife, in December 1950) would hardly be enough to permit a life free from financial cares but, in combination with income of other family members or income from other sources, might in some cases be the crucial amount.

It is hoped that through the growing interest in the aging population valid information will be developed on the relation of income to attitudes of this group toward complete or partial retirement, both for persons anticipating retirement and those already out of the labor force, voluntarily or involuntarily.

[1] Margaret L. Stecker, "Beneficiaries Prefer to Work," *Social Security Bulletin*, January 1951, pp. 15–17.

Definition of "Older Worker"

The use of the comparative adjective "older" in a discussion of this kind is in part an obvious form of escape through euphemism. No one wants to be labeled "old" but all of us are "older" than someone. In part, however, its reflects the elasticity of the concept. Age, like beauty, may be "in the eye of the beholder," but it is also closely related, as far as labor force activity is concerned, to occupation. The age at which a person becomes an "older worker" will vary by as much as forty or fifty years depending on whether he or she is a prize fighter, a chorus girl, a ballplayer, a plasterer, a piano tuner, a symphony conductor, a lawyer, or a college president. For purposes of summarization, it is necessary to be arbitrary and to ignore these basic differences, however.

Tradition and social insurance provisions tend to set 65 as the retirement age, but the problems of older persons in the labor force give evidence of their existence before this age. On the basis of the census statistical classifications, older persons in the labor force might be defined as those 55 years old or more. For men, the peak age groups are those from 25 to 54, in the sense that these are the groups which have the largest proportion in the labor force—employed or looking for work. Therefore, the next age group, in which the statistics show a marked dropping off in this proportion, might be said to begin the "older" group. In the following discussion the activity of persons 55 to 64 years of age will be shown separately from that of those 65 and over, wherever possible.

Older Persons in the Labor Force Today

Currently, in a typical month one out of every six civilians in the labor force is at least 55 years old.[2] That is, almost 11 million persons working for pay or in a family business, or looking for work, are 55 years old or over. (Three millions are 65 or more.) More than 8 million are men; over 2 million, women. Most of the older persons who are not in the labor force are "voluntarily" idle, retired, or engaged in keeping house (12.6 million). Only 2.3 million are estimated as permanently unable to work or in institutions.

[2] Based on data from the Current Population Survey, a monthly survey of a cross section of the population conducted by the Census Bureau. See *Current Population Reports*, Series P–57 and P–50.

TABLE 1—PER CENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN LABOR FORCE BY AGE, APRIL 1951

Age	Men	Women
14–15 years	22.1	7.3
16–17 years	43.5	26.4
18–19 years	70.6	48.3
20–24 years	85.0	44.8
25–34 years	95.1	34.4
35–44 years	96.1	38.7
45–54 years	94.4	37.8
55–64 years	86.0	28.0
65 years and over	43.5	9.1

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, "Monthly Report on the Labor Force," Series P-57, No. 106. Adapted from Table 6.

When expressed in terms of "worker rates," that is, proportion of population in labor force, the participation of older persons in gainful economic activity is seen to be significantly less than for the central age groups. Among older men it corresponds roughly to participation in the late teens and early twenties, but among women it drops back to the level common among girls of high school age. As of April 1951, the percentage of each age-sex group in the labor force is shown in Table 1.

The industries in which older persons make the largest contributions, numerically, are extremely varied with respect to their wage levels, and consequently their status, social as well as economic. Industries with one-fifth or more of their work force consisting of men 55 and over in April 1951, were agriculture, transportation (railroads in particular), finance, insurance and real estate, personal services, professional services, and state and local government.[3] Men 65 and over had the best chance in agriculture, finance, insurance and real estate, and personal and professional services.

No industry provided relatively as many jobs for older women as for older men. In agriculture, retail trade, service industries, particularly service in private households, professional services, and public administration are found the largest proportions of women 55 and over—roughly 10 per cent.

On the one hand, then, in activities where principles of seniority have been long established or where job security is legal or quasi-legal such as government, education, or transportation, the older worker has an advantage, or at least is not at a disadvantage. On the other hand, industries in which wage rates are comparatively low, such as agriculture, trade, and some of the service industries, make use of older workers, as they do of youngsters of school age, because they cannot attract the more productive workers in the other age groups. Finally, where small independent enterprises are common, such as in agriculture and trade, the older worker can continue along for many years as his own employer if he can make a go of it financially. In April 1951, almost one-third of the employed men 55–64 years of age were self-employed, and almost two-fifths of those 65 and over. Among women 55–64 only 15 per cent were self-employed, but for those 65 and over the percentage was about 25.

[3] Bureau of the Census, unpublished data from the Current Population Survey. Unless otherwise specified, all of the figures cited in the remainder of this article are from this source. Since they are based on a sample, they are subject to sampling variability which may be particularly large for the 65 and over group.

PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT

Part-time employment has often been proposed as a means by which older persons can remain at work on a basis that takes account of their strength and health. Currently, however, the great majority of older workers are still full-time workers. Almost all male workers in the central age groups and about three-quarters of the female workers work full time (35 hours a week or more) as a usual thing, except for illness, vacation, or other factors. Part-time employment becomes much more common in the 55–64 age group, but even among persons 65 and over, far fewer than half were working less than 35 hours in April 1951 (25 per cent of the males and about 40 per cent of the females). More farm workers than nonfarm workers work part time, as a rule, in these age groups.

The picture taken as a cross section of activity during a single week is confirmed by the work experience pattern over a whole year. Part-time work was a usual thing for less than one-tenth of men 55–64 years of age who worked during 1950, but for almost one-quarter of those 65 and over. For women, who at almost all ages must combine housekeeping with other activities, one-third usually worked part time in the 55–64 ages, and about one-half among those 65 and over. Full-time employment was the goal of the remaining workers in these age groups, but, as among workers in other age groups, many of them did not have full-time employment the year round because of periods of slack work, sickness, withdrawal from the labor force, and other reasons. These interruptions were noticeably more frequent for the population 65 and over; little difference was observed between the 55–64 group and the next younger group.

To what extent do older workers work less than full time because they wish to? Various studies of part-time employment conducted by the Census Bureau have given a basis for judgment on this point. These studies have repeatedly shown that part-time employment is usually voluntary in an era of full employment, like the present. Older persons work part time on a voluntary basis fairly frequently after the age of 65, but, even at this age, the majority of employed persons usually work full time. The situation, again, differs for men and women, as is shown in Table 2.

Few of the regular part-time workers were in manufacturing, the largest single major industry class. Should a program of planned part-time work for older workers be inaugurated in this industry to meet labor shortages or as part of a general program for older workers, it is likely that the situation shown by the census study would change markedly. Not only would some workers

TABLE 2—PERSONS AT WORK, CLASSIFIED BY FULL- AND PART-TIME STATUS, MAY 1951
(Per cent distribution)

Employment status	Men			Women		
	45–54 years	55–64 years	65 years and over	45–54 years	55–64 years	65 years and over
Total at work	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Worked full time	94.6	90.9	78.7	75.6	71.2	58.7
Worked part time	5.4	9.1	21.3	24.4	28.8	41.3
Usually work full time	3.0	4.2	3.8	4.4	3.8	1.9
Usually work part time	2.4	4.9	17.5	20.0	25.0	39.4
Prefer and could accept full-time work	1.0	1.1	1.5	3.1	2.2	2.8
Do not prefer full-time work	1.4	3.8	16.0	16.9	22.8	36.6

Source: Bureau of the Census, unpublished data from the Current Population Survey.

currently working full time prefer a less exacting schedule, but retired workers might be expected to return to the labor force under those more favorable conditions.

WARTIME EXPERIENCE OF OLDER PERSONS

Anyone who remained in civilian life during World War II will remember the numerous aged telegraph messenger "girls," delivery "boys," waiters and waitresses, plumbers, doctors, and their contemporaries filling in for younger workers who had gone to war or had transferred to war production jobs, generally at higher rates of pay. These were the people who met the public. Thousands of other older workers were employed in factories or on construction jobs. Statistically, how did the older ones count up? In 1944 there averaged 6.7 million men and women 55–64 years old and 2.9 million 65 and over in the labor force—almost 10 million persons or nearly one-fifth of the civilians who kept the American economy going. In 1940 the number had been only 8 million or about one-seventh of the total.

Because of the long depression of the 1930's, a fairly substantial decline in labor force activity of older men had taken place, giving further impetus to an already recognized long-term trend. Thus, during the war it was estimated that close to one million of these workers were "extra"—that is, they would not have been in the labor force except for the war. It was expected that when the war ended the long-term downward trend would be resumed and the shrinkage of the older labor force might be especially sharp after the war demand for manpower was over. Subsequent developments have not confirmed these speculations. Rather, although wartime peaks were not sustained, the postwar period of relatively full employment and now the heightened activity of the renewed defense program have thus far maintained labor force participation at prewar levels for men and allowed for a further increase for women 55 and over.

TABLE 3—PER CENT OF NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION IN THE LABOR FORCE ANNUAL AVERAGES 1940–1950

	Men		Women	
	55–64 years	65 years and over	55–64 years	65 years and over
1940	87.2	45.0	18.7	7.4
1941	88.6	46.5	19.6	7.7
1942	90.5	47.8	22.1	8.4
1943	92.1	50.6	24.3	10.1
1944	92.1	52.3	25.5	9.8
1945	91.4	52.1	26.5	9.6
1946	89.6	48.5	23.6	8.4
1947	89.6	47.8	24.3	8.1
1948	89.5	46.8	24.3	9.1
1949	87.5	46.9	25.3	9.6
1950	87.0	45.8	27.0	9.7

Source: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey. Averages for 1940, 1941, and 1942 estimated from broader age groupings.

Generally speaking, the industries that normally employ older workers relied more heavily on these age groups during the war. Some war plants could cite a few spectacular instances of 70-year-old lady chemists on their pay rolls, but those dramatic examples were the exception and are overshadowed by the more pedestrian jobs of the great mass of workers. Construction, in particular, was outstanding in the use of older workers. In 1944, 28 per cent of all construction workers were 55 or older as compared with 19 per cent in 1950. In trade, 16 per cent were in this age group during the war as compared with 14 per cent in 1950, and in service industries, 22 per cent as compared with 19 per cent.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT DEFENSE PROGRAM

If the present defense program together with the high-level activity in civilian production presses too hard on the readily available labor supply, there is a substantial reserve among persons no longer in the labor force but who had wartime or postwar work experience, and who still are considered able to work. A Census Bureau survey in March 1951 disclosed about 13 million such persons, of whom 1.7 million were 65 or more. On their highest-paid war job, about half of the 1.2 million men 65 or more in this group had been skilled craftsmen, semiskilled operatives, or farmers; most of the women, semiskilled operatives and service workers.

When asked why they stopped working, most of them indicated that they thought they were too old to work, that they had become ill or disabled, or that they had wished to retire. Nevertheless, none of the group surveyed was currently considered permanently unable to work, so it is likely that for some the opening up of job opportunities would again serve as an attraction into the labor force, at least on a part-time basis. One-quarter of the older women but only one-tenth of the older men had been part-time workers.

Separate data are not available on the wartime work experience of persons 55 to 64 years of age not currently in the labor force, but on the basis of other information it may be estimated that about 1.5 million had recent work experience, war or postwar, and that a substantial proportion would be available to work again.

The Department of Labor has estimated that in order to meet manpower needs as projected in April 1951 for the 1951–52 defense program, it will be necessary to add a net 1.4 million to the labor force, over and above the normal growth, and that these "extra" workers would have to come from among such groups as women, youth, the handicapped, and older workers.[4] The census survey gives ample evidence that there is an adequate number of persons with recent work experience who are physically able to work, but that some of them are in the upper end of the age scale where special recruitment and placement measures will be required to make a satisfactory adjustment of workers to jobs.

PROSPECTS FOR OLDER MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE

If it is agreed that retirement from the labor force, in most instances, may not result in individual and social gain, then prospects for the future may be far from encouraging. Recent studies have made it possible to estimate the "working life expectancy" of men, using the same techniques that have long been familiar in the field of construction of life tables.[5] This analysis shows that, if past trends continue into the future, we may expect the length of time a man spends in retirement to increase. Advances in medical and other science have prolonged the life span of the average man, but social and economic developments have tended to put a terminal point to his work activity.

To illustrate, a 40-year-old white man in 1900 could be expected on the average to live until he was almost 68 years old and to remain at work until he was 64½, having somewhat less than four years in retirement. In 1940, however, a 40-year-old white man could,

[4] U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Projected Manpower Requirements and Supply for the Defense Program, 1951–52," Manpower Report No. 7, April 17, 1951.

[5] U. S. Department of Labor, *Tables of Working Life*, Bulletin No. 1001, August 1950.

on the average, expect to live until he was 70 but could expect to retire from the labor force about six years before that. If the prewar trend in labor force activity of older males should continue, by 1975 the average retirement period might extend to nearly nine and a half years.

This calculation for the future, as has been indicated, is based on the assumption that prewar patterns will continue. Considerable discussion currently centers around the probable trends for older men—whether or not the sharp long-term decline in labor force participation of men 65 and over observed between 1890 and 1940 will continue or whether the experience of the wartime and postwar years in the employment of older workers means that a permanent change has taken place in attitudes toward their employment and in their job opportunities.

Factors tending to reduce labor force activity

One or two demographic factors which operate in a known fashion may be considered first. Chief among these, perhaps, is the growing urbanization of the population and the migration away from farms which have had the effect of reducing employment opportunities for older workers. In an agricultural economy, many hands are needed to meet seasonal and emergency needs, and there is room for the not too efficient worker, both young and old. Another factor operating in the same direction is the increasing longevity of the population. As the group past retirement age consists to a greater and greater extent of septuagenarians, the probability of employment in the group will diminish.

On the economic side, there are many factors whose effect is to reduce the probability of labor force activity among older men. The list is familiar. Increasing industrialization and the development of highly mechanized operations in many industrial processes have put a premium on those attributes which tend to wane with advancing years, such as agility and speed, and have reduced the value of skills that become more highly developed with age and experience.

Another development which over the long run has meant reduced employment opportunities for older workers is the increase in wage or salaried employment and the decline in self-employment. Although the operator of a small independent business faces many financial hazards, it is nevertheless true that the man who is working for himself is not nearly so often handicapped by age. He may continue to operate his business or practice his profession at a reduced rate of activity or profit, if he so desires, long after his contemporary in a wage or salaried capacity has been retired. During the decade of the 1940's the decline in self-employment was very marked. In 1940, just over half of all employed men 65 and over were working their own farms or operating their own businesses; in 1951, only two-fifths. In the next younger age group (55–64), the decline was from two-fifths to one-third.

The ability to retire voluntarily from the labor force at an advanced age and to remain self-supporting has always been rated high in our society. One manifestation of this is, of course, the social security program for old-age insurance and the recent rapid growth of private pension plans, now so important an issue in trade union policies. There is no reason to believe that, short of a depression, there will be a halt to the development of such plans.

Economic depression in itself would bring about labor force retirements of the most painful kind. The experience of older workers during the Great Depression of the 1930's showed that although they had a lower unemployment rate than the younger workers, they were less able to achieve re-employment, and had longer periods of joblessness. As a consequence, many left the labor force permanently, after the fruitless search for jobs.

Factors tending to increase labor force activity

What are the factors which may be expected to operate in the other direction—that is, to permit or compel workers past the usual retirement age of 65 to remain active in the labor market? Most of these might be called "short-run" factors in the sense that their operation has been observed only in the fairly recent past in a period of full employment, and, at times, of labor shortage. With the present state of international tension and the wide-scale defense program, however, it is possible that what has seemed a temporary interruption of normal peacetime trends may become the normal. As indicated earlier, an unprecedented increase in labor force activity took place during the years of World War II. As a result, the long-term downward trend was interrupted, and at the end of the decade of the 1940's the proportion of men 65 and over in the labor force was at about the level of ten years earlier. For the first time in the past sixty years, there was no drop between the beginning of one decade and the beginning of the next. On the basis of what we know about the past, it is not unlikely that some further decline will be seen in the coming decades, but the extent or rate of the decline is a matter of controversy.

As the defense program steps up, it is expected that manpower will again have to be shifted from trade and service pursuits to activities labeled essential, and that again the older person who desires to work may be welcomed to fill the empty jobs in the occupations which traditionally have been open to him. On the basis of World War II experience, close to a million men 55 and over could possibly be added to the labor force. Impetus for them to seek employment has undoubtedly already been given by the rise in the cost of living and the diminishing value of the dollars they may be receiving in pensions or other forms of fixed income. This last factor may be more important than any other consideration affecting the tendency of older workers to seek employment.

Apart from the needs of the defense program, the factor of cost of retirement is likely to force some permanent changes in policy. The cost of pensioning off larger and larger segments of the population may become an intolerable burden on the economy. Recognition of the need for the productive services of persons past 65 may lead to the adoption, under public or private auspices, of some of the proposals that are now being put forward more or less casually. Various of these require public action, and concern such procedures as reduction of pay-roll taxes on the earnings of workers past retirement age, or the use of income from the federal old-age insurance funds to subsidize the earnings of older workers. Another suggestion is to raise the legal retirement age under certain conditions. A proposal requiring not legal steps but negotiation between labor and management is that the piecework method of payment for older workers be used as a way of meeting declining productivity but providing continuing employment. The combination of rising retirement costs and the defense program needs for manpower may lead to removing such proposals from the realm of speculation to that of serious consideration.

Other influences that may act to

bring about continuing employment of older men are beyond the province of the economist or the statistician. They include such things as increased awareness on the part of the community of the need for some opportunity for oldsters to be occupied in ways that command respect—a development resulting from changing attitudes toward retirement on the part of psychiatrists, welfare workers, industrial relations experts, and others. Greater sympathy and understanding may obtain as a larger and larger part of the population enters the upper age brackets itself or numbers a veteran worker in its own family group.

PROSPECTS FOR OLDER WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE

A spectacular increase in the propensity of women to work outside their homes took place in the decade of the 1940's, continuing a development that has been observed during the last fifty or sixty years. The sharpest changes were noted among women past 35 years of age. Furthermore, gains made during the war were maintained, as was not the case for men.

Older women shared with younger women the new opportunities for employment. Those 65 and over were only in rare instances in the labor force (less than one in ten), and, although the proportions have increased, they are still negligible. Big gains, however, were made by women in the 55 to 64 age group. In 1940, on the average, 18 per cent were in the labor force; in 1944, 25 per cent; and in 1950, 27 per cent (see Table 3).

Women's prospects not similar to men's

Curiously enough, some of the factors that have pointed toward a reduction in employment among older men might produce the opposite results among older women. For example, the diminishing importance of farming in our national life and the expansion of urban areas will tend to mean that more and more women will have paid jobs. Opportunities for employment for women are much greater in urban areas than on farms. Industries that are more likely to provide jobs suitable for older women particularly—in public utilities, retail trade establishments, insurance and real estate offices, hotels and lodginghouses, and some of the professional and government services—are "city" industries for the most part, or at least tend to cluster in urban areas.

The reduction in the work week in American industry and business which may be expected to continue in the absence of war is often cited as a factor favorable to employment of older people, particularly women, who generally carry responsibilities for housekeeping in addition to their jobs outside the home. The sizable proportions of women 55 and older who report that they prefer part-time work (see Table 2) suggest that if the use of part-time workers should extend into more and more fields of employment, an increase in the labor force participation of older women would be assured.

For women, the pattern of working life that seems to be developing is to find a job after leaving school and to work until marriage or until children become a major responsibility. Beginning at the time that the children reach school age, and at an accelerating rate as they grow up, their mothers tend to return to the labor force. A second high point for employment is between the ages of 35 and 45, after which the relative numbers gainfully occupied start to diminish.

Households where both the head and his wife are in the labor force have shown a sharp increase in number. One in five households were in this class in 1950, but only one in nine in 1940.[6] As more and more American families establish living standards based on the earnings of both husband and wife during their forties it will become increasingly desirable, and perhaps acceptable, for the wife to continue working into her fifties and sixties. This is already true in specific areas where employment opportunities for women are abundant. In Washington, D. C., for example, the preliminary sample data from the 1950 Census of Population show that the proportion of women 55–64 in the labor force was 38 per cent as compared with 26 per cent for women in all urban areas, and the rate for women 65 and over, 14 per cent, was almost double that for all urban areas.[7]

These considerations lead to the conclusion that more women past middle age will be desiring employment in the coming decades and that, on the basis of current trends, their opportunities for employment will become more numerous.

[6] Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, "Marital and Family Characteristics of the Labor Force in the United States: March 1950," Series P–50 No. 29.

[7] Bureau of the Census, 1950 Census of Population, Preliminary Reports, PC–5 No. 53 and PC–7 No. 2.

CONCLUSION

The American economy is providing jobs for about 8 million full-time workers 55 years old or over and for some 2 million part-time workers. World War II experience demonstrates that almost a million more men in this age group would be available for employment if jobs were to open up. There is no question that failure to employ these involves a loss of productive power to the nation in a wide range of activities. Many of the "housekeeping" tasks in the economy are being performed by older workers—service jobs in particular—but also many of the jobs requiring highly developed manual skills, as in construction, or advanced educational and technical abilities, as in the professions. There is some reason to think that the exigencies of the present defense program may result in at least a temporary solution for the older worker who finds retirement unpalatable. For the long run, the probable pattern is not clear, but it is likely that without basic changes in current attitudes and policies the older man will find himself facing a long period of retirement.

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Barriers to the Employment of Older Workers

By Albert J. Abrams

THERE are two main types of barriers that hinder the older job applicant—the indirect and the direct. The indirect type is found in industrial processes and techniques which exclude older job seekers though not instituted primarily to do so. (These include restricted-entry jobs, promotion-from-within systems, pensions, unvalidated medical and psychological tests, time-pressure tasks, and certain union regulations.) The indirect type of barrier is also found in culture bars within and without industry which have an impact on industry, such as glorification of youth, upward gradients, a high-energy society, and success values based on job status and monetary return.

The direct type is found in the following: written rules excluding job seekers over a predetermined chronological age; unwritten rules followed by hiring or screening authorities to bar applicants over a predetermined chronological age; deficiencies of the older worker, whether in training, adjustability, or preparation for job seeking; and lack of public or private counseling and placement service geared to older job seekers.

It should be emphasized that barriers against older job seekers are not peculiar to American industry. There is evidence that they exist in underdeveloped and agrarian economies as well as in industrial societies, and in statist as well as democratic regimes. The extent and intensity of such obstacles may vary depending upon a host of factors, such as the significance of work in the culture, the role assigned to older persons in the family, and provision of work substitutes; but throughout the world, employers generally are not eager to hire older persons.

Measures of Formal Age Barriers

The resistance of employers to the employment of older workers is indicated by three post-World War II surveys. A community-wide study of 38 firms employing 62,828 workers in Rochester, New York indicated that 29.5 per cent of the companies imposed a maximum age limit "above which new employees are not ordinarily hired."[1]

A state-wide survey by State Senator Thomas C. Desmond, chairman of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, disclosed that 39 per cent of 172 companies admitted imposing formal aging barriers.[2]

A nation-wide joint survey of 277 concerns by the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1949 indicated that 26 per cent of the firms "did not follow a practice" of hiring older workers.[3]

The NAM two decades earlier had conducted a similar inquiry and found that 28 per cent of the firms had such age barriers.[4]

[1] Industrial Management Council, Community Survey of Employment of the Elderly, Rochester, N. Y., Jan. 1, 1948, 7 pp.

[2] Albert J. Abrams, "Industry Views its Elderly Workers," in *Birthdays Don't Count* (Albany, N. Y.: New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging. Leg. Doc. 61 of 1948), pp. 152–53.

[3] National Association of Manufacturers, Industrial Relations Department Report, *Employment of the Physically Handicapped and Older Workers* (New York, 1949), p. 15.

[4] *National Association of Manufacturers, Public Old Age Pensions* (New York, 1930), p. 24.

A 1930 study of firms in New York State concluded that "in approximately one-quarter of the moderate-sized and large companies including 40 per cent of the jobs in the state, the older person would encounter an insurmountable hiring bar. His chances of being accepted would be practically zero."[5]

Thus over a period of twenty years, from one-quarter to two-fifths of firms queried in various surveys have admitted the imposition of direct formal barriers.

These figures are only suggestive. A more realistic yardstick to measure the prevalence of formal age barriers is the data in job orders filed with public employment service agencies. A study made in 1950 showed that in New York State, of 3,500 job openings 25 per cent had an age limitation; in Columbus, Ohio, of 3,925 openings 81 per cent had age restrictions for women, 75 per cent for men; in Lancaster, Pennsylvania of 511 openings 60 per cent had age restrictions; in Birmingham, Alabama 90 per cent of the openings, and in Dallas, Texas 50 per cent, specified age restrictions.[6]

Another measurement of age bias is the extent to which "help wanted" advertisements contain such restrictions. A recent analysis of 3,474 job opportunities for males advertised in the *New York Times* showed that 38.2 per cent included an age limitation.[7]

[5] Solomon Barkin, "The Older Worker in Industry," in *Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Unemployment*, Leg. Doc. 66, 1933 (Albany, N. Y.: J. B. Lyon Co.), pp. 190–204.

[6] U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, *Older Workers Seek Jobs*, Aug. 1951, 10 pp.

[7] Walter G. O'Donnell, "The Problem of Age Barriers in Personnel Selection," in *Personnel* (New York: American Management Association, May 1951), pp. 461–71.

Pattern of Age Barriers Varies

It is clear that age barriers are a pervasive force in industry. However, the pattern of the barriers varies widely from industry to industry, from job to job, and from community to community. Advertising and public utility firms are notorious for rigid utilization of inflexible age requirements. New industries such as chemicals, plastics, and aviation customarily impose age restrictions to a greater extent than older industries. The age bars are not as numerous in the service industries or in service jobs in any industry. There is a tendency to ignore age restrictions for jobs requiring a high degree of skill, such as tool and die maker. Large concerns are more likely to impose age restrictions than are medium or small firms.

An indication of the different levels at which age barriers are imposed in various jobs is seen in the fact that restaurants will take highly skilled people like cooks up to 65 years of age, but waitresses, waiters, and counter people meet resistance at age 50 or earlier. Hotel clerks run up against age barriers at 40. Professional nurses over 40 find difficulty obtaining jobs on hospital staffs but can be placed on private duty. In commercial offices, the age limit is frequently 35 for women and 45 for men except in specialized fields such as legal stenography, insurance brokerage, and sometimes bookkeeping.

Culture Barriers

The disregard in our high-energy culture for the biological, social, and economic demands of life in the later years must be viewed as a temporary, transitional phenomenon. More satisfactory adjustments are being sought amid rapidly changing values. There

is developing a planned, conscious effort to re-examine, re-evaluate, and reshape the attitudes and policies of society toward its older people.[8] This issue of THE ANNALS is in itself an overt manifestation of this conscious effort.

These efforts clash with our traditional culture values which impede the hiring of older workers. We are a nation of youth worshipers. Our national heroes are not philosophers or physicists, but twenty-year-old baseball players and teen-age Hollywood stars whose obvious lack of dramatic powers is obscured by more obvious features. Many respectable corporate fortunes are being made today by successfully conditioning the public to a dread of aging. The purveyors of face creams, liver pills, slenderizing mechanisms, and so forth hold before us the grim prospect of a wrinkled, obese, ill old age. Youth, youth, youth! We idealize it. We crave it. We fear its loss.

How natural that industry should fall prey to the theme fostered by itself, and call for workers with "zing," "bounce," "drive," "aggressiveness," and for women "with looks"!

Age respect has certainly withered before intergeneration mobility, industrialization, and urbanization. But another restricting force is the exaltation of upward gradients. Anthropologists inform us that we value not past success or past eminence but continued upward achievements. "Going to the top" is our goal. And once at the top, we must continue to find new heights. Confronted with pressures of this type, the older person is likely to flounder, become disheartened, deem himself a failure, accelerate the likelihood of his inability to obtain work, and remove himself from the labor market entirely.

The gradual disappearance of the kinship-oriented conjugal family which provided status, emotional security, and often work security for the aged is another block in the path of the older person. In days gone by, "working for relatives" was quite common among older persons. The family took care of the work needs of older people. Today with the family economy gone, and with family businesses replaced by corporate structures, the opportunities for such jobs are restricted.

CULTURAL AIDS

There are numerous cultural forces which are operating to advance work opportunities for older persons. The premium we place on autonomy from infancy to senility forces many older people into the labor market who otherwise might not seek employment. Since opportunities for older persons to be autonomous are less numerous than such persons, our older adults are often held in disrepute in the family, in the commnuity, and in the personnel office. Increasingly older persons want to be "on their own." Sociologists point out that apart from any biological need for activity, paid work becomes the means of mediating the conflicts that rage in families when individuals have feelings toward responsibility for their parents which conflict with pressures to protect the living standards and future of their own children.

One of the most hopeful of the current cultural forces is the tendency to glorify the worth of the individual and to maximize his opportunities. The emergence of this culture value will serve to mold industrial, economic and policical policies to the advantage of older men in the labor market.

Other societal pressures operating for the older job seeker are those which establish work as status, as prestige, as success, as power. The lack of interhuman associations apart from work also helps to build up pressure for expanding job opportunities for older persons. There are thus at present conflicting cultural forces in our society which are stimuli and inhibitors of employment opportunities of older persons.

[8] See Margaret Mead, "Cultural Contexts of Aging," in *No Time to Grow Old* (Albany, N. Y.: New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, 1951), pp. 48–51.

LACK OF JOBS

As obvious as Cyrano's nose, the *main* barrier to the employment of older workers is simply a lack of available jobs. A United States Employment Service survey disclosed that as "unemployment increases, employer specifications with respect to age are tightened and the per cent of older workers among the jobless increases . . . and if not reemployed at their regular work, [the older workers] are usually downgraded in skill and pay."[9]

Similar conclusions have been reached by studies in various foreign countries.[10] World-wide, the plight of the older worker varies in intensity with the extent of employment or the condition of the labor market.[11] If the demand for labor can be broadened particularly in areas of high technological change, declining industries, contracting employment, or underdevelopment, older workers will find it easier to obtain work.

However, the condition of full employment will not ipso facto eliminate all obstacles to the hiring of older workers. Prejudice against them may not diminish in a tight labor market, but its overt manifestations and its practical impact are lessened. The prejudice lies simmering, awaiting an opportunity to steam forth in repressive age restrictions.

Even in times of labor shortage, defense plants and governmental agencies will advertise for workers "under 35" or "under 45" depending on the type of position. One recent study, however, indicated that among those 65 and over, only 17 per cent had been seeking a job for twenty weeks or more in a tight labor area, compared with almost 29 per cent in an area of very substantial labor surplus.[12]

BARRIERS ERECTED BY OLDER JOB SEEKERS

Out of the new research on the older job seeker has come awareness that he is one of his own main obstacles.[13] He often comes to the task of seeking a job with little understanding of the nature of the project. He lacks skill in merchandising himself—does not know how to carry on an aggressive sales campaign in his own behalf. He may be a poor letter writer. He may be so affected by what can only be described as "unemployment shock" that he reacts in interviews either with overtimidity or with overaggressiveness. He often lacks familiarity with the job leads in his field, such as trade directories and publications.

Very frequently, the older worker is unfamiliar with the principle of conversion. A watchmaker thinks only in terms of watchmaking instead of any

[9] Robert C. Goodwin, "The Older Worker in the Labor Market," in *Young at any Age* (Albany: New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, Leg. Doc. 12, of 1950), p. 79.

[10] See International Labour Office, *Discrimination Against Elderly Workers*, Geneva, 1938 (mimeo.).

[11] Albert J. Abrams, "Discrimination in Employment of Older Workers in Various Countries of the World," abstracted in *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 6 (July 1951), supp. to No. 3, p. 51.

[12] U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, *Older Workers at the Public Employment Office*, Aug. 9, 1950.

[13] New York State Employment Service and Division of Placement and Unemployment Insurance, *Employment Problems of Older Workers in New York City*, Aug. 1950, 123 pp.

related precision work. A sheet metal worker thinks in terms of sheet metal work alone rather than allied metal work jobs. This failure to dissect his own talents properly hits especially hard at those men who have worked for years at one single operation which has become obsolete.

The high obsolescence of machinery and skills in modern industry and the increased mobility of industry itself are severe, real barriers to the employment aspirations of older persons. They often serve to leave older workers, with long experience on a single job or single machine, high and dry. The pace of modern production lines often is not attuned to reaction timing of aging nervous systems.

Experienced counselors are familiar with the reactions of older men with stable work histories who are suddenly cast out of a job; the counselor often finds that "time purges unrealistic demands," but it is a harsh cure.

The worker whose production is declining imposes his own barriers when he refuses to recognize his own failing capacities and adjust to them, when he refuses to accept work of lower prestige or status, lower skill, or lower pay than he has been accustomed to in the past. Many men resist wearing hearing aids, glasses, or other appliances which would enable them to remain on the job or expedite their adjustment to a new job. They often fail to realize that they would be much more likely to obtain employment if they searched for work in plants that are out of town or uptown instead of downtown, or if they would consider split-shift jobs.

When the older worker is "set in his ways," when he obviously has a know-it-all attitude that alienates younger supervisors or other associates, when he suffers from emotional disturbances which may be related to climacteric changes, family difficulties, or other factors, he is obviously his own barrier.

Sometimes women resist brushing up on old skills when they re-enter the labor field after years of layoff to raise families, and find difficulty obtaining work such as bookkeeping, stenography, typing, or photography.

Many of these obstacles fortunately can be prevented or overcome. The older workers can themselves block development of many of these self-made barriers or can be aided in skirting them through the aid of skilled employment counselors.

INDUSTRY OBSTACLES

Many of our foremost production executives argue that hiring older job seekers means increasing production costs. Mr. Charles E. Wilson, shortly before leaving General Electric Company to become Director of Defense Mobilization, informed the Desmond Committee that "keeping older people with diminished capacity in the labor force tends to raise costs appreciably and reduce efficiency." The coupling of "older people" with "diminished capacity" is significant, as one of the dominant stereotypes in industrial thinking is the linking of older workers with decreased production. However, there are no data which indicate that older men generally produce less than younger men, or that younger men can keep pace with older men on certain types of jobs, or that older men cannot keep up with younger men on other types of jobs if permitted to sit rather than stand, or if permitted occasional rest periods.

On the contrary, a Desmond Committee survey showed that nearly three-fourths of the firms reporting indicated that older workers produce as much as younger workers. A NAM survey indicated that one-third of the reporting concerns felt that the quantity of work of the older person was greater, and a majority of them believed that the quality of work was superior.

Nonetheless, there is widespread belief in management circles that since our American economy is based on low-cost mass production, this conflicts with the hiring of older job seekers. Closely associated with this concept is the rationalization that younger men are needed for competitive strength. "We need young, hard-hitting, aggressive employees," the employer says, "if we are to compete successfully." The values of mature judgment, experience, and know-how are rarely equated with "drive," "pep," "dynamic personality."

Pension and compensation rates

Pensions may indeed prove costly, when older men are hired. For example, a single premium for a newly hired 40-year-old who is to be retired at 65 with a $100-a-month annuity may cost a firm $6,823; for a 55-year-old, $10,623; for a 60-year-old, $13,860.[14] While these figures are approximations, and will vary depending on the type of pension arrangement set up, they indicate that the penalty for hiring an older worker under current pension systems may be felt keenly; this is not likely to be true, however, of pension systems operated on a cents-an-hour basis which disregards the age of individual employees.

Mr. William White, president of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, recently informed the Desmond Committee that since pension plans usually require long periods of service to qualify for annuities, concerns are hesitant to hire those who will not benefit from the pension plans because of an insufficient number of years remaining before compulsory retirement. Firms are reluctant to hire short-term help who will be retired on a pittance. Mr. Eugene Holman, president of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), emphasizes that pension plans which require workers to serve a long number of years with a particular concern "introduce inflexibility into the labor market and discourage the hiring of older employees."

There is no conclusive evidence that workmen's compensation rates generally go up as older men are hired. Senator Desmond assails this contention as "a myth of management," conjured up from isolated cases of large compensation awards granted in instances of injuries to older men. He reports:

> Investigations show that while accidents tend to be more severe among elderly and the duration of disability longer, older workers tend to have fewer accidents, and are less likely, due to their know-how, to be burned, crushed, cut, punctured, or lacerated on the job. Too, the rate-making process does not take into account age. Adoption of so-called Second Injury Laws tends to reduce the risk of employers in hiring older persons with disabilities.

Other personnel policy factors

Another frequently expressed reason for barring older job seekers is the need to maintain a balanced labor force. Since many American companies do keep in their employ workers of many years' seniority, they sometimes fear permitting entry of newcomers in the upper age brackets, as tending to an overload of aged.

"But if we hire older men we will be cutting down job opportunities for youth. Youngsters have to be given a chance too." This lament is often heard. It is based on the questionable assumption of a restricted job pool.

[14] Assumes a 2¼ per cent interest rate, based on 1937 standard annuity mortality rates, set back one year and loaded 8 per cent of gross.

Furthermore, there are many jobs youngsters do not want or cannot fill, such as dead-end jobs, monotonous jobs, technical supervising jobs. Nonetheless, the youth-versus-age conflict is a very real restrictor of job opportunities for older workers.

Many companies cite their policy of "promoting from within" as seriously restricting their ability to hire older workers. Entry jobs are restricted to low-pay, low-skill posts, such as office boy, sweeper, and junior clerk, and it is expected that persons filling those jobs will be promoted through the ranks in accordance with an industrial career system. For the company this is expected to build a "team spirit" and "better morale," which in turn are expected to lower turnover and step up production. The inflexibility of these promotion systems which bar entry of high-level talent of mature years and conflict with the realities of an aging labor force calls for re-examination. Even when a company does not have a rigid promotion-from-within policy, there is often a feeling that the "family spirit" within the plant cannot be developed in workers hired late in life.

Among the main impedimenta to the hiring of older workers are a host of unverified premises. For example, a recent study in the needle-trades industry disclosed these attitudes: "Old people think they know everything and insist on doing things their own way"; "they're sick too often"; "they can't get along with younger workers"; "old people can't turn out enough work"; "they're going to retire soon on pensions, and we need workers who will stay on the job"; "they can't get around fast enough"; "they can't stand on their feet too long"; "you can't ask old folks to do heavy work."

The validity of many of these attitudes is questionable; all cry out for scientific analysis and verification. But that they compose a very formidable barricade to the older job seeker is unquestioned.

EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES

Recent inquiries have shown that older job seekers are commonly given little consideration in public employment agencies. Experiments in the United States and Canada have indicated that when special attention is given in the form of counseling and extra placement efforts, twice as many older persons obtain employment as under usual procedures. Until the public employment service is financially enabled to provide the necessary personnel to give special service to the 40-plus group, and until federal funds are allocated to the state employment offices on a work-load basis, the older worker will continue to meet his first barrier to a job when he steps into a public employment office.

At the plant, a magnificent array of pseudo-scientific medical and psychological tests authorized by personnel directors who confuse the apparatus of science with science itself adds to the obstacles that lie in wait for the older man or woman who seeks a job.

The medical job-screening examinations, for example, are rarely related to the job that is available. Too, they aim to ferret out disease rather than to assess health status or ability to work in relationship to a specific job. Industrial physicians are primarily doctors, and, as such, are disease hunters, rather than physiological experts capable of determining with precision stamina and and health status. Cardiac specialists, for example, constantly complain of medical generalists in industry who simply are unaware of the work tolerances of a job applicant with a heart impairment. The physician attached to a small plant in particular is likely to be wholly unfamiliar with job demands.

Psychological tests of personality or aptitudes generally have been validated on younger persons—college students for the most part. No one knows whether they are at all valid for older people; in fact there are a number of reasons to doubt their applicability to older persons. They are often unmeaningful to older persons who are not test oriented, as are young people who have been tested and retested from elementary grades through colleges. The tests are often unrelated to the specific job opening. They may impose time-pressure limitations that are not imposed by the job itself. The president of one concern which utilizes psychological tests to screen job applicants informs me that he has come to appreciate the deficiencies of the test when dealing with older persons, and so automatically upgrades scores of the 40-plus applicants! "Evaluation of the work ability of older persons is less simple, is less adapted to routine procedure, and requires more time and consideration," one investigator points out.[15]

When hiring is done at the gate, individual prejudices against older men block their obtaining an equal chance at jobs. When the hiring or screening is done in the personnel office by crew-cut, bow-tie juveniles fresh out of college, the older worker is often at a serious disadvantage. Dr. Irving Lorge and J. Tuckerman of Columbia University Teachers College have conducted research which indicates that even sophisticated individuals such as graduate students of psychology have absorbed prejudices against older job applicants.

One of the major obstacles to the employment of the older worker is the lack of job analysis data which would give management an accurate picture of the demands of each job. These, used in conjunction with physical demands data, could be utilized to place older workers in jobs for which they are suited.

Is it in the very nature of our industrial society that our older workers must be discarded and thwarted in their efforts to obtain work? There is no indication that there is anything inherent in a complex, mass production economy to prevent the hiring of older workers. Some large companies, such as Eastman Kodak and Endicott Johnson, do hire older workers successfully. The main obstacle is lack of data, lack of research, lack of knowledge. Stemming from these are obstacles of attitudes and prejudices. Machines can be adapted to gray-haired men, and gray-haired men can be adapted to machines. But when the foe is not machines but ignorance and prejudice, the task is much more difficult.

BARRIERS BY UNIONS

The barriers imposed by unions to the hiring of older workers are largely of an indirect nature and have not been given thorough, critical analysis.[16] The older worker is one of labor's constituents, and the unions are, it may be assumed, just as likely on the whole to seek to promote his interests as is a California Congressman the interests of a Long Beach taxpayer. Union pressures for old-age insurance, corporate pensions, medical benefits, seniority, and full employment have operated to protect the older person. However, the interest of unions in the older worker varies considerably depending

[15] Arthur J. Noetzel, Jr., *Personnel Administration and the Older Worker* (Cleveland: Welfare Federation of Cleveland, Occupational Planning Committee, Jan. 12, 1951, mimeo.), p. 6.

[16] A preliminary analysis is contained in Albert J. Abrams, "Unions and the Older Worker," in *No Time to Grow Old, op. cit.* note 8 *supra*, pp. 119–44.

on a host of factors such as age of union members, age of union leadership, nature of the industry organized, and stage of unionization achieved.

One of the obstacles to the hiring of older workers is the refusal of many unions to permit workers of declining abilities to be downgraded in pay or position. Sixty per cent of the international unions reporting to Senator Desmond in one survey said they permitted older workers to take lower-rated jobs at lower wage rates, 30 per cent that they refused to allow such downgrading, and 10 per cent that they left the matter up to the locals. All of the internationals reporting, with the lone exception of the International Typographical Union, refused to permit older workers to remain at their same jobs at lower wage rates if unable to do a full day's work. Management reported that even when union rules permitted downgrading, in the actual give and take of collective bargaining, the labor leaders strenuously opposed such moves.

Unions with closed shops or hiring-hall arrangements reported they were able to combat management barriers against hiring older workers quite effectively by controlling the employment referrals. However, where unions utilize work permits and older men seek to switch from one skill to another or from one industry to another, the man of mature years is likely to run into severe obstacles.

Some unions have been loath to open up entry jobs for older persons which would enable them to get a foothold in plants. Older workers coming to a plant for work are sometimes confronted with the regulation that they must start as apprentices to obtain employment, but they are too old to start as apprentices!

Thirty per cent of internationals reporting to Senator Desmond stated that they placed some bar in the way of part-time work for retired union members. The exploitation of homeworkers in the early decades of the twentieth century and fear of the tearing down of wage structures have led to a refusal to reopen the question to permit homebound elderly people to earn a living and to enable many on old-age assistance roles to gain an income.

One of the barriers imposed by unions in the past has been an understandable subordination of interest in the older job seeker to the larger issues of higher wages, union security, and better working conditions. Even today, some union leaders are prone to dismiss the problem of the aged job seeker as an insignificant but inseparable aspect of the issue of full employment. However, many unions are beginning to recognize that their constituency is aging, and that the problems of older job seekers, while akin to those of all job seekers, are often unique, and demand careful consideration and prompt action.

PROGRESS BEING MADE

The barriers that block the employment of older persons are formidable but not insuperable. They are being slowly penetrated.

The National Association of Manufacturers, the National Industrial Conference Board, the American Management Association, and the United States Chamber of Commerce have conducted surveys or educational programs. Both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as well as some independent internationals, have assigned personnel to explore this area and to help promote the hiring of older workers. Foundations are beginning to allocate funds for basic and applied research. At many universities, including Columbia, Cornell, and the universities of California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Chicago, research in this area has started.

Governmental agencies are undertaking research, education, and service functions. The Federal Security Agency's Committee on Aging and Geriatrics, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Women's Bureau are stimulating or engaging in research and education. The United States Bureau of Employment Security has undertaken fundamental research and has issued a manual on counseling older job seekers. Research on capabilities of older workers has been underway for some time at the Gerontological Division of the National Institutes of Health. Significant studies of skill and age are being made from grants made to Cambridge University by the Nuffield Foundation.

Private groups such as the National Committee on Aging have set up special task forces to promote the interests of older workers. The National Planning Association, the Twentieth Century Fund, and other such groups are making contributions to understanding the gray-haired man who comes to the factory gate in search of a job. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television are beginning to do an effective interpretative job of employer and employee problems in this field.

On the state level, the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging has pioneered in development of programs in this field. Massachusetts by virtue of a 1950 law has become a testing ground for the efficacy of the approach of the Fair Employment Practice Committee to banning discrimination against older job seekers. Many other states are turning their attention to this field.

In Schenectady, Syracuse, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Portland (Oregon), Chicago, and Los Angeles, local community groups are seeking to improve the opportunities of older job seekers to obtain equal consideration in employment. Forty-plus clubs are active in obtaining work for older executives.

The goal of all these efforts is to assure an opportunity to obtain work for all older men who want work and can be fitted for work. The mental blocks of attitudes and myths can be smashed. Research and education will overcome the barriers of myth and ignorance that strengthen stereotypes about older workers and block sound personnel procedures. The barriers that stem from lack of technical tools, such as suitable testing apparatus and training facilities, will be overcome as money, time, and personnel become allocated to the task. New experiences in utilizing an aging work force will speed up acceptability of older persons by industry. And since the product—older men and women—is constantly being improved by better education, better medicine, and better living conditions, there is every reason to believe that in the not too distant future when a 40-plus or 60-plus job seeker applies for work his birthdays will not be counted against him.

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Should There Be a Fixed Retirement Age?

SOME MANAGEMENTS SAY YES

By Stanley C. Hope

FOR a half-century Esso Standard Oil Company and its predecessor and affiliated companies have been concerned with the importance of making it possible for career employees to retire with continuing incomes. More than thirty years ago a formal annuity plan was adopted. Two important principles—first, that all employees from top to bottom could acquire annuities under the same terms, and, second, that all employees should be retired not later than a fixed age—were parts of this plan. In the case of male employees retirement was made mandatory at 65; in the case of women, at an earlier age. The original annuity plan was amended from time to time and has been superseded by new plans as conditions changed, but in none of these plans have we departed from these two principles. Our annuity plans have been the subject of constant study, and the advantages of a definite retirement age have, in our opinion, outweighed objections raised to them.

Among the advantages of mandatory retirement at a predetermined age are these:

1. *All employees are treated alike*

From the employee's standpoint, he cannot feel that he is discriminated against or another employee is favored. When retirement may be postponed beyond a fixed age, seldom will the employee, his working associates, his superior, and the retiring authority all agree as to the correctness or justice of a decision. One or more will feel that the employee is being favored or discriminated against, thus weakening employee morale in general and raising a question in the minds of other employees as to the value, acceptability, and fairness of the retirement program.

From the stockholder standpoint, retention of officers or employees in positions of major responsibilities to the detriment of efficient management will not depend upon the influence which a given employee may be able to exert to postpone his retirement.

2. *Effective plans for retirement can be made*

From management's standpoint, replacement tables can be developed with reasonable certainty so that no efficiency in operations is lost becaue of retirement of the employee. Necessary preparation and training can be planned well in advance.

From the employee's standpoint, plans can be made for satisfying activities to commence upon the given date. Programs have been inaugurated by the company to counsel prospective annuitants and help them to prepare for their retirement. Should the employee wish to engage in a professional or business activity he can plan to do so with the knowledge that such activities will in no way affect his annuity from company plans. In fact, the reasonable certainty of the date of retirement permits the individual employee to plan his retirement, including the financial aspects of it, many years in advance.

3. *It provides incentives for capable younger employees*

One of the most important reasons for a retirement system warranting, from the stockholder viewpoint, company participation in financing, is the incentive provided to capable younger employees. Under a mandatory retirement system, they know they have a greater chance for promotion through continued creation of vacancies by retirement. The lack of such a system may impair or even destroy this incentive, with commensurate effect upon morale. This might result in inefficiency and the loss of younger capable employees. Renewed vigor is put into the business when younger capable employees with up-to-date viewpoints are placed in positions of responsibility. Superannuation among executive or supervisory forces can seriously affect efficiency of a company's operations and may seriously impair its success. Superannuation among employees impairs the morale of the employee group.

4. *It is desirable from the employee's personal standpoint*

The employee retires without apologies, excuses, or explanations. Any implication of physical or mental deterioration or incapacity is avoided.

5. *It provides the most practical solution*

Because of the human element, the exercise of discretion cannot always be accurate. Under the best of circumstances, where retirement is discretionary, mistakes will be made in borderline cases. Some employees may in fact meet the desired standard of mental and physical capacity but will be retired earlier than others, while some of mental and physical capacity actually below the desired standard will have their retirements postponed.

While various criticisms have been leveled against the principle of mandatory retirement, those who have studied the problem carefully have found no satisfactory answer to the question as to who is qualified to render a decision in individual cases based on human judgment.

6. *It is desirable from the general economic and social standpoint*

While the requirements of an aging population may dictate a review of the age at which mandatory retirement is to take place, it does not affect the basic soundness of mandatory retirement. Other advantages to the economy and to society in general, which are most likely to develop under mandatory retirement, cannot be ignored. There are many activities and positions in the business, economic, and political communities which need doing and filling, but which now receive only part-time or even no attention. Mature, experienced people who have not exhausted their mental and physical capacities in their career employment and who are not required, because of monetary considerations, to continue in their usual lifetime activity, can find satisfying work in these activities, making valuable contributions to the social, economic, and political development of the communities in which they live or to which they may retire. If retirement is postponed until there is an actual deterioration of mental or physical capacity, no such contribution can be made.

. . . . .

When all is said and done, even with its limitations, the mandatory retirement rule provides the most practical solution to the problem. It is a reasonable tool necessary to give adequate assurance of the continuing efficiency of the working organzation. While other plans administered on a discretionary basis may continue in service some still efficient workers, they are more likely to retain the inefficient in employment, thus ultimately developing a full-salary "pension roll" more costly to the company in dollars and more detrimental to

the company's interest because of loss of effective operations. Those who are more able and efficient will have the initiative and foresight to plan their affairs looking toward their normal retirement dates, and thus will leave the company's service no matter what retirement rule is followed.

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SOME MANAGEMENTS PREFER FLEXIBILITY

By CRAIG P. COCHRANE

NOT many years ago, planned retirement from active work was a purely academic consideration. The individual's struggle to make a living normally continued until death or disability wrote an end to his working life. Not until industrialization multiplied individual productivity did society face the dual problem: should a man retire before the disabilities of old age force him to, and, if so, at what age should he retire?

We are, of course, fortunate in having this problem of retirement. Whatever disagreement there may be over the answers, the very fact that retirement has become a new opportunity for men is further evidence of our economic progress, of our ability to produce more while still increasing our leisure time. Retirement is a problem which people in many other lands would assuredly welcome.

One of the questions concerning retirement which sometimes arises is that of a "fixed retirement age"—that is, a definite and specified age at which the individual is compelled to retire irrespective of the circumstances. I have been asked to present in this article some arguments, as I see them, against a fixed retirement age. I have been glad to do this because I believe that, from the standpoint of both the individual and the company he works for, there are a number of valid arguments against it. It should be understood, however, that these arguments are not intended to apply to a "normal retirement age." Here, an entirely different concept is involved and I shall want to touch briefly on this a little later. Furthermore, my comments are based on the assumption that a reasonable retirement income is available. I am not attempting to deal with the question of the individual's economic situation.

NEED FOR FLEXIBLE RETIREMENT POLICIES

Experience seems to show a need for flexibility in all formal industrial relations policies and procedures. Whether we are dealing with wage policies, insurance plans, a communications program, provisions for assisting the individual's development, or other phases of the industrial relations program, it is important to avoid procedural strait jackets. Unless we do, occasions will arise when the administration of the program may harm rather than benefit those affected. A retirement plan with a compulsory retirement age lacks this flexibility.

We can readily think of situations wherein a fixed retirement age would work to the disadvantage of individuals, groups, or even society as a whole. For example, changes in general economic conditions and in the country's manpower situation may call for great flexibility in retirement policies. When defense or wartime production goals have demanded every last reserve of available manpower, it has been difficult to justify the forced retirement of an able person at an arbitrarily established retirement age. On the other hand, in periods of reduced business activity, the forced retirement of a man—say at age 65—may be socially and economically sound. Certainly, if a choice must be made for layoff between a man without family responsibilities who can retire on an assured income of social security and company pension payments as against a younger man with growing family and no assurance of continuing income, I believe the choice is an obvious one.

Flexibility also works to the advantage of the individual, because a better adjustment to retirement may result if some leeway can be permitted. I think, however, that this consideration grows less important as time goes on. Retirement is becoming a normal and accepted thing, and an increasing percentage of employed people are preparing for, and even looking expectantly to, the normal time for retirement. This, certainly, is far better than an attitude of being forced into retirement.

From industry's point of view, it seems to me, flexible retirement policies are desirable because all decisions with respect to retirement bear on industry's responsibilities to many different individuals and groups. The wishes and best interests of the older worker are not alone involved. The opportunities and aspirations of the younger people in industry must also be considered. Furthermore, retirement policies should be socially valid because industry must always take account of the general public interest. And, finally, a company must keep in mind its own position in a competitive economy and its continuing ability to provide steady employment at fair rates of pay.

When we have in mind these many—and often conflicting—interests, I think we must conclude that retirement policies should be flexible enough to provide an acceptable degree of fairness to each of the individuals or groups affected. I do not believe a policy calling for compulsory retirement at a specified age will permit this in many situations.

In the last analysis, the establishing of a fixed retirement age implies that everyone reaching a given age automatically becomes incapable of further active employment. We know that this is not true. The physical and mental abilities and the general health of people vary greatly at any given age. Equally important, the requirements of different jobs make different demands on the individual. Some jobs require little more than the maintenance of good physical condition. Others have much broader requirements. Executive positions, for example, necessitate an alert mind, initiative, and a willingness to explore new fields. When we take account of both these variables—the differences in people and the differences in job requirements—we can appreciate the difficulty of trying to establish general and inflexible retirement procedures which will fit all cases.

NORMAL VERSUS FIXED RETIREMENT AGE

Perhaps some of the situations I have referred to above will point up the difficulties in the operation of a fixed retirement age. At the same time, I believe we must recognize the need for a stated age which will serve as a "normal retirement age." Unless we have

a specified normal retirement age, neither the individual nor the company can work in a logical way for the successful retirement of the older worker. Retirement takes preparation and planning, and the individual's retirement program needs a specific goal—a specific time when he will expect to alter his way of life according to plan. A specified retirement age offers both the incentive and the basis for such planning and preparation.

The company also must work on the assumption that its people will retire around a certain age even though they may not always do so. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible to plan effectively for future promotions and personnel changes. Retirement from supervisory and other management positions according to plan is especially important because the general health of a company depends to a large extent on the enthusiasm, resourcefulness, and energy of the men in administrative positions. Progression up the management line, made possible by a regular program of executive retirements, also contributes much to the morale and adds to the incentives of the entire management line.

The need for a normal retirement age is recognized in our social security laws and in company pension plans. Without it, formal retirement programs, either of a statutory or voluntary kind, could not be administered in a practical way.

I believe the value of a stated or normal retirement age is now widely recognized. But, there is not complete agreement on this. There are those who hold that continued employment at his regular occupation in a person's later years is the goal to be worked for. I wonder if there is not a contradiction in this point of view which deserves our attention. Within the past forty years, working hours have been reduced from 60 to 65 hours a week to the now widely accepted 40-hour week This striking reduction in working hours has given Americans a freedom and leisure unequaled in history. It has given us an opportunity to enrich our lives—though an opportunity, to be sure, which is not always used to full advantage. While we are proud of our progress in reducing the work *week*, it does seem to me that we sometimes overlook the benefits we have also gained by reducing the work *years*. Yet the potential benefits to the individual and to society may be even greater in the latter case.

The conflicting points of view we find here may arise from different conceptions of what retirement means and what it is or should be.

MEANING OF RETIREMENT

If retirement were to be accepted as a final period of uselessness and dependency on others, then it would seem that the older person should be continued as long as possible at his regular job or some special job set up for him by his employer. But this conception of retirement is, I think, a faulty one. If retirement in fact proves to be a barren and unproductive interlude between regular employment and death, it is only because society and the individual have failed to utilize the rich possibilities of planned retirement. As I see it, retirement is a time for taking up new and useful activities adapted to the older person's capabilities—activities that do not demand his participation beyond voluntary limits. True, adequate preparation must be made for this kind of retirement. The individual must develop his interests and resources over the years against the day when he is free to leave regular employment.

When all is said and done, where will the older person find self-realization and carry on with a full measure of self-respect in these later years? Will it be in carrying on and meeting as best he can the demands of regular employment? Or is it not more likely to be found where a person is free to apply his efforts and talents wherever he wishes—either to normal activities at a reduced pace or to entirely new and appealing pursuits which may never before have been within his reach?

By continuing our present efforts to provide financial security for the later years and, in addition, by seeking out new and worthier goals for the older person, we should be able to make better use of the precious time which industrial efficiency has given us. If this comes about, I believe retirement will be regarded with anticipation. The problems of retirement, including the question of a fixed retirement age, will have largely disappeared.

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ORGANIZED LABOR SAYS NO

By SOLOMON BARKIN

THE practice of establishing compulsory fixed retirement ages flows from pension programs in private industry and the drive to avoid employing older, less effective persons. Pension programs were originally designed particularly for executive personnel to encourage their retirement. Their orderly exit would make way for new talent, points of view, and experience. New persons could be more profitable and valuable. The more useful older persons could be re-employed as consultants or on other part-time and occasional services with the company.

The above practice has been carried over, with undesirable results, to the general mass of employees. The transition was easy, as the first pension programs required long service and predominated in such industries as railroads, utilities, and other service industries. The high continuous service requirements weeded out a large proportion of potential beneficiaries. Unions were not there to force a careful consideration of the merits of this practice.

FIXED RETIREMENT POLICIES INAPPROPRIATE FOR INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

The underlying attitudes which produced the policy of compulsory fixed retirement ages are wholly inappropriate for industrial workers. First, the worker is not anxious to retire. He has adapted himself to industrial employment. The maintenance of self-support and personal independence rate high in his scale of values. He prefers not to be dependent. His life pattern has always included the regular performance of work. It has provided him with a means for productive participation in the community. Most of his vital associations have been developed around his employment.

Unions have strengthened this experience. Many individuals have devoted time to union activities which offered them personal satisfactions and opportunities which no other interest had previously provided them. To continue to fulfill these interests, the worker must retain his job. His most crea-

tive experience has been his work and he prefers not to interrupt it. Forced retirement is a traumatic rupture in his life pattern. Counseling and preparation for retirement will not aid in the adjustment of most of those who now attain old age. Quick deterioration of personal and physical well-being is not uncommon among retired or unemployed workers.

Second, most workers cannot afford to retire. At best, the payments received in pensions or retirement benefits are a mere pittance. Those who received $100 to $125 per month could not easily subsist with these funds. The inadequacies have been disclosed by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, which reports that the net cost of services in October 1950 to maintain an aged couple at a modest living level was $1,700 to $1,800 a year. The result is that great numbers of aged persons seek employment and prefer it to retirement. The huge numbers who return to employment during periods of full employment is abundant illustration of this fact. The discrepancy between benefits and needs becomes greater in a period of rising prices, and the desire to remain in employment is then strengthened. The benefits now generally received are only sufficient to induce the physically exhausted and those unable to work to choose the lesser of the evils and live less adequately and less strenuously.

JOB ADAPTATION FOR OLDER WORKERS

Third, there are numerous jobs in industry for older persons, and many others can be made fully available. There is abundant evidence in support of this conclusion in the experience during periods of high employment. The proportion of older persons in the labor market and the ratio of employment then rise markedly. The standards of employability are changed to allow for the hiring of older persons. Placement is then more careful so that younger persons are shifted to jobs for which they are fitted, and jobs are reserved for older persons for which they are adapted. The jobs in industry are diverse and there are many at which older persons can be as productive as any other group of employees.

Moreover, jobs must be redesigned to allow for the increased employment of older persons. Job patterns are flexible and can generally be arranged to meet the characteristics of the persons in the labor market. As we learn about the productive capacities of the older age groups, more jobs must be designed to allow for their employment.[1] The increased proportion of older persons in our population and the diversion of millions of young persons to military pursuits demand that this task be undertaken immediately.

Much can be done to increase the workers' capacity for longer and more effective employment. Physical care and rehabilitation are necessary. In some instances psychological treatment and guidance are called for. Vocational counseling and retraining can be helpful. In this connection it must be underscored that the techniques for training older persons are essentially different from those for younger workers.

Fourth, the social and economic costs of retirement are so huge that we must consider means of extending employment opportunities. Millions of men and varying proportions of our national products are being devoted to the production of military goods and the increased security of the democratic world. By increasing our work force,

[1] Solomon Barkin, *The Older Worker in Industry* (New York: J. B. Lyon Co., 1933), pp. 131, 318-25, and 409-23; and A. T. Welford, *Skill and Age—An Experimental Approach* (published for the Trustees of the Nuffield Foundation, London: Goeffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 145.

the burden of carrying these tasks will be eased for each one of us. The larger number of workers increases output and relieves the economy of the cost of maintaining unproductive persons. We are seeking to recruit women, the handicapped, and other persons who are not in the labor market. It is essential that we enlist all older persons who can be brought in. Jobs must be adapted to them.

UNION POLICY ON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT

The general trade-union policy has been to resist compulsory fixed retirement ages. In a number of instances unions have challenged these policies and prevented their application by strikes. Trade unions have been insistent upon the worker's right to a job while he is qualified and able to do the job. The pension program should not be designed to force retirement, but to facilitate the retirement of those desirous of it, who have found employment burdensome. Unions have been guided by the principle that, insofar as possible, jobs should be adjusted and workers transferred to other employments if they are not able to maintain themselves productively on their own jobs. Moreover, it is common in many industries for the workers to carry along older persons whose productivity has been faltering. Such aid is an expression of the common concern for the security of all persons on the job.[2]

Managements which have tried to maintain or introduce compulsory retirement policies have been faced with frequent union efforts to break down the practice. The legality of such action has been challenged where the contract did not specifically provide it and the action conflicted with seniority rules. Unions have contested such retirements by considering them as discharges and have sought reversal of such decisions in arbitration. Where companies have been insistent, unions have arranged for flexible retirement age provisions wherein employees may voluntarily retire at one age, usually 65 years or less. The company retains the right to petition for compulsory retirement at a slightly higher age. Compulsory retirement is set above this level with the right of the employee to petition for an exemption. Trade unions have been opposed to compulsory fixed retirement age policies no matter how high they are placed, where there are no opportunities for exemptions to be granted at the employee's request.

On the other hand, there have been instances where unions have recognized the propriety of more abundant retirements among the aged in plants. Such attitudes have been particularly common in industries or employments which have been contracting either because of their decline or because of far-reaching technological changes. In such instances it has been observed that the retirement of the older persons would allow for more adequate employment of the middle-aged persons in the market. But unions have not fostered compulsory retirement even when they have recognized that such withdrawals may be desirable for the group as a whole. They have also felt keenly about the right of the individual to determine his needs for continued employment up to the point of not handicapping the economic well-being of the enterprise.

Individual business concerns have proposed that personal retirements should be reviewed by joint committees of unions and employers. Such committees can deal effectively with ob-

[2] Solomon Barkin, "Union Policies and the Older Workers," in *The Aged and Society* (Industrial Relations Research Association, 1950), pp. 168-82.

vious cases of incapacity. The usual practice is to provide the committee with production and medical reports. But doctors tend to use absolute standards of capacity. While they may be prepared to recognize real abnormalities, they are unable to measure workers' capacity to perform various occupational tasks. Not only do they lack measures, but they have no terminology for itemizing these capacities or appraising the range of capacity possessed by a worker. At best, they will give loose personal judgments. Nor are records of production adequate, since employees may be better suited to other jobs, and the task is that of finding those for which they are better adapted. There are no scientific criteria for determining the propriety of retiring workers, except in extreme cases. The union must take the position that the personal preference of the worker should be binding. Management will usually seek to effect the retirement of those it believes are less productive, unless its policy dictates the more generous treatment.

SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF INDUSTRY

Those who argue for compulsory fixed retirement ages on the basis of simplicity of administration or necessity of granting a priority to the interests of the enterprise are insensitive to the social responsibilities of industry. Management is an agent of the enterprise which society has allowed to utilize the community's natural and human resources effectively in a socially approved manner. Management must meet the test of employing all persons who are willing to work when it can thereby increase our national well-being and the satisfaction of the individuals who make up our society. The means of achieving this end lie within management's hands through the redesign of jobs and the rehabilitation of older workers.

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THE FARMERS' VIEWPOINT

By MARSHALL HARRIS [3]

THERE appears to be no composite attitude of farm people, so far as I have been able to discover, toward a fixed retirement age for themselves. The widely varying economic status and social position of farmers make it impossible to arrive at an average or a central tendency. The typical farm owner has accumulated more worldly goods than the average tenant of the same age, although both are independent entrepreneurs. As a consequence, the owner's economic retirement problem is much less. Furthermore, he has reached a highly coveted goal—farm home ownership—whereas the tenant is landless. Thus, the owner's psychological attachment to the land and to farming is greater than the tenant's.

[3] The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics or the Department of Agriculture.

Considering only these two items, both the owner and the tenant are in a paradoxical position. The owner may be economically able to retire, but he is not psychologically prepared to do so. The reverse is true of the tenant. Since the problems facing the typical owner and tenant are different, any retirement plans and programs, including private and voluntary ones, must be tailor-made to meet the needs of each group.

Looking at the retirement problems of farm laborers, we must distinguish between the year-round worker and the migrant laborer, although they have many characteristics in common. Neither is as deeply rooted in the land as are farm owners. Their savings, if any, are notoriously inadequate. Both migrant and year-round laborers are accustomed to working for others. Yet there are significant differences. The year-round worker is established in the community. The community, if not the employer, has a feeling of responsibility for him—it is ready to furnish him odd jobs, little services, and petty assistance to help out. On the other hand, the migrant laborer has no community ties; no one feels responsible for him; and often he finds it difficult to supplement retirement income.

A tentative generalization and a hypothesis can be presented at this point for consideration. (1) The economic problems of retirement at a fixed age diminish, while the psychological problems increase, as farm people attain higher rungs on the so-called agricultural ladder. (2) If retirement plans and programs are adapted to the distinctive needs of each farm group, the benefits of retirement will be maximized and costs will be minimized. We need to consider more fully farmer economic and psychological problems to determine if the generalization is based on facts and if the hypothesis is worthy of testing.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

For farmers who are forced to retire or who want to retire, the largest single problem is an economic one. Having assurance that income will be available until the end of life is part and parcel of this complex. This is shown clearly in an Illinois study.[4] The magnitude of the economic problem increases when the price level rises rapidly, as during the past two decades, and when rising prices are coupled to an ever improving level of living. These two factors have tended, over recent years, to make retirement with a fixed income rather uninviting, whether such income be derived from savings, pensions, or public assistance.

Compulsory retirement at an arbitrarily selected age would deprive many owners, most tenants, and practically all laborers of the food, housing, and clothing that minimum standards would indicate as acceptable. If not physically disabled, they could supplement their retirement income with gardens and subsistence livestock. Some could do odd jobs in the community to add to their income. But few of them are interested in public assistance that would require one "to sign papers against" his house, as a retired man in Pennsylvania put it. Retirements can be made most effective by blending private self-help and public old-age assistance.

There is another economic aspect to the matter of retirement at a fixed age. It would entail a large, needless, money cost to society; for numerous farmers at age 65 still have many hours, properly rationed, of physical labor to con-

[4] Cleo Fitzsimmons, *Provisions for Security Made by a Number of Farm Families in Three Areas of Illinois*, Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 537, Urbana, 1950.

tribute. And, more important, there would be an uneconomic dissipation of much knowledge gained through years of experience, if farm operators had to retire at a given age.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Keeping occupied, fighting idleness, is a problem of considerable magnitude for many farmers when they retire, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. The problem of keeping occupied for a person who has maintained an active physical life is largely a matter of being physically busy at something that is needed, something that counts. This is difficult for a retired person who has worked hard all his life at farming, giving little thought to the development of a time-consuming avocation.

A Pennsylvania study [5] shows that physical disability causes much more retirement than all other reasons—physical disability 70 per cent, voluntary retirement 12 per cent, and all other causes 18 per cent. When retirement is thus involuntary, the matter of keeping occupied is greatly aggravated.

Farmers, generally, in my observation, do not understand why anyone should want to retire voluntarily; they are amazed that a person should want to be unproductive. This viewpoint is strongly undergirded with long tradition. Farmers vie with neighbors to see who can produce the most. They pride themselves in providing food and fiber for an ever increasing proportion of the population. Although the farm may be one of the few places where the innerspring or air foam mattress has not completely replaced the feather bed, farmer psychology frowns upon "featherbedding" as practiced in some urban industries. The rural mind cannot sanction permanently any means employed to limit the output of a day's labor.

RETIRE OR RETREAT

The problem of retirement of farm owners is traditionally throught of as a problem for mother and father. However, what mother and father do after they become 65 or so is of much concern to the younger people. With the disappearance of free land and the declining possibility of buying a farm, the young couple have a problem in getting started in farming before they become old. Retirement plans of family farmers determine quite specifically what the young people can do. Can family arrangements be worked out whereby the objectives of both couples can be attained?

An ever increasing number of farm families appear to think so. Numerous sons are being introduced to farming via 4-H Club and Future Farmers of America projects. They gain experience and accumulate capital while working with father. At the proper time, when dad is wanting to take it easy and son is rearing to go, a father-son agreement is made for joint operation of the farm. Later, without divesting himself of his old-age security, the father makes arrangements for the son to take over full operation of the farm with the assurance that he will become owner of the farm when his parents die.[6]

The father does not *retire* from the farm, rather he *retreats* from active management and hard work. He remains on the farm, gets income from it, works when and as it suits him, enjoys the things to which he is accustomed, and lives in happiness and security at peace with the world. Lucky indeed are a rapidly increasing number of farm owners who can retreat yet not retire. Obviously, very few tenants and practically no laborers have been able to work out arrangements whereby they can retreat from farming in this way.

[5] A'Delbert P. Samson and William G. Mather, *Personal and Social Adjustments of 49 Retired Rural Men*, Pennsylvania Agricultural Experiment Station Progress Report 19, State College, 1950.

[6] Marshall Harris, "A New Agricultural Ladder," XXVI *Land Economics*, 258, Aug. 1950.

CHANGING ATTITUDE

A generation ago, many well-to-do farmers looked forward to the day when they could retire and move to town. But today, as a result of modern improvements, the typical farmer with means plans to spend his last years on the soil that he knows so well and in the house where his children played. A New York study indicates that about seven out of eight farmers planned to live on the farm after "retirement" and continue to work.[7]

Another urban attitude that appears to be spreading in rural areas is the decreasing feeling of responsibility for the old folks on the part of the children. In an earlier generation or so, the young people saw to it that mother and father were adequately taken care of during their declining years. Today the mantle of filial responsibility seems to rest somewhat more lightly upon farm youth. This is not by way of lamenting the passing of a custom, but to point out one of the problems of present-day retirement.

This trend is being accelerated by a lengthening life expectancy and a diminishing size of farm families. These trends have increased by leaps and bounds the magnitude of the burden of parental care that falls on rural children. In former years the farm family was made up of six to ten children, and many a mother and father passed on soon after normal aging began to sap their vitality. Today, with smaller families and longer life, three or four children would have to provide for mother and father for many years of low physical vigor.

[7] T. N. Hurd, *Old Age Plans and Programs of Farmers*, Cornell University Department of Agricultural Economics, A.E. 698, Ithaca, 1949.

FLEXIBILITY NEEDED IN RETIREMENT PROGRAM

Farmers do not age at the same rate nor do they look with favor upon retirement while still able to do productive work; retirement at a fixed age is not advisable. The economic and psychological problems of retirement are different for owners, tenants, and laborers; as a consequence, retirement plans, whether private or public, voluntary or involuntary, should be tailor-made to suit the needs of each group. Barring severe physical disabilities, farmers should retreat rather than retire from farming. Many farm owners are doing this now, but it is a difficult accomplishment for tenants and laborers. Any retirement program must be kept flexible to meet the changing attitudes of farmers resulting particularly from apparent lessening of family responsibilities, decreasing size of family, and increasing life expectancy.

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Creative Activities of Older People

By Howard Wheeler

I HAVE been asked to contribute to this survey a layman's view relative to creative activities of older people. An endeavor to comply has been based upon an assumption that by "creative activities" is meant exercise of the native creative capacities of the individual in making his full contribution to society throughout the entire course of his life. To find and apply measures that will ensure the maximum of freedom in the exercise of creative capacity, therefore, seems to me to be the crux of this aspect of problems connected with aging.

Now a lay adventurer into waters largely uncharted must be wary about crossing the bows of explorers more scientifically equipped. This observation comes out of a feeling that when a writer enters upon an assignment in an environment new in his experience, it is highly desirable that he establish at once a basis of understanding with the reader.

A reporter in the field of popular journalism ordinarily has little opportunity to familiarize himself with the methods and the tools of scientific investigation. He relies mostly upon seeing, hearing, and reading as much as he can, understanding as much of it as he can, and telling about it as accurately and clearly as he can. When it comes to a consideration of the creative activities of human beings in the later years, therefore, this reporter would seem to have little choice but to continue to make these his chief reliance. Included in the aggregate can be some fortuitous experience as a participant in the First National Conference on Aging, held in Washington, D. C., in August 1950. Here was opportunity not only to broaden horizon by watching the play of specially qualified minds in dealing with the various aspects of a national problem, but to observe at close range the approach, attack, and techniques of scientific research. This, and a deal of reading since, have more than ever persuaded a lay investigator that in undertaking an exploratory venture into the terrain of the gerontologist he would better stick to tools comfortably suited, through long use, to his hand.

Some Lay Concepts

As well worn as any of these, perhaps, is one fashioned of necessity for drawing from the pigeonholes of experience those things needed for servicing a specific need. Use this as I will in the present need, I find myself arriving always at three rather well-defined conclusions: first, that creative activity is creative imagination at the point of self-expression; second, that creative imagination, chronologically, is age-free; and third, that while the creative imagination may decline in liveliness in the later years of life, the value of its product may steadily increase, even right up to the life experience identified as death.

To find Science inclined to give the nod to conclusions such as these is to give edge to zest in a reporter's quest for the facts about man and his years. Gerontology is a new science, geriatrics a new profession. The words themselves are still strangers on the tongue of the uninitiate. Gerontologists and geriatricians who took part in the Conference on Aging were as one in their

emphasis on the need for a tremendous amount of research before the sciences can give anything approaching final answers to a myriad of questions that have to do with the aging of the individual and the aging of a population. One of the conclusions reached by a conference group made up of specialists in the van of investigation, the section on Research, was this:

> There is no intelligence test in existence which samples all or even most of the mental abilities known to psychology. Creative thinking, for example, usually is not measured by our tests. . . . Equally important it is to promote research aimed to delay or fully prevent the loss of mental abilities. If we couple added years of life with undiminished mental vigor, who can say what wonders will emerge from our laboratories, or what songs our poets will sing?

A conclusion of another group of the same conference, the section on Population Changes and Economic Implications, gave further reassurance:

> "Aged" or "old" are relative terms. . . . There is no single criterion or classification by which an individual or class may be unequivocally designated as aged or old.

An ageless faculty

Here and elsewhere in the deliberations of men and women from many regions and diverse callings, a newspaperman gathered that comfortable feeling of being safely on course. He had watched human actions and reactions, including his own, in earthquake, conflagration, pestilence, social upheaval, and war, as well as in more normal settings. He had watched genius at work, and had bought some of its product for its value in the humdrum business of attracting readers, building circulation, increasing advertising at increasing rates, and so holding place in an editor's chair. Ideas had been his stock in trade—ideas and the promotion of them. He had experienced occupational victories and defeats; good times and hard times; the elation of fruition and the bitterness of frustration—including a rather long stretch during which he had no eyes to see with, and so, perforce, had learned not a little about the baleful work of destructive imagination as well as about both the prophylactic and therapeutic power of the creative imagination. Out of it all had come no hint that the number of times the earth makes its circuit of the sun in the course of a lifetime has aught to do either with the actuality of the creative faculty or with the individual's right and ability to channel it for his own and others' good.

Thus it was that a lay investigator, without much awareness of it, had been more or less well conditioned for an enlivening experience in conference participation in a field to which theretofore he had given scant thought, and for a sharp new interest in the reading and listening which were to follow. The reading, by a happy circumstance, was to include a close study of the entire manuscript of the group accounts of the conference discussions and the reaching of conclusions. Going on from there has been something like following the blaze marks of a newly broken trail. Explorers out ahead have been finding scientific support for a lay observer's impression: that the human faculty which finds its expression in creative activity is time-immune.

The "Curve" of Contribution

If this should turn out to be the truth about the faculty itself, what of the quantity and quality of its expression? Here it is clearly part of a reporter's job to take into full account the work of those who have sought in the history of great achievement a relationship of chronological age to creative contribution.

H. C. Lehman's studies of the creative impulse, in *Scientific Monthly* and elsewhere, Dorland's analysis[1] of age averages at which four hundred eminent persons produced their masterpieces—such as these make memory-provoking reading. It seems out of line with experience, somehow, that writers of best books and military leaders should be grouped together as reaching their peaks in the middle 40's; that medical men should be classified with certain types of musical composers as at their zenith between 35 and 39; that philosophers should be bracketed with men of affairs as not reaching full creative stature until the late 50's.

Out of clear-cut recollection come items of individual performance by the outstanding which do not seem to check. It is quite easy to thumb through memory records of high-level contribution, of friendships or close contacts with men and women distinguished in creative work, of opportunities to be at the scene of action when certain of the world's great were transforming ideas into creative action—Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau; Pershing, Joffre, Foch; Walter Hines Page, Brand Whitlock, Hull; Steffens, Brandeis, Norman Hapgood; Lillien Martin, Ida Tarbell, Helen Keller; E. W. Scripps, William Allen White, Fremont Older; Oliver Herford, George Bellows, Gordon Grant; Frederick Palmer, Sir Philip Gibbs, the Irwins; John Drew, Otis Skinner, the Barrymores. Names bring back personalities—the detail of outstanding performance; and nowhere, or so it seems, an age-performance pattern.

Surely, one thinks, Science will find ways by which to identify and evaluate factors other than chronological age which can enter in when creative activity shows a downward curve in the later years. Immediately, and again out of personal experience and observation, several such factors suggest themselves. Prominent among them are economic insecurity; lowered living levels; anxiety; age barriers to gainful employment; frustration; loneliness; a sense of being "out of it"; deeply grooved social attitudes running all the way from indifference as regards the aged and aging to contempt and outright antagonism; defensive reactions of older people themselves, causing emotional blocks to creative expression.

Again the lay investigator comes upon evidence that scientific method has been out ahead of him, and has not been overlooking factors such as these. For example, he finds Lawton making a point of Lehman's general conclusion that individuals may think creatively and make invaluable contributions at practically every age level beyond early youth; that it is merely a question of when a gifted person produces either his masterpiece or the greatest quantity of high-quality performance.[2] And this from Miles:

> The aging person quite naturally does not want to admit that the total psychological organism, the personality, is changing in an unfavorable way. Nor should he, because until the true course of adult personality development is plotted in detail with as full regard for positive as for negative aspects, the available picture, although correct as far as it goes, may be fundamentally misleading. . . . The peak values are interesting and significant, but they do not tell the whole story. . . . The pertinent conclusion, for average as well as for specially gifted people, is that good work is not limited by life age.[3]

[1] W. A. N. Dorland, *The Age of Mental Virility*, New York: Century Co., 1908.

[2] George Lawton, "Aging Mental Abilities and Their Preservation," in *New Goals for Old Age* (George Lawton, Ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 25.

[3] Walter R. Miles and Catherine C. Miles, "Mental Changes With Normal Aging," in *Geriatric Medicine* (Edward J. Stieglitz, Ed. Second edition, Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1949), p. 91.

Senescence but not senility

Says Gumpert,

> Senescence has to be, and there will be more and more of it to the degree in which people stop dying prematurely from disease. Senility need not be, and its presence will in the future be evidence of individual or of social neglect. . . . We have scores of magnificent examples that life is not ended at "threescore and ten" or at the point where our social security laws put an end to it. . . . The "master work," the climax of creative life, is often produced in what we consider old age. . . . Most of the great old men . . . were leaders and fighters. Their brains could not deteriorate because they used them hourly in creative activity.[4]

Only historic exceptions in the operation of a rule, these "magnificent examples"? Perhaps. Yet almost as this is being written, Dr. Gumpert moves out of the historic to report a trip abroad, during which he visited a number of distinguished persons of advanced age who still lead active and useful lives. The youngest was 77. In concluding an account of his adventures, he says:

> I wonder whether life as a whole will not be richer and happier for all of us once we start discovering the unknown riches of old age, now hidden under old age's miseries. . . . We sometimes call an old man's dotage "second childhood." I would suggest there is often, instead, a second prime of life which we should discover and explore and cherish.[5]

Will scientific research one day turn suggestion into a solid fact? Should the normal curve of creative contribution show twin peaks, rather than a single one? Certainly there is much in the experience of the later years to encourage a layman's belief that the physician and others of like or similar mind are on the trail to something close to the core of the aging problem.

THE CREATIVE POTENTIAL

As a nation more or less engrossed in mobilizing our resources for defense, we have fallen into a way of using the word "manpower" as though it were possible to compute the sum total of it from a unit of it. Yet in the run of the news, as well as in the run of a day's work, there is plenty to indicate the importance of the mental factor as an element of manpower. It asserts its authority while defying scale and slide rule. This, as the senescent well knows, becomes especially apparent as the years pile up. (I use the term "senescent," of course, in the sense of a normal, natural, healthy moving into the older years, not with the derogatory connotation which much thoughtless usage has given it.) Indeed, there can be times when the mental factor becomes the determinant of creative endeavor. So it can be like light in the clearing when a disheartened traveler through the older years comes upon evidence that experts are alert to this, and on the job; evidence, for instance, such as this from a prominent urologist:

> The physical let-down with senescence is largely mental. Frustration, discouragement, unhappiness and fear are the hazards that lead to loss of appetite, insomnia, apathy, and then the physical break-up. . . . The ounce of prevention must come from within. . . . A plan is needed which will make useful and active the later years of life.[6]

[4] Martin Gumpert, *The Anatomy of Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951), pp. 188, 190.

[5] Martin Gumpert, "A Second Prime of Life—After 70," *New York Times Magazine*, July 8, 1951, p. 14.

[6] Frank Hinman, "The Story of Old Age," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1947), pp. 105, 106.

Fruitage of imagination

What is the creative imagination? Where does it come from? Reading, a lay inquirer gathers that definitions and explanations, ancient, modern, and current, run the whole gamut from the furthermost in materialism to the absolute in philosophy.

As an American, it may occur to him that in the American way of life which he enjoys there is much whose source is intangible—much which stems directly from the creative thinking of somebody. Evidences of the actuality and the potency of the creative imagination have become commonplaces in his experience. When he looks back, it may seem close to incredible that within the span of his own life he should have seen the first telephone and the first motor-driven vehicle to appear in his home town; should have witnessed the advent of the flying machine, the motion picture, radio, television, and a new era brought in through the interplay of human imagination and ingenuity in releasing, harnessing, and turning to use the awe-inspiring energy of that which can neither be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or smelled. As hard to realize, almost, is that it was only as far back as 1828 that the school board of Lancaster, Ohio should have written to a debating society of young men:

> You are welcome to the use of the school house to debate all proper questions in, but such things as railroads and telegraphs are impossible and rank infidelity. There is nothing in the word of God about them. If God had designed that His intelligent creatures should travel at the frightful speed of fifteen miles an hour, He would clearly have foretold through His holy prophets. It is a device of Satan to lead immortal souls down to hell.

What, comes the irreverent thought, would the good men have said of an idea that one of those creatures might eat a day's breakfast in the nation's capital and the evening meal on the Pacific Coast? Here imagination falters.

To accept the creative faculty as an actuality is one thing. To think of the potential of its contribution is something else. It was only last evening that an aging Austrian, Haydn, reached across sea, land, and a century and a half, to give to a troubled and tired American, of about his own age, a full hour of complete relaxation; a blessed release from the bombardments of a world in conflict; an hour of life-renewing vacation in a world of serenity, beauty, master harmony. To how many millions of others, this free gift? To how many in the years past? To how many in the years, or centuries, to come?

Release of creative capacity

Lawton says:

> It is fear of aging, rather than the aging process itself, which often causes a functional loss in the mental realm, just as it does in the physical. Anticipating the loss of efficiency, we hasten the arrival of what we expect. If the confidence in one's ability is essential at earlier life periods, it is most important during senescence. . . . There are unsuspected potentialities in almost everyone.[7]

If this is true—and experience in aging certainly tends to confirm it—then the obvious thing to do is to get rid of the smothering overlay of fear and so reveal and release the creative potential of older people. How to do it would seem to be a difficult problem. But surely not, once we accept, as essential of our continuing security and well-being as a nation, a change in social attitudes from those of indifference toward our aging, and worse, to that of the prospector—the expectancy of rich discovery. For appreciation of his worth is meat and drink to the fear-ridden senescent. Low evaluation, or none at all, is the father and mother of most of the anxieties which obscure the vein of his capabilities.

To survey; to dig; to analyze; to appraise and reappraise; to discard or refashion old tools; to invent and try out new ones; to do anything and everything that American ingenuity can devise to uncover and identify, community by community, individual by individual, the precious deposit of creative capacity; to open opportunity for its self-expression, and so to utilize —this, if appearances give true promise, is going to be the way.

A long and tedious process? Or one not distinct and isolated, but all one with the whole American process of growth? Only relatively, the thought comes, have we been a long time at work on the structure of a new, free society in the New World. We are still a young nation. As we are confronted by the fact of an aging population, perhaps it would be for the better to see ourselves as only accepting in stride the challenge of a new problem encountered in our building. Looking back, it does seem that that has been the way with us—always something new to surmount as we have moved to higher and higher ground, closer and closer to realization of the American ideal. Clearly, discrimination against the older members of our national family can be no part of that ideal. So we try new ways for meeting new situations, and hold course.

Indifference turns to interest

Gerontology is drawing prospectors from all the sciences. The list is impressive, and a heartener for those who are trying under heavy impost to "put life into the later years." Almost every week brings news of some research project expanded, planned, or being pressed forward. This and much more, surely, may safely be taken as herald, at least, of a new and determined approach to the problems of aging, full of real promise.

Great question marks are being hung over personnel theories and employment practices affecting older workers. Means of rehabilitation are being made more available to them. Techniques of job and worker analysis, job adjustment, retraining, and selective placement are being re-examined and revised. It was only the other day that the United States Department of Labor announced a new program for special older-worker counseling in public employment offices.

Responsive to widespread and insistent demand, the Federal Security Agency has made a start toward establishing a national clearing house for exchange of information and ideas, and has set up a Committee on Aging and Geriatrics. Countrywise, conferences, lecture courses, and institutes are on the increase. Programs of adult education are being broadened and improved. Closer attention is being given to the maintenance of the health and the incomes of older people, to their housing and family life, and to the provision of opportunities for social, civic, and recreational activities.

Horseshoes are all right. Pitching them can be fun. There is nothing to say against parchesi, square dancing, shuffleboard, or guessing games. All can be diverting, at times. But an aging worker ventures to rise in his place to say this: An attitude that would make children out of older adults is a mistake. As he watches a shift in attitudes, particularly as regards the

[7] George Lawton, *op cit.* note 2 *supra*, pp. 25, 27.

recreational needs of the aging, he is encouraged at indications of a widening recognition of the fact. There has been proof in his own experience that when the senescent is given opportunity to demonstrate that he can pull his own weight, lesser forms of recreation will take care of themselves. In his book, creation and recreation are one. The handicaps of the later years are at once challenge and distinction. It is the dignity of usefulness that counts: the certain knowledge that his creative potential is recognized and wanted in the work of the national community. That is living.

CONSERVATION OF CREATIVE RESOURCES

A time of national danger has given rise to more than ordinary interest in our human resources and their utilization. Perhaps, it occurs, there would be advantage in a little more emphasis on the difference between utilization and conservation; for a nation with more than 12 million men and women over 65 in its population, and with a prospect of having 17 to 20 million by 1975, is faced by long-term problems of wise utilization as well as by immediate problems of utilization in emergency—of conservation as well as of mobilization.

Mr. Marion Clawson is the director of the Bureau of Land Management, United States Department of the Interior. As such, he is a conservationist who speaks with authority. He said recently:

> Conservation means maximum, continued use of resources both material and human. While conservation relates very largely to the use of material or physical resources such as land, and the resources above and below the earth, it can apply also to the use of human resources. . . . Thus defined, conservation is an attitude of mind, rather than a specific program of any kind. Conservation in this sense involves primary emphasis on human values. We are concerned with the maximum well-being of the individual, both now and in the future.[8]

Can it be that here—in "an attitude of mind, rather than a specific program" —we shall find the key to problems connected with the aging of our population? During the months since the holding of the National Conference on Aging, certainly, a growing public awareness of the serious implications of census figures has been clearly discernible at any point of convergence of citizen thinking and community activity. It has been reflected not only in conferences, educational extension work, and research, but also in the launching of community programs for the solution of problems of aging, in the spread of "golden age" clubs and similar groups, in legislation enacted and proposed, and in definitely expressed insistence on the need for a national policy and co-ordinated action.

The signs are provocative. These evidences of a new outlook—could they not add up to a conservation movement in the making? Can they not be taken as indicative of a people's revaluation of a resource heretofore unsuspected or unappreciated—ignorantly, thoughtlessly, or contemptuously abandoned as worked out? From some vantage point of the future will not the careful historian see them as advance markers of a nation's attainment of new heights of wealth, well-being, and power through the reclamation, utilization, and conservation of the creative abilities of millions of seasoned Americans too long barred from opportunity to contribute by reason of chronological age alone?

[8] Commencement address, Eastern Montana College of Education, Billings, Montana, June 4, 1951.

Trying the impossible

One thing, at least, is certain. Time was, and not so far back, when we would admire, wonder, and let it go at that, if the creative drive of someone well advanced in years would break through all barriers in an astonishing display of capacity. Now we try to understand. Pitkin, for example, in an endeavor to explain "Grandma" Moses, makes use of this "bit of wisdom":

> There was a man who asked, "Why
> Can't I see in my ear with my eye?
> If I put my mind to it I'm sure I could do it.
> You never can tell 'til you try."

Professor Pitkin thinks

> Here is the fountain of all science, as well as all common sense. Here is more wisdom than is set down between the book of Genesis and the last line of the Bill of Rights. Please do six impossible things before breakfast. If you don't end up painting 1086 paintings, at good prices, you may hit on something better.[9]

If a volunteer gerontologist's first reaction is to lift an eyebrow, second thought brings this reflection: After all, every time we turn on a light instead of fussing with a candle or wasting good expletives on a balky and smelly kerosene lamp, every time we pick up the telephone, climb into an automobile or plane, use the radio or television, or read about some new wonder in an atomic age, aren't we, literally, experiencing the success of somebody who was sure he could "see in his ear with his eye," and found what it took to try it? Besides, it is true that old people, by and large, have more time than young people for trying the impossible.

The Gumpert idea of a second prime of life recurs. Tibbitts, always the pioneer, seems also to be looking in this direction. There was that in a recent offering of his which suggests a whole new region for exploration:

> Changes characteristic of aging are but part of the continuing life process. They may well mark the beginning of the phase of life in which the individual possesses the maximum accumulation of knowledge, experience and judgment. Indeed, it has been suggested that survival beyond the period of reproduction and responsibilities of parenthood may be part of the master plan of life. For not until we are freed of these responsibilities do we have the time and energy to make our greatest contribution.[10]

"The master plan of life." The concept attracts strongly. Why not? We of America have not found it hard to accept the concept laid in the base of our nationhood—that of certain specified rights divinely given and inseparable from the individual. It was only the other day that we read of a new and costly process being used by the government, the better to preserve the declaration of our belief in the actuality of these rights and our readiness to fight for the enjoyment of them. Would it be too hard to include a concept of the creative faculty as an aid, similarly bestowed and likewise inseparable? Or to think of what we call old age as a period of lightened load, intended for maximum enjoyment through greater freedom for expression of creative power?

Certainly if our whole nation should begin to think this way, our older people would move again into their place of dignity and importance. They could stop thinking about their age, or even about themselves. For all of us would be as alert and determined in defense

[9] Walter Pitkin, *The Best Years* (New York: Current Books, Inc., 1946), p. 49.

[10] Clark Tibbitts, address, 11th Annual Townsend Convention, Detroit, Michigan, July 2, 1951.

of unseen potentials as we are in defense of unseen rights.

THE JOB AHEAD

"Master plan." Perhaps that is why the creative faculty does not wear out. And perhaps the job ahead of us may be broadly conceived as a three-pronged attack on the problems implicit in an aging population, with the objectives these:

1. To bring about a general citizen acceptance of the actuality of the creative faculty of each individual, regardless of age, as a national asset.

2. To bring about a general citizen recognition of the immeasurable value of its potential.

3. To bring about a general acceptance of citizen responsibility for opening and holding open opportunity for its free expression, and for provision of capable evaluation and wise utilization.

Indeed, at least one lay observer has become convinced that we have on our hands a job of education and re-education whose scope is national and whose challenge is such as to call for the best we have in American ingenuity and the demonstrated American capacity for achievement of the difficult.

Howard Wheeler, Washington, D. C., is a veteran journalist whose experience as reporter, news analyst, war correspondent, and editor covers almost half a century. He is a former editor of the San Francisco News, Harper's Weekly, and Everybody's Magazine. Following World War II, during which, commissioned as a commander, he served as editor and officer-in-charge of Mast Magazine, United States Maritime Service, he became actively interested in problems connected with aging. He participated in the 1950 National Conference on Aging, helped to edit the reports of the various sections for book publication, and is now an editorial consultant attached to the staff of the Federal Security Agency Committee on Aging and Geriatrics.

Creative Activity Through Handcrafts

By RUTH BUNKER

FOR many older persons handcrafts as a second career can provide an absorbing energy outlet and vocational resource which not only will replace but can exceed the job satisfaction hitherto enjoyed. And handcrafts will pay, too. But the greatest dividends in terms of success and enjoyment are gained by those who make plans and start on them early, so that the transfer from a first to a second career is an easy one. All of this takes hard work. Communities can contribute by organized planning.

PERSONAL SATISFACTION THROUGH CRAFTS

For years the idea has been spreading that everyone should have a hobby of some kind, some absorbing interest that will be a change from the regular routine. To my way of thinking, if the choice is one of the many handcrafts, the individual making it is especially fortunate.

There is a basic need within us all to create things with our own hands. Experience has shown that older people have a heightened appreciation for anything which they themselves have made.

The extensive use of the handcrafts in occupational therapy has had far-reaching results. In the years since World War I, thousands of patients have become familiar with crafts as used in hospitals, and have been so intrigued that they have chosen one of the crafts as their hobby or even as their vocation. The therapeutic value of crafts is now accepted and well known. Crafts are an ideal solution for many of the problems facing the older people in our population.

The great variety of crafts from which to choose means that there is one to fit almost any physical capacity, inclination, or capability, and practically any purse! The numerous craft guilds give opportunities to participate in a group, to become a leader in that group. Craft groups answer the need for companionship, recognition, and status. There are local and national shows in which to compete. One can develop a small business to augment one's income. All this activity can fill one's days to overflowing if one wishes. The membership of the craft guilds is composed of a healthy mixture of all ages and both sexes. The older person may naturally gravitate to his own age group for close companions, but younger individuals in the same guild will keep him more alert and mentally young.

Frequently husbands and wives find in crafts an opportunity to work together. The husband may be the craftsman, with the wife handling the business or vice versa. There are cases of wives who became interested in a craft and managed to inveigle their husbands into a much-needed chance to use their hands. One instance was an older woman who decided to take up pottery. After a few months her husband, a professional man, became so intrigued by the formulas used in glazes that he now makes all her glazes. A woman who loved to make silver jewelry finally persuaded her husband to try cutting gems for her; as an engineer who had recently recovered from a serious illness, he became fascinated and now has a much-needed leisure-time occupation. They are making retirement plans which center around these mutual interests.

HANDCRAFTS GAIN RECOGNITION

Twenty-five years ago, the craftsman had little opportunity to exhibit his work. If he belonged to one of the few guilds, there would be a small private showing of the members' work, going quite without notice by the general public. The museums had many examples of ancient Japanese ceramics, of American Indian pots, of Colonial silverwork; but the work of contemporary craftsmen received no attention.

Since the late twenties the craft movement in the United States has been growing, at first slowly and then more rapidly until now there are thousands of craftsmen in all sections of the country. With this growth in interest there has come a parallel growth in the recognition of crafts as a valuable part of our culture.

Today the artist-craftsman is an accepted member of the art world. Museums, both large and small, sponsor annual craft exhibitions in their areas, and purchase prize-winning pieces for their collections. Some artists now work both in the fine arts and in the crafts without any loss in stature. The sculptor frequently makes small ceramic sculpture for the modern apartment; it is but a step for him to make other ceramic pieces and ally himself with a craft group. Lithographers, etchers, and printers are often found in the craft guilds. Artists working in serigraphy (the silk-screen process of printing) find a welcome among the craftsmen. These few examples illustrate the increased awareness of the craftsman as a valuable contributor to our culture.

Society is also willing to give more than recognition; it is willing to support handcrafts by buying them. The better gift shops now stock handcrafted items. The gift departments of the big stores are glad to carry the work of craftsmen who can meet their large orders. The shops that depend entirely on tourist trade have found that crafts from their own localities sell well as mementos of trips. The huge attendance at the large summer craft fairs demonstrates this growing interest on the part of the public. The fairs have become focal points around which to plan vacation trips. There are demonstrations to watch, fellow craftsmen to talk to, work to compare with one's own, and the judges' decisions to challenge.

STATUS OF CRAFT MOVEMENT

People not directly connected with the craft movement have little realization of how widespread this movement is today. There are many elements which have contributed to this growth —the teaching of crafts to children in summer camps, the frequent inclusion of craft courses in the public school curricula, the extensive use of occupational therapy in treating the veterans of two world wars, the use of crafts in adult education programs, and now, in a few communities, in homes for the aged and for older people confined to their own homes. All these factors have produced many people with at least a preliminary knowledge of craft work. Even for those who have not taken up handcrafts seriously, it has led to a genuine appreciation of the work of the producing artist-craftsman.

Craft guilds, older and more numerous in New England, from which the craft movement has spread, are now to be found all over the country. Some are large, some small, some include crafts, and some but one type of craft. Founded in 1897, the Society of Arts and Crafts in Boston, Massachusetts, is the oldest of the craft groups. Its aim has always been to uphold a high standard of craftsmanship, and it is credited with great influence in the present craft movement.

An example of the state-wide type of guild is the well-known League of New Hampshire Arts and Crafts. The first to be state supported, it functions under a council and has a paid staff and many volunteer workers. Now in its eighteenth year, it has over 3,800 members. Maine was the second state to have a state-aided program. The program was discontinued during World War II and has not yet been resumed. However, handcrafts in Maine are flourishing, generally on an individual basis, but with several local guilds. In Connecticut, where there is a state-wide guild, state aid for crafts has been directed only to the educational aspect. This is true also in Massachusetts, where there are twenty-one handcraft groups. The state-wide Pennsylvania Guild of Craftsmen has over 1,000 members and is still growing. It is not state supported, and its activities are centered in the various county chapters. New York has recently established a state program, and it is too early to judge what direction its emphasis will take.

While local craft groups may be urban or rural, these state-wide groups are a mixture of both. There is a growing tendency for retired people to settle in small rural communities. A craft guild membership makes this transfer from urban to rural an easy, natural shift, with new friends and associates ready-made.

One large guild which works entirely with rural people is the Southern Highland Handicraft Guild. Established in 1930, it was formed to help the mountain people of the southern Appalachian region to improve and preserve their handcraft skills and market their products. Many of its members are older persons who continue to work at their crafts until well into their eighties. This guild has grown steadily, until now it has eight shops in various cities, including New York and Washington. It has become an important factor in the income of many families in that region.

Local craft groups exist in practically all the states, with the crafts of weaving and ceramics predominating. New York and Florida have recently formed state programs. The Midwest and the Far West have no state-wide groups that I know of, but there is great activity in many regions, such as among the potters in Ohio and in California.

FACILITIES FOR TRAINING IN CRAFTS

Many thousands of people now enjoy crafts as a hobby or as a part-time or full-time profession. Where do they get their training? The facilities are better than might be expected.

In urban areas there are craft classes at the museums, summer courses under the art departments of colleges and universities, craft courses in art schools, adult education courses in crafts in the evenings at public schools, and innumerable private instructors (both adequate and inadequate).

In rural areas, probably the best sources are the home demonstration agents, employed co-operatively by the State Extension Service and the Department of Agriculture Extension Service. For many years the federal Extension Service had a craft consultant who spearheaded this work nationally. Since her retirement no national leadership has been provided, but the home demonstration agents continue to advise rural people, primarily women, on how to improve and market their handwork. While much of this work is not

of top quality, the extension workers are of definite assistance.

As noted earlier, the movement of older people to small communities for retirement has brought top-notch craftsmen into rural areas, where they are available for teaching. Another interesting factor in some rural areas has been the settling of displaced persons who have brought European techniques to add to our knowledge. The intensive, short-period, summer training courses now offered by many universities and colleges have made training facilities available to almost everyone. There are summer camps for adults which specialize in craft instruction. Although some of these camps are conducted by the guilds, most are the undertakings of individual craftsmen.

HANDCRAFTS CAN PAY

The question which almost immediately crops up is: Can handcrafts be a source of income? The answer is definitely, Yes. In recent years numerous books have been written about making money at home with one's hands. Most of these deal with the handwork, hobby-type activity, too much of which consists of poorly designed and crudely made work. But some of the books are written for those who do want to turn out craft work of a high standard. The good ones contain suggestions about marketing, packaging, advertising, efficiency in production, and similar problems.

To be self-supporting from craftwork calls for skill, salesmanship, and hard work. It is not easy, but it can be done, as many cases prove. One young World War II veteran who was given weaving as occupational therapy found he had an unexpected talent for it—he is a born weaver, his teachers say. He went on to weaving as a profession, and enjoyed almost instant success. A middle-aged woman, advised by her physician to do some weaving as light exercise for her arms and legs, developed such skill in a few months that she now has more orders than she can fill comfortably.

It is, of course, less difficult to earn only a partial income from crafts, as is the need of many retired people with a small pension or retirement income. This is quite within the realm of possibility for a great many. A librarian, facing retirement within a year, took up jewelry work with the object of establishing a small shop in her home town. The small town had many tourists and no gift shop, so she planned to sell other crafts, also. She had no exceptional talent, but did good, workmanlike pieces of conventional design. Her plans have worked out just as she hoped.

Many professional men are attracted to crafts. Dentists, with their training and experience in work with gold and silver, frequently take up jewelry making as a hobby. Engineers often like metalwork and gem cutting. A surprising number of men make rugs—hooked, braided, woven. For all these craft products there is a market. It may take time to find the right outlet, but if designed well and made well, they will sell.

Many people who only supplement their income through crafts rely on the summer fairs of the guilds as their sole outlets. Their sales at the fairs, plus the orders taken, provide them with all the work they can handle for the rest of the year. One weaver makes up a few yards of sample patterns each spring. She has a tiny shop during July and August, and takes enough orders then to keep her busy through the fall and winter. At last summer's sale of The Maine Coast Craftsmen there were none of the hooked rugs for which the state is famous. On inquiring I learned that the craftsmen who usually bring their work were entirely sold out before fair time. The tourist trade, an important business in many states, is a good source of income for the craftsman.

The craftsman's marketing problem is one place where both guilds and states can help effectively. One of the aims of most guilds is to advise craftsmen in marketing, and to provide an outlet, often through a guild shop.

One of the most successful programs of government aid to craftsmen is that of the province of Nova Scotia, Canada. Administered by the Department of Trade and Industry, this handcraft program includes extensive training courses for any groups requesting it, individual advice on marketing problems, aid in contacting buyers, the renting of equipment, a library, exhibits, and a design service. It has been so successful that handcrafts are considered an integral part of the economy of the province. New York has a similar but less extensive or technical program, which advises women who want to make money by doing handwork at home.

COMMUNITY FACILITIES FOR HANDCRAFTS

Communities wishing to further the craft movement in their areas can do several concrete things. They can sponsor the formation of a guild. The guild will be interested in ensuring that standards of workmanship are maintained, training in crafts offered, exhibitions given, and sales outlets explored. A central meeting place is needed. Perhaps there is a room in the public library, the museum, the art club, the Young Women's Christian Association, a church building. Schools can be encouraged to offer craft classes in the evening adult education program. And so on.

An active craft guild can be a most important factor in promoting a full and satisfying life for older people. The retired person who has time to give to it will find ample opportunity for participation, and for leadership if he is qualified. Age has never made any difference among craftsmen—skill, yes; enthusiasm and interest, yes; but age, no.

Ruth Bunker, Washington, D. C., jeweler and silversmith, is editor of the monthly news bulletin The Cross-Country Craftsman. Medicine and art have shared her interest. She was successively a staff member of the Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia, of the Social Security Board's (Administrator's) Bureau of Research and Statistics, and of the Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home Administration.

Sharing Community Responsibility

By Jean and Jess Ogden

TWO years ago the University of Virginia's Extension Division published a leaflet on the aging population.[1] On the cover page is the following statement: "The facts show that people are living longer in Virginia. . . . They want nothing so much as to share in the daily responsibilites and enjoyments of their communities." The pamphlet carries the suggestion that the problem of continued participation of older citizens is one that must be studied thoughtfully in every community by people of all ages and varied interests and by every institution and agency in the community.

"We have published this bulletin," it continues, "in the hope that it may initiate a process of cooperative inquiry that will serve to formulate the needs in this field, assess available resources, and devise plans for bringing resources to bear on the needs." [2]

Community Responsibilities

It is only, we are convinced, in the communities where they live and move and have their being that people "can devise plans," for every community has its unique pattern and its special resources. Any plans devised on a national or even a state-wide scale must be general. Communities can undoubtedly make specific application of the generalizations in terms of their special needs and potentialities. And certainly a pooling of ideas, achievements, and experiences by many communities seriously engaged in "cooperative inquiry" could help other communities throughout the nation. But those that are so engaged are a small minority—largely in urban areas. Some means must be devised for helping all of us to understand the implications of the age shift in our population and to accept the necessity for seeing public life and the institutions of our communities in new relationships.

In looking over the rapidly increasing literature on the subject of our aging population, one finds many articles whose titles, and frequently contents, suggest that "we" must do something for or about "them." "We," presumably, means society or possibly the younger segment of the community; "they," all too frequently, means the poor, the sick, the physically and emotionally inadequate among the aging. There will always be some of these for whom others must bear the burden of planning and care. But they constitute only a small part and will become a smaller part as medical science understands better the diseases of age, as industry progresses with its study of jobs for older workers, as financial plans for retirement are improved. The body of able elder citizens who can be real assets to the community is already large. It will be larger. Planning is not a job that any "we" can or should do for any "them." It is a job that involves the total community. Only as we "see the community whole" can we do any intelligent planning for any segment of it.

Reports from most of the communities that have been working on the problem of the aging give considerable attention to clubs, hobbies, sociability, recreation, and similar activities—in addition, of course, to physical needs, housing, and financial problems. Too few make any mention of civic and social activities and ways in which the older citizens might bear a share of their responsibility for the common welfare. Among the exceptions is a report [3] from Kansas City in which we find this statement:

> The progressive, prosperous community of the future will be one that makes use of older persons who want to participate in social and economic affairs. Kansas City cannot afford to neglect this largely untapped source of talent and experience.

No community can afford to neglect it—particularly in view of the fact that a smaller proportion of younger people must carry a heavier burden of those aspects of living that require physical strength and vigorous bodies. Enlightened self-interest places on the citizens of every community the necessity for analyzing the contributions that can best be made by each age group in its population. Then they must so proceed as to disassociate themselves from old, accepted patterns and accept the implications of the age shift in our population.

Unless careful planning of this kind is done, we shall all be the victims of what happens to happen. Nothing is to be gained, however, by approaching the problem of community responsibilities of the aging from the purely sentimental point of view. Thought must be given to their liabilities as well as to their assets; and much thought must be given to the kind of preparation for aging that will prepare all of us as we grow older to carry our civic responsibilities wisely and well.

Years and Wisdom

In most primitive societies and early civilization, the "Old-Men-Who-Knew" were assured of a pretty important place in public life, as Professor Simmons shows in his article. The Spartans, at a relatively advanced stage of civilization, were governed by a council called the gerusia made up of thirty gerontes, each of whom had to be at least 60 years of age.[4] But, with the rapid progress made by science in the past century and other factors contributing to longevity, the mere fact of age nowadays does not guarantee wisdom. That is, we are being kept alive. This is a far cry from keeping ourselves alive. The latter required an eternal vigilance, a continuous alertness, a conscious habit of learning from experience that made for a self-directed program of continuing education throughout life—the kind of approach whereby the knowledge that is acquired becomes the wisdom that lingers. By the same token, age, per se, does not today command veneration or even admiration. Older people—like children, adolescents, and younger adults—are respected as individuals rather than as a group; and they are respected because of what they are, rather than because of the number of years they have, or have not, lived.

Yet the available evidence does not show that the wisdom of the elders is being disregarded today in relation to the common welfare in the United States. In the Seventy-ninth Congress, thirty-two out of the ninety-six senators were over 65—one-third of the total group. In the House of Representatives, 21 per cent belonged to the same age group. In 1948 we elected the oldest Vice President we have ever had, and with him the third-oldest President. We have, during the war and the period following it, drawn back into public life retired men whose former experience and accumulated wisdom were felt to be

[1] "People Are Living Longer," Vol. XXVII, *University of Virginia Extension*, No. 5, Oct. 1, 1949.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[3] *We All Grow Old: A Study of Kansas City's Aging Population.* Community Studies, Inc., no date.

[4] Joshua Nelson Larned, *New Larned History*, rev. by D. E. Smith (Springfield: Nichols, 1922–24), Vol. 5, p. 3819.

needed—for example, Herbert Hoover, Bernard Baruch, George Marshall, and many others at slightly lower age levels. During the same period, in a national list of top business executives, 28.6 per cent were past 65.

THE SPEED-UP IN "THIS CHANGING WORLD"

But there is another side to the picture. As it becomes a statistical fact that people are living longer, it becomes an equally important statistical fact that the proportions of old to young are changing rapidly. Census figures show that whereas today we have only 13 million adolescents, we have more than 18 million Americans who are 60 or over. More than 12 million of these are at least 65. Less than a century ago seven-eighths of our population was under 45. We were indeed a young country! In those early societies in which the elders were so important their numbers were relatively small. The same was true of our country when the Constitution was written. It is sometimes hard to remember that in setting the minimum age of the President at 35, the writers of the Constitution were providing that the chief executive be chosen from the elder citizens of that day. That the first President was 57 is further evidence of recognition of the need for the kind of wisdom that comes with years.

The figures quoted from the Seventy-ninth Congress seem to indicate that as our age level has advanced, the age of our governing bodies has kept pace. But these elder statesmen generally have been participating in public affairs for many years. Few of them reach the age of retirement and then suddenly assume civic responsibilities. Of course, exceptions can be found. But in general, citizenship is something that needs to be practiced during one's earlier years if one's contribution during later life is really to count.

Together with shift in proportions of young to aged, there is another important consideration. This shift in age groups in the population comes at a time when change has been speeded up to a point that makes it difficult for even the most alert to keep up. Up until *day-before-yesterday*, figuratively speaking, in the long stream of recorded history, social change was relatively slow. Knowledge of the heritage and keeping things steady were, in general, enough, as far as rulers and educators were concerned. The elders had the relatively simple task of giving to the oncoming generation understanding of the tools and accumulated knowledge of the past.

Yesterday, however, in this long period of development of mankind, technological progress speeded up. And *today* the acceleration continues at an even more rapid rate. Changes in methods and speed of travel and communication, changes in ways of working in a mechanical world, realization of the fact that the world has shrunk so that we are now part of a complex society whether we want to be or not—all the changes in our ways of doing and thinking implicit in the results of technological change, the facts of life in the world of today, present an unprecedented challenge to those who are charged with planning and policy making at the several governmental levels.

The rapidly changing world calls likewise for changes and readiness for continuous change on the part of the established and hard-to-change institutions of our society. Education, for example, must now equip individuals for control of living in a world in which change is the only constant. It can no longer rely on teaching solutions to problems. The solutions of yesterday can no longer be relied on to meet the problems of today and tomorrow as they could in the more simple societies of long ago, in which the institution of education has its roots.

Religion faces similar problems. It must help individuals prepare for the complexities of living rather than (or as well as) prepare them for dying. During the increasing perplexities of recent years churches have tended to accept the latter, and infinitely easier, role. Harry Overstreet points out that religion does in

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if it clings to old interpretations of human life simply because it has built these into revered institutions and practices. Where a thing as complex and inadequately known as our own nature is being dealt with, there is need for a constant alertness to new discoveries and implications.[5]

To this we would add the need for a constant alertness to the increasing complexities of society as it relates to a "thing as complex as our own nature."

AGE AND ADAPTIVENESS

Accepting the fact of the acceleration of change and the need for individuals and institutions not only to accept but, even more important, to become able to guide change in desirable direction, we must give serious thought to the implications of the increasing proportion of age to youth in our society. As George Lawton points out, it is a "normal tendency of all of us to grow somewhat more rigid and hostile to change and new ideas as we get older."[6] We are therefore faced with the dilemma of having to accept and guide change at a greatly accelerated rate when inevitably, by sheer force of numbers, the older portion of our population will be able to determine policy and program.

[5] H. A. Overstreet, *The Mature Mind* (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1949), p. 265.

[6] George Lawton, *Aging Successfully* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 261.

Evidences of this control by the elders are already discernible in the rural communities of the South. These communities have continuously, over a period of years, lost their young adults of the productive years to industrialized areas. Frequently the children remain in the rural community with their grandparents or other kin because of crowded and unhealthy living conditions in the city to which their parents have gone. (This is particularly true of the Negro population when parents go off to jobs in Baltimore, Washington, Akron, or other congested cities where housing is a serious problem.)

In such rural areas, one cannot presuppose even the average imbalance of of age groups. It is greatly exaggerated. The great proportion of the population is at the extreme ends of the age range. This of necessity means that the governing bodies, the welfare boards, the boards of education, the planning groups in these rural communities are made up of older citizens. Many of them are looking towards and clinging to the past. Their tendency to do this is easily understandable. In the past they feel secure. The swirling present and the uncharted future are terrifying to persons whose lives—and, more important, whose timing—are geared to horse and buggy days.

ASCENDANCY OF THE ELDERS

In one very prosperous county where men in their 70's and 80's hold the balance of power on the board of supervisors, the children go to the same school buildings that these old men went to sixty years ago. These men disregard the increased school population—especially in the high schools—due to higher age limit for leaving school and to more strictly enforced compulsory attendance. They disregard the need for laboratories in an age of science. They disregard everything but the importance

of keeping taxes down. They have formed a "Taxpayers League" of men all of whom are their contemporaries. One of these remarked in a public meeting: "I went to that school and I went on my own two feet. And I done pretty well in life, didn't I?" As far as economic success is concerned, his question must be answered in the affirmative. But has he done well in keeping informed as a citizen and keeping his mind alert to changing needs in a changing world and in a community whose children, as adults, will have to compete with children educated in more farseeing communities?

In almost any community, especially the smaller ones, there are people who deplore the lack of interest of youth in the church. At the same time the churches tend more and more to have programs planned by the elders for the elders. (The very use of the term "elders" for their policy-making bodies in some Protestant churches is in itself indicative of a deeply ingrained attitude.) A minister in a rural community —himself over 60—suddenly realized that "we keep telling the young people not to dance, not to go to unwholesome roadhouses and juke joints. We surround them with prohibitions. But have we people of this church ever helped them find something to do?" He was not "too old to change his ways." He, with the help of others who saw his point of view, launched a fine community recreation program that served the needs of all ages. To be aging is not necessarily to become inflexible. But we must admit that the tendency for all of us is to become more resistant to new ways of doing.

In another church situation—this one in a small city—two elderly and deeply religious parishioners protested to the minister about his sermons. They were too lively, had too many examples drawn from present-day life, contained too little church doctrine. He was sympathetic and assured them he wanted to meet the needs of all members, but it was a matter of very special concern with him to keep the young people in the church. His sermons were geared to their needs. These two elderly people now hold their Sunday service together in their own living room.

NOT A NEW PROBLEM

It is interesting to note that this problem of conservatism of the elders is not new. It was felt even in ancient societies where they were accepted as the teachers and the rulers.

Even in the Spartan society, referred to above, the people who accepted the rule of the gerontes were forced to set up another body as a kind of system of "checks and balances." This consisted of three younger and more able men called "ephors." As a matter of fact, they were appointed by the kings on the strength of their abilities and not for their venerabilities. The point for us to remember is that even as early as 1000 B.C. the problem of the power of the aging was in evidence. Even then it was recognized that the contribution of the individual to society depended upon his "personal balance and social wisdom," rather than the incidence of his longevity. Neither youth nor age in itself is a guarantee of such balance and wisdom.

THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT

We have admitted that we can point to "councils of elders," at both national and community levels, who are carrying a heavy share of their civic responsibility. We recognize the fact that most "boards" in every community have a large proportion of gray-headed and bald-headed members. Some of us find that in many communities it is the young adults who have no voice in public affairs. It is still necessary to contend for their right to have a part in planning activities instead of having their affairs planned for them by their elders. Why, then, are we concerned about elder citizens feeling bereft of responsibilities in their communities? Why have we said there is need for serious stocktaking by each community?

We are concerned because of the increasing number of elders. Those to whom we have referred are not new participants in public affairs. They have "been in there" working for years —and often their fathers and mothers before them.

What then do we need to do?

1. We need to understand the total community and analyze the potentials of the total population in terms of community service. Any attempt to set apart any segment of the population as a special group is dangerous. In the September 1941 issue of *Platform* a statement appears that may be startling to those who believe the no-longer-young are "on the shelf." We quote the statement in part:

> Don't think the more healthy and active of America's older people are patiently waiting for the rest of us to decide their fate. . . . On the contrary . . . it may be they who decide ours. Robert Havighurst, professor of education at the University of Chicago, predicts that by 1980 the balance of power in any election will be held by those over sixty. The Townsend and newer, similar movements . . . . indicate what this may mean in the life of the country if the rapidly growing number of oldsters are forced to band together as a "special interest" group. Couldn't age *vs.* youth, "retired" people *vs.* workers, become as real a conflict as capital *vs.* labor? [7]

We concede the possibility. We refuse to concede the necessity, or even the probability, of such a conflict. But, in spite of our optimism, we know that careful planning and intelligent action by all concerned are essential to ensure against such an eventuality.

[7] "Has Old Age a Place in a Young Man's World?" *Platform*, September 1941, p. 7.

POPULATION FACTS AND IMPLICATIONS

2. We need to help every community accept the population-trend facts and see their implications in terms of rethinking community life. By community we mean not only private citizens, community councils, social service agencies, and recreation departments. The community involves all these. But it also involves industry, business, educational institutions, churches, government, planning boards, and every agency or institution concerned with total community prosperity and general welfare.

Many older people have been able to do their own thinking and planning in terms of their community contributions. A retired lawyer gives his time and attention to persons needing legal aid but unable to pay for it. A retired doctor, disturbed by the needs of the medically indigent in his rural community, decides to open his office and let it be known that money is not a primary consideration with him; he needs to serve. A group of retired Quakers have made themselves part of a rural community in Florida where they are fostering a remarkable, if not unique, program of sharecropper education. Their aim is to help raise the total social and economic level of that area. Each member of this group is past retirement age, has financial security, and can devote his years of wisdom to a socially useful community program.

Among the professional group with assured income countless examples could be cited of conscious planning for social usefulness during the years of leisure. And some individuals can be found in nonprofessional groups who have worked out a way of sharing com-

munity responsibility. There is the elderly housewife in a small suburban community, self-sufficient in her own small home, who has become a self-appointed information center. Anyone who needs a maid or a baby sitter or information about where and how to register to vote in this district calls her. She is in no sense a gossip, but she makes it her business to *know*. Everyone else in the community is so busy, she explains, that the least she can do is to try to use her time to save theirs. She also volunteers her services for various fund-raising drives. Her families must be within walking distance, for she has no car. But she is a fine walker!

There is the elderly man in another small community who is concerned about the small proportion of persons eligible to vote who ever go to the polls. Many give as their excuse that they do not know enough about the issues and do not have time to find out. What better use, he asks, could he make of his new-found leisure than to become well informed on the way government works and to study the issues and the qualifications of candidates for public office? This would make him a more intelligent voter, and he might be able to share what he learned with those who "don't have time."

There is a retired farmer in a small western town made up primarily of retired farmers. He has prepared for retirement and is enjoying it. But he is made miserable by seeing the unhappiness of his neighbors who have achieved their life's goal—retirement—but who have retired *from*, with nothing to retire *to*. What can be done for them? he asks. Or are they now hopeless, and would it be better to concentrate on helping the young folks get ready for retirement? He is now working at both—"and have never had so little time for my hobbies in my life!"

Cases of this kind prove that talents of the elder citizens can be used in important community service. The fact that it is a small minority who can work out their own salvation indicates the need for accepting the facts of the increasing aging group and rethinking community life with their contributions in mind.

CONTINUOUS EDUCATION—CRADLE TO GRAVE

3. We need—and perhaps this is what we need most of all—a plan for continuous education from the cradle to the grave. In a rapidly changing world with a rapidly aging population, elementary, secondary, and higher education are not enough. The fine courses on and for aging that are being given at such institutions as the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago are not enough. They are exceedingly important for those who have grown into mature years without the kind of preparation that continuous education could provide. But only a few can avail themselves of the opportunity offered by such courses. Those who have the initiative and the funds to go to a distant university to learn how to make the most of the mature years are undoubtedly those who have already done some thinking and planning. Again our concern is with the increasing number who need the help of total community planning for all age groups and by all age groups. Each community must assume responsibility for the program of continuous education if it is to be available to everyone.

Another advantage of the community education program is that it could help the individual to relate himself continuously to the community to which he may devote much of the leisure of his later years. It would, of course, provide help in self-understanding in each age group, but would also provide help in relation to other age groups and to the community as a whole. Again we underline the importance of wholeness. Every community has babies, children, adolescents, young adults, adults in their middle years, and elder citizens. But these groups are not mutually exclusive, nor are there clear-cut lines of demarcation.

A program of "education for aging" tends to set this group apart as a problem group. A problem group, like a problem child, is all too likely to capitalize on the fact of being a problem. And the community is the loser. On the other hand, lifelong learning can help to keep limber the mind that tends to become inflexible with age. And the community is the gainer.

Moreover, the aging are in no more need of help in self-understanding and in understanding relationships than are adolescents; or young adults who are eagerly assuming adult privileges but rebelling against adult responsibilities; or the no-longer-young but not-yet-old who feel that because they are no longer young life is sterile. There seems to be no doubt that there is real need for continuous education if we are going to live with the kind of people and in the kind of communities that are really good to live with and in.

The adult education program has given some attention to problems of aging. George Lawton's course on "Aging Successfully" has been outstanding and, without doubt, has been most helpful to those it has reached. But adult education has always been spotty. There has been little unified planning for a program that would serve the whole man in his total environment. Lyman Bryson explains this by saying that in America adult education has always been meeting the urgent need rather than finding and meeting the important need. By "urgent" he means immigrant education, emergency-education programs of depression years, education for civilian defense and other wartime needs. What might be considered the important function of adult education? May it not be that in helping citizens to find ways of sharing community responsibilities at all ages on local, state, national, and world levels the urgent and the important have become one? Might it not be in this way that we could move most effectively toward "organizing the world for peace and collaboration," which Dr. Bryson considers the important role of adult education? [8]

[8] Lyman Bryson, *Handbook of Adult Education in the United States*, edited by Mary L. Ely (New York: Institute of Adult Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1948), p. 3.

Jean and Jess Ogden, Charlottesville, Virginia, are codirectors of the University of Virginia's Community Services. They are a husband-and-wife team, and their community development programs have grown out of an experimental and exploratory project set up in 1941 to find ways of helping communities help themselves. They are responsible for 125 studies of communities in the Southeast, published as the New Dominion Series. Previous to 1941 they made similar studies for the American Association of Adult Education. Mr. Ogden served as educational director at Hull House, and Mrs. Ogden as director of the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers in Industry. Both have written numerous pamphlets and magazine articles, and together they have written four books, the last two of which are Small Communities in Action (1946) and These Things We Tried (1947).

Family Living in the Later Decades

By Ernest W. Burgess

ONLY recently has attention centered on the family life of the aging. Other aspects of changes with aging have been studied: physiological, psychological, economic, and social. But research on the status and problem of family living has been conspicuous by its absence.

Three recent events have called attention to the needs for research and to the importance of family living to persons in the later decades. In outlining the fields of study in his research planning report for the Social Science Research Council, Otto Pollak devoted a chapter to "The Family."[1] The First National Conference on Family Life held in Washington in 1948 called attention to family living in old age as the last stage of the family cycle. Finally, the First National Conference on Aging, held in Washington in 1950, included the subject of family living, living arrangements, and housing as one of its ten major divisions.

As yet, however, no systematic study of the social psychological aspects of family living in the later decades has been attempted. Within the last year two doctoral dissertations have made significant contributions to an understanding of the family relations of older persons, although not focused on this topic. They are *Isolation and Conduct in Later Life: A Study of Four Hundred Sixty-four Chicagoans of Ages Sixty to Ninety-five* by William H. Harlan[2] and *The Social Roles of Old People* by Ruth Albrecht.[3]

The findings of these two studies especially will be relied upon in discussing the majority of the following topics: basic facts relevant to family living, the last stage of the family cycle, the married couple in old age, living with in-laws, the widowed, and further research.

Facts About Family Living

There are a number of facts significant for understanding the family living of the aging that must be presented first. These are selected from three different sources.[4]

1. The proportion of older people is increasing. There are twice as many people in the United States today as in 1900, but nearly four times the number of persons 65 years and over.

2. The rural population is declining. Fifty years ago 60 per cent of the population was rural; at present only 41 per cent is. Of the rural population, those living on farms declined from 30 per cent in 1920 to an estimated 19 per cent in 1949.

3. The marital status of the population aged 65 and over is as follows: 66 per cent of the men are married, as compared with 37 per cent of the women; 54 per cent of the women are widowed, as compared with only 24 per cent of the men; the proportion that have remained single is the same for both sexes—8 per cent; 2 men and 1 woman per 100 of each sex are divorced.

4. The great majority of persons 65 years and over are living in families: 82 per cent of the men and 76 per cent of the women. Thirteen per cent of the males and 22 per cent of the females are living alone or with nonrelatives. Only 6 per cent of the men and 3 per cent of the women are living in institutions.

5. Low income is common among the aged. Nearly all persons receiving wages or salaries experience a sharp drop in their income at 60 or 65, which at present are the favored years for retirement. About one-fourth are receiving public assistance. The income distribution of older persons and the sources of income are given in detail in the article by Wilbur Cohen in this volume. The big drop in income of persons after age 65 is shown by the fact that their median income was only about $1,000 in 1948, compared with around $3,000 for men in the age group 35 to 44 and approximately $2,400 for men of 55 to 64.

6. There is a decline of older men and an increase of older women in the labor force. The proportion of men 65 years of age and over who continue to work dropped from 68 per cent in 1890 to an estimated 45 per cent in 1950 while employment among older women increased from 5.7 per cent to 8.7 per cent. The changes and present situation are discussed in the article by Gertrude Bancroft in this volume.

7. There has been little increase in the life expectation of older persons. In fifty years the average life span has increased from less than 50 to more than 67 years in 1948. At the age of 65, however, the increase of life expectancy is only from 11.9 to 13.4 years. While more people live longer, those who have arrived at age 65 do not live much longer than they did a half-century ago.

8. Older persons average less schooling than those younger. Each age group in our society has had on the average more formal education than the next older group.

9. The amount of close companionship decreases with age. This is caused not only by the death of spouses but by the loss of intimate friends by death, change of residence, or other reasons.

10. Participation by older men and women decreases. This is shown by attendance at meetings, offices held, number of hobbies, and plans for the future.

11. There is an increased feeling of economic security in spite of lowered amount of income. The greatest economic insecurity seems to be in the 60's when the adjustment to loss of employment is necessary. In each succeeding decade the economic condition of the person becomes further stabilized.

12. Physical handicaps increase with age. Illness and nervousness are more frequent, and the feeling of satisfaction and health decreases.

13. Older citizens increase their religious activities and dependence upon religion. Frequency of church attendance drops in the 80's and 90's. Incapacity to go to church, however, is more than compensated for by listening to church services over the radio and by Bible reading.

14. Feelings of happiness, usefulness, zest tend to decrease with age, and lack of interest in life grows correspondingly.

15. Psychological tests show a lower median attitude score, indicating poorer adjustment. Attitude scores are repre-

[1] Otto Pollak, *Social Adjustment in Old Age*, Social Science Research Council Bulletin 29 (New York, 1948), Ch. 6.

[2] William H. Harlan, *Isolation and Conduct in Later Life: A Study of Four Hundred Sixty-four Chicagoans of Ages Sixty to Ninety-five*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1950.

[3] Ruth Albrecht, *The Social Roles of Old People*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1951.

[4] National Conference on Aging, Washington, D. C., 1950, *Some Facts About Aging Population*, Washington: Federal Security Agency, 1950; *ibid., Man and His Years*, Raleigh: Health Publications Institute, 1951; and Ruth Shonle Cavan, Ernest W. Burgess, Robert J. Havighurst, and Herbert Goldhamer, *Personal Adjustment in Old Age*, Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949.

TABLE 1—MARITAL STATUS

Median Age of Husband and Wife at Each Stage of the Family Cycle for the United States: 1940 and 1890

Stage of the family cycle	Median age of husband		Median age of wife	
	1940	1890	1940	1890
A. First marriage	24.3	26.1	21.6	22.0
B. Birth of first child	25.3	27.1	22.6	23.0
C. Birth of last child	29.9	36.0	27.2	31.9
D. Marriage of first child	48.3	51.1	45.6	47.0
E. Marriage of last child	52.8	59.4	50.1	55.3
F. Death of husband or wife	63.6	57.4	60.9	53.3
G. Death of husband, if last	69.7	66.4	—	—
G. Death of wife, if last	—	—	73.5	67.7

Source: Paul C. Glick, "The Family Cycle," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XII, No. 2, April 1947.

sentative of the way older people react to their experiences in the major areas of their life such as work, family, friends, recreation, leisure, and religion. They include also the subject's statements of attitudes on health, economic security, zest for life, and happiness.

THE FAMILY CYCLE

The above statement of facts relevant to the family living of older adults presents a static picture. In actuality a longitudinal point of view is necessary for perspective and for the understanding of the problems of the aging.

Paul C. Glick, in an article on the family cycle, has indicated seven stages in the married life of individuals. The first four stages occur in youth and middle adulthood, the last three in the decades of the 50's, 60's, and 70's as determined by the median age of husband and wife. These stages are shown in Table 1.

The family cycle demonstrates that middle-aged and elderly people pass through different experiences. Therefore they may be listed variously at different times as (1) parents living with single children, (2) parents living with married children, (3) parents living alone, (4) widow or widower living away from children, and (5) remarried aging persons.

One phase of the family cycle is change of residence. While there is no universal pattern, two variations may be hypothetically presented to indicate the series of residences in the life experience of older persons.

One urban pattern for middle-class persons presents the following residential cycle: (1) birth and rearing on the farm, in town, or in a small city; (2) attendance away from home at college or university, often in dormitories or rooming houses of a town or small city; (3) marriage before or shortly after graduation and living in furnished rooms or small apartment; (4) birth of first or second children and removal to a small single dwelling in the suburbs; (5) with growing family, purchase on time of larger residence in the suburbs; (6) after departure of children from the home and on retirement of husband, return of couple to city and rent of a small apartment; (7) after death of spouse removal of surviving member to hotel, furnished room, or kitchenette apartment.

Variations of the last two stages are

moving to California or Florida to a small home and later to a small apartment or rooming house. Two other variations are having married children move in with parents, or taking up residence in the home of a married son or daughter.

Other patterns of residential change will occur to the reader. For example, when farmers retire they typically move into a smaller home in the nearby small town. Patterns of the residential cycle vary considerably with social class, ethnic group, and marital status of the older persons. Studies of certain trends in the mobility of older persons in a town of 6,000 persons are now being completed by Marian McLaughlin.

THE MARRIED COUPLE IN OLD AGE

Of the population aged 65 and over, 35 per cent of the men and 18 per cent of the women constitute married couples living in their own homes apart from their children and other relatives. The great majority of these are first marriages, but they also include some remarriages of widowed or divorced persons.

Couples in this over-65 group comprise a high proportion who have been married for a long time and have been happily married. Most of them have celebrated silver weddings; some have had their golden wedding anniversaries. Husbands and wives have shared joys and sorrows. They have weathered crises. Their lives have become more or less closely intertwined. Now they are often living, perhaps more than ever before, in the lives and activities of their children.

The following personal document gives a picture of a successful married couple in Prairie City.

Mr. Royce is 68 and his wife is 62, but both look younger. Their four children, now married, live within a radius of 200 miles from the parental home. They are financially independent of their parents, have their own friends, and handle their own problems, but seem to enjoy visiting their parents and try to space their visits so one or two families visit every weekend. . . .

While the children were growing up the Royce family lived in a large eight-room house. . . . They attended school with other children of this upper-lower class neighborhood and had room to play and entertain their friends at home. When they finished school the boys went to work or joined the armed forces. There is no evidence that the break from home was overly difficult for either parent or the children.

Mr. and Mrs. Royce sold the large house when the children left home and moved into the five-room cottage next door. It is more modern and comfortable, but Mrs. Royce says, "Sometimes we wish we still lived in the big house so all of the children and their families could visit us at the same time. The old house seemed so empty with all the children gone. Now they are all married and there are two in each family, and in one the family is four, so we don't have room for all of them at one time. . . ."

The Royces look forward to the children's visits. . . . Mrs. Royce keeps the guest bedroom ready at all times and has the baby beds set up for the grandchildren. They are proud of these grandchildren, have their pictures framed and prominently displayed.[5]

Unhappy marriages in old age have not often been depicted in sociological studies. Waller, however, gives an account of an incompatible couple. He traces the process of alienation to its culmination in old age.

Conflict was constant and unremitting from morning until night, from one week's end to the next; no intervals of peace relieved the tension [except] when one of the children was seriously ill. . . .

The initiative of these quarrels was almost wholly with the wife. . . . The refusal of sex relations was one of her most potent weapons, and she inflicted a terrible price

[5] See note 3 *supra*, pp. 84–85.

upon her husband for any yielding. She nagged constantly, complaining about every possible point. At about the twelfth year of marriage, she developed a new technique, that of constant whining, and for a time her husband objected strenously to this, but soon it, too, was a part of the folkways of the marriage. She was an adept at dry, sarcastic humor; her genial wit and humor made her highly popular outside her family, but when her jokes were directed at her husband they always had a sharp edge.

. . . Throughout the long middle period of their marriage this pair continued to live together in the manner described. . . . They made no effort to get along; . . . The adjustment of the pair was conflict; conflict in its most inclusive and destructive forms. Every quarrel left each member of the pair partly satisfied, but with new injuries to redress and therefore ready to take up arms again. The pattern of association was not one of distance, but one of extraordinary neurotic closeness. Both suffered from these quarrels, but they also took pleasure in them. In between times they prepared their statements, and when they managed to get off a telling shot, the triumphant expression on their faces and the gloating tone of voice demonstrated their glee over their success. . . .

When this marriage reached the period of devolution, it slowly but steadily improved, although within very definite limits. . . . The two never departed from their quarreling pattern. The wife never ceased to fuss and whine and complain; the husband never ceased to be emotionally bound up in his conflict relation with her.[6]

RELATIVES

In Prairie City ties of kinship appear to be less strong than in rural communities. Albrecht reports that only thirty-seven of the group of one hundred persons who answered the questionnaire claim one or more of the following: frequent social contact with relatives, close family feeling, assistance during illness. Of the remainder, fifty have little or some contact, ten have little or no interest or contact, and three have no living relatives. The actual nature of association with relatives is shown by the following excerpts from two contrasting statements by people in their later years:

We have all our relatives in this town or near enough to visit. We have our car and go to visit them often. They come to see us all of the time and there were six different visitors here yesterday. I came back . . . here because my brother is here and when my husband died I came back to the town where I grew up. I have lovely nieces and nephews, their pictures are on the table, and I hear from them often and get a chance to visit them once in a whole. Our brothers and sisters are scattered all around here and we see them often. I like to make pies and make a lot of them for cousins. I have a brother in Denver and see him ever so often. . . . We always kept up with our families and like to visit them. Since we have no children of our own, we like to be with nieces and nephews. On vacation we visit around with relatives.[7]

. . . My brother is here but his wife is sick and we don't see each other often. . . . I try to get to my sister's home about once in three months and then I see other relatives but usually I am too busy for any visiting.[8]

IN-LAWS

Among many primitive, ancient, and present-day Oriental societies, the newlyweds take up their residence in the home of the parents of either the bride or the bridegroom. When this occurs, the young husband generally works for his father or father-in-law, and the young wife carries on household duties under the direction of her mother or mother-in-law. The authority and power are clearly in the hands of the aging parents. Old age is honored and respected not only in the community but also in the extended kinship groups by the children and the grandchildren.

Under these conditions, conflicts and antagonisms no doubt exist, as indicated by life histories and personal documents. In general, however, manifestations of these attitudes are repressed and controlled. Traditions, ceremony, and ritual regulate relationships, and the younger generation fits into the expected roles. Even with retirement from active physical labor of the aging parents, provison is made for their maintenance, and their position is secure.

In our own society, the norm is for the newly married couple to establish a home of their own. Nevertheless, through economic necessity, shortage of housing, or sense of responsibility, many older persons are living with their children, married or single. Statistics indicate that 32 per cent of all older men and 17 per cent of all older women are living with both their spouses and other relatives. These other relatives are not broken down in census reports, but undoubtedly include a considerable percentage of married couples. Among older persons who are not married (largely widowed, but also including the single and the divorced), 14 per cent of the men and 41 per cent of the women are living with relatives, the majority of whom undoubtedly are their own married and unmarried children.

The discussion of the relation of in-laws to their children will be taken up under three headings: (1) aging parents living with children; (2) aging parents residing apart from their children but maintaining satisfying relations with them; (3) aging parents living apart from children but in conflict with them.

Case studies of young married couples made by Burgess and Wallin[9] indicate conditions which make for satisfying or frustrating relations between aging parents and their married or unmarried children. These data are the basis of the discussion which follows.

Living with children

This situation may be a matter of choice or of necessity. Where both parents and children elect to live together, the arrangement may work out more or less satisfactorily. Where the wife is working, the mother-in-law often takes on the major charge of the household responsibilities. She may be very happy to function as a baby sitter when the young couple take a night off. Although there may be some disagreements these tend to be minor, and both generations report the relationship as satisfying.

Often, however, especially where the arrangement is one of necessity, difficulties arise. During the present housing shortage, many young couples have had to move in with either the husband's or the wife's parents. In these situations the wife generally gets on better with her mother than with her mother-in-law. Often the relationship may be satisfying to the aging parents, although a difficult one for the children. Sometimes the situation would be satisfactory except for the attitude of the young husband or wife.

Living apart from children but having satisfying relations

At the present time, the most satisfactory situation from the standpoint both of aging parents and of the married children is where the two generations have separate residences but maintain satisfying relations.

[6] Willard Waller, *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation* (New York: Cordon Co., 1938), pp. 369–70 and 376–77.

[7] See note 3 *supra*, p. 131.

[8] See note 3 *supra*, p. 132.

[9] Ernest W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, *Engagement and Marriage*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., in press for 1952 publication.

Mr. and Mrs. Brown have been a happy couple, independent of their children but with a close social relationship.

Mrs. Brown: I have four children, 19 grandchildren and 13 great-grandchildren. I see them often. They come in here a lot and sometimes bring the little ones for the day.

Mr. Brown: The grandchildren and their families come here and visit once or twice a week. It depends on whether I am working. We go with our children on long trips for vacations and one of our children always comes in and takes us to church.[10]

The following case study illustrates a new type of attitude on the part of aging parents:

What do I think of children continuing to live with their parents after they are married? It is a fine idea and I am for it for everybody except myself. I have a twelve room house with two screened porches on a forty acre farm and I am always glad when my married son and his wife and children and my married daughter and her husband and children come for a visit. My wife and I are delighted to see them and the grandchildren, but after they have stayed two or three days, what a relief for both of us when they and the children all depart![11]

In her study, *The Social Roles in Old Age,* Ruth Albrecht concludes:

These old people are representative of other parents in roles they take and in their attitudes toward their children. Some parents like to be independent and want their children to allow them to remain so. Others appreciate the attention and care their children and other descendants offer unless they try to take too much responsibility away from them. Parents who have a good relationship to their children do not dwell on their own early lives but are happy in the present time.

Parents who are mutually independent of their children show the following characteristics:

1. They can accept or give favors or suggestions without feeling threatened. A basic security in loving and feeling loved removes the threat that could be present for either parent or adult-child.

2. They enjoy working or playing with the second generation.

3. They are proud of their children, like them and have not grown too far apart in interests and mode of life.

4. They accept in-laws as members of the family. Since they have interests outside of the family they are not threatened by the spouse of any second generation member.[12]

Living apart from children but in conflict

Not infrequently aging parents and their children are in conflict with each other. Typically, the antagonism tends to be between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law or son-in-law. The aging father or father-in-law seems to get on better with his son-in-law and daughter-in-law than does his spouse. Often there are differences in culture, particularly in religion, that make for chronic conflict. Where the aged parent or parents are dependent and do not live with the couple, the burden of financial support, although assumed by the son, may cause financial stress and even emotional difficulties on one or both sides.

More research is needed on the types of relation between aging parents and their children and the conditions under which they are emotionally satisfying or disturbing. Particularly significant is the hypothesis that the mutually satisfying relations are much more likely to be maintained where living with or away from parents is a matter of choice and not of necessity both for the elderly and for the younger couple.

THE WIDOWED

Widows and widowers constitute a high proportion of persons 65 and over (54 per cent and 24 per cent respectively). They are persons who have experienced family life and are now deprived of it.

The higher proportion of widows as compared to widowers can be explained in three ways. First, the expectation of life is higher for women than for men. Second, brides on the average are younger than bridegrooms. Third, widowers who remarry select women on the average much younger than themselves.

The death of a husband or wife is a crisis forcing the person to make decisions important for family living. This crisis experience and its aftermath will be considered in two aspects: (1) bereavement, and (2) reasons for not remarrying. Interviews secured by William H. Harlan in his unpublished study *Isolation and Conduct in Later Life* provide the data for the following discussion.

The death of a spouse after a marriage of forty or more years does not terminate the association. The departed one, especially at first, may be recalled with a vividness that simulates actual presence. An eighty-year-old widower reports this experience, as well as the shock of his wife's sudden passing.

My wife died . . . sudden; got to feeling bad one night, so I called the doctor and he sent her to the hospital. The next night she died. I was lost for a time afterward; felt like it was the end of the world. For a while I went on thinking she was still there. I could imagine what she would be doing at a certain time, or what she would have said to something. Well, that went on for quite a while, but in the last few years I haven't thought about it so much. I guess in a few years more I won't remember it at all.[13]

Another widower married for twenty-five years when his wife died attempts to preserve his house as he thinks his wife would wish.

I've tried to keep everything just as it was when she was alive. I've kept it just as I thought she would like it. I've always taken a great deal of pleasure in caring for the lawn and garden. Some men take up golf; my house has always been my recreation.[14]

Reactions of widows to the deaths of their husbands are similar to those quoted from widowers. There is the disposition to reconstruct in memory and imagination the illusion of the departed.

Harlan summarizes the reasons widowers give for not remarrying, as

a feeling that life purposes had been achieved in first marriage; feeling that remarriage would signify disloyalty to memory of wife or to her family group (and perhaps to children); and, an idealization of the first marriage. . . . Others quite obviously were not touched upon, such as necessity to support an invalid relative, devotion to career, unattractiveness, chronic illness and so forth.[15]

Many of these reasons apply equally well to widows who do not remarry.

PROBLEMS A CHALLENGE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The materials presented indicate that aging in the later decades presents its particular problems of family living. Instead of their children being dependent economically and emotionally upon them, parents in old age often find they are dependent upon children for financial and emotional support. There arise new problems of relationships with their married children complicated by the attitudes and behavior of sons-in-law and daughters-in-law. These difficulties may be chronically disturbing if they are sharing the same living quarters, especially when this housing arrangement is a matter of necessity rather than of choice.

[10] See note 9 *supra.*

[11] See note 3 *supra,* p. 86.

[12] See note 3 *supra,* pp. 91–92.

[13] See note 2 *supra,* p. 217.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 220.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 186.

There are those deprived of family living—the widowed, the single, the separated, and the divorced. The problem of loneliness seems particularly prevalent and poignant among them, although some have made more or less satisfactory adjustments.

The many different patterns of family living among older persons and the various types of problems they encounter constitute a challenge for further research.

A quite complete outline for further research in the family relations of older persons is presented in Chapter 6 of Pollak's *Social Adjustment in Old Age*.[16] Therefore only a few significant projects will be mentioned here.

1. Studies are desirable of the various patterns of family living of the aging by urban or rural residence, by region, by ethnic and occupational group, and by social class.

2. Particularly interesting studies could be made of patterns of family living according to the nature and degree of dominance exerted by the aging father over his wife and over his children, whether or not they are residing with him.

3. A significant study could compare the factors making for and against satisfying relations of the aging parent or parents with the children and grandchildren. Among those to be considered are temperamental and emotional compatibility or incompatibility, attitude toward marriage of children, acceptance or rejection of reciprocal roles, common or diverse interests, and adaptability or unadaptability.

4. A public opinion poll might provide interesting data on the approved patterns of family living for aging persons classified by the age of respondent, by region, by ethnic and occupational group, and by social class.

5. A valuable study could be made of couples who have celebrated golden wedding anniversaries to discover the factors associated with the happy and with the unhappy unions.

6. The quasi family of older nonrelated persons is important for study, particularly from the standpoint of conditions and arrangements making for its successful or unsuccessful operation.

7. A study is feasible of the factors determining whether a widowed person does or does not remarry or does or does not wish to remarry.

8. Demonstration or experimental projects on preparation of the aging for retirement should include a section on planning for family living.

[16] See note 1 *supra*.

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Education's Role in Maintaining the Individual's Status

By WILMA T. DONAHUE

AGING is a process of change, and can be fully understood only when it is viewed in the perspective of a continuous life flow from conception to death. The differentiation and maturation of cellular material and its involution and senescence constitute the continuously changing biological substructure of the aging organism. Each change in function is conditioned by concomitant or preceding biological circumstances and by environmental stress to which the aging individual is exposed. The concept of the individual as a functional but changing whole moving through a dynamic life space has been accepted in the study and treatment of children; it has not yet been fully comprehended as including the total life span.

The period of later maturity has been traditionally regarded as static, as a time when the individual's development has been halted and his potentialities dissipated by the blight of age, during which he can only await his ultimate dismissal from life. Fortunately, there is a growing awareness that age in itself need not impale the individual and transform his life from a state of useful participation to one of doddering retirement. Resources for personal development are lodged within the individual throughout all his years. Educators have assumed responsibility for stimulating, developing, and preparing youth for the roles of early adulthood; their responsibility for rendering a corresponding service to the older adult for his role in later life appears obvious.

FUNCTIONS OF EDUCATION FOR THE OLDER ADULT

The major function of education for older adults is to help them to continue the exploration of their potentialities, and to assist them in preserving their integration in society. To achieve such a broad objective, education must design a fourfold program. First, it must aid in the adjustment of the individual to the personal and social changes accompanying aging by providing information necessary to achieve lifelong adjustment. Second, it must promote the adjustment of society to its aging population by helping to create appropriate attitudes and by encouraging the development of opportunities for the continued use of the talents and skills of older citizens. Third, it must train personnel to serve older people by establishing courses of study, programs of field practice, and in-service training in gerontology. Finally, it must promote research for the development of a body of knowledge about aging and its implications for individual and social practice.

Although there is admittedly much to be learned, gerontologists already have sufficient information, if they were to apply it, to improve markedly the economic status, the health, and the emotional welfare of aging adults, and to assist communities in developing patterns providing for role maintenance with age. This information must be made available to the aging and their society through broad educational chan-

nels. The programs currently in progress and others which are under consideration represent important advances in this new phase of adult education. Before reporting upon these, however, it is in order to discuss some of the considerations common to all approaches of education for the older adult.

PROBLEMS AND NEEDS

Modern education for youth has attempted to identify the critical life issues and basic needs with which the developing individual must be equipped to deal. Through the regular curriculum, it has then set about to provide training and skill for making the necessary adjustments. This approach has not been extended to form the basis of adult education. As Thomas Van Sant has pointed out, "education for adults has been and to a large extent still exists as a second chance for them to pick up things they missed for good, bad or indifferent reasons when they were children, teen-agers or young adults."[1] More realistic and pertinent programs of education for all adults will result when their social, personal, and economic needs are analyzed, with these analyses used as a basis for designing programs which will help them in finding solutions and making adjustments throughout life.

Reaching the older adult

A primary problem encountered in implementing the ideal of lifelong learning is that of reaching the older adult. Those individuals who are now old have been exposed only casually to adult education. They suffer from fears generated from knowledge that they have experienced both physical and mental change, and that they do not measure up to the academic requirements set for their children and grandchildren. They are unaccustomed to entering into group learning experiences. They are aware that public attitudes condone, if not encourage, their acceptance of passive patterns of behavior or the pursuit of happiness through purely recreational activities. As a result of these factors, they have not demanded educational opportunity, and, in far too many instances, have ceased from intellectual exploration upon graduation from the "little red schoolhouse" or its more modern counterpart.

If the few statistics available concerning the age distribution of students enrolled in regular adult education classes are typical, it is clear that present programs are not attracting many older adults. Willis Reals reports that only 4 per cent of students enrolled in the evening classes at Washington University are over 50 years of age.[2] In one city school, the mean age of students in the adult education program is 26 years, with only 5 per cent over 50 years of age. In classes specifically designed for but not restricted to older adults average ages are of course higher: 53 years at the University of Illinois,[3] and 62 years at the University of Michigan.[4]

In recognition that, at least for the present, only a limited number of older persons are becoming involved in activities offered directly by the school, the New York State Education Department now provides aid to local school systems for the implementation of programs being offered by other agencies. Under this arrangement, the educator is enabled to serve groups which are well established (such as golden-age clubs), to co-operate with industries in developing educational programs for retirement, and to assist churches, clubs, private and public community agencies, libraries, and homes for the aged in providing educational services to old people.

[1] Thomas A. Van Sant, "Responsibility of Education to the Older Adult," in *Growing in the Older Years* (W. Donahue and C. Tibbitts, Eds., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1951), p. 120.

[2] Willis H. Reals, "The Place of the University in the Education of the Aging," paper read at Second International Gerontological Congress, St. Louis, September 1951.

[3] Robert Peterson, "University Extension Courses in Gerontology," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 6 (1951), p. 40.

[4] Wilma Donahue, "Age with a Future," in *Social Work in the Current Scene 1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 82.

Learning and the older adult

Basic to a program of education for the older adult is the assumption that people can continue to learn throughout life. It has been estimated that 70 per cent of our older people are still mentally alert and active. There is good reason to believe that the way to maintain this mental alertness of the aging is through continued intellectual activity, such as educational experiences provide. That educators have been laggard in offering programs for older adults may reflect a lack of awareness of the effectiveness of learning as an antidote to psychological aging. When both educators and the aging are convinced that the adjustment of older people can be greatly improved through educational channels, it is probable that many new developments will take place.

Content

No clear-cut roles have crystallized for the adult beyond retirement age. This fact creates a problem in designing educational programs for older adults, since the starting point for planning should be the actual needs of the people served. Adult educators are loath to undertake the development of programs, preferring to wait until the ultimate role of the older individual in society and his associated problems are more clearly defined.

Although research data relative to the most appropriate content of educational programs for older adults are not yet available, we do not have the pooled judgments of the eighty members of the Education Section of the First National Conference on Aging as to the most important areas to be included. Areas recommended included education for physical and mental health, family and group membership, economic security, vocational skills, leisure-time pursuits, social and civic responsibility, and religious experience.[5] At the Governor's Conference on the Problems of the Aging held in Sacramento, California, in October 1951, a study group recommended that education center its function around economic problems, physical and mental health, and leisure-time interests.[6] In Homer Kempfer's study of the needs of older people, guidance services are also included in the recommended content of educational programs.[7]

It is appropriate with reference to content of educational offerings to point out the need for modification of existing curricula at the various school levels in order to provide an interpretation to all ages of the potentialities and roles of older people in contemporary life.

Techniques and materials

It is perhaps fortunate that uniformity does not exist in the techniques being employed in the various educational programs throughout the country,

[5] National Conference on Aging, Washington, D. C., 1950, *Man and His Years* (Raleigh, N. C.: Health Publications Institute, 1951), pp. 135–36.

[6] *Background Material for the Governor's Conference on the Problems of the Aging* (Sacramento, Calif.: Department of Social Welfare, 1951), p. 6.

[7] Homer Kempfer, *Education for a Long and Useful Life*, Office of Education Bulletin No. 6, 1950 (Washington, D. C.: Federal Security Agency), pp. 14–29.

because we are yet at an experimental stage of development. Research has not been done on such questions as whether older people learn better in mixed age groups or in peer groups, whether smaller assignments are indicated, whether more time should be allowed for discussion, and whether the lecture technique is better suited to classes of older students than, for example, are group project techniques. Other questions which need to be probed include: What and how much visual aids material will be of value in the instruction of people whose visual and auditory acuity is diminishing? Do special materials need to be prepared? What type of leader is best suited for instructing older people, that is, how important are age and prestige factors in speakers?

Some progress in the development of materials has been made. There are at least three documentary films—*Steps of Age*,[8] *Life with Grandpa*,[9] and *Date of Birth*[10]—which are valuable for discussion purposes. Lectures on problems of aging have been recorded by national experts and are available with instructional aids for use by educational groups, clubs, industry, and others.[11] A manual for a course on retirement has been prepared by the Bureau of Adult Education of the New York State Education Department.[12]

In addition to the usual classroom techniques of lecture and discussion, radio and television have been employed to educate older people and other age groups about the potentialities of the aging.[13]

Financing education for older people

After retirement, a large proportion of people must live on drastically reduced budgets. The fear of outliving their financial reserves leads to programs of severe economy, and hence to an avoidance of such expenditures as tuition for educational courses and materials.

It has been suggested that schools should offer free services to the aged, who have contributed to the building and maintenance of schools in their communities for many years. It has also been pointed out that school buildings and facilities normally receive far less than maximum use and can therefore be made available for use by adult groups at little added cost.

Certain types of programs can be operated with state or federal aid. Vocational education, for example, could be offered as part of the federally subsidized vocational educational program in agriculture, homemaking, trade and industrial education, and business occupations. The example of New York State has already been cited, in which funds are being made available for educational programs carried out by communities and industries, and for such services as counseling and retraining of older persons. Many other states have financial aid programs which provide reimbursement for each individual enrolled in an educational course. Unfortunately, under these programs educators have sometimes preferred to emphasize numbers enrolled, failing to consider the needs of minority groups such as represented by the aging.

[8] *International Film Bureau*, 6 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago 2, Illinois.

[9] Same address.

[10] National Film Board of Canada, 1270 Avenue of the Americas, New York 20, N. Y.

[11] Audio-Visual Education Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[12] "Retirement—A Second Career" (mimeographed), Bureau of Adult Education, New York State Education Department, Albany, N. Y., 1951.

[13] Wilma Donahue, "Experiments in the Education of Older Adults," *Adult Education*, Vol. 2, December 1951.

Who shall do the educating?

The problem of leadership in the education of the aging is complicated by the fact already observed that older adults are not usually found in large numbers in educational programs. They do constitute significant groups, however, in industry, community organizations, and churches. A national survey of educational programs has not been conducted, but casual observation would lead to the conclusion that more programs are offered under community and employment auspices than under the supervision of educational institutions. In a few instances educators have been invited to provide leadership for programs conducted under noneducational sponsorship.

Industry is not agreed as to the educator's responsibility in conducting programs for the older worker. According to one viewpoint, industry should assume entire responsibility for the education and pre-retirement conditioning of the older worker up to the point of retirement, after which the responsibility is transferred to the community. Other representatives of industry contend that educators should provide education for the aging worker either under the auspices of industry or by direct course offerings in the community. It is unlikely that educational programs which do not permit integration of industrial and community planning for the older worker will be maximally effective.

CURRENT EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Some of the representative programs offered by educational agencies, by community groups, and by industrial and business organizations will be reviewed in order to assess the present status of education for the aging and to determine the respects in which its fourfold functions are being served.

UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

Adjustment programs

In 1949 the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging conducted a survey of 468 American colleges, from which it was concluded that "our colleges are slowly but surely beginning to set up a wide variety of courses, institutes and research studies aimed at the ultimate goal of making man's later years his golden years."[14]

Among those colleges offering courses directed toward the adjustment of the individual to the problems of aging are Syracuse University, the University of Illinois, the University of Chicago, and the University of Michigan. The most direct approach to individual diagnosis and counseling is to be found in an experimental course offered currently at the University of Chicago under the direction of the Committee on Human Development. The course is entitled "Making the Most of Maturity," and is designed to assist men and women between the ages of 55 and 64 in developing specific plans for their later years. In the weekly class meetings, extending over a period of approximately thirty weeks, information is being provided on gerontological problems on the basis of the needs of students, with emphasis and direction in the course content being determined by the class. Students are being aided in the formulation of individual plans for the retirement years by expert counseling in such areas as financial planning, vocational

[14] October 28, 1949 release from the office of State Senator Thomas C. Desmond, Chairman, New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, Newburgh, New York.

guidance, health, and personal and family problems. A medical examination including a diagnostic psychiatric interview is an integral part of the course.[15]

The programs in "Living in the Later Years" offered for older people through the Extension Service of the University of Michigan are based on the assumption that the individual older person who is equipped with essential information about aging and experienced in the skills necessary for adjustment to the problems of aging will be able to solve his own problems and adjust to age changes.[16] The casework approach of individualized counseling for everyone is not feasible in terms of time and personnel; nor should it be necessary. Most people at younger ages maintain their emotional equilibrium through the satisfactory execution of purposeful life tasks for which they have been trained. We consider this to be mature living. There is no reason to assume that old people have any less capacity for mature behavior.

The Michigan courses have taken difference forms, but all have been based on the achievement of adjustment by a group procedure. One course is currently underway in which the first part of a three-hour weekly period is used for instruction in the discussion of common gerontological problems and then followed by laboratory practice in social living.[17] In another course, students defined some of the major problems with which they were concerned and set up projects for exploring them. The class divided into three groups; the projects selected by the groups and carried out during the semester were concerned with a study of the satisfactions and dissatisfactions of older people with the church, an analysis of work and training opportunities for older women in the local community, and planning a community center for older people. The students designed interview schedules, collected and analyzed data, and prepared final reports. In addition to gaining information, they learned about the community and the techniques to be used in approaching the problems of changing conditions for older people.[18]

In 1950, Dr. Henry Curtis, himself a man past eighty, proposed that colleges and universities establish a one-year college to help older people learn how to adjust to the problems of old age.[19] His proposal is based on the assumption that old age is a specific life period, and that people need training for living during this period just as for the earlier phases of life. The college which he proposes would have separate buildings, a campus, and its own staff. Its courses and training programs would be individualized and would be based on the results of a physical examination, appraisal of capacities, and financial resources for future living. Students would be taught the best daily habits regarding nutrition, exercise, play, and rest. They would also be stimulated and trained in the development of new interests, new fields of endeavor, new skills and creative activities.

The recently announced Sunk Mine Project, sponsored by the Walt Foundation, embodies much the same principle as Dr. Curtis' proposition.[20] A college for over-sixty Vassar graduates and their husbands has been established at the Sunk Mine Farm, located twenty-five miles from Vassar College. The farm was provided by Mary Babbott Ladd, and the project will be directed by Mary Fisher Langmuir of the Vassar faculty. The educational plan is designed to meet the needs of older persons who are still physically fit, still adventurous in their attitude toward life, but in a quandary as to how to spend their presently enforced leisure. The opening month will be devoted to orientation courses in problems of readjustment, in world and national affairs, and in the arts and sciences, following which students may choose special interests for further study.

Establishing attitudes

Two methods have been employed by colleges and universities to bring the problems of an aging population before the public and to help change attitudes toward the aging. One method has been the sponsorship of radio and television programs which has already been mentioned. These programs have presented the older person with dignity and with emphasis on his positive qualities, in contrast to the semicaricature of old age characteristic of such commercial programs as "Life Begins at Eighty."

A second procedure used by colleges and universities in the education of the general public as well as professional groups has been the holding of conferences and institutes. Conferences have been held at the University of California,[21] the University of Florida,[22] and the University of Chicago to explore research needs. General explorations of the problems of an aging population have been conducted in conferences at Marshall College,[23] Ohio State University, Northwestern University, New York University, and the University of Michigan.[24] Special topics have been considered by some conferences: geriatric nursing at the University of Minnesota; employment and social casework for the aged at the University of Wisconsin; and rehabilitation of the older worker at the University of Michigan.

Training personnel

In 1947 the results of a survey by the Division of Maturity and Old Age of the American Psychological Association showed that university and college instruction relating to problems of the older adult lagged behind the concern and needs of labor unions, social welfare groups, and the aging themselves. From the responses of seventy-one medical schools only five were found to offer specific courses in geriatrics, and only two of sixty-two departments or colleges of education reported courses on the psychology of maturity.[25]

The situation has not improved significantly in the last five years. Everett Soop examined the 1949–50 catalogue

[15] Mary H. Little, "Method and Content of an Intensive Course in Preparation for Later Maturity," paper read at Second International Gerontological Congress, St. Louis, September 1951.

[16] Clark Tibbitts, "Aging and Living," *Adult Education Bulletin*, Vol. 13 (1948), pp. 204–11.

[17] Wilma Donahue, "Experiments in the Education of Older Adults," *Adult Education*, Vol. 2, December 1951.

[18] *Ibid.*; *see also* Wilma Donahue, "Challenges of Aging," in *Proceedings of the 1951 North Carolina Conference on Aging* (in press).

[19] Henry S. Curtis, "A College for Our Aging Population" (mimeographed), 1100 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[20] Mary Babbott Ladd, "The Sunk Mine Project," *Vassar Alumnae Magazine*, Vol. 37 (1951), pp. 20–21.

[21] *The Adjustment of the Aging Population*, Berkeley: University Extension, University of California, 1949.

[22] T. Lynn Smith, Ed., *Problems of America's Aging Population*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1951.

[23] *Proceedings of Conference on Living the Later Years*, Huntington, W. Va.: Marshall College, 1950.

[24] Proceedings published by University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan: *Living Through the Older Years* (Clark Tibbitts, Ed., 1949); *Planning the Older Years* (Wilma Donahue and Clark Tibbitts, Eds., 1950); *Growing in the Older Years* (Wilma Donahue and Clark Tibbitts, Eds., 1951).

[25] Dale B. Harris, "Courses of Instruction on Maturity and Old Age," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 3 (1948), p. 225.

of sixty schools of social work and found that only five listed special courses focused on the aging.[26] In 1949 the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging found that out of 486 colleges and universities only 13 had special courses on some phase of aging.[27] The same survey showed that some emphasis was placed on the aged in other courses in 463 schools, most frequently in departments of sociology or social work (234) and in economics (104). Since 1949, a few more schools have instituted training courses. For example, New York University conducted a two-week workshop on gerontology as part of its adult education curriculum in the summer of 1951.[28]

Research

Every medical school in the United States is carrying out research on the diseases of old age. Other research areas, however, are receiving much less attention. The extent to which researches in the physical and medical sciences have outdistanced investigations in the psycho-social and economic spheres is indicated by the fact that more than three-fourths of the entries in Nathan Shock's *Classified Bibliography on Gerontology and Geriatrics* fall under the categories of "Biology of Aging," "Organ Systems," and "Geriatrics." The Committee on Human Development of the University of Chicago has taken leadership in the investigation of psycho-social problems of aging. The University of California, Cornell University, and Columbia University are concerned with investigations on the employability of older people. As Shock points out, however, aging is not the major concern of any university research organizations, and most data have been accumulated by isolated investigators.[29]

CITY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

The public school system is the center of adult education in most communities. State aid programs make it possible for schools to receive remuneration for adult students in many states. Although there is no upper age limitation in such financial aid programs, few schools have emphasized education for the older adult.

Statistical data regarding the number and kinds of programs offered by the city schools are lacking. Homer Kempfer conducted a survey of schools in 1947 to determine the number offering courses for people past retirement age.[30] He found that only seven schools were offering such courses; four offered training in handicrafts, one offered a course on nutrition, another a course on current events, and one school offered a course on family life.

The situation today is somewhat better than when the Kempfer survey was made. In Michigan alone, at least fifteen city school systems have provided general courses on the problems of aging. San Diego, California has a similar course. The Los Angeles city schools report the most ambitious program, with 1,600 individuals enrolled in sixteen different evening schools. These courses continue from October to June and are made up of a series of lectures devoted to each of the following

[26] Everett J. Soop, "Proposed Programs in Education for an Aging Population," in *Growing in the Older Years*, cited note 24 *supra*, p. 138.

[27] Unpublished report of New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, 94 Broadway, Newburgh, N. Y.

[28] Wilma Donahue, unpublished report, 1510 Rackham Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[29] Nathan W. Shock, *Trends in Gerontology* (Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 75.

[30] Homer Kempfer, in a private communication to the author.

topics: health, personal affairs, nutrition, psychology of aging, philosophy, and crafts.[31]

Henrietta Rabe of the New York State Bureau of Adult Education reports that in the past two years there has been a significant increase in the number of local adult education programs provided for older adults in New York. These have developed among special interest groups in clubs and in homes for the aged, and some of the activities are concerned with preparation for retirement, vocational counseling and retraining, and community education.[32] In order to stimulate and encourage public schools to expand their programs for older adults, Mrs. Rabe has prepared a guide for a series of meetings designed to help the individual plan his retirement and find some secondary purpose in life.[33]

Direct attempts to change community attitudes have not been made in most of the school programs. Some programs, however, have featured community hobby shows and choruses which at least draw favorable attention to old people.

There appears to be little effort to design school programs so that they will yield research data, which are vitally needed for the guidance of other educators in developing programs.

COMMUNITY EDUCATION PROGRAMS

With the advent of compulsory retirement, communities have become aware of the problems of the increasing numbers of idle citizens. Concern for their welfare and their inadequate preparation for old age has led many communities to undertake educational programs to assist in adjustment to the problems of aging.

The educational programs developed by community agencies have varied from courses of lectures to institutes and conferences. A few examples will illustrate the variety of community agencies sponsoring programs: Young Men's Christian Association in Minneapolis[34] and Hyde Park, Chicago; welfare councils in Dayton,[35] Cleveland, New York City, Chicago, Rochester, Philadelphia, and Denver; libraries in Cleveland and Detroit; churches in Toledo, Cleveland, Grand Rapids, and Pasadena; and special research agencies, such as Community Studies, Inc. in Kansas City, Missouri.

Significant research on the community level has been carried out by Community Studies, Inc., which has surveyed the needs of the aging in Kansas City and has conducted an evaluative study of one of the local homes for the aging. The Community Project for the Aged, a committee of the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago, has made an exhaustive study of the needs of the aged in Chicago. The Family and Children's Service of Minneapolis is making a study of the effects of an activities program in boarding homes for the aged.

PROGRAMS FOR THE OLDER WORKER

Education for older workers may have several goals: (1) training and retraining for new jobs, necessitated by technological changes or by age changes; (2) training for continuation

[31] Ann M. Barron, "A Large City School Program for Older Adults," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 6 (1951), p. 58.

[32] Henrietta F. Rabe, "Educational Programs for the Older Adult in New York State," paper read at Second International Gerontological Congress, St. Louis, September 1951.

[33] "Retirement—A Second Career" (mimeographed), Bureau of Adult Education, New York State Education Department, Albany, N. Y., 1951.

[34] Jerry Kaplan, mimeographed report, Hennepin County Welfare Board, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1951.

[35] Gordon W. Allen, "Dayton's Institute on Preparation for Retirement," *College and University*, January 1951, pp. 247–51.

of employment after retirement from primary occupations; or (3) preparation for retirement from work. Not only the older worker, but unions, employers, and the community also have an interest in providing education which will increase security in old age and maintain the older individual's participation. Industry recognizes that preparation for retirement is important, but it is also becoming concerned with the corollary objective of keeping older men in the labor force, since the proportion of laborers in the normally preferred age groups is now declining. Organized labor is concerned not only with maintaining adequate pensions, but also with the right of the individual to continue in employment as long as he is able to work. Communities have responsibility for utilizing the skills and the wisdom of the older worker.

These various interests should develop integrated programs to serve the needs of the older workers. Arthur Carstens points out that this will involve "training and retraining facilities, an adequate placement service, educational opportunities and all kinds of professional service," and he comments that "while active experimentation has begun, *no* comprehensive program for the older worker is underway anywhere in the United States." [86] Perhaps it will be possible to correlate the isolated programs being carried out by industry, unions, and the community so that the older worker will not continue to experience such a marked contrast between his pre-retirement life and that which follows.

Most industrial programs at the present time are concerned solely with preparation of workers for retirement, and these programs are of several types. Some consist of a series of lectures presented either by professional educators, as in the General Motors of Canada experiment,[87] or by personnel officers, as in the Standard Oil of New Jersey program. The programs of the Prudential Insurance Company of America and the Ford Motor Company are examples of those which provide personal counseling services. In other programs, printed literature on problems of the aging is issued, for example, the series "My Time—Is My Time" published by General Motors.

Research on employment and retirement practices is underway. Probably the most comprehensive is that being directed by Elizabeth Breckinridge of the University of Chicago's Committee on Human Development. It is from such studies as these that hope for integrated programs to serve the aging is to be found. As research reports are published, educators should study them with a view to determining what contributions can be made by educational programs toward maintaining the older individual as a participating and useful member of society.

CONCLUSION

It appears obvious that adult education has given but scant attention to the needs of older adults. Growing awareness of the problems and of the opportunity to assist in maintaining older people in functional roles is apparent, but little more than sporadic and isolated action will be taken by educators until more systematic information and more trained leadership are available.

In appreciation of this need, the Adult Education Association of the United States has adopted a recommendation that a study group be established to survey the educational needs of older adults, to provide direction and content for programs, and to develop plans for the integration of educational programs with total community planning for the older adult. A second recommendation adopted by the association was that a workshop for the training of leaders in the education of older people be conducted for the purpose of assessing needs, developing programs, and evaluating outcomes over a period of years.

The tempo of developments in the field of aging, however, precludes postponement of action until the results of such undertakings are available. Education for and about the aging must be developed at every level. Local communities can provide services to the individual older person; state organizations can assist in the formulation of policy and the promotion of co-operation between agencies; and national groups can provide for broad-scale research and for an over-all integration of activities for the aging. By these means, education can make its contribution to the maintenance of the older person as a useful member of society.

[86] Arthur Carstens, "Community Attitudes Toward the Aging," *Adult Education*, Vol. 1 (1950), p. 53.

[87] R. B. Robson, "Experiments in Education of the Older Worker," *Industrial Medicine and Surgery*, Vol. 18 (1949), pp. 365–67.

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Housing Our Older Citizens

By Hertha Kraus

MODEST but regular cash incomes, as provided by social insurance benefits, by industrial and government pensions, by annuities, and also by old-age assistance have given to many of our older citizens a new freedom. Some are thus given freedom to determine whether they want to live in their own households as owners or tenants, whether they prefer to be partly or wholly relieved from housekeeping responsibilities by moving into a hotel, a rooming house or a boarding house, whether they wish to live under the care and management of a public or private charitable institution, or whether they would feel happier and more useful moving in with married children or other close relatives, sharing their homes and some of their responsibilities. Such choice represents great improvement indeed as against earlier periods, not so long ago, when mostly for economic reasons the older generation was forced to yield its independence in exchange for family support, or for the far less acceptable support of almshouses and other congregate institutions.

In reality today the choice may be quite restricted, however: by anxiety in anticipating need for personal care in illness and emergencies; by the shying away from responsibilities for household management, cooking, cleaning, marketing; or by failing strength. There are the inconveniences and hazards of dwellings not planned for the older years. In many cases, income is so limited as to prohibit an easy change to a more suitable dwelling. And there is definitely a shortage of desirable dwelling units of low and medium cost, and of desirable living arrangements in pleasant and welcoming institutions.

Income Restrictions on Housing

There is a general belief that most older people wish to live in their own homes. Data from the 1950 Census show that, whether by choice or circumstance,

> over 80 per cent of the urban and rural nonfarm families of people 65 years of age and over maintain independent households. Generally speaking, their housing circumstances are worse than those of the rest of the population. The aged tend to occupy relatively more very low rent dwelling units and low value structures, and their housing is relatively more dilapidated and deficient in plumbing facilities.[1]

Limited purchasing power is, of course, a primary factor influencing choice of living arrangements of older people. Families at the upper age levels are disproportionately numerous among all low income families. The best data available on money income of the older population are summarized in the article by Dr. Cohen, "Income Maintenance for the Aged," in this volume.

Obviously there is little or no problem in this respect for people of substantial means who can select hotel or apartment living or independent homes at prevailing rates, and who have the funds from which they can supplement their housing by invited, usually paid, companions, and by professional and personal services as their conditions may require them.

There is also, perhaps, little of a housing problem for those who continue in employment, earning incomes high enough to maintain acceptable living standards in a familiar setting among old associates with some money to pay for lightening domestic responsibilities and to meet the exigencies of ill health. Continuing employment and earning may delay their housing problem—not necessarily solve it for a later period. And, finally, there is a group of unknown size—parents and grandparents—needed and personally wanted by a younger generation of their family, and willing and able to adjust to the younger generation's life pattern and friends in exchange for the satisfaction of continued usefulness and an affectionate climate.

Factors in Unsatisfactory Housing

In the records of community agencies, in national and local studies,[2] and in the experience of many professional workers and volunteers there is ample evidence that housing and living arrangements for many of our older people are often most unsatisfactory. Ministers and physicians, caseworkers, visiting nurses, and visiting housekeepers know of the problems. Councils of social agencies and information centers receive innumerable requests from older persons to find new living quarters for them. Boarding and nursing homes serving the aged often have long waiting lists, particularly those which offer desirable arrangements in familiar neighborhoods. Hospitals, general and mental, know of many patients who might be released if they could only have a home suitable for some continued care.

Severe family tensions, most painful conflicts and injuries to old and young, are reported by psychiatrists and caseworkers when families are trying to combine arrangements satisfying for two or three generations in the same home. People living alone or with elderly spouses may fight a constant depressing struggle with environmental hazards: difficult stairs, poor lighting or heat, inconvenient kitchens and bathrooms which grossly overtax the capacity to deal with daily needs. Malnutrition and neglect of personal care and cleanliness may result for some, while others are filled with increasing anxiety and guilt. But even a convenient home may be lonely because of its inaccessibility for relatives and frends.

Besides, housing costs may be too great, quite out of proportion to total incomes. Pricing rentals for an elderly couple in eight large cities, Social Security Administration Studies found in 1946–48 that they must spend from 37 to 51 per cent of their total budget on rent, heating and light.[3] Among nonfarm householders 65 and older, 1946 figures of the Bureau of the Census show that more than two-thirds—2.5 million of the 3.5 million households in this group—owned their own property.[4] We may also wonder how

[1] L. S. Silk, "The Housing Characteristics of the Aged in the United States, 1950," paper presented at the Second International Gerontological Congress, St. Louis, Sept. 13, 1951, p. 4.

[2] Editor's Note: Dr. Kraus supplied a large number of references to United States and foreign literature on housing for older people. Unfortunately, there was not space to print them. The Revised Division of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington 25, D. C., has incorporated Dr. Kraus's references in a bibliography which is available on request. See also Hertha Kraus, "Older Persons Have Special Housing Needs," *Journal of Housing*, Jan., 1950.

[3] See Social Security Administration, "A Budget for an Elderly Couple," *Social Security Bulletin*, Feb. 1948.

[4] See Subcommittee on Low Income Families, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, *Low-Income Families and Economic Stability* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 27–28, 83.

many of the 2.5 million homeowners are actually able to maintain their property in adequate condition, and how many contribute to deterioration and blight of entire neighborhoods.

The overwhelming evidence of need and social damage can be offset only to a very small degree by the positive response of those older people who in recent years have been helped to strengthen their living arrangements and are now occasionally reached by newer community services extending into their homes. Friendly visiting and counseling, housekeeping and nursing aid, recreation, library, and hospital extension services have brought a new outlook and a new lease on life to a fortunate few.

COMMUNITY RESPONSE

There has also been a new sympathetic response to the gradual discovery of the housing needs of our senior citizens. We begin to recognize that the rapid increase of the aging population, the longer life span of many individuals, the longer span of married life—in combination with other well-known factors such as urbanization, industrialization, physical mobility, and class mobility—have created conditions which can no longer be met by traditional measures and practices. We have also become a little more sensitive to the meaning of emotional needs which will hardly be satisfied by extending minimum economic support.

Current attention and efforts, responding to increasing demand, have approached the housing problem from various angles, including: (1) nationwide attempts at modernization and expansion of various institutional facilities; (2) extension of diversified services into the homes of aged persons or at least into their immediate neighborhoods in an attempt to strengthen and prolong independent living arrangements, similar to the services described by Miss Dorothea Ramsey in the article, "Community Services for Self-Maintenance in the United Kingdom," in this volume; and (3) fact-finding and exploratory studies, workshops, conferences, and programmatic statements on better housing.

The Working Committee on Aging in its progress report[5] to the Federal Security Administrator set forth six principles with regard to housing, confirmed by the 1950 National Conference on the Aging: (1) development of substitutes for family life and encouragement of opportunities which will allow older people to form new families; (2) consideration of certain amendments of the National Housing Act which would permit federally aided public housing projects to include units for the elderly who are living alone; (3) exploration of the merit of government loans to municipalities, co-operatives, and other nonprofit groups to build low-cost or low-rent housing for older people; (4) expansion of nonresident community services, with special emphasis on housekeeping and nursing; (5) allocation of some space for specially designed and equipped units in all public housing projects and in those supported by private investments; and (6) mobilization of extensive research for the study of existent facilities and trends, and appraisal of current efforts.

It must be noted with distress that, within the entire range of activities and plans, least attention is being given to improving and increasing the actual supply of low- and medium-cost dwelling units for those who wish to live outside of institutions and also independent of their own families if such exist.

[5] Federal Security Agency, *Programs for an Aging Population*, March 1950, pp. 23–25.

Waiting for a solution are those in inadequate dwellings, those spending far too much of their meager income on maintaining their independence, those forced into rooming houses and rented rooms who crave the dignity of their own homes, and those forced into dependency on a younger family without being compatible or welcome.

There are practically no new developments in this area. We scan the literature and meet the same old friends: a few cottage colonies for the elderly developed by public enterprise as in Millville, New Jersey or by fraternal efforts in a few spots in California and Florida; fewer than three hundred apartments designed for the aged in public projects in New York City, Chicago, Denver, and Bridgeport, Connecticut; and even a smaller number of apartments for the aged under the auspices of voluntary agencies in New York City.

More must and can be done. We may need a clearer focus. Experience, observation, assorted studies—all available information indicates: (1) a clear preference of an overwhelming majority of aging people for noninstitutional living; (2) great benefit for the individual of continuing as long as possible in familiar surroundings in personal homes; (3) the need to protect many specialized and expensive institutions against the growing demand for long-time care by patients who might be cared for differently at less expense to the community and to themselves, and with far greater comfort; and (4) the high capital and operating costs of institutional care of every type—general hospitals, mental hospitals, hospitals for the chronically ill, nursing homes, and boarding homes of adequate standards—which can rarely be met without substantial subsidies.

ALTERNATIVE HOUSING PATTERNS

What then shall we do? Shall we try to build up a stronger feeling of family responsibility so that the homes of the younger generation will increasingly provide a solution?

Is return to the three-generation family the natural, the decent, the most economical way? Many factors point in the opposite direction. The answer is likely to be "no." The arguments of great mobility, urban living, smaller size of families and of family homes, all in line with long-time trends, have been stated frequently.

If, then, a return to family care and three-generation living arrangements seems rather unlikely for considerable numbers of the aged, now and in the near future, what can be done realistically to provide large numbers with more adequate homes? Will the present community services, expanding, provide the answer?

All true friends of individualized service must recognize the inherent limitations of community services outside institutions, must wish to protect them against the dangerous and crushing pressures of mass demand. Their continuing extension into numerous homes will depend on a number of rather uncertain factors: leadership; sustained community interest, understanding, and support; availability of qualified personnel in specialized fields, capable of functioning both independently and as part of interprofessional teams.

Even if there should not be any lack in most of these areas, the problem of priority and of balance in the utilization of a limited service potential must arise. Who shall have first claim on highly skilled and costly services if not all can be helped: the younger or the older generation? the well, those only

slightly handicapped, or those severely disabled? those who can be helped to reach a high level of social and economic productivity, or those where such expectation would be entirely unrealistic?

Is a further expansion of general and specialized institutions for the care of the aging urgently needed? Frankly, we do not know. The obvious current demand may be partly, if not largely, a result of inadequate domestic living arrangements. The pressure on institutional services, including mental and other hospitals, may represent a last choice, an escape out of intolerable conditions—not necessarily a desirable, suitable, and advantageous solution in meeting real needs.

Caution seems indicated before we decide to make substantial permanent capital investments in order to create institutional service units which cannot easily be converted if housing conditions or policy should change. The surplus of children's institutions, of antiquated almshouses, or correctional institutions for youth should serve to underline this consideration. It may be one of the most important characteristics of the expanding noninstitutional home-service program that, without capital investment, they can be stretched to meet urgent needs temporarily, taking some of the pressures off the institutions until we are more ready to focus attention, energies, and co-ordinated action on the greatest gap in our resources for the aging—special housing with built-in facilities.

We are dealing with a mass problem, rather similar to the problem of income protection as we discovered it in its true proportion only during the depression of the thirties. Then we learned, at the cost of great and prolonged suffering of millions of people, that mass problems cannot be solved by improvization, by voluntary action alone, by personal resourcefulness, or even by a maximum of professional individualized service, and certainly not by charity.

FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS

At this point a brief look at foreign developments in our field may be in order. Limited space will allow only a sketchy analysis of available data, and an attempt at their interpretation in reference to the American scene.

Old-age housing is receiving marked public attention in a good many countries. Outstanding illustrations of carefully planned projects have become known especially in England, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland; also in the Union of South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. On this continent, Canada and Mexico have produced interesting developments in recent years.

Most of these countries have a tradition of nation-wide public housing programs for the planned improvement of neighborhoods and family dwellings covering all population groups, not only those in the minimum income brackets. Most of them have also established public old-age insurance and pension schemes which for many years have provided large groups of aged with modest but regular cash incomes, outside public assistance.

In their current planning for the aged, all recognize typical repetitive conditions which can be anticipated. Needs differ only slightly, in degree, among several groups: the ablebodied older folks, those frail and in need of some help, those more seriously disabled, and those disabled requiring hospital care and service. Foreign countries now tend to integrate facilities for these groups, so that any transition as needed may be easy and will not represent a complete break with familiar surroundings. They also tend to relate institutional units more closely with the community at large, making small institutions part of integrated neighborhood schemes, to become available in every planned neighborhood. Such an approach has meant the development of projects where institutions have taken on many features of living arrangements once typical of private dwellings only, and specially designed private dwellings have been increasingly enriched by built-in services once typical of institutional care.

Isledon House in London (England), the Protestant Evening Sun Home at Velp (Holland), the sixty Catholic institutions following the design of Raalte (Holland), the standard model for town planning as approved by the Dutch Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing with its senior apartment-cottages-hospital unit, may illustrate this point. So may the Riehler Heimstaetten in Cologne (Germany), the Sabbertsbergs Alderdomishem in Stockholm (Sweden), and the Eventide Home at Rockhamton (Australia).

These and many other projects are imaginative attempts, many frankly experimental, to deal effectively with a world-wide problem. Solutions have been encouraged by close co-operation of public bodies with mutual aid, co-operative associations and other voluntary agencies. A policy of mutual trust and partnership, applied also to many other fields of social welfare, has provided public funds for a substantial part of the capital outlay without stifling private initiative and freedom of management by nongovernmental groups.

Design and management

Foreign design for community housing of elderly people is quite varied. There are nursing homes everywhere (also modified as rest and "halfway" houses); there are boarding homes and hostels; there are residence clubs with light housekeeping facilities; and there are many low-rent cottage colonies, including one-family and duplex buildings. There are also many small and large apartment houses, practically always with special provisions for housekeeping and nursing aid and for group recreation. Many have nursing units for those who are incapacitated, or simply sick bays—a somewhat controversial feature. While all newer units have been designed with very special attention to health and accident hazards, and to the convenience of elderly people, there is a clear influence of national preferences and living patterns on each nationl program and its unit design.

Responsibility for management of the housing units varies. Often the municipal government has charge through its public welfare department. Public housing agencies, also administering other housing projects, may carry full responsibility, unless co-operative associations, voluntary nonprofit housing societies, or church-related or other humanitarian agencies assume the role of landlord. In the same country several different forms are practiced side by side.

Financing

There is, however, a practically uniform source of finance for the entire investment capital, or at least a very substantial part of it. Public funds are used everywhere. They are at the core of all newer projects. They may stem from different budgets: from funds allocated to housing in general, from social insurance reserve or operating funds, or from the budgets of local public welfare and health agencies in line with their traditional policy of developing adequate social facilities. In addition to public funds, capital investments by co-operative associations have played

some role; also generous contributions from foundations and private trust funds, mostly interested in social experimentation. Churches of all denominations have channeled substantial funds into housing developments for the aged, supplementing public grants for the same purpose.

In the main, projects try to cover most of the operating expenses from earnings: income from rentals, boarding fees, or service charges. Rentals follow a sliding scale related to current tenant incomes. There is also, frequently, regular project income from subsidies, from social insurance funds, or from government housing funds. Some voluntary contributions and a great deal of voluntary personal service enrich the programs of both public and voluntary enterprises.

An additional word about subsidies may be in order. Their pattern in each country follows closely the general pattern of government subsidies for all kinds of social welfare purposes. Subsidies may be attached to specific housing units or, as more recently in Sweden and some other countries, to individuals and families wherever they find adequate housing, as long as they are eligible for such subsidy within a given legal category.

It should, however, be clearly understood that these subsidies are not part of a public relief scheme, and are never administered as such. Under European conditions, subsidies not only reflect a different, completely accepted policy, hardly controversial: they may serve as a device in equalization in order to meet, at least in part, the differential between the cost of prewar and postwar housing, thus spreading the advantages of modern housing to all income groups. They may also serve the purpose of supplementing rather inadequate social insurance benefits which reflect heavy losses of capital by inflation and other retarding factors. Low-cost housing and subsidized rents may offer an inflation-proof supplement to many beneficiaries, while cash benefits follow but slowly the ever rising cost of living.

Scope of programs

The scope and speedy expansion of many programs for special senior housing is truly impressive against the background of impoverished economies struggling with a multitude of pressures and social responsibilities. England and the Netherlands both aim at producing not less than 5 per cent of special housing, counting all dwelling units, old and recent. This means at least 10 per cent of all new buildings —a figure not yet completely reached but a clear objective. In 1947 there were already 13,000 housing units for old-age pensioners in little Denmark; the current goal is 20 per cent special units for the population 65 and over.

Observation, study, and reports of foreign developments reflect clearly: (1) a rapidly broadening concept of public social policy; (2) wide interest in active support for good housing and neighborhood planning as an important community resource; (3) a leading role of local government in planning, initiation, and operation of community services for the aged, often assisted by strong citizen participation; and (4) a sincere recognition of the peculiar needs and urgent claims of an aging population.

They also reflect the strong impact of war and destruction on many countries: a heightened sensitivity to human misery, a readiness to yield a high priority to the needs of a sinking generation involved in the shocks and losses of at least two wars. Shortages of supplies and scanty capital have not interfered substantially with imaginative design, nor with carrying plans into action.

CHALLENGE TO AMERICA

On the American scene with its mass problem of more than 12 million aged right now—a rapidly increasing group according to all population forecasts—we note the hopeful beginnings in federal legislation and public opinion of a new national housing policy, but a tragically small public housing program. It currently provides 50,000 units a year narrowly confined to the minimum income groups, and among them to families coming from substandard housing, with some exceptions for veterans. Shall we simply expect the aging in the American community to take their chances in housing along with other millions of limited means? Shall we refer our friends and ourselves for our sunset years to the famous "filtering down" process in housing, which perhaps may yield some cheap housing which no one else wants?

What counsel do we have for the 4 million people over 65 with incomes between $500 and $2,000 a year (1948), or the 5.5 million with less than $500 (among them some spouses of the first group)? We are not even sure whether the three-quarter million people who boasted incomes between $2,000 and $3,000 a year in 1948 will find adequate dwellings.

The validity of special housing schemes for the aging, particularly of low-rent projects, is questioned by some well-meaning people, while it is strongly endorsed by most experts. The latter are not afraid of segregation in any well-planned scheme. Nor are they convinced that most elderly people would prefer to live in the midst of crowds of children, teen-agers, young couples, and their visiting friends. Older people will always be quite free to do so if they wish.

Adequate housing for the aged must develop at the crossroads of two important programs: better housing in better neighborhoods within the reach of all income groups and more adequate services to meet the peculiar needs of a large and growing senior consumer group commonly characterized by waning ability and a proneness to multiple handicaps. Because of these characteristics, service resources for them must be widely available, highly decentralized, truly accessible. Those commonly in greatest demand and of greatest importance should be built into their homes and immediate neighborhoods—resources for preventive care, support, and active aid.

PLANNED ENVIRONMENT, A BASIC RESOURCE

We all know the importance of a positive, helpful environment. Why not deliberately create such environments and put them to work? An environment may be planned in such a way that it will release the powers of self-help and mutual aid; it may stimulate satisfying activities and give them scope. It may form a strong supporting base for those specialized services and facilities which may be needed at times, and which the community at large must continue to provide in increasingly adequate manner—leisure-time facilities, casework, nursing and medical services; hospitals, nursing and convalescent homes, and clinics of all kinds.

In American communities, as abroad, oldsters should have a choice among a variety of living arrangements, priced within reach of medium and low income groups but meeting high standards: nursing and boarding homes, residence clubs (all managed by nonprofit organizations); senior apartment hotels; colonies of single and two-family dwelling units arranged in clusters, in addi-

tion to traditional dwelling units in one-family or multiple dwellings. Standard hotels and apartment houses might devote some sections or entire floors to a senior unit with special facilities. Some homeowners favoring stability and preferring to continue in their own homes with a reduced income, or just looking for a sound investment, might plan for their own retirement a small but independent senior annex—creating the American version of the British "Plus Granny" flat.

In line with foreign experience and with a natural approach, it would seem that many neighborhoods in both urban and rural communities should have several or all of these facilities under good management, as closely co-operating units and part of a balanced neighborhood scheme.

COMPANION APARTMENTS

Realism suggests an additional design which at first glance may find little approval. But are we not dealing with a group whose economic status is rather low and who cannot expect to improve it substantially in any foreseeable future, a large number of whom tend to be lonely, would enjoy more visiting, and would profit from help in keeping house?

Under American cultural conditions, companion group apartments may be a practical answer, promising economy in investment and operation. They are designed for economy and comfort for otherwise lonesome people, for people who during their working years have been quite used to eating out and rather enjoy eating in company, for people whose idea of fun is doing something with others, for people who like to be good neighbors and have naturally and simply helped when there was trouble or some special strain, for people who enjoy friendly relations without expecting to become close friends. Such folk seem to be abundant in the American community. Many have great ease in working together without direction for some immediate tangible purpose.

Aging people of such background and long-established habits of co-operation may be suited by a dwelling which allows for both privacy and group experience in the same unit.

The standard basic unit, similar to a large apartment, would provide family-style facilities for a pseudo family of approximately seven residents, among whom one, the senior resident, would have specific responsibilities. Seven pleasant single rooms, some connecting, all with running water, would be planned around a large, comfortable living-dining-kitchen, preferably with a common porch or balcony. There would also be a small office in each unit for the senior resident's outside contacts and for sickroom supplies. There would be two toilets, one spacious, well-equipped bathroom, convenient for people who might need assistance for physical care. The family kitchen would be planned to allow for individual preparation of meals if so desired or for doing things together. Each would have his own food locker and space for supplies. All essential kitchen utensils, pots and pans, china and silver, would be part of the initial equipment of the "family" unit. A reasonable number of such basic units would be clustered in one apartment house or in a block of such buildings, with a minimum of common facilities, preferably a spacious multiple-purpose workshop, a hobby room, and some club rooms.

There might or might not be a small professional staff; the regular community agencies would extend their professional services into the buildings.

The management would provide, as standard housekeeping service, the regular cleaning of bathrooms and toilets, and the periodic cleaning of individual rooms. Laundry service for all household linen, if not for personal items, should also be part of the service covered by rentals.

The extent of additional services within each unit would depend on the grouping of residents in each and on their particular needs or desires. As needed, the senior resident in a number of units (or one member of a resident couple) might actually be a practical or graduate nurse, an attendant capable of meeting the problems of mental disorders, a housekeeper-cook, a skilled semiprofessional homemaker and case aide. Some units might also decide, as a family group, to hire a part-time cook to prepare the main meal. They might share a practical nurse with a neighboring unit in the same building. Some might be fully capable of managing all their own affairs as a co-operative group, perhaps taking turns in handling the role of the senior resident and his public relations.

Expected advantages

This plan claims a number of distinct advantages, of which only a few may be listed here. It allows for utmost flexibility in grouping of residents and in their service, adaptable to changing needs, advancing years, and decreasing capacities. It offers the physical framework within which mutual and neighborly aid may be readily available and may be stimulated into new and satisfying experiences. It forms a solid base for many organized community services and would thus strengthen home care, even in critical days.

It is likely to meet such personal needs as the desire for sheltered independence, for belonging, for recognition, for sociability and friendly relations. It makes self-help convenient by providing fully adequate physical facilities (bathrooms, kitchens) and by decreasing the chores of individual housekeeping. It lends the support of neighborly help and, incidentally, provides a new outlet for resourcefulness, initiative, and skills, as applied to daily and familiar problems.

It improves the standards of sanitation and cleanliness, and probably also of nutrition. It has a potential for all kinds of leisure-time activities at home without the need to face traffic and unpleasant weather conditions. It may attract many more "friendly visitors" from the community willing to share time and skill with groups of older folks who have become easily accessible.

It offers physical care and companionship in familiar surroundings during periods of disability and reduces the anxiety about such days. In other words, it substantially strengthens the potential of home care, even for the chronically ill.

Last, but not least, it may provide an increasingly eager group with work opportunities, creating suitable part-time and full-time positions. In addition, neighborhood demand may discover many capable baby sitters, seamstresses, part-time household aides, secretaries, bookkeepers, and handymen ready and waiting for calls. The common workshop would also allow the placement of some industrial homework under favorable conditions.

This unit plan of a companion group apartment with semi-independent housekeeping is also applicable to cottages and small buildings designed along similar lines, and to the remodeling of large, outdated family homes if they have at least seven bedrooms on the first and second floors.

Personnel and management

The management of these group apartments would best be in charge of various co-operative and voluntary agencies, including "senior housing" associations. In the long run, nonprofit associations of women managers, somewhat similar to the Octavia Hill Associations of England, might handle most effectively the innumerable daily details of such projects. Personnel would need some training and provisions for staff development. Early model units should be equipped as training centers for additional staff groups needed elsewhere. Each unit might well offer new and satisfying work opportunities for a middle-aged group and for the "young" old folks whose employment on a mature level we desire so urgently.

FINANCING SENIOR HOUSING IN U. S.

What about the financial aspects of such and similar ventures? Should they become a part of the public housing program? In line with present American traditions and laws, probably they should not. They should not be tied up with the replacement of substandard housing, with slum clearance, with severely restricting requirements for tenant selection. They should not be in competition with all too limited housing funds for the urgent improvement of living conditions of families with growing children. They should not be tainted by the unfortunate stigma of public care for the lowest income group. And perhaps they should not aim at a form of financing which is characterized by annual public subsidies.

Units may and should, however, profit from redevelopment plans and their financial advantages in cutting the cost of land. A good many of them belong in downtown districts, close to the busy life and to the old, familiar places. Incidentally, broad developments in senior housing should release many low- and medium-cost family homes for younger families, according to foreign experience—an advantageous exchange for both parties and for the community at large. They might also release some definitely substandard housing ready for demolition or at least for major repairs, again to community advantage.

Apart from public housing and redevelopment funds, there are obviously various sources for investment capital for senior projects: insurance companies, national and local foundations, churches, and special state and municipal funds which may become available. Co-operative associations of church members, union members, fraternal, professional, and interprofessional groups may be able to raise substantial funds. There are also, as a new and rapidly growing capital source, important labor welfare funds resulting from collective bargaining programs and their "fringe benefits."

The most important potential source for developing adequate senior housing as the very core and center of old-age security all over the land must be seen, however, in a substantial common property of the working people of this nation—the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund with assets of $14.5 billion (as of May 1951). According to present responsibilities and estimates, this reserve fund will continue to grow for some time. At its peak in 1990, it is expected to hold $83.5 billion or eight times as much as the highest expected annual disbursement for the following five years—from all angles an exceedingly strong reserve. According to law, it is now invested exclusively in United States Government securities for general government purposes at less than 3 per cent interest.

Let us assume a review of fiscal policy and an amendment to the law which would authorize the Secretary of the Treasury, managing trustee, to invest $500 million a year for, we may say, a period of five years, in nonprofit housing developments (under various auspices) for the exclusive benefit of older people and their dependents. Then those insured, 90 per cent of the population, would become eligible as tenants at a minimum age of 60 to 65 years. Let us further assume that the average per capita cost of senior housing units would be $5,000 exclusive of land, the latter to be contributed locally. Investing roughly one-half of the yearly increase of the OASI reserve fund in various approved types of senior nonprofit housing units as a basic community resource would thus yield 100,000 units a year, or half a million units in five years—a reasonably adequate supply until further experience is gained. A return of 3 per cent interest would keep the reserve fund on at least the same earning level as now. It would provide approved senior housing projects with a source of capital at least 2 per cent cheaper than ordinarily available and thus contribute also to the economy of operating costs. It would provide a stable security factor, limited rent for shelter plus, in the midst of generally rising prices and dwindling values of earnings and benefits.

Must this capital be amortized? Perhaps very slowly, perhaps not at all. It might thus become a permanent social investment of the American people raising the senior citizens' living standards, generation after generation. It might keep annual costs of community services to the aged, public and private, within more reasonable bounds, thanks to built-in social security.

Must we now pay for and pile up a tremendous reserve in order to relieve the economic burden of future generations alone, while those who are elderly now or will be in the near future, and their families, have not yet been relieved from the crushing burden of seriously inadequate housing and its consequences? Why not put our capital to work to meet immediate as well as permanent needs?

VENTURES IN SOCIAL INVESTMENT

A recent survey[6] of organized community planning for old age, covering 155 American communities with populations of 75,000 and more, showed that "the most pressing need pertains to living arrangements and housing." "Extremely few community areas are operating programs and services that are on the frontier of knowledge or are substantially experimental." There is urgency for action, for putting available knowledge and experience to work. Action should mean experimentation on a limited scale, experiments as a responsible first phase of a large-scale program of national scope. We need linked experiments, not on paper but built right into community neighborhoods in selected communities: offering a welcome and active participation, a grant of land in the right setting, an enthusiastic citizens' committee (with a good share of senior citizens) with some modest funds of its own as an equity and token of sincere interest.

From the very start, experimental housing units for the aged, following different designs, should be studied and become part of an integrated research project. Live research in controlled environments should, after a few years of intensive study and participant observation, yield concrete answers for many

[6] P. W. Swartz, "Organized Community Planning for Old Age," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 6, Supplement to No. 3 (Sept. 1951), Abstract, p. 154.

questions of the senior citizen and his family; of the taxpayer, the social economist, and the designer, manager, and administrator of the planned services; and of the various occupational groups and interprofessional teams concerned with the welfare of the aged.

The immediate call is for venture capital and leadership in free nonprofit enterprise for the common good.

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Community Services for Self-Maintenance in the United Kingdom

By DOROTHEA RAMSEY

AS a rule an individual, as he grows older, comes to cherish more and more closely the wish to remain independent. Those among us who are ready to sponge on friends and relatives for money, or to become more and more demanding of attention, though conspicuous by reason of our claims, are in the minority.

It is pretty clear that many workers who are now forced to retire by mandatory regulations would be glad to continue in work if suitable employment could be found. This is not only because earnings mean more independence and freedom of action, but almost more because the regular pay check brings with it a feeling of self-respect ultimately based on the fact of making a definite contribution to society.

Unfortunately it is difficult today to find jobs for those over age 40, and insufficient efforts have been made to explore the possibilities of part-time work for the older worker. Thus, one of the most valuable sources of contribution to the wealth of the community is being unused, while the potential happiness of the older individual remains unfulfilled in many cases.

USUAL HOME LIFE PREFERRED

In the United Kingdom there is no doubt that the aging man or woman, whether working or not, wishes to remain independent and live in his own house, apartment, or just one room, however squalid. Therefore we can take this fact as a starting point in a discussion on the social contribution which the older citizen can make. We can normally assume that we shall find willing collaboration in any service which the community may be able to bring, and that the alternative, which is to seek entrance into a communal home, will not be acceptable unless and until an independent life has proved quite impossible.

While on humanitarian grounds we can claim to be fulfilling the wish of the older person when we enable him to continue to live as an ordinary citizen outside an institution of any kind, it is very fortunate that this is the case, for the burden on the nation's finances would soon become quite intolerable if we were to assume that the older person should as a general rule be cared for in a home or hospital.

It has been estimated that it costs from 8 to 15 pounds a week to maintain a patient in a hospital,[1] while the maintenance cost in a home for old people will vary from 3 to 5 guineas a week according to the size and character of the home. It is therefore of the greatest importance that this type of care should be kept for those who need it.

At present in the United Kingdom a great many elderly people are occupying hospital beds because there is no other place for them. Many of these patients could be removed to a communal home if a suitable one could be found, while many doctors feel that relatives would be more willing to take their elderly folks from hospitals if more home care services were available and if an immediate bed could be relied upon in time of real crisis.

[1] *Hansard*, June 7, 1951.

In fact, however, it is extremely difficult for new cases of elderly sick to gain admittance to most hospitals, because of the pressure on beds. This is due partly to a shortage of nurses, but partly also to the fact that the supposedly chronically ill old person is occupying, sometimes for years at a time, a bed which might have been used for a very large number of acute or surgical cases.

REPORT OF BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

In July 1946 the British Medical Association established a special committee to consider the care and treatment of the elderly and infirm. The Report (1947) of this committee recommended

> the establishment of a co-ordinated geriatric service for the better investigation and treatment of disease and disability in old people. It was proposed that this service should be based on geriatric departments in selected general hospitals. The main functions of these departments would be to investigate the condition of elderly patients with a view to the arrangement of suitable treatment; to co-operate with the other departments of the hospital in the treatment and rehabilitation of such patients; to assess the condition of such patients on the completion of treatment and arrange their discharge to their own homes, or to residential hostels providing domestic care or, in irremediable cases, to long-stay annexes for prolonged nursing care; to conduct research into disease in old age; and to take part in the teaching of medical students and student nurses.[2]

In addition, the committee stated that its plan would relieve the shortage of hospital beds in two ways:

> First, the expert investigation of all elderly patients in the geriatric department would prevent the occupation of beds by those old people who in present conditions are allowed to become bedfast unnecesarily owing to lack of systematic arrangements for thorough diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation. Secondly, through the provision of sufficient long-stay annexes for irremediable cases, and residential homes or hostels for elderly people too infirm to conduct homes of their own, but not in need of continuous nursing, it would be possible to make arrangements, under the control of the hospital geriatric departments, for discharge from hospital of the large numbers of infirm old people who at present, to their own disadvantage, remain indefinitely in hospital beds because more suitable and homely quarters for them cannot be found.[3]

HOME CARE FOR THE SICK

That this is an effective way of saving the pressure on hospital beds has been proved by Dr. E. B. Brooke at St. Helier Hospital, Carshalton, Surrey, England. At this hospital the procedure is as follows. The patient's own doctor will ring up the hospital and ask for a bed for his patient. Dr. Brooke or his assistant will then ask permission to visit the old person in his own home "to assess urgency and priority." A report is made, and after consultation with the patient's own doctor, arrangements are made to bring the hospital services to the home whenever possible. Such services may include nursing equipment, investigation by X rays or laboratory, physiotherapy at home, or transportation to the outpatients' department for physiotherapy Only if there is real urgency is the patient admitted to the hospital.

This is in great contrast with the more usual method of simply placing a patient's name on a waiting list, which in nearly every case means very serious delay which is discouraging to both patient and doctor, and may even be fatal in its consequences. Dr. Brooke affirms, too, that often by promising an immediate bed if the illness should become acute, he has encouraged relatives to continue to look after their elderly people at home in the knowledge that when the burden becomes too great it will be taken from them. There is no doubt that this makes for the greater happiness of the sick person, who may often be able to end his days with those he loves around him, instead of in a hospital ward with other sick and dying people.

The pioneer of this form of home care was Dr. E. M. Bluestone, until recently director of the Montefiore Hospital, New York: there are important differences in the method of dealing with the problem, but the principle is the same. Dr. Bluestone deals with his out-patients direct, and patients rely entirely on the Hospital Department of Home Care. In addition to a "medical service around the clock, seven days a week," the Montefiore patient has the help of a social worker visiting him in his own home, and a housekeeping service provided by the hospital for five to ten hours weekly. It is estimated that a patient can be treated in this way for between a quarter and a third of the sum which would be spent in keeping him in the hospital.

In the United Kingdom the Health Visitor and the Home Help perform a similar service, and specialist nursing which the patients receive from the Visiting Nurse Service of New York is paralleled by the District or Home Nurse under the National Health Service.

NURSING HOMES NEEDED

A spectacular reduction in beds for the chronic sick can be made through thorough diagnosis and active treatment for those previously classed as "bedridden," and it is of great relevance here to stress the importance of the provision of more nursing homes to which patients can be discharged when no longer in need of a hospital bed. Today many old people are occupying hospital beds for social, not medical, reasons, simply because they have no relatives who will take them and there are not enough suitable homes to receive them. In fact there is an urgent need for special homes with a high ratio of staff and much ground-floor accommodation. This is a far less expensive type of accommodation than a hospital bed, and its value is exemplified by a case quoted by the British Medical Association Report

> of a fully equipped general hospital, where, over a period of two and a half years, eight old men not in need of active treatment had continuously occupied beds which otherwise could have been used during the same period for 360 acute surgical cases.

Further, the eight old men were removed to accommodation less formal and restrictive than the hospital, to their own greater happiness.

The pressure on hospital beds could be relieved all over the country—perhaps all over the world—by proper classification before admittance, accompanied by the necessary services in the nursing home and by speedier discharge from the hospital either to such a home, temporary or permanent, according to need, or to the patient's own home with the necessary home care services.

Not only, however, is the pressure on expensive institutional facilities minimized, but also that on health manpower. From the point of view of the nation's health, it is most important that the time of doctors and training personnel should be used to the best advantage. If we consider the long years spent and the high cost of train-

[2] British Medical Association, *The Care and Treatment of the Elderly and Infirm*, London, 1949.

[3] *Ibid.*

ing doctors and nurses, it is obviously uneconomic to employ personnel attending the sick if the sickness could have been prevented. Home care services are therefore essential to the nation's economy, and, properly used, are also a valuable source of preventive medicine.

HOME NURSE

One of the most effective services in the home is that of the visiting nurse. There is a long tradition of service in the United Kingdom from the home or district nurse. Until the passing of the National Health Service Act (1948) this was a service of fully trained nurses organized by a voluntary society—the well-known Queen's Institute of District Nursing (founded in 1889). These nurses visit the sick in their own homes, sometimes several times a day, and carry out the directions given by the patient's own doctor. Although this is now part of the National Health Service, the Institute continues to provide nurses for the local health authority.

The District Nurse is a real friend, particularly in rural areas, where she is a cherished member of the village community. To the elderly who are frail and lonely she is a real guide and philosopher and a link with the outside world. Today she is often hard pressed, because of the general scarcity of trained nurses, to fulfill the many calls on her time; and the two great voluntary societies whose charter calls them to care for the sick—the British Red Cross Society and the St. John Ambulance Brigade—have in some areas developed a Nursing Aid Service which works through the official scheme by performing simple nursing tasks in order to relieve the fully trained nurse for more expert work.

HOME HELPS

For thirty years in the United Kingdom there has been a Home Help Service for maternity cases. During World War II acute illness and other emergencies induced the government to authorize the extension of this scheme to other types of cases. During the war also the value of the Home Help Service for aged people was demonstrated by the Old People's Welfare Committee of the Plymouth Council of Social Service. This voluntary body started in 1941 to recruit and employ women to help those whose increasing infirmity made domestic work a problem. The scheme proved two things: (1) what a boon this service could be in preventing deterioration in personal hygiene and in the care of the home, and (2) that this type of service appealed to women, who came to look upon it as a service rather than as a job.

The Plymouth Scheme started with two part-time Home Helps. Now there is an average of 70 Home Helps, looking after 440 old people, averaging 1,850 hours' work each week. It is now operated by the Old People's Welfare Committee for the local health authority.

Increasing powers to extend the scope of the official scheme were gradually given by a number of Circulars from the Ministry of Health (179/44 and 110/46) and have now been brought together under Section 29 of the National Health Service Act (1948), and today old people are able to look for this help along with the rest of the community. It is interesting to note that recent figures given by the National Association of Home Help Organisers show that 75 per cent of the domestic help is in fact going to assist old people to remain in their own homes.

The local authority either operates the service through its own organizer or grants aid to a voluntary society to operate it—for example, Women's Voluntary Services. The organizer recruits the Home Helps, looks up references, and visits the homes requiring help and assesses the amount of help required. She chooses the Home Help to suit the home, and thereafter keeps a check on the service provided. Scales of payment are determined by each local authority, but those who cannot afford the charge are assessed and the whole or part of the cost is borne by the local authority.

The value of this service to an old person cannot be overestimated. To many, the provision of this domestic help means that they can stay in their own home surroundings, with their own personal possessions, and continue to live a normal, independent life, when otherwise they would have to be removed to a communal home.

The gradual increase of infirmity obviously makes the ordinary work of keeping a home clean and up to standard more and more difficult. Too often in the past, and even today, we have found too late the solitary person whose infirmity has prevented the continuance of a high standard of personal cleanliness and home care. The resulting unhappiness and serious consequences to health need no emphasis and the value of the Home Help Service as preventive medicine cannot be overestimated.

The Home Help goes from case to case, like a visiting nurse, but she does domestic work; she cleans rooms, makes beds, carries down ashes and slops, and carries up coal and water. If required, she can do shopping or provide a simple meal. Sometimes only an hour a week is needed for a fairly able-bodied old person; sometimes an hour daily. The organizer will pair off suitable Home Helps and cases—a quiet woman to someone with heart trouble, an understanding one to a difficult or awkward character.

COST OF HOME HELP SERVICE

This service is expanding very rapidly, but in some areas there is a shortage of Home Helps, not always due to the difficulty of recruiting, but also to the fact that in some districts the local authority has had to restrict the service because of the cost.

There are some who feel that the Home Help Service is being used to care for patients who should be cared for in hospitals, and that therefore the Regional Hospital Board should contribute towards the cost of the service. It can also be argued that the Regional Hospital Board should contribute because patients can leave hospitals sooner and so free beds more quickly if the Home Help Service and other home care is readily available, and because if we compare the figure of between £8 and £15 per week per bed in a hospital with the cost of home care, including Home Help and domestic service, estimated at about £3,[4] we find there is a saving of between £5 and £10 for the hospital. It has also been suggested that the National Assistance Board should pay for domestic help to those who are in receipt of assistance grants. Viewed as a whole, however, there is no doubt that it is far more expensive to maintain a patient in a hospital or even in most residential communal homes than to provide care for them in their own homes.

THE HEALTH VISITOR

The Health Visitor is an experienced nurse who has completed an approved course of instruction in medico-social work. She works under the local health

[4] *Hansard*, June 7, 1951.

authority as a nurse with special training in health education, child welfare, and social work. Her knowledge of social contacts affecting the welfare of the family often means that she is the first person to become aware of the needs of old people, and she is in a unique position to judge how far these needs can be met by adjustment within the family circle. When the aged are physically ill, it is the Health Visitor's duty to:

(a) co-operate fully with the general practitioner, almoner, home nurse and/or geriatric unit in treatment, to assist in procuring domestic help, loan of equipment, and rehabilitation;

(b) assess the need for admission to hospital on social grounds and the suitability of the home for ultimate discharge;

(c) to promote good neighbourliness and link those willing to give service with those in need of help.[5]

It is clear that the Health Visitor can do much towards helping the old person to maintain his capacity to live independently.

VOLUNTARY SERVICES

So far we have been describing what might be called the professional services for the aged; but in the United Kingdom a real opportunity for the voluntary societies, and for the ordinary "lay" citizen, to help and supplement these services has been eagerly seized upon.

The number of professional workers is necessarily limited, and they should by rights be kept for those old people who need professional care. In the United Kingdom today there are found numbers of old people who are isolated and lonely and who need a friend more than anything else. If a voluntary worker can be found who will drop in regularly and chat, say once a week, who knows how valuable a form of preventive medicine this may prove to be? Too often old people are found who do not know of the services that are available to them. They do not know how to contact the National Assistance Board if they are in financial need; they do not know how to contact the Home Nurse or the Home Help. Many of them are found to be quite out of touch with everyone and to have no contact with a doctor or anyone in the outside world. Such a person "turns in on himself" and is unable to make any contribution to the community. His own future rapidly becomes a nightmare which he can discuss with no one, and the very dread of infirmity may itself cause illness which brings the long-dreaded state of helplessness.

So it is important to count among the valuable home care services the contact of friendly visits carried out by many voluntary societies and to know the value of the clubs for old people which are springing up all over the United Kingdom. Members of such clubs are never isolated, for if they miss a club meeting someone will make it his business to go and find out the reason. If a member falls ill, other members will visit while the sick one is in a hospital or in bed at home, and when he comes out of the hospital someone will have been to see that the house or room is ready and clean for him. These facts, together with the psychological effect that the interest of membership in a club for old people brings, make this, too, come into the category of home care.

There are other services, such as chiropody and mobile physiotherapy, which voluntary agencies[6] and local authorities are trying to arrange. Neither of these services comes under the National Health Service at present unless it is given within the hospital. Chiropody in particular is found to be of great importance in the relief it brings, for with the increased activity comes more opportunity for going out, for managing shopping and cleaning. How much of the malnutrition which is found among the aged when they are admitted to hospitals is due to the fact that painful feet have prevented them from making the necessary effort to purchase and cook the foods required for health? The once active old person easily becomes isolated through inactivity caused by lack of attention to feet.

[5] Royal College of Nursing, *The Duties of the Health Visitor in the National Health Service*, 1950.

[6] For instance, some local branches of Queen's Institute of District Nursing.

EFFECT ON DEMAND FOR BED SERVICE

Unfortunately there are as yet no figures available to show the measurable saving on demands for hospital beds brought about by such services as we have been describing. The figures so far obtained in the United Kingdom are local, though very interesting. Far more research is needed before national figures can be obtained, and it is to be hoped that this research will soon be forthcoming; for without it, it will not be easy to persuade public opinion to press for more home care as part of the integrated pattern of care for the elderly.

EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES

If the capacity for living independently can be fostered and assisted, the individual old person will be far happier and will be able to make his contribution to the community in many ways. The effect of such a policy on his relations will be, we may hope, a tightening of the bonds of family affection. Today there seems to be a tendency to be unwilling to accept the responsibility of caring for the older members of the family. This is surely due in part to the strain imposed on the small family when home care services are insufficient and hospital beds hard to obtain. The strain of caring for the present needs of the elderly is increased by anxiety as to the care that may be needed in the future.

If we consider the increasing numbers of old people in the population today, we shall see the problem in its correct setting. "Between 1871 and 1947, the number of people over 65 in Great Britain increased fourfold, and the proportion rose from 4.8 per cent to 10.4 per cent."[7] We are told that the number of people over 65 will grow steadily over the next thirty years and increase to at least 2.3 millions and very probably much more. This will of course increase the proportion of old people to the total.[8]

This makes the position of old people and their proper care of the greatest consequence to the balance of the community. Unless we can give to the old their proper place, the whole community will be thrown out of balance in trying to care for them. The matter is one of national, and possibly international, importance, economically and socially, as well as being fundamental to the happiness of thousands of individuals.

[7] Royal Commission on Population Report, Par. 640.

[8] *Ibid.*, Par. 248 (iv).

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Keeping Older People Fit for Participation

By Mary E. Switzer and Howard A. Rusk

Vanity is to wish a long life and take but little pains about a good life.—Thomas a Kempis [1]

WHEN asked at the beginning of 1950 to comment on the events of greatest significance which had occurred in the first half of this century, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch listed the increase of man's life span by eighteen years in a period of fifty as having even more profound medical, economic, and social implications than such things as atomic energy, air transportation, and communication.[2]

The lengthening of man's life span has traditionally been one of the primary objectives of medicine and the other health professions. Ironically, however, the achievement of this objective with increasing success year after year has created new and mounting problems not only for the health professions but for all aspects of our culture.

The Extent of Chronic Illness

Seventy-five years ago chronic diseases caused one-fifteenth of all deaths; they are now responsible for as much as three-fourths. Added to these increased death rates is the tremendous long-term toll of chronic illness and disability. Acute infectious disease usually results in rapid recovery or death, but chronic illness may linger for years. Its social and economic costs cannot be measured by mortality tables alone.

As our population becomes older, it can be expected that the prevalence of chronic disease and its resultant physical disability will increase correspondingly; studies indicate that the higher the age group, the greater the percentage of chronic disease and disability. The National Health Survey of 1935–36 showed the following numbers of persons with a chronic disease or impairment on a given day per 1,000 population: over 65 years of age, 515; aged 45 to 64, 309; aged 20 to 44, 177; aged 5 to 19, 70; and under age 5, 34.

In the twenty-year study that the Public Health Service conducted among 1,822 white families in Hagerstown, Maryland, it was found that the five-year incidence rate of chronic disease and major impairments at age 25 was about 35 for every 1,000 persons, and gradually rose till at age 45 it was about 100 per 1,000. After that there was a much steeper climb, reaching nearly 250 per 1,000 at age 60, more than 500 per 1,000 at age 80, and more than 900 per 1,000 at age 90.

More recent data on disability are available from a special survey made in February 1949 by three units of the Federal Security Agency through the sampling facilities of the Bureau of the Census. This survey, based on the civilian noninstitutional population aged 14–64, revealed that the prevalence of disability lasting for seven months or more increased slowly through the age group 35–44 and then rose sharply. The percentage disabled for seven months or more was 0.86 for the age group 14–19; 0.95 for the group aged 20–24; 1.04 for the 25–34 group; 1.44 for the 35–44 group; 3.01 for the 45–54 group; and 6.16 for the 55–64 group. A recent study of the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance estimated that between two-thirds and three-fourths of those currently receiving old-age insurance benefits—men and women 65 years and over—are disabled when considered in terms of their ability to work full time at their usual occupations.

[1] *Imitation of Christ*, Chap. I, p. 14.

[2] In the first half of this article we have drawn heavily on an article by Howard A. Rusk and Eugene J. Taylor, "Rehabilitation," in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 273 (January 1951), pp. 138–143.

Chronic Illness and Economic Status

The incidence of chronic disease and its resultant disability is definitely related to economic status. It occurs most frequently among families of low income, and when it strikes, results in further reduced income and depletion of financial reserves. In the National Health Survey of 1935–36, chronic illness, disabling for one week or longer, was found to occur nearly twice as frequently among persons on relief as among those earning $3,000 a year or more.

A more recent study in Illinois showed that 23 per cent of all public assistance recipients were chronic invalids. In Connecticut the percentage was 20 and in New Jersey 38. In New York 37 per cent of those receiving old-age pensions suffer from some form of chronic illness—just double the average for their age group. The fear of chronic disease and disability is the most haunting specter of increasing age.

Lack of Services for the Chronically Ill

Except for those with pulmonary tuberculosis or mental illness, there are no well-planned and integrated services for most of the chronically ill aged. They find refuge in general hospitals, convalescent homes, homes for the aged, and the back bedrooms of relatives.

Much of the acute financial plight of both municipal and voluntary hospitals is caused by the increasing numbers of the chronically ill who enter the hospitals and stay for long periods. Dr. Edward M. Bernecker, former Commissioner of Hospitals in New York City, has reported that 22.5 per cent of the general care beds in municipal hospitals in New York City are occupied by patients with long-term illnesses. The percentage in voluntary hospitals is said to be around 20. In a survey in Syracuse, New York, it was found that 84 per cent of 902 successive patients in medical wards were chronically ill.

It is agreed that a great many of the chronically ill must have general hospital care initially. Many, however, remain in the hospital purely because of the lack of any place to which they can go if they are discharged. Convalescent or nursing homes are totally inadequate to meet the need, and patients discharged to their homes, where there are no facilities for their care, frequently must be readmitted to the hospital.

Problems of Rehabilitation

Until medicine finds the specific answers to the problems of the diseases of the heart and circulation, rheumatic fever and arthritis, cerebral palsy, multiple sclerosis, poliomyelitis, and the other crippling diseases, we must utilize the techniques of physical rehabilitation, psychology, social service, vocational counseling, and the auxiliary specialties to teach the disabled to live within the limits of their disabilities but to the full extent of their capacities.

Although we have in this country the

finest institutions in the world for medical care and for vocational training, there are, outside of the military services and the Veterans Administration, but a small handful of civilian agencies and organizations equipped to provide for the physically disabled the necessary retraining in physical skills which is a requisite for later vocational training. The physician has thought too much about the physiologic and clinical aspects of the patient's disability. The vocational counselor too frequently has thought only in terms of physical skills which could be utilized vocationally. Between the two, however, there is a wide area through which most physically handicapped persons must go when their medical care is completed but before they are ready to undergo vocational training or retraining. In this area lies the physical retraining in skills necessary for the carrying on of the activities inherent in daily living and common to all types of work.

Except in a few isolated instances, the physically handicapped person must be retrained to walk and travel, to care for his daily needs, to use normal methods of transportation, to use ordinary toilet facilities, to apply and remove his own prosthetic devices, and to communicate either orally or in writing. These are such simple things that they are frequently overlooked; but the personal, vocational, and social success of the handicapped person is dependent on them.

Today in our medical schools, hospitals, and scientific laboratories we are learning much through research in the physiological aspects of aging. This is useful and valuable, but we are failing to put equal emphasis on the psychological, social, and vocational aspects. The listings of current university research on gerontology carry such titles as "Nucleocytoplasmic Ratio of Different Ages in the Liver of Rats," "Mitochondrial Morphology in Arrangement of the Glandular Tissue of Rats," and "Aging Changes in Vascular Tissue of Human Subjects." This research "from the cell up" has important implications, but unfortunately we do too little research "from man as a human down."

With the tide of chronic disability which threatens to engulf us medically, socially, and economically, we must redouble our efforts to see that the lag between that which we already know and its application to those whom it would benefit is reduced.

POSSIBILITIES OF REHABILITATION

One of the great needs is provision for total treatment of the chronically ill patient in terms of his whole problem. Many such patients can be rehabilitated to the extent of employability, and a great percentage of the others can be brought to the point of sufficient self-care to enable them to live at home, requiring a minimum of aid from other members of the family.

Both the Veterans Administration and some civilian hospital programs have demonstrated that rehabilitation to the point of self-care, and even to full or limited employment, is possible for many of the chronically ill who have been hospitalized over long periods.

Typical results obtained by the Veterans Administration are shown by a study of 130 chronic neurologic patients in one hospital, all but two of whom were World War I veterans, and many of whom had not been out of bed in ten years. After nine months of medical rehabilitation, 25 had left the hospital and were employed; 40 others had been discharged to their homes capable of light work; and of those remaining, 30 were ambulatory and undergoing advanced rehabilitation and 25 were capable of some self-care. All but 10 of the group had shown worthwhile permanent improvement. With a five-year life expectancy of these patients, and per-patient-day hospitalization cost of over $12, rehabilitation of this one group has saved the government, and eventually the taxpayer, over $1,250,000. It would seem logical that a similar program for the civilian chronically ill would result in comparative savings.

In another study at the Veterans Administration Hospital at Manhattan Beach in Brooklyn, through rehabilitation, 74 of a group of 126 patients suffering from such diseases as arthritis, multiple sclerosis, paralysis, and Buerger's, Parkinson's and heart diseases have been discharged from the hospital and are now at home taking care of themselves. All but 13 of the original 126 patients have recovered all or part of their ability for self-care. At the beginning of this program, 83 of these veterans were "completely hopeless"; but 49 of that group have been rehabilitated to the point of complete independence, and the rest are capable of self-care. However, in most of our civilian hospitals, the patient receives no such services. Hospitals complain that the chronically ill are responsible for their crowding, but they do little to provide many with the training services that will permit them to leave the hospital.

That many general hospitals recognize their limitations is shown by a study made in New York State on the medical, social, and institutional aspects of chronic illness. Although almost 70 per cent of the 139 hospitals surveyed accepted chronic patients, relatively few had specialized departments for their care. The great majority frankly admitted trying to avoid their admission.

THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES

The problem of providing an integrated service for the chronically ill is a complex one. It affects tremendous numbers of persons, numerous diseases and types of disabilities, various types of medical and semimedical institutions, and, particularly, all community service agencies. There is one facet of the problem that stands out glaringly at the present time. That is the need in our general hospitals for dynamic training programs to enable many of the so-called chronic invalids to live independently within their own homes.

In searching for resources which can be redirected toward the growing problem of chronic disability associated with aging, many states have turned toward the utilization of the county home. The almshouse, poor farm, or county home in this country has been traditionally regarded by self-respecting individuals as "the end of the road." Its residents and their relatives have long borne the painful social stigma of destitution or pauperism. Years ago, and unfortunately still in some isolated instances, the county home was the dumping ground for all those who could not compete economically or socially with normal society. Its "inmates" consisted of homeless children, healthy but inadequate indigents, the sick, the insane, the senile, and the feebleminded. They had but one common characteristic—they were destitute.

Today such practices are universally recognized as being socially undesirable, and specialized institutions have been found to meet the needs of the various groups who formely lived in the county home. Mothers' pensions, old-age assistance, and other aid programs provided by the federal Social Security Act and state programs also have materially

altered the population of public homes. As a result, the function of county homes has changed, and today they are primarily homes for the aged and the chronically ill.

THE NEEDS OF THE AGED

As several studies have brought out, accessibility and privacy are two of the main factors to be taken into consideration in converting public homes into facilities for the chronically ill. Aged patients fear isolation and want to be where their friends and relatives can visit them, and where they can shop, go to the movies, and see friends. They want a place in which to keep their possessions, and to live, if possible, in a private room or small dormitory—a place where they can live in dignity.

This, however, is not enough. The older person who must live an institutional life must also have the opportunity to do something purposeful and constructive. The majority of older persons have worked steadily and industriously in a society that respects only the productive. The ending of ability to do gainful work is, for most, a tragedy; it symbolizes the end of independence and purpose in life.

By failing to utilize activity, we have neglected one of the most valuable tools in the management of the chronically ill and aged. All who have gone through an institution have noted the apathy and hopelessness of the residents. There are always a few, however, who are bright and alert. They are the residents who have voluntarily assumed or have been assigned to tasks within their physical capacities.

The use of selective placement, whereby the physical capacities of the individual are matched against the physical demands of the job, can be used in an institution as well as in industry. Even though their disabilities may be severe, the great majority of the residents of public homes can do some tasks about the home. For some, it may be only simple housekeeping assistance; others have the ability and the experience to assume greater responsibilities.

If the aged and the chronically ill are to have the comfort, security, dignity, and companionship that should be the heritage of every older person, public homes must provide them with cheerful, attractive surroundings, as much privacy as possible, a place for their belongings, opportunities for recreation and social activities, and a chance to do something productive.

With the introduction of rehabilitation programs in general hospitals, and increased facilities for effective convalescent care and home care programs of medical, social, visiting nurse, and visiting housekeeper services, many of the aged and chronically ill will not need to seek admittance to public homes. Many present residents could also be restored to either employment or self-care with suitable rehabilitation programs.

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

The Federal-State Vocational Rehabilitation Program is giving increased attention to the aged handicapped person who could remain in or re-enter the labor force if provided co-ordinated services directed to his particular problems. Except for the program for veterans with service-connected disabilities, this is the only public program of vocational rehabilitation. This program serves all segments of the population, including the aged who are handicapped. The services available through the program include counseling, vocational and personal adjustment, vocational diagnosis, physical restoration, vocational training or retraining, and other services to restore work capacity. After the provision of these restorative services, assistance is given in finding employment suited to the individual's capacities and abilities.

Vast expansion of this program is needed, however, if we are to meet adequately the needs of the hundreds of thousands of disabled aged persons who are with us today and who tomorrow will be with us in even greater numbers. There is urgent need for rehabilitation centers to provide co-ordinated restorative services, for workshops for building work tolerance and providing useful and productive employment for those who are not able to enter the competitive labor market, and for research to develop and test new techniques and methods.

It is estimated that about 10 per cent of the current labor force at all age levels has significant physical impairments that must be taken into consideration in job placement. Using selective placement techniques in which the physical capacities of the individual are matched against the physical demands of the job, these less severely handicapped individuals do not present great placement problems. The older person with a chronic disability, however, has two strikes against him when he seeks employment—his age and his disability.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

It is the discrimination based on lack of understanding, which is discussed in greater detail in the article by Mr. Abrams, that prevents the older worker with a disability from getting a job—not his lack of ability. Statistical data on the productivity of older workers compared to younger workers in the same occupation are almost entirely lacking. Several studies, however, have shown that older workers, even those with disabilities, make reliable and safe employees.

Among the most significant of these was one survey of the work records of 17,800 employees in 109 companies in which the absenteeism rate decreased consistently as age increased. In every age group above 50 years, employees lost fewer scheduled workdays than those in any age group below 50. Disabling injuries reached their peak at about age 41 and then declined continuously until age 75, except for a slight rise between 50 and 55. The peak of nondisabling injuries came at about age 26 and then declined steadily and sharply all the way to age 75, when they amounted to one-third of the peak number.

Nor is it true that older workers cannot be retrained for new operations. Many industrial programs during the last war demonstrated that with careful, selective placement and with simple changing of engineering design, many of the jobs formerly assigned to younger workers could successfully be performed by older people.

The experience of the Federal-State Vocational Rehabilitation Program has shown that even disabled persons in the older age groups can become independent wage earners if they are given proper services. In 1949 its agencies gave services to 12,469 persons aged 45–64 and 931 persons over 65. Prior to rehabilitation, two-thirds of this group were unemployed; after their rehabilitation, the average weekly earnings of the 45–64 group were about $35, and of the over-65 group, about $28.

Of the 11,000,000 persons over 65 in 1948, about 3,500,000 had no money income of their own. Of the 7,500,000 with some money income, almost one-third had incomes of less than $500.

It is significant, however, that employment constitutes the major source of income for the 65-plus age group. Almost half of the older workers work for themselves, as compared with one in five in the total male working force. They are more frequently farmers, proprietors, managers, officials, and service workers. Fewer are found as clerks, sales personnel, craftsmen, foremen, and machine operators.

Although the great industrial concerns have thousands of jobs which older persons can successfully perform, we must remember that "big business" actually hires only a fraction of America's workers. About 70 to 75 per cent of the nation's workers are employed in the 99 per cent of the industrial plants in the nation which have fewer than 500 employes. It is to small industry, commerce, and the service trades that the great majority of older workers must turn if they expect to be successful in finding new jobs in competitive industry.

FACTORS OF THE "GOOD LIFE"

These facts and figures underline the responsibility of all agencies, public and private, to show the way to the mature handling of this problem in the years ahead. Its magnitude makes the teamwork of these agencies even more essential in developing services for our older citizens than has been true in many other health and welfare fields. The core of our theme—"to take pains about the good life"—demands a balanced consideration of all factors that make for total security, economic, social, spiritual.

The national government may find its role to be primarily in the broad areas of income maintenance, in cooperation with states and local communities in the welfare field and with the whole working population in the old-age insurance field. Federal support will also be needed to stimulate research into the medical and social methods essential to aid the individual in having "the good life" from age 60 to 80 as well as from age 30 to 60. But, as has been true traditionally in our country, it will be the voluntary institutions—hospitals, community groups, and religious organizations—that, by virtue of their close ties with their people, can point the way to precise methods to accomplish our ideal. Housing for older people, particularly for those living on old-age pensions, is one of the most difficult problems to solve in our society. The federal government should have a broad program, working with all forces in the housing field, both public and private, to meet more nearly the needs of older people.

The importance of chronic diseases in older people places on hospitals treating chronic patients a major responsibility for research into their treatment and rehabilitation. No more fruitful endeavor can be undertaken than the continued effort to find ways and means to ensure that the chronically ill shall be as nearly self-sustaining as modern medical knowledge can make them. Physicians dealing with people as patients all through life will be an important influence in guiding us to "embrace old age proudly" and with the conviction that it is the crowning glory of life. Teachers will show their charges that each stage of life has its special compensations. The many voluntary and religious institutions serving the aged must continue experimentation in ways of living to keep fit for participation to the end of life. Colleges and other educational institutions increasingly will need to readjust their programs to put more emphasis on adult education and particularly on education and the pursuit of knowledge as an enriching influence for a full life.

The traditional relationships which have been built through the years by those interested in health and welfare, both in and out of government, must be closer and more responsive than ever; for "keeping fit for participation" is the moral responsibility of our whole country.

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Income Maintenance for the Aged

By Wilbur J. Cohen

THE year 1951 was a very important milestone so far as income for the aged was concerned. For the first time in our nation's history the number of persons receiving old-age *insurance* exceeded the number receiving old-age *assistance* (February). Likewise, for the first time, the total amount of insurance payments to aged persons exceeded the amount of old-age assistance payments (August). The number of aged persons on the assistance rolls declined slowly and steadily in 1951 from the high of September 1950, while the number receiving insurance steadily increased (see chart). At the end of 1951, over 4 million persons, representing nearly one-third of the population aged 65 and over,[1] were receiving some form of public insurance benefit or pension or were the wives of such recipients. About 85 to 90 per cent of all persons working for a living were earning credits under some public retirement or pension program.

Despite these noteworthy developments, there are still many aged persons with inadequate incomes, many pressing problems with respect to income for the aged still unsolved or awaiting consideration, and a need for much more information on the economic status of the aged.[2] Some of the most important of these pressing problems and future trends will be summarized. The entire area of income for the aged is a very swiftly changing subject. The situation five years ago was very different from that today. As a result of programs recently established or improved, the situation five years from now will have changed markedly from that today.

Sources of Income of the Aged

Five main sources of income of the aged will be considered: (1) earnings from employment, including self-employment; (2) income from individual savings, individual insurance policies or annuities, or property; (3) benefit payments from public or private insurance or pension programs; (4) assistance payments from public agencies; and (5) assistance from voluntary agencies, friends, or relatives.

Employment

About 2.9 million, or a little less than one-fourth of all persons aged 65 and over, are employed in an average week at the present time.[3] Of this number 2.3 million are men and 0.6 million are women. In addition, there are about 0.9 million women aged 65 and over who are the wives of aged earners. Thus, about 3.8 million aged persons representing a little less than one-third of all the aged were in receipt of earnings from employment or were the wives of earners.

There is some reason to believe that because of manpower needs during the present defense period, the number of aged persons employed during the next few years will increase. There is considerable doubt as to the long-time


[1] In this article it is assumed that the number of persons aged 65 and over was 12.3 million in April 1950, was about 12.6 million in mid-1951 and will be about 13.0 million in December 1952.

[2] For further research which is necessary, see National Conference on Aging, Washington, D. C., 1950, *Man and His Years* (Raleigh, N. C.: Health Publications Institute, 1951), pp. 60–64.

[3] This figure greatly understates the number who work during the year. The number during the year is nearly 725,000 more than the average number employed during the year. "Work Experience of the Population in 1949," *Current Population Reports, Labor Force*, Bureau of the Census, Series P-50, No. 24.

INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE AGED, 1940–1952

OLD-AGE ASSISTANCE INCREASED IRREGULARLY UNTIL 1950 AND IS NOW DECLINING SLOWLY. OLD-AGE INSURANCE INCREASED RAPIDLY AND, AS THE RESULT OF THE 1950 AMENDMENTS, BECAME THE LARGER OF THE TWO INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS EARLY IN 1951.



ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONS, AGED 65 AND OVER, RECEIVING INCOME FROM SPECIFIED SOURCES, DECEMBER 1940, 1945, 1950, AND 1952.[a]
(In millions)

Source of Income	December 1940	December 1945	December 1950	December 1952
Total population 65 years and over	9.1	10.2	12.3	13.0
Employment	2.8	3.7	3.7	4.0
Earners	2.1	2.8	2.8	3.0
Wives of earners	.7	.9	.9	1.0
Social insurance and related programs				
Old-age and survivors insurance	.1	.8	2.6	3.7
Railroad retirement	.1	.2	.3	.3
Federal civil-service retirement	[b]	.1	.1	.1
Veterans' program	.2	.3	.3	.3
Other[c]	.2	.3	.4	.4
Old-age assistance	2.1	2.1	2.8	2.6

[a] Some persons received income from more than one of the sources listed.
[b] Less than 50,000.
[c] Federal employee retirement programs other than civil service; state and local government retirement programs; wives of male beneficiaries of programs other than old-age and survivors insurance.

SOURCE: Data for 1940, 1945, and 1950 from *Social Security Bulletin*, June 1950, p. 16, and June 1951, p. 19. Data for 1952 estimated by author.

trend.[4] In 1890 a little more than two-thirds of the aged *men* were in the labor force; this proportion dropped to about 54 per cent in 1930, to 42 per cent in 1940, rose to about 50 per cent in 1944–45, and declined to nearly the 1940 level by 1950. In June 1951 the proportion was about 43 per cent. The decline from 1944–45 to 1951 was largely a reflection of the failure of employment opportunities to keep pace with the gain in the size of the aged population, rather than a drop in the absolute number of aged workers, which remained at about the wartime levels. If the 1920–50 trend continues, the percentage of aged men in employment will drop by 1975 to 35 per cent.[5]

For older persons who are able to work and want to work, employment can be both a satisfying means of securing an income and the most productive as far as the economy is concerned. The value to the national economy of the services of the aged who are now working is about $10 to $12 billion per year. If the wartime proportion were again reached, perhaps about 500,000 additional aged persons would be working, which would increase the national production about $1.5 billion annually, while at the same time the costs of relief and insurance benefits for the aged would be reduced.

Savings, annuities, property

Only very scanty information exists on the amount of income available to the aged from their own savings, or from individual annuities or private insurance they purchased, or from property or investments. From various information available it seems that about 800,000 aged persons were receiving *insurance company annuities* in 1950 exclusive of any payments under any group retirement or annuity programs. The average payment was about $40 per month.

About 46 per cent af all spending units in which the head of such unit was 65 and over saved some of their income in 1950; 19 per cent came out even; and 35 per cent had expenditures *in excess of income.*[6] Surveys made of the income and assets of old-age and survivors insurance beneficiaries suggest that about half of the commercial and industrial workers who have retired in recent years have some assets other *than an equity in a home, but that such* assets typically are small. In the areas studied, between only a sixth and a fourth of the retired male workers had assets enough to last for their life expectancy *if withdrawn at the rate of* $25 a month.

Perhaps it would be fair to say, in conclusion, that while available data are not very satisfactory, they suggest that most people do save, in various *amounts, and that in recent years* about half the aged have been able to accumulate some savings. Such savings are generally small, and for most persons are not large enough to provide a significant resource in old age.

Insurance and pension plans

About four million aged people are now receiving regular monthly payments under some type of public or private group *insurance retirement*, pension, or *annuity plan*. Of this number, about three million persons are drawing benefits under the federal old-age and survivors insurance program, and one million under some other program.

There are probably about 350,000 persons drawing retirement benefits or annuities from private employer plans or collective bargaining plans. These benefits probably average about $55 per month. However, a very large proportion of the persons receiving such benefits are also receiving benefits under one of the public insurance or retirement programs.

The number receiving insurance benefits will *continue* to grow in the *future*. By the end of 1952, it is estimated that there will be about 3.7 million persons receiving federal old-age and survivors insurance benefits. This number will *increase* to about 5.5 million by 1960 and continue growing steadily for many years thereafter.

Public assistance

About 2,700,000 needy aged persons are receiving assistance. This represents about 22 per cent of the aged population. While the number of aged on assistance is much higher than it was ten years ago, the proportion of all aged persons on assistance has slightly declined. From a high of 2.8 million in September 1950, old-age assistance rolls have declined about 5,000 to 10,000 a month. A more detailed discussion of assistance is given later in this article.

Contributions from relatives

Only the most fragmentary and incomplete information exists on the contributions received by aged persons from their children, other relatives, or friends.[7] Some information exists which

[4] According to Peter F. Drucker, manpower shortages and public pressures will compel the employment of more older workers during the coming decades. "Population Trends and Management Policy," *Harvard Business Review*, May 1951, pp. 75–76.

[5] Harold Wool, "Long-Term Projections of the Labor Force," paper presented before Conference on Income and Wealth, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York City, May 25, 1951, Table 5.

[6] "1951 Survey of Consumer Finances," *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, September 1951, Table 3, p. 1063.

[7] Incomplete information also exists on the number of aged persons in nursing homes, hospitals, and other institutions. The number is probably close to 400,000 but we do not know to what extent these persons have some income of their own or are supported by relatives or from public funds.

indicates that a number of individuals receiving old-age assistance also receive some contributions from relatives,[8] but the proportion is currently not known. The number of such beneficiaries receiving cash contributions is probably very small, but contributions in kind such as shelter and medical and other services are probably more extensive. However, information is not available on the extent of such contributions to aged persons not receiving assistance. It is generally assumed that there must be at least 2 or 3 million aged persons being supported wholly or in large part by their children or other relatives, and a large additional number receiving partial support from children or other relatives.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION

In 1948, about 9,200,000 of the 11 million aged had some income or were the wives of individuals with some income.[9] However there were wide variations in the amount of income. Information available to date does not give an accurate picture of income or resources of the aged,[10] and it is evident that existing information tends to understate income and assets. Nevertheless, it is clear that a very large number of the aged have a very modest cash income. Omitting those without any income of their own, including wives of income recipients, available statistics for 1948 show that out of the remaining 8,000,000 aged there were approximately:

2,500,000 with under $500 for the year
2,300,000 with $500 to $999
1,600,000 with $1,000 to $1,999
750,000 with $2,000 to $2,999
500,000 with $3,000 to $4,999
200,000 with $5,000 to $9,999
100,000 with $10,000 or more

The Social Security Administration, in co-operation with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, has worked out budget estimates to show what it costs an elderly couple to maintain a "modest but adequate" level of living in an urban area. These estimates, as of October 1950, ranged from $1,620 in Mobile, Alabama to $1,908 in Milwaukee.

It is clear from these statistics that much remains to be done to improve the economic status of the aged.

SUMMARY OF PRESENT PROGRAM

Federal old-age and survivors insurance

The federally administered old-age and survivors insurance program now covers most employees in commerce and industry, self-employment (other than in farming and certain professions), certain employees of federal, state and local governments not covered under a retirement system, employees of nonprofit organizations, regularly employed farm workers, and regularly employed domestic workers in private homes. Approximately three-fourths of the nation's gainfully employed are now covered by old-age and survivors insurance. The chief groups not covered are farmers, seasonal and migratory farm workers, domestic workers employed on a day basis, and persons covered under other government retirement systems.

The program provides monthly benefits, related to previous earnings and paid as a matter of right without investigation of need. Approximately 60 million individuals are insured under the program. About 4.2 million persons were drawing insurance benefits in August 1951, of whom 3.2 million were aged persons, 800,000 were children, and 200,000 were widowed mothers of the children receiving insurance benefits.

The average benefit for retired workers is currently about $42 a month; and for a retired worker and wife, aged 65 and over, $68. For those retiring in the next few years, the average will be between $50 and $60 for an individual, and between $80 and $90 for a man and wife. The minimum monthly benefit is $20 for a single individual and $30 for a man and wife. The maximum monthly benefit is $80 for a single individual, $120 for a man and wife, and $150 for a family of three or more persons.

The program is financed by contributions from covered employers and employees. At the present time the contribution rate is 1.5 per cent of pay roll for each. The rate is scheduled to increase to 2 per cent each in 1954 and gradually to 3.25 per cent each in 1970. Self-employed persons are required to contribute three-fourths of the combined employee-employer contribution.

Public assistance

To be eligible for old-age assistance, an individual must meet a test of need. Each state sets its own standards for determining whether a person is needy. State policies commonly allow recipients to own their homes, have small life and burial insurance policies, or maintain small cash reserves. The amounts and kinds of property that a recipient may have and the circumstances under which he may retain it differ from state to state. In some states, automatic liens are placed on the real property of a recipient so that at his death or that of his surviving spouse the state may recover for assistance granted. Some states require a recipient to surrender title to the property to the state or locality as a condition to receiving aid.

Very great variations are to be found among the states in the number of recipients of old-age assistance in relation to the aged population. In June 1951 the recipient rates ranged from 50 per 1,000 in the District of Columbia to 671 per 1,000 in Louisiana. In general, the states that are predominantly rural—and consequently have least protection from the old-age and survivors insurance system—have the highest recipient rates. These are for the most part states with low fiscal resources and with a relatively large amount of need.

Old-age assistance payments in June 1951 averaged $43 for the United States, but ranged from $76 in Colorado to only $18 in Mississippi and $7.66 in Puerto Rico. In thirteen states the averages exceeded $50, the maximum monthly amount in which the federal government will share. In eleven states —all but one in the South—the averages were under $30. The variations in assistance levels reflect differences among the states in their ability to finance their share of assistance costs and in attitudes toward meeting need.

The federal share of old-age assistance costs in 1950 was 54 per cent, but in individual states it ranged from 75 per cent to 39 per cent. Total expendi-

[8] "Children's Contribution to Old Age Assistance Recipients in North Dakota and South Dakota," *Social Security Bulletin*, August 1951; *Requirements and Incomes of Recipients of Old Age Assistance in 21 States in 1944*, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration.

[9] Jacob Fisher, "Income of Aged Persons, 1948," *Social Security Bulletin*, July 1951.

[10] For over fifteen years there have been various attempts to analyze the economic status of the aged. Some indication of the difficulty of the task, the gaps in the available information, and the differences in approach in analyzing the data, can be obtained by studying some of these attempts. See Marjorie Shearon, "Economic Status of the Aged," *Social Security Bulletin*, March 1938; Barkev S. Sanders, "Economic Status of the Aged in Urban Households," *Social Security Bulletin*, October 1940; *Hearings before the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the Old Age Pension System*, pursuant to S. Res. 129, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1941; *Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance* on S. 1932, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1941; *Issues in Social Security;* A Report to the House Committee on Ways and Means, 1946, pp. 268–71.

tures in 1950 for old-age assistance were $1.5 billion, of which the federal government contributed $0.8 billion. Under present law the federal government shares in individual assistance payments up to a maximum monthly amount of $50. The federal share of assistance costs is three-fourths of the first $20 of the average payment and one-half the balance within the limit on individual payments. Thus, the federal share is highest where payments are lowest. States making payments about $50 get a relatively low percentage of federal funds, but the amount per case is higher than in the low-payment states.

GENERAL IMPROVEMENTS SUGGESTED

A full discussion of the many changes which are necessary or desirable to improve the income status of aged persons would take many pages. In the limited space available here, it is not possible to enumerate the changes which are necessary in existing private pension plans [11] or in public assistance.[12] Nor is it possible to consider the over-all economic and fiscal implications of improving all the various programs for the aged [13] or the pros and cons of various incentive plans for reducing the extent of premature retirement.[14] Many alternatives have been proposed, and these proposals are in large part controversial and involve many difficult problems of economic, fiscal, social, and political philosophy. In these few pages, only a brief reference can be made to a few of these proposals and issues.

One fact, however, seems quite certain. The United States has accepted the principle that the government acting for all the people is responsible for providing a system of income payments to aged persons. No responsible group is advocating a reversal of this policy. But there is a good deal of difference of opinion as to the most desirable way it should be carried out. In general, there are a number of alternative ways being discussed for improving the situation:

First, there are the advocates of the present contributory insurance plan who urge that the coverage of the program be made universal, that its benefits be liberalized, that the benefits continue to be geared to wages with substantial differentials between benefits to low-paid and higher-paid workers, and that such benefits continue to be paid as a matter of right upon retirement.

Second, there are those who advocate that under such a universal coverage program, all the present aged should be "blanketed in."

Third, there are the advocates of a universal uniform pension (such as the Townsend plan) supported out of earmarked taxes.

Fourth, there are those who advocate a federal assistance program, supported by a general personal income tax, under which benefits would be paid only to persons with income under a stated amount.[15]

[11] See Robert Ball, "Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining: An Evaluation of their Social Utility," *Proceedings Second Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association*, 1949; Wilbur J. Cohen, "Pensions and Welfare Funds Under Wage Stabilization," *Proceedings Fourth Annual Conference on Labor*, New York University, 1951.

[12] See *Annual Report, Federal Security Agency*, 1950, pp. 62–66.

[13] See Charles V. Kidd, "Economic Security for Older Persons," in *Living Through the Older Years* (Wilma T. Donahue and Clark Tibbitts, Eds., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1949), pp. 155–77.

[14] See Sumner H. Slichter, "Retirement Age and Social Policy," in *The Aged and Society* (Industrial Relations Research Association, 1950), pp. 109–11.

[15] For the views of advocates of such a plan see Lewis Meriam, *Relief and Social Security*, Brookings Institution, 1946; Senator Hugh Butler, in *Congressional Record*, June 16, October 20, 1950, and January 17, 1951; and minority views in Senate Committee Report No. 1669 on H. R. 6000, 81st Cong., 2d sess., May 17, 1950, pp. 313–19. For the views on those opposed to the Meriam-Butler plan see Senator James E. Murray, *Congressional Record*, June 19, 1950, p. 8963 (daily issue); Edwin E. Witte, "Social Provisions for the Aged," in *The Aged and Society*, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1950, pp. 131–32; and Robert M. Ball, in *Public Welfare*, October 1950, pp. 187–90.

IMPROVEMENTS IN OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE

It seems highly likely that most serious attention will be given to improvements in the existing program rather than a basic change in the program. Among the proposals made for improving the existing program are:

Universal coverage

While most persons who work for a living are covered by the existing program, farmers, some professional persons, and about one-half of all farm workers and domestic workers are still excluded. These groups should be included. Also excluded are a number of different groups covered under their own retirement plans, such as employees working for the railroads and federal, state, and local governments, and military personnel. Various proposals have been made which will improve the retirement protection of persons who move from one plan to another without reducing the protection afforded to the long-service employee under a particular plan.

Further extension of coverage will make the program more effective in the long run, and will help to keep the assistance burden from growing in the future Extension of coverage will not help so far as the present assistance load is concerned. Most of the old people now getting assistance will probably never work again, and therefore cannot be expected to acquire benefit rights under the insurance program no matter how broad its coverage. This fact has led to proposals to work out some sort of arrangement to pay benefits under the insurance program to all of the present aged.

Such proposals would not solve the problem and could not be adopted without destroying the essential contributory nature of old-age and survivors insurance unless two major conditions were included. The first condition is that the insurance program would have to be extended to cover all gainful employment. Otherwise, many persons becoming aged in future years would still be without insurance protection and in need of public assistance. The second condition is that the cost of these noncontributory benefits would have to be financed from general revenues and not from employers' and employees' contributions.

Increases in benefits

Another way to increase the effectiveness of the program is by making it more responsive to increases in wages, prices, and standards of living.[16] If benefit amounts fail to adjust promptly to these factors, more people dependent on benefits will become needy, and increased supplementation of benefits by assistance will be necessary.

Under the present provisions, benefits are based on an average wage computed over the worker's working lifetime. This means that low earnings in the early years of a worker's lifetime reduce the benefit amount. Moreover, the long-run trend of wages is upward. Benefits could be related to rising wages that had determined the worker's standard of living before his retirement if the average monthly wage

[16] See Wilbur J. Cohen, "Should Old-Age Assistance Again Outpace Old-Age Insurance?" *American Economic Security*, July–August, 1951.

were computed over the five or ten consecutive years of highest earnings.

One additional element should be reflected in the benefit formula. Under present law, a man who is now aged 60 will get the same benefit amount after contributing for only five years as a man now aged 40 with the same average earnings who has contributed for twenty-five years. Before the 1950 amendments, the basic benefit amount was increased by 1 per cent for every year the individual spent in covered employment. The 1 per cent increment should be restored to the benefit formula, so that the long-term contributor would get some return for his extra contribution.

Even if these changes are made, benefit amounts will not keep pace with rising wages unless the maximum on wages which may be credited toward benefits is raised. The limit was increased in 1950 from $3,000 a year to $3,600, but the $3,600 ceiling is not enough to take account of increases in wage rates in the past twelve years. In 1939, when the $3,000 limit was established, only 5 per cent of all year-round workers earned more than $3,000. In 1950, 22 per cent earned more than $3,600. To keep the proportion of workers with all their earnings credited toward insurance benefits at the 1939 level, the maximum wage base would have to be about $6,000 at the present time.

Similarly, as wages go up, the portion of the average wage to which the first part of the benefit formula is applied should be increased. Under the new formula the benefit is equal to 50 per cent of the first $100 of the average monthly wage, plus 15 per cent of the remainder. This formula expresses the intent of Congress to replace a larger percentage of wages for low wage workers than for those with high wages. However, as wage rates rise, the concept of what constitutes "low" wages also changes. Unless the amount to which the 50 per cent part of the formula applies is increased to $115 or $120 as wages rise, the intent to replace a larger proportion of low wages will not be effectively carried out.

Finally, as wages go up, the amount (at present $50 per month) which beneficiaries may earn and still get benefits should be increased. The amount should be large enough so that the beneficiaries may supplement their benefits by engaging in part-time work; as wages increase, the amount of wages which can be earned by part-time work also increases.

Further consideration should also be given to the question of permitting women to qualify for benefits at age 60. Wives are usually a few years younger than their husbands, and it cannot reasonably be expected that when a man retires at 65 his wife will be able to get a job to supplement his retirement income. Similarly, a woman widowed at age 60, or an aged dependent mother, may have a very difficult time getting a job if she has not previously worked. If wives, widows, and dependent mothers are permitted to receive benefits at age 60, consideration may be given to lowering the retirement age for women workers, also.

Hospitalization insurance

Many beneficiaries have heavy emergency expenses—such as for needed hospital care—which the benefits cannot be expected to cover. It would not be practicable to increase payments to all beneficiaries sufficiently to cover hospital expenses, since not all of them have such expenses. A recent survey of insurance beneficiaries in two large cities showed that only one out of twelve aged couples who had obtained hospital care had any form of hospitalization insurance. Most beneficiaries are not members of groups to which such insurance is available, and they unquestionably have higher-than-average hospital needs. The need for insuring beneficiaries against hospital costs can be met through the old-age and survivors insurance program.

Insurance against disability

About two million of the civilian population between the ages of 14 and 65—not counting persons in mental, tuberculosis, and other hospitals—are unable to go about their regular pursuits because they have a prolonged disability. Moreover, the number of disabled people is increasing, and will continue to increase as proportionately more of the population is in the older ages.

The approach to the problem of disability must be twofold. It is essential to rehabilitate and return to productive employment as many disabled workers as possible, and it is essential to provide income for those who cannot be rehabilitated, as well as temporarily for those who can eventually return to work.

A program of disability insurance should make rehabilitation services available to all those in danger of suffering permanent and total disability. Moreover, during the rehabilitation process, such a program should provide cash benefits to support the disabled persons and their families. A program of this sort would ensure that as many disabled people as possible would be rehabilitated. It would bring about an expansion of rehabilitation facilities, which are now severely limited, and it would promote the training and employment of additional expert personnel, since rehabilitation services would be paid for from the trust fund.

Such a program should also contain provisions to preserve the retirement and survivor protection of disabled workers. Under the present insurance program, a disabled worker not only must get along without benefits until age 65, but even when he reaches that age he may not get adequate benefits because his period of disability will have substantially reduced his benefit amount or will have entirely wiped out his right to benefits. Similarly, if he dies prematurely his family may be left with inadequate benefits or none at all.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A sound and comprehensive program for improving the income of the aged requires: (1) more employment opportunities for the aged; (2) more adequate incomes during their working lives in order to increase home ownership, savings, and insurance protection; (3) a method of insuring families against medical costs; (4) broadening and improving public and private retirement and assistance provisions for the aged and the disabled; (5) more adequate rehabilitation and medical services for older persons.

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Community Programs for the Elderly

By Harry A. Levine

Old age is in fact a quality of mind and body whose onset varies from individual to individual rather than a mere quantity expressed by a term of duration applicable to all.
—Nuffield Report

THE purpose of society is the elevation of human life. Step by step, society has taken to itself the responsibility for public health, public education, public welfare, the care of the defective, the aged, the dependent, and the unemployed; and in the area of recreation, the provision of free parks, playgrounds, libraries, and museums. More and more, with the higher development of our civilization, we are including education in the helpful use of leisure time and the provision of means for such use.

Recreation and activity programs for the older person are peculiarly a function of democratic society. In his lifetime, the older person has made his contribution—given us his energy, his skill, and his children. We owe him the possibility of living his later years without frustration and rejection. We owe him the opportunity to prolong his usefulness—to contribute his energy and his wisdom to the life around him.

Recreational Resources

While society has largely accepted responsibility for the physical welfare of the older person, little consideration has been given to activity that will give him a feeling of usefulness and belonging, of adequacy and accomplishment, of acceptance and understanding—the things that tend to preserve the personality.

The institutions and resources for the older person that are presently available are limited. They have in no way kept pace with the increase in the number of older people, and with their strength and vitality. For the most part, they have paid little heed to the emerging concepts in the field of gerontology. These institutions were organized for a shorter life span and the different needs of an earlier era; they have changed little, despite the fact that the tired and worn old man or woman has been replaced by an aging person of considerably greater potential, with a whole set of new values, needs, and problems.

In the last decade the very numbers of older unemployed people drew attention and forced recognition of their presence. The recent interest in recreation and activity programs is a result of that recognition.

In many cities, councils of social agencies have special committees to work with the problems of the aging. They have stimulated the organization of a number of clubs and club programs. New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Washington, Milwaukee, and San Francisco have clubs sponsored by social agencies; some are co-sponsored with national organizations, like the National Council of Jewish Women; some in co-operation with settlement houses and community centers.

Settlement houses and community centers are very much interested, and are developing club programs. A few are developing day center programs.

Churches, synagogues, and other religious organizations have an important contribution to make and are becoming aware and interested, but the facilities

are not often conducive to free and easy associations. Church rules about smoking and playing cards are restrictive; also, janitorial service and heat seem to be a primary factor for many churches.

Some homes for the aged have recognized the value of creative and recreational programs in maintaining the strengths of the older resident. They have arts and crafts, choral groups, entertainment and occupational therapy programs. They are only now becoming aware of the possibilities of extending services to, and of their responsibility for, the nonresident as well as the resident older person.

Libraries and museums are co-operating; Cleveland has its Live Long and Like It Club. Libraries plan book clubs and reading clubs, lectures and discussions, with hobbies and health as the major interest.

A few universities in this country, such as the Institute for Human Adjustment at the University of Michigan, sponsor courses and institutes on aging. Some school boards, like the Board of Education in New York City, sponsor courses and adult centers. They have opened some of the public schools in the evening for recreation and activity programs. Some park departments and home economic departments sponsor hobbies, crafts, gardening, lectures, and educational activities.

The golden age clubs

There are some golden age clubs sponsored by business and professional groups; a few have been started independently by older people and are completely autonomous, like the grandmothers' clubs. Most are open to all, regardless of race, color, or creed; others have been formed with particular cultural and professional interests in mind. There may be as many as three hundred clubs in the United States. All clubs provide social contacts; many include lectures, discussion groups, motion pictures, and television.

Noncommercial recreation for the older person is best exemplified by these golden age clubs, meeting once a week or once a month for a few hours in an afternoon or evening. They are a blessing for those who have other activities during the day; they can and often do supplement work or household chores. In some cases they are a substitute for membership in societies and organizations which the old people can no longer afford. They provide companionship and have cultural value. They are a valuable addition to recreational resources.

The day center

A recent development and a new resource—one which recognizes the broader needs of the older person—is the day center. The Department of Welfare in New York City developed the first day center in this country some eight years ago. There are now twelve such programs, open from nine to five o'clock, five days a week, in New York City and a number in other cities in this country. The idea of the centers has spread to England, Canada, France, and Australia.

The centers have adopted the knowledge, the techniques, and the programs developed by the recreation field. They have found that the values and benefits accruing to younger people in such organized programs are applicable to older persons. They recognize that recreation is a basic human need, and the facilities are planned accordingly.

Facilities in the centers include lounges for talk and reading, large rooms for mass activities, playrooms or play areas for cards, checkers, and chess, workshops, meeting rooms, classrooms, and libraries. A number have darkrooms for photography; one has a

poolroom. Some have yards for outdoor games. A kitchen is part of every center, for lunch and refreshments and to make parties possible.

The members of the centers sing, dance, and play cards and games. They make friends. They visit each other. Some even find romance; there have been eleven marriages in one center to date. They visit museums and places of interest regularly. They celebrate each other's birthdays once a month. They plan boat rides and picnics, and celebrate holidays. They have motion pictures, bazaars, and exhibitions of their work. They paint, write, and participate in editing magazines. They write their own plays and act in them. They make clothes, hats, jewelry, and costumes for plays. They have classes in woodwork, copper, leather, ceramics, English, sculpture, poetry, music and music appreciation, elocution, and acting. They maintain old skills or develop new skills and interests. They have discussion groups and regular information programs on health and geriatrics. The center becomes a major source of information. They have orchestras and choral groups. They do all the arts and crafts. The retired or unemployed older person may well bring a renaissance of folk art and craft to America.

There seems to be no limit to the interest and activity that may be developed. Interest can be aroused that will hold groups of different cultural levels. There are unlimited areas for activity, both intellectual and physical, for continued personal development.

Staff members include caseworkers, group workers, registered occupational therapists, and specialists in activities such as music, dramatics, carpentry, and arts and crafts. Counseling and casework are important areas of activity for the staff. A housing registry is maintained in some centers. Every center has developed a visiting committee of members who not only visit their own sick members but are extending this service to agencies in the community to visit shut-in older people.

Meeting the diversity of desires and needs of their members, these centers are planned as a constructive substitute for the loss of the workday. Members come and go freely. Most come all day, every day; some come two or three times a week. The centers are self-governing, with members carrying a considerable part of the responsibility for program planning and management. The centers are sponsored by public welfare agencies, voluntary agencies, interested citizens, or a combination of any of these.

Open opportunities

Industry and unions have an unusual opportunity to contribute to the well-being of the older person and to themselves by establishing day centers for their retired workers. Along with furnishings for the usual activities, these centers should be provided with shop and laboratory equipment, tools and materials. This would stimulate and open up vast opportunities for the retired worker, permitting him to explore and develop some of his ideas that he could not bring to fruition in a busy work life—to invent new tools and make changes in those with which he has worked. He can maintain some of the elements of his job; it can yield a reward that is rich in satisfaction and possibilities for him. His skill, knowledge, and time are tremendous untapped resources that have untold possibilities. The knowledge and the time used in these work-related activities should net innovations and improvements which may make a lasting contribution to our economy.

There is a beginning movement, today, to have homes for the aged open their doors to the nonresident. Old age homes—with physical plants, facilities, and funds for the care of the aged—have a stake in the preventive as well as the custodial care of the older person. Some homes have accepted responsibility for the nonresident, through a home care program. The program is necessarily limited by the number of older people that can be served and the kind of services possible. However, a day center program, as part of the homes for the aged, can give service to additional hundreds in the homes. Multiform activity programs and related services, developed in the day centers, can enrich the lives of the resident and the home-care older person, as well as the nonresident in the community. The resident can continue contact with the community through a contemporary healthier, stronger, more dynamic, day center member. He can be stimulated to join the integrated and less dependent day center members in many activities. Mental health seems contagious and communicable. The day center can bring that to the home. It can participate in the life of the home. The visiting committee program can be extended to include services to the bedridden, visiting, reading to them, writing letters for them, and so forth.

THE DEEPER NEEDS

Golden age clubs and other community programs are a beginning movement of recognition and acceptance of the older person. They enrich the resources in the community for his recreation. His contemporaries in these clubs add to his enjoyment and friendships.

Actually, however, the aging person does not need to seek out contemporaries to find pleasure and entertainment in his leisure time. Loss of employment may separate him from the industrial part of community life, but it need not separate him from the recreational fabric of the community. Neither loss of work nor diminishing physical capacity need change his leisure-time activity much. By and large, he can continue with familiar activity and be part of the community that he knows. Much, if not all, of his leisure time is associated with the evening. He can continue to enjoy movies and go to concerts, lectures, and classes. He can participate in church activity and community center and settlement programs. He can listen to the radio, watch television, read, and visit relatives and friends.

Recreation, no matter how important and no matter how broadly used, is only one aspect of the activity needs of the older person. Occasional and short contacts, inherent in recreation, do not satisfy the deeper need for creative and purposeful activity and do not meet the basic biological and psychological needs of unemployed, unoccupied older persons.

Activity

Activity as a primary human need, expressed physically, mentally, and emotionally, is basic to the older as well as the younger person. It is fundamental in preserving the personality. Basically, the older person needs to fill in his unused day with activity that will continue to use his abilities and his experiences—activity that will give him a feeling of adequacy, accomplishment, and usefulness.

There is belief that continued employment is the answer; it may be for some. Industry may learn to utilize more older people longer, but the greater number of older people will be unemployed. They must experience and resign themselves to unemployment at some time in their life. Nor does em-

ployment take into consideration the women who lose responsibility for the family or household. Together they form the main body, the largest number, of older people. It is this large reservoir of older people that should be the major concern of the community.

Activity-charged preventive programs for this large group will reduce the pressure and the need for custodial and remedial institutions. Dr. MacCurdy, of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, sees the investment of taxpayers' money in prevention rather than in building more and bigger institutions for the aged.[1] The steady increase in psychiatric casualties may be an indication of what is in store for us if a positive program of prevention is not developed.

"Retirement to"

Then, there is the other concept that man need not work until he dies; that after contributing forty or fifty years to our industrial well-being, he should have the opportunity to enjoy the contribution he has made—to enjoy our culture, our civilization.

Most people have areas of competency which a busy work life did not permit to develop. With longer life expectancy, with a stronger, less worn body, with a zest for life, with an interest in living and doing and a longer period in which to do nothing, deterioration will follow unless we develop preventive programs.

Most older people have experienced a great deal of frustration in their work life. Retirement could bring some satisfaction and happiness in later life if they could retire to rather than from something. Today, they have no choice.

Dr. E. G. Fried found that motivations for the frequently obsessive desire for work were the need to maintain self-esteem, the wish to escape from self-preoccupation and depression, and the striving to combat inner restlessness.[2] Folsom and Morgan found only a moderate correlation between work and happiness.[3] Conkey found, through interviewing, that the older person considered strong and varied interests and activity most important; economic security and independence were second.[4]

Activity and Motivation

In studies made by J. Landis of 450 persons 65 to 98 years of age, he found that all those who were active and had enough to do, including those even with hobbies, were better adjusted than others.[5] Folsom and Morgan found that hobbies and interesting activities are related to happiness. One-third of the persons studied found time hanging heavy on their hands; the busiest were happiest. Morgan also discusses the opinion of 55 older persons listed in *Who's Who in America*. They, too, emphasize the importance of having plenty to do in order to be happy.

Resources for activity are very limited. Community day centers for older people need to be developed to promote:

[1] Frederick MacCurdy, "The Aged in Our Mental Institutions," in *Birthdays Don't Count*, report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, Legislative Document No. 61, 1948, pp. 243–46.

[2] E. G. Fried, "Attitudes of the Older Population Groups Towards Activity and Inactivity," *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1949), pp. 141–51.

[3] J. K. Folsom and C. M. Morgan, "Social Adjustment of 381 Recipients of Old Age Allowances," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1937), pp. 223–29.

[4] F. Conkey, "Adaptation of Fifty Men and Women to Old Age," *Journal of Home Economics*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (May 1933), pp. 387–89.

[5] J. T. Landis, "Social-Psychological Factors of Aging," *Social Forces*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (May 1942), pp. 468–70.

(1) the social and emotional adjustment of the older person by making it possible for him to find companionship and create an environment that is favorable to his expansion; (2) the rehabilitation of personal efficiency by making it possible for the older person to make the maximum use of the capacities least impaired; and (3) community usefulness by creating a feeling of adequacy and accomplishment through an activity program.

A day center program utilizing the added time, the remaining strength, and the areas of competency of the older person during the hours usually spent at work can provide satisfactions associated with work, such as social usefulness, opportunities for self-expression, recognition, belonging, companionship, an established routine, something to look forward to. The center offers him choices in a climate that is conducive to experience and growth. Choices are fundamental. What the older person does from choice has meaning for him. At the center, activity is not just arts and crafts but motivation to do, movement, participation, and excitement. Time hangs heavy on his personality, particularly between nine and five o'clock, when everyone is busy and he feels separated from the main stream of life. Time can be a corroding factor with little to do, but in a center program on a planned basis, it becomes an added form of energy, replacing diminishing energy and vitality.

Decline does exist for the average, but individuals differ sufficiently to develop opportunities for creative activity for many members, particularly when decline in capacity may really be decline in motivation. Fatigue may easily be a defense mechanism—the result of being bored, useless, or not necessary to anyone. Even orientation or difficulty in accepting people may be due to lack of channels for emotional expression; for when put at ease and encouraged, such persons show unusual improvement and change.

The Group Factor

The center recognizes the importance of group interaction in the life of an individual, and its tendency to be pattern-setting. The center uses the group to support and strengthen the individual; to help develop his talents and experiences or redirect them to find new uses, new goals, new roles of social usefulness. While physical fitness, psychological needs, and acquired habits and attitudes affect the choice of activity, the group can and does modify the motives, habits, and attitudes in continued effective participation.

Physical limitations may not change fundamentally, but changes in adjustment to such limitations are observed in group activity. The center helps the older person to live with his limitations, but, even more, it concentrates on his strengths as it utilizes them in activity programs. It affects his tempo and accomplishment. As he becomes more involved in a group program, his understanding of himself undergoes change. There is less and less effort to rationalize inadequacy and failure on a health level. Instead, there is discovery of skills and talents that he can appreciate and others will accept, and there is recognition of the idea that these skills and talents can grow, increasing his feeling of adequacy and accomplishment. Integrating the older person in group activity enables him to recognize that others around him have equal limitations and are utilizing the strengths they have to achieve and create.

As the individual becomes more integrated in the group, there is noticeable day-to-day expansion which, in itself, is energy created through the group. In a group setting he is helped to de-

velop a definite interest in purposeful activity, which he is stimulated to follow systematically. Energy may be increased by using it. The more the group accept responsibility, the more they participate. The more they participate, the more easily they learn. The more they learn, the more they retain what they learn.

Acceptance, recognition, attention, relationships, make for a steady recovery from fear, loneliness, and frustration. There are members whose chief preoccupation was with their health and visits to clinics, who are now more discriminating in their visits to clinics. In one center there was a drop of 70 per cent in clinic attendance after six months of membership. In a recent study of the visual acuity of sixty members of the Hodson Center by psychologists and ophthalmologists of the United States Public Health Service, it was found impossible for a number of the members to see; yet they have not been limited in their activities. The same was found in a survey of some thirty members who had cardiac conditions. In a number of instances, their physicians insisted that the patients were too sick to be out of bed; yet they attended the center regularly. The obvious conclusion is that the adjustment to decline in capacity or a physical handicap depends on more than strictly organic factors.

CONCLUSION

In a democracy it should be possible for the later years to be less of a struggle and to be filled with some satisfactions in accomplishment and creativity. Given the opportunity, the older members of our society can contribute to our cultural well-being. The Grandma Moses' are not unique; they can be the rule, rather than the exception.

The constructive use of man's later years is possible if we can give him a sense of achievement, lessen failures in his efforts, and develop possibilities compensating for impaired capacity. To do that, we need to evolve an activity program in a day center that will include medical, psychological, and psychiatric facilities, as well as group work, casework, and personal counseling. Such a center can constructively affect the characteristics of the older person. The enormous amount of unused time holds untold possibilities of cultural enrichment for the individual and society. Society must provide the opportunities for the constructive use of time and energy. It must enable all to fulfill the promise of growth and achievement offered in the prolonged life of man.

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Employment Services for Older Workers

BY CHARLES E. ODELL

DURING the first six months of 1950 the public employment services in five states co-operated with the Bureau of Employment Security of the United States Department of Labor in making a comprehensive study of the employment problems of older workers. Localities in which studies took place were Columbus, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Los Angeles, California; and New York City. These localities represented small, medium-sized, and large communities with labor market conditions ranging from relatively high unemployment to virtually full employment. The studies covered a cross section of the labor market, including all occupational and industrial groups.

Local employment offices which participated in the studies selected, over a period of four months, a random sample of all their applicants 45 years of age and over. They divided the total sample into a control group and an experimental group similar in composition with respect to age, sex, occupational distribution, handicapped status, and length of unemployment. The control group received no service they would not have received under any circumstances in the regular course of operations of the employment office. The experimental group received intensive employment counseling and job placement services exploiting every device suggested by the experience or ingenuity of the most capable and best-trained counselors and placement interviewers. The counselors and interviewers analyzed carefully the characteristics and problems of these applicants, and attempted to determine the effectiveness of the services of the local office in improving their employment opportunities and in assisting them to achieve successful job adjustment.

During the course of the studies, participating local offices collected labor market information on 342,000 workers of all ages. They analyzed over 13,000 job openings to plot the pattern of hiring specifications as they relate to age. The more intensive study of the control and experimental groups of workers 45 and over for a period of six months yielded complete counseling and placement information on 4,657 individuals and partial information on 4,070, or significant data on a total of 8,727 older workers.

WHEN IS A WORKER TOO OLD?

Quantitative data of the studies refer only to workers 45 years of age and over. This, however, is merely a statistical convention. The age at which a worker encounters employment problems because of characteristics associated with aging varies widely with his occupation, his industry, and the locality in which he works. A worker in one occupation or industry, such as retail specialty sales, may begin to experience employment difficulties at 35 or younger; while another worker in, for example, the wholesale field, may have no trouble in finding and holding a job at 55 or even 60. In New York City, a floor girl in the needle trades is "old" at 40, but a patternmaker at 65 is often preferred to a younger worker.

Generally, employment problems connected with age arise earlier for women

than for men. Columbus reported that, in the opinion of the counselors, women of 35 meet employment difficulties comparable to those of men at 45 or even 50. In Houston, more than one-third of all women over 45 registered with the local office were clerical or sales workers, but four-fifths of the employers' orders for women in these occupational categories bore age restrictions below 35. Lancaster found that not only in clerical and sales work but also in factory production work, employers placed age restrictions of 18 to 35 on the hiring of women workers.

Evidently, the age at which a worker is considered old industrially depends heavily upon the kind and degree of skill, the industry, the prevailing conditions of the local labor market, the type and strength of unionization, and the personal qualifications of the individual job seeker.

Since it is inaccurate to define the older worker in terms of age brackets, the Bureau of Employment Security has adopted, for the purposes of employment services to older workers, a definition specifically in terms of their employment problems: "An applicant is an older worker only if he is encountering difficulty in getting or keeping a job principally because of his age or of characteristics ordinarily associated with age."

ATTITUDES AND BIASES

Many complex factors affect the difficulty of the older worker in obtaining and retaining employment. Particularly serious are widespread and obstinate attitudes which reflect common biases and the tendency to stereotyped thinking about older people.

One instance is the misconception that chronological age is synonymous with physical and mental aging—despite all experience to the contrary. Case reports in our studies of older workers demonstrate dramatically that some people in their 40's or 50's manifest all the characteristics associated with aging, whereas many people in their 60's or older do not. For example, the New York report describes one applicant of 51 as follows: "His face was haggard, his hands had a discernible tremor, his manner was alternately bold and whiningly timid. . . . He repeated himself endlessly and revealed no growth of insight into his problems." This would strike most people as a description of traits associated with advanced age. On the other hand, the Los Angeles report cites the case of a woman of 63 who was remarkably young-looking and whose "personality was so delightfully youthful that she could not understand why so many women of her age were so drab." She was so ill able to understand that she set herself up in business giving private lessons in "charm" to women over 50. Obviously, this woman was young beyond her years.

Generalizations concerning the comparative productivity and stability of older workers are another example of conclusions unfounded in fact. Employers often give as their reason for not hiring older workers their opinion that such workers have set work habits and are not adaptable; that they cannot get along with younger workers; that they lack physical stamina necessary to keep up with production schedules; or that they do not respond to training. No studies support these opinions.

The typical older worker is a stable and responsible individual who changes jobs less often and has a better record of attendance than younger workers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, in a study of nearly 18,000 plant workers in a wide variety of industries and occupations, showed that the absenteeism rate fell steadily as the age of the worker increased, and that in every age group over 50, workers lost fewer scheduled work days than those in any age group below 50.[1] Older workers produce as much as do younger workers, and with a more even work pace and less wastage. In a recent survey of 2,794 companies with 2.5 million employees, 22 per cent of employers reported superior work performance, 48 per cent superior attendance, 32 per cent superior safety records, and 48 per cent superior work attitudes on the part of older workers.[2] As to the ability of older workers to work with younger groups, the Lancaster report mentions especially that some employers find the older ones have a steadying influence on younger workers, and therefore prefer to integrate some older workers into each operating unit.

Personnel workers too often fail to consider older people as individuals. They frequently assume that any job change for the older worker must necessarily be a downgrading. They assume that older workers fall perforce into certain limited occupational classifications, for instance, service fields, and that certain jobs are eminently suitable for older workers, such as those of watchman and elevator operator. The employment service studies show that, while about 29 per cent of older workers who obtain employment accepted lower pay than they had formerly received, 16 per cent got jobs at higher pay.

ECONOMIC OBSTACLES

Economic considerations are an important factor in the employment problems of the older workers. Many older workers have incurred financial obligations which require a relatively high income. Such workers are not able to accept job changes or downgrading with significantly lower pay. Even in the absence of other obligations, responsibility for dependents and for a home often limits the older worker's job choices.

For example, jobs in service occupations are less likely than others to carry age restrictions, but they frequently furnish meals as part of their compensation, and many of them require the worker to live on the employer's premises. The Houston report points out that many older workers cannot accept such jobs, because people "want food for their entire families, not just for themselves," and people who have homes do not wish to live on the job. Also, responsibility for a family often limits the mobility of the older worker. The Lancaster report notes that the older worker often cannot consider a job in an area other than that of his home.

Again, older workers, as the Columbus report comments, are not often in a position to engage in long or expensive training, though it might vastly improve their opportunities for employment.

Economic considerations seriously affect, too, the willingness of employers to hire older workers or to retain them in employment. Many employers argue that the older worker's reduced physical activity or production speed raises cost of operation. A great many employers fear rising cost of pension and insurance systems should their pay rolls show any large number of older workers. When the employed older worker actually cannot perform adequately in his usual occupation, employers feel that his shorter work expectancy does not warrant the expense of training or retraining him.

[1] Max D. Kossoris, "Absenteeism and Injury Experience of Older Workers," *Monthly Labor Review*, July 1948, pp. 16–19.

[2] National Association of Manufacturers, unpublished survey data, 1951.

MODERN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES BOTH HELP AND HINDER

Certain practices which modern industry has adopted, and which are generally beneficial to workers, are often complicating factors in the employment of older workers. Seniority, which generally protects the employment of workers until they reach retirement age, affects adversely the unemployed older worker's chance of becoming re-employed at the occupational level and pay rate for which he qualifies.[3]

The practice of promotion from within, or the career policy, is generally beneficial to both workers and employers, because it is an incentive to employees to develop their aptitudes to the maximum extent possible and to maintain high standards of production. This practice, however, may have the same effect as the practice of seniority in limiting employment opportunities for the unemployed older worker.[4]

Insurance and pension plans generally provide protection to workers and their dependents against financial hardship. Compulsory retirement, however, cuts off employment opportunities at arbitrary chronological ages regardless of the worker's need for employment or ability to perform.[5]

Reports from all the employment service study localities cited company policies with regard to seniority, promotion from within, and insurance and pension systems as the reasons which employers most often gave for their applying age restrictions in hiring.

[3] Richard Lester, *Economics of Labor* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 469–72.

[4] Richard C. Wilcock, "Who's Too Old to Work?" University of Illinois Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, Bulletin Series, Vol. IV, No. 3 (September 1950), p. 8.

[5] N. W. Shock, "Older People and Their Potentialities for Gainful Employment," *Journal of Gerontology*, April 1947, pp. 93–102.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES—SCARCITY AMID ABUNDANCE

The total number of job opportunities is an important factor in the employment problems of older workers. However, the employment service studies conclusively disprove the popular assumption that full, or at least expanding, employment provides a complete solution to the older worker's difficulties in finding employment. The studies provide undeniable evidence that, under any and all circumstances, workers over 45 in every occupational category have fewer employment opportunities than their representation in these categories would warrant.

For example, in Lancaster 46 per cent of the skilled applicants were over 45, but only 19 per cent of the persons placed in skilled trades were over 45; the odds against placement of workers over 45 as a whole were on the average 6 to 1, with odds of 4½ to 1 in clerical and sales occupations, and 5 to 1 even in the semiskilled trades. Houston had had a tight labor market for a long time, yet 52 per cent of employers' orders in the local office carried age restrictions. In Columbus, where the labor market became stringent during the course of the study, four-fifths of the orders were for workers under 45, and two-fifths called for workers under 35.[6] A comparable condition prevailed in placements everywhere.[7] Generally, the odds were greater against women than against men.

In their unequal competition for employment, older workers often have to

[6] "Trained Manpower Going to Waste? Employment Services Survey Job Prospects of Older Applicants," *The Labor Market and Employment Security*, May 1951, pp. 18–19.

[7] Louis H. Ravin, "Live Longer and Like It?" *Employment Security Review*, April 1951, p. 32.

accept work in the less desirable occupations and industries. The study data show that there is a decided increase with advancing age in the proportion of workers in service occupations. In Lancaster, 23 per cent of older men applying for work at the local office were service workers, in contrast to about 4 per cent of those under 45; and in each of the other study areas, the proportion of older men in service occupations represented a similarly sharp increase over the proportion of younger men so classified.[8]

Since service jobs are comparatively low paid and often involve poor working conditions, the availability of opportunities for employment of older workers in the service occupations is really significant of disadvantage rather than advantage.

LONG PERIOD OF UNEMPLOYMENT

One of the gravest aspects of the employment problems of older workers is the long period of unemployment which the majority of them suffer once they lose their jobs. This is a severe hazard both to the worker himself and to society. In all the employment service study localities, a considerably larger proportion of older than younger workers remained unemployed for more than twenty weeks.[9] A high percentage of older workers remain unemployed long enough to exhaust their unemployment insurance benefit[10] and also any personal financial reserves they may have accumulated. Thereafter they must accept private or public assistance, which entails for most people a loss of social status and self-esteem.

[8] *Op. cit.* note 6 *supra*, pp. 15–16.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[10] "Older Workers at the Public Employment Office," *The Labor Market*, June 1949, p. 36.

Serious as is the effect of unwonted dependence as concerns the older worker, however, it is even greater with respect to society as a whole. It increases the cost of social security and public assistance programs. It deprives the economy of much potential production. Estimates of the value of production we lose because older people who are willing and able to work are not working run into billions of dollars.[11] The unemployment of older workers eventually lowers the standard of living of both the older workers and employed workers whom they burden.

IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

The services of the local offices of the public employment service are of pivotal importance to the older worker in his job seeking. An unexpectedly high percentage of the older workers of the study groups who became employed obtained their jobs through the employment service. This was true of the workers in the control groups as well as those in the experimental groups, although those in the control groups received no special services and benefited from no special placement efforts. Employment through relatives, friends, advertisements, private employment agencies, and even unions, was negligible in all groups.

The prominence of the employment service as a source of placement for older workers is remarkable because for the general run of applicants, employment agencies, whether public or private, rank well below other sources of placement. A number of investigations have shown that about 40 per cent of

[11] John D. Durand, *The Labor Force in the United States, 1890–1960* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948), pp. 184–85.

all applicants for work secure jobs through their own efforts, while another 25 per cent find employment through relatives and friends, and substantial numbers get work through unions. Generally, only from 15 to 20 per cent secure employment through the public employment service. Among the older workers studied, 39 per cent obtained placement through the employment service.

INTENSIVE INDIVIDUALIZED SERVICE NEEDED

No doubt the employment service ranked so high as a source of placement for older workers in general and those in the experimental group in particular because of the need of large numbers of these applicants for intensive counseling and placement services to assist them in securing and retaining employment. About half of the older workers do not require any special service; but the other half require a great deal of attention in order that they may locate and take advantage of employment opportunities.

It is safe to say that the employment service has better facilities for providing the special services which these latter applicants need than does any other source of placement service open to them. While there are instances of outstanding performance by some private agencies and institutions, nowhere outside the local offices of the employment service can workers obtain the comprehensive information and assistance which the employment service can provide to help them arrive at a realistic appraisal of their own capacities in relation to immediate and prospective employment opportunities, and of the ways in which they can adjust themselves to existing labor market conditions.

The services available to older workers through the public employment service consist of especially careful application taking; technically accurate occupational classification; intensive employment counseling; placement service, including the development of job opportunities by individual job solicitation, where necessary; and an employer promotion and public relations program which encourages understanding of the advisability of employing older workers. The application process and the technique of occupational classification have their bases in the extensive occupational research in which the employment service constantly engages, and which has produced the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, defining 22,028 individual jobs occurring in industry in the United States.

EMPLOYMENT COUNSELING SERVICE

The older worker studies showed that traditional methods of factual recording and classification of past work experience and training of older workers was not an adequate approach to the counseling interview. The employment counselor must often assist the worker to dissect and analyze his employment history, by isolating all the separate skills he has acquired, by recognizing relationships among these skills, and by seeing how various combinations of these might make it possible for him to perform a number of different jobs. After helping the worker to analyze his qualifications for the performance of jobs, the counselor must often assist him to relate this analysis to information regarding the labor market conditions currently surrounding opportunities for employment in specific types of jobs.

Employment counseling services were also found to include special techniques for the placement of the physically handicapped, known as physical capacities–physical demands analysis techniques. These are devices for appraising the abilities of the physically handicapped and matching these abilities to the demands of jobs which they can perform in equal competition with workers who have no disabilities.

These techniques are also used with workers who, though not actually physically handicapped, are undergoing the physical changes of aging, but who do not recognize that these changes are the source of their difficulties in securing or maintaining employment. In such cases the counselor modifies the specific check lists to reflect the effects of decline in capacities rather than loss of capacity. The positive emphasis of the physical capacities approach upon abilities which remain intact usually overcomes the worker's reluctance to acknowledge impairment or slowing down of other capacities. It was found that the use of the physical capacities approach may actually broaden the scope of the worker's search for employment in that he need have no fear of conceding that there are jobs which he can no longer perform, since this approach opens up many possibilities for which he can apply with confidence.

INCIDENCE OF DISABILITY

What has just been said about the use of techniques ordinarily associated with the placement of the disabled should not be misconstrued to mean that all, or even a very significant number, of older job applicants in the studies were physically disabled. The studies indicated that the incidence of physical handicaps among older workers was only slightly higher than among the general applicant population and the younger age groups. The studies show, also, that physical handicaps in older workers are not in themselves a major factor in their problem of finding employment. Proof of this is that the proportion of handicapped older workers who obtained employment was very close to their proportion in the samples.

It was reported that the handicapped older worker has usually made a more satisfactory adjustment to his disability, so that it is no longer a significant factor in his competition for employment. This is, no doubt, because the most prevalent handicaps among older workers are of types which result from gradual deterioration rather than from sudden accident or acute illness. The most common handicaps found in the study groups were impairment of vision or hearing, spinal or abdominal weaknesses, and cadiovascular conditions. In addition to being gradual in development, such handicaps usually do not involve a diminution of strength or agility to levels below those required in most jobs.

ORGANIZATION OF COUNSELING AND PLACEMENT SERVICES

Those who participated in the older worker studies agreed unanimously that adequate service to older workers does not require organizational segregation. In fact, they agreed that the special attention which the older worker needs consists of intensified, individualized treatment frequently involving counseling, employer solicitation, and other services already available to applicants in the public employment service. The methods and processes involved are in many respects similar in technical content to those used in service to youth, the handicapped, and other groups. The total facilities of the local office are necessary for effective service to older workers perhaps to a greater degree than for any other special group. Integration of services to older workers with the regular service to applicants in

the local office was felt to be the best method of providing adequate counseling and placement services to the older worker group.

VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TOWARD EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER WORKERS

Prejudices against older workers are deep-seated and widespread. Efforts to overcome them should be equally widespread, and all agencies and individuals interested in the problem should be encouraged to participate in working toward a solution. Beyond the necessity for full exploitation of limited resources, voluntary efforts toward the placement of older workers have a morale-building value, and help them to help themselves in alleviating their plight.

One example of a voluntary enterprise which assists older workers toward employment is the type of organization known as the Forty-Plus Clubs. These are groups of unemployed older people who have had successful experience as executives in business and industry.[12] They supply to each other their employment histories, and visit employers for the purpose of soliciting employment for each other. That is, the individual does not try to sell himself to the employer, but attempts to persuade the employer to hire another qualified member of the organization. The theory behind this procedure is that workers are sometimes embarrassed in attempting to present to employers their own work histories, whereas a man can often make a very good case for another man. In some communities, the local employment offices have furnished space and facilities to Forty-Plus Clubs and similar enterprises in order to expand the scope of their own limited contacts with employers.

Another type of voluntary effort at employment is self-employment. Instances of this type of effort have developed in Wilmington, Delaware; Erie, Pennsylvania; and Schenectady, New York; where well-qualified technicians, forced into retirement by company policies, have sought and found means of furnishing engineering, designing, accounting, purchasing, and other services to smaller firms which could not afford full-time personnel in such specialties. The employment service in New York cites as an instance a man who, finding it difficult to obtain employment because of his age, developed a miniature golf course for himself, his wife, and another couple. This enterprise provided employment for four older workers, willing and able to work and maintain their independence.

Another type of voluntary effort is reported by the Cleveland Vocational Guidance Bureau and the Federation Employment Service of New York City. These are local community projects. They do both individual and group counseling, and also provide the services of recreational consultants.[13]

PARTICIPATION OF MANAGEMENT AND LABOR

Management and labor can make a significant contribution toward solving the employment problems of older workers. In collective bargaining for pension plans, there should be agreement on permissive retirement age at which those who no longer want to work or are unable to work could retire on full pension. Where pension plans with fixed retirement ages are already in effect, the companies and unions involved should study the possibility of making retirement voluntary at the specified age, with the exception of those certified on the basis of medical examination and other criteria as unable to perform, for reasons of health, on plant.

The development of criteria for such their jobs or other jobs available in the purpose constitutes an important task for management and labor alike. Management and labor should arrive at arrangements for the vesting of pension rights. This would mean that an employee who leaves a job would have retirement rights proportionate to contributions already paid into the pension fund. An older worker with a vested interest in one or more pension funds would have one disadvantage removed in seeking another job. His new employer would not have to look forward to retiring the worker on an inadequate pension based on a limited period of employment. Better still would be some pooling of private plans paralleling the federal old-age insurance system.

Management and labor have, in a number of cases, worked out and adopted flexible wage standards which enable older workers to take less productive jobs at lower hourly rates. Some unions have added to seniority provisions of contracts by agreeing to shift older workers to easier jobs at lower earnings in order to continue employment. Other areas requiring the attention of management and labor in maintaining continuity of employment opportunity for older persons who wish to go on working will be explored at a conference to be held soon under the joint sponsorship of the McGregor Fund of Detroit and the National Social Welfare Assembly, and in the forthcoming report of a survey of management practices in dealing with older workers prepared by Mrs. Elizabeth Breckinridge of the Committee on Human Development of the University of Chicago.

RESEARCH NEEDED

Success in increasing job opportunities for older workers depends heavily upon research findings. We should investigate the attitudes of older workers toward employment, their ability to meet job requirements, their need for jobs, and ways of expanding their employment opportunities. This type of research is being done to some extent at present by individual companies, employer organizations, unions, universities, and private and governmental research agencies. More is needed. Specifically, research programs should investigate some of the following: (1) physical, mental, and social changes typical of various age groups, and the extent of overlap; (2) development of measures of functional capacities particularly significant in employment; (3) employment opportunities and job requirements in particular industries and occupations in relation to changes characteristic of the aging process; (4) pilot studies within industry to test in operation various plans for utilization of older workers; (5) the costs of retraining and rehabilitation programs in relation to the resulting value of production; and (6) analysis in statistical terms of the work capacities and productivity of older persons as compared to their younger fellows.

[12] The Forty-Plus Club of New England, Boston, 1938.

[13] Edward W. Gressle, "New Vocations for After-50 Workers," *The Clevelander*, July 1950, p. 8.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

CANHAM, ERWIN D., together with members of the staff of the *Christian Science Monitor*. *Awakening: The World at Mid-Century*. Pp. x, 209. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1951. $2.75.

This simple, straightforward compilation is held together with hope. It is couched in a constructive journalism which reports, wherever possible from a wide arena of activities, the spirit in confronting "all-powerful materialism." The hope is meant to be a personal challenge. It is difficult to know the precise audience for this volume, but it would be a pity if the volume's simplicity were mistaken for inadequate analysis.

The concluding program of action recommended by the distinguished editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* does not seem impossible after the clues of the preceding chapters. (1) "The free world must continue to strengthen its physical defenses against aggression." (2) "We must preserve the economic soundness of the free world." (3) "We must set forth our program of coexistence and peace alongside the communist powers." Canham adds, "The free nations have not yet thought through and proclaimed the terms on which they are willing to make peace." (4) "We must lift a standard for a more effective, righteous government within the free nations." (5) In addition to improving international organization, we must "proclaim and clarify to ourselves and to the world the spiritual significance of the free systems as the true and liberating revolution of human history." (6) Finally, we must seek to understand the viewpoints, the needs, and the spiritual pride and hunger of other peoples and other races.

After discussing the twilight of materialism, the rise of womanpower, the new frontiers of the natural sciences which can include "compassion," the weakening of the second principle of thermodynamics (entropy), and the theory of the "survival of the fittest," there is a shrewd analysis of the "formidable massed impatience" of the "have-nots." Trygve Lie is quoted: "I believe that the rise of dependent peoples and the human-rights movement will in the long run have far more significance and give rise to greater events in the second half of the twentieth century than will the present ideological struggle." A prescription follows, what Canham calls "free collectivism"—"our whole social structure is crossed and recrossed by lines of individual-based togetherness." He adds, "the free collectivism of our system points the way to progress far beyond Marxian collectivism."

Fairly confident chapters on medicine, education, and theology, and more tentative chapters on art, music, fiction, and drama round out this stimulating volume. If readers of THE ANNALS note that Mr. Canham and his colleagues might well have distilled a chapter of strength from the social sciences, it can be said that some of the insights of these disciplines are sprinkled, without jargon, through the book.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL

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MORGENTHAU, HANS J. *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. Pp. xii, 283, viii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951. $3.50.

Incisively critical of postwar American foreign policy, this brilliant analysis by the author of *Politics Among Nations* is built around an appeal for recognition of the dignity of the national interest. The utopianism that has handicapped American diplomacy since 1900 needs, the author feels, a healthy admixture of realism —of old-style balance-of-power, sphere-of-influence politics.

In the course of his argument Morgenthau touches on a favorite theme—that a major defect in our postwar policy is refusal to compromise or even to negotiate with Russia. This, combined with failure to realize the military realities in Europe, failure to comprehend the genuineness of the revolutions in Asia, a chronic tendency to underestimate Russian power, and a "failure of will" to act even when we understand what is required—has so intensified the present highly charged atmosphere that diplomacy is next to impossible.

Support of a settlement with Russia is not to be confused with appeasement: the author is quite aware that a settlement may be impossible. His point is that it has not been tried, and that it ought to be tried. He cites Winston Churchill in a phrase which puts his own theme quite well: "It is better to have a world united than a world divided; but it is also better to have a world divided than a world destroyed."

The book suffers somewhat from the author's tendency to make too sweeping an indictment. With all its utopianism current American policy contains a hard core of *Realpolitik* never quite acknowledged in the book. In his analysis of the political revolution of our time the author develops the concept of the bipolar world, wherein "the give and take of compromise become a weakness neither side is able to afford," and "the flexibility of the balance of power and its restraining influence . . . have disappeared." Nonetheless much of his condemnation of American policy appears to be aimed at this very uncompromising quality which he asserts is inevitable; much of his case for negotiation is supported by nineteenth-century balance-of-power examples which he elsewhere deems inapplicable.

Despite such occasional inconsistencies the book stands as a major landmark among analytical studies of American policy a stimulating, searching, and often penetrating work which will accomplish that elusive objective of such studies—to make the reader think.

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KENNAN, GEORGE F. *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*. Pp. viii, 146. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. $2.75.

This little volume comprises six lectures delivered at the University of Chicago by the man responsible for setting up and for a time directing the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, and an appendix of two articles by the same author reprinted from issues of *Foreign Affairs* for July 1947 and April 1951. It may be remarked in passing that in the opinion of this reviewer the articles are better written, more tightly reasoned, and altogether less vulnerable than the preceding addresses. In the latter the author examines our foreign policies of the last fifty years and in general finds that we have slipped badly. It is apparent that he longs for the good old days when diplomacy was accepted as an esoteric art in which trained and experienced "realists" could work unhampered by the distracting intrusions of a prying public.

The greatest concern of the lecturer is apparently aroused by the "impractical

idealism" (p. 69) which has led to serious errors in judgment of our diplomats during this fifty-year period, and to their failure to take account of "power realities" (pp. 45, 51, 53, *et passim*). In particular he deplores the American tendency to venture moral appraisals of the actions of other nations and our habit of "making ourselves slaves of the concepts of international law and morality . . ." (pp. 53–54). He is distressed at our disinclination to admit "the validity and legitimacy of power realities and aspirations, to accept them without feeling the obligation of moral judgment, to take them as existing and inalterable human forces, neither good nor bad, and to seek their point of maximum equilibrium rather than their reform or their repression" (p. 53). Here, then, as well as elsewhere in these lectures, we find in substance a prescription of good old-fashioned *Realpolitik* with perhaps a slight dash of cautious idealism.

The author deplores big wars and long wars and is all in favor of compromises, especially to prevent the balance of power from being upset. One infers that this is regarded as far more important than to prolong a war for the purpose of thwarting the power aspirations (which we should not judge) of law breakers. From all of which it is understandable that the author takes a dim view of the League of Nations experiment, of the United Nations, and of international law except as it may come to be useful as the "gentle civilizer of self-interest . . ." (p. 54). But are not ideals and human aspirations, quite apart from power politics, also "realities" which the practitioners of diplomacy would do well to take into account?

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MCLAURIN, JOHN. *The United Nations and Power Politics.* Pp. xiii, 468. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $5.00.

This is by all odds the most vital and pungent book yet to appear about the United Nations. It gets in behind the facade of formal debate and constitutional procedure to expose the political motivation of national governments as they have argued and decided the manifold issues which have come before the international organization. In the process, McLaurin (a pen-name) provides a remarkably detailed and factual account of the evolution of United Nation's operations from its inception to the end of 1950 on social and economic, as well as political, questions.

The result is a powerful indictment of national policies within and towards the United Nations—they "would shock our morals and revolt our common sense if we could see them in the light of day"—followed up by a bold, provocative appeal to the people of his own country (Britain) and of the other democracies to demand that their governments "call off the cold war so far as they are concerned, attempt conciliation and honour their pledges under the Charter."

McLaurin's central thesis is that governments, almost without exception, have betrayed the promises they made to their peoples in the Charter of the United Nations to make peace more secure and to advance human rights. On issue after issue, they have used the United Nations simply to pursue their own narrow national political ends. Even if a government appears to take a stand on broad principles of justice, fredom, or peace, the author demonstrates the presence of mixed motives, with the paramount regard being for "power-political" interests. As a result, the United Nations has had to function on the "low level of *Realpolitik*" instead of fulfilling the noble ends for which it was created.

Nevertheless, some positive achievements have been made. The net effect of political pressures, however base their motivation, has afforded a degree of protection to small states and dependent peoples. Even weak support from the United Nations has raised the fighting morale of victims or intended victims of aggressive or oppressive policies. Guilty governments have been exposed and made to feel uncomfortable. Good co-operation has developed between governments and technicians on social and economic problems, up to the point where these questions too came under the lethal hand of cold war politics or special interests. Through the work of the Economic and Social Council and its related agencies McLaurin accurately discerns that "lives have been saved, seeds of social growth sown, technical knowledge and skill have been spread . . . abuses of some human beings by others have been restricted." The most hopeful sign for the future, he believes, lies in the ability of citizens who oppose the wrong policies of their own governments to find "fresh determination and useful ammunition" in the debates and votes at the United Nations. With sympathy for world government as the ultimate answer to international conflict, he insists however that this object must first be earned by "honouring the Charter as it stands."

McLaurin freely admits that he has an "axe to grind." His righteous indignation against what he considers hypocritical, selfish power politics by member governments of the United Nations crackles through his fast-moving pages. He believes that common-sense dictates a primarily moral approach to political problems: "policies which pay heed to moral claims are likely to secure for us all that is legitimate in the concept of 'national interest.'" The onus for corrupting the United Nations is laid heavily on the West, because the author is particularly sensitive to a 'holier than thou' attitude on the part of his fellow-believers in democracy. But the score is also called on the Soviet Union and its satellites for willful, though not necessarily sinister, pursuit of national gain at the expense of human welfare.

While the author allows his moral convictions full play, he does not neglect the canons of objective scholarship demanded by his own profession of education. (He has recently been Visiting Professor of Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, and helped to organize the United Nations-UNESCO Seminar on teaching about the United Nations.) His factual account of United Nations developments is reliable, based upon extensive official documentation and information derived from obviously close personal acquaintance with the Secretariat. Moreover, his exposition of national policies in the United Nations is fair, depending principally upon the direct statements of delegates, selected with a reasonable regard for their context.

The most valuable part of the book is the comprehensive discussion of United Nations action on economic and social questions. This functional phase of the organization has not previously been presented so vividly and with such thoroughness to the layman. The operations of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the Economic Commission for Europe, the technical assistance program, the Trusteeship System, and the specialized agencies are reviewed sympathetically but with realistic awareness of the political and other obstacles which have blocked their maximum effectiveness. In addition, a blunt and refreshingly candid chapter on "The Veto and Unanimity" dispels much of the fog which has beclouded public discussions of this procedural question. McLaurin convincingly points out that, in fact, the veto has *not* been responsible for the discomfiture of the United Nations on vital political issues, except where the contemplated action might have led to a world war.

PHILIP E. JACOB
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CORBETT, P. E. *Law and Society in the Relations of States.* Pp. xii, 337. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951. $4.75

This study of international law, published under the auspices of the Yale Institute of International Studies, establishes a position somewhere between a skeptical radical denial of any binding rule between nations and the claim that nations are subject to a complete system of international legal order. The latter idea, which has guided academic treatment of the subject for centuries, is not even well founded in its own theoretical terms, according to Corbett's searching analysis of the main systems of juristic thought.

He concludes that neither the apostles of natural law nor advocates of the various positivistic consent—theories have suc-

ceeded in furnishing a consistent explanation of international law without having grossly to distort the relevant facts. The same is true of the closely related concept of a society of nations which in many of these theoretical systems figures as an explicit or implicit premise.

The practices of governments can hardly be reconciled with the assumption of a world society. Furthermore, the concept of such a society stands in direct contradiction to the notion of the sovereignty of its "subjects." Nor can we infer the existence of this society from the functioning of international organizations, since the latter are really but associations for specific purposes rather than manifestations of an over-all system. The idea of a society of nations is also constantly refuted when legal "obligations" of states to that alleged society receive second billing behind national statutes in courts which have to decide a conflict between the two systems. In short, there is no international law and no international society, and the effort to classify the usages of nations under these concepts the usages of nations under these concepts "involves wasteful self-deception and misdirection of energy, and leads to false expectations on the part of the public."

Is there then nothing but arbitrariness? Are the cynics right? No, says Corbett, there is a certain degree of social coordination depending on an "active but fluctuating and limited consensus." These conventions are something less than full-fledged legal rules. They are in a constant process of modification by pressure in which the might of the great powers plays a predominant role. This, while not approaching the regularity and predictability of national legal orders, is nevertheless useful. In the light of that thesis, the main body of the book surveys the foci of those conventions (such as territory, nationality, immunity, responsibility, war, and neutrality), showing both their regulating effect and their susceptibility to political forces. The most that can be expected from these "rules" is a slowing down of the pace of adaptation and some assurance against political action for frivolous reasons.

As one might gather, "rules" concerning war and warfare are more than others dependent on political conditions. This realization leads Corbett to the last part of his book in which he deals with international organization which alone, so he says, can remove the causes of armed conflict and thereby prepare the way for a genuine order of world law. With the cool detachment which characterizes most of the book, Corbett appraises the United Nations and finds it "legally powerless (in the case of conflict between the permanent members) to enforce its obligations." He concludes that the United Nations as "a society including the Soviet Union" has but marginal competence "in the sense that it does not reach to the great issues dividing our world."

At this point, Corbett abandons the sober judgment which has guided him so far in the study and proposes to base a more effective organization on "the international protection of the individual," that is, on an international guarantee of human rights. He seems to be unaware of the fact that this is a matter in which even the federal government of this country finds it unwise to assert its might against dissident regional conventions. It is difficult to see how he expects this most sensitive spot in a community's sense of independence to become fertile ground for the growth of international organization. Anyone who, like this reviewer, finds it beyond himself to accept Corbett's proposal as a realistic plan must close the book with the disappointed feeling that the largely negative insights of Corbett's study have not conduced him to the threshold of any rational guidance about where to go from here.

GERHART NIEMEYER

Washington, D. C.

KELSEN, HANS. *Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations.* (A Supplement to *The Law of the United Nations*). Pp. 909–994 (continuous numbering). New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $2.50.

The North Atlantic Treaty, the action in Korea, the subsequent adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in the United Nations, and the representation of China are developments of such importance that Kelsen found it necessary to deal with them in a separately published eighty-page supplement to his *Law of the United Nations*. In this, as in the main work, he confines himself to presenting different logical meanings of the documents, prefering not to concern himself with the political overtones which might also be taken into account. Thus, for instance, he finds that it is possible to infer from the Charter that the decisions of the Security Council regarding North Korean aggression were illegal because of the absence of the Soviet delegate, but that it is equally possible to conclude that they were legal, the Charter admitting both interpretations. Here, as elsewhere, Kelsen's preoccupation with formal words detached from the circumstances which give them color and meaningful effect leads him to unrealistic results, since he overlooks the fact that the Security Council itself settled this question. It assumed its right not to be thwarted by an absentee member, and fifty-three nations by their actions honored this assumption.

At one point only does he seem to deviate from this noncommittal attitude. Examining the Uniting for Peace Resolution he states that "it can hardly be denied that the United Nations under this Resolution assumes the character of an international organization very different from that which the framers of the Charter had in mind. The system of collective security established by this Resolution is much nearer to that established by the Government of the League of Nations than to that intended by the framers of the Charter." If this statement is meant to convey doubt as to the legality of the Resolution, it would seem to derive from somewhat vague general notions about the nature of the U.N. and the League rather than from Kelsen's own strictly formal premises. Moreover, it would appear to treat as legally irrelevant the fact that fifty-two nations, in voting for the Resolution, obviously deemed it to be in accord with the Charter.

Kelsen does not incline to attribute a similarly incisive effect to the development of a system of regional defense pacts which he considers an aspect of, rather than an alternative to, a global collective security organization.

GERHART NIEMEYER

Washington, D. C.

ASCHER, CHARLES S. *Program-Making in UNESCO, 1946–1951.* Pp. ix, 84. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1951. $2.50.

This is an account of program-making in United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization during its formative years by one who during a substantial part of the period participated as a staff officer in the actual processes which he describes. Furthermore, the author brought to his work in the Organization and to the analysis which he now gives us an extensive experience in the study and practice of public administration. The result is an exceptionally useful analysis and evaluation of UNESCO experience. The teacher and student of international organization, as well as the practitioner, are greatly in debt to Mr. Ascher for this case study. It can only be hoped that in addition to making this valuable contribution to our understanding of program-making in international organizations, he has also established a pattern of scientific inquiry which will be followed by others with similar, if not equal, competence and opportunity.

Dr. Ascher's account covers the period during which Dr. Julian Huxley was Director-General, from late 1946 through 1948, and in lesser detail, the first two years of the Bodet regime. He covers the work of the first five sessions of the Conference as well as the work of the Executive Board during this period. For the period of the author's active participation in the Secretariat, corresponding roughly to the directorship of Dr. Huxley, he gives in great detail the actual sequence and interrelationship of events. For the remainder of the period the account is less detailed and ceases to be based on first-hand experience. Consequently, one loses somewhat the feeling of participation in a vital process which for the earlier period the author is able to convey.

Mr. Asher's thesis is that the processes of program-making must be evaluated in terms of their success in achieving "balance and harmony in the program," "proper emphasis and concentration of effort," adequate co-ordination, the fixing of responsibility, "manage-ability" as well as economy, and the operation of each organ "on its proper level." His major conclusions with respect to UNESCO are that "only the self-restraint of Member States and better internal organizations of governments for participation in the work of UNESCO can assure balance, harmony, and concentration in the final decisions on program, and that if UNESCO is to develop "a corporate tradition of its own, above rivalry and self-seeking of regionalism or specialism, it must look to the Director-General for leadership." This leadership, Dr. Ascher concludes, must be "responsible, human leadership" which "evokes institutional loyalty."

Dr. Ascher recognizes the special difficulties of the first formative years of UNESCO. He also sees clearly the difficulties arising from the wide range of UNESCO's concerns which require of the Director-General exceptional intellectual qualities combined with administrative skill, besides putting exceptional strains on participating governments. He is nevertheless basically optimistic, in the light of his own experience, regarding the possibilities of making UNESCO an effective working organization.

LELAND M. GOODRICH
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BESTERMAN, THEODORE. *UNESCO: Peace in the Minds of Men.* Pp. xi, 133. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $2.50.

On the correct assumption that UNESCO should be better understood by the public, Mr. Besterman has detailed his account of its aims and accomplishments in a manner that will be found both readable and informative to the general reader. The book embodies the observations of a man who from 1946 to 1949 held a high position in the organization as head of the Department for the Exchange of Information; it makes no pretense of scholarly research into documentary materials.

Mr. Besterman's description of the work of UNESCO begins with its efforts to promote education up to a fundamental minimum standard, particularly in parts of the world where illiteracy has been common. In later chapters he explains the work of the organization in the fields of science, the social sciences and humanities, reconstruction, mass information, and the exchange of persons. It is not surprising that he has found that "none of the disciplines is better organized on the international level than science," and that the social sciences and humanities have been "much less adequately organized."

The most interesting chapter of the book is the last one (Chapter VI) on criticisms and conclusions. As might be expected, the first point which the author makes in this chapter is UNESCO's lack of funds; its annual income of about $8 million, so he says, is approximately one-twentieth of the amounts spent by the member states on cultural propaganda. Mr. Besterman objects to the strict control now exercised by the annual conference over UNESCO's activities, and he questions the wisdom of the present principle of equal voting rights in the conference. He is critical of the "intellectual narrowness and inertia" of the delegates to the conference, as well as of their "financial niggardliness." The national commissions, he believes, have become too important, acting as the principal agencies by which UNESCO can make formal contact with member states. He is somewhat disturbed at the rapid turnover in the personnel of UNESCO. Although these criticisms seem both numerous and substantial considering that the author asserted in his preface that he did not intend "to pick holes" in the organization, they are presented without rancor.

The usefulness of the book is increased by bibliographies appended to each chapter. The Constitution of UNESCO is provided at the end of the volume. Pictures displaying phases of UNESCO's work will be of interest to some readers.

NORMAN HILL
University of Nebraska

NEWMAN, BERNARD. *Epics of Espionage.* Pp. 270. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $4.50.

This book is not a study of the institution of espionage, but a popular account of leading spies; it deals with actions more than motivations, with strategems and techniques to a greater extent than with the organization of spy systems. The time span is from Moses to Klaus Fuchs. The absorbing interest of the material outweighs carelessness as to style and silence as to sources. Newman does not overwrite; he does not gush; he does not romanticize the frequently sinister and sordid figures who crowd his pages.

A well-known British authority on the bizarre world of spydom, Newman is at his best in dealing with pre-Soviet European espionage. Avoiding the overpublicized and rather inept Mata Hari, he concentrates on the *strategic* spies—those whose activity was on a sufficiently grand scale to turn the tide of wars, not merely battles. From Napoleon's Schulmeister, who was "all brains and no heart," he turns to Stieber, the creator of the Bismarckian espionage bureaucracy. There is a succinct treatment of the Dreyfus case. Colonel Alfred Redl, the homosexual who betrayed the Dual Monarchy to the Czar from within the Austrian military counterintelligence, emerges as one of the most resourceful agents in modern history. Newman is also to be commended for giving Tyler Kent the place he deserves in any international gallery of infamy. This minor American diplomatic official betrayed both the "unbreakable" State Department code and the Churchill-Roosevelt cables to the Nazis. Had he remained undetected, he might have won the war for Hitler. The espionage accomplishment of Alger Hiss is minor by comparison.

Lucid and interesting accounts of the gallant Polish underground organization which saved London from V-bomb demolition, of the fantastic Trebitsch Lincoln, of Paul Dukes who served England from inside Lenin's Cheka, and of many others are interspersed with much firsthand information.

A minor weakness of the book is its treatment of the American War Between the States. A major weakness is the routine exposition of Soviet spying. Projecting his vast knowledge of espionage on the new canvas of Soviet Communism, Newman tends to search for identities, rather than significant differences. To be sure, he is aware of the fact that the professional spy is becoming absolete and is giving place to the indoctrinated traitor in high places. The changes brought about by atomic warfare, however, are not analyzed. For the first time in history, subversion of the outstanding scientific minds of a nation—minds which are normally incorruptible—has become the primary target. Technological and other factors may have made espionage most decisive in prewar, rather than in actual combat, conditions.

NATHANIEL WEYL
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MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA, VICE-ADMIRAL THE EARL. *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander: South-East Asia 1943–1945.* Pp xi, 280, 47 maps and charts, New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $12.00.

This is a literarily unadorned, factual official report, generally chronological in make-up and subdivided into: Introduction, Stategy and Operations, Civil Affairs, and Conclusions. Not designed for light reading, it will be a primary source for historians and students of the South-East Asia Theater, the one least known to Americans and one whose priority on troops and supplies was low.

The military student will discover a brilliant ground campaign in almost roadless country planned and executed by General Sir William Slim, now Chief of the British Imperial Staff, against numerically superior Japanese forces possessing better communications. His troops were principally British-led Indian, East African, and West African. Their exploits remind us that good soldiers are limited to no race but are the products of morale, leadership, training, and adequate equipment.

The United States never furnished more than about 6,000 combat troops but had by the end of the war more than 270,000 in the theater. The difference consisted of service personnel mostly engaged in road, railroad, pipe line, and airfield construction and maintenance.

The most valuable lessons are in the field of logistics and organization. "It was air supply alone which made the campaign in Burma a feasible proposition." Air drops supported surrounded units for as much as a fortnight until they achieved victory. Korea is not new in this respect, and it is of interest that our first Air Commander in Korea, General Stratemeyer, was Allied Air Chief in Burma. Of him Mounbatten says he "provided an outstanding example of how an Allied Air Commander should conduct himself."

On the other hand Mountbatten had sharp differences with his first American deputy, General Stilwell, partly due to Stilwell's many hats, including the one he wore as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang. The comment that "General Stilwell was succeeded by three Lieutenant-Generals, each of whom had at least two entirely separate functions" sum up the organizational enormities and diverse loyalties involved. Disagreements also arose between Mountbatten and Lieutenant General Wedemeyer when the latter replaced Stilwell in China after loyal service as Mountbatten's chief planner.

These disputes came fundamentally from the divergent aims of the Allies. The Americans' principal interest was aid to China. The British primary objective was the reconquest of Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. Mountbatten attempts and achieves a very fair statement of these differences, but one reads more between the lines than appears in the carefully chosen phrases of this official document.

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LAMONT, CORLISS, *The Independent Mind; Essays of a Humanist Philsopher*. Pp. 187. New York: Horizon Press, 1951. $2.75.

The weaknesses, not less than the strengths of this book, arise from the author's conviction of the duty of independent mindedness, and from his consciousness of the snares and gins set in the path of a humanist, too readily ensnared by carelessness or unwariness. Mr. Lamont's tone is invariably generous and elevated; and the breadth of his sensitivity to nature and to art, and his sympathy toward the dignity and the suffering of persons, both in the abstract and within his own culture, deserves its full meed of praise. Likewise, however much may be said against the possibility of a metaphysics or of an ethics which postulates the ultimacy and the self-sufficiency of man, the attempt to discover and develop a purely humanist philosophy, to draw out its full implications for the social order, is a worthy undertaking in an age when widespread unbelief readily leads to extreme skepticism, to cynicism, and to an ethical postivism which in effect ends with a rejection of values. Similarly, an independence of mind which courageously opposes illiberal intolerance and craven fear as unworthy of the upright individual as, in their unwarranted lack of confidence, they are deleterious to the collective American people, deserves commendation.

To attack herd prejudices and misrepresentations based on inability to face, or refusal to acknowledge, plain facts in our own society, is an insistent job for any critic. Similarly, it is desirable to avoid the folly of misrepresenting and of underestimating our opponent, in this case the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is praiseworthy to possess the magnanimity of sympathetic understanding of institutions and behavior patterns alien to our own, and even abhorrent to us. It is, finally, the part of wisdom to seek to avoid armed conflict, to be prepared and even eager to meet with our opponent, to make every effort consistent with our own integrity to reach temporary accommodations and (if it is in any way possible) lasting understanding.

On the basis of these essays alone, both by reason of their tone and their statement, I am prepared to accept it that Dr. Lamont is a humanist philosopher concerned with the well-being of humanity in *all times* and places and under all conditions; that he desires to be a friendly yet understanding critic of the Soviet Union, not less than of ourselves; that he stresses our own sins because it is us whom he is addressing; and that his insistence that he is not a Communist, or a very close fellow traveler, is a sincere, honest, and true avowal. Yet I am forced thereupon to conclude that his teaching is doubly dangerous by reason of that very sincerity, good will, and noble elevation of tone.

One may readily grant that the Soviet regime must have some appeal, some promise, and some real achievements to its credit, to hold the loyalty of its own people and to win that of others. Mere force alone, even aided by effective propaganda, cannot create loyalty, devotion, and indeed idolatry, even if it could (which is doubtful) keep vast populations subdued and orderly. Had the regime no appeal an no accomplishments, economic or otherwise, the present concern of America, of the Atlantic powers, and of a major portion of the United Nations would be, not simply folly, but quite incomprehensible folly.

Unfortunately, Mr. Lamont's determination to be independent leads him to lean over backward; to deny the full horror of totalitarianism, which includes slave labor camps as well as absence of civil liberties generally; to insist, with a technical correctnes only equalled by its complete lack of perception, that Russia did not intervene in the Korean struggle; to insist that it is consequently pacific and we in essence aggressive; and to argue the need for an honest search on our part for conversations looking toward peace, with a quite fantastic ignoring of the actual record of the U.S.S.R. in conferences at Lake Success, as well as in other negotiations.

Similarly, Mr. Lamont insists that Communist dictatorship must be distinguished from the Fascist brand because of the universalism of its ethical aspirations, as against the insistent and utterly inhumane particularism of, for instance, the Nazis. That its formal doctrine of a classless society and of equality as between men is of this character there is no need to deny. But it is surely error, and an error paradoxically based on the acceptance of national particularism, to fail to observe that the doctrine of class struggle, whatever its end, is also particularist and excludes from genuine consideration all those persons who are, or are defined to be, class enemies.

At root I think Mr. Lamont's error is the naïveté of his nobility, and his deviation in his determination to be independent and humane from the straight and narrow line of upright impartiality.

Behind this error lurks another: a purely naturalist humanist, with his roots in eighteenth century rationalism, he tends in his optimistic search for human emancipation to forget, even as he attacks prejudice and error, the ambivalent character of man, his proneness to sin, and the tragedy and uncertainty of his lot, which is inherent and not external. It is no doubt proper and necessary to attack that despair and resignation which may in some religious viewpoints lead to inactivity, as it is necessary to undermine that excessive sense of sin which prevents joy even as it inhibits the creative release of human energies. But a doctrine which, save for its acknowledgment of the limits of external conditions, is in essence one of perfectability, though it may be used effectively as criticism of actual imperfections, does not lead to the calm, balanced, disinterestedness which is needful for effective judgment and wise action in a world at present bi-polar. There reason itself would seem to indicate that, whatever our real refects which need criticism, we are, alike in ideal and in the proximity of actuality to ideal—however great the distance between—yet on balance right.

It is our duty, as it is our interest, to understand the Soviet regime. It is likewise essential, for purposes of moral sanitation, to perceive our own mote. But theirs is the beam. That its presence and nature make accommodation without surrender hard, and that they make failure of preparedness folly, are evaluations surely not to be rejected by any man who seeks

to further the causes of democracy, freedom, and human dignity.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICAL THEORY

GRIFFITH, ERNEST S. *Congress: Its Contemporary Role.* Pp. vii, 193. New York: New York University Press, 1951. $3.50.

If Congress awarded an Oscar each year for the best book about itself, the present work would be a worthy candidate. This slim volume embodying the James Stokes Lectures on Politics at New York University is a timely contribution to the voluminous literature on our national legislature.

The prevailing impression of Congress is familiar: an unwieldy, undisciplined assembly, overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of modern governmental responsibilities, assailed by the special interests and outgeneraled by the bureaucracy. From his vantage point of ten years' intimate observation, including much personal participation in matters directly linked with the daily work of Congress, the author has a different story to tell. Mr. Griffith asks a practical question: Is Congress discharging its responsibility under the Constitution? His answer, which will come as a surprise to many people including some political scientists, is a definite affirmative.

Congress does not function in accordance with any text book theory of governance. When its pattern of behavior is judged upon the basis of theories of party responsibility the Congressional performance seems chaotic. Yet business is transacted, and the public interest seems to prevail. Running through its complex operations is a definite and consistent logic of procedure.

Leadership is present, recognized, and utilized in both houses, but partisan leadership is only one element. Political party though never absent does not hold the crucial place because in the legislative process party is often collateral and supplementary rather than central. Specialized knowledge of the subject in question rather than party affiliation tends to be the accepted index of influence in legislation which is, in the main, the joint product of bipartisan effort.

By its reluctance to go counter to a committee recommendation, by its tendency to accept the principle of specialization and to look to different people for guidance on different subjects, and by its increasingly systematic use of experts outside its membership but in its employ Congress has recaptured much of its constitutional role as the independent policy determiner.

Mr. Griffith is impressed with the wisdom, honesty, and responsibility of the many independent individuals within Congress who identify the public interest in any particular issue and who work effectively to maintain a general balance in policy. He believes that this tough spirit of independence provides the surest defense against the ubiquitous special interests. Not less important, it serves as a governor when party and executive influence threaten to move too rapidly. His comments upon party responsibility are particularly perceptive and thought provoking. It is to be hoped that they will receive the close attention of those who contend that party responsibility must be built into congressional organization and procedure.

L. H. CHAMBERLAIN
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MALONE, DUMAS. *Jefferson and the Rights of Man.* Pp. xxix, 523. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951. $6.00.

This volume is the sequel to *Jefferson the Virginian* in Dumas Malone's "Jefferson and His Times," a work originally projected as a four-volume biography, but one which will be extended to include a fifth. The thoroughness and skill of Dr. Malone probably will make this the most important biography of Thomas Jefferson in our generation.

Jefferson and the Rights of Man covers the years from 1784 to 1793, a period when Jefferson was closely associated with the foreign affairs of the United States—first as minister to France during the preliminaries and early phase of the French Revolution, and then as Secretary of State during the formative stages of the federal executive departments.

In this volume Jefferson is portrayed as a genteel Virginia gentleman with rather expensive tastes, who admired feminine and architectural beauty, possessed a keen, observant mind especially in agriculture and politics, and promoted the liberation of mankind in France unobtrusively without becoming a doctrinaire or neglecting the duties and proprieties of his office. He is described, too, as a minister, who represented all the interests of America without sectional bias, working as hard to secure French markets for New England whale oil as to promote the opening of the Mississippi to American navigation or the development of new European markets for Southern tobacco. In debts, both foreign and domestic, Dr. Malone finds him to be a scruplously honest conservative, opposed to inflation of the currency and repudiation of pre-Revolutionary debts that were owed to British merchants by Southern planters.

Not least among the contributions of this book to an understanding of Jefferson and his times is its interpretation of him not as an immediatist but as a gradualist. A son of the Enlightment, he was certain that mankind would make more progress through open discussion and free education than through social upheaval. This attitude helps to explain his continued friendship for Edmund Pendleton and other avowed moderates and his dislike for Henry, who was often impetuous.

Some other significant conclusions are: that Jefferson's years in France "served only to confirm him in the fundamental philosophy he had already adopted" (p. xxii); that "the traditional picture of Jefferson the politician . . . is largely the creation of Hamilton and his partisans" (p. xxiii); that Jefferson was not led blindly by Hamilton into support of the bill for the assumption of state debts (pp. 297–301); and that Hamilton, "more than any other major American statesman of his time, lusted for personal as well as national power" (p. xxii).

ROBERT LEROY HILLDRUP
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BELLAMY, FRANCIS RUFUS. *The Private Life of George Washington.* Pp. v, 409. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1951. $5.00.

When Mr. Bellamy undertook to produce a popular, one-volume life of George Washington, he assigned himself a most difficult task. There are not enough good secondary works on the subject to enable the amateur historian to write such a book within a relatively short time. To do the work from the sources would require forty years of unremitting labor. Mr. Bellamy's varied career as a dairy farmer, playwright, song writer, Broadway producer, book salesman, and free lance magazine writer has not afforded the time for the extensive research that is required for the study of even a limited phase of the career of the greatest figure in political history.

The title of the volume suggests a limited treatment. But Mr. Bellamy has not confined himself to the private life of Washington. Most of the work deals with the public career. But as an inclusive biography, the result is far from satisfactory. It runs down at the end. After devoting sixty-five pages to Washington's public activities in the 1750's, Mr. Bellamy disposes of the presidency in twenty-four pages.

His failure flows in part from the nature of the subject. Washington's career was one of continuous action in a series of intricate events that covered nearly forty years. He usually acted in complex situations, which must be explained if the reader is to understand what he did, how he did it, and the influence he exerted. Only through such a study can one discover what manner of man he was.

Mr. Bellamy has not gained a mastery of the situations in which Washington acted. He has not used the vast collection of Washington's papers, without which no satisfactory study of this sort is pos-

sible. When isolated from the context of events, Washington appears as suspended in mid-air. He was so much a part of his world that his biographer must have a thorough knowledge of the history of the times. This Mr. Bellamy does not have. He is an intelligent observer; his attitude is admirable; and at some points he displays insight into Washington's character.

Based largely on the biography by Rupert Hughes, which has been carried only to 1781, Mr. Belamy's work is glaringly inadequate for the part of Washington's life after that year. The book has little interest or value to scholars. Nor can it be recommended to lay readers. Mr. Bellamy did not have the sort of mastery of the material that might have enabled him to make intelligible to the uninitiated the many complex episodes of Washington's life.

CURTIS P. NETTELS
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MORISON, ELTING E. (Ed.). *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt.* Vols. III and IV: "The Square Deal, 1901–1905." Pp. xvi, 710; viii, 711–1438. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $20.00.

This is the second two-volume set of Theodore Roosevelt's letters to appear under the editorship of Morison and his associates. The first set covered *The Years of Preparation,* and the sets to follow will bring us *The Big Stick* and *The Days of Armageddon. The Square Deal* volumes contain over seventeen hundred significant and respresentative letters of some twenty thousand Roosevelt wrote during the four-year period. The editing maintains the same high standard that characterized the first set, editorial comment being held to the minimum and presented with painstaking care. The notations will richly reward the diligent reader.

We have long supposed that Roosevelt's family life was ideal. These letters settle the matter absolutely. He was inordinately proud of "mother" and most considerate of her. As for the children, he talked to them, read to them, played almost every conceivable game with them ("bear" was their favorite), and spanked them when they misbehaved. With equal verve he could "spank some little brigand of a South American republic" (p. 1328), and refer to his critics as asses, jacks (he seldom combined the two), liars, and scoundrels. "Colonel is the title I am proudest of," he wrote (p. 854), and often he proclaimed his joy at being in the White House. He was a stickler for the dignity of his office, wrathfully pronouncing as an "outrageous impertinence" the action of a lawyer in referring to him by a nickname (p. 392).

Even-handedly he could denounce the "hopeless attitude" of capital or management and an "arrogant and domineering" labor union, and in 1902 he achieved a notable succes in bringing about a settlement in the anthracite coal strike. He skillfully used the tariff revision issue in which he was not greatly interested as a basis for a bargain on railroad legislation for which he believed the need was urgent. With about the same skill he succeeded in bringing Russia and Japan to the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Always he was the politician, knowing when to move and how far it was safe to advance.

He corresponded with practically every statesman, politician, or writer of consequence and he "lectured" some of them. He showed great confidence in and admiration for Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, Elihu Root, Leonard Wood, Nicholas Murray Butler, William Howard Taft, and a number of less famous persons. "Woodrow Wilson is a perfect trump," he wrote. "I am overjoyed at his election" (p. 275) as President of Princeton University.

Disclaiming genius, he reasoned that his success was achieved by supplementing ordinary ability with "the requisite industry, judgment and foresight" (p. 1282). Why his great popularity? His intelligence, his common sense, and his unyielding moral character hardly explain it. It may be due in part at least to his display, in relatively attractive form, of some popular prejudices, a little intolerance, a certain jingoism, and a marked tendency to see only black or white, traits that numbered him with ordinary men and caused them to see in him a greatly magnified image of themselves.

CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON
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HELLER, FRANCIS H. *The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: A Study in Constitutional Development.* Pp. 195. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1951. $3.50.

This essay of 151 pages of text plus 44 pages of notes and references is an excellent brief discussion of an important part of the Constitution. The Sixth Amendment says: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

Chapters I and II deal with the historical background of the amendment in the English and colonial law, respectively. They show that the rights guaranteed by it were, at the time of its adoption, of recent origin, and that expansive statements such as that of Mr. Justice Story that Magna Carta granted trial by jury in any form comparable to that which the draftsmen of the amendment had in mind were mistaken by some centuries. The chapter on "Colonial Experiences" shows that the jury systems of the several states were so different that it would have been impossible for the writers of the amendment to have been specific in describing a jury without jeopardizing the adoption of the amendment. This makes it surprising that the Supreme Court was able to conclude that the amendment required a jury of twelve who must unanimously agree upon their verdict.

Chapter III, "Scope and Application of the Amendment," shows that the Supreme Court has been able to read the words "in all criminal prosecutions" as not applying to petty offenses, though it has had difficulty in defining what are petty offenses. The interesting cases involving the questions whether the amendment imposed the jury system on the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands when they became United States territory or whether these territories could continue to use the only systems of trial with which they were familiar are well discussed. They show that a constitutional text can be tempered, in its application, by practical sense. Mr. Justice Brown's statement in the Hawaiian case that trial by jury was not a right that was fundamental in nature is noticed and adverted to later in the book.

The requirement of an impartial jury is discussed principally in connection with the cases tried in the District of Columbia with government employees sitting on juries in which the government was prosecuting.

In Chapter V the requirements of definiteness in the indictment, confrontation by witnesses, and compulsory process are treated. None of these has given rise to extensive litigation. But the subject of Chapter VI, the "Right of Counsel," has taken on new life in recent decades, with the concurrence of all the judges. The applicability of the right to the varied fact situations has, however, split the Supreme Court in numerous cases which are acutely analyzed by the author.

Chapter VII, "Crime and the Ideal of a Fair Trial," is a comment on the whole amendment. It shows how time and circumstances have changed current ideas of the importance of the different rights named in the amendment, increasing some and diminishing others. The author seems to agree with the tendency to diminish the importance of trial by jury, and increase that of the right of counsel. It is hard to imagine that a Fourth of July orator, referring to a Paladium of our liberties, could make as much of the latter as of the former.

This is an excellent book, full of interesting history, intelligent analyses of

decisions, and good philosophy of government.

J. WARREN MADDEN
United States Court of Claims

NYE, RUSSEL B. *Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870–1950.* Pp. 422. East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State College Press, 1951. $5.00.

"When it came to rock bottom, the Midwest farmer wanted, as he always had, a good market with high prices, control of his own government, more currency, easier credit and good times." This is the fundamental explanation, according to the author, of the middlewestern farmer's rather strange political activity in the rocky 1930's, and this is the explanation of the middle border's excursion into the greenback movement, the granger crusade, populism, and twentieth-century progressivism.

In this very well written synthesis, Professor Nye sees the farmer's economic discontent as the almost exclusive driving force of middlewestern reform politics. He also detects a straight-line progression in these reform parties since Civil War days. It was because of his thin pocket book rather than his pinched soul that the middlewestern farmer, according to the author, contributed so much to American "socialized politics" in the last hundred years. And by implication at least, although it is not so explicitly stated, this pinch-penny explanation of reform must account in large part for the bleak political toryism of the Middlewest today. For the once lean, individualistic, democratic, and radical-minded farmer has grown fat with government subsidy, and thus has become a follower of Capehart, Dirksen, McCarthy, and Wherry.

One of the main difficulties with this simple relationship of economics and farm politics is that it leaves so many things, particularly about the twentieth century, unanswered. As Professor Nye has pointed out, it was during the first decade of the twentieth century that most of the reforms urged by the grangers and the populists were actually accomplished. But it was also precisely during those years that the American farmer was enjoying the most prosperous days he had experienced since the Civil War. For an explanation of the seeming paradox one will have to dig a lot deeper along the fault lines of American politics than the author has done.

Professor Nye has, of course, devoted some of his time to a discussion of factors other than economic in the conditioning of the progressive mind. He has a good chapter on the capture of the ivory tower. But it is still rather disappointing to find a professor of English and American literature devoting so little of his time to things of the mind, to literary expression, and to the basic psychological drifts of the American mentality. Apparently the author has not used much, if any, manuscript material nor middlewestern newspapers in his research. It is probably for this reason that his book is strong in areas where Buck, Hicks, Destler, Curti, and others have preceded him with basic research. And this, perhaps, accounts for the fact that there are so few new ideas in the volume. At times the author's sense of chronology and some of his statements on local and state politics are a bit weird.

GEORGE E. MOWRY
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SALOUTOS, THEODORE, and JOHN D. HICKS. *Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900–1939.* Pp. viii, 581. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951. $6.75.

Weighed by its content, this is a big book and an important contribution to the knowledge of the politics of agriculture in the United States and the agrarian side of American democracy in action. It offers the key to the secret of how the American farmers gained the extraordinary political power which for the last twenty years has determined to so large an extent the social and economic legislative measures of the nation.

After fourteen years of unprecedented prosperity for American agriculture, the subject of the serious discontent that stirred among the farmers for several generations is still as timely as it is timeless.

As historians, the authors have traced the social unrest among farmers and rural people and the evolution of the farm movement back to the beginnings in the region they call the Western Middle West—Wisconsin and Minnesota, Illinois and Iowa, the two Dakotas and Nebraska, Missouri and Kansas. In their view this has been the critical area in which the resentment of the farmers against their position of inferiority compared with other economic groups took the form of a host of interconnected movements and was progressively transformed into political action.

The authors do not attempt to weigh the political unrest and its active contribution to the shaping of American institutions by comparison with other national regions and their performance. They achieve their purpose by a series of separate monographs on the major individual movements which succeeded the Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists of the nineteenth century. The reader is made acquainted with the political atmosphere left by populism and the insurgents' concern for institutional assurances that the people could really govern themselves; with their fight for the direct primary, the initiative, and the referendum; and with efforts to capture for the people the machinery of government. The reforms by Robert M. La-Follette in Wisconsin which led to drastic changes in railroad taxation and regulation of public utilities, the reforms by Governor Cummins in Iowa, Governor Johnson in Minnesota, Governor Folk in Missouri, and others in other states, are treated as one major phase of action arising out of discontent.

Two chapters deal with the history of the farmers' co-operative movement as the initiative, motivated by distrust and resentment against the trade and the commodity exchanges, to make farming more profitable. However, three other chapters seem to this reviewer to have been exceptionally well written and illuminating. They deal with the American Society of Equity and the Non-Partisan League—the most spectacular and colorful of all agrarian movements. The discussion lays bare many strands in present-day politics which otherwise would remain obscure and inexplicable. The temporary collaboration between the radical agrarians and the Socialist Party of North Dakota and the attempt to solve the marketing problem by state ownership of nearly all facilities, such as warehouses, elevators, and terminals, is a particularly revealing phase.

Of the League, which reached its peak in 1918, the authors say: "The actual organizing of the farmers was one of the most dramatic aspects of the League, for it had gathered together one of the most artful groups of radical writers and speakers the nation had ever seen. They were thoroughly saturated with radical doctrines, techniques of indoctrination, and large scale organization methods. In knowledge of mass psychology they were unsurpassed."

In five chapters the authors treat the formation of the farm bloc in the United States Congress and its legislative activities from 1920 to 1923, third-party ideologies, the McNary-Haugen movement, Herbert Hoover's Farm Board and its failure, and the Farmers' Holiday Association and its strikes.

Finally it is shown how the New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Administration program attempted to cope with the mass insolvency and the distress and discontent of farmers, who were still most articulate and politically effective in the Western Middle West.

The strength of the book lies in the fact that nowhere does it attempt to appraise the economic situations or the remedies proposed and enacted, but throughout gives a concise and detached review of the political course of events, revealing the ideas and motives which made the movements move. The reader also obtains good portraits of the majority of the men who were decisive as political leaders of the farmers.

This is a most welcome and long needed history of a strategic area and era in politics, government, and agricultural policy.

KARL BRANDT
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DAHL, ROBERT A., and RALPH S. BROWN, JR. *Domestic Control of Atomic Energy.* Pp. v, 117. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951. $1.00.

A condition of semimobilization sometimes comes as a relief when the emergency demands that the familiar nagging questions—the housekeeping problems—be dropped for the time being in order to give full attention to immediate overriding necessities. But when the emergency is over the problems still remain and have to be solved.

The pamphlet entitled "Domestic Control of Atomic Energy" by Messrs. Dahl and Brown poses a whole set of the questions in the field of atomic energy with which this country sooner or later is going to have to deal—questions of a type with which social scientists are familiar and where their assistance can be invaluable in finding answers. Among the topics which are raised for discussion are questions of public control, communication of information, appraisal of results, Commission organization, Commission-owned towns, and, finally, the ultimate role of private enterprise in atomic energy. Atomic energy must eventually work into the main stream of American life. These topics must have intelligent discussion and workable answers before our major problem of how best to control atomic energy can be solved.

The authors feel that they have been hampered somewhat by the air of secrecy which surrounds a good deal of the Commission's operation. As a Commissioner, this reviewer suspects that the handicap has not been as great as the authors suppose. They have put their fingers unerringly on practically all of the questions which we on the Commission know must sooner or later be solved. They have very properly, in most cases, not gone farther than raising the points; in a few cases they have suggested ranges of answers within which probably the eventual solutions will lie.

One of our most troublesome questions, and one to which the authors have given a good deal of attention, is that of communication between people with various degrees of information and differing levels of technical understanding. We are continuously battling to maintain, for instance, fruitful, accurate lines of comunication from the nuclear scientists to the Commission, and from the Commission to the proper committees of the Congress, to the Congress itself, and finally to the citizens of the country. How to keep such a line of communication effectively open without the kind of oversimplification that leads to distortion and misunderstanding is a question which is constantly with us. There have been and will be vivid instances of failure in this respect, but, if the job is not done with reasonable effectiveness, the American people cannot come to a proper appraisal of the effort which is being made in their behalf and for which they are paying.

This pamphlet, which is really a small book, will give background for useful thinking not only among the social scientists but among that great group of interested laymen who are interested, for instance, in the "effects of secrecy on the democratic process." As a case study of an outstanding example of increasing complexity of government, the pamphlet is and will remain a fruitful source of ideas.

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POLANYI, MICHAEL. *The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders.* Pp. viii, 206. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. $4.00.

This is unquestionably a remarkable book. It delves into questions concerning liberty which have rarely been discussed; and it is done with rare, analytical skill and great liveliness of style. Paradoxically, its author, Professor Michael Polanyi, is an unconscious positivist who belabors positivism at every turn with positivistic fineness. In part, his opposition may lie in his refusal to accept, as basic, criteria which he constantly uses to test and substantiate his own hypotheses about liberty and planning. For the remainder, it may lie in his love of large words like "truth," "justice," and "reason," which he exploits without giving them the meticulous attention and scrutiny he turns upon other concepts like spontaneous (free) and directed (unfree) order-systems.

A number of chapters in the *Logic of Liberty* deserve careful study by every student of society whatever his political or philosophical bias. Chapter 2, "Scientific Convictions," points out the often forgotten fact that science depends upon a society of scientists and a strong, well-ordered tradition of ideas and practices without which scientific advance is well nigh impossible. Chapters 3, "Foundations of Academic Freedom," and 4, "Self-government of Science," provide the most persuasive arguments I have read anywhere for academic freedom and scientific self-government. The arguments, the theoretical basis of which Professor Polanyi develops is chapters 8 and 9, are essentially two: (a) Certain types of social orders or sub-orders of a social order—for example, scientific and educational institutions—can function only as spontaneous, that is, self-ordering, self-regulating, and self-adjusting systems. To regulate or plan such systems is, in essence, ultimately to destroy them. (2) To obtain maximum utility and good from them, society must permit them to regulate themselves. Chapters 8 and 9, which provide the theoretical framework for these conclusions, especially deserve careful study.

Original and profoundly stimulating as is Professor Polanyi, he is not immune sometimes from obvious contradiction. One example will suffice. Science, he says, is most useful to society when it is left to its own devices. Nevertheless, he adds, it is improper of society to ask, "What is its use?" No matter what science produces, it is and can only be its own justification. Yet he takes great pains to show that the freedom which science enjoys and the income it receives derive from the fact that society recognizes the scope and magnitude of its contributions to human welfare. He even admits that, if science failed to serve society or if important sectors of mankind failed to see any import to science, it might be starved for funds and even totally suppressed. Obviously, then, whatever Professor Polanyi may think, science cannot be its own justification, for it must justify its usefulness to mankind. Certainly the fact that science needs to be free or self-regulatory is not an argument to prove that it need not justify itself; this fact serves only to prove that maximum utility of science to society depends upon maximum self-regulation.

RUBIN GOTESKY
University of Georgia

WINDOLPH, F. LYMAN. *Leviathan and Natural Law.* Pp. ix, 147. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. $2.50.

Not the least useful of the polarities we all nourish in our minds is that which classifies thinkers as disturbers or moderators. If the most striking and "original" books are usually the work of disturbers, mankind could hardly get along without the moderators, the men who take the fighting edge off ideas, the men who accommodate ideas to the complex world of Reality—or of realities.

Mr. Windolph belongs in this latter group. He sets himself the difficult task of moderating between Hobbes and Aquinas, between the positivist and the believer in natural law. He writes the language of law, politics, political theory, and writes it very well indeed. This little book makes most refreshing reading for anyone accustomed, but not wholly reconciled, to current American social-scientese. Mr. Windolph has read widely from Plato to Holmes. Some part of him—one can't be sure whether it is his head or his heart—is drawn to James's tender-mindedness, some part to James's tough-mindedness. But since he is a mediator by temperament, this division is no horrendous civil war in the breast, but a challenge to use his gifts for mediation.

Mr. Windolph's final words sum up his position: "In the sense in which I am using the words, government of the people means a government ordained and established by a democratic sovereign. Government by the people means a government either purely democratic or republican in form. Government for the people means a government conducted in accordance with the developing principles of natural justice. If the last is an illusion, or comes generally to be regarded

as an illusion, the first and second will surely perish from the earth."

The historian in comment must note that Mr. Windolph's book is one more evidence of a shifting climate of opinion. The concept of natural law, so distasteful to positivist, utilitarian notions about the political process, is once more on its way to good repute. The old eighteenth-century alliance betwen democracy and virtue is being revived. This Mr. Windoph sees clearly. He hopes he can convince the positivist, and will not worry greatly over the mere skeptic, who is never convinced, or convincible.

CRANE BRINTON
Harvard University

BROWN, FRANCIS. *Raymond of The Times.* Pp. x, 345. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1951. $5.00.

The pre-eminence of the *New York Times* lends to this admirable biography, by Francis Brown of the *Times* staff, of Henry J. Raymond, who founded the *Times* in 1851, an importance it would otherwise lack. If in 1896 the late Adolph S. Ochs had not taken over what little was then left of the *Times* and, by a combination of character and genius, re-created it as it is today under his successor and son-in-law, Arthur H. Sulzberger, Raymond's career would still be interesting—yet an isolated episode.

Mr. Brown has left to another member of the *Times* staff, Meyer Berger, the history of its completed century. Yet the fact which stands out in this biography is that, under the conditions which prevail today, with all the mechanical marvels which serve the collection of the news and the printing of a newspaper, the *Times,* with its literally unrivalled coverage, is a realization of the newspaper ideal which Raymond conceived one hundred years ago. Less colorful than Greeley of the Tribune or Bennett of the Herald, he was free of the whims which exposed Greeley's limitations of judgment and the unprincipled sensationalism which exposed Bennett's limitations of character. Raymond was, moreover, a great reporter himself. His feats, both as a war correspondent and as a political correspondent, conspicuously served that ideal of careful, unspectacular news coverage which could be trusted then, as it is trusted today.

Second to this similarity between what the *Times* tried to do in 1851 and what it so fully accomplished in 1951 is an almost equally significant dissimilarity. The great disaster of Horace Greeley's career (also the great disaster to the liberal, independent movement of that time) was his nomination for the presidency by the reformers who, shocked at corruption under the Grant administration, met at Cincinnati in 1872. Both Greeley's avidity for public office and his unfitness for it were therefore advertised. But too many readers have forgotten that Raymond ran successfully for both the New York legislature and the House of Representatives at Washington and that he acted efficiently as Lincoln's campaign manager in 1864. In those public offices he rendered valuable service. In the columns of the *Times* and in the House he was a more consistent and sounder supporter of Lincoln than Greeley was in the Tribune.

But the dissimilarity is that no editor of the *Times* would today think of being a political candidate. The better tradition, by which journalism protects and strengthens its function in a democracy, and to which the *Times* has, I believe, subscribed ever since Mr. Ochs took over, is that no editor or publisher should cherish political ambitions for himself, and that by disavowing them completely he can wield a greater influence. The fact that this tradition is still too often violated does not affect its soundness.

RICHARD HOOKER
Springfield, Massachusetts

BERGER, MEYER. *The Story of The New York Times, 1851–1891.* Pp. 589. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951. $5.00.

When Adolph Ochs acquired *The New York Times* in 1896, he was the publisher of a country newspaper burdened by debt. Invading New York City, he acquired a nearly moribund newspaper with a circulation of only 9,000 and a debt of more than $300,000. How he challenged his competitors and what he accomplished with his newspaper is one of the great stories of American enterprise and ingenuity.

Out of the millions of words that flow daily into its editorial offices, *The New York Times* prints an average of 145,000 words. It employs more than 4,000 persons. In paper and payroll alone, its operation amounts to $36,800,000 a year. On occasion, it turns down more advertising than most newspapers accept. Its current daily circulation averages more than 524,000, while the Sunday edition, which sometimes runs more than 414 pages, has a press run of more than 1,146,000.

One can speak of *The Times,* which has earned worldwide respect for American journalism, only in superlatives. No other daily publication in the mid-twentieth century keeps the records of current history so completely. For kings, statesmen, and ordinary citizens it is an indispensable source of unbiased information, for scholars it is the daily medium of contemporary history, for students it is an essential textbook. Working journalists regarded it as the newspaperman's newspaper. More than this, it has become the symbol of a free press and its function in the defense of Western civilization. It is of supreme importance to the free world at a time when the greater part of humanity is exposed to a flood of lies and distortions.

When the present reviewer and Richard B. Morris were compiling *A Treasury of Great Reporting,* which was published two years ago, we were confronted with so great an embarrassment of riches from the columns of *The Times* that we found it to be a very real problem to prevent the book from developing into *A Treasury of Great Reporting From The New York Times.* The task involved a painstaking search through tens of thousands of clippings, but every event of importance in the last century was so beautifully handled by *Times* reporters that it required the hardest kind of work to discover news stories superior to those of *The Times.* Our experience was substantiated by a careful poll of news editors throughout the country. As it was, the number of stories from *The Times* in the anthology far outdistanced those from any other newspaper.

The author of this intimate biography of a great newspaper is Meyer Berger, a newspaperman for the last forty-two years, a *Times* reporter since 1928, one of the twenty-two Pulitzer Prize winners on its staff, and one of the finest craftsmen in the history of journalism. This is one of the best feature stories that has ever appeared under his by-line. It is popular history in the best sense, unburdened by distracting documentation, and written with accuracy and clarity. It is a thoroughly competent job in the best *Times* tradition.

Berger devotes a large part of his attention to the three publishers who made *The Times:* Henry J. Raymond, the aggressive crusader who founded the paper as a conservative organ devoid of sensationalism; Adolph Ochs, who rescued it from financial collapse and gradually built it into an institution of world-wide prestige; and Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the current publisher who lifted the paper to new heights of renown. The author gives an unforgettable picture of the paper's greatest managing editor, Carr Vattel van Anda, whose exploits included catching Albert Einstein in a mathematical mistake, discovering a 4,000-year-old murder from the hieroglyphics on a news picture of Tutankamen's tomb, and climbing on a delivery wagon at dawn to make certain that an extra edition of *The Times* got on its way to its readers.

Berger's book is filled with the stuff of great journalism—the inside stories of *Times* beats, the paper's encouragement of exploration and discovery, the publication of the texts of important historical memoirs and significant documents, and hundreds of other fascinating memorabilia. The swift pace of the story covers most of the social history of the last century. As a proponent of the eyewitness technique, the author always shows the story through the eyes of the reporter.

This book is a mine of information for the *Times* enthusiast and a find for any newspaper reader. Simon and Schuster are to be congratulated on the publication

of a volume handsome in both typography and production.

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The City College of New York

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

NOURSE, EDWIN G. *The 1950's Come First.* Pp. 184. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951. $2.00.

A captious reviewer could point to "inconsistencies" in this book, or to lack of clarity as to whether the author is for or against some important programs which he mentions. But such criticism would tend to be unfair. The author is pragmatic, not dogmatic; and he is stating and illustrating a philosophy rather than making a tabulation.

That philosophy will disappoint those uninformed persons who may have regarded Dr. Nourse as a "reactionary" or even "conservative" economist or political scientist. He is modern and forward looking. He asserts that our economic fate is determined not by impersonal forces but largely by wise or foolish human action; that reasonable economic stability is not only attainable but also preferable to the recurrent depressions which were supposed to "purge" the economy of its weaknesses; that we cannot go back to a simpler or "free market" economy by fragmentizing big private economic organizations or big government; and that competition and co-operation are both useful and dynamic concepts.

He then states the core problem as follows: (a) to achieve the fairly stable progress which technology makes possible (in the United States), the enjoyment of available resources must be so apportioned that production and consumption are kept in workable balance; (b) the greatest threat to this balance arises when powerful economic groups seek to obtain for their own use an excessive share of our total resources; and (c) the problem is compounded when these powerful economic groups seek this excessive share, not only through action on the economic front within the area of private enterprise, but also through action on the political front designed to pressure big government into helping them get more.

This thesis seems sound to this reviewer. There has developed in some quarters an overoptimistic belief in the capacity of government to redress economic deficiencies. Placing more emphasis upon making the general private economy itself function more smoothly would help to avoid such concentration of public power as might be inconsistent with the maintenance of dynamic initiative and of the great personal freedoms.

The incompleteness of Dr. Nourse's book, granted the soundness of its thesis and the excellence of its purpose, seems to me three-fold:

(1) It seems overly pessimistic. It leaves the general impression that trends over the past two decades in big business, big labor, big agriculture, and big government have reflected a disheartening deterioration in matters economic and moral, and that retribution will be certain even if it has not been swift. An equally strong argument might be advanced that, admitting excesses and mistakes, the American economy has become more stable, more just and even more conducive to true initiative than it was two decades ago. The book might be more persuasive if it listed gains as well as losses.

(2) Severe criticism of powerful economic groups is less likely to improve their ways than the assumption that their motivation is good, coupled with concrete proposals about what they should do next. Mere exhortation not to seek too large a share is inadequate, without economic analysis of some measuring rods or patterns for sharing the total output which may be consistent with a well-functioning economy. There is need also for "institutional" exploration of how this process may operate in our kind of economy, with the big economic groups participating and contributing instead of being "told" by some professor or bureaucrat. No one has yet solved this problem; but Dr. Nourse slips into near ridicule of those who suggest possible techniques.

(3) The book applauds the reelection of an outstanding Republican senator, censures the political campaign of a Democratic ex-Undersecretary, and makes some slighting personal references to the President. This gives a flavor of partisanship, although I am sure Dr. Nourse could defend the proposition that he reached these conclusions by a "non-political" process. This reviewer appreciates that the author's most recent government work undoubtedly disclosed some things he found distasteful; that is a common experience of those in public service. Yet many may share my hope that Dr. Nourse's next book, in addition to addressing itself to points (1) and (2) above, will return to the more complete detachment and objectivity which helped to make some of his earlier works—such as his studies on productive and consumption capacity, and of the price system—among the finest contributions to the literature of American economic thought.

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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. *Studies in Income and Wealth.* Vol. XIII, Conference on Research on Income and Wealth. Pp. xiv, 587. New York, 1951. $6.00.

The analysis of income distribution is one of the major ways to find out "who gets what when" in any society. It therefore lies at the heart not only of economics but also of political science and other branches of social science.

One of the most interesting things about people who get the largest share of man's worldly goods is that the more they get the more they want. Statisticians and economists, it seems, are also human beings. This volume demonstrates not only that *Homo Americanus* has more figures on who has what than any other tribe in history, but also that American income distribution experts—far from being satisfied—are eagerly striving to obtain still more and still better data.

With six learned papers by eight outstanding specialists and stimulating comments by eight discussion leaders, this volume provides a truly remarkable picture of the progress that has been made and the improvements under way in the collection and initial handling of data on this subject. It should serve as an invaluable reference volume for economists, a guide to statisticians, and a source of elementary education for political scientists who have generally failed to give sufficient attention to work in this area.

Two of the commentators deserve special quotation. "It is time we gave less attention," writes Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago, "to uniformity, to measuring what we neither understand nor can agree on defining, and more to specific problems, to understanding the facts of income determination, and to the development of theories and hypotheses that would put these facts into a meaningful relation one with another" (p. 56).

"Despite any and all complaints that data are deficient," writes Harold Barger of the National Bureau of Economic Research, "it is obvious that facts about the distribution of income among recipients are piling up and are being compared and summarized at a staggering rate. The contrast in this respect with the poverty of information twenty, not to say ten, years ago is striking indeed. Yet it does not appear that the study of the theoretical distributions, which must underlie the observed data, has made any comparable advance" (p. 260).

One of the first steps toward the improved utilization of income distribution data has already been taken in the Economic Reviews of the Council of Economic Advisers, which appear every six months as supplements of the President's Economic Reports to Congress. Since January 1949, the Council has been including in these Reviews studies on income distribution which pull together the available data and draw broad conclusions concerning shifts and trends.

But to achieve more fully the objectives sought by Friedman and Barger, two additional steps must be taken—steps which are more appropriate to private research organizations. The first is the

analysis of how and why changes in income have really taken place. This involves an adventure into social dynamics —into such questions as how incomes have been affected during the last twenty years by the activities of organized labor, of the "farm bloc," of social welfare programs, and of "progressive" tax legislation. The second is the development of standards in terms both of "equity" and of implications for consumption and investment. This, of course, leads into broad questions of social behavior and moral values.

If the market for income distribution data is more fully exploited by studies along these lines, the work of the Conference on Income and Wealth in designing and producing the data is bound to grow in significance during the coming years.

BERTRAM M. GROSS
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C.

HART, ALBERT G., and E. CARY BROWN, assisted by H. F. RASMUSSEN. *Financing Defense: Federal Tax and Expenditure Policies.* Pp. xiv, 161. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1951. $2.00.

This is an excellent analysis of the problems arising in federal finance under the conditions of a garrison state. The study outlines the estimated budget requirements of the "readiness economy" which the nation must maintain over a long period, if necessary, if it is to be prepared for the emergency of another world war. The fervor of patriotism, which flames high during total war, cannot be counted on during this period as the primary urge for popular co-operation in the programs of economic and financial mobilization. If inflation is to be controlled, heavy reliance must be placed upon fiscal controls.

The authors criticize wasteful federal expenditures for defense as well as for non-defense services. But they believe that economy efforts will not suffice to keep the budget from soaring upward and to head off the need for greatly increased taxes. Judiciously employed subsidies to producers may have a limited usefulness in increasing the supply of needed materials and in keeping prices down. They run the risk of political abuse, however, and require additional taxes to meet their costs.

The tax system should be placed in readiness to meet spiraling governmental costs and keep the budget in balance. The main pillar in the tax structure must be the personal income tax. It reaches the great mass of consumers directly, is paid currently, in general, and is reasonably equitable. But it is more likely to be paid with funds that would have been saved than is a sales tax, and in raising a given amount of revenue is likely to be less restrictive of inflation. The pros and cons of different types of general consumption taxes are discussed.

The authors urge heavier profits taxes with the objective of keeping profits after taxes generally at the 1948 level. An excess profits tax is found to be highly complicated and exerting some inflationary pressures but a necessary supplement, politically at least, to wage and other controls. The tax system must have sufficient flexibility to meet the changing requirements of defense financing.

The little volume is clearly written and is balanced in its appraisal of economic and financial problems growing out of the current critical world situation. Limitations of data and analysis are freely admitted. The reader may disagree with the analysis of budget and tax questions at particular points and wish for a more adequate discussion. This is probably inevitable in such a brief study. But the volume will be found to be ably written, stimulating, and constructive by those who are concerned about the dangers of inflation and seek to minimize them.

ALFRED G. BUEHLER
University of Pennsylvania

HAMBERG, D. *Business Cycles.* Pp. xviii, 621. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $5.00.

Cast in the highly technical language of the economic specialist, this is not a book for the general public, though the exhaustive discussion of the application

of business cycle theories in the later chapters is more readable. The author expresses a pious wish that he may write a book rigorous in its analysis of the main theories of business cycles but not so rigorous as to overshoot the intelligence of the undergraduate upperclassman. If the average college senior could come out of this series of lectures with a "C" grade, he would deserve high commendation. The average citizen would most certainly flunk.

But the author must deal perforce with existing theories. He must use their terminology. This he has done with great zeal and keen insight. His analysis is of especial value to the student of business trends. A triple reading of the definitions in Chapter two is recommended.

To speak of business cycles is in itself confusing. We may speak of cycles in weather, in sunspots, in the tides of the sea—all processes in nature—but to describe the vagaries and fluctuations of human attitudes and activity as a cycle is a misnomer. The one constant in the problem is human self-interest: the multitude of other factors are variables, elusive to a high degree—all of which Professor Hamberg fairly recognizes.

His book is of special value in its assembly of the five principal theories of the business cycle. Each is exhaustively taken apart and its weaknesses pointed out. Without presuming in any way to be hypercritical or iconoclastic the author has nevertheless taken these famous writers to task and bumped their heads together with a resulting sound of emptiness. Then follows a chapter on the eclectic theory—a chapter of synthesis—in which values from all approaches to the problem are assembled and cast into a rational answer to the riddle of business change.

The student of this branch of economics will appreciate the author's historical analysis of business cycles in the United States during the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's. Those who struggled through those troubled decades with two major and five minor depressions and a period of wars and the economic wreckage of wars will derive a greatly clarified view of that vast experience. This book is a major work. The reader who will keep his lexicon handy may profit well by careful reading.

ROBERT W. KELSO
Pleasant Ridge, Michigan

COPELAND, MELVIN T. *The Executive at Work.* Pp. 278. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $3.75.

This book by the Director of Research and George Baker Professor of Administration, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, is neither a work of science nor of scholarship; nor is it intended to be. It is addressed primarily to those who have little understanding or perhaps false notions as to what executives have to do and what kind of problems they have to meet. There is little or no definition of terms and no attempt at developing conceptual schemes relating to the subject. The author wishes to speak out of his personal experience and observation rather than to cite the considerable volume of literature on the subject of organization and administration. He succeeds admirably in his purpose. The style is highly personal, chatty, and anecdotal.

The book should be of interest not only to those having no experience or knowledge of the work of executives, but also to those in the lower and intermediate levels of the larger organizations who often wonder what the men in the top offices do and who frequently have quite erroneous views about the matter.

As presenting a good deal of case material in the abbreviated form of anecdotes, the book should also interest experienced executives who have difficulty in selecting illustrative material from their own experiences. This difficulty in part explains the fact, noted by Professor Copeland, that most autobiographical material by those whose chief claim to eminence is their organizing and administrative capacity fails to say anything of importance about this aspect of their work and experience.

One might expect in a book of this kind a great many unwarranted oversimplifications and platitudinous generalizations that are mere expressions of personal opinion. Professor Copeland did not

entirely escape this danger. Here is an example (p. 47): "Integrity, honesty, and sincerity are qualities in which a man must rate 100% or zero. Unless a man can be rated 100%, it is futile to dream of educating him to raise his standards after appointment." To the reviewer this is sheer nonsense.

As stated, Professor Copeland ignores the considerable literature that is available. This, no doubt, makes the book easier reading for those to whom it is primarily directed, but it also limits the usefulness of the book for others. It also makes rather conspicuous a notable exception in that the author cites many times the research studies of the Harvard Business School. To the reviewer this treatment seems to give a lack of balance to the book and the impression that it is a bit of propaganda for Harvard Business School and its research department.

The personal tone maintained throughout the book comes close to the limit toward the end when the author discusses in detail his plans and attitudes with respect to retirement.

CHESTER I. BARNARD
The Rockefeller Foundation
New York City

MOORE, WILBERT E. *Industrialization and Labor: Social Aspects of Economic Development.* Pp. xx, 410. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for The Institute of World Affairs, New School for Social Research), 1951. $5.00.

The general intent of this scholarly and carefully written book is indicated in the author's preface: "Its focus is not primarily on the historical experience in the industrial West, but on the more recent and contemporary experience in areas commonly called 'undeveloped.' The theoretical justification of this focus is precisely that of the significance of varying social institutions and life patterns for economic development, and the practical justification is that it is precisely in such areas that industrialization is being proposed as a solution to the problems of poverty." It is in a sense a co-operative enterprise, and the author gives credit to several foundations and research organizations that assisted him in his work.

It is difficult to summarize the many conclusions emerging from the book, most of them stated cautiously and tentatively. Among the factors tending to promote the shift to industries in industrially backward regions, the author mentions the following: poverty, arising from overpopulation; debt and modes of inheritance; deterioration of the land; loss of markets for craft skills and products; escape from social pressures of various kinds at home (for example, Chinese women going to the factories to escape the domination of their mothers-in-law); deliberate restriction of agricultural employment; direct coercion of workers through taxes (to force them to earn money), indenture labor recruitment by native chiefs and headmen who have sometimes robbed the workers scandalously; and, in a few instances, patriotism.

Among the many factors hostile to the shift of labor to industry, the following are discussed: hostility to change; unawareness of other patterns of life; loss of security, economic and social, and of family and village connections; loss of freedom as producers; love of the land; loss of status; lack of goods available for purchase with wages earned; opposition to authority and discipline in the factory, and to the time-discipline," the punctuality and steadiness of industrial jobs; and in some cases hostility to foreign control of factories, race discrimination, and lack of any chance of promotion.

The problem of morale and efficiency of workers is discussed with perspicacity. The cycle of poverty and inefficiency is analyzed carefully—"the cycle of poverty, lack of physical vigor, frustration, low productivity, low wages, and further poverty." Absenteeism and rapid turnover are noted as serious evils; the waste involved in race discrimination is clearly indicated, and the notion of race superiority is blasted properly.

Part II of the book gives us a detailed discussion of the history and status of industrialization and labor in Mexico.

To the question whether industrialization promises a remedy for the poverty of industrially backward and overpopulated countries Professor Moore offers no simple answer; but his book should be required reading for all who are optimistic about this.

JOHN ISE
University of Kansas

FRANCE, ROBERT R. and RICHARD A. LESTER. *Compulsory Arbitration of Utility Disputes in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.* Pp. 90. Princeton: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1951. $2.00.

It should not be inferred that the decision of the United States Supreme Court of February 26, 1951, holding the Wisconsin Compulsory Arbitration Statute unconstitutional makes studies like this one academic. Not only is there doubt that the Court's decree is equally applicable to all compulsory arbitration laws, but the decision itself rests on a doctrine of conflict with Federal law—a conflict easily removed by Congressional action.

Of the seven states with this sort of legislation, these two were selected for study probably because of convenience, although New Jersey possibly has accumulated more experience in the administration of a compulsory arbitration statute than any other state. The inclusion of Pennsylvania adds little to the study because the Pennsylvania experience has been very limited. The Pennsylvania act has ben invoked only 7 times, with the procedure carried as far as an arbitration award in only 3 cases.

The limited use of the Pennsylvania law is not explained by its newness since it has been in operation for virtually the same period of time as the New Jersey statute. The authors speculate that the greater maturity of collective bargaining in Pennsylvania utilities and the undesirable restrictions imposed by the Pennsylvania act on the selection of arbitrators and on the standards they must employ in reaching their decisions are responsible for the meager experience.

The most surprising conclusion advanced is that "the results in both states would seem to indicate that bargaining relationships which were functioning successfully before the enactment of the laws were not disrupted greatly by the statutes" (p. 87). This conclusion is at variance with the results of earlier studies of the New Jersey legislation made by Professor Thomas Kennedy and Professor Lois MacDonald, both of whom found collective bargaining was impaired (Kennedy, The Handling of Emergency Disputes, Industrial Relations Research Association, Proceedings of Second Annual Meeting, 1949, p. 14. MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration in New Jersey, Graduate Division of Public Service, New York University, 1949).

It is not possible in this brief review carefully to evaluate the evidence on which this very important finding rests. It can be noted that the authors tested the opinions of members of the arbitration boards and of management and union representatives in the utility industries. They also reviewed the experience of each industry and examined the trend of statistics with regard to the percentage of negotiations in which the procedures of the legislation were invoked. Their conclusion is entitled to respect.

Other significant findings are that both states have avoided prolonged stoppages—with one exception—since the laws were adopted; that the procedures of the New Jersey law are more conducive than those of Pennsylvania to workable solutions to labor disputes; and that the entire process of compulsory arbitration is endangered by judicial review of arbitration awards.

The study is a significant contribution to the growing literature on the problem of the emergency strike.

JOHN PERRY HORLACHER
University of Pennsylvania

GINZBERG, ELI, SOL W. GINSBURG, SIDNEY AXELRAD, and JOHN L. HERMAN. *Occupational Choice: An Approach to a General Theory.* Pp. ix, 271. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $3.75.

This little book impresses the reviewer as one of the most significant contributions yet made to the literature of vocational guidance. The study it summarizes was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences.

On what basis are occupational choices now made? What are the personal and social factors conditioning such choices? Is there a commitment pattern in the psychological process of selecting a vocation or is it a matter of fortuity and chance? Does the pattern change predictably with the maturation of the child through adolescence to young adulthood? How far do the techniques in our present counseling system insure an adequate and intelligent use of our potential manpower resources? What can be done to make our vocational guidance system more effective? These and derivative questions which have long plagued the minds of high school and college counselors are tentatively answered. The answers come out of "several years" of systematic interviewing of children and adolescents from the sixth, eighth, tenth, and twelfth grades, mainly of the Horace Mann School, and of typical undergraduate and graduates in Columbia University and its associated colleges.

The authors stress the point that occupational choice is not an act of simple decision but rather a developmental process—a kind of progressive commitment, irreversible, with compromise always an essential aspect. Normally the child passes through a "fantasy" stage of occupational interest, the adolescent through a "tentative" period, characterized by considerations of interest, capacity, and values. The latter gives place to the maturer "realistic" stage marked by exploration, crystallization, and specification of choice. Deviations from these norms due to economic background, class, sex, emotional and other psychological factors, and parental and social orientation are analyzed and abundantly illustrated by case histories.

In a penetrating chapter on "The Conservation of Human Resources" the authors deal with the problem of how to develop "appropriate methods—in addition to financial support—to help those with capaciety and talent in the lower income groups to pursue additional education and training." They stop far short, however, of advocating a general prolongation of education. They insist that the latter is not necessarily desirable from the standpoint of occupational choice and adjustment. Its value lies rather in "the opportunity for leisurely deliberation concerning an occupational choice and for avoiding premature commitments."

The treatment is lucid, stimulating, and readable throughout. In method of presentation it is direct, objective, and cogent as a syllogism. It contains no discernible element of the pedantic or doctrinaire. Pet theories are conspicuously absent.

With this study as a background a similarly balanced study evaluating the present methods and techniques of vocational counselors would be of inestimable value.

CHARLES W. COULTER
University of New Hampshire

PFIFFNER, JOHN M. *The Supervision of Personnel: Human Relations in the Management of Men.* Pp. viii, 454. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951. $6.00.

This volume is a successful effort to produce both a text for the teaching of the human relations aspects of management and a useful handbook for supervisors interested in a plain-talk presentation of the findings of human relations research during two decades. The author sets his material within the framework of several controlling premises: that the democratic way of life is desirable and feasible in management; that man is a social animal, influenced by belief-systems in his work habits; that communication, participation, and constructive conflict as well as cooperation and consultation provide the main pattern for supervisory leadership; that adjustment to living and working in large-scale organizations is still a new and difficult problem for most of us, an adjustment with which we have had only a few decades of experience.

The volume is divided into six main parts: the supervisor and human nature; the human relations aspects of organization and management; the social aspects of supervision; motivation; clinical approaches to troubled people; and selection and training of supervisors. These central issues are dealt with mainly at the level of the work unit composed of the supervisor and his rank-and-file subordinates; the larger world of the total organization and its surrounding social environment is seen only incidentally and by implication. The exposition thus profits from intensive analysis of the first-line supervisor and his group, but tends to isolate his intimate world artificially from the powerful influences of the universe of administration in which the work unit lives. In this respect the author faithfully reflects the virtues and the weaknesses of the human relations research upon which his text depends.

The supervision of personnel is seen as having a generic pattern: "people follow a rather uniform pattern of behavior in working relationships." As a consequence, the analysis assumes a common pattern of supervisory problems and maxims in both public and business administration. For political scientists and others interested in the distinctive features of supervision in public agencies, the omission of any emphasis upon the political environment of the supervisor will have special significance. But every reader interested in supervision as a problem in human relations will find this a workmanlike addition to his shelf of useful books.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
The City College of New York

ZALEZNIK, A. *Foreman Training in a Growing Enterprise.* Pp. xv, 232. Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1951. $3.50.

As is clearly stated in the foreward by Professor Fritz Roethlisberger, the foreman in a business offers the most fruitful focus for the study of the administrative process in general. The foreman is literally "the man in the middle." He stands between management and employees. He operates in the middle of the abstract and the concrete; in the middle of theory and practice; in the middle of good intentions and practical achievement; in the middle of verbal and nonverbal worlds, and in the middle of a changing technology and time-honored customs. It is he who is expected to bring about an hourly and continuing miracle of integration. In consequence, the author has centered his study on the foreman, with particular reference to his training and the appropriateness of this training to his needs. Dr. Zaleznik is principally concerned with the question: what kind of help do supervisors need from training for more effective action on the job?

To find an answer to this question, the author selected a single, young, and rapidly growing enterprise for study (the book is his doctoral thesis) on the assumption that its management would be more receptive to observation of its practices than would an older and more rigid organization. His research consisted in: (1) the observation of the supervisory training meetings held by the company; (2) the conduct of a series of individual interviews with supervisors to ascertain their problems and their reactions to the training programs; and (3) the observation for five weeks of a single foreman, Tony, at work under the particularly difficult circumstances of starting an assembly line in a new plant. On the basis of these observations, the author draws a number of conclusions relative to the relevancy of the training offered in this particular company, the needs and problems of first line supervision, and the approach and content of the training which will provide the most help to supervision.

His conclusions concerning the relevancy and value of the company's supervisory training program are not only significant but have long needed expression. He points out that the establishment of the program was not the outgrowth of some critical or sharply defined problem. Instead, management merely had a vague "feeling" that supervisory training was needed. It is probable, the author suspects, that this was stimulated to some extent by the fact that as a result of the Training Within Industry programs, such work with supervisors had become something of a "fad." The man selected to do the training, while experienced in the company, was chosen primarily because he had an advanced degree in psychology and had taught in the public schools. In turn, his choice of subject matter was equally fortuitous. He had studied psychology;

it seemed logical that a knowledge of psychology would be helpful to the supervisors, so that is what they got, with particular emphasis on developing a background knowledge of psychological principles, the formation of desirable "attitudes" in the supervisors, the teaching of rules of supervision, and the instilling of confidence in them. The melancholy outcome was the expenditure of much time and effort with few or no practical results. The content and conduct of the training sessions, as reported, would be ludicrous were they not so tragic in their futility—and their representativeness of what is being done in industry generally.

The author's conclusions resulting from his interviews with the foremen are less significant. He finds that their attitudes toward the training are colored by the state of their morale. Furthermore, he discovered that where poor morale (negative attitudes) exists, management tends to be too preoccupied with other and more pressing problems to be too much concerned about it.

A major part of the book is devoted to a detailed exposition of the problems and reactions of Tony, the foreman, in getting his assembly line started, in meeting production goals, in dealing with various staff specialists, and in handling his people. Tony has trouble, almost from the start, and it grows progressively worse. As a result, he becomes increasingly disorganized in his activities, unrealistic in his thinking, and wracked by anxiety. In short, the pressures of his responsibilities and his failures adequately to meet them induce an almost complete state of panic in Tony. His problems mount in geometric progression during the course of the study, so that at the end of the five weeks of observation he is about ready either to break down or to have management replace him. The picture of the disintegration of a supervisor on his job which is provided is a poignant and realistic one—and one which is played out in many plants every day.

The most unfortunate feature of the study—and a critical source of weakness in the book—is the fact that the author has apparently had no training in clinical psychology. The true significance of Tony's disintegration under the cumulative stress of the job has apparently escaped the author completely. He provides a detailed clinical account of Tony's descent into a state of panic without any awareness of the sources and basic nature of his difficulties. With surprising naïveté, he diagnoses Tony's behavior simply as a failure to grow and develop in spite of the fact that in his daily job activities (1) "he did not observe events about him, (2) he did not attend to specific problems, (3) he did not relate himself effectively to people, and (4) he behaved in a frantic manner and was generally apprehensive." Briefly the author does not clearly recognize that Tony's problem is not one that training of any kind can help. Tony's difficulties stem from the fact that he is essentially a weak, dependent (probably not too intelligent) individual who has never learned to think realistically or relate himself practically to his problems. Simply stated, he is not supervisory material and should never have been promoted beyond group leader. Having been made foreman, he begins to regress and become increasingly immature and unrealistic in his responses as he is subjected to greater and greater stresses. The solution, as much for Tony's good as for management's, would be to take him off supervision at the foreman level as soon as his incapacity becomes evident and before he breaks down completely.

By way of conclusion, the author stresses the desirability of focusing training on the supervisors' needs, of diagnosing their problems and understanding their feelings and attitudes, and of addressing training meetings more specifically toward the supervisors' problems, attitudes, and beliefs. He feels that the end goal of such training should be to help all types and levels of line and staff employees to diagnose situations effectively, to act effectively, and to become self-aware. These are undeniably laudable objectives for training; the extent to which they can actually be accomplished by most industrial training departments is open to considerable question. In this respect he follows most professional industrial trainers in substituting a proneness to wishful thinking for a tough-minded appraisal of the limitations of training. Taken as a whole, the book contributes little that is new or original with respect either to methodology or conclusions. It does present one case study in faithful detail which provides the uninitiated with a valid picture of what frequently happens in industry. The interpretations, on the other hand, as already indicated, tend to be rather naïve. The author's recommendations, while undeniably admirable, are probably much more difficult of attainment than he fully recognizes. In short, the study represents a typical research project at the graduate level, but hardly one which makes a major and lasting contribution to human knowledge.

ROBERT N. MCMURRY
Chicago, Illinois

COOK, FRANKLIN H. *Principles of Business and the Federal Law.* Pp. xxi, 563. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $5.50.

This is a combination text and case book purporting to deal with important "legal and economic principles that affect business in its relation with government." Actually, it is a book on constitutional law. The emphasis throughout is on the application of constitutional clauses—impairment, equal protection, privileges and immunities, due process, and commerce—to business and labor practices. There is little economics in it.

In Book I, entitled "Constitutional Law," the material is arranged according to the constitutional framework rather than by subject matter. For example: taxation is treated in five chapters of Book I; labor in four chapters of Book I and in Part V of Book II, consisting of four chapters; monopoly and competition in five chapters of Book I and in four chapters of Book II. Book II, entitled "Federal Statutes," is divided into four parts—"Restraints upon Business," "Labor Legislation," "Security Regulation," and "Regulation of Transportation."

This method results in considerable scatteration of subject matter, repetition, and functional disunity. Whatever its pedagogical value for the elucidation of constitutional principles to prospective lawyers, it is confusing and somewhat frustrating to the lay student who is more concerned with the social philosophy and the consequences of constitutional interpretation than with underlying legal principles. If, for example, one wants to ascertain the constitutional metes and bounds of federal antitrust policy, one does not relish the prospect of searching through nine chapters to find the answer.

The material, except for statutory citations in Book II, consists almost entirely of excerpts from Supreme Court cases. This is far from satisfying to the social scientist. He misses reference to the criticism appearing in learned journals of law, politics, and economics; to notable works on constitutional law; to the contributions of state courts and administrative commissions; to the interplay of social forces which has influenced judicial decisions. These deficiencies are partially offset by textual explanations, but these are generally brief and legalistic.

The Constitution is regarded as a bulwark of individual and property rights vis-a-vis the State. The rationale of the Court is "precedent and its own sense of reasonableness" (p. 5) and its "idea of what is right and what is wrong" (p. 111), which the author equates with "natural" or "higher" law. The necessity for public restraint of private economic power and for flexibility of interpretation is conceded but only within the permissive limits of traditional legal theory. It is a useful case and reference book, but scarcely an adequate guide for social policy.

HORACE M. GRAY
University of Illinois

CLOUGH, SHEPARD B. *The Rise and Fall of Civilization: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Economic Development and Civilization.* Pp. xiii, 291. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951. $4.50.

While it is not written in a bellicose or controversial tone, it may be fairly asserted that this stimulating essay was in-

spired by a desire to combat the conception of the rise and fall of civilizations promulgated by Arnold J. Toynbee in his *A Study of History* and, to a lesser extent, the views of Oswald Spengler on the same topic, as expressed in his *The Decline of the West*.

Toynbee presented an essential spiritual interpretation of history. For example, he held that the rôle of each great civilization has been to fulfill destiny assiged to it by God. Spiritual creativity is the chief dynamic factor in history. Civilizations are rehabiliated by the spiritual etherialization of leaders as they retire into the wilderness to hold communion with God. The chief hope of saving Western civilization today is to be found in a more complete appreciation and utilization of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, the only authentic savior.

Professor Clough's book provides a far more realistic approach to the problems of the nature, rise, flowering, and decline of civilizations. He regards economic factors as more potent than spiritual items in creating and supporting human civilization. But economic aspects of life, however essential, are not the highest manifestations of human civilization. According to Professor Clough, civilization is measured by the extent to which "a people produces aesthetic and intellectual works of high merit and provides physical and social security for its members. . . . Of great importance also is the prevention of such a rigid structuring of the culture that the individual has no choice of action."

The production of conditions favorable to a high state of civilization depends, more than anything else, upon the provision of a substantial economic surplus. But this will not, in itself alone, invariably create a rich culture. The controlling ideology is also of great importance. To attain a high type of civilization, and with reasonable rapidity, requires an ideology that, making use of the economic surplus essential for stability and prospertiy, "embraces the idea that great works of art should be created, that knowledge of the universe should be acquired, and that man should extend his control over the human and physical environment."

Building his theory of the rise and fall of civilization upon economic progress and the creation of an economic surplus, Professor Clough sets down the following factors which he regards as exerting a controlling influence over economic progress: (1) natural resources; (2) technology and techniques of production; (3) labor; (4) capital; (5) business leadership and economic institutions; and (6) demand for goods and techniques of distribution. He applies these criteria in the bulk of his book, in the course of which he examines the rise of the earliest cultures, the cultures of the Bronze Age, notably Egypt and Mesopotamia, ancient Greece, Rome, and Western civilization. He holds that "Western culture now has the highest civilization of any culture in the world." Leadership in this is now passing from Western Europe to the United States and Canada. The greatest threat to the dominion and permanence of Western leadership in civilization is to be found "in the threat of war, as well as actual war."

Space does not permit any detailed commentary on Professor Clough's survey of the history of civilization, but it may be said categorically that it is an unusually thoughtful and stimulating work. In the opinion of the reviewer, it is more instructive and fruitful than a library full of such books as those by Toynbee and Sorokin, with their single-track mysticism, or even of books like Brooks Adams' *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, which overworks an equally unilateral materialistic interpretation of history. Professor Clough's broad approach and his theory of multiple causation are more in accord with the facts and more entitled to respect.

HARRY ELMER BARNES
Cooperstown, New York

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

GREEN, ARNOLD W. *Henry Charles Carey: Nineteenth-Century Sociologist*. Pp. viii, 218. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. $4.00.

Whether or not Henry C. Carey (1793–1879) was or was not "a sociologist" is a question that could be debated endlessly; indeed Mr. Green does not unequivocally claim that designation for Carey in the present volume.

At any rate, Carey published successively, in 1858 and 1860, the three volumes of his *Principles of Social Science*, which thus became one of the earliest works to bear any such title, in any language. To be sure, Vico's *La Scienza Nuova* appeared in 1725, over one hundred years earlier, and there had been a few other works during the interim that can be argued to have something of the character and pretensions of general social science. But for all that, Carey was among the pioneers in this field of endeavor. Though his "social science" was a mixture of economics and miscellaneous items of special pleading for reforms in which he was interested, especially protective tariff, and though, as Green frankly shows, there is ground for believing that his views were not altogether uninfluenced by personal pecuniary interest in the Pennsylvania coal and iron industry, he deserves some credit for his effort to demonstrate that there could be a *general* "social science."

It will, therefore, be of value to those interested in the history of social science to have this competent and compact account of Carey's life, with an analysis of his work, available. Apart from some difficulty in ascertaining, on a rapid reading at Green's first chapter which is primarily biographical, which passages refer to him and which ones to his only slightly less distinguished father, Mathew Carey, I find nothing to criticize in this book.

FLOYD N. HOUSE
University of Virginia

VOLKART, EDMUND H. (Ed.) *Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research*. Pp. ix, 338. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951. $3.00.

This collection of excerpts from the writing of W. I. Thomas is a timely and most welcome contribution. Dr. Volkart has made a judicious selection of key passages from books and articles written by Thomas (most of which are out of print and hard to come by) and has has shaped them into an integrated whole. Unfortunately, Thomas never wrote a systematic statement of his thoughts. During his entire life he was engaged in the pursuit of fresh knowledge, and the fertile ideas he had he used as guides rather than as subjects of contemplation. Besides, Thomas' ideas were always evolving and changing, and he was reluctant to formalize them. Some of his basic concepts, for example, that of "situation," have never been adequately defined. Dr. Volkart is fully aware of this dynamic character of Thomas' work and has succeeded admirably in organizing the passages he has selected in a manner that conveys a sense of the development and growth of Thomas' thinking about social phenomena. The fact that there was no element of finality in Thomas' thought makes his contributions especially valuable as a living heritage to be elaborated and deepened by future generations of social scientists.

This volume clearly shows that Thomas' contribution to the social sciences has been a major one. In his excellent introduction which summarizes this contribution Dr. Volkart rightly concludes that "in retrospect, Thomas looms as more than a historical figure of importance. Directly and indirectly he has influenced the course of social science development, and his basic conceptions can be discerned in much of contemporary theory and research. If today it is difficult to appreciate his originality and authority, it is because so much of his work has been accepted in the body of social science" (p. 31).

Among these conceptions are the postulate of the situational approach which asserts that behavior is adjustment to existing relationships and that change in them (crisis) is the dynamic element in social development and the postulate of the "definition of the situation" which assumes that subjective factors—the attitudes and valuations of individuals and groups—are an integral part of behavior analysis. Thomas also offers methodological directives concerning the priority

of case studies over statistical investigations; the use of life history material; the employment of control groups; and, above all, the avoidance of limitation of the physical sciences and the recognition of the distinctive qualities of human behavior.

Dr. Volkart has gathered together seventeen selections, slightly abridged to avoid repetition, from Thomas' books and articles. The inclusion of a hitherto unpublished report submitted to the Social Science Research Council which outlines a program for the study of personality and culture and contains the most mature expression of Thomas' position is particularly welcome. Each selection is preceeded by an introduction by the editor which places the selection in historical perspective and relates it to the other materials presented in the volume. The selections are divided into four parts which deal respectively with the nature of social science, with personal dynamics, with cultural dynamics, and with personality and culture. A good bibliography has been compiled by A. Paul Hare, and Donald Young has written a foreword.

A slight flaw in an otherwise excellent volume is the absence of any discussion of the nature of the collaboration between Thomas and Znaniecki and of the possible influence which the latter may have exercised on the shaping of Thomas' approach to the study of social phenomena. For example, the "Methodological Note to the Polish Peasant" is regarded by Volkart simply as a continuation and elaboration of ideas previously set forth by Thomas. Consultation of Znaniecki's "Cultural Reality" which was published at the time he was collaborating with Thomas would have undoubtedly modified this view. Znaniecki is an original thinker in his own right, and he subsequently developed a system of ideas which to some extent diverged in interest and emphasis from the course pursued by Thomas. However, they are fundamentally alike in their approach and both contributed to its elaboration in equal measure during the fortunate period of their collaboration.

THEODORE ABEL
Hunter College

EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. *Social Anthropology.* Pp. vii, 134. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951. $2.50.

These six lectures, given on B.B.C.'s famed Third Programme in the winter of 1950, are designated to explain social anthropology to a lay audience. It is hard to believe that the attempt was other than successful. Professor Evans-Pritchard's style is clear and straightforward if a trifle humorless, and his grasp of his subject matter is firm and large, gentled by a candor and a humility that are as rare as they are commendable. There is no hesitation about the theoretical confusions that clutter anthropology in its present state of development just as there is unapologetic pride in the increasing accuracy of ethnographic methods and general field work techniques. The concluding chapter on applied anthropology is an especially neat blend of caution with a rather impressive statement of anthropology's credentials to contribute to such practical affairs as colonial government. (If the chapter deals with little else in the way of applications, it should be forgiven for its excellence as well as its British origin and audience.)

But Evans-Pritchard, like any good professional, has a rather definite point of view toward his work, and that point of view, while it may be rejoiced in by some, is anathema to many. Denying that social anthropology either is or can be a science, Evans-Pritchard (a) classifies his descipline with the humanities, believing its ties to history the most intimate among its intellectual relations, (b) feels that a close linkage between psychology and anthropology is impossible since they study different kinds of phenomena, and (c) refuses to admit the discovery to date of any cultural laws.

Without challenging his assertions about the utility of history in anthropological research and theorizing, it seems hard to understand how Evans-Pritchard can overlook the kind of history that is most garmane to understand how the members of society come to preserve or modify their social structures and to play their culturally determined roles. This kind of history has to do with the socialization process and brings the anthropologist willy-nilly into contact with psychological thought and methods. *See* Mead, Whiting, and Kardiner, among others, on this point. The denial of discoverable lawfulness also is a trifle diffiucult to accept in the light of the recent work by Kroeber, Murdock, and the researchers utilizing Yale's cross-cultural index. It also seems to be inharmonious with Evans-Pritchard's own insistence that anthropologists study "problems and not peoples." Does this not imply regularities in the processes and relationships characterizing cultural behavior, and does this not imply lawfulness?

The approach of science deserves its long day in court if for no other reason that that the disciplines concerned with man have too long been unproductive in their literary and "humanistic" settings. Science may prove as powerful a tool for understanding the social environment as it has for plumbing the physical world. Those who deny it its chance do a real disservice in the sense of impeding the kind of public acceptance that would facilitate what may be a crucial effort at expanding man's knowledge of man.

EDWARD JOSEPH SHOBEN, JR.
Columbia University

MUDD, EMILY HARTSHORNE. *The Practice of Marriage Counseling.* Pp. xix, 336. New York: Association Press, 1951. $4.50.

Association Press makes a valuable contribution to the entire field of marriage and family relations in this latest volume in their family life series. Marriage counseling has developed so rapidly in recent decades that many questions about what and why is marriage counseling, what is professionally sound practice, just what is the process, who uses marriage counseling services, and what good do they do are as inevitable as they are difficult to answer.

Of all the persons who might have been prevailed upon to write a volume on marriage counseling practice, Dr. Emily Mudd is undoubtedly most competent. The marriage Council of Philadelphia with which she has been identified from its beginning is an outstanding model of a well-organized, carefully developed, professionally sound marriage counseling service. That its experiences, standards, and practice through the years form the basis of this volume gives the guide a practical reality that no arm-chair philosopher could possibly emulate.

The purpose of marriage counseling is succinctly stated as "promoting personal and social adjustment within the family by aiding those individuals who feel inadequate to utilize their own strength, and of furthering knowledge concerning the dynamics of relationship between husband and wife" (p. 4). Similar carefully defined terms in context throughout the volume enhance its use as a reference work.

Appendix B, "Reports from Functioning Services as Furnished by Their Executives," is a rich mine of current marriage counseling practice as reported by some thirty-five services in concentrated parallel format covering some seventy pages in the book. Such material suggests itself for courses and seminars dealing with the norms and variables in counseling clientele, settings, philosophy, and practice.

Perhaps the most valuable section of the entire work is Chapter 10, "The Process of Counseling," in which the reader is taken step by step through the process of professionally sound marriage counseling with an ease that only a thoroughly experienced practitioner could pace. Such a guide has been eagerly sought for some time and will be warmly welcomed by the many marriage counselors in service, in training, and in the related professions where marriage counseling is expected even though the professor, physician, or leader may feel inadequate to the task. Seeing the process in sharp focus as Dr. Mudd outlined it here will possibly reassure many a counselor that he or she is on the right track, and send him seeking supervised counseling training and experience to further develop his skills.

The only limitation is one of coverage. One wishes that there were some discussion of group counseling in connection with Table 10 on the group counseling experience of the Marriage Council of Philadelphia. The specific forms and materials developed by the agency are missed too. It

is therefore especially heartening to find a promise of their availability at the source upon request (p. 73).

This volume is an essential tool in the hands of the professionally interested. But further, it has wide implications and use far beyond the field of marriage counseling. For instance, "Current Events Affecting Marriage Counseling" (Chapter 2), treats intimate human interaction through the periods of social change and wartime disruption in far more vivid living terms than do most treatises on the subject: "And while these years were passing, men and women were living together in love and hate, in sickness and health, in poverty and wealth, in war and peace, as they have since the beginning of time. Others, separated by the exigencies of war, were waiting to live together in the hope of fulfilling their dreams, or in the dread of repeating a past replete with conflict and disappointment. . . ." It is this sense of flesh and blood people facing real life situations often just beyond their strength that gives dynamic meaning to the book and challenging purpose to the field.

EVELYN MILLIS DUVALL
Chicago, Illinois

BRAV, STANLEY R (Ed.). *Marriage and the Jewish Tradition: Toward a Modern Philosophy of Family Living.* Pp. xiii, 218. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $3.75.

This small book is a collection of essay materials by fifteen authors written at various times from 1916 to the present day. It would seem that the editorial effort by Stanley Brav might be justified by the rich contribution of Jews to the family tradition of Western Europe civilization, directly and through Biblical influence.

Unfortunately the contributions are of uneven value, at least to the non-Jewish reader. The section concerned with Jewish values reveals interesting facets of Jewish thought but is marred by ethnocentrism and somewhat naïve claims for Talmudic wisdom as foreshadowing the best modern scientific thought. In a brief historical section, however, Stanlay Brav gives a straightforward historical survey without reliance on selected evidence.

A philosophical section contains some fine rhetoric by Goldstein and an essay by Felix Alder on "Permanence" which is worth the price of the book. Alder, in lucid prose, makes the case for broad ethical implications of family life, the significance of ideals, fulfillment by self-denial, and tendency for an expectation of permanence to create a broadly satisfying reality. Here is ethical thinking without intellectual compromise.

Concerning education for marriage, a valid point is made by Brickner that facts without values are not enough to motivate and integrate behavior in marriage. Without a hierarchy of values, there is doubt as to the use of knowledge, and there exists the possibility of using knowledge for evil ends. In this section there may be over identification of religion with morality, but there is also a revelation of the broad, tolerant, humanitarian conception of human destiny which flourishes along with religious ethnocentrism in the Jewish tradition.

A final section contains a stimulating new decalogue of family relations which proves that there is a growing eclectic Jewish tradition, sensitive to scientific evidence and not passively rigid in the dead hand of the past. Weinstein argues effectively for love as the rich product of responsible family living and sanely deplores the love fever brand of romanticism.

The book has some merit but fails to render the needed service of giving the full systematic picture of Jewish theory and practice of family life, past and present.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK
Indiana University

POWERS, EDWIN, and HELEN WITMER. *An Experiment in the Prevention of Delinquency: The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study.* Foreword by Gordon W. Allport. Pp. xliii, 649. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $6.00.

This report of an extensive attempt to prevent delinquency through counseling is scrupulously honest in making clear that the project did not meet expectations.

Planned from the beginning to include a comparison of the counseled boys with a group who were not counseled the study reveal no better *average* delinquency record and no better "adjustment" for the counseled group than for the noncounseled. On the other hand, the thirty counseled boys who were most helped had a significantly superior record to their matched controls, and fewer counseled boys committed delinquencies that were classified as "serious."

One significant truth emerges—some boys are "counseling potentials" and will benefit from counseling. Such boys are those (1) whose homes have reasonable social and emotional integration, and (2) whose parents want help for their children. If these conditions are absent, continuous counseling relationships may provide no better results than ordinary social agency contacts. Although the original proposals by the late Dr. Richard Clarke Cabot had stressed the "friendliness" emphasis of counseling, there is some evidence to indicate that counseling is more successful when specific needs are sought and met. Mere good will is not sufficient. There is also evidence that, whereas counseling may not prevent early delinquency, it may be effective in forestalling repeated or serious delinquencies.

The foreword by Gordon Allport is most satisfactory. It includes a complete recapitulation of the study and a searching evaluation—all in the space of twenty-three pages. He—and this reviewer—decries the existence of twenty-two thousand pages of case reports and yet so little objective measurement and so little reporting of the study by professional writers. The evaluations by both Powers and Witmer are honest and searching, and yet somehow the reader is left unsatisfied. Is the reported delinquency record a good criterion when only 1 or 2 per cent of delinquencies ever become a matter of record? Why weren't measurement data used more frequently, and why weren't more of the quantified data treated statistically? Why was such a large variation in type and background of counselor permitted, thereby admitting an uncontrollable variable in the study? Who knows what might have happened had it been possible to carry out the original plan to have all boys under counseling for a ten-year period? (Four and a half years was the average length of counseling for all boys in the study.)

From Dr. Cabot on, great devotion to boys and to human values is seen to be a strong motivating force in the workers of this study. Some of the concepts and procedures used now seem ineffective—case work and counseling have changed and have increased in professional effectiveness since 1935. To friendship must be added knowledge of personality dynamics and skill in dealing with individual need. Although the study lacked a point-by-point evaluation planned from the outset all future studies of this nature will profit greatly from what this study has taught us. It even teaches us to be more hopeful—three times as many boys were predicted to be delinquent as actually became so!

C. GILBERT WRENN
University of Minnesota

MICHIGAN, STATE OF. *Report of the Governor's Study Commission on the Deviated Criminal Sex Offender.* Pp. xi, 245. Detroit, 1951. No price.

In 1949 Governor G. Mennen Williams appointed a commission of twenty-one members to study the problem of the sex offender and to make recommendations for more effectively meeting the problem. This report presents in detail (245 pages) the facts gathered by the commission, the conclusions reached by the various subcommittees, and the final recommendations of the commission as a whole.

The summary and recommendations, forty in all, are wisely placed at the beginning of the volume with the committee reports and statistical data following. The recommendations will receive particular attention since they represent the crystalization of much fact finding and of many hours of discussion. Some are applicable only to the State of Michigan, others are of general interest to scientific workers in this field, to law enforcement agents, and to legislators.

No review can do justice to the mass of information and detail of conclusion which is embodied in this report. However, this reviewer would choose to accentuate certain findings which deserve widespread dissemination. In the report of the subcommittee on fact finding, Paragraph XI calls attention to the fact that sex offenders do not progress from petty offenses to serious crimes but rather remain, with few exceptions, confined to their specific pattern of disturbance. The petty sex offender of today is not the sex fiend of tomorrow. "The rapist and child attackers of tomorrow will come, in the main, not from today's minor sex offenders but today's reserve army of severely traumatized children and youth, many of whom have not yet committed a sexual offense of any kind." Widespread understanding of this point would be effective in preventing local hysteria on the detection of minor offenders.

Most scientific workers are convinced that the problem has been overemphasized to a serious degree. Spurred on by newspaper and magazine publicity, a state of hysteria may be said to exist at the present time. The report very soberly points out that most citizens are prone to react to sex offenses out of proportion to other types of peril which affect women and children even more grievously. The automobile kills 300 victims and injures thousands for every victim of a sex attack. "As for the emotional injury done by sex offenders we must not forget that maladjusted parents and neurotic teachers do incalculable harm to thousands of children every year." The misery and suffering and loss of life resulting from alcohol is many times more seroius that that resulting from the sex offender.

It is difficult to maintain perspective in a field so bound up with conscious and unconscious taboos. A careful reading of this report will assist, however, and will well repay the effort. It is well written, lucid, and well organized. The report should be made widely available, representing as it does a valuable contribution to the subject.

LEWIS H. LOESER
Newark, New Jersey

HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J., and H. GERTHON MORGAN. *The Social History of a War Boom Community*. Pp. xix, 356. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951. $4.00.

This book is deceptively easy to read and could easily slip through the social scientist's hand as a light-weight and ephemeral story of something done and gone, and therefore of little more than antiquarian interest. Of course, boom towns may not be pure history. They may repeat themselves, and if so it is well to have the story of their growth, characteristics, and decline by an objective and competent observer; and it is equally important that that observer have sufficient standing in the field so that the responsible authorities would easily turn to him for the benefit of his observations when the time came to profit by it. But the book in its almost innocently bland story may well be—and seems to this reviewer to be—not only the history of a boom town but also an unusually fortunate laboratory study of community organization. That laboratory could hardly have been made to order, but the study represents an astute utilization of what the accident of wartime boom happened to offer.

Seneca, a small, simple community, suddenly grows fivefold its natural size to take care of an emergency shipbuilding program. Briefly, simply, but exquisitely, its social and economic protrait before the boom is sketched. Then, with the onset of the boom, the observer goes to his post and for some three years observes and records what he sees as the town grows to five times its size; later he sees it dissolve back to roughly its original dimensions. During the boom, tremendous tasks in production and administration are performed in a miraculously short time. Friction, discontent, unwonted prosperity, unnatural mixing of groups, the excitement of sophisticatedly planned propaganda accompany the events. Livelihood, social classes, church, school, politics, prejudices, physical plant, all pass under review and are seen before, during, and after.

What have the authors learned from it all? Much about the problems and difficulties of a boom-town. But far more about the cultural characteristics of a mid-western American small town, and to the reviewer's eye, of the general American pattern. Under laboratory conditions more clearly observable than during normal pace of life, we see the preponderant attitudes about church and dancing, school and movies, cliques, neighbors, and neighboring strangers, social stratifications, anti-minority impulses, in fact daily life of a large segment of the American culture of the day. Many of us had pious hopes and did wishful thinking about community organization under such conditions. Without being any less idealistic, the authors seem able to stick to realities to avoid self-deception.

It seems that under an unpretentious form we have been given an unusually penetrating sociological study, supported on foundations of both quantitative data and qualitative evaluation with scientific objectivity, but without timidity in passing judgment when that seems useful and pertinent. One would wish, perhaps, a bit better use of statistical presentation, but one would not make a fuss. One would perhaps like to have more about method, but it is not too difficult to distill from what is given the details that one might want for similar enterprises.

The book does more and better than the title indicates.

PHILIP KLEIN
New York School of Social Work
Columbia University

CHASE, STUART, in collaboration with MARIAN TYLER CHASE. *Roads to Agreement: Successful Methods in the Science of Human Relations*. Pp. xii, 250. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $2.75.

Stuart Chase is a ubiquitous author. Trenchant volumes from his pen now form a library: *The Tragedy of Waste; Your Money's Worth; Man and Machines; The Road We Are Travelling; Where's the Money Coming From; Rich Land, Poor Land; Idle Money, Idle Men; Government in Business;* and *Men at Work* reveal a rare facility in interpreting for popular consumption a wide economic knowledge, informed by an engineering background. These fine books have helped educate young America realistically. In *Mexico* and *The Tyranny of Words* (reflecting his semantic hobby, now perhaps become well-nigh an obsession) we see how widely Chase can range.

In the present volume under joint authorship with his able wife, the author is deeply concerned, as in the early volume on *Democracy Under Pressure,* with the values and techniques of living together happily in our complex modern society.

How men behave in groups or collectively is, as our authors make fully if laboriously clear, our consuming problem. The 250 pages seem longer than they are, though this interesting volume reads easily and leaves a good flavor. Yet it is hard at times "to see the woods for the trees." There are, frankly, so many instances of the new and diverse community movements which illustrate the innovating intellectual processes of agreeing, that one wonders if it would not have been wiser to select a few. In that case the book could well have lived up to its high promise. For instance, Chapter 6 on the Quaker business meeting as a method of obtaining unanimity is ably and convincingly written just as is Morris Llewellyn Cooke's application of the Friends' method to the corporate or staff meetings of industry some months back in the magazine section of the Sunday *Times*.

Again, "Conditions of Labor Peace," "Maturity in Labor Relations," and "Conciliators and Arbitrators" contain authentic material and hold together well. The conflict background is effective and detailed. The author has a happy way of handling terse words and phrases—"blocked goals," "solid ground," "the in-group and the out," "two worlds in one," "the road is open." All are intriguing. And the new gadget-like procedures—"role playing," "clinics and laboratories," "from the files," "in conference," come up for pertinent review, albeit perhaps for too much praise and too little criticism.

But hobby or predilection are played up, too! Chapter 18, "Danger—Men Talking—Semantics as a Useful Tool," fails to support its good title.

The book should really be three or four separate volumes—each integrated and clarified—each demonstrating the logical or scientific method of the new social science that Chase has so persistently supported and so wordily interpreted. For, we must ask, what are the weighty conclusions from this rather chaotic and therefore largely journalistic review? The main "principles of agreement"—stated, it is true, with engineering definiteness, are still in part high-level abstractions needing analysis and interpretation through illustration; and of course they require acceptance. These principles of agreement are: "participation," "group energy," "clearing," "communication lines," "facts first," "agreement is easier when people feel secure."

Where and whither the roads to agreement? And agreement over what? For agreement, granted all its smooth techniques, is not any more than the semantic cure-all, an end in itself. The book is really a compendium of ideas and methods; and so it lacks the "integration" that is its declared purpose and central, reiterated advocacy.

FRANCIS D. TYSON
University of Pittsburgh

HAAR, CHARLES M. *Land Planning Law in a Free Society: a Study of the British Town and Country Planning Act.* Pp. xiii, 213, 16 plates. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $4.00.

This monograph, the first of a series of Harvard Legal Studies, ranks with John N. Hazard's *Society Housing Law* (1939) as a model presentation of foreign legal material in its administrative, economic, social, and technical setting, with illuminating comparisons to American problems and legislation. While at the Harvard Law School, Mr. Haar found his way across Kirkland Street to the Graduate School of Design, so that he knew what to look for when a Sheldon traveling fellowship took him to Britain—and knew how to interpret what he saw.

Mr. Haar's tightly written volume is the chronicle of a major revolution, little understood in this country because it is embodied in a highly complex and technical act of Parliament, buttressed by a dozen detailed Ministerial Orders supplemented by schedules—all couched in a foreign tongue of such phrases as "betterment," "appointed day," and "notional lease." It is the great merit of Mr. Haar's book that he has explained these provisions lucidly and as simply as their technical content permits.

The revolution is in the concept of land ownership, often considered the ultimate bulwark of free, private property. Henceforth in Britain increases in land value arising from change in use belong to the state. A person wishing to use land more intensively pays the state a "development charge." A fund has been created to compensate owners for the loss of that part of the value of their land that reflects its possible future increase in value growing out of change in use. The only point where I fail to follow Mr. Haar's analysis is when he says that this fund (£300,000-000) "in effect, is the liquidation value of Britain's land" (p. 104). This device frees the state to supervise land use, to control when and where what should be built, without the necessity of public ownership of land through compulsory acquisition, which remains a reserve power. As Mr. Haar makes clear, the desired economic and social results are achieved without the "nationalization" of land; if anything, land is being "municipalized," all of this in a typically British framework of broadly drawn legislation, to be implemented by administrative refinement, relying heavily on such technical criteria as common sense.

Interestingly, Mr. Haar begins with an exposition of the machinery of town and country planning, showing how local government, specially created "regional" bodies, and the national government work together (well or badly). He is conscious that a national plan cannot be evolved by a ministry co-equal with other ministries, since the planning process is essentially co-ordinative and is a task of the executive; but he fumbles in identifying the proper place for planning in the organization of Britain's national government.

Mr. Haar is not content merely to digest the legislation. He is concerned with the dynamics of planning and land development, both politically and in the market place. What will be the motivations of landowners and developers under the act? When and how must public authorities prod, restrain, or intervene? Where will the friction points be? It is to such questions that he addresses himself. One cannot in a brief review present the manifold trains of thought and speculation that will excite Americans in a variety of social sciences if they will accept Mr. Haar's guidance in interpreting this technical material, of such revolutionary import. Both Conservatives and Socialists have contributed to invent these new tools—for the first time truly the tools of the planner, not merely an adjunct to laws for better housing—to make England a green and pleasant land with homes fit for heroes.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
Brooklyn College

HUNTINGTON, EMILY H. *Cost of Medical Care: The Expenditures for Medical Care of 455 Families in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1947–1948.* Pp. xvi, 146. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. $2.50.

The Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics of the University of California has presented a study of the expenditures for medical care of 455 moderate-income families in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1947–1948. After extensive analysis of the expenditures for medical care, the composition of the families, the illnesses for which medical care was required, the types of medical care required, and the amount of prepayment coverage, this report concludes that expenditures for medical care can be burdensome and sometimes disastrous and that "the only way that real protection can be accomplished is through a system of compulsory health insurance at least for the low—and moderate—income groups in our population." When this study could have contributed greatly to the available literature on medical costs, it is unfortunate that the author chose to present such a preconceived idea in her final statement rather than a conclusion based on the findings of the study.

The families used for the study generally consisted of a husband, wife, and one or two children; almost two thirds of the wives were at the child-bearing ages of life. The average income of these families was $4,100 Half had incomes between $3,000 and $4,000 and only a few had incomes less than $3,000 or more than $6,000. In the words of the author, they were considered "a well-to-do group of our wage-earning population." On the average, these families spent about $300 for all types of medical and dental care during the year the study was made, or 7½ per cent of their family income. This compares with 4 per cent of income spent annually for medical care by all families in the United States as reported by the Department of Commerce. While the average family medical expenditures in the Heller study were $300, one-half of the families had expenditures of less than $225, 64 per cent had bills less than $300, and 76 per cent bills less than $400. Thus the great majority of these families had expenditures for the entire year that could not be called disastrous in relation to their income.

The most common illnesses were colds and influenza. In approximately 75 per cent of the reported illnesses the bill was less than $50. The high bills were incurred primarily for childbirth. Other conditions for which the bills were large were female disorders, diseases of the heart and circulatory system, cancers and tumors, allergic disorders, and nervous disorders. Childbirth costs were the largest single item of medical expense for the group as a whole as well as for those families in which a child was born during the year. This fact indicates a defect in the author's sample and in her understanding of the data. Every social scientist knows that young families spend heavily on childbearing and that the heavy expenses for clothing, recreation, and education come later when the family income is usually higher.

The study found that a large proportion of the costly illnesses were hospitalized—70 per cent, in contrast with only about 10

per cent of all illnesses. And two-thirds of the families with health insurance were covered for hospitalized illness. The author, however, states that while 60 per cent of the families had some form of health insurance during the year, the insurance was inadequate primarily because its coverage was concentrated on hospitalized illness.

But the hospitalized illnesses are the costly ones for which families want protection. The fact that they are getting protection for these illnesses is indicated in the Heller report which states: "The more expensive illnesses were those which were most likely to receive prepaid care." Furthermore, for those illnesses where the costs were covered by insurance—usually the costly ones—any additional costs were very low, less than $25 in 68 per cent of the cases. Of course, it is desirable that other medical costs be covered, but in something as new as health insurance it is only logical that the first plans introduced would be designed to meet the costs of the most burdensome illnesses—the hospitalized ones. More and more plans offering other types of medical insurance are being introduced.

According to *A Survey of Accidents and Health Coverage in the United States, 1950* (prepared by the Survey Committee of the Health Insurance Council), at the end of 1950, 76,961,000 persons were protected against hospital expense, 54,477,000 against surgical expense, and 21,589 against medical expense. This compares with 60,995,000 persons covered for hospital expense, 34,060,000 for surgical expense, and 12,895,000 for medical expense at the end of 1948—the year used in the Heller study. Thus in the two years since the Heller study was made, hospital expense coverage increased 26 per cent, surgical expense coverage increased 60 per cent, and medical expense coverage, 67 per cent. In fact, since 1947—the first year during which the Heller study was conducted—hospitalization coverage has increased 46 per cent, surgical coverage 108 per cent, and medical coverage 143 per cent. It is obvious, then, that health insurance coverage is increasing at a phenomenal rate and that surgical and medical expense coverage is rapidly catching up with hospitalization coverage. It is likely, however, that hospitalization insurance will continue to be the most popular since it meets the costs of the most burdensome illnesses.

For these reasons I cannot agree with the author that "voluntary health insurance has been tried and found wanting, and that it is not likely in the future to be able to give insurance protection to those who need it most." On the contrary, it has proved to be the most effective method of meeting medical costs and it is rapidly reaching more and more individuals.

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American Medical Association
Chicago, Illinois

HOPKINS, C. HOWARD. *History of the Y.M.C.A. in North America.* Pp. xiv, 818. New York: Association Press, 1951. $5.00.

The elaborate detail by which the author has tried to accord fair appraisal to so many local organizations of the Young Men's Christian Association and to the many movements and internal groups has made this history bulky. But the eighty pages of notes and index redeem the work and make it a valuable library edition.

The year 1920 was the watershed of the century. During that year Y.M.C.A. membership reached one million. "The demise of traditional methodology of the Association was illustrated by the dropping of revivalism" (p. 590). Also the adoption of new aims "for the purpose of building Christian personality and a Christian society" marked the period. Strangely, the use of life problems, economic questions, and personal conduct in the Bible class discussions (Bible classes had always been a central activity) produced the top enrollment of young men in Bible classes—250,000. Staff structure also shifted from a list of secretaries classified by function (physical, religious) to one classified by age level.

In the United States there are 1,688 Associations: 1,088 city, 116 transportation, 360 college or university, 96 rural, and 28 with military units. In 1950 one hundred buildings were being built, involving the investment of $37 million (p. 725). The running story is readable. It tells of the Boston and Montreal locals patterned after the George Williams units in London and existing before 1851. It describes the growth of physical training methods and of the modern gymnasiums in major centers throughout America and the Orient. It shows how our athletic codes of honor were helped along by the Clean-Sport Roll of Luther Gulick and how James Naismith, with Stagg, McCurdy, and others, invented basketball specifically to meet indoor needs of the Associations as set for the secretaries in the perspective of creative leaders. The author might have shown but did not that in the campus situation it was the Young Men's Christian Association leaders who introduced orientation week ideas and methods, originated the foreign student services, including the International Houses, set a pattern for the campus pastorates, introduced the intercollegiate and general student conventions, and were virtually the precursors of the deans of students of our era.

The history gives attention to the beginnings of the organization, the separate movements within it, its great leaders, and its experiments.

It was early necessary to declare that the Association was not a church. In 1857 Alexander Campbell, speaking on the philosophy of the Associations, said of the lectures sponsored by them: "they might range from spiritualism to geology," and "religious controversy was scrupulously avoided"; but "the subjects ought not be anti-religious" (p. 31). In 1869 at the Portland convention the "Evangelical Test" for membership was adopted, thus assuring the centrality of religion, favoring Christianity, and establishing the lay basis of the organization and staff leadership.

The will to remain remote from political issues was severely tested on abolition, and the author shows how three enthusiams were interwoven: (1) the national reach of the independent Associations recently become conscious of general strength; (2) an international relation between various young men's organizations —Canadian, British, French, and American; and (3) the two political loyalties, South and North. In the eyes of this historian the action during this period to deny the over-all Y.M.C.A. convention any power over any local Association seemed to have served a genuine service (pp. 80–90).

The student movement had its inception in 1858 when at the two state universities of Michigan and Virginia students and faculty established Christian Associations. Ten years later the Y.M.C.A. officially adopted the purpose "to plant a Christian Association" at each university, college, and seminary in the nation. The first ones established after this declaration of purpose were in 1870 at Lawrence College and the University of Wisconsin.

Apparently women joined the local Associations, but later the sexes were separated organically after college women appeared at conventions.

The educational work emanated from the two centers for the training of secretaries, Springfield in Massachusetts and George Williams College in Chicago. The summer training schools and conferences at Silver Bay, Lake Geneva, Asilomar, Blue Ridge, Estes Park, and Seabeck became centers of inspiration, instruction, and dedication. Through these, able college ment were enlisted for the secretaryship.

The student volunteer drive in the American colleges, led by C. K. Ober, John R. Mott, and later Sherwood Eddy, E. T. Colton, and Robert E. Speer (p. 304), yielded 600 college men and women for posts in Christian Associations in the Orient.

An industrial movement prepared special secretaries for manufacturing centers. An agricultural movement was instituted. And the Army-Navy Associations grew with World War I. The camping movement found able sponsorship in the Associations. The Association Press was organized in 1911 to bring the public literature not available to lay groups on adolescent psychology, camping, recreation, personal adjustment, sex education, and group work.

Chapter 15 describes the Chicago Y.M.C.A. College, the Southern Y.M.C.A. Graduate School, and the contributions of Yale, Oberlin, Princeton, and Cornell.

The record, difficult to present with good perspective, is well drawn, and the facts are alive with human values.

EDWARD W. BLAKEMAN
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Berkeley, California

TENENBAUM, SAMUEL. *William Heard Kilpatrick: Trail Blazer in Education.* Pp. xiii, 318. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $4.00.

Every student of modern education knows something, or possibly a great deal, about Professor William H. Kilpatrick, the Columbia University professor of education who celebrated his eightieth birthday in November. His place in twentieth-century education has been equaled by few. He is widely known both as a teacher and as an education theorist. But his claim to greatness rests more on his instructional skill than on his philosophy. His classes at Columbia were the largest ever assembled at the university. Kilpatrick's philosophy followed rather closely the pattern of John Dewey's and that of various other Columbia associates. Although an interpreter of Dewey, Kilpatrick's contributions adhered more closely to strict educational theory, and it was only occasionally that he made brief sorties into the realm of social and economic theory. As teacher, Professor Kilpatrick had few peers. His large classes caused him to develop a new teaching method for handling auditorium-sized groups. His plan involved a panel discussion by students with the instructor furnishing an introduction and summary of the problems under discussion. Used entirely with eager, conscientious graduate students, the plan was highly successful. Emerson once wrote, "an institution is the lengthened shadow of the man." Men such as Kilpatrick have made Columbia the institution that it is.

Samuel Tenebaum, a former student of Professor Kilpatrick, has compiled a timely book about the retired Columbia educator. At times Tenebaum makes broad and sweeping statements concerning the merits of some of Professor Kilpatrick's theories and accomplishments. For example, he says (p. 88) of the *Project Method,* it "probably had more influence on modern American education in changing and modifying classroom practice than any other document yet written." Again, the author compares his subject's blasts against conventional practices with Martin Luther's ninety-five theses and Thomas Paine's *Common Sense.* And, one notes this sentence (p. 156), "The project method is the ideal medium for ensuring wholesome, desirable concomitant learnings, which are so much more important than the ostensible, overt, direct learnings." One wonders if the side show and the main tent shouldn't change places.

This book throws much light on the Essentialist-Progressivist controversy of a dozen years ago. On one side was Bagley, realist philosopher with emergent evolution theories, and on the other Kilpatrick, the champion of the project method and concomitant learning. Loud were the accusations hurled by each side, and the bitterness was apparently great if we are to judge from Kilpatrick's sharp-edged diary notes made at the time of Professor Bagley's death. Unquestionably the project method made a deep imprint on modern school method, but whether it can be blamed for some of the soft pedagogy of today is debatable. Contemporary educators wonder whether the project method philosophy is tough-minded enough to cope with modern school and social problems, problems such as pressure groups interests and tactics and the new media of communications.

Any student who has admired a former professor finds it difficult to write objectively about him. Mr. Tenenbaum says in the preface to his book that he is vexed because he could find so little on which to disagree with his subject. Much of the book is, therefore, a narrative of Kilpatrick's early life, his personal battles, his academic life, and a scant critical evaluation of his philosophy. By reading between the lines, one gathers that Professor Kilpatrick was exceedingly egotistical, probably vain. He fought his university retirement regulations, and glorified in the kudos of a coterie of handpicked students. The author tells us that much of the material for the book came directly from Dr. Kilpatrick, and at times the author employs a direct question and answer technique to bring out a point. Checking facts or bits of theory directly with the originator or with friends and former students has advantages, but the drawbacks of dealing so closely with a dynamic personality are equally noticeable. The author may experience the hot breath of his subject on his neck.

JAMES S. KINDER
Pennsylvania College for Women

BROWN, FRANCIS J. (Ed.). *National Defense and Higher Education.* The Report of a Conference of Representatives of Member Organizations of the American Council on Education, Washington, D. C., January 19–21, 1951. Pp. vi, 126. Washington: American Council on Education, 1951. $1.00.

As summaries of speeches and commentaries go, this is a particularly lively and informative document. The occasion that gave rise to the remarks reported was the 1951 midwinter conference of the constituent member organizations of the American Council on Education.

The impact of four major national defense problems on higher education was discussed. The problems considered were manpower, economics, civil defense, and veterans' education.

The papers and discussion on emergency manpower problems in general approved the Universal Military Training and Service bill then being debated in the Congress (and subsequently enacted into law with modifications). President Conant, education's chief champion of universal military service, presented the usual arguments favoring his point of view. Contrary to his previous public statements, which seemed to many to simplify the issues with amazing abandon, he recognized a serious difficulty. It is the need "to have a small fraction of each age group selected in some manner and, after a brief period of basic military training, continued in college for their education" in order to accomplish the training of "officers and specialists." Charles Odegaard cogently discussed certain issues relating to the administration of the Selective Service System, to which he has been an adviser. Jesse Bogue, of the American Association of Junior Colleges, condemned the Selective Service College Qualification Test as giving special privilege (deferment) to the intellectually elite and advocated more military training on college campuses. Only one of the speakers whose remarks are recorded opposed universal military service—as a contribution "to the deepening of poverty, disease, and ignorance."

In speaking of education and present-day economics, Leon H. Keyserling, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, told of the difficulties in making people understand the serious implications of the fierce competition for manpower and materials among military, industrial, and civilian components of the nation. He viewed the problem as a major educational responsibility of the government since the government is responsible for most of the basic programs involved. "It is government alone which has access to the range of information required to place before the public what the problem is. . . ." John D. Millett, of the Commission on Financing Higher Education, argued that in light of the current inflation, any reduction in faculty salaries would be disastrous to higher education. The teacher shortage, school construction costs, and uneconomic college curriculums were considered by other speakers.

No holds were barred by the commentators on veterans' education in referring to the administration of the GI bill by the Veterans Administration. The chairman of the House Committee to Investigate the Veterans Education Program led off with a review of the problems besetting the administrators of the program—and they have been many and complex, indeed. Representatives of three universities followed with an animated discussion of some of the unhappy experiences undergone by institutions of higher education in trying to provide an education for veterans of World War II. A representative of the Veterans Administration closed the discussion with a

reading from the federal budget for the fiscal year 1952.

Educators who did not attend the conference summarized in this review will find it interesting reading.

CLAUDE E. HAWLEY
Washington, D. C.

COOK, LLOYD ALLEN. *Intergroup Relations in Teacher Education.* Pp. xiii, 271. Washington: American Council on Education, 1951, $3.75.

Lloyd Allen Cook, professor of educational sociology at Wayne University, was for four years the director of the College Study in Intergroup Relations. Last year he issued the first of a two-volume report in which the various participating colleges describe the programs they developed to reduce prejudice and to teach co-operation attitudes and behavior. The present volume is the final one in the set. It is largely analytical and interpretative.

The volume is divided in four parts. The first deals with the nature of intergroup relations. Professor Cook points out the confusion which exists in this area and concludes that intergroup relations is primarily concerned with the problems of status, or positions of groups of people in our society. While he properly focuses on the social tensions, he stresses the need for a democratic social philosophy which will permeate efforts in this area from policy making to the day-to-day behavior.

In the second and third parts the nature of prejudice and ways of dealing with it are discussed, followed by an application of the conclusions to problems of improving teachers, both trainors and trainees. The main point is that the basic units in society are not individuals but groups of personalities. The problem of intergroup education is to help people see themselves and others "groupwise" and to learn to act democratically on group levels of behavior. "What this viewpoint argues . . . is the obvious need to make changes in the social system that causes so much individual maladjustment" (p. 248).

In the last two chapters, Professor Cook refers to a "confusion corner" where problems were often stored. That he has not successfully cleaned up this corner is no discredit to him. When it is recalled that the College Study in Intergroup Relations included 24 colleges from New York to San Francisco, from Moorhead, Minnesota, to colleges in Alabama and Texas, with a director serving only half time, an associate who changed yearly, and with limited funds, it is not surprising that the results achieved did not go far beyond the exploratory stage. Finally, it must be said that this volume will repay its readers many times because it reveals in unprecedented ways how a democratic leader works with people. Teachers of all kinds will find it helpful; and laymen who have read Stuart Chase's *Roads to Agreement* will find a discussion of group dynamics in action which will sober, yet hearten, them.

MARTIN CHWOROWSKY
University of Pennsylvania

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *The Conduct of Life.* Pp. ix, 342. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951. $5.00.

This volume is the "preface," so its author indicates, to several volumes that have gone before, namely, *Technics and Civilization, The Culture of Cities, The Condition of Man.* The point of view is that of an architect and student of design with a fair working knowledge of general philosophy and recent trends of thought. No existing philosophy, he finds, is adequate, nor is science or religion equal to our needs. "Personalism," "humanism," "materialism," "idealism," "existentialism," "communism," "Emersonian individualism" are rejected by name. Economics, politics, the social sciences in general, are also weighed and found wanting, or at least found wanting, whether weighed or not.

The main purpose of the author is, by his own declaration, an "axial change" in our system of thinking and in the social order—a quest for an order in which man is no longer a mirror, but an interpreter and director. Sundry applications of the new system are made to religion, to the family, the community, to forms of volunteer service. Various types of mutual aid and love loom large. There is a strong trace of Gandhi in his opposition to the machine as against muscle, and of Kropotkin in mutual aid as a factor in evolution. The values of love go a long, long way.

Between contriving a group or community, always small, and a constitution of the world, the industrious seeker for the new opus pauses to lament the opening of second-class mail, and the using of tobacco and alcohol, although conceding generously the value of piped running water instead of the bucket carried from the spring.

Distinguished thinkers of the type of Einstein, Conant, Keynes, MacIver, Overstreet, Smith, and in general most students of economics, politics, and jurisprudence are not drawn into the discussion. Even Lasswell's brilliant essays on politics are conspicuously passed by. He has no time or space for the United Nations, the cultural work of United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the Social Science Research Council, the struggles of many noble men and women in our day and others for a better world. After all, he might say, this is not a work of analysis but of neosynthesis.

In this brief review it is impossible to do more than offer a brief summary of much effort and many words. This work does not rise to the heights of a final neoaxial philosophy—the center of a new order. Yet it has some of the essentials of such a plan—dreaming and daring. After all, this volume, says the courageous author, is only a "preface." We can always hope and pray for the emergence of his new key to the new day.

CHARLES E. MERRIAM
University of Chicago

CASSERLEY, J. V. LANGMEAD. *Morals and Man in the Social Sciences.* Pp. ix, 230. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951. 12/6.

Given in part as lectures (at the Ecumenical Institute, near Geneva), this book is calculated to interest the religious more than the scientific. The author, himself "an ordained sociologist" in England, observes that there is more overlap, and so more room for controversy, between theology and social science than between it and natural science. The zone of dispute is marked out by him as "the interpretation of ethics and the evaluation of man." The conflict itself is between "relativism," indigenous in social science, and "absolutism," here treated as imperative in religion.

The author of course deplores the conflict, however natural it may be; and he sets himself to minimize it. The undertow of science is toward determinism and the minimization of the personal; and the glory of religion is its maximization of the personal, even to the elevation of man above the natural order. Already it can be seen what the line of argument is, ending with proper leeway to save both through this end-formulation of the maxim of social science: "There are sociological aspects of human activities. There is no human activity of which the sociological aspect is the only aspect" (p. 218).

Though the outcome of the argument be foregone, apologetics being what it is, nevertheless the intervening means are not without interest and importance. Contrasting not only secularism and religion but also classical and Christian ethics, the author not infrequently by means of biblical texts unfolds a humanism generally acceptable to civilized men today, and that regardless of the theological basis he finds for it. This fact makes translation possible between the religious and the scientific sectors for our division of labor, provided one sees that not secularism but sectarianism is the enemy of religion, as it is of science. Since our author seems relatively free of sectarian motives, we can allow him the "defects of his qualities," seeing that he has the "qualities of his defects." I was particularly interested in his contribution to the history of sociology, and notably in his deference to John Stuart Mill and the honorable place therein which he accords Vico.

By grading relativism up toward absolutism (for what otherwise is it relative to?) and by grading absolutism down

from sheer transcendence (for how could it otherwise be relevant for us?), Christianity emerges not only as the end of our endeavor but as the very precondition of all social science. The "problem" here presented will strike some scientists, especially in America, as trumped up, and the victory over the problem as cheap; but, given the problem, who will not allow this victory to be better than defeat? They also serve who only reduce their own tensions.

T. V. SMITH

Syracuse University

KRONER, RICHARD. *Culture and Faith.* Pp. xvi, 278. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. $5.00.

This book, by a former German scholar now professor of the philosophy of religion at Union Theological Seminary, is another attempt to deal with the cultural crisis of our epoch. It is tightly reasoned work, persistent and consistent in the movement of its argument, and rich in the scope and quality of its scholarship. It is not a secular treatment in the manner of Mannheim, Kahler, Mumford, and Sorokin; it is rather a religious orientation in the tradition of Reinhold Niebuhr to whom the author admits discipleship. Refuting the conclusion that philosophy and theology are different "sciences," and hoping to achieve a "new synthesis" of them, the author functions both as secular and theological philosopher.

His point of departure is the philosophic quest. The philosopher "is compelled to give an answer to the ultimate questions concerning the meaning of human life." These questions revolve fundamentally about the duality of world and self (or ego), which is the *Urphänomen*, and which poses "the most fundamental and the most astounding of all oppositions." Secular philosophy in itself is inadequate to answer these questions fully. To "civilize" himself, man must also have faith—"biblical faith." The analysis consists of an examination of experience, culture, and faith.

Experience—of man in and with the universe—comes from impressions and not by means of reason. It is the procedure of being "directly acquainted with the object of knowledge"; what we experience is given to us. Scientific or experimental or impersonal experience provides us with but an infinitesimal fraction of the store of knowledge we need, acquire, and use in daily life. Most of our experience is personal. But our "ultimate knowledge" —knowledge of ultimate truth and reality —can only be achieved through the cooperation of all kinds of experience, impersonal and personal, individual and social, private and public, immediate and mediated.

Experience issues in culture or cultural activity, that is, "man's self-civilizing exertions and performances." It also motivates cultural activity in that it contains the tasks or sets the purposes which are carried through in civilization. As far as we know "culture" is confined to the human realm. Man alone has intellect and will, "freedom" (in choices) and self-determination, "history" (his long specific experiences and achievements), ends and purposes, and an "inner" life; above all, he has communication on the language level. Culture provides adjustment through science, art, technology, economy, morality, the state, and so on.

But secular experience and culture are not sufficient. Man never gains paradise by his own effort. Full self-sufficiency, satisfaction, and completion come from outside and beyond culture—from the "giver" himself. Eventually human thought has to embrace divine understanding of men and the world, and yield to divine instruction for the ultimate answers to the "antinomies." Faith thus overcomes the limits of culture and effects the ultimate reconciliation of the polarities of experience. This faith is the articulation or expression of "mystical experience," and is a "mystical reality." It comes, not by reasoning, and not through the mythological religions, but only through the "revelation" of biblical, prophetic religion. Cuture is consummated by such faith.

In the last chapter, Kroner transposes himself completely from the role of systematic philosopher into that of biblical theologian. He seemed to the reviewer to become a dogmatist propounding a special religious faith—a "school" of faith, so to speak.

In addition to a fascinatingly developed thesis, the social scientist will find here excellent treatments of experience, its nature, meaning, and place in the human career, and of culture, especially the analyses of language, science, art and aestheticism, technology, economy, morality, the state, and statism.

While the author doubtless wanted the book to be read as a whole and not for its details, in view of the richness of its scholarship and the wealth of superbly selected and developed concepts, it is a pity that there is no index.

J. O. HERTZLER

University of Nebraska

MOEHLMAN, CONRAD HENRY. *The Wall of Separation Between Church and State: An historical study of recent criticism of the religious clause of the First Amendment.* Pp. xvi, 239. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. $3.00.

Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the *Everson v. Board of Education*, popularly known as the New Jersey School Bus case, and the *McCollum v. Board of Education of Champaign, Illinois* case, together with the wide publicity given to the several bills which have been introduced in the United States Congress providing for federal aid to education, have served to highlight the whole question of church-state relations before the American people. Our Roman Catholic friends are undoubtedly on the march, and one of their main objectives is to breach the wall of separation between church and state in order to gain, for their church, government assistance in maintaining their now elaborate parochial school system.

Specifically this book has been prepared by Professor Moehlman to refute the arguments advanced by J. M. O'Neill in his book *Religion and Education under the Constitution* (1949) in support of the Catholic claim for such assistance. The O'Neill book may be accurately described as a diatribe against the Supreme Court decision in the McCollum case, in which the use of public school property to teach sectarianism was delared unconstitutional. O'Neill argues that because the words "separation of church and state" do not appear in the first clause of the First Amendment, therefore our constitutional fathers had no intention of bringing about a separation of church and state, but intended that the states be left free to establish churches as they pleased.

Moehlman convincingly shows that the attitude of the founding fathers was diametrically opposed to such an interpretation of their intentions. In a number of other recent Catholic publications, such as W. Parsons' *The First Freedom* (1948), as well as in numerous pronouncements by Catholic bishops and archbishops, it has now become fairly evident that the Catholic Church has adopted a definite and well thought-out plan of attack against the principle of separation of church and state.

No one in the nation is better prepared to refute these sweeping claims than Professor Conrad H. Moehlman. A life-long student of church history and particularly of American church-state relations, he has to his credit four important books dealing with this question: *The Catholic-Protestant Mind* (1928); *The American Constitutions and Religion* (1938); *School and Church: The American Way* (1944); and the present volume. The author is adept in using the sources. Perhaps the most valuable section of the book is Chapter I, "Historical Background," where Catholic official pronouncements are brought together, clearly showing the Roman Cathloic position through the centuries on the whole matter of church and state.

A Roman Catholic bishop in Illinois has recently proclaimed that the public school is public enemy, number one. The principal argument advanced by the Catholics for such an assertion is the growing secularism that is abroad in this country and thoughout the world. Professor Moehlman refutes this sweeping condemnation of the public school in a splendid chapter entitled "The Splendor of Public Education," a chapter which every public school teacher and every Protestant minister should read. But why recommend one

chapter above the rest! The entire book is a mine of accurate information upon one of the most important issues facing the American people today.

WILLIAM W. SWEET
Southern Methodist University

FICHTER, JOSEPH H. *Dynamics of a City Church.* Vol. I of "Southern Parish." Pp. ix, 283. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. $5.00.

Several types of readers will be interested in this book (and the three volumes to follow) on the inner organization of the life of a Catholic parish, written by a Jesuit priest and a group of research associates: (1) Catholics, for it deals candidly with, and documents statistically, such matters as the amount and intensity of daily Catholic observance perhaps rarely faced or discussed openly by Catholic laymen. For instance, it concludes that ". . . the Catholic mind of [40 adult males and 28 females selected as] outstanding parishioners [in beliefs and practices] is about two-thirds Catholic and one-third pagan." (2) Those Protestants who wonder what it is really like to be a Catholic, and will scratch their protesting heads over such concepts as "the pure supernatural culture." (3) Students of the sociology of religion, as here are important beginnings of sorely needed analysis of a hard-to-penetrate area. (4) and those who, like the writer of this review, regard the Catholic Church as the best-organized international power structure operating across the world today and want to study its organization close-in at the American grass roots.

Father Fichter begins with two statements that—together with the *Imprimi Potest,* the *Nihil Obstat,* and the *Imprimatur* of the Catholic hierarchy on the reverse of the title page—suggest how seriously he and his fellow churchmen take this empirical study of "the purposive inner functions of Catholicism":

". . . Roman Catholicism is the institution with the best possible prospect of reintegrating Western culture" (p. 4).

"In so far as the 'order of nature' is employed, Catholicism will succeed or fail in the imperative job of reconstructing and reintegrating modern society mainly on the basis of the strength or weakness of its individual parishes. In other words, a vigorous parochial system not only bespeaks an internally strong Catholic social structure but also promises solidarity for the larger community and the nation in which it exists" (pp. 7–8).

This first volume deals intensively with the religious functions of a single urban parish of nearly 7,000 persons, part of a large city in one of our Southern Mississippi Valley states. (The other three volumes to follow will analyze, respectively, the structure and operation of the network of Catholic societies in this same parish—parochial school and family life and "particular problems of the parish structure.") The organization of the contents is fairly conventional: the nature of the parish; recruitment to the parish; the confessional; the sacraments; Catholic revivalism; "the Catholic mind of the parish"; and so on.

Here one sees a hard-working pastor and two assisting priests at their daily work, rather surprisingly not without friction with adjoining parishers, among a Catholic population in which women outnumber men in all spiritual activities except the occasional week-end retreats by seven to three. Only 51 per cent of the parishioners seven years old and older follow the "minimum obligation" of 100 per cent attendance at mass on Sundays and holy days "imposed by the Church under pain of mortal sin." Parishioners grumble that the priests are too busy to make sick calls. The apparatus of the Church fights a ceaseless battle against "leakages" of members from religious observances and parochial school. ("Making allowances for mortalities, we find that approximately 700 elementary-school children who ought to be members of the parish have 'disappeared' from it since baptism," as compared with 755 in the parochial school.) Particularly interesting are the tensions regarding the marriage ceremony: requests from socially-aspiring members for the performance of the ceremony in a higher-status church in an adjoining parish; requests for home and fashionable outdoor weddings; mixed marriages (29 per cent of all marriages in the parish in the past two decades were mixed marriages, with a low of 17 per cent in 1938, a high of 42.5 in 1932, and each year 1941–46 showing a higher-than-average percentage); and birth control. (The average number of children per marriage, unrefined for age of wife and length of marriage, is 2.25 where both parents are Catholics, 2.10 where only the wife is a Catholic, and 1.54 where only the husband is a Catholic.)

The parish studied was not selected as markedly superior or inferior. A priest warned the research group that it might find the parish "a hollow shell of Catholicism." This judgment the book rejects in its final pages, stating that the parish simply "has not been awakened to its full religious possibilities." These volumes as they appear invite close study. For this is an apparatus, still in its developmental stage in the United States but advancing rapidly, which, unlike the rest of our institutions, works with planned programs definitely envisaged in terms of centuries ahead; an apparatus equipped with international and subordinate national general staffs; which utilizes a stout, though flexible, policy that aims both at advancing Catholicism as a power structure and at enhancing welfare policies consonant with its doctrines in the general society.

ROBERT S. LYND
Columbia University

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

COLE, G. D. H. *The British Co-operative Movement in a Socialist Society.* Pp. 168. London: George Allen & Unwin (distributed in the U. S. by the Macmillan Company), 1951. $3.00.

This book is written by a Fabian socialist who is reluctant to contemplate either an indefinite continuance of capitalistic enterprise or any important extension of nationalization (pages 15–16). In the preface, Cole makes it clear that this is a personal report to the Fabian Society and the Sara Hull Trust, which perhaps neither of them will like. "The great majority of leading Cooperators will almost certainly dislike it, because they will find the idea of a great competing 'mutual trading' movement under State sponsorship distasteful as well as novel. Nor will most of them like any better the high importance which I attach to the development of Producers' Cooperation."

Cole points out that retail trade in England is divided among the consumer co-operative stores, the small private shopkeepers, and the large-scale capitalist retailers, and that the last of these does the largest share of business. He would have positive steps taken to change this situation and essentially eliminate the large-scale private retailers. His reasons are two, namely, these large concerns engage in wasteful competition for patronage, and the "mutual" type of trading exemplified by the co-operative societies has positive virtues which he believes should be extended (Chapter 5, especially page 75).

Mutualization means nothing, according to Cole, "unless it carries with it a real element of democratic control," and this requires organization of participants into local groups (page 98). Apparently he believes that the co-operative movement should be so organized that it not only will result in a particular distribution of income through patronage dividends, but also so that individual members will have a direct voice in management and in directing the use of resources. He appears to fear that the employees may take over the actual control of the entire co-operative movement in place of the consumers. This point was made some years ago by Carr-Saunders and associates in their classic study of British co-operation.

The basic dilemma in which Cole finds the co-operative movement is that the State now is doing in England many of the things for which co-operation was established. Cole is sure something should be done to protect the position of co-operation as a potent force in the economy, but it seems to this reviewer that no clear-cut remedy for the situation appears in the book.

ROLAND S. VAILE
University of Minnesota

STAHL, KATHLEEN M. *British and Soviet Colonial Systems*. Pp. ix, 114. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $2.50.

This little book presents a clear if brief analysis of British colonial administration, but when it attempts to do the same with that of the Soviets it breaks down. It could not well be otherwise in view of the scarcity of information as to what is taking place in Central Asia. Miss Stahl allots but thirty-five pages to the Russian side of her picture, and the scanty material which she does use consists largely of extracts from Stalin's writings and from the Soviet constitution, all of which we have learned by experience is of dubious value. About the only contrast between the British and the Soviet system that is valid is that the former tends to move more and more toward decentralization and greater autonomy, whereas the reverse is true of the latter.

The most useful part of this book has to do with the British Empire and Commonwealth, the framework of which is described with accuracy and in considerable detail, particularly as concerns the thirty-five Crown Colonies, protectorates and areas for which Britain acts as trustee.

The thirty-five are in various stages of development, and all are headed hopefully in the direction of home rule and perhaps ultimate dominion status. Thus, in the various Crown Colonies in the governor's executive council "the proportion of unofficial members in relation to that of official members is increasing," —a fact also true of the legislative councils which are gaining more and more power as the electorate is enlarged. "Imperial control over colonial government is primarily negative in character and operation." Governors appointed by Whitehall still retain veto powers but seldom use them. About 96 per cent of the civil servants in these dependent areas now are native born, and even in the higher echelons of the colonial service the appointment of Africans and Asians is becoming more and more frequent. The constitutional convention which drew up the new constitution of the Gold Coast consisted entirely of Africans and was presided over by an African judge. In Malaya, the West Indies, and East Africa progress in self-government is the rule rather than the exception.

Meanwhile, British interest in the dependent empire is steadily rising. Both the Conservative and Labor parties have standing committees engaged in research on colonial problems, and the hard-pressed British treasury is providing out of its slender resources considerable sums as grants in aid. In both West and East Africa new dominions are now clearly foreshadowed.

WALTER P. HALL
Princeton University

MITCHELL, SYDNEY KNOX. *Taxation in Medieval England*. Edited by Sidney Painter. Yale Historical Publications, Studies, XV. Pp. 413. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. $5.00.

When Sydney Knox Mitchell died suddenly in 1948, he left a manuscript upon which he had been working for a long time. It has now been edited by his friend Professor Sidney Painter in the volume under review. Professor Painter has carefully respected the original text; missing references have been supplied and notes recast in a consistent form, but only minor corrections have been made. A posthumous work could harly fail to leave something to be desired; in this case, perhaps, a concluding section that Professor Mitchell would doubtless have given us had he been spared to complete his work.

Professor Mitchell made his first contribution to scholarship in 1914 with his *Studies in Taxation Under John and Henry III*. The present work might at first sight appear to be second edition of the older one, even though the reigns of Henry II and Richard I have been included. Some of the same problems are necessarily dealt with, but *Taxation in Medieval England* is an entirely new book. The amount of fresh material drawn largely from unpublished sources is immense. The point of view adopted is likewise quite different. Topical in arrangement instead of chronological, the work is less a technical study of taxes than an examination of the significance of taxation and of the methods of assessment, authorization, and collection employed therein, for the evolution of twelfth—and thirteenth-century administration.

Difficult as it may be for us to conceive of it, taxation was a new condition for the society of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. And, because the men of that age had no definite notion regarding the sources of taxation that could be profitably exploited, there was initiated a struggle between the taxpayer and the state over this question. In the first place, taxes were not strictly owed; with every successive repetition, nevertheless, they tended to become obligatory, hence the persistent opposition. By the close of the reign of Henry III, a solution had been found. It was the tax on movables, which came to be the normal tax and the basis of all future developments.

Professor Mitchell's book covers precisely this period, when society was adjusting itself to a new condition. The definite and striking changes that took place affected the administrative organization, the character of taxation, and the structure and power of the government. None of these changes was anticipated or planned; they grew out of the necessity of adjusting the government to new conditions which it faced.

It was found necessary, for example, to create a central body, a branch of the exchequer, to administer the receipt of and sometimes audit the new levy. The change was not permanent, but the experience acquired in the handling of unusual sums of money probably led to the expansion of the exchequer under Edward I so that it was able to take over this work.

It was also discovered that the existing methods of assessing and collecting revenue were inadequate for the new levy, and a new organization was devised which was a modification of the conventional *missi*. To maintain movable property as the basis of the tax, and with an adequate valuation, was the most arduous task and was not wholly successful, but the attempt led to a great change from the conventionalization that marked all preceding levies.

Authorization is an aspect of the problem which is more familiar because of its connection with the origins of Parliament. The earliest authorization for the new levies was given by the Curia Regis; and this continued to be the case as the aid on movables became more predominant and more frequent, but there is a change in the nature of the consent as it takes on a corporate character, the consent of the present binding the absent, and the majority binding the minority.

The depth of Professor Mitchell's historical insight and the breadth of his perspective make of his book more than a technical treatise on taxation; it will be of interest to all students of medieval England.

G. B. FLAHIFF
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AMERY, JULIAN. *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain*. Vol. IV: "1901–1903: At the Height of His Power." Pp. 533. London: MacMillan and Company (distributed in the U. S. by the MacMillan Company), 1951. $4.50.

Mr. Julian Amery has assumed the task of completing the biography of Joseph Chamberlain left unfinished by the late J. L. Garvin. The third of Garvin's massive volumes, published in 1934, carried the story till the end of the nineteenth century. The one under review ends in February, 1903. Of necessity some of the topics handled by Mr. Emery start in the mid-nineties. Still, in the main he in concerned only with the activities of Chamberlain in the years 1901 and 1902.

These years were crowded with significant actions in British domestic and imperial affairs. Joseph Chamberlain was then at the height of his power—the most dynamic personality in the government headed by Lord Salisbury. Mr. Amery has had full use of the Chamberlain papers and of confidential government documents. He has secured information and advice from members of the Chamberlain family and from persons like his father, Mr. L. S. Amery, who knew Joseph Chamberlain quite well.

As might be expected, the author gives much space to the war, the peace negotia-

tions, and the reconstruction in South Africa. New light is shed on these problems, more particularly on the relations between Chamberlain and Milner. Among general imperial topics, the work of the 1902 colonial conference, the West Indian sugar question, and Chamberlain's colonial development and welfare programs deserve special mention. The section which deals with the Anglo-German negotiations, September 1900–February 1902, is disappointing. Apparently the Chamberlain papers contain little new information on that subject. On the other hand they have interesting items on negotiations leading to the formation of the Anglo-French entente.

Mr. Amery defends Chamberlain's stand on Irish home rule and seeks to explain his waning interest in old age pension and his support of the Education Act of 1902 which conflicted with his earlier views on this issue. In the discussion of imperial affairs, Mr. Amery shows a lack of an intimate knowledge of this vast subject. His Conservative bias stands out quite clearly. But his story is well organized and clearly told. It calls to mind an era which now seems both strange and very remote.

PAUL KNAPLUND
University of Wisconsin

HAYEK, F. A. *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their Friendship and Subsequent Marriage.* Pp. 320. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. $4.50.

In this work Professor Hayek has collected and edited the correspondence passing between Mill and the woman who, after many years of friendship, became his wife. He has edited the letters, largely found at Yale University Library, added copious notes, and introduced secondary evidence on their relationship, their characters, and their intellectual collaboration.

The editing has a purpose: to throw light on the extent of Mill's intellectual obligation to the woman to whom he ascribed "joint production" of his *Political Economy* and other works, and to whom he dedicated his *Political Economy* alleging he had first learned from her his ideas on social improvement. The blurb goes so far as to say that "Mill's description of Harriet Taylor is not exaggerated," and that here is direct evidence to prove it.

Any evidence that throws a light on an influential philosopher's spiritual evolution is of interest to the world, and so we may be grateful for the additional insights furnished, not least on Mill's interest in music; his thoughts on life and death when he was told by his doctor he had not long to live (he lasted for many years longer!); his cold, indeed callous estrangement from his mother and sisters; life at the India Office; estimates of various contemporaries; and his own philosophic self-doubt.

But whether the main question is cleared up is extremely debatable. A few letters do, indeed, show that Mrs. Taylor made suggestions of ideas and theories and policies to Mill, and that he welcomed them. But they are inconclusive as to anything of importance. There is discernible a desire on the part of the editor to show that such "socialism" as appears in Mill's economic theory is due to his wife's influence.

The suggestion is neither supportable nor destructible by the evidence presented. The letters have been edited, it is true not for thought-suppression, but to prune away the intimately personal. But at critical times there are great voids in the correspondence, as between 1840 to 1847.

If the direct evidence is tenuous and incomplete, we are obliged to fall back on other grounds of judgment of probability. This is when the nature of their intimacy attains crucial importance. What do we know?

Mill could not abide his father, mother, sisters, and brother. He knew no warmth of love till he met the very beautiful young Mrs. Taylor. She loved him deeply, romantically, and possessively. She was a luscious and *highly opionated* Victorian blue-stocking, and of such there were thousands in her England, except that most were unattractive, sex-frustrated frumps. She wrote rationalist and feminist articles and poems. The few samples given in this work demonstrate their poor, adolescent quality, at an age when, if she was anything like Mill swore she was, she would have shown talent, not conventional puerility of mind. She never ceased flattering Mill, who hungered for beauty, affection, assurance, and praise.

The understanding of romantic love of this kind is a key to the understanding of what a man like Mill would do with the ideas presented to him by the one he loved and who showed that she loved him. He may have had the ideas in his own mind before she spoke. He may have already given them to her, and then received them back from her, with the added significance of coming from someone *else* when she rendered them to him. But (a) they would receive importance and consideration because she had mentioned them, and (b) the outflow of his gratitude might even come from his surprise that she, so lovely, shared his thoughts.

The relationship is rather like that between Mill's contemporary, August Comte, deprived of love all his life, and Clothilde de Vaux. Comte was bowled over also. He gave gratitude for love in the form of intellectual acknowledgement. This view of Mill-Taylor is borne out by the fact that when, on the death of Mr. Mill, Mill's home was tended by Mrs. Taylor's daughter Helen, Mill apostrophized the daughter as extravagantly as he did the mother, though the correspondence shows that the girl was far from possessing even a mind that we should grade as a B average.

The verdict must still be "Not proven!" We must be very careful then to avoid the conclusion that Mill's "socialism" stems from an erotic source; or, if it did, that this would be a sin against laissez faire, on the basis that men unaffected by women would be vigorously laissez faire; or that it is wrong that men should be affected by the minds or characters of women—the human race has two sexes, and human nature will not be somehow restored to purity of doctrine by the wishing away of one of them.

What is not clear from the letters, and what is material, is whether Mill and Mrs. Taylor had adulterous relations in the long years of their friendship, when they travelled abroad for long periods unchaperoned. I incline to the view that we should have been given everything that is extant. The truth of nature that is immanent in a blob of penicillin was discovered by accident when the mould was observed, and not excised by an editor. And Karl Marx excluded a vital truth from the theory of value by ignoring the value of a diamond as "an exception."

HERMAN FINER
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SCHUTZ, JOHN A. *Thomas Pownall, British Defender of American Liberty: A Study of Anglo-American Relations in the Eighteenth Century.* Pp. 342. Glendale, Calif.: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1951. $10.00.

Thomas Pownall was an obscure young Englishman when he came to America in 1753 as secretary of the governor of New York. While he was a student at Cambridge, where his family's financial resources were barely sufficient to support him, his younger brother John got a clerkship in the Board of Trade and began his rapid rise in the civil service. On graduating from the university, Thomas took a post under John to train himself for a political career in colonial administration. His apprenticeship taught him the need for drastic reform. Seeing little chance of breaking into the oligarchic monopoly of power at home, he turned to climb the ladder in America. The first rung broke almost as soon as he mounted it. He had not been in New York a week when the suicide of his chief left him without any position.

Undaunted by this misfortune, Pownall somehow managed to travel up and down the colonies, assiduously improving his already considerable knowledge of them and cultivating the friendship of prominent men who might help him up. His ascent is amazing. In 1757, at the age of thirty-five, he was appointed governor of Massachusetts in succession to Shirley, whom he had helped to remove. After ably piloting the province through the difficult war years, he declined further service in America, not because he disliked the colonies but because he thought he could do more for them and the mother country by returning home and shaping public

policy to solve the imperial problem that loomed ahead. He was confident that the knowledge and experience he had gained in America would win for him a position of authority in England. With this in view, he produced his famous *Administration of the Colonies*, first as a pamphlet of 131 pages and later as a substantial two-volume work; and he secured a seat in Parliament, where he raised his voice on behalf of colonial liberty. But no ministry would invite him to join them or even hearken to his advice. His opinions were too independent; he was not an effective speaker in the House; and his written style was so difficult that it was reputed to have given many a headache to his readers.

Historians have repeatedly lamented the lack of an adequate biography of Governor Pownall. His life by C. A. W. Pownall, which appeared in 1908, was based on little source material. But Mr. Schutz's is built upon extensive research in private and public repositories and is a solid piece of scholarship containing few flaws except in the actual writing, which is sometimes irritatingly careless.

A. L. BURT
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SLAVIC COUNTRIES

HERLING, ALBERT KONRAD. *The Soviet Slave Empire*. Pp. xx, 230. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1951. $3.75.

Forced labor in a form which deserves to be designated as slave labor exists in all Communist-dominated countries. If there is still a need to prove this, the necessary and sufficient evidence can be found in A. K. Herling's *The Soviet Slave Empire*. Based mainly on the hearings before the Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor (initiated by the Workers' Defense League), the book is largely a collection of well-selected witness reports about forced labor in the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Eastern Germany. The authenticity of the reports is indicated by the fact that the reliability of the witnesses has been established beyond doubt.

The first chapter shows that as early as 1927–28 "the idea of forced labor became part of the Soviets' Penal Procedure" and that the characteristic trait of a slave labor system became more pronounced with the passage of time.

Two quotations from the reports illustrate this assertion: A report of a camp near the Pechora River states "the principal incentive used by the MVD builders is hunger, not wages or force. . . . The amount of work performed determines the amount of food that a prisoner receives. . . . Those who refuse to work are put in solitary confinement and receive minimum rations" (p. 15). Regarding another camp it is stated that "anybody who expressed an opinion that his work was too hard, or made any other complaint, was liable to be taken into the forest by the guards and shot, their disappearance being explained by saying that they had tried to get away" (p. 25).

Valuable as are the reliable descriptions of concrete facts, the book has its weak points, particularly the uncritical reproduction of some grossly exaggerated estimates of the number of "slaves" in the Soviet Union and of the economic importance of the slave labor system. For the author "there is no doubt that in the last decade the prison camps and forced labor camps have had a *minimum* of eight million workers, and at various times a maximum of twenty million." The available substantial evidence suggests much more conservative figures. Also, according to the author, "new construction projects alone are estimated to require at least ten million forced laborers." The work on new construction is characterized by the highest degree of mechanization, and the whole number of workers employed will hardly reach even *one* million. A very large number of highly skilled workers, of Stakhanovites, and, for propaganda purposes, of party and Comsomol members are employed; this would seem to preclude the possibility of a large use of forced labor.

Fortunately, these shortcomings take only a small place in an otherwise very useful book.

GEORGE DENICKE
Washington, D. C.

Soviet State Plan for 1941 (Supplements to the Decision of the SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) N 127 of January 17, 1941), American Council of Learned Societies reprints, Russian Series N. 30. Pp. 746. In Russian. Baltimore: Universal Press, 1951. $12.00.

Everyone wanting to study the Soviet economy thoroughly must be greatly thankful to the American Council of Learned Societies for the reproduction of the so-called Soviet 1941 Plan (actually only statistical supplements to the plan are involved) and, moreover, everybody familiar with the Russian language must own a copy. Library study of this volume of 746 pages will rarely prove enough.

In due time this all-important document was released in the U.S.S.R. with the warning on each table "not to be disclosed." Unfortunately it was so treated in this country for some time. Access was permitted almost exclusively to those who were unable to make proper use of it.

In a monograph devoted to the Soviet price system and a paper analyzing the labor in concentration camps this reviewer made extensive use of the material in the volume. Yet he has used only a fraction of the wealth contained in it. He intends to give it several additional goings-over after he comes into possession of a copy of his own.

The all-important indexes of national income, industrial production, and labor productivity showing fabulous successes of the Soviet planned economy are, or at least were until 1949, based on "unchangeable 1926–27 prices." The phony nature of these prices and the manipulated character of the indexes in them had been clear to a few even before the 1941 Plan became available. The data of the 1941 Plan on industrial production and its production costs in 1941 prices make this obvious to anyone who will take the trouble of comparing these data with the value of the same output in "unchangeable 1926–27 prices." The 1941 Plan wrestles this implement of world-wide propaganda from the Soviets.

The Soviet sources use for comparisons with postwar phenomena the data of 1940 as the basis, although the year was one of feverish preparation for war, with private consumption cut substantially below the level of the preceeding year and several other abnormalities. In a misleading way, 1940 is even commonly referred to as "the prewar 1940 year" in Soviet sources. A further important drawback of the official statistics of this year is that they covered the newly acquired territories to a greatly varying extent, and thus each comparison is between 1940 data for a smaller territory and, say, 1950 data for a larger territory. On top of this, it is the custom of Soviet sources to be discretely silent on the territory to which the 1940 figures used for the comparison pertain. The 1941 Plan unfortunately does not provide data for 1940. Still, the territorial coverage of the 1941 goals permits some conclusions as to the territory covered by the usual official 1940 data.

The evidence of the Soviet concentration camps normally comes from former inmates who are in no position to know the total number of inmates in the camps and naturally are inclined to exaggeration. Such figures as eight, ten, fifteen, and even twenty million persons in the camps are cited. The 1941 Plan permits glances also in the direction of this horrible institution. It does not state the number of inmates, but it provides information on the economic activities planned for the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), and from this data rough estimations of the numbers of inmates involved can be made.

The first mentioned item, the light the 1941 Plan throws on the fake "unchangeable 1926–27 prices," alone makes the volume invaluable. The evidence on concentration camps is likewise of great interest, if only to show the world of difference between evidence and estimates. (The evidence of the 1941 Plan points to fewer than half as many inmates in concentration camps as in the lowest common estimate.) However, the three mentioned problems for which the 1941 Plan is helpful, are only those for which this reviewer primarily used its evidence. There is an almost endless number of others, for the clarification of which the material in the 1941 Plan is helpful.

While the document was marked "not to be disclosed," several items such as the data on output of gold, nonferrous metals, and rubber were not covered in it. They were considered even greater secrets than the activities of the NKVD, and were incorporated in a special secret attachment or attachments, which are no part of the released volume.

NAUM JASNY

Washington, D. C.

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

SCHMIDT, PAUL. *Hitler's Interpreter*. Edited by R. H. C. Steed. Pp. 286. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $4.00.

Dr. Paul Schmidt, with his great flair for the deeper meaning of words and his extraordinary linguistic talents, should have been the first to realize that the English title of his book *Hitler's Interpreter* would expose its greatest weakness. It shows that, while he was eminently suited to translate Hitler's words, he remained an "interpreter" only in the narrowest sense. He joined the Language Division of the German Foreign Office in 1923 and found himself in a world of diplomatic notes, of memoranda and treaties, on which, we hoped, a new German, a new Europe, a new and better world might have been built.

By the time Dr. Schmidt appeared more prominently on the stage of international diplomacy and had become a familiar figure behind a succession of German statesmen, most of these notes, memoranda and treaties had been reduced to "scraps of paper." Angry verbal exchanges, futile conferences replaced the more graceful traditional diplomatic routine. Dr. Schmidt seemed unaffected by these changes. Proudly unpolitical, keeping his views (if any) to himself, he served Hitler as faithfully as he had served his predecessors (and what a pity it is that the first part of his memoirs dealing with Germany's pre-Hitler history has been omitted from the American edition of his book).

At one stage of his narrative he describes the visit which Japan's foreign minister, Mr. Matsuoka, paid to Hermann Göring at Karinhall in 1941: "Do you know that abroad they say that he [Göring] is mad?" Matsuoka asked Mr. Schmidt, adding a little later, "There are many people in Japan who say . . . 'Matsuoka is crazy!'"

It was indeed a crazy set-up into which Dr. Schmidt affords us an intimate insight. He records it with studied, colorless sweet reasonableness which would have been more impressive had he not risen to it only after the event. There is little evidence that Dr. Schmidt was just the "enlightened cosmopolitan German nationalist" as his editor, Mr. R. H. C. Steed, describes him in the introduction. An inflection here, an addition or omission there reveal a surprisingly wide area of agreement with his last German masters, tempered only by *post festum* admissions that he (and they) might have been wrong.

From his account there emerge once more the now-familiar figures of the Nazi government and those who tried to reason with them. Chamberlain and Eden, Molotov and Ciano, the satellite rulers people these pages. We watch them in Hitler's study, hear them at conferences in Berlin or wherever his duties took Dr. Schmidt. To the well-known facts, which we know from the perusal of many other sources, from official documents and the host of memoirs which illuminate the history of the vital ten years under review, Dr. Schmidt adds many interesting snippets and sidelights. Although his account does not quite live up to the subtitle "The Secret History of German Diplomacy 1935–1945" it should be read by all students of the peculiar brand of diplomacy practiced by the Nazis and likely to be emulated by other dictatorships.

Dr. Schmidt's diplomatic career came to an end when he was captured by the United States Counter-Intelligence Corps in Salzburg in 1945 (but his services, we are told, were utilized by the U. S. occupation forces during the Nuuremberg trials). He might, Mr. Steed says, perhaps even more aptly, be described as "Stresemann's Interpreter." We should know more about the shape of things to come if we could correctly guess for whom Dr. Schmidt is going to interpret in the future.

WILLI FRISCHAUER

London, England

PLISCHKE, ELMER, with the assistance of H. J. HILLE. *History of the Allied High Commission for Germany, Its Establishment, Structure, and Procedures*. Research Project No. 107 of the Allied High Commission for Germany. Pp. v, 122. Published: Office of the U. S. High Commission for Germany, APO 757-A, c/o PM, NYC, 1951. No Price.

The development of Germany's political structure has been in a state of constant flux since 1945, particularly in relation to the various forms and phases of Allied military government. The student of contemporary German government and politics finds it none too easy to locate the essential facts and documents, and depends, to a large extent, on the publications of Allied authorities in Germany for basic orientation. Plischke's *History of the Allied High Commission for Germany* is the first of a series of studies written under the auspices of the Historical Division of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, and future studies will deal with the revision of the Occupation Statute, the relations between the Allied High Commission and the German federal government, and similar subjects.

The first chapter provides the background of the establishment of the Allied High Commission, starting out with the London Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference (February 23 to June 2, 1948) and ending with the Foreign Ministers' Conferences of Washington (April 1949) and Paris (May 23 to June 20, 1949). The record of these conferences shows that the movement toward integration of the American, British, and French Zones of Occupation into one unit was largely the product of American initiative and leadership. The second chapter outlines the establishment of the Allied High Commission in May 1949, paralleled by the setting up of a German government shortly thereafter. Chapters III and IV describe the committee structure of the Allied High Commission and the Allied General Secretariat; procedures are described in full detail, including, for example, the information that "most committee meetings are preceded by the serving of coffee, tea, and other refreshments" (pp. 74–75). The sixth (and last substantive) chapter covers the relations of the High Commission with the German Government and with foreign powers, and includes data not conveniently assembled elsewhere. The value of the study is greatly enhanced by the reprinting of important documents (Occupation Statute, organization charts, and others) in the appendix.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN

Princeton University

MILLER, JANE KATHRYN. *Belgian Foreign Policy Between Two Wars, 1919–1940*. Pp. 337. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951. $5.00.

For the scholar and statesman, *Belgian Foreign Policy* is a useful study, but for the average reader it must be virtually incomprehensible. A background chapter attempts to set the stage, but when the chief actor (Belgium) enters, the stage is bare of scenery, and the reader has to suffer through a maze of statistics, negotiations, and crises never tied to the full diplomatic story of the interwar period. It may be that Miss Miller's book is a condensation of a larger work, but as it stands it is more of a footnote than a chapter in the diplomatic history of interwar Eunrope. Almost no effort is made to place Belgium in its proper place in the diplomacy of the day, and the author has presumed a knowledge on the part of her readers that few are likely to have.

Although Miss Miller comments in her preface that Belgium's shift in policy from co-operation with the Allies of 1918 to a completely independent policy had "disastrous" results, she later (p. 259) describes the same shift as "not a blunder." She justifies the latter comment by relating the immediate effects of Leopold's new policy (the Franco-British-German pledges and the closer union of Walloons and Flemings), but not three lines later she re-

fers to that May 10, 1940 which "proved" the impossibility of such a policy for Belgium. I find these statements hard to reconcile.

Occasional but no serious errors of fact occur. In referring to the French Revolution of 1789, the author contends that Belgium followed the French pattern; she makes the same mistakes that Desmoulins had made in 1789. Her interpretation of the importance of Belgium's actions in 1914 is also somewhat outmoded, and I suspect that her reference (p. 131) to Belgium as Poincaré's "satellite" is a misstatement. Her offhand description of Albert's death is also hard to explain.

Despite these faults, *Belgian Foreign Policy* is an excellent volume, with a volumious bibliography, useful footnotes, and a good appendix, although the flow of the story is sometimes marred by the absence of maps and an excessive number of printing errors. Scattered through the book are passages of rare interest and even brilliance, but taken as a whole the book is scholarly dull, especially the accounts of ministerial crises, reparations, and war debts. The later chapters, telling the story of the new "independent" foreign policy and of the invasion and surrender of Belgium, are fascinating.

R. T. TURNER
Montana State University

STRODE, HUDSON. *Denmark Is a Lovely Land.* Pp. xi, 304. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951. $4.75.

Travel guides as a class belong to a most ephemeral species of literature. They have appeared in many variants and guises for at least 2,000 years. Among the best known—and the least ephemeral—of ancient descriptive guides is Pausanias' *Description of Greece,* written in the second century of our era. The declared aim of Pausanias was to present "the most famous of the Athenian traditions and sights," and to select from the mass of materials "the really notable." It was his way of saying that topographical features should be seen in their historical setting. Superficial descriptions of man-made phenomena are quite useless until man's memory—history—is levied on to give them perspective depth.

It is, therefore, refreshing to find that a seasoned and observing traveller, Hudson Strode, has produced a book on contemporary Denmark that gives vivid glimpses of land and people, and with these, salient bits of historical information to throw the topics discussed into their proper perspective. *Denmark is a Lovely Land* owes its title to the famous national song by Adam Oehlenschläger. The author's prefatory statements that "What Denmark has achieved for herself is out of all proportion to her tiny size," and "Implicit in Danish democracy is the conception of the independence and nobility of the individual," indicate his approach.

The large number of buildings surviving to bear witness to the restless energy of the royal "architect," Christian IV—structures ranging from his seamen's housing project, the *Nyboder,* to Rosenborg castle—receive deserved attention, as do many other distinguished buildings, museums, promenades, bits of charming coast line, the chalk cliffs of Mön, and physical and architectural scenes from Zealand, Fyn, and nearby islands, and the Jutland mainland.

He included in his itinerary visits to a few estates belonging to Danish noblemen to which ordinary tourists would scarcely have access, and he dwells on the success achieved by them in improving the yield of milk cows. But of the small farmers whose industry and intelligence have made Danish dairy products, bacon and eggs, famous abroad for their uniform quality, the reader gets but faint glimpses. However, the co-operatives which process and distribute these products, and the rural co-operative stores run on the Rochdale plan, are given generous space, as are the Danish folk high schools, which have become models for many similar schools throughout northern Europe.

The proletarian novelist, Martin Andersen Nexö, author of *Pelle the Conqueror,* is discuseed by way of introduction to Denmark's social legislation that dates largely from the Social Democratic ministry of Thorvald Stauning. Here are brief answers as to how Denmark has solved the problem of sickness insurance for all without either endangering the economy of the state or ruining the poor but innocent victim of a disastrously long illness; how children are cared for from the prenatal stage through their school years; how the aged are given adequate shelter in the Old People's Town in Copenhagen; how the state encourages vacations in the country and on the farms for urban children.

For the reader familiar with Isak Dinesen's (pseudonym for Baronness Karen Blixen) *Out of Africa* and *Seven Gothic Tales,* the "Portrait of a Danish Writer" will be rewarding. Apropos a recently suggested idea of Bernard De Voto, is this another case of prolonged stay abroad providing latent literary talent with the needed impetus for self-expression?

A few errors in this otherwise excellent book should be noted for correction in a new edition, should one appear. To say that Christian IV's bourse is "the world's oldest market exchange" (p. 54) is misleading. At least seven such exchanges were established from the early sixteenth century down to 1608—at Bruges, Antwerp, Lyon, Toulouse, Hamburg, London, and Amsterdam. The English bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 (p. 215) occurred two years after Lord Nelson's death at Trafalgar. Nelson bombarded the city on April 2, 1801. Canute (p. 152) is called the "Great" because of his rule of England, not because he was "this greatest of Denmark's kings." As a preparation for a visit to Denmark or for later reflection after such a visit, this book is to be warmly recommended.

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PURYEAR, VERNON J. *Napoleon and the Dardanelles.* Pp. 437. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. $5.00.

Napoleon and the Dardanelles—I do not think that this title does justice to the wide range of events the book covers. Dr. Puryear's subject is the whole "Eastern Question" in the Napoleonic Era. In any case you cannot divorce the Dardanelles or the Turkish Straits, as they have come to be more commonly known today, from the problems of the Near and the Middle East or as events have proved once again from the political problems of the European Continent.

For serious students of international events, this is a very timely publication. Take out the dates, efface the names, you will find that the problems Dr. Puryear brings to our notice are as fresh as the events of the last ten years. Take, for example, Napoleon's negotiations with the Czar concerning their mutual interests in Ottoman Turkey and in Persia. Dr. Puryear suggests that the final break between the two "would-be masters" of Europe came on this issue. The Nürnberg trials have proved that in the attempt at division of the world between Hitlerite Germany and Soviet Russia, once again the final break came about over the geographic area around Turkey. A more significant parallel in history would be hard to find. For this indicates that atomic age or not, the land mass between the three continents and three seas is of crucial importance in any attempt to intercontinental mastery. Turkey, because of her key position in this area, strengthened by her historical experience in nationhood, is bound to play a major role in any event involving the whole of Europe. Those who seek the true significance of Turkey's incorporation into the Atlantic Defense System will find the answer in Dr. Puryear's narration of another attempt at global domination.

There is abundant material here for students of Ottoman Turkey. The commercial rivalries between France, and Britain in Egypt, the diplomatic intrigues in Istanbul, which were meant to undermine the power of one and against the other but which instead ended with undermining the power of the Ottomans to the profit of the third power in the North, are vividly illustrated.

In these days of great controversy about imperialism these events ought to inspire international co-operation. The big should understand that self-seeking intrigues against each other profit only a third party and the small should know that to play the big against one another ends up with the

small losing their independence and integrity completely.

The book is well documented. Dr. Puryear, the painstaking scholar, has dug well in the archives of the French Foreign Office. But in a scholarly book like this one would have expected a more balanced study of the problem. The author has not gone into the Turkish archives, and this seems to me a deficiency. Take, for example, the incident concerning Napoleon's title. Dr. Puryear tells in detail how relations between France and the Ottoman Turkish Empire were strained because the Ottoman Court would not accord the title of padishar to Napoleon, and he suggests that this problem of protocol made a mountain out of a molehill. For those who know their Ottoman Turkish history this explanation sounds very naïve because in this incident seemingly revolving around a title one finds the core of all the political problems between France and Turkey at the time. But this deficiency, unfortunately, is common to all the books on Ottoman History. Only in the last ten years have scholars begun to dig into Turkish archives. The impact of Turkey on Europe as viewed from the Turkish side of the fence has yet to be written. In the United States Princeton University was among the first to recognize this deficiency, and it has already produced a number of outstanding Turkish scholars. Columbia University with its new Middle Eastern Institute will be a great contributor in the field.

I would recommend Dr. Puryear's *Napoleon and the Dardanelles* not only to those with a historical interest but to every one actively interested in current international affairs. The problems it deals with are timeless—until man learns to treat other peoples and countries as he would like to have his own people and country treated.

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HERMENS, FERDINAND A. *Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy*. Pp. xix, 291. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951. $4.00.

In the recent British elections the Labour party polled more votes and a higher percentage of the votes than it had the time before. It also polled more votes than any other party. Yet it lost the absolute majority in the House of Commons it had won on a minority vote at the previous election, and its Conservative rivals were given an absolute majority instead.

Thus are the fortunes of nations fashioned by the vagaries of an election system which makes results dependent not merely on numbers of votes but on where the votes are cast and on the number of candidates among whom the votes are divided. The Labour party was given control before a majority of the British people were ready for its far-reaching program of socialization. But when that program gained new recruits and the general conduct of the Labour party in office brought increased popularity, the party was thrown out of power, and its slightly less popular rivals were given power to undo as much of its work as they pleased.

Such distortions of popular wishes seem of minor consequence to Professor Hermens, arch-crusader against proportional or accurate representation. He would prefer to see the largest party come out on top and even suggests (p. 19) that the British Labour party would have been justified in some deliberate gerrymandering to compensate for the wastage of its votes in the districts where it has top-heavy majorities. But the most important thing in his mind is not who governs but that someone shall be in position to govern. He is obsessed with the idea that some party or group must be able to enact its whole program expeditiously, whether the people like the whole program or not. If the people sufficiently dislike parts of it, their recourse should be to rise up and throw the rascals out at the next election, thereby giving some other group unlimited power to do as it will. The thing to be avoided at all costs is a situation where there is no constant parliamentary majority but different majorities on different issues, in the legislative body as among the people themselves.

The title of the book is revealing. Democracy is thought of not as the opposite of dictatorship but as the opposite of anarchy. The emphasis in "rule of the people" is not on "the people" but on "rule." Some distortion of the popular will is regarded as endurable and even desirable in the interests of strong government; but any difficulty in steering the course of government, even in the interest of reflecting more accurately the people's wishes, is to be avoided like the plague. For, just outside the door of parliament lurks the man on horseback ready to ride over if there is any indecision.

Like most of Professor Hermans' writings this book is devoted largely to special pleadings against proportional representation. His thesis is that if you let minorities get their own separate spokesmen in a legislative body in proportion to their numbers, you will be likely to get a conglomerate of discordant elements in which no one party will have a majority to enact its program and in which no group of parties can be found in sufficient agreement to govern without constant turmoil. As a result the people may turn to dictatorship in disgust. If, on the other hand, you have a plurality system of election which gives all the representation in each district to the largest group, people will be forced to forego the preferences which divide them differently on many issues and to choose between the two parties which appear to have the best chance of success. Since the mass of people are not extremists, any party attracting the mass support necessary to win will be forced to be moderate, and extremists of all kinds will tend to be frozen out. The result will be a strong government not too far off center, whichever side wins.

In pursuit of this thesis Professor Hermens scans the whole European scene, and even takes short excursions into Israel, Japan, India, and the United States. Wherever he finds difficulties in a country using proportional representation (P.R.), he bears down on the contribution of accurate representation to the difficulties and speculates on the wholesome effects of a suitable distortion. Wherever he finds things working reasonably well under P.R., as in Ireland, Italy since the war, the Scandinavian countries, Finland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, he ascribes the success to other factors and gravely shakes his head at portents of future disaster. Conversely he sings the praises of plurality of majority governments in Britain, the United States, and elsewhere and minimizes their difficulties. Where he finds really serious difficulties, as in France before its adoption of P.R. at the end of World War II, he seeks explanations other than the electoral system or blames variations from the straight plurality pattern.

The book contains a vast amount of interesting material. Viewed through glasses of a different color from the author's, much of it supports the feasibility of accurate representation and of making suitable adjustments in government machinery to let people say and get what they really want. Many of the untoward effects he ascribes to proportional systems are not due to proportionality at all, but to the shortcomings of the European party list forms of P.R., which entrench party organization and deny the voters the freedom of choice among individual candidates they enjoy in Hare system P.R. elections in Ireland, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Professor Hermens is an honest and sincere man who makes some careless misstatements but does not deliberately mislead his readers and tries to face all the facts. Consequently if you take all his concessions which he tries to explain away, you have quite a mass of evidence against him.

The one thing he does not do, and never has done, is to explore seriously the possibilities of making real democracy work—not a democracy which forces people to forget many of their real desires and make a choice of evils, but a democracy which invites an honest expression from everybody and condenses the electorate into its chosen leaders in the right proportions to form a body as accurately representative as the old New England town meeting.

There is plenty of evidence, in this book and elsewhere, to indicate that people would often prefer to be represented by a large and powerful party if they can find one to their liking rather than by a small splinter party—for example, the two-party set-ups in Cincinnati and the Australian province of Tasmania, and the succession of stable governments in Ireland under the freest form of P.R., and the moderate one-party parliamentary majorities in Italy, Norway, and Sweden under somewhat inferior but still nearly proportional systems. And there are various expedients, mentioned but not given due credit by Professor Hermens, that have been tried successfully to make government *function when no party has a majority*—coalitions proceeding with the planks on which the governing parties agreed and not resigning if overruled on any but a major issue, minority center governments appealing first to the right and then to the left for known majorities on different issues, all-party governments formed on a more or less proportional basis and bringing forward proposals on which a majority agreed (sometimes with minority dissenting reports), nonpartisan executives ready to carry out on particular issues whatever a majority in parliament might decree. One-party governments have not always been the best governments, and other governments have sometimes given greater popular satisfaction.

Professor Hermens' is essentially a counsel of despair. That there are difficulties and dangers to be overcome in accurate self-government any reasonable person will agree. Professor Hermens thinks the difficulties are so great that we have to sacrifice accuracy and settle for a distorted strong government instead.

It may be doubted whether distortion is even the best way to get strong government. For despite debates and wrangles there is often a popular support of a completely representative legislative process such as exists in Ireland, Winnipeg, Calgary, Cincinnati, and Worcester that is frequently lacking in one-party-machine near-monopolies like those customary in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and the solid South. Be that as it may, the real challenge of democracy is to do not just something but what the people want done.

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OTHERS

WILGUS, A. CURTIS (Ed.). *The Caribbean at Mid-Century*. Pp. xxv, 284. Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1951. $4.00.

This volume contains, besides a foreword by President J. Hillis Miller and an introduction by A. Curtis Wilgus, twenty lectures given at a conference held at the University of Florida early in December of 1950. As might be expected in volumes of this kind, the topics are of unequal importance and the treatment is of unequal length and value. Four of the speakers spread their discussion beyond the geographical region announced by the title and dealt with Pan-American relations. Aside from these, the major subjects discussed were economic, political, sociological, and literary.

All are presented in satisfactory style and with few typographical errors, and all well worth reading. The contributions which proved most interesting to this reviewer were those by Edward H. Miller, head of the Latin-American Division of the State Department; Harry F. Guggenheim, once United States Ambassador to Cuba; Wilson Popenoe, noted expert in tropical agriculture; Lowry Nelson, Minnesota sociologist just returned from a research sojourn in Cuba; Maynard Phelps, University of Michigan economist; John A. Crow, specialist in Latin-American literature; and J. Lloyd Mecham, political scientist from the University of Texas. The contributions by Nelson and Mecham, the first dealing with rural life in Cuba and the second presenting an appraisal of Mexico's recent revolution, seem to be the most scholarly. Crow's survey of Carribbean literature is couched in impressive language. He makes a persuasive plea for the study of literature as well as statistics.

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ALEXANDER, ROBERT J. *The Perón Era*. Pp. x, 239. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $3.50.

This little volume contains a clear, straightforward, "blow-by-blow" account of the rise to power of Argentina's president-dictator, Juan Domingo Perón. A minimum of space (nine pages) is devoted to the background of Peronismo, and to a discussion of the factors that made possible the present dictatorship. When, however, the author moves into the current era, he really hits his stride. He includes chapters on each of the major factors in Argentine life, as affecting and affected by Perón. One chapter is entitled "Labor under Perón." Others deal with the army, the church, the universities, the great landowners and their workers. There is even a chapter devoted to Evita, the clever ex-radio actress who has "used her stylishness as a political weapon." Considerable space is devoted to Perón's economic policies and foreign relations, especially with the United States.

Perhaps the chief difficulty with this book is that it seems to aim at no particular group of readers. For the man in the street it seems to lack the flair of the professional journalist. There are no cleverly turned phrases to capture the imagination. Facts are presented simply as facts, with no attempt to emphasize the picturesque. But for the specialist the book has other defects. The story that it presents is already well known to students of Latin American affairs. Moreover, there is an almost complete lack of documentation. Footnotes are conspicuous by their absence, and the only bibliography is an inadequate "bibliographical note" at the end of the volume.

The weakest part of the book is probably the short and entirely unnecessary "postscriptum," which has apparently been added for the purpose of enabling the author to end with a flourish. The thesis of this final chapter is that Perón is a dangerous demagogue—which can readily be domonstrated; and that the United States should therefore ignore him as completely as possible. The book ends with these words: "Unless the United States is careful, she will one day wake up to find a united front of totalitarian military dictatorships among the nations to the South, proudly headed and dominated by El Líder—Su Excelencia Señor Presidente de la República Argentina, General Juan Domingo Perón."

Now that is sheer nonsense, as the author of this book, who is an economist, ought to know. Economic factors have always been far more important than political ideologies in inter-American relations. Argentina was a leader of the anti-United States bloc, even in its democratic days, and the answer is to be found in beef and wheat. Dictators like Somoza and Trujillo have demonstrated their friendship for the United States, and will continue to do so as long as their welfare depends on such a course.

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THOMAS, LEWIS V. and RICHARD N. FRYE. *The United States and Turkey and Iran*. Pp. xii, 291. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (in "The American Foreign Policy Library," edited by Sumner Welles), 1951. $4.25.

The latest volume published in the American Foreign Policy Library series is a very timely and important book. It is the work of two young students of the Middle East. Mr. Thomas, who teaches at Princeton, knows Turkey well and writes in the first half of the book on "the United States and Turkey," while Mr. Frye of Harvard, whose knowledge and understanding of Iran and the Iranians is remarkable, writes on "the United States and Iran" in the second half of the book.

In his part Mr. Thomas properly emphasizes the strategic importance of Turkey and of the Turks in the current bitter East-West rivalry. He stresses the role of the Turk as a rugged and brave fighter, as a friend of the West, and as such a definite asset on the side of democracies. His historical treatment is informative, but his inordinate liking for things Turkish blinds him to some of their shortcomings. He gives the impression of viewing every event as seen with the eye of an Ataturk or his successor. In this respect his por-

tion of the book would have gained considerably if he were half as critical of his Turks as he seems to be toward many who have known the Turks and have written about them.

In the opinion of this reviewer Mr. Frye's portion of the book is more balanced and better written. His historical sketch of Iran is just as detailed, but he never loses his critical sense. He knows modern Iran, with its tribes and minorities and numerous sects, exceedingly well, and he shows warm sympathy toward the Persians. His analysis and exposition of Iran's political, social, economic, and religious problems emphasize the mature judgment in this youthful teacher and writer.

Both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Frye treat our relations with each country rather briefly, devoting to them exactly fourteen pages in each case. They both add useful appendixes containing population and financial statistics, the fundamental laws of these countries, and lists of "suggested reading."

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

PANKHURST, E. SYLVIA. *Ex-Italian Somaliland*. Pp. 460. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $7.50.

Comparatively little in English is written on those parts of Africa which are not or have not been under British rule. The voluminous Italian writings about their former holdings in the East African horn, including that part of Somaliland which they now govern under a United Nations trusteeship, have not been distinguished by their political objectivity.

E. Sylvia Pankhurst has assembled an enormous amount of material on the political development of Italian Somaliland with an emphasis on those years following the rapacious Italian invasion of Ethiopia down through the period of British military control and the beginning of Italian trusteeship. In the process, she touches intermittently upon administration, agriculture, physical geography, land tenure, treaties, and the difficulties of economic development. Unfortunately, for social scientists, these thin slices of meat are sandwiched between large slabs of polemics.

Miss Pankhurst, editor of the *New Times and Ethiopia News*, makes a strong case for Ethiopian, or at least non-Italian, control of the territory, but many people who may agree with her conclusions will find her argument disorganized and emotional.

Politics or not, *Ex-Italian Somaliland* is an indispensable source for students of eastern Africa and for those concerned with the pros and cons of U.N. trusteeships.

EDWIN S. MUNGER
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MALCOLM, GEORGE A. *First Malayan Republic: The Story of the Philippines*. Pp. 460. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1951. $5.00.

The author, a former justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, was in the Islands in various official capacities from 1906 to 1940, and he went back to Manila in 1948–49. His career spanned almost the whole period of American control, and he knew personally the leading Americans and Filipinos of the past half century. He was thus in an unusually favorable position for writing an account of the establishment of self-government. He has written a well documented history, which is based on his personal knowledge as well as on a careful study of other authorities on the Islands. It gives a clear picture of political, constitutional, military, and economic developments, and of the serious problems which face the young republic. Unlike many authoritative works it has an interesting and readable style, and it is enlivened by character sketches and appraisals of the leading actors on the Filipino political stage.

The most valuable part of the book describes the form of government in theory and—a somewhat different matter—in actual practice. The constitution adopted in 1935 was in general similar to its American model. It attempted to divide authority between the executive, the legislature, and the Supreme Court; but at the same time it conferred very extensive powers upon the first named. The result has been that "everyone realises that executive power in the person of the President outranks the other two powers," and that a forceful and ambitious leader like the late President Quézon can infringe the spirit if not the letter of the constitution. The author is careful to point out that this does not arouse the same reaction as in the United States, since "the psychology of the masses reacts more favorably to a government dominated by one person than to more democratic direction." Another reason for this popular acquiescence is that "the Philippine Government may in theory be one of laws, but in practice the Government is pretty much one of men."

The author frankly indicates the serious shortcomings in the government of the Republic; but he believes that it is as democratic as can reasonably be expected. This book can be recommended to anyone who wishes to understand the present situation in the Philippines.

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GRUNDER, GAREL A., and WILLIAM E. LIVEZEY. *The Philippines and the United States*. Pp. xii, 315. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951. $4.00.

This is a competent account of the political relations between the United States and the Philippines. Its authors have used official documents such as Congressional hearings and reports, as well as the rather scanty secondary literature. Apart from some purple patches (one of which appears on page 50 and in a diluted form on page 70) and some straining after literary allusion—as in the phrase "gilded over with the pale cast of goodwill and paternalism" (page 60)—the writing is clear and straightforward.

The story is told from the expedition which brought the Philippines under American control up to the achievement of independence. McKinley's hesitancy and Theodore Roosevelt's intransigence and the work of successive proconsuls are surveyed. Adequate emphasis is given to the economic pressures within the United States for getting rid of Filipino competition by the grant of independence. Not much is said about the motives actuating the Filipinos themselves and generally one has the impression that the emphasis in the book ought to be reflected by changing the title to read "The United States and the Philippines." It is in fact a study of American policy largely from American sources.

There is a curious insistence that in the final grant of independence the United States was motivated in part by a desire to expose the islands to exploitation by American capital. The attempt to stabilize a free peso by linking it with the dollar is stigmatized also. It is possible perhaps to regard the imposition of maximum export quotas to the United States as prompted by a shortsighted protection to American primary producers, though the quotas have proved adequate so far. The facts do not indicate any great desire of United States industrialists to invest in the Philippines. It is indeed difficult to arouse their interest on any significant scale. And it is hard for an economist to believe that the Philippine economy would have profited from an unstable peso. When the pinch came, the United States acquiesced in exchange control and even in a tax collected by the central bank on exchange receipts. The economic troubles of the Philippines, which are the root cause of the present threat to its political stability, do not stem from American imperialism. They should be sought in analysis from the Filipino side of the weaknesses both of political and of economic organization in the islands themselves.

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DOBBY, E. H. G. *Southeast Asia*. Pp. 415. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951. $5.00.

Professor Dobby calls his volume "one of the first studies of locational perspectives in Southeast Asia." But his work is of more general interest than this technical description might suggest. What he has done essentially is to assemble in clear, compact, and well-organized form a mass

of useful data about the geography and economic life of the region. This result is a work that students of Asia will find valuable in many contexts.

The volume is divided into three broad sections. The first part, on the natural landscape, discusses the geologic structure, climate, drainage patterns, and soils of the region. In the second part, comprising about two-thirds of the text, the author takes up the separate political units in succession, dealing not only with their physical features, but especially with many aspects of their economic life. The chapters on Malaya, for example, range in content from an analysis of the main rock formations and a description of the atmosphere of a rubber plantation to a listing of Malaya's chief edible fish and a discussion of the evolution of the life of the peninsula. In the final part of the book the author again considers the region as a whole, devoting separate chapters to agriculture, fisheries, industry and trade, and the general politics and prospects of Southeast Asia.

Professor Dobby's precise, lean style, hardly involving a wasted word, has a literary quality that breaks through the technical barriers of his subject matter, especially since his personal familiarity with the territory he is writing about subtly flavors many descriptions. The book is notable for its emphasis on detail, including not only the main facts about the countries of the area, but also a wealth of specific material not readily available elsewhere. From this material a picture emerges of a region of unparalleled diversity in stages of development and people—a region whose economic life has been shaped to a striking degree by the impact of the West and its demands for minerals and agricultural products. In the final chapter on general politics and prospects there are some weaknesses, such as the suggestion (with regard to the people of Southeast Asia) that "a congenial poverty may ultimately prove the normal and agreeable thing for them, as it was in the 16th century." Nothing seems less likely than that in modern Asia poverty will prove "congenial" and "agreeable." Fortunately, the author's viewpoint on this question does not vitiate the main content of a valuable geographical work.

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ISAACS, HAROLD R. *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution.* Pp. xv, 382. Rev. ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951. $5.00.

This famous history of Chinese events in 1925–27 was first published in England in 1938. Now, with numerous revisions, it appears under an American imprint. In the process of revision it has lost nothing of its bitter bite and highly polemical tone, although on issues and questions relatively minor to the principal argument it reflects some change of viewpoint. The original edition was uniformly labelled "Trotskyist," a conclusion induced by Trotsky's Introduction to it—which is now deleted. As Isaacs puts it, the revision "no longer accepts his [Trotsky's] conclusions and cannot be characterized as Trotskyist" (p. xii). But whether Trotskyist or not, the book remains sharply anti-Stalinist in slant.

To Isaacs, "the tragedy of the Chinese revolution of 1925–27 lay precisely in the fact that it took place within the same period of years during which the Russian national dictatorship was coming into being" (p. 51). This "Russian-made debacle . . . [not only] imposed upon China the heavy burden of the Kuomintang regime" (p. xi); it exacted tremendous toll of the revolutionary forces of China, and it developed for the present leaders of the Chinese Communist party concepts of bureaucratic power modeled more closely upon those of the Stalin machine than upon those of the nascent native Communism of earlier years in China. Writing as a self-styled "democratic socialist," apparently sympathetic to less adulterated forms of Marxism than now prevail in the Stalinite world, Isaacs is brought to this condemnation:

"The Russian Communist party under Stalin had taken many years to divest itself of its proletarian roots and ideology and to become a power machine rooted in the new ruling bureaucratic caste. [In consequence of the Stalinite heritage derived from the catastrophe of 1927,] the Chinese Communist party came to power already equipped to play this role, already fashioned into a power mechanism with an almost unique capacity to balance itself among and above the classes of the population" (p. 309). In both cases, proletarian revolution had been subverted by bureaucratic power.

Because they plunged with their Russian associates down the "blind alley of totalitarianism," the Chinese Communists become targets for Isaacs' pointful analysis and scornful derision. None of the analysis, however, offers comfort for the Kuomintang, from whom nothing but duplicity and treachery—to the proletarian cause—could ever have been expected. The Western democracies also come under attack for the shortsightedness of their China policies, although Isaacs infers that enlightened Western statesmanship may yet save the day. This, perhaps, is the point where Isaacs departs basically from the Trotskyist position. But however the arguments are weighed, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* reminds us of the impact of nearly-forgotten historic events, and remains a work of primary historic significance. So far as it incorporates Isaacs' conversations with leading participants it is actually source material.

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WEBER, MAX. *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism.* Translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth. Pp. xi, 308. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951. $4.50.

Max Weber, the great German scholar, has contributed many ideas to the social sciences. There are writers who have taken, without acknowledgement, some of his concepts, and called them original. His *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is the thesis of an American school of economics. His *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* has widespread influence. His *General Economic History,* containing the brilliant chapter, "Evolution of the Capitalistic Spirit," is a standard work. His *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism,* as translated and edited by Professor Hans H. Gerth, will appeal to all interested in world cultures.

The Religion of China contains three parts. Part One considers Chinese money, central government and local officialdom, feudal and fiscal organization, and the general features of capitalism. Part Two will delight the sinologue with its discussions of the literati, the development of the educational system, the examination techniques, the "gentleman" ideal, the prestige of officialdom, views on economic policies, and sultanism and the eunuchs as political opponents of the literati. This section also contains a brilliant interpretation of the Confucian life orientation, constructed on a foundation composed of myriad-colored designs Weber has characterized as bureaucracy and hierocracy, absence of natural law and formal logic of legal thought, indifference to the natural sciences, the inner-worldly nature of Confucianism, the central concept of propriety, piety, the Confucian attitude toward the economy and rejection of the professional expert, the significance of the Chinese classics, the "pathos" of early Confucianism, and its pacifist character.

Part Three considers Taoism, a portion of the book which will appeal mainly to the student of comparative religions. There are pages devoted to doctrine and ritual in China, anchoritism and Lao-tzu, Tao and mysticism, the contrast between the orthodox and heterodox schools, the Taoist hierocracy, the general position of Buddhism, the systematic rationalization of magic, the ethic of Taoism, and sects and the persecution of heresies in China.

The conclusions of this study, entitled "Confucianism and Puritanism," are Weber at his best. "Confucianism hallowed alone those human obligations of piety created by inter-human relations, such as prince and servant, higher and lower official, father and son, brother and brother, teacher and pupil, friend and friend. Puri-

tan ethic, however, rather suspected these purely personal relationships as pertaining to the creatural; but Puritanism, of course, did allow for their existence and ethically controlled them so far as they were not against God" (p. 241).

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In the September 1950 issue of THE ANNALS, devoted to "Moscow's European Satellites," in an article entitled "Political Emigration from Iron Curtain Countries," written by Dr. Feliks Gross, there appeared on page 183 a reference to SRBSKA NARODNA OBRANA. The editors of THE ANNALS wish to assure the members, readers, and subscribers that there was no intention in this article to refer to the Serbian National Defense Council of America or any of its officers or members.

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VOLUME 280 MARCH 1952

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
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ETHICAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE

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PHILADELPHIA
1952

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FOREWORD

SELDOM in history have political institutions been subjected to greater scrutiny than at the present time. In a world where widely divergent theories of government are competing for acceptance, the fidelity and effectiveness of their institutions have become a matter of great concern to the adherents of each particular pattern. To those who hold to the democratic form, the matter assumes special importance. Since democratic institutions are an inseparable part of the democratic way of life, the preservation of their basic character is essential. But more than an acceptable form is necessary; democracy must also provide responsible government, particularly so in times of stress. To the United States as the leader of the Western world, with major responsibility for the future course of events, effective government has become a matter of paramount importance. The problem is one of many facets. This symposium is concerned with only one—honesty among public servants as an essential factor in effective government. In our volume *The Crisis of Democracy* in September 1933 we considered ethical standards in public life as one in many problems of government; today it seems an appropriate subject for wider and more particular attention.

The American system was born as an experiment; it is still an experiment. But it has grown up, and maturity brings greater responsibilities. No longer may we condone our indiscretions as those of infancy or adolescence. Maturity means placing greater responsibilities on public officials and holding them to their trust. It means greater recognition for faithful public servants and a willingness to back them up. It means an abandonment of the fatuous stereotype of many thoughtless Americans that the public service is an inferior occupation and that honesty among public servants is not generally to be expected. On the contrary, maturity means giving to the faithful public servant as high esteem as Americans have traditionally bestowed upon the successful businessman. Political maturity connotes a high standard of ethics in government regardless of what the level may be in business or private life, and the community is entitled to insist that all public servants accept the fact. Again, political maturity involves acceptance of the principle that, although the prevention of unethical practices is a nonpartisan matter, the party in power must assume primary responsibility for what goes on under its auspices, and that it is no defense that revelations of skulduggery by the opposition are politically motivated. (But it does mean that criticism must be honest, that it must not be unfounded character assassination.) Finally, political maturity requires that we re-examine and reappraise public attitudes concerning standards for the public service. With what degree of insistence does public opinion demand honest government? What, first, is the attitude of the electorate? Again, how effectively do the press, the radio, the pulpit, and the educational institutions promote higher standards? To what degree do the pressures of self-seeking groups inhibit legislation in the public interest and corrupt public administration? These are some of the pressing questions which an adult community attempts to answer.

Difficult tasks have been assigned to our contributors. Theirs is the delicate undertaking of interpreting the civic conscience. Then there is the difficulty of recognizing the public interest amid the welter of conflicting private interests, and

of preserving a balanced judgment in the midst of fierce partisan attitudes. Furthermore, there are few absolute ethical standards by which to appraise much that goes on in public life. Although it is easy to recognize the ethical deviations involved in embezzlement and bribery, it is sometimes difficult to assess the moral aspects of campaign contributions, lobbying, and the use of personal influence in public affairs.

We have not attempted to present opposing points of view on the various topics discussed by our contributors. Instead, we have chosen to invite one spokesman on each of a wide range of subjects having ethical implications, and to leave to readers the pleasures of entertaining divergent points of view. If the articles prove as stimulating to others as they have proved to the editors, we shall be content.

CLARENCE N. CALLENDER
JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

Past and Present Standards of Public Ethics in America: Are We Improving?

By ESTES KEFAUVER

THE problem of public ethics is merely a phase of the problem of general ethics. At the bottom of the ethical problem, for both the individual and society, is the conflict between the self-interest of the individual and the more or less collective interest of society as a whole; and the essential problem of conduct can be expressed in the question: To what extent should the purely selfish ends of the individual be sacrificed to or limited by the ends of the society he lives in? Philosophically the conflict is between selfishness and altruism; politically, between self-interest and public welfare.

The standards of public ethics have accordingly reflected and mirrored the standards of private ethics; and the different standards have expressed every philosophical point of view from the cynical to the idealistic. Like that of our culture itself, the behavior pattern of our public life has traced a serpentine course veering between the easy tolerance of cynicism and the inflexible propriety of idealism. Cynicism may have exerted the greater pull, but generally our course has nevertheless tended toward the standards of idealism more and more.

Our standards of public ethics in the United States have been conditioned by certain considerations which, whether or not they have counterparts in personal ethics, have provided certain limitations on our idealism.

The first is the fact that, especially in a crisis, a people's government like our American democracy must act. A democratic government can never leave the battlefield of action, not even to retire to contemplation. At times when the citizens as individuals cannot solve their own problems, ethical or practical, they turn to the government for solution. The people's government cannot abdicate in such a situation; it is forced to cope with the problems its citizens find individually insoluble. This forces a certain need for expediency which drives our thinking on public ethics toward a pragmatic philosophy even more strongly than is the case in our individual thinking.

Secondly, here in the United States we appear to be committed to the basic concept that not only our own progress but the *summum bonum* itself is more likely not only of attainment but of better attainment through the expression of the individual character and will than through the expression of collective wills and characters. This tends to keep us sympathetic to self-interest and also to define general welfare not as the state in which the welfare of the mass of society is greatest, but as the state in which the opportunity for the nobler types of individual self-expression is greatest. This idea obviously leaves much more room for individual interpretation of both ends and means, and therefore for individual interpretations of public ethics; it also tends toward an easier identification of public welfare with self-interest.

DOUBLE STANDARD FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ETHICS

Moreover, our consideration of public ethics has been and still is conditioned by the existence of a double standard of ethics. Although our public ethics mirror the ethics of our private lives, they are by no means identi-

cal. For one thing, there is a greater contradiction in the ends we establish for public than in those for private ethics. I have already pointed out that to some degree the realities of our American democracy drive us into a pragmatic concept of the behavior of the government. But, on the other hand, we have tended to expect much higher ethical standards of public servants than of private citizens, particularly than of citizens in business.

Indeed this trend leads us into a peculiarly one-sided view of public probity. On the one hand, we deny our public servants the right of behavior which is a perfectly normal part of business and private life. On the other hand, when they fail in ethics we tend to place the full blame on them alone. Thus, we excoriate and scorn the public servant who takes a bribe, but we overlook and even forgive the tenderer of the bribe. This tendency led one historian of our corruption to say: "In politics alone, the pimp enjoys a higher moral standing than the prostitute." [1] Moreover, because of this duality it is much more difficult to attain high ethical performance in public life than in private life.

EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS

With these considerations in view, we can examine the evolution of the standards of public ethics in our own past and try to arrive at an answer to the question: Have we improved?

Before the War of Independence the concept of public ethics as we know it today simply did not exist for the simple reason that the concept of general welfare was almost completely nonexistent. In pre-Victorian days England's public servants operated on the principle that a public office was a means to wealth, and this principle was not only accepted by the rulers but encouraged by the fact that few offices carried with them anything but a nominal salary. Bluntly but quite accurately the system of public service could be described as that of selling the bounty of the government for the best obtainable price. Even seats in Parliament were available at a standing price of £4,000 sterling. "Official dishonesty in the Colonial period attained the static and convincing quality of a known science, like arithmetic or geometry." [2]

Graft and bribery of the public servants were an economic factor which every businessman took into consideration, the more so since the scale of values was well known. In a sense the whole populace engaged in the profitable process of mulcting the government —which was after all a hated tyrant— of every possible penny. Indeed, public opinion did not begin to be outraged until the process of graft and bribery began to be pointed at mulcting the populace itself, not so much for the benefit of the king, for he received a pitifully small proportion of even the legal taxes, but for the benefit of the grafters. The taxes themselves were to some extent, one suspects, an early example of "nuisance laws" enacted by the grafters to provide an opportunity for them to sell immunity or amelioration at a price.

The general welfare in the concept of public ethics

The Revolution was to an extent at least a revolt against the corruption and dishonesty of British public service. Moreover, the Revolution not only transferred sovereignty from the king to the people, but also the property of the government from the king to the people. Public servants were no longer custodians for a faraway and hated king, but custodians for the people; and the people no longer had cause for complacency about the theft of that property. The Revolution also established the idea of general welfare as a foil and opposing force to self-interest and self-aggrandizement. Thus the improvement in the *concepts* of public ethics after the Revolution was in itself a small revolution.

However, the habits of a heritage and a lifetime are not easily put away, and though we now had a concept of public ethics the standards of conformance to it were still low. Even during the revolt itself officers had to be cashiered for "drawing more provisions and pay than they had men in their company," to use Washington's own words, or for "seeking by dirty and base means the promotion of their own dishonest gain." A stalwart and hot patriot like Samuel Chase while a member of Congress could try to corner the supply of flour during the war. And Robert Morris was investigated on charges, largely supported by facts, that he used his position of public trust for private gain. At one point Washington was driven to say:

> Such a dearth of public spirit and want of virtue, such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantage of one kind or another, I never saw before and pray to God I may never be a witness to again. I tremble at the prospect. Such a dirty, mercenary spirit pervades the whole that I should not be surprised at any disaster that may happen.

But there was a difference. Where such behavior had formerly been deplored by the virtuous only as a *personal* defect in character it was now being deplored as a sin against a larger interest or ideal—the general welfare. Despite his previous, unquestioned patriotism Samuel Chase was ostracized and refused reappointment to the Congress. And Morris was absolved only because the patriots, as realists, appeared to believe that his contributions to the general welfare were greater than the personal profit he made through his position.

The disposition of these cases produced the first criterion of public ethics. Private profit by public servants at the expense of the general welfare was corrupt; but private profit by public servants obtained as a *concomitant* to service in the general welfare was quite proper. The principle remained the basic criterion of our public morals until a few years ago. Indeed, it was used to justify the conduct of Andrew Mellon as secretary of the Treasury as late as the 1920's; and vestiges of it are still found in our practical approach to the problem.

Realism in public ethics

There ensued a period of what we might call realism in public ethics. The fathers of the Revolution were idealists and radicals; the fathers of our Constitution and the republic it established were realists and conservatives, at least in comparison with the former. It is always easy to identify self-interest with general welfare. In the first years of the constitutional republic the tendency was expedited by the fact that most of the influential fathers of the republic were men of firm convictions, and by the fact that their first concern was naturally to make the government work. So far as public ethics were concerned, the problem of the first sixty or seventy years of the republic was to establish definitions of general welfare rather than standards of ethical performance. The problem resolved itself into a struggle between two groups each claiming that its own self-interest coincided with the general welfare.

On the one hand, there were the conservative mercantile interests whose prophet was Hamilton; on the other, the liberal agrarian interests whose

[1] David Loth, *Public Plunder, A History of Graft in America*, New York: Carrick & Evans, 1938.

[2] William E. Woodward, *A New American History*, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936.

prophet was Jefferson. Since this was not simply an academic contest aimed at arriving at philosophical answers but a matter of real and earnest life aimed at arriving at a working government, neither side, though motivated by highly principled conviction and ideals, was inclined to be very choosy about means. Moreover, although the criterion of public ethics frowned at public servants placing their self-interest above general welfare, it placed no such limitations on private citizens. The contrary was true.

The war had not been fought for any abstract concept of general welfare. It is probably a fair statement that it was fought for the principle that the power of government should be used not to forward the self-interest of the rulers, but to forward the self-interest of the people. The immediate aim of our founding fathers was to make our republic work in this sense. Finally, the people themselves were a product of a society in which the perversion of public service to private ends was the norm. Considering all this, it is a high tribute to the basic integrity of the founding fathers that the standards of public ethics were realistic rather than downright cynical. But their realism made precedent for cynicism, as John Adams, in a remarkable anticipation of the basic presumption of Marxism, foresaw when he wrote:

> In every society where property exists there will ever be a struggle between rich and poor. Mixed in one assembly equal laws can never be expected; they will either be made by the numbers to plunder the few who are rich, or by influence to fleece the many who are poor.

He concluded that government by either faction could therefore only be sustained by "the cohesive power of public plunder."

Since in our early days the power of government was largely concentrated in the legislative branch, it was here that problems of public ethics first occurred. The disillusioned, who do not believe we have made at least some progress in our standards of public ethics, might consider this instance:

Early examples of public ethics

As part of the program of establishing the financial integrity of the new government, the first secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, pressed for and received Congressional approval for the assumption by the federal government of the largely defaulted debts of the states and also for the redemption of the nearly worthless Continental currency at face value. Although this was no doubt a measure in the public interest, it was also in the self-interest of the moneyed classes. Moreover, historians are inclined to agree that the members of Congress who voted for redemption at face value made a personal profit out of the scheme. A suspiciously convenient fire in the Treasury destroyed records before the Jefferson administration could seize them; but what was left of them indicates that at least 16 of the 26 Senators and 29 of 64 Congressmen had acquired more than nominal quantities of state securities or Continental currency, and accordingly that they profited personally from their vote in favor of redemption at face value.

On the other hand, Jonathan Dayton, Speaker of the House (1798–1800), was driven from office for embezzling some $15,000 from the pay and traveling allowance of members. Thus embezzlement of government funds, widespread in colonial times, became a sin against public ethics. For a half-century Jefferson and his agrarian liberals kept the Congress and federal government from becoming a self-profiting servant of the moneyed interests. They insisted that most of the favors the moneyed interests wanted were the prerogative of the states rather than of the federal government. This turned the attention of those who sought these favors to the state legislatures. The corruption, bribery, graft, and incredible lack of ethics in the state legislatures which followed are too well known to require any mention here. But the interests had their friends in Congress too, and many of our national heroes had feet of clay when seen from today's perspective.

In 1837 Congress was concerned with renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States. A large number of Congressmen and government executives had loans, largely unsecured, from the Bank, among them Vice-President John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster.

Members of Congress had large and lucrative private practices, and among their clients were persons vitally concerned with bills before Congress. Both Webster and Clay were counsel for the Bank of the United States at the time when its charter came up for renewal. Webster represented New England businessmen, and once he received from them a "memorial" of $37,000 with, so it was said, no strings attached. While in Congress and even as Secretary of State Webster represented Danish, French, and Spanish claimants for damage by American shipping during the War of 1812. Though these facts were quite well known, they caused little furor except among his political enemies.

The spoils system and cynicism

A landmark in setting the pattern of our public ethics appeared in the administration of Jackson and Van Buren with the establishment of the so-called spoils system. Actually, we know today that Jackson has been considerably libeled in our popular views of his responsibility for and belief in the system. But this administration set a precedent by establishing Burke's principle of party responsibility without clearly defining party obligations to the general welfare. Moreover, by reducing the security of tenure, it discouraged the entrance of men of integrity and honorable ambition into the government and encouraged the lesser men who did enter government service to seek security of tenure by subservience to the party in power and its friends. The consequences can still be discerned in public life.

The realism of pre-Jacksonian days began to ripen into outright cynicism. The Civil War eliminated for a few years the checks presented by the conflicting self-interests of an opposition, and there followed the shabby profiteering during the Civil War itself, the corruption of the Grant regime, and the nearly complete capture of both Congress and the executive branch by the robber barons of the 1880's and 1890's. The judgment of Henry Adams that "one might search the whole list of Congress, Judiciary and Executive during the twenty-five years, 1870 to 1895, and find little but damaged reputations," might be extreme, but it was not entirely unmerited.

Certainly those years represented a low in our standards of ethics and the peak in our tolerance for corruption and in our subversion of the machinery of government, both state and local, to the purposes of private profit rather than general welfare. The general welfare became completely identified with the most selfish self-interest of one group only—the money makers. Moreover, the interests which captured the government not only manned it with their own men but furnished their own ethics—or, rather, their contempt for ethics.

John Adams may or may not have been right in his idea that a conflict of self-interests could produce effective government only through the cohesive power of graft. But events appeared to have proved once more—as they have

in all Western history—that a government committed only to the self-interest of one group breeds corruption as carrion exposed to summer heat breeds flies.

Reform and revolt

The very completeness of the cynicism and hypocrisy however served a purpose. It moved us from reform to revolt. In the last fifty years we found and threw out the corrupt wherever we could; we established laws and machinery to encourage probity and integrity; but we also re-examined and revised the philosophy behind our public ethics.

Since by our peculiar double standard the taker of the bribe is considered more blameful than the giver, we attacked in that direction first. We became more effectively critical about corruption in government. We not only threw out the corrupt wherever we found them, but we discerned corruption in actions which previously had caused no furor. Where the criterion of public ethics established by the First Congress was that private profit by public servants at the expense of the general welfare was corrupt but that private profit by public servants obtained as a concomitant to service in the general welfare was quite proper, today, I think, the qualifying clause has been eliminated. Today, I am sure, most of us agree that the criterion should be: "Private profit by public servants at the expense of the general welfare is corrupt, period."

To make it possible to obtain and hold men of sufficient ability and integrity to live up to this criterion, we have offered them security in the form of Civil Service tenure, and on the whole a scale of pay which, though not comparable with that of private life, is at least sufficient to eliminate excuses for graft.

Until quite recently these measures were highly effective in the federal government, though much less so in our local governments. Perhaps the best measure of their success was the fact that although World War I produced 18,000 new millionaires, not one of them was a career public servant in the federal government. It is all the more dismaying to discover, as we recently have in the Bureau of Internal Revenue scandals, that not only the political appointees, or amateur public servants, but also some civil or professional servants have been involved in highly unethical conduct. This grievous fact points a moral which, though obvious, is often overlooked in practice, that is, that it is not sufficient merely to establish high standards of ethics and a system of civil service but that we must also have public servants whose personal ethics and private probity are high.

PUBLIC ETHICS AND GENERAL ETHICS

Further improvements in our public ethics had to wait for improvement in our general ethics, and these, too, evolved in time. The individual's right to foster his self-interest at the expense of the general welfare began to be more and more circumscribed both by law and by public opinion. The process led first to the period of "enlightened self-interest" which characterized the first quarter of this century. The moneyed interests acquired, partly by their own perception and partly by forced feeding, a standard of ethics of their own in which their own self-interest made some concessions to the general welfare. The public would no longer countenance and capital could no longer afford—either in money or in damaged public esteem—outward bribery and graft. Capitalists learned the trick of capturing public opinion and the machinery of election and found such methods cheaper and more effective, as well as less obviously corrupt and base. Other special interest groups adopted similar techniques.

This less direct approach of the special interests has raised a whole new area of ethical problems and a corresponding set of new sins of corruption. We have in the federal government, at least, reduced the possibility and, to a less extent, the incidence of outright bribery and graft. We appear also to have pretty well reduced the possibility of any further outright capture of our government by a single special interest group. But we have seen grow up, in place of these obvious direct methods, a whole new family of subtle, indirect influences whose purposes are on the one hand to capture the minds and the loyalty of public servants and on the other hand to ensure the election of sympathetic legislators.

We cannot control these indirect corruptions by imposing ethics on our public servants only. We can perhaps, as we seem to be tending to do, make our criterion of public ethics more stringent—make it read: "Private profit by public servants, whether or not it is achieved at the expense of the public welfare, is corrupt." Perhaps, too, as has been suggested, we can spell out the ethics by codifying the particulars in a code of conduct. But these alone will not suffice. Moreover, we cannot go very far in controlling these indirect methods without running into the dilemma that by so doing we may be infringing on the Constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to petition, and other freedoms. We have legislated some limitations, and perhaps we can legislate a few more without endangering our Constitutional rights. For the rest, however, we shall, I fear, have to await a higher ethical standard among the general citizenry.

Benjamin Franklin once commented: "There is no kind of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and frequently fall than that of defrauding the government." We have done fairly well in finding a remedy for Franklin's complaint so far as it concerns our public servants, but we will not achieve really honest and moral government until the comment loses its point when applied to the private citizen. As long as the citizen continues to place his own self-interest so far above the general welfare that he feels justified in employing almost any means of obtaining government favor for his selfish ends, we shall continue to have a climate in which corruption can flourish. Until the citizen's own moral code prevents him from debasing himself by procuring corruption of public servants, the problem of corruption and morality in public life will remain very real and earnest.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE

No adequate public ethics is possible without a clear and accepted definition of general welfare. A public servant cannot be expected to do a good job of protecting the general welfare against the selfish interests of individuals if he does not know what the general welfare is. On the other hand, if the general welfare is regarded as synonymous with the self-interest of one group, he cannot be blamed unduly for doing what he can—short of graft—to forward that self-interest.

Unfortunately, a definition of general welfare is extremely difficult in our American life because of our rightful acceptance of, and even dependence on, individualism. Indeed, to my mind this is the reason why such nations as England and Germany were able to precede us to the achievement of reasonably ethical governments. They have had a much more social concept of the general welfare than we have had. In

both of these countries the relatively easy and simple utilitarian definition of public welfare as the state in which the material welfare of the mass of society is satisfactory was early accepted and established. On the other hand, in America, such a definition would find great resistance, and not from conservatives alone.

However, in the last twenty years we have been slowly evolving a concept of general welfare which, though not yet really defined and certainly far from clear, is finding acceptance and gives some promise of being sufficient to give us a working pattern of public ethics. So far the concept is more negative than positive. Although we may not be able to agree on what the general welfare is we do appear to agree that it is not the welfare of any single self-interest. And we are arriving at a picture, rather than a definition, of the general welfare as a synthesis or community of nonsubservient self-interests. Just how this sort of thing can be attained in practice few of us have a clear idea; but the vision, however vague and blurred, offers us some guidance, not only in our effort to establish standards of public ethics, but also in taking part in the arena of legislative and executive action. Some day, no doubt, the picture will be replaced by definitions clear enough to be used in syllogisms; and when this point is reached we shall have more logic and less mysticism in our standards of public ethics. Meanwhile, the new concept is sufficient to establish the idea in our public ethics that the government, and especially its servants, must protect the general welfare—leaving the nourishment of self-interest to individual citizens, who have thoroughly proved their ability to look after it.

RISE IN STANDARDS OF PUBLIC ETHICS

So, all in all, our *standards* of public ethics are unquestionably much clearer and much higher today than ever before. Indeed this fact is evidenced by the very intensity of our horror at each new instance of failure of our public servants to live up to them. Unfortunately—and here is the rub—our performance and enforcement of our standards fall far short of them. Indeed, in some respects, like the entrance of the criminal gangster into politics, our position is more serious than it has ever been before; the threat to our basic institutions is more menacing than ever. Moreover, it is naturally disheartening to discover that, while we have been closing the doors to the success of the old methods of corruption and influence, our antagonists have been discovering and employing more insidious methods of ingress against which we have not yet established adequate bars.

CITIZEN RESPONSIBILITIES

We have gone a long way since colonial days and even since the start of the twentieth century; but we are still far from any semblance of the millennium. It will take continued vigilance and energy to keep moving. And, if our history shows anything, it shows that we cannot delegate the job entirely to the government. The vigilance at least, and certainly the insistence on high standards of performance as well as high standards of concept, will have to be supplied in the future as in the past by the citizens themselves.

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The Voter's Natural Bent

BY J. T. SALTER

THE subject of this paper is *the voter*. That is like saying that my subject is American civilization. For politics may be equated with life. It is not a detail; it *is* life. And voting, or failing to vote, is an expression of that life. To know the reasons why an individual marks his ballot as he does is to have an insight into the innermost recesses of that individual. Voting tends to make a man thoughtful; it challenges him to examine the record, to get the facts, to put two and two together, to take a stand—and that means to stand off in the privacy of a polling booth and tell what the facts mean.

Election day itself is only an official interruption of an endless process. This interval of several minutes is for the purpose of letting a voter make a record of his opinions on the candidates and the issues that he has been listening to and thinking about for a long time and relating them to a sense of himself and the community he lives in. The official ritual of standing within the isolated polling booth helps the citizen focus his impressions and makes him give them direction. To do this he must think of something beyond his own skin and bones; he is reminded that he is not living alone. He uses his vote for the state, the public—not for a private interest. Grover Cleveland well said: "Your every voter, as surely as your chief magistrate, exercises a public trust."

DIGNITY OF VOTING

In one way or another on election day the American voter considers the old question—Am I my brother's keeper? Thus voting has both a civic and a spiritual significance. It is a process that nourishes the human being and helps him behave like a free man in a free society.

To mark a ballot is to belong to the society of which one is a part. To mark a ballot is twice important. It helps the government to know what the people are thinking: it helps the individual to feel that he is important and a part of the government; the consensus is then one that he accepts. To keep a citizen from voting is a crime against personality. Such action thwarts the development of personality and weakens the government—weakens the social structure. The South, for example, is weaker because fewer people vote. There is something healthy about numbers in politics. Thomas Jefferson once remarked that that government is strongest of which every man feels himself a part. One cannot feel himself a part if his opinion is not asked. He may not vote, but no man wants to be unfairly denied the freedom to decide. That is what freedom is.

In 1947, while waiting at a rural bus stop in a Southern state, I asked a young colored man and woman if they intended to vote for Truman in 1948. They remained silent, and as the bus came, I repeated my question. The woman partly turned as she was getting on the bus and softly said, "You see we are kinda delicate about politics." When one set of Americans makes another set of Americans "kinda delicate about politics," all America suffers.

Voting is a substantial part of a man's freedom. It is more than a symbol; it is the idea and the personality focused

at pencil point on a small square on a ballot in a polling booth; it is democracy's badge of knighthood that carries with it the *noblesse oblige* of study and participation; it is the voter's membership in the body politic. The vote is to the individual in this interdependent day what his stone axe was to his ancestor twenty thousand or more years ago. It is the political arrangement, or weapon, or voice, that gets the citizen what he wants. It is at least the twentieth-century approach to what the individual wants.

NEED FOR ENLIGHTENED CITIZENRY

The voting that I am thinking of—wise voting—has varied facets. Most appropriately it is based on the idea that facts, facts, facts are needed plus the individual background against which to place these facts. For a fact is useless unless one sees its significance.[1]

The basic evil today is not so much greed and selfishness as it is ignorance; ignorance of the pertinent facts and their meaning. "Where there is no vision, the people perish." What can be plainer than that?

This means that education is needed. It means a chance to get all the facts, not merely an authorized version. It assumes that spiritual values are, and are recognized as being, as real as any other values. Law, justice, fair play, freedom, truth, the sacredness of human personality, as well as wheat, electric power, coal, cotton, statistics, and money, are staples of our politics and voting.

Finally, not only the community's attitude toward the voter, but the individual's attitude toward the ballot and elections is a descriptive fact of great significance. To know the voter is to know the individual, and to know the individual is to know the civilization.

Let us consider the nature of politics, the election, and the voter. Each, of course, is fashioned by the other and by the civilization, and, in turn, has much to do with the fashioning of our civilization. One answer to the perennial question about the value of our politicians and voters is to ask: What of our American civilization? What is it worth to the individual and to the world?

COMPLEXITY OF VOTING

Voting is relatively new, and because the mechanics of the ballot is so difficult to understand in the United States, it is likely to seem remote, unsubstantial, and difficult to get at. That is partially because we have a check and balance system, an unnecessarily long ballot and frequent elections.

The long ballot can be, and is being, shortened. But there is a problem independent of the number and kinds of offices to be filled at the polls. Suppose the last Presidential election is considered. Let us even assume that the citizen had been asked to mark *only* one "X"—Dewey or Truman. That would have been a very short ballot, but it would have been as difficult as it was short for a great many people; for I believe that unknown numbers of people did not relish voting for either candidate. And so it may be with every election for a varying number of individuals.

Our Presidential system of checks and balances,[2] bicameral legislature, and federalism has made it impossible, save

[1] The English author Frederic Harrison expressed the opinion that "what you want in a body of electors is a rough, shrewd eye for men of character, honesty, and purpose. Very plain men know who wish them well and the sort of thing which will bring them good." See John Morley, *Oracles on Man and Government* (London, 1923), p. 92.

[2] Our constitutional checks are minimized by unofficial party pressures and connections that make the government run.

in times of stress, for a victorious party to enact its program into law. Politics in America is uniquely American. I think it was Bryce who once said that the special genius of the Americans is their ability to make badly devised governmental machinery work well, rather than to create perfect machinery. Because our political parties cannot carry out the mandate of the people, the people view the parties with a variety of emotions, including those of skepticism and hostility. If the majority party cannot enact the public's program into law, the public is less likely to think in terms of program and issue. For more than a century, from the beginning for many voters, attention is focused on *personality* ("I vote for my friend"), *party name* ("I never have voted for a Democrat. My father said, Don't vote for a damn Democrat; they will get you into debt; they will get you into war"), *nationality* (the three top offices in New York City are held by men of Irish, Italian, and Jewish descent), *religion* (a sheriff said that in the rural towns where the German Catholics predominate, he got every vote but seven; but in the Protestant towns his opponent got the votes), and *personal service*[3] (Congressman ———— says that nine-tenths of his letter mail is from people that ask him to do something. "I try to do it").

THE VOTER HIMSELF

Who is the voter? He is the one who votes. For example, Mr. C. A. Hanan, former chairman of the Dane County (Wisconsin) board has just died in his ninety-second year. He had long been a civic leader, sometimes called a politician, and was a member of his local drainage district committee when he died. Furthermore, "he was proud of the fact that he never missed voting in an election."[4] He was a voter; a rare one, for most of them do not live so long or express themselves at the polls so regularly.

There is one qualification for voting that is not stated in the statutes, but exists nonetheless because of the nature of things. Grover Cleveland said that "before we have a citizen we must first have a man." I add that before we have a voter we must first have a man. A voter is a man that can do two things: he can earn his own living and he can govern himself.

There are millions of voters in the United States but there is no such thing as The Voter, a generalized voter. No two voters are alike, just as no two fingerprints are the same. As far as function and purpose are concerned, however, all fingers are the same (they can all pick up things). Similarly, all voters are the same voter.[4a]

[3] It is also true today that more and more people, when they mark their ballots in national elections, are thinking of the issue—the probable effect of the legislation upon themselves and upon the country. Tony's letter that follows on page 13 is pertinent. See Chapter IV, "Personal Attention," in J. T. Salter, *The Pattern of Politics*, New York, 1940.

[4] *Wisconsin State Journal*, October 12, 1951.

[4a] The voter, even as the rest of mankind, is not immune from flattery. He likes attention of a personal sort. A greeting, kind words, or a smile may count as well as logic in a discussion of the issue. Much depends on the traditions and climate of opinion in the constituency where the election is held. That flattery, though, is a staple in the art of politics is suggested by the stereotype of the word—politician—one who smiles. But the people wanted something besides a smile in 1948. Boswell's Dr. Johnson reminds us that kings as well as commoners like flattery. "It has always been formular to flatter kings and queens; so much so, that even in our church-service we have 'our most religious king,' used indiscriminately whoever is king. Nay, they even flatter themselves;—'we have been graciously pleased to grant.' No modern flattery, however, is so gross as that of the Augustan age, where the emperor was deified;—'*Praesens Divus habebitur Augus-*

THE VOTER'S ETHICS

What are the ethics of the voter—what is the state of one's own ethics? How can this question be answered? Statistics will not give the answer. It is a difficult matter to investigate satisfactorily. One hears about evil politicians; some are promptly thrown out like bad apples, but others continue for term after term. I have found, however, that when an individual is once convicted in a court of law, he is not elected again. (Curley of Boston is an exception.) Regarding other men in politics, men who are denounced in newspapers, in magazines, and over the radio, yet continue to be re-elected, I find that their supporters may be as honest as are their opponents. Their supporters are likely to think that they are doing the right thing. Maybe the political climate where they live is different. A man can vote as he will. And as Bryce once remarked, "A certain bias of mind is not incompatible with virtue." A voter's wisdom may be suspect, even though his ethics is not.

There are different ways, however, of approaching this ethical question. One is to observe what is happening on all sides all the time, or one can learn much by asking the voter himself, or the politician, the voter's alter ego, or just by observing them. I have attempted a combination of these methods.

For a lifetime I have read the papers of my university students on the guest politician who had just addressed our class. Two or three times each term I invite some well-known politician to speak to us about his life in politics. The students then write a brief paper of analysis and evaluation.

The great majority of students in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, or California that write these papers write about sincerity. I do not ask them to do so. I give them a list of more than fifteen probable personality traits that does not emphasize sincerity. It is the one, however, that is interesting to the student. Reading these papers makes me think that if the public man is sincere he has a vital element for success at the polls; at least, if he is not sincere he is not in favor, regardless of what other traits he possesses.

This quality, sincerity, is likely to be associated in the student's mind with such other qualities as hard work, down-to-earth manner of speaking, not too great smoothness of looks, humility, forthrightness, and a sort of old-shoe quality of friendliness. But the student calls it sincerity; or these other attributes are meaningless without it.

Some years ago the Hon. Sol Levitan spoke to my students. He had little or no schooling, he spoke English with difficulty, he had a foreign-Jewish look, he also had much native wit and ability, much personality and individual color, and he was honest. Each class of Wisconsin students loved this man. Ninety-nine students out of one hundred enthusiastically wrote that he had color and sincerity. The parents of these students must have thought the same thing about Mr. Levitan, for six times they elected him State Treasurer of Wisconsin.

This innocent student testimony throughout the years gives a clue to the ethics of the voter. For the student qua voter differs from his parents mainly in that his parents are older and more experienced. The elected politician that pleases the voters of Wisconsin, for example, usually pleases the students in the classroom.

POLITICIANS' VIEWS OF THE VOTER

What does the politician himself think of the voter's ethics? A politician must be something of a specialist if not an authority on this matter; for he would not be elected once or more times if he did not have some intuition about the voter more subtle than that held by the generality of people. I have asked some local politicians and some outstanding members of the House whom I know. I quote a few representative responses.

About fifteen years ago Dr. Harold Groves, a State Senator of Wisconsin who was my neighbor and a professor of economics, told me that honesty in politics was smart politics. The professor served in the Assembly and in the Senate and for a year was a member of the State Tax Commission. Recently I asked him what he thought of the voter's ethics today. He agreed with his earlier declaration and added that, like Churchill, he has yet to find a system of government that is not worse than democracy. One votes both his own interest and the public's interest. The simple virtues constitute good politics. A good character generally wins more than smart techniques.[5] Attlee is "terribly honest but he cannot make a speech."

The Hon. Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House for more years than any predecessor, is a rewarding and refreshing man to talk to. I believe he has served with three thousand members of the House; only Adolph Sabath and Robert L. Doughton have served with more members. Mr. Rayburn gives me the idea that there is something glorious and noble about the profession of politics. He said in an unforgettable way that it was an honor to be elected to any public office. Now I find that Mr. Rayburn thinks that the average voter is a good juror and will usually come up with the right verdict when the facts are fully presented. Voters are not to be spoken down to. They have a high degree of native intelligence. They want the best arguments that can be made on both sides of the question. All this is conditioned by the fact that when the man in politics once gets the voter's full confidence, the man in politics must destroy that confidence himself—no one else can.[6] Is not this true of all the ethical relationships of life that are built on trust?

Voters—new style

From Philadelphia I received a letter from Tony Nicollo (fictitious name), who is a lifelong Republican ward politician and an honest man. Tony's division is in the river ward that was once the home of all the Vares—George, Ed, and Bill. It is an organization ward. I shall quote Tony's letter at some length because it gives an interpretation of the voter since Roosevelt. It seems that Tony does not like the new voter because he is trying to act like a voter and mark his own ballot. He writes:

> What is the Voter like?
>
> Without a doubt in my mind, the greatest question, since Hoover. This question has been bothering me for some time. I have thought about it over and over again. I have disgust this with friends and with political workers, with business men. Yes, it is the question that should be very important to all.
>
> I first would like to take you back, to the days to Bill Vare, when I first got my start the voter was a more grateful person, he was more satisfied with everything in general. He went about his work, or his business, he made a living, he was happy. He appreciated every little thing. A favor, some little remembrance or just your friendship . . . . Then came Roosevelt, well things began to change. People started to get the better things in life, cars, radio's, later two cars to a house, television, better

tus.'" James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (London, 1844), Vol. III, p. 277.

[5] One must be able to sense the feeling and opinion of the people and be able to communicate with them.

[6] Letter from Speaker Rayburn to the writer, August 18, 1951.

working conditions, more money. People started to live and try to keep up with the Jones's, then came the second world war, and boys started to go away to war. Many were just kids satisfied to just get along.

They went into the service and many became sergeants, and other officers, many became hero's, well when they came home you had a different boy to contend with. One little example. A family who were very friendly to me in the division, the parents respected me and I was a sort of a little tin God to them their children had to respect Mr. [Tony], or they would get their pants slapped. The boys all thought a lot of me, they came to me for everything, then two of them went away, they kept in touch with me by letters, and I in turn kept up with them. Then they came home, what a difference, one of the boys came to see me one day and after a lot of glad your back and so on, we sat down, and he began to tell me that he was now used to giving orders and he did not think he could let me have him do as before that he knew the score now and that he was going to do what he thought was right, well if ever I was set back, well here it was, the kid who I could almost make do anything for me now telling me where I stood, I took it in stride and it wasn't long that I learned that this sort of thing had effected a good number of other boys almost in the same boat. So you can see we are dealing with a different voter today, yes we can say because of the good time, the war and lets not forget, the average boy today is far more educated and a good deal more independent. So much so, that today, he doesn't know his own relations, does not chum with his neighbor, but plays it big, he goes out sees things goes places, parents have trouble, they won't even listen to them. They have their own set ideas. Telivision keeps people home, they see educating programs, listen to all the news going on and so is more up to date on everything I am amazed the way the people in my own division have changed. Over and over again, they tell me of the great improvements that have happened to them, their children and how they feel about conditions, where in years oh say about in the twenties, they never looked at all the stuff that they do today.[7]

Good in the long run

The Hon. James W. Wadsworth of Geneseo, New York was known in the House Office Building as the Congressmen's Congressman. When he spoke the other members were most likely to listen with attention and approval. He served twelve years in the Senate before he was elected to the House. He served there for eight years and retired at the beginning of the Eighty-second Congress.

Mr. Wadsworth characteristically remarked that he did not think he was competent to add much to my investigation, but then he continued:

> I am willing to state, however, that my experience in public life, commencing back in 1904 when I was first elected to the Legislature in New York and continuing down to the present day, persuades me that for a long-long pull the voter puts up a pretty good performance. True, upon occasion, large numbers of voters have been carried away in an atmosphere of hysteria. In many instances they have followed an hysterical or demogogic leader but I have noticed that they are very apt to recognize the error considerably in advance of some of the leaders they have been following and that eventually, having learned the lesson settled down to a calm and thoughtful consideration of the issues which confronted them. Such a performance indicates to me the correctness of the old adage—to wit: "Truth Must Prevail!" or words to that effect.
>
> Another thing I have noticed with respect to voters is that a lot of them are very apt to forgive a public office holder for doing things contrary to their wishes, providing they are convinced that the public office holder is absolutely honest in the stand he has taken. Indeed I think it may be said that a goodly portion of the voters are tolerant so long as the atmosphere in which they do their thinking is free from hysteria.
>
> These are general observations and I am convinced they are reasonably correct. But if the voter is persuaded that Government owes him a living and will make him secure from the cradle to the grave then he will surrender his control to an all-powerful Government and his reactions thereafter will not depend upon depth of conviction.[8]

[7] Letter to the writer, August 27, 1951.

PUBLIC EVALUATION OF VOTING PERFORMANCE

On the first day of the new term I asked my class in Political Parties and Citizenship how well the students thought the voter is doing his job. Nine out of ten students said that he was doing his job poorly. Five students thought that he was doing well, or fairly well; fifty-one thought he was doing poorly. One girl expressed the tenor of opinion in the class when she said that not enough people vote, and "on the whole I do not believe that the voter is well enough informed, nor makes much of an effort to become well informed."

The student's reaction to the voter's performance or to the politician and his works is likely to be the same as the public's; both are generally bad. This is strange in a country that loves democracy. William Hazlitt once remarked that "no reader of history can be a lover of kings." That is one reason why the people prefer to govern themselves. The people can do for themselves better than another can do for them. The people are the voters and the politicians. The people, though, criticize voters, politicians, and politics with gusto. They are criticizing themselves; they consciously or semiconsciously know it. And they know that Jesus said that none is perfect. By criticizing politicians and voters (by wearing a hair shirt as it were), democratic man, illogical as he may be, finds comfort.

[8] Letter to the writer, August 14, 1951.

VOTER PARTICIPATION

The voter is criticized because he does not vote or because he votes only half the time. Half of the qualified people vote in Presidential elections, and if there is an issue, as in 1928, 1932, 1936, 1940, or 1944, more than half of the electorate goes to the polls. The voting record varies greatly from state to state and from election to election within the same state.

What is the optimum percentage of voter participation? Truly not 100 per cent. For if 100 per cent of the people voted, we would probably be on the brink of revolution. There would certainly be a fever in the body politic. Everyone entitled to the privilege should be urged to mark his ballot on election day, but in a free society enjoying domestic tranquillity and stability it is not entirely surprising that half of the people or more stay away from the polls. They do this for various reasons. Some may be willing to see either candidate elected, or nominated. Others may be undecided as to how to vote. Or people may believe their vote to be futile under the circumstances. This is an unfortunate viewpoint in a land where other people believe that anything can be accomplished in politics that the people will set out to accomplish.

There is, however, a difference between politics and elections. Politics is life, and an election is one approach to that life. It may be the significant approach, but there is talk, and more talk; and there are letters and petitions and editorials and other approaches of the individual, ranging all the way from an effective public address to a bang on the head.

There is a pertinent cartoon in the *Saturday Evening Post* of December 8, 1951. An irate householder with his arm in a sling, his left eye blackened, and a bandage around his head is explaining to a friend who has just called: "All I can say is, for a guy who never bothers to vote, he certainly takes politics seriously." Any reader is likely to number among his acquaintances a person or two (or he may be such a person himself) who studies the issue and often talks about some political personality or question but may not vote, or may not vote in every election.

Only 13.6 per cent of the adult people in South Carolina voted in the 1948 Presidential election.[9] This is not the first time that South Carolina has had a smaller percentage of its adult population voting than has any other state. Does this mean that the people in the Palmetto State of John C. Calhoun are not interested in politics?

I quote Howard P. Cooper, the editor of the *Beaufort Gazette*. "I doubt," he writes, "if there is another state in the union that could claim to talk as much politics and vote as little politics as South Carolina. It is not because South Carolinians are not politically conscious. They are—very." [10]

An outstanding public servant in a country in the tropical Orient told me that her people did not have the right idea about politics. They do not see it as the organization of social goods for the people; they see it as a cockfight, a lot of treats, a friendly smile or word of recognition. All can agree that this is not a mature or helpful way in which to consider politics. The same can probably be said for the attitude of the people in South Carolina and in any other state where only a small fraction of the people vote.

LIMITATIONS OF POLITICS

If politics is the great servant of the people, the question may well be asked, Why, at so many points, is life still "short, nasty and brutish"?

The ways of government are mysterious, and ballots are not simple. Through politics, however, the people are refashioning their environment. This does not mean, though, that the citizen can vote poverty, disease, ignorance, and crime out of existence today. When, for example, has the individual had a chance to vote slums out and modern housing units in? Before some needs of the voter can be met, spadework must be carried on in the form of study, discussion, and organization.

Man is not logical; he is a frail reed, but as Pascal declared, he is the toughest reed in the world. To charge the voter with neglect for the evils that exist in our civilization is like holding the public school and the universities responsible for the crime in our society. The voters and the schools are responsible; we are all responsible; none is perfect.

The goal is improvement—more people voting and more attention to the issue and the roll call. If the citizen does not know his congressman, whose failure is that? If the legislator provides leadership in his constituency and instructs the people on the why of the issue, the people will know who he is and what he amounts to. The task of the politician includes the job of the teacher.[11]

[9] Voting statistics prepared by Library of Congress. Reported by Senator Humphrey in *Congressional Record*, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (June 25, 1951), pp. 7192–7194.

[10] Letter to Mr. George Black Rea, July 4, 1947.

[11] Lincoln, the politician, was a teacher; he has been buried for nearly a century, but he is still teaching the people. He once said that his opponent, Douglas, was a man with tens of thousands of *blind* followers. Lincoln added, "It's my business to make some of those blind followers *see*."

Voters may be debauched through the wrongful use of public money. Old-age pension plans may be socially useful, or they may be disastrous. The same may be said about the veterans bonus, farm parity prices, special tariff legislation, for any interest. The leadership of the eager group as well as the political leadership must show the members that in the long run any special interest group is most favored when its objectives are brought into harmony with the public interest.

If my definitions are less conclusive than I should wish, that is partly because in pondering the voter one is reminded of Bismarck's observation: "In politics the influence of imponderables is often greater than that of either military power or money." Yet, in spite of the merit of this valued insight, the voter is usually, when the facts are known, an understandable person. He wants to know whom his party is serving, and whether his party is meeting the urgent problems of the day.

POPULAR GOVERNMENT PREFERRED

The voter seems to have a nose for smelling out dictators—a natural bent for candidates that believe in government by the people as well as for the people. Authoritarian candidates, whether fascist or communist, are foreign to the voter's taste. He goes home when he marks his ballot; he votes on the principle of "blood of my blood and bone of my bone." He is more tolerant of an incompetent than he is of one who hates democracy. Abraham Lincoln is his greatest hero, and Abraham Lincoln is the best spokesman popular government ever had.

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Political Parties and the Public Interest

By E. E. Schattschneider

SINCE politics deals with the attempts of people to live together peaceably and well, it is obvious that ethical questions are close to the essence of politics at all times. This is especially true of the management of the largest and most powerful political organizations produced in our civilization, the political parties. The fact that the future of the American people and perhaps the future of the greater part of the human race may depend on the work of these political organizations inevitably implicates our whole value system in most of the great controversies developed by the parties.

To say that the conduct of people engaged in party politics is to be judged by the moral standards commonly accepted by the community in nonpolitical matters is to make an assumption about politics, however. To speak of morals in connection with party politics is to assume that the parties are deliberate, purposeful, and responsible forms of social activity carried on by people who know what they want to achieve and are able to act accordingly; for there can be no ethical basis of politics if we suppose that political behavior is irrational and uncontrollable, or if we assume that parties are what they are because they must be. In this article we assume, therefore, that the parties are what we make them and that we are responsible for the parties we produce, because we can create any kind of party system we have the intelligence and the energy to create.

Questions of morals in politics can be defined very largely in terms of the public interest. If the party system serves the public interest broadly, it is reasonable to suppose that it can be defended on moral grounds. For this reason it is proper to discuss the relations between political parties and the public interest in this symposium. Party politics deals with conflict. Whether or not any conflict is good or evil depends on what it is about and how it is carried on. It is necessary therefore to see, first, what kinds of conflicts lend themselves to exploitation by the party system.

Conflict and Unity

All politics consists of attempts to organize and exploit the conflicts and agreements in our society for some purpose considered good or desirable by the manipulators of the system. Ideas about conflict and unity are inherent, for example, in all concepts of democracy, in all ideas about liberty, and in majority rule, all of which assume that there will always be differences of opinion and conflicts of interest in the community.

It is not always equally well understood, however, that every conflict necessarily implies unity within the antagonistic and conflicting groups, interests, minorities, and majorities. This is true because conflicts become possible only when each of the contending factions can mobilize and consolidate its own supporters. Without such unification no faction could function as an instrument of conflict, and no conflict could be developed beyond its most rudimentary forms as a disorganized and amorphous brawl. Therefore every cleavage or alignment necessarily unites people while it divides them, and the

unifying aspect of the process is as important as is the dividing aspect.

In a complex society the potential number of conflicts of interest and opinion is certainly very large; theoretically, it approaches infinity. At first glance, therefore, politics in a free and complex society seems to consist of an expanding universe of conflicts in which people divide and divide and divide endlessly. A little reflection, however, will satisfy most people that any political system that emphasized and exploited all conflicts and tensions would simply explode.

Conflicts Among Conflicts

It is necessary to understand something about the relations among conflicts to understand why a free system of politics in a democratic society is possible. The multiplication of conflicts in a free society is restricted by the fact that conflicts interfere with each other, because the lines of cleavage never or rarely coincide. In an extreme case, lines of cleavage may cross each other at right angles, and may tend therefore to neutralize each other completely or to subordinate one conflict to the other. If the conflicts in this case are of equal intensity, they will tend strongly to immobilize everyone. On the other hand, if they are of unequal intensity, the more intense will blot out the less intense conflict.

An extension of the logic of the foregoing argument leads to the conclusion that the conflict among conflicts is so great that an indefinite multiplication of conflicts is extremely unlikely even in a free political system. Not only do conflicts compete with each other, but the more intense conflicts suppress or subordinate or blot out the less intense.

The very fact that people must close ranks in order to engage effectively in any conflict compels them to subordinate a great multitude of inconsistent antagonisms, which are then neglected, disapproved of, explained away, and forgotten. The point of this discussion is that it is conflict itself that forces people to unite, that unity is a function of conflict, and that as a consequence the number of conflicts that can be developed in a free society at any one time is limited.

The history of American politics is full of examples of the conflict among conflicts. Thus sectionalism tends to suppress class conflict, and vice versa; international conflict tends to repress domestic conflict (though sometimes class conflict may become international in scope and may therefore interfere with nationalistic conflicts). American politics is today profoundly influenced by the way in which cleavages related to the social structure are tending to interfere with traditional sectional alignments, and by the tendency of foreign policy cleavages to be incompatible with domestic policy cleavages. The Solid South for a considerable period of American history was "solid" because all other conflicts were subordinated to the requirements of a sectional racial policy. Thus also there has been a tendency in American politics in recent decades to subordinate local issues to national issues.

The very fact that conflicts interfere with each other and that there is therefore a sort of hierarchy of dominant and subordinate conflicts in which one may be used to destroy another makes it possible to manipulate the political system.

Achieving Unity Within Factions

How is unity within the factions produced? It is chiefly the more or less spontaneous consequence of conflict. The greater the conflict, the greater the unity. It follows that unity is not produced primarily by a precarious negotiation among great numbers of conflicting

minorities and interests within the alignment. Primarily, it is the result of the consciousness of the overriding conflict and the realization by all who find themselves on one side or the other that they must stand together.

Once the conflict is well exploited, therefore, the members of the alignment discover for themselves with relatively little assistance why it is important that they work together. When this happens, there is a transvaluation of goals, internal conflicts are deflated, there is a shift of emphasis from what once seemed important to what now seems important, people who were once hostile discover new virtues and attractions in each other, and old causes of conflict are forgotten. In these circumstances people merely rediscover the truth of the Oriental proverb that the enemies of their enemies are their friends.

This process can be accelerated by political leaders who invent generalizations and rationalizations useful for this purpose and promote better relations and a more co-operative attitude by a number of familiar processes; but principally people unite for common action because once the line is drawn and conflict is in the air, people want allies with whom they can combine against a common antagonist. Cohesion is part of the process of conflict, and it is as strong and as vigorous as is the conflict itself.

The upshot of this process is that the greater part of the total tension in the community, like an iceberg, is submerged. As long as this tension remains at a subpolitical level, it cannot be exploited.

Leadership and Democracy Use Conflicts

Moreover, the only interests and alignments that count in politics are those that are *actually exploited.* It follows that we always have some kind of choice among the bases of conflict (considering conflict and agreement as instruments of power). This is an application of the formula of "divide and rule" not exactly in the original sense of the phrase. Politics is not simply a process of divide and divide and divide; neither is it a question of getting everyone to agree about everything to produce a new kind of concurrent mapority. Leadership and power in a democratic society imply a willingness to draw a dividing line and to exploit the division so underlined in order to create a majority with the power and will to govern. At the same time, the greatest of all democratic rights is the right to "take sides" in the controversies so produced.

The kinds of cleavages we are likely to prefer and therefore to exploit are closely related to what we want to accomplish. Whoever is able to make prevail his concept of how the nation should be divided for political purposes is likely also to run the country. For this reason, people who have discovered that one kind of alignment works well for them are likely to be alarmed at any attempt to shift the basis of conflict. As long as any given cleavage can be perpetuated, the majority produced by that cleavage will be kept in power. Conversely, a new majority can be produced only by drawing a new dividing line which brings about a new set of alignments.

Every conceivable kind of division can be made to serve some purpose. Thus, the Marxian class struggle is a concept of conflict designed to produce a revolution. Theories of interests such as "government by pressure groups," which now have a certain vogue in the United States, are designed to implement the power of the business community, the segment of society most intensively organized in pressure groups and most strategically based for this kind of politics. Sectional alignments serve certain interests extremely well while they frustrate others; alignments based on the social structure are likely to produce a social policy that could not be sustained in any other kind of alignment.

Diagnosis of Alignments

Since the conflict of conflicts forces us to choose among a variety of bases of division and unity as a means to power, what criteria can we apply to the competing claims of the proponents of the various and incompatible alignments that are offered to us for support?

In the first place, *all* divisions are dangerous to some extent. Certainly all concepts of conflict become dangerous if they are pushed too far. It is worth remembering that the form of alignment which produced the greatest of all political disasters in American history (the Civil War) was sectionalism, which is now sometimes admired as a "safe" basis of politics. The overemphasis on the development of special interest pressure groups in American politics has produced a political base for inflation and war that may yet involve the country in a great catastrophe.

On the other hand, alignments that were satisfactory at a time when local questions seemed most urgent are not likely to satisfy the demands now made on the political system. Moreover, all cleavages look bad to the people who find themselves excluded from power by them. In the last analysis, the kind of cleavage we prefer is likely to be determined by what we think is most important.

Two Kinds of Politics

For the purpose of distinguishing between cleavages that are likely to seem desirable or undesirable, it is possible to differentiate roughly two different kinds of politics.

There is, first, the kind of politics that is likely to develop when no one is greatly concerned about the future of the community. When the stability and permanence of the community are assumed with sufficient confidence, it is possible for individuals and factions within the community to pursue their special ends as if the larger questions did not exist.

This was the nature of American politics for two generations before the beginning of World War I. Even as recently as the middle 1920's, politics seemed to be very much like some extremely individualistic system of economics in which the stability of the system was assumed and each individual pursued his own private aims with no other thought than his own private gain. The parallelism between the economic theories and the political theories of that period is remarkable.

The political theories of Arthur Holcombe, an ex-economist, illustrate this kind of thinking. He treats politics essentially as a private matter based almost altogether on private and special interests acting very much as they act in the economic system. The political process therefore becomes a kind of capillary activity in which very many independent private decisions at widely scattered times and places may produce a statistical tendency but in which nothing like a conscious national decision is ever reached.

Although Professor Holcombe sometimes refers to the public interest, he has no clear and comprehensive concept of the subject. Throughout his writings, he shows that he does not distinguish sharply between the functions of the political system and those of the economic system; nor does he see that the alternatives and choices in the economic system develop differently from the way in which they develop in the political system. The theory and analy-

sis developed by Professor Holcombe are more appropriate, therefore, to the Coolidge era than they are to American politics in the 1950's.

On the other hand, instability or revolutionary change, war, and international tensions and crises tend to produce the politics of survival, in which private and special interest conflicts are strongly subordinated to a dominant concern for the preservation of the great common interests of the nation. These interests may have seemed remote or unreal when the stability of the community was taken for granted, but there is no doubt about their overwhelming force when the time comes to balance the lesser against the greater interests.

The difference between the two varieties of politics described in the foregoing discussion (roughly the shift of emphasis and the change of feeling and point of view Americans have experienced in the twenty-eight years since the election of Calvin Coolidge) is sufficient to invalidate a host of political generalizations made a generation ago. Contemporary politics cannot be understood in terms of private and special interests exclusively. The situation calls for a clear concept of the public interest.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS

The public interest may be described as the aggregate of common interests, including the common interest in seeing that there is fair play among private interests. The public interest is not the mere sum of the special interests, and it is certainly not the sum of the *organized* special interests. Nor is it an automatic consequence of the struggle of the special interests (a struggle in which everyone demands too much and feels entitled to it).

It is a serious misconception to regard the special interests as selfish and the public interest as unselfish. This is not the distinction. Each of the members of the crew of a ship at sea in a storm may have an individual selfish interest in survival, but only a very stupid person can fail to see that all will perish or survive together.

To understand the relations between the public and special interests it is necessary only to remember that if the community is threatened, all special and private interests are equally jeopardized. All property, all privileges, all security, all tenures, all expectations, all commitments, priorities, and values, become extinct if the society which established them is destroyed. Every crisis in the life of the community illuminates the social nature of all private and special interests.

As a political matter there is no doubt about the overwhelming power of the public interest once circumstances make it possible to draw the line and once the issue has been defined. No special interest could demand of people the sacrifice of money involved in modern taxation or the incomparable sacrifice implied in military service. The war mobilization now going on is not accounted for in terms of the pressures of special interests. As far as business is concerned, the defense mobilization of the economy produces a tremendous dislocation in which industry loses the initiative in the economy and is no longer master of its own house.

As far as the general public is concerned, it is impossible to imagine any combination of special interests able to provide a political base for compulsory military service. For that matter, what combination of special interests exerted sufficient pressure on the government to bring about the adoption of the Marshall plan? In view of the extreme weakness of consumer organizations, is there any adequate explanation of price controls in terms of *pressures?*

The truth is that the pressure concept simply does not explain what is now going on in American government.

POWER OF PUBLIC INTEREST

Indeed, Lasswell's famous definition of politics as who gets what, when, and how has very little relation to the realities of 1951. The function of politics is now very largely to explain to people why they must make greater and greater sacrifices. Austerity is not so harsh in the United States as it is in England, but only a very obtuse person would suppose that he could now promise the American people less harsh taxation or less drastic military service or relief from priorities and allocations and price controls and a less burdensome prospect of very heavy public expenditures, and be taken seriously. The truth is that it is politically possible to make great demands on people because the public interest is extremely powerful.

One consequence of this situation is that the men and the parties responsible for the making of policy decisions are forced to resist the demands of special interests because they know that unwise decisions, however great the pressure may be at the moment, will involve them in disaster a few months hence. It was never less true than it is now that public policy may be permitted to be the mere resultant of the pressures of the special interests.

The nature of modern public policy (economic stabilization, control of inflation, war mobilization of the economy, the integration of defense and foreign policy) creates a new kind of politics. The *dominant anxieties* in the community are neither local nor special. Whether we like it or not, we share these anxieties with most of our fellow citizens because the ultimate question involved in them is the future of the community and all that that implies. The scramble of private and special interests for concessions and advantages at a time when the whole community is involved in a struggle to continue its existence as a community is reminiscent of what Abraham Lincoln once said about people who try to rent rooms in burning houses.

CONFLICTS ABOUT PUBLIC INTEREST

The distinguishing characteristic of modern politics is that it is based on conflicts about the public interest rather than on conflicts among special interests. It is the principal function of politics to defend the public interest. The fact that both sides are concerned with the public interest conditions the conflicts tremendously, but it does not produce unanimity. Conflicts about public policy are real because there are real differences of opinion about what the best public interest in any given situation may be, but there is likely to be a broad base of agreement about the ultimate objectives of public policy among all who participate in this kind of politics. Therefore, controversies about the public interest are the least dangerous kind of conflict.

The circumstances of contemporary public affairs give controversies about conflicting interpretations of the public interest a dominant place in politics. As long as politics was a private matter dealing primarily with special interests, the tendency was to divide people into relatively small groups. On the other hand, the cleavages produced by differing interpretations of the general interest necessarily divide people broadly, because the alternatives are so defined as to appeal to the widest possible public support. That is, people who are defending their own concepts of the public interest are bound to believe that everyone ought to think as they do, and they are likely to address their appeals to the whole nation. The more successfully controversies about the public in-

terest are exploited, and the greater the ascendancy of these conflicts, the greater is the subordination of a great multitude of lesser conflicts.

General Policies Necessary

The dominance of conflicts of opinion about the public interest is made greater by another circumstance. Modern public policy involves general measures and general control of the government at its highest levels. There is no *local* defense against inflation, and no special interest can find a special remedy for instability in the economy, just as no locality or interest can hope to survive untouched if the community as a whole is destroyed. General control of the government and its operations implies several things, however.

First, it means that public affairs must be discussed in terms of public policies. This is necessary because the operations of the government are so large that they can be understood only in terms of general policies; this is true of people in the government and outside of it. The process of generalization, the simplification of alternatives, the establishment of general rules and classifications within the system, are therefore essential instruments of democratic government under modern conditions.

It does not seem likely that the country can survive if it does not develop a capacity to take charge of its own affairs. At one time it was possible to let the course of public affairs be determined by an accumulation of detailed and relatively minute decisions made at widely scattered times and places by individuals who treated each decision as substantially a private matter. Speculation about the future of American politics now is based on the realization that capillary political processes are not adequate to deal with the situations in which we find ourselves today. It is necessary for the community to take conscious control of its affairs by making deliberate high-level decisions.

Importance of Majorities

Another consequence of the situation described here is that majorities (as a part of the process of making decisions about matters of public concern) assume a much greater importance than they did under the older system. The only satisfactory political base for general policies concerning the public interest is a majority. As long as politics was treated as a private matter, it was possible to conceive of the political process in the framework of concurrent majorities (in modern terms this means government by the unanimous consent of all special interests). But once it becomes necessary to make any great decisions, the community is forced to use the oldest and best-understood device for making decisions—*the majority*. The numerical majority has a role to play in modern government because we can no longer wait for the vegetative processes of an infinitely disintegrated system to solve our problems.

It follows that it is the function of political leaders to seek decisions on the greatest issues of public policy in terms that produce the majorities which alone can give any body of political leaders general control of the government and provide a stable base for public policy. The state of public affairs calls for the development of general alternatives by which the principle of majority rule can be exploited. At a time in which the nation needs to give direction to its affairs, a period in which public business must be discussed in terms of general policies, at a time when the greatest decisions must be made and broad policies require stable support, the failure to produce a numerical majority and the failure to use the principle of majority rule may be fatal to the survival of the whole regime.

Majoritarian Politics and Public and Private Interests

There is some danger that the whole concept of the majority may be destroyed by political theorists who think of politics exclusively in terms of private and special interests. These theorists describe a majority as a mere aggregate of special interest groups. From this they conclude either that the majority is oppressive and dangerous or that the majority is necessarily so divided as to be ineffective. The difficulty is that these theorists have no concept of the public interest. A majority is conceivable only terms of controversies and differences of opinion about the public interest because as a practical matter it is impossible to combine enough special interests to form any numerical majority.[1]

Why is it impossible to create a majority by forming a combination of special interest groups? First, because the special interest groups are usually very small and the accumulation of a majority by a process of trading with these groups one at a time would involve political leaders in an impossible task. This is doubly true because it is rarely possible to win the whole of any group by this process. Moreover, if the groups can be appealed to only on the grounds of their special interests, the complexities and conflicts within any possible majority become so great that it is inconceivable that the majority could ever take any decisive position on any question. It is not surprising, therefore, that Professor Holcombe, who thinks almost exclusively in terms of special interest groups is led to write about the natural limits on the power of majorities.

Second, the *organized* special interests probably amount to substantially less than a majority of the people in the country, even if all of them could be brought into one combination.

There is no historical basis for the notion that anyone ever has produced a majority merely by forming a combination of special interests. Majorities are produced by general controversies about the public interest. It is not surprising that political theorists who have no theory of the public interest should end by denying the validity and usefulness of the whole idea of the majority.

Public Interest and the Party System

As long as majoritarian politics is pursued in terms of controversies over the public interest, it may be carried on with great vigor without endangering the stability of the regime, because the public interest is best defended when competition for power is conducted on these terms. If the purpose is to exploit as fully and as effectively as possible the potentialities of general divisions about public interests, it follows that the form of political organization best adapted to this use is the political party. The parties are the only political organization established on a scale sufficiently extensive to mobilize a country-wide majority. However inadequate the traditional party structure may have been for these purposes, it is obvious that no other form of political organization can begin to compete successfully with it in a general conflict about broad policies for the control of the government at its highest levels. Therefore,

[1] Professor A. N. Holcombe's *Our More Perfect Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950) is the best single statement of the political theories here criticized. I am indebted to Stephen K. Bailey for calling to my attention G. D. H. Cole's illuminating introduction to Rousseau's *Social Contract*, Everyman's Library Edition, in which he discusses this point.

it is not unreasonable to suppose that the party system is likely to feel increasingly the impact of the modern development of public policy.

A political party is merely an arrangement in which a large number of people co-operate for the accomplishment of certain common purposes which they could not achieve acting alone or in smaller groups. As such, the parties are simply what we make of them. The party system is shaped, therefore, by the answer we make to the question, What at any given period in our history is politics about?

Whatever the functions of the party system may have been a generation ago, it seems likely that the future development of the system will reflect the dominance of general conflicts of opinion about the public interest resulting from the new world situation of the United States.

It is unreasonable to expect the parties to be moral for us or to expect the system to produce a high moral order by some automatic process. All that we have a right to expect of any political system is that it will give us a reasonable opportunity to do something effective to protect the great public interests of the community. About all that can be said for the parties is that they are the kind of political organization best adapted for these purposes, or are more adaptable to these purposes than any other political organization now available to us.

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International Ideals and the National Interest

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

IF all men were saints and all women angels, the Marxist ideal of the "withering away of the state" could doubtless be readily realized. All government is a reflection of sin, at least in its coercive and enforcement functions. Conscience keeps most mortals virtuous and assures conformity to the mores. But the weaker vessels among us are ever tempted to transgress and must be deterred from ways of vice through fear of force and prospect of punishment—and, if vicious, kept confined—by the organized power of the community. Ethics, as translated into law, are thus buttressed by policeman, jury, judge, and jailer to the end that all decent citizens may go about their business in peace, free of the evils of anarchy and lawlessness.

These truisms are universally accepted in all ordered societies and are peculiarly sacred in the Anglo-American tradition. They admit of application to the problem of "morality" and of "law and order" in the society of nations. The problem itself, however, is the product of a paradox. Moreover, the customary application of the generalizations or "principles" already referred to is the fruit of an analogy which is ancient, revered, and all but unanimously embraced by the present generation, but nevertheless so false (it will here be argued) as to be misleading and dangerous in the highest degree. The paradox has never been more striking, nor has the analogy ever been more fanciful and hazardous, than in our own time. Both are deserving of the closest scrutiny on the part of all who strive for straight thinking about the confusing interrelationships of ethics and power in the tangled fabric of motives and acts comprising the community of states.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS

An initial instance of sin in international conduct may be briefly disposed of at the outset—not because it is rare but because it is usually self-evident and always tangential to our central problem. Few would dispute the proposition that when public power is used to serve the selfish interests of some section of society rather than the safety and welfare of society as a whole, the result is at once bad morals and bad politics. Charles A. Beard, in his still notable study of *The Idea of National Interest* (1934), suggested that the American "national interest" has often been identified with, or defined in terms of, the aspirations or demands of particular sections, classes, or aggregations of private wealth or enterprise. An extreme case is represented by Major General Smedley D. Butler's bitter comment in *Common Sense,* November 1935:

> I spent thirty-three years and four months in active service as a member of our country's most agile military force—the Marine Corps. I served in all commissioned ranks from second lieutenant to major general. And during that period I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. . . . Thus, I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank to collect revenues in. . . . I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I

brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras "right" for American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested.

To the degree to which this harsh judgment is warranted by the facts (a matter with respect to which no opinion need here be ventured), the pattern of policy thus described would be deemed by all to be a flagrant example of abuse of power, and of the corruption of the national interest by private profit seekers. The Mexican and Spanish-American wars have often been characterized in these terms by commentators of the more cynical sort. The memory of "dollar diplomacy" is still fresh. If it could be demonstrated (as is not the case, despite the weighty work of the Nye Committee in the mid-1930's) that American intervention in World War I was dictated less by the national welfare than by the influence of banking houses and munition makers, greedy for blood money, the moral sense of all good citizens would obviously be outraged by the fact.

The same sentiment is sought to be evoked in efforts by the Communist press and by *The Chicago Tribune* to denigrate the Marshall plan by reference to the profits of Will Clayton's cotton company and of various Manhattan banks, and to discredit the American rearmament program by reference to the allotment of defense orders to General Motors, General Electric, Ford, and other giant corporations.

Authentic instances of the corruption of diplomats and strategists, within or without the law, by private business interests come readily enough to hand in almost all countries. They need not here be reviewed, for they do not differ, save in their locus, from other cases of skulduggery on other levels of government discussed elsewhere in these pages. In our epoch the use of private business interests, with suitable profit to those used, to serve the purposes of diplomacy and strategy is a more common pattern. But this relationship is almost never regarded as unethical or "corrupt"—apparently because the use of business by government to serve allegedly public purposes is morally distinguishable from the use of government by business to serve obviously private purposes. Yet neither of these relationships, however worthy of careful analysis, cuts to the core of the dilemma of right versus might in the international community.

ETHICS AND RAISONS D'ÉTAT

The problem of international ethics lies in a different dimension. In all politics those who acquire power, wield it, and seek to retain it, have from time immemorial been judged to occupy a position with respect to moral standards which is not quite the same as that of ordinary citizens or private entrepreneurs. Some have demanded from statesmen, as from clergymen, a higher level of integrity and probity than it is reasonable to expect from laymen. Others, and these more numerous, have perceived that the statesman, precisely because he is responsible to his state—and to his dynasty, party, cabinet, parliament, or some other incarnation of the commonwealth—must base his decisions not merely on the superiority of virtue to vice, but on a shrewd calculation of the probable political consequences of his acts.

Politics seldom offers choices between good and evil, but only between greater evils and lesser evils. No one willingly admits that the end justifies the means. But when the end is envisaged as the security and well-being of all the members of the community, the means appropriate thereto offer a wider ethical latitude than is generally regarded as acceptable in the service of private purposes. Raisons d'état are often invoked

to excuse crimes and to transmute sin into virtue. "If we did for ourselves what we do for our country," Count Cavour once remarked, "what rascals we should all be!"

This relative flexibility of moral norms, allowed to all politicians, is most marked in matters having to do with foreign relations. This is the case precisely because the society of sovereign states is not a united community or an ordered and organized polity possessed of a government capable of enforcing a code of law. International organization does not have these attributes, nor is international law anything more than a set of rules which sovereigns habitually observe out of calculations of convenience and expediency. The society of sovereignties, lacking effective government and enforceable law, is a society in anarchy, wherein, as Hobbes put it, life tends to be "poor, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short," and wherein force, rather than fraud or favors, is the ultimate determinant of the distribution of influence, indulgences, and deprivations.

It is therefore the obligation of every statesman to pursue power rather than virtue. Under anarchy the virtuous who lack power succumb, while the powerful who lack virtue often survive. For states no less than for individuals, survival is the first law of life. The resultant paradox is well stated in the words which W. Somerset Maugham, in his charming novel *Then and Now*,[1] puts into the mouth of Niccolò Machiavelli:

> In this world it is only necessary to seize power and hold it and the means you have used will be judged honorable and will be praised by all. If Cesare Borgia is regarded as a scoundrel it is only because he didn't succeed. . . . In this world of sin and sorrow if virtue triumphs over vice, it is not because it is virtuous, but because it has better and bigger guns; if honesty prevails over double-dealing, it is not because it is honest, but because it has a stronger army more ably led; and if good overcomes evil, it is not because it is good, but because it has a well-lined purse. It is well to have right on our side, but it is madness to forget that unless we have might as well it will avail us nothing. We must believe that God loves men of good will, but there is no evidence to show that He will save fools from the result of their folly.

[1] Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1946.

THE FALSE ANALOGUE

All politics is "power politics" in a community lacking a common government able to enforce order and law. Since power politics makes might rather than right the test of success and survival, its devices often involve deceit and violence. Its imperatives appear morally outrageous to those—for example, most Americans during most of our history—who assume that sovereign states ought to be guided by the same ethical precepts binding upon nonsovereign individuals in societies ruled by governments.

The customary remedy proposed for this sad condition of affairs is based on an equation of the society of sovereignties with a society of individuals. Six centuries ago Pierre Dubois elaborated an approach to the problem which has been followed ever since and is even more popular in the twentieth century than in the fourteenth. He proposed a Council of Europe and a court, whereby peace would be preserved through the excommunication and military coercion of any lawbreaking and peacebreaking sovereignty by the combined body of all law-abiding and peace-loving sovereignties. This conception was reiterated, with only minor variations, by George of Poděbrad, Émeric Crucé, the Duc de Sully, William Penn, the Abbé Saint-Pierre, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, Count Metternich, William Ladd, Woodrow Wilson, Maxim Litvinoff, Franklin D.

Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and innumerable others.

If the test of truth is the capacity of an idea to fascinate the minds of men and to secure the approbation of the most respected philosophers and statesmen of Christendom, then the notion that peace and morality among nations are best served by the formula here suggested is indubitably "true." But if the criteria of validity are derived from the pragmatic consequences of hypotheses in action, then this conception is, unhappily, nonsensical if not altogether irrational.

In every system of sovereignties, states act to protect and promote their interests—not to defend or vindicate ethical ideals. When the two conflict, the former invariably prevail over the latter, save where statesmen assume the role of Don Quixote to the embarrassment or ruination of their states. The distribution of power, moreover, among the seventy-odd sovereignties of our state system bears no resemblance to the distribution of power among individuals in a civil society. The so-called "community of states," acting collectively, can conceivably enforce "law" and "morality" on such sovereignties as Monaco, Denmark, El Salvador, or Luxembourg—though the problem never arises, for obvious reasons. But no aggregation of the "virtuous" against the "wicked" can coerce such sovereignties as America, Russia, China, or India without a world war resulting. Sovereignties, furthermore, are not permanently divisible into categories of "peace-loving" and "aggressive," since incentives, necessities, and opportunities for aggrandizement or defense are constantly changing.

Effects of international policing

It may finally be noticed here that the "burglar-policeman" or "cops-and-robbers" conception of international relations is operationally unworkable because the risks and costs are as great to those who undertake the "police action" as to the "criminals." In Walter Lippmann's words (January 15, 1951), this conception

> proposes to achieve peace through law by calling upon great masses of innocent people to stand ready to exterminate great masses of innocent people. No world order can be founded upon such a principle; it cannot command the support of civilized men, least of all democratic men, who respect the individual and consider it the very essence of justice to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent, the responsible and the irresponsible.

Despite these considerations, which have only to be stated to become self-evident, most civilized men have in fact embraced, often with passionate conviction, the idea that morality among nations can best be promoted by envisaging the society of sovereignties as a community of individuals and by organizing the "good" to "enforce law"—that is, to wage war—on the "bad." The actual nature of international society is suggested, albeit unwittingly, by Lawrence Frank, as quoted by Hubert H. Wilson in *The Nation* of November 24, 1951 ("Cynics and Feeble Good Men"): "So long as our society has no clear aims or purposes but to grant individuals opportunity for self-aggrandizement, there is no reasonable basis for deprecating racketeering." In the face of the facts, so perceptive and sensitive an observer and so able a political scientist as Senator Estes Kefauver can yet write:

> As the leading nation in the world today, it is not enough for us to control the domestic criminal at home; we must lead in controlling the international gangster abroad in the world. . . . There is a parallel between the code of the domestic criminal and the social philosophy of the totalitarian state. Both are predatory. Both have the same insolent disregard for man's freedom.[2]

DESIGN FOR MURDER

The contemporary confusion in the minds of men over problems of right and might in international relations has sources so various and complex that it seems unlikely to be resolved in what time remains to Western mankind to avoid another and final orgy of mutual murder and suicide. Its roots are enmeshed in the fallacious analogy already noted. Its branches are entangled in three wholly different sets of motivations which have become hopelessly ensnarled one with another.

The first is the familiar principle of the balance of power according to which every state, if it is to survive as a sovereignty, must join forces with others by diplomacy and by arms to prevent any other state from attaining such a preponderance as to jeopardize the independence of all the rest. This principle, plainly, has nothing whatever to do with morality but has to do exclusively with calculations of power.

The second is the moral injunction to resist evil, to fight evil, and to suppress evil—an imperative which, in its pure form, denies all calculations of power as "dishonorable" and directs its disciples exclusively to the vindication of ethical precepts. (We must leave to the chroniclers of the intellectual and spiritual history of Christendom the problem of why Western mankind has ever been so addicted to ferocious inquisitions and armed crusades against sin in the name of Him who urged His followers to forgive their enemies, turn the other cheek, and resist not evil.)

The third is the delusion of "collective security," according to which, contrary to all reason and experience, all sovereignties are to be made "moral" by solemn covenants of self-abnegation and by arrangements whereby all sovereignties will jointly punish each sovereignty that breaks the peace.

The first of these guides to action is, or ought to be, elementary wisdom for all statesmen. The second is a madman's formula for what Charles A. Beard once called "perpetual war for perpetual peace"—since the wicked, like the poor, are with us always, and all efforts at their forcible reform or extermination can have no result other than wholesale slaughter and devastation. The third is a hallucination (as demonstrated anew in Korea), with its actual as distinct from its anticipated results comparable to the second imperative. The mingling of all three into a murky mélange of public attitudes and policies is productive of consequences which can be regarded as conducive to the vindication of moral values or to the promotion of national interest only by those wholly hypnotized by their own semantic devices of self-deception.

In our century Woodrow Wilson was the most eloquent moralist in politics to give voice to the theses that "any war anywhere is everybody's business" and that peace was to be had by agreement of all states to wage war on any state taking the sword. The tragic futility of this endeavor in the 1930's has not prevented most Americans from embracing it with redoubled fervor in the 1950's. Thus the American Association for the United Nations asserted in April 1951 that

> the principle of collective security is as sound today as when the United Nations took action to repel the aggression against the Republic of Korea on June 25. The nations must profit by experience. The experience in Korea clearly demonstrates the necessity for improvement in collective security action.

[2] *Freedom and Union*, October 1951.

Thus Secretary Acheson reported to the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, June 1, 1951:

> The operation in Korea has been a success. . . . It has been charged that the American and Allied forces fighting in Korea are engaged in a pointless and inconclusive struggle. Nothing could be farther from the fact. . . . [Yet] no one can predict when the fighting will stop and when the aggression will end.

And thus Warren Austin, speaking at Georgetown University, June 11, 1951:

> I end where I began: with the apparently paradoxical thought that the way to peace may sometimes lie through bloody battlefields. . . . The forces of the United Nations are fighting for a principle beyond mere rational advantage: the principle of world order. . . .

WAR FOR PEACE

The degree to which modern mankind, in its ambivalent pursuit of morality, security, and power within the context of a system of rival sovereignties, has entrapped itself in an apparently insoluble dilemma is amply demonstrated, for all with eyes to see, in the frustrations of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. World War I, fought as "a war to end war" and "to make the world safe for democracy," delivered Russia and then Italy, Germany, Japan, and Spain to totalitarian dictatorships and paved the way for a far more disastrous conflict. World War II, fought in the name of the "Four Freedoms" and enduring peace, eventuated in the extension of new tyrannies over much of Europe and Asia and in frenzied preparations five years after "victory" for another and greater war in the name of peace. In both cases, the aspirants to global hegemony were smashed, but all other fruits of victory were lost in the sequel.

In making ready for the next round, the rulers of the Scarlet Empire have relentlessly waged war in the name of peace, while American spokesmen have repeatedly championed peace to be achieved by war—as when Secretary of the Navy Matthews in August 1950 urged Americans to launch a "preventive war" and thus become "an aggressor for peace," and Senator Patrick McCarran a year later opined that "the United States should make it clear to all the world by everything we say and do, that our objective is the overthrow of the Soviet dictatorship by all means at our disposal."

Under these circumstances, principles of ethics in international relations have no operational function save as devices to rationalize the quest for aggrandizement (or for the diminution or destruction of the dangerous power of others) and thus to persuade the gullible that the dictates of *Realpolitik* are equivalent to the injunctions of morality. Georg Schwarzenberger, in the monumental second edition of his *Power Politics*,[8] observes:

> The primary task of international morality, as actually applied between states, is to reinforce state policy. If states are in search of territorial expansion, they do not normally justify their demands on grounds of the economic or strategic assets they wish to acquire. They refer to the need for "natural" frontiers or to a "natural" right of access to the sea. Allies, who band themselves together against a third power, do so in the interest of peace and security, if not of mankind at large. . . . Gestures of this kind are addressed primarily to public opinion at home and abroad. . . . As compared with an appeal to public opinion on legal grounds, a case based on principles of international morality has a special appeal. . . . The ideological use of international morality reaches its highest pitch when public opinion has to be prepared for war or to be sustained in a prolonged struggle. Then every conflict between the powers is elevated into a struggle for the highest moral principles which each side has equally at heart—until the stage of peacemaking is reached. Thus, within a system of power politics, the chief function of international morality does not consist in controlling one's own behavior, but in the use of morality as a powerful weapon against potential or actual enemies (pp. 225–27).

[8] New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951.

DANGERS IN EQUATING ETHICAL IDEALS WITH NATIONAL INTEREST

Sober reflection on human fortunes suggests an addenda to this contention. Efforts to equate "national interests" with ethical ideals as a means of eliciting public support sometimes eventuate in equation of the "ethical ideals" with national interests in the minds and acts of policy makers. When this transposition fosters prudence, moderation, and forbearance in foreign policy, its results may be happy rather than disastrous.

But more commonly the consequence of this confusion is a firm resolve to fight sin, by force if need be, in order that virtue may be vindicated—in a spirit of rashness, self-righteousness, and fanatical intolerance. The customary result is exemplified in "Holy Wars," the so-called "Wars of Religion," and the increasingly frenzied ideological "crusades" of our own times—for "democracy" or "Greater East Asia" or "liberty" or "Aryan race purity" or "the dictatorship of the proletariat" or "freedom" or "anti-imperialism" or some other abstraction having no practical relevance to the concrete interests of nations or the actual lives of men, but capable of stirring them to mighty exertions in mutual butchery.

The point, though obvious, is forever ignored or hotly resented by those who mistake symbols for realities. Yet it need not here be labored. All of us live in a world wholly dedicated to this pathetic misconception of the relationship between the ends and means of ethics and politics. In his essay on "War," William Graham Sumner in 1903 said all that needs to be said on this score. He was writing of the Monroe Doctrine. The process he describes is equally applicable to the Truman Doctrine, the Molotov doctrine, or any other doctrine whatever, once it becomes a guide to foreign policy.

> If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betray him against himself. Civilized men have done their fiercest fighting for doctrines. . . . What are they all? Nothing but rhetoric and phantasms. Doctrines are always vague; it would ruin a doctrine to define it, because then it could be analyzed, tested, criticized, and verified; but nothing ought to be tolerated which cannot be so tested. . . . A policy in a state we can understand. . . . A doctrine is an abstract principle; it is necessarily absolute in its scope and abstruse in its terms; it is a metaphysical assertion. It is never true, because it is absolute, and the affairs of men are all conditioned and relative. . . . Any politician or editor can, at any moment, put a new extension on it. The people acquiesce in the doctrine and applaud it because they hear the politicians repeat it, and the politicians and editors repeat it because they think it is popular. So it grows. . . . It may mean anything or nothing, at any moment, and no one knows how it will be. You accede to it now, within the vague limits of what you suppose it to be; therefore you will have to accede to it tomorrow when the same name is made to cover something which you never have heard or thought of. If you allow a political catchword to go on and grow, you will awaken someday to find it standing over you, the arbiter of your destiny, against which you are powerless, as men are powerless against delusions. . . .
>
> The President of the United States talks about it and he tells us solemnly that it is true and sacred, whatever it is. . . . He says that, on account of the doctrine, what-

ever it may be, we must have a big navy. In this, at least, he is plainly in the right; if we have the doctrine, we shall need a big navy. . . . [And] if you prepare a big army and navy and are all ready for war, it will be easy to go to war; the military and naval men will have a lot of new machines and they will be eager to see what they can do with them. . . . A wiser rule would be to make up your mind soberly what you want, peace or war, and then to get ready for what you want; for what we prepare for is what we shall get.

EXITS FROM CHAOS

In revulsion against the monstrous consequences of basing foreign policy upon ethical abstractions which are the first casualties of the wars to which they lead, a growing host of American thinkers and writers, despite the unpopularity of their position, have sought in their several ways to persuade their fellow citizens to return to the precepts of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson (and of Hume, Gladstone, Disraeli, Talleyrand, Churchill, and others), according to which diplomacy and strategy should serve the "national interest," pragmatically defined, rather than moral ideals which are incapable of realization in a system of separate sovereignties. Space is lacking for a survey of such pleas. They include the writings of the late Edwin M. Borchard, Harry Elmer Barnes, Walter Lippmann, Lawrence Dennis in his weekly analysis *The Appeal To Reason,* and sundry other authors. Two current instances will suggest the flavor of the whole.

Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago has long decried the folly of moralistic crusading in international relations and urged the prudent practice of *Realpolitik.* His recent book, *In Defense of the National Interest,*[4] is an eloquent defense of this conception. His central contention is a puzzling, yet persuasive, contradiction: a "selfish" foreign policy is more "moral" than a "moralistic" foreign policy, which is in fact "immoral" when tested by results. He writes:

> Self-preservation for the individual as well as for societies is not only a biological and psychological necessity, but in the absence of an overriding moral obligation a moral duty as well. . . . The antithesis between moral principles and the national interest is not only intellectually mistaken but also morally pernicious. A foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles.[5]

More recently George F. Kennan, in *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950,*[6] states much the same position as follows:

> I cannot resist the thought that if . . . instead of making ourselves slaves of the concepts of international law and morality, we would confine these concepts to the unobtrusive, almost feminine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest in which they find their true value—if we were able to do these things in our dealings with the peoples of the East, then, I think, posterity might look back upon our efforts with fewer and less troubled questions (pp. 53–54).
>
> I see the most serious faults of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years. . . . It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints. This belief undoubtedly represents in part an attempt to transpose the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual law into the international field and to make it applicable to governments as it is applicable here at home to individuals. . . . It is the essence of this belief that, instead of taking the awkward conflicts of national interest and dealing with them on their merits with a view to finding the solutions least unsettling to the stability of international life, it would be better to find some formal criteria of a juridical nature by which the permissible behavior of states could be defined (pp. 95–96).
>
> This legalistic approach to international relations is faulty in its assumptions concerning the possibility of sanctions against offenses and violations. In general, it looks to collective action to provide such sanction against the bad behavior of states. In doing so, it forgets the limitations on the effectiveness of military coalition. . . . We see that the legalistic approach is closely identified with the concept of total war and total victory, and the manifestations of the one spill over only too easily into the manifestations of the other. And the concept of total war is something we would all do well to think about a little in these troubled times. . . . It is not only a question now of the desirability of this concept; it is a question of its feasibility. . . . In a sense, there is not total victory short of genocide, unless it be a victory over the minds of men. But the total military victories are rarely victories over the minds of men. . . . I am frank to say that I think there is no more dangerous delusion, none that has done us a greater disservice in the past or that threatens to do us a greater disservice in the future than the concept of total victory (pp. 99–102).

The dichotomy between "international morality" and "national interest" is not the fruit of moral or mental confusion. It is an inescapable imperative of effective political action in every system of sovereignties in which statesmen must be concerned with calculations of power while moralists and laymen, bewitched with the legal fiction that "states" are "persons," are no less concerned with the precepts of ethics. Since other powers feeling themselves threatened by an expanding power will at some point resist its further aggrandizement, relentless pursuit of power spells war—which is the ultimate negation of all morality. But relentless pursuit of ethical ideals, in the usual form of fighting sin, also spells war, since we live in a world of inescapable diversity in which populous nations and formidable powers can always be counted upon to reject, to the death if need be, any particular definition of virtue sought to be imposed upon them by the power of others.

Secretary of State Acheson in an address to publishers on June 29, 1951 sought to bridge these gaps in an utterance remarkable for its political and ethical ambivalence:

> Korea's significance is not the final crusade. It is not finally making valid the idea of collective security. It is important, perhaps, for the inverse reason that, in Korea, we prevented the invalidation of collective security. . . . What we must do is to be conscious of our national interests. A commitment is a national vital interest of which we have become conscious and for which we have made provision, but we may have national interests, which are just as valid, of which we have not become conscious and for which we have not made provision—about which we should immediately become conscious and about which we should immediately make provision. . . . I have no doubt there is a point beyond which the United States cannot go, but I am equally sure that we are not anywhere near that point.

Ethical ideals and propaganda

Kennan, Morgenthau, and other like-minded analysts of the human scene are contending that under present and foreseeable circumstances a prudent concern with "national interest," reasonably defined, is likely to be less conducive to wholesale violence and global catastrophe than an impassioned solicitude for the messianic and millenarian vindication of moral values. With this

[4] New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, especially pp. 25 f., 73, 81, 117, 165 f., and 211 f.

[5] "The National Interest Versus Moral Abstractions," *American Political Science Review,* December 1950.

[6] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

view the present writer finds himself in full agreement—but without conviction that its propagation in the public prints will necessarily alter the determination of policy makers in Washington and Moscow to "save the world." This fatuous and foredoomed enterprise has enormous popular appeal and is a weapon of politics which policy makers are always reluctant to abandon.

We are faced, then, with the probability (not yet the inevitability) that the loftiest ethical standards—mistakenly applied to world politics where they can in the nature of the case have no meaning and no possibility of effective implementation—may become the slogans of symbol manipulators whose task it is to rally public support for Gargantuan adventures in mutual murder and destruction. In this melancholy event, it may confidently be forecast that all ethical norms will vanish in a prolonged holocaust of devastation in which the victors, if any, will hang the surviving leaders of the vanquished, in the best traditions of savagery disguised as civilization, and most of mankind will sink into an anomy and barbarism wherein moral values, as hitherto understood, will become as inconsequential in national and private affairs as in international relations.

World government and moral precepts

Temporary escape from this prospect may conceivably be found in a sagacious return to *Realpolitik* in East and West alike, with a concomitant abandonment of all "crusades" of the virtuous against the wicked. Permanent surcease from irreparable calamity is possible only through a revolutionary transformation of the society of nations in the direction of world government. This goal is not attainable in our epoch through the military subjugation of one group of powers by another. Whether it may become attainable through voluntary agreement among all powers depends upon the imaginations of men and upon their willingness and capacity to translate the ancient dream of human unity into a functioning political reality. Only on this condition can moral precepts have instrumental meaning in international affairs. For the condition presupposes that some minimal code of ethics and law for the entire world community will be accepted by, and can therefore be enforced upon, all mankind—not through the coercion of states by states, which always means war, but through the effective application of rules of law to individuals, which sometimes means peace, order, and justice.

In the absence of such a revolution in attitudes, policies, and institutional arrangements, all national action in world affairs dictated by "morals" rather than by "interest" threatens the betrayal of the interests which are thus ignored and the destruction of the morals which are thus sought to be vindicated.

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The Presidency as Moral Leadership

By ERIC F. GOLDMAN

EVERY so often the big black limousine would roll out of the White House, and Mrs. Harding, the empty whisky bottles tucked under the lap robe, would give instructions to head for a remote ravine. It was all right for Warren Harding, the businessman and editor, even the Senator, to be casual about his habits. It was decidedly wrong for Warren Harding, President of the United States.

There is something very special about the Presidential office, no doubt, and that something has often produced notable changes in its occupants. Sometimes the change has been toward a mere surface respectability, as in the case of Harding; more often, it has represented a growth in courage, breadth of thinking, and vision. Men of considerable dimensions take on an awesome bigness once they assume the office. The biography of Abraham Lincoln, for example, is essentially the story of a somewhat aimless, shifty politician who became a President of iron purpose and profound humanity. Average men discover unexpected wisdom and strength within themselves. The classically mediocre Chester Arthur, for years a routine politician who was little disturbed by grafting, suddenly emerged a stanch champion of clean government. The most inadequate men find at least the discernment to recognize their inadequacy. "I am not fit for this office . . . ," Warren Harding would tell intimates as he roamed the house where Abraham Lincoln had lived.[1]

The feeling that the Presidency is a post far removed from workaday thought and action has been so fixed in the public mind that millions have demanded of the Chief Executive standards which they never would have thought of exacting from themselves or from their own circle. An acutely snobbish eighteenth century never quite forgave John Adams for allegedly suggesting that the President be called "His Excellency." A generation which winked when businessmen said "Nothing is lost save honor" wondered darkly why Ulysses Grant accepted the gift of an expensive home. And thousands were so shocked by Harry Truman's reference to an "s.o.b." columnist that they announced the country should get "that s.o.b" out of the White House.

American Presidents have often tried to define this peculiar aspect of their office. "The White House," said Theodore Roosevelt, "is a bully pulpit." The Chief Executive, Woodrow Wilson put it, "is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can." Probably Franklin Roosevelt came closest to the heart of the matter. The Presidency, Roosevelt declared shortly after his original election, "is not merely an administrative office. That is the least part of it. It is preeminently a place of moral leadership."[2]

[1] Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present* (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 99.

[2] *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1932. The Theodore Roosevelt quotation is from Edward S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1941), p. 267; the Wilson quotation, from Woodrow Wilson, *The President of the United States* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1926), p. 43.

DEFENDER OF THE FAITH

Roosevelt, who was no man for the intricacies of definition, left the phrase "moral leadership" dangling without much explanation, but nevertheless he had pointed to a real and important aspect of the Presidency. Every society has certain values which it considers essential beyond the self-interest of any individual or group of individuals, and it seeks in some one human being the symbol and ultimate guardian of these values. For Americans, that one human being is the man whom they choose to call, with all the grave dignity of the title, "Mr. President."

The essential values of most Americans have been an amalgam of patriotism, religion, and democratic aspirations. The patriotism has insisted that the Republic be preserved intact against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The patriotism and democratic aspirations have combined to identify the American way with freedom, justice, and abundant opportunity for all citizens. Patriotism, democratic aspirations, and religion have joined to maintain a bedrock emphasis on the home, family life, and honesty, forthrightness, and decency in human relations.

For considerable periods during the history of the United States, most Americans have felt that their basic values were reasonably secure. At such times, they have sought no fire-burning crusading from the White House. They have given their respect, even their enthusiasm, to Chief Executives whose moral leadership amounted to little more than keeping an ample lap robe over any personal peccadilloes and uttering the proper sentiments concerning the Union, Opportunity and Motherhood. At other times, the general public, either gradually or in a sudden surge of apprehension, has come to feel that some fundamental of the American ethos was in peril, and then they have turned to the White House for rousing and exacting moral leadership. If the leadership was forthcoming, the country as a whole followed, even if thousands grumbled about "dictatorship" all the while. When it was not forthcoming, the American people felt their way through another election, sometimes through a series of elections, until the devious processes of their electoral machinery placed in the Presidency a strong man with a cause.

FOR THE HOUR, THE MAN

The United States was born in the midst of its first moral crisis. The Republic itself was in question. Would it really work—this bold attempt to combine great freedom and practical organization under the Constitution? No other nation had ever tried it; Europe was openly skeptical, often derisive. At this point the country found the firm moral leadership of George Washington, who kept reminding his fellow citizens that something more important than their private concerns was at stake. "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the Republican model of Government," Washington declared in his first statement as President, "are justly considered as *deeply*, perhaps as *finally*, staked, on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people."[3]

The country responded; the experiment worked. Then, welling up out of the facts of everyday living, came a second great issue. It was all very well to assume that American freedom gave every man an equal chance to enjoy the delights of success. But as a practical fact, how equal was opportunity when seaboard commercial interests were

[3] John C. Fitzpatrick (Ed.), *The Writings of George Washington* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), Vol. XXX, pp. 294–95. The italics are in the original.

steadily bending the activities of the federal government to their own advantage? First under Jefferson, then two decades later under Jackson, the American people found a Chief Executive who resummoned them to the ideal that government should exercise itself to keep the avenues of opportunity open for everyone.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the issue posed by George Washington pressed for attention again. Could this extraordinary experiment of union and freedom really be kept going, now that the powerful slave domain was tugging in the opposite direction? The frantically careering North tried to brush the issue aside, compromised its way through administration after administration, then, prodding and being prodded by Abraham Lincoln, took its moral stand. The Union, above and beyond any region's special interests or desires, had to be preserved.

For almost three decades after the Civil War, the United States had all the appearances of a nation that had suddenly and irrevocably relegated honesty to the Sunday schools. Callous adventurers flung together economic empires to the plaudits of ministers, professors, and the corner groceryman. Politicians ravaged the public resources with only flurries of protest. The "smart man," the businessman and the public official who could maneuver, bludgeon, or steal his way to a fortune, had become the glamour figure, to be excused his frailties as a later generation was to forgive movie stars their divorces. Thinking back to his boyhood in a Delaware town of that period, one social commentator has recalled that if A-B-C marks had been given, the ratings would have run something like this: a radical thinker, E; a lover of the arts, D; an inventor or a scientist, C; a good parent, B; a good salesman, retail B, wholesale A; and a "first-rate businessman," with all that implied, A++. The civic-minded rated the same dim C that was given to that stereotype of the drunken ne'er-do-well, the newspaperman, or the disgraceful waster of opportunity to rise in the world, the man who cultivated the arts of love.[4]

Delicate choice

Slowly, in two stages, the reaction came. In its most obliviously careering moments, the United States has never been entirely free of the disturbing tap on the shoulder from its Puritan tradition. Mounting hard times in the agrarian areas and an increasing frustration of ambition in the cities made the ways of Washington less and less easy to dismiss. In the election of 1884, for the first time in the history of the country, the major issue was corruption in the federal service, and the Democrats presented as their candidate Grover Cleveland, apostle of the doctrine that "public office is a public trust."

One incident of the campaign illustrates, in a way that has never quite been paralleled, the process of the American people feeling their way toward significant moral leadership. The United States has always assumed that the sexual habits of its Chief Executive would be proper beyond the severest scrutiny of the ladies' clubs; the President is to have only one wife, and he is to confine his amorous activities to her. (As late as 1940, Franklin Roosevelt, reckoning the Presidential possibilities of his friend, Harry Hopkins, made Hopkins' divorce the No. 1 of his "handicaps."[5]) In the middle of the campaign of 1884, the *Buffalo Evening*

[4] Henry S. Canby, *The Age of Confidence* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934), p. 241.

[5] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), pp. 95–97.

Telegraph flatly accused Cleveland of being the father of an illegitimate son, and the Presidential candidate could reply only: "Tell the truth." The Cleveland forces reeled in consternation. Gleefully, the Republicans chanted:

> Ma! Ma! Where's my pa?
> Gone to the White House
> *Ha! Ha! Ha!*[6]

But Cleveland's opponent, James G. Blaine, was bespattered by accusations that he had used his senatorial post to line his pockets. When the votes were in, the country had found its way through all the issues of the campaign, even through the distracting moral question involved in bastardy, to a decision on the overarching moral issue of restoring honesty to the democratic process. To adopt the language of one Cleveland supporter, the voters made the nice distinction of sending Cleveland to the White House, where he could exercise his moral leadership against public graft, and of remanding Blaine to private life, which he adorned.[7]

The cycle of moral issues

Cleveland had not left the White House when a second reaction was making itself felt to the roar of crumbling political dynasties. The Cleveland years marked a high point in the transition from an agrarian, small-town America to an industrialized, urbanized society, and the transition left millions sure that America as the land of wide-open freedom and opportunity was more in danger than it had ever been before. A large part of the public was soon joining in President Theodore Roosevelt's crusade against "malefactors of great wealth." The country tried Roosevelt's suggestion for a successor, William Howard Taft, quickly found him too amiable for moral leadership, and responded to the cathedral summonings of Woodrow Wilson.

The moral leadership established by Wilson as a domestic reformer was soon transferred to his wartime Presidency, when the issue of the security of the Republic asserted itself once again. In the early 1920's the Harding scandals almost created the type of major moral crisis that Cleveland had met; but the situation was easily handled by the Coolidge administration and was passed over without requiring of Coolidge any crusading beyond a kind of picklish honesty. After the respite of the later 1920's, Hoover's boggling before the depression storm opened the way for Franklin D. Roosevelt's call to the faith that, stock crashes and bread lines notwithstanding, the American dream of freedom and opportunity would endure. Then Roosevelt, like Wilson, passed over to the moral leadership of the defense of the Republic.

The two Roosevelts, Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, and Wilson—these are the eight Presidents who, by summoning their countrymen to look beyond selfish interests at a time when a large part of the population felt that essential values were at stake, have provided effective moral leadership. Since moral leadership is the ultimate test of the Presidential office, it is not surprising that the whole group are also among the most highly esteemed of all American Chief Executives.[8]

[6] Allan Nevins, *Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1947), pp. 162–69.

[7] M. A. DeWolfe Howe, *Portrait of an Independent, Moorfield Storey* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1932), p. 151.

[8] One of the most interesting surveys of the esteem in which American Presidents are held was undertaken by Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger several years ago. He asked fifty-five historians or political scientists throughout the country to rate the Chief Executives (excluding William Henry Harrison and Garfield, who served only short periods, and President Truman, whose record was just in the making). The consensus called Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt "great" Presidents, and placed Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt (along with John Adams and Polk) in the "near great" category. See note 1 *supra*, pp. 95–96.

WHERE THEY CAME FROM

These eight men came from exceedingly varied backgrounds, ranging from Lincoln's rail-splitting youth to F.D.R.'s boyhood at Groton; but their origins are not without a pattern. All the essential values of the United States were formed in a society that was fundamentally agrarian. Consequently, the values are part of a powerful national tradition which tended to assume that the urban businessman was a slick conniver at dishonest government, the chief blockage in the way of sweeping freedom and opportunity for everyone, a schemer with his eye so fixed on material gain that he might even hurt the defense of the Republic for profit. Over the years the country rapidly urbanized, and all sections of the population dropped a good deal of their hostility to the man of industry and commerce; but in times of moral crisis, the suspicion of the businessman has never entirely disappeared. Not a single one of the Presidents in whom the American people found important moral leadership came from a predominantly business background.

Four of the eight Chief Executives were not particularly associated with practical politics—General Washington, Thomas Jefferson, a jack-of-all-gentlemen's-trades, the planter-soldier Jackson, and Wilson, only a few years removed from Princeton University. If the remaining four had spent most of their mature lives thinking about or practicing the art of getting office, they were politicians whose careers, at least to some extent, were connected with battles against the regular organizations. Lincoln was first elected President as the candidate of a maverick third party. Cleveland had risen to the governorship of New York as the hero of the anti-organization Democrats. Both Roosevelts first gained public attention by opposing established leaders within their parties.

This disassociation of the outstanding moral leaders from old-line politics is no accident. The American depreciation of the mere politician is as old as the country, and it was driven deep into the public mind by the events of the post–Civil War era, when going along with the organization was likely to mean serving as part of a cabal that was engaged in a cynical looting of the public interest. Historically, the man with a predominantly political stamp has not been the type to whom Americans have been willing to entrust their more anxious moments.

The nonpolitician who was also a military hero has a confused place in the story of moral leadership. Throughout American history, war heroes have often been boomed for the Presidency on the grounds that they would be magnificent moral leaders, scourges of corruption, and totally aloof to political or class concerns. Some of these heroes fizzled in the course of becoming candidates—most notably Admiral George Dewey of Spanish-American War fame, who embarrassed his most ardent supporters by virtually drawing up a blueprint for the house which was being given him by public subscription and then proceeding to deed it over to his bride as a wedding gift. William Henry Harrison, victor at Tippecanoe, so exhausted himself winning the Presidency that pneumonia struck him down a month after he took office. "Old Rough and Ready" Zachary Taylor, hero of Buena Vista, managed to leave a White House record that historians are still arguing about, and General Grant, entering the Presidency at a time when

there was little demand for moral leadership, certainly did nothing to create one. On the other hand, two men among the eight successful moral leaders, Presidents Washington and Jackson, were military heroes. The evidence ends up in a snarl of meaning.

The importance of sniffishness

More clear-cut is the role of the aristocracy. The whole 156 years up to the death of Franklin Roosevelt produced only four Chief Executives who came from the unquestioned aristocracy of their periods, and all four of these men—Washington, Jefferson, and the two Roosevelts—appear on the list of outstanding moral leaders. In any civilization, the patrician group, freed from the pressure of economic and social striving, is likely to include a number of men of ability who concentrate on idealistic values, and the nature of the American credo has peculiarly qualified the aristocrat for moral leadership.[9]

Two types which so many Americans have seen as menaces to their essential values—the rapacious businessman and the boodling politician—have been especial anathemas of the patrician with social values. He has not only opposed them as dangers to the American ethos; he has despised them as vulgarians of little cultivation and less manners, men who operated with no sense of *noblesse oblige* toward the victims of business and politics, opportunists who constantly threatened to stir up revolution by insisting on going too far. "Of all forms of tyranny," Theodore Roosevelt once expressed the feeling, "the least attractive and the most vulgar is the tyranny of mere wealth. . . ."[10] The patrician reformer brought to moral leadership a sniffishness toward parvenu men of power that was reassuring to a country which had too often seen its Chief Executives overawed by millionaires or by bosses with states in their pockets.

If the aristocratic Presidents have played so important a role in the history of moral leadership, the obverse of the coin also has its significance. Probably the most flagrant instances of unrequited yearning for moral leadership occurred during the administrations immediately preceding those of Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. As the secession issue grew acute, the President was James Buchanan, the son of a small-town storekeeper. Roosevelt's predecessor, Herbert Hoover, an orphan at ten, was out earning his living as a chore boy by his fifteenth year. In times when Americans have felt a need to be summoned to a larger destiny, they have rarely been satisfied with a man of the people. He reminds them too much of themselves.

THE KNOW-HOW

Whatever their origins, all eight Presidents who proved important moral leaders shared certain ways of carrying out their leadership. The essential technique, of course, was not to need any technique; the President had to be, in his own self, the morality incarnate—not all the values which made up the American credo, but the one which was foremost as an issue at the time. A good many Americans may well have doubted how much the stiff-backed George Washington was concerned with the economic and social strivings of farmers and mechanics, but the public could and did see in the architect of victory against the British Empire the new nation incarnate. If Grover Cleveland, who had paid a substitute to fight for him during the Civil War, was hardly a symbol of the Union, the immediate and continuing impression he left was one of burly honesty. Franklin Roosevelt's warmest admirers did not deny that he was quite capable of shrugging off political skulduggery, but to millions his very voice, rich and friendly, bespoke concern over ambitions frustrated by depression.

There is a story that a devoted follower of Jackson, asked whether his hero was going to Heaven, snorted in reply: "He will if he wants to."[11] The successful moral leader has not only been the ideal incarnate; he has been, or appeared to be, a man who could do something about it. In their most conscience-lashed moments, the American people, raised in a tradition of getting things done and getting them done quickly, have shown little interest in the ineffectual saint. With the exception of Washington, whose administrations closed just as political parties were forming, the moral leaders have been men who demonstrated that they could lead, manipulate, and if necessary, hammer their own political parties into line while simultaneously outwitting the opposition. They were all able to convince powerful segments of the population that they had foreseen the next curve in the road of history and were surely, adeptly preparing for it.

The individual touch

Once beyond these fundamentals, each exerted effective moral leadership in his own special way, with the aid of traits of mind and personality suitable to the age. At a time when dignity was akin to godliness, George Washington gave the idea of the Republic all the aloofness of his own impeccable serenity. In an era when the frontier was feeling its power but was a bit ashamed of its uncouthness, Jackson was Opportunity in a buckskin coat and a tall silk hat. Theodore Roosevelt, coming in the midst of the great expansion of communications, turned the White House into a spectacular advertising agency for reform. In the churchist early twentieth century, Wilson managed to make some of his most expedient political moves sound moral. And a generation later, when slickness was *de rigueur*, Franklin Roosevelt gave some of his most genuinely moral moves the glamour of seeming expedient.

Perhaps the most interesting additions to the arsenal of moral leadership were made by those notable innovators, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt. As the twentieth century whirled ahead, with its farms and factories where the boss was as remote as a feudal lord, its shaking of family cohesion and of old, comforting standards, its harsh anonymity and impersonality, millions were feeling alone, frighteningly alone. Seeking some secure anchor, they turned back to religion or ahead to Freud or into and around a dozen movements. With the kind of moral leadership the Roosevelts gave, these people could turn, as no previous generation had been able to do, to the President of the United States. For the two Roosevelts permeated all of their leadership with the suggestion that they were not only some ideal incarnate, not simply able and colorful personalities, but fathers—fathers who would preserve essential American values with the personalized concern that a family expects from its head. "Steward" of the nation, T.R. used to call the President in his more portentous moments.[12] With a flick of

[9] The words "aristocrat" and "patrician" are here used in what seems to me the most useful American sense. The men came from the group with the highest status in their communities; they were, if not independently wealthy, at least removed from the wage or salaried class; and their means of livelihood brought no intimate involvement with the industrial or commercial world.

[10] Quoted in Eric F. Goldman, *Charles J. Bonaparte* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943), p. 5.

[11] See note 1 *supra*, p. 105.

[12] Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1931), p. 543.

the long cigarette holder, F.D.R. put it: "They want Poppa to tell them." [13]

THE TECHNIQUE OF FAILURE

The day after Franklin Roosevelt's death, the new President paused for a chat with some newspapermen. "I don't know," Harry Truman said, "whether you fellows ever had a load of hay or a bull fall on you. But last night the moon, the stars and all the planets fell on me. If you fellows ever pray, pray for me." [14]

The new President was only beginning to realize the magnitude of his task. A number of previous generations may have sought moral leadership against dangers to the Republic, to America as opportunity, or to basic honesty; and sometimes concern over a second of these values, most notably during the administrations of Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, and Theodore Roosevelt, played an obbligato to the issue that was foremost. But never before has the situation equaled the 1950's. Gradually, over the two administrations of Truman, the President has come to face a moral crisis in which large sections of the American public feel that all three of its essential values are seriously menaced, two of them more gravely than ever before.

This is a generation made jittery by the depression; it is, more importantly, a generation which remembers the boom and bust that followed World War I. During all the Truman years, despite the general prosperity, concern over continued opportunity has equaled, or come close to equaling, the apprehension of the periods of Jefferson, Jackson, and the two Roosevelts. The forebodings of World War III are graver than any previous worry over the safety of the Republic because war with communism is not simply war against troops, but against a pervasive doctrine; not simply against a great power or even two, but against an agglomeration of forces that could amount to more than half the population of the world. Similarly, the indignation over scandals in the federal service contains elements unparalleled in the history of American crusading against graft.

The elements of additional gravity were described by Senator J. William Fulbright in one of the most widely discussed and applauded speeches of the decade. "Scandals in our Government," Senator Fulbright conceded, "are not new phenomena in our history." But during both previous periods when they became conspicuous, in the Cleveland era and during the early 1920's, the country was at peace, and governmental activities were relatively limited. Now, in the 1950's, the East-West tension means that

> this question of the moral strength of our people is not just an internal domestic matter. It has grave implications in our international relations. Without confidence in their Government, the people will not make the sacrifices necessary to oppose Russia successfully.

Moreover, Senator Fulbright pointed out,

> the growing size and complexity of our Government, much as we may deplore it, only emphasizes the need for a clarification, a restatement of the moral standards of governmental conduct. When our Government was small, when it took only 10 per cent of our earnings in taxes, we could afford a certain amount of official boodling. Today, it has become important. We simply can no longer afford moral obtuseness in our public officials.[15]

[13] Quoted from an interview with one of the late President's intimates, who prefers not to be identified at this time.

[14] Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1950), p. 268.

[15] *Congressional Record*, 82d Cong., 2d sess., March 27, 1951, XC, 2993–2994.

The Truman way

To provide the unprecedented moral leadership being demanded on all sides, President Truman came from a background which, if the past is any judge, is just about as unfortunate as it could be. This is no patrician, no politico with an antipolitician air. This is the loyal protégé of Boss Tom Pendergast, haberdasher and farmer, deacon of the Second Baptist Church, Shriner, Legionnaire, Elk, Lion, Moose, Eagle, and devotee of the Society for the Preservation and Encouragement of Barber Shop Singing in America, Inc.

The President's methods of leading cut contrary to almost every practice that has marked the successful moral leader. The grayish little man in the screaming sport shirts is neither the Republic nor Opportunity nor Honesty incarnate. He jerks and pushes and never exalts; he calls for action and then seems to forget the call; he manages to taint everything he does by a highly developed talent for acting too late, and with an air of peevish reluctance, when the mink coats appear. The President's usual moves, far from bespeaking a mastery of party, smack of a wheel horse working with the boys, and any sense that he controls the total situation is frequently jolted by a White House press release which explains that the President of the United States did not really mean what he said an hour before. As for the father concept which the Roosevelts added to moral leadership, any man who is so exclusively and so articulately Margaret's father can hardly be Poppa to a nation.

ONCE MORE, THE PROCESS

The results add up to an intriguing political phenomenon. History will probably record that on some critical occasions Harry Truman has acted with a courage, a farsightedness, and a disregard of petty advantage which were unexcelled by any of the great moral leaders of the past. At a time when experts freely told him that the move meant political suicide, shortly before the election of 1948, he demanded a sweeping program to meet the acid test of American opportunity—Negro rights. Risking the awful responsibility for World War III, he boldly ordered American troops into Korea to protect ultimate American security. Facing squarely into a gale of McCarthyism, he repeatedly summoned the country to recognize that character assassination could not be made compatible with honesty and decency.

But moral leadership from the White House has never been a matter of specific actions. It has come from an amalgam of actions and tone, of personality and program, of the special worries of the hour and the total impact of the man. So the nation, restive and troubled, goes on feeling its way, as it has done so many times before, toward a leader it cannot describe except by saying that with him it will feel that all its essential values are safe.

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Governors, Mayors, and Community Ethics

By William H. Young

LIFE is just a bowl of Seaburys," quipped debonair Jimmie Walker after spending several difficult days under the searching and relentless cross-examining of the judge who sought to restore some sense of righteousness to the government of the greatest city of America. The New Yorkers, although far gone in the nation's worst slump and smitten by a succession of shocking revelations about the kind of government the Mayor's friends had been providing, applauded their playboy idol. Even after the experience of several years of a very different kind of rule by the upright, although flamboyant, "Little Flower," a poll by one of the New York papers showed that Walker's popularity still exceeded that of La Guardia and of the man who next became mayor, William O'Dwyer.

The ethics of the officials of our cities and states is rarely far removed from that of the communities which they are elected to direct. Lincoln Steffens, probably the most searching analyst of the morals of local government that this nation has produced, concluded after firsthand studies of the major cities that the politics of "boodle" was not the result of the wicked machinations of a few soulless bosses, but rather the reflection of the mores of the community or at least the "better" part thereof. It is the price we pay, he implied, for our individualistic, self-centered, and competitive society.

Lest this be interpreted as the counsel of lofty indifference or of cynical despair, let me hasten to add that our cities and states are for the most part incomparably better governed and more honestly governed today than when Steffens wrote or even than when Jimmie Walker charmed New York's millions. It is nevertheless true that the development and recognition of standards of public propriety have been a slow and difficult task in a country which is as highly individualistic as the United States and which at least since 1830 has been so imbued with the identity of private and public interest. Our current preoccupation with the ethics of public administration is a convincing demonstration that we are no longer willing to rely on "the invisible hand" to promote public welfare. We now expect our public officials to perform this office.

Effect of Public Officials on Public Ethics

Although political leaders at the state and local levels, in their conceptions of public right, usually reflect the conceptions of their respective constituencies, they are never perfect mirrors. What is more, it lies within their power to mold the popular notions and to add something, however small, to them. In this sense, governors and mayors may be grouped into three classes: (1) those who by exhortation and precept raise the general level of community ethics; (2) those who by consorting with men of easy virtue and by rewarding them seem to dignify misconduct and thus lower the general standards of the community; and (3) those who so completely reflect prevailing sentiment and whose careers are so undistinguished for either good or ill that they leave no impression whatever either on the government or on the community. The last two categories need not detain us long. To the second belong mayors like Oakey Hall, the Tweed Mayor of New York City, Van Wyck, Boss Croker's selection for the same office, "Doc" Ames of Minneapolis, Kline of Pittsburgh, Ashbridge of Philadelphia, and Curley of Boston, and governors like Ferguson of Texas and Huey Long of Louisiana. Each of us could suggest candidates for the third classification, but history has silently closed its pages to searchers after mediocrity.

Judgment in these matters is personal and subjective. Statistical demonstration is impossible. It is, nevertheless, my considered conviction that relatively few of those thousands who throughout our history have governed our states or our cities belong in either of the two categories under consideration. Most governors and many mayors have left their communities and their governments a bit better because of their administration. I attribute this result to the effect of the office on the man. Certainly the voters have elected countless hundreds of undistinguished individuals whose practicing ethics was no whit superior to that of the men and women who chose them.

The contributions to good conduct of a few governors and mayors have been outstanding—more, I am certain, than historians have recorded or journalists described. These recorders of the passing scene have largely selected for meritorious acclaim those with tangible achievements in the physical betterment of their peoples. The contributions of statesmen to the spiritual life of the country have typically been unnoticed. This is dangerous ground on which to journey, and the lack of notice is understandable. How can one be sure that community ethics has been improved? In practice, ethical conceptions are more likely to be influential in the day-to-day routine of executive direction. What goes on behind the closed doors of the mayor's office? Virtually all popularly elected executives profess high-sounding ethical principles when their organizations are assailed by wrathful "muckrakers." All judgments, therefore, must be hesitant and tentative.

Records of governors and mayors

Among those governors and mayors about whose conduct of office some records are preserved, a handful stand out for their dedication to righteousness. John Purroy Mitchel provided New York City with probably the most honest and efficient administration of its affairs in the long annals of that great metropolis. He was defeated in great part because he insisted that certain private philanthropic and religious institutions be operated on the basis of minimum standards of decency, safety, and health. He said:

> For two years and a half, as the representative of the people of the City, I have been endeavoring to secure humane treatment and proper care for the 22,000 homeless and dependent children committed as city wards to private charitable institutions. I have been endeavoring to secure proper administration of public funds annually disbursed to these institutions for the care of the City's wards. That is the cause I am fighting for and I shall continue to fight for it, no matter what damage it may bring to me, for it is a matter of public duty and personal conscience.[1]

Percy Jones, Mayor of Minneapolis, held firm in his determination to rid that city of the worst abuses of organized gambling and crime despite pressure, in the form of a manufactured

[1] Quoted from Cleveland Rodgers and Rebecca B. Rankin, *New York: The World's Capital City* (New York, 1948), p. 107.

"crime wave," from the leaders of the gambling syndicate.[2]

The rugged honesty and courageous righteousness of Grover Cleveland as mayor, governor, and president have been equaled only by George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson among those who have ascended to the highest office in the land. As governor, Cleveland repeatedly defied Tammany Hall, which was believed to control the largest block of votes in his own party, and appointed fit men to public office. As president, he vetoed more than six hundred veterans pension bills as a matter of principle, although no one of them was expensive, and thousands of such pensions were then being paid. Any bill with the word "veteran" in it was just as popular then as it is today. He clung stubbornly to his sense of fiduciary virtue in the matter of the gold standard although he knew it would probably cost him the nomination and the leadership of his party—which it did.

The Presbyterian conscience of Woodrow Wilson dominated most, if not all, of his decisions as governor of New Jersey and president of the United States. Like Cleveland, he defied the leaders of the New Jersey Democracy. The New Jersey leaders further had supported him for office in the hope of continuing their plutocratic behavior behind the platitudinous administration of a respectable but naïve professor. Wilson battled his primary election law through the legislature against the wishes—even against the orders—of the leaders of his own party who had helped to elect him. Wilson even ordered the most powerful of the Democratic leaders out of his office for what he considered an improper suggestion. Wilson claimed no great merit in the courage of his conduct. Strongly held views of civic right make such a course easy to the owner, although it may appear courageous to the outsider. It took courage, Wilson once said, to deviate from the dictates of his conscience, not to follow them.

Charles Evans Hughes gave New York State an unusual example of honest and forthright conduct of the chief magistracy, and Mayor Seth Low gave New York City the same kind of conduct under even more difficult circumstances. The list might be continued indefinitely: the elder La Follette in Wisconsin, Altgeld and Lowden in Illinois, Johnson in California, Hoan in Milwaukee, Tom Johnson in Cleveland, Blankenburg in Philadelphia.

[2] Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York, 1948), pp. 93–97.

EFFECT OF PUBLIC ETHICS ON PUBLIC OFFICIALS

In the case of most mayors and governors, the office makes the man. This is to say that the standards set by the community through predecessors, journalists, historians, oaths of office, and all the other subtle and intangible ways that tradition is established, recognized, and transmitted to each incumbent press upon him so strongly that his conduct is enriched and strengthened beyond his previous experience.

Whatever the motivations or the egocentric ambitions that drive men to seek public office, most of those who reach the highest executive posts are, in my experience, powerfully moved by the awesome responsibilities which they face and by the high expectations of their families, friends, and disinterested supporters, and the community at large. Compelled by the press of affairs, the importunities of their advisers, and the profound implications of their decisions to cultivate a broad view of their obligations, they soon come to look at things differently than when they were not in office. Previous experiences, even in other public offices, rarely prepare a man for the weight with which responsibility bears upon his conscience once he seats himself in the chair of chief executive. Governors and mayors in my acquaintance have been concerned with the propriety of their official conduct far more than with that of their private conduct or their conduct before entering high office.

While one may question the validity of the reasoning which may be used on this or that occasion, chief executives usually try to convince themselves that what they propose to do is "right." They may listen to and sometimes enunciate justifications for courses of action which are essentially expediential or "practical" or politic, but they want also to be persuaded of the ethical soundness of the proposals.

The widespread assumption that publicly elected executives are indifferent to ethical considerations and have regard only for "political" motives is largely unfounded in my experience. The inadequacies in this regard which are frequently revealed stem in part from the imperfections of human character and in part from the absence of well-defined and carefully elaborated standards of public ethics in this country. Precedent and articulated public opinion do not point clearly to the proper response in many of the decisions which executives must make. What inhibitions, for example, should restrain a governor in dealing with members of the legislature? How far is it proper for him to go in urging a course of action? Is the occupancy of administrative post a fit subject for bargaining? Is official entertainment extended to legislators proper? The American constitutional system of checks, balances, and the fractionalization of power places a high premium on personal dealings between the executive and the legislature, and yet we have no recognized rules of etiquette or manuals of style to instruct an executive in good conduct. This aspect of political science is neither well-documented nor well-delineated.

EXECUTIVE MACHINERY FOR INFLUENCING COMMUNITY ETHICS

If we assume that, on the whole, the influence of governors and mayors has been beneficent in the field of community ethics, how is this brought about? What is the machinery by which this influence permeates a city or a state?

Among the traditional methods by which executives make their influence felt in a community, I would assign the least important role to public exhortation. Public professions of official rectitude or exhortations to better behavior are typically unconvincing and are probably ineffectual. Usually they are cast in platitudinous form designed to elicit a favorable emotional response toward the speaker, rather than to change the conduct of the listener. The American public is long habituated to political preachment, and probably is utterly indifferent to it.

Confucius long ago declared that the example which the governor of a province sets is far more important than his official acts or utterances. Of the highest importance in impressing his constituents is the way an executive treats those who come to him soliciting his favor. For good or ill, word of his reception spreads from mouth to mouth in ever widening circles through the community. Obviously, no chief executive could long occupy his chair if he received every solicitation with an injured, "How-dare-you!" attitude. On the other hand, the slightest hint of self-interest or of party aggrandizement has significant repercussions. Not only does the executive weaken any concern which such solicitors or their confidants

may harbor for the public weal, but he also invites upon himself new and more importunate solicitations until he has little peace. It is well to remember that not all the persons to whom a suitor repeats the details of his reception will regard it in the same way that he does. By the questions he asks, by the form in which he casts his response, and by the tone of his address, the executive can inculcate into his audience, and into the far larger audience that will hear of the interview, conceptions of public righteousness which will be incomparably more influential than anything he might say or do on the public platform.

Next in importance to the executive's dealings with his constituents are his dealings with his subordinates. No typical executive of any sizable public establishment can hope to give to the conduct of his employees the detailed scrutiny that he has habitually given to that of his business or professional subordinates theretofore. Some of his "subordinates" have been in office much longer than he has; many are independent of some of his most impressive sanctions. All of them together form an army too vast for personal direction. Example is the most effective method he has for inspiring proper conduct. Fortunately, few of a public executive's departmental subordinates really appreciate how little time and attention he can afford to give to their affairs. Ignorance of just which of all the many things they do may become the object of executive review, if coupled with certainty that some things they do will be scrutinized, tends to make subordinates more thoughtful and more circumspect in their decisions.

If the executive indicates his concern for the propriety of administrative behavior, if some of his decisions or instructions turn on the ethics of the issue rather than on its legality or expedience, his subordinates will be encouraged to exercise their ethical principles, and they in turn will encourage their subordinates in the same way, until the whole mass is brought to a little higher level of virtue.

To be most influential in raising the level of public ethics, positive exertion is, of course, indispensable. It is not enough to react only to the matters which come to the executive's desk. It is easy and occasionally even wise to be ignorant of things that cannot readily be corrected. Those who make the smallest imprint on society normally follow this course. Executives, however, who in addition to using the other methods discussed seek out weaknesses in conduct and deal with them decisively are the enduring architects of the edifice of public righteousness. Sound ethical administration is much easier in some positions and departments of government than in others. The ethical principles of the public servants in these posts are not harassed by temptations. In other posts, however, such as those of tax assessor, inspector, policeman, investigator, the price of virtue is high. A governor or mayor does not fully live up to his office if he does not inform himself about the soft spots. By strengthening the good, by punishing the bad, by asking no favors for himself or his friends, he creates an atmosphere in which the government itself lifts up the community to a higher and nobler plane of conduct.

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Ethical Standards in American Legislative Chambers

By HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

A MEDIEVAL English quatrain, brought to the attention of our Subcommittee on Ethics by Senator Douglas, has real meaning for our times. Commenting on the way in which the common lands were enclosed and taken over by the nobility of England, the poet wrote:

The law locks up both man and woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
But lets the greater felon loose
Who steals the common from the goose.

Politics is not practiced in a vacuum; and the activities of politicians reflect, albeit with some distortion, the prevailing standards of American society, particularly of American business. Nevertheless, transgressions or practices that might be overlooked in business life assume far greater importance in public life because of the greater magnitude of the consequences. For instance, the businessman who uses pull to "get it wholesale" for a friend is regarded as doing a favor; but a Congressman who uses pull to get a contract for a constituent is often regarded as having committed a crime. If the businessman is rewarded, few eyebrows are raised; the Congressman who accepts gifts is regarded as having compromised himself.

AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICS

It has become almost a truism today to equate politics with corruption. Nor is this a new phenomenon in our society. A member of the Continental Congress joined in an attempt to corner the market on flour, despite the rigors being suffered at Valley Forge. Artemus Ward amused Lincoln by saying: "I am no politician, and my other habits are good." More recently, the National Opinion Research Center discovered that five out of every seven Americans believed it impossible for a professional politician to be honest, and only 18 per cent of America's parents were willing to let their sons enter political careers. This is a revealing if startling commentary on the public attitude toward politics.

American public office has little tradition of honor behind it. In part, this can be traced back to the axiom: "That government is best which governs least." Americans have habitually ignored the government as much as possible and too frequently left office-seeking to those who stood to gain personally from it. Too many people still cherish this early, idyllic concept of the government—or act as if it were still attainable. At bottom, the solution to the problem of corruption in legislative bodies lies in an alert, participating and interested citizenry. Public opinion must not wait for the disclosure of glaring transgressions before rousing itself to action: it must constantly support men of integrity, ability, and candor. Only the active participation of a large proportion of the electorate in political activity—through the medium of political parties—can supplant the power of organized pressure groups on the one hand and backroom politics and personal favoritism on the other. When the people leave politics to be the plaything or special interest of a few, the public can expect that it will be played with and serve the special economic and political interests of the participants. Democratic or representative government is

everyone's business if it is to be an honorable pursuit. If the people want clean and honest government, the minimum price is an active and continuing interest in political parties and political processes.

Legislative responsibility

Blaming the public for complacency does not solve our problems. Legislative bodies have all too often tolerated corruption in their midst. Even where flagrant violations of law have been proved and the miscreants jailed, too frequently no disciplinary measures have been taken. In this vein it should be pointed out that men who stoop to smear tactics, demagoguery, and general confusion of the issues in order to gain public office cannot be expected to change suddenly once they are sworn in. They cannot be trusted with the government of this country or any of its states. While most of the responsibility for correcting such abuses is up to the public, legislative bodies themselves should also act. Callous disregard of the intelligence of the public and the integrity of political office should be punished by voters and legislators alike.

With this background in mind, let us turn now to the problems which face the legislator who attempts to abide by a "code of ethics" in his conduct. Unfortunately, there are no clear-cut criteria or solutions in this field. Certain practices are obviously unethical—but the honest legislator is tormented by a twilight zone into which many of his actions unavoidably fall. I shall set forth the problems as I see them, suggest some solutions, but give no final answer.

FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

One of the major danger zones in legislative ethics is centered on finance. The costs of waging political campaigns have become exorbitant and the salary and allowances of office are usually insufficient to cover the expenditures required.

Mounting costs of campaigns

Twenty-nine years ago a senator from Michigan was forced to resign because of public pressure after a Congressional investigating committee publicized the fact that he had spent $195,000 on his campaign. In 1950, the national committee of one of the parties is said to have spent $100,000 for one half hour on television and radio. According to the *Congressional Quarterly*, $10,000,000 was spent to elect the Eighty-second Congress. Even so, loopholes in the law enabled many expenditures to go unreported. Two of the successful candidates are each said to have had spent in their behalf campaign contributions amounting to more than $2,000,000. This is $1,925,000 more than either will be paid during his six-year term.

The chief cause of this tremendous rise in costs is the importance of radio and television time. A good TV personality is a must for successful campaigning in many sections of the country today. For liberal candidates the importance of radio and television is emphasized by the conservatism of the national press. In 1948, for example, thirteen states were without a single daily paper supporting Truman.

The expense of campaign headquarters, posters, advertisements in the press and by special campaign sheets; the cost of staging rallies and public meetings; the innumerable special projects carried out in a state-wide campaign—these total to a staggering figure.

Obligations incurred

It is obvious from the foregoing figures that conscientious candidates often face the dilemma of either accepting disproportionate contributions from particular groups or persons or of not having enough money to make an effective and successful campaign. Many questions arise. Where can the candidate solicit funds? What is his obligation to special interests or groups which help him? What degree of personal independence can he maintain? Should he limit the amount he will accept from one individual or group? How much of a claim on his time has a firm whose president has contributed heavily to his campaign? Do his supporters believe in his policies or are they expecting something concrete in return?

Thus the matter of campaign funds is central to the whole issue of ethics. Present laws place a $3,000,000 ceiling on the amount any one national committee can spend during a calendar year and a $5,000 limit on individual contributions. These figures are totally unrealistic. There are dozens of devices used to get around the law—in fact, it is almost impossible accurately to estimate the cost of a national campaign. Evasions of the law through the formation of separate committees and by splitting donations among the members of a family are common. Often the statutes are not enforced. In many cases, the bulk of the expenditures is never reported, nor are the sources of much of the money. The result has been a very unwholesome atmosphere.

Totalitarians, both of the left and of the right, attack democracy as a farce and fraud where special interests govern. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect successful candidates not to feel a certain responsibility to their financial angels. But we can at least demand a full disclosure of who—and how angelic—they are. I am therefore unequivocably for requiring publication of all campaign contributions right down to the last dollar. This would include not only donations to candidates, but also those to all participating committees.

Possible remedies

To supplement this essential first step; study should be given to other methods of dealing with the problem. Persuasive evidence was received by the Senate Subcommittee on Ethics in favor of direct public support for political campaigns. The difficulties in working out such a policy are not insurmountable. It has been proposed that the government could pay for legitimate campaign expenses. This is not as revolutionary as it may sound. Theodore Roosevelt recommended that the Congress provide "an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties." In the 1920 campaign William Gibbs McAdoo stated: "If the National Government paid the expenses of the national campaigns and specified the legitimate objects for which expenditures might be made, politics would be purified enormously."

Similar to direct subsidy is the proposal to set up a public corporation—or trust fund—to aid in providing all bona fide candidates with access to the public eye and ear. Safeguards would assure emphasis on rationality and limitation to legitimate expenses. In addition to public funds, the corporation might also receive and administer private contributions. Many persons who do not give directly to parties or candidates might be willing to contribute to such a public corporation. Such a public corporation or trust fund is now being sponsored by a group of interested citizens in Minnesota. It will be interesting to watch the response such a project receives. This is an experiment in American politics—and a worthy one.

In any case, efforts should be made

to broaden the base of the campaign structure. Some have suggested that the tax laws should be amended to allow deduction of small contributions, perhaps up to $100, for income-tax purposes. It is argued that government, by not permitting such deductions, is discriminating against its own vital processes and undermining its support. Another step to help candidates which could be undertaken with only minor disruption would be a qualified extension of the franking privilege. A further proposal would make free radio and television time available at stated periods during the campaigns. Since ownership of the airways is vested in the public, such a requirement in the licensing of broadcasting stations would be perfectly valid. Should this prove too great a burden on them, stations might be asked to denote a stated proportion of the total time contracted for. Both Canada and Great Britain provide free radio time to candidates, while in the Netherlands, prior to the Nazi invasion, radio stations were owned by the parties.

All of the above proposals, of course, require elaboration and further study. I mention them, not necessarily as an advocate, but to stimulate thinking and discussions.

Expenses of office

Unfortunately, financial problems do not end with the election. The Congressman also has abnormal expenses after he takes office. He must maintain a residence in Washington without losing touch with his constituency. This means frequent short visits home. Many members of Congress maintain two residences—one in their state and another in Washington. Travel expenses are high, and the government pays for only one trip per session. As a public figure, a Congressman has pressing social obligations. He is fair game for solicitors for all worthy causes—and even small contributions add up. Office budgets have not kept pace with the ever increasing volume of mail, to say nothing of providing adequate professional assistance. To do a conscientious job, the legislator must dig into his own pocket. The high cost of political campaigns plus the ever increasing cost of living in Washington, along with added office expenses, may well serve to make Congressional service a special prerogative for the rich. Surely a person of moderate means finds it increasingly difficult to make ends meet.

Supplementary income

There is little likelihood of forthright action to meet these problems. The fear of public opinion recently forced repeal of the tax exemption on the $2500 expense allowance Congress voted itself in 1946. Congress is therefore not likely to vote salary increases. Hence, many legislators seek outside means of supplementing their income. Except for the independently wealthy, important ethical problems arise.

Lawyers may resort to fees or legal retainers. This raises the question of influence. Similarly, it comes up when business connections are not severed, since frequently members have access to confidential information from which they can gain financially.

Many Congressmen accept fees for speaking engagements. In a sense, this is in line with their duty to keep the public informed about important issues —but it is also an important drain on their time and energy. I have often been criticized for going out and making talks here and there. Certainly I have no desire to travel around the country on week ends and leave my family and my job. But I am the father of four children, I must maintain property in two places, I must be able to meet hospital bills and similar

emergencies, I must make frequent trips back to Minnesota, costing a minimum of $200 each, and I must pay additional expenses of office. This would be impossible if I had no outside income. My choice is either to make the speeches and earn the money or to leave the Senate.

Acceptance of additional income cannot, at present, be outlawed. But one simple step would be a strong deterrent to shady or undercover dealings: full disclosure of all sources of income. I am now co-sponsoring legislation which would require all members of Congress to disclose their incomes, assets, and all dealings in securities and commodities. These reports should be made generally available. Then, I believe, it would become politically unhealthy for legislators to handle matters from which they stood to gain personally.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF OFFICE

A Representative or Senator is not merely a legislator. He is, increasingly, an investigator. And he has always been errand boy and helper for his constituents. Let us explore the problems arising from each of these functions in turn.

The major problems connected with legislation deal with determination of values, personal and political obligations, and lobbying. The scope of this article permits only a suggestive listing. To start with, should a legislator vote as he thinks best for the country, even though he knows that it will be contrary to the wishes of the majority of his constituents? Democratic theorists have reached no consensus on this problem of representation. To say that the people know what is best does not provide us with a rule of action.

Even more puzzling, perhaps, is the problem presented by legislation where what is best for the country as a whole affects particular constituencies adversely. Take, for example, the question of reciprocal trade. I have had to face the fur farmers of my state who have stood to lose as a result of my votes in support of the program. I can sympathize with the representatives of some of the states whose industries have suffered from the low tariff rates. They are really in a dilemma.

Party loyalty

Turning now to political obligation, what loyalty does a Congressman owe his party? Political independence, though long cherished as a virtue, has had disastrous consequences in the past. For instance, our failure to enter the League of Nations, despite clear commitments by both parties, led to twenty years of isolationism and abetted the rise to totalitarianism abroad. The traditional vagueness of party platforms obscures substantial differences, and elections have seldom provided mandates for action. Lack of party discipline often makes even clearly recognized objectives impossible to attain. The need for greater responsibility is manifest in the present refusal of a nominally Democratic Congress to carry out the President's domestic program.

Pressure groups

Intimately connected with the issue of party responsibility is the problem of lobbies and organized pressure groups. These have, in part, usurped traditional party functions in the field of policy determination. Yet the present hue and cry about lobbies largely neglects this basic issue. It is focused not on the root but on the results. We are concerned not with increasing party responsibility, but with regulating lobbies. The shortcomings of this approach are obvious, though understandable.

Since 1946, expenditures or contributions designed to "influence directly or

indirectly the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States" were to have been reported to the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate. A compilation based on their records from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1951 showed that $71,000,000 had been contributed and $34,000,000 had been spent for lobbying purposes. The House Committee on Lobbying judged, however, that only a small fraction was actually reported. Because of the stigma attached to lobbies, many people are uncomfortable at calling themselves lobbyists. The House Committee found that some individuals did not register because they said the purpose of a lobbying organization was to bring pressure on Congress for a special interest and they represented the common good. Moreover, many organizations, the CIO for example, have varied purposes, of which lobbying is a minor one. Nor are lobbying activities confined to Washington. "Grass roots lobbying" gets the people back home to put on the pressure. And, as already mentioned, they are important contributors to campaigns.

Lobbies, despite their well-known evils, perform useful functions in political life. I like to know how proposed legislation affects the needs of people—the lobbies tell me. I like to hear about conditions which need correcting—the lobbies tell me that too. But I also want to know just whom these lobbies represent: how many people, where they get their funds, how they make their policy decisions, and what their other activities are. Therefore, I should like to see tighter, better-enforced laws, which would trace funds back to their sources. I have introduced a bill which would help tighten one of the loopholes. Then the public, as well as responsible legislators, could make decisions with better understanding of what is involved.

Investigative function

The investigative function of Congress, although firmly established for some years, has recently threatened to overshadow the legislative function. Members have taken advantage of Congressional immunity to make spectacular charges on the floor, and probing committees have made sweeping revelations. While much good has been accomplished, the reputations of honest and able men have sometimes been irreparably and irresponsibly damaged and the perstige of the government has been considerably lowered.

Administrative officials attacked on the floor of either house should have protection equal to that afforded congressional members; and agency heads who are subject to personal attack on the floor should be given an opportunity to make an immediate or early reply. Similarly, private citizens should have the right to reply in the *Congressional Record*. Immunity from suit rewards irresponsibility with protection, and prevents recourse for damaged reputations. Three current proposals deal with this problem: a proposed Constitutional amendment withdrawing this immunity entirely; a statute making it clear that immunity does not extend to defamatory statements inserted in the *Congressional Record* but not actually made in the chamber; and a proposal to make the Federal Government liable in damage for defamatory statements.

Congress also needs a code of fair procedure governing committee investigations and reports. Recommendations here include withholding publicity regarding accusations against individuals until there is evidence to support the charges, giving advance notice to individuals wherever possible if they are to be attacked in public hearings, giving such individuals an opportunity to be present to cross-examine and to reply, and avoiding the intimidation or browbeating of witnesses. Such standards of fairness would not interfere with effective committee investigations. Congress, as the representative branch of government, should take the lead in respecting the rights of individuals and ensuring the validity of its findings.

Assistance to constituents

Members of Congress receive a large number of requests from constituents asking for assistance in dealing with federal departments and agencies. These come from various sources: job-hunters, contractors and would-be contractors, businessmen with requests for loans from the RFC, applications for privilege, men who want to get into the armed forces as officers, or those who want to get out, veterans with claims, people with naturalization problems, and many others. Congressmen are also expected to see that business interests at home do not suffer; that their area is not discriminated against; that hotel reservations are made for visitors; and that worried parents and wives are told about servicemen and how they are getting along.

There is nothing wrong with using members of Congress to perform these traditional functions. Government today is so complex that many people do not know how to get what they need. My constituents tend to look upon me as an ambassador. Most of them don't want any pressure brought to bear; they just want to know where to start and what to do.

I have exercised and will continue to exercise the right to go to any agency in the government to plead a case for my constituents and to do so vigorously. I consider it to be one of my responsibilities as a representative of the people of Minnesota. Most recently, for example, I urged the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of the Budget to include in their budgets an item for the construction of public power transmission lines for the western part of my state. I did not succeed, but it was not for want of trying.

In the past businessmen have sometimes come to my office accompanied by five percenters or attorneys. They have wanted me to arrange for them to see high government officials. If their case merited it, I helped them. In one instance, I learned that the attorney alleged he knew me personally and thus received a retainer fee on the basis of his self-proclaimed "personal friendship with the Senator." I have since insisted that I will help constituents only if they come to me directly and unencumbered.

It occasionally happens that a man in the Senate or House will get a letter saying in effect: "I contributed to your campaign. I am coming down Wednesday and I want an appointment to see so-and-so." After the appointment is made, the Congressman is expected to follow up and see that desired action is taken. He runs the risk of alienating support if he does not do so. But relatively few requests are of this nature. In the last Minnesota election, there were 1,350,000 votes cast. Fewer than one per cent of these voters ever write to me in a manner suggesting some special favor.

Ethics of using influence

If a Congressman desires to assist a constituent, he can express personal interest in three ways. The first will merely ask that the constituent be given every consideration and that the matter in which he is interested be expedited. The second kind of pressure is stronger and may say: "I know Mr. X and I can vouch for his integrity. He is honest, able, and fulfills certain requirements. Anything you can do for him will be appreciated." The third, and rarely used, kind of pressure says: "I

know everything about this case. If I were in your spot I would grant the request, and I think you ought to do it." It is the last that gives rise to the ethical questions, particularly when it is accompanied by the implicit threat of an appropriation cut or legislative reprisal.

Whenever a legislator uses pressure in a case, he cannot help having some effect upon the responsible officials. The extent of his influence depends upon both the Congressman and the administrator. It is reported that at one time in TVA whenever a job applicant had a letter in his behalf from a Senator or Congressman, that job application was turned down. This may be exaggerated, but it does happen. Other administrators find it difficult to say no. A part of the influence of the legislator will depend on his committee assignment. If he deals with legislation or appropriations touching the department concerned, he has, of course, a power which may be abused.

The responsibility of the legislator is to act as an inspection or screening committee with regard to requests that come into his office. He must make sure in his own heart and conscience that he is seeking to advance cases only on their merits and that he has no personal economic interest. This is more difficult, however, where political considerations are involved. How can he draw the line between proper and improper personal interests when those interests are essentially political in character?

RAISING ETHICAL STANDARDS

The foregoing treatment has been suggestive rather than comprehensive in nature. I have skirted flagrant violations of ethics which have already been brought to public attention in favor of noting some of the causes of legislative corruption and bringing into focus some of the problems which face those legislators who honestly try to serve their country. The usual American remedy is "there ought to be a law." Yet the law cannot deal effectively with every range of human activity. Many of the ethical questions cannot be solved by legislation—remedies must instead be sought in a new consciousness of the dignity of public office and a higher sense of civic duty. All of us, as citizens, can achieve this through awareness of the difficulties and active support of all efforts to raise legislative standards. We can require, as the price of our support, declarations similar to the following code of "Ten Congressional Commandments" which Senator Benton presented in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Ethics, and to which I fully subscribe:

1. In the same sense in which a judge debars himself from decisions in which he has a direct personal financial stake, so I shall debar myself from legislative decisions, or, if I take action or choose to vote I shall fully disclose the nature of my interest.
2. I shall never use my office to exert extra-legal pressure over the decisions of executive or administrative agencies.
3. I shall treat witnesses who testify before committees on which I sit with courtesy and fairness, following self-imposed limitations which for centuries have been the hallmark of the judicial process.
4. I shall not abuse my privilege of Congressional immunity; I shall not say things on the floors of Congress that I am not prepared to say outside, nor shall I betray the official confidence of the Congress, or of any committee thereof.
5. I shall not indulge in personal vilification of any kind, but I shall not hesitate to criticize public figures and public policies with determination and courage whenever facts of public nature justify such criticism.
6. I shall not vote on any issue without an attempt to consider the voiceless interest of the unorganized in our society.

7. I shall strive constantly to interpret interests of my constituents in the perspective of the total national interest.
8. I shall try to be loyal to the promises of my political party, and thus to strengthen party teamwork and party responsibility in the Congress.
9. I shall not waste my own or my colleagues' time with irrelevant and inconsequential talk in committee or on the floor.
10. Whether as a member of the majority or minority, I shall attempt in my actions and words to educate and clarify, never to obscure or confuse.

Hubert H. Humphrey, Washington, D. C., was elected United States Senator from Minnesota in 1948. He has been, among other things, a registered pharmacist, an instructor in political science at the University of Minnesota, and professor of political science at Macalester College, St. Paul. In 1944 he was state campaign manager for Roosevelt and Truman. From 1945 to 1948 he served as mayor of Minneapolis. He was a member of the recent Subcommittee on Ethics of which Senator Douglas was chairman.

Is Justice Blind?

By J. Warren Madden

The Ethics of Judges

THE statue of the blindfolded goddess suggests that the ideal court should decide its cases as if the parties involved were anonymous and unseen. It should consider the facts and the law and arrive at its judgment in the way in which a law student in an examination decides as to the rights and liabilities of A and B, given certain facts, and applying the law he is supposed to know. Thus any consideration of whether the parties are rich or poor, young or old, charming or repellant, would be eliminated. In this respect, justice, as administered by judges and leaving out juries, is, in general, as close to the ideal of the goddess as it should be. But as to whether judges are blind in another respect, in the sense of being ignorant of economic and social facts and trends about which they should know in order to decide their cases wisely, there is much room for argument.

The honesty and integrity of most judges is beyond question. The scandalous occasional lapses properly cause great public resentment, and the culprit is heaped with obloquy, as he should be. But in general, a party may go into court with confidence that the judge will do his best to decide the case according to the facts and the law, as he is able to understand them. The pressures upon him to do so are very heavy. His decisions are immediately the subject of the scrutiny and criticism of acute lawyers, articulate in pointing out their defects. The judge knows that for any departure from honesty he will be held in disrespect, even by the lawyer who has won the case. In the relative isolation of the bench, he covets above all things the respect of the bar, who are his link with his community. Whether the judge gets his place by appointment or by popular election, and even though his past has not been particularly distinguished for integrity, all the pressures upon him after his elevation to the bench tend to make and keep him upright.

There is a code of ethics for judges, drafted by the American Bar Association. It contains little which would not naturally occur to practically all judges, even if it had never been written into a code. But it contains wise suggestions about the ethics of some kinds of conduct, which suggestions may be helpful to a judge when in doubt.

The dishonest judge

It is probable that in the occasional case when a judge is dishonest, the dishonesty is not investigated and exposed as promptly as it would be in the case of other kinds of public officers, or of private persons. There is a customary respect, amounting almost to obsequiousness, in the attitude of lawyers toward judges, which makes a lawyer slow to suspect wrongdoing on their part, and slow to believe that any accusation which he might make would persuade his brother lawyers and the prosecuting authorities. If the judge is dishonest, as the lawyer may suspect, an accusation which did not result in his removal from the bench would put the lawyer in the position where no one would hire him, for fear of the prejudice which the judge would naturally harbor against him. So it is probable

that the occasional dishonest judge does not get his just deserts until his conduct has become quite intolerable. Some system should be devised whereby prompt investigations would be made by lawyers from other communities, or officers who are not dependent upon the accused judge for a living, when there is any substantial reason to doubt a judge's integrity.

Lack of knowledge

Of the other kind of blindness referred to above, which certainly is not an ideal of the goddess of justice, there is, naturally, a great deal among judges. In a court of general jurisdiction, lawsuits may involve absolutely anything within the range of human activity. Medicine, mechanics, psychology, explosives, or any other subject may confront the judge. The lawyers and the witnesses must teach him as much as they can, and hope for the best in the way of an intelligent decision. Since judges must be human beings, and no human being can, nowadays, "take all knowledge for his province," there is no help for this kind of blindness except the doubtful help of establishing a variety of special courts.

The blindness that is more commonly, and with more reason, complained of is the asserted lack of awareness on the part of judges of what I have above called economic and social forces. These are not specialized fields of knowledge which no judge or other nonexpert could be expected to know, but are things which are known or sensed by large segments of the community, but are not known to the judges because of their origins and training and experience.

Some years ago this was a serious problem. Courts were holding unconstitutional attempted social legislation such as workmen's compensation statutes and those regulating hours of labor, on the basis of the indefinite constitutional standards of due process of law, freedom of contract, and so forth. The Constitution did not really forbid this legislation; society was ripe for it and it was necessary. But many judges, having learned the common law of no liability without fault, regarded a change in that law as revolutionary, and debased the Constitution by finding in it a prohibition of legislation regarded as necessary by many then and by practically everyone now. The tendency of judges in those days to regard all the law as they knew it to be constitutional law, the fact that as lawyers, usually prosperous lawyers, they had had little contact with laboring people and knew little of the social forces which were on the move, really disqualified them for the task of deciding such questions wisely. A sort of running battle between the legislatures and the courts went on, and Congress, having the power to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, in effect voted no confidence in them as to certain subjects by removing those subjects from their jurisdiction.

The situation described above is not likely to recur in an extreme form. Judges of more varied background have attained the bench; the bar as a whole has, by the events of recent decades, been educated to a broader outlook on current affairs; and, in particular, the law schools are and have been for some years giving their students an excellent initiation into the things which, in addition to technical law, they need to know to be intelligent lawyers and citizens. Justice is being cured of this kind of blindness.

The Ethics of Lawyers

The "ethics" of the trial lawyer is hard to discuss in normal terms of ethics. It is not ethics at all in the sense of right conduct, in the sense of

determining what is the right side of a controverted problem, and taking one's position on that side. It resembles rather the rules of games of skill and chance, or a combination of both, in which there is no right side or wrong side, but only an effort to outplay the adversary and win the game. The rules of most games permit almost any conceivable feint or false start, made for the purpose of deceiving the adversary. If one in his social or business life should so misrepresent his intentions for the purpose of misleading his friends or fellow traders, he would be branded as untrustworthy and unethical. But the trial lawyer is not condemned for using substantially the same kind of tactics that is used by the earnest player of bridge or tennis.

No trial lawyer would contend that the objective of his advocacy is to assist in seeing that justice is done, regardless of the consequences to his client. Is this because he thinks there is no such thing as justice as regards the outcome of a lawsuit, any more than there is as regards the outcome of a game? The lawyer is no doubt as much disturbed as his neighbor at the prevalence of crime or fraud or dangerous negligence, and at the danger to the community and to his family and himself that results from that prevalence. But that normal feeling as to lawbreaking in general does not prevent him from using all his skills to prevent the punishment or detention of the particular lawbreaker who employs him. And in doing what he does, he may, and usually does, keep strictly within the code of ethics, the book of rules, of his profession. He receives the adulation of his community, not because the community is pleased that his lawbreaking client has escaped justice, but because it is willing to give credit to the accomplished player, even though he plays on the enemy's team.

Evolution of the practice

What manner of profession is this, then, whose members are licensed by the state to carry on war against the state, and give aid and comfort to its enemies; to prevent the enforcement of its laws; to subvert its elaborate efforts to do justice as between man and man, and man and society? What sort of tradition or superstition is it that causes society to tolerate and even encourage such activity? The tendency of the state in earlier times to oppress the citizen, and the natural desire of the citizen to resist oppression, led to the demand that the citizen who could not effectively speak in his own defense should be allowed to have a spokesman. The spokesman, to be effective, had to be permitted to be bold and independent, unawed by the power of the state; to question the state's witnesses, bringing out by cross-examination the falsities or inconsistencies in their testimony. And, since the decision had to be made by human beings, judges or jurymen, the spokesman was permitted to argue to those who were to decide what their conclusion should be. All this was natural and proper.

What has come out of the practice is, however, that the lawyer, with a complete lack of responsibility for the just decision of the case, cross-examines the adverse witnesses not only to bring out flaws in their testimony but to confuse and discredit them so that whatever is true in their testimony may be disbelieved or discounted. He questions the witnesses for his client only in such a way as to bring out what may be favorable to his client, thus leaving a misleading impression unless his adversary is well enough informed to bring out the rest of the story. In his argument he marshals the evidence in a completely one-sided fashion, and asks for a verdict based upon that false representation of what has been proved. By these activities he may, and often does, defeat justice and win a verdict for his client. He goes to his home and his luncheon club and his church and is congratulated upon his victory. If the businessman who sits next to him at the luncheon club had engaged in such a succession of sharp practices and had thereby made a profitable deal, his associates would consider ejecting him from the club, and the prosecuting attorney would consider seeking an indictment.

The "ethics" of the trial lawyer is, then, something wholly apart from the ethics which we demand of other members of the community in their serious affairs. This condition has existed for centuries. It is a part of our mores. Is it necessary, or tolerable? Is our freedom from oppression dependent upon its perpetuation?

What might be

Let us suppose a wholly different code of ethics for the trial lawyer. Like the witnesses, he is sworn, either upon the trial of each case or upon his admission to the bar, to use his best efforts to bring out "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth"; that he will, in his examination of witnesses, leave nothing undisclosed which might shed light upon the case; that in cross-examination he will not seek to confuse a witness or discredit his testimony unless he sincerely believes that it is false or mistaken; that he will not urge upon the jury or judge a decision unless he honestly believes that that decision would be in accord with the facts. Would such a code of ethics, effectively enforced by the courts and bar associations, leave sufficient play for the lawyer to be useful in the trial of cases?

If the trial lawyer had such a code of ethics, his role in the trial would be to help the court, and the opposing lawyer who would be similarly motivated, to bring out all the facts in the case, no matter which party they helped or hurt. He would warn his client and his client's witnesses that if their testimony seemed to him to be incomplete or false or mistaken, he would question them until he got to the truth of the thing. If he honestly thought that the facts as they really existed and as proved showed that his client was not guilty of negligence or of contributory negligence, he could urge that thought upon the jury or the judge with all his eloquence. But if the evidence showed that his client was at fault, and legally liable, he would limit his argument to the question of the amount of harm done to the other party, and what would be fair compensation for it. The trial would become a search for the truth, and would lose much of its adversary and gladiatorial character. The result would be that many trials which now occur, with their expense and annoyance and bitterness, would not be held at all, since the truth could be arrived at by frank informal discussion.

Rationalizations

It may be urged that the jury trial and the traditional lawyers' tactics are a necessary safety valve to humanize the law and make it tolerable. The prohibition law became unenforceable in many communities long before it was repealed, because public opinion in those communities had no respect for it, and juries would not convict. The defense lawyer's task was to try to eliminate from the jury any citizen who might feel bound by his oath to convict; to let the accused and his friends testify to an alibi; to urge subtly upon the jury that the law was a mistaken and oppressive one which should not be enforced. The consequences were that jurors violated their oaths, lawbreakers went free, and law enforcement as a whole suffered a demoralizing blow from

which it has never recovered. To whatever extent freedom was enhanced by this episode of disregarding the law instead of repealing it, a heavy price was paid and is still being paid for the experience.

Another important instance of a supposedly beneficial result of the lawyer's traditional privilege of subverting the law is that of injuries caused by automobiles, streetcars, and railroads. It is said that the privilege of plaintiffs' lawyers to induce juries so to find the facts as to create liability when the true facts do not legally create liability is merely a step in the development of the law toward the more beneficent doctrine that absolute liability, regardless of fault, should be imposed upon those most able to pay, that is, the automobile owner's insurance carrier, the streetcar company, or the railroad. It is said that in the course of time the habits of juries, induced by skillful lawyers, will become the law, and the burden of injuries will be spread, through insurance rates and public conveyance fares, over the public, instead of being left to be borne by the victim of the accident. Perhaps this extension of the workmen's compensation idea would be a desirable change in the law. Surely our society is mature enough to face the question of whether or not the change should be made, and if it is desirable, make it, rather than continue the demoralizing practice of having judges solemnly instruct juries as to the law, which instructions the juries, at the urging of the plaintiffs' lawyers, disregard.

A case in point

The writer had an interesting discussion the other day with a young lawyer of fine character, a graduate of one of the best law schools, as to his practice. In a middle-sized county-seat town, he has had some ten cases involving charges of drunken driving within the last couple of years. He has secured acquittals in all the cases, and his services are now sought by persons so accused. He says that he succeeds in eliminating from juries the occasional person who comes from the country and probably would be opposed to any drinking; that he concentrates upon some one juror who seems to be responding to his argument that the police are taking too seriously what is, after all, a trivial and personal thing, and that the hardship of having a recorded conviction and losing one's driver's license is very severe. The young man said that none of his cases had involved damage to persons or property. I asked him whether it might not be expected that if, due to his services, persons could with impunity drive while drunk, they would not ultimately hurt someone. He said that their arrest and trial would deter them from repetition, because he charged them a flat fee of $500 for each case.

Here, then, is a well-educated, otherwise high-minded young man devoting his efforts to defeating the purposes of the law and the law enforcement authorities, and justifying himself by thinking that the fine which he imposes on the lawbreaker in the way of a fee has substantially the same effect as would the enforcement of the law.

The ethical lawyers

What I have said relates to lawyers who engage in the trial of cases, particularly before juries. The trial lawyer's work is an art and a craft, rather than a task of research. Not many lawyers nowadays become adept at jury trial work, or are willing to do it. For many, especially those who represent accused persons in criminal cases or injured persons in civil cases, the strain is very great, because their clients are, whether guilty or not guilty, whether entitled to compensation or not, unfortunate persons and objects of sympathy.

But probably another reason why most lawyers prefer the relative humdrum of office work is that it does not put such a strain on one's conscience. The writing of contracts, deeds, and wills, the searching of titles in the record offices, the drafting of corporation charters, the giving of advice to businessmen, usually involve no deception, no palpable feints and tricks. They require a knowledge or a finding out of what the law requires or permits, and an understandable presentation of the results to the client. And so it seems to turn out that the ethical members of the bar, by the ethical standards of other good people, are the office type of lawyers. They also make the most money, and are the least known in their communities.

It is an unfortunate result of the practices of trial lawyers that many excellent lawyers and law firms shun jury trial work, not only because it is relatively unprofitable, but because it offends their sense of dignity and of right and wrong. They are not willing to get down on the level on which such work is done. The consequence is that on the occasions when an innocent person is in the toils of the law, or a real case of oppression by the government in violation of the Constitution arises, the kind of lawyer who ought to be engaged in such a case is not available, and might not be very adept at handling it if he should undertake it.

The ethics of lawyers is an absorbing problem, which deserves constant study. The present status of legal ethics, though not essentially different from what it has been for some centuries, ought not to be the final answer.

THE ETHICS OF LITIGANTS

I cannot write with much assurance about the ethics of the litigant, never having engaged extensively in trial practice. Perhaps the fact that one is in litigation indicates, per se, that he may be below the normal ethical standard, since somehow he has found it necessary to go to law. Certainly the general run of defendants in criminal cases are below that standard, as it is rare indeed that one finds himself on trial without being guilty, or close to guilty, of some crime, since the case must have been investigated by the police and approved by the prosecutor and the grand jury before the accused is brought to trial. I should say that as far as defendants in criminal litigation are concerned, there is an absence of ethics, they being who they are, and having the normal instinct of self-preservation. Their objective is to "beat the rap" and get off with as little punishment as possible.

The civil litigant

In civil litigation the situation is quite different. The party to an automobile collision, the person who reads a contract or other writing as more favorable to himself than his adversary does, the corporation executive who is alleged to have oppressed the corporation's competitors in violation of the antitrust laws, may not, as a person, be deficient in ethics. The case may be, and probably is, a doubtful one, which, or some features of which, might be decided either way. In such cases the litigant gives way to the lawyer, as far as ethics is concerned. The battle is on, and it all becomes a matter of tactical maneuvering.

As I have already said, the trial lawyer's ethics is, for the duration of the trial, of a different sort from that of the rest of the world. The litigant sits by and hears his injuries and his virtues exaggerated, his carelessness minimized to the vanishing point, his grasping aggressiveness as an entrepreneur represented as a benefit to the community.

What should the litigant do? He is not familiar with this game and did not make the rules. It is being played between the lawyers, both respected citizens, and he assumes that it is being played according to the rules. If his champion wins he pockets his winnings, and vice versa, somewhat as if he had bet on a horse or a hand of poker. So, as far as trials are concerned, I do not see that the litigant has much ethical responsibility. If the ethical tone of trials is to be improved, the judges and the lawyers will have to do the improving.

The judge's limitations

The judge, who is not a party to the exaggerations and misrepresentations which occur during a trial, and who, after some experience, is little affected by them, could do more than he usually does to neutralize their effects on the jury. But in most states he cannot do much without danger of being reversed, for the jury trial in its conventional form is regarded as sacred, and a litigant is deemed to have a right to have the jury led, within limits, to a mistake in his favor. The whole process is not very logical, and the ethics of trials would be greatly improved by giving the presiding judge more freedom to control the proceedings and make the search for the facts and the application of the law a more rational one. But centuries-old fears of oppression will have to be dispelled before much progress can be made.

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Public Administration and Private Interest

By WESLEY C. CLARK

PUBLIC administrators at every level operate in an atmosphere generated by special interest groups. In fact, in the Federal Government, where many policy decisions have been delegated by law to the administrators, much of the business of public administration consists of reconciling the competing demands of these pressure groups in what may be conceived to be the public interest.

In a society such as ours it is inevitable that the great majority of these groups which have found the climate of Washington so favorable to their growth represent private business. Increasingly, however, government bureaus, government employees, political partisans, and labor groups are represented.

It is unavoidable that some policy decisions of administrators shall favor one group as against another. In many cases the question as to which group shall be favored hinges on the specific facts and pressures brought to bear upon the administrator charged with the decision. Or to put it another way, some of the pressures which might be centered upon a particular point are not brought to bear, chiefly because there are no vehicles for their expression. In this category are the interests of such large unorganized groups as consumers.

ELEMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLIMATE

But over and above the special pressures and the particularized arguments which are used to secure special and sometimes illegal concessions is the pressure of the general administrative climate which exists at all times in Washington. This climate is not a constant; it varies from time to time. Depending upon many factors, it may favor administration in the public interest, and again it may favor administration in the private interest. In this variation is to be found the answer to many of the ills which beset the federal administration today. An examination of the factors which compose and condition this administrative climate reveals the reason.

Five major factors contribute to this administrative climate, and there are a multitude of subdivisions of these factors. First there is the moral tone of the nation, second the machinery of administration, third the staff of administration, fourth—and perhaps most important—the leadership which guides the staff and controls the machinery of administration, and fifth the news spotlight in which administrative activities are conducted.

Moral tone of the nation

The basic attitudes of federal administrators cannot be expected to differ greatly from the attitudes of the nation as a whole. It is axiomatic that Washington in any area cannot lag far behind or run far ahead of the thinking of the people of the nation. This is just as true in respect to moral standards as in respect to defense or tax measures. Thus, if the moral standards of the nation are lax, if there is a negligent attitude toward other people's money, this attitude will be reflected in administrative Washington, as well as in legislative and judicial Washington.

The moral tone of any nation may be likened to a great river into which hundreds of tributaries pour their waters.

From time to time, depending on what may be called localized incidents or even cyclical changes in the climate, the importance of these tributaries varies. While it is difficult to determine the importance or to single out the effects of any particular tributary, it seems clear that the great contributors to the present lowering of the moral tone of the nation are two.

The first of these is the wars which have engaged this nation in the last three decades. Even those who recognize the necessity for war do not deny that war is an uncivilized and uncivilizing operation. Of necessity, wars for survival must be fought with deceit, trickery, and treachery, and there is unavoidably some transference of this kind of operation into the arena of civilian life and administration. In the limited area of governmental action, any war generates a tendency to praise the administrator who gets things done without reference to the means by which he achieves these ends; and part of the aftermath of any war is that the same attitude is largely applied to civilian administrators. Yet in any civilization there is no need for the public administrator to ape the warrior. The canons of society and the rules of orderly civilian administration demand that those who bring the tactics of warfare into civilized intercourse ought to be penalized, not praised.

Second, for almost three generations the people of this nation have been taught by example and by experience to believe that the mass mind can be so manipulated as to deny reality. A whole generation has grown up watching the efforts of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin to condition the thinking of whole nations. The rise of the public relations and public opinion research industries in the country bears witness to the impact of these examples of mass persuasion. This doctrine is an outgrowth of the findings on conditioned reflexes by Pavlov and others. It attacks the very philosophical foundations of the American system, but it has nurtured a generation of administrators concerned with the manipulation of the minds of people in the mass. These administrators, many of them ill educated or half educated, have discarded, if they ever knew, the qualifications which give validity to these psychological theories. They are a little like Humpty Dumpty in *Alice in Wonderland* who maintained that words meant what he said they meant, even when he said that black was white. As a matter of fact, these administrators seem to have taken one step further into the realm of fantasy than Humpty Dumpty dared to. They have now promulgated security regulations which seem designed to make it difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to prove that black *is not* white if the administrator has already said that black *is* white.

Once a man believes that he can manipulate public opinion and that he can manipulate it forever, there is no compulsion to be honest; there is only the compulsion to be a more clever manipulator than his competitors or those who would find him out. If he no longer believes that truth will ultimately find a buyer in the market place of our civilization, but that the untruth made palatable will be bought in preference to it, then his be-all and end-all is not the finding of the truth, but the covering of that truth which will hurt him, and the sugar coating of the fact which will oust him from office.

Machinery of administration

The second major factor in determining the administrative climate of the Federal Government is the administrative machinery itself. The tremendous growth of the Federal Government in the last two decades, not only in the number of people employed but also in the scope and magnitude of its operations, has created an administrative leviathan. It seems apparent that the means of controlling the leviathan have not grown as fast as the beast itself. Evidence to this effect is to be found in the countless reorganization plans which have been brought forth, the most recent of these being the report of the Hoover Commission.

Almost all these reorganization proposals have been directed at simplifying the federal organization, largely to erect lines of administrative control leading directly to the Cabinet and thence to the President. There have, however, been some attempts to develop common techniques of administrative control within departments or agencies. At present, in no two departments or agencies, not even within departments, are administrative responsibilities of like importance or worth handled in precisely the same manner. This flexibility probably has some advantages, but there are certain fundamentals of good administration which ought to be common to all federal agencies.

There is, for instance, one great difference between the well-run and orderly department and the poorly run one. In the poorly run department, complaints are referred immediately to the bureau concerned, and the bureau handles the complaint in its own way. Thus, for instance, if an employee writes the secretary of a department complaining about ill treatment, the letter is referred to the employee's immediate superior for reply. This, of course, stultifies complaints. In well-ordered departments the secretary's office, after an investigation of its own, prepares a reply. Thus a more thorough review of the case is assured, without the opportunity for the bureau concerned to cover up its errors.

Staff of administration

The staff of administration in Washington is another of the great barrier reefs upon which the best of administrative intentions often founder. The machinery which has been set up to provide the multitude of safeguards without which government cannot properly function, creates a kind of friction, or braking action, that slows down operations until the whole mass of government seems to move at a lava-like pace. And, like lava, administrative procedure continually has a tendency to slow down to a stop and to congeal into a hard basaltic rock which can be moved only by blasting.

In this situation the bureaucrat tends to lose his initiative. Many of the best minds find the slow pace of government unsuited to their temperaments, and they leave for private enterprise where they can get things done and done quickly. The comparative ease with which good men can secure jobs in private industry and the difficulty under civil service regulations of ousting the inefficient make for a general downgrading of the caliber of civil servants over the years. Thus, for instance, with the advent of the New Deal and again with the advent of World War II numerous new agencies were set up and staffed. Frequently the caliber of the staff was excitingly good. But after the initial job of setting up the programs was done, the excitement wore off and these newcomers to government looked for new worlds to conquer. Time has decimated their ranks, until now, some ten years after the advent of the war, comparatively few of the better men remain; but there are great numbers of people whose sole consideration is not the public interest but private interest, usually their own.

These people, concerned with making sure of their jobs, continually use the

cumbersome machinery of public administration to avoid work, to sabotage programs which require the drive of imagination. In short, they drag their feet. The infusion of new blood into administration from time to time is a necessity; otherwise, over the years the bureaucrat tends to identify the public interest with the bureau interest, and the bureau interest with his own private interest. This divergence becomes so great that only a major political earthquake can change it.

Qualities of leadership

In this circumstance, where the administrative staff is so susceptible of stagnation, in fact almost pushed into quiescence by the machinery of bureaucracy, dynamic leadership in the public interest is a necessity. Civil servants must be pushed and hauled into confronting new problems imaginatively and constructively. They must be goaded and led, cajoled and driven. It is not that there is not in them a willingness to do things in the public interest; it is only that they must be shown the close relation between the continuance of their jobs and the operation of the administrative machinery in the public interest.

Energy

To achieve the kind of leadership required to administer any federal program requires certain special skills above and beyond that required in private industry. First and foremost is, of course, a willingness to work, far greater than that required in many areas of human endeavor. The operation of a department with perhaps as many as thirty or forty thousand people, weighted down with a host of civil service regulations and staffed with civil servants none too eager to work, requires a tremendous amount of drive. Second, while it is true that there are only twenty-four hours in a day and only seven days in a week, the span of attention can be greatly extended within limits; but a willingness to put in a fourteen- or sixteen-hour day, instead of a seven- or eight-hour day, is necessary.

Sense of history

A third and important requisite which the good administrator must bring to his job is a sense of history. Perhaps this can best be illustrated with an anecdote taken from *Franklin D. Roosevelt's Own Story*, edited by Donald Day.[1]

The story (a quotation from F.D.R.) concerns the time when Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, called upon President Wilson to urge him to direct that the American fleet, then based in Cuba, return to the States to be refitted for the war which Roosevelt felt was about to break out between the United States and Germany.

President Wilson told him "No" and then after a minute gave him an explanation. Wilson said: "I am going to tell you something I cannot tell the public. I owe you an explanation. I don't want to do anything, I do not want the United States to do anything in a military way, by way of war preparations, that would allow the definitive historian in later days to say that the United States had committed an unfriendly act against the Central Powers."

Roosevelt said, "The definitive historian of the future?"

Wilson said, "Yes. Probably he won't write until about the year 1990 and when he writes the history of this World War, he may be a German, he may be a Russian, he may be a Bulgarian—we cannot tell—but I do not want to do anything that would lead him to misjudge our American attitude sixty or seventy years from now."

[1] Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1951, pp. 38–39.

This anecdote reveals not one but two of the qualities which make for great administrative leadership. First there is the obvious evidence that Wilson had a very deep sense of historical perspective, a sense which he imparted to Roosevelt. But more important, the anecdote reveals that Wilson had a deep fundamental belief in the doctrine that the truth will always find a buyer in the market place; that "murder will out," so to speak. Further, it seems apparent from this and other evidence that President Wilson and President Roosevelt both had the feeling that death would not wipe clean the slate of their deeds, but that these actions would be up for review and judgment long after they were dead.

The lack of historical perspective seems more prevalent today among administrators than ever before. Now the administrator seems to think in terms of immediate goals. He seems to wear graven in his mind a slogan: "Hurry, it is later than you think." He seems beset with the fear that he is building on a kind of shifting sand which must be temporarily solidified somehow or other, until he gets out of sight. He seems to have no faith in his works or in the works of the men who may follow him. In this circumstance, the immediate goal justifies almost any means, and consequently leads to a general lowering of the ethics of administration.

Correction of errors

Another quality implicit in good administrative leadership can be described as adherence to the doctrine of fallibility. There must be at the very top level a willingness to admit errors. To throw an aura of infallibility over a whole department is to raise the eyebrows of all the rest of us who are human. But more than that, it discourages those who have justifiable complaints, an investigation of which would lead to the correction of administrative malpractice.

In this connection, one of the charges against newspapers and other publications is that they seldom, if ever, admit their mistakes. Yet this very same fault, and it is a fault, is to be found in the operations of almost any bureau or department. In this administration it extends clear up to and includes the President of the United States. Such an attitude on the part of administrators leads to a situation in which the average citizen doubts the government and doubts the words of government officials, just as many citizens nowadays have some doubts about the accuracy of everything that appears in their daily newspapers. But there is a more serious danger. Will the citizen bring his complaints to the bureau? Will the bureau have a chance to rectify the wrongs it is perpetrating if the citizen feels that his charges will be dealt with summarily and against a knowledge that the bureau thinks that it is infallible?

This is a serious danger in a democracy in a time of crisis. For one of the great advantages that a democracy has over a dictatorship is that the democracy provides a slow but generally reasonable way in which wrongs and injustices may be rectified. There are wrongs within dictatorships which are and have been rectified, but in the totalitarian state the process by which these wrongs are righted is more tortuous, more devious. In them the problem is to reach the ear of the top man at a moment when he is sympathetic.

Openness

Finally, all of these qualities of leadership must be capped by an administrative determination to conduct the

public's business in a public way. While there may be some excuse in the field of foreign affairs for not adhering to the proposition of "open covenants openly arrived at," the arguments which apply to the field of foreign affairs have no comparable application in the field of domestic affairs.

Publicity

Closely connected with the last quality of leadership is the fifth factor which composes and conditions the administrative climate in Washington. This factor can be described as the publicity factor. Particularly at the cabinet level, the federal administration in Washington operates in a pitiless glare of publicity. The mere presence of the great corps of Washington correspondents tends to make action by high level administrators conform to the moral standards of the nation. In contrast to this is the comparative news blackout which curtains executive action in the field of private enterprise. This is not to say that the administrators of private enterprise are any less moral than the administrators of public enterprise, but in private enterprise the chances of being found out are considerably less.

It is, however, also true that while the spotlight of news interest always plays upon public officials in high places and the men immediately around them, the same spotlight finds little time to probe the murky depths of officialdom, except on those occasions when it is apparent or suspect that something is wrong. It is this fact that accounts for the failure of the press to bring out earlier the unsavory mess in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In the nation's capital, with its many cabinet officers, independent agency heads, directors of emergency boards, and the host of their immediate assistants, the span of attention of the newspapers and the reporters is not great enough, nor their reportorial resources large enough, to cover thoroughly all of the governmental areas in which wrongdoing may occur.

Even this brief survey of the factors of the administrative climate in which the Federal Government operates indicates that some tend toward promoting higher ethical standards while others operate to reduce the moral standards of the operation of the government. Thus the moral tone of the nation at this time seems to have a degenerative effect upon ethical standards in Washington. As an opposite effect the glare of publicity thrown upon Washington tends to keep the moral standards of top administrators at a high level. On the negative side, again, is the tremendous growth of government without a comparable growth in the reportorial resources of the nation's press—a situation which makes more difficult the uncovering of malpractice in the lower administrative levels. But this whole survey also indicates that the crux of the problem of governmental morals lies largely in the kind of leadership that is supplied at the top levels of government.

HISTORY OF PRESENT POLICIES

The bell was tolled for the kind of administrative leadership this nation needs—which it had during the early years of President Roosevelt's administration—when, early in February 1946, President Truman told a press conference that he would continue to support Ed Pauley for the job of Under Secretary of the Navy. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes had already testified under oath that Mr. Pauley had asked him to delay action on the Tidelands oil question so that he, Pauley, could raise moneys from the oil companies for the Democratic campaign fund. The President may have thought he was merely standing up for a friend.

Actually, however, he was making it impossible for the Secretary of the Interior to remain in office. Secretary Ickes construed the President's statement as a rebuff of one of two kinds. The President's statement suggested to him either that the President did not believe Ickes, even under oath; or that if he believed Ickes, he still preferred to have people of Mr. Pauley's caliber in the government. In either case, Ickes felt that he must resign, and he did so, saying that he felt he "saw a small dark cloud on the horizon which might grow into a major scandal." Since at the cabinet level Secretary Ickes was admittedly one of the truly great administrators of the New Deal, President Truman's rejection of him and his preference for Mr. Pauley was a signal to every administrator in the government that good administration was no longer enough. As a matter of fact, it was not wanted. The era of administration by crony had definitely arrived.

The blow to administrative leadership given by the resignation of Secretary Ickes has had its effect throughout the government. With one or two exceptions, leadership at the cabinet level is definitely of a low order. If anything, the weight of the leadership factor in the administrative climate has shifted from favoring administration in the public interest—as it did in the Roosevelt administration—to favoring administration in the private, the special, and the partisan interest.

The tremendous gulf which separates the present generation of top level administrators in Washington from the kind of administration supplied by Secretary Ickes is perhaps best exemplified by Secretary Ickes' willingness to conduct the public business in a public way in contrast to the repeated attempts of the present administration to curtain its manifold activities.

Secretary Ickes, operating on the fundamental assumption that in the long run the truth would out, welcomed the press. He enjoyed the press conferences and the reporters enjoyed him. But he got far more out of the press conferences than the excitement of matching wits with some of the keenest minds in Washington. Press conference days were days of stock taking in the department. Bureau chiefs, assistant secretaries, deputy administrators hurried into the Secretary's office to warn him of questions that might be asked and to brief him on the answers. It was an unhappy bureau chief who tried to mislead the Secretary, for the latter's questions were often sharper than those which were asked by the reporters later. Bureau chiefs soon learned that the best policy was a complete—well, almost complete—frankness. Bureau chiefs soon learned that while they were expected to attend the press conferences they were seldom given the ball. The Secretary answered the questions and it was on his shoulders that the onus for poor answers fell. When he could not answer a question, he made it a point to call in the bureau chief as soon as the conference was over to find out why he had not been briefed and, moreover, what the bureau chief had to hide.

FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE

Thus in a very real sense the press conference operated as a tool of administration. It kept the bureau chiefs on their toes and kept the Secretary informed as well as informing the press and the people. Further, it was a means of communication between the Secretary and the staff of the department, for anyone who could get away from his work could attend.

It brought home to each man who attended it a sense of responsibility in that his bureau or his operation was

not just a little kingdom for him to run without interference except as he owed occasional deference to the emperor in the figure of the secretary of the department. It brought home to each bureau chief, and in fact to each member of the department, that it was to his interest so to conduct himself that his operations could safely stand the light of publicity at any time.

The function of the press conference as a means of internal communication as well as of external communication—with the departmental staff as well as with the press and the public—has been too long neglected. The public trust of public office in the case of administrators of large organizations rests on more than their just being honest. They must *appear* to be honest in their dealings with the public. While each cabinet officer must be a politician, he need not consort with politicians of the lowest type. To do so creates situations like the Merl Young and John Maragon affairs, where access to the White House lent an aura of importance to their activities. It was this very aura of importance that permitted them to secure favors from underlings in various departments. Much of what is done in Washington is done by little people, not because they are ordered to do it, but because they do not know how their superiors feel about this or that subject. With a good deal of logic, the lower echelons of government can say: "Since men like this can frequent the White House, it would be well not to incur their enmity, for who knows what the White House might do to me, personally?"

The whole of Washington and the Federal Government—and this is true also of the larger state governments and of course of many large private organizations—operates in a kind of miasmal fog of distrust. There is so little communication from the top side down through the lower echelons that lower case civil servants operate by guess and by God. They hunt for signs and portents everywhere as indications as to how their superiors want them to conduct their jobs. All of this underscores the imperative need for communication between those of secretarial rank and the lower echelons of their departments. It also makes clear the importance of a press conference as a means of providing this communication as well as of presenting clearly visible evidence that the department head is willing to do public business in public as far as possible. Both of these things are important to the underling in government. The first lets him know what is going on. The second brings home to him the necessity of giving the public access to what is going on.

In contrast to the modus operandi of Secretary Ickes is the present operation of the government, in which the press conference has been less and less frequently used by cabinet officials. Part of this is due to the Korean war, part to security regulations, but as the *New York Times* suggested at the end of 1951, part seems due to a very real dislike of the press conference by officials holding cabinet posts and positions of like importance.

SECRETARY ICKES

A willingness to conduct the public business in public was not the only characteristic that made Secretary Ickes stand out above the present generation of administrators. He had an integrity, a sense of history, and a sense of fallibility which made him distinguished even in the Roosevelt cabinets. Ickes' sense of history manifested itself in many ways—his keeping of a diary, his fussiness about the letters he signed (the Department of the Interior contains many a graying stenographer whose nightmares still consist of typing letters for the Secretary's signature over and over and over again to conform to his style). But perhaps the best evidence of his sense of history as well as of his sense of fallibility is to be found in his treatment of the Ballinger case. During his early years as a Bull Mooser Ickes was sympathetic to the aims of Gifford Pinchot and raised no outcry when Pinchot spearheaded a drive to oust Ballinger, then Secretary of the Interior, from office. Later, after Ickes became Secretary, his curiosity led him to have the records of the case reviewed. He came to the conclusion that Ballinger had been wronged. He wrote an article for the *Saturday Evening Post* admitting that he had been wrong in thinking Ballinger guilty, and the whole article was a complete exoneration of Ballinger.

In terms of public administration the importance of the article lay not in the fact that it exonerated a public servant from any wrongdoing; its importance lay in the fact that even a dozen years in a cabinet post had not dulled Ickes' willingness to admit error.

These evidences of the kind of administrative leadership provided by Secretary Ickes are, of course, merely small threads in the fabric of his administration. Yet they make abundantly clear how different is the pattern of administration now being woven by so many of the top ranking administrators in the government today. And the evidence seems strong that the pattern of administration in the public interest sought after and fought for by Secretary Ickes and others is not the pattern of today.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

A consideration of the other factors of the administrative climate in Washington provides little excuse for dancing in the streets. There seems little to cheer about in respect to the staff of government, the machinery of government, the publicity attendant upon the operation of government, and the moral tone of the nation. It is, however, not yet time to abandon all hope.

There are and there will continue to be attempts at reorganization of the administrative machinery. If they continue to be of the kind which have been proposed in the past, they will aim at providing more orderly lines of administrative control. The assumption is that once these agencies are brought within the lines of executive responsibility, they will become more responsible to the public interest and more responsive to it. But this assumes that the leader of the organization into which these independent agencies are brought is himself responsive, or has a staff which is responsive, to the public interest. If they are not, what then? It may be argued that in such a case the President would remove the offending administrator, or that the Congress would act. The evidence of our day seems to indicate that there are times when the President may not act, and that the Congress cannot or will not act. When the interests of the United States, of the Federal Government, were comparatively few, public attention could be focused upon the problems continually. Now with the interests of the government so varied, it is comparatively easy to divert the attention of the public from an unsavory governmental mess and far easier to make it impossible for the Congress to act. In these circumstances it seems we must begin to look for new devices of control over administrators, not for the purpose of stultifying the administrator concerned with the public interest, but for effectively controlling the administrator who is several levels removed from the top and who may be favoring some private interest.

We may expect further attempts to

enlarge the civil service to cover many positions not now covered. If this is done without a comparable effort to revise the civil service rules so that it is made easier to get rid of the inefficient and incompetent, the net gain will be little, if anything.

A grass-roots revival leading to a moral regeneration of the nation is hardly to be expected in view of the war in Korea and the continuing cold war with Russia. Rather a continued downward sagging of the moral fiber of the nation may be expected. Again, the wars will make it easier to give substance to the idea that the minds of men can be manipulated. The psychology of battle will make more and more difficult the job of the press in turning the light upon the operations of administration. As the cold war becomes warmer, more and more civilian operations will find justification for seeking the haven of security regulations.

The marshaling of the evidence seems to portend a gradual lowering of the standard of ethics in Washington as elsewhere. This could be checked, momentarily at least, and perhaps reversed entirely by a strong dynamic moral leadership of the nation. But as long as the President remains obstinate in his insistence upon party loyalty as the criterion of good administration, as long as he pays only lip service to the idea of administrative reorganization, as long as he gives sanction to the closed door policy in respect to the press, the nation may expect a continuation of the kind of administration which leans toward the special interest and the party interest as against the public interest.

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The Public Service as a Springboard for Private Profit

By CARL W. MCCARDLE

THE events in Washington during a good part of the past year could justify the notion that consideration of the public service as a springboard for private profit was a shamelessly academic question. In a mounting roll of cases one did not have to "spring" off the board at all to receive private profit. All one had to do was stay where one was and let the chips fall where they would; it was sheer monotony how the chips seemed to fall into one's pocket. Without any sense of neurotic introspection, the governmental employee could ask himself, "Why leave, when I can stay on here and get rich too?" The outbreak of Washington scandals in 1951 gave a morbid answer to the question.

The outbreak was signalized by the rush of internal revenue collectors in city after city to quit their public offices, with or without a fire being built under them. Their exodus was comparable in speed, if not in circumstances, to that of Republican stalwarts departing the scene of the party conventions during the Democratic surety of the New Deal era of Roosevelt II when someone happened to mention them as a vice-presidential possibility on the G.O.P. ticket.

There can be no doubt that public service can be and is a springboard to private profit and one that can carry a man into lush, green fields of pay dirt.

A quick study of the matter indicates that by and large there are two types of candidates who capitalize on their government experience in the field of private business—that is, for money. One type is the honest public servant who of course is motivated in leaving the government by the attractive sheen and supply of the gold to be found in the field of private business. But in his new career he retains, or tries to retain, the same sense of public responsibility that he had while in government. The other type is the out-and-out "fixer," on the alert for a fast dollar, with no nonsense about standards of public trust.

EX-PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH SENSE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

An example of the first type could be Clark Clifford, a very able man, who was President Truman's chief counselor at the White House. Clifford, as handsome as a Hollywood movie actor, but with brains, had been in a St. Louis law firm before going into the Navy and later doing service at the White House. Clifford wrote many of the smashing assaults upon "special interests" for Mr. Truman to regale and arouse the voting citizenry at the whistlestops in his surprisingly victorious campaign in 1948. With Mr. Truman solidly ensconced by the electorate in the White House on his own, Clifford felt that in fairness to his family he should return to the practice of law and make some money. From his vantage point of a place near the President's desk at the White House he could realize that Washington is a trackless jungle.

The government went into big business under the New Deal and the Fair Deal—not only in the public utility area, as with TVA, but elsewhere. And the government has dragged business into government. Both government and business now have a feeling of being "lost" in this blind morass full of

drop-away cliffs and unmarked curves and very soft shoulders on the road. It is a fearsome development that makes the relationship between government and business of McKinley's day—or even of Cal Coolidge's day—a Sunday school picnic by comparison.

Industry, looking on the Washington jungle from the outside, was filled with all kinds of horrors. It didn't want to brave it with its own untried "company" lawyers as guides. It wanted someone who knew his way around the jungle. Clifford, having occupied a position on the right hand of the President, obviously did know his way.

Clifford soon found, as others have, that there is a kind of underground that seeks to ascertain if a man newly out of a lofty position in the government can be "had."

It is said that in the first few months after he had set himself up in law practice in Washington several men, obviously well heeled, who had got themselves into serious tax difficulties came to see him. He advised them that he wasn't taking that sort of case. Apparently the word gets around, for since those initial months as a practicing lawyer he hasn't been approached in that way by anyone.

Also in the opening months, there were people coming in to see Clifford wanting him to work out an arrangement whereby they would give him a juicy fee if he would only lend himself to the abracadabra of getting them government contracts. Clifford informed them he was running a law office and that he did not take that type of work at all. That intelligence seems likewise to have got around in the underworld of influence peddlers, for he has not been bothered by such applicants since.

His accepted clients have not sought influence, but merely aid in getting them through the jungle. Shortly after he hung out his shingle in Washington, the boss-man of a big industry—the kind that Clifford in political campaigns for the President had hauled over the coals with abandon—is said to have come in to see him. Clifford was curious to know why this man, obviously a Republican, and all bruised by the clinically sharp Clifford prose, was seeking his legal services. "All that I want you to do," the tycoon said in effect, "is to give me the same kind of service that you gave Harry Truman."

To a great extent, government and business now have the same kind of problems. The government, for the most part, is just as anxious to find a solution as is industry. There becomes apparent a vast area of similarity in the perplexities of business and government as the running of this nation becomes more complicated, and the government-business interrelationships more complex. That is one of the principal reasons why governmental experience brings in trade for those who go into private life, especially lawyers.

Such ethical practitioners appear to render a genuine service, not only to their business clients but to government. Naturally business wants to hack its way, legally, through the jungle of Washington, and it wants lawyers who can do the job; the man endowed with the necessary inside background can feel justifiably that he is doing both the government and his clients some good. But that is not all. The industrialist, however top level he may be, does not seek out a person of Clifford's unquestionably brainy caliber just because he is a bright boy. And, on Clifford's part, he clearly did not leave the high prestige of the White House because he thought there was more altruistic work for him to do as a lawyer for business dealing with the government. There was lucre in substantial

quantity awaiting him, and he knew it. He and his clients each know what they are getting. And there is nothing wrong about it. It is eminently right, all parties agree. It is one of the few opportunities open to man where he can be high-minded and at the same time well paid for it.

Thomas G. Corcoran, the famous "Tommy the Cork," who was as close to Franklin Roosevelt as Clifford has been to Truman, has for some time been doing very well for himself as a practicing lawyer. He has been quoted, without verification, as saying that he was going to make a million dollars which certainly is neither hay nor a crime. It is unlikely that he'd take a case for less than $5,000.

Clifford has not made any public pronouncement as to how much he is making or expects to make. Jokingly, he has said to friends, "Oh, I've had a few $10 and $15 cases and some little ones."

Another good man eminently qualified to bridge the gap between government and business is David Lilienthal, who has left the government to be a consultant to private industry and to do some writing at which he has a natural talent.

It is ironical that Lilienthal, who as head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and later as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission was one of the most controversial figures in public life—especially under attack from the right wing—has now set up shop in Wall Street. The TVA did as much as anything to put government in business, and so Lilienthal now recognizes the fact that business and the government are having to cope with the same perplexities. He sees that the nature of things in government has changed during the New Deal and Fair Deal era, becoming more similar to that in business. And he sees also that in business a degree of public responsibility has been voluntarily accepted or forced by the times. Some business executives, as he sees it, are glad to have this responsibility; others are not—but all, whether they like it or not, realize that it is there. And that is where such men as Lilienthal come in.

Lilienthal is now in business. His clients (it can be assumed they are mostly of the top rung of industry) vary in kind and in the sort of advice they seek from him. One man, for example, reportedly came to him with the hottest problem of our times. He wanted help on building an atom-proof shelter. And, moreover, he wanted it at a place which would be outside of metropolitan New York and thus not in the pathway of the hordes of refugees who would presumably be choking all roads out of New York. The client, it is said, came with map in hand, and Lilienthal went over it with him and advised him on what looked like a safe spot for a shelter in an unsafe world.

THE FIXER TYPE OF EX-PUBLIC OFFICIAL

As for the "fixer" type, especially if one is looking for notorious success, recent events almost of their own volition cast up the name of E. Merl Young. If it hadn't been for E. Merl Young and his activities, only a very few in the uppermost brackets would know about pastel mink coats. Now even the lowliest housewife knows about them, even if she does not possess one. And Washington's wealthiest ladies who went out and bought their mink coats legitimately in the old days—even as other women would buy calico dresses—have put their minks away in moth balls. They are afraid to wear them for fear of being wrongly accused in some way of influence peddling, or of

at least being taunted by their cynical and suspicious acquaintances.

Young's rise to riches would outdo the rise of a Horatio Alger hero in almost every way. He was once a grocery clerk in Kansas City. In 1940 he and his wife came to Washington. He got a job as messenger in private industry at a salary of $1,080 a year, and Mrs. Young got a job as a member of the office staff of the then Senator Harry S. Truman. When Mr. Truman moved to the White House as President in 1945, Mrs. Young became a White House stenographer. Young himself was appointed an examiner for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a post paying at the time around $5,000 a year. He held that post in 1947 when the Lustron Corporation of Columbus, Ohio, manufacturers of prefabricated houses, got the first of a series of RFC loans that eventually totaled $37.5 million. In 1948 Young quit the RFC and became a vice-president of Lustron at $18,000 a year. At the same time, the erstwhile grocery clerk and messenger became a vice-president, at $10,000 a year, of the F. L. Jacobs Co., of Detroit, a company that had received $3 million in RFC loans.

After he left the government, Young was involved in transactions connected with RFC activity. He worked with the Washington attorney, Joseph Rosenbaum, who it appeared was quite a specialist in RFC matters. Rosenbaum at least seemed adept in getting RFC loans for his clients. And thus the mink coat inadvertently got to be a household word, and a kind of symbol of influence peddling. For Rosenbaum bought for Mrs. Young, the White House stenographer, a $9,500 pastel mink coat, and that fact came out in Congressional hearings. Mrs. Young has long since quit her job at the White House—after the mink coat publicity. And Young himself and Rosenbaum have been indicted for committing perjury before a Senate committee.

THE LOBBYIST

The story of how, when, and where to spring from public service to private profit, whatever the amount, does not include only the Clifford-Lilienthal type and the E. Merl Young type. There is still another great area of profit, and that is called "lobbying." It is almost a truism, as certain as that there exist the Capitol dome and the pork barrel and that politicians never hit a prospective voter over the pocketbook with taxes in an election year, that a Senator or Congressman rejected at the polls by his constituents seldom leaves Washington until he is carried out with appropriate ceremonies at the end of his distinguished span. He stays on—practicing law, if he is a lawyer, or doing some other job less easily classified. Lobbying is a major function of many of these jobs and consists primarily of saying the right word at the right place at the right time on behalf of or against legislation for a client at what must certainly be a right price.

In the off-year Congressional elections of 1950, for instance, a number of administration Senators and Congressmen were defeated back home. Number one of these was Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois, who had been the Democratic floor leader of the Senate. As such his task had been to get the administration bills passed, and he labored long and hard hours to get that done. But, beaten at the polls, he stayed on in Washington, established himself in a law firm, and before long was registering, according to the *Congressional Quarterly*, as a lobbyist. The fees listed as received or anticipated were quite handsome, and the Lucas firm set itself on record as being "interested in advising and counselling" particular corporations regarding credit control legislation as well as tax legislation. It can be imagined that Lucas as a lobbyist would not always be taking the same view that Senator Lucas, the Democratic floor chieftain in the Senate, took in regard to the same topics of legislation.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES WHO PROFIT A SMALL MINORITY

It must be said, in sum, however, that the big majority of government workers are in Washington not because it produces a livelihood, for the compensation is generally small. They are in government service because they want to serve the public welfare, and they do it effectively, self-effacingly, year in and year out. Those who take the leap off the springboard to private profit are relatively in a minority, such as the "tax experts" who go to work in the internal revenue bureau for the studied purpose of learning the ropes, and then rush out to hang out a sign and collect the fees for their "advice" on how to cut corners.

All in all, one need not be graceful or able to do a swan dive to get off the springboard from public service into the gleaming waters of private profit. He can simply fall in, and come up clutching gold in both fists.

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How Public Spirited Is American Business?

By Howard R. Bowen

In attempting to answer the question posed by the title of this article, I shall refer to the several hundred large corporations which we think of collectively as "big business." This restriction of the subject is made only in the interests of clarity and brevity. A discussion of the public spirit of our several million smaller enterprises would be both useful and important, but it would require special treatment beyond the scope of this paper. Thus in the following paragraphs, when such words as "business," "businessman," "business leader," are used without qualifying adjectives, they refer exclusively to *big* business.[1]

Many of the leaders of America's large corporations are deeply concerned about their obligations to society. This is not an entirely new phenomenon. The concepts of "stewardship" and "the gospel of wealth" are, of course, old ideas dating back perhaps several centuries. And for at least fifty years, a growing number of businessmen have seriously pondered their role in modern society and have earnestly considered how this role might be integrated more fully into the total social structure.

Only within the past few years, however, and particularly since World War II, have large numbers of business leaders actively preached the doctrine that they are servants of society and proclaimed their obligations not only toward stockholders but also toward workers, consumers, suppliers, the government, and the general public. Today, discussion of "the social responsibility of business" has become both acceptable and commonplace in leading business circles.

The increasing interest in social responsibility has introduced a positive and constructive note into the social thinking, the public utterances, and the policies of businessmen. Traditionally much of their thinking and action was negative and defeatist. It was directed toward maintaining the freedom and the power of private business. Frequently it consisted of little more than attacks against organized labor and against whatever governmental measures were being considered from time to time for the regulation of business.

But thoughtful businessmen have learned from depression, war, inflation, and social unrest, and from world-wide tendencies toward public ownership and public control of industry. They have been forced by the revolutionary events of past decades to think carefully about the conditions that must be met if the private enterprise system is to remain the basic economic organization of this country. They have seen clearly that private enterprise will be accepted, and can retain its freedom of action, only if it demonstrably serves society better than alternative systems. From this line of thinking has emerged a new emphasis on the social responsibilities of business.

Environment Control and Adaptation

The heightened concern of businessmen for their social responsibilities can be explained in terms of the changing environment within which business is conducted and in terms of the efforts of businessmen to control that environment and to adapt to it.

The environment of business firms may be divided somewhat arbitrarily into two parts, the operational and the social. The operational environment includes the physical supplies of productive resources (labor, capital, and natural resources), the known technology, the wants of consumers, and the competition of other firms. The social environment consists of the socially accepted laws, customs, attitudes, and values which govern business in the acquisition and use of productive resources, which influence its selection of technical methods of production, which affect the demand for its products, and which guide its competitive relations.

Although the response of business firms to both their operational and social environments is primarily adaptive, they do characteristically attempt to control these environments as well. They attempt to control their operational environment, for example, through such activities as prospecting for new sources of raw materials, scientific research and development, product differentiation, advertising, and efforts to allay competition. And they attempt to control their social environment through such activities as fostering favorable public attitudes toward their individual companies or toward the free enterprise system, influencing legislation, seeking favorable judicial and administrative decisions, and attempting to guide or curb labor organization.

Limited power to control

In general, the power of a single business firm to control its social environment is narrowly limited. Any one firm, however large it may be, is a relatively small part of the total economy and of the total society. Its single voice can hardly wield much influence in the shaping of the laws, the customs, the attitudes, and the values of a people. It may on occasion affect detailed legislative, administrative, or judicial actions of government, it may influence public sentiment a little, and it may even on occasion control a city council or a state legislature; but it can hardly exert a major influence on the essential quality of its social environment. Hence, in this respect, a firm is essentially an adaptive organization which takes its social milieu as given, and attempts to adjust to it as best it can.

The single business firm can, and often does, act in concert with other firms in its efforts to influence the social environment. When this happens—whether or not as a result of conscious collaboration—the combined influence of many firms becomes appreciably greater than that of any one firm acting singly.

In this connection it should be noted that deliberate organization is not a necessary condition for business firms to act in concert. Because businessmen have common experiences, face common problems, and communicate with one another frequently, their attitudes, mode of thought, semantic orientation, and world outlook tend to be molded into fairly uniform patterns. Accordingly, businessmen tend to think and act alike on social questions—even when they have not organized or reached conscious agreement. For example, a large majority of businessmen would ordinarily exert their influence against an increase in income tax rates or the strengthening of labor unions or the socialization of coal mines, even though they had neither organized nor met together to agree on their position. But if they organize—as they commonly do—their influence then becomes focused and strengthened.[2]

[1] Much of this article is in the form of a description and analysis of the attitudes of businessmen. It is based on the following sources: speeches and publications of businessmen, public opinion studies, mail questionnaires, and interviews. Because of space limitations, documentation has been omitted. Full reference to sources and methods will be included in my forthcoming book on the social responsibilities of business.

[2] However, organization sometimes reduces their effectiveness if their organizations come

Yet, in spite of their common interests and their tendency to organize, the power of businessmen, either individually or collectively, to control their social environment is limited by two important and almost inevitable facts: (1) successes on the part of businessmen in influencing the social environment will give rise to counterinfluences on the part of other groups having interests opposed to those of business; and (2) the laws, customs, attitudes, and values of a society—rooted as they are in the habits and beliefs of people—cannot readily be shaped according to the will of any group. Therefore, the problem of businessmen is primarily that of adapting to the given social environment, and only secondarily that of controlling it—despite the popular view that "Business" or "Wall Street" really runs the country, and despite the many instances when business influence has apparently been successful in winning detailed concessions.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND BUSINESS REACTIONS

The social environment to which businessmen must adapt has changed dramatically in the past fifty or seventy-five years. The most important change has been, of course, the marked transformation of American social ideals toward humanitarian concern for the welfare of the common man. After centuries of struggle against social inferiority, injustice, tyranny, poverty, and insecurity, the masses of people have come to hope and believe that through the powers of science, technology, education, and democracy a new and better life for them is possible. They have come to believe that a high standard of living—including comforts and luxuries—need not be the exclusive right of the privileged few. Moreover, they have become conscious of their power to achieve these things through political and collective action.

Accordingly a long series of economic reforms—many of them involving controls over the operations of businessmen—have been enacted. These have included the regulation of railroads and public utilities, antitrust legislation, labor legislation, social security, regulation of bank credit and financial transactions, public ownership of forests, and many others. The speed of reform was, of course, greatly accelerated by events surrounding the Great Depression, and in other countries the reforms were carried considerably further than in the United States.

As a result of these developments, businessmen today find themselves in a climate of opinion in which the interests of the common man have precedence over the traditional rights, powers, and freedoms of private property and private enterprise, and in which increased public regulation, or even public ownership, is an ever present threat. At the same time, business has been confronted with relentless pressure from a labor movement which has gained power and status only within the past generation, and which is concerned not only with wages, hours, and working conditions, but also with other aspects of business operations.

During much of the past half-century when social control over business operations was on the increase, businessmen as a whole failed to sense the larger significance of these historic processes, and adapted to them only reluctantly and imperfectly. Their characteristic response was to attempt to prevent, or at least slow up, the evolution of their social environment by opposing each detailed change as it was proposed or threatened. Thus, businessmen tended to dissipate their influence in relatively ineffective rearguard actions designed to prevent particular regulatory measures and to curb the growing strength of organized labor. Business, individually or collectively, was found in opposition to practically every reform measure enacted, including the factory laws, railroad and public utility regulation, antitrust legislation, conservation, the Federal Reserve Act, banking reform, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the personal and corporate income taxes, social security, labor legislation, fiscal policy, and many others.

The opposition of businessmen usually consisted of attacks on these measures as infringements on the "rights" of private property, as interference with the "right" of management, and as unnecessary modifications of laissez faire capitalism which they argued was, prima facie, the most desirable form of economic organization. And when these various reform measures were carried over the opposition of businessmen, their further response was to try to weaken these measures by influencing administrative or judicial interpretation of them.

But eventually the reforms became part of the established social environment, and businessmen succeeded in accommodating to them. This entire history is, in effect, a demonstration of the weakness of business in its effort to control the social environment. On the whole, it was a demoralizing experience for businessmen, who emerged from the 1930's with attitudes of defeatism, disillusionment, and inferiority.

PRESENT ATTITUDES TOWARD BUSINESS

During World War II, public attitudes toward American business and its political fortunes changed perceptibly. The long period in which business was constantly on the defensive against general social hostility and against a steady stream of social reforms came to an end. Just as the Great Depression had apparently demonstrated, for all to see, certain crucial and almost fatal weaknesses in the system of private enterprise, World War II demonstrated with equal clarity that business, if given adequate demand, could perform miracles in producing goods and services. The magnificent wartime record of American business restored much of its former prestige, and with the continued prosperity following the war, businessmen have again been able to hold their heads high and to proclaim that the system of private enterprise is neither moribund nor antisocial. And since World War II, business has had at least a partial and temporary respite from social criticism and from additional social controls (except those relating to the defense program).

It cannot be said, of course, that past suspicions and past antagonisms toward business are entirely dormant. The memories of past abuses and of the Great Depression have been engraved indelibly upon the mind of the American public. There is much apprehension that the present prosperity, based on government spending for defense, is artificial and ephemeral, and that one day the old problems of depression, unemployment, poverty, and insecurity will return. Nevertheless, public attitudes toward business are distinctly more favorable than they have been for many years, and the drive for economic reform has been at least temporarily abated. In this atmosphere, businessmen are carefully taking stock of their social assets and liabilities and pondering their future in the American scene.

Many of them have reached the conclusion that if they are to avoid further infringement of their power and their

into public disfavor. For an interesting discussion of this problem with reference to the National Association of Manufacturers, see Alfred S. Cleveland, "NAM: Spokesman for Industry?" *Harvard Business Review*, May 1948, pp. 353–71.

freedom of action, they must conduct their businesses in reasonable conformity to the new standards and aspirations of the American people. Thus, the shaping of business policies in accordance with socially accepted standards has become an imperative from the point of view of the businessman's own long-run self-interest.

But businessmen do not live in a vacuum. They are members of their society, and—despite biases resulting from their group orientation—they inevitably assimilate many of its values and attitudes. Thus, the evolution of American social ideals has had a double effect on businsesmen. On the one hand it has created a new social environment to which they must adapt if they are to retain their power and freedom. On the other hand it has influenced their own thinking as to their proper role in society, and has changed their own conception of themselves. They have begun to see that a business firm is more than an impersonal instrument for making profit. They recognize more clearly than before that it is a human organization which touches the lives and welfare of many people and which must be conducted with the welfare of these people in view. Society has spoken to the businessman in two languages. It has spoken in the language of controls and threatened controls, and it has spoken also in the language of persuasion. Businessmen have received the message in both languages, and are attempting to follow society's instructions as they understand them.[8]

[8] Certain supplementary factors, aside from the changes in the general social environment, are also partly responsible for the increasing concern of businessmen for their social responsibilities. Among these are: the increasing maturity and security of our large corporations, the perspective which businessmen have acquired in their frequent contacts with government and its problems, the rise of university education for business, the separation of ownership and control in the large corporation, the professionalization of management, and the subdivision of the managerial function and the resulting broader participation in business decision-making.

EDUCATING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

Despite their notable lack of success in influencing the social environment in the past fifty years, businessmen have by no means decided that they must supinely accept the present social environment and adjust to it.

A great majority of leading businessmen agree that one of their first responsibilities, not only to themselves but to society as well, is to attempt to control the social environment by "selling" the American system of free enterprise and the philosophy on which it is based. They believe that the public has been indoctrinated with mistaken economic ideas which underrate the importance of production and of incentives to production. They feel that business has been subjected to unfair and unsound attack by demogogues and that it has had a bad "press." They believe that the public is in danger of being led astray by enticing but deceptive theories of socialism and state planning. And so they believe that the idea of free enterprise must be attractively and convincingly presented to the American public. They believe, perhaps naïvely, that if only other people knew what they know, and had access to facts they are aware of, all sections of the public would stand shoulder to shoulder with them in defense of free enterprise. And so they conclude that a persistent and large-scale educational campaign is required—a campaign that will convey economic literacy to stockholders, workers, consumers, citizens of the communities in which business operates, government officials, teachers, and the general public.

On the question of how the educational job should be done, businessmen are not in complete agreement, or they place emphasis on different techniques. A large group apparently believe that the methods used in selling soap or television sets will be equally effective in selling free enterprise and in purveying economic literacy. In statements of businessmen, one finds frequent references such as the following: "it is a continuous selling job"; "we must merchandise certain simple facts"; "we should take people by their mental hands."

Other businessmen are less confident that the traditional methods of advertising and public relations are suited to the job of winning the public over to the businessman's economic ideas. They feel that persuasion must be based on deed and example—that public relations are of little value unless they are founded on high ethical standards in business and on the conduct of enterprises with a regard for the social interest. Some of them feel that business should be less secretive about its activities and disclose full information to workers and the public. Others feel that public relations begin at home in the sense that each company must pursue sound and ethical policies and must then concentrate on communicating its own accomplishments to the public, rather than harp on abstractions like "the free enterprise system" or "the American Way." Some feel that a useful approach is "to make every man a capitalist" by promoting widely diffused ownership of corporate securities. Others feel that economic education must be based on enlightened research and sound facts. Only a few businessmen decry such efforts to win popular approval.

THE SOCIAL INTEREST AS A FACTOR IN BUSINESS POLICY

The attempts of businessmen to adapt their policies and practices to the changing social environment are perhaps of more interest and more importance than their efforts to control that environment. A comparison of the policies and practices of American business in 1900, let us say, with those of today will be impressive evidence of the extent to which business has adapted to changing social standards. This is true of financial practices, product quality, labor relations, working conditions, community relations, competitive practices, use of natural resources, research, productive efficiency, relations with government, and almost every other aspect of business operations.

Here are some examples of actual achievements by businessmen in their efforts to make their businesses work better from the social point of view:

1. They have co-operated magnificently with government in war and defense production.

2. Many companies have deliberately held prices below the market level during the postwar inflation, and some have even reduced prices in the face of inflationary demands.

3. Many businesses have worked out effective codes of ethics designed to improve their business practices and have developed and strengthened these codes over the years.

4. Great progress has occurred in overcoming misrepresentation and adulteration of products, short weights, and other sharp practices.

5. Individual companies have made great efforts to improve working conditions, to reduce hours, to give vacations, and to provide greater security to workers against old age, sickness, and unemployment.

6. Unions have been recognized, and the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively has been widely accepted.

7. Individual companies have shown increasing tendency to be concerned about the human problems of workers, to regard the workers as persons, to treat them with dignity and respect, and

to consult with them on the affairs of the enterprise.

8. Discrimination among workers on the basis of sex, race, and religion has been reduced.

9. The atmosphere of secrecy in business has been changed to one of fuller reporting and accounting to workers and to the public.

10. Businesses have actively supported community activities such as education, welfare programs, and recreation.

11. Business has become more actively interested in the conservation of natural resources and has improved methods in the use of these resources.

12. Many companies have considered social factors in the location of new plants and the abandonment of old plants.

13. Definite and constructive efforts have been made to smooth out seasonal and other variations in the rate of production and employment and to provide guaranteed annual employment or wages.

14. Many companies have tried to avoid speculative accumulation of inventories.

15. Important efforts have been made to smooth out variations in the rate of investment in new plant and equipment and in the maintenance of existing plant and equipment.

16. Business practices in the field of consumer credit, insurance, and mortgage lending have been greatly improved.

17. Business practices relating to the flotation of securities and reorganization and promotion of companies have improved.

18. Commercial bankers and other lenders have co-operated in voluntary credit control.

19. Business leaders have organized the Committee for Economic Development for the objective study of public policy.

These are solid accomplishments. To appreciate their significance, it is only necessary to read the literature about the attitudes and practices of business during the muckraking period at the beginning of the century and to read some of the more discerning writings of the 1920's.

Achievement through compulsion

The realist, of course, will say that these accomplishments have been achieved only with great reluctance on the part of businessmen and only under extreme pressure exerted by public opinion and by a government reflecting that opinion. He will point out the many companies which have been laggard in these developments. He will mention the many aspects of business operations where improvement is still urgent. And he will suspect that any relaxation of pressure on business will bring a reversion to former acquisitive and antisocial tendencies.

It is true that businessmen were bludgeoned into improvement in many cases by government regulation, by the pressure of organized labor, by the demands of outraged public opinion. But in the process they gradually realized that many of the reforms imposed upon them were, after all, socially justified, and did not result in disaster for them. Moreover, they found that at least some of the demands made upon them turned out to be good business in that they promoted stability, increased productivity, lowered costs, helped avoid unfavorable public attitudes, or improved human relations.

Thus, businessmen on the whole no longer actively oppose such reforms as the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, pure food and drug laws, factory laws, social security, the income tax, or the right of labor to organize. They may oppose specific aspects of these reforms, or they may wistfully look back to the good old days before the reforms were adopted; but on the whole they accept these things as part of the basic environment. Similarly, their attitudes toward tariff reductions, antitrust legislation, and fiscal policy have been tempered through experience and greater understanding of social implications.

Most important, businessmen recognize that future reforms and future whittling away of their freedoms can be forestalled only to the extent that business voluntarily pursues policies that conform to the evolving needs and aspirations and standards of the American people. Businessmen may try to change public sentiment, they may influence legislation, they may retard the growth of labor power, but they cannot expect to shape the environment to their own desires. In the last analysis, they must adapt to it—either voluntarily or under compulsion.

Thus, when businessmen become concerned about their social responsibilities, they are acting in their own long-run interest which they have defined after a careful and realistic appraisal of what society is likely to demand of them. They are searching for the conditions that must be met if they are to remain in good standing in American society.

ALTRUISM?

It would perhaps be idle to debate whether, or how much, the growing social responsiveness of businessmen rests on selfish or altruistic motives. To declare that it is based entirely on cold calculation of normal business interest would hardly be fair to the many businessmen who consistently try to modify their policies in light of social requirements. On the other hand, to ascribe this behavior entirely to benevolence would be totally unrealistic. Unquestionably, selfish and altruistic motives are blended. However, the fact that self-interest (interpreted broadly and for the long run) is so important gives one some confidence that trends toward greater social responsiveness of business may persist into the future.

Senator Ralph E. Flanders, a former businessman, ably summed up the situation when he said:

> Our system is based on the faith announced by Adam Smith that, in the sum total, selfish interests work together for the general good. The time has come when that doctrine is no longer tenable in its historic form. If, however, we learn to distinguish between short-sighted selfish interests and long-range selfish interests, then the whole formula still applies and still will work with this simple readjustment of one of its elements. We may still be selfish, but let us be selfish in the long-range view. What harm will there be if the disinterested observer finds it difficult to distinguish our selfishness from old-fashioned virtue? [4]

[4] "Businessmen's Responsibilities to Government," in *The Responsibilities of Business Leadership* (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 38–39.

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How Public Spirited Is American Labor?[1]

By Joseph A. Loftus

AMERICAN workmen who combined to raise their own wages were prosecuted for criminal conspiracy *at one time*. We did not officially jettison *that doctrine* until little more than a century ago. As late as 1917 the Supreme Court of the United States was giving positive support to the "yellow dog" contract, in which workers agreed, as a condition of getting and keeping their jobs, not to join or support a union. The court held that union leaders might not encourage these workers to join a union.[2] Twenty years ago the labor movement in America could claim only three and one-quarter million members. Fifteen years ago labor's statutory protection of the right to organize freely was challenged by employers in the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds. Today we ask how public spirited American labor is.

No doubt about it, labor has come a long way. The question implies that it has come to a place of power, perhaps even to maturity.

How Powerful?

Labor union membership totals about fifteen million. This is less than one-fourth of the total work force. The more important fact economically is the concentration in coal, steel, transportation, and mass manufacturing. This is a powerful striking force. A prolonged shutdown in one of these areas at this time would disrupt the economy of the country. The whole world would feel the tremors.

The labor leaders are conscious of this power. Perhaps that is what leads them into a certain bombast in the political area—that and their successes in the New Deal days. When their threats in political campaigns are contrasted with the achievements, one wonders if the labor leaders have not made the error of thinking their political influence has the same dimensions as their economic power.

Aldric Revell, who is a political writer and columnist for the *Madison* (Wisconsin) *Capital Times*, as well as a leader in state and local CIO activities, found that only 52 per cent of organized labor in Madison was registered after a two-year registration campaign by labor. Mr. Revell concluded: "On the basis of the record in Madison—certainly a more politically conscious city than many others—the labor vote is a myth."[3]

Mr. Revell's flat conclusion needs some modification. Labor's power is measured not only in the registration of its members in a given year or in its enrolled membership totals or in their strategic location in the economy. Consider, for example, the concept of the "labor community," embracing the unorganized as well as the organized employees. This is the base of labor's power. That is not to say that labor speaks for all American workers at all times; labor cannot speak for itself with a unified voice on many questions. But on broad economic and social issues

[1] For purposes of this article, "labor" and "organized labor" are used interchangeably and refer particularly to the AFL (American Federation of Labor) and the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations).

[2] Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Marshall, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).

[3] Aldric Revell, "Labor's Mightiest Myth," *The Progressive*, Vol. 15, No. 9 (Sept. 1941), p. 21.

—a wage and hour law, for example, or government action to aid the unemployed in a depression—labor is spokesman for the mass of American workers. Its demands and its protests over the years have impressed themselves on the laws of the land—the Clayton Act (labor is not a commodity); maximum hour laws for women and minors; workmen's compensation; the Railway Labor Act, which adopted existing collective bargaining practices in detail; the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which curbed the use of injunctions against labor.

These are some of the achievements that have entrenched labor in American life. On such issues there is such a thing as a labor vote, and that vote is articulate and effective because of unions.

Self-Interest Approach

More frequently labor operates on a narrower base, as in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act. This law has made life more difficult for union leaders; it has raised the cost of organizing and staying organized for most unions. But it has yet to be shown that the whole labor community has been seriously hurt by this law. The labor leaders thought they could arouse the community on this issue. Obviously it did not inspire employees in general to abandon their traditional or local political loyalties or their lethargy.

Labor spokesmen often speak of the movement as if it were a holy crusade. "What's good for labor is good for the country," is a phrase often heard. Other groups employ similar themes. The phrase can be defined in a way that gives it validity, but labor often uses it loosely to support a narrow position. Almost any group would be acting in the public interest most of the time if it lifted its eyes to the long run. But labor, with its scarcity conditioning, is still confined to short-run goals.

In fact, organized labor is not very well organized. The carpenters are well organized. Their union looks after the interests of carpenters. The steelworkers' union looks after the interests of steelworkers. But are they looking after the interests of labor? The opportunity for economic and social uplift in the farm labor and southern textile areas is still great. AFL and CIO unions struggle along in those areas on scarcity budgets with little or no help from the better-entrenched unions with millions in their treasuries. Dogged fights for supremacy go on between unions within the AFL and within the CIO and between the two big groups. Some unions still discriminate against Negroes. The closed union, high initiation fees, and the like, antagonize some members of the labor community.

When these practices persist, it is no wonder that labor's appeals to the crusading spirit or the humanitarian instincts of the American people often miss their mark, political campaigns miss fire, or legislatures write restrictive labor statutes. Where labor can clearly identify itself with the interests of the masses of employees—as it often can—it has tremendous power. Where its interests are narrow, labor is a pressure group that sometimes has its way, sometimes not.

Labor's power and external relations have been weakened by the split in the labor movement. Much of its energy has been drained away through that gap. Example: If one textile union, instead of two rivals, had tried to organize the southern branch of the industry, the effort surely would have been less costly. The division intensifies rivalries and makes labor leaders more insecure. Given these conditions, labor statesmanship has difficulty in developing and expressing itself. Legislators who want to be friendly to labor are often confused by the conflicting

demands and have to move cautiously or not at all to avoid offending one group or the other.

INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT

It seems hardly necessary to state that unions must engage in political activity if they are to perform a successful economic function for their members. (The writers of the Taft-Hartley law saw the connection between the economic and political areas; they not only restricted the labor leader's freedom of action in the labor-management area, but inhibited him from retaliating politically, by writing into the law restrictions on the use of union funds).

When it comes to organizing workers and conducting strikes, the attitude of the local political officials, the use of the police power, often means the difference between success and failure for labor. This is a down-to-earth reason why labor dares not shun politics.

The extent to which unions should use or rely on government to advance their economic aims has long been an issue in the labor movement. The decline of the Knights of Labor was a product, in part, of the conflict between those who favored processes of collective bargaining as a primary tool and those committed to basic change through political power.

"What the government gives the government can take away" was the tradition of the Gompers era. Gompers wanted a minimum of statutory compulsion and a maximum of voluntaryism. The Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia acts did not violate the Gompers philosophy, in that they protected the rights of the unions to pursue their ends; but Gompers probably would have quarreled with the Wagner Act's compulsion on the employer to bargain, because it meant, as the Taft-Hartley Act now spells out, compelling the employees to bargain.

AN EXPEDIENT APPROACH

The unions' principal legislative effort of the last four years has been directed toward repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, or substantial dilution of its restrictive features. A few unions, which dominate their jurisdictions and feel strong enough to maintain their positions, would also throw out the Wagner Act (which someone remarked has been interred in Taft-Hartley); but for the most part the unions want their right to organize protected by a statute like the Wagner Act. That is the kind of government intervention they want. They want nonintervention by the conspiracy and injunctions laws. They object vigorously when government interferes with the terms of the bargain, as in the ban on the closed shop, but they accept government intervention in individual disputes on an opportunistic basis. That is, there is little objection to government fact-finding boards in principle; the unions accept them—even seek them—when it is expedient to do so.

It is clear from history that American labor's political activity is not aimed at taking over the government or revolutionizing the economic and social system. The AFL, under the strong leadership of Samuel Gompers, always sought to defeat "labor's enemies" in government, but at the same time rejected the ideology of the socialists and other radical groups in the movement. The newer industrial unions are more politically minded; their problems are often political problems. Yet they, with minor exceptions, have rejected the communist ideology and techniques. The evidence still strongly supports the Commons-Perlman theory[4] that the primary object of the American labor union is job control. Political power and influence are outposts to protect and strengthen control over the job.

[4] This refers to John R. Commons and Selig Perlman.

LABOR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

What is the public interest? Nearly everyone thinks he knows; but ask a man to identify it, and see how far he gets, or where he goes with relation to self. The most passionate, articulate, and moralistic devotees of the "public interest" often speak matter-of-factly as if there were one public. Is the public interested in lower prices? The inclination is to answer Yes. Actually, that answer applies only to the buying public. What of the selling public? It is axiomatic in our society that people want lower prices for the things they buy and higher prices for the things they sell.

Most persons would agree that a good school system, with competent, satisfied teachers, is not only desirable but essential to build a better society or even to preserve today's cultural levels. What public is doing anything about the public interest in that case? Competent teachers quit because of low pay and take jobs in business; but they are not therefore condemned as antipublic, even though their action is selfish and hurts education. Who is hurting education more—the teachers who are demanding more money so they can continue to teach and maintain standards, or the taxpayers (public) who refuse to pay?

One wonders at times whether even Congress always acts in the public interest, or in what public's interest. Two rollbacks of beef prices ordered by the Office of Price Stabilization in 1951 were blocked by Congress. Was Congress then acting in the public interest? I believe not, but perhaps that is because my primary interest in beef is that of a buyer.

It is a common failing that we identify the public interest as a simple concept, usually something that harmonizes with our own interests. There are many publics, not just one. They overlap. Some publics are sanctioned and supported; others, like the crime public, are not. Labor is one of many groups, or publics, competing for approval of the whole. We cannot assume that because the wage earner organizes against the employer to raise wages he is against the public interest, any more than we can assume that the employer, in wanting to keep wages down, is *for* the public interest.

Early in 1951 the labor organizations waged a two-month campaign for greater representation in defense agencies, more liberal wage policies, and tighter price control. In the price area labor identified itself as coextensive with the consumer public. This was an assumption of leadership that many persons objected to, because they were critical of labor's wage demands.

Whether they were justified or not in speaking for more than their own members, the labor leaders' assumption of that role was quite indicative of their image of themselves. One of these leaders said at the time:

> Our job is to educate our own people, and let us not forget that our own people are all the workers of America, not just the people that pay dues to our union. We must educate our people. The people who do not belong in the union must be educated to know that whether they will it or not, they are represented by the people who do belong to the union. . . .[5]

Certainly labor *believes* its objectives accord with the public interest.

LABOR'S DEFENSIVENESS

The union came into being as a response to a need; it was a device of

[5] George Meany, in "Equal Sacrifice for the Defense of America" (a collection of addresses at the United Labor Conference, Washington, D. C., March 21, 1951), p. 17.

self-defense for oppressed employees. Much of the defensiveness remains, despite labor's growth to a position of great power. The reasons for that may be deeply psychological. Because of the influence labor leaders wield in our society, they are expected to behave maturely. Yet sometimes they seem to overplay the underdog role.

That may be a deliberate device to further selfish ends. Still, there is evidence that the labor leaders really feel that they have not been fully accepted as the respectable, equal partners of other powerful groups in our society.[6] That was their theme when they withdrew from defense agency posts in the spring of 1951 to dramatize their demand for still greater recognition, alongside businessmen, in the defense agencies.

The labor leader's power is a relatively new thing, and he can point to some signs that this power is not stable or secure. A feeling of security is an essential element of maturity. Organizing and staying organized is still a costly business to unions. The commercial press and radio seldom give labor's cause understanding and support; it is more common to find them hostile. Today's middle-aged labor leader can recall the mass unemployment, the struggle for existence, and the attitude of the national administration in the bleak 1929–33 period. The older labor leaders are conditioned by the open-shop battles that followed World War I, and some are old enough to feel the lash of still earlier days. It is not astonishing, in the light of the not-so-remote past, that the word "injunction" today induces some violent reflexes in the older labor leaders. White House collaboration is not so ancient that labor leaders can assume it is here to stay. If the executive branch in postwar days had shared the philosophy of the Eightieth Congress, which passed the Taft-Hartley Act over a veto, labor might have been in deep trouble.

[6] Evidence that such feelings are not necessarily fanciful can be found in C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power* (New York, 1948), pp. 31–46.

ROLE IN STABILIZATION

Let us look at a concrete situation—labor's position on economic stabilization, for example. Labor contends, with justification I think, that in writing the Defense Production Acts of 1950 and 1951 Congress was better attuned to the needs of business than to the needs of labor or the labor community. The executive branch then devised a wage policy that permitted labor to get wage increases commensurate with changes in the consumers' price index, plus certain other concessions in the wage and nonwage areas. In other words, labor was being assured that its real standard of living would not suffer; indeed, it might even improve through correction of inequities and through health and welfare insurance. There was no interference with higher earnings achieved through overtime work at premium rates; merit increases, promotions, upgrading, and so on were permitted under the regulations.

In the fall of 1951, labor embarked on a determined campaign to get more. Labor's charge that there was no price control could not support its demand for still higher wages, even if the charge were true, because the wage policy permitted wage increases to follow price increases; labor's short-run position was thus protected. In fact, from the Korean base of June 1950, wages kept a little ahead of prices.[7]

[7] From June 1950, when the Korean war started, to September 1951, average hourly earnings in manufacturing, excluding overtime, rose 10.6 per cent. The consumers' price index in the same period rose 9.6 per cent. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor.

Labor was free to denounce wage controls as such, and withdraw from the Wage Stabilization Board. Instead, the labor leaders accepted wage controls in principle—accepted positions on a government policy-making board. From these public positions they continued to operate as labor leaders, seeking more, feeling no doubt that the presence of employers on the same board, pushing in the opposite direction, justified their demands. The CIO publicly attacked the wage board policies and announced its intention to break through them. Labor was unwilling to reject controls outright, yet was willing to weaken them as long as government could bear, or share, responsibility or guilt for that weakening.

This is pressure government in a public guise; labor used the cloak of government to further private interests. Labor has no monopoly on this practice. Administrative agencies in every area encounter pressures that would make them the tool of private government.

The question raised here is whether labor's wage objectives coincided with the public interest. Labor would argue that they did coincide; that labor was advancing the interests of all except those they identified with predatory capital. Every action of labor is related to the employer, to the corporation, to profits, as if there were only two publics, labor and the employer. That is labor's normal orientation operating in an abnormal situation. (Labor no doubt would say here that business insists on normal profits.) It overlooks not only other publics but also the long-range interests of labor itself, which would be harmed if economic values were destroyed.

OTHER PUBLICS

In a readiness economy there are other publics immediately concerned with labor's activities. Wage controls were geared in a way that gave labor short-run advantages over some other groups. Public employees, even those who are organized, lag in a race between wages and prices, to say nothing of the unorganized employees of private business, annuitants, professional people, and one-man entrepreneurs. Labor is unsympathetic with the unorganized, and says they should join up—a line of argument that negates labor's claim to speak for more than its own members in matters of economic stabilization.

Automatic wage escalation is a perfect expression of the dichotomy of the employee group. The fact that many unions do not have these automatic cost-of-living clauses does not blunt the point; they are doing just as well with other techniques. The point is that unions with pre-emergency escalator clauses were allowed to keep them, and that set the tone and pace of wage stabilization. Legally, escalation was made available to everybody. In reality, it is special-group protection.

This does not exhaust the store of evidence that labor functions primarily for its own members, and that some of its activities do not advance the welfare of all in our society.

Nor is it possible in this space to list all the labor activities that coincide with, or are designed to advance, the public welfare. Some instances may be given. It is an easily supportable thesis, for example, that without unions, wages in an overemployment economy would have risen faster and higher than they did; that the resulting instability in money values and manpower distribution would have impaired the efficiency of our production machine and jeopardized the economic structure.

Unions more and more are taking roles in community activities. Unions bring democracy to industry, even when the union is not internally democratic.

The union provided some of the necessary elements of a satisfying life that the industrial revolution had taken away, and thereby lifted the tone of the whole community. The public interest was served.

The public hears a good deal about "featherbedding" and union practices that retard technological advance; it is less well informed of the technological adaptability of such unions as the United Mine Workers and the United Automobile Workers, CIO.

Business fears communism, but gives little credit to American labor for rejecting communism at home and for using its own funds to fight communism abroad. Despite its attacks on capitalists, labor is pro-capitalism.

SUMMARY

Labor is strategically organized to exercise great economic power. Its influence extends into the political field in varying degrees. As a legislative lobby it has been effective, on balance, for several decades, although this power has waned since the war. It has successfully adopted the tactics of other interest groups in putting pressure on administrative agencies. At the polls, labor's organization is young, weak, and inexperienced; it has failed to perceive fully that, in the absence of a political machine, patronage, and so on, its appeal lies in issues that cut through narrow union lines, and in convincing nonunion as well as union people that labor has long-range goals that are good for the country.

Labor has no pretensions to power as a political party, but seeks to defend and advance the job interests of its members. It seeks the protection and help of government in organizing and staying organized, but guards its right to say the government shall not go beyond that point.

Labor unions are not public-interest organizations. That is not to say they are against public interest. Labor is essentially a protest group, born and bred that way in the hard realities of the business world. It seeks primarily to satisfy its own needs, as many other groups in our society do.

Public and private interests can and do have common points, especially when a group, such as labor, is representative of a large economic element in our society. But there are deviations, too.

"Labor versus capital" describes labor's conditioning. Operating in that area of conflict, how shall labor identify "the public"? By dividing a complex society into two simple parts, labor and capital, labor can easily identify itself with the overwhelming number of people and thus rationalize much of its behavior as consonant with the public interest.

This is an approach loaded with danger when the economic pie (for civilian consumption) is not expanding but contracting; when more pie for one group means not only less for another, but perhaps less for all beyond the short run. This is where labor's lack of long-range interest shows up as a lack of public interest.

Labor's objectives are often summarized in one word: More. It means not only more pie, but more security, more recognition, more of the intangibles that make a human being human. None of these is inimical to the public interest per se, not even the quest for more pie, so long as it contributes to a bigger pie. By and large, labor has made the contribution. What it needs are long-run goals and philosophy. Perhaps it will get them if it feels secure in the short run.

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Professional Patriots and Ethical Levels

By BARENT TEN EYCK

WHEN space limitations enjoin brevity, the essayist on an assigned subject cannot waste words. The subject of this essay, as limited by its very title, is a special and vitally topical one; but it lies pinpointed within a very general field, which a host of earnest and powerful thinkers have cultivated for many centuries. That field consists of the area where a broad and historic line of philosophical thought, on the subject of ethics, crosses the historic development of man's devotion to his own native land, known as patriotism.

This suggests that the shortest way to the formulation of any well-considered conclusions on the subject of "professional" patriots, viewed with reference to ethical levels, will be to define the essential terms. More explicitly, it is necessary, before saying anything useful about professional patriots and ethical levels, to do some pondering both upon the nature and meaning of patriotism and upon the meaning of man's persistent striving to make himself an ethical being.

THE MEANING OF ETHICS

I believe that the elucidation of the terms "patriotism" and "ethics" will be best accomplished, for the purposes of this essay, by seeking first to define "ethics." Of the two terms, it has the longer history and the broader scope. Usage as recorded in dictionaries and linguistic history as discoverable from etymology agree in fixing the meaning of the word. Ethics relates to *morals*, moral questions. It is that part of philosophy dealing with moral conduct and judgment. It aims at establishing standards of right and wrong. In its practical application, for example, it determines what a professional man may or may not properly do. The word is derived, of course, from the Greek *ēthos*, meaning custom or moral nature.

The ethical, or moral, problem is a problem of the individual, in virtue of the fact that he is born, grows up, and is obliged to live within a society requiring his adjustment with his fellow men. Professor Warner Fite has said that to be moral (or ethical) is to be thoughtful, or self-conscious: that is, conscientious and responsible.[1] In so saying he has only repeated two famous sayings of Socrates: "Virtue is knowledge," and "Know thyself."

In the same study on ethics, Professor Fite has also suggested that, if the moral ideas governing international relations were those which govern the relations of decent individuals, if national honor meant what individual honor means "to a man of intelligence and a gentleman," and if the expression of contempt for what the citizens of other nations hold dear "could cease to be regarded as an evidence of patriotism," the necessary adjustments between nations might easily come, producing peace on earth and good will to men.

THE NATURE OF PATRIOTISM

But what is patriotism? Mr. Justice Holmes has said: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content ac-

[1] Warner Fite, *An Adventure in Moral Philosophy*, London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1926.

cording to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." [2]

If this be true (and I think it is), the "color and content" of the term "patriotism" cannot be apprehended merely from dictionary definitions. This word is, indeed, "the skin of a living thought." It has been, and is, more: a symbol and a rallying cry. What, then, is the nature of this living thought? How does it function, and what are the proper limits of its use?

The difficulty is that patriotism, being the love of one's country, and in its absolute form being the love of one's country right or wrong, *tends* to replace the individual's ethical judgment by an objective and unexamined standard. Moreover, that standard consists, to a very considerable degree, of the hard deposit of years of dead history. It is not wholly the crystallization of responsible, conscientious judgment of any kind—even that sort of composite judgment which is deducible from the taking of a poll or from the choice between alternatives that is presented in a political election.

In another, but very relevant context, Roger Williams saw this when he said (using the terms of reform Puritanism) that the true Church is spiritual in nature, and as such does not need the civil magistrate to maintain its proper position but should use "the breastplate of righteousness, the helmet of salvation and the sword of the Spirit." [3] Milton, too, saw the dreadful danger of man's abdicating the responsibilities of individual ethical judgment when he wrote: "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all other liberties. . . ." [4]

[2] Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 (1918).

[3] Roger Williams, *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience* (1644), Ch. XLV.

[4] John Milton, *Areopagitica*, 1644.

Patriotism, like other concepts connoting conformity, represents a standard which can readily be stated in extreme form, and which those who are perhaps neither responsible nor self-conscious individuals, in the ethical and moral sense, can readily exploit for their selfish ends. G. E. Lessing, the great German leader of the Enlightenment, wished there might be men in every land "who had advanced beyond the prejudices of the populace, and knew exactly when patriotism ceased to be a virtue." [5]

Voltaire found the condition of the human race such "that to wish the greatness of one's own country is to wish ill to its neighbors." [6] Goethe, probing into the question what it means to love one's country and the question what it means to be a patriot, stated his conclusions in a rhetorical question: "If a poet is busy all his life fighting evil prejudices, removing narrow views, enlightening the mind of his people, purifying their taste and ennobling their opinions and thoughts, how could he do better or be more patriotic?" [7] Two years previously, this enlightened man and lover of justice had written: "National hatreds are peculiar things. You will always find them strongest and most vigorous among the lowest stages of culture." [8]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL PATRIOTISM

Critics of the tendency to enshrine patriotism as an absolute and unconditional virtue, to which even conscience must make obeisance, have themselves been rather extreme in their strictures.

[5] Quoted in T. Ziegler, *Die Geistigen und socialen Strömungen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in Deutschland*, Berlin: G. Bondi, 1899.

[6] *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, art. "Patrie."

[7] Conversations with Eckermann, March 1832.

[8] *Ibid.*, March 14, 1830.

Leo Tolstoy, Christian and pacifist that he was, wrote:

> If patriotism is good, then Christianity, which gives peace, is an idle term, and the sooner this teaching is eradicated, the better. But if Christianity really gives peace, and we really want peace, patriotism is a survival from barbarous times, which must not only be evoked and educated, as we now do, but which must be eradicated by all means. . . .[9]

Our own bold American thinker, Thorstein Veblen, poured out his phials of wrath in the following statement, explicitly recognizing the social and economic developments that characterize the world we live in today:

> Into the cultural and technological system of the modern world, the patriotic spirit fits like dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings. Its net contribution to the outcome is obscuration, distrust, and retardation at every point where it touches the fortunes of modern mankind. Yet it is forever present in the counsels of the statesman and in the affections of the common man, and it never ceases to command the regard of all men as the prime attribute of manhood and the final test of the desirable citizen. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no other consideration is allowed in abatement of the claims of patriotic loyalty, and that such loyalty will be allowed to cover any multitude of sins.[10]

The choleric Dr. Samuel Johnson, irascible and dogmatic as always and lacking the patience for fine discrimination, made short work of the whole matter when he exploded with his celebrated dictum: "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel." One need not agree that this is *all* that patriotism is, or properly conceived can be; but it is hardly deniable that all too often patriotism has been conceived of, and preached as, an absolute—indeed almost as a religion, in the sense that Fascism, National Socialism, Soviet Communism, and Falangism have been quasi religions.

Such a view, or one might say perversion, of the patriotic ideal makes it irreconcilable with *any* defensible ethical ideal. Indeed, patriotism so conceived is not a rational ideal at all. Its appeal is not to the mind, or to the ethical sense and judgment of individuals, but wholly and powerfully to their emotions. Its roots are in the dim prehistoric past, when men were pitifully terrified of nature, and even more terrified of other men; when their hunger for security aroused the herd instinct and drove them together into mutually hostile tribes.

The *effect* of patriotism upon the individual's emotions, as well as its appeal to emotion, is intensely powerful; and this is equally true whether we speak of true patriotism, with its ethical ideal of sacrificing the individual's selfish interest for the sake of the broader good of his country, or of patriotism in the perverted caricature the professional makes of it, distrusting and hating all who are different. The trumpet call of patriotism can easily lull the individual's moral sense to sleep. Regarded as an instrument of policy it has been of great use to the virtuoso "professional patriot," whether he was (or is) called Napoleon, Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Franco, Senator Whoever-it-is, Publisher Jones, the master of a great chain of newspapers, or anyone else.

THE ANTIQUITY AND STEADY PERSISTENCE OF PROFESSIONAL PATRIOTISM

The professional patriot is nothing new. Conspicuous examples from earliest history suggest themselves without effort. One need go no further back than the captivity of the ancient Jews

[9] Leo Tolstoy, Letter to Manson, 1896, *Patriotism or Peace.*

[10] Thorstein Veblen, *The Nature of Peace*, New York: The Viking Press, 1919.

in Egypt: Pharaoh was a professional patriot. The ancient Hellenes were not yet a Greek nation, belonging as they did to prenational city-states like Athens and Sparta. Yet, as professional patriots they hated and distrusted not only their non-Hellenic neighbors but also each other. It may be said that (apart from the shifting alliances and confederacies which even professional patriots, chameleonlike, have to this day always countenanced) their only common political ground was in their sharing the professional patriot's xenophobia. It was the *Greeks*, not the Athenians merely or the Spartans, who had this word for it.

The Romans started down the same path, with Cato's *"delenda est Carthago."* Later, with their political talent and institutional adaptability, they matured to the point of conceiving the Pax Romana; while the unifying and civilizing impact of early Christianity helped in opening Roman citizenship to rank outsiders, clearing the way even to imperial place for rude barbarians—natives of Illyria, Germany, and other countries which to the Italian were not only crude but alien.

The story has been the same through the centuries since antiquity. Even before the development of the modern nation-state there was really no hiatus. Early in the game the Moors burst out of their homeland in the name of a superpatriotism called Islam. Sure of their righteousness and scornful of those who professed another faith and other ideals, they swept all before them through North Africa and Spain, drunk with success until they were stopped at Tours.

Christendom, on its side and in its turn, became a superfatherland. The motivation of the Crusades was, of course, an emotional drive not dissimilar in kind and effect to the emotional drive of patriotism, though nobler because broader and derived from a generous spiritual ideal. Originally pure in conception, the Crusades soon attracted such figures as Richard the Lion-Hearted—professional soldiers rather than spiritual men; and the logical development was a new wave of bloodshed and conquest in the Mediterranean.

One reaction begot another. Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of the Osmanli Turks, ruled his heterogeneous empire in a way that set an example for western Europe as to tolerance of ethnic minorities and cultural dissidence. But, we are told, he was repelled by the princes of Europe, who were nominally if not genuinely Christian, when he sought admission to their circle and wished to participate in the forging of a harmonious Europe where peoples of differing stocks, cultures, and customs could dwell together in peace and amity. Thereupon, the Turk embarked on his own headlong course of aggression, embracing xenophobia with a vengeance, so successfully that the phrase, "the Terrible Turk," has become part of the languages of all Europe.

After the Reformation, during the long years of religious wars, the witches' Sabbath of professional patriotism mounted to what must have seemed a climax of frenzy. Throughout that sad period each side, without discrimination, was more notable when dominant for its fanaticism than for anything one could regard as ethics. But even this apparent climax was attained, and surpassed, again and again in the furious clashes after the full development of nation-states when professional patriotism had grown aware of itself as well as self-righteous. Successive new crescendos were achieved upon the discovery of the New World, when the Old World's great maritime powers, each holding aloft a banner of patriotism, fought each other tooth and nail for the prizes of colonial empire.

Professional patriots and minorities

But the violence of these wars has been outlasted by the smoldering fanaticism with which all the European conquering powers have treated the natives of the lands they conquered—whether their skins were black, brown, yellow, or red. This has been a continuing manifestation of that kind of professional patriotism which battens on racial antipathy, enduring unabated down to our own times. Rousseau's pleasing picture of "the noble savage" has never been more than a picture, for the delectation of philosophers, writers, and bookish stay-at-homes. The statesmen who have prepared the ground for the wars, the demagogues who have nurtured the distrust and hatred, and the men of action who have carried out the conquests seem never to have seen his picture at all.

Likewise, the bullies who have suppressed and scourged minorities have never been true patriots in any ethical sense, but only professional patriots. They have debased true patriotism, a conception originally ethical, which inspired the individual, exercising a moral judgment, to sacrifice his selfish interests in favor of the broader interests of his country and his fellow citizens. They have made of patriotism a golden calf, a blasphemous idol before which the hypnotized unthinking and the timorously unethical have been made to dance.

The history of English-Irish relations over a shockingly long period of time is but one sorry illustration of this, out of many that might be chosen. The reflection of that history in the treatment, still remembered by living Americans, that good patriotic American Bostonians once accorded to Irish immigrants in their city is a striking illustration of the power of such perverted patriotism to endure, and even to cross an ocean. The persistence of anti-Semitism in Europe and its revival by Nazi professional patriots when the memory of older pogroms had almost faded out is another example; and the transference of anti-Semitism to the United States is still another, and a grim one to think about with the memory of Dachau and the Nazi gas chambers still haunting our minds.

PROFESSIONAL PATRIOTISM IN AMERICA TODAY

It would be easy to catalogue our own present-day private organizations of professional patriots, of one kind and another, starting in either direction from a certain organization of female xenophobes who not long ago denied to a great woman singer, because she was Negro, the use of their auditorium, but who nevertheless call themselves Daughters of the American Revolution. The shades of Locke, Jefferson, and Franklin, among others, must (after quailing) have concluded that the patriotism of these ladies was a professional kind of dilute; and it seems clear, at least to me, that their only connection with the ethical ideals of the American Revolution is one of distant family descent. But it would be tedious, and unprofitable for present purposes, to construct a list of even the best-known private organizations.

The professional patriotism that flowers like deadly nightshade out of distrust and fear of those whose color, national origin, or religious faith is different is certainly widespread enough. Everyone knows this, and everyone admits it, except with respect to the particular form of professional patriotism which reflects his own fears and his own insecurity. Such blossoms of perverted patriotism may wilt, but like other weeds they revive and seem to be al-

ways with us. Our nativist "Know-Nothing" party of the 1840's and 1850's was not the first of these organizations, and we have certainly not yet seen the last.

THE INFILTRATION OF PROFESSIONAL PATRIOTISM INTO GOVERNMENT

Today, however, we are witnessing a renewal of another, and ostensibly ideological, form of professional patriotism. It slyly attaches itself to something that properly commands the devotion of all Americans, which is the welfare and security of the United States. It holds itself out as wanting to do no more than shield our country from the malevolent assaults of Communist Russia and her satellites. It has many instruments. On occasion it seems to have affected the policy and the functioning of an immensely potent agency of our government—the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives.

That Committee was created as a standing committee by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. It is the successor to a select committee first called the Dies Committee, which was authorized in 1939 by a simple resolution of the House of Representatives. At that time our immediate ideological (and immediately menacing) enemy was Nazi Germany, supported by her allies—not Soviet Russia or international Communism. The Dies Committee was continued from session to session under a series of chairmen, each of whom gave it his name during the period of his chairmanship, until its existence and powers received the more permanent form they now have.

The present Committee, like its predecessors, is authorized to conduct investigations, from time to time, of:

(i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The key terms in this charter of powers, of course, are the words "un-American" and "subversive," with respect to propaganda activities and their diffusion within the United States; and the phrase "propaganda that . . . attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution."

But what is "un-American"? And what is "subversive"? And what is "the principle" (the *single* principle) of our form of government as guaranteed by the Constitution?

It seems clear that "un-American" is an indefinable term that may be used as an epithet to characterize whatever it is one does not happen to like. To Abolitionists slavery once seemed un-American, while the Abolitionists' drive to free the slaves seemed to the South equally un-American, as an unwarrantable invasion of the property rights of Americans. Similarly, capital has considered trade unionism in this country un-American, and trade unionism has returned the compliment with regard to what it has seen as excesses of capitalism.

"Subversive," clearly enough, is whatever tends to subvert, overturn, or undermine something already established. One who advocates a change, in ideas or in institutions, is certainly attempting to subvert existing ideas or institutions. When Democrats throw Republican rascals out of office, that is subversive; and when the converse happens, that is equally subversive. It is undeniable that when a privately owned rapid transit system is taken over by a municipality, that is subversive to a certain extent of the whole institution of private property.

What of attacks upon "the principle" of our form of government as guaranteed by the Constitution? It need only be recalled that good Americans have over the years constantly advocated the most far-reaching changes in our governmental form and have successfully carried through many of them. It is hardly arguable that they were any the less good Americans for having done so.

In *Schneiderman v. United States*,[11] the Supreme Court of the United States, after noting the many changes in our Constitution since 1787, held that these "refute the idea that attachment to any particular provision or provisions is essential, or that one who advocates radical changes is necessarily not attached to the Constitution." The Court suggested, in fact, that if any one principle was essential it was freedom of thought. It may be observed, parenthetically, that freedom of thought is ethical, or moral, since it implies the individual's right and responsibility to judge what is right and what is wrong.

Dangers involved

Serious heed must be paid, I think, to the voices of those who tell us there is danger—if not unconstitutionality—in the granting of so vague and ambiguous an investigative authority to a committee armed with the immense powers of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. There is no guarantee that all members of the Committee will always be men of moderation, ethical and truly patriotic men, who will zealously avoid abuse of their power to hurt and even to destroy those whose ideas they happen to dislike.

To many it appears that the activities of the present Committee and of its predecessors, which operated under an exactly identical grant of powers, have sometimes been tainted with professional patriotism rather than with true patriotism, which is an exemplification of ethics. Among the organizations which have been investigated are the American Civil Liberties Union, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Farmer-Labor Party, the Federal Theatre Project, various consumers' organizations, publications as diverse as *The Daily Worker* and *Time*, and a whole series of private industries. These were certainly not *all* members of an international conspiracy, either Fascist or Communist, against American security.

WHAT STAND SHALL WE TAKE?

To many it appears that our country's best way to strength and security lies in being true to itself and to its own traditions and that there is poison for the body politic in the heady potion of character blackening for mere difference of opinion, on no matter what subject. Ample means exist to deal with *actions*, or even words that are used in such circumstances "as to create a clear and present danger" to our safety.

I am unconvinced that the menace of Communist Soviet Russia has anything to do with communism as an economic system, or with sovietism as a pattern of government. The Oneida Community of the last century in upstate New York, and many other Utopian experimental communities that have briefly flourished in our country from time to time, were communist in their economics and their political form; but no one has suggested that their existence, or the possibility that others might emulate them, ever threatened the security of the United States. Most observers believe that Soviet Russia is not a truly communist community, but

[11] 320 U. S. 118 (1943).

rather the ultimate development of state capitalism. Yet she and her satellites are now seen, and with reason, as a source of danger to the whole free world.

The characteristics of the world behind the Iron Curtain that create danger are precisely those which are abhorrent to ethical men, and probably abhorrent even to the submerged mass of ordinary Russians who (many believe) are more truly patriotic Russians than their masters in the Kremlin. Such Russians there must still be if there remain any Russians who even in secret make their own moral judgments as individuals, exercising freedom to think for themselves though dreading to express what they think. What has made the danger is dictatorship, irresponsible power over fellow men, the suppression of dissent—in a word the marks of the totalitarian police state, which treats individual men and women merely as pawns in a game played for power and national aggrandizement. These things are not ethical; but they are, and through history always have been, quite acceptable to the professional patriot.

Let us forswear the professional patriotism of Pharaoh, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, and Hitler. Let us hold to our own time-honored Western ethical ideals. Let us leave the laurels of professional patriotism, indicating world championship in that field, upon the brows of Marshal Stalin and his principal pawns in and out of the Kremlin. That is where the laurels now rest, despite the efforts to compete, as yet rather amateurish, of some of our own professional patriots.

Let us as Americans be ethical in our patriotism: truly loving our country as individual conscience tells us is right, and respecting the conscientious scruples of all the men and women in it who are our fellow Americans. Patriotism, in that sense, will unify us. It will make us strong, as strength needs an ethical foundation; and it will keep us so.

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Good and Evil from the Press

By WILLIAM ALBIG

Responsibility—The right of a newspaper to attract and hold readers is restricted by nothing but considerations of public welfare. The use a newspaper makes of the share of public attention it gains serves to determine its sense of responsibility, which it shares with every member of its staff. A journalist who uses his power for any selfish or otherwise unworthy purpose is faithless to a high trust.

Independence—Freedom from all obligations except that of fidelity to the public interest is vital.

Promotion of any private interest contrary to the general welfare, for whatever reason, is not compatible with honest journalism.[1]

THIS quotation from the editors' code of ethics well states the principle of the responsibility of the commercial press for the public welfare, which I presume implies also the advocacy of generally diffused economic well-being as a basis for the maintenance of a public capable of judicious, democratic decision making. It would seem that the editors also assume responsibility for supplying the readers' minds with such fare as will admit of a rational, balanced mind life, to the extent that the readers' abilities and potential abilities permit. The editors' statement appears to consider as unethical the exploitation, agitation, or degeneration of the readers' mind life in the pursuit of any journalist's objective, including circulations and income. This is, indeed, a statement of high principles, but somehow much current practice appears to deviate from the editors' ideal.

[1] From the Canons of Journalism of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

In the topic assigned to me, good and evil from the press, the term "evil" has a connotation which I would not choose to emphasize in this discussion. Evil has an implication of purposely unethical behavior which does not properly characterize the fundamental attitudes of the newspaper publishers and editors of the United States. Yet much that is evil in terms of the general welfare, in terms of the progress of cultural values, and in terms of the general mental well-being of the readers, does emanate from the daily newspaper.

There have been myriad discussions of the specific evils and shortcomings of the contemporary newspaper. And because of the resentment of publishers and the frequent emotional animus of the critic, the discussions are usually acrimonious. A fresher view may be possible if we are not engaged in the subservience of contradiction, the restrictions of controversy.

PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL FORCES

Analysis of the evolving anatomy of the press has frequently overemphasized the power of the dominant figures in the history of journalism to innovate and has overstated their responsibility for change. Again, impersonal influences have been stressed. The press today is largely the product of impersonal forces—the economics of publishing, the over-all competition, and the markets for diverse kinds of news and information. But the imprint of the decisions of the great journalists, past and present, is also found in today's newspaper. And although the impersonal pressures are stronger today than

ever before in determining the patterns of the press, the powerful publishers of the United States have some remaining areas of choice and decision. Therefore, it may not be quite futile to ascribe some measure of praise and blame and to discuss possibilities of changes, some of which could be introduced by publishers and editors who had a heightened sense of responsibility.

To some extent, change in the quality of the press could result from changing attitudes and values of the present and next generation of newspaper publishers and editors. It may be that in the not too distant future, self-interest will dictate a quest for popular leadership and power over the readers' opinions on public issues which is not now enjoyed by large sections of the daily newspaper press.

GROWTH OF THE PRESS

The ephemeral, limited-circulation papers of the Colonial period, with their emphasis on foreign news, shipping, and business news, were essentially of interest to the business and governing classes concerned with public affairs. In 1833 no paper had as many as 5,000 subscribers. In the thirties and forties the penny newspapers began to seek mass circulation, and added popular features, and by 1860 the *New York Herald* could claim to be the world's largest newspaper, with a circulation of 77,000. However, the period from 1890 to the present is the time of newspapers of mass circulation, with the now enormous coverage of 53 million daily copies.

This period covers the entire history of modern advertising in its often intricate relations to press policy. It is during this period that almost all the features and special sections of the modern newspaper have been developed. The press has been popularized for a growing literate public. It disseminates organized gossip as well as more serious news. During the first two decades of the period great circulations were achieved, in part through the espousal of popular causes and in part through the growing general interest in special features.

LOSS OF LEADERSHIP

During the past two decades public confidence in the press as a source of guidance on public affairs has waned, while the exploration of circulation-building through the servicing of public tastes for features has been enormously successful. The gap has widened between press and people, especially on issues relating to welfare legislation, popular democracy, economic issues, and the proper locus of power. In the report of the nine Nieman Fellows of 1946, professional newsmen all, it was stated:

> The American popular press reached a peak of public leadership, for better or worse, at the turn of the century. That was a period when William Randolph Hearst's newspapers could boast that they had led the nation into war with Spain. It was a period when the press gained great prestige by exposure of political corruption. Led by vigorous newspapers that took an active part in trust-busting campaigns and in championing Woodrow Wilson's idealistic conception of democracy, the press maintained its great influence through the first World War.
>
> Today the newspapers, while still powerful, have lost their leadership. Readers no longer look to them for advice and wisdom in making great decisions. The newspapers are held suspect by millions of Americans. Beginning in 1919 and 1920, two years of industrial strife and suffering for many people in the United States, underlying rifts which had always existed between the press and many readers widened into a deep gulf. There was a wave of postwar disillusionment and skepticism. The hostility of the newspapers against the reviving labor movement, their one-sided stories about the efforts of bewildered workers to raise their standards of living, their bias against social legislation, made millions feel that most of the papers were far from sympathetic to the large numbers of Americans who passed their lives on the edge of economic disaster.[2]

EVIDENCE OF WANING INFLUENCE

Evidence of the waning influence of at least the sections of the paper in which the publishers' avowed positions appear is to be noted in the general commentary to that effect by many astute observers who are professional journalists, in the repudiation of the political position of about 80 per cent of the press by a majority of voters in the past five national elections, and in the type of answers which have been collected by the pollers during the past fifteen years. Here are a number of poll results which illustrate widespread beliefs concerning the press. Even if there are doubts concerning the validity of some of the polls, the cumulative evidence is considerable.

"Do you feel that the press has abused its freedom in any way?" asked a *Fortune* poll in August 1939, and 21.3 per cent of the answers were Yes. "In what way has the press abused its freedom?" "Prejudice in general and in politics," answered 36 per cent, while 30.8 per cent declared there was too much distortion, exaggeration, and sensationalism.

"Are the newspapers you read fair in their treatment of labor news?" asked Gallup in July 1937, and 40 per cent said No.

"Are the newspapers you read fair in their treatment of political news?" asked the American Institute of Public Opinion on at least three national polls, and 45 per cent answered No in July 1937, 47 per cent said No in March 1939, and 59 per cent said No in April 1939.

"Do you think the advertisers in the newspapers you read influence the treatment of news?" asked the American Institute of Public Opinion in December 1938, and 65 per cent of the answers were Yes.

A national sample of readers appeared to be more suspicious of publishers' partiality than of unions' distortion, for when *Fortune* asked in August 1939 "Do you think a reporter's impartiality is apt to be affected by membership in a newspaper union?" some 34.6 per cent thought that it would, but 55.6 per cent declared that "fear of displeasing the boss" would destroy the reporter's impartiality. The same poll included the question "Do you believe that newspapers furnish fair and unprejudiced news about politics and politicians, about labor and labor leaders, about business and business men, about foreign affairs, about religious and racial problems?" and the answers were as shown in the accompanying tabulation.

	Yes (Per cent)	Not always, depends (Per cent)	No (Per cent)	Don't know (Per cent)
Politics and politicians	33.1	3.7	45.9	17.3
Labor and labor leaders	41.8	2.2	31.4	24.6
Business and business men	51.6	2.3	25.9	20.2
Foreign affairs	50.1	1.3	20.1	28.5
Religious and racial problems	59.3	1.1	15.5	24.1

Most of these polls were taken some years ago, but I very much doubt that the answers would be very different today. All of which would appear to add

[2] L. Svirsky (Ed.), *Your Newspaper* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 8.

up to something less than trusting public confidence in publishers' attitudes and behavior.

In spite of the doubts, questions, reservations, and at times animosities of readers, the newspaper has certainly not lost its customers. And the prudent publishers, secure in present prosperity, and perhaps psychologically secure in confident belief in the ultimate validity of economic conservatism, evidence little concern as to the suspicions and doubts of what they may view as the mentally and financially less stable 25 to 50 per cent of their readers.

This is not an indirect way of saying that the press should regularly agree with majority opinion. A principle that the press should always be in accord with majority opinion would represent intolerable restriction on the basic function of criticism. Yet a belief that the positions of publishers on public issues is motivated by interest in the general welfare is necessary for healthy confidence. It is the responsibility of publishers and editors to create such assurance. This is best done when it is in fact true.

SOME OF THE GOOD POINTS

Much that is good in the American newspaper is quite evident. It is free from government restraint, in contrast to the press of all the authoritarian states of the world. In this mid-twentieth-century world, this is a fact to be more cherished every year. The press is broadly based on advertising income and is therefore not dependent upon the subsidized support of faction, class, party, or group. And while there are pressures upon the press by particular advertisers, direct pressure by individual advertisers is less influential today than has ever before been true in American journalism, because of the diversity of advertisers supporting the now fewer but more financially secure dailies.

Objective reporting of news, the strengthening of the journalistic tradition of objective news reporting, has made considerable gains in the United States. In a large city daily, preeminently conservative on economic issues, certainly not evidencing zeal for a greater diffusion of the national income by redistribution, I read a large front page headline today: "TOP FIFTH GETS 47 PCT. OF MONEY; ONLY 3 PCT. GOES TO BOTTOM FIFTH. HIGHEST GROUP IN SOUTH RECEIVES 50 PCT., CENSUS ANALYSIS SHOWS." Regarding political news, Herbert Brucker has recently written:

> It is often argued, too, that in 1936 and 1940 and 1944 most of our newspapers were defeated at the polls by Franklin Roosevelt. So they were, in so far as their editorial pages were concerned. ***But they elected him by means of the objectivity of their news pages.*** For, no matter what bias in reporting may remain, our anti-Roosevelt and pro-Roosevelt papers hardly differed in that for a dozen years they covered their front pages with substantially accurate accounts of everything the President said and did. This, and not the fulminations on their editorial pages, is what they really told their readers; and this is what elected him, as he used to say, again and again and again.[3]

In comparison to papers anywhere else in the world, the press of the United States provides an amazing variety of news in the better large city dailies, though such is usually not the case in dailies in cities of 50,000. The quantity of materials in the larger papers is enormous, obviously beyond complete reading by anyone. It has been estimated that it would take an average reader 72 hours to read the Sunday edition of the *New York Times*, exclusive of advertising.

[3] Herbert Brucker, *Freedom of Information* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), p. 272.

The press services commerce through providing a regular daily medium for advertising. Advertising is an inevitable and necessary concomitant of the American economic system with its wide distribution of consumers' goods. The large city dailies contain about 50 per cent advertising, about 25 per cent news, and about 25 per cent entertainment features.

The newspapers of the United States are themselves a large industry and an important part of the economy. They provide regular and speedy news, although the factor of speed is not so significant now as it was before the development of radio.

The newspapers do bulwark against encroachments on civil liberty by governments. Although it is true that perfervid screams from the press about freedom of the press must usually be interpreted in terms of motivations other than abstract dedication to freedom, this fact must not depreciate the press contribution to freedom.

The press provides a very great deal of entertainment to engage some of the increasing leisure of the readers.

These are among the impressive contributions of the newspapers in the United States which have made our readers the most enlightened and best informed in the world.

CONTROLLING POSITION OF COMMERCIAL PRESS

As the significant press of the United States has been the commercial press, there is every indication that commercial newspapers will remain in almost exclusive control. Alternative backing is suggested from time to time. The idea of a labor daily, proposed occasionally by the unions, is not implemented. Of the church papers, the most powerful, the *Christian Science Monitor*, excellent though it is, requires church subsidy for survival. The adless papers, a suggestion cherished by reformers for decades, had an ambitious trial run for six years in *P. M.*

So it is evident that the decisions of the powerful and prudent publishers of the commercial press will determine the content of the newspaper of tomorrow. Therefore, the attitudes of publishers and editors, agreements by publishers for standards of self-regulation, and the assumption of responsibilities for additional services to readers are crucial.

CHARGES OF IRRESPONSIBILITY

Publishers and editors may believe that they are assuming full measure of responsibility of press to public. Yet many have noted a growing lack of responsibility in newspapers. Erwin Canham, editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, has said: "The gravest fault in all of us is a kind of irresponsibility. That is one word which spells to me the greatest need in the American Press."[4] Most frequently, lack of responsibility is charged regarding sensationalism, overrepresentation of economic conservatism, careless printing of false or inaccurate information, invasion of private rights in news accounts and pictures, overemphasis on conflict and violence, cheap entertainment, whipping up of unjustified hysteria, and the like. But there are more fundamental responsibilities of the press to which specific charges relate. A more ideal press must assume responsibility for the maintenance of: (1) a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, (2) instruction and education of the reader, (3) an open forum, (4) freedom of

[4] L. Svirsky (Ed.), *op. cit.* note 2 *supra*, p. 13.

communication, and (5) interpretation and guidance amidst the glut of news.

RESPECT FOR PUBLIC OPINION

It is possible to combine respect for the matured opinions of large publics, especially on matters of principle and of sentiment, with a slight regard for transient, ephemeral, ill-founded, uninformed popular expressions. It is also possible to concentrate on the foibles of popular mind life so that respect for the opinions and judgment of the common members of large publics decreases. Such disrespect may be theoretically sincere or practically cynical. For five decades, the newspapers have been purveying human interest materials, comics, features, and organized gossip. In our day, much of the contents of periodicals, radio, and motion pictures, as well as of most newspapers, evidences something less than a pristine belief in the rationality of the common man.

It is an occupational hazard of the opinion industries that success in manipulation corrodes faith in the quality of the mind life of the large publics. To some extent the traditions of journalism have saved the practitioners from the extremes of disrespect to be found in radio. Interestingly enough, the professional pollers, dealing regularly and directly with the opinion responses of their subjects, develop a respect for the significance of popular opinion.

> Men by their constitution are naturally divided into two parties. 1. Those who fear and distrust the people and wish to draw all power from them into the hands of the higher classes. 2. Those who identify themselves with the people, have confidence in them and consider them as the most honest and most safe, although not the most wise, depository of the public interests. In every country these two parties exist—and they will declare themselves.

The fundamental issue of his day, as thus succintly and clearly stated by Thomas Jefferson, remains a central and intensified issue today. It is more difficult to discern man's faith or disdain for the opinions of his fellows than in the days of the Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians. But nonetheless it remains an issue on which men sharply divide as to their fundamental attitudes, now as then. In our day the attitudes are more often hidden. A fundamental faith in the efficacy of popular opinion may be partially concealed in an age when much has been done to make the common man appear irrational and even silly; and a disdain for popular opinion may be hidden in an age when there are goods to be sold, electorates to be wooed, publics to be cajoled, and personal legends to be built. In the United States, in the middle of the twentieth century, these attitudes must often be discerned through a cloud of protestations of faith in the opinions of large publics.

A climate of opinion unfavorable to confidence in popular opinion frequently exists among men most eminent in the fields of publicity, advertising, propaganda, and the managers of mass media. Believers in their own superior judgment, in moral relativism, and in the rights of the mentally alert, they may underestimate the significance of meaningful popular opinions at crises. These attitudes are understandable in terms of the experience of the directors of mass media in seeking appeals to ever larger audiences with ever lower common denominators. But the standards of intelligence, taste, and ethics of the larger publics are also, in part, a product of mass media. Here is the obvious dilemma. However, responsibility rests on those who would assume power over opinion. What the managers believe about the intelligence of common men is a prime factor in their decisions as to whether the minds of the readers or listeners should be propagandized and manipulated or developed and informed.

Defense of collective judgment

Today the forces arrayed against the liberal assertion of the worth, the dignity, and the significance of the opinions of the individual personality are more formidable than at any time in the past two centuries. A great deal of modern psychological theory has tended to remove much of the dignity and significance of human life. Much anti-rationalist evidence appears convincing. Romantic idealization of the common man has been cut down in the cross fire of modern realist descriptions. Political ideologists of various authoritarian types elsewhere in the world are busily engaged in churning publics into masses. Communist and fascist ideologies alike reject belief in the significance of the common man and in democracy. Yet, withal, respect for collective judgments can be defended. "What we need is the belief that the mass of common men are, in the long run, less likely to be wrong than the individual judgment of any superman, or the limited judgment of any self-appointed elite." [5]

And it may be argued that the reason for that ultimate superior judgment is to be found less in wholly rational analysis than in sentiment.

> The common people, as a rule, live more in the central current of human experience than men of wealth or distinction. Domestic morality, religious sentiment, faith in man and God, loyalty to country and the like, are the fruit of the human heart growing in homely conditions, and they easily wither when these conditions are lost. . . . The originality of the masses is to be found not so much in formulated idea as in sentiment. In capacity to feel and to trust those sentiments which it is the proper aim of social development to express, they are, perhaps, commonly superior to the more distinguished or privileged classes.[6]

Therefore, a proper respect for the opinions of mankind forbids the editor to cheapen and corrupt the sentiments. The sentiments can be burlesqued into absurdity or cultivated into a sound basis for democratic political action.

INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION OF THE READER

Generalizations about the inadequacy of newspaper content for the instruction and education of the reader are vulnerable to denial, for the press ranges from the superficiality of fragmentary items in the most fugitive tabloid to the rich fare of the *New York Times*. However, the papers providing a quite rich fare have total daily circulations of not more than a million, about 2 per cent of the national circulation. It is true that since Jefferson wrote "The press is also the best instrument for enlightening the mind of man, and improving him as a rational, moral and social being," other means of mass communication have come to share the responsibility. Yet, as the principal dispenser of mass communication, the newspaper publisher must accept a larger responsibility for popular education. The motion pictures have long proclaimed their role as entertainment, and the radio is immature and laggard in public service programs.

The immediate rejoinder is that a commercial press will provide the content demanded by the readers; that, as the British Royal Commission on the Press states, "If a newspaper does not

[5] C. J. Friedrich, *The New Belief in the Common Man* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1942), p. 31.

[6] C. H. Cooley, *Social Disorganisation* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), pp. 135–36.

reflect the limitations and prejudices of at least a considerable section of the public, it will soon cease to exist, for it will find no buyers." But to what extent does the press itself modify the demands of the readers, and what are the variables of influence and the degree of responsibility now assumed by publishers at each level of the press from tabloid to *Times?* Certainly the methods of instruction must vary with the reader group, but the editors' continuing responsibility is constant. Not all newspapers can maintain the same standards, but must adjust to their publics. And very large sections of the public, in part encouraged by the press, have become preoccupied with entertainment, confused amid the political charges and countercharges, and inadequately concentrated on facts essential to rational decisions on public affairs. Dr. George Gallup has recently reported on some astoundingly widespread areas of ignorance concerning foreign and domestic affairs.

What about the role of the newspaper in this situation? The historical function of the newspaper has been to keep the public informed about issues of the day. It is, in a very real sense, "the schoolmaster of the people." But have the newspapers of the country lost a sense of mission in this respect? Have they begun to worry too much about having the most popular comic strips and the most complete sports pages, and too little about keeping their readers interested in, and informed about, the important problems of the day? [7]

In another poll of copy-desk chiefs, concerning the quality of presentation of news of foreign affairs, which may be part of the reason for the astonishing ignorance of so many readers, these working newspapermen rated the readability of such news lower than that of any other type of news. Vastly concerned with the readability of popular features of newspaper content, editors may give scant attention to the quality of news writing on such public affairs as interest but a small proportion of readers. Concerned with the interests of the maximum audience,

When a journalist says that a certain event is news, he does not mean it is important in itself, often it is; but about as often it is not. The journalist means by news something that has happened within the last few hours which will attract the interest of the customers. The criteria of interest are recency or firstness, proximity, combat, human interest, and novelty. Such criteria limit accuracy and significance.[8]

Again we come to the attitudes and values of publisher and editor. It is exasperating to publisher and editor, amidst busy lives, to be charged with such diffused responsibility; but the increased education of readers can occur only as publishers seriously review their papers' contents and exert steady pressure for the gradual improvement in the instruction of readers.

MAINTENANCE OF AN OPEN FORUM

The newspaper as a quasi-public agency has the responsibility of maintaining a reasonably open forum for the discussion of significant public issues. Obviously, this does not mean responsibility for publishing everyone's ideas on all topics, regardless of importance of the subject or regardless of the market for the ideas in the readers' interests. It does mean the duty to present important topics of general interest, and to indicate significant ideas which may be contrary to those of the publisher.

It is often claimed that the fundamental restriction on diversity of expressed viewpoints is the fact that there

[7] George H. Gallup, "What We Don't Know *Can* Hurt Us," *The New York Times Magazine,* November 4, 1951, p. 51.

[8] Commission on Freedom of the Press, *A Free and Responsible Press* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 55.

are a diminishing number of papers and that the remaining dailies are largely controlled by individuals who share the same points of view on matters of economics and on the appropriate locus of power. But, as Raymond Nixon has ably argued, an increase in numbers of competing commercial newspapers does not guarantee diversity and quality of content. Nixon notes that the number of competitive daily newspapers will continue to decline, but that the one-publisher town is not an evil in itself—it all depends on the publisher.[9] Moreover, concentration is likely to be carried further because local businessmen, who contribute 40 to 50 per cent of the gross income of newspapers, rather like newspaper monopoly, as they believe that the job of advertising is done more economically that way.

In any case, the important issue is not solely the need for competition. Nixon declares, "What is needed, above all, is a higher quality of content, coupled with a journalistic effectiveness that will assure this content being read and understood." [10] And he believes that well-founded criticism by specialists, based on a more exact science of communication, will have an impact on publishers which past criticism has not had; and that the increasing suspicions of the general public will engender an extensive critical spirit which will have results on all the mass media. Let us hope so. In any case, for any foreseeable innovations we come back once more to the attitudes of publishers and editors.

They must therefore themselves be hospitable to ideas and attitudes different from their own, and they must present them to the public as meriting its attention. In no other way can the danger to the mind of democracy which is inherent in the present concentration be avoided.[11]

RESPONSIBILITY AND FREEDOM

The newspaper for entertainment had not developed when the theorists of democracy were establishing the legal basis of freedom of the press. Certainly they could not envisage the newspaper in its gossip activities, the emotional sensationalism, the cameraman prowling among faces contorted by grief, terror, horror, vacuousness, and fear, the world of the comics, columnists as name-callers, the concentrated power of great publishers. The Founding Fathers' concept of freedom was essentially that of freedom from governmental restraint. This was protected. Beyond this essential protection, their theory was based on the self-righting process, that truth would emerge from competition, that excess would call into being the answer or antidote. They could not envisage the need to relate freedom to responsibility. Yet today the dilemma is how to achieve responsibility while protecting the essential freedom. The issues were brilliantly examined by W. E. Hocking.

As with all freedom, press freedom means freedom from and also freedom for.

A free press is free from compulsions from whatever source, governmental or social, external or internal. From compulsions, not from pressures; for no press can be free from pressures except in a moribund society empty of contending forces and beliefs. . . . The free press must be free to all who have something worth saying to the public, since the essential object for which a free press is valued is that ideas deserving a public hearing shall have a public hearing. . . . There is an antithesis between the current conception of the freedom of the press and the accountability of the press. Accountability, like subjection to law, is not necessarily a net subtraction from liberty; the affirmative fac-

[9] R. B. Nixon, *Communications in Modern Society* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948), p. 51.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 53.

[11] *Op. cit.* note 8 *supra,* p. 93.

tor of freedom, freedom for, may be enhanced. . . . The situation approaches a dilemma. The press must remain private and free, *ergo* human and fallible; but the press dare no longer indulge in fallibility—it must supply the public need.[12]

This basic issue must now be left on a note of query.

INTERPRETATION AND GUIDANCE

The first American newspaper stated, "It is designed that the Country shall be furnished once a month (or if any glut of occurrences happen, oftener) with an account of such considerable things as have arrived unto our notice." The glut of occurrences of the past thirty years has brought not only daily and almost hourly news, but also great public confusion and inability to clarify and interpret the news. The newspapers' contribution to clarification has been the editorials, the columns, the magazine sections, and special interpretive features. Amidst the confusion of mind life and values which characterizes contemporary intellectuals, academicians, men of politics and action, and the general public, we cannot properly demand that publishers and their employees single-handedly chart the road to clarity and culture integration. But they have a responsibility to provide a good quality of simplifiers, explainers, and popular interpreters.

A great many of our columnists, cherished by publishers as the name-callers and hatchetmen, the *condottiere* of attack on individuals and of permanent regular barrage against innovation and reform, can hardly be classified as clarifiers. True, they are the creatures of their faithful publics, which cherish the epithets of the masters. And so I suppose, in some degree, supplying the market for specialists in personal attack is inevitable. So, too, with the providers of gossip, the advisers of the harried, and the specialists in interests and entertainment. But where are our popular clarifiers, dominated by concern for the public interest, devoted to rationality, wary of special interest, determined to expose fundamental relationships? A few intermittently sincere attempts are evident, but superficiality is a most evident defect. High-quality explanations by specialists are provided in the features sections of a few of our great newspapers. For the rest, there is neither current market nor supply. It is not surprising that a matured profession of columnist-clarifier has not developed. The great need for such is recent; the necessary qualities of training are ill defined, and public response untested.

TO BRIDGE THE GAP

At the time of publication of the report entitled *A Free and Responsible Press,* Mr. Wilbur Forrest, president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, wrote: "Are we to sit quietly by and permit people who have very little knowledge of the working of newspaper publishing or editing to preach so-called reformation blindly and without the slightest responsibility?" It is not intellectual remoteness, presumption, or irresponsibility to note some responsibilities of the press which are not adequately met, though one cannot implement the analysis with concrete, detailed proposals for specific reform. Certainly I have no plans for the improvement of the press, no particularistic reforms, no practical suggestions as to how to make more income while increasing responsibility for the readers' interest. Only the professionals can properly implement reforms.

The pattern of the commercial press in the United States has changed a great deal during the past 150 years.

[12] W. E. Hocking, *Freedom of the Press* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 228–30.

There is no reason to assume that it is now static. The press is too public an institution to sustain a permanent schism between reader and publisher. If at least the large proportion of readers now alienated do not reform from what so many publishers currently assume to be erroneous beliefs and the following of false economic and political doctrines, it is likely that another generation of publishers will seek for leadership in espousing the popular causes.

It is also possible that economic changes based not on the preferences of publishers but on objective realities of a rapidly changing economy may make obsolete the present discrepancies between publishers and the opinions, views, and interests of many readers. At some point there will be a cleavage between the roles of the publisher as representative of conservative economic views and the publisher as publisher in quest of reader following, not only for his comic strips and features but also for power over opinion, for deference and public status. Then, once more, publishers will campaign for what the public believes to be in the public interest.

Montaigne once wrote: "I speak truth, not so much as I would, but as much as I dare; and I dare a little more as I grow older." Is this one's cautious mood engendered by the almost invariably violent attack by the newspapers on critics from without the fold and depreciation of critics from within? Since writing this article I have reflected on my attitudes to ascertain the conditions of its writing. Was it written with even an unconscious impulse to depreciate the evil and laud the good from the press? I think not. I feel I had no especial compulsions from within or without. However, I am not a professional journalist, but have my life in an institution which cherishes freedom of expression. It would be a significant evidence of a responsible press if the professional pressmen, wayward and otherwise, without fear but without venom, made regular, responsible public criticisms of their handiwork.

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Radio and Television and Ethical Standards

By Frederick C. Gruber

SINCE the Radio Act of 1912 the Federal Government through its various agencies has been attempting, within the framework of the American economic system, to regulate the radio industry so that the air waves are used for the public good. Such regulations are predicated on the proposition that the air waves belong to the people, that their number is limited by the nature of the radio spectrum itself, and that the use of these air waves by an individual or group for commercial broadcasting should be looked upon as a public trust and should be continued only as long as the daily schedule of broadcasts can show that the welfare of the general public is being served. The Radio Act of 1912 merely denied the right of any person to operate a radio station without a license from the Secretary of Commerce.

The tremendous increase in the number of radio stations, the overlapping of radio signals, and adverse court decisions denying the Secretary of Commerce the right to assign frequencies, to regulate hours of broadcasting, to restrict the number of licenses issued, or even to prevent one station from using a frequency assigned to another station caused such confusion that in 1926 President Coolidge appealed to Congress to enact a comprehensive radio law.

The Radio Act of 1927

. . . proclaimed that the air waves belonged to the people of the United States and were to be used by individuals only with the authority of short-term licenses granted by the government when the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" would be served thereby. A temporary Federal Radio Commission was created to administer the law.

Advertising abuses also engaged the attention of the new Commission which stated as its policy that: "Advertising must be accepted for the present as the sole means of support for broadcasting and regulation must be relied upon to prevent the abuse and over-use of the privilege." The Commission decided not to renew the license of one station in 1928 because a large part of its program service "was distinctly commercial in character consisting of advertisers' announcements and direct advertising, including the quoting of prices."

Despite the Commission's moves to control advertising, and the efforts of responsible broadcasting leaders to eliminate abuses, public reaction against overcommercialization of the air was apparently so great that in 1932 the United States Senate passed a formal resolution calling for a survey to be made of plans that "might be adopted to reduce, to limit, to control, and perhaps, to eliminate the use of radio facilities for commercial advertising purposes."

In 1934, after reviewing seven years of federal radio regulation, Congress was ready to write a permanent law embodying the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" approach which has been tried and found successful. The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications Commission with substantially the same powers and responsibilities as the earlier Radio Commission except that it was given jurisdiction over wire communication too. The 1934 statute with certain amendments remains on the books as the governing law of modern broadcasting.[1]

[1] Giraud Chester and Garnet R. Garrison, *Radio and Television* (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, Inc., 1950), pp. 29, 30, 31.

Self-Regulating Agencies

Responsible radio officials have recognized their duty to the general public and have developed codes or operational procedures. Each network and each station has developed its own code applicable to its specific situation, and practically all stations subscribe to the *Standards of Practice* as set forth by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) to which most network stations and many independent stations belong. The *Standards of Practice* is an eight-page pamphlet which sets standards covering almost every phase of radio broadcasting. A similar set of standards is now being prepared for the television industry. The general tone of the *Standards of Practice* is well set in "The Broadcasters' Creed," which is here quoted in full.

We believe

That American Broadcasting is a living symbol of democracy; a significant and necessary instrument for maintaining freedom of expression, as established by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States;

That its influence in the arts, in science, in education, in commerce and upon the public welfare, generally, is of such magnitude that the only proper measure of its responsibility is the common good of the whole people;

That it is our obligation to serve the people in such manner as to reflect credit upon our profession and to encourage aspiration towards a better estate for all mankind; by making available to every person in America such programs as will perpetuate the traditional leadership of the United States in all phases of the broadcasting art;

That we should make full and ingenious use of man's store of knowledge, his talents and his skills and exercise critical and discerning judgment concerning all broadcasting operations to the end that we may, intelligently and sympathetically:

Observe the proprieties and customs of civilized society;

Respect the rights and sensitivities of all people;

Honor the sanctity of marriage and the home;

Protect and uphold the dignity and brotherhood of all mankind;

Enrich the daily life of the people through the factual reporting and analysis of the news, and through programs of education, entertainment and information;

Provide for the fair discussion of matters of general public concern; engage in works directed toward the common good; and volunteer our aid and comfort in times of stress and emergency;

Contribute to the economic welfare of all, by expanding the channels of trade; by encouraging the development and conservation of natural resources; and bringing together the buyer and seller through the broadcasting of information pertaining to goods and services.[2]

Theory versus practice

From the foregoing quotation there can be little doubt as to the high intent of the radio industry. But there seems to be considerable discrepancy between theory and practice. Many radio executives are devoted to the high ideals set forth in the Broadcasters' Creed, but their devotion does not appear to be great enough to overcome the pressures that they frequently meet from competition, Hooperatings, advertising agencies, mounting costs of operation, and the demands of stockholders for sizable profits. There is also no clear definition of what constitutes good taste. High aims seem to be implemented with wishful thinking—with inadequate and mild restrictions.

While much has been done by radio stations to promote civic projects, to uncover vice and corruption, and to keep the American public informed re-

[2] *Standards of Practice for American Broadcasters* (Washington: The National Association of Broadcasters, 1948), pp. 1–2.

garding current events with a fair degree of accuracy, the approach of many radio executives toward current issues is timid and fearful. They seem to be afraid to offend anybody, especially the potential customer and those with large accounts. "Radio is not in business for its health" is a familiar phrase among financial vice presidents. To take an extreme example, "in 1935 . . . Alexander Woollcott's 'Town Crier' broadcasts were discontinued when the sponsor complained Mr. Woollcott had criticized Hitler and Mussolini, and might thus offend some listeners." [3]

RADIO AND THE SPONSOR

American radio is supported for the most part by revenue from advertising, of which there are two types: network advertising and local advertising. About twenty-five agencies handle most of the 200 million dollars spent annually for big network advertisers. Of the 241 national advertisers on the four national networks in 1949, five major advertising groups accounted for almost three-quarters of the total network time sales. They were (1) Food and Food Products, (2) Toilet Goods, (3) Smoking Materials, (4) Drugs and Remedies, and (5) Soaps and Cleaners. Procter and Gamble spent over 17 million dollars, which represents almost twice as much as the next two advertisers combined.

When advertisers spend such sizable sums for advertising, it is not surprising that they tend to exercise considerable control over the content of the programs they sponsor. Advertisers are out for sales. They are interested that their message be carried to the largest number of potential buyers possible. The whole program is built around the commercial, the entertainment being calculated to induce the listener to stay with the program until the next commercial announcement. Advertisers by and large are not interested in the welfare or interests of minority groups or in the advancement of American culture or taste. One radio executive described "good taste" by saying: "We don't want anything that would be offensive. We don't want anything improper, that couldn't be heard in the home." [4]

Such a point of view makes radio programming entirely subservient to the undiscriminating taste of the general public, with very little chance for improvement. Procter and Gamble probably has more to say about what the American public will hear than any other single organization in America.

Sponsors often use their commercial time to promote their own particular views with regard to social, economic, and even political questions rather than to use the time for a description of their product.

In 1944 the du Pont Company used its commercial advertising period on "Cavalcade of America" to explain its side of a suit filed against it by the United States Department of Justice. Other examples of the misuse of air time to propagandize in the interest of individuals and groups are cited in the publication of the Federal Communications Commission.[5]

In 1946 the trade magazine *Broadcasting* queried radio station managers throughout the nation to determine what factors or agencies had most retarded the improvement of broadcasting. The station managers overwhelmingly laid the blame at the doors of the advertising agencies and the sponsors. "Yet by law, the licensees, not the advertisers who buy time, are entrusted with the responsibility of determining what we shall hear." [6]

Attempted improvements

In order to correct these abuses the radio industry has drawn up a great many restrictive rules. For example, the NAB *Standards of Practice* suggests how much advertising time should be allowed for each broadcast period, that no advertising copy should be approved without positive proof of the truth of its statements, that the word "cure" should never be used in drug advertisements, that advertising copy should never be so placed that it could be mistaken for a news item, and that whereever possible the newscaster should not read the commercials. These suggestions, however, are negative in their approach, and many of them are constantly violated.

Bad as radio commercials may be, it must be said for the industry that they are generally of higher quality and veracity than the type of advertising permitted in the tabloid newspaper and the pulp magazine. Any comparison of press and radio advertising would show that considerably more care is used in the investigation of the claims of the product by radio program departments than is exercised by some types of publications.

It is not so much the commercials as the cheap quality of the fill-ins that offends the listeners. One step in the right direction, it seems, is the building of a balanced program by the network programming departments and the development by the networks and their affiliated stations of package shows which are offered for sale to sponsors at such times as fit into the program pattern. Such a practice will return the responsibility for programming to the broadcasters, where it legally belongs.

NEWS AND FREE SPEECH

In a lengthy discussion of censorship and free speech, Robinson concludes: "In the traditional sense there is no such thing as free speech in radio today. Furthermore it is unlikely that there ever can be. . . . What is there then, if there is no free speech in radio? Free hearing." [7]

These statements seem to imply that the *only* defense the American public has against current radio and television fare is to turn it off—a truly negative point of view, especially considering the fine phrases of the Broadcasters' Creed.

Any thoughtful person will realize how news is slanted by news analysts and even by newscasters and news commentators.[8] The danger of such news slanting becomes especially acute when both press and radio in the same area are controlled by the same interests. Then, too, large corporations have been known to keep commentators on the air even when their Hooperatings have fallen far below those of other commentators whom they have dismissed, because the former express the political and economic point of view of the sponsor.

In a searching discussion of "Freedom of Speech on the Air," Siepmann cites a survey of radio news reporters in an issue of *Variety Magazine* dated July 25, 1945, to the effect that of 30 reporters studied, 12 were conservative

[3] *Public Service Responsibilities of Broadcast Licensees* (Washington: Federal Communications Commission, 1946), p. 17.

[4] Thomas Porter Robinson, *Radio Networks and the Federal Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 78.

[5] *Public Service Responsibilities of Broadcast Licensees* (Washington: Federal Communications Commission, 1946), pp. 46–47.

[6] Giraud Chester and Garnet R. Garrison, *op. cit.* note 1 *supra*, p. 96. See also Chapter 8 for a discussion of advertisers and agencies, to which the author is much indebted.

[7] Thomas Porter Robinson, *op. cit.* note 4 *supra*, pp. 82, 85.

[8] Mr. Kaltenborn is a news analyst. Lowell Thomas is a news commentator. A newscaster merely reads the news as it is assembled from the wires of the Associated Press or the United Press.

(5 extreme reactionaries), 8 liberal (mildly so), 6 middle-of-the-roaders, 1 independently liberal, none extremely liberal, and the rest defying classification.[9] Were the survey to be made today, it is likely that the proportion of conservatives would have increased.

In order to avoid criticism, the Columbia Network has declared that it has no editorial policy. Another suggestion is that each network should have a battery of news reporters representing different points of view. This latter suggestion is more positive, in theory at least. It would appear, however, that many radio stations are so afraid of being accused of being biased that they become ineffectual in the performance of their duty to the public. When the station has no editorial policy it leaves its air waves wide open to the sponsors, who usually have a very definite one. There is no harm in a station's having a point of view, openly acknowledged and openly expressed, provided that listeners in its service area have an opportunity to hear opposite points of view sincerely expressed at times convenient to them. Radio stations that have taken definite stands on public issues, especially on the local scene, have earned the gratitude of the communities they serve.

A type of program once popular but now losing its appeal, perhaps rightly, is the forum discussion of topics of current interest. Of course these programs are forums and town meetings in name only. A few chosen individuals, scarcely ever equally matched in ability or background but allegedly so, discuss a topic (often stated so that it begs the question) either among themselves, oblivious of the radio audience, or with a period for questions from the floor. Most of the forums, both sponsored and sustaining, produced in commercial stations are looked upon as entertainment. The show was "terrific" if the participants lost their heads, yelled at each other, and generated enough heat to melt the microphones. The program director of one of the nation's largest stations has a motto: "Never let your speakers agree." Conclusions are seldom reached. The moderator usually remarks that the speakers have "explored the subject and the decision is left up to the listeners"—which of course they have already made, usually before they tuned in the program. In all fairness it should be said that many universities do a better if less spectacular job. The Chicago Round Table is a notable example, but its Hooperating is quite low.

[9] Charles A. Siepmann, *Radio's Second Chance* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), p. 100, also Chap. IV, pp. 80–133.

Access to the air

Access to the air is by no means everywhere the same. Minority groups, racial, religious, and political, are frequently denied time on the ground that radio as a mass medium must appeal to the majority. But the success of democracy depends upon the encouragement and protection of the minority, for it is often within the minority groups that the seeds of progress are sown and nurtured. Even large groups are often denied free access to the air. Until recently, labor found it very difficult to secure air time. Fortunately this situation has been remedied.

According to Robinson, the networks, in order to handle this difficult problem, base their policy on five premises:

(1) that since frequencies and broadcasting time are limited and since the chains have been granted a public franchise within this scarce supply they should have no editorial opinions; (2) that, except in political campaigns, time should not be sold for the primary purpose of opinion expression on matters of national import because of the great disparity among individuals and groups in their ability to purchase such time; (3) that when editorial opinions on important issues are expressed during a commercial program the advertiser should provide an equal opportunity for an answer; (4) that only bona fide representatives of substantial groups should be given the privilege of speaking on the network; and (5) that in the event time is accorded free, both sides of controversial subjects should be represented.[10]

There is, of course, a point here, because, unlike the public square where the supply of soapboxes for orators is practically limitless, in radio and television there are comparatively few available channels; so broadcasting over them is a responsibility that cannot be lightly granted by the station or assumed by the broadcasters. Fortunately the bulk of the time of American radio is devoted to entertainment, and the large number of independent stations prevents the control and systematic limitation of free speech by a small group. Then, too, it must be remembered that radio is not the only tool for molding public opinion.

[10] Thomas Porter Robinson, *op. cit.* note 4 *supra*, pp. 83–84.

[11] *Reader's Digest*, Vol. 59, No. 356 (December 1951), p. 59.

CHILDREN'S PROGRAMS

One of the weakest spots in radio-TV today is programming for children. Except for a few notable examples ("Let's Pretend" is one), the network entertainment for children consists of a schedule of horror on the one hand and saccharine condescension on the other. A survey of television offerings in the Los Angeles area during the first week of May 1951 revealed a total of almost 700 crimes, 82 per cent of which were committed before 9:00 P.M.—that is, before bedtime for most children.[11]

It is not because of lack of standards that this is so. In 1942 the Federal Radio Educational Committee published a notable pamphlet in which the basic purposes served by children's programs were reported as follows:

1. Radio programs should convey to children, or reinforce among them, the commonly accepted moral, social, and ethical ideals characteristic of American life.
2. Radio programs should contribute definitely and specifically to healthy personality development in children.
3. Radio programs should, by excellent showmanship, provide children with opportunities for relaxation, entertainment, and pure enjoyment.[12]

The pamphlet then continues to set forth specific criteria under each category. These criteria are repeated in slightly modified form in the *Standards of Practice* of the NAB.[13]

All the networks have extended codes for children's programs, that of N.B.C. being most worthy of comment for its implementation of these standards; but here again, many of the regulations are stated in the negative. The Mutual Broadcasting System, with its series of adventure programs for children, has been under greatest fire, and deservedly so. M.B.S. contends that right always triumphs; but it is to be doubted whether the thirty seconds wherein the criminal is brought to justice at the end of the program has much effect after the twelve, and in some cases twenty-five, minutes of exciting carnage and mayhem which precedes it. Such programs as "Superman" are now supposed to be purified because the hero now devotes himself to solving modern social problems. But it is rather dangerous for youngsters to get the notion that

[12] Howard Rowland, I. Keith Tyler, and Norman Woelfel, *Criteria for Children's Radio Programs* (Washington: Federal Radio Education Committee, 1942), p. 9.

[13] *Op. cit.* note 2 *supra*, p. 4.

one can set the world straight by liquidating all one's enemies.

Here again it seems that the radio networks realize their responsibility on paper but do very little about it. This is not true of the local stations, especially those commercial stations which work closely with local school systems, or of the educational stations operated by colleges, universities, and school boards. The problem is an acute one, not to be dismissed lightly. As Reinsch writes:

> Juvenile programs present an interesting challenge to the local radio station. It is well to remember that the adult audience in the years to come will be developed from the juvenile listeners of today.[14]

A Positive Approach

It would seem from the above discussion that radio and television broadcasters have been regulated almost to the point of impotence not only by the Federal Government but also by themselves, and that by surrendering in large measure to the sponsor and advertising agencies they have neglected their duty to the general public whom they are licensed to serve. In order to keep radio and television up to American cultural and ethical standards, two things are needed: a positive policy and vigilant, vocal critics.

Dr. Franklin Dunham, chief of radio and television of the Office of Education, has submitted a manuscript which he calls "A First Draft of a Declaration of People's Rights in Radio and Television," which is herewith quoted in full.

> Radio and television enter American homes and classrooms as the greatest potential for good that the world has ever seen or heard. In order to realize this potential, fundamental rights of the American people must be maintained. These rights include:
>
> 1. The right to free communication with the world as it exists.
> 2. The right to receive news, clear and free from color or bias.
> 3. The right to hear as many sides as there are within a question discussed with utmost freedom.
> 4. The right to the information, education, and entertainment being sent over the air.
> 5. The right to wholesome entertainment as an escape from the problems of the workaday world.
> 6. The right of every citizen to find satisfactory radio and television fare, appealing to some legitimate interest whenever he wishes.
> 7. The right of all levels of taste, within the standards of decency, to be served through the medium of radio and television.
>
> In order to secure these rights in a democracy it is incumbent upon those who render such service not only to consider "what the people want" but also what they would want if they knew about it. The responsibility for serving the American people rests upon those who operate our stations and is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. Not only educational stations operated by school-systems, colleges, and universities have this responsibility but also commercial stations which operate in the public interest, convenience, or necessity. Radio and television as an educational force deserve the wholehearted and generous support of everyone engaged in the educational task in our country. These media should be the ally of good government and all healthy forms of recreation.
>
> Erecting the structure of our service to the American people upon this basis, our country can assume its rightful place among the civilized nations of the world, gaining from the old the strength of their many cultures and intermingling it with the vigor and the progress of the new.
>
> So shall we, through the media of communications, share our ideas, our thoughts, and the results of our labors, with those willing to share with us. Thus radio and television will reach their highest affirmation in bringing about a world citizenship in a community of like minded and equally responsible nations.
>
> To these ends and purposes we devotedly pledge our hearts, our minds, and all the resources of our human natures.

[14] J. Leonard Reinsch, *Radio Station Management* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 53.

Dr. Dunham's "Declaration," with its crusading spirit, is a step in the right direction. It deserves wide circulation. It should instigate a rethinking of radio programming by American broadcasters, in line with the trust which they have assumed, to use the air waves "in the public interest, convenience, or necessity." This implies a devotion to the continuing improvement of American cultural and ethical standards. The British Broadcasting Corporation has such a positive policy and provides three separate networks to care for the diversified tastes of the British public, from music hall quips to the reading of Milton's *Paradise Lost*.

Radio and television need competent and vigilant critics. Fortunately such critics exist. John Crosby and Jack Gould delight thousands with their searching, though humorous, comments on radio and television. Leading magazines frequently carry critical articles on the subject. Various national organizations publish lists of things to view and to listen to. Notable is the little publication, *Lookables and Listenables*, of the National Council of Teachers of English. Listener groups are springing up throughout the country. Among the most effective are the Radio Council of Greater Cleveland, the Wisconsin Association for Better Radio Listening, and the Radio Listeners of Northern California. These groups develop standards, audition and criticize radio-TV programs, publish lists of recommended ones, encourage study and discussion of radio-TV offerings, and exert whatever influence they can to improve program content. There should be an organization for radio-TV listening in every community. Public schools of the more progressive type are developing courses in radio-TV program appreciation and discrimination.

Responsibility of the Industry

But the main responsibility for the improvement of broadcasting lies with the industry itself. Radio-TV stations virtually monopolize the nation's air waves. These admittedly belong to the people; yet the American public can express itself on the air only in conformity with the interests and policies of the broadcasters, who are motivated all too often by a desire for large profits. Each of the major networks has its own characteristics and excellencies which should be developed to serve the various interests and needs of all the people. But the tendency is toward competitive simultaneous broadcasting of similar programs. What the public gets on the air is what the broadcasters want to give them. Ratings merely show the listeners' choice of what is offered.

To view programs as entertainment is not conducive to building a national culture. Many a good public service program has lost its character and effectiveness after it has become sponsored and has been gone over by the professionals.

Occasionally radio-TV stations promote the general welfare by coming out for pure water (who wouldn't approve of that?) or announcing stray dogs. Such programs are under the direction of the promotion or public relations department and are looked upon as publicity stunts to catch more listeners.

In many commercial stations the educational director is almost impotent. He often has little to say about what goes on the air under his direction. His programs can be swept aside at any time

by the sales department. All too frequently the station does not even attempt to secure a professionally trained educator for this post. He is subject to the public relations department and appears before many educational and other community groups to promote good will and to defend the station's policies. Yet a properly qualified individual should be one of the most valuable members of the policy-making and program-making group.

There are some notable exceptions. A few stations devote their programs to good music and straight news reporting. One station reports a documentary about a reformatory that brought about needed changes. Another vigorously promotes a safety campaign. The Junior Town Meeting League annually chooses a topic of wide interest, such as juvenile delinquency, for discussion throughout the nation.

While highly commendable, these scattered programs are not enough. Radio-TV stations and networks must develop positive policies for the advancement of American life in all its desirable phases. Broadcasters should free themselves from the advertising agencies and control their own programs. They should have enough backbone to impose their own voluntary codes upon themselves. Their editorial policies should be their own, unhampered and uncontrolled by outside pressures.

And above all, broadcasters should develop a broad, positive, progressive, national program in the public interest. Under the pressure of the national emergency, the radio stations did much to develop American unity and to promote the war effort. Now they should work just as enthusiastically and cooperatively to serve the peace effort and to safeguard American liberty in the face of growing world tensions. The nation looks to the radio-television industry for leadership. Instead, it gets a singing commercial.

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Do Churches Exert Significant Influence on Public Morality?

BY F. ERNEST JOHNSON

LET it be granted at once that the question propounded in my title admits of no categorical answer. The causes of human conduct and of social phenomena are multiple, and an appraisal of any one factor must be based on broad inference, not on conclusive proof. My interest in the topic is not forensic, but exploratory. I should like to indicate some of the areas in which the churches may be assumed to be influential in developing sanctions for public conduct and to make some appraisal of the quality of such influence as they exert. To this end it is important to consider from a sociological viewpoint the nature and the limits of the influence of organized religion on social standards. Although the generalizations offered will have primary reference to Protestant Christianity, I believe they are susceptible of wider application.

SCOPE OF PUBLIC MORALITY

I am asuming that the term "public morality" is to be taken as meaning more than *the morality of the public.* It is, to be sure, related to the sum of the personal morals of the citizenry of the nation. But public morality denotes the quality of all conduct that is public in character, conduct in which the community has a recognized stake. Indeed, it is basic to this discussion that public morality is much more than a projection of the standards of private conduct. Those who see in the contemporary "wave of corruption" merely the reflection of a degradation of personal standards are, it seems to me, missing the central fact, namely, that a cultural crisis is upon us in which no clear picture of what public responsibility means can be discerned. I doubt that there is any such phenomenon as a *general* moral disintegration. What confronts all our institutions, especially those of education and religion, is the necessity of making our heritage of beliefs and loyalties relevant to a rapidly changing social structure.

The temptation to explain our present situation in terms of a character debacle is a natural one, but the explanation is too facile. It is a melancholy fact that standards of personal morals do not always reflect comparable standards of public behavior. Men who keep their pledged word and pay their debts may participate without compunction in oppressive political practices. Generous persons who readily give to charity are sometimes insensitive to the antisocial consequences of business policies that are maintained by their own proxies in stockholders' meetings. Rackets are carried on by men who seem to be exemplary in their private lives. All this means that it is not enough to teach conventional morals if we are seeking to raise the level of community life. To the extent, therefore, that the churches and synagogues fail in their *educational programs to direct* their attention to public morality as such, they may be assumed to have little influence on its standards.

It follows that, reluctant as we of the churches may be to acknowledge it, the churches have not been conspicuously successful in raising the standards of public morality; for the prevailing preoccupation of the churches

has been with individual behavior patterns rather than with group behavior. This has been notably the case where politics is concerned. The churches have no doubt been an important factor in maintaining the respectability of public office, particularly in local communities, where "clean government" is often the aim of "Christian citizenship" campaigns. But it is probably safe to say that beyond enforcing standards of common decency, the churches have on the whole played relatively little direct part in the continual building of social-moral standards. That process is the result of stresses and conflicts from which the churches tend to remain aloof. In other words, the ethical significance of the churches' ministry has been socially conservative rather than regenerative. The churches have effected the regeneration of individuals and have given them new resources for living in accord with common sanctions, but they have not, it seems to me, conspicuously influenced those sanctions themselves.

CHURCH AND COMMUNITY IDENTIFIED

There is a fundamental reason why religion is in general a conservative force. Profoundly social in cultus and ritual, institutional religion has sanctified the universal values of human experience. Viewed in the perspective of history, it has therefore been a steadying rather than a reconstructive force. In primitive society, and indeed until modern times, religious organization and expression tended to be coextensive with the community. Even today in many countries religion goes with nationality and the church is the "community on its knees." The church furnishes a powerful support for a common ethos, but it cannot be expected to be socially regenerative in any profound sense.

This is why, when attention is focused on spiritual and moral faults that have deep cultural roots, such as racial and other group antagonisms, the churches often take such a severe beating. They follow the patterns of social stratification and practice race segregation to such an extent that secular societies and agencies often put them to shame. Thus a strange paradox emerges: the very fact of the church's authentic identification with the "community" it represents tends to fasten upon it the limitations and the faults of that community.

I am speaking here, of course, of the typical church, which includes in its membership the people who come in contact with each other in secular life. It has within its fellowship "some of everybody." It is not a group observing a special moral discipline. Unlike the small "sect," which in addition to a common body of religious beliefs has a way of life all its own, the "church" is held together chiefly by an impulse to worship—supplemented, of course, by certan social and cultural attractions. The church teaches an ethic, but its organizing principle is religious rather than ethical. Its moral standards are shared with the community in which it lives.

It is in the relatively small sects—groups characterized by a discipline that is in contrast to common practice—that the prophetic, reconstructive genius of religion most vigorously expresses itself. Thus we have "peace" churches which defy the community at the point of its greatest sensitiveness—patriotism and self-defense. We have sects whose austere way of life sets at naught the prevailing cultural standards in the interest of what they believe to be "a more excellent way." But the minuteness of the small sects renders their impact on the total social conscience inconsiderable. What the large, representative church body lacks the disposition to do in the way of social regeneration, the small religious group lacks the capacity to do.

This is the great dilemma of religion as a social-moral force in the community. An appreciation of it will prevent us from expecting too much of the church in the way of a direct impact on public morality. After all, the frequent impatient query why the church does not do this or that is really a complaint about the majority of the people, who are responsible for the church's policy.

COST OF GROWTH

The loss of crusading power that accompanies increase in size is strikingly evident in the history of the evangelical sects as they have grown into great churches. This has been impressively documented in a recent book by Dr. Wade Crawford Barclay, entitled *To Reform the Nation.*[1] One of a series on early American Methodism, the book is a major contribution to the history of evangelical Christianity in America. There was great social dynamic in that movement, but the church paid for its rapid growth in the weakening of its testimony. In particular, the account of the church's witness and discipline with reference to the liquor traffic and to slavery is instructive; for in both cases a policy that was initially courageous and uncompromising became watered down as the growing religious body adjusted itself to a secular environment. The temperance movement was "strongly religious" in motivation, and the Methodists gave to it a crusading zeal expressed in "the original Wesleyan rule" which condemned "drunkenness, buying or selling spirituous liquors, or drinking them, unless in cases of extreme necessity." But the "buying and selling" interdict was eliminated about 1790.

Concerning the slavery issue, the author points out that "during the early post-Revolutionary period Methodism as a whole was practically a unit in its anti-slavery attitude." By means of disciplinary regulations the church undertook to accomplish the manumission of slaves; but the rules were subsequently suspended. The argument was a typically secular one: "compromise was necessary that the church might grow." The economic determinant was at work, for the economic importance of slave labor was increasing. Finally, the voice of the church was raised in definite opposition to the abolition movement.

One is inclined, of course, to read into this a severe condemnation of organized religion. But reflection will furnish a corrective of such a judgment. No more than individuals, can institutions eat their cake and have it, too. As the church becomes broadly inclusive and representative, it inevitably takes on the character of the community as a whole. To the extent that it is "of the people, by the people, and for the people," it will faithfully reflect their imperfections and their deep involvement in the total human situation. Again, this is the moral dilemma of religion, especially in its democratic forms.

PROPHETIC GROUPS WITHIN CHURCHES

The most fruitful approach to a resolution of this dilemma is through the growth of small prophetic groups within the conventional churches. Such groups maintain vital contact with the religious fellowships of which they are a part, but persistently challenge the prevailing public morality. The church, which in the performance of its true religious function keeps its doors open to every human being who is following a spiritual gleam, cannot bear a strong, cru-

[1] *Early American Methodism 1769–1844,* in two volumes, Vol. II, *To Reform the Nation.* New York: Board of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church, 1950.

sading testimony in the name of its entire membership. Its people mostly fall far short of being saints; they are seekers, at best. Again and again I recall the remark of Dr. Vida Scudder: "The church is loaf, not leaven." But within the churches there are groups of restless, prophetic spirits inspired by a hereditary faith, purified by a voluntary discipline, who are continually extending the boundaries of the Christian testimony and giving leadership in social-moral reconstruction. They are the leaven!

The groups I am speaking of are autonomous in character. They may appear in the local church or at any level of ecclesiastical organization. They may be confessional or interconfessional. Their autonomous character consists in the fact that they are accorded status as recognized elements within the membership of the church and are valued for their prophetic character, while at the same time they understand that they speak for themselves and not for the church at large.

Concern groups

Broadly speaking, there are two types of organization of this autonomous character. The first is in the nature of an "interest group." A number of people who have a special "concern," to use a Quaker term, devote themselves unitedly to thought, prayer, and consecrated effort to realize what they conceive to be the divine will in some significant area of human relationships. The particular concern may be the existence of group antagonisms within the community, the persistence of racial segregation within the church, industrial strife, child labor, juvenile delinquency, drug addiction, or any one of a large number of matters that press upon the Christian conscience. Or the objectives may cover a wide range of social education and action.

The members of these groups are "second-milers." They are always doing what theologians call works of supererogation, extending their efforts beyond what is required, seeking to widen the areas within which Christian sanctions operate.

A number of the larger Protestant denominations have encouraged the formation of "concern" groups of this sort. Recently an organization was formed within the Protestant communions known as "Christian Action." It differs from many previously organized groups in that it seeks to find all its social-moral imperatives in Biblical religion and in the authentic stream of Christian testimony. It is politically liberal and theologically conservative. It will have no party line, but will seek to bring to bear the most exacting of Christian sanctions upon personal living and public morality.

The limitations under which such small groups operate were suggested earlier in discussing the religious sect. In a sense, these groups are themselves sects organized within the churches. The fact that they belong to the religious community gives them a purchase which a small dissident group standing by itself does not have. They make pronouncements and formulate programs which are seldom implemented in their entirety and which are more often respectfully listened to than followed. At the same time, there is good reason to think that the criticism and the stimulation which such groups bring to bear upon their parent religious bodies contribute much toward maintaining and increasing the sensitiveness of the Christian conscience.

Vocational groups

The second type of organization is the vocational group. The recovery of the idea of Christian vocation is one of the most significant religious developments of our time. The concept is by no means limited to Protestantism, though it received much emphasis in the Reformation. The central proposition is that all work is a "calling"; that every occupation should be considered just as truly a sacred vocation as is the ministry. The idea is, of course, related to the Protestant conception of the "priesthood of all believers." But this obviously potent idea has been too little in evidence since it was developed by the Reformers. Today many people are coming to see in it the greatest single instrumentality for bringing the common, everyday life of men and women under Christian ethical sanctions. A new imperative in this direction seems to be emerging, particularly in the European churches. The tragic experiences of the war served to illumine the chasm between the world as it is and the verbal professions of religious men and women who are so largely responsible for the state of the world.

In this country, perhaps the most striking manifestation of the religious vocational conscience at work has been the activity of Quaker businessmen who endeavored to bring the Friends' testimony to bear upon their business responsibilities. The pattern for this was set by a group of British Quaker employers who, during the First World War, felt impelled to discover the relation between their vocational responsibility and the fact that they were Christian men, bearers of the Quaker witness. The book they produced, *Quakerism in Industry*, has long been out of circulation, but they lighted a lamp which was not to be put out. One of the main present emphases of the World Council of Churches, and of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in this country, is the exploration of this concept of Christian vocation and the realization of its potentialities for building a better world.

CHURCHES RAISE THE MORAL LEVEL

What I have said thus far might be taken to indicate that the church *as a whole* has relatively little function in relation to the improvement of public morality. It was necessary to stress the limitation of the large religious body in order that the conditions of prophetic activity might be made clear. It is by no means true, however, that great church bodies cannot and do not influence the standards of public morality in a significant way. Even though they are too big and too representative of the whole community to be a crusading force—except in isolated instances—they play their part in lifting the level of the common life. I wish to devote the remainder of this article to a discussion of the way in which church bodies, even the most inclusive and representative of them, function in raising the moral level of society.

MORAL SENSITIVENESS

To begin with, there is the function of creating moral awareness. Nothing is more evident than the ambivalence of the human mind with reference to questions concerning values. It is of the essence of human nature that men censure themselves for unworthy acts, that they recognize obligations that they fail to live up to, that they have a reach that exceeds their grasp. A major function of religious worship and religious education is to focus attention on the imperfections evident in human behavior. To many psychologists and psychiatrists these may be fighting words. It is the fashion today to deplore a sense of guilt and unworthiness as unhealthy and as tending to impair the normal functioning of human beings. It may be granted at once that a morbid sense of guilt is an evil thing. But far more dangerous than an excessive feeling of guilt is the absence

of it when the guilt is an objective fact.

Undoubtedly evangelical Christianity has often erred in the fostering of spiritual agony, especially in the minds of the young. But to be nihilistic about a sense of guilt is to cut the nerve of moral regeneration. One never feels a high imperative except as it cuts across the existing pattern of his behavior. When I hear psychiatrists deploring the sense of guilt, I find myself wishing they would be much more discriminating about it. To make use of an economic analogy, I am much less concerned about the production of a sense of guilt than about its distribution! In a very true sense it may be said that the level of moral life in individuals and in a community is indicated by the things people feel guilty about. A major problem of social-moral regeneration is to increase the incidence of guilt where there are grievous unrecognized consequences of men's habitual actions.

DIVISIVE FACTORS

Now, how can this task of increasing moral sensitiveness be accomplished in a widely representative religious communion—let us say in a congregation of a thousand persons among whom are rich and poor, liberals and conservatives—people who react in very different ways to the issues with which they, as citizens, are being continually confronted? Obviously, the minister who wants to commit such a church to a specific political reform, however well conceived, will get nowhere. Even an effort to deliver the church on the "right" side of a controversy that looks like an open-and-shut case may result in cleavages growing out of a great variety of considerations. As suggested earlier, the more the issues arising affect deeply laid cultural patterns, the harder it will be to achieve unity of judgment and purpose. It is for this reason that the churches, for the most part, cannot participate in movements for legislative reforms. Agreement on the ultimate objective may be obscured by the many divisive factors which arise.

An illustration of this is furnished in the effort to abolish lynching. The scandalous neglect of duty on the part of state officials has led church people to declare that it is an obvious duty of the church to champion a federal anti-lynching law. But adverse political factors immediately intrude themselves. Men of equal intelligence and equally sensitive conscience will divide on the relative responsibilities of federal and state governments. The same is true of the problem of meeting perfectly evident and appalling needs for social and educational services.

Again, purely technical questions arise to plague those who are seeking a clear application of ethical principles under religious sanctions. Many a lusty and wholesome impulse has been quenched by the experts' admonition, "You can't do that!" It is no easy matter to separate questions that present authentic moral issues from questions that are of a technical character. On the other hand, in the effort to avoid debatable specifics and partisan formulations, a sound principle easily becomes lost in vague generalities.

An approach to a solution of this problem has been made in Protestant circles during recent years through appeal to what is called the "middle axiom." By this is meant an ethical proposition which is sufficiently definite to avoid being smothered in generalities but which at the same time has a universal quality that cannot be strangled by particular practical or technical difficulties. The document known in American Protestantism as "The Social Ideals of the Churches" consists, in the main, of such middle axioms. Take, for example, the following principles: "the right of all to the opportunity for self-maintenance; a wider and fairer distribution of wealth; a living wage, as a minimum, and above this a just share for the worker in the product of industry and agriculture." Here is a proposition which is not vitiated by specifics that people may endlessly argue about. To be sure, there is plenty of room for difference of opinion as to what a "just share" is, but the imperatives here stated can be insisted upon in every situation where a demand for economic justice arises. A major task of the church is to create an atmosphere that calls forth a response to these universal imperatives.

MORAL JUDGMENT AND INTERNAL DISCIPLINE

It should be noted that in the very nature of the case, the churches' influence on ethical standards often has to be exercised in negative fashion. The prophetic function is one of pronouncing judgment rather than one of social engineering. It is the business of the specialist and the technician to devise expedients, but it is the business of the common conscience to announce the imperatives which the technician undertakes to implement. It has been well said that the church has a "searchlight" function, a responsibility for illumining dark areas where the first requirement is the moral judgment: "These things ought not so to be."

However, if the church is to function in constructive fashion with reference to public morality, it must have *an internal discipline corresponding to its external testimony.* The remarkable demonstration of political power on the part of the Protestant churches which culminated in the adoption of national prohibition calls forth, in the perspective of history, conflicting judgments. Misgivings as to the wisdom of that crusade, however, should not be allowed to obscure a striking illustration of effective political action that began in the application of a discipline. The churches were able to strike a forceful blow at the liquor traffic only because they had, by and large, settled the issue in their own household.

On the other hand, the impact on the public conscience of church pronouncements during the 1920's with reference to war was a demonstration of abortive action. A corporate repudiation of war and a refusal to sanction it on the part of church bodies which had not made pacifism a part of their own internal discipline proved quite ineffectual when the showdown came.

Likewise, the vigorous testimony called forth by the social gospel movement with reference to the economic order often ran far beyond the discipline practiced by the church people on whose behalf pronouncements were presumably made. Church bodies sometimes issued statements which were in effect socialistic declarations. This did not mean that they were un-Christian, but the fact remains that the membership of the churches had never personally repudiated the profit system. When church bodies and agencies expressed adverse judgments concerning the economic order they were quite without a supporting discipline in the personal lives of their own people. The condition requisite to a corporate moral influence on the part of the church is a conviction shared by the membership which is so clearly supported by common religious testimony that it is a cohesive rather than a divisive force.

IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL CONVICTIONS

One thing more. The awakening of the lay conscience, and particularly the emphasis on religious vocation, make it possible to implement social-moral pronouncements through research and prac-

tical demonstration. I will end this discussion with a description which I wrote several years ago of an event which to my mind admirably illustrates the possibility of bringing the influence of organized religion to bear upon a grievous social problem:

In the year 1923, national Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish bodies undertook to secure the abolition of the twelve-hour day in the steel industry. Three years earlier the Interchurch World Movement, a Protestant enterprise, had published its report on the great steel strike of 1919, a document that attracted country-wide attention. President Harding had requested the chairman of the Iron and Steel Institute to consider the elimination of the long shift. After a year's deliberation the Steel Institute's committee appointed to study the matter brought in a negative report. In the meantime, the research department of the Federal Council of Churches had been gathering data for a fresh presentation of the matter to the public. It was learned that the Steel Institute's inquiry had elicited a letter from the president of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company reporting the successful establishment of an eight-hour shift but that this had not been disclosed by the committee. A threefold strategy was devised.

First, a statement was issued by the appropriate departments of the Federal Council of Churches, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis, declaring that "this morally indefensible regime of the twelve-hour day must come to an end." A week later the factual report, in which working conditions were described and the social consequences of the long shift were depicted, was released. The following week a letter from the president of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, similar in content to the one that had been withheld by its recipient prepared expressly for our use, was given to the press. It was a devastating sequence—moral pronouncement, factual documentation, and demonstrated practicability of a reform. A few weeks later, in dog days, the Iron and Steel Institute was assembled and in deference to public opinion formally instituted the change.[2]

Retelling this story here could not be justified on the ground that it is in any sense a typical achievement, for unfortunately it is not. Such illustrations are not numerous. But this account indicates a pattern of successful action in raising the level of effective public morality. If it should be objected that the twelve-hour working day was a scandal which common decency should have outlawed without any crusading, I can only repeat that it is precisely in girding the citizenry for action in accord with its unimplemented convictions that a great church body makes its most significant moral contribution to society. The church has its roots too deep in the culture to admit of radical moral crusading, but it is an incalculably great potential force in making convictions articulate and in mobilizing moral resources on issues where action lags behind social conscience.

[2] "The Influence of Religion on Power Relationships," in *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture* (Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, Eds.), New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

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The Colleges, Ethics, and the Public

By RALPH E. HIMSTEAD

IN the discussion of any subject, definition of terms is important. In this discussion the terms which need definition are college, ethics, and public.

A college has been defined as "a society of scholars, or friends of learning, incorporated for study or instruction, especially in the higher branches of knowledge." The basic concept is a community of scholars. This, at least, is the basic concept of what a college should be. Later in this article there will be discussed in some detail what a college is and what a college is not, in relation to what its ethical functions may be.

Ethics is concerned with morality, with the ideals of morality, with ideal human character, and with ideal human action. The questions with which ethics deals concern the nature of the *summum bonum* and the validity of the criteria of its achievement. Ethics has been defined as "a system of moral principles." Thus, we have individual ethics, social ethics, professional ethics, and other kinds of ethics, which govern the moral actions of individuals in their personal relationships and in their social and professional relationships. There have been, and are, various theories of ethics—the egoistic, the altruistic, and the perfectionistic; and two conceptions of its nature—absolute and relative. Those who view ethics as absolute affirm an unchanging moral code. Those who view it as relative regard the standards of moral conduct as subject to change with human development. With these theories and views of ethics, this article is not concerned. The term "ethics" as used in this article means those principles the observance of which contribute to the highest good.

The term "public" as used in this article means the whole of the population of a nation, state, or community and not merely those portions of the public directly related to our colleges—students, parents, alumni, benefactors—with which the college has special and direct relationships and which may be regarded as having special claims on the services of colleges.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COLLEGES AND PUBLIC

This article is concerned with the relationship of the work of colleges to the public with special reference to the principles conducive to the highest good of the public. That the work of our colleges affects the public cannot be questioned. Through the process of educating successive generations of youth, our colleges have contributed, and are contributing, greatly to the welfare of the public by helping to lift the level of enlightenment of our citizenry. Indeed, it may be said that the state of the public is in large part determined by the state of our colleges.

Is the work of our colleges affected by the public? The answer is clearly in the affirmative. It may, therefore, also be said that the state of our colleges depends on the state of the public. This has always been true, but is more so today than ever before, when we have so many lay spokesmen for education who hold themselves out as specialists in higher education and who speak with certitude concerning what our colleges should teach and how they should teach it. These self-appointed

spokesmen are frequently influential in forming public opinion, and our colleges are influenced by public opinion.

Our colleges are also not infrequently influenced by pressures from representatives of special interests, or segments of the public, in reference to what is taught, how it is taught, and by whom it is taught. Those who bring such pressures on colleges either do not understand what a college is or, possessing this understanding, disregard it. What such pressure groups wish of our colleges is not education but indoctrination. They would have our colleges become agencies of propaganda for certain views and beliefs—economic, political, social, or religious. They would subvert our colleges. Because most colleges are in need of money, and the pressures to influence their work are frequently made by prospective donors or by persons thought to be prospective donors, or by influential legislators or by persons influential with legislators, such pressures are frequently successful. To the extent that they are successful, our institutions of higher education are corrupted, and the institution concerned is no longer worthy of the name college or university.

WHAT IS THE ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF COLLEGES?

Concern about ethics and morals is not new, nor are the conditions which justify such concern new. Both are familiar phenomena. Efforts to lift the level of the standards of ethics and morals have always been regarded as necessary and desirable and should always be so regarded. This does not mean that every individual should become a "reformer," or that all of our institutions—educational, governmental, and commercial—should become ethical societies, seeking reform. It does mean, however, that individuals, as individuals, and those who administer and are a part of our institutions should be aware of the ethical implications of their work, in relation to the general welfare.

As regards our institutions of higher education, it is the thesis of this article that the greatest contribution they can make to the ethics and the morals of the public is to maintain their integrity as institutions of higher education and to adhere faithfully to their purpose, namely, the pursuit of scholarship and the instruction of youth. Those whose profession is the education of youth at the higher levels should also seek at all times to "educate" the public concerning the nature of an institution of higher education and concerning the values to the public of maintaining the integrity of these institutions and of their adhering faithfully to their functions.

While there is general verbal concurrence in the conception of a college defined above, experience has made it clear that in the day-to-day work of our colleges this conception is frequently more honored in the breach than in the observance; that what educators permit to be done to our colleges, without protest, belies what they say they believe a college should be. The reason may be an imperfect understanding of what a college is or the lack of courage to speak and act in accordance with their understanding and convictions.

It is sometimes helpful to an understanding of what something is to note with some particularity what it is not. Experience has shown this to be so in defining institutions of higher education. Organizationally speaking, institutions of higher education have many things in common with other institutions. They are incorporated; they have governing boards; they have administrative officers; they have employees, for, legally speaking, their faculties are employees. Boot and shoe factories and other commercial corporations have similar organization. They are incorporated, have governing boards, administrative officers, and employees. Because our colleges and universities have organizational aspects in common with commercial corporations, they are frequently regarded as analogous in other respects to commercial corporations. This confusion is serious as regards the welfare of higher education and of the public, for attitudes toward, and actions taken in reference to, institutions of higher education resulting from this confusion are of a kind likely to impair the integrity and subvert the purpose of these institutions. It is pertinent, therefore, to note and to emphasize what an institution of higher education is not.

An institution of higher education is not a commercial enterprise. It is not in the business of manufacturing, processing, or selling commodities. It is not a proprietary institution. Its character is eleemosynary, strictly eleemosynary. An institution of higher education, even though state supported, is not an arm or branch of the state government and should not be so regarded or administered. An institution of higher education is not a political party. It is not an ethical society. It is not a church. It is an educational institution, and as such is *sui generis*. Its purpose is scholarship, which means research and reflection, and the education of youth. Its concern is with the life of the mind, with the attainment of intellectual excellence. This fact is basic in the thesis of this article.

EDUCATIONAL GOALS CONDUCIVE TO MORALITY

Intellectual excellence is not unrelated to ethics and morals. In one of the most familiar passages in John Henry Newman's series of lectures in 1852 on "The Idea of a University," he said,

> Liberal Education . . . makes not the Christian, not the Catholic but the gentleman. It is well to be a gentleman; it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life;—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a university.

Concerning the values of liberal education to the student, he said,

> He profits by an intellectual tradition, which is independent of particular teachers, which guides him in his choice of subjects, and duly interprets for him those which he chooses. He apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points and its little, as he otherwise cannot apprehend them. Hence it is that his education is called "liberal." A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are, freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom; or what in a former discourse I have ventured to call a philosophical habit. This then I would assign as the special fruit of the education furnished at a university, as contrasted with other places of teaching or modes of teaching. This is the main purpose of a university in its treatment of its students.

An institution of higher education administered in accordance with Cardinal Newman's conception of a university would be unique in the United States today—unique in many desirable ways. Such an institution would never be imperiled as many of our institutions of higher education are today imperiled by anti-intellectualism, evidenced in part, but only in part, by the overemphasis on intercollegiate athletics and the resultant practice of subsidizing and professionalizing football and basketball in the guise of scholarships. This practice has given many of our

students a sense of values which, educationally speaking, are false. These false values explain the susceptibility of some students to the kind of corruption currently revealed at a number of colleges and universities. These students are the victims of an immoral anti-intellectualism, for the development of which educators are in large part responsible.

While the attributes of an educated person—devotion to freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, wisdom, cultivated intellect and dispassionate mind—do not guarantee morality, since they are themselves attributes of ideal human character they are conducive to morality. The truly educated person seeks freedom, has a sense of moral and ethical values, and has respect for truth and justice—the greatest of our moral virtues.

Institutions of higher education in the United States are usually governed by lay boards which are the ultimate repositories of power. The institution's governing board appoints the institution's chief administrative officer and has the legal responsibility for all the other appointments to the staff of the institution—administrative, instructional, and research. The work for which the institution was created—instruction and research—is carried on by the teachers and investigators who constitute the institution's faculty.

For this work, these men and women have been carefully prepared, and presumably they are qualified to deal at first hand with the sources of knowledge, and to impart to their students and to the public the results of their own and their colleagues' research and reflections. Presumably they are more than trained specialists; they are educated men and women and, as such, are aware that in their calling intellectual freedom is essential. They will, therefore, wish to inquire and to teach without fear and without favor. Their work, if the institution of which they are a part is to fulfill its purpose and to meet its obligations to its students and to the public, must be uninhibited by repressive directives from the administrative officers of the institution, the institution's governing board, or any of its members, or by outside interference—economic, political, social, or religious. Robert Maynard Hutchins had this thought in mind when he said, "Freedom of inquiry, freedom of expression, and freedom of teaching—without these a university cannot exist. Without these a university becomes a political party or an agency of propaganda."

Freedom is a moral proposition

That our institutions of higher education must be free is a moral proposition, and those whose life work is the education of youth at the higher levels have a moral obligation, not only to their profession but also to the public, to insist on this freedom. This moral obligation, of course, is not confined to those of the academic profession. It is the obligation of all who are devoted to the American way of life, for freedom is inherent in the American way of life. It is the moral obligation particularly of those whose work molds public opinion, notably journalists, the basic principle of whose profession is freedom of the press, the rationale of which is the common good. Indeed, both freedom of the press and academic freedom are founded on the democratic faith that freedom is wholesome and essential to the achievement of the highest good in society.

The representatives of the American Association of University Professors and of the Association of American Colleges, in a series of joint conferences from 1934 to 1940 relating to the principles of academic freedom and tenure, formulated a restatement of these principles, now known to the academic profession as the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. They were unanimous in the conclusion that these principles are of public concern; that they are essential not only to institutions of higher education, but essential also to the common good. Thus, in the preamble of the Statement of Principles agreed upon, they spoke as follows:

> The purpose of this statement is to promote public understanding and support of academic freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures to assure them in colleges and universities. Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher [1] or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.
>
> Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning. It carries with it duties correlative with rights.
>
> Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) Freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) A sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom and economic security, hence tenure, are indispensable to the success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society.

In the case of education, the relation of freedom to morality is direct. While our colleges are not character-building institutions in the usual acceptance of the meaning of character building, the work of our colleges contributes greatly to the development of character. Character depends upon choice. To make intelligent choices requires some excellence of intellect and knowledge. A college worthy of the name seeks intellectual excellence and encourages the quest for knowledge. Knowledge provides perspective, without which intelligent choices are impossible. Our colleges seek to encourage in students a habit of inquiry, a continuous quest for knowledge; and no quest for knowledge can be honest without freedom.

Since the public is the sum total of its individual members, the standards of the ethics and morals of the public are determined by the standards of the ethics and the morals of its members. We cannot, therefore, expect the standards of the ethics and morals of the public to be higher than the level of the standards of the ethics and the morals of its members. Occasionally they are. But when they are, it is because of the effect of a currently dominant leadership of an individual or individuals of high ethical and moral standards. Occasionally they are lower, because of the influence of a currently dominant leadership of an individual or individuals of lower ethical and moral standards.

WHAT IS ACADEMIC FREEDOM?

What is academic freedom? Academic freedom is the freedom to inquire, the freedom to learn and the freedom to teach in institutions of higher education. It also means that teachers shall have the freedom of all other citizens. By definition, it does not mean license. Thus, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure provides:

> The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject. Limitations of aca-

[1] The word "teacher" as used in this document is understood to include the investigator who is attached to an academic institution without teaching duties.

demic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.

The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraints, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.

The history of the development of the principles of academic freedom is not unlike the history of the development of our constitutional freedoms. The principles of both academic freedom and constitutional freedom were developed to subserve a purpose. In the case of our constitutional freedoms, the purpose was to ensure the integrity of the institutions of government created for a free people. In the case of academic freedom, the purpose was to ensure the integrity of our institutions of scholarship. Basic in the principles of both constitutional freedom and academic freedom is the freedom of the individual, for without freedom for the individual, there is no freedom. Thus, in our constitutional system there are certain rights accorded the individual in the exercise of which he is protected against actions by the government, even when it acts in accordance with the will of the majority. Only by such protection to the individual can we achieve the kind of government envisioned by the founders of the Republic. The same is true of academic freedom. Only by the protection of the freedom of the individual scholar can we have freedom of scholarship, for scholarship is the work of individuals.

LOYALTY—TO FREEDOM OR CONFORMITY?

In the light of current developments evidenced by the widespread use of disclaimer loyalty oaths in our institutions of higher education and kindred measures of repression, it would seem that intellectual excellence and intellectual integrity are no longer regarded as essential qualifications for a college or university professorship. Apparently, what is desired above everything else in the academic profession is conformity. As regards politics, apparently only those are regarded by the oath-promoters as acceptable on college faculties who are conservative Republicans or right-wing Democrats, that is, anti-Fair Deal Democrats.

I have stressed the moral obligation of those of the profession of journalism to concern themselves with the integrity of our institutions of higher education, and specifically with the values of academic freedom. In this connection, it is gratifying to quote the words of Alan Barth of the Editorial Staff of the *Washington Post,* in an address to the Thirty-seventh Annual Meeting of the American Association of University Professors in March 1951, entitled "The Loyalty of Free Men." In reference to nondisloyalty oaths, Mr. Barth spoke as follows:

> It is no accident that non-disloyalty oaths and inquiry into political opinions are directed in large part at our schools and universities. They are devices for compelling conformity. And the men responsible for them are men who distrust diversity and fear ideas. They are in revolt against rationality. Their attack is directed in the first instance at schools and universities precisely because these are centers of ideas.

Professor Chafee has called this attack, aptly, "a barbarian invasion." It is just that. It is another manifestation of the age-old assault of ignorance upon learning, of bigotry upon reason. It is the thrust of the lowered brow upon what it cannot understand. The men who launch it here are one with their spiritual kinfolk in Germany and Russia who prefer to think with the blood and who despise everything that concerns the intellect. If we do not ward off their attack, we shall descend into a new dark age.

Universities are the citadels of intellectual freedom. And it is against these citadels that the attack is launched because its aim is nothing less than the extinction of intellectual freedom. You of the academic profession are, therefore, its first targets—and the first defenders of the whole great tradition of diversity. In a period of profound anxiety, when fear can be exploited and unreason flourishes, the danger of this attack must not be underestimated. The attackers will have their way, as their counterparts had it in Germany and Italy before the war and have it today behind the iron curtain, unless you, as men of learning, close your ranks, recognize the deadly peril to your independence, and fight resolutely, with every resource at your command, to repel the barbarians. You have a responsibility in this that goes beyond your own interest as teachers. You are the trustees of a cultural heritage.

If you defend freedom for your profession, you defend the whole of human freedom. And it is to this, more than to any other value, that Americans owe allegiance. The loyalty of free men is, above all, a loyalty to the illimitable freedom of the human mind.

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT A REQUISITE OF MORALITY

Freedom of the human mind is not only essential to scholarship as we of the Western world understand scholarship, it is also essential to the morality of our social order created by and for a free people. Freedom assures independent thought and the right of criticism. The repression of independent thought and of criticism is the salient characteristic of totalitarian regimes which enslave the minds and the souls of their people. Loyalty to the freedom of the human mind is, therefore, a moral attribute of the highest order. Freedom of thought and of expression for the individual assures us of the most effective means of achieving the highest standards of ethics and morals of the public, because it gives us the only practical way of protecting the public against a misuse of power by those who hold public office and of protecting the public against practices which are inimical to the welfare of the public, morally or otherwise.

In this country, with its great tradition of freedom, it should be unnecessary at this juncture to emphasize the values of freedom in relation to the welfare of the public. But freedom is not easily understood, and is not readily accepted as a way of life, for freedom requires tolerance and restraint on the part of the individual. Freedom today is in danger, in great danger. Many have come to fear it, or to say that they fear it, which may mean that they prefer repression. Be that as it may, the critical world situation resulting from the threat to the free nations of the world by the aggressive, imperialistic government of Soviet Russia gives plausibility to the spurious arguments of those who advocate limitations on our freedom.

There are, of course, some risks to freedom, but these risks are as nothing compared with the risks of repression. This is the moral of the history of repression. Repressive measures have never contributed to the ultimate security of a nation. Repressive governments may achieve stability for a time —for a long time—but repression leads to disaffection among the people, which leads to instability. The reason is clear.

Repression ignores the values of freedom, which conduce to stability, and ignores the salient fact that the desire for freedom is strong and is widespread even in countries whose people are thought to be habituated to repression. Repression creates conflict which ultimately becomes irrepressible.

What are the resultants of freedom and of repression as regards social stability? Freedom encourages individual responsibility; repression, irresponsibility. Freedom creates an atmosphere conducive to the development of wholesome character and normal personality; repression warps character and personality. Freedom encourages forthrightness and confidence in justice; repression invites conspiracy and deceit. Individual responsibility, wholesome character, normal personality, forthrightness and confidence in justice—all of these are moral attributes and are essential to the achievement of social stability. The road to freedom is the road to stability; it is the road away from revolution. This at least is the theory of our constitutional system, and it is well to remind ourselves that our constitutional system is one of the oldest and the strongest in the world. American institutions were founded upon and have been developed in accordance with the philosophy of freedom. Repression is alien to our institutions. It is at home only in lands governed by autocratic or totalitarian regimes. Its only advocates are the conscious or the unwitting votaries of the philosophy of dictatorship.

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MISUSE OF FREEDOM

In developing our constitutional system the Founding Fathers were fully aware of the risks of freedom; they were students of history. They chose freedom because of their awareness of the greater risks of repression. Their objective was not only to create a government based on freedom but also to create an enduring government. In choosing freedom they provided appropriate safeguards against the misuse of freedom, and the safeguards they provided evidence their respect for the individual to the end that he might have the maximum of freedom, for these safeguards assure to the individual whose actions may be called in question the protection of due process of law.

In higher education, in addition to the legal and constitutional safeguards against a misuse of freedom—safeguards applicable to all citizens—there are the safeguards provided in the principles of academic freedom which have been developed by the custom and usage of the academic world, principles which have the support of a responsible profession prepared to apply appropriate restraint to a misuse of freedom.

THE COLLEGES AND MORAL CRUSADES

Since the principles of intellectual freedom are moral principles and the observance of these principles is essential to the general welfare, the proposition is frequently made that our colleges should concern themselves directly with the ethics and the morals of the public, and should embark on moral crusades. It is the conviction of this writer that for our colleges to do so would impair their integrity as institutions of higher education to such a degree that they would cease to be institutions of higher education. Proposals that our colleges embark on moral crusades, or on any other kind of crusade, are wholly unrealistic because they are based on a false conception of what a college is or, more specifically, *who* a college is. A college is not a legal entity separate and distinct from its component parts—its trustees, its administrative officers, its teachers and investigators. Trustees, administrative officers, and teachers are the college.

While a college should be regarded as a community of scholars, it should never be regarded as a community of like-minded scholars, because it can never be that kind of community. In one sense, a college is an institution which provides for intellectual anarchy. The basis of the unity of scholars is the belief in intellectual freedom—the freedom to seek the truth and to teach the truth as the individual scholar sees it. Therefore, aside from the consideration of the wisdom of our colleges' embarking on moral crusades, few colleges could ever do it because it is highly improbable that the groups which constitute a college could ever reach a consensus with reference to the moral nature of a proposed crusade.

It is recognized that what is said above in reference to the wisdom of a college's embarking on a moral crusade may be regarded as in support of the ivory tower concept of a college. It is. The ivory tower concept of a college must not, however, be confused with a teacher's ivory tower concept of his individual responsibilities in a free society. The college teacher is a citizen, and, if he is to meet the obligations of citizenship, he must be free to participate in the activities of citizenship.

But the role of a college as such, in public affairs, is very different from the role of an individual member of the faculty of a college. If our colleges, as such, were to embark on moral crusades, one result would be that they would be under even greater pressure than now in reference to what is taught, how it is taught, and by whom it is taught. Their role would come to be regarded as socially utilitarian. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the social utilitarian conception of the role of a college is the conception of a college which prevails in Soviet Russia today. The Soviet government wants no research without social utility and denounces pure scholarship and the kind of research which an individual conducts out of intellectual curiosity wherever it may lead, leaving it to time to discover utility in his findings. The insistence on the immediate practical social utility of the work of our colleges is but another instance of the lack of understanding, or of imperfect understanding, of the nature of an institution of higher education, and of the lack of awareness, or of insufficient awareness, of fundamental presuppositions in our social order.

MORAL OBLIGATION TO PUBLIC

We of the academic profession have the privilege of helping to educate young men and women for life in a free society. In our special academic disciplines we must, if our colleges are to make the greatest moral contributions to the public, insist upon intellectual integrity, intellectual excellence, and basic knowledge. We must do more. We must also be specialists in freedom and instruct our students in the values of freedom. To do less is to be unworthy of our calling; to do less is to fail to meet a clear moral obligation to the public.

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What Is the Civic Conscience?

By Charles P. Taft

THE operation of the civic conscience depends in considerable part on the political community in which it is called upon to set a standard for public life. There are many kinds and sizes of communities, and, different as they are, each sheds light on the ethical problems of the others. Here are some typical situations. They are of course colored by the author's experience, but Ohio is a fairly typical American state.

In the Counties

We have some counties near the large metropolitan areas, well within close automobile range, which, if not rural in the strict sense of being agricultural, have only a few incorporated villages, none over a few thousand people. In the unincorporated areas professional gamblers sometimes set up shop with a glamorous night club that may well include other illicit activities. The sheriff and prosecuting attorney of the county, the township constable, and the justice of the peace may conveniently look the other way. There are good citizens in the neighborhood, but none of them wants to run for sheriff, and getting evidence and convicting before a jury at the county seat is a slow and far from certain process. Besides, these gamblers are tough, they have connections, and if a man disturbed them there is no telling what might happen to his business in town or even to his children in the country.

There are other counties, mainly agricultural, with a county seat town of ten or fifteen thousand people, rather self-contained, with a fine little home-owned industrial plant or two. Sometimes for ten years or so the county is dominated by a courthouse gang. Its members get the jobs and the contracts, and manage a few "rackets" besides. The minority party gets enough recognition to discourage any vigorous competition. The officeholders are hand picked in a primary, so the good citizen has little choice. Open scandal is avoided. Organizing to get people to vote in a primary is just too much trouble, and "things aren't so bad, anyhow."

In the Large City

The large city is different. The machine of the old days (and sometimes today) worked like this: The city and county together employ say six thousand people. There are six hundred election precincts, and, curiously enough, the six thousand employees seem to reside about ten in each precinct. The condition of holding each job is to produce the jobholder's vote and four or five more *in a primary*. Twenty-five thousand votes in the primary will usually control it, and in a contest a little more work will double that controlled vote. The "Committee" or perhaps one or two men on it, who keep careful track of what goes on, have the say about the jobs, and therefore about what candidate is to be nominated. There are always a certain number of bipartisan operations and a few more jobs or favors that can be handed to the minority party to keep it in line. The theoretically democratic process in these cities is in the election of each precinct committeeman by his own constituents in the precinct. But as a practical matter, the democratic

process has often been thus turned into a dictatorship. The corruption that can develop in this situation is so familiar that it need not be described here.

When the large city is just the core of a metropolitan area from 150 per cent to several times the size of the city, with all the overlapping jurisdictions and even state lines through the middle that are so prevalent in this country, we have the conditions that permitted what the television audience saw and heard in the Kefauver investigation. That perhaps disclosed a national scandal; but to speak accurately, it showed a total failure in the United States metropolitan local government. Until the new federal gambler's stamp, we in Cincinnati had the central headquarters of our gambling in Newport, a city of 30,000 across the river in Kentucky, and in Elmwood Place, a city of about 5,000 in Ohio completely surrounded by Cincinnati. There cannot be annexation across state lines, and annexation has been made nearly impossible anyhow except in Virginia and Missouri. The core city is the heart without which the satellites could not live, but it is attacked by blight at the center, loses revenue to the suburbs, and pays for many services whose benefits are shared by nearly all the outsiders around its fringes.

Each of these different kinds of community is relatively integrated geographically, with the possibility of considerable acquaintance, familiarity, and common experience across artificial lines even in the largest.

In the Capitals

But in the state capital, and even more in Washington, the factors of distance and of wide differences in experience and economic interest become dominant. For much of his term the governor is on his own in the absence of the legislature, and the dispatches of half a dozen big city newspapers plus the wire services furnish the only contact for all but those in the capital city. Legislators, very much part-time and frequently new to their work, have to rely on lobbyists for much of their information. The setup lends itself to manipulation, especially because there is seldom a leadership for the party government of the state constituting an effective team for the administration of state business. The state party organization is far more likely to be a part-time team for the election of a ticket, whose actual power is considerably weakened by the fairly complete independence of each of the many county chairmen.

Washington is Washington, with honest and effective bureaucrats frequently frustrated by political department heads, and with such a degree of regulation of business as to make the stakes high for any business seeking either justice or a preferred position. The links of business and politics with the White House and major departments and agencies disclosed in the Fulbright investigation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and in the current probes of the tax scandals of the Bureau of Internal Revenue have centered the spotlight on the question, What and where is the civic conscience?

"One [Question] Indivisible"

This brief survey of communities has shown, I trust, that despite the differences in locale and complexity, the same question arises in each community, and the failures in Washington may well be due to a want of character originating in the home districts. The banker who goes on the RFC board and assumes that the honest principles by which he ran his bank in the metropolitan city are not applicable in high Washington politics may well have looked the other way when his local party bosses dealt

under the table at his own city hall or even out in the pleasant suburban county where he lived. The failures of integrity in the political headquarters in Washington reflect any and all failures of integrity right down the party line to the precinct.

THE NIEBUHR THESIS

This essay having apparently reached a low point of pessimism, it is appropriate to suggest as one basic philosophical explanation the general thesis of Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. That thesis may be summarized (rather unfairly) thus: Sin is inevitable in the human heart, especially for a man in a position of power. Power is poison, and the man with power is always a beast of prey. Yet coercive power is essential to avoid anarchy, so the Christian conscience can never be reconciled with the government and public life of our communities.

That is a hard saying, hard for Americans to take, with our confidence in progress of righteousness and good will. The trouble with that philosophy of pessimism, notwithstanding the kernel of truth and sound theology in it, is, as William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, said about it, that it is almost an encouragement to continue in one's pet sins. It is something of an excuse for Machiavelli.

THE OLIVER THESIS

The spirit of Machiavelli is still alive. Twenty years ago that extraordinary dry goods merchant F. S. Oliver began publishing his essay on politicians, political thought, and political action, which purports to be a modern application of Machiavelli to this basic problem of political ethics. I say "purports" because Oliver's conclusion is that politics is the noblest career any man can choose. That is not the conclusion to be drawn from Machiavelli. Hear Nicholas Murray Butler's summary of Oliver:

> Mr. Oliver makes it plain that it is not merely the business of the politician to govern, but that it is his duty to do so. Therefore his acts must be judged with constant and due reference to the limitations under which the government of men is, of necessity, carried on. Too often the politician is tested by ideal and quite impractical standards of accomplishment. His power is the product of human consent and human approval, and that power must be exercised from day to day within the limitations which human nature itself sets.[1]

Besides the factor of carrying public favor along with him on pain of losing power, the politician has another objective. This is how Oliver himself describes it:

> The most complete victory does not make him the possessor, but only the custodian, of that strange monster which he calls his country. His first duty is to keep his charge in health, and, if possible, in good humour. He loves his monster, and this love, which assumes many odd forms, is what we mean by patriotism. Of the motives that urge him on, self-interest (in the pecuniary sense) is usually one of the slightest.[2]

This is better than a bare theological realism. This patriotism leaves no place for the kind of miscellaneous favors and shoddy ethics we have read about and seen on television and heard on the radio. Oliver goes on:

> It has never yet been decided . . . how far a politician may stretch, and when he may break the rules of private morality. . . . If he can and does control [the circumstances of each particular case], so as to benefit his country, much will be forgiven him. But as there is no code to guide him, it follows that he is often tempted to plead necessity when there is no real necessity. . . . Yet it is not the greatest characters, as a rule, but the little frightened ones, that most freely help themselves to dispensations.[3]

[1] F. S. Oliver, *Politics and Politicians* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), p. vii.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

A PESSIMISTIC VIEW

Both Niebuhr and Machiavelli take a pretty pessimistic view of human nature, especially in leaders of men, though from slightly different points of view, to be sure. The logic of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Ricardo gives results that are equally pessimistic for the idealist and reformer. Man in his natural state is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish," and his life is short. He lives by certain logical rules based on the scarcity of the things he wants. Self-interest in making these relative choices is the dominant motive of men and of their leaders.

This assumption underlies only too much of our current thinking. Even the preachers constantly talk as if the dollar sign were what drove most men; businessmen think so much in terms of price that they assume that money wages are the main incentive of workers; and labor leaders know no program today in their own contact with employees except more pay, fringe benefits, and material security. All of them, from the preachers to the union leaders, talk "co-operation," but few of them understand how the co-operative systems in which we all live are organized and operated.

GROUP FUNCTIONING

On the political side, even while the ordinary person exercises his right to damn the government, local, state, or national, it is very easy, especially for the long-time public servant and even for the political leader, to think of the state as something apart which operates on the rabble as its instrument. Elton Mayo, of the Harvard Business School, describes the idea this way:

> We have an economics that postulates a disorganized rabble of individuals competing for scarce goods; and a politics that postulates a community of individuals ruled by a sovereign state. Both these theories foreclose on and discourage any investigation of the facts of social organization.[4]

Actually, there is no rabble and there is no sovereign state except in one instance—the crisis of emergency.

> If extreme emergency shatters the routines of co-operation in a specific social group, if no leader appears providentially to devise co-operative means of meeting the crisis, then the society will disintegrate temporarily into a horde of individuals each seeking desperately the means of self-preservation.[5]

Mayo goes on to demonstrate by actual investigation that it is only in those abnormal circumstances that the "laws of economics" really apply and that the people look to a powerful government to save.

All the rest of the time we each live in several kinds of groups—families, clubs, colleges, plants, unions, associations—each group related to each other in the most complex relations, in a kind of ascending hierarchy. We develop only in society, and each begins as a member of something. Each as a distinctive individual can function only in the groups to which he belongs. The strongest incentive, for which in many instances persons will sacrifice as for nothing else, is the instinct of human association, with a purpose in the small group close to our daily living, and a general purpose in some larger group of which the small is a part.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[4] Elton Mayo, *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945), p. 54.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

All of this analysis is essential to the understanding of the way the civic conscience operates. For any individual public servant, it can operate effectively only within the little groups to which he belongs, and in the larger groups of which each of his own personal little ones is a part.

The last seventy-five years has made these considerations even more important, because the extraordinary growth of organization in our life has multiplied the pressures or the release of pressures. This expansion of organization began in labor, with now one-third of the working force, and in the farms, with over half of the farm population. Corporations (the United States itself not the least), trade associations, professional associations, and special interest groups take in nearly every inhabitant. There are even organizations for those left out of organizations.

COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE—OR LACK

The strongest of these become the conscience of their members. They may give weight to what our Ohio Constitution calls the public or general interest, but the shouter for the immediate concern usually gets the votes, however shortsighted. Each group has its pet symbol or taboo. Here is a list:

Labor—union label; crossing a picket line
Farm—reapportionment
Religious groups
  Jewish—Zionism
  Protestant—Church and state
  Catholic—Spain or birth control
Business—tariff; closed shop
Political party—independents

Dissent from those or other party lines brings social and economic pressures that few persons can resist. Again, membership may undermine standards fully established or accepted in other groups to which the person also belongs. If there is one job which the churches must undertake, it is to strengthen moral fiber so that the members of pressure groups will insist on full and free discussion within their respective groups and fight for what they believe is right.

The very size of organizations drives us into representative systems. Here, too, the party line may force acquiescence or undermine standards. The public interest and the moral or ethical consideration are not always assured by a favorable majority among the constituency. Public hearings on controversial issues before a city council can produce the most shortsighted view in opposition to nearly any major proposal for improvement, and its proponents will seldom face the hostile crowd, as their representatives must.

PERSUADING THE CONSTITUENCY

So the conscientious public official faces the necessity of hard, thankless work in gradually persuading his constituency as to what is the right course. In that effort he needs organized help, and it ought to begin with his party. Unfortunately, the form of our party organization frequently does not produce such active support. It is easier not to stir up the animals. On the other hand, the reformer tries to move too fast. The test of political judgment is in the rate of possible progress.

Most of us, especially those in state or national government, have to conduct our persuasive operations in the media open to us—the newspapers, the radio, television (if one can get on it without a bank roll), and addresses to the pressure groups and the civic organizations (if there is any difference). There are house and trade and group organs, but there the party line almost excludes reason and persuasion. So the newspapers of general circulation become the principal medium of persuasion, either to adopt a particular public policy or to observe standards of integrity. One has to learn how each operates, and the relation of the publisher, the editor, the city desk, and the political correspondent. If an important paper can be induced to start a crusade, it may be extremely effective.

THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOLS

I have not said anything about our educational system as part of the civic conscience, probably because its contribution is much like a delayed action bomb that will not explode for half a generation. What is being taught now will not solve the problem posed today by the Kefauver or Fulbright or Williams investigation. It is, of course, worth talking about and working on.

The fact is that dishonesty among school children is a very common affair. What school is not plagued with a pest of pilfering every so often? One good reason for that condition is that the effort to separate the public school (as "state") from the church has led to a curriculum of many colors with no harmonizing thread of moral theory. It is most encouraging that the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association has spoken in no uncertain terms in its report, *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools*, in February 1951. These values are essential for the decisions every child must make, and the schools must teach them. But the "how" and the extension of the "how" into every community school is the task of a generation—not a single year.

LEADERSHIP AND TEAM PLAY

Perhaps the only answer is leadership, strength, independence, and character in public life, and intelligent support of those qualities by the organizations, such as the churches, which stand for moral foundations of life.

I am not describing or advocating lone-wolf operation, however successful temporarily. Political life is a team operation. I would not wish to detract for a moment from the success of Fiorello La Guardia, for whom I had great admiration; but the City Charter Committee in Cincinnati has left a more permanent impress on the moral and ethical standards of my city than La Guardia left on New York.

In many ways those great political figures, now forgotten, who created the five boroughs in one city of New York at the turn of the century, have really left the stamp of their integrity upon their community as it should be done. But the leader must have flare (*élan*) and vitality, as did La Guardia and Theodore Roosevelt and Lincoln. He cannot be one who appeals to a stolid orthodoxy whom he invites to come out from among the evil ones. For the stolid orthodoxy has no majority, any more than the extremes of the left. Twenty-five per cent or more make up the fluid center, and the truly great leader, who likes and understands people because he has true humility and a listening ear, can give to that group an eagerness to support the right.

Such a leader gets much of his support from women. There are many women in politics who are simply echoes of the male, but there are many in and out of politics who are not. He gives to them and to the independents a representation of conscience. His operations, political in the best sense, demonstrates that conscience has the casting vote, that politics is not just sound and fury, but signifies everything for community life.

Obviously, no such result can come from last-minute conversions, especially when associated with long-standing adherence to the party line. But on the other hand, the most effective operation of this kind of independent conscience is associated with skillful operation of

the party machinery, as in the cases of Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. The only qualification is that the party machinery and the forms of government should permit the success and survival of the men of independent mind and character, as long as they are also team players. There is nothing necessarily dishonest in politics, any more than there is in business or in professional or church organization. The promotion of clean politics is a question of ways to deal with people, to help them participate in their own public affairs, and to convince them that only solid moral and ethical foundations can win the battle, whatever the political community, from precinct to nation.

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Improvement of Ethical Standards in the Federal Government: Problems and Proposals

By PAUL H. DOUGLAS

PURSUANT to a referral to it by the Senate of a proposed resolution (introduced by Senator Fulbright of Arkansas) to establish a Commission on Ethics in the Federal Government, a subcommittee [1] of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1951 held hearings and took extensive testimony from a broadly representative group of distinguished witnesses. These hearings have been published and a summary report with recommendations has been issued.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

As summarized by the subcommittee, the factors contributing to the over-all problem may be stated in this way:

(1) In this day of big government, there is much at stake in public policies which directly affects the income and welfare of individuals, industries, and groups.

(2) Members of Congress have almost free discretion in making these policies, and administrative officials have great discretion in administering them.

(3) The great authority vested in elected officials is justified by the principle that they, as representatives of the public, will exercise their authority in the public interest and for public purposes; similarly, the discretionary authority delegated to administrators is based on the assumption that they will exercise it reasonably in accordance with public policies, and for the furtherance of public purposes.

(4) Although the importance of the issues, the breadth of discretion involved, and the basic nature of responsible government make it necessary that as far as humanly possible issues shall be decided on their merits, interested parties are not willing to let the wheels of government turn unassisted, but in a great variety of ways bring pressure to bear upon legislators and administrators in order to secure favorable decisions.

From these basic factors emerge special problems, most of which, in the opinion of the witnesses, call for affirmative and corrective action by the government.

PROBLEMS OF PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

One of the most pressing problems is that the government is employing mature, well-established businessmen, especially in numerous positions in defense agencies which deal directly with the very industries from which they recently came. These men are needed, and their work for the government, like that of every other public servant, must be considered a patriotic service. The employment of these men in defense agencies, nevertheless, creates ethical problems and hazards. Can they be perfectly fair if cases come before them which directly or indirectly involve the company from which they came? Can

[1] The members of the subcommittee were Matthew M. Neely, Hubert H. Humphrey, George D. Aiken, Wayne Morse, and the present author, who was chairman.

they be completely objective in decisions which affect their industry—for example, where the industry favors a policy divergent from public policy or from proposed public policy? Can these men be completely detached in determining what the public interest requires?

The basis of their employment may affect the perspective of ex-businessmen. Are they employed without compensation (WOC) or at a dollar a year, continuing to draw a corporation salary while on leave for public service? Some believe that these men should be as dependent on the government as salary can make them, and that a WOC status is improper. Others say, however, that many able businessmen of middle age without accumulated savings, and with heavy fixed obligations for insurance, house payments, education of children, etc., cannot afford to come into the government (short of an all-out emergency) if they have to drop from the industrial to the governmental scale of compensation for executives.

PROBLEMS OF SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT

Another situation fraught with danger is the later affiliation of government servants with business concerns with which they have had official dealings. Public employees who place or settle contracts, recommend loans, award subsidies, or make similar decisions directly touching persons or firms which do business with the government and then leave the government to take positions with these same firms inevitably raise doubts as to how impartial they were when they decided these issues while in the government. If their new salary is out of line with the old (after allowing for differences in the business scale), this doubt is further strengthened. These circumstances are in fact inherently so suspicious that a public employee who values his reputation for integrity should feel himself disqualified for employment with a firm to which he has made valuable awards until a considerable period (e.g., two years) has elapsed after that business has been completed. Governmental employers should discourage such transfers by all possible means.

Coming events cast their shadows before, and if the possibility of lucrative employment with a private concern should be raised in any way, directly or indirectly, while the public servant is negotiating or doing business with that concern, it also casts doubts on the merits of the pending business. If public employees were under a standing order to report such improprieties and to ask to be relieved of the assignment in question, it might help to avert untimely offers.

Even when direct monetary payments or similar valuable privileges are not involved, a public employee who enters the employ of a concern which regularly does business with his former governmental employer creates an ethical problem. All agree that in this new employment, he should not handle specific matters for which he was formerly responsible or which he officially knew about. The consensus of opinion is for disqualification in all such cases, and agency regulations more or less approximate this rule. The problem arises most frequently in the tax and regulatory functions where public servants become expert in the law and the economics of the taxed or regulated industries; and their services are then demanded by business concerns.

PROBLEMS OF BECOMING UNDULY INVOLVED THROUGH INVESTMENTS, GIFTS, AND ENTERTAINMENT

A recognized problem of long standing is that of public officials becoming unduly involved with persons, concerns, or industries which are affected by their decisions. There is a strong presumption that a substantial economic involvement will create either a bias or an emotional problem through fear of bias. It is generally agreed, therefore, that any such involvement should be avoided. This is the purpose of the conflict-of-interest statutes, and of the law of incompatible offices.

Involvements which it is generally agreed must be avoided include salaries, fees, and other compensation from business concerns, direct or indirect ownership of concerns doing business with the government, speculation in securities or commodities in a field touching that in which the public servant has official functions. Somewhat less clear but also coming under the taboo for administrators is substantial investment in an industry affected by his official functions. How much is "substantial"? That probably depends in part on its ratio to the individual's total investments. On these points there is not much disagreement. There is some feeling that public officials should be permitted to own businesses which do not concern their official function in any way and which they can operate through an agent or employee. But this, too, is frequently forbidden by law, perhaps to make sure that his official duties will have a public servant's full attention.

The recent disclosures have also shown that one of the most common ways in which interested parties seduce public officials is through costly gifts and expensive entertainment. Many men profess to see nothing wrong in this and state that it will not affect the attitude of the official. This is excessively naïve. What frequently happens is that the loyalties of the public official are shifted gradually from single-minded devotion to the public interest to a friendship for and loyalty towards the donor and patron. Then when decisions are made, it is easy for the official to be influenced by considerations of friendship and personal obligation. Many public officials have gone wrong in this fashion and have shifted their loyalties so slowly and imperceptibly that they were not fully conscious of what was happening.

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT: CONGRESS

The pressures on members of Congress which create ethical problems are of several varieties. One is financial pressure. Campaigning is costly. Where shall the candidate seek funds to help with his primary or his final campaign? Politics is not classifiable as philanthropy for tax purposes, and the average voters, including those who are most harsh in their judgment of politicians, do not contribute to campaign funds. The normal candidate's only recourse is to the more actively interested persons or groups which are in politics to protect their interests. From which of these shall a candidate seek funds and support? Is it possible for him to retain some degree of independence if he does so? How much dare he obligate himself to a single group? Diversification is a good principle, as in investments, but frequently it is not possible.

Being the nominee of his party places the candidate under some obligation to the party; but who has a right to define its policy? The candidate, or the professional workers below decks who run the "machine"? Assuming that some consideration of each for the other is normal, how far shall a successful candidate go in honoring obligations which the machine has assumed? In a complex industrial society these questions get rather complex. No wonder the old system of finding a financial "angel" and then of sending him on a flight to the embassy in Graustark

has its attractions, even from an ethical point of view. It had its advantages even though it still pains the foreign service officers who would like these posts for themselves.

The financial pressure does not end with the campaign. The senator or representative has abnormal expenses. Maintaining a residence in Washington, in addition to keeping his roots in his home soil, is expensive. To keep in touch also, he generally needs to come home frequently for short visits. Travel is costly, and the government pays only for one trip per session. A senator or representative is a public figure and fair game for solicitors for all worthy causes. Even small contributions add up. Some members, particularly from the more populous states, find the allowances for clerk hire insufficient to cover the cost of maintaining their offices.

The upshot is that a majority of the members of Congress find it necessary to supplement their salary in some way. Were Congress meeting but six months or less a year, as it once did, there would be no serious difficulty, but membership is now practically a year-round activity, which, with the duties of campaigning, leaves little time to engage in business or professional activities. Members who are lawyers may accept fees or retainers for giving advice and counsel or for other legal services. But they have little time for very extensive service and if their duties become perfunctory, the question always arises, are they being paid for their influence and to influence their perspective? Men who pay legal retainers expect to get something for their money.

Members who are not lawyers have no device as well established as the legal retainer, but fortunately many of them are quite articulate and enjoy speaking. Since their function is one of educating the public, as well as themselves, on public issues, a good many public speeches can be considered to be in the line of duty. But there are other questions. To what groups should one speak? At what point does a large fee become payment for something more than the speech? How can adequate diversification be maintained?

Men of property in Congress, as well as the impecunious, also have their problems. If their investments are concentrated in one or a few industries, how can they avoid becoming protagonists of those industries, at the expense of a genuinely public perspective on issues of policy? What steps can they take to protect the public from their own bias?

ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT VERSUS VENALITY

Differences of degree, usually accompanied by differences in motivation, change the character of improprieties. Gifts and favors which may begin as entirely innocent practices become improper when they begin to affect the public servant's ability to act for the public as agent or representative, fairly and objectively. They are improper as subtle influences upon his point of view.

If carried further, they become ends in themselves, a way of increasing the public servant's income. At some point, the receiver becomes venal. He is, in effect, taking bribes and graft to enrich himself. This has been recognized to be wrong as long as "western" civilization has existed. One can find it vividly depicted and scornfully denounced in the pages of the Old Testament. It is always a problem, but it is a less important problem today in its effect upon the conduct of public affairs than subtle economic involvement.

When gifts, favors, and lavish entertainment begin to be evident in the relations of contractors with the government, it is prima facie evidence of something wrong, and time for corrective action.

PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENTS

Politics itself can give rise to embarrassing conflicts of interest. When men are appointed to important administrative positions, often with the clearance and approval of county and state political organizations, or national committees, or members of the Senate and House of Representatives, should they feel especially obligated to their political sponsors? If so, to what extent? Is there any obligation touching specific administrative decisions? If there is no obligation to the sponsor which can affect handling of administrative issues strictly on their merits, how can political sponsors be induced to accept this role of impartiality? Often political sponsors take a proprietary interest in departments or agencies in which they have helped to place men in key positions, and if their interest is pushed aggressively, it creates serious ethical problems for the administrator.

PROBLEMS OF "REFERENCE"

The so-called function of reference is well established in the Federal Government. Members of Congress receive a large number of requests from constituents asking for their assistance in dealing with federal departments and agencies. Job hunters, contractors and would-be contractors, applicants for loans, applicants for privileges in the public domain, men who want to get into the armed forces usually as commissioned officers, and others who want to get out, veterans whose benefits have been delayed or denied, and many others such as those seeking naturalization, come to their senator or congressman or write to him for help in getting a favorable decision from administrators. There is so much of this business that a member of Congress could spend his entire time on it.

It is, indeed, desirable that legislators should perform this function provided they observe proper restraints in doing so. For civil servants frequently become perfunctory in their work and careless of the people whom they are presumed to serve. Legislators can, therefore, legitimately serve as an informal board of inspectors. They can prevent the administrators from flagging in their zeal and can detect and check abuses in the conduct of public business. From another point of view, legislators can serve as informal ambassadors for their states, which often seem to constituents to be rather far removed from the center of power in Washington.

PROBLEMS OF EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS

One of the most obvious influences upon the conduct of public business is the selection of persons for top administrative posts. The President in his nominations, the Senate in its votes on confirmation, citizens who are invited to accept key positions, and the groups which seek to influence the selection or approval of nominees have great power to raise or lower the levels of public service.

Despite government's difficulties in competing with more remunerative or more peaceful occupations for top-grade talent, their enlistment must be a constant aim of every administration.

Refusal of able citizens to accept the responsibilities of public life, nomination of mediocre persons or those who are subservient to private interests, denial of confirmation to nominees who have been outspoken champions of the public interest, and sniping, unsupported attacks on various public officials are bound to result in depressing the

morale and the practices of various government agencies.

On the other hand, the zeal to protect the public interest and the competence that is brought to government work at all levels are greatly strengthened when persons of high caliber receive appointments to leading positions and when able officers have the full support of the President, the Congress, and the people.

ADMINISTRATIVE FAULTS

Certain institutional tendencies or failures of administration tend to defeat public policies. One is the tendency of independent regulatory agencies to surrender their regulatory zeal as they age, and to become more and more the protagonists of a clientele industry, and less and less the vigilant defenders of the welfare of consumers or the general public. All too often, those who are supposedly being regulated, actually regulate their nominal regulators.

A related fault in public administration is "tiredness" and a routine performance of public duties. This generally becomes worse as the agency grows older and as it tends to lose its initial zeal. It is unfortunately characteristic of all too many government departments at the present time.

Criticisms are also heard that the administrative interpretation and enforcement of statutes are unduly flexible and variable. Heads of agencies commonly turn to legal officers whom they appoint for rulings as to whether or not they can proceed in a given manner. The resulting opinions are not unbiased. They commonly tell the administrators what they want to hear. Undoubtedly they are leading to an undue expansion of administrative power under which administrators are changing or creating law, and hence usurping legislative functions. Administrators argue in their defense, however, that in addition to the language of substantive acts of Congress, they receive instructions from the appropriation acts, the two appropriations committees and at least two legislative committees in each house, and sometimes also from individual committee members. They say that part of the problem is that these instructions are not always consistent. In those circumstances, any interpretation of public policy may seem to some to be improper. In any case, the consistent and equal application of the law is an objective that seems not yet fully attained.

CAMPAIGN METHODS

Just as serious as the problem of campaign finance is that of campaign methods. Here the root of the problem is a tendency in campaigning to disregard the truth. The worth of the election system in representative government depends upon its being an extension of the legislative discussion of issues and policies. This is intended to be a process of revealing and of weighing the facts. If mendacity, misrepresentation, and irresponsible statements characterize electioneering, the mind and emotions of the public are immediately exploited, and in the long run, the whole electoral process is discredited. These facts are apparent to members of Congress, and from the testimony we received, it is evident that the public is also beginning to be aware of and concerned about the trend of campaigning. The level of responsibility and truth-telling is below that which the public in its heart approves. The fact that violators of reasonable standards may win an election is not evidence to the contrary. The European dictators demonstrated that it is possible to exploit the democratic tradition—a tradition of responsibility and reasonableness—by ruthless methods. As with monetary inflation, those who deliberately depreciate the currency of language can keep one step ahead of the rate of exchange. Cheating is unethical in any system, and cheating the public is more serious than cheating a rival.

The problem of equitable electioneering is complicated by the subtle campaigning which can be undertaken by advertisers, business sales organizations, labor organizations, and farm organizations. Thorough exploration of the problem will doubtless lead also to the reconsideration of tax allowances, and the political activity of organized groups.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of these complaints and disclosures, the subcommittee concluded that:

1. A Commission on Ethics in Government

A Commission on Ethics in Government should be established by joint resolution of Congress. The commission's function should be twofold. First, it would investigate and report to the President and to the Congress on the moral standards of the official conduct of persons and groups doing business with the government or seeking to influence public policy and administration. And second, it would report on the moral standards generally prevailing in society which condition the conduct of public affairs or which affect the strength and unity of the nation. The commission's inquiry should focus primarily on the legislative and executive branches, but should not exclude the administration of justice, federally supported activities of the states, and such ideas, attitudes, habits, practices, and standards of American society as are relevant to the commission's functions.

The second function of the commission should be to recommend measures to improve and maintain at a high level moral standards of official conduct in the Federal Government and of all persons who participate in or are responsible for the conduct of public affairs. It should be noted that the commission would not be concerned with the morals of individuals—governmental personnel or private citizens—except as they are involved in the conduct of public affairs.

The commission should consist of fifteen members, five appointed by the President, five by the President of the Senate (i.e., the Vice President), and five by the Speaker of the House. All members should be persons of recognized integrity, judgment, and experience in public or civic affairs. Of the members appointed by the President, two should be public employees, one a career civil servant holding a position not above GS-16, and one holding an office of higher rank. Of the members appointed by the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, in each case two should be members of the respective legislative body of the appointing officer, one a Democrat and one a Republican.

The commission should have power to hold hearings and secure testimony and evidence, authority to employ staff, and funds to carry on its work. It should have two years in which to complete its investigation and report, but should place its major recommendations before the President and Congress during the first session of the Eighty-third Congress. It should terminate thirty days after submitting its final report.

2. Amendments to Administrative Procedure Act

The Administrative Procedure Act should be amended to provide that the following practices shall be improper

for federal officials and employees and shall be grounds for summary dismissal from the federal service:

(a) Engaging in any personal business transaction or private arrangement for personal profit which accrues from or is based upon the official position, authority, or confidential information of the official or employee.

(b) Accepting any valuable gift, favor, or service directly or indirectly from any person or organization with which the official or employee transacts business for the government.

(c) Discussing future employment outside the government with a person or organization with which there is pending official business.

(d) Divulging valuable commercial or economic information of a confidential character to unauthorized persons or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

(e) Becoming unduly involved, for example, through frequent luncheons, dinners, parties, or other expensive social engagements with persons outside the government with whom they do official business.

The Administrative Procedure Act should be amended also to prohibit federal officials who participate in the making of loans, granting of subsidies, negotiation of contracts, fixing of rates, or the issuance of valuable permits or certificates from acting in any official transaction or decision which chiefly concerns a person or organization by which they have been employed previously in the preceding two years or with which they have a valuable economic interest. Any violation of this prohibition should be grounds for summary dismissal.

The Administrative Procedure Act should be further amended:

(a) To provide that former federal officials and employees shall not appear before agencies in which they were formerly employed in cases which they previously handled or of which they had some direct knowledge as federal officials or employees and that they shall not participate in the preparation of such cases.

(b) To provide that for a period of two years following the termination of their employment, federal officials and employees of the ranks GS-15 and above, that is, those in policy-making posts, who leave the government shall not appear before the federal agencies in which they were formerly employed as the representative of a person or organization doing business with the government.

The penalties of disbarment from practice before a federal agency and of cancellation of contract in appropriate cases should be authorized to discourage those who would corrupt as well as those who allow themselves to be corrupted. Publicity for findings of improper practices would serve as a further deterrent.

3. Mandatory disclosure of income, etc.

Legislation should be enacted requiring all members of Congress, all federal officials receiving a salary of $10,000 or more, or who are in positions of GS-15 and above, or of equivalent rank, and the principal officials of national political parties to disclose their incomes, assets, and all dealings in securities and commodities. The disclosures should be made by filing reports with the Comptroller General on forms provided by him to show income by source and amounts and to identify assets and show their value. These reports should be annual.

The revelation of such information will tend to deter individuals from accepting any income, holding any assets, or making any transactions which they believe are questionable. It will encourage public officials and political leaders to judge their own conduct with greater care. It will also provide for the public and for the great majority of such public servants and party officials whose actions and motives rise above personal considerations, the strong ground of truth on which to stand against unfair charges and innuendo.

4. Thorough study of proposed changes in criminal law

The laws governing conflicts of interest and bribery should be amended to correct inconsistencies, close loopholes, and extend their coverage. The proposed amendments, which the subcommittee recommends for thorough study by executive agencies and appropriate congressional committees, would if enacted effect changes which can be made quickly and which are obviously needed. This action should not preclude a more exhaustive examination of the law governing illegal practices by the Commission on Ethics in Government and more extensive revision which the commission may recommend.

5. Creation of a citizens' organization to work for better government on the national level

Congress should encourage private citizens to establish a nonpartisan, national citizens' organization to formulate suggestions and support affirmative programs for the improvement of government service. The successes of many reforms in local and national government stem from the activity of well-organized citizens' groups. To win public understanding of the recommendations of a commission on ethics and to serve as an effective watchdog over the administration of approved measures, such a national organization can be a most effective force.

In addition, the subcommittee recommended that certain other measures receive further study looking to further positive action. These measures include corrupt practices acts, financing of election campaigns, voluntary ethical codes for functional and professional groups, enforcement of existing ethical standards and codes, rewards for high standards of conduct, the strengthening of personnel administration, improvement of departmental management, clarification of the purposes of public policies, questioning of department heads on the Senate floor, fair play toward administrators and private citizens in congressional debates, and fair treatment of committee witnesses.

Inasmuch as ethical standards in public life are likely to become the subject of political disputation in the forthcoming campaign, it is not unlikely that the Eighty-third Congress—or even the second session of the Eighty-second—may enact some of these proposals into law. In any event, public discussion and consideration of them is invited.

Paul H. Douglas, Ph.D., is United States Senator from Illinois. He was formerly professor of economics at the University of Chicago. During World War II he enlisted in the Marine Corps as a private and advanced to lieutenant colonel after having been twice wounded in action and decorated for bravery. He recently served as chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to consider the establishment of a Commission on Ethics in the Federal Government.

Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1951

SINCE the depression of some twenty years ago the Academy has steadily grown in membership. From fewer than 8,880 our members have increased until at the end of 1951 the total was 16,806.

Meetings

On January 26, 1951 a meeting of the Academy was addressed by Mr. Thomas B. McCabe, chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and by Professor Lester V. Chandler of Princeton University, the topic being "Financial Controls During Crisis."

On April 6 and 7, 1951 there was held the Fifty-fifth Annual Meeting. During the six sessions of the two days the addresses and the discussion were on the topic "Lessons from Asia." Conditions in the Far East were the reason for the choice of the topic and explained the special interest shown in the meeting and in the July 1951 issue of THE ANNALS which contained the addresses.

Publications

Last year attention was drawn to rising costs. These increases affect all or nearly all phases of our work. The steady increase in membership brings larger receipts, and there is a gain also from the sale of copies of THE ANNALS in addition to the copies which go to members. During 1951 special efforts were made to sell earlier issues still on hand. The results were gratifying, the total of these special sales of pamphlets, indexes, and copies of THE ANNALS amounting to 9,708 copies.

Since each issue of THE ANNALS is a symposium of from fifteen to twenty-five articles on a topic of current public interest, many teachers use THE ANNALS as a text or as required supplementary reading. It is difficult to forecast this demand, and frequently we find that we must have extra copies printed. Also it is worth noting that our material has interest and value for years after its original appearance. Recently we publicized a number of issues that have been published during the last ten years or so, and as a result received a gratifying number of orders.

During 1951 the titles of the six issues were:

January	*Medical Care for Americans*
March	*Labor in the American Economy*
May	*Civil Rights in America*
July	*Lessons from Asia*
September	*Report on China*
November	*The Search for National Security*

Membership

We enrolled 3,473 new members in 1951. This may be compared with 3,538 in 1950 and 3,549 in 1949. Each year there are a considerable number of losses, but we closed 1951 with a membership of 16,806, which is a net gain of 730 over 1950.

Finances

Members of the Academy presumably understand that it is a self-supporting organization and meets its expenses out of its own activities. Gifts are few and small. This calls for a persistent effort to maintain or increase memberships and sales. The results for 1951 are shown in the report of our Treasurer which will be presented at this meeting.

Emphasis should be placed on the fact that thus far we have maintained dues at $5.00 per year although most organizations have increased them. We have even lowered our dues to $4.50 for Canadian members and to $4.00 to members in other foreign countries. Also, we have some 1,300 student and military service members who pay only $3.00 per year. The only increase that has been made is to those who wish clothbound copies of THE ANNALS. They are now charged $10.00 per year instead of the $7.50 which we charged a few years ago.

Respectfully submitted,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Ernest Minor Patterson, *President*
C. A. Kulp, *Vice President*
J. P. Lichtenberger, *Secretary*
Charles J. Rhoads, *Treasurer*
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January 28, 1952

REPORT OF AUDITORS

January 22, 1952

CHARLES J. RHOADS, ESQ., *Treasurer,*
American Academy of Political & Social Science,
Philadelphia, Penna.

Dear Sir:

We herewith report that we have audited the books and accounts of the *American Academy of Political and Social Science* for its Fiscal Year ended *December 31, 1951.*

We have prepared and submit herewith Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for the year ended December 31, 1951.

The Receipts from all sources were verified by a comparison of the entries for same appearing in the Treasurer's Cash Book with the records of bank deposits and were found to be in accord therewith.

The Disbursements, as shown by the Cash Book, were supported by the proper vouchers in the form of cancelled paid checks or receipts for moneys expended. These were examined by us and confirmed the correctness of the payments made.

As the result of our audit and examination, made in the manner above indicated, we certify that, in our opinion, the accompanying Statement sets forth the results of its operating activities for the period under review.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed) EDWARD P. MOXEY & Co.
Certified Public Accountants

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1951

Cash Balance January 1, 1951			$ 3,275.39
Receipts			
Members' Dues		$47,730.92	
Students' Dues		4,054.58	
Life Membership		200.00	
Subscriptions			
Individuals	$ 222.46		
Libraries	4,906.10		
Agents	13,828.55	18,957.11	
Sales		12,346.69	
Advertising		3,359.01	
Income from Investments		12,103.69	
Proceeds from Sale of Securities		4,286.56	
Special Donations		11.00	
Translation Royalties		35.33	103,084.89
			$106,360.28
Disbursements			
Office Expense		$14,962.20	
Philadelphia Meetings		5,604.69	
New Membership Expense		12,550.96	
Publication of Annals		52,668.53	
Membership Records		10,761.94	
Sale of Annals Expense		2,881.04	
Securities Purchased		2,284.50	
Trust Agency Expense		490.59	
Property Improvements		216.00	
Discounts, Collections and Miscellaneous		13.36	
Office Equipment Purchased		24.89	
Social Security Taxes		510.16	
Prepaid Postage		274.41	103,243.27
Cash Balance December 31, 1951			$ 3,117.01
Represented by:			
Cash on Deposit in Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank		$ 2,968.44	
Cash at Academy Office		148.57	$ 3,117.01

Book Department

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

SCHWARZENBERGER, GEORG. *Power Politics: A Study of International Society.* Pp. xxii, 898. Second rev. ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $12.75.

What can be said within the confines of a single volume about international relations that is useful and meaningful—to college students or laymen or the mythical "general reader"? Many have been intrigued with the question and have sought to answer it, this reviewer among them. Machiavelli achieved exceptional brevity and clarity in the enterprise more than four centuries ago. More recent endeavors have been less succinct, from the late Raymond Leslie Buell's *International Relations* (1925) to the present work. Yet the project is worth pursuing. Every effort to see the world steadily and to see it whole contributes something to our understanding of the global system of sovereignties in which we live. Such understanding may in turn contribute something (in ways devious, obscure, and ill understood) toward making life in such a system conducive to survival rather than to death.

The present hefty tome is a notable addition to this type of literature. Dr. Schwarzenberger is Reader in International Law at the University of London, Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Laws of University College, and Director of Studies at the London Institute of World Affairs, under whose auspices this work is published—originally by Stevens and Sons, Ltd. Among other useful works, he published the first edition of the present book in 1941. Its importance on both sides of the Atlantic was then somewhat obscured by the flames and smoke of war. This second edition is longer, more diffuse, more analytical, less well documented (a defect redeemed by an admirable bibliography of 16 pages), but more exciting in its lucid and highly readable commentary on the shape of things, past, present, and future, in relations among sovereignties.

Despite the impressive bulk of this volume, it is short on factual data—a characteristic which may be deemed a virtue rather than a vice for all I can discover to the contrary in the distribution of similar works among American readers. There are no tables of statistics, nor any maps beyond two end-papers. There are no illustrations save the frontispiece, "The Tower of Babel" by Peter Breughel the Elder. Schwarzenberger obviously believes, and rightly so, that "facts" without interpretation are worthless, and therefore concentrates on interpretation. The result is

always interesting, frequently provocative, and occasionally brilliant.

For all the author's professional preoccupation with international law, this analysis is not at all afflicted with "legalistic" illusions. International law, he avers (p. 213), is "emphatically a law of power" and little more than "a body of mutually advantageous rules of social conduct" (p. 217). In thirty-six chapters, Dr. Schwarzenberger undertakes, with animation of spirit and success in accomplishment, to depict and analyze the moving human factors and forces in the Western State System. Particularly suggestive are his comments on "The International Aristocracy" (the sovereignties of the System), "The International Oligarchy" (the Great Powers), "Strategies" and "Tactics" of politics, "The Functions of International Morality," and the chapters on the League of Nations and the United Nations.

The author prudently takes pains to document his detestation of Soviet Communism (a precaution unnecessary in England but essential in the American market), but is not misled thereby into any advocacy of Holy War. He hopes for a resumption of diplomacy and has much to say, genially or acidly, on the loss of freedom of choice by European States and on the pretenses, hypocrisies, and delusions of policy-makers in both halves of One World. He concluded his first edition with a plea, akin to Toynbee's, for a return to God. He concludes this stimulating revision, more modestly, with a plea for Atlantic Union—not as a weapon of war but as a possible nucleus of world federation.

This long and challenging essay deserves wide reading. Unhappily, since academicians on fixed incomes are hard pressed by the "war-for-peace" inflation, *Power Politics* at $12.75 is unlikely to be widely bought by professors or generally adopted for class use. A wiser publisher would have priced it at a more available figure, even though publishers, no less than writers, are victims of the constantly rising prices which accompany the world's muddle and drift toward a final and fatal Armageddon. Dr. Schwarzenberger has analyzed many aspects of this process with acumen and insight. His work will at least be accessible in good libraries. May it find many readers!

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

MAURER, HERRYMON. *Collision of East and West.* Pp. xvi, 352. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951. $4.50.

The writing of history has been profoundly affected by the striking successes of the experimental sciences. Historians have spared no effort in marshaling available sources, in analyzing, weighing, and testing evidence, and in documenting conclusions so as to facilitate verification.

This methodology has produced excellent accounts describing and explaining *how* events occurred. Motivation and the logic of historical evolution, however, have proved more difficult of demonstration. *Why* people act as they do, and *why* certain results ensue are either ignored entirely or explained in accord with premises and hypotheses that do not yield readily to verification.

The volume under review seeks to determine fundamental causation in the troubled area of the Far East during the cataclysmic decade of 1937–1947. The author is fully conversant with the sequence of events of this "moment" in history, and he surveys the unfolding panorama, indicating valleys of indecision and peaks of crises. The primary purpose, however, is to explain rather than to describe the collision between East and West, and understanding, he warns us, must be sought in terms of the past—"the total immense bulk of the past, eternally inherent in the present." A study of the past reveals a clash of minds, cultures, and ways of life which a century of contact failed to bridge.

Mr. Maurer argues that the primary factors in China's tragedy were not feudalism, landlordism, or illiteracy, but a cultural malaise resulting from the pressure of the dynamic West upon a static society which did not desire change and could not find the means of harmonizing tradition with the modern techniques that were forced upon the country. The mental roots were lacking for the acceptance or understanding of the Westerner's drive to control nature or to subordinate personal and family

relationships to the molding of an abundant life. The West, equally incapable of comprehending the scale of values of the East, saw only poverty and confusion, and made little effort to conceal its contempt for a society which tolerated such evils. Had the West resorted to total conquest in the manner of the Soviets, the gap might have been bridged by force, but that too proved impossible because of the accepted mores of the West.

The relationship, cemented neither by peaceable interchange nor by complete domination, proved irritating and perplexing, and, under the strain of the late war and its aftermath, it broke down completely. The necessary understanding and confidence were wanting in the West to render possible adequate aid from abroad. The sources of native strength, weakened by the long process of cultural attrition, were completely exhausted by the economic and political dislocations and confusions of war. China, *therefore*, fell easy prey to a determined and unscrupulous conqueror.

The author's hypothesis is especially convincing when applied to the East-West relationships in Japan. The latter was indeed "Westernized" with astonishing rapidity, but true interchange between East and West was lacking. Changes were effected by edict, preserving the aristocratic code of loyalty to superiors, duty, oppression, and self-restraint. Thus, modern technology and armaments only reinforced totalitarian government and the war cult, the most dangerous pillars of Japanese traditionalism. Moreover, the attempt to preserve intact the ancient ways in an industrialized society added to the strains and frustrations of the Japanese way of life. An explosion was inevitable.

One need hardly add that Mr. Maurer regards recent American policy in the Far East as a ghastly failure. But one must be careful not to identify him with the critics whose views of the State Department are darkened by the shadow of the forthcoming elections. The author's analysis provides historical perspective for our failure, and he is careful to point out that the mistakes in China were inherent in the historical situation and must be laid at the door, not of a small group of government officials, but of the American people as a whole.

Indeed, Mr. Maurer's criticism of our Far Eastern policy stems from a conception which is altogether outside the sphere of present political discussions. He believes that our policy was morally wrong and inevitably invited disaster because it failed to treat other nations and cultures as ends in themselves. From that point of view, our occupation policies in Japan and Korea could hardly succeed because these have been subordinated to our global foreign policy.

This high purpose merits unstinting praise. Yet, the dilemma of our age remains in all its baffling perplexity. Assuming that our occupation policy in South Korea had been flawless and had won the full approbation of all unfettered Koreans, would that of itself have prevailed against the blandishments of Soviet imperialism? Even full understanding between East and West in South Korea would hardly have met the challenge of an army of 100,000 trained and indoctrinated North Koreans. Realistic statesmanship would have required the conscription of an army of equal strength, and it is doubtful if that could have been accomplished without dictation and control. Democracy and high moral purpose have not yet found the answer, short of force, to the challenge of the unscrupulous and violent messianism of the Soviets.

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PERLO, VICTOR. *American Imperialism.* Pp. 256. New York: International Publishers, 1951. $2.75.

Take the technique of the Big Lie (the bigger, the more readily believed, said Hitler). Mix in a proper proportion of history from which the real substance has been wrung and into which a prearranged spurious substitute has been injected. Load it heavily with "fitting" documentation to give weight to the resultant peace-is-war gobbledegook. The product is Kremlin double talk, of which the rantings of Malik and Vishinsky before the United Nations are examples. Another example is

the present work, written (be it noted) by a former employee of the United States Treasury, the War Production Board, the Office of Price Administration, and the Commerce Department.

When Miss E. T. Bentley, confessed former Soviet agent, on July 30, 1948, at a meeting of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, identified an espionage ring as the "Perlo Group" and its "ostensible leader" as Victor Perlo, and when shortly thereafter another former Soviet agent, Whittaker Chambers, confirmed this testimony, Victor Perlo vigorously denied the charges. *American Imperialism* gives the strong impression that Perlo is a Communist. The book faithfully and consistently follows the Kremlin propaganda line.

In the light of what has happened in recent years to the previously independent Baltic States, to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, it would seem a simple matter to find the culprit fitting the following description:

"Imperialism is military, political, and economic domination of subject nations. The forms of domination include incorporation into the home territory of the conqueror, establishment of colonies, and establishment in the subject country of nominally independent governments actually controlled by the imperialist power."

No, you are quite wrong, says Perlo (p. 15). This description does not apply to Russia. These Baltic and other peoples "destroyed imperialist rule in their lands," and then voluntarily (shall we say?) "joined 200 million Soviet people in the world of Socialist construction" (p. 29). For the first time they are now "liberated" and "independent"!

In fact, says Perlo with every variety of "illustration," the foregoing description of imperialism applies pre-eminently to the U. S. A. This is the essence of his white-is-black front regarding "imperialism."

Take the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the North Atlantic Pact. Are the objectives here to feed hungry people and to save free institutions and nations? No, the objectives are "the political and economic domination of Europe, the taking over of European colonies, and the preparation of bases for war against the U.S.S.R." (p. 135). By whom? By the U. S. government as a "tool of Wall Street," doing the bidding of its "imperialist masters."

The steps involved in this alleged conquest and domination of Europe include: (1) arrangements in every transaction "to provide immediate profits to specific American monopolies"; (2) the weakening and undermining of European economies, the elimination of "barriers to Wall Street ownership of European industry, and the superexploitation of European labor"; (3) the ultimate "establishment of Western European industry as a Wall-Street-controlled arsenal"; and (4) "goods are shipped not because Europe needs them, but because American monopolies have to get rid of them" (pp. 150–52).

"The American People were stunned by the Truman Doctrine. The atrocities of the British soldiers and of Greek fascist forces against the Greek people had evoked wide-spread disgust" (p. 176)!

What are the "real" goals of the Atlantic Pact? They are: (1) "to permit the actual invasion of Western Europe by U. S. armed forces, to complete the colonization of that area, and to subjugate other peoples to American imperialism"; (2) to prepare for "war against the U.S.S.R., the People's Democracies, and the People's Republic of China" (pp. 205, 212).

"The Pentagon strategists plan a war of annihilation against at least one third of the earth's people" (p. 217).

As for Korea: This constituted "the beginning of open American aggression in Asia," but it "resulted in a political defeat of the first magnitude for Wall Street. Its military results completely shattered the myth of white superiority which still serves as a vehicle of chauvinist incitement. . . . MacArthur won temporary military victories by pouring virtually all the combat troops of the United States Army and Marines into Korea" (p. 195).

These are but a few of the many examples of the type of pattern-in-reverse followed throughout Perlo's travesty. Beginning with the Revolution, through the Civil War, the War of 1898, World Wars I and II, the "Wall Street imperialist masters" and their government and military "tools" have pursued a consistent and set plan to dominate the world and to consolidate the "Wall Street Empire."

There is an interesting resemblance here, which would hardly seem to be coincidence, to the caricature of America we get from behind the Iron Curtain, from the Soviet press, plays, movies, and school books, recently pictured in "As the Russians See Us," published in *Reader's Digest*, December, 1951.

Is it too much to assume that the Kremlin is systematically culling, from newspapers, periodicals, and books, every derogatory remark that has ever been made about the United States, classifying these tidbits, and making them available to its agents of slander, double-talk, and intimidation for most effective propaganda use, whether behind the iron curtain or on this side of it? At any rate, Perlo's work and Russian propaganda by and large are all of a piece.

Who will read Perlo's caricature? We may just as well get acquainted with it, in order to be prepared for what the Kremlin will continue to dish up for us until its evil power is finally destroyed.

JOSEPH MAYER

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DENNETT, RAYMOND, and JOSEPH E. JOHNSON (Eds.). *Negotiating with the Russians*. Pp. xi, 310. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951. $3.50.

It is difficult to praise this volume too highly. The materials contained in it should be extremely useful not only to specialists on Soviet affairs, international relations, and comparative government, but also to all responsible officials concerned with American foreign policy. Editors and journalists, and, perhaps most of all, members of Congress might also do well to study this volume.

The reviewer has one minor but not unimportant criticism of this collection. It would have been more accurate to have entitled it "Negotiating With The Kremlin" than with the "Russians." Choice of the latter word carries unnecessary and undesirable implications, particularly with regard to the identification of Kremlin policies with popular aspirations in the U.S.S.R.

The lesson of this book is that the most highly skilled and patient negotiation with the Kremlin's representatives is absolutely necessary, but that this is a kind of negotiation which can be expected to produce very few results. This is because the Kremlin has never, even during its alliance with the West during the war, regarded diplomacy as anything but as an instrument of political war against the states with which it was negotiating. This fact places its agents in a situation in which they cannot establish frank communication with their foreign counterparts. A minor but important corollary of this is the fact that American negotiators dealing with the Soviets feel personally hurt and indignant because of the treatment accorded them by Soviet negotiators.

Within the above framework, there are many individual variations of tone, emphasis, and interpretation among the contributions to this volume. While each of its ten distinguished authors qualified for participation in the enterprise by considerable experience in high-level negotiation with Soviet representatives, their backgrounds are sufficiently varied to account for considerable differences of approach. Parenthetically, regret must be expressed that no top-level State Department professionals contributed to the collection, although as the editors, Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, point out, pressure of public business rendered such participation impossible.

All of the authors strove earnestly for objectivity. Only occasionally do notes of irritation obtrude. On the other side, the contributions, almost without exception, are realistic in spirit. Professor Mosely's concluding chapter, entitled "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation," achieves a remarkable combination of hard-headed critical realism and sympathetic objectivity. His contribution is particularly noteworthy for the valuable suggestions which it offers for facilitating successful negotiation with Soviet diplomats. While this contrbiution is far more than merely "technical" it is at the same time technical in the best sense of the term. Virtually

all of the authors are agreed on the important point that Soviet lawyers, economists, traders, and diplomats are able, hardworking, and tenacious. To these formidable individual qualities is added the power they derive from working as cogs in a highly organized mechanism.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
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BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, International Studies Group. *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1951–1952.* Pp. xiv, 479. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1951. $1.50 paper; $3.00 cloth.

The first four volumes published annually in the Brookings series of problems in American foreign policy endeavored primarily to "inform" the American citizen. The fifth and present volume strives, however consciously, to increase his "wisdom and understanding" of the timeless rules and principles of foreign policy in general. This marks a departure, at least in emphasis, from earlier postwar writings which were purely descriptive, as has been the tradition in histories of American foreign policy. Whereas the preceding volume in this series conceived the broad aims of American foreign policy as "the maintenance of enduring peace," this volume systematically reviews the main outlines of American "national interest." In so doing, it takes a leaf from the wise pages of prudent diplomats like George F. Kennan and profound scholars like Hans J. Morgenthau. But it remains an open question whether these concepts which have become respectable so painfully and tardily can be widely appropriated in time to help us avoid a third perhaps final world tragedy. Unless public opinion schooled by its academic and political mentors in utopianism can relearn the enduring truths of realism, no popular administration can be sure of its ground. Lacking this confidence, it must become a prisoner of domestic critics from the political extremes.

The arrangement of topics in this useful volume follows the conventional and not unsuccessful Brookings pattern. Part I surveys the present position of the United States in world politics. The quality of this section, particularly Chapters III and IV, is worthy of special note. Part II is a survey of contemporary problems which is thorough if uneven. Part III employs the heralded Brookings technique of isolating a particular problem for policy analysis. The value of this approach, so common in public service, has been successfully tested in classroom experiments and in public seminars conducted by the Institution. The plan of the volume is beyond criticism.

Not so for parts of its content, however, for if much is realistically grounded, the reader should expect to discover as well pious phrases solemnly intoned which even to the writers must ring hollow at this critical time. A section entitled "The Political Field" becomes profoundly unpolitical when nations are admonished to follow the United States in renouncing war, intervention, and any further territorial ambitions. Even for the greatest of world empires these preconditions of peace have become elusive, for since the "Cold War" we have intervened by supporting old and encouraging new regimes literally around the globe and today find ourselves deep in a tragic struggle for influence and control. *Major Problems* is an invaluable addition to the field, but one would hope that the institution through its seminars would strive to bolster these theoretical weaknesses by the same steadfast pursuit of truth here as has been evident in its discussions of area problems.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
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LEONARD, L. LARRY. *International Organization.* Pp. xv, 630. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951. $6.00.

This volume, the latest contribution to the list of first-rate textbooks in the McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science, is based not only on the author's teaching experience, but also on his substantial contact with international organizations while in the service of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the United States Government, and the United Nations. Divided into four major parts, it surveys in turn the framework and the political, economic and social, and colonial aspects of international organization. Part IV, made up of three chapters on colonial activities written by Lawrence S. Finkelstein, is a real contribution to the volume. It presents a thoughtful and temperate assessment of the problems, achievements, and failures of international supervision of trusteeship and other non-self-government territories. Perhaps even more to be applauded is the fact that these chapters have a freshness and readability that is too often lacking in textbooks in the field of international organization.

As for the book as a whole, it should serve as a sound and useful introduction to put into the hands of students. It seems weakest in its handling of certain of the theoretical—perhaps it is permissible to say philosophical—aspects of international organization. For the reviewer, the most unsatisfactory parts were the first two chapters, which survey the general problems posed in organizing the relations of sovereign states and sketch in the history of the development of international organizations. The chapter on the genesis of international machinery and arrangements in particular could have been more carefully and systematically developed to indicate more fully the importance of the past in molding the international institutions of the present.

In contrast, the major portion of this textbook is a solid, competent presentation of the materials. Professor Leonard outlines and explains in considerable detail the structure, functions, and procedures of the United Nations and other international bodies. He has set himself the task of viewing international organization through the study of the actual practice of governments. In so doing, he has provided the student with a mature and accurate insight into how things are done in the various international bodies.

The approach, however, has its dangers. In chapter 10, for example, the author describes the handling of a number of disputes by the Security Council, in order to illustrate the nature of the security system of the UN. The description is at times so spare and sketchy that it contributes inadequately to an understanding of the issues involved. As a result, there is room for question whether the brief account of procedures followed illuminates the "practice of governments" to any noticeable degree. More to the point, perhaps, is the fact that this chapter precedes rather than follows an outline of the actual organization of the Security Council, a peculiarity of sequence which may have some purpose, but which may also result in a measure of confusion among students using the volume as an introduction to international organization.

These comments are not intended as a major criticism of Professor Leonard's study. For the most part, the matters criticized seem to be outgrowths of what the reviewer would guess was hurry and pressure in getting the work to press. They can be remedied in a future edition. Meanwhile, this is a useful text and should fulfill its primary purpose in meeting the needs of college students of international organization. As in the case of other textbooks, however, there is unfortunately little reason to anticipate that the author's hope for a broader reading public will be realized.

HENRY R. WINKLER
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HAVILAND, H. FIELD, JR. *The Political Role of the General Assembly.* Pp. x, 190. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. $2.75.

In this monograph the author has made an original and invaluable contribution to the literature on the United Nations. After a careful study of the documents and a vigilant observation of the General Assembly in action, Professor Haviland presents us with a critical analysis of its organs and procedures, both in theory and in practice, evaluating with admirable objectivity their defects and virtues and their potentialities for the future. He compares the work of the General Assembly with that of the League of Nations Assembly, describes the role of the General Assembly as anticipated at San Francisco, traces the truly remarkable changes in this role brought about in practice, and analyzes the forces which have produced these changes.

Of course the most significant of these changes has been the gradual acquisition by the General Assembly of a major role in the handling of international crises, notably those occurring in Greece, Palestine, and Korea. While this development may be justified legally, it is hardly in accord with the original spirit and purpose of the Charter, according to which the Security Council was to be the organ responsible for the maintenance of peace, especially when collective force was to be brought into operation. But, as the author remarks, "Constitutions that do not bend are very apt to break . . . and as long as that change does not inflict undue violence upon the language of the constitution, the change would seem not only feasible but desirable."

As effective action in the Security Council was blocked by the operation of the Big-Power veto, there was no alternative between complete frustration on the one hand, and, on the other, an enlargement of the political role of the General Assembly. But the Russian veto was not the only force at work in this direction. As a matter of fact, Soviet Russia itself aided in extending the powers of the General Assembly. "It was the Soviet Union which urged the Assembly to take extraordinarily strong measures regarding Spain, the Soviet complaint of United States aggression against China, the status of the former Italian colonies, Palestine and other similar questions."

Certain criticisms offered by the author are worthy of emphasis. The Secretariat, he believes, has failed to furnish adequate documentation to help the Assembly deal effectively with the crises which have come before it, with the possible exception of the Palestine case. Also, he deplores the tendency of members to speak too often and too long. Furthermore, the caliber of those chosen to serve on Assembly commissions leaves much to be desired. Investigations are too often of a superficial nature. The potentialities of judicial settlement have been almost completely neglected. Finally, an inordinate amount of time has been given to the preparations and discussions of draft conventions such as the Genocide Treaty.

Despite these defects, the General Assembly, through the formulation of substantive recommendations, has taken a significant step beyond mere inquiries or even pacific settlement, and this may turn out to be the groundwork for a true international government. Furthermore, as its action in Korea demonstrates, the Assembly is moving ever closer toward providing "teeth" for its recommendations. Finally, it has played a leading role in actually establishing new political regimes and has been one of the principal factors in channeling and directing "revolutionary forces so as to avoid a political inundation that might engulf the entire world."

JOHN B. WHITTON
Princeton Listening Center

CHEN, TI-CHIANG. *The International Law of Recognition, With Special Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the United States.* Edited by L. C. Green. Pp. xxvii, 461. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $15.50. Published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs.

This book, with a foreword by Professor J. L. Brierly of Oxford, is a comprehensive exposition and analysis of the law of recognition. It includes parts dealing with the recognition of states, of governments, and of belligerency and insurgency; the consequences of recognition; the modes of recognition; qualified recognition; and the doctrine of nonrecognition. The cases and voluminous literature of the subject are cited in footnotes, and fourteen pages are devoted to a listing of the cases and the literature.

Dr. Chen espouses the "declaratory" as opposed to the "constitutive" theory of recognition, believing that the latter rests upon a legal "positivism" which would tend to reduce all international law to a nullity. He believes that states and governments which exist in fact have by virtue of that fact rights and duties under international law.

This theory assumes that the interpretation of "facts" is self-evident in a degree hardly justified by experience. Homicide, for example, committed with malice aforethought, is doubtless murder, at the moment committed, yet none of the legal consequences of murder follow until a court has given judgment. Until that judgment the individual is presumed to be innocent, although once judgment is given it has "retroactive" effect in the sense that the accused is to be regarded as a murderer from the time he committed the act. The judgment is "declaratory" but nevertheless legally important. To consider another illustration, an organized group may have characteristics of social unity apart from any act of law, but it is not generally regarded as a "corporation" with legal personality until the moment it has complied with the legal formalities of incorporation. There have been a few judicial decisions attributing some corporate characteristics to organizations which have not complied with those formalities, but in general the legal recognition of corporate character is "constitutive." United States courts have dated the title of the United States to all the territory accorded it by the Treaty of Peace (1783) from the Declaration of Independence (1776) although it was not generally recognized by other states in the community of nations until a number of years later. On the other hand the Permanent Court of International Justice held that Poland lacked title to the former German territory it claimed until the Treaty of Versailles went into effect, although Poland had been given some recognition by the Allies prior to that time.

These illustrations suggest that "facts" of sociology and history are not usually "facts" in law until the legal community has "recognized" them as such. The issue as between the "declaratory" and "constitutive" theory concerns the extent to which "recognition" of a given situation operates retroactively, and courts of different competence may decide differently in the same situation, and the same court may decide differently in different situations. Retroactivity is actually determined by the extent to which recognition is a "juridical" or a "political" act. It is difficult, therefore, to formulate any absolute rule. The problem is one of evidence rather than of argument. In some circumstances recognition is a "juridical act" implying a duty to recognize *vel non* and in others it is a "political act" exercisable at discretion. Dr. Chen properly indicates "the multifarious aspects of international life in which recognition comes into play" (p. 13). This complexity of the subject militates against a dogmatic attitude. The impression of such an attitude, suggested by Dr. Chen's brief statement of theory at the beginning, is happily reduced by his and his editor's (L. C. Green) careful weighing of the sources in considering the varied aspects of the problem in the body of the book.

QUINCY WRIGHT
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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. *Payment by Results.* Pp. viii, 204. Geneva and Washington, 1951. $1.25.

There is growing interest in incentive wage systems as a method of increasing production and raising living standards throughout the world. Under the Technical Assistance Program of the United Nations, the International Labor Organization has offered its expert services, and this report is an indication of ILO activity in the field of payment by results. The term is defined to cover all systems under which wages are directly related to some measurement of the work done by the individual worker or group of workers. Consequently, it does not include such schemes as profit sharing or workers' stock participation.

The first seven chapters of the study and the appendix were prepared by the International Labor Office mainly on the basis of information supplied by governments, employer organizations, and unions. Chapter 8 contains a significant statement of general principles concerning the use of payment by results which was unanimously adopted by experts drawn from employers', workers', and independent groups of different countries at a meeting in Geneva held in April 1951 under ILO auspices. The experts recognized that the successful operation of piece rate and standard hour systems depends upon good industrial relations and whenever possible should be the subject of collective bargaining. The authors of the report do not argue for or

against payment by results as such arguments must ultimately be based on value judgments.

Although the majority of workers in most countries are paid by time, substantial numbers in many countries are paid by results. Thus, the estimated percentage of total hours worked on piece rates in industries surveyed in 1949 was approximately 70 in Hungary, 58 in Sweden, and 37 in Western Germany. In the United States a Bureau of Labor Statistics Study indicated that 30 per cent of plant workers were paid by results in 1945–1946. The ILO survey shows that in most countries, such systems are extensively applied in the textiles, clothing, and metal trades, and to a moderate extent in leather, rubber, mining, and commerce.

While much of the material explaining these systems is found in the standard texts on wage incentive methods, the information on the extent and use of the various systems of payment by results in the different countries is a notable contribution. However, since the data were furnished to the ILO by organizations in the various countries, they should be carefully evaluated by the reader. The International Labor Office prepared this report to provide governments, employers, and other interested parties with information on the various systems now in use. Among the interested parties will be experts and teachers in the area of personnel management.

MELVIN J. SEGAL
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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICAL THEORY

SMITH, LOUIS. *American Democracy and Military Power: A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States.* Pp. xv, 370. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. $5.00.

If the United States is to remain free, it must continue its traditional policy of subordinating military might to civilian control. So argues the dean of Berea College, a political science teacher of the Leonard D. White school of thought, in a comprehensive analysis of the history of this country with particular attention to the wartime conduct of its civil authorities. He examines the strain imposed upon accepted structures and patterns by the heavy military expenditures and expanding armed forces incident to the current drive for security. Have our international involvements become so extensive since 1898, he asks, that a garrison state with autocratic rule may ensue?

Dr. Smith holds that this menace, while real, can be checked by a proper understanding and application of constitutional procedures. The Constitution is a remarkably able document; its proper operation assures civilian domination and public liberty. Under it in time of war, presidents —especially Franklin D. Roosevelt—have wielded great authority, but in such manner that military power never became an implicit threat. Cabinet officers and bureau and agency chiefs, even those who exercised wide influence after Pearl Harbor, were not subordinated to the military in policy or action. The most delicate of all operations, the one which the author considers most badly conceived—the removal from the Pacific coast of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry—was performed under civil authorization.

Congress and its committees, the records of which are analyzed in one-third of this study, have served as checks upon the armed forces and upon executives who might otherwise tend to go too far, especially upon officials who have held military commissions. Federal courts from the post-Civil War case *Ex parte Milligan* onward have restrained military agents and their civilian principals from injurious actions against civil rights. At present mid-century, American civilian pre-eminence is threatened by pressures from outside the democratic world, but "it is vital that civil control remain lest free men should lose their liberties at home in the very process of defending them abroad."

The volume is a model of accurate scholarship, careful documentation, and fine writing. Events since its compilation, including the deepening of the Korean War and the recall of General MacArthur, have tended to substantiate the author's thesis.

EARL CRANSTON
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JONES, JESSE H., with EDWARD ANGLY. *Fifty Billion Dollars: My Thirteen Years with the RFC (1932–1945).* Pp. xvi, 631. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $6.00.

This book presents the history of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation through the years 1932–1945, covering the period during which Jesse H. Jones was chairman, directing the policies of the corporation. Part I, consisting of 25 chapters, describes the antidepression measures of the thirties. Separate chapters are devoted to a discussion of advances to banks, railroads, insurance companies, building and loan associations, business and industry, states and cities. Other chapters discuss the steps taken to aid agriculture, to revive the real estate market, to further rural electrification, to stimulate foreign trade, and to bring relief to the victims of the Ohio flood in 1937, the New England hurricane in 1938, and the great drought in the South in 1939.

These chapters give summary figures of the advances made in each field, but they are enlivened by the selection of individual loans for detailed consideration, with their attendant personal and human incidents and relationships. As would be expected, the author vigorously defends the actions of the corporation in certain matters which were the subject of public criticism at the time; for example, the loan of $90,000,000 to the Central Republic Bank, of which General Charles G. Dawes was chairman. This loan was made to the bank shortly after General Dawes had resigned as President of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to return and take charge of his own bank. The author also defends the policy of giving publicity to the loans made, although there was a strong feeling at the time that such publicity might imperil the institutions to which advances had been made, by advertising the weaknesses which had made the loans necessary.

No one can read this section of the book without being convinced of the vast services rendered by the corporation in combatting the depression. The author makes occasional mention of losses taken on loans, but the overwhelming bulk of the advances made were repaid in full with interest. A proper distinction is drawn between the loans made on a business basis, and the use made by Congress of the corporation as an agency for the advances of relief funds which were not intended to be repaid.

The lengthy 21st chapter ignores the R.F.C. to a considerable extent, and is a critical discussion of the political scene in Washington during the Roosevelt administrations and the early months of Mr. Truman's regime. It is entertaining, being as it is the impressions of a competent observer and participant, but some of the comments are matters of personal opinion only, and of doubtful validity as, for example, that President Roosevelt was anxious to "get into the fighting since that would insure a third term."

Part II of the book is devoted to the services rendered by the corporation in preparing the country for war and in fighting the war itself. Chapters are devoted to certain subsidiary corporations set up for preparedness and war purposes such as the Defense Plant Corporation, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Metals Reserve Company, the War Damage Corporation, etc. Much attention is given to the rubber program and the development of the synthetic rubber industry. The author answers the Baruch Committee report which had condemned the slowness of our steps in that direction. Certain "friction and interagency troubles over rubber in 1942 and 1943 were directly attributable to . . . Vice-President Henry Wallace's Board of Economic Warfare." Throughout the book the author's clashes in viewpoint and policy with Henry Wallace, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and others of the inner circle of the New Deal are forcibly set forth.

Only occasional instances of attempted influence to sway the actions of the corporation are cited, for example, the suggestion of President Roosevelt that the corporation should purchase The Empire State Building. In most cases the sug-

gestions were not followed. The recent disclosures, or at least allegations, of such improper influence in the granting of corporation loans, which have received such publicity in the press, apparently do not date back to the Jesse Jones regime.

The final chapter is a tribute to the author's associates and employees in the corporation. The book is well worth careful reading, particularly at the present time, when the R.F.C. is under fire and its future life and powers are problematical.

W. CARLTON HARRIS
University of Pennsylvania

HOOVER, HERBERT. *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874–1920.* Pp. xi, 496. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $4.00.

Here is an autobiography constituting a real-life Horatio Alger story. Herbert lost his father at six and his mother at nine years of age whereupon he was sent to be reared by Oregon relatives. He entered Stanford University the first day it opened and evidently got a good start on a mining engineering education while organizing the "barbarians" and managing athletic finances. Summers he built up a tough physique on geological surveys. Then, in the hard times of the nineties, he learned firsthand the lot of the unemployed, tramping endlessly in search of a job.

Luck turned as the young specialist was employed by a great English mining firm. It was no tenderfoot that penetrated the wilds of Australia seeking and developing mines. In China he became involved in litigation that was garbled into smears in the 1932 presidential campaign. Taken into partnership he traveled to and fro over the planet on mining missions.

On long voyages he read omnivorously. "It seemed at times I would exhaust all the books in the world." In 1909 he completed a text book on mining engineering still used in schools. It was no mean intellectual feat for him and his wife to translate *De Re Metallica,* a folio of 1556 hitherto untranslated because of its obsolete mining nomenclature.

The role of the "Great Humanitarian" seemed forecast in repeated expressions of deep concern over the poverty and suffering he witnessed. So deep-seated in him were the American democratic folkways that long residence in Britain could not reconcile him to its social stratification despite his admiration for individual Englishmen.

Then there is the profound faith in his profession. "The more men of engineering background who become public officials, the better for representative government." But who does not feel thus concerning his own vocation?

From his home in England we get a close-up of the outbreak of World War I; and soon he was busy efficiently managing Belgian relief. He broke down obstacles by scaring British, French, and even German ministries into reluctant cooperation by dangling before their eyes the threatened wrath of neutral public opinion if his relief were not permitted.

But why did this supermanager who moved from one gigantic achievement to another, with scarce a frustration, have to be so frustrated during four years as President? A later volume may throw light on that.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY
Ohio Northern University

PUSEY, MERLO J. *Charles Evans Hughes.* 2 vols. Pp. xvi, 410; vii, 411–829. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $15.00.

Since the appointment of Mr. Pusey as the official biographer of Charles Evans Hughes several years ago, students of the recent American scene have awaited the publication of these volumes with considerable skepticism. They will, however, be pleasantly surprised. The author, now an associate editor of the *Washington Post,* has written a warm and perceptive biography of a great and kindly man. More important to scholars, however, is the fact that he has written the history of an important era and filled in some of the large gaps in our knowledge of American history since the early 1900's.

A few examples will suffice to indicate the significance of some of Mr. Pusey's revelations. His account of Hughes's service as investigator of the utilities ring and of the great insurance companies and next as a crusading governor of New York is original and practically definitive. His chapters on the campaign of 1916, in which Hughes was the unsuccessful Republican candidate against Woodrow Wilson, shed much new light on that episode. Moreover, Mr. Pusey's discussion of Hughes as Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925 is full and immensely revealing. Here, for the first time, the story of the Washington Disarmament Conference is told from the inside.

Of greatest interest to contemporary scholars, however, is the author's well-documented and thoughtful account of the great battle over Franklin Roosevelt's proposal to reorganize the Supreme Court. Mr. Pusey squarely meets the charge that the Court deliberately set about to undo the New Deal program and shows that it simply was not true. In addition, he demonstrates convincingly that the Court's so-called shift in constitutional interpretation in 1937 was in no way related to the President's attack, but was rather the logical outcome of the broad liberal interpretation of constitutional powers that Hughes and some of his colleagues had been urging. There is not space enough to go into this matter further. It suffices to say that no student of recent constitutional law or history can afford to ignore Mr. Pusey's thesis.

This biography, excellent though it is in many respects, has important limitations that this reviewer cannot let pass without comment. Its chief fault stems from Mr. Pusey's complete lack of the critical faculty. He admits that Hughes made two, perhaps three, minor errors of judgment during a public career lasting nearly sixty years. On all other occasions, however, Hughes acted from high motives and was right. The author may have given us a fair estimate of the man, but this reviewer was on occasion dubious. This reviewer, for example, was not convinced that the chapters on the campaign of 1916 did full justice to Wilson or presented the real reasons for Hughes's defeat. Nor was he convinced by Mr. Pusey's explanation of Hughes's failure to live up to his promise, given during the campaign of 1920, to work for the entry of the United States into the League of Nations should the Republicans return to power.

The author's unfailing loyalty to his hero, therefore, had a serious impact on his judgment of men and events of twentieth century America. The final, definitive estimate of Hughes will have to be given by some one not blinded by the amplitude of the great man's virtues.

ARTHUR S. LINK
Northwestern University

FREEMAN, DOUGLAS SOUTHALL. *George Washington, A Biography.* Volume III: *Planter and Patriot.* Pp. xxxviii, 600. Volume IV: *Leader of the Revolution.* Pp. viii, 736. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. 2 vol. $15.00.

The predictions of a definitive biography of Washington, recorded by many of the reviewers of Mr. Freeman's first two volumes on the Young Washington, which were published in 1948, are fully justified by these successive volumes. However, the significant years between 1759 and 1778 have absorbed so much attention and space that the original limit of six volumes for the entire biography seems to be hopelessly lost. It is to be hoped that a basic work, so valuable as is this one to all who teach or study, will be made available in a later edition within the financial reach of all libraries and schools. The need is real for a standard and generally available analysis of Washington. A surprising number of libraries today list nothing more adequate than the century-old edition of *The Writings of George Washington* by Jared Sparks. Mr. Freeman's skill at research and presentation, his scholarship, and his easily readable style are at their best in these volumes which librarians will probably find adequate for the needs of students and general readers for the next hundred years.

In these two volumes the author gives almost a third of his attention to Washington, the Planter, and two-thirds to the Patriot and the Leader of the Revolution. The value of Mr. Freeman's thorough reanalysis of well-known sources is especially evident in the chapters dealing with the administration of Mount Vernon and the Custis plantations. Washington's reputa-

tion as one of the most progressive farmers in colonial Virginia is confirmed, but sometimes his naïveté is surprising. For example, he could write seriously to his English agent in 1759 asking for a definite statement of the price at which Mount Vernon tobacco would be selling months later in England, and could ignore the effect of differences in soil on the quality of tobacco. Most surprising is Mr. Freeman's carefully documented conclusion that Washington's hitherto highly respected system of plantation bookkeeping actually was so inadequate that no accurate profit and loss balances could be determined. In a generally declining plantation economy, only speculation in western lands maintained the family fortune.

Washington, the Patriot, remains unblemished in these volumes. His attendance at the meetings of the Virginia House of Burgesses, each of his campaigns for re-election, his services as local justice, warden, and town trustee, all are traced and described. These years of training in public affairs served him well when broader responsibilities were placed upon him. It is again evident that his statesmanship and his unswerving devotion to principles were the bases for his strength and for his sound reputation. Washington's ability as a general must be questioned. Each battle and campaign is analyzed thoroughly and impartially.

Mr. Freeman's suggestions on potentially fruitful fields for further research are especially valuable to investigators interested in related aspects of the Colonial and Revolutionary periods. The items in the general bibliographical note on the resources of state and local historical archives are supplemented by frequent comments in the footnotes on subjects warranting full-scale development.

CHARLES M. THOMAS
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SMITH, MORTIMER. *William Jay Gaynor: Mayor of New York.* Pp. xiii, 192. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951. $2.50.

William Jay Gaynor, the reform mayor who is reputed to have swallowed the Tammany tiger instead of having it swallow him, is a little remembered figure today. An upstate New York farm boy who became a successful Brooklyn lawyer, Gaynor entered public office by way of the bench at the age of forty-five. As a judge he was unusual and refreshing. He sped through his calendar, castigated pompous, turgid, and lazy lawyers, and belabored the highest appellate court when it infrequently reversed him. Although he was ambitious, higher political office long eluded him. In 1908, when Gaynor was sixty, Charles F. Murphy, then leader of Tammany, decided to make Gaynor, a onetime Catholic and a divorcee to boot, the next mayor. Once elected, Gaynor ungratefully struck out on his own and accomplished a series of important reforms in city administration. New Yorkers found too that their mayor was entirely uninhibited in expressing acid views on issues and personalities, especially reformers.

In August 1910, he was shot by a crazed ex-city employee and never really recovered. When his administration came under heavy fire during the remainder of his term, ill health further strained his cooperativeness and good temper, never very strong qualities in him at best. In 1913 he was sidetracked by the Democrats and found himself with little organized support. He died before the election.

Mr. Smith calls Gaynor a "libertarian, the last thoroughgoing primitive Jeffersonian in our public life." Certainly he was an uncompromising individualist, and Mr. Smith demonstrates that these qualities ill fit a man for survival in urban politics. Gaynor's career also shows that an official who pursues without deviation what he believes is the public interest is likely to lose the support of all except the inarticulate, unorganized multitude who may dimly realize that somehow this beleaguered figure is basically on their side. It is clear that our system gains vigor from the Gaynors who come along, but we are probably more comfortable without too many of them.

Although this book reveals little that is new about Gaynor, it is written with distinction and maturity. There are many insights which catch the spirit and issues of Gaynor's day and hold them up in the perspective of our own times. There are not as many studies of American mayors as there might be. This is a good and useful contribution to that literature.

JAMES R. DONOGHUE
University of Wisconsin

TEN BROEK, JACOBUS. *The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment.* Pp. vi, 232. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. $3.00.

The author's fundamental view is that the Fourteenth Amendment was not, as generally assumed, the result of spontaneous action by Congress after December 1865, but that it was the result of a sequential chain of developments that originated with the abolitionists during the early 1830's. The aim of this group was to liberate the slaves and confer upon them and other free Negroes the rights of citizenship. After their failure, through a reasonable program of persuasion, to effect abolition, they found it necessary to appeal to constitutional safeguards to protect their persons and the right of free speech. The next step consisted of the claim that under certain provisions of the Constitution—the Preamble, the comity clause, and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments—the slave had personal rights denied him. It is pointed out that history did not always validate these contentions. The Southern counterargument, emphasizing the slave as property, is explained.

Gradually, through political channels, the abolitionist constitutional arguments gained ground until, by 1860, the Republicans were determined to destroy slavery. All the antislavery steps during wartime which culminated in the Thirteenth Amendment were motivated by this fundamental purpose. The Thirteenth Amendment meant far more than the breaking of the bond between master and slave; the power to enforce it meant the conferring of those civil rights which many abolitionists, in the 1830's, had contended appertained to slaves. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment completed the cycle.

The author probes significant constitutional history, and does establish a connection between the Fourteenth Amendment and the constitutional theories of the abolitionists. He, however, drives so straight to his goal as to give an unbalanced view of the complex sectional controversy. He claims that the South forced the abolitionists to adopt a political program because the persuasive appeals of the latter were not heeded, but there is no reference to the fact that the "persuasive appeals" were surcharged with violent abuse. There is no more than an allusion to the political and economic factors involved in the slavery controversy. The conclusion that the Republicans would not compromise in 1860 because they were resolved to destroy slavery is based upon a very superficial examination of the evidence touching this matter. The author acquits the Republicans as a group of any political motive (enfranchisement of the Negroes) in connection with their emancipation program, but he does not discuss those political clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment that weighed heavily upon the South.

HENRY H. SIMMS
Ohio State University

CLINE, RAY S. *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division.* Second in the 90-volume series "The U. S. Army in World War II." Pp. xvi, 413. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951. $3.25.

"Some of the greatest generals of World War II, far from striking the posture of the man on horseback, issued their military orders from the quiet of their desks and fought their decisive battles at conference tables." So starts this institutional biography which describes the birth, development, and activities at maturity of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff during World War II.

At the time Hitler's army marched into Poland in 1939, there existed under the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, an extraordinarily complex structure completely unsuited for close control and direction of the various parts of the Army. The Chief of Staff supervised and administered this

unwieldy, far-flung, growing Army with the aid of a small War Department General Staff and his numerous chiefs of arms and services. The General Staff formulated plans and issued orders to all organizations under Chief of Staff control, but enjoyed no responsibility in the execution of plans or policies. It exercised little or no control over procurement and distribution of equipment and supplies, over the training of officers and specialized units, or over the administration and management of the bulk of Army affairs. Of greatest importance, there was no tightly controlled machinery through which a directing brain could control and co-ordinate expeditiously the actions of the gigantic United States military machine to be developed for fighting World War II.

By virtue of necessity, as world crises occurred and General Marshall was faced with one unique major problem after another, he began to lean more and more heavily upon one of the staff divisions, the War Plans Division. Originally, its functions had been those of drawing up strategic plans in peace time, with a view toward going into the field and executing them in time of war. As the international situation became worse, however, War Plans Division, commonly known as WPD, assumed all functions not specifically delegated to the other staff divisions. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, this role of WPD was enlarged and an Operations Section was set up in the division. By January 1942, it had become the operating agency of the Chief of Staff. It received reports from overseas theaters, from all other General Staff agencies, and from the Air Force; and it reported daily on the operational decisions and actions of the entire War Department. Thus, the division assumed a dominant position, directing and checking the actions of all other staff agencies.

Meanwhile, the deficiencies of the War Department organization had been thoroughly recognized and had been, for a long time, the subject of intensive study. As of 9 March 1942, reorganization was formally effected. With the reorganization, each staff division, other than War Plans Division, was reduced to a strength of from 12 to 16 officers, with functions curtailed accordingly. War Plans Division, on the other hand, was expanded to 107 officers and officially assigned the function of strategic direction and control of operations under the Chief of Staff. Except for basic decisions to be made by the Chief of Staff on recommendation by the General Staff, mobilization and preparation of the forces for war became the responsibility of three separate and autonomous Zone of the Interior commands: the Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces, and the Services of Supply. With respect to activities in the field, War Plans Division, later renamed the Operations Division and referred to as OPD, became the directing nucleus of the General Staff through which the Chief of Staff planned, supervised, and directed operations.

Against the background of international events of the period and the major problems that faced the Army until after the surrender of Japan, the authors of *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* describe the manner in which the officers of OPD shouldered unlimited responsibilities and directed the war efforts of the Army. The book relates how they maintained personal liaison and continuous communication with overseas commanders, providing immediate War Department response to field requirements and insuring high command familiarity with operational problems; how they were instrumental in developing and defending before allied councils U. S. views on the allied strategy for conduct of the war; how they developed plans on the basis of which theater commanders advanced toward ultimate victory; how they furnished guidance and assistance to our military and political representatives in international relations; and how they "stuck their necks out" daily in the making of basic decisions necessary to the expeditious prosecution of the war. Difficulties created by instances of inadequate co-ordination between the State Department and the military services, and by lack of close liaison between the President and his military agencies, are revealed in comparisons between the loosely woven U. S. war cabinet and the tightly woven British system.

The book provides a prolific source of information for historians and a fertile field of study for military men seeking the optimum form of organization for our armed services in time of war. It contains a great deal of detail and a certain amount of repetition; nevertheless this book is of extreme value in pointing out necessary and desirable characteristics of military high command organization.

Last, but not least, it is a tribute to the efforts of those unsung individuals who manned the Washington Command Post during one of the most critical periods in the history of our nation.

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DICKERSON, OLIVER M. *The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution.* Pp. xvi, 344. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. $6.00.

In the first half of this book Mr. Dickerson has demolished the myth that the Navigation Acts were a cause of the American Revolution, and he has done it so thoroughly that one might say that he has pulverized the pieces. Having devoted many years of painstaking research into the operation of these laws and the colonial reaction to them, he presents an enormous mass of convincing evidence that the old Navigation Acts, far from being oppressive to the colonies, were of great benefit to them and were accepted by them as such.

New England shipping throve mightily on the restriction of British trade to British bottoms, and the consequent colonial prosperity "was shared by every colony." The principle of enumeration, a proverbial sin of mercantilism, imposed no burden on the planters. Their best market was in the mother country; and after the Revolution, which deprived them of advantages they had there enjoyed, their industries slumped. As for the general evasion of the old laws of trade and navigation, reducing them to a dead letter, this too is part of the myth. The only body of eighteenth century evidence to support it applies to trading with the enemy in time of war, which is another matter, or to resistance to new laws, from 1764, that taxed colonial trade for revenue purposes, which is likewise irrelevant.

Tucked away at the end of the volume as an introduction to the lengthy bibliography—like a light hidden under a bushel—is an illuminating note on the history of the myth. It is scarcely more than a hundred years old in America, where it first appeared in George Bancroft's classic *History of the United States.* A generation later Mellen Chamberlain, writing the chapter on the causes of the Revolution in Justin Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America,* observed the discrepancy between Bancroft's thesis and his own discovery that the old commercial regulations had not worked badly or been condemned by contemporary Americans; and he reconciled the conflict by asserting, without any supporting evidence, that the laws in question were generally evaded. But where did Bancroft get his idea? Dickerson says from the free trade atmosphere of the 1840's in England and the United States. He does not seem to know that the myth was manufactured in England and became current there in the 1820's as a powerful argument for the fiscal reforms that Huskisson championed.

The second half of this volume contains some excellent material on the British attempt to tax the colonies and their resistance to it. Here, however, the hand that has just struck down one myth builds up another—that there was a conscious and widespread conspiracy in Britain to destroy American liberties and set up a centralized system of colonial "control patterned more or less on the French and Spanish models." Mr. Dickerson ignores the baffling complications of the imperial problem of the 1760's and 1770's, and obviously he is not at home in the intricacies of British politics of that period. But the defects of this part of his book do not affect the value of the first half, which is a capital piece of work long overdue.

A. L. BURT
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PAUL, JAMES C. N. *Rift in the Democracy.* Pp. xiv, 200. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. $4.00.

One of the most intricate processes of American democracy is the manner of nominating candidates for the presidency. Machinery for this purpose was long in the making, and it was not really achieved until 1844 after more than a half century of effort. It was in this year that the techniques now so well recognized as belonging to national party conventions were first really exploited.

Prior to 1844 there had not been much controversy over nominations. In the days of the Virginia dynasty Jefferson, Washington, and Monroe had been chosen as candidates by Congressional conferences. In the days of Jackson, he and Van Buren had exercised the controlling voice. Then a series of unexpected events upset the routine. The Panic of 1837, the defeat of Van Buren for re-election, the immediate death of President Harrison, and the peculiar set-up developed by the accession of John Tyler, the first Vice-President to achieve the chief magistracy, all combined to scrap the existing controls.

The chaotic politics of the Tyler administration gave opportunity for new developments hitherto undreamed of, made possible not only by the demoralization of the Whigs but also by the schisms within the Democratic party—the inevitable consequences of its years of power. Within the latter party many were tired of Van Buren and distrustful of his ability to lead the party back to power. There resulted a series of political maneuvers to prevent him from receiving the third nomination which the party leaders expected to offer him.

Various candidates and their friends now began to seek combinations and understandings not only within the Democratic party but also among the Whigs. Here the hope was to reclaim Tyler and his faction, a group of former Democratic believers in states rights who had opposed Jackson's centralizing tendencies. Calhoun and his followers were the first leaders. When they failed to stop Van Buren's drive for delegates others like Lewis Cass, Richard M. Johnson, and James Buchanan joined in the task.

Then opportunely the battered Tyler administration tried to gain political capital by seeking to annex Texas. This raised sectional, antislavery prejudices and offered an opportunity which opponents of Van Buren cleverly manipulated. Their strategy was successful, and by a complex series of maneuvers Van Buren was deprived of the nomination, and James K. Polk became first the Democratic candidate and then President of the United States.

Mr. Paul has made a very careful study of a complicated and scattered mass of evidence and has skilfully constructed the story, climaxing it with a very vigorous and exciting account of the Democratic National Convention of 1844. The great value of the book is its expert analysis of political maneuvering; its fault is that it claims too much for the Texas issue. The key to the situation was not the introduction of the Texas question but the fact that no organization even when built around Jackson could be free from the inevitable tendency to fall apart with the aging of its leaders. The rift of the 1840's in the ranks of the Democrats was as much a product of the rapid growth of the nation, the Panic of 1837, the growing sectional tension, and the rise of a new generation eager for power as it was of the Texas annexation question.

ROY F. NICHOLS
University of Pennsylvania

TAYLOR, GEORGE ROGERS. *The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860.* Pp. xv, 490. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1951. $4.50.

This is the fourth volume in a series of nine on the economic history of the United States. Therefore this detailed treatment of the rather short period is to be expected.

Professor Taylor does not confine himself to a treatment of transportation as the title of his book might suggest. He discusses foreign and domestic trade, manufacturing, labor, prices, financial institutions, and the role of government—as well as canals, turnpikes, steamboats, railroads, and the merchant marine.

It appeared to Professor Taylor that "transportation developments were so revolutionary and were so fundamental to the economic growth of the country that, in [his] judgment, they seemed to require the central position they have been given." He avoids, however, stating that transportation developments are the explanation of all economic development during the period. One expects such an interpretation in view of the attention given to transportation. But it is wanting, and this is well.

The era was one of prenational markets, and the development of transportation had to occur before national markets could exist. Consequently every segment of the economy was aware of the importance of improved transportation. The states and the federal government subsidized it, private capital invested in it, and farmers and manufacturers agitated for it. But it is to the developments in the market that one should turn for an interpretation of the economic development of the time. Transportation developments were but an aspect of the more fundamental development that was occurring.

Professor Taylor was necessarily writing within the framework of the other volumes of the series, and this placed restrictions upon him. Therefore he describes and leaves any general interpretation of the period to the reader.

This book is useful to anyone who desires a more detailed treatment of the period than is found in the general economic histories that are available, but agriculture is not covered since it is to be covered in another volume of the series. The tariff is given less space than might be anticipated, but from the present point of view the treatment of the tariff is sufficient.

Professor Taylor has done a workmanlike job. His book is adequately documented, and a classified and annotated bibliography is included. Newer literature as well as the standard primary and secondary sources for the period is included. The illustrations are well selected for providing the atmosphere of the period.

FRED M. JONES
University of Illinois

MILLER, JOHN C. *Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts.* Pp. 253. Boston: Atlantic–Little, Brown, 1951. $3.50.

Probably there exist no more carefully studied episodes in all American history than the Alien and Sedition Acts and their sequels, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. And yet this little book admirably justifies the research that has gone into it. By a meticulous examination of primary sources, particularly the newspapers of the period, Mr. Miller has made clear the tremendous influence that public opinion played in all these proceedings. To read the book is to renew one's faith in democracy. According to the Federalist concept, "democracy always destroyed itself —consumed in the fires of vice and ignorance it generated. Like a volcano, said Ames, it contained the fiery materials of its own destruction" (p. 15). But the "crisis in freedom" that the Federalists precipitated seems to show that the exact reverse more nearly approximates the truth. It was the authoritarian regime of the Federalists, the rule of "the good, the wise and the rich" (p. 17), that went down; and it was the more democratic regime of the Republicans, which recognized "that dissension, discord and parties were inevitable," that won out. Fisher Ames was much sounder when he said: "A monarchy is like a merchantman. You get on board and ride the wind and tide in safety and elation but, by and by, you strike a reef and go down. But democracy is like a raft. You never sink, but, damn it, your feet are always in the water."

Most of the Federalists, to be sure, did not want a monarchy, but their leaders, at least, did want an oligarchy. The purpose of the legislation they sponsored in 1798 was to destroy their opponents and to consolidate and perpetuate the Federalist system. But they soon discovered that it was only war psychology which made their policy of suppression feasible. With the war scare over, the people refused to be coerced. The Alien Acts fell of their own weight. The Sedition Act served only "to multiply Republican newspapers and to increase vastly their circulation" (p. 221). The people managed even to view the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves with the suspicion they merited and to turn for a remedy, not to nullification, but to the dismissal of the Federalists from power. Even good Federalists saw eventually the error of their way. "There is danger of proscribing, under imputations of democ-

racy," said John Adams, "some of the ablest, most influential, and best characters of the Union" (p. 225).

This is not a particularly objective study. There is no question as to where the author's sympathies lie. He enjoys ridiculing the Federalists, and does it with skill and aplomb. "They induced hysteria," he points out, "then turned it to party purposes" (p. 22). But this reviewer, at least, shares the author's opinions too fully to play the role of faultfinder. The lesson of the book is that the Federalists got what was coming to them, and they got it rather sooner than even the most pessimistic among them had anticipated. Something of the same kind might even happen again.

JOHN D. HICKS
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Berkeley

WHITE, LEONARD D. *The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829.* Pp. xiv, 572. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $6.00.

The second volume of Prof. Leonard D. White's "Study in Administrative History" covers the period of the Jeffersonians, as the first volume covered the Federalist decade. The practical business judgment and organizing capacity of the Federalists rendered services of permanent value in the organization of the purely administrative side of government. The purport of this volume is to show that the Jeffersonians did not depart radically from the system they found.

It was Jefferson, however, not the Federalists, who laid down, and carried out, the essential administrative plan for the State Department. And where the Federalists' administrative plan was changed by the Jeffersonians, as in the case of the Treasury Department, it was infinitely improved. The Hamiltonian theory that the Secretary handed down money bills to Congress merely to be passed blindly was certainly rejected by the Jeffersonians who insisted on the constitutional stipulation that such measures must originate in the House of Representatives. It was Gallatin, the Jeffersonian, who brought into being the Ways and Means Committee of the House. The Jeffersonians, led by Gallatin, put an end to the dictatorial control over the use of congressional appropriations and established the rule, never to be put aside, that the appropriations should be made specific and beyond the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to shift at will.

The author is eminently fair to the Jeffersonians. He makes the point that both political groups sought and found men generally of high caliber. Certainly no Federalists approached Jefferson in the State Department, or Calhoun in the War Department, or McLean in the direction of the post office; and Gallatin in the Treasury was fully as great a genius in finance as Hamilton. No Cabinet of the Federalist period approached that of Monroe in the uniform greatness of its members.

The author truly says that the political differences between Jefferson and Hamilton were "much more profound and significant than their differences in the manner and spirit of conducting public business." The Federalists shared Hamilton's contempt for democracy, and Jefferson was its greatest philosopher and molder. The twelve years struggle of the Federalists and Jeffersonians revolved around the issue of democracy and the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights which Federalism attacked through the Sedition Law. Never was there a truer statement than that of Lodge, in his biography of Hamilton, that the triumph of the Jeffersonians in 1800 "definitely determined that ours should be democratic republic."

The author has rendered a long needed service in his history of the purely administrative side in the formative days. His book is scholarly and sound, but equally interesting and entertaining—a fine achievement.

CLAUDE G. BOWERS
U. S. Embassy
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ROBERTS, OWEN J. *The Court and the Constitution.* Pp. 102. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $2.00.

This book comprises the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures for 1951 in the Harvard Law School. The three lectures constitute the reflections of Mr. Justice Roberts, after fifteen years on the Supreme Court and six years of "retirement" into tremendous activity as a public-spirited citizen and as a law professor and dean, on the functioning of the Supreme Court as an interpreter of the Constitution. More strictly speaking, Justice Roberts examines the role of the Court in relation to the federal system, since it was out of the federal system that conflicts of jurisdiction were anticipated and the resolution of these conflicts relegated to the Supreme Court. The general theme of the lectures is well suggested by Justice Roberts in these words: "In the performance of the function so conferred upon it, the Court has repeatedly found itself called upon to announce propositions nowhere expressly stated in the Constitution. It has had to formulate rules deduced from the fundamental nature of our dual system." With this task in mind, the lectures deal, respectively, with "Sovereignty and the Power to Tax" (the problem of reciprocal taxation), "Conflicts of Police Power" (the problem of regulation in the public interest), and "The Fourteenth Amendment" (the problem of due process).

In respect to the problem of reciprocal taxation, Justice Roberts points out that *McCulloch* v. *Maryland,* enunciating the doctrine of immunity because the power to tax is the power to destroy, was "the forerunner of some eighty cases of major importance dealing with state taxation of federal activities and federal taxation of state activities," that about one-fourth of these were expressly or tacitly "overruled, modified, or ignored" in later cases, principally because the Court was called upon "to exercise statesmanship in an uncharted region" rather than to interpret the text of the Constitution, or, in other words, "to implement policy rather than law." He also seems to think the Court has performed this function rather badly, or, at the best, in a very confusing way, referring particularly to *U. S.* v. *County of Allegheny* (1944) in respect to the immunity of a war contractor's real estate, as "the capstone of confusion"; and, although he considers that the steady progress toward the abolition of reciprocal immunities has been beneficial, he is severely critical of several of the Court's conclusions (pp. 29–35). For example, the doctrine that neither state nor nation may tax the other's property he considers unjust to the states, and the doctrine that neither may tax the other's securities or the interest on those securities he thinks produces an "unhealthy" effect.

With respect to the police power, Justice Roberts is again critical of many particular decisions, but concludes that the resulting expansion of federal power at the expense of the states "probably has been inevitable," and that the Court was wise in allowing Congress to regulate matters not intended to be within its jurisdiction through the "subterfuge" of its powers over taxation, commerce, and the general welfare, since resistance to the popular demands for such federal regulation might have produced "even more radical changes in our federal system." Similarly, the developments in respect to due process and the Fourteenth Amendment are analyzed in such a way as to lead up to Justice Roberts' conclusion "that the Court's decisions represent an alternation between expansion of federal power and an effort to protect state sovereignty." He is extremely critical of the view that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment somehow gave the Supreme Court power over state legislation, state judicial procedure, and state executive power—it "was not intended to put the states in tutelage to the Supreme Court in any such fashion." Neither does he appear sympathetic with the doctrine, in connection with the recent applications of the Fourteenth Amendment to the national Bill of Rights, that due process should be considered as "shorthand for the first eight amendments."

In general, Justice Roberts is critical of, although apparently reconciled to, the way in which the Supreme Court "has limited and surrendered the role the Constitution was intended to confer on it." That is, the Supreme Court has not actually preserved the federal system, but has permitted the "sharp division of powers" between states and nation to become "blurred," and Justice Roberts thinks that

this may have been a beneficial development, although he is not sure. In making this appraisal and in coming to these conclusions, he examines or notices 225 cases, and essentially nothing but decided cases. An article by Charles Fairman of Stanford University is conspicuous for being mentioned in a footnote. Although Robert Cushman, Thomas Reed Powell, and many others have made most significant contributions of which notice might well have been taken, it was the role of the Supreme Court that Justice Roberts set out to examine, and that he has done rather neatly in this little volume.

CLARENCE A. BERDAHL
University of Illinois

HOPKINS, VINCENT C. *Dred Scott's Case.* Pp. ix, 204. New York: Fordham University Press, 1951. $4.00.

Students of American legal history and constitutional law will applaud the publication of this full-length study of the Dred Scott Case. In fact, this book suggests the hope that we may have comparable analyses of other celebrated and important litigation, such as the Legal Tender Cases (1871), the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), Munn v. Illinois (1876), or the Civil Rights Cases (1883), to cite only a few obvious examples. There is much that we want to know about these great cases that is not now readily available. Of course, the opinions of the justices can be found quickly enough in the austere pages of the Court Reports. But they tell only a very small part of the story.

We want to know who the parties were, and how they happened to get involved in the litigation. (As to Dred Scott, Mr. Hopkins is not yet certain that he can explain this aspect of his case, though he ventures a guess.) We want to know who the lawyers were, how they got into the case, what kinds of evidence they thought were important, and what legal arguments they presented. We want to know a great deal about the general social and political milieu within which the problems that eventually matured as legal issues took form. It is also necessary to know how the case was handled in the trial court, what kind of a record was made, precisely which questions survived for the appeal, how the appeal was taken and presented. When the case finally reaches the highest appellate court, the briefs and oral arguments of counsel must be examined with great care. Only then are we prepared to study the opinions of the justices; and with regard to these opinions we want to know the sources of their principal ideas, and an explanation for the divergence of views expressed. This means also that we have to be told a great deal about the judges themselves, their careers in public life, their legal experience, their social and economic predilections. Finally, as a minimum, we should also want to know what happened to the parties after the litigation was concluded, and above all, the subsequent history of the legal doctrines upon which the outcome turned.

This is, of course, a tall order, and I am not sure that Mr. Hopkins has filled it entirely, although I think he has done very well. This book is a work of very careful scholarship; the original sources are cited properly for all statements of fact, and the author has been diligent in studying a wide variety of sources—the opinions, briefs, court records, contemporary newspapers, diaries, legislative records, and various collections of papers of leading actors in this great drama. And he is careful not to push his inferences beyond the limits of his evidence.

Mr. Hopkins devotes three chapters to an account of how the case got under way, its Missouri phases, and its disposition by the United States Circuit Court. The next two chapters describe how the case was presented to the Supreme Court, by Montgomery Blair and George Ticknor Curtis in behalf of Scott, and by Senator George S. Geyer of Missouri and Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, formerly U. S. Attorney General, in behalf of Sanford. The arguments advanced in the opinions of each of the justices are summarized in very great detail in the following two chapters. The next three chapters are devoted to an historical analysis of the three main legal issues of the case: the question of Negro citizenship, the question of the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, and the conflict of laws issue, that is, the matter of Missouri's obligation to recognize the force of Illinois law. In a general way, this historical survey suggests that as to the citizenship and territorial issues there were available juridical and historical precedents to support both the majority and minority views of the justices. A final chapter recounts briefly the reactions of the country to the decision, as expressed by politicians, newspapermen, clergymen, and other makers of opinion.

As Jefferson once said about the Constitution, which in the large he approved, "I will now tell you what I do not like." The legal issues of this case were extremely technical and complicated, each justice wrote his own opinion, and most of them wrote at great length. All of the views of the justices are summarized with meticulous care by Mr. Hopkins, but the net result is that the reader is overwhelmed with detail. The author should have made a greater effort to summarize and synthesize, so that the points of agreement and disagreement among the justices would stand out more clearly, and so that the reader could grasp the total picture with less effort. Furthermore, I think Mr. Hopkins should have given much more information about the nine men who sat on the Court at this time. He does give a little, but not nearly enough to describe them adequately. Most literate Americans have a pretty good idea who Roger Taney was, but such men as Grier, Nelson, and Catron are quite unknown except to highly specialized scholars.

Perhaps the most unsatisfactory part of this book is the uncritical way in which Mr. Hopkins explains why the Court blew up a case which could have turned on an issue of jurisdiction alone into one involving such fiercely debated questions as the constitutional scope of congressional power over the territories. He offers the customary explanation that Nelson was originally selected to write a minimum opinion not touching upon such cosmic issues as the Missouri Compromise, but that because the two dissenters, McLean and Curtis, insisted on discussing everything, Justice Wayne "quite abruptly" (p. 55) moved that Taney write an opinion on all questions that had been argued.

It is unlikely that this is what ocurred. On the contrary, the evidence strongly supports the opposite view, that the issues were broadened at the insistence of the Southern justices and certain Democratic politicians. This explanation is advanced with great persuasiveness by Professor Allan Nevins in his recent book, *The Emergence of Lincoln* (Vol. I, Chap. 4, and Vol. II, Appendix I). I am not prepared to say that the position taken by Nevins is entirely correct, though it may well be, but the point is that Mr. Hopkins does not seem to be aware of the fact that on this important question there is a difference of opinion.

DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin

LERNER, DANIEL, and HAROLD D. LASSWELL (Eds.). *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method.* Pp. xiv, 344. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951. $7.50.

"The word 'policy' is commonly used to designate the most important choices made in organized or private life. . . . The expression 'policy sciences' is not in general use." In making policy, "it is important to consider the entire context of events which may have an impact."

These quotations from coeditor Harold D. Lasswell define the scope of this volume. There are sixteen essays by sixteen authors. In 180,000 words they describe the methods and findings of the many disciplines which may help mankind in making its "most important choices."

The fact that "the entire context of events" is never available in human affairs is no bar to the development of a science. Hans Reichenbach uses meteorology as an illustration of that point in his excellent chapter on "Probability Methods." In meteorology "the physicist faces problems in which it is not the statistical totality but the statistical elements that are given in immediate observation. It took a long time to define what a weather situation is: such concepts as the path of a barometric minimum, or the location of a front, had to be elaborated from a multitude of individual data which do not indicate, in their immediate aspect, any structural grouping.

Had it been possible to watch the surface of the earth from some distance—say, from a vantage point on a space ship—it might have been possible to see a traveling storm center or a front in the way we see the eddies in a river. There is no such vantage point possible for the social scientist."

The "policy sciences" range beyond the social sciences as Douglas Whitaker's excellent chapter on "The Natural Sciences in Policy Formation" will testify. Natural science set the policy for Columbus even though his facts were faulty. The policy need for natural science data sent Darwin voyaging on the "Beagle," and Captain Bligh was an implement of a policy dictated by an official theory about botany and biology.

Those who are familiar with the works of Elton Mayo, Chester Barnard, Margaret Mead, Clyde Kluckhorn, Harold Lasswell, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Rensis Likert, some of whom are among the authors and all of whom are extensively cited, will have some clue to the character and scope of this useful volume.

As one reads Harold Lasswell's comments on the processes of the garrison state he cannot help but note that these comprehensive and expensive tools have had their most highly developed application in the military. Social science appropriations are hard to come by in a civilian democratic society; private donors seek a relative safety from political attack and from internal revenue criticism such is afforded by the physical and medical sciences. It would be regrettable, indeed, if democracy should lose out because the world had mastered, through research in national military services, the techniques of government command authority, but had left democracy trudging behind the wooden plow.

PHILIP S. BROUGHTON

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

SPAIN, AUGUST O. *The Political Theory of John C. Calhoun.* Pp. 306. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951. $3.50.

Shocking though Calhoun's justification of exploitation may be to twentieth century America, the South Carolinian is probably the only one of our statesmen, not even John Adams being excepted, who has thought through to a systematic political philosophy; and here is a comprehensive and clarifying study of his political theory, with due attention to the life of its creator, its historical origins, its leading ideas, its relation to earlier and contemporary state rights doctrine, its use by von Seydel in Germany, and its possible applications to present-day problems. The author, who took his doctorate at Yale in 1937, is now Professor of Government at Texas Christian University.

To the reviewer it is one of Calhoun's merits that he realized that the concept *sovereignty* is useful only for purely juristic purposes. To talk about political sovereignty is to change the subject to what Woodrow Wilson once called a catalogue of influences, and to confuse our thinking about that catalogue to boot.

While, however, Calhoun rejected as a *contradictio in adjecto* Madison's idea of divided sovereignty, and insisted upon its indivisibility, he failed to see that its inalienability rests upon precisely the same logic.

No change of sovereignty, therefore, can have a legal explanation. It is a *historical* fact that we simply ceased to think in terms of the Articles and began to think in terms of the Constitution. The character of the new order was a question of *legal* fact. Would it so operate that the states or the Union would have the last word on the division of powers? The amending clause and Supreme Court decisions under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 went far to refute Calhoun's claims for the position of the states *in* the Union. But might they withdraw *from* the Union? When conventions in some of them passed ordinances of secession, the theory that these ordinances were void, and that resistence to Union authority on the part of combinations of individuals must be put down as unlawful, was successfully maintained. That the legal fact of the existence of the states only as nonsovereign member-commonwealths of the Union has not since been disputed is the result of the *sociological* fact of the postwar emergence of an all-sectional national unity. The author is

referred to W. W. Willoughby's *The American Constitutional System,* which his excellent bibliography does not mention, though it lists two other books by Willoughby.

Calhoun's concurrent-majority idea is, in the reviewer's opinion, normally most fruitful when it is not formalized, as in the compromising of sectional and group interests produced by our magnificent electoral and two-party arrangements. It is also still in formalized existence, as in the Senate's cloture rule, while Southern politicians would restore the two-thirds rule for Democratic presidential nominations.

JAMES HART

University of Virginia

WILCOX, CLAIR (Ed.). *Civil Liberties Under Attack.* By Henry Steele Commager, Robert K. Carr, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter Gellhorn, Curtis Bok, and James P. Baxter III. Pp. xi, 155. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. $3.50.

Arnold Toynbee has recently reminded a wide public in the United States that nations and civilizations may rise, flourish, decline, and, sometimes, disappear altogether. The cycle, however, does not result from fate but rather from the decisions and choices of men who are, in large measure, masters of their fate.

The evidence presented by the authors of *Civil Liberties Under Attack* suggests that decline threatens the republic established by Washington and Jefferson. "We Americans are having the jitters again," remarks Clair Wilcox in his foreword, and are shaking, curiously enough, in spite of the fact that in the present century we have emerged victorious from two mighty wars and are possessed of the greatest productive capacity and the most powerful armament in the world. "We are afraid," continues Mr. Wilcox, "afraid, for one thing, that communism will overthrow our government by resort to force and violence." The Communists and their sympathizers compose an insignificant fraction of 1 per cent of our population. We have dealt with the principals in the Communist party. Yet, if the ground swell of suspicion of teachers, writers, organizations, and officials still moving across the nation is any evidence, we are still scared. There is a possibility that the country that produced Stonewall Jackson and Sergeant York may come to look to the free world, which it has undertaken to lead, like the rodent-haunted Aunt Nora on the kitchen chair.

The authors of the present volume have pointed out some of the things we have already learned from the road tests through which we have put our new models for combating subversive activity. They assume, perhaps naïvely, that we are a practical people and believe in road tests. We have indulged in smear campaigns in the Congress of the United States against experts who, on request, have given honest and considered, but unpopular, advice to the government. "By denouncing as Communists or traitors those who gave us unpalatable advice, we have in a sense cut ourselves off from unpalatable advice."

We, who are so self-righteous in our abhorrence of the Lattimores and the Jessups, might well ask ourselves why a citizen should stick out his neck in answering a question put to him even by the President. By our interpretation of "loyalty" as conformity to "Americanism" as we privately understand it, we are killing the seed from which free enterprise grows, namely free enterprise in ideas. From the beginning of our history as a nation the two important types of institutions that have made free enterprise in ideas the life-giving sap of our civilization have been our colleges and universities and the voluntary associations that millions of our citizens have joined for the discussion or the propagation of ideas. In California we have imitated the practice of the Nazis and the Kremlin by attempting to impose the authority of the man in power on the scholar in the university who is attempting to follow Ralph Waldo Emerson's exhortation to seek the truth. The result is that the scholar who does not want a rough time is tempted to turn his canoe out of the hazardous main current of civilized life and to paddle quietly in stagnant bayous. In voluntary associations outside the universities we have borrowed the invention of the authoritarian despots called "guilt by as-

sociation" and in so doing have tended to persuade the ordinary citizen that the philosophy of Mr. Milquetoast, who refused to join the P. T. A. because some of its members might have advanced ideas, is the shrewd counsel of security.

In a world of change the civilization that stifles criticism and discourages free enterprise in ideas has topped its crest and is moving toward slavery. As for America, the future is still uncertain. The present volume is evidence that the convictions and the determination that characterized the men who signed the Declaration of Independence still exist after a century and three-quarters. It should be read by every citizen who has children who will have to live in tomorrow's world.

RALPH HENRY GABRIEL
Yale University

MACLEISH, ARCHIBALD. *Freedom Is the Right to Choose: An Inquiry Into the Battle for the American Future.* Pp. ix, 186. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. $2.50.

In this collection of essays Archibald MacLeish offers an eloquent statement of the liberal analysis of the crisis of our time—a highly useful statement for helping us understand the strength and weakness of that position.

His thesis is this: Things have gone to pot in America since 1945. We are drifting into an avoidable war. Our foreign policy is so obsessed with anti-Communism that we are acting only *against* something and not working *for* our real national purposes. McCarthyism, teacher loyalty oaths, and the like are bringing us dangerously close to thought control. Why have things gone wrong? Because, says MacLeish, we have failed to perceive that the real contest of our time lies not between communism and capitalism but rather between the age-old authoritarianism of church, state, party, *and popular majorities* over the minds of men and the rebellion against authoritarianism so gloriously expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. We have abandoned "the American Proposition," which inspired us in the past and made us great—"the proposition that if men are free . . . to believe as they think and to say as they believe . . . the world in which they live will be a better world."

Much of MacLeish's analysis is convincing—particularly his description of the negativeness of our foreign policy; and no one will dispute his observation that classical liberalism is in low esteem in America today. But when one asks *why* Americans have abandoned "the American Proposition," the weakness of MacLeish's position becomes apparent; for he, like most of his fellow liberals, makes no serious attempt to answer that question. Thus the burden of MacLeish's message to his countrymen is: "I know it's tough for a nation to practice liberalism; but you did it in the good old days and you can do it again if you'll only try!"

The American people today are acting as though they believed that Communists should be persecuted at home and battled abroad. Do their actions result, as MacLeish says, from an absence of belief produced by the abandoning of what they used to believe? Or do they result instead from a very real popular conviction about the kind of society we want and the relative rights of majorities and minorities in that society? MacLeish has carried the former explanation as far as it can be carried and has shown us its futility. Intellectuals might well ask themselves what the American people do believe that makes them reject MacLeish's liberalism as too feeble a barrier against the onslaught of communism.

AUSTIN RANNEY
University of Illinois

WORMSER, MARGOT HAAS, and CLAIRE SELLTIZ. *How to Conduct a Community Self-Survey of Civil Rights.* Foreword by Gordon W. Allport. Pp. xiv, 271. New York: Association Press, 1951. $3.75.

This book represents one more of a long series of very valuable books dealing with methods and procedures for making community self-surveys. The recognition of this approach began in the early part of the nineteenth century. Following the experience of the monumental London survey and later the Pittsburgh survey smaller surveys were undertaken by groups of individuals from the outside. The Russell Sage Foundation under the direction of Shelby Harrison began encouraging self-surveys, and there appeared a number of specific pamphlets, manuals, and books based upon actual experience which presented the techniques and procedures for making community social surveys.

From 1912 to 1917 several valuable studies of this kind appeared with which the names of A. B. Taft, Nat Frame, Carol Aronovici, Margaret Byington, E. W. Burgess, M. C. Elmer, C. J. Galpin, J. L. Gillin, and many others are well known. During this period basic principles, methodology, and techniques were established.

From 1918 to the late 1920's specific application of these principles was made to more particularized studies such as race relations, industrial situations, public health, education, and human ecology. The emphasis on methods of conducting such self-surveys was brought out in monographs and books by Emory Bogardus, E. W. Burgess, F. S. Chapin, M. C. Elmer, R. D. McKenzie, B. McClennahan, and Robert Parks with many others.

From 1930 up to the present time general principles of research have been prepared presenting many approaches including the social survey, as illustrated by the books of Wilson Gee, Mildred Partin, Pauline Young, M. C. Elmer, and George Lundberg.

This book by Wormser and Selltiz reemphasizes the principles established in the first period, with special concentration on civil rights as applied to certain minority ethnic groups. The book is composed of five major sections. Section One deals with "information which might be gathered in a community self-survey of civil rights." Included within this are suggestions concerning assembling data on employment, housing, education, public schools, private schools, community services and organizations including health and welfare, recreation, public accommodation, and community organizations. Section Two deals with the organization and planning of the survey and includes resources such as manpower, time and cost, community support, as well as describing the setting up of the survey organization and the making of the over-all plan and determining working procedure. In Section Three there is discussion about preparing interview schedules, selecting the samples, recruiting and training interviewers, interviewing, analyzing the data, and reporting the survey findings. Section Four is a brief chapter of about seven pages discussing what should follow after the survey is completed. Section Five is devoted to work materials, including such items as time chart, principles of sampling, selection of samples, the need for credentials for interviewers, and respondence.

The book should prove of much value to persons interested in making a study of civil rights. It will do much to keep the persons active in the study, who will be principally untrained persons, from allowing their emotional interest in the subject to divert them from a true evaluation.

MANUEL C. ELMER
University of Pittsburgh

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

HARRIS, SEYMOUR E. *The Economics of Mobilization and Inflation.* Pp. xii, 308. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1951. $4.50.

One of the most sensational revelations by Professor Harris in this volume occurs in the preface: "This book, my twenty-fourth, I hope is the last in a long series of (ten) books dealing exclusively or in substantial part with problems of mobilization and war." In view of his literary propensities and in view of the merits of this book, we expect and hope that his forecast is wrong.

It has been customary to comment concerning prolific authors that they contribute little that is new, and in a sense this is valid as a description of this latest Harris product. But what is new anyway? If one means by it a contribution to economic theory, he need not look for it here. However, newness (and I accept a reorientation of existing thought and data in a current context as comprised by the term) may well be overlooked by the too many economists today who are overly concerned

with price-cost or income-flow analysis. Fortunately Professor Harris has the breadth to provide something new by relating fact and theory to current political and social problems. In this book he does it admirably for those who know some economics (not the general reader).

Stating first the major economic problems of mobilization, he proceeds in turn to analyze the resources for mobilization, the relationships of money to inflation in mobilization, the issues involved in taxation, expenditure, and saving, the rate of interest and the national debt, the problems of various direct and indirect controls, the burdens inflicted by inflation, and inflation's effects upon welfare programs.

In general he takes the position that fiscal and income control must be relied upon more heavily in the present defense period than in World War II. He assumes a firm liberal stand in favor of an excess profits tax, the maintenance of welfare expenditures and the adoption of overall price control based on ceilings as opposed to price-cost formulas.

My one major quarrel with the author concerns his general point of view regarding fiscal policy. I consider it somewhat unrealistic to admit the impracticality of the level of taxes he proposes to curb inflation, to describe the success of the Roosevelt Administration in preventing inflation from 1942 to 1945 through price controls, and then to insist that fiscal policy is the major answer to our present difficulties. An unconscious prejudice against price control would seem to underlie his reasoning. Barring that, however, the whole matter may be one of opinion since we cannot necessarily assume that what was effective from 1942 to 1945 will be effective from 1951 onwards.

WILLIAM WITHERS
Queens College

SIMMONS, FREDERIC L. *Mobilization and Inflation.* Pp. xiii, 98. Claremont, Calif.: Claremont College, 1951. $2.75.

This little book contains much pertinent information and sound interpretation on problems central to our present economic situation and the outlook for the future. It embraces three lectures, the first two of which were presented at Claremont Men's College last spring, and the third at Los Angeles under auspices of the College.

The central theme of the discussion is the danger of a drift into socialism. This drift is, by many people, explained either as an aftermath of war or as a consequence of inflation. The author, however, rightly argues that there "were economic and political trends which would have given us considerable changes even without the disruption of world wars." Mr. Simmons, therefore, devotes his first lecture to "The Broader Issues." One of the noteworthy phases of this lecture is the author's concern to reconcile—in a democracy—subjective demands of fairness with objective requirements of economic workability. "It should not be too much to hope that, in discussion of legislation to redistribute income and ownership, the probable effects on our rate of economic growth will be considered. There can be long time lags between causes and effects in economics." The author does not dodge the political aspects of economic problems. He ends this first lecture with the observation that "our economic system operates within a political and social framework."

In the second lecture, it is argued that the requirements of defense are not so great as to preclude the maintenance of high standards of civilian consumption, but that the attainment of guns *and* butter depends on "the psychological forces." "Even a small reduction in the standard of living during full employment may be so unpleasant for organized groups as to create new political problems" and demands a leader of Churchillian stature.

The author's analysis of inflation (the third lecture) is distinctive in that he gives the full weight and significance to market forces and practices along with fiscal and monetary influences—unlike those who are so preoccupied with the latter that they give a lopsided treatment of the inflation process in its entirety.

"It is essential," he says, "to make a distinction between what might be called the initiating factor and the sustaining condition. . . . Within recent years we have had a number of price increases of manufactured products where the initiating cause obviously had been wage increases previously granted. There is a connection, of course, between money supply and wage rates. . . . Three possible ways in which an increase in prices can start were designated—quotation mark-ups, increased unit sales, and increased costs. Regardless of the initial cause, there must be a sustaining condition for the higher price to be maintained. . . . The significance of an increase in interest rates is that they result from credit restriction and that it is the restriction of credit which is significant in limiting spending and price increase rather than the accompanying increase in interest rates." Finally, he observes: "More production of goods wanted by the public or needed for defense is always desirable, but it will not stop the price rise if costs of production also increase." But the idea of eating our cake and having it too is so alluring!

EDWIN G. NOURSE
Washington, D. C.

HARRIS, SEYMOUR E. (Ed.). *Schumpeter: Social Scientist.* Pp. viii, 142. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $4.00.

With the passing of Keynes and Schumpeter the world has lost its two greatest recent economists. While Keynes has found his Boswell, Schumpeter's memory is being honored chiefly in the form of memorial articles, and of these the present volume contains an outstanding collection. It is, in substance, a bound copy of the May 1951 issue of the *Review of Economics and Statistics,* enriched by five additional essays. As the May 1951 issue was sold only to the subscribers of the *Review,* the publication of the present book will meet the needs of a wider public desirous of having available between two covers a collection of essays interpretive of Schumpeter's work and serving a purpose similar to that fulfilled by *The New Economics,* also edited by Harris, in the case of Keynes.

Since the appraisers of Schumpeter's work, whose contributions are included in this volume, are distinguished scientists in their own right, the reader will learn not only of Schumpeter's economics but in addition will find himself in a position where he can trace the reflection of the work of a towering figure in the minds of other outstanding thinkers. This is indeed the principal advantage of a symposium such as the present. It shows the effect and impact of a great man on his peers, opening up to the reader new facets of a scintillating personality and bringing to light a wealth of fascinating perspectives.

Schumpeter represented the flower of a generation of European economists who have found a new home in the United States. His achievements stand out in the field of economics, and have left their mark on the neighboring disciplines of politics and sociology. He was a thinker characterized by highly complex attitudes. Faithful to the tradition of the Austrian school, as he was, his antisocialist attitude is unmistakable, but so is his fascination by Marx. He was deeply attached to capitalism, but capitalism's very successes made him despair of its future. Throughout his life, he placed the entrepreneur, a true *homo oeconomicus,* in the center of his analysis, but he also was a most understanding interpreter of extraeconomic wellsprings of human action. And, most important, perhaps: few influential economists did more than Schumpeter to make mathematical economics palatable to their colleagues, but this master of the abstract-generalizing method of investigation left a record of historical-descriptive writing unparalleled in our time. For the interpretation of such complex attitudes the symposium method of appraisal does not seem as adequate as a full-fledged biography, and it is to be hoped that the present collection of appraisals will be followed by a "Life of Schumpeter," just as *The New Economics* was followed by Harrod's *The Life of John Maynard Keynes.*

HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL
The Catholic University of America

MCCLOSKEY, ROBERT GREEN. *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise: A Study of William Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field, and Andrew Carnegie.* Pp. xiii, 193. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $3.25.

To Professor McCloskey, democracy was identified properly in the early decades of the republic with human rights. However, after the Civil War attention began to be focused more and more upon the economic freedoms, and eventually the symbols of democracy became identified with the rights of property, and the rights of property in turn presupposed an unregulated economic order.

The conflict between human rights and property rights is hardly a fresh subject, but this little book does put it in an unusual setting. The emergence of the new conservatism is pictured in terms of the careers and ideas of three quite different men, William Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field, and Andrew Carnegie. Sumner is seen as the scholar who rigorously insisted on a social ethic which is utilitarian in the narrowest possible sense. His social evaluations all rested upon material well-being as the primary criterion. Capital and the capitalist became manifestations of the highest good. The new social hero was the rising entrepreneur.

Field, through his opinions delivered in the Supreme Court, gradually converted the body of prevailing legal doctrine to the new materialism. Under his years of prompting with of course some help from the spirit of the times, economic liberty was exalted in the law on the basis of that inspiration rather than demonstration, which once led the Supreme Court Building to be known as Mount Sinai.

Carnegie was of course the epitome of the new conservatism, the "self-made" economic man appropriate for hero worship. Pictured as a man with more inner conflict than either of the others, he nevertheless is seen to resolve his ideal conflict in terms of materialism. After all, his success in accumulation would in the long run be best for society as well as for himself.

The descriptions of the lives and ideas of these three men are stimulating reading. It is still not entirely clear as to just why the new conservatism emerged when it did, and perhaps the very type of approach gives an unintended impression of oversimplification in the historical process. However, clearly Professor McCloskey is not writing history, but using history to make the point that democracy is concerned primarily with humanity and not with business, that democracy need not be identified with an unregulated economic order.

It is interesting to note that the current Communist interpretation of the United States is based in large part upon the assumption that we are still dedicated to the unmitigated materialism which is described in this book. The fact of course is that, as Professor McCloskey points out, nineteenth-century conservatism began to die a little even before it had fully matured. And this is half a century later.

WILLARD L. THORP
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D. C.

TINBERGEN, J. *Econometrics*. Translated from the Dutch by H. Rijken van Olst. Pp. xii, 258. Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1951. $4.50.

Research in econometrics has grown rapidly in the last twenty years, particularly as a result of the increasing availability of long-term economic data. Professor Tinbergen has rendered a useful service in showing the relationship of econometrics to economics and statistics and in presenting the highlights of recent advances in methods, applications, and pitfalls of the econometric approach.

The work consists of four parts and an appendix. Part I is brief, defining econometrics in relation to the older fields of economics and statistics. His definition of econometrics as "statistical observation of theoretically-founded concepts" gives the clue to the tools of analysis which must be increasingly applied in order eventually to develop economics as a science on a par with the physical sciences.

Part II describes the technique of econometric analysis, the various steps from the theoretical formulation of the variables involved, through the selection of the form of relationship, to the quantitative determination of the coefficients in the formula.

This part leaves something to be desired. For those unfamiliar with econometrics the exposition is quite inadequate for four major reasons: (1) the treatment is too brief to be useful to a beginner; (2) it fails to cover adequately the refinements necessary in applications to specific problems; (3) it does not sufficiently emphasize and illustrate the necessity for having an intimate knowledge of the specific field of application; and (4) many important principles could have been clarified by the use of detailed illustrations from actual experience.

Part III develops some of the results of econometric research, particularly demand relations for agricultural, industrial, and other products. Here again, the author has omitted mention of the many new results developed in recent years, particularly in the field of consumer durable goods and in connection with business forecasting.

Part IV gives an example of the use of econometrics for purposes of guiding economic policy. The author analyzes the influence of wages, taxes, price policy, and productivity on the balance of payments and on employment in The Netherlands. It is a good example of the translation and quantification of economic theory through the econometrics approach.

The appendix is valuable in giving some of the principles involved in the correlation techniques and providing examples.

Since one of the basic end results of the use of the econometrics technique is to furnish the basis for business and economic forecasts, it is strange that so little reference has been made by Professor Tinbergen to this increasing application.

LOUIS J. PARADISO
Washington, D. C.

BEZANSON, ANNE, assisted by BLANCH DALEY, MARJORIE C. DENISON, and MIRIAM HUSSEY. *Prices and Inflation During the American Revolution, Pennsylvania, 1770–1790*. Pp. xvi, 362. Industrial Research Department, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, Research Studies XXXV. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. $6.75.

Through the efforts of the late Professor Edwin F. Gay of Harvard and others here and abroad the International Scientific Committee on Price History was organized in 1929 with funds provided by the Rockefeller Foundation. Under the auspices of this Committee Professor Arthur H. Cole of Harvard directed the six studies which made up the volume that first gave us an adequate picture of price trends in eighteenth century America. This was *Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States, 1700–1861*, published in 1938. Anne Bezanson prepared the study on Philadelphia prices. Her study and two of the others starting before the Revolution broke off for the period, 1775–1781, the era of continental dollar inflation. This book now fills that important gap.

Wholesale price data for the period are based chiefly on the price behavior of some fifteen commodities, such as beef, corn, bar iron, molasses, sugar, tea, and wheat. Miss Bezanson and her assistants collected the prices for these commodities by consulting the correspondence and journals of various Philadelphia merchants and the reports of contemporary newspapers. They found these in seventeen libraries. The task of gathering, sifting, and organizing these price data was a long and tedious one. They were able to compare their findings of currency depreciation with two contemporary scales of depreciation, those of the Pennsylvania Assembly and of Pelatiah Webster. Webster's scale begins in 1777, for many contemporaries "viewed the rise in prices as normal" in 1776 (p. 24). They also kept an eye on Amsterdam prices to compare the world trend with the American.

Miss Bezanson begins her price study in 1770, five years before Lexington and Concord, and she carries it to 1790. Thus she is able to point out long-run trends in the general price level and in the prices of particular commodities. Continental Congress first issued the continental dollars in 1775. In early 1778 it took five paper dollars to buy one of specie; by 1779 the rate was climbing fast, reaching 38 at the year's end. Early in 1781 it was 100 and still mounting. The state legislature removed their legal tender quality, and most merchants ceased using them, turning to state notes and specie instead.

Most of the book is devoted to a detailed examination of the price behavior of the individual commodities. Their

prices rose unevenly because of temporary shortages. In 1778 Samuel Ogden remarked that though coal cost "six times as much as formerly, carting hath cost me eight times as much, my workmen's wages about five times as much, provisions about four times, rum about twenty times as much" (p. 315). The author says of the shortages, "That they were not persistent, except in the case of salt and specialized military equipment, because the channels were kept open for the flow of goods, must be rated as one of the crowning achievements of the period" (p. 323). She describes a few of the methods used by merchants and others to carry on despite the difficulties caused by a serious inflation.

Miss Bezanson and her assistants deserve the gratitude of all American economic historians for this important contribution to price level history.

DONALD L. KEMMERER
University of Illinois

MUDGETT, BRUCE D. *Index Numbers.* Pp. x, 135. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951. $3.00.

Dr. Mudgett's book on index numbers is bound to arouse considerable controversy among those interested in the field, and this reviewer predicts that few will accept his conclusions without reservations.

Although the title suggests a consideration of index numbers in general, the emphasis of the book is clearly on price indexes, both wholesale and retail, in terms of their adequacy for specific uses, namely, (1) to measure P in the equation of exchange, (2) to measure changes in the cost of living, and (3) to measure the magnitude of price change over long intervals of time.

The pattern for the ensuing discussion is set in the opening chapters by outlining some of the economic problems that have led to the use of index numbers. From this point on, the analysis of index number formulas follows fairly conventional lines, though the development of the concept of "homogeneity error" is both new and interesting.

The conclusions resulting from this analysis, except for one, are less conventional. Probably very few will disagree with the conclusion that the measurement of the magnitude of price changes over long time intervals is of very doubtful accuracy. On the other hand, there will be less wide spread acceptance of the proposal for a chain index number series, the link relatives of which to be computed by the Laspeyres formula. One cannot object to the use of the Laspeyres formula for the calculation of the link relatives, but dispute over the legitimacy of chaining these link relatives to a fixed base is inevitable. In a chain index so calculated, there is the inescapable difficulty that both price and quantity are allowed to vary, and hence the precise meaning of the index becomes obscure.

Dr. Mudgett completes his discussion with a brief history of the Wholesale Price Index and the Consumers' Price Index prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and concludes, on the basis of his earlier analysis, that both of these indexes are good but not good enough.

J. PARKER BURSK
University of Pennsylvania

GOLDENWEISER, E. A. *American Monetary Policy.* Pp. xvi, 391. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951. $4.50.

Monetary policy and its relation to a stable progress for our economy has become a matter of great public interest. Much of the recent literature about money, because it has been either too technical or too theoretical, has discouraged many who seek a better understanding of the subject. This book on American monetary policy in the past thirty-five years is written in nontechnical language which makes for enjoyable as well as instructive reading. At the same time, it is grounded in sound theory and comprehensive knowledge about the technical aspects of monetary organization. Sponsored by the Committee for Economic Development, its primary purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of the Federal Reserve System and its role in the American life. It deserves to be read widely by those who wish to gain insight into the historical and contemporary factors shaping present-day monetary policy.

The author is uniquely qualified to write on American monetary policy. For most of the past three and a half decades he was Director of Research and Statistics for the Federal Reserve Board and in that capacity was an active participant in American monetary management. He knows, perhaps better than anyone else, the facts whereof he writes.

Of special interest is Dr. Goldenweiser's review of policy actions taken by the System since its inception and his evaluation of the effectiveness of these actions. Here he draws upon his first-hand knowledge of System history. His most critical comments concern the postwar period through the end of 1950. He was not in sympathy with the System policy of maintaining marketable government securities at par and felt that this policy was basically inconsistent with a monetary policy geared to restraint of inflationary trends in the economy. In this period, he argues, Federal Reserve action was neither adequately prompt nor sufficiently vigorous. This was due to the overwhelming size of the public debt and to the System's failure to define clearly the limits of its responsibility to this debt.

A significant contribution to an understanding of the System's policy actions is the chapter on economic intelligence, which describes the types of economic information developed by the System for the use of its policy-making authorities and as a service to the public. The System's policy of maximum publicity, Dr. Goldenweiser concludes, while sometimes overdone, has nevertheless contributed greatly to the public's understanding of monetary problems and to the esteem in which the System is held.

The discussion of the international operations of the Federal Reserve brings together considerable material not readily available elsewhere. Changes in the manner in which the System has carried on international relations over the years, the types of transactions engaged in, and the scope of operations form an interesting though less well known part of the System's activities. Closely related is the discussion of gold and its influence on monetary policy.

A number of suggestions for changes in the organization and operation of the System are made throughout the book. Dr. Goldenweiser concludes that, while the System is capable of discharging its responsibilities adequately under existing law, the entire financial and monetary organization of the United States should be reviewed at an early date. He feels that a careful review is needed of the structure of the Board itself and suggests that the present Board of Governors might well be replaced by one Governor and by two deputy Governors. Whether this suggestion has fundamental merit is a moot question. The author does not, in this reviewer's opinion, develop fully the arguments which weigh against it.

RALPH A. YOUNG
Washington, D. C.

WEISSMAN, RUDOLPH L. *The Investment Company and the Investor.* Pp. xxi, 217. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $3.50.

This volume undertakes to describe and to appraise the American investment company. The book is addressed to the reading public in general, and to the small investor in particular. With that market in mind, the writing style is unusually simple and clear, and the text is relatively free of technical terminology and detailed analysis. Aside from the author's evident predilection for his subject, the book was inspired by the remarkable increase in popularity of investment company shares which has occurred since 1943.

The first portion of the book provides historical background, tracing the development of the investment company from its beginning in Scotland through the unfortunate American experience of the late 1920's. The mistakes and excesses of that latter period placed investment companies in the United States under a cloud of distrust and laid the ground work for remedial legislation which took form in the Investment Company Act of 1940. The author believes that this Act was largely responsible for the restoration of public confidence in the investment company and for its subsequent growth in popularity.

Then follows a survey of the investment company "industry" as of 1950 and four case studies of individual companies. A chapter is devoted to investment funds in general, stressing diversification and the timing of purchases and sales, and another chapter discusses objectives, policies, and performance, with some little emphasis on the research aspect of fund management. Separate chapters are devoted to closed-end and open-end investment companies, and, although the author does not specifically say so, he leaves the impression that his preference is for the latter. The concluding chapter discusses the role of the investment company in stimulating savings and providing equity capital.

Although the author's approach is objective, it is clearly evident that he has a very high regard for investment company shares as investment media. He stresses repeatedly the advantages of diversification and expert management. With reference to the latter, he recognizes that, thus far at least, expert management has seldom been able to better the stock market average in the matter of capital appreciation. However, he believes that continuing emphasis on research will gradually produce better results in this area. Meanwhile, diversification and management together have been able, in the case of the larger companies, to return an average annual yield of 4 to 4½ per cent on invested capital. He concludes quite correctly that steadiness and continuity of income return is more important to the investor than capital appreciation. The author's over-all appraisal might be summed up in his own words: "Investment companies have come of age. Maturity should bring with it renewed dedication to move from doing a good job to doing a better job."

JAMES C. DOLLEY
University of Texas

MYERS, CHARLES A., and GEORGE P. SHULTZ. *The Dynamics of a Labor Market*. Pp. x, 219. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951. $3.00.

This work is accurately subtitled "a study of employment changes on labor mobility, job satisfactions, and company union policies." Statistical materials on this case study of a partial mill shutdown in a New England community of 35,000 are presented in 36 tables. The method of obtaining data was primarily through interviews with both employers and displaced workers. The study is balanced by an emphasis upon the dynamics of the situation, such as the impact on the displaced workers, on the firms, and on the unions. An interesting verbatim account of an interview with a displaced worker is given in the appendix, and quotations of remarks of workers and others enliven the pages. Among the experiences studied were those growing out of job hunting—where the workers went, unemployment policies, union-management relationships, and collective bargaining relationships. The book is of interest and value not only to the economist but to other social scientists, to management, and to labor. A summary at the end of each chapter helps the reader to keep the theme of the study in perspective.

A few of the many findings may be noted as illustrative of the conclusions drawn from the study. The large majority of workers interviewed were unwilling to make any change of residence, and there was very little movement out of manufacturing into other positions. Most workers were soon able to find other jobs, but few of them located jobs through the formal placement channels of the state employment service, actual employer solicitation, or "help wanted" ads. Information on jobs came mainly from acquaintances and relatives working in the factories, illustrating "the great informality characteristic of human contacts in the labor market." Manufacturers likewise made little use of the employment service for active recruitment.

Unemployment had an impact on the behavior of the workers and employers with a shift in emphasis toward security of employment and wages on the part of the former and an ability of the latter to follow a more selective hiring policy. Employers were able to undermine the bargaining position of the union "by using the pool of unemployed as a way to increase the workers' dependence on the employer." Displaced workers showed a surprising knowledge of wages and working conditions. The authors employ their data to make a creditable case for using the "labor market concept" to explain worker and employer behavior and for the contributions that economic analysis can make toward explaining behavior. They hasten to add, however, that they have no intention of asserting the "economic man" theory.

HUGH A. BONE
University of Washington

JAFFE, A. J., and CHARLES D. STEWART. *Manpower Resources and Utilization: Principles of Working Force Analysis*. Pp. xii, 532. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1951. $6.50.

The present volume, appearing at a time when manpower problems are again in flux, has much of interest for the many who now require a broad understanding of the working force and of its work behavior.

The primary purpose of the authors is stated to be a study of the working force of the United States; while venturing into many other fields, the book's more instructive chapters all conduce to the principal objective.

The book develops the practical importance of working force data, especially bearing on public policies of the United States: methods of collecting factual data during more than a century and extensive analyses of trends and present aspects of labor force characteristics. In these analyses much useful data is contributed, a good part of its original work by the authors. The effects on the working force of such economic phenomena as migration and technological changes are discussed in their special significance.

The authors are at their best on working force measurement and in analyzing trends discernible from decades of statistics on the United States scene, though sometimes reservations are made on the accuracy of earlier statistics. The writers are enthusiastically impressed by the advance in methodology represented by the United States Bureau of the Census monthly sample survey of the labor force, to which many pages are devoted. Admitting fully the improvement in available statistics, one wonders whether the accumulation of information will render so easily possible the solution of future manpower problems as the authors seem to think.

But the book is by no means restricted to factual or statistical presentation, for it carries the authors' views on a broad variety of topics. Many of these opinions rest on adduced facts, but not a few others will strike the reader as oversimplifications. Two typical illustrations may be cited. It is stated that manpower resources today set the ultimate strength of military might; surely this statement would require lengthy examination and qualification. Then in reference to underdeveloped areas it is stated that aid toward industrialization, if effective must be applied all around and rapidly, while the prime need is outside capital; many expert in such endeavors will doubt the practicability in many areas of such an assistance program—and even an African development quoted in the volume shows the slow pace of results.

But readers will be mindful of the pervasiveness of working force ramifications, and hence will realize the difficulties of treating at deserved length more than a few of these ramifications in a single volume. This the writers offer in explanation of limited attention given unemployment. No doubt it accounts also for nonexploration of such matters as natural resources and world trade in their relevance to manpower, particularly as background for valid international comparisons.

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SCITOVSKY, TIBOR. *Welfare and Competition: The Economics of a Fully Employed Economy*. Pp. xv, 457. Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 1951. $7.35.

Economists have been waiting a long time for this book, and it proves itself to have been worth waiting for.

The focal point of the book is a deeper and more penetrating examination of the nature of competition. The idea of competition contributed so much to the foundation of modern economics that it came to be sanctified and elevated from a means

for achieving socially desirable ends to an object of adoration as a good in itself. It has consequently tended to obscure rather than to enlighten many aspects of our understanding of the economy. In recent years this has been somewhat corrected by the tendency of economists to look behind perfect competition to see what are the socially desirable objectives which perfect competition may or may not be able to help to attain. Professor Scitovsky does this perhaps a little more carefully than anyone else, but his primary contribution lies in looking more deeply into the conditions which make competition possible and in emerging with some startling insights into the nature of markets and bargaining.

No less brilliant than these initial ideas is the way in which they have been integrated into a study of welfare economics. Under the main headings of "Perfect Competition," "Free Competition," and "Restricted Competition," different kinds of social organization are carefully examined to see the degree to which they satisfy carefully worked out criteria of efficiency and equity. Pure economic theory is thus brought several important steps nearer to the actual world in which we live.

In the course of doing this, many parts of economics are given a new and unsurpassed clearness and lucidity of treatment. Perhaps the most striking and most satisfying of these is the treatment of capital and investment, but also outstanding is the presentation of the indifference curve analysis and the treatment of monopoly and oligopoly. Throughout the book there are many original and exciting developments—the primary idea of distinguishing between price-makers and price-takers; the clarification of the importance of expert knowledge in providing any approach to a perfect market; and some fascinating results of nonprice competition.

This reviewer is a little disappointed to find Professor Scitovsky fashionably reluctant to assume the minimum of human rationality from which would follow the diminishing marginal utility of income. However like other writers he is quite ready to make such an assumption in supposing that the indifference curve analysis has relevance for human welfare—that is, in supposing that consumers choose "rationally" in allocating their resources between different consumers' goods. But this is a mild and perhaps questionable blemish in a distinguished performance which will contribute very greatly to the serious teaching and understanding of economics.

ABBA P. LERNER

Roosevelt College

WRIGHT, DAVID MCCORD (Ed.). *The Impact of the Labor Union.* Pp. ix, 405, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951. $4.00.

The volume consists of a symposium by eight outstanding economic theorists. The purpose of the book is, according to the editor, to contribute toward a workable and democratic solution of some vital labor problems. The organizers of the conference hoped that general theorists would consider the all-pervasive labor problems within the complete economic framework and thus present the most fruitful discussion of these problems.

Clark deals with criteria for a sound wage policy. He asserts that unions, in order to survive, have to demand wages higher than increased productivity warrants. Haberler contends that union wage policies are not compatible with full employment and stable prices. Knight examines some ethical aspects of union wage policies. Boulding presents a technical discussion of wages as a share of national income. Chamberlain invokes the spirits of Taussig and Simonds and displays particular concern over alleged socially harmful monopoly powers of unions. Friedman explores the role of unions in setting wage rates and concludes that the influence of unions in this field may have been exaggerated. Walter Reuther might be surprised to note that the wage rates of auto workers would have been higher during the last few years had there been no union in the industry! Wright, the editor of the volume, contributes two papers dealing with aggregate wage problems. Finally, Samuelson presents an historical review of leading wage theories over the last two hundred years.

The title of the volume is somewhat misleading. As the above summary of the subject matter would indicate, *The Impact of the Labor Union* is limited to the economic aspects of union activities and fails to deal with their socio-political effects.

It is difficult to find a central thesis for the nine separate and independent contributions by the eight participants, but throughout the volume there is dominant, as one of the contributors recognizes, an unfriendly or at least a "querulous attitude toward the labor movement" (p. 371). It would appear that unions have undermined the well-established economic theories, and the economists are trying to settle scores. The negative aspects of union policies are accentuated, but the positive contributions are ignored. Thus, the inflationary evils resulting from pressures for wage increases are stressed over and over, but the positive contributions of unions toward increased productivity are not even mentioned.

In spite of the eminence of the eight contributors, two of them past presidents of the American Economic Association, the reader will find few new ideas in the present symposium. It consists of a stimulating restatement of received economic theory as applied to modern wage problems, but it falls short of its announced purpose in presenting a workable solution to these problems. The authors are apparently interested more in expounding their controversial views than in presenting solutions that might be acceptable to the parties involved in labor-management conflicts. It is doubtful whether realistic policy makers would find any guides for action in this volume.

SAR A. LEVITAN

Wage Stabilization Board
Washington, D. C.

GULICK, LUTHER HALSEY. *American Forest Policy.* Pp. 252. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1951. $3.50.

Luther Gulick takes a critical look at fifty years of public forestry. He finds much to praise, little to blame.

The Institute of Public Administration had five objectives in mind in studying the effect of governmental action in forestry. These were: (1) Does the public get what it seeks by government regulation of forestry practices and management of forest lands? (2) Does such government action stifle private forestry enterprise? (3) Does public action spread a smothering blanket over technologic advance? (4) What administrative problems are created and with what degree of constructive imagination are they met? (5) What new political problems are created?

Gulick concludes that the American people have found what they sought, a sound forest conservation program, and that they would not have achieved this without public intervention. Management of publicly owned timberland and regulations of private operations by the public have tended greatly to strengthen rather than to suppress private forestry. Government and privately sponsored research have been mutually stimulating in furthering technologic advance. Administrative problems have been met by an imaginative system of decentralization and delegation of responsibility backed by broad policy directives and informative inspections. On the final question, government intervention has tended to intensify rather than solve political problems. It does, however, focus attention on these problems.

Gulick's analysis of timber growth and requirements may leave the informed reader unconvinced that an ample future timber supply will result from present forestry programs. Gulick admits that future production at an adequate level is by no means assured on 56 per cent of the commercial forest land that is held in small tracts averaging only 62 acres in size. A federal program of regulating cutting practices on these holdings such as is advocated by the United States Forest Service where there is no state program would, Gulick believes, encounter insuperable difficulties. Gulick places heavy reliance on the foresters themselves. Because of common educational background and indoctrination, he finds these men to have a high sense of duty and public responsibility. Thereby forestry has gained substantial momentum in the right direction. He foresees minor shortages in the future but no major timber famine.

HARDY L. SHIRLEY

State University of New York

MIGHELL, RONALD L., and JOHN D. BLACK. *Interregional Competition in Agriculture, With Special Reference to Dairy Farming in the Lake States and New England.* Pp. xiv, 320. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $5.00.

Since the days of John Stuart Mill, the principles of comparative advantage and of diminishing returns have occupied an important place in economic theory, but as is true with so many other such principles in the social sciences, they have been tested by altogether too sparing an amount of empirical research. Following the passage of the Bankhead Jones Act of 1935, which provided that 20 per cent of the funds it made available were to be devoted to research in the sciences fundamental to agriculture, the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry of the Social Science Research Council sought to have the United States Department of Agriculture set up two major projects which would serve to give objectivity and quantification to these economic principles. One outcome of these representations was a joint project on interregional competition which was jointly financed and directed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture and the Harvard Committee on Research in the Social Sciences in co-operation with a number of agricultural experiment stations in the Lake States and New England.

The actual quantitative research of the project was concerned mainly with the supply responses of milk production to milk prices in five sample areas in New England and five in the Lake States of the Midwest. A considerable number of technical United States Department of Agriculture monographs, experiment station bulletins, and journal articles have appeared at various times since the studies were initiated in 1936. The book with which this review is concerned "presents for the first time a full summarization of the results of these various area studies on the supply side made in 1936–38 and of the results of a resurvey of these same areas in 1946 in order to check actual supply responses with those estimated ten years earlier."

The discussion in the volume includes a chapter on the theoretical framework of the concept of interregional competition and considers briefly, in an over-all manner, other patterns of its operation besides dairy products—for example, eggs, citrus fruits, potatoes, and vegetable oil crops—but the analysis is confined principally to dairy products, and specifically to that portion of them which is produced in New England and the Lake States mainly for consumption in the population centers of the northeast quarter of the United States. According to the authors, the study is designed to be used mainly by the following groups of economists: (1) those working the general field of international and interregional trade; (2) those whose interests are in the methodology of economic research; (3) those interested in location theory and economic geography; and (4) teachers and students in the economics of agriculture.

Those who have followed the various monographs, bulletins, and journal articles which have resulted from the regional competition project will find little that is new in this book. The relatively uninformed person in this regard will discover a wealth of significant material but he will have to pay the price of reading a good many pages of highly technical and detailed subject matter.

WILSON GEE

University of Virginia

CLAWSON, MARION. *Uncle Sam's Acres.* Pp. xvi, 414. Illustrated. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1951. $5.00.

Despite its juvenile-book title, this is in every respect an adult work, the reflection of a well-grounded mind and a mature, objective spirit. It is all too common for the textbook writer to express the hope that his book may appeal to the intelligent layman. Of this volume it can more truly be said that it is an excellent introduction for the intelligent layman to one of the basic concerns of American life, that may also prove useful in the classroom.

It is fitting that this book should appear in a year during which the United Nations has put land reform high upon its agenda and during which the head of public administration in the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations has asserted that land administration is the Number One problem of underdeveloped countries.

This is the story of our federal public lands, their role in the national life, how we got them, how we got rid of most of them, what we have left, how we can use it while conserving it, how to manage it, and how the uses of land and water are linked. A final chapter deals with "Policies and Politics." As the author says, "Larger books have been written about relatively small parts of the subject matter"; he has notably accomplished his purposes of "comprehensiveness of scope" and "balance between the treatment of one subject and another."

Mr. Clawson is Director of the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of the Interior. He could easily have written a paean about his bureau with covert insinuations or open blasts against the Forest Service, the Army Engineers, or the Bureau of Reclamation. He has not. He has high praise for the Forest Service; he shows how the conflicts between the Army and the Reclamation Bureau stem from conflicting emphases among the many possible uses of land and water, each supported by strong economic and political forces, so that knocking heads together by an administrative union would hardly resolve the issues. He may be forgiven if, even while acknowledging his virtues, he gives Gifford Pinchot the back of his hand.

Mr. Clawson as a scholar understands the place of the public lands in the larger panorama of American history and economics: the frequent reference to these broader movements lends depth to his chronicle. As a scientist, he sees what happens when the law disregards the basic requirements of geology. As a bureau chief in the federal government, he shows a sensitive understanding of the matrix in which an administrator operates when he deals with concerns that are the subject of strong economic pressures charged with high political voltage. His comments on leadership, co-ordination, communication are sapient.

While Mr. Clawson never strives for the flamboyant (one reason why the title does the book an injustice), his objectivity is not passionless. His writing is controlled but fluent, free of jargon. The book is not only a picture of our public lands but a self-portrait of the kind of man we should cherish as a responsible public servant, endowed with vision and hard-headedness.

CHARLES S. ASCHER

Brooklyn College

SMITH, LINCOLN. *The Power Policy of Maine.* Pp. vii, 344. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. $5.00.

Lord Bryce was perhaps the first to point out the value of the American states as laboratories in which political devices and policies can be tested. Maine has for a number of years conducted a unique experiment in the field of power policy, which Dr. Smith reports in a competent and well documented study. The study reviews the political and legal history of Maine's power policy and considers its economic aspects. The principal tenets of Maine's power policy are summarized: (1) major lakes or ponds are owned by the state and controlled by the state legislature, (2) the riparian proprietor may, to store water for mills, flood land belonging to another by paying just compensation, (3) waterpower law is based on the fundamental principle of *private* ownership of the bed of the river and the flow of the water, (4) development and distribution of power should generally be under private initiative, (5) Maine hydroelectricity shall be kept at home to industrialize Maine, and (6) Maine power shall be controlled by Maine.

Students of regional development will be especially interested in the doctrine, "Maine power for Maine people," embodied in the Fernald law of 1909. This statute, which provides that corporations may not transmit hydroelectric power outside of the state without legislative consent, represents an attempt to induce industries to come to Maine for cheap power. The present situation, however, is characterized by the underdevelopment of hydroelectric power in Maine and by the in-

creasing utilization of steam and of marginal waterpower sites throughout Southern New England. The study poses the question, "Can a single state retain strict economic isolation in a world of increased planning?" Based on the power experience of Maine, a negative answer is suggested.

The book contains a good chapter on the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project. What has and has not happened at Quoddy becomes more meaningful when considered in the light of Maine politico-economic policy. Dr. Smith likes neither the Fernald law nor public power. He recognizes, however, that private capital cannot undertake some multiple purpose projects essential both to the national economy and grassroots welfare, and he believes that regionalism offers a middle way between national and state control. Dr. Smith observes in this connection: "The real problem is not so much one of authority but of administration, because central or regional concentration of authority, when properly and conscientiously administered, has actually strengthened local units of government."

This review was written on the day the Atomic Energy Commission opened the door of what may prove to be a new era with an announcement that nuclear energy had been harnessed to produce electric power for everyday uses. The chapter on the new technologies of power production and distribution in Dr. Smith's book, of course, does not consider the impact of such a development on Maine's power policy. The chief importance of the study, however, is not found in the attention it gives to problems of power supply for New England or to the problem of utilization of Maine's hydro potential. Rather, the study is significant because of the light it sheds on more basic and enduring issues of economic particularism, interstate cooperation, regionalism, and federalism.

LAWRENCE L. DURISCH
Tennessee Valley Authority

DURISCH, LAWRENCE L., and HERSHAL L. MACON. *Upon Its Own Resources: Conservation and State Administration.* Pp. xiii, 136. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press (co-operatively with University of Georgia Press, University of Mississippi Bureau of Public Administration, University of South Carolina Press, and University of Tennessee Press), 1951. $3.00.

This study of the administration of agencies dealing with the natural resources of the eight southeastern states is notable on several counts. It is the final product of the combined research activities of six state universities and the Tennessee Valley Authority and demonstrates, as a consequence, the possibility of interstate cooperation in the appraisal of regional problems. It is specific in its suggestions for improvement in the administration of agencies dealing with natural resources. It is not unreasonably biased toward the federal authority as against state and local agencies in the solution of natural resource problems, and finally it is miraculously brief.

This last quality cannot, in the opinion of this reviewer, be overemphasized. In years when every mechanical agency has been concentrated on devices for the economy of time, neither sociologists, economists, nor students of government have as a class shown the least awareness of the necessity for concise statement. As a consequence much—perhaps most—of the valuable, painstaking, and costly research in these fields yields little tangible benefit. Whatever oasis of fact has been discovered is merely lost again, and permanently, behind the sandhills of statistics, the mirages of chart and diagram, and the vast deserts of jargon. This little book (136 pages) has the outstanding merit that it says something and does not waste words.

It faces up to the fact that in the conservation of natural resources government is dealing with a problem demanding a unified approach, yet in no other field have the operations of government been more peacemeal, departmentalized, and competitive, and consequently more ineffective. At one time we were so rich that this blundering seemed unimportant, but today after two great wars and in the face of a third, it has become supremely important that we do everything in our power to save our forests, our soil, our minerals, and our water for their best use before we find ourselves too poor to defend our freedom, or to maintain our way of life.

Though this book deals specifically with the Tennessee Valley area its implications are more general. The confusion of conservation agencies is analyzed, state by state. The conflicts between state and federal authority are not minimized. An effective argument is presented for a unified attack on the problem through strengthened state agencies and through a higher degree of co-operation between state and federal authorities in this field. The study suggests the formation in each state of a state advisory resource committee, the adoption of a consolidated state resource program and budget, the formation in each state of a joint legislative committee on conservation, and the granting of increased state authority in the administration of federally supported programs.

ROY HELTON
State Planning Board
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

GREENE, LEE S., and RENE DEVISME WILLIAMSON (Eds.). *Resources and Policy: Curent Issues in Conservation.* A symposium reprinted from *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 13, No. 3, August 1951. Pp. 313–481. Gainesville, Fla.: Kallman Publishing Company, 1951. $2.00.

This is series of essays dealing with our natural resources and the various techniques we are evolving for their development and conservation.

The first of these, by Stanley Cain, an ecologist, is on "Food and People: A Second Look at Malthus. . . ." He points out that measures to improve health and to increase the food supply are receiving much more support than efforts to control population growth. This leads him to fear that these efforts will trigger "a population growth that will consume all the increased production . . . and leave the people, except for the gougers who always manage to do quite well for themselves, no better off than before." He pleads for an integrated approach to the problem, with population control securing its due share of attention. The "Opportunities for World Abundance," as discussed by Charles E. Kellogg, Chief of our National Soil Survey, are very great, with achievements much more likely to be restricted by social, economic, and political impedimenta than by shortages of natural resources of soil, water, or minerals.

The "Administration of Federal Lands" is discussed by Marion Clawson of the Department of the Interior and "Education and Demonstration in American Forestry" by Earle H. Clapp, formerly of the Forestry Service.

Three papers are devoted to critical analyses of the river basin approach to resource development and conservation. One, by Norman Wengert, deals enthusiastically with the Tennessee Valley Authority approach, another, by Henry Hart, reviews the efforts made to date to bring the unruly Missouri under control, and the third, by Roy F. Bessey, deals similarly with the Columbia basin. All seem to agree that there is a "pressing need for a well-coordinated and well balanced program of development to meet regional needs." In spite of the fact that TVA has not developed as broadly as its early champions visualized, it seems to be the most promising approach to the problems to date.

The last paper, by Charles M. Hardin, deals with "The Politics of Conservation" and is based largely on a study of the operations of the Soil Conservation Service and the Production and Marketing Administration's conservation program in this area. The differences in philosophy and techniques among the land grant colleges, the SCS, and the PMA and the conflicts resulting from their overlapping interests and responsibilities are clearly presented and the need for a more efficient administrative set-up made obvious.

RICHARD BRADFIELD
Cornell University

BURNET, JEAN. *Next-Year Country: A Study of Rural Social Organization in Alberta.* Pp. xv, 188. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951. $4.00.

A nonplainsman might suspect from the title that the author is describing a land of promise; to the contrary this dry wheat-growing country around Hanna, Alberta, the author concludes, after reviewing the experience of the wheat farmers from 1909 to 1946, can have "no permanent self-sustaining population." The title is derived from the recurrent hope of the settlers that they will make a killing "next year."

The account is a well-written, sociologically sound historical analysis of the social and economic aspects of rural life in a representative area of the semiarid plains —a story that is no less true of the Hanna community than of great areas of the United States stretching from Montana to Texas, which natives also describe as "good next-year country."

With the extension of the railroads into the Plains, Anglo-Saxon peoples tried to superimpose their culture, developed in eastern Canada and the United States, on the dry land area by settling small tracts during the cycle of high rainfall and by transplanting all their old rural institutions. Then came the ever-recurrent drought bringing destitution to families, decline to schools, churches, farmer organizations, and informal group activities, and the abandonment of farms.

The German-Russian group came in numbers during the 1920's. Its background in peasant culture, with its familism and ascetic ideals, proved to be better adapted than was that of the Anglo-Saxons. But the high birth rate, combined with expanded farm operation due to mechanization, is bringing pressure on the land, and the migration of youth, as it acquires more schooling, threatens to break the integrity of the ascetic ways of the old generation and lead to disruption of the native culture.

The conflict between town and country over such issues as the mail order catalogue, the lack of a rest room for farm women in the towns, and consolidated schools is characteristically American, as is the lack of effective rural leadership in the farm trade centers.

The study, financed by the Canadian Social Science Research Council through a Rockefeller Foundation grant, is one of the series bearing on the background and development of the Social Credit movement in Alberta. It does not, however, deal directly with this movement as such.

One distant hope is held out for the Hanna community—much of it is potentially irrigable. The reported success of rain making—which has come since this book was published—leads one to wonder if it may not also offer hope.

PAUL H. LANDIS

State College of Washington

BAUMHOFF, RICHARD G. *The Dammed Missouri Valley*. Pp. xi, 291, vi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951. $3.75.

MAASS, ARTHUR. *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers*. Foreword by Harold L. Ickes. Pp. xiv, 306. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $4.75.

Both these books add significantly to the growing literature on resource problems, programs, and practices. The one focuses upon a single river basin; the other upon the work of the federal agency primarily concerned with river engineering. The relation between the two books is apparent, though in purpose, methodology, and scope they are in sharp contrast.

The Dammed Missouri Valley is a frankly journalistic description of the physical resources of the region, of some of its cultural history, and of the programs currently underway to develop the river. It is pitched to the layman's ear, and should provide timely background for understanding the work of the newly created presidential Missouri Basin study commission. But, with the exception of a very incisive chapter on the role of radio and the press in the Basin, Baumhoff's work suffers from a pseudo-objectivity, typical of much American journalism. The sophisticated reader would be more inclined to identify the author with the tepid Scripps-Howard press than with the crusading St. Louis Post-Dispatch with which he has been associated since 1918.

The situation in the Missouri Valley requires more than a mere review of what

this person or group advocates and what another person or group alleges. The formation of informed public opinion requires incisive analysis, appraisal, and evaluation. This the author fails generally to give, although his coverage of conflicting interests and points of view is comprehensive. One example may illustrate. The discussion of the Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee presents a good description of how it works and what it does. But whether it is worth the candle, what its weaknesses and limitations may be, or how it compares with alternative co-ordinating devices is not suggested.

In contrast to Baumhoff, Professor Maass is deeply concerned with normative questions, especially as related to problems of governmental responsibility. Against his own clearly stated standards of administration, which he calls "working biases," he reviews the activities of the Army Engineers and finds them grossly deficient. One might wish that Professor Maass had indicated more fully what he thinks is to be done to remove or arrest this "cancer in the body politic."

Muddy Waters is unquestionably an outstanding contribution to the study of public administration and public policy, and it is very provocative of thought and discussion. Unfortunately, space prevents suggesting more than a few of the stimulating problems presented. The aroused reader would, for example, like to examine with the author the implications and perhaps the validity of his working biases. One of these states: "An administrative agency should be responsible to pressure groups so far as necessary to equalize opportunities for safeguarding interests, to acquire specialized knowledge, and to secure consent for its own program." Again, the reader would like to ask what are the root causes for the irresponsibility which the Army Engineers evidence? The people working for the Corps (including the Generals and the Colonels) are typical public servants. The communities and individuals benefited by Army "pork" projects are likewise not exceptions to the American pattern. Malorganization or maladministration may be a part of the answer, but mere organizational shuffling will not get at the heart of the problem of irresponsibility.

Muddy Waters poses this problem well. It only begins to suggest the answer. It is at this point where it points to the need for a great deal more thought and analysis if some of the crucial problems of our society are to be solved.

NORMAN WENGERT

The City College of New York

GATES, WILLIAM B., JR. *Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars: An Economic History of the Michigan Copper Mining Industry*. Pp. xiv, 301. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $5.00.

This scholarly and yet interesting book is an economic history of copper mining in Michigan from its beginning in 1843 or 1844 down to the end of the Second World War. In it the author traces the speculative beginning, the rise, the maturity, and the decline of the industry; the development of mining technology; the consolidation and integration movement among the producers; and the organization of pools and other monopolistic combines among domestic and foreign producers, in some cases fostered by tariffs. He finds that management, controlled by Boston capitalists, was usually fairly conservative, with relatively few speculative scandals. Labor relations were marked by benevolent paternalism, strong hostility to labor organization, and by generally lower wages than were paid in the Western copper mines. The gyrations in costs and prices and their effects on output, dividends, and expansion, and at times on the waste of the resource, are discussed with care.

Throughout this book the author, who streses the fact that he is an economist, traces economic relationships and economic interpretations of events. There is a rather extensive appendix, with graphs and tables, and a bibliography. Footnotes, unfortunately, are not at the foot of the pages but bunched together at the end of the book, where they are as hard to find as possible. Why do some publishers thus misplace footnotes?

JOHN ISE

University of Kansas

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

ODUM, HOWARD W. ***American Sociology: the Story of Sociology in the United States Through 1950***. Pp. vi, 501. New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1951. $5.00.

Those who have expected this book to be merely a reworking of Odum's earlier studies in the history of sociology are in for a surprise. Although it here and there bears traces of its predecessors, it is in all essentials a new work.

The amount of hard, grinding effort that has gone into the 500 pages can be adequately estmiated only by similar toilers in the vineyard; Odum has placed American sociologists permanently in his debt. Words similarly appreciative cannot be bestowed, however, on the publishers. To have forced Odum to eliminate 300 pages, presumably with an eye to textbook sales, means that Odum hmiself has suffered through inadequate presentation of his views and that every instructor and student using the book will suffer with him. More of this later; just now the reviewer merely wants to say that it is this cutting-to-fit-the-textbook-bedstead that in the long run will result in the vanquishing of the big-publisher Procrustes by the small-publisher Theseus. Is it not clear that venturesome little organizations such as the Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, the Harren Press of Washington, D. C., the Norman Paul Press of Gary, Indiana, and the Beacon Press of Boston, to name only a few, could not have won the acclaim (*and* sales figures!) already attained had it not been for the crassly commercial attitude of the larger houses? It is high time that sociologists ask every "bookman" who pays them a visit this question: "What is your concern doing to advance the science of sociology —or are you merely peddling textbooks?"

But within the space limits imposed on him, Odum has done a remarkable job. With the utmost catholocity and kindliness, he has given a remarkably detailed and, on the whole, accurate survey of American sociology from its earliest period to mid-twentieth century. Few important figures are slighted, although the device of dealing with all the presidents of the American Sociological Society has forced him to give relatively more attention to a scattering of unimporant writers than is perhaps warranted. The missing three hundred pages probably account for what now seems excessively egalitarian procedure.

Also understandable is the apparently undue attention to authors of textbooks; Odum had to do something to bring in a collection of writers who lacked political appeal but who were and are widely read. Once one starts cataloguing texts, there is no good place to stop. Further, the big publishers' policy, above noted, has made American sociology, in altogether unhealthy ways, textbook sociology; to get a treatise published, it usually has to be disguised as a text.

The situation has been partially saved, in Odum's book, by Parts I, IV, and V; here Odum moved with more freedom. Part V, in particular, entitled "Toward Inventory," is a stimulating treatment of major trends in American instruction and research, commendably free from the sectarianism of some recent surveys. It reflects his generosity, optimism, and readiness to offer appreciation and encouragement; one can only imagine, alas, what the caustic E. B. Reuter would have said on the same themes. The contrast, although at times distressing, would have been most instructive.

The lists of authors, journals, institutions, and the like are exceedingly valuable, as are also the bibliographies. No one can hereafter write about American sociology without liberal use of Odum's work; it is literally indispensable.

And now, in spite of, or perhaps because of, what has been said about publishers, comes the sixty-four-dollar question, "Is this book usable as a text?" The answer, where the reviewer is concerned, is "Yes and no." "Yes" for junior-senior courses, or better still, at the graduate level, where the instructor is prepared to provide the necessary selection, exposition, and critical comment that the missing three hundred pages might have made available, and in addition where he is willing to require a very considerable amount of reading in the primary sources (when they *are* primary sources). "No" if these demands cannot be met, or where the instructor is inclined to try to cover everything merely because "It's in the book," or where the textbook gullibility discussed by Hobbs in *The Claims of Sociology* is too much in evidence. In the latter case, however, not even a book superior to Odum's would remedy matters. Moreover, for American sociology, no such book exists.

If you can agree with the reviewer's "Yes," then put into practice the old slogan of the MacGregors, "E'en do, and spare not." It is highly unlikely that you will find a better book for your purpose today, or in the future now foreseeable.

HOWARD BECKER

University of Wisconsin

PARSONS, TALCOTT. ***The Social System***. Pp. xviii, 575. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951. $6.00.

The present volume sustains the verdict that Parsons conceives the fundamental objective of sociological theory as the logical conceptualization of theoretical systems. Since Parsons is still committed to the action frame of reference, he is obliged to relate the other two subsystems of action, personality and culture, to the social system—the major object of theoretical construction. The personality subsystem is manifestly interpreted with the aid of Sigmund Freud's views, and, perhaps as a consequence of the collaboration with E. A. Shils, culture is construed in terms of George H. Mead's theory of symbolism.

In defining the subject of the volume as "the exposition and illustration of a conceptual scheme for the analysis of social systems in terms of the action frame of reference," Parsons indicates his adherence to the same conceptions of science and methodology and social behavior implicit in his earlier works. Basically antiempiricist, these conceptions fundamentally derive from a theory of human nature.

By its use in *The Social System* science is still rendered contingent upon "bodies of logically interdependent generalized concepts of empirical reference." Only if these theoretical (a priori) constructs are employed is scientific observation, problem formulation, and explanation possible (p. 327). This notion of science is indifferent to empirical facts because it was originated to circumvent cultural relativity. To make knowledge certain, Kant lodged the a priori categories of perception and understanding in human nature as bases for a logical system of knowledge. The basic categories for Parsons' system construction are similarly contained in the units of the action frame of reference, the "actor-situation." The theory of social systems is necessarily certain because it is logically deduced from these premises. Implicating only logically interrelated categories, the system excludes all relationships other than logical ones. Social relationships in time can, therefore, be included only by distorting their empirical character, by introducing them as categories. Although Parsons accepts such misconstruction of the empirical world, he professes to desire knowledge about that empirical world.

The theory of human nature underpinning this logico-deductive conception of science is also assumed in the action frame of reference from which the theory of social systems is derived. The characterization of action as teleological, volitional, or voluntaristic stems from the notion of the nature of man whose activity has historically been distinguished from natural phenomena by endowment with morality or the exercise of choice. However, the closed, deductive system proposed by Parsons requires that the alternative choices of the actor in a situation be known and derivable from the action frame of reference. Accordingly, Parsons argues that within a situation—comprised of physical, social, or cultural "objects of orientation" —an actor is constrained to orient himself by one of the three "modes of motivational orientation,"—the cognitive, cathectic, or evaluative. These three basic modes are the orientational manifestations of the "need-disposition" system common to all human beings. As determinants of the classification of value-orientations, these motivational orientational modes ultimately prescribe the nature of the differentiation of roles minimally required in a social

system and delimit the range of possible institutional variation from one social system to another. The structuring of human nature is reflected thus in the social system itself.

This volitional conception of human nature is obviously incompatible with Parsons' methodology which commits him to complete knowledge of the alternatives of action. Parsons therefore excludes a part of the cathectic mode of orientation from the influence of symbolic conditioning. While the available choices are cultural, the basis of choice-making itself remains a unique and private aspect of human nature.

Both the related antiempiricist notions of science and methodology and the purposive conception of human nature are assumed in this "essay" on the theory of social systems. To hope that such a theory will discover how the empirical world works is inconsistent with all its assumptions.

ROSCOE C. HINKLE, JR.
University of Maine

KINGDON-WARD, F. *Footsteps in Civilization.* Illustrations by Erna Pinner. Pp. 240. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. $3.00.

The author, a British geographer and naturalist with a better than ordinary flair for popularization, in the best sense of that word, has given us a highly readable account of the principal material achievements in the development of culture. Many an educated layman, interested in the general story of man's progress over the long span of cultural history from the Stone Ages to civilization, will find in Mr. Kingdon-Ward's little book an adventurous, sometimes exciting account. Moreover, it is happily unfreighted with the mass of technical details that so frequently turns the nonspecialist from standard anthropological works in dismay or boredom. And if the author is occasionally given to speculation about the events he discusses, the reader knows that it is speculation and that the author so regards it.

In an opening chapter called "The Film of Life" we are reminded of the narrow physical limits within which life exists on earth. "Thus life is a rare phenomenon, not only in the universe, but even on the one tiny planet where it is found at all. Life exists as a mere film because the conditions under which it is able to sustain itself occur only within a film, varying in thickness, but nowhere more than a few miles thick" (pp. 17–18).

After a brief discussion of the "invention of civilization" and a setting forth of an evolutionary time perspective, the author discusses, in turn, such major developments as fire, the domestication of plants and animals, the evolution of tools from stone axes to power machines, the invention of writing, and the discovery of time. These chapters constitute the solid core of the book and represent a skillful distillation, in intelligible language, of a large and complex body of knowledge.

In his closing chapters Mr. Kingdon-Ward relates man's achievements, sketched in the bulk of his book, to the modern world. He points out what has been said so often as almost to become trite: that discoveries and inventions are in themselves neither good nor bad, but that it is their "ill use" which leads to "frustration and disaster." Equally true and perhaps not sufficiently appreciated is the statement that the highest achievements of man's technological evolution have benefited only a very small portion of the human race so far. But such truisms merely constitute background for posing the enormous problems—economic, social, and political—that rack the modern world and threaten it with disaster.

For whatever reason, Mr. Kingdon-Ward does not pose these problems. Instead, we are offered a small dose of what might be termed the optimism of the naturalist's long view of things. *Homo sapiens* alone of the genus *homo* has survived the vicissitudes of his environment because he was fit to survive; therefore, he will continue to survive. So we are told, in comfortingly optimistic terms, that because "Man has, during a span of 8,000 years more or less, taken those forward steps which are the theme of this book, there is no reason why he should not take another. . . . In fact, *it is certain that he will"* (p. 223, reviewer's italics). This reviewer's guess is that few social scientists, soberly reflecting upon the modern scene, with its arms races and "atomic diplomacy," would be disposed to share either the optimism or the certainty of Mr. Kingdon-Ward concerning future progress.

Having decided that man will continue the march to ever greater mastery of nature, the author turns to a discussion of atomic energy. He tells us that thus far nobody has benefited from atomic energy and that it will be a long time before anyone does. But not only is the constructive use of atomic energy in the distant future; the vast majority of mankind *"will have to do without it,* and will continue to do things in the good old way, even to wearing out their bodies with hard labor" (p. 225, reviewer's italics). Thus excluding the mass of humanity from the benefits of constructive use of atomic energy, Mr. Kingdon-Ward proceeds to the conclusion that atomic energy is not a fundamental step, such as fire, because "the real point is: who benefits?" (p. 225).

From this conservative outlook it is but a step for our author to decide that civilization is not mechanization, nor any of the steps in technological evolution, nor all of them put together, nor, yet, a higher standard of living. For him these are merely *means* to an end, which is—civilization. We are told, further, that higher living standards do not bring about "a new vision of life" and that "many luxuries are merely nuisances" (p. 227). Thus prepared for a rather etherealized conception of civilization, we are given his definition of it as "a sense of responsibility; responsibility towards oneself, towards mankind, and towards God" (p. 227).

What Mr. Kingdon-Ward may have left out of his equation is the pervasive determination of vast sections of humanity throughout the world not to be bypassed either by the existing technological achievements of western civilization or by future productive utilization of atomic energy. Indeed, many observers of today's world scene would argue that a point has now come in the evolution of culture when its fruits will be tasted either by all or by none.

CHARLES S. BRANT
Colgate University

WEAVER, W. WALLACE. *Social Problems.* Pp. viii, 792. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1951. $5.00.

To write a good book on social problems is a difficult task. It must deal with a great mass of factual material, yet must not be a "World Almanac." It must be based on sound theory, yet not be too theoretical throughout. The "pure theorists" must be very unhappy over books on social problems, for to admit that a social phenomenon is a "problem" is to use a "value judgment," and that is taboo. (One cannot but wonder how they can even declare anything taboo without using a value judgment!) But fortunately most sociologists are broader minded than this, and are therefore on familiar speaking terms with social problems.

Weaver divides his analysis into six parts, most of which are logical, though it is difficult to see a clear distinction between Part II (Personal Crises) and Part III (Family Discord). "Prostitution," in Part II, requires *two* people who flout social standards as surely as does "Illegitimacy," in Part III. One is no more *personal* than the other. Likewise divorce, under "Family Tension" in Part III, is often as much of a "Personal Crisis" as are many of the items under that label in Part II. Also, in Part I, on "The Nature and Scope of Social Problems," it is doubtful whether a whole chapter on "Disaster" is justifiable. One paragraph could show the usual five successive phases of disasters, which after all are sporadic affairs and not subject to the same degree of social control as are the "normal" social problems.

In the first chapter the concept of the social problem is fairly well stated, providing a basis for the discussion of specific problems. But the closing chapter, "Social Problems and Social Policy," is better. It is an excellent bit of social philosophy—clear, analytical, and broad in scope of

thought. The main body of the book—the twenty-five chapters on specific social problems—is well done. It covers, for the most part, the usual list of topics, but there is an excellent chapter on "Old Age," not always found in similar books. The current emphasis on this topic, the country over, makes this chapter especially timely. Some of the statistics in a number of chapters are older than necessary, but others are up to the minute. In general, the numerous problems are dealt with satisfactorily, the factual material being adequate, the viewpoint hard-headed and objective, and the conclusions well taken. The writing throughout is admirable, with very clear expression of thought and many a well-turned phrase. All in all, the book will be found a very useful text.

RAY E. BABER
Pomona College

JOHNS, RAY, and DAVID F. DEMARCHE. *Community Organization and Agency Responsibility*. Pp. xiv, 214. New York: Association Press, 1951. $3.75.

For those who are looking for a good, panoramic view of social welfare with highlights on community organization this book will be helpful. Its moving camera covers the field of social work from the history of Social Security in America to methods of conducting community surveys.

A most interesting and helpful section presents the findings of an original study made by the authors of interagency relationships. This material lends strong support to the thesis that social agencies providing direct social services have a responsibility for community planning.

It is disappointing to this reviewer that the book fails to emphasize social planning as a process whereby people—all people—evolve, through orderly and conscientious effort, more fruitful and efficient ways of solving their social problems. By implication, the material seems to adhere to the doctrine that it is the community organization *worker* who makes it possible for communities to effect social progress. The book seems to stress the indispensable role of the "expert" in community organization, who weighs community problems, evolves solutions and then through "citizen participation" tries to put these solutions into effect.

A larger number of "experts" than ever now agree that community organization is not just a method used by social workers to help solve social problems, but rather it is democracy's own peculiar way of *organizing itself* into a more satisfactory way of life. Experts do smooth the way for this democratic process, but they neither originate nor control it. Community organization goes on apace whether professional workers are available or not. The contribution of the experts is to help determine how "good" or "bad" the process shall be.

In one quotation, apparently endorsed by the authors, the "elements of democracy" in social planning are said to consist of a "hospitality" by the *community organization worker* "to all positive and creative ideas" and "careful consideration of them after they are in form to be considered." Democracy, which is making remarkable strides in building a better America through the use of community organization in one form or another, may be puzzled to hear that social workers are willing merely to give "hospitality" to democratically generated ideas.

A. DAVID BOUTERSE
Philadelphia, Pa.

TAPPAN, PAUL W. (Ed.). *Contemporary Correction*. Pp. xvii, 434. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951. $5.50.

This book attempts the ambitious project of discussing all pertinent aspects of contemporary correction by having different "authorities" contribute separate chapters dealing with specialties in which they are expert. Thus a chapter on "The Federal Prison System" by James V. Bennett, director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, is a natural; likewise the one on "Classification in the Prison System" by Frank Loveland, now an asssitant director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, but formerly Director of Classification for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, or the one on "State Organization for Correctional Administration" by Richard A. McGee, director, Department of Corrections, State of California. Many other well-known names are included in the list of contributors. In justification of the effort, the editor says, "This volume is predicated upon the importance of understanding the total task, as seen through the experience of outstanding authorities in each of the varied fields of correctional practice" (Preface, p. ix).

There are 26 chapters by 32 different authors (some chapters involve more than one author), grouped under five principal headings, namely: Part I, "Correction: Preliminary Considerations"; Part II, "Administrative Organization and Classification"; Part III, "Programs in the Correctional Institution"; Part IV, "Types of Correctional Institutions"; Part V, "Extramural Treatment." Very brief editorial explanations precede each part, and there is a reasonably comprehensive index. The book carries a foreword by Sanford Bates, and there is a full listing of authors with identification information and an indication of why they may be taken to be experts in their several specialties.

As is inevitable in a book of this type, there is considerable unevenness in presentation as well as some overlapping and redundancy in treatment, but on the whole, the editorial job has been sufficiently well done to eliminate most of the objections to this procedure. As is to be expected, the authorities frequently give their opinions and interpretations in connection with many problems about which there is little or no factual information. The emphasis is on contemporary practice, or on what is believed to be desirable practice at the present time. There is very little reference to historical materials, or to the problem of how we have come to advocate or to practice procedures now assumed to be "better" than those similarly approved in earlier times.

As a treatise outlining current ideas and ideals of the "new penology," this book is a welcome addition to the field. Correctional workers will find it a challenging barometer against which to compare their own efforts, and students and professional people generally will be equally thankful for this compilation. It is a "must" book on the list of anyone professionally interested in the field of correctional work.

GEORGE B. VOLD
University of Minnesota

ANDERSON, MARY, as told to MARY N. WINSLOW. *Woman at Work: The Autobiography of Mary Anderson*. Pp. xii, 266. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951. $3.50.

"Now I am working for a federal law requiring equal pay for women. After we get that I know there will be something more to do. . . ." With these words, Mary Anderson, woman at work, ends her autobiography, which she calls the story of a "fine, full life."

In 1889 a Swedish girl of sixteen immigrated to this country, with little education, no knowledge of English, nothing but her own strong hands and active mind. From 1920 to 1944 she was director of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor. It is with fifty-five years of hard, uncompromising work that Mary Anderson's story deals.

Mary Anderson was a student of life, not of books. She describes her early years as a casual worker—ten jobs in the first six years; then as a factory worker, progressing from a skilled job in the shoe industry to trade union leadership; finally, as a government employee, with the working conditions of women her one concern. From her experiences in the harsh reality of the working world, she distilled the practical wisdom that stood her in good stead when she had reached a position of high responsibility, with a major role to play in determining the standards and needed regulations of women in industry. Slack time, unemployment, night work, the ill effects of the ten-hour work day were no academic matters to her. Of her experience in the shoe factory and her work in trade unions she says, "I learned that it was not always necessary to change jobs to get better working conditions."

The generation that remembers Jane Addams of Hull House, Florence Kelly of the National Consumers League, and Mrs. Raymond Robbins, President of the Women's Trade Union League, will retrace

with deep interest the hard road over which these and other great leaders led the working women in the first half of the twentieth century. But younger workers, who today reap the fruits of past labors, will profit most by reading this book. The battles against the inequities that have barred the progress of working women make dramatic reading, and those battles are not yet over.

Mary Anderson disposes effectively of the hoary clichés about working women. The "pin money" theory, for example, was exploded through factual evidence that most women work for their own living, and for their dependents. She describes her persistent struggle to ensure appointment of women to important governmental committees, to get consideration for such matters as hours and wages of women in the war industries. Then there were the unions themselves, with all too little interest in the unionization of women, opposed to equal pay for equal work, yet afraid of low-paid women as competitors who were undercutting men. There were also to be faced, of course, those employers who welcomed a mass of unskilled, unorganized women workers. And finally, there were the women themselves; "the only security women could see was in marriage and that made it difficult to get many of them into the trade union movement."

The book is a simple, personal narrative by a woman whose life was her work. Many paragraphs begin "I said" or "I think" and go on to describe how her words and her thoughts were translated into action. Her opinions are salty and realistic; "day care centers," for example, she regards as only a "stop-gap . . . the wear and tear on the mother is something to be thought of . . . she cannot be a very good mother if she is so tired she is ready to drop. . . ."

Miss Anderson served under five Presidents, and various Secretaries of Labor. The Presidents and Secretaries of Labor were just people to her, but powerful people, who could further or impede the progress of the working women in the world of today. On that basis, she judged them. While her book is a story of a single life with a single theme, the role she played was against the changing scenes and great movements of our times.

HELEN GLENN TYSON

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AGING. *Man and His Years:* an account of the first National Conference on Aging. Pp. viii, 311. Raleigh, N. C.: Health Publications Institute, 1951. $3.25 cloth; $1.75 paper.

This is a summary account of the first National Conference on Aging sponsored by the Federal Security Agency. The book is framed with brief introductory statements by Oscar R. Ewing, Federal Security Administrator, and John L. Thurston, Deputy Administrator, and a concluding chapter forecasting the "next steps" by Clark Tibbitts, the conference director. In between are eleven chapters dealing with population changes, income, employment and rehabilitation, health, education, family life, creative and recreational activities, religious programs, professional personnel, research on the aging, and community organization. These chapters are condensed, unsigned statements prepared by the eleven separate planning committees and represent the leading ideas, formulations, and proposals for private or public action with respect to the interests and welfare of the aging population.

The conference was apparently an outstanding success and provides a fine demonstration of democratic action in planned discussion groups. Anyone contemplating similar deliberations by selected panels on a nationwide basis can profit from a perusal of the conference procedures. The amount of ground covered in the three-day conference, the selection and relevance of the facts presented, and the core unit of agrement running through a diversity of points of view and minor qualifications constitute an impressive achievement. Any leader of community programs for the aged or director of research in the problems of aging will want to have this reference source within easy reach. Those facing old age personally will find therein encouragement, guidance, and a sense of security and pride in a country represented by such leadership both in the federal agency and in public and private institutions. Indeed, a word of praise is richly deserved for the excellent selection of registrants for participation in the conference.

The book suffers somewhat from lack of continuity and orderly progression in the development of concepts, from irregularities in chapter structure and in quality of writing, from the not infrequent repetition of ideas, and from a relative sparsity of facts presented and conclusions reached. But it compensates for these and other defects in the abundance of stimulating ideas and proposals and as a cross-section representation of contemporary American thought and interest in the problems and, also, in the challenge of aging. It is the opinion of this reviewer that both the conference and the book have been well worth the efforts expended and that such a conference should be repeated at a suitable time and place.

LEO W. SIMMONS

Cornell Medical School

PLOSCOWE, MORRIS. *Sex and the Law.* Pp. ix, 310. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951. $3.95.

In this book a judge of great legal erudition and practical experience analyzes the limitations of social efforts to control sexual behavior by legislation. The author's survey of common and statutory law regarding marriage, annulment, divorce, illegitimacy, and sex crimes culminates in a number of interesting and to some in all probability provocative conclusions. In essence, these conclusions are that the existing law makes it too easy to get married and too easy to get divorced, that our law should be better prepared to deal with the problem of illegitimacy than it is, and that it needs a complete reorientation in the field of sex crimes. In the latter area the author recommends dropping many of the legal prohibitions concerning sexual activities which can be better controlled by agencies other than the law. He believes in confining the scope of control through the threat of severe penalties to the following four aspects of sexual activity: (1) heterosexual and homosexual acts in which force and violence or their threat is used to achieve sexual objectives; (2) heterosexual and homosexual acts involving children and adolescents; (3) heterosexual and homosexual acts which outrage public decency or give rise to public scandal; and (4) heterosexual and homosexual prostitution.

To laymen this book will render an important service in giving them a great amount of pertinent information about existing legislation and court practice in relation to sexual behavior. It will also provide them with some challenge for the formulation of public opinion in that respect. To lawyers it will give the significant if not happy experience of finding expounded by a member of their own profession the limitations which human nature and social conditions put upon the effectiveness of the law. To both groups it will give the rare pleasure of encountering detachment in the discussion of emotionally charged material and clarity in the presentation of legal complexities.

Another merit of the book is that the premises from which the conclusions and recommendations are drawn are always clearly stated. The reader is thus enabled to know in cases of his disagreement with the author whether the controversy is one over goals or one over methods.

The book is interestingly written with a wealth of documentation by case material which, however, is never presented in such a manner as to leave doubt about the abstract principle involved. It deserves welcome as an important and socially significant piece of work whether one is in agreement with the author or not. It is a work which gives the citizen confidence in the vitality and seriousness of social concern with which the legal profession on occasions examines its functions, its effectiveness, and its power of reform.

OTTO POLLAK

University of Pennsylvania

DEES, JESSE WALTER, JR., and JAMES S. HADLEY. *Jim Crow.* Pp. xiii, 529. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor Publishers, 1951. $4.00 cloth; $2.50 paper.

This reviewer has long wished that some competent scholar would write the story of racial discrimination in the United States, particularly in view of the changes which

have come about as a result of our participation in World War II. Thus the feeling of ancicipation with which he sat down to read *Jim Crow*, a study by "two trained social scientists—one a University professor . . . and the other a social worker . . . one white and the other a Negro." Evidently he expected too much.

While the authors have brought together a large mass of material, this material is taken from comparatively few sources. Each chapter is "adapted" or "adopted" (*sic*, p. 245) from other studies. Thus chapter 12 consists of twenty-seven pages summarized from the October 1949 issue of *New South* with no other authority cited. Chapter 13 is a sixty-four page summary of a report prepared by the American Jewish Congress and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People with no other authority cited. These are typical. One wonders whether the studies from which these chapters are "adapted" really have garnered all the knowlege available on these subjects. At any rate the authors admit that they have not written their own book, occasionally using quotation marks extending over many pages (pp. 152–62, 199–215).

One wonders also whether the authors are ignorant of the laws regarding the use of the comma since the most elementary rules of punctuation are frequently unobserved. We cannot but deplore a university professor's violent disagreement with Webster in spelling. "Colier's magazine" (p. 63), "religeous" (p. 131), "front yeard" (p. 156), "stollen property" (p. 223), "hous of the legislature" (p. 225), "at lease eight" (p. 252), and "efficancy" (p. 263) are samples of individuality which leave a bad impression. Why is the word "South" capitalized in one place and put in lower case three lines farther down (p. 193)? Since the book is the product of an electroplate process taken directly from manuscript, perhaps the typist is at fault. A typist's work should be proofread before publishing. But not even bad typing can excuse lapses into incredible grammar (pp. 48, 119, 160, 196)!

Nor does the material appear to be consistent. On page 7 we find the statement: "Myrdal was amazed at the apparent hypocracy (*sic*) of the American people during a war with Hitler in what they said—a professed belief in racial equality—and actual practice." On page 71, "The Negro in America today is still a second-class citizen." This is substantiated by the consideration of the Negro slums (chap. 9) and the Truman Report, *To Secure These Rights* (199–215). Yet in chapters 12–14 nearly every southern state is mentioned as giving the Negro better educational facilities, hospitals, recreation, slum clearance and housing projects, extension of political privileges and civil rights, and ending discrimination in employment. If we were to judge by these chapters alone, our conclusion would be that the Negro is at least as well off as the white citizen of the lower economic group. We wonder if this really is true.

JOHN G. VANDEUSEN

Hobart College

RUBIN, MORTON. *Plantation County*. Pp. xxiv, 235. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951. $3.50.

This is one of a series of studies of the *Modern Cultures of the South* organized by Professor of Anthropology John Gillin of the University of North Carolina and financed by the Julius Rosenwald Fund. Mr. Rubin presents a fluently written social anthropological survey of the organization of a southern community and the behavior, thoughts, and concepts of its people. The community was chosen as a typical one in the coastal plains or the old plantation cotton belt, and has 5,000 whites and 20,000 Negroes in its population. The author lived in this county in 1947 and 1948, returning to it in 1950, and carried on a thorough field study guided from Chapel Hill, and reported all findings to the University. The result is a study which is probably one of the best examples of the uniquely American procedure of the inductive research method of cultural anthropology applied to a difficult area with a sensitive pattern of biracial social standards. The study reveals most of the relevant facts with scientific candor and keeps aloof from sensational revelations or rash judgments of mores or institutions.

The book covers in meticulous detail several plantations, the small farms, the industries, the relations of whites and Negroes as well as the social statuses of whites and Negroes within their own races, the churches, the cultural patterns and social circumstances for youth, adulthood, and old age, and finally a survey of the culture of the plantation area. Throughout the book a fascinating process of change is revealed which today pervades the entire South. Not only does cotton give way to livestock and lumber and factories, but the entire institutional and social pattern is undergoing many changes. This is unobtrusively revealed and gives the impression of the operation of a powerful ferment to which there seems no end.

This is another most worthy contribution to our knowledge of the South by the University of North Carolina, and makes the reader impatient for the appearance of other studies in Professor Gillin's series.

KARL BRANDT

Stanford University

HOLLOWAY, MARK. *Heavens on Earth: Utopian Communities in America, 1680–1880*. Pp. xvi, 240. New York. Library Publishers, 1951. $4.75.

The utopian communities that were founded on American soil and lived, most of them, for a short time and then disappeared into the main current of American life have been of increasing interest to American historians in the new vogue for social history and of especial significance for the various American studies programs that are endeavoring to integrate the diverse fields of American culture. Professor Victor Bestor, for instance, has spent much time working over the material for the Fourieristic groups; the Shakers and several of the other religious communities have had their stories told; and recently Mr. W. R. Cross has analyzed in detail the part played in many of the vehement movements of the nineteenth century by the inhabitants of Central New York—the famous Burnt-over District.

This little book by Mark Holloway is a more popularly written account of the utopias of the two centuries marked off in the title. The story is interestingly told, but there is little new material, few footnotes, and a bibliography that is obviously shorter than the number of works that the author must have used, even if he relied, as he says, heavily upon the two books so long almost alone in the field —John Humphrey Noyes's *American Socialisms* and Charles Nordhoff's *Communistic Societies of the United States*, both of them a combination of primary and secondary material. Tribute is paid also to *The American Faith* by E. S. Bates, but there is little evidence that Mr. Holloway has done much research in the rich contemporary material for any of the communities.

The book starts with a sketch of the utopian ideal and in a few pages makes a rather vague connection between eighteenth and ninetenth century utopian groups and the utopian and escapist ideas through the ages. The first chapter sums up what is known of the communities founded in America in the colonial period, then in eleven chapters there are brief accounts of the Owenite, Fourierist, and Icarian secular socialist groups and of the religious communities such as the Shakers and the Rappists. The book ends with a glimpse of the post-1880 utopias and an estimate of the significance of the whole movement. Within these limits the story is interesting, if thin, and is well written with a sympathetic treatment that should make an appeal to the general reader, although any student working in the field will need to explore much farther in the rich literature on the subject.

Many of the obvious and sometimes amusing errors or slips are doubtless due to the great condensation necessitated in covering so much in such short compass. It is most unfair, for example, to call Governor Bradford and his associates of Plymouth an "oligarchy" when they endeavored to pay off the debts of the colony by control of the Indian trade, and it is difficult to see what that group could have done to further Boston "authoritarianism." The new life of Governor Bradford by Bradford Smith would have been helpful on this point.

No student of colonial history should make the statement (p. 31) that Boston

authoritarianism "reached its peak at the end of the seventeenth century"—the time of its obvious decline—or that the witchcraft trials could justifiably be called "Cotton Mather's trials."

It is possible that the connection implied on p. 99 between Count de Leon and the Zoarites is unintentional, but the evidence of any "signs of success" in the Frances Wright colony at Nashoba is unauthenticated and seems peculiar to the author who is, I think, equally unjustified in calling Nashoba an Owenite settlement (p. 114).

Even Professor Bestor would smile, I think, at the statement that Albert Brisbane "initiated a Fouierist movement *that swept a nation*," and the idea that Horace Greeley gave "*sober* advice" to the Fourierists is more than a little amusing. (The italics are reviewer's in both instances.)

The condemnation of the Jansonists (p. 168) is unduly harsh, and the reference to Oberlin students (p. 179) needs qualification or clarification to make it anything other than smart or slapstick humor.

The same tendency is seen in the remark (p. 183) that Oneida was chosen by Noyes as the site for his community because it was "near the Canadian border in case further flight should be necessary"—a statement true neither in fact nor location.

In general, it seems evident that the author either failed to understand or, perhaps, had no space to explain the reasons why the utopian idea was prominent in the minds of both Europeans and Americans in the early nineteenth century and why the combination of cheap land on the frontier, American perfectionism and revivalism, and a democratic way of life provided for a time a fertile soil for experiments caused largely by religious restrictions and revulsion from the unfortunate effects of rapid industrialization. There is no adequate tribute, either, to the enrichment of American culture from such a galaxy of "socialisms" which tempered, at least, the effects of what Professor Hacker has called *The Triumph of American Capitalism*.

ALICE FELT TYLER
University of Minnesota

HART, JOSEPH K. *Education in the Humane Community*. Pp. xiii, 172. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $3.00.

Under the title "Education in the Humane Community," the John Dewey Society has published the last writing of Joseph Kinmont Hart, who passed away March 10, 1949. He was regarded as an outstanding exponent of progressive education in its community-centered interpretation. Throughout his career as a writer and teacher Professor Hart propounded the thesis that the school itself cannot adequately educate; genuine education of humane character needs to be rooted in the life of a real community. He held that the democratic task in education was not primarily a problem of teaching children in school, but of building a community within which children could not help but grow up to be democratic, intelligent, disciplined persons.

Professor Hart looked back to the small face-to-face village communities of Greece and of New England. In such communities, thought, nourished by a rich cultural heritage, achieved creative solutions as real problems of life were faced. But now industrialism has decimated our villages, and our overgrown cities are marked by individualism and cultural disintegration. Modern life does not supply the depth and wholeness which is prerequisite for morality and religion, and for the creative self-realization of the individual.

The achievement of a humane culture has three facets: First must come a restoration within our complex civilization of the small community which will give the growing child rootage in an actual, tangible, social reality. Second, we must build a school which will help the child enter into the larger world of humanity without losing his natural élan and will to live. Third, we must have a social development which will make it possible for the human individual to discover himself, and to discipline himself, for a creative part in the world's work.

The book looks towards the future, but it is qualified by a nostalgic idealization of the small communities of the past. The village community, with all its virtues, was —and still is—often the seat of prejudice and general backwardness. In any case, we cannot restore it. Our problem is how to develop a humane culture in the large-scale civilizations of the present day. To this problem, no very concrete answers are given; the author's main purpose was to locate and define the problem. It is not meet, in the present instance, to quarrel with this intent: the sincerity, the gentleness, and highmindedness which pervade the writing preclude an ungracious epitaph. Joseph Kinmont Hart has left us a thoughtful piece, somewhat sentimental perhaps, but fragrant with a tender hope.

I. B. BERKSON
College of the City of New York

BUCKLEY, WILLIAM F., JR. *God and Man at Yale*. Pp. xix, 240. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951. $3.50.

This extremely interesting and forcefully written book, by an alumnus who had just completed his four years of undergraduate study at Yale, is one of the most controversial publications about higher education since the issuance of the Harvard Report.

Buckley's major thesis is that Yale "derives its moral and financial support from Christian individuals and then addresses itself to the task of persuading the sons of these supporters to be atheistic socialists." To prove this thesis he candidly but unconvincingly describes Yale professors by name and quotes excerpts from identified texts used in their courses. The Departments of Religion and of Economics reap the most vigorous vituperation, but those of sociology, psychology, philosophy, and the social sciences, as well as specific extracurricular organizations, come within the author's caustic purview.

While Mr. Buckley would allow freedom of research, he is convinced that the teaching faculty of Yale "is morally and constitutionally responsible to the trustees of Yale, who are in turn responsible to the alumni and thus duty bound to transmit to their students the wisdom, insight, and value judgments which *in the trustees' opinion* will enable the American citizen to make the optimum adjustment to the community and the world." His remedy is simple: fire those who do not conform to the opinions of the trustees. Surprisingly enough in the light of the specificity of his citations, he states: "I shall not say what specific professors should be discharged."

The most obvious criticism of Mr. Buckley's analysis is that he has selected only those instances or quotations that prove his thesis and has conveniently or deliberately ignored all others. At the time the author was assembling his material, a committee of alumni completed its report on religious life at Yale and unanimously agreed that the religious atmosphere was remarkably wholesome. A member of the Yale faculty deliberately used Buckley's technique of quoting out of context and has shown that the economic texts criticized by Mr. Buckley as Keynesian could be proven to be in vigorous support of the most conservative authoritarianism of the capitalist class.

The smear technique of selecting isolated experiences and quoting out of context is not new. But it is unfortunate that one as young and as capable with his pen as Mr. Buckley should stoop to this level in his first book.

In this reviewer's judgment, the issues are much deeper than those treated by Mr. Buckley. It is not a matter of indoctrinating Christianity or failing to do so; it is, rather, assuring freedom to the student to make his own value-judgments based upon comprehensive knowledge and broad experience. It is not a matter of perpetuating individualism or promoting collectivism but rather that of instilling in each individual a sense of responsibility for his fellowmen whether expressed through person-to-person relationships or through representative government.

FRANCIS J. BROWN
American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

HURLEY, HELEN ANGELA. *On Good Ground: The Story of the Sisters of St. Joseph in St. Paul*. Pp. xvi, 312. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951. $3.75.

This volume sets down the history of the Sisters of St. Joseph in St. Paul, but at the same time it does much more, for it recounts the growth of the diocese of St. Paul under Bishops Cretin, Grace, Ireland, and Dowling. Since the Sisters of St. Joseph came to St. Paul at the very beginning of the diocesan history, the author wisely chooses to tell the story of her community in an indirect manner, citing the great contributions of the sisters as a companion piece to the work of the bishops, the priests, and the laity.

In November, 1851, four sisters of St. Joseph arrived by Mississippi River steamboat at the frontier landing in St. Paul. They had set out from the motherhouse at Carondelet near St. Louis and were the first sisters to arrive in the new diocese of St. Paul. Now, one hundred years later the community maintains in Minnesota and North Dakota numerous high schools, academies, grade schools, hospitals, orphanages, and schools of nursing, as well as the College of St. Catherine in St. Paul.

Sister Helen recounts with great accuracy and care the many incidents great and small which make up the history of her community, but she is at her best when she turns to the great figures of her narrative, Bishop Cretin, Archbishop Ireland, his sister Ellen, and Sister Antonia. Father Joseph Cretin had been sent to work originally among the Indians in Minnesota but soon found himself assigned to parish work in Prairie du Chien. Seven years later he became the first bishop of all of Minnesota territory and almost immediately he invited the Sisters of St. Joseph to assist him in his missionary labors. During the seven years of his career as a bishop he was closely associated with the Sisters of St. Joseph. This close relationship continued under Bishop Grace, but it was during the lifetime of Bishop Ireland that both the diocese and the community of sisters made the great strides that promised a bright future.

The pen of Sister Helen is at its best in describing Archbishop Ireland. She presents the "consecrated blizzard of the Northwest" with candor and understanding. She pays tribute to his greatness and personal sanctity but notes, too, that Ireland was outspoken to the point of rashness and was apt to overstate his case in pleading a cause. Few bishops ever made more of an effort to put themselves right with American public opinion, and perhaps none has had a better understanding of America and its people. Ireland regarded his great task as a simple one—to reveal the church to America and America to the church.

As for Ireland's relationship to the Sisters of St. Joseph, Sister Helen emphasizes that he was clearly their friend, and she regards it as a tribute to his personality that there is to this day almost no perception of the fact that for a full forty years he headed a veritable family dynasty which governed the Sisters of St. Joseph in St. Paul.

The other great figure that pre-empts a major part of this volume is Sister Antonia McHugh, who almost singlehanded raised the standards and stature of the teaching sisters in the United States. With great foresight and hard work she made the College of St. Catherine an institution to be envied and emulated. She sought and secured full accreditation for her institution and she insisted that Catholic parochial schools find their place as the equal of the public schools chiefly by providing the teaching sisters with as much or more training as public school teachers; moreover, she did everything in her power to raise the standards of teaching in Catholic high schools. The integrity of Sister Helen as historian again comes to the fore when she notes that Sister Antonia's efforts to make St. Catherine's another Vassar were not enough, for such a goal failed to consider the central purpose of any Catholic college—to make better Christians as well as to impart intellectual training.

This fine study of Sister Helen concludes with a series of excellent bibliographical notes and a complete index. The volume is a first class addition to the history of education in America.

FREDERICK G. HOCHWALT
Washington, D. C.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

SINCLAIR, ANGUS. *The Conditions of Knowing: An Essay Towards a Theory of Knowledge.* Pp. 260. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951. $3.50.

Mr. Angus Sinclair's theory of knowledge has the merit of rejecting separate "realms" of the "subjective" and "objective." Distinctions of this sort have limited, not absolute or ultimate, import for conditions of knowing.

The theory proposed sets our from differences in interpretations of progress, order, purpose, laws, causality, probability, time, space, qualities, and the like. Emphasis on such differences leads to the strange conclusion that we cannot reliably discuss these subject matters, but only our own attitudes, the selections and groupings we make in our attention, or our own experience. On this approach, a theory of knowledge would basically consider "men" as having experience and knowledge; language would become little more than a "causative" device for the altering of attitudes; and logic would give place to the study of factors prominent in our experience and of techniques effective in producing satisfactory experiences.

The presentation of this theory neglects to follow out to a solution the traditional difficulties which it poses. Thus it takes the difference between an illusory and a real pyramid as exemplifying conditions of knowledge rather than peculiarities of perception which we may examine and explain. Again, this account sets up a sharp contrast between relationships of cause and effect and of means and ends in behavior. Above all, the theory fails to take into account that points of view cohere for all their relativity—and not only because we may happen to agree, but because of the nature of the things with which we deal; so that we may, despite differences say among astronomical or botanical or other interpretations, nevertheless distinguish stars from plants and even pursue metaphysical inquiries into space-time and qualities and the rest without being unduly disturbed by fabricated epistemological puzzles.

At the same time, this essay contains some important insights. To cite a few: metaphysics is not explanatory but analytical; epistemology does not have special knowledge totally differing in kind from the normal; the physicist's table with its primary qualities is not in another world than that of the common table vivid with secondary qualities; the present has both succession and simultaneity in it; and current disblief in inevitable progress is disbelief in inevitable decline also.

RICHARD HOPE
University of Pittsburgh

TAYLOR, A. E. *Socrates.* Pp. 192. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. $2.50.

This book by the late professor of moral philosophy in Edinburgh University has been published in this country to commemorate the 2,350th anniversary of Socrates' execution. It is however not a new publication, for it first appeared in England in 1932, more than a dozen years prior to the author's death in 1945; the American publishers should have stated these facts explicitly somewhere in the present edition.

The book is an expression of the interpretation of Plato and Socrates, which Taylor and the late John Burnet cultivated with extraordinary scholarship and vigor. Taylor assumes that the allegedly early dialogues of Plato are reasonably accurate historical accounts of the life and thought of Socrates; and the argument in the volume is based on this assumption. But though this premise is supported by considerations that carry some weight, they are not generally accepted by competent scholars as conclusive. In any event, more than two-thirds of the book deals with the life, the trial, and the death of Socrates as reported chiefly in the Platonic dialogues. On the other hand, sufficient background material is supplied concerning the political significance of Athens' decline as a consequence of the Peloponnesian War to give the reader a genuine understanding of the historical circumstances under which the life of Soc-

rates came to its tragic end. Taylor's account, it is almost superfluous to add, is engrossing and moving.

The final chapter of the book deals with the nature of Socrates' self-appointed "mission" and with his doctrinal contributions to philosophy. In agreement with Burnet, Taylor held that it was Socrates who created the conception of the soul which has since dominated European thought; and he maintained that Socrates' mission and ethical teachings were indissolubly related to this conception. Taylor also gives an unusually clear account of the Socratic theory of knowledge and science, and he explains with sympathy Socrates' turning away from the causal analysis of events as practiced by the ancient physicist-philosophers in favor of a thoroughgoing teleological approach to nature. Quite evidently Taylor did not believe that this latter turn of thought was a capital misfortune for the subsequent history of science. It is indeed pertinent to note that Taylor's judgments on various incidents in the life of Socrates, as well as on Socratic doctrinal tenets, were not uninfluenced by the circumstance that he was firmly committed to the ethical and theological teachings of Christianity.

ERNEST NAGEL
Columbia University

MONEY-KYRLE, R. E. ***Psychoanalysis and Politics: A Contribution to the Psychology of Politics and Morals.*** Pp. 183. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1951. $3.00.

Money-Kyrle is a British psychoanalyst who has written this brief book to show that the findings of psychoanalysis justify ethical absolutism rather than ethical relativism. He reports that "the changes produced in moral character by a deep analysis are always away from the authoritarian and toward the humanistic end of the scale." People are normal and rational when no part of their mental life is permanently excluded from consciousness.

The summary which is given of psychoanalysis depends mainly upon the theories and observations of Melanie Klein, and in consequence has a great deal to say about the aggressive, persecutory, and depressive characteristics of infancy and early childhood. Disturbances of character formation "consist of what is manifest in the operation of defence mechanisms against persecutory or depressive anxiety or both."

Three principal types are distinguished which have significant consequences for politics. Some authoritarians possess an exceedingly strict superego (conscience) which makes them feel inhuman in the pursuit of whatever they conceive to be their duty. Besides these obsessionals are certain hypomanics, in whom aims are pursued with ruthlessness unhindered by any sense of guilt. The "hypo-paranoids" continually project their feeling of guilt upon others, so that they are sustained through life by a sense of righteous indignation against the real or imaginary sins of others.

It is impossible to read an essay of this kind without obtaining many valuable insights into human growth, and to gain new hope concerning the long-run impact of self-knowledge upon the democratization of human affairs. However, it is odd to find an experienced student of human affairs who beleives in the "either-or" of rational persuasion *or* force in dealing with hostile ideologies (p. 26). Hostile ideologies have often been reconciled by the sharing of values which are ultimately held on a nonrational basis; and bearers of the same ideology have permitted themselves to diverge disastrously from one another over concrete applications. The grounding of the democratic aspiration on rational absolutes may be worthy and convincing exercise for some members of mankind. But it is doubtful that it is the most important, or even a necessary basis for the Good Society.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL
Yale Law School

BAUMGARDT, CAROLA. *Johannes Kepler: Life and Letters.* Introduction by Albert Einstein. Pp. 209. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $3.75.

This is a heart-warming insight into the lovable and moving personality rather than into the scientific discoveries of Johannes Kepler, one of the four great founders of modern physics and astronomy. The introduction by Albert Einstein tells how Kepler first determined the twin movements of the earth in planetary space and says: "Neither by poverty, nor by incomprehension of the contemporaries who ruled over the conditions of his life and work, did he allow himself to be crippled or discouraged. In addition, he dealt with a field of knowledge that immediately endangered the adherent of religious truth. He belonged, nevertheless, to those few who cannot do otherwise than openly acknowledge their convictions on every subject. . . . He had to realize clearly that logical-mathematical theoretizing, no matter how lucid, could not guarantee truth by itself; that the most beautiful logical theory means nothing in natural science without comparison with the exactest experience" (pp. 12 and 13).

In this introduction by Einstein, we detect this unconscious self-portrait and a reason why Einstein is particularly able to interpret Kepler to our times. Kepler's letters are full of such stirring ideas as: "The variety of the phenomena of nature is so great, the hidden treasures in the dome of the universe so rich, that nature should never run short in material for the human spirit . . . ought never come to rest, but that there should be always in this world a workshop open for the training of man's spirit."

This book may be read with equal interest by a person who knows nothing about astronomy or mathematics. Kepler's letters are more poetical, mystical, and philosophical than technical. About 90 per cent of the material is in Kepler's own words from his letters arranged and sympathetically explained by Carola Baumgardt. Their setting is made clear in relationship to Kepler's lifelong search for truth against as much intolerance in a German Protestant State in 1605 as would have been experienced in a totalitarian state today.

Although written 350 years ago the beauty of Kepler's character and the depth of his wisdom make these letters as fresh and vital and illuminating as if they had been written today.

OTTO TOD MALLERY
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

VOGT, V. OGDEN. *Cult and Culture: A Study of Religion and American Culture.* Pp. ix, 269. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $3.25.

Seldom has this reviewer read a book that contained so many penetrating insights as does this volume by the minister emeritus of the First Unitarian Church of Chicago. The author gives evidence of having read widely, particularly in the fields of history, the history and philosophy of religion, and anthropology, and he has done a great deal of careful thinking about the problems of our confused world. The book is divided into three parts, headed respectively, "Conceptual," "Critical," and "Constructive," about two thirds of the total space being devoted to the first, and fifty pages each to the last two. The book makes interesting reading, not only because it is crowded with ideas, but also because the sentences are concise, the chapters brief, and the style direct.

The first book, dealing with concepts, treats such subjects as the sources of culture, culture and civilization, culture and philosophy, culture and art, culture and commerce, and culture and government. Culture, the author states, is not a matter of leisure, "an overtone of refinement beyond storms and crises"; culture is a satisfaction in things of the spirit, with a bare minimum of material necessities. In other words, luxury is not culture. The mark of culture is familiarity with the best, and the truly cultured man is always at home no matter what his surroundings. Religion and geography are the two chief sources of culture. Religion plays the principal role in the formation of a social order. Culture must be both conservative and radical; it must be attached to some tradition of order, but not so much attached as to resist beneficial change. The first section closes with a chapter entitled "Primacy of the Cult" by which is meant that the rites and ceremonies of religion are the primary sources of political order and national unity.

Book two, devoted to criticism, is opened with a chapter on American unity, or rather American disunity, caused by a whole series of clefts—racial, religious, economic, intellectual, and educational.

The intellectual cleft is that between the "intelligent non-religious, and the non-intelligent religious"; the educational cleft results from our attempt to educate our children without and apart from religion; the religious cleft is due to the Roman Catholic challenge to the democratic principles upon which America was established; the racial cleft is between white and black, Jew and Gentile; the economic cleft, between labor and mangement. It is true that in many respects the United States seems to be the most divided nation on earth, for here we have a cross section of all the cultures of the world. In another sense we are the most unified of nations, united about the principle and practice of freedom and resistance to tyranny. (This last statement is not the author's.)

The final section is devoted to constructive suggestions as to how these clefts, which tend to destroy American unity, may be overcome, the final suggestion being the adoption of a national American ritual or cult in which all Americans could join, regardless of race or religion and economic status, a somewhat Pollyanna solution.

WILLIAM W. SWEET
Southern Methodist University.

MADDEN, WARD. *Religious Values in Education.* Pp. xiii, 203. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $3.00.

The author states that "the problem is to find a religious outlook suitable to the modern temper." He then attempts to do two things seldom undertaken—to analyze supernaturalism and to demonstrate in class work how the creative social act satisfies the modern need of children and youth.

This creative social act, a modification of Henry N. Wieman's "creative event," the author holds will conserve the dynamic of a religious conviction without isolating man's mind from the pain of joy involved in realizing the value claim. With Clarles H. Cooley and George Mead he sets forth to discuss the social process, though he fails to use the terminology of the sociologists.

The varieties, contrasts, and diversities of life are constantly being transformed into a more inclusive whole. Under the proper teaching there can be created a richer variety and range which "result in new meanings." He finds insight emerging at the juncture of a metaphysical or religious assumption with a social event when, in that social event, integration and differentiation are operative. He defines the democratic group as one in which the creative social act can generate two values, namely the step in the direction of a goal predetermined or anticipated and the reformation of the persons involved. It is when leadership "becomes domination bent" and seeks to serve a leader's "vested interest that creativity—the Creator—itself is destroyed."

The creative social act, without being "supernatural," is "superhuman" in several respects. It is a part of the cosmos, of which man is but a part. It is only when the learner is possessed by a sense of profound "dependence upon the forces that generated man" and with which he "must work humbly" that he can merit the progress which religion labels "his destiny." He believes that a new self, as it were, emerges "within the vast ferment of the cosmos." Here he gets far off the beaten track delineated by Dewey, Childs, and other experimentalists. If he will take the next ten years to resolve the differences existing between the pragmatists and the theologians of the Niebuhr school, or even the Wieman followers, all religious educators will be greatly in his debt. He states that (p. 50) "The good participant —the one who is neither rigid nor herd-minded—is the one who is able to surrender to this spirit and to let it transform him, even while he does not lose his distinctive individuality. . . . There emerges a new self capable of more distinctive contributions to the common effort."

Madden finds that the dual nature of life as well as the dual nature of values are best symbolized in Christian idealism through symbols. He enumerates man finite yet able to transcend life, the Kingdom of God on earth yet not of it, God one yet also a trinity (p. 44). He offers several teaching situations, and the book is a philosophy of education under what

he terms "Modes"—valuation, communal, executive, aesthetic, and contemplative. His chapters are devoted to these "modes." He may seem to desire to have his cake and eat it, for he is at once mystic and classroom teacher. His effort to escape the inhibitions of "revealed" religion by deliberately making use of spiritual values in the environing reality is commendable. He hints that the theses of the sociologists may prove to be the salvation for our epoch, though he resorts to "the creative social act" and not to sociological motivation.

He states (p. 190) that the foregoing principles in his chapters on the modes "embody not a new religion"—but they "state the conditions by which young people, their teachers and others in the community are enabled to release the religious quality potential in their shared experiences." The public school teaching events are well stated, the situations carefully delineated, and the effects fairly well reported, though validation of course would have to wait upon farther measurement of progress. Nathaniel Cantor has performed a similar service on the collegiate level in his small text *Dynamics of Learning.* Should this thesis finally be worked into patterns of public school practice we might be on the way to a religion-on-its-merit instead of having continually to think in terms of religion-by-the-sect. While this is only an introductory text, it merits wide reading by sociologists as well as by teachers and religious leaders.

EDWARD W. BLAKEMAN
Pacific School of Religion

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

CLARKE, C. F. O. *Britain Today: A Review of Current Political and Social Trends.* Pp. 248. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $3.00.

At a time when much is to be gained from better popular understanding of the problems of our allies this book may be of some value. Written by a journalist, who previously worked for Reuters and the Kemsley Newspapers, the book comprises the Lowell Lectures delivered to public audiences in Boston in 1950. It is clearly addressed to the layman and contains no facts or ideas of any special interest to the informed. It is intended to promote better popular understanding of the problems of postwar Britain.

Even for this purpose it seems a weak contribution. It is witty, urbane, and informative on the casual, chatty, and generally evasive level that characterizes British clubroom conversation. Americans who have lived in England will understand it without being informed. Those who have not will gain little understanding, and are apt to be irritated by the subtle, but pervasive note of condescension that Englishmen abroad love to employ, and the reaction to which they seem never able to understand. Children, it seems, should learn a few of the facts of life, but only those which they are able to understand, and which it is good for them to hear.

The total lack of dogmatic statements itself contributes to this effect. We learn that the Britisher has many faults and many virtues, and these run ad libitum the gamut of the more familiar clichés. These clichés deal with persons, the British psychology, British history, Empire, and Commonwealth. In this anthology of pleasant irrelevancies nothing stands out, nothing is clear, nothing is explained. One would not, for example, get from this book the slightest inkling of how or why Britain is currently having trouble at Abadan, the Sudan, Egypt, Malaya, or elsewhere. One could not imagine how the first or second world wars occurred, why the League of Nations folded, why the production drive in Britain has achieved such small results, why Labor *really* sought nationalization, nor why it has been turned out of office. This list of things it is important for Americans to know a little about, and concerning which they can learn nothing of importance here, includes virtually every important question from devaluation to Western Union. Any two or three of Howard K. Smythe's fifteen-minute weekly broadcasts from London would add far more to the American popular understand-

ing than all the pages of this pleasant, but frothy volume.

ROBERT A. BRADY
University of California
Berkeley, California

JONES, THOMAS. *Lloyd George.* Pp. xiii, 330. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $5.00.

Insofar as the statesman here described as "the most famous Welshman of all time" can be compressed into 290 pages of text this biography is well done. It is scholarly, impartial, and readable. It is not in the class known as official, because it is not based on the Lloyd George papers, but the bibliography shows an extensive use of published documents. The author, moreover, was long a close associate of Lloyd George who appointed him Assistant Secretary of the Cabinet in 1916; in this capacity and later as Deputy Secretary for some twenty years he was in a position to observe British politics from the inside.

The author's conclusion, which coincides with Winston Churchill's, is that Lloyd George more than any other man of the twentieth century shaped the fortunes of the British people both in peace and in war, because his early social legislation and his People's Budget were so important in Britain's social evolution, and because as prime minister he was the supreme architect of victory in a world war. The former contribution is the less well treated: thirteen pages provide only the briefest sketch of his contribution to the making of the Welfare State. The discussion of his great war services is more adequate. There is a good picture of the man who assumed command in a crisis and replaced flabbiness and muddle with resolution and system. Fuller, too, is the account of his moderation at Paris and his conciliatory efforts during the period of the Coalition government and international conferences. The years of exclusion and frustration which followed his fall receive a long chapter which shows him at first struggling to provide declining and divided liberalism with a program and the means for a return to power, but later outwardly resigned to a lonely position though to the day of his death secretly hoping to receive the call to guide his country again in its time of greatest peril.

The author's admiration for the courage and resolution, the vision and practical idealism, and the cleverness and charm of his subject at no moment blinds him to defects and shortcomings. The early demagogery, the dubious Marconi transactions, the many inconsistencies, the irresponsible and flippant handling of the Chanak crisis, the Lloyd George Party Fund, and the pollution of the honors system receive frank treatment. So, too, does the visit to Hitler when "his critical faculties were left in abeyance."

CARL F. BRAND
Stanford University

ROWSE, A. L. *The England of Elizabeth: The Structure of Society.* Pp. xv, 547. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $6.50.

It is not surprising that the exuberant age of Elizabeth has attracted many colorful writers. Mr. Rowse writes in the great tradition. His volume is the first half of an attempt to make a synoptic view of the whole Elizabethan age. It is concerned with the structure of Elizabethan society, with its foundations on the land, its developments in industry, commerce, and finance, and its expansion—especially in its cities and most of all in London. Then come social classes, government, law, church, and, finally, education.

Everywhere he looks there is creativeness, confidence, and daring. The age is "tough, vigorous, pulsating with energy . . . the most remarkable in our history." Mr. Rowse knows it all intimately, from the humble cottager to the great Burghley and the still greater Elizabeth, and he loves what he knows. He has all the Elizabethan qualities himself, except the Elizabethan style. His style is his own, and it is an effective expression of his mood. It is capable of rising to great heights, as in his appreciation of the queen, and sinking to irritating asides. There can be no question but that Mr. Rowse has caught the spirit of the period and established himself, as by no earlier volume, as an outstanding writer.

He does not, in the strict sense, write history. His writing is (p. 158) "essentially a portrait." He gives us a cross section of England under Elizabeth; he is not interested in the processes of change so much as in the nature of the community at one fixed point in time. In many ways, he is in the great line of antiquarians—the Lambardes, Carews, Hookers, Camdens, and Stowes whom he obviously admires—to whom England owes so much of the material out of which history is made.

He is apt to explain the achievements of Elizabethan England in simple terms of national genius or geography; his understanding of the long preparation of the Middle Ages is not strongly displayed. On the other hand, he takes liberties which are no longer fashionable among historians: he loses no opportunity to point contrasts between what he likes in the age of Elizabeth and what he does not like in his own. The fact that he is so often right does not fully excuse him. "The responsible historian," he very properly reminds us (p. 222), "must adhere always to what is true and forego the pleasures of generalized reflection, still more the indulgence of contemporary political prejudice in the form of moral indignation."

In any case, he is not always right. We may all, for example, deplore the wars of religion of the sixteenth century; but should our moral indignation make us write of them: "Men were in for one of those gusts of convulsive idiocy when they kill one another for what they cannot know about"? Or, how seriously must we take the observation, relative to the Elizabethans (p. 173): "they *were* children, for all their gifts and all their ability. For the wise and adult do not quarrel"?

But these are only occasional deviations from a great theme expressed in the great manner. The range of Mr. Rowse's knowledge is truly impressive; even more striking is his ability to communicate what he knows. Most astonishing of all is his feeling: his feeling for England in 1588 and (we must add) in 1940. It is no small achievement for a writer to capture the spirit of the English people at two such high points of their life.

B. WILKINSON
University of Toronto

ROBERTSON, D. B. *The Religious Foundations of Leveller Democracy.* Pp. x, 175. New York: King's Crown Press, 1951. $2.75.

Mr. Robertson has undertaken yet another examination of the considerable body of a radical sectarian thought that emerged in England during the revolutionary era. He has made full use of the splendid collection of pamphlets available in the McAlpin collection and has given thoughtful, if not particularly critical, attention to the whole range of Leveller thought.

The author's discussion of the relation of Leveller thought to Puritanism is useful and in some particulars original. The formidable John Lilburne is treated sympathetically and carefully, though it is possible that Mr. Robertson, like some of Lilburne's own contemporaries, may be more swayed by his powerful if prolix rhetoric than the structure or quality of the thought warrants.

The central section of the book, dealing with Leveller thought on law and democracy, is useful and well documented. English political theory was undergoing a basic accommodation to the historical realities during the period of the Puritan revolution and the Levellers, and the other radicals loosely allied with them, were seeking to hasten as well as to expand this process of change.

Mr. Robertson's study suffers from looseness of organization and from a probably inevitable difficulty in keeping the focus of his argument on the specifically Leveller contributions to political and religious thought. As has been suggested, this short essay has much to commend it, and it is to be hoped that the author will continue his investigations in an important area of the history of ideas.

W. K. JORDAN
Radcliffe College and
Harvard University

HUTCHINSON, F. E. *Cranmer and the English Reformation.* In "The Teach Yourself History Library" edited by A. L. Rowse. Pp. viii, 188. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $2.00.

Since this little book is one of a series designed to aid a wider reading public in

its need, and what the editor confidently believes to be its desire, to read more history, it is not to be expected that it will provide new material for the specialist in the field. It does, however, tell an important story simply and well, and in small compass, yet with due regard for the findings of modern scholarship. The result is a useful little book.

In the main, both its organization and interpretation follow traditional lines. There are no surprises except perhaps that the Elizabethan Settlement is dealt with as an epilogue. One had always thought it more than a mere epilogue to the English Reformation. Perhaps since the book is also designed to be biographical it was thought better to end the story proper with Cranmer's trial and execution.

Indeed this biographical approach, chosen, it is said, as the "key-idea" to the series seems to have posed something of a problem to the authors of several of the volumes. It is likely that the editor is on sound ground when he calls it the most "congenial" approach to history for the general public; but the desired result is sometimes a difficult one to attain. In this case, for instance, in order to treat the English Reformation even briefly, it is necessary to include so much that had nothing to do with Cranmer, or to be more exact, with which Cranmer had nothing to do, that he must either be left out of a great portion of the work or else at times pulled in rather awkwardly. It seems sometimes as if the author has said to himself, "Dear me, I haven't mentioned Cranmer for pages and pages, I must bring him in more often, mustn't I?" In this dilemma, however, one's sympathies are with the author. What else could he do and stay within the intent of the series and the framework of his title?

The above problem is, of course, absent in the chapter on Cranmer's trial and execution which rightly take a central place in the story. Here also the interpretation holds pretty well to established lines. The events are recounted with the moving drama inherent in them, and Cranmer's recantations are held redeemed by the martyr's courage at the end. Throughout, Canon Hutchinson handles the controversial parts of the story in the same "charitable temper" he ascribes to Cranmer as participant. The "Elizabethan Settlement" is a term he finds "accepted and justifiable," though he is quick to point out that there was much that it did not settle.

The book closes with a good summary statement evaluating Cranmer's contribution to the later history of the English Church.

MILDRED CAMPBELL
Vassar College

STRAUSS, ERIC. *Irish Nationalism and British Democracy*. Pp. x, 307. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $4.25.

In the preface to this book the author states that his subject "is neither a restatement of Ireland's wrongs, grievous as they have been, nor an apologia for England's historical mission." On the contrary "the accent lies on *Ireland's* influence on *British* society, *British* politics and the *British* Constitution. . . ." This is, of course, an elaboration of the title of the study which implies that somehow Ireland has shaped the growth of British democracy.

Despite the author's disclaimer, the main part of the book is devoted to Irish grievances. Oft told tales are rehashed, and Ireland's ills are attributed to the English conquest, to colonialism, and to absentee landlordism. Oddly enough, England is blamed for "the destruction of mining" in Ireland (p. 76). On this point one might think that the lack of minerals ought to be worthy of consideration. Equally loose is the author's line of argument when he tries to explain (p. 205) why Ireland failed to compete successfully with Denmark in the English butter market.

The Irish home rule question hastened the departure of the Whig element from the Liberal party and brought about the passage of the Parliament Act of 1911. Both events promoted the growth of political democracy in Britain. But the author is not convincing when he tries to establish causal connections between Ireland and the three British parliamentary bills of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the acts which democratized the government of urban and rural areas are ignored.

A reader's confidence in Mr. Strauss's objectivity will be severely shaken when the following sentence is examined critically: "Gladstone began by advising Parnell's temporary retirement [from politics after the O'Shea divorce scandal] as a means of placating English opinion and ended by employing his formidable powers of pressure and persuasion to crush his ally of yesterday out of existence" (p. 208). By failing to state that Parnell's refusal to heed Gladstone's advice imperiled the cause of Irish home rule and made drastic action necessary, Mr. Strauss has put Gladstone's conduct in a false light.

Nor is Gladstone the only one whom this author treats somewhat arrogantly. O'Connell is accused of insincerity (p. 94) and Parnell of "strategic blindness" (p. 190), and Cardinal Manning is severely censured (p. 208).

Students familiar with the life of Friedrich Engels will be surprised to learn that he was an "unbiased observer of the English industrial scene" (p. 123). That the Irish problems had far-reaching effects on British politics after the union of 1801 is common knowledge, but that Ireland determined British progress toward political democracy is a thesis which needs stronger proofs than those which Mr. Strauss has been able to present.

PAUL KNAPLUND
University of Wisconsin

SANDERSON, GORHAM D. *India and British Imperialism*. Pp. 383. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951. $4.50.

It is difficult fully to fathom the author's underlying purpose in writing this strange book. There being no preface or foreword, the reader is not provided with the usual means for orientation. A clue can be found, perhaps, in the fairly extensive bibliography appended. This is remarkable on two counts: it does not contain the titles of several of the more authoritative works particularly pertinent to this subject, while it does embrace a list of "Selected Works Relating to Irish History." In view of frequent efforts throughout the book to correlate the misdeeds of the British in India with their misrule in Ireland, one can only surmise that the book may have been written more for subjective than for objective reasons.

The book describes an India of which the reviewer has had no previous knowledge. "In the halcyon days before British imperialism drained from India a large portion of her wealth," he writes, "the Indian people were a proud, courageous, clean, physically strong and noble nation. . . . The people of India, living their contented and productive lives for many centuries in thousands of small republics, owed much of their happiness and prosperity in Pre-British India to the enlightened, just and wise revenue laws and practices which the free Indian Government permitted them to enjoy" (pp. 31, 32).

A few other excerpts from typical passages will serve to illustrate the general tenor of the book. "The die of fate was already cast for the populous and prosperous free empire of India. . . . The long, bright day of independence, contentment and culture inevitably moves onward into the dark, long night of conquest, exploitation, destitution and death . . ." (p. 53). "The province of Bengal, until the advent of the British, was undoubtedly the richest land in the world. . . . British imperialism needed only thirteen years to bring destruction, destitution, death and imperial famine to the province . . ." (p. 102). "British imperialism was not a civilized institution. It was a heartless, inhuman, money-mad tyranny" (p. 104). "The inhuman mercenary exactions of the East India Company created a new type of rule for the governing of mankind. . . . Almost beyond the grasp of human imagination were the results in death, disease, human misery and mass torture which this policy brought upon the manifold millions of human beings in India . . ." (p. 131).

The author concludes with the observation that "within the elastic limits of British law and order there was always in England an environment of freedom and justice" (p. 345), but he believes that "the British Empire exists today half free and half enslaved" (p. 346). It is hardly nec-

essary to add that the book will be of much interest only to those afflicted with Anglophobia.

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
Library of Congress

SHUKLA, CHANDRASHANKER (Ed.). *Reminiscences of Gandhiji by Fortyeight Contributors.* Pp. 220. Bombay: Vora & Co., 1951. $2.00.

This is a fascinating little book about Gandhi from the pens of 48 contributors from both East and West "who," as Rajkumari Amrit Kaur states in the foreword, "would not write anything but what was strictly correct." There is a short paragraph biography of each author which helps the reader to estimate for himself the value of each contribution. From this joint effort emerges a well-rounded picture including quite a few little-known anecdotes concerning his personal life.

The title of "Mahatma," meaning Great Soul, first given him by the poet Rabindranath Tagore, distressed him, yet all who came into his presence, including this reviewer, instinctively realized his saintliness, his humility, and his utter lack of pretension and pose, "the pure spirit burning as a clear flame upon an altar to shed light in the darkness," "the overwhelming power of the streaming torrent of a morally disciplined man." As Lord Halifax testifies: "The man himself was larger than any of the attempts made to paint his portrait. He was concerned with the human problem of how the Indian poor lived. He was the natural knight-errant, fighting always the battle of the weak against suffering and what he judged injustice."

We also get glimpses of his worldly characteristics. We see him as a young man in England, upon being advised by his physician to drink beef-tea (forbidden to Orthodox Hindus) or die, replying: "If it were God's will that I should die, I must die but it could not be God's will that I should break the oath I made at my mother's knee before I left India." Upon his return to that country in 1931 for the Round Table Conferences, on one of the rawest days he wore only a loin cloth, a cotton shawl on his shoulders, and leather sandals on his bare feet. He often worked twenty hours a day for periods of months, but he could relax and go to sleep the moment after he expressed a desire to do so. Once, because he had no other free time, he paid a visit to a friend at five o'clock in the morning. He was completely approachable, and in the words of Countess Mountbatten, "he seemed to have time for everybody and everything," and the range of subjects on which he was consulted was infinite. We see Bapuji (little father) advising a typhoid sufferer to ease his pain by repeating the holy name Rāmnām, and himself successfully healing the sick with his nature cure method of "earth treatments." He disapproved of the modern type of education, and of his four sons, three were never sent to any regular "school" but were taught at home. The fourth had to run away, leaving a farewell letter, before he was permitted to prosecute his studies in an Ahmadabad school. He never liked having his grandson studying in college, considering that sort of education showy and unrelated to practical life.

While he admired some British personally, he was bitterly opposed to their rule, thought they were "clever politicians who would take advantage of the fact that things were left to rec llection" and not reduced to writing, and felt "suspicious of even their best actions."

Ghandi believed in the equality of all religions and that "Truth is God." He could never approve of violence and thought Ahimsa (nonviolence) was the means, and truth the end, but on one occasion he appeared inconsistent, unequivocally stating that the women of Assam could use knives and daggers to save their honor. He clearly stated that nonco-operation was not a weapon for those who found shelter in a negative attitude of life but a most positive action leading straight to success if principles were not compromised on the way. In spite of India's political independence, he felt Indians would remain slaves unless they overcame the more formidable enemies of greed and attachment. He agonized over the separation of Pakistan from India and the crimes that followed it and felt that political division on the basis of religion was apt to degrade both politics and religion. One of his last desires was to go to Pakistan on a mission of peace. On his final journey "millions prayed, millions sobbed unashamedly, and these millions belonged to all walks of life."

ALBERT E. KANE
Washington, D. C.

PEDLER, F. J. *West Africa.* Pp. viii, 208. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $2.25.

Mr. Pedler, who is a specialist on finance and British colonial policy, must have had a lot of fun in writing the first half of this little book on West Africa. He shares that pleasure as he takes the reader with him on an impressionistic airplane trip over the vast territory from the Gambia to the Cameroons. One sees with him, as on a Cook's conducted tour, the forests, mountains, streams, and plains, the interior cities and the coastal ports, the dusky peoples and their ways of life. He listens to their history and traditions told in almost anecdotal form. He feels with the writer their poverty and observes the signs of recent wealth with intrusive hints as to why and how it came to be. He is introduced to native trade and foreign trader as these are intimately, almost chattily, described. He is lulled by the unexploited immensity of this little known region and by the bits of authentic information artfully woven into the narrative. The story appears innocent of purpose or design other than to make the reader see, feel, appreciate, and understand.

This charming backdrop seems to be the colorful stage-setting for a serious 68-page analysis of "the political scene," which is neither guileless nor descriptive but a thinly veiled defense of British colonial policy from Lord Lugard to Lord Hailey. It is obviously addressed to the British public in an attempt to create favorable backing for the reintegration of a crumbling empire, the restoration of British prestige. His favorable comparison of the administration of Colonial Nigeria and the Gold Coast with Free Liberia and Nationalized French Equatorial Africa from the standpoint of peace and progress is a part of this apology. While it may satisfy the wishful thinking of the British imperialist it leaves many unanswered questions with the impartial reader who has followed the long continued acrimonious demand of these very colonists for independence. Pedler's insistence on imperialism seems to center on the value to Britain of the growing West African trade. The fear of the growth of nationalism prompts the suggestion not of encouraging the war-born West African Union but of working out an "Organic Association" of Sierra Leone and Gambia with the United Kingdom.

The author has a facility for slurring over some of the most difficult political relationships in West Africa. For example, he dismisses the Ewe situation which has developed under the split mandate of Togoland with the statement that there will be "administrative dispositions which will mitigate the disadvantages." This at a time when the Ewe delegation was vociferating to the world before the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations about the "French reign of terror" and Britain's "economic exploitation" of the mandate and her "frustration of any effort by Africans to market their products."

If Mr. Pedler's book helps to mobilize British public opinion behind a defensible colonial policy, perhaps the polemic section of the book might be justified. One could wish, however, that he continued from page 126 to describe what he saw and felt and heard. The book is readable, comprehensive in coverage, and thought provoking.

CHARLES W. COULTER
University of New Hampshire

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

MEAD, MARGARET. *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Problems of Soviet Character.* Pp. 148. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951. $4.00.

Miss Margaret Mead wrote this little book on the basis of materials developed by a research team of ten persons headed by herself. One of the main consultants

was Geoffrey Gorer, whose fantastic theory that the fundamental Russian character traits are derived from the swaddling of infants has received the endorsement of Miss Mead. Fortunately, the author does not bring this hypothesis directly into this study, but she has swaddled herself in other theories which appear almost as far-fetched.

In supporting the self-evident thesis that Soviet political pressures and teaching aim to have all citizens subordinate their personal lives to the achievement of socialism and the decisions of the Communist party, Miss Mead brings in much valuable documentary and source material. But her interpretations of this material are truly remarkable for one who purports to be presenting a scientific report. Thus in her treatment she makes the initial—and questionable—assumption that there is a traditional Russian character (shades of that poor, overworked "Russian soul"!), and then ascribes to it distinguishing qualities which seem fairly universal.

For example, to explain the general atmosphere of suspicion prevailing in the Soviet Union, the author puts enormous stress on the Communist idea that each individual possesses capacities for both good *and* bad; and claims that this expresses "in new form the traditional Russian assumption that all individuals are potentially both good and evil." But this is a psychological truism about human nature supported by naturalistic, anti-Communist philosophers like John Dewey; and it is likewise close to the *Christian* concept of the inherent possibilities in every human being for both sin and redemption.

Again, the author emphasizes the present re-establishment of parental authority in the U.S.S.R. as compared with the early years of the Revolution and interprets this development as an introduction into the home of dictatorial attitudes which "bear a closer resemblance to Stalin's relationship to every Soviet citizen." Yet I had thought that "Honor thy father and thy mother" was a precept highly valued throughout the world and not considered altogether outmoded even in democratic America. Miss Mead also suggests that Russians who smoke heavy pipes do so in order to conceal their facial reactions. Here of course is the key to the sinister pipe-smoking of Joseph Stalin.

A final most serious defect in this study is that while it might well be taken as applying to the entire Soviet population, actually it deals only with the Great Russians and does not cover, unless perhaps by indirect implication here and there, the 177 minority groups that make up almost one-half of the Soviet people. All in all, then, this book, though interesting, even stimulating, is unreliable in its basic assumptions, methods, coverage, and conclusions.

CORLISS LAMONT

New York City

MEISSNER, BORIS. *Russland im Umbruch: Der Wandel in der Herrschaftsordnung und sozialen Struktur der Sowjetunion.* Pp. 91. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wilhelm Cornides, 1951. D.M. 10,50 paper; D.M. 12.— cloth.

Russia has experienced several revolutions since 1917. The profound internal social and political changes in the Soviet Union since the ascendancy of Stalin to power have transformed the October proletarian revolution "from below" into an autocratic revolution "from above."

The author of this informative volume traces with scientific thoroughness and scholarly objectivity the revolutionary transformations in the organizational structure and administrative functions of the Communist party, the secret state police, the Red Army, the Soviets, and various mass organizations under the Stalin regime. The original purposes of these agencies of Soviet power have been so profoundly altered, according to the author, that today they are no longer the bearers and expositors of a proletarian revolution. Instead they have become the ready instruments of a bureaucratic authoritarianism.

Fundamental to the creation of this transformation has been the role played by the new intelligentsia, schooled and indoctrinated under the expanded system of Russian higher education. The Marxian doctrine of the withering away of the state and the emergence of a classless society has yielded to the Stalinist thesis of "stationary dictatorship" and increasing social class stratification. The Communist party, once viewed as the vanguard of the proletariat, has become the foil and mouthpiece of a bureaucratic regime. The Red Army, one time defender of the proletarian revolution, has been transformed into the exponent of the military prowess of autocracy. The erstwhile position of workers and peasants in the supreme Soviets has given way more and more to that of the rising class of young intellectuals.

According to the author, the internal policy of the present day autocratic regime, with its bureaucratic veneer, has two main objectvies, namely to preserve and strengthen the existing authority and to enhance the economic and military power potential of the totalitarian state. Of secondary importance are catering to the needs of the people, assuring adequate living standards, and promoting individual progress and development.

As an outgrowth of the Second World War, the state police, military might, and bureaucratic administration have increased in importance under the Stalin autocracy while the social dependence of the Communist party hierarchy upon the new intellectuals has been strengthened. The broad masses have come into closer contact with a technically and culturally superior bourgeois-capitalistic environment. Fear of the consequences of such contact has allegedly contributed to the deliberate isolationism of the Stalin autocracy, since the policy of "equalling and surpassing" the industrial prowess of the United States has proved to be illusory.

These are typical conclusions reached by the author of this penetrating analysis of the social and political transformations which the Soviet Union has undergone and is continuing to undergo since the rise of Stalin to power. The well-documented interpretation of present-day Soviet political reality is devoid of any semblance of propaganda polemics. It presents a most revealing picture of the Stalinist revolution "from above."

It should be reassuring to those who fear the aggressive intentions of the Stalin dictatorship that, according to the author, so long as a cool realist such as Stalin is at the head of the Soviet state the Soviet Union will not unleash an adventurous global war unless, indeed, it should feel itself economically and militarily strong enough to take the concomitant risks. Since the continued armaments race may lead to national bankruptcy of the Soviet Union, as was intimated by Stalin in February 1951, it would appear that the transition from the cold war to peaceful coexistence is recognized by Soviet rulers as an urgent necessity of Soviet domestic policy.

An exact knowledge of the political and social forces at work in the Soviet Union and of their development is of decisive significance for an unbiased objective evaluation of present-day Russia. Such an evaluation is dispassionately presented in this scholarly volume.

KARL SCHOLZ

University of Pennsylvania

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

GEIGER, THEODORE, and H. VAN B. CLEVELAND. *Making Western Europe Defensible.* Pp. viii, 85. Washington: National Planning Association (Planning Pamphlet No. 74), 1951. $1.00.

This slender volume is a cogent analysis of the economic, political, military, and psychological facts of life in western Europe. It is well reasoned and well documented. Its basic thesis rests on the undeclared policy of the United States not to allow the military potential of western Europe to fall into the hands of an unfriendly power.

Both World Wars were, of course, fought pursuant to this policy. Subsequently ECA help and now arms assistance further fortify it. The authors, however, persuasively argue that no amount of economic or military aid will create an effective defense in the absence of economic and political integration of western Europe.

Lack of confidence in government, distrust of currencies, dearth of venture capital, and numerous barriers to trade

have made the nations of western Europe weak both economically and politically.

Strong democratic governments with both the will and the means to resist Communism can come only with strong economies. And a strong economy in western Europe can only be built by knocking down the barriers which prevent the free flow of raw materials and finished products to the potential market of 160 million western Europeans.

While not denying the obstacles to unification in the old rivalries and jealousies of nationalism, the authors point out that Europe nonetheless has a common heritage of religious and political institutions, laws, and customs. And, in truth, much has already been accomplished in the direction of unification.

The European Payments Union and the European Consultative Assembly and Council of Ministers are already functioning. The Pleven plan for a European army controlled by a supranational authority would result in military integragation of Europe. The foreign ministers of France, Western Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and Italy recently approved such a step, as did the consultative assembly.

Similarly, the Schuman plan to pool European steel and coal production would be an enormous step toward the economic integration of western Europe. The French national assembly has already voted approval of that proposal.

Political leaders like Pleven and Schuman of France, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, and Alcide de Gasperi of Italy are presently showing their acute awareness of the nature and importance of the problem. They are also showing the highest statesmanship in their efforts to bring about effective union.

It will come as a surprise to most Americans that the Congress wrote into ECA legislation a declaration committing the United States to promoting unification of western Europe. Individual congressmen have emphasized the urgency. England—playing an ancient game—has cast a cold and fishy eye on the whole business. Our own Department of State apparently has done nothing to support, implement, or execute the declared policy of Congress.

This book persuasively presents a sound doctrine. Every citizen will profit by its reading. It should be required reading for every candidate for President of the United States.

WALTER J. KOHLER
Governor, State of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

COLTON, JOEL. *Compulsory Labor Arbitration in France, 1936–1939.* Pp. xvi, 220. New York: King's Crown Press, 1951. $3.25.

Dr. Colton's able monograph presents a history of the French experiment in industrial arbitration from its origins in the sitdown strikes of June, 1936, until its wartime suspension. The first part describes the circumstances under which the labor-sponsored Popular Front government introduced compulsory arbitration despite French labor's traditional hostility to the very idea of arbitration. The study then proceeds to examine the nature of the system that was adopted and to explore the problems that arose out of its operation. Considerable attention is paid to such aspects as the adjustment of wages to rising prices through arbitration, the effect of compulsory arbitration on "the right to strike" as well as on the strike record, the enforcement of arbitration awards, and the working of the system in assisting in the conclusion of bargaining contracts. A final chapter analyzes the significance of the general strike of November 1938, which can be regarded as the dramatic conclusion of the Popular Front period. An examination of the role which arbitration played in the aftermath of the strike gives the author an opportunity to describe the general outlook of labor and management on industrial relations during the immediate prewar months.

The book presents a fine example of an essay in social history. Dr. Colton writes with skill and uses the available sources—government, union, and management documents, as well as earlier literature on the subject—with discerning judiciousness. Much of the material has never been made available before, at least not in English. Over the numerous French monographs which have analyzed the arbitration system at the period of its inception, the author has the advantage of writing with the perspective provided by distance both in space and time.

Although the study does not attempt to give a comparative analysis of social legislation, occasionally enlightening parallels are drawn between essential features of collective bargaining in the United States and in France. By comparing truly comparable over-all situations rather than special institutions or statutes, and by taking fully into account psychological intangibles coloring domestic and foreign experiences, the author avoids almost completely the pitfalls characteristic of all too many comparative essays.

The book states correctly that throughout the years under scrutiny industrial relations in France remained tense. "The arbitration system could do little to blunt the agressiveness and mutual distrust of both sides" (p. 118). Nevertheless the author feels that "there was justification for Léon Blum's assertion that the compulsory arbitration system was one of the most important social reforms introduced under his administration" (p. 155). Dr. Colton bases his conclusion on the belief that the arbitration system helped to diminish the number of disputes that might otherwise have flared into open conflict.

Yet the descriptive parts of the book clearly show how much arbitration in France, at all times only a shifting expedient adopted to meet situations it could not master, has contributed to increase confusion about the mutual objectives of labor and management and the role of government in democratic industrial society. And out of confusion there arose further unrest. How little the present-day French legislators are thinking of the earlier experiment in arbitration is demonstrated by the fact that the collective bargaining law of 1950 contains no provision whatsoever for industrial arbitration. As in many other respects the Fourth Republic manifests here its antagonism against the Third Republic by blunt protest. That this will not solve the problems of industrial relations in France is easily conceded. But the mere fact speaks ill for the historical importance of the institution so admirably analyzed by Dr. Colton.

HENRY W. EHRMANN
University of Colorado

LEWINSOHN, RICHARD. *Trusts et cartels dans l'économie mondiale.* Pp. 386. Paris: Librarie de Médicis, 1950. Pp. 750 fr.

The greater part of this book is of a descriptive character. It gives some useful information on the rise and growth of some of the giant enterprises in American as well as European industry. Producers' cartels of the European type are described in a separate section. There is, moreover, an account of intergovernmental commodity agreements relating to primary products such as wheat, sugar, rubber, and tin.

Thus the field covered by the book is very wide, and it can scarcely be said that any part of it is treated in great depth. Yet the author often manages to present interesting and significant details, for example, about the coffee "valorization" schemes in Brazil, or about the iron and steel industry in prewar Germany. There is a good summary of the formation of the European Steel Cartel, whose political background of Franco-German rapprochement in the years 1925–27 seems curiously reminiscent of the background of the Schuman Plan in the years 1950–52.

Most of the book appears to have been written before World War II: The attempt to bring it up to date has been somewhat perfunctory and certainly uneven. While, for instance, there is a discussion of some draft legislation introduced in France in 1950, there is no mention of Britain's "Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act" of 1948. In most passages where reference is made to "the war" or to "postwar" developments, the reader will find, though sometimes not without a little trouble, that what is meant is World War I.

No strong views are expressed on the question of public control of monopolistic

organizations, though it is clear that the author is no friend of trusts and cartels. On the whole, his reaction is one of melancholy resignation in the face of a baffling and persisting problem. The forward march of monopoly (private or public) seems to be accepted as more or less inevitable. The author is, of course, well aware of the difference between American and European attitudes toward the control of restrictive business practices. At the same time, he misses no opportunity to point, almost gleefully, to the shortcomings and difficulties in the actual enforcement of antitrust legislation in the United States.

Written mainly for the general reader, this is an instructive and lucid account of the role of trusts and cartels in the world economy and in the leading industrial countries.

RAGNAR NURKSE
Columbia University

RUSSELL, FRANK M. *The Saar, Battleground and Pawn.* Pp. xi, 204. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951. $5.00.

In this extension and elaboration of a study first published in 1826, Professor Russell critically traces political and economic developments in the Saar from the early beginnings to the present, in the series of "Stanford University books on World Affairs." His account focuses on the post-World War I settlement as a point of departure for a searching review of the development of French attitudes toward the Saar since that time. Russell, in taking issue with French intransigence in the earlier administration of the Saar, lays bare the roots of a later reaction which was due not so much to economic factors as to the violent upsurge of German nationalism in the Saar following the advent of Hitler. He correctly cautions against easy assumptions that the present more enlightened, though hardly less single-minded French approach automatically lessens this danger in the future—an observation which might call for a reference to the threat of the new unholy alliance of German nationalism with a doctrinaire socialism based on largely noneconomic attitudes. In their approach to the Saar question, German Social-Democrats, determined not again to succumb to encirclement by the extremes of the political left and right, now often appear willing to protect their flank by flaunting an aggressiveness designed to neutralize their appeal.

After the extensive wartime destruction of Saar mines and industries and the collapse of the German economy, French efforts toward ultimate integration of the territory fell on fertile grounds, particularly while the erstwhile standard bearers of nationalism were disfranchised. The Monnet Plan (not referred to in the book) brought the Saar the benefits of large investments in the coal and steel industries and the development of gas transmission lines. As a result, Saar coal production now exceeds prewar levels by some 40 per cent and, in fact, surpassed 1951 Organization for European Economic Co-operation objectives—the only member area to do so. However, with the revival of a sovereign Western Germany and particularly with the more effective anti-inflationary measures taken in that country, the relative economic advantages of membership in the franc area may easily diminish. Recognizing this, French administration has put equal stress on cultural and political *rapprochement*. While these trends are ably developed in the discussion, one wonders why the rather brief comments on the Schuman Plan do not more systematically set out the various means by which this plan proposes to neutralize the historic tensions of a political and economic nature which have made the Saar a pawn of power politics in the past. European integration, to be effective, must rest on a stable economic foundation, which neither France nor Germany alone is able to furnish, regardless of political relations. However, in the larger framework of a Western Union oriented toward the primary purpose of maintaining peace through economic strength, the inhabitants of the Saar may yet find an outlet for political aspirations which might else be forced into less desirable channels. It seems to this reviewer that in this respect the Schuman Plan presents a radical departure from earlier approaches to the Saar dilemma which may yet prove to hold the definitive solution.

It seems regrettable that the publishers have found it necessary to restrict circulation of this scholarly study by pricing it at $5.00, even though nearly 70 of its 200 pages consist of documentation.

ADOLPHE J. WARNER
New York City

LUXEMBURG, ROSA. *The Accumulation of Capital.* Translated from the German by Agnes Schwarzschild. In series "Rare Masterpieces of Philosophy and Science." Pp. 475. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. **$5.00.**

Rosa Luxemburg is one of the few outstanding personalities among European Marxists who did independent thinking within the Marxist tradition. Where she was orthodox, it was not in virtue of scriptural fetishism but in consequence of a fresh attempt to rethink problems. Sometimes this led her to a belief in the doctrine of the inevitable and automatic breakdown of capitalism and the "spontaneity theory" of working class revolt which was its corollary—notions more mystical than scientific. But she was not always orthodox. This volume is a criticism along Marxist lines of Marx's own attempt to solve the problem of expanded reproduction of total capital, that is, of what keeps capitalism a going concern when production is accompanied by accumulation of capital. Rosa Luxemburg argues that the premises of Marx's discussion and diagram of enlarged reproduction, legitimate enough for purposes of his analysis of the theory of value and individual accumulations of capital, are insufficient to explain the actual historical process of accumulation of aggregate social capital.

For purposes of his analysis Marx had assumed the universal hegemony of capitalism, or what is logically tantamount to the same thing, that it was an isolated, self-sufficient system subject to no external influences, and that capitalists and workers constituted mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes in the process of production. Rosa Luxemburg maintained that these assumptions were too parsimonious, that Marx could not make ends meet with them in explaining the historical facts, and that the problem could only be solved by recognizing that "the accumulation of capital, as a historical process, depends in every respect upon noncapitalist social strata and forms of social organization." Without foreign, external markets capitalism cannot continue to function, and the limits of its expansion are set by the available foreign markets. It is imperialistic by its very nature and the more it succeeds the greater its difficulties, and the sooner it must break down because of its "immanent contradictions."

Dr. Joan Robinson contributes a helpful introduction translating Marxian terms into current economic language. "For all its confusions and exaggerations," she says, "this book shows more prescience than any orthodox contemporary could claim." This prescience which is less than that found in Hobson, however, does not flow from any of the theoretical economic assumptions which she shares with Marx.

As an intellectual figure the stature of Rosa Luxemburg in the free world depends more upon her critical reflections on the Bolshevik Revolution and Lenin's transformation of "Soviet democracy" into a minority party dictatorship than on her economic contributions which are mainly of historical interest.

SIDNEY HOOK
New York University

NORMAN, ALBERT. *Our German Policy: Propaganda and Culture.* Pp. 85. New York: Vantage Press, 1951. $2.50.

This is a very small book (only 70 pages of text) which aims to describe the American policy on the problem of the cultural reorientation of the German people. In an introductory chapter, the author discusses, in very broad terms, the gradual change from the 1945 Morgenthau-Vansittart objective of a pauperized, pastoral nation, reformed through the mailed fist, to the 1946 realization that democracy is only possible on a decent economic foundation. Within the short period of about a year, the premise of mass guilt and the attitude that nothing could be done with Germany until "a new set of German

mothers" appeared was replaced by the knowledge that most Germans did not feel guilty and that Germans were capable of reorienting their country toward democracy in the educational as well as economic, political, and social fields. The five succeeding chapters present a somewhat more detailed picture of this trend in American policy as it attempted to solve the problems of the press, book publishing, radio, motion picture, the theater, and music.

The aim of the book is modest and, hence, it is hardly unfavorable to say that the result certainly goes no further than the aim. Perhaps because Mr. Norman's story is so short, it is also easy to suggest that much has been omitted. And, yet, in a subject such as this, there are certain basic assumptions that need analysis. It is true, as the author states, that "There are those who consider Hitler to be the only true representative of the German people's immutable character," a war-making nation ravaging the world, but the subject needs further exploration. Some analysis of the nature of these Germans, even only one chapter, is a necessary introduction and must have been an essential taking-off point for any American policy on educational reorientation.

Several chapters—for example that on newspaper publishing—although including good descriptions of the regulatory and licensing processes, are written without sufficient reference to the human stories involved. Conversely, the chapter on policy toward the movies is excellent, because the author gives us from his peculiar vantage point his own evaluation of the elements which went into the formation of policy as well as his judgment of the impact on the German people.

RALPH F. BISCHOFF
New York University

RADBRUCH, A. *Langfristige Auslandskredite: Ein Beitrag zur Problematik der internationalen Kapitalbewegungen.* (Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Neue Folge, Band 4.) Pp. 224. Tübingen: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1949. DM 18.—.

Maintaining that the possibility of a smooth repayment of foreign long term credits (loans) depends on the economic structure of the debtor country, a novel approach to the transfer problem, Dr. A. Radbruch undertakes to investigate (a) the course of foreign credit in debtor countries in different stages of economic development and (b) whether the credit process in these economies makes possible an effective transfer of debt payments abroad.

As the tool for the analysis, the author develops the theory of foreign long term credit in the first of two parts of her work. Stated crudely, the essence of the theory is as follows: a foreign long term credit movement means a transfer of buying power from the creditor to the debtor nation for "productive" purposes. Productive employment—the vital phase of the credit process—means that the foreign loan will be invested in those industries of the debtor's economy that will produce "export capital" (that is, export goods that earn, or goods previously imported that save, foreign exchange), which alone makes possible the effective transfer of debt repayments and assures future equilibrium.

In the second part of the book lies Dr. Radbruch's original contribution to the subject. Here the author uses the concept of export capital to measure the productivity of a foreign credit by analyzing its flow through the individual phases of the credit process—the granting, utilization, and repayment of the loan—in debtor countries of different economic structures. The experience of debtor nations, particularly that of Canada from 1900 to 1913 and that of Germany from 1924 to 1928, provides the factual material. The analysis and empirical verification are carried out with care and in considerable detail.

For the purpose of analysis Dr. Radbruch classifies debtor nations into three categories: new capitalistic, half capitalistic, and capitalistic "overconsumption" countries—the concept "capitalistic" denoting the density of population and the degree of intensity of capital equipment of the specific economic area. Her analysis shows that prospects of debt repayment are most favorable in new capitalistic, or underdeveloped, countries with relatively rich, unexploited resources of raw materials demanded by industrial nations, and in half capitalistic countries in the process of industrialization. In these two categories of countries an inflow of foreign credit leads directly to formation of export capital.

In the capitalistic "overconsumption" countries, on the other hand, foreign credit does not contribute to formation of export capital; hence they face a transfer problem. England, France and Germany, and some other European countries comprise this category. These nations have lost their former economic leadership and creditor position. Since the war they have been forced to borrow abroad for reconstruction and other purposes. But their high wage levels have increased production costs to such an extent that they cannot compete in the world market. While production can be expanded through foreign credits and rising costs, the increased output is offset by the generally high propensity to consume. This helps to obtain a higher internal living standard, but does not provide for repayment of debt (that is, it does not form export capital). Since under such conditions a steady flow of credit into those countries cannot be expected, Dr. Radbruch believes that their borrowing abroad requires planned utilization of foreign credit and of internal distribution of income in order to assure the formation of export capital. Moreover, she favors foreign loan agreements which provide for repayment of debt by specific commodities.

Only a few brief comments can be made here. The author's conclusions regarding foreign borrowing by "overconsumption" countries probably were influenced by the immediate postwar experience. Further, the type of debtor-creditor relation which she favors in the case of these countries is restrictive in character not only as regards the immediate contracting parties, but also —and primarily—as regards the future of international investment. It may be noted that more appropriate solutions to the problem of foreign investment in the industrial countries in present circumstances were suggested, for example, by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in two recent studies, *Report on International Investment* (1950) and *Intra-European Investments* (1951). Significantly, these documents stress the important part that private investment might play in the economic and financial recovery, as well as expansion, of those countries.

Regarding the new and half capitalistic countries, to draw conclusions from earlier experiences for the present situation appears scarcely justifiable. Conditions now are less favorable to foreign investment than before 1914, or even prior to World War II. The author seems to underestimate the risks to foreign capital in these areas. Also, there does not appear to exist a direct relation between foreign loans and formation of export capital, as may have been true in the earlier period. The aforementioned OEEC *Report on International Investment* indicates that precisely these countries cannot now be developed by private investment. Public investment will have to do the job because the future of the economies of the underdeveloped countries depends largely on nonrevenue-earning basic development.

Despite the foregoing observations, Dr. Radbruch's work—as an analysis of a particular episode in the history of foreign investment—is an important contribution to the literature on international capital movements.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
Washington, D. C.

MAY, ARTHUR J. *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867–1914.* Pp. x, 532. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $6.00.

Among the numerous books which are now being published about the Hapsburg Monarchy, Professor May's comprehensive study of the period from "the great renunciation" after Sadowa and Sedan to the outbreak of World War I is certainly one of the best. Thanks to its high literary qualities that big volume is eminently readable.

The author's painstaking research is evidenced by his quotations from unpublished documents in the British Record Office and in the United States National Archives, which he uses not only in the discussion of political affairs but also in the survey of social, economic, and cultural developments to which he devotes much attention. Chapters and sections on the latter aspects "have been woven into the narrative." These brilliant essays necessarily interrupt the chronological account of political events, but they are highly welcome. Professor May has interpreted with admirable insight the involved conditions and ways of life in each half of the Dual Monarchy and in each of its various nationalities. He seems to be less well informed regarding some provinces, especially Galicia, than some others, such as Bohemia; but in every case he makes an earnest effort to maintain an objectivity almost impossible in dealing with the controversies and rivalries under consideration.

In his epilogue Professor May discusses the "schemes for reformation," but, of course, in less detail than appears in R. A. Kann's two-volume study on *The Multinational Empire* (Columbia University Press, 1950). And stressing here the "sources of strength" of the Monarchy, the author has apparently left for his next volume, which will cover the years 1914–19, his intrepretation of the deeper causes of the final catastrophe. However, the present work gives ample evidence that the fateful German alliance was indeed—much more than the introduction of universal suffrage—"a leap in the dark." It also shows clearly that, on the other hand, Foreign Secretary Baron A. Aehrenthal, "the most respected and most feared Austrian foreign secretary since Andrassy," assumed a very heavy responsibility when he abandoned as "too timid" the international policy of "his easygoing predecessor" Goluchowski, who, in agreement with Casimir Badeni (quoted in the conclusions), realized that "a State of nationalities can make no war without danger to itself."

O. HALECKI
Fordham University

LOCKHART, R. H. BRUCE. *Jan Masaryk, A Personal Memoir.* Pp. 80. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $5.75.

It is a part of human nature that people like to claim a friendship, and even an intimate friendship, with contemporaries of fame. There are many such persons all over the globe who assert that they have been close friends of Jan Masaryk. Actually, the number of people whom Masaryk himself would have called his friends probably could be counted on the fingers of one hand, and this reviewer certainly would not dare to claim this privilege. He thinks, however, that Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart takes a place among "the big five."

"Remember, if in difficulty or in need of frank counsel, we can always ask Bruce Lockhart for help. He understands us better than anybody else, even should he say *no* to our wish," Masaryk told me, sometime in 1940 when I served him as his private secretary. Lockhart's tender volume of personal memoirs proves that he understood well not only Czechoslovakia, but her son, Jan Masaryk, also.

To casual acquaintances made at diplomatic parties, official negotiations, international gatherings, Masaryk appeared as something of a playboy and joker. In fact, he was a man of lonely heart and mental isolation. His life was one of improvisation, his mind one of artistic genius, his heart one of humaneness concealed by roughness. None of these virtues would ordinarily make a good diplomat, and there were officials with striped pants sitting in various chancelleries whose stiff attitude and memorized knowledge did not allow them to understand Masaryk's unconventional approach to what they considered matters of a high-brow diplomacy. Yet it was his intuitive sense of seeing international affairs as basically human relations in which the lot of human beings is ultimately at stake which brought him and his country victory in some political battles, but which, if the struggle was lost, gravely depressed him.

Lockhart knew Masaryk for over thirty years and saw him in times of both success and defeat, of both joy and distress. He laughed at his jokes and shared his sorrows. In his book he presented his friend as he was—a bundle of nerves, sentiments, complexes, and complexities—in a carefully balanced picture which will answer many questions asked by Americans whenever Masaryk's name is mentioned.

The Czechoslovak people are suffering again under foreign domination—this time Soviet-Communist. During the war they turned their radio dials to the British Broadcasting Corporation to listen to Jan Masaryk who would never miss a broadcast and a chance to give them encouragement and hope. His voice was silenced by the Communist rulers. But they find some consolation and inspiration in hearing regularly from London the voice of his and their friend, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart.

JOSEF KORBEL
University of Denver

OTHERS

BORTON, HUGH (Ed.). *Japan.* Pp. viii, 320. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951. $4.00.

The mills of studying, writing, and deliberating about almost any topic of human inquiry grind only if there is a mass of ready reference data for them to turn upon. The difficulty is that the printed collections of such data can be, on the one hand, so massive that they are bothersome to handle and, on the other, so slim that they are useless to consult for any but the most elementary facts, names, and dates. The value of the new ready reference book, *Japan,* is that it succeeds in being both comprehensive and manageable, and that it points to a new way of being encyclopedic without being annoying—annoying in the manner of the typical multi-course collation of wisdom, which makes it impossible to bite at a fact without eating one's way through a vast series of meals. *Japan* avoids this annoyance by the simple trick of collecting twenty-three particular articles of the 1951 edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana* and printing them within the covers of one book. The book probably contains more facts of more variegated sorts about Japan than have ever before been brought within one-volume compass. Its success is so considerable that it makes this one volume an important aid to research and raises the question whether encyclopedias should not be issued in the form of a series of topical volumes rather than in the form of a series of alphabetical booby-traps, enticing the unwary into picking up oddments of information on topics not under consideration.

The consequence of bringing together many facts is, of course, the exclusion of many theories. For twenty authors to detail the outward facets of twenty-three topics is necessarily to overlook a great many hidden meanings and to pass by quite a number of details of the sort that are important only as they illuminate other events. Discussed at length, the Panay incident of December, 1937, could give light on the operations of the Japanese mind in war, diplomacy, economics, and personal relationship. But in an encyclopedia, the Panay can rate only half a paragraph. Perhaps no topic is more important than the social and cultural consequences of the U. S. occupation of Japan, but an encyclopedia has to cut this topic up among a dozen-odd writers. It has to settle for a discussion of what actually and openly took place, has to shun what may be taking place somewhat less obviously.

Within these limitations, *Japan* offers a number of impressive contributions. George B. Sansom, for instance, presents a remarkable précis of Japanese history; John F. Embree boils down his broad research on the Japanese people into just fifteen pages; Douglas G. Haring covers the Japanese way of life and still penetrates it; Hugh Borton, editor of the book, gives a coherent, knowing narrative of the rise of Japan as a modern state. It is significant that contributions such as these are impressive precisely because they are successfully encyclopedic: they proceed out of a recounting of many facts. The contributions which were least impressive to this reviewer seems to him to share a tendency to channel facts in accord with unstated theories. The book underlines

the new fact that an encyclopedia is the better for having the format of a book; it underlines also the old fact that an encyclopedia is the better for not being a book but a collection of facts.

HERRYMON MAURER
Princeton, New Jersey

SCHWARTZ, BENJAMIN I. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Pp. 258. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $4.00.

This is a much needed book. Numerous writers have described their personal experiences in Chinese Communist territories, but until recently, few attempts had been made to analyze the basic documentary evidence which Bolshevik leaders—Russian and Chinese—have themselves created. In accomplishing this task for the approximate period 1918–1934, Mr. Schwartz has demonstrated how the painstaking scholar can reconstruct from Communist records an objective history of a Communist movement and its rise to power.

Piecing the story together with exceptional patience, Mr. Schwartz shows how throughout the twenties Stalin and his agents in China failed to promote successful revolution on the basis of working class revolt. During this period, Moscow made Chinese Communist leaders and broke them, dictating nearly every turn and twist of the Chinese Communist policy. More often than not these policies failed, and, when they did, it was usually a Chinese Communist, rather than a Russian, who took responsibility.

Mao Tse-tung saw the peasantry, rather than the urban working class, as the main force of the Chinese revolution. But although the Stalinist hierarchy censured him for his first attempts at organizing peasant Soviets and building a peasant army, Mao remained a Communist, working always within a Marxist-Leninist framework. Mr. Schwartz shows, however, that Mao, like other Communist leaders before him, did not hesitate to improvise within that framework. Mr. Schwartz believes, moreover, that the greatest Maoist improvisation—the use of Chinese peasants as the main force of the revolutionary struggle—is actually a negation of fundamental Marxist-Leninist tenets.

This book should dispel any lingering illusions that the Chinese Communists are simply agrarian reformers or "a new kind of Communist." Mr. Schwartz also presents ample evidence to indicate that the Chinese Communist movement is considerably more than simply a Soviet Russian plot. For Mao Tse-tung and his followers, while remaining within the framework of Bolshevik ideology and Bolshevik discipline, have been peculiarly successful in adapting to Chinese conditions and in contributing to Bolshevik theory and practice.

There are minor points over which one might take issue with Mr. Schwartz. There is considerable evidence to suggest, for example, that Mao did not win control of the Chinese Communist apparatus in 1932 or 1933, as the author states, but at the Tsun-yi Conference of January, 1935. But this is an academic point. Mr. Schwartz has written a book which should be read and digested by every American who is interested in the problem of Asian Communism.

ROBERT C. NORTH
Hoover Institute and Library
Stanford University

HUNTER, EDWARD. *Brain-washing in Red China: The Calculated Destruction of Men's Minds*. Pp. 311. New York: The Vanguard Press, 1951. $3.50.

Mr. Hunter has made an impressive contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the working methods of the Chinese Communists in the general field of education, propaganda, indoctrination, and thought-control. His study is based principally on interviews conducted in Hong Kong with refugees from Red China; and the first half of the volume records, in first-person, autobiographical style, the experiences of his anonymous informants. This source of information is supplemented by Mr. Hunter's own observations and by his analysis of the current literary output of the Chinese Communists. Despite its journalistic form and style, which make it lively reading, the book rings true and, in the opinion of this reviewer, it faithfully reflects and interprets the situation in Red China.

No feature of Communist totalitarianism is more horrifying than its unceasing and relentless struggle to capture and destroy the human mind. By what terrifying process can men be taught *not* to think for themselves? How can they be hypnotized to believe that black is white, war is peace, hate is love? How can they be led to doubt the integrity of their own minds and to accept the capacity of others to pass judgment on themselves and their friends and neighbors? The very fact that such questions can be asked is alarming evidence of the danger to which the whole tradition of liberalism, humanism, and democracy now stands exposed. Yet, while it can hardly be said that the Chinese Communists have fully succeeded in attaining the results they desire, Mr. Hunter leaves no doubt of the vigor and intelligence with which they have embarked on the task of remolding the educational and cultural tradition of the Chinese people.

The story of how the Chinese Communists proceed with the "calculated destruction of men's minds" is necessarily a complex one. The mere force of the police state is not sufficient, of itself, to paralyze the brain of man. "Brain-washing"—the process by which men's thoughts are changed and brought under control—could hardly be carried out except in the circumstances of a police state; force must stand in the background, and terror and intimidation must contribute to the pattern of mental exploitation. But the principal devices are the schools—public and party—the press, drama and literature, and the total cultural activity of the regime. Education, propaganda, indoctrination, and thought control become totally synonymous. "Brain-washing" makes enthusiastic converts out of doubters and is designed to obliterate the will to resist on the part of covert opponents. Much remains for the Chinese Communists to do before they can claim complete success, but meanwhile their program and activity raise formidable obstacles to the effort of foreign "voices" to reach through them to the people of China.

H. ARTHUR STEINER
University of California at Los Angeles

YOUNG, T. CUYLER (Ed.). *Near Eastern Culture and Society: A Symposium on the Meeting of East and West*. Vol. 15, "Princeton Oriental Studies." Pp. x, 250. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. $4.00.

This charming and informative little volume deserves wider circulation than it is likely to receive. As a symposium on the meeting of the East and West by men of widely differing interests and competencies, this collection of essays, garnered from a conference on Near Eastern culture and society held at Princeton University in 1947 in connection with the celebration of its bicentennial, is of significant importance to all those interested in Near Eastern and Islamic culture.

In his introduction, "Near East Perspective: The Past and the Present," the editor, T. Cuyler Young, gives a definite and adequate preview of the various contributions and a thumb nail sketch of the contributors.

The volume is divided into two parts which differ greatly with respect to content and treatment. In both parts there is considerable variation in both quality and approach to the problems dealt with. In Part I Richard Ettinghausen's essay on "Islam Art and Archeology" contains twenty-five delightful illustrations, most of them showing the influence of Moslem art on that of Europe. The text is primarily for scholars, to whom it should be most useful. George Saxton's treatment of Islamic Science in chapter five is immensely stimulating and contains some very practical advice to research scholars. The essays on Islamic literature—Arabic, by Evon Grunebaum, and Persian, by Arthur J. Arberry—are written for scholars, not for the layman, and deal principally with the history of the evolution of western studies of these two great bodies of literature.

Part II deals in six essays with recent and contemporary times. T. Cuyler Young contributes two of these, both on Iran, one dealing historically with the "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Iran" and the other on internal and international affairs of that troubled nation. Both essays are excellent. Abdulhak Adnan-Adivar's essay, chapter seven, on "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey" is rather superficial and not overly satisfying. Habib Amin Kurani has a far more satisfactory chapter (nine) on the same subject with respect to the Arab World. Mr. Kurani raises some interesting questions with respect to present trends of education in the Arab countries, dealing with the conflict between secular and religious education and the lack of educational training for skilled artisans. Chapter ten by Lewis V. Thomas, although its title "The National and International Relations of Turkey" is misleading, is first rate. It presents clearly some of the problems which confront the westernized Turkish leaders in their attempts to modernize and unify the Turkish people. Constantine K. Zurayk in chapter twelve gives a brief résumé of the Arab nationalist movement and the discontent of the Arabs following the peace settlements of 1919. He also briefly discusses the Arab reaction to Zionism and the movement towards Arab unity in relationship to the Arab League and the United Nations.

The conclusion consists of an essay by H. A. R. Gibb, "Near East Perspective: the Present and the Future." This is a timely and thought-provoking summary in which the author points out that "the utter failure to achieve a truly mutual relationship on the political front is due primarily to cultural rather than political antagonism."

WILLIAM YALE

University of New Hampshire

BISBEE, ELEANOR. *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920–1950.* Pp. xiv, 298. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. $5.00.

From a redwood cottage in California Eleanor Bisbee has written the best analysis of the everyday Turk that has yet appeared in English. She spent some six years ending in 1942 in Turkey as a professor at the two American colleges in Istanbul. She returned home with a love of the Turkish people but without her notes about them—the notes were lost at sea. This volume largely depends, therefore, on her memories and on the help that Miss Bisbee has obtained from Turkish friends. Such collaboration has doubtless served to paint a more detailed and colorful picture; the perspective has likewise become rather more Turkish.

Contrary to foreign misconceptions, the Turks are a sensitive people, often quite introspective. They do not accept criticism readily. They like to believe their achievement to be as far advanced as their ideal. Their ideal is a progressive Western civilization. They have made vast strides in this direction—in political organization, in economic orientation, in industrial development. And they are remaking their social services, their hospitals, and their schools. But these are mechanical and material achievemnts. In outlook and in mode of life the progress is slower; the results are less tangible.

Miss Bisbee does a realistic job in showing the confusion in this transitional period of the past quarter century, the era of the New Turkey. Social habits are not remade by decree. Life in the home and on the farm, attitudes toward marriage and work and religion are slow to change. The government can proscribe Arabic script in public display. But it cannot excise a tradition based on Arabic literature; it cannot create a new literature overnight. The Turk may go through the civil marriage ceremony as required by law; he may write in a new and somewhat synthetic Turkish tongue; he may even work in a ministry of health and welfare or a social insurance agency. But this present generation, having abandoned the old, has yet to understand the new; it is confused. The leaves have grown faster than the roots. Sometimes Miss Bisbee makes this clear; sometimes she is too kind and generous to do so.

The book is not perfectly organized or perfectly documented: after all, it is largely the experience of one person; and it attempts too much in too short a space. But it says a great deal, and says it honestly. It makes you like the Turks, and they deserve to be liked. It gives you an understanding too, or at least the basis for a deeper and more personal understanding. For the casual traveler, actual or armchair, it is an interesting commentary. For the person who will live or work with Turks, it is required reading.

GEOFFREY MAY

Norton, Massachusetts

POOLE, BERNARD L. *The Caribbean Commission: Background of Cooperation in the West Indies.* Pp. xix, 303. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1951. $5.50.

The title of this volume is so worded that it could be construed to fit a number of approaches to an interesting subject. What the author does is to set the background for the inauguration in 1946 of the four-power Caribbean Commission by tracing the long and complex development of the Caribbean possessions of Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, and the United States. The nearer Professor Poole advances to the creation of the Commission the more satisfactorily he accomplishes his task. His chapter dealing with the unilateral action of the home governments in regard to their Caribbean colonies following World War I is valuable. When he deals with Anglo-American co-operation in the area during World War II he is at his best and presents his story in such a way that the creation of the four-power Caribbean Commission in 1946 seemed the only logical step.

A far more qualified approval must be given the first six chapters, which comprise over half of the text and which attempt to treat historically the political, economic, and social problems of the Caribbean colonial area in general and in particular. This is a tremendous undertaking, and the fact that the finished product has any value perhaps reflects more discredit on previous scholarship than credit on the present writer. What Professor Poole has to say—and it is not a lot—about the area prior to the winning of independence by the great bulk of the hemisphere is so superficial and barren of research that it might as well have been omitted. Here as elsewhere in the volume one wonders how much better could have been the study had Professor Poole examined the vast store of literature on the area done in languages other than English.

Professor Poole discusses the economics of the region in a narrow sense of the term—land, crops, imports, exports, and wages. Little or nothing is said of banking, credits, and financing. He does not fix prices in relation to buying power, which is always frustrating. If the reviewer recalls correctly, foreign capital is 100 per cent damned in the best tradition of the 1930's.

Professor Poole, understandably, feels for the underdog—largely the Negro—of the area. In fact his personal feelings may have affected his objectivity on the subject. Very conceivably the race problem in the Caribbean could be even more complex than it is made to appear by Rex Tugwell, Paul Blanshard, or Eric Williams, all of whom are relied upon heavily for points of view as well as facts.

The volume contains only the barest suggestion that the Point Four program and the South Pacific Commission might benefit (as they actually have) from the experiences of the Caribbean Commission.

JOHN J. JOHNSON

Stanford University

WALLICH, HENRY C., and JOHN H. ADLER with the collaboration of E. R. Schlesinger, Florence Nixon, and P. J. W. Glaessner. *Public Finance in a Developing Country: El Salvador—A Case Study.* Pp. xviii, 346. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $6.00.

This is an intensive study of the public finances of an underdeveloped country subject to the pressures of the increasing emphasis upon social services and economic development. El Salvador has enjoyed fiscal and monetary stability for many years, even though it has had to suffer some of the consequences of the world-wide inflation.

Beside a summary and evaluation, there

are a dozen chapters, eight appendices, and an index. A wealth of statistical data are presented, 92 tables in all.

There follow some excerpts from the volume: "El Salvador is an export economy, with coffee, the chief crop, constituting about 82 per cent of total exports." "Although the production of coffee is the economically and politically dominant activity of the country, it accounts for only about 12 per cent of the total gross national product. . . ." "Large sectors of the population are relatively self-sufficient in most of the basic needs. . . ." "The government [relies] heavily upon taxes on foreign trade and other indirect taxes; income taxes and other direct taxes yield only small amounts." "[The country] has been able to withstand economic fluctuations successfully enough to maintain a balanced budget, a stable exchange rate, and freedom from exchange control for over fourteen years."

H. R. ENSLOW

Binghamton, New York

BLANKSTEN, GEORGE I. *Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos.* Pp. xiv, 196. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. $3.00 cloth; $2.00 paper.

This is one of the most realistic studies of governmental organization and functioning and political behavior in Latin America that has come to the attention of the reviewer. It should prove interesting and useful not merely to others working in the field of political science, but to geographers, economists, and sociologists as well. Indeed it is to be hoped that the little volume will be read by many of the 5 million college graduates in this country.

The author set for himself a substantial goal, and he executed his plan well. Unlike many works in the field, the book is not merely a painstaking analysis of constitutional provisions, such as some of the irreverent might call a "chewing over of old straws." Nor is it only an attempt to observe, record, and classify empirical facts about the political activities and behavior of the Ecuadorian people. Instead, it is a well-balanced combination of the two. By his penetrating study of the interplay between established constitutions and actual behavior patterns the author has provided a volume that long will be helpful to all those working in the field of Latin American studies.

A glance at the titles of the nine chapters into which the volume is divided gives a fair idea of the scope of the undertaking. The first two of them are introductory, with a general "Survey of the Republic of the Equator" presenting a brief summary of physical and political geography and a thumbnail sketch of the history of the country, and Chapter II, "The Ecuadorian Pattern," giving descriptions of the three principal regions and the Galápagos Islands. Chapter III, "Political Instability in Ecuador," is, in many ways, the most interesting and important chapter in the book. In it the details of the Caudillo system are given, and significant case studies of outstanding chieftains are presented. Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII are devoted to "Parties and National Elections," "The National Administration," "The National Legislature," and "The National Judiciary," respectively. Chapter VIII is given over to "Provincial and Local Government," and the conclusion appears as "The Ecuadorian System: A Recapitulation." It is more than a recapitulation, however, for it contains suggestions as to possible remedies as well as a brief diagnosis of the ills of the country. A ten-page bibliography and a brief index complete the volume.

A few words about the author's methodology and procedures are essential. A specialist in Latin American affairs, Blanksten served for several years in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American affairs in Washington. To get many of the materials used in the present study he went to Ecuador where his activities may be described in his own words: "During my six-month stay in Ecuador I visited all three continental regions of the country and lived with the people and their problems. Documentary materials are abundant in the republic, and I used them liberally; but this book is not pieced together from documents. I shared the life of the Sierra Indian in some of his villages; I attended sessions of congress and of a number of the courts; I lived in picturesque and formal Quito and in lazy, easygoing Guayaquil; and I bounced in a jeep through a part of the fabulous Oriente" (p. ix–x).

T. LYNN SMITH

University of Florida

BUTLAND, GILBERT J. *Chile: An Outline of Its Geography, Economics, and Politics.* Pp. vii, 128. New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951. $2.50.

This short volume is the first in a series of factual studies of several Latin American Nations sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The textual materials go way beyond what one would expect from the subtitle, "An Outline of Its Geography, Economics, and Politics." Quality of description and analysis makes up for brevity. Throughout one gets the impression that the author is thoroughly familiar with his subject. The book is an up-to-date analysis of the geographical, economic, and political components of the nation.

One may say that the book is primarily a regional survey. In the first chapter the four main regions—the Desert, Mediterranean Chile, Forest Chile, and Atlantic Chile—are analyzed from the point of view of physical conditions. One might disagree with the inclusion of the southern part of Tierra del Fuego in the same region—Forest Chile—with the southern part of the central valley. Although the first chapter is the only one organized strictly on a regional basis, the reader is not left in doubt in the other chapters as to which region of the country the subject matter applies. A special feature of the volume is the regional distribution or location of the various elements treated.

An outline of Chilean history since 1925 illuminates the present political, economic, and social structure of the country. The latest available statistics are used in analyzing agriculture, mining, manufacturing, finance, and trade. In the last thirty years Chile has made significant progress in all these lines, despite the serious problems arising as a result of the world depression in the 1930's, World War II, and the unsettled conditions in the world in postwar years. The progress made to date lays the foundation for much greater progress in the future. The final chapter analyzes briefly, but effectively, Chile's relations with its neighbors, the United States and Europe, and the part Chile has played in the Pan-American System and in the United Nations Organization. Chile has not only strengthened democratic processes in social and political evolution, but it has also played an effective role in international affairs. With all, Chile has gained stature as a Latin-American Nation.

This little volume should appeal to the economist, geographer, political scientist interested in Latin America, and the industrialist interested in the Chilean market. The textual discussion is supplemented by seven simple, clear, effective maps and by many short statistical tables.

CLARENCE F. JONES

Northwestern University

BORAH, WOODROW. *New Spain's Century of Depression.* Pp. vi, 58. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. 75 cents.

In this comparatively brief paper the author interprets the movement of Mexican colonial economy in terms of demographic findings, and he shows that from 1576 until well over a century later New Spain had a contracting economy. This long period of depression was a major factor in molding the Mexican land and labor systems which became dominant in the seventeenth century and remained down to the Revolution of 1910. In this period the number of Indians diminished and the number of whites increased. The author points out that the long continued decrease of Mexico's Indians from the Conquest until the beginning of the eighteenth century must be accounted one of the important factors in Mexican history. He writes, "Had the aboriginal populations of Central Mexico borne the impact of conquest with little demographic loss, there would have been scant room for their conquerors except as administrators and receivers of tribute. Mexico today would be an Indian area from which, in the process of achieving independence from Spain, a

white upper stratum holding itself apart, like the British in India, could easily have been expelled."

The author does not claim to have produced a definitive piece of research in Mexican economic and social history. He has, however, developed a hypothesis which he hopes may be investigated further by himself or by other writers. The volume contains numerous charts and nearly twelve pages of notes. The study is published as volume 35 in the "Ibero-Americana Series" of the University of California Press. This is a thoughtful, ground-breaking piece of scholarship which may be continued by persons of like-minded interests.

A. CURTIS WILGUS
School of Inter-American Studies

LEWIS, OSCAR. *Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied.* Pp. xxvii, 512. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951. $7.50.

This book is of more than usual importance and interest for several reasons. First, it is an excellent example of community study in the modern anthropological manner. Lewis had the services of a crew of investigators, most of them Mexican field workers, and he made good use of his opportunities to produce a well-rounded ethnographic study which also explores the personality and social psychology of the people. Second, it is a restudy of a Mexican rural community made famous at the end of the 1920's by the pioneer investigations of Robert Redfield. Just as crucial experiments in the physical sciences must be constantly repeated and rechecked, so important field studies in cultural anthropology need to be followed up over the course of time and by others than the original worker. Lewis' book is one of the first such "repeat jobs" in cultural anthropology to be published. Dr. Redfield, far from taking a dog-in-the-manger attitude, set a noble example by giving the project his blessing and assistance. The present book is dedicated to him.

The aspect of the work which will attract the greatest attention among social scientists in general is the fact that Lewis' findings directly contradict those of Redfield at several important points and call for a reconsideration of Redfield's theories of "folk culture" and cultural change which have achieved wide acceptance during the past twenty years. Whereas Redfield found Tepoztlán to be homogeneous and peaceful, Lewis discovers class and wealth differences and a surprising amount of interpersonal and intergroup bickering and quarreling. Where Redfield sees culture change to be a fairly regular and orderly movement along an urban-folk continuum in which the folk culture gradually suffers increase in heterogeneity, secularization, and immorality, Lewis finds so many exceptions in the data that he rejects the theory as inadequate, without extensive revision, for interpretative and predictive purposes. Many other points of difference are explicitly discussed throughout the course of the book.

The present reviewer believes that this sort of honest examination of data from different points of view and the level-headed subjection of theory to empirical test is a healthy development and, in fact, the only way in which cultural science can move toward increased precision. It is essential, however, that scientists engaged in the mutual revision of each other's work avoid entangling their own egos with their science. Professors Lewis and Redfield have shown the rest of us how this can be done with mutual good will and with benefit to all.

JOHN GILLIN
University of North Carolina

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

Through a friend I have just received a copy of the critique of my *Hart and the Chinese Customs*, which appeared in the September 1951 issue of THE ANNALS.

May I, first of all, express my gratitude for this sympathetic notice. Appreciation from a well-informed and well-qualified critic is always encouraging, and especially so when the book criticized deals with a subject which is no longer of popular interest.

I would, however, request permission to make a few remarks on points raised in the critique.

The book is admittedly very long, but whether it is unnecessarily so is another matter. Had I been writing solely, or even mainly, for pundits and Sinologues an attempt would have been made to treat the subject with classical economy and conciseness, and perhaps with even fuller documentation, but as the victim kept in view was any average reader who might wish, or be enticed, to read something well authenticated about Hart and his romantic career, it was thought that the diffuseness —made popular by some of our modern novelists—would be more likely to win acceptance. Present indications, however, tend to show that this assumption on the author's part is wide of the mark. Notes, references, and bibliographies are repellent to the average reader, who regards such impedimenta as highbrow. Besides today —at any rate in Great Britain—things Chinese are of little or no popular interest. A century, or even fifty years ago, it was very different.

It is, however, at the close of his article that the critic's bludgeon comes down with resounding force. "Because Dr. Wright scarcely availed himself of Chinese sources, the whole work carries a decidedly occidental, and especially official British slant. Only two collections of Chinese documents are listed in the bibliography, and they were apparently little used." To that accusation I must, with all due deference, take exception.

As a matter of cold fact I did make full use of the two specified Chinese collections of documents cited in the bibliography, though I admit that I did not clutter up the notes with references to them for the simple reason that, as I was not writing with my eye on the Sinologues, such references would not have contributed anything essential to the task I had in hand. The very absence of these references might have suggested to the Sinologue that the book was not meant solely for him.

Furthermore, I made use of important Chinese sources which I refrained from including in the bibliography because they are very difficult—in most cases now impossible—of access. I refer to the published and unpublished historical Annals of those Chinese provinces having old-time customs establishments. Back in 1915 I began to plough through the dusty sahara of the trade, customs, and taxation sections of these Annals; and when in Peking from 1920 to 1929—where I had the free run of whole series of these records—I made for my own use copious notes and translations from them. These manuscript notes fill a large box which I still have in my possession. While in Shanghai in 1918–1919 I was given permission to consult the manuscript of the then unpublished Annals of the Province of Kiangsu. Nowhere in the book have I made mention of these provincial Annals. Had I done so and listed them in detail in the bibliography, their inclusion would have been useless and would only have given the bibliography an even more pedantic appearance than it has.

When dealing with references to Chinese authorities it should not be overlooked that practically every reference denoted "I. G. Circ." is a reference to a primary Chinese source, as Hart's practice was to base his instructions in these circulars on the Chinese text—which he would quote in full—of dispatches or other communications received from his chiefs in the Tsungli Yamen, and later from the Wai-wu Pu and the Shui-wu Ch'u. To be on the safe side perusal of the Chinese text of a circular was a necessity. A glance at the seven volumes of "Documents Illustrative of the Origin, Development and Activities of the Chinese Customs Service" (listed in the bibliography!)—a full set of which was presented to the Columbia University library—would have made this quite clear to the critic. When all is said, the most authoritative documents for the purpose of my book are these circulars and Hart's private, semiofficial, and official correspondence.

Finally, I protest emphatically against the book being stigmatized as bearing an "especially *official* British slant" (Italics mine). Such a statement is obviously a misrepresentation. If the book has any slant or bias, it is pro-Chinese, a fact to which attention is drawn in the preface.

Hart was a severe critic of British policy in China, and this comes out again and again in the book. Witness the quarrel between Hart and Wade, the British minister, in the Taiwan and the Cadiz Hulk cases in Shanghai, against the verdicts of which Hart appealed, successfully, to the Privy Council in London. Witness Hart as an advocate—even in the sixties and seventies of last century, and in the teeth of British official opposition—urging the relinquishment of extraterritoriality. Witness the stand he made against Sir Claude Macdonald, the British minister, when the latter tried to bully the Chinese into accepting his scheme for the opening of the inland waterways of China to foreign penetration. Witness Hart's fight against the pretensions of British officials and merchants in Hong Kong and Kowloon. Witness his persistent struggle against the British government and the government of every country having import trade with China for the placing of China's import duty rates on a gold basis. Witness his defense of China's right during the negotiations for the Peace Protocol of 1901. Witness the publication of his book, *These From the Land of Sinim*, which by its frank and fearless criticism roused the wrath of British officials and merchants alike. Witness his strongly expressed disapproval of Sir Claude Macdonald's interference to have the post of inspector general secured for a British subject. And witness the cold shoulder reception that Hart had from the *official* world in London when he came home on leave in 1908. Where is the "especially official British slant" in all this? It would be more in accordance with fact to describe it as anti-British.

Very sincerely yours,

STANLEY F. WRIGHT

St. Helier, Jersey, Channel Islands

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VOLUME 281 MAY 1952

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH, *Associate Editor*

THE FUTURE OF OUR NATURAL RESOURCES

Edited by

STEPHEN RAUSHENBUSH

Consultant to Public Affairs Institute

Washington, D. C.

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Conservation in 1952

By STEPHEN RAUSHENBUSH

CONSERVATION is in danger of becoming a lost cause.

As a cause, rather than a series of techniques, it started with two ideas. The first was the concept of a national patrimony, a God-given heritage and legacy which was to be handled by responsible stewards rather than by prodigal and wastrel sons. The second was that the advantages of our natural resources should be shared by all the citizens of the nation, not used primarily for the benefit of a few.

Today the emotional content of these old ideas survives mainly among the small farmers who love the land which gives them their living. It is their group of soil conservationists that holds that "the right to own carries the duty to conserve." But for most of the rest of the community, the two moving ideas of Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot, and the host of great conservationists of the early part of the century seem to have lost attractiveness. The cause that rose from these ideas has been weakened. This is not to say that many things are not still done in the name of conservation. It is not to say that there are few sincere recreationists, or few people worried about the pressure of population on land, or few diligent technicians of soil and forest conservation. They are all present. They are all doing valuable jobs of sorts. They are simply no longer so sure of their community of interest or so confident of the national value of their work as were the old-time leaders.

CONTRARY FORCES

What happened? Some five distinguishable forces and events battered away at the old ideal.

First was the peculiar sequence of war-depression-war-defense that has extended over the past 38 years. The war and defense periods drained our resources at rates that were unthought of in the early conservation days. In those emergencies there was little possibility of considering slower rates of use. The greatest service to future generations seemed clearly to be that of mobilizing all our resources as rapidly as possible. Sandwiched between war emergencies was an agricultural, coal, and lumber depression that began in the middle 1920's. Owners and tenants had to exploit the land, the forests, and the coal in destructive ways to stay alive. They had few funds to maintain the national resource capital. Dust storms then transported topsoil from the Midwest to Washington, and a few starts were made (the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Soil Conservation Service) toward belated conservation; but then war and defense claimed the national surplus. In this whole sequence of war-depression-war-defense it became easier to preach conservation than to achieve it, and easier to ignore it than to preach it.

Second was the demonstration of the ability of our applied scientists to produce substitutes or find alternate sources. When lumber became scarce, light metals and useful clay products were available. When good range for our sheep became scarce, synthetic substitutes for wool appeared. As the soil resources were depleted or eroded, a host of seed, insecticide, and fertilizer improvements produced larger crops on less land. Internal combustion engines made land available that had previously been used for the maintenance of horses

and mules. When the more easily discovered petroleum resources approached exhaustion, new geophysical devices led to the discovery of other supplies. The popular faith now is that science will do everything for us, including the saving of our energy for more important purposes than the conservation of natural resources.

Third was the discovery that our exhaustible resources (conspicuously petroleum and high-grade iron ore) could be supplemented expeditiously and economically from abroad. The Rockefeller Board's report in 1950, *Partners in Progress,* pointed out that our heavy industry was dependent on imports for most of fifteen basic raw materials. It recommended American aid for development of these foreign necessities. We could become another England, importing raw materials, fabricating them, and exporting finished goods.

Not only did other world resources become available to us, while our financial position made it quite possible for us to obtain them on favorable terms, but international trade became more clearly a good and desirable thing. As a minor corollary, conservation of domestic resources in the sense of slower use, or use for higher-value purposes, seemed to become less important for our survival, or even, at the worst, another interference with international trade, world stability, and possibly peace.

Next was the fact that the nation experienced a fairly high standard of living, and during the past ten years an extremely high one, in spite of all the conservation failures and the heavy resource drains for war and defense. Prices of natural resources rose—some of them conspicuously above the general level—but increased incomes absorbed them without very much trouble, and were still high. These higher resource prices did not take us out of world markets for our finished goods. The organization and ownership of some resources became somewhat more concentrated; special tax privileges had to be given in order to induce oil and other mineral discoveries. Still, the benefits of the whole economic arrangement were largely shared—if not directly, then indirectly.

In the face of this situation, attention to the dark warnings of the prophets of shortages of land, oil, coking coal, and metals, of monopoly and of lower living standards, seemed both postponable and shiftable to those obviously benighted areas where population was more clearly pressing on resources.

It was only when the floods came roaring down the Missouri or the Kansas or the Ohio, or when material shortages inflated world prices disastrously, or when the threat of losing Middle Eastern oil resources appeared, that we had cause to remember the black prophecies. And these occasions did not come often. By and large, the people of the nation seem to have done extremely well, in spite of some serious neglects of the future and an accumulation of local ghost towns, eroded areas, and inflationary pressures circling out from raw materials.

Finally, the conservation ideal ran afoul of the fear that it might lead to too much governmental control. Even those who recognized clearly that the interests of time and society were not necessarily identical with the operations of the free market could also see that governmental action was not always a perfect solvent.

QUESTIONS OF FACT

The impact of these five happenings has been heightened by a number of disturbing questions about fact. The estimate of the United States Bureau of Mines that our coal reserves would last for many hundreds of years has been questioned in terms of the high costs of producing most of the reserves. Its figures that gasoline can be produced from coal at a cost of 14 cents a gallon have been challenged by the assertion of various industry groups that it may cost several times that much. The figures of the United States Forest Service indicating that our lumber and pulp supply is already inadequate for our needs and is growing more inadequate have been questioned sharply by the wood industries. The estimate of the Soil Conservation Service that we need to restore or rebuild several hundred million acres of rapidly or slowly eroding land has been doubted by technicians who put their trust in the methods by which production could be increased on the remaining land base. The United States Weather Bureau has expressed public doubts about the value of much of the cloud seeding that is now being undertaken in the arid West.

The confusion has been increased by the absence, from the end of World War I onward, of any common grouping of the various conservation interests. The conservation movement, like so much else in modern society, has been atomized. There are many separate groups, each devoted to some special purpose. But there has not been any inclusive association that attempted to find the similarities of all the resource situations, think out the major problems, and deal with them, or even to keep track of what were facts and what were special pleadings, and inform the public accordingly.

PAST AND PRESENT

To explain why conservation today is not quite so appealing a cause as it was in the first decade of the century is not to question the two ideas of wise use of a national patrimony and wide distribution of the benefits of that use. Those ideas are necessary for a nation that intends to survive and for a society that wishes to become a community. We shall come back to them in due time.

That time may come sooner than we now think. The scars left by the depression of the 1930's are so deep that it is hard for us to comprehend that we not only are out of it, but shall probably not again see anything of its magnitude of severity in our lifetime. Instead, we shall more probably see the growing population, the increasing demand, and the generally rising prices that can call for emergency conservation practices, as well as enable the resource owners to undertake them.

What the nation did for the major resource industries during the depression was conservation only in the life-saving sense, not in the sense of assuring stabilization of the land or forest base, or less wasteful physical recovery of minerals. The petroleum industry was allowed to step a little outside of the free market system by state-approved limitations of production. The agricultural industry moved out of it along the more difficult road of taxpayers' help to take surpluses off the market, the coal industry temporarily by a minimum price arrangement, and the forest industries, briefly under the National Recovery Administration, by price maintenance.

It was recognized at that time that many small farmers, coal mine operators, oil producers, and lumber companies were, in effect, outside of the business system. They could hardly be expected to act with foresight. They were not institutionally equipped to fend for themselves. They did not evaluate their own labor or their family labor at the market rate, nor withhold their products until price justified their efforts. They sought to maximize their incomes by maximizing production, gutted their resources in that endeavor, and were overwhelmed by the consequent glut. They had no credit resources to do otherwise. The social costs of over-

cutting and soil mining were loaded off onto their downstream neighbors, and later onto the general taxpayers.

The national consent that was given for these various breaks with the free market system did, along with other factors, result in higher incomes for resource owners, and these were recognized as a prerequisite for conservation. The gains to society from these actions became clear as the war and postwar demands grew. However, the gains could have been greater if good conservation practices had been a basic rather than a perfunctory part of the process of consent.

Since those days a considerable amount of conservation work has been done. It looks small against the backlog of things undone, but it is promising, in parts. The Southeast, for example, is a much greener and more prosperous-looking place than it was twenty or more years ago when it was still in the cotton rut. A large number of Soil Conservation Districts have been formed, and many of these are getting some work underway. The Bureau of Reclamation is saving a considerable number of older irrigation districts that have overused their water supplies. The United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management have been able to make a small start on reseeding some of the public range. The Soil Conservation Service has at long last been able to undertake work on a dozen smaller watercourses.

All this is a fair start, but when it is put next to figures for private and public investment that may go as high as $25 billion for forest and soil work, $10 billion for reclamation work, and $60 billion for water control work, it looks small and inadequate.

NEEDS, PRICES, EFFICIENCY

Conservationists are bedeviled by three main questions whenever they look at that backlog. The first is, How is the national need to be met at reasonable prices when resource owners (particularly the small ones) refuse or are unable to adopt good conservation practices and the higher immediate costs that attend them? The answer found in the wood industries seems to be that it is not so to be met. The United States Forest Service finds that the cutting practices are still bad on about 60 per cent of the private forest land, and that the supply will be much less than the demand at reasonable prices for many generations to come. In addition, the social costs of clear-cutting, in the form of erosion and downstream flood damages, are still largely paid by others. The United States Forest Service has suggested state control, but if that fails, federal control, of cutting practices and reforestation. The woodworkers and the Congress of Industrial Organizations think federal control of both is necessary. The lumber and pulp industries oppose both suggestions. There has been almost no major public discussion of the matter in Congress for almost a decade.

The second question is, How can the governmental part of the conservation job be done efficiently? It was to this question that the Hoover Commission and the Cooke Commission (Water Resources Policy Commission) largely addressed themselves. The former aimed its heaviest guns at the competition between the Army Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation in the Missouri Basin. It recommended uniting them into one agency to get rid of a rivalry which was carried on at the expense of the conservation ideas. Hardly was the ink dry on its report before the Department of Agriculture produced a conservation program of its own for the Missouri Basin. Without saying so, that report indicated a belief that hardly any of the basic soil and forest conservation work that was needed would be covered by the other agencies. Another $4 billion of private and public investment was required to meet those needs in addition to the water control projects (which may cost $6 billion) already authorized by Congress.

Considerable emphasis was added to this second question as a result of the Kansas and Osage River floods of 1951. For almost the first time, the people of the region who were interested in upstream conservation protested the emphasis laid on, and the money to be committed to, large flood-protection dams that did little or nothing for the farmers and upstream communities. The connection between forest and soil conservation and downstream water control had rarely been clearer. It was also the burden of the two thousand pages of the Cooke Commission's report: only in unified watershed work was there any efficiency, any maximizing of social benefits.

Another part of the answer may well lie in government aid in establishing credit facilities for small owners, that are tailored to the needs of soil, forest, and water conservation.

FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?

The third question is, For whose benefit should national aid to conservation and development be undertaken? This presents itself for answer in several forms. One of them relates to the big cities that have expanded into the natural flood plains of the rivers. Now they want their buildings in those flood plains protected at national expense. The more they have expanded into them, the more money they need. Every extra group of buildings in the flood plains becomes a justification for extra hundreds of thousands of dollars of flood control works—a fact which explains part of the $60 billion figure for future water control. To some conservationists this seems like putting a reward on carelessness. Should the process be allowed to go on? Should this aid be given free, or should the cities pay part of the costs? The corollary questions are underlined by the probability that Congress will, in our time, never have unlimited funds, and that each protective measure is at the expense of some other one, elsewhere.

The question also frequently takes form around the acreage limitation. In 1902, in the Reclamation Act, Congress apparently intended to declare for a wide sharing of the benefits from the use of national resources in the form of land or funds. It said that irrigation water obtained through the use of these funds should go only to 160 acres within one ownership. The social ideal of the time was the family-owned and family-operated farm, and it seemed that 160 acres of irrigated land, coupled perhaps with some nonirrigated land, was enough for a respectable living in the American way of the time.

Many of the owners of land in old irrigation districts that were developed before or independently of the Reclamation Act have overused their water supply. They now want federal loans and grants (reclamation works) to get more water on their land. Without the extra water, their land will lose great value. But they have established large properties, and they object to selling some of their land to veterans or to other newcomers who want to start in. They ask that the sharing provision be put aside. The more they have overused their water supply and let their properties run down, the more they need government funds and the less they are willing to accept one of the two conservation purposes of those funds. The reward for neglect is to be large.

Before the public are also the Army Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. The former, moving upstream

into competition with the Bureau on King's River and elsewhere, are able —because of a legislative lag—to offer the large landowners water without the requirement that the old conservation idea of sharing benefits be observed. In order to stay active in that region the Bureau may yet be forced to rise above principle and find competitive ways of its own to undo the intent and action of Congress as expressed in the Reclamation Act.

This type of erosion of one of the two original conservation purposes of that act seems to be a matter of indifference to the administration and Congress. Yet once the breach in the basic act and purpose is made, at King's River or on the older developments, the whole process of obtaining a social gain from the use of public funds and other resources is soon flooded out. Much of the justification for the use of public resources goes downstream with it. The question is bound to be raised: Why devote public money in ways that will cause the growth of factory farms, as long as there are more socially valuable conservation purposes to be served elsewhere?

"UNFINISHED BUSINESS"

The unfinished conservation jobs pile up in numbers and in size if we are once convinced that growing population and increasing industrialization both at home and abroad and consequently an expanding demand, along with generally higher prices, are our lot for the next quarter- or half-century.

The articles in this issue of THE ANNALS indicate a good number of those jobs. There is a high probability that we shall not be able to escape the stringencies involved and a consequent slowing-down of our rising standard of living without looking a little more closely at the end use of some of our natural resources. Conservation of materials for the essential needs may have to be obtained at the expense of the less essential parts of the economy. This is obviously the least desirable and most difficult way to conserve, but we may have to face up to it.

Minerals

In minerals, for example, practically none of the long-term predictions that take account of foreign supply and demand as well as our own allow us to think of an adequate supply at the relatively low prices to which we were once accustomed. Is it unreasonable to think about channeling available supplies to those places where they will make the greatest contribution to our economic growth? Can the producers of nickel and chrome, for example, find some way of diverting those metals away from luxury display on automobiles to more vital parts of our industrial organization? The conservation gain could be considerable, and perhaps more than could be accomplished through more expensive forms of conservation in primary and secondary recovery.

In addition, is there not some better conservation and supply method than the one which we are applying to marginal mineral operations? Copper is one illustration. In an emergency we pay premium prices for the production of high-cost Michigan copper. Without them it could not be produced. When the apparent emergency is over, the mines are idled and flooded. Large loans plus premium prices plus years of manpower and delay are needed to get them into operation again. Surely this is not the best process that can be devised by the mind of man. With a more or less permanent world copper shortage for the rest of the century, there seems to be some room and place for discussing the possibility of a more continuous multiple-price system.

Since much of our future mineral procurement is going to be in foreign fields, it can pertinently be pointed out that the attempt to obtain scarce minerals by handling marginal producers abroad on the same short-term basis that we have used on the Michigan copper producers is bound to flare back on us. The attempt to squeeze the marginal Bolivian tin producers down to the Malayan cost and price level (although undertaken for the laudable purpose of preventing the Malayan producers from living luxuriously at our expense under a high Bolivian price-umbrella) has probably done a great deal of good to our Argentine rivals in Bolivia, and to no one else. This is on a par with our post-Korean tendency to rush out, wave a check, double prices, and expect new sources of minerals to be opened up the next day. It is also tied up with the interesting but controversial concept that the ultimate function of all the raw materials in the world is that of supporting the high American standard of living.

Petroleum

The need for some serious rethinking of our petroleum conservation is underlined by Mr. George Lamb's estimate in this issue that there will be no petroleum at all available from any source for space heating or steam raising by 1975, and not quite enough to supply the demand for gasoline and motor oils by that time. With all allowance for necessarily wide ranges of error in any such estimate, and for past predictions of shortages that have not developed, this picture by a man who is perhaps the coal industry's leading economist should hardly be ignored. His estimate warrants all the study and revision the fuel industries can give it.

Implicit in his estimate is a changeover that may not only involve an investment within a short twenty-five years of enough resources to double the present coal production. It may affect also the values of all the residences, offices, and factories that would have to convert from oil or gas heat to electric heating. It may involve the values of continuing to equip new buildings and steam plants with oil or gas heat, as well as the value of new and old automobiles. It may finally, after the petroleum production peak has been passed, include one price race between gasoline and motor oil users (who cannot use coal) on the one hand, and the space-heating and steam-raising users (who can) on the other, and another price race between coal and petroleum in which the production costs of coal are not important.

If any such major transition is ahead of us, it seems impossible to escape the need, first, for pressing a series of conservation questions some time before that period begins. Are all the desirable conservation measures in oil production now being undertaken? To what extent do present prices and production quotas allow for really complete exhaustion of the fields without the necessity for closing down and waiting for higher prices before full secondary recovery can take place? What effect, if any, does the present tax privilege of the industry (the depletion allowance) have on conservation in the extraction process?

But here again it seems impossible to avoid the problem of end use. If, at some later time, the market is going to be called upon to create very high prices in order to achieve the objective of driving out most of the users of petroleum for space heating and steam raising, is it possible for the fuel industries to ease any such transition in advance, in ways that may be less costly to all groups of consumers than those involved in the double price race indicated, with all its probable wide repercussions on property

values? And if that is not possible for them to do, how can it be done?

Incidentally, what such a change-over and such a price race in the United States might do to world petroleum prices, and through them to the European economy, is worth a second thought. As little as 40 million tons of coal has stood between western Europe and Communism several times since 1946. Several times Europe has been forced to devote a large share of the American aid to purchasing American coal at high delivered prices. It will probably, by 1975, have to depend for energy largely on Middle Eastern oil. A doubling or tripling of the world fuel price because of marginal American demands might have explosive results.

Lumber and pulp

The probability of increasing shortages and prices in the lumber and pulp industries brings us sharply back to the question of obtaining some real conservation through reforestation, better cutting, and less wasteful use; for the price of end-use conservation is a completely undesirable censorship. We may know and regret that high-priced pulp has had a part in forcing a number of independent newspapers out of business, and that a good many forests are used to produce some hundred million comic books. The permanent national economic gain from that, or even from using a good-sized forest each week to enable all our department stores to say in four pages what they used to say in a half-page, may also be questioned; but there seems to be nothing the nation can afford to do about it. The main task remains in the conservation and replacement of the growing stock, and that seems to be one of the most neglected of all.

LACK OF BASIC FACTS

A series of other questions might be pressed about our soil, range, water, and watershed conservation work, and many of them are suggested by the articles in this issue. What is really astonishing in all this land and water work is that the nation has as yet not established any preference and priority list for its conservation aid. Congress may grant $400 and loan $100 on an acre of reclamation land without ever having before it any comparisons which indicate whether the same or greater crop results or social benefits may not be obtained for much less money on some presently eroded or undrained lands. The cost-benefit ratios of the various conservation and development agencies are not comparable, and often do not give adequate basis for determining the conservation needs, let alone the reasonable contributions which the benefited communities may be expected to make to this work. A by-product of our neglect is that really depressed areas, such as some of those in the Rio Grande Basin, can never get enough help to get off the ground, overcome their conservation failures, and become prosperous and independent.

THE TASK AHEAD

Enough has probably been said here and in the following articles to indicate that the conservation job is far from completed, but that, instead, a series of major problems and tasks stretch out before the people of the nation, and especially before the resource owners and the workers in their industries.

It will be noted that the problems spread across the resources. They also spread across the various specialized fields of study and the disciplines of the colleges and universities. Almost every one of them reaches across the curtains which committees of Congress and departments of the Executive Branch set about themselves, as well as across the borders of the professional societies. This fact may, in this specialized age, have something to do with our failure to grapple with them more thoroughly.

Findings by specialists

Specialists can contribute a great deal. It would seem highly desirable, for example, that the distinguished deans of our colleges of forestry be asked to sit together and sift out the truth and the facts in the controversy about the extent of bad cutting of our forest resources, and in the even more important related controversy about the supply-demand-price situation that we may expect within the next generation or so in forest products. That would be a very considerable national service, and should be undertaken promptly, with resources adequate to cover the field. It is long overdue. The nation certainly has a right to know, beyond what may be the self-interested claims of government officials or of industries, what the situation really is.

But specialists, as they themselves will readily admit, are not enough to provide all the value judgments that the nation needs. The problems are complicated, and in the end the whole society has to decide the purposes for which natural resources are to be used, and the costs which it is willing to pay to achieve these purposes.

Synthesis by learned and professional societies

In the premises, which include the present atomization of the conservation groups, it would be exceedingly helpful if the learned and professional societies were to take on this task. They would, first of all, have to go pragmatically, resource by resource, into the question of whether there is a dichotomy between society and time on the one hand, and the immediate interests of the resource owner on the other. When there is a serious difference, they would have to see what social engineering could be developed to reconcile both private and public interests. For those purposes they would need to group some of their ablest and most disinterested people together for quite a while. They would need to draw heavily on the resource owners and workers for counsel, and on the experts for work. They would need to take into account the international role, whatever it is, that Congress and the administration want the nation to play, and the demands on our resources involved in it. They would have to do some very independent thinking of their own.

Their findings would, I believe, carry far more weight with everybody, from the smallest farmer to the oldest senator, than the studies and thinking of either industry or government bodies; for they would be dependent on, or beholden to, neither. If they did their work well, the economy and the people of the nation would be the great gainers.

When they were through, a somewhat more united and deeply rooted conservation movement might be able to grow up, and that, too, would be helpful to the nation.

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The Conservation Movement

By Robert O. Beatty

THE word "conservation" has come to signify a concept of human activity with all the characteristics of a true social movement. Like all words which are not self-defining or -delineating, its use has, however, become subject to widely varied interpretation and misuse to suit the needs and desires of assorted groups and individuals.

Even when used in its most common area today—that of husbanding natural resources—the strict dictionary definition is not a true reflection of intent of those groups and individuals which are concerning themselves with conservation, since it connotes a bottling up of resources without use.

Significance of the Term "Conservation"

As commonly applied by professional conservationists and for the purposes of this paper, conservation means development, with wise use or management in the best public interest, of our natural resources of soil, water, vegetation, wildlife, and minerals. It means further the restoration to sustained productivity of worn or damaged resources, where possible, and the management and utilization of renewable resources in such manner as to guard against depletion. Only in a limited field of activity, including the safeguarding of special reservations such as parks or established wilderness areas, does the connotation of preservation apply to an appreciable extent. Otherwise, it might best be summed up as meaning "to use without using up." [1]

We should not, therefore, accept the use of the term "conservation" without inspection of the scope or application intended in writing or speaking the word. For example, there exist many so-called "conservation clubs" whose chief interest is the harvest of fish and game, but whose activities make little, if any, contribution to the conservation of these resources. The bare fact that a man hunts or fishes does not, as the general public is inclined to assume, make him a "conservationist."

The term "conservation pool" is employed by the large dam building agencies of the Federal Government to designate the residue of water left in reservoirs, beyond which they will not be drawn down or depleted. By interpretation, such a pool may be appropriately named. To an observer but casually familiar with the broad aspects of conservation of resources, however, the term "conservation pool" would seem to employ a use and management of land and water definitely in the public interest, whereas quite the reverse may be true if the pool itself has been created at the expense of other public values such as productive agricultural land, fish and wildlife crops, or recreational and scenic resources.

Anyone wishing to familiarize himself with the ideas, ideals, and activities of the conservation movement as I have attempted to define it here should, therefore, be quite circumspect in his acceptance of the term, as well as in his own use of it.

[1] The problem of conserving the nation's mineral resources has received the least attention from the organized conservation groups to date, and then not so much in the interest of the minerals themselves, but more to conserve other resources which outmoded mining laws allow to be exploited. The conservation of mineral resources is tremendously important, of course, but beyond control of the rate of use and manner of taking, little can be done.

Conservation as a "Movement"

Dr. Carl C. Taylor, head of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare, Department of Agriculture, has characterized, quite accurately, I think, resource conservation activities in the United States as a true social "movement" brought about by the need for economic adjustments compatible with the pressures of increasing population on limited resource wealth.[2] He points out that it is only beginning to take the form of a "people's movement," it heretofore having pretty much been propounded and supported by the scientists and technicians. As with all movements, it will not get very far unless it *does* become a full-fledged people's movement. A sizable number of lay organizations, mostly operating without profit and concerned with defending the public's interest in one or another natural resource, are currently in existence. Drawing membership from all walks of life, they are giving continuity, organization, and effectiveness to the task of conservation as a people's movement.

To the majority of the people, including many responsible and astute lay and professional leaders, the fact that conservation has actually achieved "movement" status and is rapidly growing in energy and influence will come as something of a surprise. This is not to their discredit, for it seems a fundamental characteristic of human nature that we concern ourselves only with those matters which affect or contribute directly to our wants, desires, or experiences.

It is difficult, for example, for the furniture dealer to comprehend, except in general terms, that the net figure in his monthly profit column is tied inescapably to a perpetual supply of timber resources of a quantity and quality suitable to maintain his line of chairs and tables. He looks and thinks no further than his supplier, and is seldom conscious of the fact that the method of harvesting a forest a thousand miles from his plant may have an important bearing on whether his company will be solvent ten years from now. In far too many cases he still doesn't care, to be sure, and is contributing little to ensure the perpetuation of the resources from which he draws his living.

Similarly, the average housewife, concerned with the day-to-day tasks of raising a family, going to market, preparing the meals, and many others, is alarmed at the price of hamburger (or steak, as the case may be!). But she is often unconscious of the fact that the way a rancher in Wyoming is utilizing publicly owned grasslands may ultimately have a bearing on her food budget; or, for that matter, that the supply of water coming from her tap is influenced in quantity and quality by how a farmer fifty miles away plows his furrows. A similar analogy can be drawn for almost any endeavor in our society, regardless of the product or service rendered.

I cite these oversimplified examples by way of challenging the student of economics, sociology, and politics to show me a single material item satisfying our physical needs, a single emotional sentiment, a single moral or spiritual thought or idea—in short, a single activity or belief of man in any field which is not directly or indirectly dependent upon or conditioned by the continuing supply, or absence, of a basic physical resource. All of these must stem from the soil, the water, the air, and the sunlight. We can do little about the air and the sunlight; the con-

[2] Carl C. Taylor, "Conservation as a Movement," *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, Vol. V, No. 3 (July 1950), pp. 103–5.

servation idea with all it portends is fundamentally concerned with maintaining and continuing a useful supply of soil and water and the resources which flow from them. It is as simple as that.

WHAT MAKES A CONSERVATION CONTROVERSY?

There are many and diverse opinions as to what are the best uses or methods of use of the soil and the water and their products. Therein lie the resource controversies which, in essence, are largely differences of opinion, or differences in interpretation of facts and their application. Both amount to about the same thing, and always bring the same results; that is, battles in which the conflicting views are aired publicly and which are usually resolved in favor of that side which can bring the most political, economic, or social pressure to bear. In many cases (with some notable exceptions) these controversies revolve around who shall have superior rights to natural resources held and administered in the public trust—the general public, or some special interest group or individual pressing for economic advantage. The notable exception is the difference of opinion between informed segments of public and government over the best use and development of our water resources.

This is one of the chief conservation problems, and perhaps the most controversial one, facing the nation today. The soil also is involved because, in management, land and water are virtually inseparable.

THE WATER PROBLEM

On one side are the adherents of federal control of water resources through huge multiple-purpose river basin developments, some on the pattern of the Tennessee Valley Authority, wherein the government decides the highest use of a given natural supply of water (power, irrigation, navigation, domestic supplies, recreation, or a combination thereof), decides how it shall be developed, who will get how much, and at what price. This is sometimes referred to as government "paternalism," and sometimes it is called "socialism." The effect is the same, whatever the term.

The other view, and one most closely approaching that held by the active and most widely recognized conservation groups concerned with the public interest, is pretty well summed up in the general conclusions of a report on the nation's water problems prepared by the Engineers Joint Council, composed of representatives of five of the nation's top engineering bodies. This report states:

> Consideration and control of the waters of the U. S. are in the national interest, but not necessarily a function of the federal government. On the contrary, that which can be done by the individual should be done by him and that which requires collective action should be done at the lowest governmental level practicable. The federal government should engage in the conservation and control of waters only when the collective action of all the people of the nation is necessary for accomplishment of objectives.[3]

In essence, these divergent views place the conservation organizations, most technical engineering talent, and most American business on one side of the fence, and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the other power producing and administrative agencies of the Federal Government, their respective lobbies, and advocates of valley authorities on the other. It is a striking example of how conservation problems delve into and

[3] Engineers Joint Council, *Principles of a Sound National Water Policy* (New York, July 1951), p. 20.

are affected by the political and social affairs of the nation; it is one of the many conservation problems which will only be solved when the people become sufficiently informed and aroused, one way or the other, to assert their collective political and social influence.

There are already built, being built, or authorized by Congress, federal dam building projects to cost more than 50 billion dollars. The Task Force on Natural Resources of the Hoover Commission reported extensively on the waste and duplication going on in the government's water development program, chiefly by the two agencies named above, and all at great cost to the taxpayer. This seems as yet to have had little effect, however. No legislation has been enacted, and little constructive revision of attitude and procedures has taken place designed to correct the objectionable practices pinpointed. Nor has much attention been given, up to now, to another factor that appears to be of growing importance—the annual recurring losses of foods and fibers which can *not* be produced from flooded acres.

One case history will serve to illustrate the point and show reasons for the considerable interest developing over this factor.

Far down the list of projects planned by the Army Corps of Engineers under the Pick-Sloan plan for the Missouri Basin is the Tuttle Creek Dam to be built across the Lower Blue River which flows out of Nebraska and joins the Kansas River at Manhattan. The reservoir would inundate 55,000 acres, and is proposed on the basis of flood control and sewage dilution benefits to Kansas City. At 1949 prices, the construction cost was $68 million.

The Army capitalized on the impetus given flood control activities by the July 1951 floods along the Kansas River, and dusted off the Tuttle Creek plans. Congress was asked for $5 million to start construction. The story of potential losses was then made generally public. It was shown that the Army anticipated $3 million annual benefits downstream, from flood mitigation and sewage flushing. Local residents had canvassed their neighbors in the 55,000 acres and determined from actual sales and appraised values that annual recurring losses in foods and fibers amounted to $6 million—more than twice the benefits claimed.

If the Tuttle Creek reservoir area may be taken as average, and fifty years considered a normal economic life of reservoirs under present eroding and silting conditions, the total national loss in foods and fibers from nonproduction would be in the neighborhood of $250 billions as a result of the construction of the $50 billion of dams and reservoirs authorized or built. Economists and engineers, after exhaustive calculations, might produce a different figure, to be sure. It seems certain, however, that the losses from this cause will be tremendous—this in an era when it is increasingly doubtful whether the foods and fibers can be spared from America's pantries and storehouses.

POLLUTION CONTROL

Another broad area of conservation interest, again having to do with our water resources, is the problem of how to control the assorted wastes of a growing economy which are all too often still deposited in the most convenient watercourse, be it by municipality (sewage) or industry (a wide variety of either toxic or "nuisance" effluents). The problem here is the twofold one encompassing, in broad generalities, public health (sewage wastes) and the recreational and other use benefits of clean waters (sewage and industrial wastes).

Much progress has been made in recent years in this field, with industry

particularly coming to take a more enlightened view of its responsibilities with regard to its use of public water supplies (general speaking, all surface water supplies belong to the public). There are still, to be sure, some 22,000 sources of pollution in the United States, divided nearly equally between 11,800 municipal sewer systems and 10,400 independent factory waste outlets.[4] More than two-thirds of the industries surveyed by the Water Pollution Control Division of the United States Public Health Service have reported that water pollution control conditions are either unimproved or getting worse. The waste from municipal and industrial sources together which is still discharged into our waters equals that from over 150 million people! About $500 million is necessary to do a thorough clean-up job on municipal pollution alone.

Nevertheless, under Public Law 845 (the Taft-Barkley Water Pollution Control Law), passed in 1948, a definite policy has been established by the Congress to deal with pollution matters. This is a necessary development of jurisdiction; for since watercourses do not conform to political boundaries, intervention by the Federal Government is required.

Controversy in this field is now largely restricted to local differences of opinion between the public and the polluter as to how fast a given municipality or industry should get its clean-up job done. In rare cases is it still a question of whether it *can* or should be done.

PUBLIC LANDS

Another broad area of conservation interest involves several natural resources; it concerns the best and wisest management of our vast public estate. The Federal Government owns and administers, ostensibly in the public interest, some 500 million acres of the land and water area of the United States and it territories. This land includes 89 million of the 461 million acres of commercial forest land and contains more than one-third of the nation's supply of standing commercial timber. Another 250 million acres is in range where one-fifth of the cattle and more than half the sheep raised in this country spend a part of their lives.[5] Administering these lands are such agencies as the United States Forest Service (106 million acres), United States Park Service (16 million acres), United States Fish and Wildlife Service (4 million acres), and the Bureau of Land Management (180 million acres).[6]

One controversy which reached heated proportions in 1947, and is by no means a closed issue today, concerns the nearly 180 million acres of public domain in the western states which a small minority of livestock operators have eagerly sought to control for their grazing. Initially, they proposed that the land be sold to them by the government. This proposal was effectively defeated by the conservation groups. Currently they are proposing that the government grant them additional concessions which appear to amount to virtually exclusive authority to graze national forest range lands *without* concurrent responsibility for maintaining the productivity of these lands or safeguarding other uses (including watershed protection, timber, and recreation).

Another conservation problem of some magnitude involving public lands has to do with private ownership within

[4] Public Health Service, *Water Pollution in the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office), Part 2, p. 15.

[5] "Management of Public Land Resources," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 60 (March 1951), p. 455.

[6] *Area, in Acres of Lands in Federal Ownership*, Report No. 3116, 81st Cong., 2d sess., H. R., pp. 7, 8, 10.

our national parks and monuments on which anything from a tavern to a pig ranch can be, and often is, operated. Some 500,000 acres within our national parks are still privately owned, and in many cases these lands are being employed in a manner detrimental to the public values for which the parks were created. The problem of safeguarding for scientific and recreational use the ½ of 1 per cent of our land and water area which can still be classed as wilderness is also concerning conservationists in a great many areas.

Arguments on into the night could be developed around the wisdom of federal administration of such huge chunks of land. The record of development and use of forest and land resources privately held has been such in our short history, however, as to raise serious questions as to the wisdom of unbridled free enterprise in the exploitation of resources in the public domain. It is generally believed by students of conservation that the public interest in these resources must be safeguarded for the long-term good of the nation. To date this has taken the form of administration by federal agencies. This is not ideal, by any means, because of tendencies toward bureaucratic empire building and political "trading" which seem characteristic of the existing system. Nevertheless, the public still has a measure of control through pressures properly applied, and until a better plan comes along, it will have to do.

FOREST CONSERVATION

In forest management there have been significant trends and occurrences in the last three or four years which indicate that we are making progress toward bringing about a better use and management of our timber resources—this in spite of the fact that we are still cutting three saw-timber trees for every two that are growing to replace them in the forests of the nation as a whole. Significant last year was the decision of the United States Supreme Court which ruled against a private timber owner in Washington state who had appealed a law which forced him either to leave seed stock or to plant and reforest the acreage from which he took his lumber —his own land. The Supreme Court ruled in effect that he had a "pact with the unborn"—a responsibility to future generations in the way he used the land which belonged to him.[7]

This is not a squelching of private enterprise, in my opinion. It is merely common sense. It is unfortunate that it has to be done by law, but it indicates a trend in which men are beginning to realize that they have a certain stewardship of the land, a responsibility for it, not only today and in their own lifetime, but to those who come later. Twenty-six states now have some form of forest tax legislation which has partially ameliorated the impact of property taxes on forest lands, regulating cutting practices by private owners in such a way as to help to maintain a sustained yield in timber products. In New Hampshire, which enacted in 1949 a new forestry tax law, provision has been made for a premium, universally applicable, in the form of reduced taxes when cutting has been in accordance with specified forestry practices.

Still, this is a far cry from the old days fifty to seventy-five years ago, when the creed was "cut out and get out." Thousands of acres of dead stumps and burned-over land in the Lake states, in the Pacific Northwest, in New England, and in the South stand as mute testimony to this exploitive use of a highly important and basic resource, valuable not only for timber products but also in holding the water

[7] "Pact With the Unborn," *Outdoor America*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Feb. 1950), p. 2.

on the land where it falls, thus reducing floods and maintaining water supply.

While we may not have a "timber famine," as Gifford Pinchot predicted, we have reached a point of inadequate supply of growing trees in terms of our real needs at a reasonable price. Unfortunately, the day of recognizing a timber famine has been postponed by the stored-up abundance in our virgin west coast forests. Atom bombs severing our east-west transportation arteries would leave little doubt of a timber famine on the eastern seaboard. The debate as to whether we actually have a timber famine, which is the chief area of controversy in this field, would be settled quickly.

WILDLIFE CONSERVATION

In wildlife conservation there are many current predictions that wildlife is on the way out and that the end of public hunting and fishing in this country is near at hand. Opinions are many that much of our wildlife will have vanished soon or reached the point where it will be unimportant, at least from the sportsman's point of view. True, we have lost several important species for all practical purposes; the buffalo, the passenger pigeon, the heath hen, the condor, and the whooping crane are among them. A current case is the Florida key deer—a tiny animal weighing not more than 30 pounds, of which there are probably not more than fifty now living on isolated keys. Steps are being urged upon Congress by state and national conservation organizations to preserve this final remnant.

Few people realize the impact which the harvest of fish and game crops has on the nation's economy. Arthur H. Carhart has pointed out, in a well-substantiated article, that the total expenditure of those hunting and fishing in the United States in 1950 was in the neighborhood of $9,200,000,000! It is interesting to note that the annual hunting dog bill alone is *greater* than what the whole American public spends attending football, basketball, baseball, boxing, horse racing, and all other spectator sports combined.[8]

Our future wildlife supplies, on which this large investment is based, are again tied to a basic problem of land and water maintenance in the face of growing population pressures. It is commonly expected that unless unforeseen conditions prevent it, the population of this country will reach 200 million by the year 2000. In addition to raising problems of feeding and clothing this populace (and a sizable number of other peoples of the world), growing population pressures have had a great impact upon our wildlife resources. In 1935 a total of about 10 million hunting and fishing licenses were sold in this country. Last year 16.5 million fishing licenses and 12.5 million hunting licenses were sold. Also, we have more leisure time to go out in pursuit of fish and game than in past years. At the same time, expanding agriculture, towns, industries, transportation, and other facilities are taking habitat away from the desired and sought-after game mammals, birds, and fishes. Something obviously has to give.

That is the big problem today—how to maintain habitat for the wildlife which we like to have around us for one or another purpose, in face of increasing pressures upon them. Basically, our wildlife resources will fluctuate with the way in which we handle and manage places where they live and the food they eat; that is, the soil, the forest, the vegetative cover, and the waters. It is important to us to have programs for the management of fish and game populations and other wildlife populations; nevertheless, thoughtful conservationists recognize that these are by-products of sound land and water management in the public interest.

[8] Arthur H. Carhart, "Hunting and Fishing is Bigger Business," *Sports Afield*, June 1951.

Again, the chief conflict in this area of conservation is over *what* products shall be produced from a given land and water area, and for whose benefit. For example, shall we produce X number of birds and mammals for the hunter to harvest or the nature lover to view, or shall we use that same area to produce cash crops of corn, wheat, or potatoes? We can do, and are doing, both. The controversies arise over how much land shall be delegated to each objective, and to what extent we can achieve both.

SOIL CONSERVATION

The conservation of soil resources is a broad field with which the public is becoming increasingly concerned, and rightly so. Soil conservation is basic to conservation of all other resources, and obviously to the continued health and prosperity of the people. Since the dark days of the thirties when we suddenly woke up to find much of the soil of the Great Plains blowing away on the wind, great strides have been made in the development and the putting into practice of techniques to conserve the thin layer of topsoil which represents survival to our civilization. The Soil Conservation Service has done an admirable job of getting the man on the land to recognize his responsibilities to himself, his neighbors, and the future, though, of course, the job is by no means completed.

An organization of the landowners themselves, the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts, has come into being with the chief purpose of spreading the soil conservation gospel in the common interest. This is a grass-roots organization, legally established, locally governed by landowners. There are over 2,300 Soil Conservation Districts now in existence in the United States.

The chief point of controversy in this connection is whether drainage, certain types of reforestation, and other soil conservation practices are inimical to wildlife conservation—this in spite of the fact that basically what is good for the land is also good for wildlife. Wildlife interests have questioned the desirability or need of widespread drainage of potholes used by waterfowl in the Lake and Plains states. This controversy is gradually being resolved through co-operative efforts of the Soil Conservation Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the landowner (who is still being paid in some cases, with tax money alloted the Department of Agriculture, for draining his potholes), with the interested sportsman who wants to harvest the ducks keeping a watchful eye on the whole process.

HISTORY OF THE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT

The reader will now recognize, I trust, that conservation encompasses a great deal more than saving a few songbirds or producing a few more fish or animals for the sportsman to harvest. Historically, to be sure, the nature lovers and the sportsmen, one for aesthetic reasons, the other to perpetuate his harvest, gave the movement its initial impetus. By the time Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot came along at the turn of the century, and broadened the concept of conservation to include more than just wildlife, the people were emotionally ripe for a crusade. That is precisely what occurred. Wildlife was the first resource product of the land and water to receive attention, because our early economy was hitched closely to it for a continuing supply of food, clothing, and other necessities. Next to receive attention were our forests

(the Pinchot crusade), and for thirty years the term "conservation" meant forest conservation to most people. In that era we established the National Forest system for timber and watershed management and protection, and the National Park system for the protection of wildlife, native flora, and scenic resources.

Next, stimulated by the specter of middle America blowing away in the dust bowl calamity of the early thirties, soil conservation became popular. The wildlife enthusiasts remained active and grew in organization and strength the while.

The technicians began to understand and to get across to the people the concept that all these resources were interdependent and that what we did with one affected another for better or for worse. A few technicians, administrators, and laymen developed what the late Aldo Leopold referred to as "an ecological conscience,"[9] and began to preach it to all who would listen. The understanding of man's relationship to man and to his environment developed into a full-fledged science called "ecology."

During the growth of the movement several lay organizations came into being, most of them to champion a particular aspect or resource in the conservation movement. These followed the professional societies, most of which already existed in the fields of forestry, fisheries, wildlife, mammals, birds, botany, ecology, soil, and others. Added together, their policies and programs pretty effectively encompass most aspects of resource conservation, and collectively they represent the organized public voice and public interest in our country's resources. The lay organizations (not the professional) are pressure groups, to be sure, but almost without exception they are pressuring in the public interest, rather than for any special group.

[9] Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in *Sand County Almanac* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 207.

NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL FORMED

In 1948 these lay conservation organizations joined with the technical societies in establishing the Natural Resources Council of America to serve some thirty-five member organizations. This council, a service organization, proposed a public Policy for Renewable Natural Resources at the time of the Seventeenth North American Wildlife Conference on March 18, 1952 in Miami, Florida.

This statement can be considered a fair reflection of fundamental agreement by the member organizations on principles for the management of our renewable resources for the long-range economic and social welfare of the nation, and, as such, is being urged by the member organizations for adoption by Congress. It represents a definite milestone in the conservation movement in that it indicates a union of technicians and laymen in a common cause —a major achievement fundamentally necessary to such successes as the movement may ultimately enjoy.

The growth of the conservation idea will continue to take myriad forms, and controversies will rage over everything from using herbicides for clearing highway rights of way to how many sheep should be permitted to graze on a national forest. They must ultimately be resolved. Whether they are resolved for the public good over the long pull will in part depend upon how successfully the conservation forces can defend their stated principles and beliefs.

Inherent in this is the necessity for education—not only of future generations, but of the present. Needed is financial and other support to bring the public to a realization of conservation essentials before this society and civilization disintegrate, as have others in the past when they suddenly found the cupboard was bare. With many resources, the bottom of the barrel seems a long way off. With others, it is clearly just around the corner. Responsible industry has already awakened to the problem and is lending its support. More of the same on the part of professional and lay leaders in all walks of life—doctor, lawyer, preacher, merchant, housewife, union chief, professional politician, journalist—is necessary.

It is still too fashionable to deride the thoughtful student of population problems and resource wastage who may be inclined to overstress the adverse, but who, nonetheless, has pointed out that there *is* a limit to how much the land can produce in foods and fibers and that the day can come when there will be a smaller cut of the pie for each to have. How soon it may happen at the present rate of demand, I would not venture to guess. That it *can* happen here seems true. It strikes me as only common sense to take the conservation view and seek to guarantee, as far as humanly possible, that it will not do so.

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The Citizen's Part in Conservation

By JOHN H. BAKER

AMERICANS are tremendously interested in conservation. State legislators have said that they receive more mail about conservation legislation than about all other subjects combined. Laws have been put on the statute books as a result of citizen participation in conservation planning. The result is a more advanced body of conservation legislation in America than anywhere else in the world.

The greatest progress made in conservation in our generation has been growing recognition of its basic relation to human welfare—the broadening of horizons and the scope of operations and goals of the organizations working in the conservation vineyard. No longer, as a rule, can we afford to compartmentalize our thinking or action. We cannot expect thus to win, as a people, in the battle of life on this planet. No longer can we attain our ends by organizing for special purposes that represent a preferential interest conflicting with other preferential interests in the same general field.

The National Audubon Society, for example, endeavors to make people aware of the steady stream of life around them; of its beauty, richness, and complexity; and, above all, aware that they are part of this exciting pageant of events; that human life is affected in all sorts of ways by every plant that forms a seed, by every prairie dog that makes a burrow, by every dragonfly that emerges from its nymphal case; that man is, in fact, part and parcel of the biological picture, and can no more escape therefrom than from birth or death.

It is encouraging that we are getting down to fundamentals. Soil and water conservation is basic if our over-all resource picture is to improve. For too long, soil and water were orphans of the storm, and the situation is far from remedied yet. Ecology, though still dimly understood by the average layman, is slowly gaining public recognition and acceptance. The cries of "shoot the predators" and "build more game farms" are heard less often. It is finally becoming understood that game will not prosper unless it has suitable habitat, but will then prosper without any predator control other than that of man. Enlightened groups are now working to improve wildlife habitat in every possible way; they work with Soil Conservation Districts and other agencies to prevent soil erosion and abuse, because they know that wildlife needs healthy land as much as people do.

VARIETY OF GOALS

Most persons interested in natural resource conservation participate in the programs of the thousands of voluntary organizations, on national, regional, state, county, and local levels, that have been established to advance conservation objectives. Some have goals that are diametrically opposed to those of other groups that also regard themselves as conservation agencies. This is merely a reflection of the many differences of opinion about conservation matters. The disparity in viewpoint between, let us say, the Baptist preacher who espouses fundamentalism and the Unitarian minister's "realistic" approach is

no greater than is to be found in the conservation field. Despite their varying philosophies, often brought into sharp focus at legislative hearings, our conservation organizations do team up with reasonable effectiveness.

A listing of some of the national conservation organizations will give an idea of the variety of purposes they serve: American Forestry Association, Washington, D. C.; Conservation Foundation, New York City; Friends of the Land, Columbus, Ohio; Izaak Walton League of America, Chicago, Illinois; National Audubon Society, New York City; National Parks Association, Washington, D. C.; National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D. C.; Wilderness Society, Washington, D. C.; Wildlife Management Institute, Washington, D. C.

There are a number of others, many with specialized interests, such as the Sierra Club, the Wild Flower Preservation Society, Ducks Unlimited, Sport Fishing Institute, and the conservation committees of the Garden Club of America and the National Council of State Garden Clubs, Inc.

KEEPING INFORMED

Each national conservation organization concentrates on certain major objectives, though its scope of interest and influence may cover the entire conservation front. This is as it should be. Most executives of national conservation organizations make it their business to keep in close touch with key personnel of the governmental agencies charged with conservation work. Therefore the views of the organizations are usually well known to the departments and bureaus concerned. Much the same is true of Congress. Those legislators who are particularly concerned with conservation problems are kept informed as to the thinking of the conservation groups. Congressional committees frequently hold public hearings on controversial matters, and these are well attended by organizational representatives.

Somewhat the same situation exists on state and local levels. Most governors or state conservation departments have advisory committees that keep them abreast of grass-roots opinion. It is unfortunate that some of these committees are representative of special rather than public interest in the field. In some cases they reflect solely the point of view of those whose main objective is harvesting more game now, not later.

Occasionally someone suggests that perhaps greater effectiveness could be achieved by co-ordinating or merging the major national conservation groups into one superorganization. This is advocated on the ground of "efficiency." With human nature operating freely in a democracy, the chances that such a plan would produce desirable results are practically nil. There would be great dissension over emphasis, both in policy and in application of funds. A single agency probably could not command the financial support that is given to the combination of present voluntary organizations. At present there is a good spirit of give-and-take among the various groups. Any two of them may be in complete disagreement one month and work hand in hand on another issue the next month.

PERSONAL PARTICIPATION

It has been estimated that some ten million Americans pay dues to conservation organizations. It is through membership in, and financial support of, the national conservation organizations and their local branches, chapters, or affiliates that John Q. Public has the best opportunity to further conservation. In the local groups he can have

the satisfaction of personal participation in specific projects, and pride in personal accomplishment.

The individual may find himself on a committee of his local organization to survey the need of conservation in his community and its environs. If so, he is likely to sustain a series of shocks. He may discover that most of the timber products used in his area were not grown there, nor in his state, nor even in his nation. He may find deep scars on the land and observe that only a fraction of the farmers are using soil conservation methods. If he wonders at the paucity of wildlife, his questions will be answered by the drained marshes and barren fence rows that are symbols of modern farming. In our rush to put every acre to use in producing even greater farm surpluses, we have made it hard going for wildlife. The old wooden and stone fences supported vines and shrubs that offered abundant food and cover. The potholes bred ducks, muskrats, and a variety of other wildlife. The modern farm may produce a few bushels more of potatoes or corn, but one can hardly believe that it is a better place to live than the farm of yesteryear.

BRANDYWINE VALLEY ASSOCIATION

Because state lines are, after all, artificial political boundaries, some organizations are regional in nature. With the development of what is called the "watershed approach" to conservation planning, it seems logical that regional organizations will increase. A good example is the Brandywine Valley Association.

Some years ago a group of civic-minded men and women took a long, hard look at the 330-square-mile area where they lived. They decided that the Brandywine Valley in Pennsylvania and Delaware, where reside some 200,000 people, was not receiving the sort of treatment that befits a good home. Because they had the common sense to realize that their health and prosperity depended to a considerable extent on the natural resources of their region, they formed the Brandywine Valley Association. According to their own statement, it was organized to provide a common meeting ground on which ideas and information could be exchanged and progress measured. The association's program encourages and aids the people of the Bandywine Valley to reduce soil erosion and silting, lessen flooding and drought damage, decrease stream pollution, improve and protect existing woodland, reforest marginal lands, and preserve wildlife and natural beauty.

The work of the Brandywine Valley Association is largely educational, as is that of most conservation organizations. Members of its full-time staff attend meetings and demonstrations throughout the valley and succeed in arousing interest in conservation problems that are so close at hand that few people see them.

It did not take the association long to discover that no matter how valuable improved procedures are, they have to be sold to the landowners or industries involved; so it is helping to acquaint the residents of the valley with the ways in which they can utilize the services of conservation agencies. The organization has steered clear of partisan affiliations of any kind. It has enlisted as backers many of the most influential citizens of the Brandywine Valley. Certainly no one can deny that the valley is a better place today because of active citizen participation in conservation planning.

REACHING THE CHILDREN

Whenever conservationists meet at conventions, lamentations are heard on all sides about the failure of our school systems to teach conservation effectively. It is alleged that most of our problems today result from this shortcoming, and that the conservation future will not be very rosy unless remedial action is taken. Back in 1911 the National Audubon Society decided to do something about this matter. Illustrated material for children and program aids for their teachers were made available, and over nine million American and Canadian children will have enrolled as members of Audubon Junior Clubs by April 1952. The great majority of these are alive today, and it is reasonable to deduce that their combined thinking has had, and is having, measurable beneficial effect on governmental policies and legislation.

In 1936 the society launched its summer camp program for adults, especially designed to be of practical aid to school personnel, youth leaders and camp counselors, recreation and playground personnel, conservation chairmen of societies and clubs, and others with a hobby or professional interest in nature. These camps are more than natural history schools. They are concerned with more than simply stimulating hobbies or professions. They aim to develop majority public opinion favoring intelligent treatment and wise use of our natural resources, so that there may be constructive legislative results, with popular enforcement.

The society is working on the leverage principle, imparting a knowledge of successful teaching techniques to teachers and other youth leaders, each of whom may be expected to reach an average of thirty youngsters during the ensuing year. Some six hundred persons graduate each year from the three camps now operating in Maine, Connecticut, and California. Picture, then, the influence to be attained by a dozen such camps geographically distributed throughout the continent, graduating annually some three thousand youth leaders possessing opportunity to reach, each school, troop, or club year, some ninety thousand young people. Bear in mind that the camps cater to new students each summer, so the effect tends to snowball rapidly.

If, in a two-week session, the society conveys to each student comprehension of the interrelationships of soil, water, plants, and animals and an awareness of their impact on human welfare; imparts to them knowledge of successful teaching and leadership techniques, not by listening, watching, or reading about them, but by trying them out in the field under guidance; develops in them a wonderful spirit and the feeling that they have never had a better time in their lives; causes them to wonder how we can give them so much for so little and send them home with new zest in life and a will to further conservation in their own communities—if these things are accomplished, we have gained our principal objectives.

Upon returning to Minneapolis from the Audubon Camp of Connecticut, several school teachers decided that direct action was advisable. With official blessing, they formed a conservation committee in the Minneapolis public schools. Teachers from different grade levels, principals, and supervisors are on the committee. They meet regularly to discuss ways of integrating conservation into the curriculum and to exchange their own experiences and ideas. It augurs well for the future.

PROGRESS DESPITE LIMITATIONS

It is not possible to cover with thoroughness in this article all the ways in which citizens, through the organizations they have formed, take part in conservation activities. Nevertheless, public opinion continues to lag many years behind the findings of science in

conservation work. It has been said with some truth that our greatest problem now is not so much to conduct more research to find more facts, as to do the educational job necessary to acquaint the public with the known facts, so that the policies of governmental conservation agencies may be up to date.

Virtually every conservation organization is carrying on work that is made possible by the interest and support of individual citizens banded together to accomplish certain purposes. Only a handful of these groups are endowed, and those inadequately. The others are operating on shoestrings. The few organizations in the conservation field that are sometimes inaccurately described as "wealthy" have tiny endowments when compared with even small-sized colleges or museums. The largest present endowment of a conservation organization is less than three million dollars.

Despite the limitations under which conservation organizations work, a tremendous amount of progress has been made. Conservation has evolved from a philosophy propounded by people who were regarded as cranks into an accepted doctrine that now finds wide public support. No realist can afford to do much boasting about what has been accomplished, because so much remains to be done. We can all rejoice, however, in the fact that large numbers of citizens are now participating in conservation work. We shall doubtless see the day when conservation will be the way of life in America.

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Our Future Dependence on Foreign Minerals

By ALAN M. BATEMAN

A GLANCE at the history of the development of leading industrial nations reveals that their rise has coincided with the utilization of their mineral resources, notably coal and iron ore. Those countries abundantly supplied with diversified mineral resources became the great industrial nations, and the politically and militarily strong ones. It is no accident that large industrial centers sprang up in central England, in the Ruhr, in France, and in the United States around the Great Lakes, in Pennsylvania, and in Alabama. For there, coal and iron ore met, and the fusion of the energy of fuels and the solidity of metals spelled industrial growth that developed into industrial might. Today, similar developments are taking place in Russia. Those who hold the purse strings of mineral resources hold power.

It is startling to realize that the rise of the industrial age has so accelerated the demand for minerals that we have dug and consumed more mineral resources within the period embraced by the two world wars than in all preceding history. This insatiable demand for minerals to feed the hungry maw of industry and armament has made sources of supply that we used to think were adequate, now look relatively small, and sources of large supply are becoming fewer and fewer.

Our domestic mineral reserves have suffered deep inroads in the building of our economy, and the war demand made still further inroads. Our former bountiful mineral supplies of which we were justly proud now show serious depletion. Every automobile, building, machine, ship, train, tank, or plane requires its quota of many kinds of minerals, and of course armament is absolutely dependent upon them. Without a steady flow of minerals our industrial life and our national security would be jeopardized. Consequently, the distribution and ownership of mineral resources become of prime importance.

Despite intensive mineral exploration in this country, and expanded aggressive research in metal recovery, the use of substitutes, and other conservation measures, it is inevitable that the United States will more and more have to depend upon foreign sources of minerals. This demand will increase not only because of normal depletion of our ore reserves, but also because our increasing population will continue to demand houses, rapid transportation, and more labor-saving devices in the home, on the farm, and in the factory—and all of these require metals and minerals in large quantities. Should the bells of war toll again, the mineral situation would become even more acute. Thus, the United States must look more and more to increasing quantities of minerals from foreign sources. It means that we shall be forced into the British pattern of importing minerals in order to fabricate materials for export, to pay for mineral imports. This requires a different foreign policy.

But let us turn now from generalities to the lessons taught by World War II.

WARTIME MINERAL SITUATION

World War II brought a rude shock. We found that our smugly assumed domestic mineral abundances turned out

to be woefully inadequate to meet wartime requirements. The dozen strategic minerals of prewar time jumped to five dozen, because quantities of nearly every mineral used in industry had to be imported. During World War II we had to turn to fifty-three countries for imports of some sixty different minerals, of which twenty-seven came exclusively from foreign sources. We had to import six million tons of copper, lead, and zinc alone, three metals of which we had thought we had enough, and manganese at the rate of 1½ million tons a year. We get another shock when we glance at a few figures for twenty of the most vital minerals that form the basis of wartime and peacetime industry. Of these, we were 100 per cent dependent upon foreign sources for eight of them; 85 to 100 per cent dependent for six of them; 37 per cent dependent for copper and zinc, and 44 per cent for lead. It is startling to realize that in the postwar years the demand for most of these same twenty minerals for peacetime and defense developments is just as great as, or greater than, during actual war conditions, and it will be much greater in another twenty-five years.

Another interesting study was made by experts of the United States Geological Survey and the United States Bureau of Mines and published in 1948 as the *Mineral Resources of the United States*.[1] This revealing document portrays the ratio of production to consumption in 39 minerals during the periods 1935–39 and 1940–44. Before the war, production equaled or exceeded consumption in 11 out of 39 minerals, but several of these are common and not vital minerals. But for the more critical minerals, in 12 out of the total of 39, domestic production yielded only 50 to 100 per cent of our needs; for 6 it ranged from 10 to 50 per cent; and for the last 10, from 0 to 10 per cent.

The present and probable future rate of domestic consumption of minerals is vastly greater than in the 1935–39 period. Then, steel production, as a gauge of industry, ranged from 28 to 50 million tons annually; today it exceeds 102 million tons. Since then there has been a population increase of about 15 million people; there are more homes, higher wages, and labor shortages, and these spell demand for mineral-consuming labor-saving and luxury articles. The home, the farm, and the factory have become more mechanized. All of this means an increase in the future demand for metals and minerals vastly greater than the consumption of 1935–39.

It is timely now to glance at the present situation as to our well-being in available domestic supplies of these materials so basic to industry and defense.

PRESENT MINERAL SITUATION

Even more revealing, however, is another set of figures prepared by the same experts that give the reserves of 41 minerals expressed as years of life based on the 1935–44 rate of domestic consumption (reserves divided by average consumption). This brings out startlingly that, although there is a life of half a century or more for 15 of these 41 minerals, 3 of them would last only 33 to 39 years, and the remaining 26 have an indicated life of less than 25 years. Of the latter, 9 have a life of less than 10 years, and for 8 there are no reserves. These are telling estimates, and it is important to note that the long-life minerals include many substances of minor critical importance, such as helium, or substances of unrestricted sources of supply, such as salt and magnesium. The real backbone

[1] Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948.

minerals such as copper, lead, and zinc are all too short—19, 10, and 20 years of life respectively. And these figures were prepared as of 1944!

Even though these estimates of reserves were too low, and in my opinion they are, they would still indicate near-future domestic shortages even if they were increased by 50 to 100 per cent. I think these figures of reserves will be extended through increased technology, the development of more scientific methods of mineral exploration, and conservation measures.

This picture of United States mineral resources is the result of the long-continued heavy drain upon them in the building and defending of a great industrial nation. In addition, we are pouring out vast quantities of goods manufactured from minerals to supply foreign aid, such as machines, railroad, mining, and agricultural equipment, and goods for electricity, power, transportation, and factories. The irony is that the more we build our industrial and military power, along with that of other countries, the faster we exhaust the very basis of this power. And, unfortunately, most of the goods we ship abroad carry out raw materials that do not return to us.

THE OUTLOOK

We have to face clearly the fact that under increasing mineral developments we are approaching a crisis in our mineral situation. Despite intensive domestic mineral exploration, technology betterments, substitutions, and the wiser use of scarce metals and minerals, the United States will have to become more internationally minded with respect to minerals and more cognizant of foreign mineral potentialities. Indeed, its foreign policy should be oriented to help eliminate existing trade barriers and stimulate the flow of minerals to this country.

A critical period is the next twenty-five years during which our increase in consumption over production of minerals will be steadily mounting and our domestic production of many minerals will be rapidly waning. The expected divergence of consumption over domestic production unquestionably will stimulate further conservation measures and the development of substitutes that will tend to lessen the normal divergence. Table 1 gives, for twenty-six critical minerals, the actual dependence upon foreign sources for the three full years of World War II and an estimate of the dependence upon foreign sources in 1975.

Table 1 does not include several mineral commodities of which indicated United States resources are more than sufficient to supply United States needs over the next quarter-century. Those include magnesium from sea water, nitrates obtained largely from the air, and natural gas, helium, coal, salt, phosphate, potash, and molybdenum. Neither does the table include several minor metals such as arsenic, bismuth, and cadmium, or platinum and uranium, each of which must largely be supplied for United States consumption from foreign sources. Altogether, of 71 mineral substances currently on the national stockpile purchase list, only 8 are produced in any large quantity in the United States; and the Defense Production Administration lists in critically short supply some 44 metals, 9 chemical minerals, and 18 nonmetallic minerals.

The figures in Table 1 of the percentage of dependence upon foreign ores in 1975 are of necessity estimates. These estimates take into consideration the probable consumption demand by 1975, the estimated domestic produc-

TABLE 1—DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN MINERALS (PER CENT) IN WORLD WAR II AND IN 1975

Mineral	Per cent foreign during World War II	Per cent foreign in 1975	Probable chief foreign sources
Antimony	83.2	94	China, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru
Bauxite (aluminum)	18.18	85	Surinam, British Guiana, Jamaica, Indonesia
Beryl	90.6	90	Brazil, India, Argentina, Africa
Asbestos (strategic)	100.0	100	Rhodesia, S. Africa
Chrome	89.6[a]	100	S. Africa, S. Rhodesia, Turkey, New Caledonia, Philippines, Cuba
Cobalt	85.6	90	Belgian Congo, Rhodesia, Canada
Corundum	100.0	100	S. Africa
Copper	37.6	65	Chile, N. Rhodesia, Belgian Congo, Canada
Diamonds (industrial)	100.0	100	Congo, Angola, S. Africa, Brazil
Fluorspar	2.0	50	Mexico, Africa
Graphite	100.0	100	Madagascar, Ceylon
Iron ore	2.0	35–45	Venezuela, Canada
Lead	44.2	70	Mexico, Peru, Australia, Canada
Manganese	85.5[a]	80	India, Africa, Brazil, Cuba
Mercury	43.2	80	Italy, Spain, Mexico, Canada
Mica (strategic)	88.0[a]	95	India, Brazil
Quartz (radio)	99.0	100	Brazil
Nickel	100.0	100	Canada, Cuba, New Caledonia, Celebes
Petroleum	0.0	50	Venezuela, Middle East, Canada
Tantalum-columbium	99.0	99	Brazil, Congo, Nigeria
Sulphur	0.0	50	Canada, Mexico, Europe
Tin	100.0	100	Malaya, Indonesia, Bolivia, Congo
Titanium	26.0	80	Canada, India, Norway
Vanadium	32.4	25	Peru
Tungsten	61.1	70	China, Bolivia, Brazil, Portugal
Zinc	36.7	60	Mexico, Peru, Australia, Canada

[a] The remainder, from domestic sources, was mostly unusable; therefore these figures in reality should be higher.

tion, and probable substitutions and replacements. Some of these may now be considered in a little more detail.

THE STEEL-MAKING MATERIALS

The making of steel requires primarily coal and iron ore, but also several other mineral constituents, chief among which are manganese, fluorspar, and graphite. In addition, there are a number of alloying constituents absolutely essential to the making of the special steels required today for the manufacture of machines, equipment, and armament. Chief among these are chrome, manganese, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, molybdenum, and vanadium.

Of these steel-making constituents, coal, of course, is in abundance; but United States sources of high-grade iron ores are now beginning to run short. Already we are turning to imports of iron ore from Venezuela, Canada, and Chile, and in another twenty-five years the United States will have to lean quite heavily on Venezuela, Canada, and perhaps Brazil for high-grade ore.

Fully alive to the situation, United States steel interests are initiating the mining and milling of the low-grade taconite ores—at a capital cost of 200 million dollars for each 5 million tons of production. Every ton of steel produced requires some 12 to 14 pounds of manganese to make sound metal. Our production today is a small fraction of the total required, but there is hope that processes presently under investigation may in the future recover some of the manganese now wasted in steel-making slags. The production of fluorspar required for the purification of steel has dropped from an excess over consumption during World War II to an estimated 62 per cent of consumption in 1951; [2] and graphite for steel-making crucibles must still come largely from far-off Madagascar and Ceylon. Of the alloying metals mentioned, the United States is sufficient only in molybdenum and partly so in vanadium, and the existing shortages of today will grow much larger in another twenty-five years when demand may increase from 30 to 50 per cent over the present. It is true, of course, that new alloying substitutes such as boron will displace the need for some of the deficient alloying metals.

THE INDUSTRIAL (NONFERROUS) METALS

One of the most striking reversals in United States domestic supplies is that of copper, lead, and zinc, three basic metals which we hardly dreamed could ever be in short supply. Today around a third of our needs must come from foreign sources, and in another twenty-five years our imports are expected to jump to between two-thirds and three-quarters of our domestic requirements, taking into account that considerable aluminum will be substituted for copper, and plastics for lead.

The use of aluminum is expected to grow by leaps and bounds, with attendant shrinkage of domestic bauxite supplies and greater leaning on foreign high-grade bauxite. As long as high-grade bauxite is available, it will be the preferred source of aluminum ore; but the industry can change over, at a cost, to the use of lower-grade clays and aluminous rocks as a source of the metal.

Tin is almost nonexistent in the United States, and none may be expected. The chief sources of free-world tin lie in areas of political unrest and uncertain future security. Consequently, United States consumers of tin have been bending every effort to make themselves independent of imported tin as far as possible. The wise use of tin and the development of electroplating with thin coatings, and of substitutes, is so reducing the needs for tin that it is even possible the demands twenty-five years hence may not appreciably exceed those of today.

Titanium, the metal of the future, will make up in part for some of the expected deficiencies in other metals. United States reserves will diminish sharply over the next twenty-five years, and the titanium center of the world will shift to Quebec, where reserves are sufficient to supply the entire world demand.

MINOR METALS

Among the critical minor metals are antimony, mercury, tantalum-columbium, silver, and platinum metals, each of which is presently deficient in the United States, and the shortage will be intensified in the future. The United States will always be dependent upon foreign sources for supplies of these minerals, although domestic production partially meets the needs for mercury, silver, and antimony. Silver, whose industrial and military photographic uses have been climbing steadily, falls far short of meeting current domestic demands, and the outlook for the future is for a much greater deficiency, to be made up largely from Mexico and

[2] U. S. Bureau of Mines.

Canada. Substitutes will be needed to meet world demands. Tantalum-columbium are relatively new metals in the industrial demand. Columbium is intensely sought at present for heat-resisting alloys for jet plane use; but the present United States demand so far exceeds total world supply that new, less effective, alloys must be developed for replacement.

NONMETALLIC MINERALS

Of the critical industrial nonmetallic minerals shown in Table 1, strategic asbestos, beryl, corundum, industrial diamonds, strategic mica, and radio quartz are largely nonexistent in the United States, and foreign sources will have to be depended upon for 90 to 100 per cent of future supplies. Sulphur has been an excess mineral of which the United States has supplied most of the world demand; but no such pleasant condition can hold twenty-five years hence. By then, the brimstone sulphur of the prolific Gulf Coast salt domes will have been largely exhausted, and the United States will have to develop economical processes for the extraction of sulphur from sulphur-bearing minerals, or rely on imported sulphur.

The nonmetallic group of critical minerals offers the best opportunity for the development of substitutes and replacements. Owing to the development of synthetic quartz crystals and synthetic and built-up mica, we are no longer wholly dependent upon foreign sources for all uses of these strategic materials. Likewise, corundum and asbestos offer opportunity of being in part replaced by other, less effective substitutes.

FREE-WORLD SOURCES FOR FUTURE NEEDS

A brief study of the last column of Table 1 reveals that the chief foreign sources that might meet the future mineral needs of the United States are chiefly Latin America and the dominions and colonies of the western European nations. More particularly, the British Commonwealth countries contain in abundance those minerals for which the United States will find itself dependent upon foreign sources. The United States and the Commonwealth together own or control about three-quarters of the free-world mineral resources. Moreover, the dominions and colonies of the Commonwealth include vast, slightly prospected, hinterland areas underlain by rocks geologically favorable for the discovery of extensive additional mineral resources to supply future world needs.

It is noteworthy that of 32 chief critical minerals the British Commonwealth has a surplus of 24, is deficient in 7, and lacks only 1. Of the same minerals the United States is deficient in 18 and has a surplus of 9. Rather strikingly, of the 18 minerals in which the United States is deficient, 13 are abundant in the Commonwealth; and all 5 that we lack are in excess in the Commonwealth. Conversely, several of the Commonwealth deficiencies are surplus in the United States. Thus, each complements the other in mineral supplies. If each desires to maintain its political security and peacetime industrial development, it follows that they must ever be closely associated in foreign policy, international trade, and naval strength to protect supplying sea lanes. If the Commonwealth were to fall, it would be almost as disastrous for us as for them.

The European North Atlantic Treaty countries by themselves are woefully deficient in most of the essential minerals of industry. However, the countries of the British Commonwealth and the overseas empires of France, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands together with the United States as a group are completely self-sufficient for all their mineral needs for the future. What one lacks, the others have. Unfortunately, however, their mineral resources are widely scattered on all the continents, and ocean voyages of thousands of miles are required to transport the needed materials to the centers of consumption. This means millions of tons of shipping that has to be protected in the event of emergency. This, in turn, spells large navies and air forces. Remove this mineral traffic, and industry largely ceases.

The United States could not support herself industrially in the future as an isolationist country, even if she had free access to all the minerals of the Western Hemisphere; for she would still lack some thirteen important industrial minerals which are supplied to her by the North Atlantic Treaty countries. Thus, there are basic mineral reasons, as well as political ones, why our security and industrial future must be closely tied in with those of Europe and our navies and air forces must jointly control the seas. If Europe should be overrun by an unfriendly power that could control the destinies and resources of the European dominions and colonies, our industrial life would wither and our national security be placed in jeopardy. Our military aid to Europe therefore is not, as many infer, a purely one-sided affair; it safeguards our future industrial development and security.

RUSSIA'S MINERAL SITUATION

In contrast to the United States, Russia is now practically self-contained in the minerals of industry. Her deficiencies of World War II have now been largely made up by the inflow of minerals from the Iron Curtain countries. Lead and zinc flow from Poland, East Germany, and the Balkans; chrome, molybdenum, and antimony from the Balkans; uranium from Czechoslovakia and East Germany; nickel from former Finland; tungsten, antimony, tin, lead, zinc, graphite, copper, and others from Manchuria and China. This inward diversion of minerals, not to return, not only has removed supplies that formerly fed western Europe, but largely makes up Russia's own deficiencies. These minerals, together with Russia's own great resources in the critical industrial minerals, make her entirely independent of sea-borne mineral supplies. In this, Russia stands alone among all industrialized nations. Moreover, the few minerals that Russia does lack are those that move in such small quantities that they can be transported by airplane or submarine.

Russia's actual and potential minerals, which she herself controls, combined with her large population rapidly becoming industrially minded, make her potentially a colossal industrial giant of the future, and perhaps the leader of the world.

OUR FUTURE COURSE

The United States' growing dependence upon foreign mineral supplies, which will be greatly accentuated in the future, forcibly brings home the necessity of the following steps, mostly conservation:

1. Intensive research into all methods of conservation of mineral resources.
2. A wiser use of scarce minerals.
3. Prevention or elimination of loss or waste of minerals during mining.
4. Improvement in mining methods and mineral processing.
5. Better and more extensive use of recovery of metals from scrap.
6. Extensive research into the development of substitutes and replacements for scarce metals and minerals.
7. The further development of inhibitors and protectors to help save metals from corrosion.

8. Revision of rigid military specifications to diminish the use of scarce mineral products for purposes for which their properties are not essential.

9. Revision of domestic mining laws to permit geophysical and geochemical exploration over large areas.

10. Inauguration of a system of domestic taxation, both state and federal, to serve as incentive for mineral exploration, both at home and abroad.

11. Pursuit of a long-range program for the development and utilization of domestic marginal mineral deposits.

12. Adoption of measures to ensure an adequate flow of foreign minerals to the United States.

13. More extensive investigations of foreign mineral resources and potentialities.

14. The building up of an adequate stockpile of strategic and critical minerals for military and essential civilian needs.

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What Is Involved in Metals Conservation Today?

By HOWARD A. MEYERHOFF

THE concept of conservation was founded upon moral issues, and textbooks on the subject have never wholly freed themselves from this approach. The fact of the matter is, conservation must always be defined in realistic terms, and in answer to the question, "conservation for what?"

VARIOUS VIEWS OF CONSERVATION

In the case of natural resources, there can be but one answer for Americans. Since the beginning of World War I we have used more of our nonrenewable resources—notably the solid and liquid fuels, the metals, and industrial or nonmetallic minerals—than in all our previous history. They have been the foundation of an industrial civilization envied but unrivaled either in history or in geography. The maintenance of this civilization does not seem to trouble the average citizen, whose experiences with shortages are associated with the extraordinary military demands of World War II, and whose ignorance leads him blissfully to assume that American ingenuity can meet any demand for finished products, except in the dire straits of an all-out war. He lumps the raw materials in the same category as labor, transportation, capital, and management—all of them secondary to the problem of having sufficient income to purchase what he wants.

The problems of conservation are thus pushed back upon the manufacturer, who tends to define the term as the assurance of an uninterrupted flow of raw materials adequate to support the consumer, who is the American public, in the style to which he has become accustomed.

Government agencies like the Bureau of Mines, the United States Geological Survey, and the Department of Agriculture, created to assure discovery, development, and production of raw materials, have, of course, refined this practical objective of industry. To them, conservation involves the efficient production and use, with a minimum of waste, of the raw materials necessary to maintain the American way of life, which is essentially the American standard of living.

The academician has distilled and idealized the concept of conservation still further. He is struggling to abandon the notion of conserving natural resources for posterity, though he clings to it—wisely, to be sure—in the case of recreational, wildlife, forest, and water resources. But in the case of raw materials he has been forced to the realization that he has not the faintest idea how technology may transform the wants of man within the next generation, and, like Roger Adams in his retiring presidential address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science,[1] he is inclined to anticipate a "synthetic future" for the human race. Under these circumstances he tends to define conservation in somewhat the same terms as the government conservationist, but more circumspectly in terms of the past and the foreseeable future. To him, not only should minerals be produced and used without waste, but production and use should be correlated with known and estimated reserves. However, he like-

[1] *Science*, Feb. 15, 1952.

wise has the maintenance of the American way of life and the American standard of living as his measure, though he is inclined to extend American standards to the other nations of the world.

On the domestic scene, academicians and government agencies have essentially a common purpose, which may be stated, with some oversimplification, as the efficient development and full utilization of domestic raw materials with due consideration of the relation between the rate of production and total known reserves. On the international scene, academicians have more in common with the users or manufacturers, though the latter are motivated to a greater degree by economics than by the concept of conservation.

Since the late thirties some government agencies have developed a growing appreciation of foreign supplies of raw materials, and this concern was first expressed in protest against the monopolistic grip of British-Dutch interests upon the production, distribution, and price of native rubber from southeast Asia. The action of the tin cartel aroused comparable resentment; but it took the impending and actual shortages of World War II to implement programs of foreign exploration and development in which United States government experts officially participated. Foreign activity has continued, but at a greatly reduced tempo; and much of it is now on diplomatic levels in connection with Economic Cooperation Administration and Point Four programs. Industry, on the other hand, has broadened its international horizons and has intensified its exploratory and exploitative projects in those parts of the world that are still open to western enterprise.

Domestic use of industrial raw materials must now be viewed as an international operation. It has not been easy for conservationists to shift their sights from the limited confines of the United States, its territories, and its possessions, to encompass the entire world outside the communist countries. But now that large proportions of our raw materials are coming from lands outside our political control, conservation must be considered as an international problem, and in no field is this viewpoint more essential than in the conservation of metals.

THE COMPLACENT ATTITUDE

There is no need to go beyond the years of depression in the thirties to encounter in American thinking the complacent attitude of self-sufficiency in regard to essential metallic minerals. It was recognized that domestic supplies of a few of the metals were inadequate to meet the industrial demand, but these deficiences were not considered a serious problem. Manganese and tin were the two most troublesome minerals, for manganese is indispensable in the steel industry, and glassware and other types of food containers have never been satisfactory substitutes for tin-coated cans.

Likewise, the evolution of ferrous metallurgy created increasing demands for alloying metals, of which the United States possessed only one in ample and commercial quantities—namely, molybdenum. However, the tonnages required for the manufacture of commercial steel were not large, and in a world where exploration, exploitation, and commerce were unrestricted, problems of supply were readily solved.

In such a world the villains were not the Communists, who were ready and willing to supply manganese for use in American steel mills. Rather, they were the British and the Dutch, who made the most of natural monopolies to restrain trade and raise prices in tin and diamonds, not to mention rubber and quinine.

American industry found it expedient to keep a watchful eye and, where possible, a controlling interest on the foreign developments, for in this way catastrophe had been averted in the American copper industry when the rich deposits of Peru and Chile were brought into production. In the same spirit the Bethlehem Steel Company's tidewater venture at Sparrows Point, Maryland, was watched with considerable interest and some suspicion, for Bethlehem proceeded to draw its supply of iron ore from foreign operations in Spain and Sweden, and from mines more or less under its own control in Cuba and Chile.

Perhaps the conservation of our own finite reserves of bauxite in Arkansas was one of the factors that prompted the aluminum industry to draw upon Dutch and British Guiana for supplies of raw material, but the copper industry experienced panic and consternation when, in the depths of the depression, British, Belgian, and French interests inaugurated large-scale extractive operations along the Rhodesian-Congo boundary. A four-cent tariff warded off disaster for domestic copper producers, and the South American producers were saved only by accelerated industrial production in anticipation of war in 1937.

With the advent of World War II the production facilities of domestic mines were badly strained, and for a time we enjoyed the illusion that the mining industry's inability to meet our needs was due in large part to the shortage of manpower. Since the war, as we have taken inventory of our mineral assets, there has been a slow and reluctant realization of the fact that the domestic reserves of most metals are extremely limited, especially when measured against the annual rate of extraction and industrial consumption. In no other field of mining operation is the transformation as striking as it is in the case of iron ore, and an analysis of developments during the past ten years will provide a pattern into which conservation measures will be cast, not only with respect to iron ore, but also with respect to the ores of the base metals, copper, lead, and zinc.

RESERVES OF IRON ORE

During the boom years of the 1920's iron ore production approximated a peak of ninety million tons. About 85 per cent of this total came from the mines in the Lake Superior district, where reserves were known to be adequate for at least twelve to fourteen years. Thanks to the tax policy of the state of Minnesota, it was not expedient to know any more about subsurface reserves, because taxes were levied upon the owners of unmined ore, and they were based upon proved tonnage. Depression hit the mining districts here, for annual production dropped to a dismal ten to twelve million tons of newly mined ore in the early thirties, and many of the mining communities shriveled to little more than ghost towns. Business picked up later in the decade, and during World War II the annual extraction of iron ore broke the records established in the late twenties.

The heavy drain on the iron ranges of the Lake Superior district has continued since the war, and one by one the mining companies have found it increasingly difficult or impossible to establish the existence of new reserves as rapidly as ore is being mined. Routine drilling, designed merely to extend knowledge of known deposits and to assure a minimum of ten years' supply in any given operation, has been supplemented by new exploration. Known deposits have been explored more thoroughly, and engineering ingenuity has been brought to bear upon the attractive but difficultly accessible deposits of

Steep Rock Lake. The industry has gone even farther afield, and reports of iron ore along the Labrador-Quebec boundary in the Ungava Peninsula have been investigated, with the spectacular discovery that this district, with its formidable climate and its awkward geographic location, probably contains the largest reserve of high-grade hematite ore ever discovered on the North American Continent. The elaborate plans for the development of these deposits have required the revision of economic principles which have long been applied to the iron and steel industry, but there seems little doubt that these deposits will soon be worked during the short summer season and will be disgorging ten million tons or more of iron ore over a railroad that will connect the mines with the Saint Lawrence estuary, 238 miles away.

While one group of operators combed the Pre-Cambrian rocks of North America, applying the modern airborne magnetometer to peer through the glacial drift of the upper lake country, another group looked to Latin America for the solution of its raw materials problem. The Bethlehem Steel Company led the way through its developments in Cuba and Chile; and just as submarine warfare broke into full fury in the Caribbean, this company completed preparations to mine and to ship ore from the Pre-Cambrian Guiana Highlands south of the Orinoco River in Venezuela. Bethlehem's discoveries in Venezuela have since been extended by the United States Steel Corporation, which has undertaken a rival operation in this same general region.

Current interest in Venezuela is the outcome of cautious and exhaustive economic analysis. For several decades the large and rich hematite deposits of Brazil have been known, and during the war years American capital and technological skill were applied to a dual-purpose project—that of erecting a steel mill at Volta Redonda to supply Brazilian needs for steel products, and providing transportation facilities that would permit the export of some Brazilian ore. The fact that the two major operating companies of the United States turned their postwar attention to Venezuela rather than to Brazil is an eloquent commentary on the relative economic advantages of ore production in these two countries. However, the fact remains that one of the largest reserves available to the nations of the Western Hemisphere still lies on the periphery of economic availability in Minas Gerais in Brazil.

MILLING AND METALLURGICAL IMPROVEMENTS

American iron ore producers are not so unimaginative as to think that the discovery of new reserves is the only solution to the problem of impending shortage. For many years they have been interested in the possibilities of beneficiating low-grade ores, and in the Adirondacks beneficiation went beyond the experimental stage nearly twenty years ago. By means of efficient milling operations, deposits in that region that had been abandoned because they could not compete qualitatively with Lake Superior iron ore were reopened, and were milled to such good effect that concentrates could be shipped by rail to mills along Lake Erie and in the Pittsburgh district in competition with hematite from Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Likewise, the impressive tonnages of low-grade ore—taconite—in the upper lake country presented a challenge that prompted a great deal of experimentation. Only within the past two years has the problem been effectively solved, and now the taconite deposits seem destined to have commercial significance. To the extent that they can be utilized in competition with the higher-grade ores in the same area, they comprise an impressive extension of our iron ore reserves.

Competition from other metals and from plastics has also been an incentive to metallurgical and engineering research in the steel industry. Variations in furnace treatment and in milling have yielded new types of steel with distinctive properties. In ferrous metallurgy, progress in the study of alloying metals has reached a point where ferrous alloys are no longer the products of empirical recipes but are the results of scientific experimentation. Special properties can now be imparted to steel forms, making it possible for them to compete in many uses with lighter-weight aluminum. And recent developments have made it possible to utilize the titaniferous iron ores and so extend our reserves substantially by the addition of these hitherto unusable deposits.

MEASURES FOR SUPPLYING IRON ORE

The problem of guaranteeing ample supplies of iron ore for American industry is thus being solved in several ways:

1. Foreign deposits are being explored and exploited, not only to supply American mills with raw materials, but also to supply some of the countries concerned with the basic ingredient of domestic steel industries. Conservation is thus effected by importing ore that curtails the drain on United States reserves, and by providing such nations as Chile and Brazil with steel mills that can supply part of the local demand and thereby reduce the export of finished and semifinished steel products from the United States.

2. Private interests and appropriate government agencies have renewed their efforts to find hitherto unknown deposits of iron ore within the confines of this country. Some confidence is felt that geophysical techniques can penetrate the comparatively thin cover of glacial drift and vegetation which mask the iron-bearing Pre-Cambrian formations of the Lake Superior country; and it is probably only a matter of time before the search will be extended to areas in which the overburden consists of younger sedimentary rocks that are not too thick for the economic recovery of ore which may be buried beneath them. In 1951, for example, the United States Geological Survey published the results of aeromagnetic studies in northern Minnesota, and at least half a dozen different localities have been mapped and have been designated as promising for more detailed and definitive ground surveys.

3. Milling techniques have been evolved or improved to the point where concentrates of commercial grades can be obtained by treatment of otherwise uncommercial ores. Technological improvements of this kind brought several Adirondack magnetite deposits into production some time ago, and it now looks as if the taconite deposits of Minnesota will acquire commercial utility and can thus be added to the domestic reserve.

4. Metallurgical research is moving in at least two different but important directions. It is being applied to ores that contain troublesome ingredients—for example, the titaniferous iron ores. And by physicochemical advances in the development of ferrous alloys, it is promoting conservation through the development of alloys that require smaller quantities of iron to yield products of comparable strength, hardness, toughness, and similar qualities.

RELATION TO CONSERVATION

Obviously, not all of these measures fit strictly within the definition of conservation, however liberal that definition may be. The utilization of foreign

ores may conserve domestic reserves, but it is not conservation from the standpoint of world reserves. The discovery and development of new domestic deposits may increase our proved resources, but it is hardly conservation. Yet conservation may result from an extension of mining operations, specifically to the smaller bodies of iron ore. Until the mines of the Lake Superior district were opened, the American steel industry depended upon relatively small deposits of iron ore in the Adirondack and Appalachian regions for its major sources of supply. Some of these deposits were mined out; others were mined to the economic limits of depth; others were abandoned because the cost of extraction made the product noncompetitive with iron ore from the Lake Superior country. As noted above, several of the old Adirondack properties have been reopened, but chiefly because improved milling methods greatly increased the reserve of commercial ore and thus provided sufficient reserves for the maintenance of large extractive operations over a minimum period of fifteen to twenty years. Although none of the Adirondack deposits is large in comparison with the Mesabi Range in Minnesota, mine production can scarcely be characterized as small.

In quite a different category, however, is the interest that has been shown during the past two or three years in the small magnetite deposits of northern New Jersey and southeastern New York. Simply stated, the problem here is to determine how small a mining operation can be and still be economic. Some of the ore bodies that have been studied were mined a century or more ago; others were never utilized, either because there was no need for additional tonnage, or because they were commercially unattractive even under contemporary economic conditions. If it should prove feasible to exploit these rather numerous small deposits, the operation will fit under the definition of conservation, because use will be made of raw material that was thrown into the economic discard nearly a century ago.

ATTITUDES OF MINING PROFESSION

The possibility of using the small iron ore deposits in the Appalachians brings up the entire question of official attitude toward marginal mines. The mining fraternity has a strangely inconsistent attitude toward marginal operations; and, as might be expected, there is the usual alignment of small operators against big industry. The large operators have achieved substantial economies by the magnitude of their operations. Through combinations of good management and adequate capital they have either acquired large properties through purchase or concession, or have consolidated adjacent but independent properties to which they have thereupon applied integrated, unified development.

In the latter situation many an independent has found himself forced to sell his property to the large operator, because he could not compete in the labor market, he was unable to command minimum transportation facilities, he was at a disadvantage with respect to smelting facilities and costs. The large operator was rarely helpful in situations of this kind, and the suspicion that his methods may have been designed to force the small operator out was not infrequently well founded. On the other hand, the economies of unit operation of a single, integrated ore body are so well known that they need little argument in their support. With respect to marginal mines, this is not the problem.

The mentality of the mining profession constitutes a unique brand of psychology, in which faith and hope have always been dominent ingredients. Until the Federal Government introduced subsidies into the national economy, independence was a third trait in mining psychology; but from the tone of reports emanating from mining districts and from mining states—for example, from such organizations as the Colorado Mining Association—it looks as if the spirit of independence has been displaced by the all but universal cry for guarantees of security. One gets the impression that every would-be miner who has had the energy and ingenuity to open a hole in the ground feels that he is entitled to a government guarantee that he will not lose money in the operation. Demands for subsidy are nearly always bolstered by statistics that reveal shortages of metals, by appeals to public interest in national security, by denunciations of reciprocal tariff arrangements whereby metals of foreign derivation may compete with domestic raw materials, and by protest against the financial support given foreign mining operations under the Marshall plan and Point Four programs.

The entire problem of government support for marginal mining operations has become so confused in domestic political issues and debatable foreign policies that it is almost impossible to view it dispassionately and in proper perspective. The writer does not pretend that he has done so in the brief remarks that follow.

QUESTION OF SUBSIDIES

For those metals, like iron, copper, lead, zinc, and silver, in the production of which the United States has been essentially self-sufficient, and the reserves of which are still large, even if not entirely adequate for future needs, the principle of subsidies for marginal mining operations is unsound. A single reservation to this statement may be made. During the depression several large mines came perilously close to failure and to abandonment, even though subsurface reserves were far from exhausted. A mine abandoned is a mine lost unless operations are resumed before deterioration of the underground workings and the equipment sets in. It is definitely worth while to maintain properties in good working condition if they are still capable of supplying a substantial percentage of our normal production. During World War II experience indicated that the tonnage produced in small marginal mines was in general obtained at an expenditure of money, equipment, and manpower that was far from commensurate with the returns. Saner wage and manpower policies in our major mining districts would have enabled the larger operations to yield equivalent tonnages at a much lower expenditure of money and equipment.

From the standpoint of the national economy, the same principle applies in the case of those metals of which our reserves are inadequate for our needs. However, against the practical considerations of economics must be weighed the problem of supply in the event of a national emergency. Security demands the assurance of supplies under any and all conditions; and to meet this situation, marginal mining and stockpiling may logically and legitimately enter the picture.

MANGANESE AND TIN

Perhaps manganese offers as good an example of the problem as any of the scarcer metals, for most of the world's high-grade reserves are located in the Eastern and Southern Hemispheres, and the two largest are in the Soviet

Union. The importance that Germany attached to manganese can be gleaned from the fact that the mining districts along the Dnieper were the last areas to be abandoned by German troops in the retreat from Russia. From the American standpoint the uncertainty of Soviet deliveries, which reflects official Soviet policy, has been brought forcibly to the consciousness of industrialists and government officials, and the latter not only have aided in assuring a dependable flow of manganese from remote foreign deposits that can be economically operated, but also have vigorously—if not wisely—attempted to increase domestic production from small, low-grade deposits which could not survive in a free, unsupported market, and which could not supply minimum needs in a stringent emergency.

There is clearly some sense in encouraging continued production in such a district as Batesville, Arkansas, and of improving flotation and other milling methods that may bring submarginal deposits within the pale of exploitation and emergency use. At the same time, stockpiling should also be undertaken with a finite objective—namely, to meet minimal needs of the steel industry for a specific period of time, presumably the maximum period during which we may, under most adverse military conditions, find ourselves cut off from our regular sources of supply and reduced to the limited tonnages available from every utilizable domestic deposit and from nearby foreign deposits that can be retained under military control.

In the case of the few metals, like tin, that occur so sporadically and sparingly that any commercial production in the United States has never been successfully achieved, stockpiling provides the only assurance of emergency supplies. Any attempt to operate currently known domestic deposits should be branded as economic idiocy. A case history of tin during the past war should provide Americans with many pointers on solving the problems posed by materials in short supply, but only three phases of the story relate to conservation. First was the effort to conserve tin by making it go farther. It was found that by electroplating, food containers retained all their efficacy with only one-third as much of the metal; and additional savings have been effected by employing some nonrusting substitute, like shellac, for the exteriors of tin cans. It was also found possible to salvage tin even where it was merely a thin coating, and for a time this secondary tin was a most important factor in ensuring minimal supplies.

ELEMENTS IN CONSERVATION

Saving, salvage, and substitution are basic elements in conservation, and they call for all the technological ingenuity at our command if we are to supply Americans in the style to which they are now accustomed and to raise living standards elsewhere in the world. The mineral frontier, which seemed endless in its capacity to yield new sources of raw materials, has all but disappeared insofar as new deposits are concerned. It can be expanded within limits by luck and by the shrewd application of modern and only partly developed exploration techniques. Technology will also enable us to expand our reserves to the extent that metals can be won economically from smaller and/or lower-grade deposits. But in these efforts we are merely finding more raw materials to feed the insatiable furnaces that supply the needs and the luxuries of modern living. It is equally imperative to make what we have go farther by using less without sacrificing effect or efficiency; by reuse through salvage; and by substitution of replaceable raw materials where the same purposes can be equally well served. These kinds of conservation must play an ever increasing part in our metals economy unless we wish to contemplate a future of rigid rationing of many raw materials.

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The Fuel Complex: A Projection

By George A. Lamb

THE United States consumes over 40 per cent of the fuel and water-power energy produced in the world. This energy—processed into many forms of solids, liquids, and gases, besides electricity—provides heat, powers machinery, and satisfies numerous needs that make the country's economy run.

Energy supply was the least of worries during the development of the American economy. The country had abundant resources of coal, petroleum, natural gas, and water power, which permitted a wide choice of energy products to the consumer. Domestic requirements could be readily supplied and export orders fully met. Perhaps, it may be said, this was the situation until several years ago.

The United States has been on an import basis with respect to petroleum since 1948. Its coal and natural gas reserves produce as required, but petroleum reserves have tended to become niggardly about output. Imports of petroleum and its products represent only 12 per cent of the total domestic oil demand. But that they have grown rapidly, and that large amounts of American capital are invested in foreign oil, point to the reality that imports are an established fact in domestic petroleum supply, and their importance will expand. It means that the United States has become sensitive to world supply conditions, and will become more so with regard to petroleum, the largest source of energy it utilizes.

The United States requirements in the world fuel market transactions are modest against those of most countries. World fuel resources of a magnitude that can produce for export are confined to a few areas. Today, the United States is the only country that can offer a substantial tonnage of exportable coal. Venezuela and the Middle East cover the countries that have surplus petroleum in volume. As a result, there are many countries that supplement their indigenous energy supply by competing for fuels in the few areas of surplus. More and more the fuel outlook must be gauged with reference to world requirements and supply if realistic evaluations are to be made.

Energy Requirements

During 1950 the world required energy from the principal sources in the following amounts:

Coal	1.62	billion metric tons
Petroleum	3.99	billion barrels
Natural gas	7.20	trillion cubic feet
Water power	0.32	trillion kilowatt hours

In addition, the energy supplied by a miscellaneous group consisting of wood, peat, waste material, and other sources, for which reliable figures are not available, may be as large as that contributed by natural gas and water power together; but this group has few potentialities in terms of prospective world technology. Its resources are limited and its fuels are inefficient compared to what is needed in the growing energy requirements.

Converting the principal world energy to a common basis, heat value expressed in terms of British thermal units, coal supplied 57 per cent against 28 per cent by petroleum. Natural gas and water power contributed 9 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively.[1]

[1] Heat value is an inadequate standard for measuring accurately the importance between energies, since it fails to account properly for efficiency in end uses. It is a convenient index, however, and serves satisfactorily for making general comparisons among energy sources, if allowance is made for its shortcomings.

The 1950 world consumption of energy derived from the principal sources was equivalent to 2.9 billion tons of coal or 14.3 billion barrels of petroleum. On a per capita basis, it was 1.2 tons of coal or 6.0 barrels of petroleum.

The extent to which energy consumption varied between continents and countries is noteworthy.[2] North America, mainly the United States, plus western Europe consumed 66 per cent of the energy while representing 18.6 per cent of the population.[3] Eastern Europe—that is, the Soviet Union and its satellite countries—required 17 per cent of the energy while having 13.9 per cent of the population, although estimates are necessarily rough because of the sketchy material available on that area. On the other hand, South America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania combined used only 17 per cent of the energy although they had two-thirds of the world's population.

During 1950, differences by certain countries in per capita consumption of energy derived from the principal sources, expressed in tons of coal equivalent, are found in the following: United States 8.1; Canada 6.6; United Kingdom 4.5; France 2.3; Union of South Africa 2.3; Soviet Union 1.7; Japan 0.8; Brazil 0.2; and India 0.1. Although these figures have the disadvantage usually attributed to averages, the per capita figures do provide a general index for energy utilization which reflects comparative general industrial development. Stated otherwise, they point to a large potential increase in energy use should there be even a modest relative advance in industrialization throughout the greater part of the world.

Sources of Energy

In 1950 the main source of energy consumed in the United States was petroleum, but in the other more industrialized countries of the world it was coal. Western Europe, like the Soviet Union and its dominated countries, depended upon petroleum for only 13 per cent of its total energy requirements. Barrels of petroleum products used per capita in certain countries were: 15.7 in the United States; 2.4 in the United Kingdom; and 1.7 in France and the Soviet Union. Today, Europe consumes coal and petroleum in proportions similar to what they were in the United States during the early twenties.

There are other sources of energy yet to be utilized, one of which is oil shale. Although still to be established on a commercial scale, shale has been explored sufficiently to indicate it as the most promising material for initial synthetic oil production in the United States. Nuclear energy has prospects for general use, though this may not come about on a substantial basis for some time.[4] Solar energy likewise finds many that consider its future promising, but its development lags behind that of

[2] Basic energy data are taken from publications of the U. S. Bureau of Mines, and the United Nations, except as indicated.

[3] Population data are from the U. S. Bureau of Census and the United Nations. In certain cases it is estimated in part. For example, the world population taken from these sources and conveniently listed on page 1 of the *Economic Almanac 1951–1952* (National Industrial Conference Board) amounts to 2.37 billion in 1949. It is assumed to be approximately 2.4 billion in 1950.

[4] For an analysis of atomic potentials see Sam H. Schurr and Jacob Marschak (Eds.), *Economic Aspects of Atomic Power*, York, Pa.: Maple Press Co., 1950. Also see statement of Mr. Philip Sporn, president of American Gas and Electric Co. and chairman of President Truman's Committee on Atomic Energy, reported in *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 18, 1952, p. 8.

TABLE 1—APPARENT CONSUMPTION AND SUPPLY OF COAL AND PETROLEUM BY CONTINENTS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950

	Coal (million metric tons)	Petroleum (million barrels)
North America		
United States	448	2,372
Other	42	262
Total consumption	490	2,634
Excess or deficit in production	+33	−375
South America		
Venezuela	[a]	33
Other	8	161
Total consumption	8	194
Excess or deficit in production	−3	+454
Europe		
Western Europe	515	450
Russia & E. Europe	435	328
Total consumption	950	778
Excess or deficit in production	−6	−437
Asia		
Middle East	4	76
Other	116	117
Total consumption	120	193
Excess or deficit in production	+1	+455
Africa & Oceania		
Total consumption	52	194
Excess or deficit in production	−1	−94
Grand Total	1,620	3,993
Excess or deficit in production[b]	+25	+3

[a] Less than 500,000.

[b] Excess is due to fuel in transit and in storage.

Sources: U. S. Bureau of Mines; also reference to United Nations documents and "Demand to top 4.4 Billion Barrels," *World Petroleum*, Vol. 22, No. 10 (Sept. 1951), pp. 40–42. Consumption partly estimated for certain countries.

nuclear energy. It appears that during the rest of the century, if not longer, most of the energy supply will continue to be derived from coal and petroleum.

ENERGY GROWTH

World production of the principal energy sources has increased steadily since World War I, although at different rates. Natural gas, produced and used mainly in the United States, has had the most rapid rate of advance. Petroleum products have had a continually expanding world market which reflects developments of motor vehicles, aircraft, and other mechanical applications. The growth of water power for electric power generation has tended to slacken since the thirties, following years of speedy development. Coal's increase is attributed largely to the demand for solid fuels in Europe.

FUEL PROJECTIONS

Past energy developments give rise to interesting speculation about the future world requirements for coal and petroleum, and how they will be supplied. On the one side, the steady increase in energy needs that has taken place will apparently continue. On the other side, the tendency for the greater portion of coal and petroleum supply to rest more and more on the output of a few countries will have the result that satisfying requirements will become increasingly complicated with each succeeding year.[5] Possibly within this decade, conditions may force considerable changes among the uses of fuel. Certainly within the next twenty-five years, the world fuel structure will have quite a different appearance from what it has today.

What may the world fuel situation be in twenty-five years? By then, population will have increased; technology, industrialization, and other components of the world economy will have advanced, providing global conditions are no worse than they have been. This economic growth may come about at a rate that corresponds to a past period.

Based upon 1937 to 1950, world requirements during the next twenty-five years will increase 27.5 per cent for coal and 170 per cent for petroleum. Coal projects to 2.1 billion tons and petroleum to 10.8 billion barrels. The two projections combined represent a growth of 74 per cent in British thermal units (Btu's). Natural gas may be excluded in the world calculations, since

[5] World coal reserves are rated by Paul Averitt and Louise R. Berryhill in *Coal Resources of The United States*, Circular 94, p. 26 (U. S. Geological Survey, Nov. 1950). Distribution of the major reserves is: United States 40 per cent, Russia 21 per cent, China 18 per cent. Germany and the United Kingdom have 6 per cent and 3 per cent respectively. Location of the major petroleum proved reserves is: 50 per cent in Middle East, 25 per cent in the United States, 10 per cent in Venezuela. *Petroleum Facts and Figures*, 9th Ed., 1951 (New York: American Petroleum Institute), p. 443. Also estimates of D. M. Duff, "Middle East Accounts for More Than Half of Global Petroleum Reserves," *Oil and Gas Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 33 (Dec. 20, 1951), pp. 224 and 227.

TABLE 2—WORLD PRODUCTION OF COAL AND PETROLEUM, INCLUDING NATURAL GASOLINE

	Coal[a] (million metric tons)			Petroleum (million barrels)		
	1920	1937	1950[b]	1920	1937	1950[c]
North America	*613*	*467*	*523*	*610*	*1,380*	*2,259*
United States	597	451	505	452	1,328	2,154
Other	16	16	18	158	52	105
South America	*2*	*3*	*5*	*8*	*260*	*648*
Venezuela				[d]	186	549
Other				7	74	99
Europe[e]	*532*	*814*	*944*	*42*	*275*	*341*
Western Europe	454	565	500			
Eastern Europe	78	249	444			
Africa	*11*	*17*	*28*			
Asia	*70*	*117*	*121*	*23*	*130*	*648*
Middle East				12	117	641
Far East				11	13	7
Oceania	*16*	*17*	*24*			
World, other				*21*	*71*	*100*
World Totals	1,244	1,435	1,645	704	2,116	3,996

[a] Lignite converted on basis: 2 tons lignite = 1 ton bituminous coal, except for higher-grade lignite of North America.

[b] Preliminary.

[c] Preliminary and partly estimated.

[d] Less than 500,000 barrels.

[e] Includes Asiatic U.S.S.R. production.

Sources: Coal: U. S. Bureau of Mines; also reference to United Nations and League of Nations documents. Petroleum: U. S. Bureau of Mines; reference also to United Nations documents; *Energy Resources of the World*, Washington: Department of State, 1937.

TABLE 3—WORLD ENERGY SUPPLY, 1937 AND 1950

Source	1937		1950		Per cent increase
	Quadrillion Btu's	Per cent of total	Quadrillion Btu's	Per cent of total	
Coal[a]	41,491	68.8	47,541	57.1	14.6
Petroleum[b]	12,280	20.4	23,175	27.8	88.7
Natural gas[c]	3,023	5.0	7,740	9.3	156.0
Water power[d]	3,483	5.8	4,836	5.8	38.8
Total	60,277	100.0	83,292	100.0	38.2

[a] Metric ton = 28.9 million British thermal units.
[b] 1 barrel = 5.8 million Btu's.
[c] 1 cubic foot = 1,075 Btu's.
[d] In 1937, 1 pound of coal was equal to 1.44 kilowatt-hours; in 1950 it was equal to 1.19.
Sources: U. S. Bureau of Mines; United Nations; *Energy Resources of the World*, U. S. State Department, Washington, 1937.

its use is confined primarily to the United States. Water power—a comparatively small energy source—also may be excluded on the basis that it will expand in proportion to total energy requirements.

In the United States, requirements for total energy—as derived from the combination of coal, petroleum, natural gas, and water power—will double in twenty-five years according to the 1937–50 experience. This will amount to 70.4 quadrillion Btu's. Petroleum and natural gas taken alone, because of their steady increase in the base period and subsequent greater volume in the years that follow, will account for 65.2 quadrillion Btu's, or most of the requirements. Allowing water power to double in output, practically nothing will be left for coal on the basis of 70.4 quadrillion Btu's. But because there are certain uses that cannot be satisfied by petroleum, gas, or water power, for instance in steelmaking, coal probably will retain at least half of its volume, making the requirements for the other energy sources somewhat less than their particular projections indicate. This is the sort of situation that may result if petroleum and natural gas are as readily available as they were during 1937–50.

TABLE 4—PROJECTED WORLD REQUIREMENTS OF COAL AND PETROLEUM
(Quadrillion Btu's)

	Actual 1950	Projected 1975	Per cent increase
Coal	47.5	60.6	27.5
Petroleum	23.2	62.6	170.0
Total	70.7	123.2	74.0

Conditions in the rest of North America will relate to those in the United States. Europe, on the 1937–50 experience, will have a 50 per cent growth (about 450 million tons) in coal consumption—most of the world increase for this solid fuel. South America and Asia will expand coal demand by 50 per cent, and Africa and Oceania together will require 70 per cent more tonnage.

The advance in petroleum demand of 170 per cent for the world will be represented by a 190 per cent increase for the United States and a 160 per cent increase for the rest of the world. In Europe it will double, the increase in western Europe being 130 per cent and that in eastern Europe being 50 per cent. Other increases of smaller volume are 150 per cent in Asia, and 400 per cent in South America and Africa-Oceania.

Few countries can look to anything but coal and petroleum to supply their increased fuel requirements. Natural gas will be a major fuel in the United States, but it offers no significant prospects elsewhere except in Venezuela and Canada, and to a less extent in a few other countries. This is exclusive of what may be done with the supposedly large gas reserves of Russia.

SUPPLY PROBLEMS

Prospective supply difficulties center around two situations. First is the likelihood that western Europe will be unable to acquire the increased amounts of coal to meet its greater energy requirements. Figured on a straight projection of 1937 to 1950, it will need 20 per cent more coal in 1975; but if allowance is made for its supply scarcity since World War II, it will probably need 50 per cent additional tonnage, or 250 million tons. Western Europe, confronted with poor mining conditions and high costs, does not demonstrate that it can better its present production 10 per cent, much less 50 per cent.[6]

The United States could enlarge its mining facilities to produce the extra coal that western Europe may need. Unfortunately, the tonnage might have to be delivered at comparatively high cost to the consumer because of transportation and handling charges. United States coal delivered to overseas buyers at costs ranging from $20 to $25 per ton, as prevailed during 1951, three-fourths represented in shipping charges largely because of vessel rates, would push European fuel budgets beyond economic reason.[7]

A reduction in these shipping charges is probable, but whether they can be lowered to the point to permit the general flow of coal to Europe economically over the long run raises a doubt.[8] The reduction may permit the movement of by-product and other special-quality coals which may be as much as 50 million tons yearly, although hardly a tonnage several times larger which Europe may be required to import to satisfy total coal needs. Little help can be expected from the Soviet Union, which must expand its mining to supply its growing coal requirements. Hence, if western Europe is to have adequate energy in the years ahead, it will look for a source other than coal. Petroleum is the only source left that has potentialities.[9]

The second major supply difficulty concerns petroleum in the United States.

[6] Coal production in western Europe has relatively high costs because of physical mining conditions and the inability to utilize mechanization in the same degree as in the United States. In October and November 1950, output per man-shift was 1.2 tons in Great Britain, 1.1 tons in Western Germany, and 0.8 ton in France. It was 6.1 tons for bituminous coal in the United States in 1950. *International Coal Trade* (U. S. Bureau of Mines), Vol. 20, No. 2, Feb. 1951.

[7] *Saward's Journal*, Vol. 34, No. 42 (Jan. 1952), p. 585, quotes ocean single-trip rates per gross ton on coal from the eastern United States as follows: United Kingdom about $12.00; Antwerp $10.50 to $11.25; Italy $11.70 to $14.00. Western Europe imported over 25 million tons of coal from the United States in 1951.

[8] During the early part of 1952, a joint UMWA-coal operators shipping pool was under consideration for the purpose of leasing and operating government surplus ships. The proposal was to operate ships at cost in order to reduce delivered coal costs at foreign ports. See *United Mine Journal*, Vol. LXIII, No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1952), p. 10.

[9] Petroleum also has lower transportation costs than coal. The maximum price on heavy fuel oil in New York Harbor was $2.45 per barrel, equivalent to coal at $10 per ton, during much of 1951. Oil from Venezuela and the Middle East was delivered at this price, or about half what it cost to deliver the equivalent of American coal in Europe.

It has been estimated, with certain qualifying conditions, that peak petroleum production in the United States may be reached by 1960 and possibly before.[10] Much oil will be produced from the country's reserves following the peak performance, but eventually at a declining rate. Estimators of the peak outlook further hold that indigenous petroleum may supply only 10 per cent of the country's total oil requirements at the end of the present century.

The world peak in petroleum production may appear in 1985[11] as figured with regard to various considerations, one of which is that the world reserves ultimately producible total one trillion barrels, larger than sometimes cited. Furthermore, it is held that world production may have a peak no larger than 7 billion barrels per annum. If the latter proves to be the case and the demand for oil approximates the increase projected—that is, a growth from 4 to 10.8 billion barrels in twenty-five years—a shortage in petroleum may develop within the next dozen years.

BALANCING OUT

Interrelating requirement and supply prospects, what may be the consumption of coal and of petroleum twenty-five years hence?

In the United States, a number of changes will take place. Where the requirement trends show coal as a solid fuel losing half of its volume, while petroleum and natural gas are advancing 190 per cent and 200 per cent respectively, the addition of supply factors present a different outlook. This is true even if it is liberally assumed that natural gas will have the production volume to take care of its demand growth.

PETROLEUM IN 1975

Petroleum production in the United States, should it reach a peak by 1960, would be at a comparatively low level by 1975. One forecast indicates that it may be no larger than 1 billion barrels annually by the early seventies.[12] Still, if it were as high as 2 billion barrels in 1975, then against a projected oil demand of 6.9 billion barrels there would be a difference of 4.9 billion barrels to be supplied from other sources.

Petroleum imports will be one way to supplement domestic supply, but in a limited manner. They amounted to 309 million barrels last year and in 1950. Canada will be the origin for part of the imports, but Venezuela and the Middle East will be the source for most of them. To have imports furnish the greater part of future domestic needs would depend upon a gigantic fleet of tankers besides the availability of foreign petroleum. The latter apparently will be wishful thinking, since the rest of the world likewise will be bidding for petroleum and will attempt to take all that is produced. An allowance of 1 billion barrels for imports in 1975 may be too large, but such a volume would still leave a deficit of 3.9 billion barrels in oil supply.

Prices will keep oil to its more essential uses and will encourage technological advancement in the development of new supply to offset petroleum scarcity. Oil for motor vehicles, aircraft, and other motive equipment will be a principal requirement. Its uses for space heating and under boilers for raising industrial steam will diminish in volume by necessity. In 1950, about 800 million barrels, one-third of the total domestic oil demand, was consumed for heat and boiler-plant steam. At the same time, 1.1 billion barrels of gasoline, diesel oil, and other light oils was required for motor fuel—41 per cent of total demand. Assuming that in 1975 gasoline and other motor oils would have a demand of 3 billion barrels, approximately the proportion of total oil demand they presently have, and that oils for other uses would be restricted, petroleum requirements could be substantially lowered. Instead of needing 6.9 billion barrels, probably 3.5 billion barrels of petroleum would yield the needed motor and other essential oils. This would leave a deficit of 500 million barrels after domestic petroleum and imports accounted for 3 billion barrels.

Shale oil would supplement supply, probably to the amount of 300 million barrels.[13] The great deposits of shale vary widely as to minability and oil content, and those that could be processed within a reasonable cost range apparently would not support a production beyond this figure.

SYNTHETIC OIL

Supplying the remaining 200 million barrels of oil would fall upon coal. Oil can be made from coal by various processes, any one of which is now in a preliminary stage and will probably be improved a great deal with further investigation.[14] Thermal inefficiency in conversion is a major problem; about half of the heat value of the coal used is lost in processes like hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch. A ton of coal instead of making four-plus barrels of oil makes only two.

An initial approach to synthetic oil output may be through the recovery of tar from coal through low-temperature carbonization and use of the principal resulting product—char or semicoke—for a solid fuel and additional synthetic output. The 40 gallons of tar taken from a metric ton of coal can be converted into oils with a high degree of efficiency.[15] This process may well take care of the 200 million barrels of oil needed to balance supply in 1975, and has potentialities for supplying much more. Five hundred million tons of coal used in this process would be the basis for about 450 million barrels of motor fuel and related products, and 350 million tons of char.

A char market will have limitations if confined to solid fuel, but may be unlimited if extended to the raw material needed by other synthetic oil processes. These other processes where the entire ton of coal or char is used for oil making will have to be employed as the spread enlarges between what oil is needed and what can be supplied through domestic petroleum, imports, and shale. Their potentialities from a cost standpoint still need a great deal more exploration before satisfactory determinations can be made as to what process is to offer the greatest advantages.[16]

[10] Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott, *Energy Resources—The Wealth of the World* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), p. 40.

[11] Eugene Ayres, "Synthetic Liquid Fuels—When and How," *Petroleum Processing*, Jan. 1952, p. 41.

[12] Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott, cited note 10 *supra*, p. 42.

[13] Eugene Ayres, "Synthetic Liquid Fuels," cited note 11 *supra*, p. 44.

[14] Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott, cited note 10 *supra*, p. 114.

[15] See *Petroleum Processing*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), p. 45, for an interesting account of the possibilities in low-temperature carbonization.

[16] It has been estimated that the large-scale conversion of the better-quality shale into motor fuel can be made presently at a cost of 14.7 cents per gallon—slightly more than 3 cents above the average refinery price. Coal hydrogenation is figured to cost 41 cents per gallon. See *Report of The National Petroleum Council's Committee on Synthetic Liquid Fuels Production Costs*, Washington, Oct. 31, 1951. The U. S. Bureau of Mines estimates that the hydrogenation process is less costly than the Petroleum Council's figure. Current figures on the Fischer-Tropsch process are not available, but some contend they will give a lower cost than estimates for hydrogenation.

HEATING AND STEAM FUELS

What about the requirements for heating and steam fuels that were to be but could not be supplied by oil? This may be harder to answer satisfactorily than the question of meeting demands for motor and other essential oils. Substitute energy to displace 3.4 billion barrels of oil is not readily available if it is to be consumed without economic hardship.

It takes about 700 million tons of coal to furnish the Btu's in 3.4 billion barrels of petroleum. Presently, coal can displace oil for some uses with little if any additional cost and without any loss in thermal efficiency. These uses consist of fuel for large boiler operations such as at electric utility plants and even at oil refinery plants located in certain areas. They will be fueled more with coal as oil tends to become scarce and its price rises. In less than twenty-five years, most of the boiler fuel that had been oil will consist of coal. Probably as much as 1 billion of the projected 3.4 billion barrels can be displaced directly by coal.

The amount of oil used for heating residential and commercial buildings totaled 400 million barrels in 1950.[17] It projects to 1.3 billion barrels, or 260 million tons of coal in heat equivalent, in 1975. Here the question of convenience to the user often is the controlling factor in selecting fuels, and it will be more so. Part of the heating requirements can be supplied by the use of central coal plants. These plants now operate satisfactorily in a number of places, especially in concentrated city areas. They are economical and provide a convenient heat. Electrical heating, now installed on a modest scale, features convenience and potential economies. It fits into the scheme of building equipment and furnishing which is tending towards electrification. Probably it will eventually become a major supplier of space heat on its own merits. Coal-generated electricity will likely furnish heat at a cost comparable to the current cost of oil heat. If this develops, then central plants and electrical units with coal as the energy source can displace 1.3 billion barrels of oil heat with thermal equivalent and, moreover, with added convenience.

While 2.3 billion barrels of oil can be displaced through the substitution of coal in boiler plants and as an energy source for space heating, there remains to be supplied 1.1 billion of the projected 3.4 billion barrels. This consists of fuel for ship bunkers, railroads, processing in manufacturing plants, and a variety of additional requirements. Much will depend upon technological advance if coal is to displace oil for these particular uses and higher relative fuel costs are to be avoided. The coal gas turbine, now under development, may provide the way for decreasing oil for bunker and railroad needs as well as for other purposes. Electric power may be used more extensively for railroad transportation. It also may serve in place of oil for many processing needs. Furthermore, oil made from coal may be utilized if synthetic production is advanced as some think it will be. A great deal has to be done in the efficient substitution of coal for oil, but there is evidence that it can be done for numerous uses within a twenty-five-year period.

SITUATION IN NORTH AMERICA

Under this sequence of fuel developments, adequate energy would be available to the United States in 1975. One billion metric tons of coal would supply solid fuel needs and be the source for 200 million barrels of motor fuel and for energy for space heating and other purposes now serviced by petroleum products. Shale oil would contribute 300 million gallons of motor fuel. Three billion barrels of petroleum would be the source for motor and other essential oils.[18]

Outside the United States, the fuel outlooks vary widely depending upon the country or continent considered. Canada has a promising oil and natural gas production, but, taking into account a rising energy demand, it still will need a larger coal tonnage. It is estimated that Canadian coal requirements will double in twenty-five years to an approximate 80 million tons, with no allowance for synthetic oil output or any special displacement of oil.[19] Half would be supplied by the United States. Like the United States, the other countries of North America will require continually greater volumes of oil.

SITUATION IN EUROPE

There is no indication that western Europe will be able to expand its coal supply through production and imports to anything like 250 million tons in the future years. Most of this additional fuel will have to be secured from a source other than coal. In the circumstances, a billion barrels of fuel oil may go a long way towards making fuel supply adequate in 1975.

Western Europe likewise is going to require sizable additions to motor and related oils. Projections, even though reflecting austere living since World War II, point to a twenty-five-year increase in motor fuels of 100 per cent, or to 1 billion barrels. The increase may be twice as great. Thus in 1975 western Europe may be taking 3 billion barrels of petroleum from the Middle East and from where else it can be had. A six-fold growth in oil consumption like this may appear to be fanciful at first glance, but it is similar to what happened in the United States between World War I and 1950. It is probable if world production and transportation of petroleum develop as assumed. Moreover, the per capita consumption in western Europe in 1975 would be only 8 barrels, compared to the present 16 barrels in the United States.

Eastern Europe apparently will be better situated to enlarge its production of coal and petroleum, and probably natural gas. It already has made good strides in coal mining and should be able to reach the 650 million tons projected. Russia may develop crude oil output in view of its supposedly large petroleum reserves. Eastern Europe's twenty-five-year projected oil consumption amounts to only 500 million barrels. An increase to 1.5 billion barrels is not too much to expect, especially if eastern Europe attempts to maintain an energy position comparable to the one assumed for western Europe.

SITUATION OUTSIDE NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE

North America and Europe account for most of the energy to be consumed. The remainder of the world, however, will plan to use more coal and petro-

[17] *Bituminous Coal Annual* (Washington: Bituminous Coal Institute, 1951), p. 135.

[18] "A Billion-Ton Year For Coal?" *Mechanization*, Vol. XV, No. 11 (Nov. 1951), pp. 89–100, makes an estimate of future energy requirements on a different basis. It assumes that the energy load of the country may double in twenty-five years under certain conditions. It arrives at a different fuel setup, since, for one thing, it is figured that the United States will have 6 billion barrels of petroleum available in 1975. This article is further analyzed by George A. Lamb, D. L. McElroy, and Joseph Pursglove, Jr., in "There's Coal in Your Future," *Utilization*, Vol. 5, No. 12 (Dec. 1951), pp. 29–38. Eugene Ayres, "Synthetic Liquid Fuels," cited note 11 *supra*, p. 44, believes that a demand of 3.5 billion barrels of motor fuel by 1980 is a plausible figure. This compares to the 3 billion barrels in 1975 used in the assumptions.

[19] Estimate furnished by letter from C. L. O'Brian, Assistant to Chairman, Dominion Coal Board, Ottawa, Canada.

TABLE 5—USE OF COAL AND CRUDE PETROLEUM IN 1975, COMPILED WITH REFERENCE TO CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS

	Coal		Petroleum		Total Quadrillion Btu's
	Million metric tons	Quadrillion Btu's	Million barrels	Quadrillion Btu's	
North America	*1,100*	*31.8*	*3,500*	*20.3*	*52.1*
United States[a]	1,000	28.9	3,000	17.4	46.3
Other	100	2.9	500	2.9	5.8
Europe	*1,250*	*36.1*	*4,500*	*26.1*	*62.2*
Western	600	17.3	3,000	17.4	34.7
Eastern	650	18.8	1,500	8.7	27.5
World, other	*250*	*7.2*	*2,300*	*13.3*	*20.5*
World, totals	2,600	75.1	10,300	59.7	134.8

[a] In addition, oil shale would supply 300 million barrels of oil.

leum—a prospect that may be underestimated. It used 180 million tons of coal in 1950, and it is conservative to say it will use 250 million tons in 1975. It will have the greater part of the petroleum reserves and two-thirds of the population, or 2 billion persons. Its 1975 oil consumption would be 600 million barrels projected from 1937–50 trends, but it could easily soar to at least 2 billion barrels—1 barrel per capita. If countries on continents like South America and Asia advance their economies as they plan to do, there will be a great demand for fuel energy, and petroleum will be the attractive source.[20]

In the circumstances outlined, world energy requirements for coal and petroleum in 1975 amount to 135 quadrillion Btu's, 10 per cent higher than projected upon the 1937–50 basis. This comes about mainly because of allowances for certain additional energy growth outside of North America.

[20] Arthur D. Stewart, "World Demand to Continue Upward Trend," *Oil and Gas Journal*, Dec. 20, 1951, p. 270, estimates that the world outside of the Soviet Union and its satellites will require one-third more oil in the next ten years. Increases are general.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPPLY

Supply has some interesting developments under the conditions set forth. In North America, coal once more regains the prominent position as an energy source. This occurs while Europe, which has been principally a coal consumer, turns to petroleum for a good part of its energy supply. Western Europe, with petroleum reserves of no consequence and the world crude production on the decline during the late part of the century, with coal reserves that offer limited production, has dim prospects for energy supply in the distant future.

Events do not have to be greatly unlike those assumed to bring about a different fuel situation in 1975. Peak petroleum production in the United States may come in 1970 or later, rather than in 1960. It may not be reached in the world until 2000. Similarly, fuel needs may not be so large as expected. World progress may be at a slow pace if at all. The fuel setup suggested for 1975 may not be approximated for decades after that time.

Similarly, it may be argued that the decline in petroleum output will start sooner than expected. Fuel requirements ahead may be underestimated, as is often the case, instead of overestimated. A new era of world advancement is about to start. Hence, a transition in fuel supply may be well underway in another ten years.

Serious thinking about the undertakings that may be necessary to assure adequate supply in the future should not be discouraged by various opinions on details of fuel outlook. That substantial fuel changes may not have to be effected until ten or twenty years later than some predict offers no respite in light of what may have to be done.

Shifting energy sources to supply increasing energy needs will be a venture of staggering proportions. Should coal and petroleum be utilized to provide energy in 1975, as assumed, it could only be the result of foresight, careful planning, and wise execution by the fuel industries. Consumers, likewise, would have to have been understanding and co-operative.

TRANSITION IN UNITED STATES

An annual coal production in the United States of a billion metric tons, twice the present rate, does not seem to present difficulties at first glance. And it would not if the increased capacity could be added gradually in accordance with its long-term as well as immediate needs. Investment could be attracted, mines developed, manpower trained, and transportation supplemented. But if past events are a yardstick, there is the danger that expansion will not come about so smoothly. A billion tons of coal may be urgently needed in 1975; half that volume will be plenty this year and likely during the years ahead while oil and natural gas remain in apparent abundance. Necessity for coal expansion may not be fully realized until there is actually a fuel shortage. Then development of additional mining will be rushed to completion with all the disadvantages of emergency application. Consumers will pay more for their energy as a consequence.

Coal mining development is but one phase of the complex transition in prospect for the American energy structure. Facilities for generating greater volumes of electricity, producing synthetic oil, and processing other energy products, will take new technology, and also an investment, along with steel and other materials, of a magnitude that might be needed to support another world war. Changes in equipment to permit utilization of the new energy supply will entail vast expansions in manufacturing and in consumer expenditures.

Only part of the great money and materials outlay applied to the transition may be in addition to what the outlay would have been had petroleum been plentiful and supplied to satisfy increasing energy needs. But the transition will be a departure from conventional practice. The change-over will have to be started well ahead of its need, or later fuel requirements will not be met. This is not the sort of undertaking that gets enthusiastic backing. It may not appear possible to formulate a sound fuel program, generally acceptable, which will move the country towards preparation that will assure adequate energy supply twenty-five years from now. This is but to admit that the country can afford to take a chance on an energy shortage, on the costly rehabilitation of energy supply on an emergency basis, and suffer no loss in the end. And such shortage and attendant cost will happen unless serious thinking and effective action are given to the future fuel situation.

TRANSITION OUTSIDE OF UNITED STATES

Fuel developments will be even more complex outside of North America. In supplying the major part of the increased energy load, the utilization of petroleum needs to be broadly established and its production greatly expanded. Plant and equipment using oil, like oil refining and transportation capacities, will take a tremendous outlay of capital if energy requirements are to be supplied in 1975. In many countries, the undertaking will be of proportions never before considered.

If it is imperative that countries of western Europe and the other Allies strengthen their economies, it is likewise imperative that they have access to more energy, with petroleum the likely source. Ways and means will have to be devised so that the necessary petroleum can be acquired and used, or the Allies will get nowhere in their quest for economic strength. Countries opposing the Allies, too, will look towards petroleum for additional energy in the attempt to maintain their position. Conditions like these may soon force the demand for petroleum upward at an accelerated rate.

Petroleum requirements outside of North America in 1975 may be quite different from those assumed, without changing the energy position of the United States very much. They may total 5 billion or even 10 billion barrels instead of the 7 billion barrels projected, and the outlook is about the same. Five billion barrels would make it easier to acquire imports which may be limited in volume regardless. Ten billion barrels would reduce imports substantially, which would advance the production of synthetic oils and other energy products to offset the foreign oil deficiency. Thus, as projections extend further into the future, the United States must become more self-sufficient in fuel supply if its energy requirements are to be satisfied.

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Adequacy of Our Mineral Fuels

By ROBERT E. HARDWICKE

IT is impossible to isolate or value the most important influences in the United States that have brought about our well-being, especially our physical comfort, but surely the extensive use of inanimate energy resources is one of them.[1]

Blessed with enormous supplies of coal, petroleum, and falling water, we have been ingenious in their employment. Although our population has doubled since 1900, each of us on the average has today four times as much inanimate or mechanical energy working for him as each individual had in 1900. Americans, per capita, use ten times as much inanimate energy as do the people of the rest of the world.[2] Fortunately, this energy has been employed in such a manner and under such conditions as to make a major contribution to causes leading to our high standard of living.[3]

Perhaps more than any other country, we are committed to an economy that is based heavily on the use of gaseous and liquid fuels. In 1945, about 56 per cent of the energy of oil was used in transportation. Apparently the percentage has not since materially changed.[4] About 25 per cent of all energy used in the United States at the present time serves to run mobile equipment.[5] A lack of adequate supply of fuels might be disastrous.

The following questions are therefore pertinent: (1) How large are the known and prospective reserves of mineral fuels in the United States? (2) What is the likelihood that an adequate supply, particularly of gaseous and liquid fuels, will be available for a long time at reasonable prices? (3) What is being done and what should be done to minimize the waste of our supplies in producing operations? (4) What other sources of

[1] "The extent to which a nation employs [inanimate] energy resources is a definite indication of the level of living which its people enjoy." Arthur A. Sandusky, *et al., Basic Data Relating to Energy Resources* (1951), p. xv. The reference is to the report of a study made for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs pursuant to S. Res. 239, 81st Congress, authorizing the Committee to investigate available fuel reserves and formulate a national fuel policy for the United States. The study was made under the supervision of Arthur A. Sandusky, a member of the professional staff of the Committee, with the assistance of specialists from the Department of the Interior and the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. The 226-page report contains an enormous amount of valuable data. Since it will be referred to frequently, a short title, *Basic Data*, will be used.

[2] Richard J. Gonzalez, "What Makes America Great," *The Humble Way* (Houston, Tex., May–June 1951), p. 5.

[3] Dr. Erich W. Zimmermann in his monumental work, *World Resources and Industries* (Rev. ed., New York, 1951), devotes chapter 6 to a critical discussion of energy expenditure and well-being. He points out that, though a general positive correlation exists between energy expenditure and wealth or well-being, it does not necessarily follow that the correlation is accurate.

[4] Eugene Ayres, "Major Sources of Energy," *Proceedings 28th Annual Meeting, American Petroleum Institute, 1948* (New York, 1949), Sec. III (Refining), pp. 109, 142. This paper contains an extraordinary amount of valuable information with respect to sources of energy.

[5] Committee on Oil and Gas Availability, *Petroleum Productive Capacity* (a report on present and future supplies of oil and gas made on Jan. 29, 1952 to the National Petroleum Council), p. 83.

energy are available if present sources of mineral fuels become inadequate? (5) What is the existing national policy with respect to mineral fuels? (6) Should a different policy be adopted?

A short answer to the second question may now be given: A continuation of our present policy of competition and freedom of individual initiative will ensure for a long period adequate supplies of mineral fuels, including liquid and gaseous, at reasonable prices.

Unquestionably, an adequate supply of liquid and gaseous fuels is of tremendous importance to this country. Ease of mobility and a lessening of man's physical burdens have consistently accelerated the progress of civilization.[6] The wheel, the sail, the steam engine, the internal-combustion and electric motors are points on the lines that mark the upward trend of ease of mobility, and the substitution of inanimate for animate work. Those lines closely parallel the lines of advancing culture.

In the United States in 1850 man did 15 per cent of the physical work, animals 79 per cent, and machines 6 per cent to produce in one man-hour goods worth 27 cents; in 1930 man did 4 per cent of the work, animals 12 per cent, and machines 84 per cent to produce in one man-hour goods worth 82 cents; and it is estimated that in 1960 the percentage will be man 3 per cent, animals 1 per cent, and machines 96 per cent to produce in one man-hour goods worth $1.61.[7] The figures indicate that a high level of living is now enjoyed in the United States.[8]

The existence of great supplies of energy resources, raw materials, manpower, and capital was an important factor in our progress, but perhaps the greatest factors of all were intangibles: social and political philosophies that encouraged individual initiative and competition. These philosophies offered to an unusual degree an equality of opportunity, and fostered conditions that challenged the individual to realize his capabilities, with consequent benefit to the country.[9]

At this very moment, as an outgrowth of our social and political philosophies, we are witnessing a dynamic of great forces: the competition of exhaustible mineral fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) among themselves and with hydroelectricity. The severity of the conflict is indicated by the following figures given in round numbers: in 1900, on a Btu (British thermal unit) basis of comparison, the output of mineral fuels and water power was as follows: coal 88 per cent, oil and gas 8 per cent, and water power 4 per cent. In 1925 the percentages were: coal 70 per cent, oil and gas 27 per cent, and water power 3 per cent; while in 1949 the figures were: coal 40 per cent, oil and gas 55 per cent, and water power 5 per cent.[10]

[6] Zimmermann, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 71 and 138.

[7] J. Frederic Dewhurst (Ed.), *America's Needs and Resources* (New York, 1947), pp. 680–82. Such information is shown in pictographic form in *U.S.A., Measure of a Nation* by Thomas R. Carskadon and Rudolf Modley, and on the back of the front page of *Popular Economics* for December 1951.

[8] Zimmermann, *op. cit.* note 3, p. 58.

[9] *Basic Elements of a Free, Dynamic Society* (New York, 1951), pp. 19 and 78. The booklet cited is a condensed record of a round-table discussion held in April 1951. The participants were outstanding executives, educators, authors, and editors. The condensed record also appears in the *Harvard Business Review*, Part I in the issue of November 1951, and Part II in the issue of January–February 1952.

[10] *Basic Data*, pp. 7–8; Zimmermann, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 483–85. Zimmermann emphasizes that the figures deal with output, not percentages of energy realized, inasmuch as the amount of energy obtained depends on the efficiency of utilization.

Tomorrow the figures may indicate a different trend, for no fuel has suffered a hopeless defeat. New techniques are being employed, and, to add to the problems of competition, new combatants, such as solar heat, wind and tides, and even atomic energy, may soon participate with vigor in the battle royal. Experience gives us the right to believe that the public will be the benefactor.

RESERVES OF MINERAL FUELS

Although enormous supplies of mineral fuels exist within the United States, these supplies are unfortunately nonreplenishing. They can be exhausted. Prudence suggests, then, that we take stock of known recoverable reserves, and consider the probability of increasing them materially.

Coal

The total of the reserves of commercially recoverable coal of all classes, assuming 50 per cent recovery of the basic reserves, was recently estimated to be about 1,213 billion (1⅕ trillion) short tons as of January 1, 1950,[11] while the total production for 1949 was about 480,600,000 net tons, or only a small fraction of the reserve.[12] A more accurate survey of the coal reserves would doubtless result in changing the basic reserve figures, either up or down, and many factors, such as prices, technology, and availability, would influence the percentage recovery to be used in any new estimate; but it is not likely that there will be any shortage of reserves of coal for a long time.

Petroleum (oil and natural gas)

Few have been willing to estimate potential reserves or the total quantity of petroleum that will eventually be produced in the United States. A true saying in the petroleum industry is: oil and gas are where you find them, they are looked for in many places where they ain't, and they are found in large quantities where they ain't supposed to be. So far, each estimate of reserves given for a date or period in the future not close to the date of the estimate has been grossly erroneous. One reason is the impossibility of estimating the effect of technology in finding and recovery, or the effect of changes in economic conditions or governmental policy and action.

In order to avoid speculation as to the quantities of commercially recoverable petroleum that will eventually be found in the United States or will be available at some future date, the petroleum industry deals with "known" or "proved" reserves, taking into account only the supply proved to exist by wells already drilled. Moreover, the estimates are based on the quantity considered to be recoverable under economic and operating conditions existing at the time the estimate is made, with not a barrel added to represent an increase that would certainly take place as the result of higher prices or improved technology in finding and producing. For many years, the estimates

[11] *Basic Data*, pp. 153, 156; *Fuel Reserves of the United States* (1951), p. 9. The latter is a statement prepared by the United States Geological Survey for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (United States Senate) in connection with S. Res. 239 (81st Cong.). It was printed by the government in booklet form for the Committee, and contains valuable information concerning fuel reserves and the methods of calculation. See discussion by Dr. Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott, *Energy Sources—The Wealth of the World* (New York, 1952), Chap. 4, and Zimmermann, *op. cit.* note 3, p. 461.

[12] *Basic Data*, p. 76.

of proved reserves of petroleum have been conservative.[13]

Proved reserves of natural gas have been steadily going up. On January 1, 1951, the figure was 186 trillion cubic feet. The net production of natural gas for 1950 was about 7 trillion cubic feet, being approximately 1/26 of the proved reserves.[14] The American Petroleum Institute and the American Gas Association released about March 10, 1952 the reserves of gas and liquid hydrocarbons as of January 1, 1952. The gas reserves were almost 194 trillion cubic feet, an increase of about 8 trillion cubic feet over the figure for December 31, 1950, though the net production in 1951 was about 8 trillion cubic feet.

Proved reserves of oil (including liquid hydrocarbons extractable from natural gas) on January 1, 1951 were approximately 30 billion barrels (barrels of 42 U. S. gallons), while the production for 1950 was about 2,170,000,000 barrels, or about one-fifteenth of the proved reserves. At the same time, reserves of all liquid hydrocarbons at the end of the year exceeded by about 1,160,000,000 barrels the figure for the beginning of 1950.[15]

The estimate of reserves as of January 1, 1952, released by the American Petroleum Institute and the American Gas Association, is approximately 32,200,000,000 barrels, an increase of more than 2,600,000,000 over the reserves of about 29,600,000,000 on January 1, 1951, though the production for 1951 was about 2,500,000,000 barrels. If there had not been a shortage of pipe and other steel items, caused by the defense program, the reserve figure might have been higher.

While production of oil (including liquid hydrocarbons from natural gas) has shown an upward trend, so have the figures of proved reserves. For a long period the reserves have been maintained at a level approximating fourteen times the annual production. For the period 1938–51, for every barrel of oil produced, about 1½ barrels of new reserves were established.[16]

There appears to be no clear indication that a shortage of oil will occur in the near future; however, although the total amount of new oil or reserves has continued to increase, little comfort is found in knowing that for the last ten years the proportion of large new discoveries has declined, or in knowing that informed persons can assign plausible grounds for predicting that domestic production by 1960 may not be large enough to supply the domestic demand unless the trend of large discoveries moves upward or something else happens to add materially to productive capacity.[17]

We do know that more than a billion acres of sedimentary deposits in the United States, including large areas of the continental shelf off our shores, are suitable for the accumulation of oil that could be produced at reasonable cost.[18]

[13] *Fuel Reserves of the United States*, p. 16. For a general discussion of petroleum reserves, with tables, charts, etc., see Stuart E. Buckley (Ed.), *Petroleum Conservation* (Dallas, 1951), pp. 15–29.

[14] Report of Hearings on March 7 and 8, 1951, before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to S. Res. 239 (81st Cong.), pp. 128, 132. The report of the hearings will hereafter be referred to by the short title, Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951). *Gas Facts* (American Gas Association, 1951), pp. 14, 17, 46.

[15] Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951), p. 121.

[16] Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951), pp. 110, 20.

[17] Eugene Ayres, "Synthetic Liquid Fuels—When and How?" *Petroleum Processing*, Jan. 1951, pp. 41, 42; Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott, *Energy Sources—The Wealth of the World* (New York, 1952), pp. 29, 38, 40.

[18] Wallace E. Pratt and Dorothy Good (Eds.), *World Geography of Petroleum* (Princeton, 1950), p. 21.

Enormous areas remain to be tested. The search for, and the finding of, new reserves continue. Experience indicates that the relation of production to reserves will not soon materially worsen if the economic incentive justifies the risks involved.[19]

Hydroelectricity

Hydroelectricity, though not a mineral fuel, is an important energy resource that competes with mineral fuels, and may therefore be considered in this discussion.

Electric plants contributing to the public supply in 1950 produced over 329 billion kilowatt-hours, compared with 40 billion in 1920, 91 billion in 1930, and 142 billion in 1940.[20] One estimate for 1951 is 372 billion kilowatt-hours, or more than twice that of 1941 or 1942.[21] Production by industrial producers, not contributing to the public supply, is much smaller and has not materially increased for some years.

Our present reserve of electricity may be considered as being composed of (*a*) the excess of generating capacity and (*b*) potential hydroelectric power. A witness at a recent hearing before a committee of the United States Senate testified that hydroelectric power could be increased about four times that now developed, or to 390 billion kilowatt-hours, and about 75 per cent of such potential power could be considered as economically feasible, and therefore a reserve.[22]

The supply of electric energy can be increased to almost any desired figure by additional plants, if all sources of power are used. Moreover, news items indicate the likelihood that atomic energy may soon furnish heat in connection with the generation of electricity. Such a development might have tremendous influence upon the supply and price of electric energy, with far-reaching effect upon the use and reserves of mineral fuels.

MEANING OF CONSERVATION

Because of space limitations, this paper has been restricted to a discussion of conservation with respect to production of mineral fuels, treating only incidentally, if at all, conservation applicable to transportation, processing, or consumption.[23]

Conservation is here used, as in many oil and gas conservation statutes, to mean the prevention of waste; and waste means reasonably avoidable loss, primarily in the production process, of a commodity that has economic value. Conservation as here used does not include hoarding. Waste with respect to mineral fuels may take place aboveground, as by permitting a gas well to blow into the air, or underground, as by failing to use economically justifiable practices that would increase the ultimate recovery of the fuel.

In determining whether waste exists, or whether additional conservation measures should be employed, prices and other economic considerations are important factors. Waste does not take place merely because a mineral fuel is lost or is not made available for use, or because maximum ultimate recovery will not be obtained by the production methods that are employed. For instance, on the average only about 50 per cent of the coal that is mined is re-

[19] *Fuel Reserves of the United States (1951)*, p. 35; Committee on Oil and Gas Availability, *op. cit.* note 5.

[20] *Basic Data*, pp. 94–95; Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951), p. 88; Edison Electric Institute Booklet, *I Want to Know About the Electric Industry* (New York, 1951–52 ed.), p. 5.

[21] Edison Electric Institute Booklet, p. 5.

[22] Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951), p. 83.

[23] For a discussion of such subjects, see Ayres and Scarlott, *op. cit.* note 17, c. 10, p. 128; Zimmermann, *op. cit.* note 3, c. 49, p. 799.

covered in a form suitable for marketing. The other 50 per cent is usually left in the mine, partly because the cost of preparing it for market would be greater than its value. The term "waste" should not necessarily apply to that loss.

Although modern practices in oil production are considered to be efficient, a large fraction, averaging at least 30 per cent, of the oil in place is not recovered, and cannot be recovered economically by any known method. The oil-bearing rocks (often called sands) are not commonly found at shallow depths. The producing formations in a great many fields are more than 5,000 feet below the surface. Many are more than 10,000 feet deep. Considerable recovery of the oil left in the rocks could be had if the overburden were removed, say to the average depth of one mile, and the rocks were crushed, heated, and subjected to various processes to extract the oil contained in the pores of the rocks. Obviously, the cost of recovering a barrel of oil by such a method would be an incredibly large figure when compared with the value of the oil obtained. Increased recovery is physically possible but not economically feasible.

Clearly, conservation does not require that the maximum quantity of mineral fuels must be produced or recovered regardless of costs or economic values, or that production should be deferred because it may be possible far in the future to recover a greater portion of the fuel in place. Though private owners of mineral fuels, or at least petroleum, may properly be required by governmental regulation to operate so as to prevent reasonably avoidable loss of the fuel, they should not be expected, much less required, to operate without profit to produce or recover the maximum amount, regardless of expense. As well say that conservation requires that the waters of the Mississippi, instead of being permitted to flow into the Gulf of Mexico, should be transported to irrigate some of the arid or semiarid regions of the country, or should be stored for use in future years, whatever the cost may be when compared with the benefits.

CONSERVATION OF COAL

Conservation in the production of coal has made great progress. The continuous improvement in mechanization and mining technique has not only resulted in better products, but has reduced costs, permitting a higher recovery at a cost commensurate with the economic value of the coal recovered. These benefits have been offset in part by the practice of by-passing areas where the recovery does not justify the use of expensive machines.[24] Of more significance may be a process of production already developed that probably will be employed when economic conditions justify its commercial use. It is called underground gasification of coal, and will permit a recovery or use of more than 50 per cent of the coal employed in the process. There is clearly a trend toward a further decrease in the loss of coal, whether or not the term "waste" may fairly be used to describe the loss.

CONSERVATION OF NATURAL GAS

For many years, great quantities of natural gas were vented or lost, especially gas unavoidably produced with oil, called casing-head gas or oil-well gas to distinguish it from gas from wells producing gas only. "Natural gas" is a term that embraces oil-well gas and also gas from wells that produce no oil.

Part or all of the oil-well gas may be dissolved in the oil in the reservoir. Such gas reduces viscosity so that the oil will move more easily to the producing well. Furthermore, the expansion of gas dissolved in oil, and of any gas associated with oil but not in solution, serves in many fields to move the oil. Frequently, some of it is used as fuel for operations or is sold for local use. It follows that gas unavoidably produced with oil, if not at an excessive ratio, performs a valuable function in the production of oil, and for carrying on operations, though most of the gas is dissipated at the surface. Gas produced in excess of a reasonable ratio does not perform its maximum function in aiding production.

For a long time there was no market or use, or any reasonable prospect of a market or use, for much of the oil-well gas after it had been produced, especially in the Southwest; consequently, operators often faced the choice either (*a*) of producing the oil with the aid of solution and associated gas, though most of the gas produced was lost, or (*b*) of shutting in the oil wells to avoid the loss of the gas that would be produced but could not be used or marketed.[25] It is reasonable to say that in most instances the operators were not acting arbitrarily and imprudently by failing to shut down their oil wells, though most or all of the oil-well gas escaped into the air.

At the present, the loss of gas from gas pools is virtually unknown. While a considerable quantity of oil-well gas is lost, the quantity that could with prudence be saved or used is relatively small. Most of the gas that is now lost has no market value at the well. It would not be saved or utilized even if it were given away to anyone who would take it. The gas may contain large quantities of deleterious substances like hydrogen sulphide, or the quantity may be small, or the cost of transporting it to available market may be prohibitive. Many of the new oil fields are far from gas pipelines or markets, and, until a reasonable amount of development has taken place so that the quantity of gas available can be estimated with fair accuracy, sound plans for constructing pipelines and marketing the gas cannot be made. Moreover, it takes time to obtain materials and construct lines. In the meantime, at least part of the oil-well gas is lost. These are some of the many factors that must be considered in determining whether the loss of oil-well gas may fairly be called a waste of such gas.[26]

Operators and officials of state regulatory agencies are fully cognizant of the evil of wasting natural gas, and its loss has already been reduced to a figure that ten or even five years ago would have been regarded as a fanciful one. More remains to be done, and is being done, but the facts do not warrant the statement that tremendous quantities of natural gas are now being dissipated that could be utilized without imposing an unreasonable burden on the operators—a burden not justified by law.

CONSERVATION OF OIL

The history of the conservation of oil need only be briefly sketched here, for

[24] Ayres and Scarlott, *op. cit.* note 17, p. 60.

[25] Stuart E. Buckley (Ed.), *op. cit.* note 13, p. 32.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 33; Robert E. Hardwicke, "Texas, 1938–1948," in *Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History—1948* (Chicago, 1948), p. 482. The conservation agency in Texas several years ago ordered that the oil wells in a number of fields be shut down until measures were taken to prevent the loss of gas. The orders were based on the finding that waste was occurring because it was economically feasible to prevent the loss of the gas. Robert E. Hardwicke, "Unitization Statutes: Voluntary Action or Compulsion," 24 *Rocky Mt. L. Rev.* (Boulder, Dec. 1951), p. 39. Orders of the Texas agency made in March 1952 will further reduce the loss of oil-well gas produced in a number of West Texas fields. The agency has announced that it will use all its power to minimize the waste of gas.

it has been told in detail in many books and articles.[27]

Serious attention to waste in the production of oil and gas did not become general until about 1930, when the domestic production of oil, plus imports, brought the stocks in storage of oil and products to an all-time peak, wholly out of line with needs. Tested by our knowledge of today, which should not however be imputed generally to members of the industry in 1930, the production practices then in use caused great waste of oil and gas, aboveground and underground.

The overproduction was largely caused by the nature of petroleum and by the manner in which it was produced under laws applicable to the rights of the landowner, usually called lessor, and the duty of the operator, usually called lessee. Oil and gas in the underground reservoir are under pressure, sometimes very great. When a well is producing, there is a reduction of pressure in the reservoir around the bottom of the well. This creates a pressure differential, causing oil and gas in the reservoir to move toward the bottom of the well, being the point of lower pressure, paying no attention to boundary lines in the migration. Oil and gas are then brought to the surface, either by the pressure available in the reservoir or by energy supplied by artificial means, as by pumps.

Prior to regulation under conservation statutes, the influence of the law of oil and gas on waste and overproduction was far-reaching. Under the typical document or lease executed by the landowner to authorize drilling and producing operations, the lessee was obligated to drill wells and operate them in a manner to produce as much oil as possible from the leased tract, draining oil from neighboring tracts if he could, and protecting against drainage of oil from the leased tract to wells on neighboring tracts. It was inevitable that as a rule each lessee-operator drilled wells as fast as he could, and produced them to capacity. Failure of a lessee to drill and produce wells with reasonable diligence, or to act prudently in preventing reasonably avoidable adverse drainage, made the lessee liable to his lessor for the resulting damages, and in some instances caused a termination of the lessee's rights. Such a situation necessarily resulted in a maximum rate of production from all wells, with no regard for dissipation of gas, the pulling in of water, or the needs of the market. Indeed, until the early 1930's, most oilmen thought that they were conducting operations in accordance with sound engineering principles. We now know that this was not true.

The situation became so serious in the late 1920's that state and federal officials, as well as members of the petroleum industry, sought adequate remedies. For various reasons not necessary to relate, agreements among operators offered no solution; and governmental regulation therefore appeared to be necessary. Lawyers expressed

[27] These books contain much information, and nearly all of them are replete with citations and references to other material: *Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Symposium* (Chicago, 1939); Blakely M. Murphy (Ed.), *Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History—1948* (Chicago, 1948); Robert E. Hardwicke, *Antitrust Laws, et al. v. Unit Operation of Oil or Gas Pools* (New York, 1948); Engineering Committee of Interstate Oil Compact Commission, *Oil and Gas Production* (Oklahoma City, 1951); Stuart E. Buckley (Ed.), *Petroleum Conservation* (Dallas, 1951). The Compact Commission book is "an introductory guide to production techniques and conservation methods." *Petroleum Conservation* is a definitive exposition of the science of conservation of petroleum. Each is a valuable contribution to the literature of petroleum production and conservation.

doubt as to the legality of federal regulation, but generally agreed that state statutes providing for prevention of waste would be upheld; consequently, the oilmen who talked about great waste being caused by unrestrained production were listened to more attentively. Leaders of the industry turned to the states for help in 1930, encouraging the enforcement of conservation statutes already in the books in several states, and recommending the passage and enforcement of statutes in other states.

Intensive study of the behavior of reservoir fluids was stimulated, and in many forums the subject of waste prevention in oil production was discussed. It soon appeared that sound engineering principles required practices quite different from those prevailing (drill and produce as you please).

State regulation

Regulation that began on a state-wide scale in several states in 1930 was necessarily comprehensive, for the practices of one operator affected another, and when self-help was denied as a method of protecting property rights, law imposed on the regulatory agency an obligation to protect those rights, subject to the reasonable necessities of waste prevention. The oilman was regulated as to the number of wells that he might drill on his property and where they might be located, as to the kind of pipe to use in the well and where he might place it, and as to the amount of oil that he might produce each day and how it should be produced to avoid waste. In many other ways his activities were directed and controlled to prevent waste. Almost never was a well permitted to flow to capacity, and rarely even to pump continuously to capacity unless capacity was very small.

By 1935 a comprehensive program of regulation was reasonably well established, and was generally accepted as being a necessary restriction on the use of private property; but it must not be supposed that in the period 1930–35 vigorous debates and bitter contests as to the legality and necessity of the program did not take place in legislative halls, in the court houses, in the hearing rooms of administrative agencies, and in other forums. It is submitted that no other owners of private property, except perhaps some public carriers, have been subjected to such far-reaching restrictions and control on the use of their property.

It was, of course, inevitable that mistakes were made, especially in the first few years of regulation, but in retrospect it is almost unbelievable that so much progress in waste prevention and in technology of production was accomplished in so short a time. It is also almost incredible that oilmen, long accustomed to drill and produce as they pleased, and to follow practices designed to recover petroleum drained from beneath their neighbors' lands, would seriously urge regulation to prevent waste and to afford each an equal opportunity to produce only the petroleum in his own land or an equal quantity. Even in states where no comprehensive laws have been passed, most of the operators have followed efficient practices that have been developed, but often they were unable to do so because of practices of other operators. Experience has proved that the aid of state regulation is almost always necessary.

It is believed that regulation under state conservation statutes during the last twenty years has resulted in a recovery of perhaps 50 per cent more oil than would have been recovered in the absence of regulation, and has also offered a workable method of protecting property rights. Few realize how neces-

ment at Gorgas, Alabama, under the joint auspices of the United States Bureau of Mines and the Alabama Power Company. By this process, a large part of the coal in place can be gasified, furnishing a gas suitable for power and with an efficiency greater than that obtainable from present mining methods and the use of coal in steam power plants. The gas may also be used to make oil and gasoline. Moreover, deposits heretofore considered to be of little value can be gasified.[29]

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Enough has been said to make clear that raw coal is now offering vigorous competition to other fuels, with technology playing an important part.

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The tremendous increase in transportation and marketing facilities for natural gas in the last ten years has made possible the utilization of much natural gas that previously had been vented and was lost, and has made available to consumers in the northern and eastern portions of the country at relatively low prices a clean fuel that is convenient to use. Natural gas, like coal gas, may be converted by the Fischer-Tropsch gas-synthesis process into hydrocarbon liquids from which can be obtained gasoline and other materials similar to those obtained from oil. A group of oil companies recently completed a gas-synthesis plant at Brownsville, Texas, costing about forty million dollars, having an initial daily capacity of about 7,000 barrels of liquid fuels.[35]

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sary is the program to adjust and protect property rights.

Percentage depletion

In determining taxable income, the Internal Revenue Code purports to allow reasonable depreciation or depletion in order to avoid taxation of capital values. With respect to petroleum and other minerals, each barrel or other unit that is recovered is in a very real sense a reduction of capital assets or depletion of the corpus of the property. The amount of depletion cannot be measured on the ordinary basis of capital invested in the property, because such measurement would fail to take into account the large sums risked and lost on nonproductive ventures.

In the early income tax laws, Congress provided for depletion to be measured on the basis of the value of a property after discovery of oil. That method involved many difficult fact questions; consequently, in 1926 the Congress met this situation by adopting a simplified method known as percentage depletion. Section 114(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes a depletion allowance for an oil and gas producing property of 27.5 per cent of the gross income, excluding an amount equal to any rents or royalties paid or incurred in respect of the property, but not to exceed 50 per cent of the net income of the taxpayer (computed without allowance for depletion) from the property; however, in no event may the allowance be less than it would be if computed on the cost and unit-of-production basis.

The provision of the Code, passed in 1926, was designed to provide a reasonable method for determining taxable income and to give an opportunity to replace the capital asset in somewhat similar manner as depreciation does with respect to an ordinary capital asset. The need for, and the reasonableness of, these depletion provisions have been the subject of inquiry many times by committees of the Congress. Each time the Congress has concluded that these provisions are proper and should be continued in effect.

If the depletion allowance were reduced materially, the income taxes on the owners of oil properties would be higher, and their net incomes would be lower; funds previously available for replacing production by further exploration, drilling, and secondary recovery operations would be reduced; there would be less incentive to risk capital in the further search for oil; and the result would be smaller supplies at higher prices. In a tight supply situation, there would be pressure on operators and state agencies to permit production at excessive rates that would cause physical waste. Inefficient practices would reduce ultimate recovery, and conditions would grow progressively worse. The situation briefly outlined is further evidence that economic factors, including taxes, have a direct bearing on conservation.

Saving of manpower and materials

Unquestionably, state conservation statutes and regulations not only prevent or minimize waste of oil and gas, but also the waste of manpower and materials.

Prior to extensive regulation under conservation statutes, operators drilled a large number of wells that would now be called unnecessary wells. Close spacing was ordinarily the rule, for competition required each operator to drill many wells in order to get quickly whatever amount could be produced on his land from wells producing to capacity or virtually so. The advent of regulation under conservation statutes brought control of spacing, wider spacing, and allocation of pool allowables. The incentive, as well as the right, to drill wells that were not reasonably needed to drain each tract was taken away or substantially lessened, and this caused a material reduction in the number of wells that were drilled compared with the number that would have been drilled in the absence of regulation. Doubtless the reduction was more than 50 per cent. Now it is common to drill only one well on each ten, twenty, or forty acres (depending on many factors, such as depth of the producing formation, the porosity and permeability of the rock, the thickness of the productive zone, and the energy available), while prior to regulation one well to each acre or five acres was quite usual. With a decrease in the number of unnecessary wells, there was a corresponding reduction in the use of fittings, equipment, connections, and the like. The saving of manpower and materials has been tremendous.

Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of unnecessary wells, there is still room for improvement. Better information as to reservoir conditions and effective drainage areas, revision of conservation acts in several states, and better administration will accelerate the rate of improvement.

EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION AMONG MINERAL FUELS UPON FUTURE SUPPLIES

It should not be assumed that members of the mineral fuel industries are content with the progress made in preventing waste and in furnishing supplies of fuels at reasonable prices, and are willing to let the future take care of itself. Competition is too keen for the enjoyment of complacency.

Coal

The statistics indicate that coal is losing in its competition with other fuels. Various reasons other than normal competition have been suggested, including the following: (1) most coal is sold in the raw; (2) it is transported by rail, and high freight rates make it difficult for coal to compete with fuels transported by cheaper methods; (3) too often a shortage of cars; (4) transportation of raw coal is the least effective method of transporting energy fuels, transportation of oil by tanker being the most efficient and by pipeline the next; (5) in spite of relatively low mine costs, consumer prices are high because of expensive hauls from mine to market and to ultimate consumer; (6) coal is not as clean or convenient to use as other fuels; and (7) labor troubles are frequent, causing uncertainty or shortage of supply at times when serious consequences may follow.[28]

From a competitive standpoint these handicaps are burdensome, but most of them are not insurmountable. A dynamic policy for the coal industry is now under way. It may shortly reverse the trend in the use of coal.

Consumers of fuels are being wooed to the use of coal by attractive advertising on a national scale, stressing the cheapness and stability of price, the enormous reserves available, the safety in storage and use, and the continuous effort of the coal industry to provide a better product at the lowest possible price.

Better mining equipment is being employed by the coal industry to reduce production costs, and continuous improvement in consuming equipment is giving greater efficiency and convenience, and also reducing costs. Gasification of coal underground has been accomplished in a major-scale develop-

[28] Zimmermann, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 486 and 490, discusses some of the causes of decline in the use of coal. Spot shortages of oil and gas in some areas, and for varying reasons, have also taken place from time to time, so the coal industry is not the only one that can be accused of having spot shortages.

ment at Gorgas, Alabama, under the joint auspices of the United States Bureau of Mines and the Alabama Power Company. By this process, a large part of the coal in place can be gasified, furnishing a gas suitable for power and with an efficiency greater than that obtainable from present mining methods and the use of coal in steam power plants. The gas may also be used to make oil and gasoline. Moreover, deposits heretofore considered to be of little value can be gasified.[29]

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by what might be called hydraulic pressure, moving a considerable distance. This force bent upward formations nearer the surface; and a dome was created, easily recognized in the coastal plane. The search for other salt domes became the aim of the oilman in the Gulf coast, and many fields were found; but before long few visible domes were left to drill, and prophecies were freely made as late as 1920 that no more oil fields would be found in the Gulf coast. These were reasonable prophecies if the dome-shaped formations could not be located without surface indications. The prophets failed to reckon, however, with technology.

The arts of the geologist and the geophysicist make possible the location in the Gulf coast of many domes and other traps or conditions suitable for the accumulation of oil and gas, without the aid of surface indications. The proof is this: 33 billion barrels of oil have been discovered in the Gulf coast since 1920, and, of this amount, geology and geophysics were responsible for about 75 per cent of the discoveries. More than 8 billion barrels have been discovered in the coastal area in the last decade, of which 99.5 per cent is attributable to geology and geophysics.[38]

A show of oil was found in West Texas in 1944 and again in 1947, in a formation that is now commonly called the Spraberry formation, or trend. Several pools were indicated by wells completed in 1949, especially in the Midland area where the sand series had vertical fractures that provided the main drainage channels. However, the likelihood of producing from the low-quality Spraberry formation at a profit was so slight that few were willing to take the risk until the latter part of 1950. A higher price level for oil, relatively wide spacing, faster and cheaper drilling, good reservoir engineering, plus the use of the "hydrafrac" method, were some of the factors that stimulated operations and the hope of profit. Now the Spraberry trend involves some two million acres extending through ten counties, with a proved reserve of one billion or more barrels of oil, and great quantities of gas. The "hydrafrac" method, as improved by one of the oil companies, not only employs "hydraulic" pressure to cause fracturing, to increase the size of old fractures, and to effect communication between fractures, but it also forces into the fractures sand grains, called propping agents, to keep the openings from closing. It is plain that technology was largely responsible for establishing a great reserve of oil and gas.[39]

In recent months, the Richey area in Montana and the Williston Basin in North Dakota, far from any oil fields, have been proved to be productive. Extensive drilling has not yet taken place, so the probable sizes of the reserves have not been indicated; but the prospects must be favorable, for millions of acres are being leased, and an active drilling campaign is under way.

These typical incidents of additions

[38] Carl E. Reistle, Jr., "The Importance of Technology in Oil Production," *Petroleum Engineer*, Drilling and Producing ed., Dec. 1951, p. A-40.

[39] Two companies are now experimenting with unorthodox drilling procedures to increase production. One company, by directional drilling or slanting the hole at a considerable angle, anticipates that a larger number of the vertical fractures will be connected than would be by drilling a vertical hole. Another company drills several short, almost lateral, holes off the main well bore in the pay zone, in order to increase the drainage area by cutting into more fractures. *Oil and Gas Journal*, Feb. 4, 1952, p. 37. A recent newspaper dispatch says that research is now going on at the University of Texas to increase ultimate recovery of oil, especially from depleted pools, by the use of soap or detergents. The results may be gratifying to the company advertising that "Duz does everything."

to reserves illustrate the truth of the statement by Max Ball; they show why there is hesitancy among informed oilmen, even after test wells are drilled, to condemn an area as being nonproductive or to make positive estimates as to potential reserves.

The effect of developments in exploration, drilling, and production technology leading to finding more oil and increasing recovery at lower cost has been told by Carl E. Reistle, Jr. in the interesting paper, "The Importance of Technology in Developing Oil Production." Reistle's sketch of the amazing technological progress warrants the belief that for a long time the domestic reserves of petroleum will be adequate.[40]

Enormous quantities of petroleum oil, conservatively estimated to be from 7 to 10 billion barrels, remain to be produced by secondary recovery methods from depleted and semidepleted pools [41] when it is economically feasible to undertake the operations. The astounding growth in the number of projects and in technology in eight years is evidenced by the two editions of the book, *Secondary Recovery of Oil in the United States*, the first in 1942 (259 pages), the second in 1950 (838 pages).

[40] Reistle, Jr., *op. cit.* note 38. A new record for fast drilling was recently set in Louisiana, when the crew in eight hours drilled 2,575 feet, or one-half mile. Such efficiency of tools and men illustrates the astounding accomplishments of the industry in doing a better job and reducing costs. Research with the aim of developing better methods of finding and producing oil and gas has been continuous for years.

[41] Committee of American Petroleum Institute, *Secondary Recovery of Oil in the United States* (New York, 2d ed., 1950), p. 31, and many papers cited therein; Ayres and Scarlott, *op. cit.* note 17, p. 44. Lt. Gen. Ernest O. Thompson, member of the Railroad Commission of Texas, the agency administering conservation statutes, in an address before the American Petroleum Institute in Nov. 1951, said that the possible recovery might be as high as 75 billion barrels.

Many additional prolific deposits of petroleum are almost certain to be found in the continental shelf, often called tidelands. Already a number of fields have been discovered off the shores of California, Louisiana, and Texas. In spite of wind, wave, and hurricane, wells have been drilled and produced in the Gulf of Mexico some twenty-five miles from land in water nearly fifty feet deep.[42] The ingenuity of the oilman in conducting successful offshore operations at expense that seems to be justified approaches the incredible. It is certain that further drilling in the offshore areas will result in finding new pools.

This is what the United States Geological Survey said in 1951 about the ability of the industry to maintain adequate petroleum reserves:

> No precise statement as to the amount of potential reserves of oil and gas in the United States can yet be made. If the future can be judged by the past, oil and gas will be found in sufficient quantities for many years to come. In the United States adequate production has been a direct function of economic incentive. Until the unpredictable date at which that incentive fails to provide the needed supplies, there will be no convincing evidence that we have reached the limits of our ability to expand the potential ultimately recoverable reserves of petroleum.[43]

Leaders in the petroleum industry agree with that statement; [44] however, they have no intention whatever of being un-

[42] Robert E. Hardwicke, "The Tidelands and Oil," *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1949, p. 21; "Offshore Drilling Symposium," *Oil and Gas Journal*, Feb. 23, 1950, pp. 135–54.

[43] *Fuel Reserves of the United States*, p. 35.

[44] Repeated statements of such import appear in Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951), in the Proceedings of the 28th and 31st Annual Meetings of the American Petroleum Institute, and elsewhere. Especially interesting is *Petroleum Productive Capacity*, *op. cit.* note 5. It is a valuable contribution to the literature of petroleum.

prepared if a shortage of petroleum is indicated. They observe that the essential business of the industry is that of supplying liquid and gaseous fuels to the public, and the industry will turn to an alternate source of raw materials, if that be necessary to stay in business.[45] To a great extent, the time and direction of the shift will be controlled by economic factors. The raw material may be coal or natural gas, but more likely it will first be oil shale.

Oil shale and bitumens

The known supply of oil shale in the United States is enormous. Especially large and rich deposits exist in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. Oil shale contains solid organic matter, part of which can be converted by distillation into oil and combustible gas. Conservative estimates place the recoverable oil content at 500 billion barrels from known deposits. The problem has been to make the recovery economically feasible. The United States Bureau of Mines and units in the petroleum industry, separately and co-operatively, have for a number of years carried on research and operated pilot plants in an effort to obtain oil, gas, and products from oil shale that could be marketed in competition with petroleum and its products. A large-scale operation is now being conducted near Rifle, Colorado, with considerable improvement in the efficiency of operations. The indications are that in time oil from shale will enter into the vigorous competitive contest now going on among mineral fuels.[46]

[45] Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951), pp. 96–99. Even if liquid and gaseous fuels are made synthetically, the petroleum industry can use much of its present facilities and organization.

[46] *Fuel Reserves of the United States,* pp. 35–38; *Basic Data,* pp. 169–71; Hearings on S. Res. 239 (1951), pp. 96–99; Clyde Berg, "Oil Shale as a Fuel Reserve," *Petroleum Engineer,* Drilling and Producing ed., Jan. 1952, p. A-37.

Many factors will bear upon the time when and the extent to which oil shale will supply liquid and gaseous fuels.

Scattered throughout the United States are bituminous rocks and asphaltic deposits from which liquid fuel may be obtained, though at much higher cost than from petroleum. A recovery of more than a billion barrels of oil is esimated as being possible from known deposits in Utah, Texas, and California.[47]

IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGY AND FREEDOM OF INITIATIVE

Whatever may be the facts with respect to reserves in the United States of raw materials suitable for mineral fuels, there are physical limits imposed by nature. The total numbers of tons of coal and barrels of oil in place are fixed, but the total numbers of available tons and barrels can be greatly increased, being stretched or multiplied by factors that virtually have no limits, such as technology and freedom of initiative.

Substantially the same idea was expressed by the United States Geological Survey in concluding its statement as to the fuel resources in the United States as follows:

> Only in appraisal of the basic geologic data and in the conception and application of new modes of discovery thinking and new techniques of discovery does the geologist have a large share of responsibility. For the fuels as for many other minerals, the other technologic and economic factors have at least an equally significant part in determining our Nation's future ability to supply itself and its citizens with the heat, light, and power requirements needful for our defense and continued progress to higher levels of civilization.[48]

[47] *Fuel Reserves of the United States,* p. 38.

[48] *Fuel Reserves of the United States,* p. 40. To the same effect, J. Frederic Dewhurst (Ed.), *op. cit.* note 7, p. 577.

Our energy-resource industries have performed near miracles under a social and political system that encouraged individual initiative and competition, subject to state conservation laws and to antitrust and similar laws. The wording of S. Res. 239 (81st Cong., 1950) may carry the implication that a new system or national policy should be adopted. Surely the need to discard the existing system or policy for a new one has not been proved. During the hearings held in March 1951, pursuant to the Senate Resolution, members of the competitive energy-resource industries who participated in the discussions expressed satisfaction with the existing system, and they opposed any change that contemplated comprehensive federal regulation, or even payment of subsidies, or allocation of markets for fuels, or control of end use, as a means of assisting any fuel in competing with other fuels.

In the round-table discussion reported in *Basic Elements of a Free, Dynamic Society,* Dr. Frank Tannenbaum, professor of Latin American history at Columbia University, and Peter F. Drucker, author and consultant on management organization, went further. They even opposed pretentious planning by government. Dr. Tannenbaum said:

> Now, second, the things that have happened in America unexpectedly, unplanned, have happened, I think, partly because we don't make great plans. We make little plans. We make no plans at all. That is, we are inclined to cross the bridge when we get to it. We don't attempt to harness the future. And I should be very sorry to see any such attempt projected.[49]

Mr. Drucker put it this way:

> My second point is, we made very clear that we are not a planned society. . . . Planning presupposes infallibility, and we don't believe in that. Yet we certainly do not want to create the impression that what has happened in the United States "just happened." Somebody made it happen. We are all agreed that what has happened came about because of the existence of conflict—because we accepted conflict and tried to utilize it, to turn it to account rather than to suppress it into the harmony of the graveyard, which is the social scientist's paradise, called "adjustment."[50]

[49] *Basic Elements of a Free, Dynamic Society, op. cit.* note 9, p. 18.

No one participating in the round-table discussion disagreed with the ideas expressed in the quotations.

Competition, individual initiative, technology, and ingenuity may be compressed into the words "man's resourcefulness." If a national policy for the mineral fuels and hydroelectric power, or for all energy resources, does not exist and must be made, and be in the interest of the whole people rather than the interest of any fuel, then the following quotation contains observations that should control:

> Our greatest resource is man's resourcefulness, encouraged by appropriate incentives and expressed in the progressive march of technology. It is the fundamental resource, and it is unmeasurable for the future. We only know that it can be encouraged or discouraged. Competition and freedom of individual initiative, together with rewards that are comparable with the risks assumed, are the driving forces behind such technological progress. Subsidies of one form or another, efforts to direct the use of particular forms of energy into specified channels, and other such devices have always had disappointing results in the long run. If used in the future, they will again fan the hot dry winds of discouragement to aggressive and competitive progress.
>
> Technology has grown and flourished in comparatively free and unencumbered climates. *Any discouragement of the progress of technology, the real resource for the*

[50] *Ibid.,* pp. 73–74.

future, might make a forecast of future availability prove to be more accurate, but this surely is a poor substitute for the abundance of all energy resources which the national interest requires. Artificial interference with the normal development of the energy resources of the future could only assure the realization of the lower limits of availabilities that are predictable on the basis of known technology.

In the free society, man will never be short of the energy he needs, for he will never be short of ingenuity.[51]

Indeed, we already have a national policy that conforms to the recommendations inherent in the language just quoted. That policy has been extraordinarily successful. To make any material change, for example by introducing federal control, certainly appears unwarranted under present conditions, and federal control might even be disastrous.

[51] The quotation is from an unpublished draft of a report of a subcommittee of the National Petroleum Council. An elaboration of the viewpoint appears in the report, *Petroleum Productive Capacity, op. cit.* note 5.

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International Fuel Economy

By EUGENE AYRES

TODAY the majority of the earth's population is living in much the same fashion as our primitive ancestors, while the way of life of a minority is beyond comparison. This is not a historical innovation; it has always been so. Each superior people has been justly proud. Each has thrived only a little while. Islands of culture have been submerged by tidal waves of more primitive humanity. But each superior people has made some lasting contribution to progress of mankind, and as the centuries have rolled by, the ratio of highly privileged to underprivileged may have become larger.

The highly privileged are still a minority. Sixty per cent of the earth's population is underfed, and this unhappy majority has a common vital goal in demand for bread. The 40 per cent, of which the United States is a part, is divided by competition for cake.

An important focus of competition today is liquid fuel. We are inclined to boast about our prodigious use of petroleum, but statistics on world versus United States consumption have a familiar ring. They remind us of the seventeenth century when England conceived of "bringing coals to Newcastle" as a description of ultimate futility. Today, as coal is indeed being brought to Newcastle in ever increasing quantities from the shores of America, it is timely to appraise our own circumstances in the light of British economic history. Let us take a brief look at some of the factors of analogy and distinction.


A PATTERN OF ECONOMIC CHANGE

Among the many useful indexes of economic health, one is generally overlooked. This is the trend with time of the ratio of per capita consumption of one country to per capita consumption of the rest of the world. This trend is remarkable because it is almost insensitive to wars, social legislation, business levels, and monetary policies.

In 1875 Britain consumed 30 times as much coal per capita as the rest of the world. The factor has declined smoothly and steadily from that date. In 1900 it was 16; in 1925 it was 8; now it is 4. Most of Britain's production has been for home consumption and for export for use in British ships. Maximum British use in comparison with the rest of the world was probably not much earlier than 1875. This is when British ships were renowned the world over, and Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India; when interest rates were abnormally low, and ratio of exports to imports had begun to fall.


The situation for the United States with regard to oil is similar. In 1910 we consumed 21 times as much oil per capita as the rest of the world. The factor rose until the maximum distortion was reached in 1930 when we consumed 30 times as much as the rest of the world. Since 1930 the factor has become smaller each year. In 1940 it was 26; in 1945 it was 22; now it is 17. No physical or economic factors appear to exist to halt the downward sweep. A good guess for 1975 is that we shall then be consuming per capita about 5 times as much as the rest of the world. It is too early to know whether our peak of relative consumption has been coincident with any other economic trend.

It is obvious that downward trends for Britain and for the United States



mean an upward sweep somewhere else in the world. A trend toward equalization of consumption might represent a trend toward economic world stability. Such a trend would be good for the world and consequently good for the United States—provided we could contrive to make the transition more gracefully than Britain. But it happens that while the most highly industrialized countries are now showing a downward trend, the same-thing is also true of areas having the *least* consumption (Middle East, India, Pakistan, and China).

Curves of relative per capita consumption are not concerned with capacity to produce, with absolute per capita consumption, with needs for energy, or with extravagance in use. They are concerned only with relative *capacity for use*. That is why they are so smooth and why they have such fundamental significance. Capacity for use is determined by degree of industrialization, national income, and distribution



of purchasing power; but the trend with time of relative capacity for use is determined by such intangibles as virility, optimism, ingenuity, confidence, and imagination—qualities that are not exclusive to any people, and qualities that are likely to change in degree with the march of time.

NATURE OF RESERVES

The present difficulty with British economy was predicted in 1865 by Stanley Jevons; but no one in Britain then paid much attention to Jevons' warning, for it was clouded by a popular misconception of the nature of reserves —a misconception that is common in the United States today. The most important factor is not the *size* of a reserve but rather the *rate* at which it may be procured. Jevons' idea of the probable optimum rate of procurement seemed unrealistic in the light of the great amounts of minable coal that were presumed to exist under British soil. Today it is believed that during the next century Britain will be able to produce not more than 25 billion tons, and will need twice this amount. Another 25 billion tons may be gradually produced in later centuries. Regardless of technical, social, political, or fiscal events, Britain is confronted with a permanent and growing shortage of domestic energy. For she has almost no petroleum or gas.

Estimates of petroleum reserves in the United States are more realistic. We are producing around two billion barrels a year, and we are virtually sure that 30 billion barrels more are producible. Plausible geologic estimates of 110 billion barrels have been made. But it has been shown that even a reserve of this magnitude does not mean that our domestic production can keep pace with domestic demand. We are already importing substantial amounts, and after 1970 we shall probably have to step up our imports drastically. We are confronted with a permanent and growing shortage of domestic petroleum, but not of energy; for our coal reserves are very large.

Britain's economy has been somewhat dependent upon exports of coal. Our economy is not at all dependent upon exports of petroleum. Britain's coal consumption is still well above world coal consumption—even a little above that of the United States, because so much of our energy comes from oil and gas. But the world is catching up. The economic consequences to Britain are painful because of two independent factors: (1) shrinking relative capacity for use of coal, and (2) insufficiency of production to meet her needs. Of the two, the former has been by far the more important. The second is a recent malady that will soon accentuate her difficulties, because her economy has been inflexibly geared to domestic coal. She has not yet found an economically suitable way of making up thermal deficiencies with imported coal or by substitution of oil from British-owned concessions abroad. One is tempted to believe that national revenues should come from anything other than imports of fuel.

Our economy is tightly geared, in part, to liquid fuel but not to domestic petroleum. We have the fortunate alternatives of importation of petroleum as long as this is possible, and conversion of our abundant coal when imports become inadequate or undependable.

Existence of such alternatives should not make us complacent. Imports of petroleum will be impeded more and more by international competition. For as the world tends to catch up with us in consumption, the rate of world production will begin eventually to decline. We shall then be compelled to use rela-

tively expensive liquid fuel from coal (and oil shale) while some other nations are still using relatively cheap petroleum. It is of the utmost importance to us (1) to import as abundantly as we can while it is still possible, and (2) to avoid unnecessary waste of petroleum. Only thus can we postpone the time when we shall be at a fundamental competitive disadvantage.

MIDDLE EAST

The long-term disadvantage to the United States of incidents like the cessation of Iranian production is not that we must export to make up world deficiency, but rather that we can import less than we need. The fabulous Middle East, of which Iran is a part, has an area nearly as large as the United States and with about one-third our population. Climatic variations are similar to those in the United States, although more of the Middle East is desert, and portions of the country are normally colder. Portions are extremely fertile, but much is arid. The Middle East is believed to be the birthplace of civilization, and has suffered the senseless ravages of civilization for a longer time than any other part of the earth. For example, deforestation has been almost complete, and erosion is widespread. The consumption of wood per capita in Iran is now little more than one-thousandth that in Finland (the most prolific wood user). But the petroleum reserves of the Middle East are believed to be larger than those in the United States—larger, in fact, than in any other known area of the earth. For its petroleum, the world is destined to be dependent upon the Middle East for several decades to come.

Iran is only one of the countries that make up the Middle East. Iran looks unimpressive on a map of Asia, but it is as large as the sum of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota—a neat slice out of the center of the United States. The population of Iran is 30 per cent larger than the sum of the population of the above states. Iran has been blessed with petroleum production since 1913, and while most of this production has been for export, Iran has had the opportunity to retain up to her capacity for use. Early statistics are inadequate to determine just when her relative per capita consumption reached its peak, but since 1938 it has been on the way down. In 1938 Iran used (per capita) only about as much petroleum as the rest of the world. In 1947 (before the termination of production) the proportion was about seven-tenths. This makes a curious parallel between Iranian and United States economy. While one is a little below world consumption and the other well above, both are on the way down in a relative sense. This is all the more remarkable in that the *production* of Iran in 1947 was 2.5 times the production in 1938, and royalties to the Iranian government have been proportionate.

Iran cannot be regarded as altogether typical of Middle East countries. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait are all different in various respects. Much favorable comment has been made regarding the special wisdom with which Saudi Arabia has been investing its oil revenues. Kuwait is remarkable because, while it is only about as large as Rhode Island, its oil reserves probably exceed those of Iran. But in spite of differences between component parts, the Middle East as a whole has not yet developed to the point of even average per capita consumption of oil. There may not be time enough. The peak of Middle East production is likely to come only about twenty-five years after the peak of production in the United States. The Middle East countries will continue to export oil until they have no more to export, and the vast royalties they will receive may not be invested in sufficiently productive enterprises to provide adequate future income. Let us hope that the governments and peoples of these countries will be able to take advantage of their significant opportunities.

DISTRIBUTION OF OIL

The Middle East and Russia are believed to divide about equally one-half of the petroleum yet to be produced in the world. Forty per cent is divided about equally between the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The other 10 per cent is widely scattered. This distribution is based upon somewhat academic estimates of ultimate production—estimates that are related in no way to "proved reserves." They are related even less to production; for about 63 per cent of the world's total oil production so far has come from the United States. Fifteen per cent has come from the rest of the Western Hemisphere. This leaves only 22 per cent for the rest of the world, and only a quarter of this has been produced by the Middle East.

From these figures it is apparent that the Middle East still has a long way to go. Russia has "proved" less than 4 per cent of her presumed ultimate reserves. For this reason, Russian production is likely to come late upon the world stage. Because of vigorous exploration by western nations, the Middle East has about the same proportion of "proved reserves" as the United States (about a fifth of presumed ultimate reserves). The Middle East, therefore, is in a position to contribute promptly to world demands.

Figures of interest are obtained by expressing cumulative production as a percentage of the sum of cumulative production and proved reserves. Such "relative depletion" is 61 per cent for the United States and only 8 per cent for the Middle East. If relative depletion is based on estimated ultimate production instead of proved reserves, it appears that we have produced about a quarter of the oil originally present under United States soil, while the Middle East has produced only 2.5 per cent of its original reserve.

SOME OTHER COUNTRIES

India and Pakistan are examples of countries with substantially no petroleum and very low per capita energy consumption. In 1938 they used 0.05 as much oil as the rest of the world. By 1947 this had fallen to 0.036.

China has always been low in per capita use of fuel, and because of continuous internal strife, her relative coal consumption today is only about a quarter of what it was ten years ago.

Russia is on the way up. She has not yet reached the peak of relative consumption of total energy (coal plus gas plus oil). The curve is still rising rapidly—about 25 per cent per decade—but her relative per capita consumption is not yet above 10 per cent of that of the United States. The United States reached a peak of relative per capita consumption of total energy about 1910, since when we have been slowly receding. We now use (per capita) about 17 times as much coal, oil, and gas as the rest of the world. If present trends continue, Russia's per capita consumption of coal may equal ours in 1960, but she will not then equal us in *total* fuel use.

Canadian consumption of oil (production plus net imports) shows a rising curve. She now uses four times as much per capita as the rest of the world. This is interesting in view of Canada's excellent fiscal position. Yugoslavia is another country on the way up. In 1942 she used per capita only a tenth as much coal as the rest of the world.

Today she is a little above par. Her curve shows a more sensational recent rise than any other.

THE FUTURE

If Middle East oil should not be freely available to us after the peak of oil production has been passed in the United States, we may be at a temporary disadvantage in energy costs; but eventually we shall be in a very fortunate position, for it seems that we have more than half the world's oil shale and about half the coal. The latter is of special importance because energy from oil shale is likely to be only about 3 per cent of energy from coal. We passed one peak of relative coal consumption before 1920. The factor has been going down since then because of our abundant use of oil and gas, but it will rise again to a new peak by the end of this century because of our prospective use of coal not only for liquid fuel but also for the generation of electric power. Our economy is geared even more tightly to electric power than to liquid fuel.

There is every reason to expect our second (and last) peak to be higher than the first. For some decades we shall have an enviable *opportunity* in the possession of ample competitive energy reserves. This does not mean, of course, that we shall take proper advantage of this opportunity. Britain's economy subsided from 1875 in spite of ample energy reserves. The economy of the Middle East is not in a position to take advantage of her present unexampled opportunity in oil reserves. Whether we prosper depends upon the economic ingenuity with which we may compensate for the subsidence of our relative capacity for use.

Back in 1768, Horace Walpole (who made many whimsical mistakes) was strangely impelled to exclaim—"The best sun we have is made of Newcastle coal, and I am determined never to reckon upon any other." Unknowingly, this statement was a counsel of despair; for the Newcastle "sun" is fading, and England has less natural sunlight than most geographical areas. The wealth of the more distant future—beginning, perhaps, a little more than a century hence —will be derived from the sun. When that time comes, the Middle East, which is generously drenched with sunlight, may again become the fountainhead of civilization.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of economic change discussed in this brief article is not easy to interpret. Statistics on world consumption of fuels are spotty and sometimes unreliable. But it is clear that a falling trend of relative per capita consumption in highly industrialized countries cannot be dismissed as a natural consequence of development of "backward" peoples. Unfortunately, peoples who are lowest in use of energy are moving still lower (in a relative sense). In general, improvement is shown in nations that have been partially industrialized and that have rapidly developing capacity for use. The trends will bear watching in the future.

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Conservation of Hydroelectric Power

By PAUL J. RAVER

THE development, use, and conservation of energy resources are indispensable to the physical progress of mankind. The high degree of correlation between the per capita use of energy and per capita production of the nations of the world is ample proof of this statement. No country, state, or region in the world today can prosper unless it assures itself of an energy supply which is adequate for current uses, can be expanded for future needs, and is low in cost and will continue to be low in cost in future years.

If men continue to increase their physical standards of living, they must increase their consumption of energy. They require energy for the transportation of people and things, for the modification of the temperatures of their dwellings and other buildings, and to change the form of materials so as to make them more useful. Continued progress in the satisfaction of physical wants means continually greater drafts on the energy sources of the world.

ENERGY SOURCES

Eugene Ayres has divided the energy sources of the world into two major categories which he calls "continuous" and "unrenewable."[1] He includes in his "continuous" sources vegetation, solar heat, water power, wind power, tropical waters, earth heat, tides, and atmospheric electricity. In the "unrenewable" sources of energy he includes the fossil and atomic fuels. Most of our energy sources can be traced to the heat and light given off by the sun at present and in past years.

There is in view today for the United States an adequate supply of energy to meet our foreseeable requirements for many generations. We have learned not only how to recover the energy from our coal and oils, but also how to convert solid into liquid fuels, and how to convert all fuels except atomic energy into electricity. And electric generators powered by atomic energy may be operating soon.

Our principal energy problem for the next few decades will be to keep the cost of energy low enough so that increasing demands will not be frustrated by increases in cost. The easily accessible supplies of energy are the first exploited, and hence the first exhausted. As less accessible supplies are tapped, the cost per unit tends to rise. Offsetting this trend to higher costs have been the continuing improvements in technology. Scientific and mechanical developments have kept the costs of coal, natural gas, petroleum, and electricity relatively low in spite of deeper mines, deeper wells, and more remote hydroelectric sites.

Conservation of hydroelectric power of the United States means the development of all feasible water power sites for maximum power and energy production. Such development should, of course, be consistent with other uses of our resources. The opposite of conservation in this respect is failure to develop and use our water power resources, or development of only part of the potential of our power sites.

The flow of water in our streams is constantly being renewed by the processes of evaporation and condensation

[1] Eugene Ayres, "Major Sources of Energy," a paper presented before the 28th Annual Meeting of the American Petroleum Institute, Chicago, November 9, 1948.

and the phenomena of snow and rain. The power of the falling water in our streams is thus considered to be "continuous." If it is not used for power generation, however, it is wasted beyond recovery. Like time, it flows on forever; but once the flow has passed, it is lost forever.

COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER POWER

Although water power was the preferred source of industrial energy when manufacturing began in the United States, it has lagged far behind. Out of 432 billion kilowatt-hours generated in 1951 by industrial and utility plants, only 102 billion were generated by water power. Of the 330 billion kw.-hrs. generated by thermal plants, steam turbines produced all but about 7 billion, which were produced by internal combustion engines, mostly diesel engines.

If all of the undeveloped hydroelectric sites in the United States had been developed and in use, total generation by water power alone could have exceeded the total 1951 electric output in the United States. In terms of capacity, about 18 per cent of the total United States water power potential had been developed by January 1, 1952. It is estimated that this capacity was capable of producing approximately 20 per cent of the total United States hydroelectric energy potential.

By January 1, 1952 there were under construction or authorized for construction projects with a potential capacity of 18 million kilowatts capable of producing 85 billion kw.-hrs. in an average water year. Of this, 7.7 million kw. were located in the Pacific Northwest, where projects with a potential capacity of 34 million kw. still awaited development in 1950.

For a variety of reasons, it will not be possible to develop *all* of America's water power potential in the foreseeable future. Cost of construction and land at some sites will be too expensive for the power output to compete with other methods of generating electricity. Development of other sites is likely to be prevented by pressure groups, representing vested interests such as railroads, fisheries, privately owned utilities, national park enthusiasts, miners, port commissions, and landowners. Some potential water power sites may never be developed because of these factors.

On the other hand, if the people of the United States were convinced of the importance of conserving our water power, the development of 65 to 75 per cent of our total water power resources could be completed in the *next* twenty-five to fifty years.

ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT

If America's hydroelectric resources are to be conserved by developing her river basins, the government will have to assume the major responsibility. By and large, the feasible single-purpose hydroelectric sites, suitable for development by private investors, have already been pre-empted and developed. By 1930, privately owned electric utilities had installed about 8 million kilowatts of hydroelectric capacity. By 1950 this had increased only to 9 million kw., and in 1951 only 140,000 kw. was added. Private investment in hydroelectric sites is currently increasing because of the ability of private companies to obtain rapid amortization under the defense laws, which in effect have reduced the investment required for hydroelectric development; but even with this advantage, the number of feasible single-purpose sites is too limited to sustain a permanently higher level of private investment.

Public development of river basins for all their values, including—in addition to power—flood control, irrigation, soil conservation, navigation, recreation, maintenance of fish and wildlife, pollution abatement, and municipal and industrial water supply, makes possible the proration of the cost of facilities common to power and other functions, thus reducing the cost to be borne by power.

On the other hand, by paying its share of the cost of such joint facilities, hydroelectric power may bring down the cost of navigation or irrigation or any other river function, and thus make it possible for the public to enjoy the benefits of such developments. These are public functions, and can be achieved only by public development of river basins on a comprehensive basis.

The key to these aspects of water conservation is the storage reservoir which holds back floodwaters for release during periods of low river flows for the generation of power, the irrigation of land, the maintenance of adequate river depths for navigation, the abatement of pollution, the restoration of oxygen to the streams to permit fish to live, and the provision of municipal and industrial water supplies. But such reservoirs will seldom be constructed unless hydroelectric power shares the cost.

Public development of hydroelectric sites is more feasible also because of the lower interest rates enjoyed by public agencies, and because public agencies can finance entirely with borrowed money and do not have to induce investors to put equity money into their ventures. These factors are extremely important when considering the feasibility of hydroelectric sites, since a preponderance of the cost of hydroelectric power relates directly to investment.

The sooner we develop our hydroelectric sites, the lower the cost of such development is likely to be. Most river basin plans include storage reservoirs to hold back flood waters for later release. Such reservoirs are feasible, however, only if land is relatively cheap and unimproved. The settlement of reservoir sites with communities or towns or cities may make the cost prohibitive.

SAVING OF FUELS AND RELATED FACTORS

If the United States in 1951 could have generated all its electric power supply from its hydroelectric resources, it would have saved more than 120 million tons of coal, 65 million barrels of liquid fuels, and 800 billion cubic feet of natural and by-product gas consumed last year in thermal electric generating plants. On the other hand, if none of its water power had been in operation in 1951, it would have required the burning of 50 million tons of coal *or* 1,400 billion cubic feet of gas, *or* 230 million barrels of residual fuel oil to replace the electric energy generated in our hydroelectric plants.

This considerable saving of fossil fuels which cannot be renewed is, of course, accompanied by important savings in transportation of fuels by railroads, pipelines, tankers, and barges. Also, manpower for mining coal, drilling oil and gas wells, and operating railroads and pipelines will probably be more expensive in future years. Production of hydroelectric power requires none of this labor, once the plant is built.

SAVING OF ORES

When power is low in cost, it can be used to smelt and refine the important metals contained in low-grade or complex mineral ores. It so happens that while nonelectric processes may be preferred, or are at least acceptable, for high-grade ores, in many cases only electric processes can be used for the lower-grade minerals.

For example, the taconite ores of the Mesabi Range in Minnesota will require 75 kw.-hrs per ton for magnetic separation in order to upgrade the ores prior to their shipment to steel mills. This compares with only 2 to 3 kw.-hrs. to prepare high-grade ores for shipment. The only commercially feasible nickel operation in the United States will use electric furnaces to recover approximately 60 pounds of nickel per ton of ore. The greatest bulk of the western phosphate deposits is low-grade rock. Only the high-grade rock, 30 per cent or more P_2O_5 content, can be used for the production of triple superphosphate fertilizer by the wet or sulphuric acid process. Electric furnaces can smelt lower-grade rock with a P_2O_5 content as low as 25 per cent. By using higher grades of rock to mix with rock of less than 25 per cent P_2O_5 content, the total tonnage of usable rock can be greatly increased. All these are examples of the use of electric energy to develop and conserve our supplies of materials. By making feasible or economical the recovery of metals and chemicals from low-grade sources, electric energy performs an important conservation function.

CO-ORDINATION OF PLANTS

Conservation of hydroelectric power, we noted, means not only the development of our water power sites but also the development of the full potential of each site. Actually, it means also development of an entire river system to maximize the energy production of all sites on the system by co-ordinated and integrated planning and operation.

A good example is the integrated operation of Hungry Horse Dam, now under construction by the Bureau of Reclamation on the south fork of the Flathead River in Montana, with downstream plants in Canada and the United States. Co-ordination of operation in this case means storing water for four months each year for release during the eight months when flows of other streams are at a minimum. Hungry Horse and downstream power plants will produce 402,000 kw. more prime power by this method of operation than if Hungry Horse Dam were to be operated on an isolated basis and its storage were to be released uniformly throughout the year. An almost identical type of operation will produce 1,124,000 kilowatts of prime power at Hells Canyon Dam and downstream plants, in comparison with only 532,000 kw. if Hells Canyon Dam and power plant were operated on an isolated basis.[2]

Such co-ordination of operation of plants is possible only if high-capacity transmission systems interconnect the plants on a river system so that large blocks of power can be shifted from plants with surplus power production during parts of the year to areas which would otherwise be served by plants like Hungry Horse and Hells Canyon operating on an isolated basis.

IMPORTANCE TO THE ECONOMY

In a paper I presented at the 1950 meetings of the American Economic Association, I stated:

> The capitalistic system flourishes under an expanding and dynamic economy. It dies under a contracting or static economy. Our system has made its greatest strides by increasing productivity per manhour. This increase has been accomplished by mass production and the machine technique. The expansion of machine production has been built on an expandable and cheap supply of energy in the form of coal, oil, gas, or falling water.[3]

If we are to continue to increase production, we must have larger supplies of low-cost energy. The use of electric energy in industrial plants has increased from 2.61 kilowatt-hours per man-hour in 1929 to 4.60 in 1939, 5.71 in 1947, and an estimated 6.29 in 1950. This ratio must keep rising if productivity is to continue to increase. The conservation of water power will contribute to the energy supplies required to increase the productivity of labor. It will help this country to maintain a dynamic economy, the backbone of the capitalistic system.

These larger supplies of low-cost electric energy can be obtained if the program of the Federal Government to develop the economical hydroelectric sites in this country is achieved. Included in this program are: the development of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, the redevelopment of Niagara Falls, and the major projects on the Columbia River and its tributaries in the Pacific Northwest. The construction of these projects represents the next important step in the conservation of hydroelectric power in the United States.

[2] In addition, Hells Canyon storage along with other Columbia River storage results in greater prime power at all system plants, through co-ordination of operation. Hells Canyon's share of this greater prime power amounts to 306,000 kw. Thus total power attributable to Hells Canyon is 1,430,000 kw.

[3] Paul J. Raver, "Government Action and Private Enterprise in River Valley Development: A Public Administrator's View," Papers and Proceedings, *American Economic Review*, Vol. XLI, No. 2 (May 1951), pp. 296–97.

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Private Forestry in Transition

By Samuel T. Dana

FROM colonial days to the present, the forests of the United States have played a major role in its development. They have built its homes, supplied the raw material for many of its manufactured products, provided containers for their shipment, and helped to prevent erosion and floods. These products and services have come, and must continue to come, mainly from the three-fourths of our forest area that is in private ownership. What are the prospects that this area of 345 million acres will be so managed as to guarantee adequate future supplies and services?

Until recently most students of the situation have viewed it with uneasy concern or even genuine alarm. For more than half a century they have emphasized the key position in the national economy occupied by forest lands in private ownership, and have successively proposed public co-operation, public regulation, public ownership, and private initiative as means of assuring their effective management.

Public Co-operation and Regulation Proposed

In 1899 in his first report as Chief of the Division of Forestry, Gifford Pinchot commented optimistically on the program which he had initiated to further the practice of forestry on private lands by public co-operation in the preparation of forest working plans. The response was encouraging; but the resulting plans so commonly gathered dust in a convenient pigeonhole that some ten years later a wag summed up progress with the remark that "forestry is now being practiced everywhere except in the woods." The co-operative approach was renewed in different form in the Weeks Act of 1911, the Clarke-McNary Act of 1924, the Norris-Doxey Act of 1937, and the Cooperative Forest Management Act of 1950. Results have been more substantial, but have fallen far short of bringing private forest lands in general under even fairly satisfactory management.

In 1919 the Forest Service, under the leadership of Henry S. Graves, and the Society of American Foresters, under the leadership of Frederic E. Olmsted and Gifford Pinchot, started a campaign to solve the problem by public regulation of cutting on private lands. Mr. Pinchot summarized his views with characteristic vigor:

> Forest devastation will not be stopped through persuasion, a method which has been thoroughly tried out for the past twenty years and has failed utterly. Since otherwise they will not do so, private owners of forest land must now be compelled to manage their properties in harmony with the public good. Pressure from without, in the form of public sentiment, crystallized in compulsory nation-wide legislation, is the only method that promises adequate results. To apply this method successfully means to fight.

Legislatively, the only immediate result of this campagin was the strengthening of the federal program in the fields of public co-operation and public ownership by the passage of the Clarke-McNary Act. Today federal regulation, in spite of sporadic attempts by the Forest Service to obtain its adoption, seems more remote than ever. State regulation has made some progress, but is neither sufficiently widespread nor effective enough to offer any real promise of providing a panacea.

Public Ownership Proposed

In 1933 the Forest Service, in the Copeland Report ("A National Plan for American Forestry"), subordinated public co-operation and public regulation to public ownership as the most effective means of solving the forest problem. This report prepared under the supervision of E. H. Clapp during the incumbency of R. Y. Stuart as Chief of the Forest Service, expressed the view "that practically all of the major problems of American forestry center in, or have grown out of, private ownership." To meet the situation, it recommended the acquisition of 134 million acres of forest land by the Federal Government and of 90 million acres by state governments. This proposal, which would have more than trebled the area of commercial forest land at that time in public ownership, was made during the depth of the depression when some private owners, particularly in the West, were inclined to regard their forest lands as a liability rather than an asset, and to regret that the government had ever allowed them to assume the "burden" of ownership. It was endorsed by Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, who strongly recommended the earliest possible action on the federal part of the plan.

Although the area of forest land in public ownership has increased substantially in the last twenty years, this increase has been meager indeed in comparison with the goal set by the Copeland Report. Today the Federal Government owns 19 per cent of the commercial forest area, and state and smaller units of government 6 per cent, with no apparent likelihood of any marked increase in either category. That we shall now attempt to solve the problems created by private ownership by largely abolishing such ownership seems most improbable.

Self-regulation

The year of the Copeland Report (1933) may also be regarded as the year of the first attempt to put private forestry on the map by mobilizing private initiative on a nation-wide scale. Article X of the Code of Fair Competition for the Lumber and Timber Products Industries provided that:

> the applicant industries undertake, in co-operation with public and other agencies, to carry out such practicable measures as may be necessary for the declared purposes of this code in respect of conservation and sustained production of forest resources.

Wilson Compton, general manager of the National Lumber Manufacturers Association, promptly announced that "this is an industry undertaking. It will be so administered."

Two large conferences of representatives of industry and of the general public led to agreement on the principles to be followed in the drafting for each forest region of the country of codes of forest practice which would have the force of law. This procedure, known as "self-regulation," was lauded as a desirable and effective alternative to public regulation.

Considerable progress in the preparation and adoption of regional rules of forest practice had been made by the spring of 1935, when the National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thereupon the interest of most forest owners and operators in the entire enterprise suddenly waned, although in some regions consideration was given to the desirability of going ahead with the program in spite of the invalidation of the act. This loss of interest may have been due to economic conditions (the depression was still with us), to lack of

faith in the virtues of forestry as a voluntary undertaking, or to preoccupation with other matters. Whatever the cause, it strengthened the skepticism of those who believed that self-regulation would materialize only under the spur of legal compulsion; and it led F. A. Silcox, currently head of the Forest Service, to renew the campaign for public regulation.

One region where organized effort by industry to push private forestry did crystallize into definite action was the Pacific Northwest. Here the timber associations took seriously the excellent rules of forest practice which they had developed. Sustained timber production, in their judgment, was highly desirable from both the public and the private point of view, Article X or no Article X. Two developments of major consequence soon followed, both in 1941: (1) the passage by Oregon, with the support of the timber interests, of legislation requiring private owners to adopt minimum standards of forest practice; and (2) the inauguration of the tree-farm movement by the establishment of the Clemons Tree Farm in Washington by the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company.

The same year saw the organization of American Forest Products Industries, Inc. (AFPI)—the educational arm of the forest industries. Under its aegis the keep-green and the tree-farm programs have gone steadily forward, accompanied by a vigorous campaign for the education both of the general public and of forest owners. Regional associations and individual owners, and of course the federal and state governments, have also played an important part in the general advance.

STATUS OF PRIVATE MANAGEMENT

Where, then, does private forestry stand today, and what are its prospects for the future? Is the perennial problem of American forestry—management of private lands—actually on its way to a satisfactory solution? Is the outlook as rosy as the optimists in industry believe, or as dark as the pessimists in government fear?

The answer to these questions, in the judgment of a middle-of-the-roader like the present writer, is that private forestry is in a state of transition from a position of minor importance in the national economy to one of major importance. It has come a long way in recent years; it still has a long way to go; and liberal public participation in the forestry enterprise will continue to be necessary for satisfactory progress.

Private forestry has gone farther in the last decade than in all the previous years of our history put together. The number of well-managed properties has jumped suddenly from the hundreds into the thousands. The rapidity of the change is dramatized by the growth in the number of tree farms from one in 1941 to more than thirty-five hundred today. Their number and distribution as of March 1, 1952, were as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1—TREE FARMS AS OF March 1, 1951

Region	Number	Per Cent	Acres	Per Cent
West	492	14	8,649,830	35
South	1,899	53	14,204,200	57
Lake	497	14	1,503,662	6
Central and Plains	346	10	150,629	1
Eastern	307	9	354,917	1
United States	3,541	100	24,863,238	100

According to AFPI, the sponsor of the tree farm movement,

> A tree farm is an area of privately owned forest land devoted primarily to the continuous growth of merchantable forest products under good forest practices. . . . Tree farming, like the raising of any crop, is a practical business venture.

Both the idea and the name have proved so popular that thirty-three states now have formal tree-farm programs. Each of these states has a responsible agency to establish and enforce standards of practice, compliance with which entitles an owner, whether of a small farm woodlot or a large industrial holding, to be officially certified as a tree farmer.

In interpreting tree-farm figures such as those given above, two offsetting facts must be kept in mind. In the first place, many of the properties included in them were being well managed in pre-tree-farm days. Secondly, they do not include well-managed properties that have not yet been registered or that are in non-tree-farm states. Statistical accuracy, however, is not necessary to prove to the careful observer that there has been an unforeseen and highly gratifying upsurge in the practice of private forestry. This is most evident on the lands of pulp and paper companies, which have been leaders both in the area placed under management and in the quality of that management. Their interest is due to the phenomenal growth of the industry, which increased its production even during the depression; to its heavy capital investment, which makes an assured supply of raw material indispensable; and to technological advances, which have made possible the utilization of species and grades of material that were formerly unavailable.

ACTIVITIES OF THE INDUSTRY

The new attitude is well stated on the letterhead of the country's largest private timberland owner: "Timber is a crop." It finds expression in the woods, both on tree farms and elsewhere, in more effective control of fire, insects, and disease; in thinnings, cleanings, and other silvicultural treatments in immature stands to improve the quality of the final crop; in the conduct of harvesting operations so as to obtain natural reproduction of desirable species in adequate amount; in the artificial reforestation of denuded areas; in the development of permanent systems of transportation; and in the practice of sustained-yield management, through which the balancing of growth and drain assures continued forest production for an indefinite future. It also finds expression in the general acquisition by larger owners (especially in the paper industry) of small holdings which for economic reasons cannot be handled satisfactorily by their present owners and are likely to be much better managed as integral parts of an extensive timber-growing enterprise.

In some instances private management is even more intensive than that on national forests, where standards have long been high. Moreover, the Southern Pulpwood Conservation Association and several individual owners assist smaller owners without charge in the management of their land. Such assistance may include the marking of the trees to be cut in a logging operation and the furnishing of planting stock for reforestation purposes. This is not entirely an altruistic gesture, but rather an intelligent approach to the problem of assuring an adequate supply of wood to meet the manufacturer's needs for raw material.

All these activities are normally conducted under the professional direction of a trained forester, who may be on the staff of the owner, employed by him on a consulting basis, or made temporarily available in an advisory capacity by a public agency. Some 5,100 foresters are now estimated to be employed by industry. Several of the larger companies have a score or more of foresters

on their payrolls, many in positions of responsibility for the determination of policy as well as of technical practice. A few concerns go so far as to employ specialists for research in such fields as forest pathology, forest entomology, and forest soils. Experimental forests, sometimes aggregating many thousand acres, are not uncommon. One of the most encouraging features of the situation is that current openings for foresters in private employ considerably exceed those in public employ.

PUBLICITY WORK

Prominent in the efforts being made in many quarters to put private forestry on the map is American Forest Products Industries, to which reference has already been made. This organization has been largely responsible for putting across the keep-green program in 31 states, the tree-farm program in 33 states, and the more-trees program in 6 states. It issues a large volume of attractive literature designed to get more forestry practiced on private lands; to inform the general public, and especially school children, as to the importance of forests, forest products, and forest industries in the life of the nation; and to make known what industry is doing to assure adequate future supplies. In 1951, for example, educational material was sent to 89,000 schools in all parts of the country.

Naturally, activity of this sort has led to the charge that industry is indulging in propaganda to lull the American people into a false feeling of security. Careful study of the literature issued both by AFPI and by individual companies fails to substantiate the charge. While the general presentation is usually optimistic, sometimes perhaps too optimistic, reference is nearly always made to the fact that the forest situation as a whole is not satisfactory, and that all of us must put our shoulders to the wheel to make it more so. If this constitutes advertising and window dressing, it must be remembered that advertising and window dressing are part and parcel of the entire system of private enterprise. From radio and newspaper to the department store's window display, they are characteristic of American business. And is it any wonder that timberland owners should emphasize the bright spots in the present picture after the names they have been called and the unfavorable publicity they have previously received?

MOTIVATION OF ADVANCE

The important question is: How permanent and how effective is the recent upsurge in private forestry? In an economic world, it is encouraging that the primary cause of the new interest is an economic one. Owners have not suddenly "got religion" or become panicky because of fear of federal regulation; nor are they unduly influenced by the opportunity to invest in their own business funds that would otherwise go to the government as income taxes. They have decided to go into the business of growing timber because it pays. High stumpage prices, the closer utilization of inferior material made possible by advances in wood technology, and the necessity of protecting heavy investments in land and mills now justify practices which most owners, rightly or wrongly, formerly regarded as uneconomical. Added to the economic motive, on the part of some at least of the larger manufacturers, is a sense of responsibility for the maintenance of the communities supported by their plants.

Enlightened self-interest thus provides a solid foundation which offers real promise of permanence. Another depression would undoubtedly lead to some decrease in expenditures for forestry by private owners, just as it would lead to economies in other directions. That it would result in the virtual abandonment of any considerable part of the present program is most unlikely, particularly in the case of manufacturers with heavy capital investments. The stakes are too high.

GOOD BUT NOT GOOD ENOUGH

On the other hand, accomplishments to date in relation to needs give no cause for complacency. Forest Service estimates showing the status of forest management in 1945 are given in Table 2. Additional areas have come under management since that date, and the intensity of management on other areas has no doubt increased. Even so, the level of management of the private forests is clearly low, both intrinsically and in comparison with that of the public forests. This is notably true of the small holdings (less than 5,000 acres) and the medium-sized holdings (5,000 to 50,000 acres), with only 4 and 8 per cent respectively under good or better management. The large owners, particularly the pulp and paper companies, are doing much better, with 29 per cent of the area involved under good or excellent management; but this group includes only 15 per cent of the total forest area in private ownership.

TABLE 2—CHARACTER OF CUTTING IN 1945
(Per cent)

	Good and Better	Fair	Poor and Worse
Private ownership	8	28	64
Small	4	25	71
Medium	8	31	61
Large	29	39	32
Public ownership	67	19	14
National forests	80	19	1
Other federal	43	32	25
State and local	47	10	43
All lands	23	25	52

A closer look at the situation in one of the most productive forest areas in the country, the southern pine region, is revealing. Here the pulp and paper industry has increased its output nearly ten times in the last twenty years, with another marked expansion scheduled for the immediate future. Although pulp and paper manufacturers are almost uniformly practicing good forestry on their own lands, these are far from adequate to meet their requirements. They must therefore obtain about half of their wood supply, in competition with the lumber industry and other wood-using industries, from other lands. Of these, the most important are the small ownerships, which greatly predominate in the region, and only 2 per cent of which are being well handled. Clearly, the progress which has so far been made, spectacular as it is on some individual properties, is far from enough.

Forest Service estimates also show that the total growth of the forests (in cubic feet) approximately equals the total drain resulting from cutting and from losses by fire, insects, and disease, and that the growth of sawtimber (in board feet) is about two-thirds of the drain. Do these figures mean that more widespread and more intensive forest management, whether on public or private lands, is not really an urgent necessity? They mean no such thing, unless we are to be satisfied with a static supply of wood in an expanding economy; and unless we are willing to reduce drastically our consumption of saw timber, on which we now depend for many important uses.

Wood, in spite of the much-advertised increase in the use of substitutes, continues to be the "universal raw material." Far from being "obsolete," it is constantly finding new uses and being improved for old uses. From lumber, plywood, and the myriad articles manufactured from them, to turpentine and

rosin, paper and its products, lignin, sugar, alcohol, vanillin, and other chemical derivatives, forest products enter into our daily life not only in many obvious but also in many unrecognized ways. Our whole economy will be richer or poorer as they are abundant or scarce.

Liberal use of forest products is desirable because of their renewability as well as because of their utility. It is reassuring to know that about a fourth of our total land area is best suited to the production of forest crops, and that these 461 million acres, *if properly managed,* would permanently provide a much larger yield than we are now harvesting.

THE SOCIAL REQUIREMENT

Is any such addition to the national wealth in the form of increased forest production likely to result from private enterprise alone? In spite of the recent highly encouraging developments in private forestry, the answer is almost certainly No. The job is of a nature and a size to require public participation. There is nothing inconsistent with the "American way of life" in this conclusion.

The institutions of private property and private profit are based on the theory that they best serve the interests of society as a whole. Here in the United States we are convinced that this is the case; but when unrestricted freedom of enterprise fails to render optimum service or results in actual disservice, the community does not hesitate to intervene. Public schools, agricultural experiment stations, blue-sky laws, pure food and drug acts, regulation of public utility rates and service, incentive payments, zoning ordinances, control of stream pollution, and national parks, to pick just a few examples, all bear witness to this fact.

Experience both here and abroad shows that forestry is a field in which such intervention is often desirable. Many owners are either unable or unwilling to handle their lands in such a way as to assure their continued productivity. When forest supplies are abundant in relation to the demand, this fact may have little social significance. When the situation becomes reversed, it may be of outstanding importance. Indeed, as population expands and natural resources shrink, the point may well be reached where the way in which they are managed is of more concern to the community at large than to their individual owners.

The United States cannot raise the standard of living for its own rapidly mounting population, nor can it exercise effective leadership in a bankrupt world, without wise use of its natural resources, among which forests are of major importance. The goal must be reached chiefly through action of private owners, but with a reasonable measure of the three forms of public participation with which we are already familiar.

FORMS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Public co-operation is exemplified in such fields as protection of forests from fire, insects, and disease; research; education; provision of planting stock; and on-the-ground aid in the management of specific properties. These activities are almost universally approved, including the liberal use of federal grants-in-aid administered by state agencies. They have demonstrated the ability of private owners and of federal and state officials to work together in the formulation and execution of constructive programs in which the participation of all concerned is on a wholly voluntary basis.

Public regulation commands less favor, even at the state level; but it is likely to prove necessary, particularly in connection with "protection forests," unless forest owners as a whole prove more amenable to educational influences here than they have proved in even such forest-minded countries as Norway and Sweden. It is significant that in Oregon and Washington, which now have the most drastic laws of any of the states, the legislation had the backing of the very owners who were to be regulated; and that in Washington these owners helped to get a decision from the state Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the act. In the words of L. F. Watts, chief of the Forest Service, regulatory measures constitute the "rules of the game" and "are as necessary in resource management as they are to transportation, communication, and other enterprises that affect the public welfare." Although mandatory in form, the fact that they automatically force an owner to consider the basic problem of sustained forest production gives them great potential educational value, which is magnified if private owners themselves participate in the regulatory process.

Public ownership to the extent of 25 per cent of the commercial forest area has resulted from the reservation of lands originally in federal or state ownership (chiefly the public domain), from the acquisition of additional lands by purchase or exchange, and by the retention of tax-delinquent lands. They include largely lands that are (or have been) submarginal for private ownership, and that are needed for purposes such as watershed protection and recreation, which are generally recognized as a public responsibility. The character of their management is less subject to the ups and downs of the business cycle than is the management of private lands, and they can be used for the production of timber of larger size and higher quality than most private owners can afford to grow. This latter function will continue to be an important one until the highly uncertain arrival of the day when technology makes it possible to substitute built-up and synthetic products for high-grade lumber and plywood with equal satisfaction from the standpoint of cost, utility, and beauty. That the present pattern of ownership is the best that could be devised is unlikely; but that a considerable backlog of public forests is highly desirable as a means of promoting stability and of providing intangible but essential services can hardly be doubted.

SUMMARY

To sum up, private forestry is in a state of transition. Timber mining is at last being replaced by timber cropping on a substantial scale. Great credit is due to the individuals, companies, and organizations whose leadership has been responsible for the change. The evidence is convincing that the new attitude is here to stay, and that the movement which they have started will continue to spread.

Enthusiasm over recent progress should not, however, blind us to the fact that it is only a good beginning. Evolution, not revolution, is the order of the day. Neither the area of private forest land now under management nor the average quality of that management gives any assurance of a continuing supply of forest products adequate to meet the needs of a nation with a rapidly expanding population, a desire for ever higher standards of living, and a responsibility for world leadership. Current efforts by private owners must be intensified, extended, and supplemented (not supplanted) by appropriate activities on the part of public agencies.

Private forestry in the United States has come far in the last ten years. It has still farther to go. With full cooperation on the part of all concerned, there is reasonable hope of success in attaining the common objective of en-

abling our forest resources to play the part they can and should in promoting and maintaining the prosperity of the nation. Industry's present attitude arouses hope and confidence that the transition from negligible planned production, through substantial production, to full production on the 75 per cent of our forest area in private hands will be faster than we had dared to hope. The prospect is one to encourage optimism but not complacency.

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"Big" Versus "Little" Lumber Operators in the Pacific Northwest

By DANIEL L. GOLDY

A STRUGGLE is going on in the lumber industry of the Pacific Northwest, the outcome of which will have important consequences for the future economic health and strength of the United States. It is popularly referred to as the battle between the "big" and the "little" lumber operators. But this is to some extent an oversimplification. Measured exclusively by size of mill, volume of raw material consumed, or value of output, one might be confused in finding some large operators on the side of the little fellows and some relatively small operators on the side of the big fellows. A more accurate delineation distinguishes between those operators who wish to stifle competition, particularly by controlling the basic raw material of the industry, and those who feel that they are dependent upon free competition and an open timber market for survival. Of course, those who are in a position to monopolize a significant portion of the timber supply in an area do not define "free enterprise" in the same way as those who must find their logs wherever they can compete for them.

NORTHWEST TIMBER RESOURCES

To appreciate the issues involved, one must understand something of the nature of the Pacific Northwest lumber industry and its importance to the economy of the United States. The Pacific Northwest contains over 40 per cent of the remaining saw timber in the United States. A substantial portion of this timber is in the Douglas fir belt of western Oregon and western Washington, which currently produces about one-third of the nation's timber requirements. Inasmuch as the predominant species in this area—Douglas fir—provides excellent structural lumber for housing and other types of construction, the area's resources have been under increasing pressure during the war and postwar construction and housing booms.

With better housing as one of the primary items in the aspirations of Americans for a higher standard of living, there is little likelihood that the pressure on the Northwest timber resources will diminish in the future. As was true in the New England and Middle Western timbered areas of the United States, the lumber operators of the Pacific Northwest have been cutting the timber resources for some time at a rate substantially in excess of a sustained-yield capacity. Citizens of communities which are dependent upon the forest resource for their principal means of livelihood, and operators who must maintain a flow of logs to their mills in order to continue operating, are becoming increasingly concerned about the imbalance in the forestry budget.

One of the clues to the problem, however, is in the definition of what constitutes sustained-yield capacity. At the present level of utilization—which involves on the average about 50 per cent waste—estimates of sustained-yield capacity in the Douglas fir belt range between 3.8 and 5 billion board feet a year. In 1951 the mills of western Oregon and Washington produced over 11 billion board feet of Douglas fir lumber. It is estimated, however, that with reasonably full and proper utilization of the timber resources—based on proc-

esses which have been tried and proved and for which a market is believed to exist—the sustained-yield capacity would be in excess of 14 billion board feet, rather than the 3.8 to 5 billion board feet. To achieve this goal would require extensive investment in secondary and diversified forms of forest products manufacture.

The overcutting that has taken place in the Pacific Northwest has been largely on privately owned timber lands. This has resulted in a major shift in the proportions of private and government timber ownership during the last decade. In 1940 it was estimated that approximately 50 per cent of the merchantable timber in the states of Washington and Oregon was owned by the Federal Government and 50 per cent by private operators. By 1950 the proportion had changed to approximately 70 per cent in government ownership and 30 per cent in private ownership.

MONOPOLY TACTICS

With timber becoming increasingly scarce, its availability is the primary determinant of whether any given operation can continue in business or will be forced to close down. Those operators with substantial or strategic holdings of private timber—whether considered big or little by other standards—tend to form a block dedicated to shutting off access to timber for other operators not so fortunately situated. There is a variety of techniques by which this is done, but the objectives are: (1) to acquire the exclusive opportunity to purchase and cut the tracts of timber held in scattered private ownerships in the drainage in which they operate, enabling them pretty much to set the price; (2) to obtain exclusive control over the federal timber in the drainage, which in many instances represents the principal raw material supply of the future; and (3) to freeze out present competitors by denying them access to the raw material needed to keep them going.

Control of access

Of the various techniques employed to accomplish these objectives, the most effective and most widely practiced relates to control of the means of access to the privately or publicly owned timber involved. In the early days of lumber operations in the Pacific Northwest, the large operators would locate their mills at tidewater or other strategic locations and would build logging railroads into the virgin forest areas. These private railroads would furnish the exclusive means of access, enabling the lumber company concerned to dictate what timber would be cut and removed, when it would be purchased, and the price which would be paid, regardless of who actually owned the timber.

With the advent of the logging truck and portable yarding and bucking equipment, it became more difficult for a few large operators to maintain such exclusive control. Hundreds of small operators came into the business. Access to the timber was obtained by extending logging roads into the drainages from state and county roads. The large companies soon recognized the potentialities of competition from this source, and considerable investments were made in acquiring strategic parcels of land located at the neck of the drainage bottle, in acquiring rights of way for the construction of roads, or in actually constructing the first segments of roads that would ultimately tap all the timber in a given drainage. Among the rights of way obtained were those over government-owned lands, generally granted in the early days without any thought to the question of preserving the public's interest in access to its own timber.

Those companies which stood to gain by exclusive control of logging roads vigorously opposed requests for governmental appropriations for the construction of access roads to overmature and decaying stands of federal timber, despite the obvious need for such roads in the interests of lumber production and conservation. Among their principal arguments before congressional committees were their willingness to build the roads themselves and their belief that they could do it better and more cheaply.

These operators did not explain to the Congress that a substantial part of the cost of constructing these "private" access roads was borne by the government timber. It has been the practice of the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management—the two federal agencies primarily involved—to make generous allowances in timber appraisals for the cost of road construction. Thus, if a tract of timber were valued at $100,000, it might be offered for sale at $70,000, the difference being an allowance to defray the cost of private road construction. By this method the federal agencies have in some instances repaid to private operators the entire amount invested by them in road systems, but have left the roads in their complete, undisputed, and exclusive control. The private operators continue to enjoy the right of exclusive access to the federal timber in the drainage, as well as to such privately owned timber as they themselves do not own.

Preference in sales

Another technique by which certain operators are able to control the federal timber being offered for sale is to obtain preference from the government foresters in the planning of the sales, so that only the preferred operator is able to purchase the timber offered. This preference can be accorded in several ways: by offering blocks of timber adjacent to the preferred operator's present area of cutting or in accordance with his cutting plan so that the time and place of the sale favor him; by laying out the "settings" in such a way that they do not constitute an economic "show" for anyone but the owner of the adjacent land, whose timber must be logged with the offered federal timber to make it economically feasible; or to offer the timber in such large blocks that only the operator for whom it is intended will have sufficient financial resources to be able to bid on it.

These informal understandings by which federal timber is disposed of to preferred operators without open competition are clear violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the applicable federal laws. These statutes require that federal timber be disposed of by open competition—except only where a cooperative sustained-yield agreement has been concluded in the manner prescribed by law. In the instances referred to above, such agreements were not in effect.

While discrimination in the disposal of government timber worth millions of dollars is inconsistent with law, it is not inconsistent with the philosophy which governs the actions of many of the federal foresters. That philosophy holds that only the big operators can practice good forestry, so in the interests of conservation and good forestry one should co-operate with the big operators to ensure that only they are purchasers of the government's timber. Those who subscribe to this point of view have concluded that what is essentially needed is monopoly in the private forestry field—where a few large companies control as much as possible of

the private timber, and they (the federal foresters) control the companies through regulations prescribed by law.

Sustained-yield agreements

One of the favorite approaches to this type of utopia is the co-operative sustained-yield agreement mentioned above. In return for obtaining the exclusive option to purchase government timber at an appraised price, the private operator must subject the time, rate, and manner of cutting on his own forest lands to regulation by the government. Through the pooling of the federal and privately owned timber lands in a co-operative agreement, the federal statutes contemplated that sustained-yield forestry operations could be achieved, thereby guaranteeing the permanence of those lumber operations which constituted the principal employment source for dependent communities.

Only one co-operative sustained-yield agreement has been entered into thus far. It was concluded between the Forest Service and the Simpson Logging Company in Shelton, Washington. Since that time the storm of opposition from those lumber operators—as well as other interested groups—who would be excluded from the opportunity to bid for government timber by the granting to one operator of an exclusive sales option for time periods ranging up to one hundred years has been sufficient to shelve the proposals. But the battle is about to break out into the open again, as the time nears for a public hearing on a proposed co-operative sustained-yield agreement between the Forest Service and the Pope & Talbot Company in a forest area not far from Eugene, Oregon.

In January 1948 the Department of the Interior conducted a public hearing on a co-operative sustained-yield agreement which had been proposed by the Bureau of Land Management and the Fischer Lumber Company near Eugene, Oregon. At the hearing, representatives of the small and independent lumber operators, and of labor, farm, and conservation groups, expressed their accumulated bitterness at the "discriminatory" policies practiced by the federal agencies in the disposal of timber. Their charges were carefully examined by the Interior Department and in the main were found to be justified. As a consequence, a new policy and program was adopted by the Interior Department in June 1948 and the BLM was directed to take vigorous steps to carry it out.

THE NEW PROGRAM

The program can be summarized as follows: first, exclusive control of roads tapping the BLM timber was eliminated, and the roads were made available to whoever purchased the government timber. This was accomplished on an interim basis by withholding from sale those tracts of timber which were tapped by a privately owned road, unless the road owner would agree to make the road available to the purchaser of the government timber upon payment to the road owner of a fair price for using the road. On a long-term basis, the problem was attacked through the promulgation of new right of way regulations. Under these regulations the government receives rights to use access roads for the removal of its timber in return for granting private operators rights of way to build roads across government lands. In effect, such agreements for reciprocal road use are nothing more than agreements between the government and private operators each to permit the other to use those segments of roads which are located on each other's lands. The investment of the private operator is recognized, and fair compensation must be paid to him under the regulations when the road is used by another party for the removal of government timber.

Although such an approach to the granting of rights of way seems eminently reasonable, it touched off a bitter fight by the "big" operators. The regulations had been carefully worked out over a period of fifteen months in consultation with an advisory board appointed by the Secretary and representative of all points of view. After considerable pressure had been applied by their industry colleagues, the representatives of the "big" operators on the board repudiated their concurrence in the unanimous recommendation that the regulations be promulgated. A war chest was begun to fight the regulations in the courts, but thus far they have not been successfully challenged. They have proved practical in operation and have stood the test of public criticism.

Second, to eliminate discrimination an advance timber sale program was instituted and administered in consultation with public advisory boards established in each of the Forest Districts. Under this program, suggestions for tracts of land to be offered by the BLM are received by the operators, screened in accordance with clearly defined and previously announced standards, and a timber sale program for the following calendar year is formulated. District Foresters of the BLM who prepare the plan must explain to their district advisory boards why suggestions are accepted or rejected, and the principles of sound forestry that were followed in making their decisions. In December the plan for the following calendar year is advertised, so that all operators who are interested in the timber offerings know well in advance where and when the timber will come up for sale. In addition, timber is offered in small blocks so that even those operators with limited financial resources can afford to purchase one or more of the blocks as needed.

The district advisory boards referred to above are composed of representatives of the various segments of the lumber industry, both large and small, and representatives of farm, labor, grazing, recreation, mining, and other groups concerned with the administration of the program. Their participation in the program is an additional safeguard against the re-emergence in the BLM of the professional forester attitude which looks kindly on discrimination in favor of the "big" operator.

COMPETITION AND ITS EFFECTS

The elimination of discrimination in timber sales and the assurance of access to the timber for all who wished to bid resulted in greatly increased competition for the BLM timber. Whereas before there was an absence of competition in over 80 per cent of the timber sales made by the Bureau, under the new policies the figures in many sales were just the reverse. On the average there was more than a 100 per cent increase in competitive sales over the previous high period in the Bureau's history.

Competitive sales taught the Bureau something about the true value of its timber. It found that on the average it received about 55 per cent more than the appraised price whenever there was competition for the timber. Or stated in another way, when the Forest Service and BLM dispose of timber without competition, the operators receive a substantial windfall, and the United States Treasury and the counties—which share in the revenues from federal timber sales—are shortchanged.

In an area where 70 per cent of the merchantable timber is owned by the

Federal Government, the value of federal stumpage largely determines the value of private stumpage. Under the impact of competition, BLM stumpage has more than doubled in value during the past few years. This has in turn resulted in increasing the economic margins on all of the private timber in the area, so that the practice of good private forestry is increasingly feasible from an economic standpoint. This is reflected in the high values now placed on cutover lands which in past years had gone to the counties for taxes, and in the rapid growth of tree farms and other indexes of conservation in private forest management.

But the most important function of competition is to furnish the incentive for investment in new plants and equipment, particularly in secondary manufacturing which utilizes raw materials which were previously regarded as waste. In an industry where it is regarded as normal to waste 50 per cent of a dwindling and valuable raw material resource, incentives for increased utilization are urgently needed. Such an incentive exists when scarce federal timber goes to the operator who can make the best economic use of it as evidenced by his ability to pay.

Forest conservation will not be achieved in the United States by having government foresters decide who are the good and who are the bad operators; nor by setting up monopolies—regulated or unregulated; nor by stabilizing the lumber industry at the present levels of waste. Some regulation of private forestry practices is undoubtedly needed, and to a limited extent is being undertaken by some of the states. But the basic problem of forest conservation will not be solved until we have made economic the practice of full utilization. And the substantial investments in plants and facilities required to make full use of the large proportion of the timber resource which is now left in the woods or burned as waste, are most likely to be forthcoming if the normal economic incentives of free enterprise and competition are maintained.

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Tree Farms Versus Regulation

By T. D. STEVENS

THE early forest history of the United States is one of devastation and desolation. The pictures of destructively cut forests and fire-blackened previously forested areas are all too fresh in the minds of many, for these conditions were prevalent even past the turn of the century.

Several great fires burned hundreds of thousands of acres; yes, even millions of acres. The great Wisconsin fire of 1871 which started near Green Bay burned over one and a quarter million acres, destroyed several towns, and left six hundred dead in its wake. Even as late as 1918 the town of Cloquet, Minnesota was virtually destroyed by a fire which burned over 250,000 acres and destroyed over four hundred people. Other conflagrations just as destructive as those at Green Bay and Cloquet have occurred in other forested areas from Maine to Oregon.

Spectacular as these fires were, they accounted for only a very small part of the total destruction wrought by fire. Of far greater importance was the cumulative destruction of thousands of small fires year after year. Resulting from carelessness or deliberate sets, frequently as an aftermath of logging, fire has taken a terrible toll of American forest resources. All too often, the lumberman has been accused of being responsible for this blackened page of forest history. True, the lumberman may have been partially at fault, but the blame must be placed largely on the shoulders of an apathetic public.

HISTORY OF LUMBERING

The history of lumbering in this country is one of exploitation and migration. Early cutting started in New England shortly after settlement. For many years, Maine was the leading timber producing state. As Maine's virgin forests were depleted, New York became the leading producer, only to be superseded by Pennsylvania. About the time of the War between the States, the lumber industry began to migrate to the Lake States. Some of the finest forests ever seen by man grew in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. In the minds of many, the forests were inexhaustible. The sawdust flew from one end of the Lake States to the other. Ruthless cutting was the order of the day, without provision or thought for regeneration and continuous forest production.

By 1880 it became apparent to many operators that the forests were not inexhaustible. They began to look elsewhere for new areas of virgin timber, and their gaze rested on the magnificent pine forests of the South. Before the Lake States were even close to being cut out, the lumber industry began to migrate southward. Southern mills were better capitalized and more efficient than their predecessors in the Lake States. Exploitation of the southern pineries took place at a very rapid pace.

During the last decade of the past century, with the end of the Lake States' timber in view and the end of the southern pineries easily calculable, the lumber industry began a planned movement to the colossal fir and pine forests of the Pacific Northwest. The center of the industry has remained in the Northwest since the turn of the century, although the end of the readily

accessible virgin timber is clearly discernible today.

Fire and the "cut out and get out" policy of the lumbermen brought about the rapid depletion, often referred to as devastation, of a large portion of the nation's forest resource. To complicate the situation further, the migratory character of the lumber industry left economic chaos in its wake as it moved from one region to another. Vast tracts of land were left in a denuded condition, since the lumbermen had little or no interest in the inherent productive capacity of the land. There was always plenty of virgin timber over the next hill, virtually free for the taking. The idea of free timber coincided with our national policy of free land. We gave the land away almost for the asking, and the timber went with it. Originally, there were over five hundred million acres of forest land within the continental boundaries of the United States. It is not surprising that the early lumbermen considered the forests inexhaustible and free for the taking. In their time, they saw little need for permanency in a particular forest region. Ghost towns and all the other evils usually accompanying the exhaustion and depletion of a natural resource were commonplace in the cutover regions.

The lumbermen were no more to blame for this depletion than they were for the fires that raged across the lands. Furthermore, the rapid liquidation of our timber resources during a critical developmental period in our history helped to create a high degree of prosperity which ultimately brought the nation to world leadership. Without readily exploitable natural resources, this almost miraculous achievement would never have been possible.

Thus, by way of recapitulation, the early forest history of the United States was characterized by exploitation, fire, and devastation. The exploitation was justified, but it is indeed unfortunate that an enlightened public was not available to insist that the exploitation be carried out in conformity with good forest conservation practices.

BEGINNING OF CONSERVATION

Toward the end of the last century, a few voices bewailed the "wanton destruction" of the forest resource and began to call for forest conservation. The conservation movement first became effective in 1891 when the Federal Government enacted the Forest Reserve Act under which forest reserves were set aside from forested areas within the public domain. These forest reserves became national forests in 1905 when they were placed under the administration of the Forest Service within the United States Department of Agriculture. While the establishment of these federal forests was an important forward step in forest conservation, it represented only a mild improvement in the over-all picture, since exploitation and devastation continued on a majority of privately held timberlands.

The forest conservation movement continued largely under the crusading leadership of Gifford Pinchot, who became the first Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service in 1905. The conservationists clamored for federal regulation of cutting on privately owned timberlands. The lumber industry, on the other hand, reacted in a typical laissez faire manner by scathingly denouncing federal regulation as unneeded and undemocratic. If needed, said industry, regulation should be at the state level and not at the national level; federal participation should be limited to co-operation with the state and local agencies.

PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION

Most controversial questions are solved, for a time at least, by effecting a compromise. The first federal act influencing the management of privately owned forest land was the Weeks law of 1911, which was definitely a compromise from the regulation viewpoint. The Weeks law provided federal co-operation with the states in controlling fire on forested watersheds of navigable rivers.

Thirteen years later Congress passed the Clarke-McNary Act, which provided three-way co-operation in the control of forest fires. Under the act, the private owner participated in the program along with state and federal governments. The act has for its goal the protection of every forested acre in the United States. As a result of this pertinent piece of legislation, more than 80 per cent of all state and private forest lands receive organized fire protection. In many states, fire protection is compulsory. Today, fire, the Number One enemy of the forest, is definitely on the wane. Despite the progress made in fire protection and the beneficial effects it had on forest management, many continued to believe public regulation of cutting on private forest lands was needed.

The depression of the thirties brought the National Recovery Administration lumber code. The code was written largely by lumbermen at the request of the national administration. In the writing of the code William B. Greeley had no small part, for he was in effect, if not in fact, the spokesman for the lumber industry. At the time the code was formulated, Greeley was executive secretary of the West Coast Lumbermen's Association. Previously he had been with the United States Forest Service, where he became chief forester in 1920. His philosophy seemed to be one of co-operation by all people and agencies interested in the forests and their management, as opposed to strict federal regulation.

Article X of the lumber code required the industry to leave "its cutover lands in good condition for reforestation." When the Supreme Court sounded the death knell for the NRA, the lumber industry voluntarily agreed to continue complying with Article X. This was the first concerted act on the part of the lumber industry indicating an interest in forestry. This belated interest was not surprising, for there were many factors working to make lumbermen forestry minded. One was the continual threat of federal regulation. Another was the influence of the ever increasing number of technically trained foresters in the employ of lumber companies. But most important of all was the frightening realization that the end of the virgin forests was in view. No longer could cheap stumpage be obtained close by or by moving the mill to a new area. Lumbermen finally realized that they had to practice forestry if they were to stay in business.

POOR PRACTICES ON SMALL TRACTS

But this realization and voluntary compliance with Article X was not enough for the proponents of regulation. They knew that 76 per cent of all private commercial forest land was in small tracts. In many instances these holdings were not well suited to good forest management, because of their smallness and lack of affiliation with a permanent forest operation. Many owners of small forest tracts felt they could not afford to practice forestry. Furthermore, many tracts were in the hands of absentee owners who had little interest in the productive capacity of the land for growing timber.

A recent United States Forest Serv-

ice survey[1] clearly showed cutting on 71 per cent of small commercial forest holdings to be poor and destructive. The regulationists had been very much aware of this fact for some time, and used it as verbal and written ammunition in their battle for regulation. In general, cutting on the larger forest holdings was shown by the aforementioned survey to be reasonably satisfactory; but industry knew something would have to be done to improve cutting practices on small private holdings if regulation was to be prevented.

THE TREE FARM MOVEMENT

Industry had consistently held that widespread improvement in private forest management practices could be obtained through education rather than by government decree. The most effective way to prevent regulation was to convince the public that it was unnecessary. To accomplish this, an improvement had to be obtained in private forest practices. About 1940 the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company decided to apply intensive forestry on a 120,000-acre logged-out tract near Montesano, Washington. To protect the area against carelessness with fire, and to teach the public that the company intended to grow a second crop of trees, the area was advertised as a tree farm. The term implied forest management for the continuous production of forest crops.

Public reaction was so favorable that the National Lumber Manufacturing Association initiated the tree farm movement on a national scale in 1941. The goal of the movement was to encourage the protection and permanent productive use of private forest lands. Co-ordination of the movement is now carried out by the American Forest Products Industries, Inc., which has as its aim "the promotion and development of sound economic forest practices and the development of a better public understanding of and co-operation with private forest enterprises." This organization encourages and assists in the initiation of the tree farm programs, keeps national records, and publicizes the movement.

Each state embracing the tree farm movement has a local sponsor, which may be the state forestry department, a state forestry association, a combination of two local organizations, or a regional wood-using industry group or association. Among the regional sponsors are Forest Conservation Committee of the Pacific Northwest industries, Western Pine Association, California Redwood Association, Southern Pine Association, Appalachian Hardwood Manufacturers' Association, and Southern Hardwood Producers, Inc.

There is more to tree farming than merely posting a tree farm sign on a piece of forest property. To qualify as a tree farm, a tract of forest or woodland must be located in a state where the American Tree Farm System operates. Size of the tract is unimportant. Tree farms vary from three acres to vast commercial holdings running to hundreds of thousands of acres. Of course, the woodland must be privately owned and maintained for the purpose of growing and harvesting commercial timber crops. Cutting practices must be of a character to ensure continuous crops of merchantable forest products. The woodland must also be adequately protected against fire, insects, disease, and destructive grazing. Any woodland owner meeting these qualifications may become a tree farmer by applying to the State Tree Farm Committee through the local sponsor. If the inspecting forester's report is satisfactory, and upon recommendation of the Tree Farm Committee, a Tree Farm Certificate is issued to the owner. Tree farm certification will be withdrawn should the land change ownership or should the owner fail to maintain high management standards.

[1] U. S. Forest Service, *Forests and National Prosperity*, U.S.D.A. Miscellaneous Publication No. 668, 1948, p. 48.

Slightly over ten years has passed since the first tree farm was established in Washington. Today, the American Tree Farm System has spread over thirty-three states. The number of tree farms is approximately 3,400, and the total acreage is in excess of 24 million. In the Douglas fir region of western Oregon and Washington, 37 per cent of all privately owned forests has been certified as tree farms. Great progress has been made in ten years. Significant as this progress has been, there is yet a long way to go. Actually, only about 7 per cent of the privately owned commercial forest land is in tree farms. Nevertheless, the movement is expanding steadily, and within the next decade or two it should be responsible for a marked improvement in forest conservation on privately owned forest lands.

A PROFITABLE BUSINESS

Tree farming, like any other business venture, must be profitable before it can be successfully sold to the public. The rapidity with which the tree farm movement has spread from coast to coast is eloquent testimony that it pays to be a tree farmer. Under normal conditions and under good forest management, most forest land will grow trees at a profit. We are truly just entering the "cellulose age," and as demands for wood and wood products increase, as they most surely will, tree farming will become more and more profitable. The American Forest Products Industries, Inc. cites the following typical examples of profitable tree farming on small private holdings.

A tree farmer in central Pennsylvania for the past twenty years has harvested an annual crop of 5,000 board feet of saw logs from his 130-acre wood lot. With the lumber he has built a modern eight-room house, a garage, an ice house, a chicken house, and an implement shed, besides keeping fences and other buildings in repair. In addition, he sells $300 worth of pulpwood and $50 worth of posts a year.

An Alabama tree farmer grossed $6,375, enough to send a son through college and law school, from timber harvests on a 286-acre wood lot. Today the wood lot is still producing regular cash crops and is in better condition than when the management program began.

An Ohio tree farmer with a 283-acre farm, of which 92 acres are in trees, averages a gross income of $2,000 per year from timber harvests off his land. His sales include selectively cut hardwood saw logs, Christmas trees thinned from hand planted stands, and veneer bolts.

A Washington tree farmer with a 50-acre stand of second-growth timber in eight years sold one million board feet of railroad ties, eight hundred cords of fuel wood, one million board feet of saw logs, and five hundred cords of pulpwood. Today his wood lot supports a thick stand of healthy, fast growing trees that will yield successive cash crops of wood.

An Oregon tree farmer owns 640 acres of land, all but 30 acres of it wooded. Since establishing a forest management program, the farmer has harvested 13,500 cords of firewood and several hundred dollars worth of pulpwood. In addition, he has cut enough saw logs to provide lumber for a new house and other farm buildings.

AN ANSWER TO REGULATION

The tree farm movement is an admission by the wood-using industry that more forestry is needed in the manage-

ment of private forest lands, and the industry proposes to obtain it by education and self-discipline—regulation, if you like, by and within the industry. Tree farming is industry's answer to state or federal regulation. It is a democratic answer, an American answer. Let us hope it will prove to be the correct answer for the furtherance of good forest management on private forest lands without government regulation.

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A Program for the Redwoods

By DEWEY ANDERSON

THE redwood forest of California stretches for 250 miles from the Oregon border southward to Sebastopol. Some of the oldest trees in the country grow there. Out of two million acres some 700,000 are in virgin growth. A large amount of Douglas fir and other white woods add to the value of this California resource.

This resource is being used up rapidly. Far more than half the cutting practices were described by the United States Forest Service as poor or destructive. Within our time, large parts of the forest will probably become ghost areas, offering neither work nor recreation for the increasing population of the state. The high prices of recent years have speeded up the cutting process.

Private conservation groups have been able to set aside a few small areas of the finest and oldest trees, and to save them from destruction. However, there will never be enough private money to save the whole area. It can and should be lumbered so that the useful trees are taken before they deteriorate, and so that replanting becomes an essential part of the process. By 1946 some 30 per cent of the redwood forest had been so badly wrecked that restoration to a highly productive forest would take 120 years.

What the Forest Service said in its 1946 survey was:

> Of all the redwood lands cut over to date, 56 per cent are growing little or no timber. The attempts made by the private owners to reforest a portion of these lands were unsuccessful and were abandoned. Restocking of these lands which have a tremendous growth potential should be a major objective for the area. . . . Ninety-five per cent of the timbered area within the proposed forest is privately owned. These lands are being cut over in such a manner that 80 per cent are left in a condition below acceptable standards of productivity.

THE PROPOSAL

Three years ago I worked out, together with Mr. Earle H. Clapp, the former associate chief forester of the United States, a program for the redwood forests.[1] The objectives of that program were to prolong and continue indefinitely the growth and value of the forest, to preserve the work opportunities of the people, to stabilize their community life, and to provide 124,000 acres of new state parks for recreational purposes. The method suggested was the establishment of a National Redwood Forest Corporation—financed by $125 million through loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation—which would purchase the forest lands and turn them over to the United States Forest Service for operation. The state would be asked to finance the new parks to the extent of $25 million, and would then own them and operate them. The forest debt could be paid off within sixty years at 2½ per cent interest, and the revenue from the forests would go on forever. The lumber companies and their workers would be continuously instead of temporarily employed.

The proposed National Redwood Forest area would cover about 2,100,000 acres. Of this, 708,000 acres are in old-growth redwoods and 220,000 are in old-growth Douglas fir. The

[1] *An Action Program for the Redwood Forests*, Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1949.

four state recreation areas proposed would be made up of some of the best stands of the old-growth redwood. These areas would be owned and managed by the state of California, and would not be logged commercially.

It is very important for the successful functioning of our democracy to bring local people into the affairs that touch their lives. In setting up a National Redwood Forest Corporation I suggested that one of the three members be nominated by the Governor of California. The chairman would be the Chief Forester of the United States. The third member would not necessarily be from California. But in addition, there would be a Redwood Advisory Committee, chosen by the Governor of California from representatives of agriculture, labor, industry, and the local communities in the forest area. This body could represent all the interests of the state very effectively.

This proposal is to keep the present logging companies in operation. It is *not* a proposal to put them out of business. It is simply to provide a mechanism by which they will be prevented from carrying on destructive cutting, and by which reforestation and cultivation can be given a chance to rebuild the forests. Private initiative is desirable, but where its chief result is the destruction of a valuable renewable resource, it should be prevented, for its own sake, from doing that harm to society. I tried to state my interest in maintaining a regular logging industry as follows:

> It might be possible in negotiating some purchases to use a repurchase-right plan to the advantage of both the Government and the present owners. Such an arrangement would be particularly applicable to large operating ownerships with heavy and unliquidated investments in manufacturing plants and logging equipment and facilities . . . the advantage to present owners would include relief from taxation on timberlands, interest on indebtedness and from carrying costs in general over an extended period. They would shift to the Government whatever risk there might be in carrying stumpage over many years. They would also be relieved of the high cost of road construction, and also of the cost of maintaining all but minor roads . . . the stumpage for repurchase would be appraised by the Forest Service at frequent intervals on the basis of current operating costs and lumber prices with a reasonable margin for operating risks and profit—usually about 12½ per cent. Since it would be paid for only when and as cut, a relatively quick turn-over would be possible. . . . Repurchase might be either with the privilege of meeting the highest responsible bid, or without competition at the appraised value of the timber.[2]

THE SOCIAL ASPECT

The forest conservation dispute is basically one between present interest and future interests. It may well be more profitable for present owners to clear-cut now, and let the future go unconsidered. It may, at the same time, be of more value to society to forgo a few of the present benefits for the sake of maintaining a permanent resource.

In preparing this program for the redwoods I was struck with the way in which these differences spelled themselves out in terms of forest growth. In 1946 the Forest Service made a survey of the area. Under the cutting practices then prevalent, the annual growth rate was less than 200 board feet per acre per year. Good cutting standards would have produced something over 400 board feet of growth per acre per year. "Intensive management" would, after a period of time, have produced over 1,000 board feet of growth each year. Perhaps cutting practices have improved a little since then, but this

[2] *An Action Program for the Redwood Forests*, pp. 16–17.

discrepancy between the actual and the potential is too wide to be made up easily. The difference in the future, when even larger numbers of people will be demanding more lumber at reasonable prices, will obviously be large.

It would seem possible to make an estimate of the social cost of allowing a growth of only 200 board feet a year when five times as much could be obtained in the future by some present decrease in cutting, and by very active reforestation. Our schools of forestry ought to have done this for us long ago. Present profits are presumably reinvested in other properties and so aid our economic progress in other ways, but they are not invested in tree-growing, which is a long process. There will always be substitutes for lumber, and demand at future high prices will, by definition, never be greater than the supply at those prices. But effective demand at much lower prices might be much larger. The difference to the future home buyers and other consumers between probable high prices and possible lower prices may well exceed any advantages to society from the present prices and profits of the lumber companies. The magnitude of the difference needs to be worked out in detail, but I believe that it will be an impressive amount. The advantages to the wood workers of having a steady occupation instead of a migratory one, and the advantages to the communities in the areas from a continuing resource, are much clearer, and quite large.

What good forest practices can mean to the wood workers and to the communities in the forest area can readily be seen through a few figures. Each 12,000 board feet of lumber supports one person for a year. With a present average growth of only 150 board feet an acre, it will take about 80 acres to keep one person at work. Under the "good forest practices" of the Forest Service, it would take only 27 acres. Under the "intensive management practices" which involve cultivation and reforestation, it would take only 12 acres to keep each man employed a full year. To put it another way, present growth rates on one acre will support one worker for a little over half a day. Under intensive management that acre will give him eight times as much work—four days. I am particularly interested in trying to prevent any new migratory labor problems in the California forests because California already has enough of them in its food crops.

What California is apparently going to experience is what the East and Southeast have already experienced in regard to overcutting and lack of reforestation. In periods of very high prices the temptation to overcut seems irresistible, and in periods of low prices there are no funds for reforestation, and many lessees feel that they must cut more ruthlessly than before in order to maximize their income. I have a great deal of sympathy for their problems, but it does seem that the social costs of their operations should not be borne by the innocent bystanders in the form of the wood workers, the communities and the younger generation of the area, and the general taxpayers. A regular, steady lumber industry, cutting in accordance with good practices and with a reasonable share of its revenue devoted regularly to reforestation, would render more of a service to the state and the nation than one which, for presumably good and generally sufficient reasons, lets the future take care of itself. That simply means shifting a whole series of burdens to the community.

The lumbering companies of California, I am certain, would make more money over a sixty-year period by welcoming and accepting the intensive forest management which has been pro-

posed than they will by objecting to it and going on as they are at present. And if the stockholders of those companies want funds to pass on to their children, they would probably get more after taxes for that purpose under my proposal than they will get under the present practices.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT

The proposal for operation of the redwoods by the United States Forest Service under the auspices of a National Redwood Forest Corporation was based on fairly low stumpage values, increasing annually at the rate of 1½ per cent. The starting figures were $6.35 per thousand board feet for redwood and $4.52 for white wood. On that basis the whole job of replanting, cultivating, and protecting would have been undertaken, with revenues sufficient to pay off the $125 million loan from the RFC and the compounded interest within sixty years. An annual cut of no more than 470 million board feet of redwood and 33 million board feet of white wood was assumed, in order to allow for re-establishing the forest. At the end of a sixty-year period the cut could be much larger, and at the end of 120 years it could be almost doubled.

In the three years since that proposal was made, lumber values have increased so much (about 17 per cent at the mills) that the cultivation and reforestation work could have been stepped up and the whole loan could have been repaid in a much shorter time, or a somewhat higher price could have been paid for the timber and a larger loan could have been repaid within sixty years.

A few figures from the pay-out estimate may be of interest. The accompanying table shows for a few selected years the total revenues from lumber sales, the salvage of minor species, and grazing rights, in Column 2. The total costs include administration, road construction, maintenance, planting and cultural costs, interest charges, and the sum of one million dollars annually paid in lieu of taxes to the state for the benefit of the forest counties. They are grouped in Column 3. The net revenue available for amortization is given in Column 4. (In this model, interest payments were postponable for the first ten years.) The last column on the right shows the unretired portion of the forest loan, originally $125 million, at the end of each of the years given.

TABLE 1—ESTIMATES OF OPERATION

1 Year of Operation	2 Total Revenues	3 Total Costs	4 Net for Amortization	5 Unretired Forest Investment
1	$4,596,430	$3,250,000	$1,346,430	$123,653,570
20	6,294,350	6,201,980	92,370	111,907,050
40	8,266,060	4,833,670	3,432,390	74,419,710
60	11,121,120	3,082,000	8,039,120	0

By the time the loan was repaid, the state and the nation would have had an investment worth over $320 million (including the improvements) at no cost to the two governments, and with a net annual revenue of $8 million to be divided equally between them, together with a far larger supply of reasonably priced lumber for the consumers, steady incomes for the wood workers, and a sound and continuous financial stability for the communities in the area.

THE NEGATIVE SIDE

It is important to attempt to understand why this proposal was not accepted when it was made. First, there was no national conservation or other group to press it on the attention of Congress. The country's policies seem to be affected more by contending producer groups than by consumer groups, and Congress does not yet see its own function as that of protector of the general welfare of the otherwise unrepresented consumers. Second, there

was no fiscal mechanism for the loan that had ever been used in quite this way before. The RFC has frequently loaned sums to mines and factories, but the practice of loaning to a national agency for conservation purposes was less common. Third, and most important, the lumber interests of the area were unwilling to forgo their opportunities for maximum short-term profits and to take their chances on contracts for regular cutting over a long period. The opposition was pronounced in spite of the provision that present timberland owners could be given the right to repurchase specified amounts of timber over the years, and stay in business. Perhaps a final explanation is that conservation has been mixed up in the public mind—and perhaps not by accident—with too much government.

One other argument was offered by some, namely, the fact that California now has a state forest law which presumes to regulate forest practices on private land. But nothing done under that law offers any hope that the redwood forest of California will be managed on a sustained-yield basis. Nor will the rapidly increasing population be provided with sufficient recreational areas that way. Simply to preserve some "forest museums" of these remarkable trees is a poor legacy to hand to the generations which follow us.

The government's expenditures for resources are on a year-by-year basis, with a host of claimant agencies contesting for the sums that are available. Actually, it is quite absurd for the United States to act as if public investment in resources were only a maintenance charge, to come out of the current annual appropriations. No business concern would put an acquisition of major assets under the head of operating expenses, to be paid for out of the year's current revenues. The odd part of this practice is that the United States treats its investments in foreign resources quite differently. It authorizes the Export-Import Bank to lend sums abroad up to a certain amount. The Bank then makes a series of loans. But none of these loans shows up in the annual budget, because they will be repaid. Wherever necessary public loans in soil or forest conservation in our own country can be repaid, it would seem reasonable to put them in the same class as our investments in foreign resources. If that were done as a matter of common practice, Congress might have been more ready to authorize this proposal.

But even more important than this revision of our accounting and budgeting system is the need for some more thorough national questioning about the whole idea of letting the forest resource owners carry on as if they had a responsibility only to their stockholders, and none to the communities where they operate. Practically all the American petroleum companies operating abroad have accepted a certain degree of responsibility to the nations whose resources they are extracting. They are helping them to build up the living standards of the people, to industrialize, to get better housing, to learn new farming and health techniques. Is it asking too much for our logging companies to accept some degree of responsibility for the future of the American communities whose resources they are extracting, and whose future they are unmaking?

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Forest Policy for the Years Ahead

By Hardy L. Shirley

THE observant traveler journeying across our eastern and southern states is impressed with the large amount of potentially productive land that is little used or completely idle. Fallow fields, brushy pastures, abandoned farms, and some heavily eroded lands meet the eye. Much land that has never been cleared for farming likewise lies virtually idle in terms of potential productivity. Pine lands cut and burned in the Lake States furnish one example. Cutover woodlands in which decadent and cull trees occupy 80 per cent of the growing space provide another. Idle land best suited to forests is estimated to total 60 million acres.

Neglected land has its counterpart in neglected farm homes, shabby villages, idle factories, and the unsightly no man's land that surrounds our cities, producing only signboards, dumps, and huts of the scavengers.

To the European, accustomed to well-kept farms, forests, and villages, these neglected acres suggest crass waste. He might with clear conscience say, Open the gates of your idle acres to the homeless of other lands that they may use the good soil to stay hunger and want.

Yes, idle land is a symbol of waste. It is a symbol of overoptimism, of hasty development and slow disillusionment. Yet what measures can we use to control it?

Remedial Measures

Some would impose drastic regulations to prevent exhaustion of our basic resources of soil, forests, and water. Others just as earnestly would invoke drastic restrictions on government expansion lest precious individual rights be irretrievably lost.

Can we find a middle way? We can; in fact, we have found it. Case histories of trends in agriculture show the way. In New York State careful records kept over the years by farmers on both good and poor land have been intensively studied by experts in farm management. Farmers on good land were found to become progressively more prosperous; those on poor land, progressively more poverty ridden. Every improvement in genetic strain of crop or livestock, every refinement in soil management, but magnified the advantage of farming good land rather than poor land.

The over-all result of applied agricultural science, therefore, was to favor enormously the farmer on good land and to discourage his neighbor on the hill farm. Abandonment resulted. This encouraged land speculators, who sold land acquired at little cost to inexperienced farmers. Average tenure on such lands dropped to five years or less. Meanwhile, the savings of a lifetime might be dissipated.

To stop this evil, land classification based on the capacity of the land to support a family practicing good farming was begun. This was supplemented by state purchase of submarginal farms and returning them to forests. County agricultural agents and local bankers advised prospective farmers against purchasing poor land. Attractive wages in nearby factories drew others out of farming. Wise management of these land resources was attained without drastic regulation, loss of owners' rights, or granting undue power to governmnet.

World Outlook

In a world where half the people are poorly fed and housed, needless waste of resources is viewed as a sin against mankind. Superabundance for a few, alongside want for the many, creates vast human unrest. Years of international tension seem to lie ahead. To ignore the consequences of such a state on domestic forest policy today is as unrealistic as to ignore atomic weapons. Leaders in other lands are demanding much in addition to food—shelter, fuel, books, education, and industries. Forest products are next to food in importance.

World forests are vast. They cover 9.5 billion acres, of which only one-half have been tapped for commercial use. However, unexploited forests are remote, contain trees of many species and unknown properties, and are mostly hardwoods. Available chiefly only from North America, Europe, and Siberia, softwoods today make up 85 per cent of total lumber demand. The densely populated Mediterranean and Far Eastern countries are mostly without adequate wood supplies. Consumption of wood in these countries is as low as 2 cubic feet per capita yearly, as contrasted with 28 in Europe and 75 in the United States. Since little prospect exists for quickly developing the untouched forest, and requirements of local populations expand about as rapidly as transportation opens these lands, the United States can expect to obtain little wood to augment our own supply or to fill needs of deficit countries.

The United States has a twofold obligation in world forestry. We should manage our own forests well to set an example before other nations. This would mean growing timber to meet our own needs, with some surplus for export.

We should assist others to develop the full potentialities of their forest land. Aid to others can be most effective and cheap if it is concentrated on efforts to spread technical information and the desire to use it. Suggested methods of accomplishing this are graduate instruction and study tours in the United States, help to establish technical schools, research centers, and extension services in other lands, and promotion of international trade. To default on these obligations is to invite rival nations to provide the service and to reap the good will that results from such co-operation.

Need of Forests at Home

Our country by 1960 assuredly will contain 170 million souls and by the year 2000 in excess of 250 millions. Such a population is vastly in excess of the 180 million forecast used in the United States Forest Service wood requirements studies. Another article in this series will deal in greater detail with domestic requirements. Suffice it to say here that little prospect exists of substantial and long-continued decline in requirements, in view of population growth, mobility of workers, high defense requirements, and the needs of other countries.

Wood has always occupied an important place in the national economy. As of 1947 the lumber and lumber products industries ranked tenth in national employment, with 636,000 workers. These created values of 2.5 billion dollars. The paper industry ranked eleventh in the values added by manufacture. Wood as a basic raw material for other fiber-producing industries and plastics industries seems destined to grow in importance in the years ahead.

Our country greatly needs the many additional services of forest land. Water becomes more precious year by year, floods more disastrous. Increasing dependence on an industrial economy multiplies the need for outdoor recrea-

tion in natural settings. Forests protect watersheds, afford recreation for man, and provide homes for useful wildlife. Forests represent the best commercial use of over 25 per cent of the land area of the United States. On an additional 8 per cent of our land area, forests serve as the most useful vegetation even though no timber is harvested.

PRESENT PROGRAMS IN FORESTRY

Our country has impressive forestry programs currently in operation. They include some 115 million acres in federal, state, county, and community forests, managed with timber production as a major objective. To this should be added nontimber-producing lands in national, state, and local parks, and noncommercial forest land included within the boundaries of national and state forests. Pulp and paper, lumber, and other forest products industries have industrial forestry programs some of which match those of public agencies in intensity. Public effort through the Cooperative Forest Management Act, and private effort through the tree farm and other movements, are carrying the management of forests to small holdings. Co-operative control of fires and disease and insect outbreaks is being rapidly expanded. Research in forestry has moved at a rapid pace.

Equally significant have been advances in logging equipment, and in milling, processing, and wood fabrication.

Progress in forest management during the past decade has been little short of phenomenal, especially in industrial forestry. Foresters employed by private business have increased from about 700 to some 4,400. Changes in attitudes and policies match the growth in industrial foresters. Still we are barely started on the huge tasks that lie ahead.

Present forestry programs fall short in the following specific instances:

Large areas of forest land are still unprotected against fire.

Losses from destructive insects and tree diseases substantially exceed those caused annually by fire.

Saw-timber growing stock still appears to be declining at the rate of 1⅓ per cent annually.

Clear-cutting immature timber, wasteful of both wood and growing space, still exists in most states.

The timber-growing potentials of the national forests are only partially realized through timber harvest.

Some 60 million acres of land best suited to forests remain today understocked or denuded. Planting programs are decades behind need.

The economic problems involved in small land ownerships have still to be clearly defined and solved.

Logging and lumber manufacture lag behind other industries in increasing output of labor and in reducing accident rates.

Lumber prices in recent years have increased at a far more rapid rate than prices of other manufactured commodities.

Floods and periods of low water supply plague many areas of our country.

RECENT PROPOSALS

Following exhaustive studies of forest resources and national requirements by both the United States Forest Service and the American Forestry Association, a Forestry Congress met in Washington in 1946. The *Proceedings* of the congress contains the best modern résumé of thinking on the question.[1] Other significant writings are those of

[1] American Forestry Association, *Proceedings of American Forestry Congress*, Washington, D. C., 1946.

Graves,[2] Pinchot,[3] Winters,[4] Greeley,[5] Raushenbush,[6] Gulick,[7] and members of the United States Forest Service.[8]

An analysis of these various proposals would be out of place in this article. Much ground in common exists, and some sharp differences.

Proposals generally supported

Agreement is general that more adequate protection should be provided forests against fire, insects, and diseases.

Those lands that are needed for public recreation or for critical watershed protection, and lands that are so poor in quality that they cannot yield sufficient forest products to justify private ownership, should be largely in public ownership.

Taxes on forest land should be neither confiscatory nor so low that the forest fails to contribute its fair share toward support of government.

States having forests should support a competent organization to protect lands from fire and manage state forests.

Research programs should be carried forward vigorously on all major forestry fronts.

Insurance to protect forest landowners against crippling losses from fire, insects, and diseases should be provided.

Barren lands unsuited to other uses but capable of supporting commercial forest crops should be planted to trees.

The national forests should be managed so as to produce to their full capacity timber to support the national economy. Other public forests should be managed likewise. Industry, landowners, government, and labor should co-operate in managing all forest land so that the social benefits to mankind are maximized. This includes use of forests for recreation, wildlife, and water and soil protection. It also implies management to stabilize employment, and forest communities dependent thereon.

Controversial issues

Sharp differences in opinion exist among representatives of government, industry, and labor over the extent and types of aids to private owners, the extent of public ownership of forests, and public regulation of private forest practice. The forest industries are opposed to the generous extension of public credit, believing that this will lead to supporting uneconomic holdings and inefficient management. Credit, they feel, should be handled through private channels. Government as represented by the United States Forest Service has favored public credit on a fiscally sound basis and has favored distribution of planting stock to farmers at nominal cost, but has not advocated direct benefit payments for forest improvement practices. Organized labor has advocated extensive benefit payments to landowners and timber operators for forest improvements, safety measures, and practice of good forestry.

The United States Forest Service wishes public ownership extended to block up holdings within existing national forests. It also advocates ac-

[2] Henry S. Graves, *Problems and Progress in Forestry in the United States*, Washington, D. C.: Society of American Foresters, 1947.

[3] Gifford Pinchot, *Breaking New Ground*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1947.

[4] Robert K. Winters (Ed.), *Fifty Years of Forestry in the U. S. A.*, Washington, D. C.: Society of American Foresters, 1950.

[5] William B. Greeley, *Forests and Men*, Garden City, L. I.: Doubleday & Co., 1951.

[6] Stephen Raushenbush, *Our Conservation Job*, Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Institute, Report No. 4, 1949.

[7] Luther Halsey Gulick, *American Forest Policy*, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1951.

[8] U. S. Dept. Agriculture, Forest Service, *Trees, The Yearbook of Agriculture*, 944 pp., 1949.

quiring lands of low productivity by the public. The forest industries are willing to exchange land within national forests to block up federal holdings, but ask also that some federal lands be relinquished to block up private holdings.

The Forest Service advocates public regulation of private forest practice by states. In states that fail to act within reasonable time, the Forest Service favors direct federal action. The forest industries favor regulation at the state level only where this is demonstrated to be needed. Organized labor has favored regulation strictly at the federal level, which would provide that no timber be cut unless designated for cutting by an officer of the United States Forest Service or a forester licensed by this Service.

NEW APPROACH NEEDED

The writer feels that the proposals discussed fall short of future needs in several respects:

1. Future United States and world populations have been underestimated.
2. Obligations of the United States as a leader in world political and economic affairs have been minimized or ignored.
3. No nation-wide classification of forest land based on uses and productivity has been proposed carrying a program for each land class.
4. No proposal deals effectively with the complex problems confronting the holders of small forest properties.
5. Proposals for regulating private forestry practice provide inadequate landowner representation, and are restrictive rather than constructive in nature.

In the following sections the writer sketches his own thoughts on forest policy. They are based on his conviction that United States industries in the years ahead will provide a good market for all the timber we can grow economically.

CLASSIFICATION OF FOREST LANDS

Forest policy can best be formulated and administered by relating it to the following classes of forests: (1) protection forests; (2) recreation forests; (3) commercial forests: (*a*) suited for intensive private management, (*b*) suited for extensive private management, (*c*) uneconomic for private management.

1. *Protection forests*

Steep slopes, municipal watersheds, and flood-producing areas are classes of lands that require the protective effect of forests to retard erosion, to hasten infiltration of water into the soil, and to impede surface runoff. Protection forests should be given the most careful handling. This will require public ownership of the most critical, and for other lands, restrictions on cutting. Because abuse of protection forests may cause disastrous public losses, these should be the first to be placed under a form of public regulation.

2. *Recreation forests*

Second only in priority to soil and water protection are forests for recreation. Lands needed for public parks, parkways, and scenic monuments should be set aside in generous amounts. Most should be in public ownership with timber use excluded or restricted so as not to interfere with recreational use. Timber harvesting on many lands can be conducted so as to enhance recreational values by opening vistas, improving food and cover for wildlife, increasing accessibility, and creating variety in otherwise unbroken forests. Private forest lands having high value for public recreation may in some cases require special treatment. The public might very well consider offering the owners inducements to open such lands to public use.

3. *Commercial forest lands*

Commercial forest lands are those capable of producing harvestable crops of timber and not required for higher uses conflicting with timber cutting.

(*a*) *Lands suited to intensive private management*

Lands supplied with a good transportation network, near timber markets, and capable of producing attractive financial returns from forestry, justify intensive management. Potential growth is such that merchantable harvests may be expected at intervals of thirty years or less. Few such lands support today timber stands of high value. In fact, it is these very lands that have been cut most frequently and heavily in the past. On many accessible forests, timber growing stock has been so badly depleted that intensive management will be unprofitable for decades. These fall in Class 3(c) below. Lands classified as suitable for intensive forestry should receive special consideration by government. It is from such lands that the bulk of the future wood supply for the nation must come. Forest practice on these well-located, high-producing lands should be in keeping with the potentialities of the land.

(*b*) *Lands suited to extensive private forestry*

Land remote from transportation, rugged in topography, with rock or poor soil, or otherwise difficult to operate, is suited only for extensive management. Merchantable cuts of timber can be had only at intervals of thirty years or more. Such land if taxed at a reasonable rate, as in the unorganized towns of Maine, may be a good investment for the private timberland owner. It can, however, support only limited expenses for forestry. Public regulation of practices should be mild. The land should be protected against fire. Public policy should encourage efforts on the part of the owners gradually to convert these lands, by means of roads and other practical measures, into land that can be handled intensively.

(*c*) *Forests uneconomic for private management*

Timber may be profitably harvested from many lands on which the stumpage value is below the cost of producing it. Lands may fall in this classification because they are remote, steep, rocky, arid, or swampy. They may also be uneconomic if overtaxed or if undersized. Lacking prospect for financial return, the bulk of such land should be managed by the public. However, small scattered holdings may prove unduly expensive to manage by government. Carefully administered public aids to private owners offer an alternative. Aids would be justified in the long run only if they enabled owners within a few decades to transform these lands from Class 3(c) to Class 3(a) or 3(b). Little can be done by the public to regulate forest practices on such lands without such requirements being tantamount to confiscation.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS ON SMALL FOREST PROPERTIES

Small forest properties owned by 3.1 million farmers and 1 million others in aggregate total 261 million acres. Practices on such lands as revealed by the Forest Service reappraisal study of 1945 are poorest of all. Present public measures grouped together are still insufficient to make timber growing economic on properties averaging only 63 acres in size unless these are an adjunct to some other use. Cull trees, low-value

species, and small trees are common. Understocking is characteristic. Timber operators usually want to cut everything useful on such a property because of the high cost to them of purchasing and harvesting timber in small quantities. Co-operative marketing has occasionally helped such owners.

The best results on small ownerships have been attained in New Jersey, where it is stated that 50 per cent of the timber is cut under state supervision.

High productivity can be assured only by consolidating such land into economically sized management units. Public policy should encourage this. Neither state nor federal government can be expected to act as agent for over four million private owners.

A PATTERN FOR IMPROVING FOREST PRACTICE

Argument during the past eight years has centered not so much on the desirability of public regulation of forest practice as on what form regulation should take, and what agency should administer it. What really concerns owners is the fear that regulations will be imposed by men lacking firsthand experience in the economic difficulties of managing timberlands.

The proposal made here is similar to patterns that have worked successfully in Sweden, Finland, and Norway. It involves organizing each forested state into appropriate-sized forest districts. A forestry board made up of representatives selected by forest landowners and appointees of the state should serve each district. Their functions would include establishing forest practice standards, supervising the administration of public aids to forest owners, and reviewing the program and activities of district foresters.

Boards should emphasize positive measures to improve forest productivity, rather than punitive measures against delinquent owners. Such positive measures might include improved protection against fire, insects, and diseases, aid in access road construction where this would benefit several owners, improvement of marketing information and services, measures to stabilize local industry and employment, and perhaps licensing or listing of forest operators who can be relied upon to do a satisfactory job of timber appraisal, logging, custom sawing, tree planting, and access road building.

Such boards should be given wide authority to promote activities that offer substantial promise of increasing the usefulness of forests. Integrated wood-using industries that encompass pulp, lumber, veneer, and small dimension manufacture are examples of opportunities to reduce waste and thereby improve potential returns to landowners.

Work of district boards should be subject to review by state forestry boards and a national forestry board. Review should be in the nature of establishing national and state goals in timber production and distributing these to districts, rather than restricting imaginative attack on local problems by individual district boards.

In addition, these citizens' boards would be useful as advisory bodies to the federal and state forestry services. Forest landowners should make up the majority representation on state and federal boards, with additional representation from forest labor, wood-using industries, recreationists, and range and water users. Constant liaison between federal and state forest officers would enable forestry boards to adjust their programs to meet national needs.

SUMMARY

It has been possible herein only to sketch in bare outline some of the major issues involved in managing our country's forest resources, and measures deemed helpful in meeting these.

Our forest policy should provide for a population far in excess of 180 millions. This level may be approached within a decade. Foreign obligations should be recognized and provided for, including assistance to other countries in developing their own forests. Generous reservations of park and other recreation lands should be made with appropriate restrictions on forest practice. Public concern should be especially directed to protecting soil and watersheds. Classification based on economic productivity should be recognized as essential for guiding practice on both public and private lands.

Public control over private forest practice should be democratically administered, with forest landowners themselves having majority representation on policy boards. Government control over forestry should be directed toward meeting positive goals rather than setting minimum standards.

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Soil Conservation and the Maintenance of Soil Productivity

By Richard Bradfield

According to the basic laws of conservation, matter and energy can neither be created nor destroyed. These principles apply to the material of which soils are made, as well as to the rest of the earth. The soil, as an individual entity, can be destroyed partly or completely. The matter in it can be transformed into a myriad different compounds and dispersed throughout the globe, but it cannot be destroyed. It will still exist somewhere and be available at some time for use in another soil building cycle.

The general public has been greatly confused by the widespread difference in views which have been appearing in the public press and in popular books and magazines in the last decade, regarding the status of the productivity of the soils of the United States and of the rest of the world. This is a very vital matter, and the thinking person should be concerned. What is the truth? Which of these conflicting views is correct—the pessimistic view expressed so eloquently by Bennett, Vogt, Osborn, and others, or the more optimistic view frequently expounded by Salter, Kellogg, Sir John Russell, and others?

As is the case in most controversies between optimists and pessimists, there is a considerable body of basic truth available to support either point of view. This is certainly true with respect to the highly divergent views regarding soil conservation. People tend to see what they want to see. They see not only with their eyes but through their specialized training and past experiences as well. Soils men are becoming more and more highly specialized. The vast accumulation of data of all sorts dealing with soils makes this necessary. We have soil physicists, soil chemists, soil microbiologists, soil fertility specialists, soil morphologists, soil conservationists, et cetera.

It is just as natural for soil scientists in these various specialized fields to reach different conclusions as to the status of our soils as it is for independent medical specialists to differ in their diagnosis of a patient's illness. No one man has at his disposal all the basic information necessary for an accurate judgment of the potentialities of the soils of the United States. The answer that one gets when one speculates on this question depends on the assumptions he makes with respect to a whole host of contributing factors.

Agricultural Experiments

From the dawn of soil science, all specialists in these fields have been more or less interested in maintaining and increasing the productivity of the soil. The first agricultural experiment station at Rothamsted in England set up experiments in 1843 to measure the effect of the soil treatments which were known and feasible at that time upon the long-time productivity of the soil. At that time, chemical fertilizers were just being introduced, and the founder of this station, Sir John Lawes, was interested in finding out whether these new chemical fertilizers would maintain the productivity of the soil over a long period of time as effectively as the well-known barnyard manure. These experiments have been continued ever since that time. The answer which

they have given is quite clear cut. Crop yields have been maintained for over a century, even with continuous culture of wheat, with both chemical fertilizers and farm manure.

When the state experiment stations were set up in this country, most of them shortly after the close of the Civil War, similar experiments designed to measure the effects of different cropping systems and different soil treatments upon the long-time productivity of the soil were started, and in a few cases these original experiments are still being continued.

The oldest of these, the Morrow plots at the University of Illinois, are now over seventy years old and show quite conclusively that systems of management known at the time these experiments were started and now widely practiced throughout the corn belt are not only maintaining but even increasing the productivity of that originally exceedingly fertile Illinois land. As a matter of fact, the plots which have been growing a rotation of corn, oats, and clover for this entire period, with modest applications of farmyard manure, lime, and superphosphate, have in recent years been producing yields of crops which are about 32 per cent larger than the yields obtained when these experiments were started. Similar experiments are located on Sanborn field in Columbia, Missouri, and the Jordan plots at State College, Pennsylvania.

Early in this century, Cyril G. Hopkins, of the University of Illinois, published a book entitled *Soil Fertility and Permanent Agriculture*. Director C. E. Thorne of the Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station published a series of bulletins about the same time on the maintenance of the productivity of soils, with special emphasis on Ohio conditions. All this early work was based on field experiments, and the criterion used for determining what was happening to the soils was the yield of crops obtained each year over a long period of time. These early leaders were working in a general farming area, in which considerable livestock was raised, in which good crop rotations were widely followed, and in which the soil, in general, was protected physically and rendered inactive biologically by long, cold winters. It is clear, then, that soil scientists have from the beginning been concerned with the problem of maintaining the productivity of soils.

Emphasis on Erosion

In the South, the situation was different. Farmers were following a one-crop system, with a high percentage of their land in row crops such as corn and cotton. The rainfall was heavier than in the North. Because of the more open winters, the soil was not so well protected against erosion nor so inactive biologically as in the North. Hugh Bennett, founder of the Soil Conservation Service, was a native of North Carolina and spent much of his professional career in the South. This was the type of agriculture with which he was most familiar and in which he was most interested. To his practiced eye, the effects of erosion were obvious and devastating. He succeeded in persuading President Roosevelt to establish a special Soil Erosion Service in the Department of the Interior in 1933. This later developed into the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture. It was given the mandate to stop soil erosion.

Bennett was a crusader. Every type of evidence that he or his employees could find of soil moving off a field or from one part of a field to another was measured, photographed, and dramatized. By comparing the depth of certain characteristic layers or features in the cross section or profile of virgin

soils in woods or fence rows with the depth of these same features in fields which had been cultivated for a long time, it was possible to estimate roughly the amount of topsoil which had been lost by sheet erosion. By the use of such criteria, land under cultivation in most of the United States was quickly surveyed and mapped and estimates were made of the amount of topsoil lost from the arable land in the United States by erosion.

DIVERGENT VIEWS

As an outgrowth of these developments, the men working on soils in the United States have, in the last twenty years, tended to be divided into two groups. First are those interested primarily in the physical losses of topsoil by erosion and in means of preventing further losses. This group is largely affiliated either officially or ideologically with the Soil Conservation Service. Second are those interested primarily in developing the best possible methods for managing the soils which we have left, their potentialities under good management, and so forth. This group is made up largely of the soil scientists in the state agricultural colleges and experiment stations and in the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering (until recently Robert M. Salter was chief of this Bureau) of the United States Department of Agriculture. We have, then, two fairly large groups of soil specialists, supported largely with public funds, either state or federal, and both interested in better soil management.

It soon became evident that while the innovations emphasized by the Soil Conservation Service for preventing erosion (terracing, strip cropping, diversion ditches) were very helpful, they needed to be combined with the best of the conventional agronomic practices. But this area of activity had already been pre-empted by the older Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering in the Department of Agricultural and the state agricultural experiment stations and colleges. Any effort made to apply such a well-balanced system of soil management obviously led to overlapping activities, controversies, and competition for funds between the various agencies, and aggravated the need of each for data for dramatizing the situation. The net result is that many thinking people on the side lines have been confused. This is all a part, possibly an essential part, of the democratic process.

Erosion control is a very important phase of soil conservation in most areas; in certain areas, unquestionably the most important phase. There is no question that, in the broadest sense, it was being neglected and is still being neglected in many areas. In a period of about two decades, largely as a result of the energetic leadership and evangelistic fervor of H. H. Bennett, the country has been made erosion and soil conservation conscious. The colleges of agriculture in many states have added specialists in soil conservation to their staffs and are offering courses in soil conservation to their students.

When he asked me to prepare this paper, the editor wished "a disinterested judgment on the merits of the controversy between the Soil Conservation Service which argues that we must restore vast areas, and the Salter-Kellogg group which seems to argue that increasing productivity will see us through fairly well." In the meantime, Hugh Bennett, chief of the Soil Conservation Service, has reached retirement age, and Robert M. Salter, then chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry, has been named as his successor.

This point is significant. It does not detract one iota from the epoch-making services of H. H. Bennett. It indicates merely that his most important job, making the United States and the world more conscious of the evils of soil erosion, has been superbly done, but that it is now time for all concerned to bury their hatchets and devote all their energies to the development of carefully integrated, well-balanced systems of soil management in which erosion control receives its due share of attention.

SOIL BUILDING AND DEPLETION

All the above is cited to give the general reader some background which I think is factual for understanding some of the confusing and at times apparently conflicting statements made in the public press and in popular magazines and books. Let us now approach our subject from the standpoint of the best basic scientific evidence available to us. Let us consider first the nature of soils, how they are formed, how and why they deteriorate under cultivation, and how this deterioration can be prevented.

The soil is not a dead, static storehouse with a few inches of topsoil built up before agriculture started and incapable of being renewed. It is a living, dynamic system, in which constructive and destructive processes are constantly proceeding side by side. If all the vegetation produced is allowed to fall back on the soil, as it does under natural conditions, organic matter accumulates and fertility increases. As organic matter accumulates, the rate of its decomposition increases until a dynamic equilibrium is reached between soil building and soil depleting processes. When the soil is put under cultivation, the destructive processes are accelerated and the constructive processes retarded.

If a soil depleting cultivated crop like corn or wheat is grown continuously for long periods, without fertilization, yields will not drop to zero but will tend to reach a new equilibrium value which can be maintained for very long periods—for practical purposes, almost indefinitely. The yields of corn or wheat produced under such circumstances usually range from ten to twelve bushels per acre. This is what has happened in many old countries with dense population and an underdeveloped agriculture.

That course is, however, not the only one open to us. We can, in many cases at least, step up the soil building processes until they equal or even exceed the soil depleting processes. Proof that it can be done on a national scale is found in the history of agriculture of western Europe. The average yields of wheat in western Europe 150 years ago were close to this limiting value of 8 to 12 bushels per acre mentioned above. At the present time, they average from 30 to 40 bushels. Many regions in eastern United States which have been farmed for over 150 years supply equally convincing evidence that practical and economical ways have been found for building up the productivity of the soil far above the natural virgin levels existing when the white man came to America. It is worth noting, too, that this has been done by farmers without subsidies. In the early years it was done without the aid of the very great advances made in the agricultural sciences in the last quarter of a century.

PLANT NUTRIENTS

All the energy stored in our crop plants comes from the sun, and usually about 95 per cent of the dry matter in them is derived from air and water, leaving only about 5 per cent coming from the soil. This 5 per cent is made up of the elements contained in the ash of the crops, plus the nitrogen which is volatilized when crops are burned. The major ash constituents are calcium, mag-

nesium, potassium, sulphur, and phosphorus. Several other elements are required by plants in very small quantities, usually only a few pounds per acre. These elements are copper, manganese, zinc, iron, boron, and molybdenum. They are usually referred to as the micronutrients because they are needed by crops in such small quantities. They are just as essential for the growth of the plant as the macronutrients. Practically all the water used by plants is absorbed by the soil through the plant roots. With most crops, between 300 and 800 pounds of water is required for every pound of dry matter produced. This calls for enormous quantities of water; and since our rains are often poorly distributed, it is important that the soil have sufficient storage capacity for water to meet the needs of the growing crop during the periods between rains.

The soil is, of course, also a storehouse for plant nutrients. An acre of soil one foot in depth usually weighs about four million pounds. Plant roots are usually able to exploit the nutrients in a soil to a depth of from two to five feet. Usually there is enough nitrogen and phosphorus in the top three feet of average soil of the humid region to meet the needs of from fifty to one hundred average crops, and enough potash for one thousand average crops. The size of the reserve in tropical soils or in very coarse sandy soils is of course not so large. Chemical analyses give us an accurate picture of the size of this stored reserve of plant nutrients. It was found quite early, however, that while chemical analyses gave a very useful picture of the magnitude of these stored reserves of plant nutrients, they often failed to give an accurate picture of the capacity of the soil to release these nutrients to the crop in a usable form. It was found, for example, that many very unproductive soils could not be distinguished from very productive ones by their chemical composition.

AVAILABILITY OF NUTRIENTS

We now know that this lack of agreement was due to the fact that these soils differed greatly in their ability to release their stored reserve of nutrients in a form which could be utilized by the growing crop. The rate of growth of the crop is not influenced by the magnitude of the stored reserves, but only by the amount of the various nutrients available for meeting the day-by-day needs of the crop. These needs, even in the case of the elements needed in largest amounts, seldom exceed two or three pounds per acre per day at the time the crop is growing most rapidly. It is very difficult and would be very expensive in most cases to make any great change in the magnitude of the reserves of fertility stored in the soil in a short period of time. On the other hand, it is very easy and often exceedingly profitable for the farmer to increase the supply of nutrients available for meeting the day-by-day needs of his crops. In the case of nitrogen, for example, he can do this by growing leguminous crops like clover which have the capacity to take nitrogen from the air and fix it in forms which can be made available to the succeeding crop by the action of soil micro-organisms. A crop of alfalfa can fix as much as 250 pounds of nitrogen per acre in one year—an amount that is more than sufficient to meet the needs of most nonleguminous crops for one year. As a matter of fact, when a crop like alfalfa is grown and the top used for hay, enough nitrogen is left in the ground in the form of roots to meet the requirements for many nonleguminous crops for one year. The farmer can also increase the supply of available nutrients for his crops by the addition of crop residues, farm manures, and commercial fertilizers.

The extent to which each of the above techniques is used for maintaining the productivity of soil varies widely in different sections of the country, on different soil types, and with different types of farming. Livestock farming is ideal from the standpoint of soil maintenance, and as long as we are able to afford a livestock economy in this country, the maintenance of the productivity of our soils will not be a very difficult problem in most areas. To produce most types of livestock economically, large areas of leguminous forage crops are needed as a cheap source of high protein feed. Crop residues not fit for feed may be used for bedding the livestock and returned to the soil with the manure. Long-time experiments at Illinois and Ohio indicate that with a three-year rotation of corn, oats, and clover handled in this way and supplemented with very modest and inexpensive applications of ground limestone and superphosphate, yields of all crops involved can easily be maintained indefinitely at levels 30 to 40 per cent above the yields obtained on these soils seventy years ago. With more liberal fertilization, yields 50 per cent above those obtained seventy years ago can be consistently obtained with techniques now available.

In the potato and truck crop areas of eastern United States, applications of commercial fertilizer are used instead of farm manures. The soils in these areas are increasing in their content of phosphorus (see Table 1) and potassium, and are holding their own fairly well in nitrogen. The yields of practically all these crops in all these areas have been larger in the last ten years than ever before in history. There is little reason for feeling that their productivity is declining.

The citrus and vegetable production of Florida is based almost exclusively upon hand-to-mouth feeding of the crops with commercial fertilizers. Many of the soils used for producing these crops contain 95 per cent or more of sand. Farmers find it highly profitable to buy practically all the plant nutrients they need in the form of commercial fertilizer. As a matter of fact, they have been buying from five to ten times as much phosphorus as their crops have removed.

INCREASES IN YIELDS

For many years, the South has been referred to as Economic Problem No. 1. This is due in part to the one-crop cotton system of farming which has predominated the agriculture of much of the area. This era is rapidly drawing to a close as improved techniques for producing cotton are adopted. Several states have reported that they are now producing as much cotton as they ever did, on half of the land that they used twenty-five years ago. This frees half of the former cotton acreage in these areas for the production of forage crops and the development of a livestock industry. Dairying and other forms of livestock production are expanding rapidly. With this change in type of farming, there is little question that the agriculture of the South will soon be on a much more profitable and permanent basis. It would be hard to find a pessimist on the future of agriculture in the South among the agronomists of that region.

A careful study of crop yields for sixteen of our principal seed crops by Pearson, Myers, and Doak [1] indicates that the yields increased an average of 27 per cent during the period 1937–48. This was an unparalleled increase. During the same period, yields of vegetables increased on the average 2,100 pounds

[1] *Farm Economics*, Cornell University, March 1949, pp. 4290–4304.

TABLE 1—RELATION BETWEEN CROP REMOVAL OF PHOSPHORIC ACID AND ITS REPLACEMENT IN FERTILIZERS

States	Tons P_2O_5 in harvested crops in 1943[a]	Tons P_2O_5 in fertilizers consumed 1942–43[b]	Percentage removal replaced in fertilizers
Maine	6,544	24,370	372
Rhode Island	272	1,773	652
Connecticut	2,177	7,593	349
New York	35,267	69,944	198
New Jersey	4,307	23,630	549
Virginia	16,831	67,985	404
North Carolina	25,725	110,619	430
South Carolina	15,183	61,865	407
Georgia	26,554	110,347	416
Florida	5,454	47,086	863
Alabama	22,550	80,762	358
Tennessee	27,894	55,392	199
Ohio	69,334	69,267	100
Kentucky	26,729	61,989	231
Iowa	175,883	10,443	6
Missouri	58,104	27,059	47
North Dakota	85,678	899	1
Nebraska	83,259	696	0.8
Kansas	91,578	8,085	9
Montana	39,765	2,098	5
California	50,247	23,798	47
United States	1,699,064	1,258,857[b]	74

[a] The figures are for P_2O_5 contained only in the portions of harvested crops that are usually removed from the land. They do not include pastures.

[b] Includes 275,636 tons of P_2O_5 in fertilizers distributed by government agencies, a considerable portion of which was applied to pastures. Does not include approximately 500,000 tons of P_2O_5 applied to the soil in the form of barnyard manure.

Source: R. W. Cummings, Soil Science Society of America *Proceedings*, 10:241, 1945.

per acre, a greater increase than had taken place in the preceding half-century. Heavy fertilization undoubtedly played an important role in both cases. During this period the use of commercial fertilizers more than doubled.

EFFECTS OF HIGHER YIELDS

This raises a question which is often asked. Do not higher yields per acre deplete soils more rapidly? In one sense, the answer is Yes. A 100-bushel crop of corn, for example, will take more from the soil than a 25-bushel crop. But it will not take four times as much, and *therefore not as much per bushel*. In another sense and from a long-time point of view, a much more important sense, the answer is emphatically No. The reason is that when we raise 100 bushels of corn instead of 25 on one acre, we free three acres for growing other crops; and if soil-building leguminous sod crops are grown on one or preferably two of the remaining three acres, the soil will be in better condition for future crop production.

Heavier fertilization results not only in larger crops but also in larger residues of fertilizer in the soil. If we calculate the amount of phosphoric acid removed in harvested crops in the states east of the Mississippi River, we find that the amount is often much less than is returned to the soil in the form of commercial fertilizer. Table 1 gives a summary of such data prepared by Cummings.[2] One needs to bear in mind when examining this table that it does not include the 500,000 tons of phosphorus returned to the soil in the form of barnyard manure each year. Since this table was prepared, the consumption of phosphate fertilizers in the United States has increased to over two million tons.

While the reserves of organic matter and of the nitrogen in it have undoubtedly been depleted in many sections of the United States, the fact that yields are increasing indicates that farmers are finding ways of meeting the day-by-day requirements of their crops for nitrogen by other techniques. With the increased production of improved leguminous forage crops already under way

[2] Soil Science Society of America *Proceedings*, 10: 241, 1945.

in many sections of the country and with the increase in the livestock industry in the South, the rate of loss of soil organic matter should be easily reduced. Our synthetic nitrogen fertilizer production has increased from practically zero at the close of World War I to almost 2,000,000 tons. Plants now being planned will increase our total capacity to about 2,300,000 tons per year by 1955. There is every reason for thinking, then, that the supply of nitrogen available to our growing crops will be greater in a few years than it ever was before, and fortunately the supply of free nitrogen in the air is inexhaustible.

In my opinion, we need not be very greatly alarmed about these losses in organic matter and nitrogen as long as crop yields are increasing. Higher yields per acre usually result in more efficient production, and more efficient production means cheaper food for the consumer, more profit for the producer, and, in general, larger residues of fertility left in the soil. The real time for alarm is when crop yields begin to decline consistently. No highly developed country has yet reached this stage, nor, in my opinion, is it likely to. The cost would be too great.

FUTURE PRODUCTION

Many have expressed concern in recent years about our future food production capacity. I feel confident that if our descendants a hundred years from now fail to produce enough food for themselves, it will be because they fail to make full use of the knowledge and materials which modern science has placed at their disposal. It will not be because of mistakes made prior to 1950 in managing our soils. There should be no problem in producing all the fruit, vegetables, potatoes, and cereals needed for our population a century hence, if it continues to grow at about 1 per cent a year. There should be but little difficulty in producing all the dairy and poultry products that we are likely to need under these same conditions. The most difficult problem will be to produce enough T-bone steaks to meet demands in times of great prosperity. While more difficult, when we consider the great potentialities for improving our vast areas of grasslands, even this goal seems attainable!

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Comparative Costs of Restoration and Reclamation of Land

By Paul B. Sears *

ANY thorough analysis of land use and management is likely to reveal the existence of conflicting interests, as well as of purely technical problems. Nor is the situation simplified when such conflict involves, as it often does, more than bare economic advantage. In spite of the present rationalization of much farm practice, the typical operator lives with his land, and his feelings are correspondingly involved in anything that concerns it.

Land subject to restoration, or old land, has been under operation, usually tillage, is relatively near to long-established markets, represents a past investment of capital and labor, and frequently reflects the presence of traditional values. As part of an older political entity it is likely to be thoroughly taxed, but in return it usually has at hand an adequate system of public facilities to serve its occupants. Any expenditure of public funds represents a charge against these occupants.

The owner of old land may question the fairness of being obliged to pay for enterprises that create competition for him. On the question of broader benefits, such as power and flood control, he may wonder whether the benefit to him is in any proportion to his contribution. But while this objection may be tenable for special assessments, it is stilled—technically, at least—in the case of expenditures from blanket taxation, such as the federal income tax. It may be noted that while the seventeen irrigation states gain practically all the direct benefits from federal reclamation spending, in 1950 they paid only 17 per cent of income tax revenues.

Any clear analysis of the pattern of equities involved would have to go far beyond the limits of the present paper. To what extent is the need of reclaimed new lands a bona fide economic and social pressure? To what extent a manufactured one? To what extent do such reclaimed lands actually compete with old lands? To what extent do they represent a rational enrichment of important production? Assuming the need for greater national production requiring the investment of more capital, should this capital come from private savings or from (increased) taxation? These are some of the very important elements in the problem that we must leave untouched.

Depletion of Old Land

The productive capacity of much old land has suffered considerably. Dr. Robert Salter stated in 1938 that in spite of enormous progress in many fields of agricultural science, the per acre yield of Ohio farms was being maintained with difficulty.[1] And the same scientist reported in 1948 that the greatly increased yields due to hybrid corn had not been obtained without a corresponding demand upon soil nutrients.[2]

* With the invaluable help of Robert D. Teeters and Susannah Coolidge.

[1] R. M. Salter, R. D. Lewis, and J. A. Slipher, *Our Heritage, the Soil*, Bulletin 175, Agricultural Extension Service, The Ohio State University, 1938.

[2] R. M. Salter, "New Horizons for Agriculture," address given at the Annual Convention of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Atlantic City, N. J., 1948.

While much of this old land can most profitably be retired to uses other than farming,[3] the bulk of it can be restored to a good level of sustained production by suitable technical measures. As will be shown in the following discussion, the expense involved in this restoration can be met out of the resulting increased earnings. The experience of certain bankers shows that such rehabilitation can be satisfactorily handled through the ordinary channels of private credit.[4]

Besides this old land, there is in the United States an extensive area, estimated by the Soil Conservation Service in 1945 to be about 85 million acres, of now unoccupied land or land subject to extensive, low-grade use, some of which has proved very productive for fishing or trapping. To date these lands represent little if any investment, settlement, or improvement, although they can be made suitable for farming through clearing or drainage. Both operational and social facilities must be developed in the process of reclamation.

Government Investment

Unlike the earlier irrigation projects, a majority of which were privately financed, those now remaining must be underwritten by government funds. This money is contributed in part by all operators of old land, through taxation. Before 1940 the contribution of the Federal Government in this direction was deemed to be about one-quarter of the total output; but in the last decade the government proportion has greatly increased, and it will no doubt continue to do so. The remaining lands are naturally the more difficult and inaccessible ones; therefore ever larger investments will be required to build roads and bridges as well as the drainage and irrigation facilities. Then, too, this large investment will require provision for markets and other social institutions. In principle, all such expense is returnable to the Treasury from those who will own and operate the reclaimed land. However, their liability is minimized by the fact that cost of power, flood control, navigation, and other benefits is deducted from the cost of bringing new land into operation.

Reclamation of New Land

Estimates of the Twentieth Century Fund and the Army Engineers, representing both private and public sources, show that as much as 100 billion dollars would be required in the next generation to conserve and develop the country's renewable resources adequately. It is perhaps ironical for those interested in conservation to question the wisdom of measures designed to improve land use.

In a 1945 survey, the Soil Conservation Service estimated that there were 25 million acres which, when cleared

The amount of deterioration is difficult to determine, although Bennett's estimate of 50 million acres of cropland ruined for further practical cultivation, 50 million nearly so, and another 100 million acres with over half its soil gone deserves consideration. (Hugh H. Bennett, *Soil Conservation*, 1939, p. 7.) A fair criterion for the ordinary observer is the extent to which mixed legume-grass meadows are developed. Where the proportion on unspecialized farms falls below one field in four, efficiency of land use may be questioned. In 1950 the writer traveled over a thousand miles in Maine, where hay is a staple crop, and observed only four farms making effective use of lime and legumes. During the same season traverses of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa revealed fewer than one grass-legume field in twelve.

[3] I. Gregory Hines, "The Economics of Idle Resources," *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, Vol. 7, Jan. 1952, p. 27.

[4] *New England Farm Finance News*, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Vol. 6, No. 9, Sept. 1951.

and drained, would be suitable for regular cultivation, and over 15 million more acres that could be irrigated. In the decade from 1950 to 1960 it is probable that about 12.5 million acres actually will be developed as farmland —more than half to be expansion of existing farms and the rest to be created into new farms.[5]

The cost of such development is conjectural, and there is no clear basis for determining what the returns from this new land will be. Study of Bureau of Reclamation figures reveals little, because the projects involve much more than the development of land for cultivation, and it is difficult to separate the costs. At the end of the fiscal year 1950 the Bureau had spent $2,196,000,000 to render 5,657,037 acres irrigable, which amounts to $388 an acre including money spent on uncompleted projects and on power facilities. In 1947 it was estimated that those whose lands were being irrigated by the projects would pay back 33 cents on the dollar, the rest of the revenues being derived from power and miscellaneous sources; while nonreimbursible items would amount to approximately 5 cents on the dollar.[6]

Clearly, the power facilities are more than paying for themselves—in fact, are paying for some of the irrigation facilities. Therefore, while we have figures for the estimated improvement in dollars per irrigable acre, the judgment is not an intrinsic one. Rather it is an evaluation of how much the farmer is equipped to contribute to the expense of construction of the project. Economists have suggested that repayment schedules might be improved and that methods for determining the economic value of irrigation and drainage need revision; but even if this were done, costs would have to be separated to provide the people of this country with a clear picture.

Except for sporadic studies made in limited areas, no substantial data are available as to what the returns are from reclaimed lands and whether the costs are justified. While no insurmountable physical obstacles stand in the way of development of vast new acreages, the economic feasibility of such undertakings is uncertain.

Determining economic feasibility

Experience can be resorted to in some degree, however. In examining irrigation prospects, a distinction must be made between supplementary irrigation and irrigation of arid lands. In many areas rainfall is adequate but poorly distributed throughout the year, in which case irrigation provides some degree of insurance against drought hazards. Or where rainfall is low, yields may be increased by supplementary watering from irrigation facilities. These objectives can be differentiated from those which are concerned with making arid lands cultivable.

One method that has been used to determine whether or not an irrigation enterprise will be economically feasible is to classify the land to be irrigated by type and then to figure how many acres of each type a farmer would need to own in order to pay for irrigation facilities and meet the other expenses of his farm. In the Columbia Basin, a Joint Investigation Committee estimated that 33 per cent of the lands to be irrigated could be classified as the highest type, that 40 per cent was suitable for most crops, and that 27 per cent could be used for pasture. At prewar prices and excluding the cost of irrigation construction, a farmer could expect to make $60 per acre per year from Class I land, $35–$50 from Class II land, and $20–$30 from Class III land. To meet operating expenses, the committee concluded that a farmer in the Columbia Basin would need to own altogether at least 50 acres of Class I land, 55–80 acres of Class II land, and 160 acres of Class III land, a total of 265–290 acres.[7] Naturally, if he owned Class I and II land only, his acreage would be less; but if his land were Class III exclusively, his unit would have to be considerably greater. While the formation of such a scale is based on judgment, it can be of value, and illustrates the kind of planning and forethought which can facilitate decisions about irrigation undertakings.

Present work and plans

In 1948 it was estimated that 22 million acres of idle, fallow, and pasture land as well as cropland was being irrigated, which is over half of the acreage that it is believed would lend itself to this development. In 1947 a tentative plan of the Bureau of Reclamation envisaged increased irrigation of more than 10.5 million acres by 1957 at a cost of $560 an acre, or a total of $5,976,000,000.[8] The Bureau further expressed its goal of eventually irrigating almost 19 million acres for less than $500 an acre; but from the present trend in prices, there is no likelihood that costs will decrease as was seemingly expected.

This ambitious program is contemplated despite certain difficulties in the past. Five projects have been abandoned and written off at a total loss of over three million dollars, and seven others have presented serious difficulties. In one of its own publications the Bureau states that "the project never became fully settled and the landowners were not particularly interested in irrigation after it became available."[9] In the Missouri Basin, surveys have shown that the unevenness of the terrain, low ridges and mounds, and small depressions present problems in planning ditches, leveling the land, and spreading the water.

The vast majority of the great irrigation schemes are in the West. Land sales records in the late 1940's show that in that part of the country land that is in or near an area of projected irrigation has sold for $50–$100 an acre. When all the improvements of clearing, leveling, and ditching are completed, the investment may be $200–$300 per acre.

Returns from improved lands

In the Pacific States the high prices that have prevailed during and since World War II for fruit and other crops have justified the costs of irrigation. Profit on some of the new-land farms of the Southwest has been derived from cotton, for which there has been a high demand, although over the long run the cotton market is known to be very uneven. Irrigation is possible only when water supplies are available. In the past few years, favorable weather conditions have been a factor in the success of a number of projects. Moreover, commitments abroad and demands of the armed forces have made the last decade a period of unprecedented returns from high prices and expanded markets.

When new irrigation projects are contemplated, the long-time lag between appropriation of funds and actual yields from the improved land must be taken into account. Payment is not com-

[5] H. H. Wooten and Margaret R. Purcell, *Farm Land Development: Present and Future* (Washington: Department of Agriculture, 1949), p. 62.

[6] Computed from the 1950 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior.

[7] Wooten and Purcell, *op. cit.* note 5 *supra*, p. 57.

[8] Report of the Secretary of the Interior, *op. cit.* note 6 *supra.*

[9] Bureau of Reclamation, *How Reclamation Pays,* Washington: Department of the Interior, 1947.

plete on any of the seventy-three projects undertaken by the Bureau of Reclamation in the western half of the United States since 1902, and has not started on some thirty projects.[10] Prevailing markets and prices are a questionable basis for evolving land development plans. Some estimate of probable future trends is essential in making a decision about present construction.

Drainage

Drainage has been used in the past as a technique by which extensive lands have been developed into cultivable areas, and it presents some promise for the future. But drainage of lowlands is expensive. The Soil Conservation Service found that whereas farm drains which emptied into natural streams could be built at a cost of about $5 to $30 per acre, drainage on land which required an outlet averaged from $15 to $40 per acre.[11] Some of the most far-reaching drainage projects are for lowlands of the Gulf coast and in the deltas of the Red River and the lower Mississippi. In the last seventy years, 8 million acres of agricultural land have been developed for farming in the lower Mississippi Delta, and since the war considerable other work has been done, especially north of the Red River. It is expected that 4,000 to 5,000 new farms may be under operation in this area by 1954.[12] Existing values such as the annual multimillion-dollar muskrat trapping industry of Louisiana cannot be overlooked when further drainage is contemplated. Moreover, flood protection will have to become more effective as these lowlands are developed. In the past, maintenance of drainage facilities in the valleys of the Mississippi and associated rivers has proved more expensive than in surrounding uplands—another factor worthy of consideration. This high maintenance cost has been caused in part by the filling in of channels with eroding soils from hillsides. Much redredging has been necessary.

In recent years the drained lands have done well as a result of high farm incomes in the postwar period. Districts where drainage is common have been able to pay off indebtedness, partly as a result of the favorable adjustments made possible by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the late 1930's.

A study of drainage in Sussex County, Delaware showed that the benefits derived would meet the costs and eventually provide the basis for gains. A drainage project in Rhode Island costing from $30 to $125 per acre, where the improved land was to be used for pasture and hay, was also considered worth while.

Possibilities and costs

In the Southeast, where the natural increase of the population is at a high rate in comparison to that in other parts of the country and where extensive acreage has been rendered unfertile by erosion, the pressure to develop new lands is great. A local survey made by the Soil Conservation Service showed that in Jasper County, South Carolina, 150,000 acres of land when cleared and drained would be suitable for farming. These findings were deemed applicable to similar areas of the Lower Coastal Plain of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, and the estimated costs in 1948 averaged $105 per acre: $55 for clearing after deduction of salable timber, $40 for drainage, and $10 for other costs.

Costs in other parts of the Southeast may vary above or below those in the Lower Coastal Plain, but studies of the Virginia Piedmont show that opportunity for the development of new farm units is slight. A considerable amount of land in Virginia and North Carolina is held for investment and is tenant farmed. Some of the owners who have considered clearing and drainage of their undeveloped lands have found that the advantages to be derived did not warrant the costs, and that it was more profitable as an investment to grow timber than to reclaim the land for cultivable crops. As long as enough farm crops to meet demands are produced on lands that are already improved or maintained at a productive level, new development of lands is not economically remunerative, and it is unfortunate that land advertisements have been persuasively designed to give a different impression.

[10] Bureau of Reclamation, *op. cit.*

[11] Wooten and Purcell, *op. cit.* note 5 *supra*, pp. 5–6.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 37.

RESTORATION OF OLD LAND

In the Southeast, the Corn Belt, the Lake States, and the Northeast, improvement of existing land suitable for cultivation presents an important challenge. Whether the development of new lands in these areas by clearing, drainage, or irrigation is justifiable is not so certain. The character and the amount of work required for restoration vary greatly. The extreme would be represented by farms on which boulders would need to be removed, stone fences buried in deep trenches, brush cleared, wet spots drained, field layouts and fencing changed, and strip cropping, liming, fertilizing, and seeding carried out. A more general situation, represented by the typical Soil Conservation District farm plans, would simply involve improved layouts, liming, fertilizing, and establishment of sound rotations based on increased use of grass-legume meadows. Where this latter is possible, an investment of perhaps $30 an acre is probably sufficient, and experience indicates that a three-year credit period is ample to repay the cost from increased earnings.

In New England, where farming is not a lucrative profession in comparison to other occupations, clearing brush for seeded pasture was estimated to run as high as $50 to $110 per acre in 1949.[13] Woodland clearing for orchards, vegetables, and other crops ranges from $95 to $160 per acre. The removal of light brush in recently abandoned fields would cost much less. Clearing in the Southeast could perhaps be kept as low as $25 per acre without stumping in areas where some returns could be derived from the timber.

Cultivated land

There is evidence that improvement and renovation of lands which are now cultivated is the most advantageous form of restoration. Estimates in a study of *The Rural Economy of New England*[14] showed that net income per acre increased in proportion to the amount invested for stepped-up productivity, although the smaller investments paid off more quickly. Another estimate[15] indicates that the costs would be about $30 per acre for "a good but fairly simple protective job, including expert help, fertilizer, seed, and use of machinery."

A study of farms in seven counties in Illinois[16] revealed that the county average of cost of conservation needs ran from $14.50 to $22.63 an acre. The farms were divided into two matched groups—"high" and "low" conservation farms—and it was found that the "high" farmers spent about 66 cents per acre

[13] Wooten and Purcell, *op. cit.* note 5 *supra.*

[14] John D. Black, *The Rural Economy of New England*, Cambridge, 1950.

[15] Stephen Raushenbush, *Our Conservation Job*, Washington, 1949.

[16] Elmer L. Sauer, *Economics of Soil and Water Conservation: Effects of Practices Followed on Farms in Selected Illinois Areas*, Urbana, Illinois, 1947.

COMPARISON OF COSTS

Purpose of project	Area	Average cost per acre (in dollars)	Year of estimate
Restoration of lands in various stages of productivity	Average U. S.	30.00	1949[a]
	New England	19.00	1948[b]
		24.50–101.00	1950[c]
	Illinois	14.50– 22.63	1947[d]
		24.00	1949[e]
		35.00	1949[f]
	Missouri	36.30	1948[e]
	Iowa	18.00	1949[g]
Clearing[h]			
Without stumping	Massachusetts	15.00– 30.00	1947
	Southeast	25.00	1946
	Delta states	17.00	1930–1940
	Pacific Northwest	18.00– 39.00	1944
Complete clearing (after deduction of salable timber)	General	50.00– 75.00	1946
	Massachusetts	95.00–160.00	1947
	North and South Carolina	36.00– 50.00	1947
	Delta states	30.00–100.00	1945–1948
	Pacific Northwest	57.00–200.00	1944
Drainage[h]	General (new areas)	15.00– 40.00	1946
	Rhode Island (including clearing)	30.00–125.00	1948
	South Carolina	40.00	1948
	Delta states	8.00– 25.00	1945–1948
Irrigation[i]	Columbia Basin	233.00	1950
	Central Valley	300.00–690.00	1950
	Missouri Basin	145.00 (supplemental)	1950
		440.00 (new land)	1950
	Rio Grande		
	Fort Sumner Project	380.00	1950
	Colorado		
	Grand Valley Project	141.00	
	Central Arizona Project	620.00[j]	1948

[a] Raushenbush, cited note 15 *supra*.
[b] Black, cited note 14 *supra*.
[c] Black and Kiefer, cited note 17 *infra*.
[d] Sauer, 1947, cited note 16 *supra*.
[e] Sauer, "Dividends from Conservation Farming," *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan. 1949), p. 34.
[f] Estimate of the Soil Conservation Service, cited in Sauer, 1949.
[g] Murray, Heady, and Timmons, cited note 18 *infra*.
[h] Wooten and Purcell, cited note 5 *supra*.
[i] Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, 1951, *Ten Rivers in America's Future*. Includes only costs allocated to irrigation.
[j] $2,200 if new acreage actually benefited is considered.

per year more than the "lows." But the crop yields for the "highs" were 9 per cent to 21 per cent higher and their net returns $7.22 more per acre. Therefore, the 66-cent investment returned them $7.22—a rate of return of $10.94 on the dollar. The farms had been matched at the beginning of the study so as to make their net income and crop yield index similar.

A seven-year program worked out for a Missouri farm of 267 acres [17] showed that an investment of $9,700 ($36.30 per acre) including interest and hired labor would increase net income by $2,000 a year.

A case history of a 160-acre farm in Iowa [18] indicated that an $18 an acre investment (actually $23 if the farmer borrowed in order not to reduce his level of living) would result in decreased returns for the first three years. But even with the minimum returns that could be expected, the investment would pay off in nine years.

Other case studies have shown that the investments pay back with interest. Yields usually double, and the net income is tripled or quadrupled. Often a program covering several years is necessary to make the investment pay, but this time lag is favorable in comparison to the construction period needed to build irrigation and drainage facilities.

THE QUESTION

There can be no doubt that the continued development of land is necessary to meet the needs of an increasing population as well as expanding commitments. Moreover, some of our land is still being depleted and will have to be retired from cultivation before long. Other areas of cultivable land will be needed for road building and urban and industrial development. Certainly the yearly acquisitions of new land by drainage or irrigation operations and conservation practices have never been sheer gain, nor are they expected to be. But with newly perfected developments in farm technology, the trend will be towards producing a greater amount of crops on the same amount of land.

For the most efficient use of land, consolidation of farms and fewer of them may be the direction in which we should move. Yet human desires cannot be ignored, and at the present time the demand of citizens seems to be for more farms. Prices are high, and good farming land is difficult to obtain at the present time. The number of those who are lured by marginal or poor lands is not inconsiderable.

Whether it be in the best interests of the country for the government to create new lands for the cultivation of crops when the productive capacity of the lands now being worked could be increased with greater efficiency and economy is a subtle question. The role of a democracy may encompass the obligation to provide citizens with reasonable opportunity to choose a profession and way of life that they feel strongly about, especially when deriving a livelihood from the land has played such a significant part in the historical heritage of the country. Furthermore, it may be argued that the farm areas have replenished the populations of our cities in the past, and, with the curtailment of immigration, will be more important in this respect in the future.

On the other hand, at a time when every exertion is being made to preserve some vestige of security in the world, it may be regarded as something of a luxury for the government to develop new lands at great cost if more practical

[17] John D. Black and Maxine Kiefer, "Food the U. S. Could Produce," in *Future Food and Agriculture Policy*, New York, 1948.

[18] William G. Murray, Earl L. Heady, and John F. Timmons, "Economic Aspects of Soil Conservation Problems," *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, Vol. 5, Jan. 1949.

solutions to expanding needs are apparent. The justification of developing new lands on the basis that the drainage and irrigation facilities envisaged would also serve to improve existing lands is an argument without end. If a line is ever drawn, the competition for obtaining a good farm will be heightened; but this in itself might be a factor favoring better land use in the long run.

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Economic Analysis of Land Use on the Western Ranges

By M. M. KELSO

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INVESTMENT, for conservation or development, in any resource that yields a recurrent product is a problem in maximization over time of the social net product derived from use of the resource and its associated productive resources (1) with only so much investment as is needed to maintain unchanged the level of physical productivity of the resource in question, and (2) with investment of capital funds or labor to enhance the physical productivity of the source. The two are separable in theory but not in practice.[1]

Maximization of social net product from these resources with or without investment to enhance productivity is attained through control over production and investment inputs through which effect is given to decisions as to the kind and proportionality of inputs to commit to production systems based upon the utilization of these resources. Such decisions are made by entrepreneurs acting through firms, the requisite control over conjoint resource inputs being provided by the institution of property. Such firms may be privately managed or publicly managed, and the property may be private property or public property. Under capitalism, it is presumed that maximization over time of private profit to the firm is synonymous with maximization over time of social net product unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.

Maximization over time of *private firm profit,* with or without investment to enhance productivity, refers to maximization of the discounted stream of net profits anticipated by the firm resulting from the resource commitments decided upon by it. The discount factor will be larger (smaller) as the risks and uncertainties of the future seem to the firm to be greater (less).

Maximization over time of *social net product,* with or without investment to enhance productivity, refers to maximization of the discounted stream of "social benefits" over "social sacrifices" anticipated by the "public firm" resulting from resource commitments decided upon or permitted by it. Many of the benefits and sacrifices are not measurable in monetary terms; even for those that are, their over-all effect within the total economy is not empirically, though it is theoretically, measurable. The discount factor used by public firms (except under stresses brought about by need for short-run survival of the society) will normally be smaller than for private firms.

When resource use is under the joint control of two (or more) public and/or private firms, maximum net social product will result from its use only when the goals and expectations of the firms are alike, only when the time pattern of their inputs (costs) are comparable, and only when they share in returns comparable to their shares in costs. Otherwise, inputs and returns will be dis-

[1] To be theoretically complete, a third aspect of the problem should be stated, namely, disinvestment (deterioration) over time of the resource to maximize social net product. But to keep the argument within limits that can be treated in this paper, the third problem will be ignored by the assumption that deterioration of the recurrently productive resource—range land—is never socially justified.

torted away from a maximum either towards a shorter or a longer time span pattern or towards a different combination of product outputs, or both.

BASIC ASSUMPTION

The function of theory is to guide the search for facts, determine their meanings (definitions), provide for their classification, and subsequently to lead to testable, predictive hypotheses as to what *will* happen over time within the situation, or what *can be made to happen* better to attain specified human ends. Within the theoretical context described, we will now turn to a description of the situation within which our problem lies. We begin with the presumption that the conservation and development of the western public range land resources are important to the nation, that these resources are neither developed to the point of economy nor used at the point of maximized long-run social income, and that this state of affairs is largely due to the institutional setting within which the use and development of these resources occur.

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

A full description of the facts of the natural environment within which our problem lies is necessary to a complete understanding of the argument. But in order to confine our analysis to the space limitations of this article, we must be satisfied with a categorical listing of the more important features.

1. The low inherent productivity per acre of these range lands (largely due to relative aridity or rough and barren mountain slopes) requires many acres for even minimum "family-sized" livestock farms.

2. The plains sod grasses, the shrubs and bunch grasses of mountains and semideserts, the annual weeds, react differently to use and abuse. Misuse will do less long-run harm, and damage will be more narrowly confined to him who causes it, in the plains sod grasses than in the bunch grasses and rough mountain ranges.

3. Hay and feed crop production is a necessary supplement to range use throughout the West except in parts of the far Southwest.

4. Except in the year-long range use areas (plains and far Southwest), range lands of proper seasonality together with necessary hay and feed crop lands do not lie interspersed so as to permit ranch units organized in self-contained blocks behind their own "line fences."

5. Water and water development are factors of crucial importance in western range land use. Hay and pasture irrigation and stock water supplies are essential to full use of associated ranges. Two-thirds to three-fourths of the water for irrigation, power, and urban use in the West originates on public land in high mountains. A significant portion of the negative value flood and silt flows originate on lower-lying semiarid range lands, both publicly and privately owned.

6. A significant portion of these western range areas are producers of other values besides range forage—water, recreation, lumber, and, negatively speaking, floods and silt.

7. Much of the western range can be materially increased in productivity by capital investments for revegetation, water development, fencing, and other purposes.

THE FIRMS

In any economy, the use and development of its resources are organized through "firms"—the units through which management decisions are channeled into action. In our economy, the conservation, development, and use of our western range resources are carried out by both public and private firms.

Western range resources are utilized through private entrepreneurial units usually called ranches. These firms are private businesses run to serve private ends, one of the more important of which is profit. These firms assemble the resources needed for a livestock business—labor, livestock, other capital items, and land—manage their use, and determine how and for what the resources owned by them shall be used. As with private firms everywhere, given the conditions imposed upon them by the property institutions and given the technical knowledge of the manager, the firm tries to maximize the flow of satisfactions coming to its owners.

Unlike any other type of agriculture in the United States, public firms play an important role in the western range livestock industry. Here, a large part of the basic land resources are owned by government and managed by government agencies. But these agencies do not carry out all entrepreneurial functions—they do not harvest, they do not invest operating capital. They look after the government-owned resources, assign their use to private users, and make capital investments for conservation and development. They perform a landlord function.

These firms are agencies of government, which means that they serve as trust agents for the citizenry to manage the public's land. Presumably, the management goal of these firms is to maximize over time the sociocultural returns to the public from use of the public's land. Objective measurement of returns to alternative uses of public lands is a much less definitive thing than is objective measurement of profits from alternative uses of private resources.

Except for the Bureau of Land Management, whose advisory boards of users have some say in management, only employees of these public firms have direct say on matters of allocation, use, development, and management of these public resources. However, these employees are aware of and often influenced by what they think or know the vocal and influential part of the public may tell or be telling Congress about them. They are rarely domineering or dictatorial in their relations with private users of the lands in their charge. They are usually helpful to and sympathetic with the private firm's problems that grow out of its relations to public lands.

The public firms decide what investments for conservation and development are economically and socially justified on these lands. But except for the BLM "improvement funds" derived from grazing fees, they must ask Congress for the money to carry out these improvements. These public firms find it difficult (in fact, in the light of fifty years of experience they have found it impossible) to secure adequate funds from Congress for the needed investment in conservation and development of these public grazing lands.

THE PROPERTY ENVIRONMENT

Private property

Slightly more than 50 per cent [2] of the western range lands are privately owned. But private ownership controls the more productive ranges, so about two-thirds [3] of the range feed is produced on private lands.[4] The proportion of private ownership is greatest in

[2] *The Western Range*, Senate Document No. 199, 74th Cong., 2d sess., 1936, Table 2, p. 7 and estimated from Table 2 and Table 82, p. 508.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] When it is considered that virtually all feed production from improved pasture, hay and crop land in the region comes from privately owned land, it will be realized that much more than two-thirds of all western livestock feed is produced on private land, possibly as much as 80 to 90 per cent.

the plains and least in the semideserts and mountains.

Not all privately owned range lands are used by the firms who own them. Several railroad corporations own extensive areas; nonresident individuals are an important class of owners, especially in the plains. Thus, it is evident that there is considerable private leasing of range lands by livestock firms.

Relatively few livestock firms in the West operate wholly on privately owned land, and fewer still own, themselves, all the land on which they operate. Such as do are almost wholly in the eastern edges of the plains. The property status of ranch firms varies from those with wholly privately owned lands to those who own only spring-fall range and/or hay and crop land or those who own only hay land and water controlling tracts. Though as recently as fifteen years ago ranch firms existed that owned (or legally controlled) no land at all, such firms no longer exist—all today have a base of controlled land of some sort. But in many areas, the privately owned ranges and feed crop lands cannot be used economically without the conjoint use of adjacent public land—and vice versa.

Public property

Publicly owned range lands furnish feed resources less than in proportion to their acreage. However, in many areas they furnish an indispensable part of the annual feed supply.

Public ownership is in the hands of county, state, and federal governments. We will consider only the last-named, for lack of space to treat them all. Of the many classes of federally owned range lands, we will consider only two —those administered by the United States Forest Service and the United States Bureau of Land Management, which control between them about three-fourths of the publicly owned range.

THE FOREST SERVICE

The Forest Service was set up early in this century to administer the lands withdrawn from the public domain for purposes of forestry and watershed protection and such other uses as are not inconsistent with the two specifically named. Under the latter clause, grazing and recreational use of the Forests has developed. The Forest Service has, over forty-five years of experience, formulated policies and procedures for the orderly supervision of grazing use of Forest lands by private firms.

It is most important to note that private use of public land under positive federal landlordship had not previously existed in the United States; therefore the Forest Service had to build its own policies and methods without guidance from any previous experience.

It is next important to note that grazing was a subordinate use, permitted only as long and as far as it did not interfere unduly with timber and watersheds.

Out of these circumstances developed the system under which grazing use by private firms is a privilege and not a right. This privilege is granted by a "permit" which is not a contract, but can be (legally though not politically) revoked or changed at the will of the Forest Service. The permit gives no contractual assurance as to the number of head or the season of use that will be permitted in any subsequent season. However, when it is a "ten-year permit," it does assure its holder that he will have the right for ten years to graze whatever numbers for whatever seasons are authorized under it each year. The permit is not directly salable or otherwise transferable, even through inheritance. If a ranchman holding a

Forest grazing permit dies or transfers or sells his ranch, whether or not a permit will be issued to the new owner, for how many head, and for how long a season, are determinable solely by the Forest Service. It is a policy of the Service (infrequently exercised, but available) to reduce permits of firms larger than some established maximum whenever transfer takes place.

All decisions at all times as to who shall graze on the Forest, with what kinds and numbers of livestock, for how long a season, and under what management rules, are the legal responsibility of the Forest Service, which it has not delegated either to individual users through contracts or to advisory boards among its users.

In addition to permit cuts for conservation and protection of the range, the Forest Service has an adopted policy of cuts and transfers of grazing privileges designed to encourage sound family-sized livestock firms. The policy works by cutting down on permits held by firms above certain maxima in size to add to permits held by firms below certain minima in size when such small firms have the necessary supplemental feed resources and are situated so that they can use the added Forest range economically. This policy has been infrequently used, but is always available. Permit cuts for range protection have been much more prevalent than have cuts for redistribution.

National forest range is predominantly mountain range, largely furnishing summer grazing to private firms who must own or control other feed resources to maintain their livestock while not on the Forest. Sometimes only one private firm can efficiently use adjacent forest range, in which case its permit for Forest grazing is relatively secure, though a sense of insecurity may arise because it may be cut in numbers and season at any time. More commonly the alternative users available to the Forest Service are more numerous; then the user may feel an additional insecurity, especially if his firm is above the established local maximum for size.

Fees and investments

The fee charged for grazing use on Forest lands is not a significant source of uncertainty to the operator. A base fee per animal unit month was set Forest by Forest by the Service many years ago; the annual fee is set by a formula based on changes in the market price of cattle and sheep relative to similar prices in the base period. The base fee was set at a comparatively low level, so the fee for Forest grazing is usually cheap, relative to private land costs, and the firm is assured that the fee will fall with falling livestock prices.

Investments to protect or enhance the productivity of the grazing resource in National Forests are solely the responsibility of the Forest Service and the Federal Government. The private firm that uses Forest range could, until recently, make such investments on its allotted range, but under restrictions so severe and under uncertainties for the future so disturbing that little use was made of the privilege. Recently, even the limited privileges heretofore available have been withdrawn. Thus, essentially all investments in Forest range are dependent on appropriations made by the federal Congress.

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

Largest in area among the many kinds of range land administered by the Bureau of Land Management (the BLM) are the remnants of the public domain—that part of our vast federal landholdings that, after 140 years of picking over, no one has wanted in 640-acre parcels even as a free gift (home-

stead). Provision for their positive protection, development, and management was made by Congress only eighteen years ago (1934). They are, in the main, the poorest of all our grazing lands; in their native state their productivity was in many cases low, and after seventy years of use under no positive landlord control whatever, many of them are badly depleted. The BLM estimates that 50 per cent of the grazing land under its control is severely depleted and that another 32 per cent is moderately damaged.

The BLM grants grazing use of these lands to private firms usually under ten-year permits. The BLM permits, like the Forest permits, are not contractual obligations. Numbers of stock, lengths of season, and management practices on the ranges may legally be changed at any time by the Bureau. But partly because the other possible uses of the grazing resources managed by BLM are of limited importance, partly because the basic law under which BLM operates gives a positive and superior place to grazing and to the stability of the user's privileges, and partly because of policies adopted by BLM, permits issued by it are less subject to change during their ten-year life, they are transferable with the base property to which they "attach," and they are not subject to reductions for redistribution or at transfer.

BLM grazing land is predominantly winter range—even usually semidesert range. As with Forest lands, these BLM lands generally do not make self-contained ranch units but must be used in conjunction with lands of other types and ownerships.

Fees charged by the BLM are fixed in amount, do not fluctuate with livestock prices, and are very low, particularly at this time of high livestock prices, as compared with Forest grazing fees or private land costs.

BLM grazing lands, naturally low in productivity and often badly depleted, need much investment for conservation and development. Permittees can make investments for improvement of these lands—with approval of BLM—with greater freedom and with somewhat greater certainty that they will derive future benefits from them than is the case with permittees on Forest lands. On BLM lands, furthermore, private firms contribute through the fees they pay to the funds needed for improvement of the lands. By law, a stipulated portion of the grazing fees collected must be used for development of the resource. But because fees are at such a low level, the portion stipulated for development accrues in very small amounts each year—much less than required for full economic development of the lands.

As with Forest lands, except for the small amount secured through fees collected, investment funds for conservation and development of BLM lands depend upon congressional appropriations.

Some BLM grazing lands, different from any Forest lands, may be sold or leased to private firms. These are those small and isolated remnant tracts of the public domain that do not lend themselves to efficient administration by the Bureau.

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED

The foregoing is merely a description of the situation within which use, conservation, and development of our western public range resources take place. The problem that it raises contains at least two elements, each equally important: (1) Much of the public grazing land has other actual or potential usefulness than grazing. How shall it be determined what use or combination of uses is best? (2) Under what form of tenure should public land committed to grazing be put in the hands of the private grazing firm?

Theory with which to solve the first aspect of the problem is not well enough developed to provide a definitive analytical base, so we will confine ourselves to the second aspect.

Not all public grazing lands are alike. For some, private ownership may be preferable; for others, public ownership. In the latter case, the situation is that of a landlord-tenant institution in which the tenant is a private firm, *but the landlord is an administrative unit of government.*

Private firms (and private livestock producing firms are no exception) find an atmosphere of bargaining transactions most congenial to the rationale of their behavior—a willing buyer and a willing seller, each with an accessible alternative of nearly equal value, bargaining out mutually acceptable contracts with performance enforceable in the courts. Public firms (and public land managers are no exception) find an atmosphere of rationing transactions most congenial to the rationale of their behavior—a superior authority distributing privileges among subordinate firms under rules or policies laid down by the superior to guide its distributions. The private firm tenant contends for arrangements formulated within the context of bargaining transactions; the public firm landlord contends for arrangements formulated within the context of rationing transactions. The two do not mix; the contending parties are striving for incompatible things.

So we find two roots to our problem: (1) Under what circumstances should public grazing lands be transferred to private ownership, and (2) what institutional arrangement reasonably congenial both to private tenant and public landlord should attach to those grazing lands that must remain in public ownership?

Measures of efficiency

A solution to these root problems will rest on a determination as to which arrangement in each case will function most efficiently for society. What constitutes a measure of efficient functioning in this context that may serve as a basis for evaluating alternative arrangements on public grazing land?

Within the context of economics there seem to be two closely related measures: (1) maximum economic productivity from whatever grazing resources are rationed to use by private firms, and (2) an optimum degree of progress as reflected in an optimum level of capital investment in the grazing resource to enhance its productivity and ensure its conservation.

A further measure, found within the context of social theory, seems necessary, namely, that in those circumstances where alternative tenure arrangements seem to function with about equal economic efficiency, that alternative be chosen which is most in harmony with the cultural habits, ideals, and goals of the society.[5]

HYPOTHESES TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

We turn now to the last step, that of outlining through theoretical analysis the hypotheses of problem solution. We can best approach the task in two parts. First, under what circumstances is public ownership of grazing land not essential to attainment of maximum economic efficiency and progress? Second, where it is essential, under what land-

[5] This formulation of the criterion begs a basic but so far unsolvable question, namely, how much sacrifice in economic efficiency is warranted in the interest of cultural harmony, and vice versa. In the absence of definitive, quantifiable theory to treat this problem, I propose to ignore it by positing that where economic efficiency is approximately equal, cultural harmony as a criterion of choice shall enter into judgment.

lord-tenant arrangements can we attain maximum economic efficiency and progress?

Private versus public ownership

Private property in agricultural land is presumed in all capitalistic societies to give the firm that degree of security of expectations necessary for it to plan in a time dimension such as to maximize economic productivity over time, including an optimum degree of conservation in the present and an optimum degree of investment for increased productivity in the future. Private property in agricultural land fails to attain these ends perfectly—especially for society—as we in the United States know from experience. But it is significant that practically no voices are raised urging public ownership of pasture and crop lands to protect them from abuses by private firms or to enhance investment in their increased productivity. But many voices are so raised relative to western grazing land. It would seem that, except where there are clear reasons to the contrary, western grazing lands—which are a form of agricultural pasture land—should be privately owned in harmony with our cultural ideals.

What clear reasons are there to the contrary? By far the most important is multiple use. Certain of the uses practiced on public range lands are necessarily public in character (recreation, and water production for power and irrigation), and certain of the uses are not generally practiced jointly within single private firms (stock raising and lumbering). For combinations of such uses, private ownership does not serve the end of maximized economic productivity. Certain of the uses will be slighted or completely ignored if the lands are privately owned. Where multiple use of grazing lands is an important factor, private ownership will not be suitable.

Some western public grazing lands, though used for grazing only, are so low in productivity that it does not pay private firms to own them. Such lands produce no net economic return with which to pay interest on investment and real estate taxes. If such lands are to be used by private firms and are to be properly managed, they must be owned and their use supervised by a public landlord.

The social costs of resource deterioration are not so acute on western privately owned grazing lands as they are on the far more productive, more valuable, privately owned pasture and crop lands in the humid areas to the east.

It is paradoxical that the grazing lands east of the 100th meridian are in a relatively poorer condition than those in other parts of the region (the Great Plains). Of the 15 million acres in poor condition (in the Great Plains), 9½ million acres are located in this area (east of the 100th meridian). The native grazing lands remaining in this area have lost so much of their original grasses from hard use that it generally requires complete new seedings of the native bluestems or other adapted grasses before the potential production can be restored. It is in this area that reseeding and careful management will net the greatest returns for time and money expended.[6]

Yet it is for grazing lands west, not east, of the 100th meridian that public ownership is urged to prevent their private owners from "shoveling them into the Gulf of Mexico."

So we conclude that any western public grazing land that has no use of significance other than for grazing and that is productive enough to support

[6] *Post-war Programs of Conservation and Improvement of Range and Native Pasture Lands in the Northern Great Plains*, Section II of Report of Subcommittee on Soil, Range and Forest Development, and Conservation, Northern Great Plains Agricultural Advisory Council, June 1, 1944, p. 13.

the costs of private ownership can, in keeping with our cultural ideals, be transferred to private ownership. By so doing, these lands will be in a setting where long-run security of property and contract on the part of the user will lead to that degree of maximized economic productivity and optimized investment for conservation and development that private firms in agriculture generally attain.

Public landlord-private tenant relations

Much of the public grazing resource will remain public property for the reasons described above. But if it is to be used for grazing, such use will be carried out by private, not public, firms. Consequently, on such publicly owned grazing resources we have a problem of tenure relations between public managers and private firms. This is a problem in public landlord-private tenant relations.

Relative to the solution of this problem, the only experience to guide us is that of the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management.

Here our hypotheses for problem solution will be theoretical; their validity will be indeterminate (except as far as analogy to private landlord-private tenant relations can be considered pertinent) until such time as they may be put to the test of trial and experience. Here we will be "speculating"—inventing—to find new institutional forms better to meet a social problem.

Our reasoning here is within and derived from the propositions with which this paper opened. We will apply them to the peculiar conditions of western public grazing land management and use.

1. The public grazing land manager will be concerned, normally, with long-run rather than short-run returns and with investments for conservation first and for long-run development second; he will be little or not at all concerned with costs and returns relative to current productive use of the resource; he will thus distort inputs in the direction of long-run future returns. And because his time discount factor is smaller (normally) than that of the private firm, he will direct investment inputs towards even more distant returns than will the private firm. When the time patterns of costs and returns are not comparable as between public and private firms, maximization of net product is jeopardized.

2. As long as the public land manager insists on absolute liberty to alter the use to which the grazing land is committed or to change the user to which it is rationed, the private firm user has limited security of expectations relative to long-run returns from such investments in the land as he may wish to make, and will distort his inputs toward short-run returns, including deterioration of the land resource. Furthermore, because of the peculiarly close relations between publicly and privately owned range resources in the western grazing industry, the private firm will feel insecure regarding the investments it has or may wish to make in its privately owned land resources.

3. Control over or access to adequate capital funds to finance investments in public grazing land (together with capital to finance other resources in the grazing firm) to the level of maximum economic productivity may be unequal as between the private firm and the public land managing firm. Under current economic conditions, the private firms are, in general, well supplied with capital for adequate long-run investments and, given security of expectations, are anxious to make such investments because of low interest rates, high income taxes, and the high level of prospective marginal returns to meat and wool production. The public land managing

firms, on the other hand, find it difficult (in the light of fifty years of experience it can be said they have found it impossible) to secure adequate funds from Congress for the needed investment in conservation and development of these public grazing lands. Such chronic inadequacy of public funds seems to derive from public apathy towards the need for such investments and from competition for public funds from other claimants with more appeal. Furthermore, given security of expectations, those private firms not possessing capital adequate in amount for economic long-run investments can and will obtain it in the private capital market. It seems evident that greatly expanded investments in conservation and development of public grazing resources would result from a greater degree of security of expectations granted to private firms.

4. Given security of expectations, the private grazing firm will be able to allocate inputs as between short-run and long-run returns to maximize returns from the resources comparable to those of the firm that owns its resources outright.

5. Security of expectations, in the above sense, implies a tenure arrangement comparable to contract, for reasonably long terms, enforceable in the courts, and transferable.

Principles of action

Propositions 1 through 4 above are empirical generalizations; proposition 5 is a definition. Test of the validity of propositions 1 through 4 awaits empirical research. If, however, they are accepted as true and valid, it follows that the problem will be solved (under circumstances where the public grazing land cannot be transferred outright to private ownership) by the following principles of action (which are simply hypotheses until tested by empirical evidence and experience):

1. The public land manager must decide (within the context of theory and relative to ends not herein discussed) to what uses the public land shall be put and in what proportion of intensities as between such uses.

2. The public land manager must decide upon and carry out a rationing plan by which it will be decided to whom grazing uses to be permitted on the public land will be allocated. (The goals to be attained by such rationing and the theory within which their realization must be analyzed have not been discussed in this paper.)

3. But once it has been decided what intensity of grazing use will be permitted on the public land and to whom it will be rationed, such uses must be assigned to the grazing firms with a reasonable degree of security of expectations on the part of the private firm so that it will be able to realize gains and losses from investments and decisions made by it relative to such resources.

4. Reasonable security of expectations requires that the grazing resource be made available by a long-run (even perpetual) contract that is renewable (if not perpetual), enforceable in the courts and transferable. If the contract is not perpetual, it should be for a sufficient number of years to permit the private firm fully to depreciate such investments as it may make for conservation or enhanced productivity.

5. Not all investments for conservation and development will or should be made by the private firm in the first few years of such a contract. It would be desirable that such investments be made by the firm continuously throughout its tenure. Consequently, no economically valid date for contract termination will ever occur. Two alternatives are possible: (*a*) perpetual contracts freely transferable by the private firm, purchasable by the public firm at a negotiated (or condemnation) price should the public firm wish to change the grazing allocation; or (*b*) term-of-year contracts which provide that unexhausted investments at the time of contract termination shall be appraised by a specified means, and the new allottee (or the government) must pay such appraised price for the unexhausted investments if the contract is not reexecuted with the same grazing firm.

6. Rental fees for the use of grazing privileges by private firms should be set at their full economic value (*a*) so as not to distort allocations of capital resources by making such publicly furnished grazing unduly cheap, and (*b*) so as not to provide windfall gains to first allottees of public grazing. (The context of theory within which such values would be determined has not been discussed in this paper.)

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A Rounded Land Conservation Program

By Charles M. Hardin

THIS article deals primarily with a federal program for farm and ranch lands in private ownership in the United States, proposing a reorientation of present efforts toward the objective of "improved farm family living on a conservation base." Conservation is taken to mean development and use as much as protection against aggravated erosion and soil depletion. A "rounded" program is not one which presents no "angles" for exploitation by organized interests; rather it is one designed in recognition of the relationship of land use to other resources and to the relevant pattern of human activities.

Present Programs

The 1945 census reports 5,860,000 farms and ranches which include 1,142,000,000 acres or 60 per cent of the area of continental United States. What are the present land conservation programs in this area? How may they be redirected? [1]

The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) is a bureau of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) which assists farmers to develop and apply complete farm plans in accordance with the principle that "each acre of agricultural land" shall be used "within its capabilities" and treated "in accordance with its needs for protection and improvement." This has now become the "basic physical objective of soil-conservation activities" of the USDA.[2] The SCS co-operates with farmers through memoranda of understanding with soil conservation districts which are established under state enabling acts and now number approximately 2,400. Annual SCS appropriations are about $55 million double the amount available in 1940; some 94 per cent goes for "assistance to soil conservation districts and other co-operators." [3]

The SCS makes a conservation survey, similar to a soil survey, of co-operators' farms, helps to develop farm plans, and assists in applying the plans. In February 1951, SCS reported that some 900,000 farm plans had been made. But application proceeds slowly. After eighteen years, less than 10 per cent of the farm land in twenty-seven states had been "treated" in accordance with the SCS plans.[4]

The Department's other major "action" program of soil conservation is administered by the Production and Marketing Administration (PMA). It dates from the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 which Congress passed to replace the original Agricultural Adjustment Act that the Supreme Court had invalidated. The 1936 act authorized annual appropriations of $500 million for conservation payments to farmers; but the object was to increase farm incomes and to attain by financial rewards what the Court had just declared could not be accomplished by regulation, namely, the control of production. Appropriations approximated the authorization in early years, fell below $400 million for the first time in fiscal 1945, reached a low of $150 million in fiscal 1949, and currently amount to $256 million, which is near the average for the past eight years.[5]

The PMA conservation program is extensive, while that of SCS is intensive. In the early years, payments were earned chiefly by staying within the "soil depleting base" allotted to farms. When acreage allotments and production quotas were generally removed early in the war, the conservation program was shifted; payments could be earned only by specific performance as approved by the local committees (then of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration; since 1945, of the PMA); and participation declined somewhat, although the program continues to reach some three million farms annually. Considerable friction has existed between PMA and SCS; numerous efforts to combine the two programs culminated in Memorandum 1278 of February 1951, which aims at co-ordination at all levels. But friction and dissatisfaction continue, and the organization of the USDA is not necessarily settled.[6]

Criticisms of PMA Program

Meanwhile, the conservation program of PMA continues to be criticized as stressing annual practices rather than long-run conservation farm plans,[7] as reimbursing farmers for what they would do anyway, as distributing the bulk of payments to farmers who need them least,[8] as representing undue expenditures in view of the federal budgetary situation, as providing an unhappy example of duplication of activities, and as maintaining an unhealthy dependence of farmers on payments from the Federal Government. Behind these criticisms are the fears, especially of the Farm Bureau and the colleges of agriculture, of the political power inherent in the PMA committee system.[9]

In addition, the co-operative agricultural Extension Service of the USDA and the land-grant colleges is involved. Its current budget of approximately $76 million (of which the Federal Government currently supplies about 43 per cent) enables a considerable range of educational, informational, and other kinds of services to farmers. A large, although undetermined, proportion of Extension's activities are closely related to improvement of land use. Relevant also are the co-operative researches of the USDA and the experiment stations of the colleges of agriculture. Thus, the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering currently spends some $2,750,000 on "soils, fertilizers, and irrigation investigations." The state experiment stations have a total budget of some $60 million (one-fifth from federal grants) of which a considerable though unknown amount is spent on

[1] For an elaboration of many points made here, see the writer's book, *The Politics of Agriculture: Soil Conservation and the Struggle for Power in Rural America*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952; and articles, "The Politics of Conservation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, Aug. 1951; "Land or People," *Land Economics*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, May 1951; and (for the group planning approach of the Soil Conservation Service) "Natural Leaders and the Administration of Soil Conservation Programs," *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Sept. 1951.

[2] Memorandum 1278, Office of the Secretary, USDA, Feb. 15, 1951. *Hearings*, S. 1149, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 344.

[3] *Hearings*, Agricultural Appropriations, fiscal 1952, H. of R., Part 2, p. 782. The remainder of the appropriations is equally divided between research and the development and management of land utilization projects which include 7,200,000 acres.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 802–3.

[5] *Ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 60–61.

[6] Cf. the Aiken Bill, S. 1149, 82d Cong., 1st sess., *op. cit.* note 2 *supra*.

[7] *Hearings*, Agric. Approp., fiscal 1952, H. of R., Part 1, p. 618.

[8] *Ibid.*, fiscal 1948, Part 1, p. 1251. Twenty per cent of the co-operating farmers get 60 per cent of the payments.

[9] In general, midwestern and northern Farm Bureaus would eliminate PMA conservation payments, but southern Farm Bureaus want to keep them. The American Farm Bureau Federation unsuccessfully attempted to lower them to $150 million in 1951; the National Grange resolved in 1951 that they should be eliminated.

investigations directly relevant to the present inquiry.[10]

SIGNIFICANCE OF OBJECTIVES

In light of present efforts, what can be said respecting a "rounded land conservation program" for farms and ranches? The assumed need is to accommodate private interests and public purposes. Any conservation program for farm land is inevitably related to efforts to support agricultural prices and adjust agricultural production; as indicated, the conservation program of PMA originated as part of the government's major economic program for agriculture. In this program, parity has become a goal which in the thought of many farmers is to be achieved by government guarantees of specific prices for different crops and products. The public interest in economic stability in agriculture has been forcefully argued.[11] At the same time, the elevation of parity prices into *ends* of policy is strongly criticized as preventing prices and the market from performing the function of allocating resources, both within agriculture and between agriculture and other sectors of society.[12] But the vesting of emotional loyalties in parity has made it a symbol of simple economic justice for farmers, and the problem becomes one of preventing particular price levels from becoming equally sacrosanct. Thus the obligation to examine the objectives of programs becomes clear. How can such programs be restated to serve the purposes not only of improving land use but also of achieving effective agricultural adjustment in the public interest?

A somewhat similar question arises respecting soil conservation as an end in itself—as the "basic physical objective" of USDA conservation activities. The concept is appealing to those who wish to identify with some high moral purposes which cannot be called "radical" by the most unhinged imagination. Erosion is like sin; everyone is against it. But where is the cause of erosion to be found? The Chief of the Division of Soil Survey, USDA, has declared that erosion is generally a symptom. "Frequently, we find weak plant cover and declining soil fertility resulting from unstable economic conditions, bad tenure relationships, overcrowded land, poverty, disease, and wars. . . ."[13] Neither the present concept of objectives in soil conservation programs nor their current organization facilitates an attack upon the fundamental causes which Kellogg has delineated.

A PROPOSED OBJECTIVE

It is here proposed to set as a goal the improvement of farm family living on a conservation base. In stating this objective, the writer has in mind a program of research, demonstration, and extension which would take over the present SCS and become an effective guide to adjustment policy. Research should establish for typical farms the most favorable combinations of enterprises and of technologies under different assumptions about trends in the market. Imaginative and vigorous extension programs should help farmers to adopt—and adapt—the research findings. Thus what is needed is not only pilot (research) farms and demonstration farms, but also workable programs which will make the alternatives developed really available to farmers. Again Charles E. Kellogg has stated the program succinctly, and his educational objectives bear quoting: not simply for farmers "to introduce new practices rapidly and successfully," but for them to learn "*how to* use technology resulting from science in making their decisions."[14]

This restatement of objectives is advanced on grounds of judgment rather than scientific demonstration. The writer strongly believes in the importance of ideal objectives to policies and programs, and, in the present discussion, in the need for offering an ideal objective which can hope to contend successfully with the powerful appeals represented by parity prices and soil conservation as goals. It is further believed that the emphasis on farm family living stresses human beings essentially as ends rather than as means (for example, to improvement in soil conservation); second, that the new objective invites planning *farms* to make them economically more rewarding within the anticipated framework of prices in a relatively free market, instead of planning *prices* to make farming more profitable; and, third, that the shift in emphasis will invite consideration of the underlying causes of soil erosion and depletion, which tend to be overlooked in programs aimed directly at erosion control.

Arguments are at hand to sustain all these points, but no guarantee exists that the shift in objectives will fulfill the promises stated or implied above. Many agricultural economists advocated production payments as a means of supporting agricultural prices but vigorously protested the Brannan plan (which proposed such payments) because of the income support levels which it included. Likewise, improved farm family living is clearly an objective of the Family Farm Policy Review of the USDA in 1951; yet the strategy, timing, and approach of this review resulted in an aggravation of most of the differences now existing in agriculture and turned the analysis of public problems into a heated debate over political symbols. In the process, the family farm tended to become a shibboleth to the friends of the review and an anathema to its enemies.

The experience of the Family Farm Policy Review in 1951 augurs ill for the present proposal, but invalidates none of the arguments advanced in its support. Whoever wins in November 1952, some major aspects of the political situation for the next four years will be laid down. Perhaps a new approach in land conservation and related programs

[10] In addition, the agricultural program cooperatively developed by the Tennessee Valley Authority and the colleges of agriculture (especially but not exclusively in the Tennessee Valley states) should be mentioned. This program will not be discussed here. Some of the literature indicates that the TVA program can be accommodated to the suggestions made below. Cf. Norman Wengert, "TVA and Agriculture: A Study in Regional Administration," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1947; but contrast Philip M. Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots*, University of California Press, 1949. The writer prefers Wengert's analysis.

[11] Cf. John D. Black, *Parity, Parity, Parity*, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, and T. W. Schultz, *Agriculture in an Unstable Economy*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945.

[12] T. W. Schultz, *Production and Welfare in Agriculture*, New York: Macmillan, 1945.

[13] Charles E. Kellogg, "Opportunities for World Abundance," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (Aug. 1951), p. 340.

[14] "The Natural Sciences and Farm Planning," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (Proceedings Number, Feb. 1947), pp. 193 ff. Space is not available to provide details of the present proposal. That a new orientation is needed is suggested by the difficulty in estimating the effects of the SCS program; cf. *Hearings*, Agric. Approp., fiscal 1952, H. of R., Part 2, pp. 792–93, 802–3; note the importance of economic planning in all the examples presented in "Conservation Problems and Achievements on Selected Midwestern Farms," Special Circular 86, July 1951, Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station (North Central Regional Publication No. 23). Note the inclusion of the pilot farms and demonstration farms in the "Family Farm Policy Review: Provisional Report . . ." USDA, June 1951, pp. 3–4, 15, 25. See John D. Black, "Federal-State-Local Relations in Agriculture," National Planning Ass'n, Feb. 1950, pp. 40 ff., and also *The Rural Economy of New England*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.

will then be possible. How may this approach be achieved? What may be its chief organizational characteristics?

THE VIRTUES OF NEGOTIATION

Recent history suggests that negotiation is the most promising means of getting a new approach in this area. None of the interests in agriculture have been able to succeed in unilateral action. So far, at least, Secretary Brannan's plan of 1949 has failed; and so has his Family Farm Policy Review of 1951. But the Hoover Commission's Task Force for Agriculture, in which land-grant college interests were heavily represented, also fell short of reorganizing the USDA in the interests of the colleges and their allies. The powerful American Farm Bureau has been least successful in its efforts in the land conservation area. This experience suggests a return to the approaches of the 1930's (until 1938, at least), when negotiation among the agricultural interests played an important part in formulating agricultural policy. Negotiation, however, needs to be informed by a conception of the public interest—a conception which goes beyond simple identification with the various group interests involved.

SUGGESTED REORGANIZATION

The problem is by no means merely the achievement of administrative efficiency. Also involved are the organization and control of political power, and the relationships of research and educational institutions to "action" agencies. Many highly organized group interests are concerned, and a stalemate may develop which will prevent the rather drastic realignment suggested. A further complication arises because on some of the proposals new legislation would be required.

Since space is not available to present various alternatives, only one line of action will be set forth. The initial step would be to transfer the functions of SCS, assigning the conservation survey to the Soil Survey of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering and the experiment stations; the research and flood control investigations to the same Bureau, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and the experiment stations; and the activities in co-operation with farmers through soil conservation districts to the co-operative Extension Service.[15]

SCS functions at the farm level would be carried on by Extension, but a shift in emphasis would take place, so that the program would become one of farm and home planning. Presumably, many of the present SCS employees would transfer to the Extension farm and home planning program; however, as replacements in their ranks appeared, the policy would be to hire men trained especially in the economics of farm management so that the professional staff would reflect the changed direction of the program.[16]

The aim of the program should be to assist every farm in the country to develop a sound economic base; this is of the essence of agricultural adjustment. As pilot and demonstration farms were developed and means devised to facilitate the spread of the techniques and combinations widely among farmers—including that mastery of technology already mentioned—the need for close relationship to the PMA program would appear very clearly.

The assumption is that a major part of public policy for agriculture will continue to be price- or income-supporting measures, together with programs to assist agricultural adjustment toward a sounder economic footing. It is argued that the public interest will be served best if the aspect of *adjustment* in such programs is favored over the aspects of price support and production control. If so, the proposed heavy investment in *farm and home planning* should show the way and provide the means for agricultural adjustment. This statement does not imply that all agricultural adjustment has to be or ought to be made within agriculture. It is assumed that much adjustment will continue to be made by the movement of people off farms into industry and trade; nevertheless, an adjustment problem *within* agriculture remains.

ADMINISTRATION OF PAYMENTS

The chief point for relating the farm and home planning program to the adjustment program is in the administration of conservation payments. It is assumed that annual appropriations for such payments will continue. But several changes appear advisable. The initial step would be to divide the fund. One part would be available to reimburse farmers for specific performance of conservation practices listed in the current bulletins; this is the "open offer" to all qualifying farmers as the program now operates. The other part would be used to help defray whatever expenditures were needed to put a farm and home plan into effect. The object would be to shift the entire fund, over a period of years, to the second category, and it may well be that Congress should designate a time for this shift to be accomplished—say in seven years. Payments would then be made only to those farmers with farm and home plans showing a schedule of inputs—whether for conservation materials, land rehabilitation, provision of permanent improvements, acquisition of livestock, or machinery purchases. After payments had been shifted to carry out farm plans, individual farmers should be eligible for no more than five years of grants from the fund.

In addition, the writer would prefer that the fund be allocated to states and counties and eventually to farmers on some formula which would be in inverse proportion to per capita farm income. Such a shift might tend to encourage persons to remain in farming without adequate resources; but this would not need to occur if some criteria of reasonable economic size of farms could be agreed upon, with regional and local adaptations. It seems to the writer that the present allocation of funds to those who need the money least is unconscionable. To be sure, these farmers are, in a sense, custodians of an important social resource; but there are countless social resources which are not subsidized in this fashion. Should we, for example, subsidize the men of military age for maintaining physical fitness?

A delicate problem arises in administrative relationships for these proposals. On the one hand, it seems clear that the technical responsibility for farm and home planning should be vested in the research and educational agencies, as noted. On the other hand, these agencies are loath to administer, and stand accountable for, subsidy programs. At the same time, it seems vital to bring about an intimate relationship between

[15] No recommendation is offered here for the land utilization program. A problem is recognized respecting that part of flood control work which has to do with *applications* rather than surveys. To date, eleven watersheds are involved; the SCS expenditures approximate $6,000,000 annually. If SCS functions were transferred as indicated, the flood control watershed improvement program would be shifted to the research and educational agencies indicated; co-ordination would remain in the office of the Secretary. Cf. *Hearings*, Agric. Approp., fiscal 1952, H. of R., Part 2, pp. 749 ff.

[16] Present SCS personnel are chiefly engineers by training. *Hearings*, Agric. Approp., fiscal 1952, H. of R., Part 2, p. 793.

the programs for farm and home planning and for agricultural adjustment. Perhaps a solution could be found in the establishment of a joint committee of the Extension Service and the local PMA organization. This committee would agree on the farmers who, having qualified with farm and home plans, would receive grants; it would also set the amounts of the grants.

How is political favoritism to be kept out of this kind of allocation? The answer may be found in creating a widely shared understanding of the objectives of the program, in developing accepted standards for the farm and home planning program, and in establishing effective co-operation between the Extension Service and the local PMA committees in allocating the funds.

THE COSTS

The program described could probably be put into effect for less than the present outlays. Presumably some administrative savings would be realized in consolidating the major part of SCS activities with the Extension Service. The opportunity for largest savings would appear in the PMA conservation program. In 1936–50, appropriations for this program totaled $5,342,800,000. In the proposed program an annual appropriation of $150,000,000 for adjustment payments might be planned for fifteen years. After a few years, Congress might well write a schedule of future appropriations which would taper off and culminate, say, in 1967. While no Congress can bind its successor, the provision of such a schedule would be advantageous. If a situation arose in which additional direct income aids for agriculture appeared advisable, they should not be confused with conservation or (preferably) adjustment payments. It would, in any event, be extremely interesting to see whether a democracy can plan a development of this sort, carry it through, and, after a period of years, end it.[17]

WHAT OF A ROUNDED PROGRAM FOR OTHER LAND?

The foregoing suggestions assume that land programs need to be designed in relationship to other relevant public activities and to the patterns of human purpose directly involved. What emerges is not one but many programs —as many as there are bona fide farms and ranches. Public programs should promote private efforts to improve farm family living on a conservation base—and thereby help stabilize an economically sound agriculture. There is also a tacit assumption that the program suggested would help to strengthen a pattern of family farming which contributes to democratic constitutionalism.

The preceding analysis for private agricultural lands is by no means all-inclusive. Some 250,000,000 acres, or 55 per cent of the potential timberland in continental United States, is in small holdings; it should produce 30 to 40 per cent of our future timber supply. Nearly half of this is in some 3,200,000 farm wood lots. It is assumed that the program advanced earlier would have the economic use of farm wood lots as an objective and thus would contribute to forestry policy.[18] It is also assumed that the program would have beneficial effects on flood control, especially in eastern watersheds, although conflict is

[17] This suggestion is to be distinguished from the "timetable" of soil conservation, criticized in *The Politics of Agriculture* (*op. cit.* note 1 *supra*), Chap. vi, Section 4. There is no timetable for agricultural adjustment; but there could well be a time *limit* on the specific means of adjustment employed in the agricultural conservation program of PMA.

[18] Cf. Luther H. Gulick, *American Forest Policy* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1952), index under "small forest owner."

possible between agriculture and hydroelectric power respecting water conservation policy. Similar assumptions may be made for the conservation of wildlife, although conflicts of interest among sportsmen, recreationists, and farmers will certainly continue to be matters of local vexation.

The largest block of other lands is in federal ownership or administration—457,600,000 acres in continental United States, or 24 per cent of the area. Four hundred and seven million acres of this is in the eleven western states, where the United States controls land that comprises 35 per cent of the acreage in Washington up to 85 per cent in Nevada. While several agencies share in the administration of western public land, the Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture is responsible for perhaps 35 per cent of it and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, for some 40 per cent.[19]

Program development for western lands poses many problems, two of which may be briefly mentioned. First, the relationship between land and water is especially important. The President's Water Resources Policy Commission has proposed a *Water Policy for the American People*[20] which embraces multiple planning and development of resources on a grand scale. The commission emphasizes sedimentation control particularly in the West[21]—an emphasis which implies a strong case for co-ordinated planning, management, and development of land and water resources. Without attempting a systematic treatment of the numerous problems raised by such co-ordination, the writer would merely point up the following. Land management may easily be exaggerated as a means of controlling sedimentation,[22] and scientific standards for the extensive management of range lands are hard to formulate.[23] The easy assumption of the interrelatedness of land and water may prompt an uncritical acceptance of the need for consolidating the management of these different resources in one agency.[24] At the same time, the complete rejection of the idea of one agency to plan and administer the land and water resources of a region may sacrifice significant symbolic values. The tension between accepted obligations and actual accomplishments has been stimulated by the regional agency approach.[25]

[19] Marion Clawson, *Uncle Sam's Acres* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1951), pp. 148–50.

[20] Volume I of the Commission's report. Vol. II is *Ten Rivers in America's Future;* Vol. III, *Water Resources Law.* A final report was made public on Feb. 17, 1952. The first three volumes were published in 1950. All are available at the Government Printing Office.

[21] Cf. Vol. II, pp. 13 (Columbia), 215–20 (Missouri), 297 ff. (Rio Grande), and 408 (Colorado).

[22] The reservoir of the Boysen Dam on the Big Horn River (Wyoming) will be depleted in an estimated fifty years by silt. Forty per cent of the silt apparently comes from one creek, which is only 5 per cent of the watershed; but only 10 per cent of the silt from this creek comes from range and irrigated lands. The rest comes from the stream bed and banks. *Ibid.*, Vol. II.

[23] See Reed W. Bailey, "Problems Ahead in Wildland Research," *Journal of Forestry,* Vol. 44, No. 11, Nov. 1946. Dr. Bailey is director of the Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, Forest Service, Ogden, Utah. Research can develop "practical guides" for the wildland manager, apparently to supplement (but certainly not to replace) his experience and judgment. The implications of this brief article for management are profound.

[24] Charles McKinley, "The Valley Authority and Its Alternatives," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (Sept. 1950), especially p. 617.

[25] Norman Wengert, "TVA—Symbol and Reality," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. XIII, No. 3, Aug. 1951.

Second, what of the proposal to transfer the Bureau of Land Management from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture?[26] Proponents argue that the public domain would be managed better in Agriculture. The BLM has been strapped for funds and has allegedly "virtually lost control of the range."[27] Many will agree that the activities concerned are now underfinanced and that the historical record of the Forest Service is better than land-management agencies of Interior can offer. Before the transfer is approved, however, two arguments should be carefully weighed. First, the vigorous leadership enjoyed by the BLM since 1948 might be given a few more years to demonstrate what it can do.[28] Second, the proposed consolidation would create an agency of considerable power. A careful study should be made of the amount of authority thus to be concentrated before this step is taken.[29]

[26] Proposed by the Hoover Commission's Task Force for Agriculture (see "Agriculture Activities," Appendix M, Jan. 1949), as well as by the Hoover Commission itself in its report "The Department of Agriculture," Feb. 1949. The proposal has been incorporated in S. 1149; see *Hearings*, S. 1149, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 15. Most of the organizations appearing favored the transfer, with the exception of the livestock groups. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 535 ff.

[27] "Management of Public Land Resources," *Yale Law Journal*, March 1951; reprinted in *Hearings*, S. 1149 (previous note); but cf. Clawson, *op. cit.* note 19 *supra*, pp. 282–96. The Bureau of the Budget is currently studying the matter; *Hearings*, S. 1149, pp. 209 ff.

[28] The BLM has moved to meet some objections. Regarding BLM's failure to "adopt a long-range program of retention-dam construction, terracing, and stream-bank protection" (*Hearings*, S. 1149, p. 65), see BLM, "Rebuilding the Federal Range" (1951).

[29] The considerable power which becomes concentrated—or spearheaded—in public agencies is shown for the United States Engineering Department by Arthur Maass, *Muddy Waters*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951, and for relevant agricultural agencies in the writer's *Politics of Agriculture*, *op. cit.* note 1 *supra*.

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The Work of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission

By ROBERT G. SNIDER

ON December 11, 1950, slightly more than eleven months after its establishment, the President's Water Resources Policy Commission presented *the first of its three volumes.* This document[1] was the product of the efforts of a Commission of seven members, working with a professional staff of seventeen, twenty-two consultants, and the periodic assistance of almost two hundred federal agency personnel.

Within approximately eight months this group had drawn and analyzed information from each federal agency involved with water in any way, from numerous agencies in each state and territory, from sixty colleges and universities, and from 196 private organizations and agencies. Eight meetings in various parts of the country elicited comment on water problems from about one-quarter of the two thousand people who attended. With this mass of information, the Commission proceeded to study, and make recommendations to the President with respect to, *Federal* responsibility for and participation in the development, utilization, and conservation of water resources, including related land uses and other public purposes to the extent that they are directly concerned with water resources. . . . give consideration in particular to (a) the extent and character of *Federal Government participation* in major water-resources programs, (b) an appraisal of the priority of water-resources programs from the standpoint of economic and social need, (c) criteria and standards for evaluating the feasibility of water-resources projects, and (d) desirable legislation or changes in existing legislation relating to the development, utilization and conservation of water resources.[2]

The Commission members were: Paul S. Burgess, dean, College of Agriculture, University of Arizona; Lewis Webster Jones, president, University of Arkansas; Samuel B. Morris, general manager, Metropolitan Water District, Los Angeles; Leland Olds, former chairman, Federal Power Commission; Roland R. Renne, president, Montana State College; Gilbert F. White, president, Haverford College; and Morris L. Cooke, consulting engineer, Philadelphia *(chairman)*.

GROWTH OF WATER POLICY

Water, as a basic resource, has suffered from lack of man's understanding. Our easy acceptance of its availability in humid areas and our uncoordinated policies for its development in the arid regions suggest the casual treatment we have given it. Fragmentary federal water policy began as early as 1879 with the recognition of the relationship between navigation and flood control. In 1891, by authorizing the establishment of National Forests, the Congress recognized the connections between forest cover and flood prevention and stream flow control. Federal development of the waters of the West was authorized by the Reclamation Act of 1902, amplified in 1906. By 1907 congressional attention was being focused on the need for co-ordinating ex-

[1] President's Water Resources Policy Commission, *A Water Policy for the American People*, Vol. I, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 309. Italics ours. It should be noted that primary emphasis is directed toward federal policy and participation.

isting water agencies.[3] In appointing an Inland Waterways Commission that year to "evolve a comprehensive plan designed for benefit of the entire country," Theodore Roosevelt said:

> Every stream should be used to its utmost. No stream can be so used unless such use is planned for in advance. When such plans are made, we shall find that, instead of interfering, one use can often be made to assist another. Each river system, from its headwaters in the forest to its mouth on the coast, is a single unit and should be treated as such.[4]

It is this thesis that serves as one of the main points of the Commission's program.

In the last half-century there has been a growing awareness of the desirability of multipurpose development, and of treating entire river systems as wholes. But haphazard legal and administrative growth has left us without a comprehensive national water policy or a co-ordinated group of responsible agencies.

INCREASED USE CONTEMPLATED

The Commission based its report on the assumption of an expanding economy. The implications of this assumption are broad. In addition to our currently increasing rate of population growth, which may give us a national total of as much as 200–300 million by the year 2000, according to Joseph S. Davis,[5] our rate of water use has shown even more rapid growth. Between 1939 and 1949, according to a recent study, 2,252 industrial plants increased their water intake by an average of 36 per cent.[6] A national survey of groundwater problems, sponsored by the Conservation Foundation, points out that current use of water may be doubled within a few decades.[7]

This growth may call for extensive legal and administrative adjustments, but from the point of view of the water supply itself, there is ample room for such increased use. By way of illustration, it is interesting to note that of the total rainfall in the United States, approximately 30 per cent is runoff, available for man's use. But of that runoff, only 4 per cent is now "used" by man—a mere 14 per cent of that available to him.[8] Much of this is susceptible of reuse, often many times.

Thus, except in the arid West, water resources are, as far as gross quantities go, available for greatly expanded use, if the facilities and administrative machinery can be established to realize the potential in an equitable manner. To define what the role of the Federal Government should be in future development was the task of the Commission.

PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING

Federal water policy must be the result of creative joint effort by individuals as well as government at all levels. Early in its report, the Commission outlines the requirements of democratic planning:

> The American system succeeds only as it encourages initiative, enterprise, and a sense of responsibility for the common good. No "plan" can be acceptable which weakens or fails to use these qualities. The recommendations of this report do indeed envisage long-range plans for each river basin, and an over-all water resources plan for the Nation as a whole. But both in the detailed formulation of these plans and in their operation, individual farmers, workers, and businessmen, as well as agencies of local, State, and Federal Government, will play an indispensable and fully responsible part.

The Federal Government is clearly charged with responsibility for safeguarding and developing our resources, but it is only one of the agencies involved. Its specific role is one of leadership—the provision of relevant scientific and economic information and co-ordination, as well as a public investment function on behalf of the entire Nation. These functions aid and supplement, but can never supplant, the work of local individuals and groups directly concerned.[9]

Further planning principles are set forth. Each regional plan should be comprehensive and co-ordinated, based on the concept of multiple use. Plans should arise from present or prospective requirements, and be designed to meet them on a regional, state, or local basis. In all, there is a body of recommendations on which general agreement exists—as the Water Policy Panel of the Engineers Joint Council notes.[10] Plans should be based on adequate data. Congress should create an independent board of review. The investment appraisal statement should be complete. Uniform procedures should be used by all agencies in estimating costs and benefits. Congress should provide a uniform national reimbursement policy and specify the principles to be applied. Reimbursement should be secured for direct benefits and for local secondary benefits. All levels of government—federal, state, and local—should participate in planning.

The Engineers Joint Council points out that "despite some references to local and state participation, *the emphasis in the report is almost universally on federal direction and control.*"[11] And this is the general tenor of much of the criticism directed at the Commission's argument. But it should be noted that "the Commission favors full participation by the states to the extent that they accept the broad responsibility which goes with such participation,"[12] indicating, however, the problems of limited funds and inadequately trained personnel in state planning groups. That much remains to be done by the states themselves has been brought out during a study now being sponsored by the Conservation Foundation, conducted by the University of Pittsburgh Law School. Here, in a state generally acknowledged as "advanced" in conservation, some twenty state agencies, controlled and affected by 663 state and federal laws and regulations dealing with water in Pennsylvania, have never had the benefit of a compendium of these interrelated laws.

FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY

Another basic point which several critics question is the Commission's emphasis on financial feasibility as distinguished from economic feasibility. In developing recommendations for evaluation of projects, the Water Resources Policy Commission deals with the various effects of water resources programs on the economy, pointing out the significance of intangible as well as tangible benefits, and emphasizing social benefits of regional and national scope.

The relationship between total costs and total returns would indicate the extent to which the program or project would be financially feasible.

Financial feasibility has been urged by some as the determining factor in evaluation, that is, they believe that all water re-

[3] *Op. cit.* note 1, p. 309.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 296.
[5] Joseph S. Davis, "Our Changed Population Outlook and Its Significance," Address before Stanford Research Club, Nov. 14, 1951.
[6] *Water in Industry* (New York: National Association of Manufacturers and the Conservation Foundation, Dec. 1950), p. 11.
[7] Harold E. Thomas, *The Conservation of Ground Water* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951), p. 10.
[8] President's Water Resources Policy Commission, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 177.
[9] *Op. cit.* note 1, pp. 7–8.
[10] *A Water Policy for the United States* (New York: Engineers Joint Council, 1951), p. 2.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[12] President's Water Resources Policy Commission, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 49.

sources projects should be self-liquidating. This view implies that Federal agencies should seek out sound business opportunities wherever they may be found in the water resources field.

The basic fallacy in such reasoning is that it seeks to transfer to public investments the limitations common to private investments. The Federal Government seeks to conserve and develop the Nation's natural resources for the general welfare and not for profit. Hence, financial feasibility is not the same as economic feasibility. Financial costs and returns should be considered in analysis, but financial feasibility alone should not determine the desirability of a program or project. For this reason the Commission is recommending that Congress eliminate the requirement that irrigation projects show financial feasibility.[18]

On the general principle evoked here, the Water Policy Panel of the Engineers Joint Council *"must record distinct disagreement."* Collective action for water conservation and control should be accomplished at the lowest governmental level practical. When collective action is taken through the Federal Government, the Council recommends as policy:

> First, to do those things which are essential to the national defense or otherwise of substantial benefit to all of the people throughout the nation; and
>
> Second, to aid in the financing of the cost of construction of works for the benefit of a limited number of people on terms equitable to all other citizens of the nation.

In the discharge of the first function the Federal Government is acting as a trustee in the disbursement of tax revenues on a non-reimbursable basis for the general benefit. It follows that such expenditures should be made for those purposes which will produce the greatest benefits to the nation as a whole. This responsibility goes far beyond any determination of feasibility; it requires a determination of what is best, not merely what is good.

[18] *Op. cit.* note 1, p. 59.

In its performance of the second function the Federal Government is basically acting as a banker responsible for the soundness of his loans. It is fundamental to this function that such loans should be repaid with interest so long as there is a national debt and that the period of amortization should not exceed the useful life of the works. It is also fundamental to this function that those who benefit directly from the construction of such works for the conservation and control of water should repay all costs properly allocable to the production of such benefits; furthermore, where indirect benefits will accrue to a region in greater degree than to the nation as a whole, the people in that region should repay a like proportion of all costs not allocable to production of direct benefits.[14]

Question of Federal Control

Reporting to the Water Problems Section of the Commonwealth Club of California, Sinclair O. Harper, section chairman and former chief engineer of the United States Bureau of Reclamation, points out that the greatest justification for the trend toward federal control of water resources development lies in

> projects too large for state or local development; projects whose benefits are largely interstate or national, such as navigation and flood control; projects serving a number of purposes—irrigation, flood control, navigation, power, recreation, etc.—but unlikely to be developed by local or state agencies without federal subsidies.[15]

He further notes that under a 1940 Supreme Court ruling, federal authority may control virtually all major streams.[16] He also suggests the desirability for local agencies to obtain operative authority over their water projects, even to the extent of returning to the Federal Treasury all reimbursable project costs.

[14] *Principles of a Sound National Water Policy* (New York: Engineers Joint Council, July 1951), pp. 20–21.

[15] Sinclair O. Harper, "Water Development —Federal, State, Local Fields?" *The Commonwealth*, Vol. XXVI, Part Two (Sept. 24, 1951), p. 5.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

However, a poll of the members of the Commonwealth Club's Water Problems Section shows 43 per cent voting in favor of continuing the policy of federal *financing* of major water resource developments, although more than 95 per cent favor giving the Federal Government less responsibility in such developments.[17] This is indicative of the continued conflict which has hampered our water development to date—the attitude expressed as "Give us the federal funds, but let us spend them ourselves."

Much of the controversial nature of the Water Policy Commission's recommendations centers around the character and the extent of local and state participation in water resources development. The National Association of Manufacturers, for example, while commending the Commission for its thorough compilation of material for study of the problem, takes issue with any type of river basin development plan similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority.

> The Association again states its firm conviction that the American people have progressed, and will continue to progress and prosper better under the present system that depends to a maximum degree on individual initiative, resourcefulness, and responsibility, and self and local control, than they would under a socialistic government, the seeds of which are inherent in the Commission's proposals for basin-wide developments.[18]

To avoid such a situation, the NAM committee favors interstate compacts or intrastate conservancy or development boards. It may be pointed out here that some of the more noteworthy of these have in fact, despite their widely acclaimed grass-roots character, received most of their funds from federal sources.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[18] Recommendations of the Committee on Conservation of Renewable Natural Resources to the September 1951 NAM Board of Directors Meeting (mimeo.).

Responsibility and Control

David M. Guy, then manager of the Natural Resources Department of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, dealing with the general water development problem, recognizes the connection between financial responsibility and control:

> In all development of water resources, it must be borne in mind that responsibility and control are inseparable. And to the extent that federal responsibility, financial or otherwise, is accepted, it goes without saying that there will be, and must be, a commensurate share of control. Financial responsibility without control is not tenable in private enterprise. It cannot be expected in government. Conversely the more financial responsibility the states and communities assume in river development, the less they will be troubled with federal intervention.[19]

This is perhaps the crux of the matter. Federal control should be kept at a minimum not only because of American tradition (a strong point in the NAM and the Edison Electric Institute arguments against the Commission's recommendations) but also because local participation, particularly financial, is likely to make the direct beneficiaries insist on the most efficient utilization of their funds.

A Complex Situation

But individual developments locally planned are unlikely to provide the de-

[19] "Background for Development of Water Problems and Policy" (Washington: Chamber of Commerce of the U. S., Oct. 23, 1951, mimeo.), p. 11.

gree of co-ordination necessary to develop the integrated system required for wise use of the renewable resources in areas linked by a common water course. Treatment of these broad areas is complex and difficult. It is relatively easy to propose a particular dam. It is definite as to location and objectives and cost. And on this information the Congress acts. However, a dam is only a part of the whole development. Without upstream treatment, silt deposition may destroy the investment; or a dam allowing for stream flow peaks, which might be susceptible of reduction by land treatment, may require unreasonable expenditures. Without integration of various developments, the river is a collection of unconnected fragments. Over-all planning for its use, taking into account local needs, is imperative.

The widely varying laws dealing with federal (and state) water development help to complicate an already complex problem. Arthur Maass, a careful student of federal water administration, points out the need for a basic law setting forth detailed standards and criteria for determining priorities among proposed water development projects.[20] Uniform standards would go a long way toward overcoming the inequities which now permit competition between federal agencies in water development. This competition does much to bring about the conflict which arises when local groups on the one hand urge local development of water resources, and on the other hand turn to the Federal Government—and nonbeneficiary taxpayers —to foot the bill.

PROPOSED FEDERAL ORGANIZATION

To put its recommendations into action, the Commission has presented a proposed bill[21] to the President. At this writing, no action has been taken, nor has it, or any like bill, been presented to the Congress, although various agencies and the Bureau of the Budget have been studying the proposal.

The legislation outlines in general terms the character of federal organization for water resources development and sets up commissions in river basins in composition suggestive of the informal Inter-Agency River Basin Committees. These commissions are to consist of nine members, representing the Corps of Engineers, the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce, the United States Public Health Service, and the Federal Power Commission, two nongovernmental representatives elected by a local advisory committee, and a presidentially appointed chairman. The last three must be residents of the region. These commissions are required to prepare a long-range program for *federal* participation in the region's resource development, co-ordinate and require co-operative *federal* resource development functions, and recommend specific legislative changes to achieve the objectives of the act.

To advise and serve as liaison with the public, the bill provides that the governors of states within an established river basin shall each appoint a personal representative and elect three representatives for the basin from agriculture, from business, from labor, and from fish, wildlife, and recreational interests, and a sufficient number from local governments to complete the committee's membership of twenty-five. These representatives are responsible to consult with their commission in the long-range program planning, to assist in co-ordination of commission and state and local resource developments, and to help in negotiation of repayment agreements from state and local indirect beneficiaries.

In addition, a five-man Federal Board of Review is to co-ordinate the operations of the various basin commissions, examine the relation of commission proposals to costs, benefits, and long-range programs, and, after consideration of the various factors involved, make recommendations through the President to the Congress. These recommendations, under the proposed bill, would serve as a guide to congressional action.

OUTWORKINGS OF PROPOSALS

In this Board of Review one finds for the first time in federal organization an agency which could, for example, weigh in national terms the merits of expensive water developments in the arid West against those in longer-established agricultural regions. Such a board could be responsive to local claims for well-planned, locally financed developments as part of integrated programs. But most important, this board has the opportunity of recommending federal expenditure on a rational basis and opposing pork-barrel efforts. With wisdom and objectivity, it should be a major force in long-range resource conservation. Its membership and the precepts under which it operates are of vital importance to the nation's welfare.

In the proposed legislation the possibilty for local developments (private or public) to arise independent of a basin-wide plan is not dealt with specifically, but there appears to be no major barrier to private and local initiative. Local participation is provided for by advisory committees and by the system of negotiated repayment agreements with state and local beneficiaries, including conservancy districts. The legislation recommended by the Water Resources Policy Commission offers a brake on unconsidered or ill-conceived programs of individual pressure groups. It provides a basis for uniform standards for each agency's projects, and a review of interrelated problems.

The submission through the Commission and the Board of Review of the various agency budgets for their resource development activities would favor a co-ordination of effort which has been grievously lacking. Instead of the artificial device of budgeting in terms of a given agency's program throughout the country, priorities for balanced development in specific areas by all agencies could be established. The needs of one agency would be functionally linked to those of others.

The device of reimbursement, by others as well as by direct beneficiaries, recognizes the merit of local participation. Since agreements must be negotiated, rather than taxes levied on the entire body politic, there is additional control over ill-conceived projects, and promise of a more equitable basis for local assumption of financial responsibility.

Uniform accounting systems, including a weighing of nondollar advantages and disadvantages, would make it possible to consider in comparable terms the economic feasibility of various projects in a development program. In all, the draft bill meets a number of important requirements for effective operation.

As the Commission says, "There is a sobering finality in the construction of a river basin development. . . ." A Board of Review, a group of river basin commissions, and local advisory groups can lay plans with well-rounded objectives for the consideration of the people involved, local residents and distant taxpayers. Informed, deliberate action by individuals immediately concerned with the development

[20] "Congress and Water Resources," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (Sept. 1950), pp. 592–93.

[21] Draft of a Water Resources Act of 1951, President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Feb. 1951, Released Feb. 11, 1952 (processed).

and use of resources is necessary in an expanding economy. Full utilization of resources must take into account their interdependence; some body must be charged with the responsibility of interrelating their development on a scale commensurate with the complex values of these interrelated resources.

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Water: West

By MORRIS E. GARNSEY [1]

Conservation is one of the least popular words in any lexicon in this country. I regret that we didn't name it development. Since it is a land-use problem, development would be a more accurate label, because conservation suggests to the fisherman that we don't want him to catch any fish, to the hunter that we don't want him to hunt, and to the axman that we don't want him to cut. All of this is wrong. If you say development you've got everybody on your side even if development is the most destructive thing in the world.[2]

THESE words offered sound advice when they were written fourteen years ago by Tom Wallace, one of the great champions of conservation in America. Today they have an added ring of prophecy about them—at least as far as the great American West is concerned; for the idea of development appeals to the westerner, not only because of its affinity with the traditional expansionist views of the frontiersman, but also because of an increasing realization among westerners that the new wave of population growth in the United States is certain to result in a relatively large acceleration of economic activity throughout the western United States during the years ahead.

WESTERN POPULATION INCREASE

It now seems reasonable to estimate that the population of continental United States will reach 200 million by 1975—an increase of approximately one-third in twenty-five years. Should this be the case, the rate of increase of the population of the seventeen western states is certain to exceed the national increase by a substantial margin. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that this group of states, which accounted for 22.6 per cent of total United States population in 1950, should provide residence for as much as 30 to 33⅓ per cent of the population in 1975. This would mean a rise in western population from 34 million in 1950 to approximately 60 to 65 million in 1975. Thus, when national population grows by 33⅓ per cent, the population of the West is likely to rise by 75 to 95 per cent!

Obviously, such a large growth of western population would require a heavy migration to the region from the rest of the United States. However, there is good reason to expect that such a migration will take place. The westward movement has accelerated when total population has been rising rapidly, and decelerated when population increase has been more moderate. It is relevant to note that the center of population moved farther west between 1941 and 1950 than in any previous decade since 1881–90.

Historic parallel is in itself not a conclusive basis for forecasting. Much

[1] I wish to acknowledge with thanks the contribution to this article of the students in my Graduate Seminar in Regional Economics, both in the preparation of the following research papers and in general discussion of water resources development in the West: H. L. Bacon, "The Central Valley of California"; R. L. Bingham, "Water: Key to the Future in the Colorado River Basin"; R. L. Hasse, "The Missouri Valley"; W. G. Neahr, "The Upper Arkansas River Basin"; J. V. Walther, "The Rio Grande River Basin"; and J. E. Wood, "Conservation of Water in the Columbia River Basin."

[2] Tom Wallace, "Getting Publicity for Conservation," condensed from *Forestry News Digest* and appearing in *Conservation*, Vol. 5 (Jan.–Feb. 1939), pp. 30–31.

more significant is the fact that the westward movement is now, as in the past, closely related to the need for bringing new land under cultivation in order to feed a growing number if persons. By 1975 the United States should have added at least 100 million acres of cropland to the approximately 400 million acres in use in 1950 in order to serve the extra 50 million persons then at the nation's dinner table. Much of this land must come from the West, and nearly all of the western share must be irrigated land. According to Wesley R. Nelson, assistant commissioner of reclamation, there are nearly 50 million acres of potentially irrigable land in the seventeen western states which under cultivation would yield crops equivalent to the produce of 100–150 million acres of average nonirrigated cropland.[3] Thus, the West could, in a pinch, supply nearly all the additional cropland needed by this country in 1975.

In addition, the West could supply most of the other resources required by a larger population, particularly mineral fuels and fertilizers, forest products, and hydroelectric power. In short, most of the unutilized natural resources of the United States are to be found in the West, and it is in the West that many of our new citizens may be expected to locate.

Technological Possibilities

Of course, it should be recognized that the precise extent and character of western development will not be determined simply by the direct pressure of population, but will be significantly affected also by the nature of the technological and social innovations which may be expected to accompany our imminent population upsurge. In the area of technology, three possibilities may be mentioned.

First, if Krilium turns out to be as effective for soil-rebuilding as its discoverers promise, much of the new acreage to be brought under cultivation may be found in the submarginal lands of the United States east of the 20-inch rainfall line.

On the other hand, if the technique of controlled precipitation through cloud-seeding develops rapidly, western expansion will be greatly facilitated. At the moment, the potentialities of cloud-seeding are being debated vigorously, with the skeptics having a bit the best of it. Nevertheless, the continued improvement of new techniques is a commonplace of our civilization. It seems a fair judgment to say that in 1952 the technique of cloud-seeding is about as far advanced as was that of the airplane when the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk. If the analogy holds, the controlled increase of the snow pack in the high mountains as a means of regulating the supply of irrigation water throughout the West ought to be commonplace by 1975; while in certain areas the control of precipitation for direct application to crops and pasture would be regularly practiced.

The third technological factor of significance for the future of land and water development in the West does not involve substantial innovation, but does require an immense extension of existing techniques, together with their refinement and adaptation to diverse circumstances. This is the diversion of water from where it happens to flow by virtue of natural forces to wherever it can be used most efficiently. Such transfers of water involve the construction of dams, reservoirs, canals, and hydroelectric pumping plants on a very large scale. Certainly the Bureau of Reclamation could not speak of "50 million potentially irrigable" acres of western land if it did not assume the fullest use of facilities for the storage and transfer of water on every natural stream of any consequence throughout the West. Indeed, it is well known that a water utilization program of great magnitude is already under construction or survey in each of the major drainage basins of the West. It is from this technique of storage and transfer that we may expect most of the more immediate expansion of land and water resource utilization throughout the seventeen western states.

[3] Wesley R. Nelson, *Water and Our Future* (U. S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation), p. 7. An extension and revision of remarks made at a symposium on "Hydrodynamics in Modern Technology" at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 4–6, 1951.

Hindering Factors

However, the rate of economic expansion in the West will depend not only upon technology but also upon the ease of adaptation of social institutions to changes in the economic and technological environment. It is here that we may introduce into our discussion a consideration of the problem of water (and land) conservation in the West. For while it seems inevitable that there will be a large degree of resources development in the West for the reasons just given, it is by no means certain that this development will be accompanied by the employment of practices and techniques of conservation on an equally large scale.

Not all the people of the West regard conservation and development as integral parts of the same process, as Tom Wallace would have us do. There is a sizable minority of standpat western "conservationists" who apparently would prefer to preserve much of the region in a primitive state, unpolluted by settlers and tourists. There is an even stronger minority who, as Wallace indicated, favor development as long as they can equate it with the unregulated private destruction of the resource base.

The western conservationist's first task, therefore, is to persuade these two aggressive minorities of the cogency of the majority view—that conservation and development must go hand in hand, and that a sound program for the utilization of resources over time is most easily conceived and implemented in a period, such as that just ahead, when new resources are being brought into employment and old ones are being utilized more intensively than before. Nevertheless, it is not likely that the mere use of exhortation would result in the conversion of the minorities to a sound conservationist point of view. Persuasiveness should rather take the form of the creation of a well-conceived policy and a carefully thought-out program for the future development and conservation of the West's water resources—a policy and program which could not ignore the values of recreation and open space, nor deny to the individual the opportunity to develop resources for private profit.

Policy and Practice

Fortunately, there has been rapid progress in the formulation of water policy in the recent past. The sixty-eight-point declaration of policy published by the President's Water Resources Policy Commission in December 1950 gives us for the first time a broad, clear-cut concept of the specific policies which must be implemented by the American people if we are to develop our resources successfully and arrest their all too rapid destruction. The emphasis on basin-wide, multiple-purpose resource planning by the Commission is particularly helpful, while its recommendations concerning the

evaluation, financing, and reimbursement features of development programs go far toward achieving the ultimate solutions to these knotty problems. It is true that some of the Commission's recommendations are controversial, and are not acceptable to many who are seriously concerned with conservation and development. Nevertheless, the major recommendations deserve universal approbation, and, for the West, the Report of the Commission is not only valuable but also exceedingly well timed.

Nevertheless, declarations of policy cannot in themselves stop erosion, control floods, or generate hydroelectric power. Our policies now must be implemented by the formulation of effective programs and the drafting of adequate plans—particularly in the field of conservation. For at the present time conservation planning in the West is lagging behind development projects, and conservation practice is lagging even further behind current development. Both planning and action are severely handicapped by inadequate local participation and by jurisdictional disputes among federal agencies and state governments—in short, by the failure of social institutions to keep pace with technological change or with the growing national demand for food and fibers.

The Rio Grande Basin

Perhaps the most appalling conservation situation is in the Rio Grande Basin, an area of severe water shortage, already suffering from advanced and serious erosion damage. This past and present destruction of the soil-water resource base has resulted from the short-run exploitation of range lands and the misuse of surface and ground-water supplies. The situation is further complicated by a heterogeneous cultural background, and the restricted economic opportunities available to most of the Spanish-American population. In many areas farms have been so divided and redivided that a surplus agricultural population is crowded on acreages too small even to support their operators, let alone finance the expensive measures necessary for the recovery of the basin. In addition, high-value irrigation farming cannot be expanded because there is no additional water available. In fact, 20 per cent of the presently irrigated two million acres should be retired.[4] Here in the agricultural sector of the Rio Grande economy, Malthus' dire predictions of population pressure on a limited resource base seem nearer realization than anywhere else in this country.

The major conservation problem of this basin is the rehabilitation of deteriorating water and soil resources. As in most of the western river basins, the soil-water relationship of the Rio Grande Basin is extremely precarious even under natural conditions. Man has accelerated the destructive forces of nature, which now produce barren lands and rivers clogged with silt. As a consequence, even the rehabilitation outlook is discouraging, because effective conservation is difficult and expensive after so long a period of misuse.

Yet something must be done. The Rio Grande Basin can make an important contribution to the national economy both culturally and materially if its water and soil resources are well managed. A balanced program which includes provision for dams, watershed rehabilitation, and an appeal to the grass-roots farmer is a must for this basin.

[4] Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Vol. II, *Ten Rivers in America's Future* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 306–307.

The Colorado River Basin

The Colorado River Basin also faces problems of water scarcity, but in a different context. Water is scarce, but this scarcity is potential rather than existing. All possible uses of the water of the Colorado River would require 25 per cent more water than is available; yet present depletion is only approximately 44 per cent of the water supply.[5] Thus, the future holds relatively bright prospects for the Colorado River Basin *if* an adequate program of conservation and development is put into effect.

Here again it must be recognized that soil and water are interdependent. If conservation is to be emphasized, resource development must be of a long-run and sustained-yield nature. It cannot be too heavily underscored that, for a sustained-yield type of water resources development, adequate attention must be given to range management and erosion control. Indeed, aside from the damaging effects of severe erosion on land, irrigation enterprises, and hydroelectric facilities, erosion also damages the most efficient natural reservoir—storage as ground water. The universal importance of ground water for irrigation is strongly emphasized in the Colorado River Basin, particularly in Arizona, where 90 per cent of the irrigated land receives all or most of its water supply from ground water pumped from wells.[6]

The Colorado River Basin also has industrial possibilities which should be encouraged by further development of hydroelectric power capacity. This source of energy production can be increased at least three times, from a present installed capacity of approximately 3 million kilowatts to an ultimate capacity of about 9 million kilowatts.

However, before substantial progress can be realized within this basin, serious administrative problems must be solved. We will find again and again throughout most of the West that although the physical techniques for water development and conservation are available, the social and administrative techniques for applying scientific knowledge to the achievement of maximum welfare are in dispute. In the Colorado River Basin this dispute takes the form of interstate conflict. In the upper basin, administrative progress has been accomplished through the creation of the Upper Colorado River Commission, an interstate compact to co-ordinate state water resource development. But in the lower basin, conflict between Arizona and California over water apportionment continues, and consequently development is retarded.

[5] U. S. Congress, *The Colorado River*, H. Doc. 419, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 14. These estimates include allowances for export of as much as three million acre-feet to other basins, although export on this scale would necessarily eliminate some of the potential uses within the basin.

[6] Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Preliminary 1950 Census of Agriculture," series IR 50–1, Jan. 14, 1952.

The Missouri River Basin

The Missouri River Basin offers another example of administrative conflict which has slowed development and retarded efforts to solve conservation problems similar to those of the Colorado River Basin. Here too there exists a relative water shortage—not enough water for all projects possible. In addition to being limited in quantity, water in the Missouri Basin is variable in quality and poorly distributed. These facts, together with the large size of the area and limited mineral resources, have been largely responsible for a scattered population and lack of industrialization.

On the Missouri, as on most western rivers of uneven regime, man must control the flow of rivers by storing excess water for later use. With a complete water control and development program for the basin, hydroelectric power capacity can be increased approximately nine times, to over 9 million kilowatts; and the present irrigation of 5 million acres of land can be doubled. However, no complete water control and development program exists at the present time, largely because of the conflict of aims and interests which exists between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Engineers. Neither the Pick-Sloan Plan nor the Inter-Agency Basin Committee has succeeded in developing a basin-wide, multiple-purpose program for the Missouri. If it proves impossible to create a Missouri Valley Authority, the recent proposal of the Council of State Governments should be seriously considered.[7] Against the dominance of federal authority, this proposal would encourage more state and local participation by setting up a policy board and an operating agency deriving their powers from an interstate compact.

The Missouri Basin also offers a most promising field for the extension of the rapidly growing watershed association movement. Because of the basin's size and diversity, the attack on conservation and development problems should be broken down into sub-basin units. The dominance of agriculture in this region and the prevalence of habits of co-operation among the farmers of the Missouri Valley also point to the success of a conservation program administered on the basis of local participation.

[7] According to the *Denver Post*, Section E, p. 1, Feb. 24, 1952. A rough draft of this proposal for an administrative board has been developed by Elton McQuery, assistant director of the Council of State Governments. Under his plan each state would have one representative and one vote. Also, the Federal Government would have one representative possessing one vote for each state.

THE CENTRAL VALLEY

The interagency conflict between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Engineers has not stopped at the boundaries of the Missouri Basin. The conflict has been even more severe in the Central Valley of California, where competition between these two federal agencies for support both in the valley and in Congress has resulted in development by political pressure. In the meantime, the Central Valley has suffered prolonged delay in securing an integrated program of development which will meet its conservation needs.

These needs are somewhat different from those in river basins where extreme water shortage prevails. There is plenty of water for all areas of the Central Valley, provided it is properly distributed. More water than can be utilized originates in the northern sector of the valley, while there is not enough water in the southern portion. To alleviate this particular shortage, the Bureau of Reclamation has proposed an elaborate network of pumps and canals to make surplus waters of the north "run uphill" to the irrigable acres of the southern basin. This water development program would cut water losses in the Central Valley from over 9 million to 1.5 million acre-feet per year, and at the same time increase the hydroelectric power output by four times and raise the irrigable acreage by 50 per cent.[8] The economy of the region must expand in order to provide adequate economic opportunity for its present and growing population. Much of this expansion depends on the utilization of water which now flows unchecked into the Pacific.

[8] Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–161.

In the Central Valley, as in the other basins, the conservation aspect of development has been neglected for short-run gain. The exploitive use of ground water has seriously damaged and reduced the flow of this valuable resource. The implementation of land treatment programs and ground-water conservation measures has proceeded at a very slow pace, with only about 10 per cent of the valley's farms and ranches included in Soil Conservation Districts.[9] Once more we find that control of water resources has begun only after the water has reached the river with consequent use of expensive and elaborate control structures. Dams and reservoirs are necessary and useful instruments of water resource development, but their full effectiveness will not be realized in the Central Valley as long as the region's water program lacks a proper balance between conservation and development.

THE ARKANSAS-WHITE-RED BASIN

Now for a brief look at the Arkansas-White-Red River Basin. It has been said that if this river system could be made to flow in a circle, the prospects of water supply would be infinitely more hopeful. The situation again is a maldistribution of water. The lower basin, situated in a more humid climate, has more water than can be profitably put to use. Additional irrigation demands are not important in the agricultural economy, because of adequate rainfall; and hydroelectric power, supplying less than 10 per cent of the power demand, is also relatively unimportant.

However, in the upper basin the water supply is chronically inadequate. The problem cannot be solved simply by the better use of existing water supplies, important as better use may be. The paramount need is to secure more water by transmontane diversions from the Colorado River Basin. Yet even with this possibility the water supply problems of the Upper Arkansas will not be solved. The possibilities of diversion from the Upper Colorado River Basin are limited, and most of the water which could be diverted into the Arkansas Valley will be needed for municipal water supplies there. In addition, the present provisions of the Colorado River Compact restrict the use of the diverted water to the boundaries of the state of Colorado. Therefore, although irrigation is very important in the upper basin, little expansion in this field is anticipated. On the other hand, hydroelectric power could be increased by approximately eight times, to a capacity of almost 5 million kilowatts.

Yet, despite these handicaps, the Arkansas-White-Red Basin does offer us the one contemporary example of an outstanding social and administrative attempt to solve the common problem. The principles of multiple-purpose, integrated, basin-wide development are the foundation of development here largely because the AWRB Inter-Agency Committee has been set up *in advance* of the formulation of unilateral plans by separate agencies or by the construction of major works.

[9] *Ibid.*

THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN

Last to be discussed in this survey of river basin water needs, shortages, and potentialities is the mighty Columbia River and its surrounding basin. Here no water shortage is faced. Only a relatively small part of the total discharge can be expected to be utilized for irrigation. The water supply is so large in the Columbia River Basin that more than half of the total water discharged from western streams flows to the sea

from the Columbia River and from the Washington and Oregon coast and Puget Sound tributaries. Water is the basin's most valuable resource, and the irrigated crops and electric power which can be produced from it affect the relative values of every other resource in the region.

Water development potentialities of the basin include the doubling of the irrigated acreage and a tenfold increase in the production of hydroelectric power. Electricity is the only energy resource of importance in the region; and with complete development, the Columbia River Basin would possess 40 per cent of the hydroelectric capacity of the entire United States.[10]

Also because of the existence of so much surplus water, unconsumed by the generation of hydroelectric energy, tremendous possibilities exist for the alleviation of deficiencies elsewhere. Transmontane diversions to Nevada and Southern California are technologically possible, and if carried out would substantially reduce the demand of the Los Angeles area for Colorado River water. In a very real sense, the Columbia Basin is the outstanding example of an interbasin maldistribution of water. If social and political developments can keep pace with technological improvements, some 50 million acre-feet of water can be made available for export to croplands in other basins. Conservationists should be the first to recognize the desirability of creating a social framework within which to apply our technology for the purpose of improving human welfare.

In terms of land management, the Columbia Basin is not superior to other western basins, in spite of its relatively greater development of water resources. The conservation deficiencies present in other basins are also present in various degrees in the Columbia Basin. Watershed management is inadequate, and irrigated lands are not always efficiently operated. Forest conservation also needs extension, not only to provide a continuous flow of forest products, but also to protect vulunerable watersheds.

[10] Department of Agriculture, *Irrigation Agriculture in the West* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 22.

AN URGENT SITUATION

What may we conclude from this brief survey of the water resources of the West? Basin by basin and in the aggregate, the practice of conservation is not sufficient to prevent the continued destruction of the land and water resources of the West. Nor do present plans for future development include a sufficient emphasis on the integration of conservation techniques with development projects. At the same time, both development and conservation programs are seriously handicapped by administrative deficiencies arising out of jurisdictional rivalries and inadequate local participation.

This situation exists, moreover, at the very moment when the West is facing an increased demand for land and water unparalleled since the original settlement of the region. If this demand is to be met without a repetition of the ruthless exploitation of the last century, new concepts must be popularized and new procedures adopted without delay. Valley authorities modeled upon, if not duplicating, the Tennessee Valley Authority should be created at once in each of the six great basins of the West. Soil Conservation Districts should be multiplied and watershed associations created as rapidly as possible. From these authorities and associations should come project studies and priority lists, plans for local and national financing of conservation projects, and a barrage of education for conservation worthy of a Wallace or a Pinchot. Without such action, the desert lands of the West will encroach upon a million more acres of useful land, and flooding streams will flow muddy to the sea. With such action, our children will arise up and call us blessed.

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Water Supply—The Industrial East

By Stephen Bergen

To illustrate the importance of water supply to human communities I should be obliged to have recourse to commonplaces, or else to the lays of the poets, who from earliest antiquity have glorified water. Water is necessary, paramount, vital. . . . No one will deny this, and yet. . . . One is really astounded to see what still remains to be done in every country in the world, even in the most advanced, in the matter of water supply as well as in the no less important matter of sanitary arrangements.[1]

IF one of the jobs of an economist is to promote the most desirable allocation of limited resources, he will find much to interest him in questions of water supply and in the natural and man-made conditions affecting its availability. For with growing national needs, the supply of good water is becoming limited in various respects in a number of places. Abundant natural water sources have made possible the development of industrialized and heavily populated areas east of the Mississippi. There is no doubt that these sources are generally so ample that they will support much further growth. But in highly developed areas of the East problems of providing enough water are demanding the attention of many communities and industries.

The challenge to communities, whether large industrial and commercial centers or agricultural areas making increasing use of supplemental irrigation, is not only one of engineering. Water in the East is becoming politics and also is entering the courts,[2] thus assuming a role long familiar in semiarid regions of the West. Along with more exacting regulation of water use and disposal by established governmental units, increasing and often conflicting water uses are begetting new forms of political association, such as interstate agencies and watershed organizations. For the use of a water source will involve the interests of all who depend on it. When a number of communities take water from and put wastes into the same river, clearly some sort of joint regulation of use will be necessary as the need for water increases.

The Watershed Is the Basic Unit

This community of interest is related to the fact that the natural land unit which continuously delivers and disposes of our water supplies is the watershed (or drainage basin). Large or small, it is the natural basis for many of the measuring and analytical operations—for example, stream gauging and sediment sampling—which aid in determining the quantity and quality of water available for use in a particular locality.

Because it is a naturally bounded unit, a watershed is the logical basis for scientific and engineering study and for harmonizing the activities of interdependent water users. This is well illustrated by a stream-analysis research project under way at the University of Michigan.[3] This project includes studies to determine the self-purifying capacities of individual streams on which pulp and paper mills are or may be located. The capacity of individual streams to purify themselves of pollution loads by natural processes varies partly with their flow. In general, the greater the stream flow, the greater the pollution load that may be safely introduced into and diluted by the stream. The flow of the stream depends, in turn, upon rainfall in the basin, which may be abnormally low in certain years.

> Dry-weather flow varies radically from river to river and year to year and each drainage has its own peculiar pattern. The prediction of drought severity for a particular river can, however, be accomplished by modern statistical analysis. As this project's researches continue, the hydrologic studies consistently emphasize the dominant role exercised by drought probabilities and the necessity for giving that factor major consideration in the establishment of stream [quality] standards and programs of stream improvement.

In other words, rainfall over its entire watershed will govern in part the use of a stream by a particular plant for waste disposal.

The Natural Water Supply

The natural water supply in the eastern part of the country is generous. East of the Mississippi the climate is humid. Precipitation (rain and snow), the ultimate source of all our water, ranges from an annual minimum of about 30 inches in the Great Lakes region to as high as 60 inches in parts of the Gulf coast and the tip of Florida. (There is an "island" of very heavy precipitation—up to 80 inches—roughly at the junction of Georgia with North and South Carolina.)[4] Precipitation is the gross supply, and only part of it is available for our use. The water that drains from the land into creeks and rivers during and after precipitation is called runoff. It has been defined as "a residual of rainfall after Nature's take—that is, after the persistent demands of evaporation from land and transpiration from vegetation have been supplied."[5] This remainder represents the total quantity of water available for development in streams and ground-water basins.

The amount of runoff in the East varies of course from place to place and from year to year, and reflects the amount of precipitation, the effect of temperature upon rates of evaporation and of transpiration by vegetation, and effects of geology and topography. Measured in inches depth over drainage areas, the average annual runoff ranges from 10 to 15 inches in the Great Lakes region, 20 to 40 inches along the Appalachians and in the Northeast, and 10 to 15 inches along the eastern Coastal Plain south of Maryland.[6] These bare figures take on more meaning in relation to estimates of the comparatively small quantity of water used by man. For the country as a whole, the average annual precipitation is about 30 inches, about 21.5 inches of which returns to the atmosphere, leav-

[1] A. Achten, *Water Supply and Sewerage* (Report of International Union of Local Authorities, The Hague, 1951), p. 7.

[2] In 1951 the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of West Virginia to join an eight-state compact, the Ohio River Valley Sanitation Commission, created to deal with pollution problems of the basin. In its decision the Court recognized "that they were faced with one of the problems of government that are defined by natural rather than political boundaries." *New York Times*, April 11, 1951.

[3] National Council for Stream Improvement (of the Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Industries). This project is part of a research program sponsored by the council concerned with waste problems of the industry. The following quotation is taken from p. 13 of the 1951 Annual Report.

[4] U. S. Department of Agriculture, "Climate and Man," 1941 *Yearbook of Agriculture* (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 711.

[5] W. G. Langbein and others, *Annual Runoff in the United States*, U. S. Geological Survey Circular 52, p. 1.

[6] *Ibid.*, Plate 1.

ing an average runoff of about 8.5 inches.[7] It has been estimated that less than 1 inch of this water is intercepted and used in passage.

THE LOCAL CONDITIONS

These broad average relationships are cited merely to illustrate that we use a very small part of the water running off to the ocean. They are suggestive, but need certain qualifications. Water is really not permanently available until developed by means of dams or wells, pumping facilities, and a distribution system. While the total quantity of water available, measured on an over-all basis for a large watershed, may be ample in relation to total demand, local conditions are extremely pertinent, and often limiting, in developing a supply for a particular community at reasonable cost. It is the relation of local demand to local sources that governs, granted that the amount of good water available to a downstream user will often be affected by use and waste-disposal practices upstream. The practical question is one of determining the dependable supply offered by perhaps several local sources,[8] and of designing facilities on a scale with local water needs.

Thus, many "shortages" of water widely reported in the last few years are not due primarily to drought or to shrinking of natural supplies. They are often due rather to present inadequate knowledge or exploitation of sources locally available, or to rapid increases or concentration of demand that strains existing water supply facilities. The case of New York City has become famous.

Careful reviews of the New York City water supply situation disclose without question that the shortage of water was due entirely to the delay in providing the physical facilities essential for delivering increased quantities, and not to the unavailability of water. This delay was manmade and was the result of a major economic depression, a serious world war and local municipal fiscal stresses. None of these causes were even remotely related to the absence of abundant water resources. These resources are abundant in the New York area and are economically available for uses far in excess of those now anticipated for the long distant future.[9]

WATER USES

How much water is used east of the Mississippi for various purposes? Uses are usually classified as municipal, industrial, rural domestic and stock use, irrigational, and water power. These may be called *withdrawal uses*,[10] requiring the water to be removed from the ground, stream, lake, or pond, as distinguished from *nonwithdrawal uses* for waste disposal, navigation, recreation, and the support of fish and wildlife. Most of the second group, unlike the first, do not lend themselves to evaluation in terms of quantity; but they are clearly of great economic and social importance.

It should be noted that when used, water is often only partly consumed, if at all, though its quality may be impaired. Obviously, the same water may be used again and again to generate

[7] Harold E. Thomas, *The Conservation of Ground Water* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951), pp. 20–21.

[8] Where demand is concentrated and great, local sources within the watershed are often not sufficient. New York reaches out 120 miles for water; Los Angeles, 350 miles.

[9] Abel Wolman, "Industry and Water Conservation," Paper presented before the American Association of Science, Philadelphia, 1951, p. 8. See also *Future Water Sources of the City of New York*. Report of Engineering Panel on Water Supply, 1951, 81 pp.

[10] Kenneth M. MacKichan, "Estimated Use of Water in the U.S.—1950," U. S. Geological Survey Circular 115, 13 pp.

power in a series of plants. In irrigation, from 20 to 60 per cent may seep into a stream as return flow.[11] A recent survey of water use in about three thousand manufacturing plants revealed that about 65 per cent of the plants discharged from 90 to 100 per cent of their intake.[12] A great part of the public water supply used in communities returns to the streams as sewage effluent.[13]

Table 1 shows rough estimates of the quantities of water withdrawn for various uses in the twenty-six states east of the Mississippi (including District of Columbia), and, for comparison, the national totals for these uses.

TABLE 1—ESTIMATED WITHDRAWAL USE OF WATER, 1950[a]

Uses	States East of Mississippi			United States		
	Ground Water	Surface Water	Total	Ground Water	Surface Water	Total
Municipal	1,817	7,580	9,397	3,549	10,048	13,597
Industrial	3,590	65,295[b]	68,885	5,495	71,682[b]	77,177[c]
Rural (domestic and stock)	1,431	347	1,778	2,803	696	3,499
Irrigational	252	286	538[d]	19,654	67,776	87,430
Water power		858,140	858,140		1,246,660	1,246,660

[a] MacKichan, *op. cit.* note 10, pp. 6–7. All figures in million gallons per day (mgd) except those for irrigational use, which are in 1,000 acre-feet per year. An acre-foot is the quantity of water required to cover an acre one foot deep; 1,000 acre-feet per year equals 0.89 million gallons per day.

[b] 11,720 mgd was brackish (from tidal streams).

[c] This does not include water for industrial use from public supply systems, which is included under municipal.

[d] This does not include irrigational use described as negligible in sixteen states.

These data reveal that, apart from water power, the largest use of water in the East is industrial. West of the Mississippi the largest use is for irrigation. On a national basis these two uses are roughly equal in total (70–80 billion gallons per day), and far exceed the total United States municipal use. Municipal systems served about 93.5 million people in 1950, an average of 145 gallons per day per person.[14] For the entire country, far more surface water is used than ground water; the proportion is about 5 to 1. But about three times as much ground water is used west of the Mississippi as in the East, and chiefly for irrigation.

These are rough estimates, indicating gross withdrawals at sources with some water unavoidably counted perhaps several times; net consumptive use is much less.[15] The estimate of gross industrial use made by the United States Geological Survey includes water for cooling purposes; other estimates, made by industry itself and others, are far lower (10–25 billion gallons per day), depending on the basis of calculation.[16] It is clear in any case that the water needs of industry in general are considerable. The economic sig-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[12] *Water in Industry* (New York: National Association of Manufacturers and The Conservation Foundation, Dec. 1950), p. 41.

[13] MacKichan, *op. cit.* note 10, p. 3.

[14] MacKichan, *op. cit.* note 10, p. 4.

[15] See Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, *A Water Policy for the American People*, Vol. I, 1950, p. 177.

[16] See Abel Wolman, *op. cit.* note 9, pp. 1–2.

nificance of industries which are large water users is indicated by the fact that they account for almost one-third of the total "dollar value added by manufacture" by all industries.[17]

In recent years federal and state agencies and industries themselves have been gathering more detailed information on industrial water use. A study made in 1950 by the National Association of Manufacturers and the Conservation Foundation developed data on some three thousand industrial plants, widely diversified as to location and type of industry. It was found that there was an average increase of 30–40 per cent in water intake, for the plants and industries covered, over the decade 1939–49.[18] The most spectacular increases in water use due to industrial expansion have been occurring in Texas. Yet in the East, Baltimore increased its water use almost 70 per cent from 1938 to 1948, while population grew only about 6 per cent; in Detroit use increased 47 per cent from 1932 to 1945, while population increased about 4.3 per cent.[19]

The range in the quantities of water used by industrial plants is rather striking. For the three thousand plants surveyed, between 5 and 6 per cent of them accounted for almost 80 per cent of the total water intake reported, while about 65 per cent took in less than 2 per cent of the total. This suggests that in many respects the problem of industrial water supply is that of the larger user. This must have considerable significance in planning the use of water resources. However, where water economy is necessary, the opportunities for conservation measures within the large water-using plants may be great. Thus, the Kaiser Steel plant in Fontana, California, uses far less water per ton of steel than the average for the industry.[20] Among large water users, the greatest part of the water intake is usually for cooling purposes; for plants in general, water is used for process purposes, cooling, sanitation, and service.

LACK OF FACILITIES

If the water resources of the East are generally ample, though varying considerably from place to place, why are supplies often insufficient in local areas to meet industrial needs? In the opinion of one authority,[21] the difficulties arise partly because of delay by communities in executing water development projects; the lag between planning and construction often amounts to ten to fifteen years. This delay reflects the fact that "municipal bodies move slowly, not only because bond issues always must carry conviction to the electorate, but because legal and fiscal restraints are many and time consuming for compliance."

The difficulties also arise because of outgrown distribution facilities. Installing and expanding such facilities require large amounts of money, "yet their significance in relation to industrial demand is most difficult to make clear to the average citizen and sometimes to the average industrialist."

Related to this is a general lack of administrative and fiscal organization on the part of existing political units for developing water for industry. (Where industry is large it often undertakes its own water development on a strictly private basis.) What could be done in this direction is illustrated by "water district" agencies, such as the Washington Suburban Sanitary District and the Boston Metropolitan District, which have power to issue bonds and to construct and to operate water systems. The Charleston Development Board (South Carolina), for example, has been successful in attracting industries recently by taking the initiative in developing a large water supply (up to 10 billion gallons a day) at tidewater.[22]

POLLUTION TREATMENT

Severe and widespread pollution of surface waters in the East by physical, chemical, and biological wastes also limits the amount of water available to industry. The Delaware River, for example, each day receives about 500 million gallons of domestic sewage and hundreds of millions more of industrial wastes.[23] According to information gathered by the United States Public Health Service, about 24 million people of the 90 million living east of the Mississippi (excluding the population of the eastern part of the Upper and Lower Mississippi drainage basins) live in municipalities lacking sewage treatment of any kind.[24] Put another way, about 3,800 of a total 6,800 muncipalities in the East lack treatment facilities. In the same area there are about 6,400 industrial sources of pollution discharging wastes directly into watercourses. Of these, 1,760 treat their wastes, 2,859 do not, and 1,817 have undetermined facilities.

One measure of the seriousness of the problem is a Public Health Service estimate that for this area about 2,900 new plants are required for treatment of municipal wastes (with 1,300 cases as yet undetermined). Similarly, about 2,400 new plants are needed to take care of industrial pollution sources (with 2,480 cases undetermined).

A brief look at the record of the last fifty years gives some perspective to the pollution problem confronting the country. In the last half-century the total population of the United States, now 150 million, has doubled. In 1900 the *urban* population was about 30 million; in 1950 it was about 90 million; it has doubled in the last 35 years, and is now increasing at a rate of about 1,500,000 a year. Not only have new waste-treatment facilities been needed for this growth; the degree of treatment also must be greater to deal with a greater density of population. About 60 million people (1950) in the United States are tributary to some 6,700 sewage treatment plants; that is, about two-thirds of the urban population has some form of waste treatment, though only about 40 million may be said to receive complete treatment. The rate of growth of sewage treatment facilities over the last fifty years is shown in Table 2.[25] It seems fair to assume

[17] Engineers Joint Council, *A Statement of Desirable Policy with Respect to the Conservation, Development and Use of the National Water Resources,* 1950, Statement of Task Committee No. I, pp. 6–7. The data given are for 1947. The industries cited are: chemicals, textiles, steel, petroleum refining, rubber, pulp, paper and board, meat packing, canning, preserving and freezing, brewing, dairy products, whiskey, soap and glycerin, rayon, tanning, and manufactured ice.

[18] *Water in Industry, op. cit.* note 12, p. 11.

[19] Engineers Joint Council, *op. cit.* note 17, p. 10. These data on Baltimore and Detroit refer to water from municipal supply only.

[20] This plant uses less than 1,300 gallons per ton of steel; the average figure usually cited is 65,000 gallons. Consumptive use by the plant approximates the amount that would be used if the site were devoted to agriculture. See *Water for Industry, A Review of Water Resources Affecting Industrial Location* (Washington: Urban Land Institute, Tech. Bull. 17, 1951), p. 20.

[21] Abel Wolman, *op. cit.* note 9. See p. 10 for the two following quotations.

[22] *Business Week,* Oct. 20, 1951, pp. 90–91, 94, 96, 98, 100.

[23] Rolf Eliassen, "Stream Pollution," *Scientific American,* Vol. 186, No. 3 (March 1952), p. 17.

[24] *Water Pollution in the U.S.,* U. S. Public Health Service Publication 64, 1951, pp. 30–33.

[25] L. R. Howson, "National Water Re-

TABLE 2—GROWTH OF SEWAGE TREATMENT

Decade	Additional Population Having Sewage Treatment
1900–1910	3,000,000
1910–1920	5,500,000
1920–1930	8,500,000
1930–1940	19,000,000
1940–1950	23,000,000

that, should this accelerating rate continue, most of the sewage from urban sources would be treated by, say, 1970. It certainly seems reasonable to say also that the country could afford it.

By and large practically any community in the U.S. that wants sewage treatment can finance it at a cost of approximately 1 cent per capita per day which will produce a sum sufficient to provide for the interest and amortization of the cost and the expense of operating the treatment plant. If waste treatment cannot be sold at so low a cost people have not been sufficiently educated as to the requirements or the cost.[26]

Estimates have been made of the total cost of reducing stream pollution in the United States to a reasonable level. Allowing for normal population increase, plant obsolescence, and so forth over the next decade, the cost for municipalities would be about 4.5 billion dollars (1950 prices). Since the industrial pollution load is somewhat larger than the municipal (while treatment methods, with known exceptions, follow the same pattern), the cost of abating it would be greater. Costs will be related also to the quality standards set for a particular stream. With a greater degree of waste treatment the stream will be suitable for more uses, but cost of treatment will be higher. Depending on the water uses finally chosen, the total cost for a pollution abatement program for the United States will range roughly from 9 to 12 billion dollars.[27] A more recent estimate (early 1952) is 20 billion dollars.[28]

MEASURES TO COMBAT POLLUTION

If the pollution situation is serious in many areas of the East, it is also true that much is under way to relieve it. A public more and more hemmed in by industrial and residential development is pressing its demand for clean water for recreation. Industry is becoming more sensitive to being called a bad neighbor, and it also has its own stake in water of good quality. The United States Supreme Court in a decision concerning the Delaware River stated some years ago: "A river is a treasure which offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have the power of it."[29] Over the last decade this sentiment has been embodied in legislation by many states to control water use and waste disposal.

As of June 1951 only one state in the East had no law or program regulating stream pollution, though it had a study in progress to draft legislation. Of the 26 states east of the Mississippi, 8 require primary treatment of all wastes; 6 have laws covering a specific industry; 23 control established sources of pollution; 24 provide penalties; 16 have provision for classification of streams; 14 classify or are now in process of classifying streams; 26 require approval of new treatment plants; 13 help or advise in design of plant.[30]

sources Policy as Related to Stream Pollution," *Sewage and Industrial Wastes*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Feb. 1952), pp. 222–27.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 226–27.

[27] U. S. Public Health Service estimate. *Op. cit.* note 24, p. 37. Probably 1950 prices.

[28] Rolf Eliassen, *op. cit.* note 23, p. 20.

[29] Quoted by R. F. Weston in "An Industrial Approach to Water Pollution Abatement," at the 1951 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, p. 2.

[30] "Industrial Waste Treatment," *Industry and Power*, June 1951. See also M. D. Weiss, *Industrial Water Pollution, A Survey of Legislation and Regulations*, New York: Chemonomics, 1951.

With the passage of the Water Pollution Control Act in 1948 the Federal Government has taken a leading role in working toward uniform and effective legislation by the states, while recognizing their primary rights and responsibilities in this field. Financial aid is also given. For the period 1948–52, the sum of 22.5 million dollars annually was appropriated for loans to states, municipalities, or interstate agencies for sewage works construction. A million dollars is given the states annually for research and surveys; another million is granted for preliminary investigation of specific approved projects. Research in waste utilization is also promoted. The United States Public Health Service, co-operating with the states, is surveying pollution conditions throughout the country, river basin by river basin.[31]

Interstate agencies

The work of interstate agencies concerned with water pollution in the East also ought to be noted. There are commissions or informal agreements covering the Delaware Basin ("Incodel"), the Potomac Basin, the New York Harbor and adjacent tidal waters and estuaries, the interstate waters of New England, the Ohio River Valley, the Great Lakes Drainage, and the Upper Mississippi Drainage.

The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission formed in 1948, for example, is actively pressing a pollution abatement campaign among the communities and industries of the valley in the belief that "persuasion with facts rather than compulsion by law [is] a speedier way to gain its objectives."[32] It has the active co-operation of five industry groups studying methods of dealing with specific wastes; the commission also makes technical studies as a basis for policy decisions. The commission has legal powers as yet unused for securing compliance with its orders. The chairman of the commission recently stated:

I consider it the responsibility of a control agency to make the necessary surveys to define the industrial problem in terms of volume, strength of wastes, their effect on the outlet stream, and the degree of treatment required. However, the solution of an industrial waste problem is the responsibility of the industry, and the fact that no practical solution to a particular waste problem has yet been effected merely indicates that insufficient time and study have been given to it by that industry. The cost of industrial waste treatment, I feel, is rightfully charged to production costs.

INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The conviction is spreading that the only reasonable and equitable public policy is that each industrial establishment must be responsible for the proper control of its wastes. Therefore, the costs of waste control facilities automatically becomes a part of plant installation costs and the costs of waste control operations becomes an integral part of the operating costs of the plant. Waste control becomes a utility requirement the same as water, steam, power and drainage. It becomes one additional cost to operation that must be borne to assure the opportunity and privilege of operating in an advantageous industrial economy.[33]

Of course the cost of equipment for the treatment of waste represents a capital investment which, along with the cost of operating such equipment, becomes a part of the cost of producing

[31] Reports have already been published for eleven drainage basins over the country. U. S. Public Health Service, *Summary Reports on Water Pollution*, Water Pollution Series, Nos. 2–7, 9–12, Washington, 1951.

[32] *Third Annual Report*, 1951, The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, Cincinnati, 36 pp.

[33] R. F. Weston, *op. cit.* note 29, p. 6.

goods and is therefore reflected in the selling price.[34]

The losses caused by water pollution cannot be computed easily; many are intangible. But it may be said that they represent social costs [35] which are gradually being recognized. Most of those discussing the subject agree that educating the public regarding the nature and extent of the problem, and their responsibilities in it, will hasten this more realistic "cost accounting."

RESEARCH NEEDED

There is broad agreement, too, about what generally would help to improve the water situation in the East. There is great need to proceed as rapidly as possible with comprehensive investigations of water sources, especially in the field of ground water. Only with greater knowledge than we have now regarding most areas will further development be soundly based. The relation of the use of land to the availability of water is also still imperfectly understood. Technical governmental agencies, such as the United States Geological Survey, the United States Forest Service, and comparable state organizations, play a leading role in this indispensable research activity; it should be expanded.

As important as knowing how much is naturally available from area to area is knowing the effects of water uses with respect to quality as well as quantity. Much remains to be done along this line; a great deal of water is or could be reused in certain areas. Reclamation of sewage effluent and reuse of water within industrial plants are increasing but could be employed more than at present.

[34] W. J. Eldridge, *Making a Waste Survey for a Large Industry* (Proceedings Fourth Industrial Waste Conference, Purdue University, 1948), p. 7.

[35] K. W. Kapp, *The Social Costs of Private Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 1–25, 80–93.

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Soil Conservation and Floods

By HUGH H. BENNETT

THE 1951 flood catastrophe in Kansas and neighboring states once more has focused attention on the urgent need for more effectively curbing the floods that somewhere every year sweep destructively across productive farmlands and through prosperous towns and cities.

What can be done to prevent the staggering losses in crops, soil, property, even human life, will depend to a very considerable degree on the wisdom and timely efforts of the people and their leaders.

In any clear presentation of the problem several points should be emphasized at the outset:

1. We can be certain that costly floods will strike again next year, or the next, somewhere in the country.

2. Our experience shows that it is possible to control or greatly reduce floods. It shows that the smaller, more localized floods along the upper tributaries or "little waters" can be eliminated almost completely; and indicate that substantial reduction of flood flows along the major streams is also practicable.

3. Soil erosion is part of the flood problem—the result of the rains that produce floods and the source of the silt that reduces the carrying capacity of streams and the water-retention capacity of reservoirs.

4. Soil conservation is an indispensable and co-ordinate part of flood control and silt control.

No single method of flood control can do an adequate job. We have seen in the recent Midwestern flood, for example, that levees high enough to withstand the largest previous floods on record were overtopped. We have also seen that the soils of fields and pastures became so nearly saturated after weeks of heavy rains that they could absorb but little more from the final big rains. To meet all kinds of flood conditions and prevent or minimize flood damages wherever they are a hazard, we must use every available method of control we know about.

Every additional gallon of water that can be stored in the soil through the use of conservation measures means one gallon less contributed to flood flows.

A first step, then, in flood prevention is to put the soil in optimum condition for maximum water intake. This will require the maintenance of good soil structure, a good cover of vegetation wherever practicable, and efficient engineering structures wherever required. What excess water runs off fields into drainageways must be slowed down with small retarding structures along the headwater drainages, and what flows out of these lesser drainages will have to be handled in the main river valleys by more imposing measures—large engineering installations, such as reservoirs, levees, floodways.

The job of flood control, then, begins where the rains fall and does not end until the runoff reaches the ocean.

CO-ORDINATION OF FLOOD CONTROL EFFORTS

It is important to determine what kind and combinations of measures are needed, where to use them, and how best to dovetail their use, watershed by watershed, in order to accomplish the best possible job of flood control. In doing this we must, of course, bear in

mind the continuing need for water storage for irrigation, power, municipal water supply, pollution abatement, and preservation of fish and wildlife, and maintenance of maximum ground and underground storage. It must be borne in mind that the use of the limited number of suitable sites for large reservoirs should be considered in relation to the multiple needs for land and water before they are dedicated solely to flood control.

Distribution of flood damage

Another feature necessitating co-ordinated effort is the distribution of flood damages. The crops of upland fields that are washed out or covered with eroded soil resulting from flood-producing rains are just as truly lost as the crops on overflowed land in the valleys below. Soil washed out of upland fields reduces the productivity of that land just as much as, or more than, deposition of soil carried by waters flooding agricultural bottomlands along the rivers. Floodwater damages to agricultural lands in the hundreds of thousands of miles of small, upstream creek bottoms represent just as much loss per acre as the flooding of the wide Missouri River bottoms between Kansas City and St. Louis.

The Soil Conservation Service, in its preliminary survey of the storm and flood damages in Kansas and Nebraska during July 1951, found that losses of crops on upland farms amounted to approximately $110 million. Losses of rich topsoil were estimated at $200 million. Losses from floodwater and sediment in the small creek bottoms above the points where anyone has yet proposed specific flood protection measures were estimated at $102 million. The total of these estimated damages amounted to $412 million. Probably at least 90 per cent of these losses could be prevented through the soil and water conservation and flood control programs being carried on by the Department of Agriculture. And the benefits would largely exceed the cost.

Without in any way minimizing the staggering downstream losses, like those at Kansas City last year, the even greater damages along the tributary streams are convincing evidence that a flood control program aimed only at protection of downstream cities and river bottoms is only partially effective and will certainly not benefit all the people who suffer flood losses.

Superfloods like this last Midwestern flood are comparatively rare events. I understand that the flood discharge at Kansas City last year far exceeded the highest ever previously experienced. Such an occurrence not only makes banner headlines, but it becomes a historic event to be retold down through the decades. It stays in our memories and gets into textbooks. People come to look on such a catastrophe as characteristic rather than something rare—or unique. Actually, if the enormous damage caused by such a superflood is spread over all the years between such rare events, the average annual loss is considerably less that that from all the smaller local floods that occur year after year in the smaller watersheds.

Surveys thus far made indicate that around three-fourths of our average annual flood loss has occurred above the main river valleys and large cities. This, of course, is partially due to the fact that some of the major river floodplains and many cities have already been protected by levees, floodways, and combinations of reservoirs—for which credit is due to the effective work of the Army's Corps of Engineers.

Erosion

There are still other reasons why a co-ordinated approach to flood control is essential. As already pointed out, erosion must be controlled upstream in order to protect flood control reservoirs downstream from rapid silting and consequent loss of effectiveness. And to re-emphasize, erosion must be controlled to prevent the silting of stream channels, which further reduces their flood-containing capacity, and to prevent overwash of infertile sand and poor subsoil material on productive bottom lands. But even more important than these, erosion must be controlled if we are to maintain the base for agriculture, on which depends national strength and defense and, conceivably, the prevention of civilization from going the disastrous way of many great nations of the past which failed to take care of their agricultural land.

One of the most important responsibilities shared by all the people of any state, county, community, or neighborhood is to safeguard and prudently use the land and the water that makes land productive. Such conservation, to be fully effective, must be applied to every acre of land needing it, and this according to the kind of land a farmer has and its need for protection and improvement. This basic concept of effective soil and water conservation is taken from nature's handbook for creating soil in the first place and then safeguarding it for perpetual productiveness.

SOIL CONSERVATION IS PART OF FLOOD PREVENTION

The flood problem was not tied in with the erosion problem in any effectively working relationship until the advent of modern soil conservation.

Look at some of the measured effects of land use on erosion and runoff: At the Northwest Appalachian Conservation Experiment Station near Zanesville, Ohio, the losses from bare ground (hard fallow) on a 12 per cent slope amounted to an annual average, over nine years, of 96.58 tons of soil per acre and 44.8 per cent of the rainfall, including snow. But from bluegrass the soil loss was only 0.028 ton per acre and the water loss 5.42 per cent of the rainfall. The corresponding losses from continuous corn on the same kind of land having the same slope were 99.3 tons of soil per acre and 40.32 per cent of the rainfall.

Comparative soil and water losses from small watersheds over a nine-year period recorded on this experiment station included only .01 ton of soil per acre and 3.2 per cent of the precipitation for woodland, and 17.18 tons of soil and 20.6 per cent of the precipitation for a cultivated watershed. During January 1937, when a huge flood swept down the Ohio River, the rainfall on these watersheds totaled 10.48 inches. The wooded watershed lost as runoff 36 per cent of the precipitation; a pasture watershed lost 75 per cent; and the cultivated watershed lost 95 per cent.

Such precise measurements made in great numbers throughout the country cannot be discarded as representing what happens on just mere bits of land, for the reason that the country is a mosaic of bits of land differing from one another in many ways. To be sure, the runoff will be much more per acre from some areas, but it will also be much less from others. Quantitative measurements have been made on so many different kinds and patterns of land that I believe these measurements represent a fair average of what happens to the rainfall of countless watersheds throughout the country. There will be wide differences, of course, but significant meaning undoubtedly can be found in the results as estimated by those acquainted with local details of climate, land, agriculture, and the land's retentiveness of rainfall. Such experienced specialists will be able to weigh

with considerable accuracy the effects of rainstorms on local flood flows.

The technicians of the Soil Conservation Service carefully weigh all these physical facts in all their work having to do with the control of floods and soil erosion. The Service has been the leader in technical investigations relating to the character of the land, the pattern of rainstorms,[1] the amount of water contained in mountain snows (as shown by snow surveys), the effect of soil and soil condition on water-absorption capacity, and similar matters. Moreover, the Soil Conservation Service has made, and continues to make, a great many detailed studies of the effects of cover, cultivation, land use, and soil conservation on runoff and erosion from both large and small watersheds in many parts of the country.

One of the first watershed erosion control undertakings ever completed in this country was that at Honey Creek in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Prior to conservation work on the upper slopes of the watershed, the land in the lower part of the little valley was too wet for cultivation because of excessive overflow, and had little value except for poor pasture. But I saw that land producing good crops as a result of conservation measures applied to the entire valley. Not only the erosion problem but also the flood problem was largely overcome.

AN EXAMPLE OF FLOOD CONTROL CO-OPERATION AT THE GRASS ROOTS

The work in the Salt-Wahoo watershed, near Lincoln, Nebraska, is a good illustration of the co-ordinated watershed approach to flood control. Here also is a striking illustration of effective community co-operation, including the Salt-Wahoo Watershed Association, which is made up of city people and farmers in Soil Conservation Districts, with representatives of the Soil Conservation Service, the Army Engineers, and other local, state, and federal agencies.

Joint studies of this watershed are being made by the Soil Conservation Service and the Army Engineers under authority of the Flood Control Act of 1936. It is hoped that this study will lead to authorization of a co-ordinated program for flood control in this area similar to that already authorized in eleven other watersheds of the country. I think the soundness of this co-operative approach was well stated in the progress report on the joint watershed survey made by the Army Engineers and Soil Conservation Service. The report pointed out that the two agencies had one objective in this study—that is, to prepare an over-all plan for the entire watershed which, quoting from the report, "will represent from the standpoint of both agencies the best plan for the basin as a whole which is practicable within the limits of economic feasibility, and one which both agencies can recommend and support without reservation."

"Both agencies feel," the report added, "that this objective can best be realized by a joint study which will produce a single plan mutually developed by both agencies rather than a compromise between two individual plans developed by the two agencies acting independently."

The Salt-Wahoo undertaking also illustrates the importance and effectiveness of local group action in watershed planning and development. Here, as elsewhere, the local soil conservation districts are taking an important part in the permanent watershed program. As the principal organization through which soil and water conservation measures are being applied to the land by individual farmers the country over, it is only logical that these districts also should be called on to serve directly in such flood control activities in the public interest.

By the same token, the Salt-Wahoo situation shows why there is a place for an advisory group like the Salt-Wahoo Watershed Association to bring together the interests of farmers and city people. For any watershed development program to operate successfully, the basic responsibility for that program must involve the people residing in the watershed. That means there should be a local responsible organization which is representative of all the interests in the watershed and which can act promptly to co-ordinate the activities and services of all agencies and interests to formulate the necessary broad, flexible program for watershed development and protection.

TECHNICAL SKILL AND DETAILED TREATMENT NEEDED

It should not be overlooked that planning and application of watershed programs require special technical skills. Downstream, the highest order of engineering skill is necessary for building dams, main-channel stabilization works, and so on. Likewise, in the uplands technical know-how is required to plan and install sound land-use and land-protection treatment and upstream engineering measures. Such work must be based on painstaking research and practical experience. It must take into account the principles of hydrology, engineering, agronomy, land and conservation science, forestry, biology, and other related fields.

In no event can the watershed planning and treatment be accomplished overnight with some magic formula, although it takes heavy rains and excessive runoff only a few days, or even hours, to do irreparable damage to land and property.

We cannot depend on windshield surveys and office planning to carry out a job of the complexity and magnitude of safeguarding our farmlands and controlling floods. Nor can we have a ready-made plan including a fixed set of practices to slap on any farm or watershed. Land and the behavior of water falling on land differ from watershed to watershed, from farm to farm, sometimes from field to field. Accordingly, every watershed and each parcel of land in every watershed must be dealt with individually. And, moreover, every distinctive parcel of land within every watershed must be dealt with according to its complementary relationship to every other parcel of land—wherever there is any significant relationship.

That, briefly, is how, in this era of soil and water conservation, we are going about the treatment of agricultural land for effective soil conservation and flood prevention and control. We have developed a unique combination of soil-conservation, engineering, and vegetative practices designed to dispose of surplus water safely while making the best practical use of the water that otherwise would also be wasted. Thus, for the first time in history, we are going into the small watersheds to do *everything possible to provide relief* from recurring flood damages. Splendid examples of the effectiveness of tributary stream flood control can be cited from the experiences of the Soil Conservation Service and the soil conservation districts.

TAKING THE TEETH OUT OF FLOODS

Not long ago, while looking over the flood control work being carried on under the Little Sioux River Watershed Authorization, in Iowa, I came to the

[1] See Hugh H. Bennett, *Soil Conservation*, pp. 179–97.

definite understanding that finally we are doing the upstream phase of the flood control job properly. I had understood all along that we were not likely to have fully effective, nationwide flood control until both the upstream and downstream phases of the job were carried out properly and in co-ordination.

Here on the Little Sioux the Soil Conservation Service is co-operating with the local Soil Conservation Districts in carrying out the upstream part of the flood control job on this typical floodstream. The job is being done, subwatershed by subwatershed, beginning at the upper end of these tributary streams and working on down along each to the main chanel. The general procedure is exactly the same in principle as that being followed in other watersheds of the country where the Department of Agriculture is going extensively into flood control work on watersheds authorized by Congress.

The flood control part of the Department's contribution, over and above the normal soil conservation work on farms and ranches, covers such items as the construction of water-detention reservoirs, gully plugs, diversions, and roadside work. Farmers ordinarily cannot carry out such operations because of their size and technical requirements. Moreover, they should not be expected to do so, because these works have a public benefit, affecting many people downstream from the points of installation—even more so, frequently, than the farmer on whose land the work is done. But farmers are helping, county highway authorities are helping, Soil Conservation Districts are assuming responsibility for general maintenance operations and farmer co-operation, and, in the instance of the Little Sioux, a committee composed of representatives from the various Soil Conservation Districts covering portions of the watershed is furnishing very helpful assistance in setting up priority work jobs, assignment and routing of machinery, developing arrangements for farmer and soil conservation district co-operation and assistance in connection with the cost and execution of maintenance operations, and so on.

Such a highly co-operative arrangement with the farmers is perhaps the backbone of the matter of getting the flood control job done expeditiously and effectively, and of maintaining the installations.

The effective performance of conservation measures under flood conditions may be observed on watersheds in various parts of the country where flood control work has been done. You may see it, for example, on the Theobold Creek subwatershed of the Little Sioux River in Iowa. There, three detention reservoirs and ten small structures on the main creek channel have reduced the fall and velocity enough to eliminate much of the formerly serious channel cutting. There are also six structures in lateral drainage, and other conservation measures, along with proper land use. The effect of these developments has been to eliminate virtually the entire erosion and flood problems in the subwatershed.

Dollar benefits

Dollar benefits accruing from such effective measures are likewise beginning to pile up over the country. For example, improvements completed in 1950 in the small Masters subwatershed of the Little Sioux prevented measurable damages of $3,600 in one rainstorm in June 1951, plus possible livestock, traffic, siltation, and other damages not evaluated.

A survey of damages from the January 1952 flood in the San Fernando Valley of the Los Angeles River watershed in California showed the effectiveness of the far from complete conservation flood control work. Damage was negligible in the areas protected by this work. Conservation-treated cropland suffered little erosion; whereas up to 100 tons of soil per acre were washed off some of the adjacent, unprotected cropland. And while a total of some $730,000 damage was done on the unprotected subwatersheds, flood control works prevented $300,000 of damage to land and property in the treated subwatersheds.

The Washita River watershed in Oklahoma is another of the eleven authorized flood control projects. Its Sandstone Creek subwatershed has suffered annual flood damage of about $60,000. The nearly completed program on this creek includes land treatment measures and floodwater retarding structures. It is estimated that future flooding will not exceed an average of 110 acres annually, out of the total floodplain of 4,700 acres, with an estimated annual damage of only $1,236. That is an estimated 90 per cent reduction in annual flood damages, or $57,461 a year. At the same time, the estimated annual net benefit from more intensive land use by farmers will be more than $11,000. All together, the measures installed on Sandstone Creek will produce approximately three dollars of benefit for each dollar of cost.

When the structural and land treatment measures have been completed on the entire Washita watershed—now one-third planned—at a cost of about $74,000,000, the total floodwater and sediment damages will be reduced by an estimated 73 per cent, or more than $4,000,000 annually. Confirmation of these anticipated benefits may be found, for example, on the approximately 6,000-acre Cloud Creek subwatershed, where the watershed treatment work was completed in 1948 at a total cost of $97,366. Annual operation and maintenance costs have amounted to about $2,900, including interest on installation costs; whereas total annual benefits have averaged about $5,700. So, for each dollar of cost this work is returning $1.96 in benefits.

Conservation and flood control benefits on an 18,432-acre subwatershed of the Little Tallahatchie River in Mississippi for the year ending June 30, 1951 were calculated at $25,000. The year's apportioned cost of the watershed improvement work responsible for that calculated return was only $13,334, or a little less than 2 to 1 benefit ratio. The annual cost was arrived at by including 2½ per cent of the federal and 4 per cent of private cost of installation, plus operation and maintenance costs for the year.

Similar benefits and dollar returns are mounting throughout the country, as in the Trinity River watershed in Texas, to cite one more. There, benefits of $2.20 for each dollar of cost are being returned on the 15,570-acre Howard Creek subwatershed, although the treatment has been only partially completed. On Honey Creek, the subwatershed program is estimated to bring benefits of $7.12 for each dollar of cost; and the East Fork program, above Lavon Reservoir, $10.12 in benefits for one dollar of cost.

In the big river basins

On the basis of such measured benefits, surveys, and other sound information available, we may estimate with reasonable accuracy the far wider resource conservation and economic returns that will come from the extension of co-ordinated watershed flood control programs to the nation's big river basins like the Missouri Basin. The whole program of the Department of Agriculture in the Missouri Basin would cost, as estimated, a total of about $8.5 billion, including cost to farmers, the Fed-

eral Government, and state and local interests.

At the same time, the program would protect an extensive but undetermined acreage, prevent annual flood and sediment damages of an estimated $25.25 million, provide three-quarters of a billion dollars in associated benefits annually, and return other, unevaluated benefits to the nation's agricultural plant, to our local and national economy, and to national security and defense. Figuring the total annual cost at something over $500 million—including interest on the investment and operating and maintenance costs—the net benefits would be expected to be about $250 million annually, or a net return of about 3 per cent on the original investment.

Although it is not claimed that such watershed programs will by themselves control superfloods like the 1951 Kansas-Missouri flood, they can be counted on to curb the flood flow in some degree. The real problem is where the people of a major river basin and of the nation as a whole may want to draw a line of compromise between the fullest utilization of protected tributary valley lands and the fullest protection of downstream urban areas and mainstem floodplains.

Soil conservationists do not hold that they can "dry up the rivers" by spending the amount of money on watershed programs that is spent on flood control reservoirs. Additional controls such as reservoirs, levees, and other main-channel protective works will always be needed for complete safeguarding of the floodplains against disastrous major floods.

PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE TREATMENT

The basic principles of effective watershed or river basin treatment are clear: conservation land treatment for soil erosion prevention and orderly disposal of runoff water, upstream engineering for waterflow retardation and channel stabilization, and downstream engineering for control along the mainstems.

There we have, as soil conservationists understand it, a co-ordinated approach to flood prevention and control —a program that protects the farmer of the uplands as well as of the lowlands, while protecting the cities, too.

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Labor Looks at Conservation and Development

BY ANTHONY WAYNE SMITH

EARLY theories of industrial unionism prophesied that a broad interest in general social problems would appear within the labor movement as plant-wide organization replaced the traditional craft-union structure. The comprehensive programs of the Congress of Industrial Organizations bear considerable witness to the soundness of these expectations.[1] Some of them, for example, deal with the conservation of natural resources and related issues of regional development, matters which might be supposed at first glance to be distant enough from labor's preoccupations.[2]

The Re-employment Plan presented by Mr. Philip Murray, president of the CIO, to the CIO Convention in 1944, is an early landmark.[3] Anticipating the possibility of a severe industrial recession after the war, this statement called for expanded government investment in peacetime projects, and recommended, among other things, the application of the principles of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the other major watersheds of the country.

The TVA idea was endorsed, first of all, as a full-employment measure: construction; manufacture of turbines, generators; production of steel, copper, and the like. It symbolized industrialization, new plants, more jobs, reduced electric power rates, and higher living standards. The CIO understood quite well that the great upsurge of prosperity in the Tennessee Valley, after TVA, was attributable in large measure to the low-cost public generation and transmission of hydroelectric power. But the related aspects of TVA policy were not overlooked: flood control, navigation, soil conservation, fertilizers, reforestation, and, above all, the integrated valley-wide plan.

At the same convention, by separate resolution, on the initiative of the late Worth Lowry, then president of the International Woodworkers of America (the CIO union in the logging and sawmill industries), a comprehensive statement on forest conservation was adopted.[4]

With these declarations as a starting point, the interest and activities of the CIO have expanded until they now touch to some extent on almost all aspects of regional development and conservation.

PROPOSED MISSOURI VALLEY AUTHORITY

When President Roosevelt recommended a Missouri Valley Authority, modeled on TVA, and Senator James E. Murray of Montana introduced the legislation, the CIO endorsed it.[5] In association with the National Farmers Union, numerous Rural Electrification Administration co-operatives, public

[1] *Proceedings, CIO Convention*, 1944, 1946–51; see the Annual Report of the President, and Resolutions on various aspects of conservation and development.

[2] *The Foundations of Prosperity*, CIO Committee on Regional Development and Conservation, CIO Publication No. 183, 1949, republished 1950.

[3] *Re-employment*, CIO Publication No. 116, 1944.

[4] *Proceedings*, 1944, cited note 1 *supra*, p. 172.

[5] See the full text of my statement to the Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, mimeographed, 1945.

power groups, and a few organizations of the American Federation of Labor, it worked vigorously for the MVA bill for several years.

As is well known, at the time the MVA proposal was advanced, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers had separate plans already prepared for the region; unfortunately, they were in fundamental conflict.[6] Nonetheless, when the MVA movement began to gain momentum, they were combined into the so-called Pick-Sloan program, which was offered as a substitute for an MVA, and congressional authorizations were obtained.

Appropriations proved slow in arriving; when they were sought, it was the residents of the valley themselves, and particularly the people who would be flooded out by the dams, that objected to construction.[7] The refusal of Congress to provide for comprehensive planning was accompanied by negative opposition to the Pick-Sloan proposals and a stalemate in the valley.

It could easily be foreseen, of course, that the first serious floods might result in an indiscriminate demand for action, of which the Pick-Sloan projects, others being unavailable, would be the beneficiaries; the Pick-Sloan forces could afford to bide their time. The disaster in the Kaw River Basin in the summer of 1951 provided the long-awaited opportunity, and the Corps of Engineers began blowing the bugles for its levees and big downstream dams.

It might have been understandable had labor joined in the uproar; the packing houses and assembly plants of downtown Kansas City which were wrecked by the flood had employed thousands of men who were members of CIO unions; the companies threatened not to rebuild, and the workers were faced with permanent loss of employment; in many cases their homes and possessions had been swept away.

At this juncture, however, Mr. Murray wrote publicly to President Truman and warned against the danger of falling back on Pick-Sloan. He recommended the appointment of a Presidential Commission to replan the basin, urged immediate attention to the watershed management program of the Department of Agriculture,[8] called again for an MVA, and went on to recommend a national Watershed Review Board, with authority over Engineers, Reclamation, and the Federal Power Commission.[9]

From the beginning, the CIO had pointed out that one of the great needs in the Missouri Valley was for substantial blocks of hydroelectric power to lighten labor on farms and bring industrialization; Pick-Sloan would not produce the power. Great waste would be involved in the flowing-channel navigation scheme and in the high-cost irrigation. Flood control should begin at the divide, and not with levees and main-stem dams. The unnecessary destruction of priceless farmland and waterfowl and game-animal habitat was inexcusable. The prospect was for the spread of man-made deserts along the margins of the enormous reservoirs during the dry cycle and for the appearance of artificial swamps and quicksands behind the huge concrete emplacements, as the silt-laden Missouri River, in the course of two or three generations, filled the reservoirs and rendered them useless. As usual, the Indian tribes were being expelled from their fertile river-bottom lands and driven into the hills, their traditional way of life destroyed; money damages, slow in arriving, could never compensate for the loss. Tens of thousands of other residents of the valley were also being uprooted. Much heavier emphasis needed to be placed on the programs of soil conservation, reforestation, and watershed management which had ostensibly (and to some extent actually) been part of the TVA approach.[10]

The President, in reply to Mr. Murray, conceded the need for an MVA, but pointed to the problem of electing a favorable Congress; in January he announced the appointment of a Presidential Commission to restudy the basin.

Proposed Columbia Valley Authority

Meanwhile, bureaucratic rivalry and conflict, contractor pressure, and local "boom" psychology had led to the presentation of another hybrid program to Congress (the Pick-Straus plan), covering the Columbia River Basin. In this case power development was not neglected, but there was the usual inattention to soil and forests, the customary callous invasion of Indian rights, a squandering of funds on fantastically expensive irrigation programs, a serious overemphasis on navigation, and a wanton disregard of the migratory fish runs as an essential resource of the Pacific Northwest. President Truman proposed a Columbia Valley Authority; the CIO endorsed the CVA legislation in the hope that better planning might result.[11] When the possibility of immediate passage faded, it opposed authorizations and appropriations for the more objectionable portions of the Pick-Straus plan (while urging the immediate construction of specific hydroelectric power projects), pending a genuine effort to solve the fisheries problem. The issue still hangs in the balance.

Power Development Versus Other Values

The controversy focuses attention on the need to reconcile the protection and conservation of living resources with the development of hydroelectric power. The CIO has always favored a generous development of power. Uniformly, the legislation it has endorsed (TVA, MVA, CVA, St. Lawrence project) has provided for public development and transmission, distribution with a priority to publicly and co-operatively owned agencies, and public aid to such agencies in acquiring existing systems.[12]

On the other hand, the CIO has urged that power development take place within the framework of complete valley-wide plans in which due attention is paid to soil, forests, wildlife, recreation, scenery, and minority rights.

[6] They had many other serious faults. See *The Big Missouri*, Public Affairs Institute, 1948; also the Hoover Commission Task Force Report (*Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, Task Force Report on Natural Resources*, 1949, p. 107, *et seq.*).

[7] For example, opposition of the Fort Berthold Indians to the Garrison Dam; of the Blue Valley farmers to the Tuttle Creek Dam; see *Flood Control . . . in reverse*, Blue River Study Association, Bigelow, Kansas, 1947.

[8] *Missouri River Basin Agricultural Program*, H. Doc. 373, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949.

[9] The establishment of such a board had been suggested by the Cooke Commission (Water Resources Policy Commission: *A Water Policy for the American People*, 1950, Vol. 1, p. 49), though with some vagueness in respect to the power of the board over the licensing function of the Federal Power Commission; but the board would be impotent without authority over the Power Commission; private power development would race ahead without plan, while public development would be frustrated. The Hoover Commission had also recommended the establishment of a Board of Impartial Analysis of Engineering and Architectural Projects (Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, Report on Department of Interior, 1949, p. 2).

[10] Frank, Bernard, and Anthony Netboy, *Water, Land, and People* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 209 *et seq.* As to the above paragraph in general, see notes 5, 6, and 7, *supra*.

[11] *The Magnificent Columbia*, CIO Committee on Regional Development and Conservation, CIO Pamphlet No. 178, 1949.

[12] Bills dealing with the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project differ; testimony on behalf of the CIO, favoring the project, has always supported the policies indicated.

It has pointed out that the damage above the dam (including intangibles and long-range factors)[13] must be balanced against all benefits.

This is a difficult position to maintain. Programs which are bad from a conservation point of view (for instance, Pick-Straus) may have merit as power producers. To oppose them in the absence of ready alternatives may seem to jeopardize industrial expansion (a serious matter in wartime), or may lead to the issuance of certificates by the Federal Power Commission for private development.[14] Proponents of public power need all the support they can muster against the attacks of the electric utility industry, but unfortunately they have too often been heedless of the well-founded objections of conservationists in particular cases.

LABOR'S RIGHTS AND DISPERSION OF INDUSTRY

At all times, the CIO has insisted that an indispensable element of the TVA idea is fair treatment for labor, including payment of not less than prevailing wages and recognition of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively and take concerted action for mutual aid and protection. Obviously, the acceptance of collective bargaining by public agencies engaged mainly in economic enterprise is a prerequisite to union support for such public operations.[15]

Another problem which the CIO has recognized in its development programs is the dispersion of industry. Clearly, power dams and transmission lines must be so located, within broad limits, as to supply existing load centers. But at the same time the choice of sites for dams and lines influences the location and density of industrial, hence residential, concentrations. The CIO has been insisting that our great cities have become impossibly congested, and that dispersion is essential for both peacetime and wartime purposes. Such dispersion cannot be accomplished without industrial decentralization; the latter can be helped or hindered by public policy in power development and transmission. Countless lives may depend upon dispersion in the age of the atomic bomb; peacetime health and happiness will depend upon it increasingly in the future. Since it is humanly desirable, it should be planned for, and the transition should be accomplished with guarantees of job security and union stability, and without undue hardship and dislocation; such an outcome is by no means impossible if we set our minds to it.

FORESTS, SOIL, AND RANGES

The forestry program of the CIO and the International Woodworkers of America has been a distinguished one, comprising some of the most comprehensive proposals since the days of Gifford Pinchot. It calls for direct regulation of timber harvesting on all private timberlands on principles of sustained yield, selective cutting, and individual tree marking; [16] for the development of a comprehensive system of access roads open to the public; for the protection and extension of the National Forest System; [17] for adequate appropriations and abundant federal credit for timber management; [18] for the extension of many of the agricultural aids to forestry; for experimentation in the public purchase of managerial rights in privately owned timber lands; and for a number of specific projects, such as a national forest with park units comprising the entire coast redwood belt in California.[19] While the employment interests of loggers and sawmill workers provide a solid foundation for this program, it is a real expression of the citizenship interests of the union membership.

Closely related have been efforts in soil and range conservation. So heavily dependent are the operations of the Soil Conservation Service on annual congressional appropriations that it has seemed best for labor to concentrate on the appropriations problem.[20] Help has also been given in fighting off special-interest legislation which would have led to serious overgrazing or even to the surrender of the ranges. Is not the interest of union members in abundant food and high nutritive content (not to mention their concern with the public welfare) sufficiently clear? Meanwhile, more and more attention has been paid to comprehensive watershed management plans as the key to both nutrition and river control.

OUTDOOR LIFE

Outdoor recreation is more and more important to union members. They have obtained greatly increased leisure through their organizations during the last fifteen years: shorter hours, longer week ends, longer paid vacations. New state and national parks and expanded camping facilities in our state and national forests are greatly needed. In consequence the CIO has lent vigorous support to such projects as the Quetico-Superior wilderness program. Again, it has urged that the Reclamation Bureau relocate the dams proposed for Dinosaur National Monument, placing them outside the boundaries, and has urged that the monument be developed promptly as a national park.[21] Considerable doubt has been expressed as to the recreational values created around the margins of fluctuating flood-control and hydroelectric power reservoirs, as distinguished from the possibilities of natural recreation in the normal river basin, if properly developed for picnic grounds and camp sites. Because union members are often sportsmen, or just plain conservationists, interest has been taken in the protection of waterfowl, game animals, and the like, where their survival is threatened by ill-advised

[13] It opposed approval of the Report of the Subcommittee on *Benefits and Costs* of the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee (1950) on the ground of inadequate attention to intangibles and long-range factors.

[14] The point about the Commission is widely overlooked; though not, of course, by the utilities; see note 9 *supra*.

[15] As to the efforts of federal agencies to solve this problem constructively, see *Labor-Management Relations in TVA*, S. Rept. 372, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); *Labor-Management Relations in the Bonneville Power Administration*, S. Rept. 192, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). The law in regard to municipalities is embryonic; there is no reason why it cannot develop favorably. As to differences of opinion between CIO and AFL groups organized in the industry, with the AFL organization supporting public power, see *AFL News-Reporter*, Jan. 16, 1952, reporting statement of Mr. Charles MacGowan, president of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, AFL.

[16] For example, the CIO supported the Hook Bill, H. R. 6221 (1946).

[17] For example, see the full text of my statement before the American Forest Congress, mimeographed, 1946.

[18] An excellent statement on the credit problem is contained in Stephen Raushenbush, *Our Conservation Job*, Public Affairs Institute, 1949.

[19] Embodied in the Douglas Bill (Roosevelt Redwood Forest Bill), H. R. 6201 (1946), H. R. 2876 (1947), H. R. 2394 (1949); see Helen Gahagan Douglas, "The Proposed Redwood Forest," *National Parks Magazine*, April–June 1947; Dewey Anderson, *An Action Program for the Redwood Forests*, Public Affairs Institute, 1949; *An Appraisal of the Economic and Social Effect of the . . . Proposed Roosevelt Redwood Forest*, U. S. Forest Service, typewritten, with maps, 1946.

[20] *Healthy Soil, Healthy People*, CIO Pamphlet No. 162; see my testimony before the Senate Sub-Committee on Agriculture Appropriations, mimeographed, 1949.

[21] I took a group of state CIO officers on an expedition into the monument in May 1951, as a result of which a consensus was reached as indicated.

drainage or construction. And the national disgrace of stream pollution has not gone unnoticed.

VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF POLICY

Many other activities could be mentioned: the organization has fought for the retention of the off-shore petroleum resources in federal hands, development to be by the Federal Government itself or by a sound system of leasing. In respect to atomic energy, the CIO has advocated not only federal ownership but actual federal operation, as distinguished from the present system of contracting operations to monopolistic corporations.

The true synthesis of policy in conservation and development in America has not yet been fully formulated. The germ of the idea was present in the TVA, but its growth, while good, was not entire; criticism by sportsmen, recreationists, soil and forest conservationists, and watershed management experts reveals the deficiencies.[22]

The ultimate solution must place heavier emphasis on upstream watershed management (ponds, terraces, check-dams, contour plowing, strip cropping, afforestation, and so forth) as distinguished from downstream river engineering for purposes of flood control. Such a shift of attention from construction to cultivation may provide a new meeting ground for farm and labor groups. Moderation and deliberation in the pace of hydroelectric development, coupled with the necessary reasonable limitation on total construction which is inherent in balanced planning, should help to bridge the gap between proponents of public power and conservationists.

Vigorous restraints should be imposed on future reclamation and navigation schemes (one good test would be ability to repay in full); the subsidies, open and hidden, which are now being squandered on them should go to watershed management. Indeed, all river engineering (for purposes of navigation, reclamation, or power whether *private* or public) should contribute to watershed maintenance by setting up suitable reserves and making proper contributions to the maintenance of that portion of the capital plant which the watershed itself represents.[23]

Recognition of the rights of collective bargaining and concerted action for employees of publicly owned economic enterprises is essential, and should moderate potential opposition to public power by minority union groups. The assignments given by Congress to federal agencies (for example, to the Army Engineers, flood control and navigation; to the Bureau of Reclamation, "irrigate everything") must be changed so that all decisions are based on balanced plans; and some central review or planning commission, with full veto powers, must be created. The administrative policies of all agencies must be based on specified *policies*, and not on naked grants of *power*.

There are some fundamental problems of *evaluation* to be solved (all politics goes back to evaluation): Do we really want to destroy our high wildernesses by "scenic" drives, timber cutting, useless transmountain diversions? Is the "drain everything" policy of Reclamation and Agriculture to proceed without hindrance to destroy our marshlands, hence our migratory waterfowl? Is idolatry of "free" enterprise going to block yardstick hydro-

[22] For example, Frank and Netboy, *loc. cit.* note 10 *supra;* cf. *Policies and Objectives of Regional Development,* statement by the author before National Emergency Conference on Resources, mimeographed, 1949.

[23] Cf. Frank and Netboy, cited note 10 *supra,* pp. 236–37, where the suggestion is advanced that the TVA "divert all its net revenues" to watershed management.

electric power? On the other hand, is human welfare measurable in kilowatt-hours, but not in the quietudes and scenic grandeurs (and the rapids and waterfalls) which are so often destroyed by the big dams? Are the big-city values, the speed values, the gadget values, the important ones, or should we try to recapture the old-time natural outdoor American life in some degree? Are we capable, as a nation, as a world, of facing the population problems involved in all of this?

QUESTION OF POLITICAL ACTION

No effective action, whether in appropriations, in regulation, or in planning, seems probable without an improvement, as the President said, in the congressional situation. Such improvement, in turn, awaits concerted political action. A coalition of creative forces throughout America is essential to such political action. Among such forces are the soil and forest conservation societies, the park and wilderness organizations, the wildlife and ecological societies, the sportsmen's organizations, the public power associations, the regional planning societies, the farm organizations, and the labor unions. Because the industrial union movement contains within itself so many of the interests and groups which appear to be in conflict in these matters throughout the nation, it may well contribute greatly, granted friendly co-operation from others, both to a workable policy synthesis and to the necessary working coalition.

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Conservation and Wise Utilization of Natural Resources in Canada

By H. A. Young

A COUNTRY'S approach to the conservation and wise utilization of its natural resources may in large part be determined by the character and extent of these resources. Canada is well blessed. In the field of minerals she leads the world in the output of nickel, asbestos, and platinum, producing 80 per cent, 65 per cent, and about 50 per cent respectively of the total. She stands second in the output of zinc and gold, third in the production of silver, and fourth in copper. She also ranks high in pitchblende, although comparative figures for the world's leading producers are not available. The bulk of this production goes abroad; 97 per cent of our production of nickel, 95 per cent of asbestos, 90 per cent of zinc, and 70 per cent of copper are all exported. Almost all of Canada's production of gold is exported for monetary purposes.

Recent developments in iron ore and in petroleum, while not placing Canada among the world's leading producers, are rapidly bringing her to a position of importance in those fields. Canada's production of iron ore has grown from an almost negligible quantity before the war to a current annual figure of 4,700,000 tons, and it has been estimated that it may be as much as 33,000,000 tons annually within the next decade. Known reserves of petroleum are now 1,700,000,000 barrels, 34 times as great as they were five years ago, and active exploration continues. In the past five years Canada's annual production has risen from 7,600,000 barrels to 48,000,000 barrels. Further, the famous Athabaska tar sands, 250 miles north of Edmonton, should not be overlooked. At present an economic method of extracting the petroleum from these sands has not been developed, but extensive research is being undertaken, and should it be successful, Canada will have petroleum reserves greater than all the present proved commercial reserves of the rest of the world combined.

Land and Water Resources

In forestry, Canada's position again is important. In 1949 she produced about 6 per cent of the world's fuel wood, 11 per cent of the saw logs, and almost 28 per cent of the pulpwood. Canadian mills accounted for 27 per cent of the total production of woodpulp and for 63 per cent of newsprint. In exports, Canada led the world (excluding the Soviet Union) in newsprint, with 83 per cent of the total, and in lumber, with 29 per cent of the total, and ranked second in woodpulp, with 29 per cent of the total.

In food products, Canada's contribution is well known. She ranks second as an exporter of wheat and of live cattle, and is an important exporter of other cereal and animal products. The coastal and inland fishing industries make her the free world's fifth largest producer of fish and the leading exporter.

In addition to all this, Canada is extremely well blessed with water-power resources. Fortunately, moreover, these are abundant in what are termed the "acute fuel zones" of Ontario and Quebec, where native coal is not economically situated but which in other respects are well suited to industrial development. In the last half-century installed hydroelectric capacity has risen from 275,000 horsepower to 13,300,000 hp.—48 times the original figure. Between 1939 and 1951 the capacity was enlarged by no less than 60 per cent. With a population of less than 1 per cent of the world total, Canada has over 10 per cent of the world's developed hydroelectric power, but even so, has developed only one-quarter of her water-power potential.

Extensive Exports

One of the most significant factors about our natural resources is that the bulk of our mineral, agricultural, fish, and forest output is sold abroad. The same may be said, to a considerable degree, of our hydroelectric output; for while it is consumed in Canada, a substantial part of it goes to the manufacture of goods for export. Two large consumers of electric energy, for example, are aluminum and newsprint. The development of an aluminum industry in Canada is due entirely to the availability of large amounts of low-cost power in the vicinity of tidewater, for the raw materials are imported. The Canadian aluminum industry now accounts for about 28 per cent of world production, and nine out of every ten tons are shipped abroad. Newsprint is now Canada's largest single export; its importance in world trade has been mentioned.

The foreign demand for Canada's natural resources has been, of course, the key factor in building our economy to a point where a country of only fourteen million people—twenty-fifth among the countries of the world in terms of population—has achieved fourth place among the trading nations of the world and second in terms of high standards of living. Our pre-eminence as a foreign trader, however, is important not only to Canadians but to all the world. Under present conditions, when preparedness to resist aggression is of paramount importance, Canada's resources are once again vital to the defense effort of the free nations of the world, just as they were during the six long years of the Second World War. Furthermore, in addition to their contribution to defense, these resources can still mean better living to countries which obtain them, and it is our earnest hope that improving living conditions may create a climate more favorable to the achievement of a full and lasting peace. For these reasons the conservation and efficient development of her resources becomes not only a national but an international responsibility.

Problems of Conservation

There was a time, not very long ago, when the abundance and variety of Canada's resources seemed to convince her people that there was little need to conserve them. Forests were cut with no heed to reforestation or the encouragement of natural growth. Crops were grown with no thought to the replenishment of the life-giving contents of the soil. Drought and dust storms, lowered water tables in the prairies and in other parts of the country, flash floods followed by dried-up river beds, the disappearance of many valuable forests, and mines abandoned too early because they had been high-graded, all served to bring home the folly of profligate exploitation of resources. It is well appreciated, too, in Canada that the rapidly increasing world population, the rising living standards in underdeveloped countries, and technical developments increasing the utility of many metals and other products, are all combining to increase at a startling rate the demand for raw materials.

Nevertheless, however fully the need for conservation is recognized, it is no simple matter to put it into practice. The fact is that, over the short run, it is more costly to exploit resources with an eye to the future than with both eyes solely on the present. It is more expensive, for example, to cut a forest on a sustained-yield basis than to adopt the wasteful method of "cut out and get out." Less accessible areas may have to be cut, and a good deal of research is necessary to obtain the requisite data on rates and conditions of growth and many other matters. Then, if conservation is to be thorough, it must not be limited to the growing forest; it must cover such fields as making the fullest use of all parts of the tree, including the sawdust, and the preservation of wood and wood products, the substitution as far as possible of more common woods for those less common, and so on. All this calls for research—much research—and research is costly.

The same thing applies to minerals. More immediate profit comes from high-grading than from mixing the rich ore with that of lower grade and thus prolonging the life of the mine. Then, here again, much research is necessary to find the best methods of discovering the minerals in the ground, of extracting them from the rock, of utilizing them and protecting the finished product against stress, strain, and erosion. And in agriculture and fisheries it is also true that the wasteful method promises the largest *immediate* profit.

WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?

Conservation is, and always must be, a responsibility of all groups in the community, including national governments and local governments; universities, private research organizations, and service clubs; large and small corporations; individual farmers, miners, fishermen, and lumber operators; prospectors, hunters, and tourists. The role of government, however, is a special one, for to a large extent it may stimulate better conservation by other groups.

The importance of government's role in conservation derives from the fact that the development of resources on sound conservation standards is not compatible with the immediate maximization of profit. It is probable that conservation will *over the long run* produce the maximum profit from resources; but as J. M. Keynes said, "In the long run we are all dead." It may be difficult, therefore, for even the most public spirited board of directors to adopt, beyond a point, more costly measures of development than appear to be necessary, merely to preserve our natural resources for the use of future generations fifty or a hundred years hence. They are inclined to argue that the very fact that it will be future generations that will benefit from conservation is a sound economic reason for *part at least* of the costs of conservation being borne by the people of the country as a whole, as taxpayers, rather than by the consumers of the raw material through higher prices, by the laborers that produce it through lower wages, or by the owners of the resource through lower profits. There is wide public acceptance of this general principle; the only dispute concerns the extent to which it should be applied—the degree to which the taxpayer by one method or another should carry the burden of conservation.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Basic to any examination of how the problem is dealt with in Canada is a knowledge of the manner in which responsibility for resource development is divided between the federal and the provincial governments. Under the British North America Act—Canada's constitution—the ownership and administration of land, forest, mineral, and water-power resources is given solely to the provincial governments, the exceptions being in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon, which have not yet achieved provincial status and where the natural resources are owned and administered by the Federal Government, and certain relatively small areas of federal land in the provinces. Concerning agriculture, the B.N.A. Act states that the provincial and federal governments shall have concurrent rights, but that provincial laws shall be valid only to the extent that they are not repugnant to federal legislation.

In practice, the provincial governments limit their agricultural legislation to problems affecting their own province, while the Federal Government concerns itself with national or broad regional problems. Both coastal and inland fisheries are a federal responsibility under the B.N.A. Act, but in regard to the inland fisheries the practice has developed whereby the Federal Government legislates in accordance with provincial desires and leaves the administration of this legislation to provincial authorities.

However, although the provincial governments have complete jurisdiction over certain resources, the Federal Government has also a valid interest in conserving and developing these resources and can properly give assistance in doing so, provided that such assistance is given in agreement with the provincial governments concerned. The Minister of Resources and Development has pointed out that in cases where natural-resource problems spread beyond provincial or national boundaries, or where the resource is of such a type and is available in such quantities that its development requires a truly national effort, joint federal and provincial action may be desirable.

CARE OF FORESTS

Government policy relating to the conservation of a particular resource is determined in part by whether the resource is renewable or nonrenewable. For example, in the case of a renewable resource such as forests it is generally recognized that the goal must be to achieve sustained yield; that is, the rate of depletion—by cutting and by loss through fire and disease—must not exceed the rate of replacement by natural growth and reforestation. Both the provincial governments and the industry recognize this, and important steps have been taken to frame provincial legislation and industrial practice so as to achieve this end.

To facilitate co-operative efforts by the provincial and federal governments to improve the care and management of Canada's forests, Parliament in 1949 passed the Canada Forestry Act, which provides, among other things, for the Federal Government to enter into agreements with any province for the protection, development, or utilization of forest resources. Unfortunately, the need for increased defense activities coming shortly after the passage of this act has up to the present restricted the extent of federal activities. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1951 the Minister of Resources and Development announced that the Federal Government was entering into an agreement with the provincial governments to give financial assistance in the taking of a reliable and complete forest inventory, and in encouraging reforestation. He pointed out that a forest inventory is essential before a policy to achieve sustained yeld can be successfully planned, and that reforestation is badly needed

in certain cut-out areas which will not regenerate themselves naturally and where forest cover is necessary not only for the development of forest projects but also in the interest of soil conservation, flood control, cover for wildlife, and other uses.

For many years past, the Federal Government has assisted in forest conservation by extensive research. Forestry research is carried on in Ottawa and through five district offices and five forest experiment stations situated in different regions throughout the country. It covers silviculture and forest management, forest inventories, and fire protection research. It is designed to provide solutions to many technical problems encountered in improving forest management. Forest products research is undertaken in two forest products laboratories, one in Ottawa and one in Vancouver. It covers such fields as wood utilization, wood preservation, timber mechanics, and wood chemistry. There is in addition an experimental sawmill in Ottawa.

AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT

In agriculture much has been done by precept to teach better methods of farming, and research is carried on by almost forty agricultural experimental stations throughout the country. A particularly interesting project is that undertaken by the Federal Government under the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act. This act was passed in 1935 to provide for the restoration of substantial areas in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Federal funds on a large scale were made available for assistance to these provinces. The federal Department of Agriculture directed the work, but joint federal-provincial committees co-ordinated the work of all agricultural bodies, including that of some private commercial and financial organizations.

This act is still in effect. Its work is divided into three main divisions: (*a*) land culture practices, (*b*) land utilization, and (*c*) water development. The Federal Government provides funds and direction for the construction of water reservoirs, for economic and soil surveys, for land classification and determination of use, for the study of cultural practices, and for the provision of illustration stations to demonstrate the proper use of land for the regrassing of devastated lands and for the establishment of community pastures. Combined with these undertakings there has been an extension of federal research in a broad range of subjects such as soils, forestry, entomology, crop production, and agricultural engineering. This work, started in 1935, is continuing and has expanded into other provinces as agreements between the federal and provincial authorities have been concluded.

FISH CONSERVATION

The responsibility for fish conservation, except in certain of the inland fisheries, is exercised by the Federal Government. The general policy is to manage the resources in such a manner as to allow maximum production for use, yet guarantee the supply in perpetuity. Effort toward this end is directed along two lines: (*a*) protection of the existing stock to allow sufficient individuals to spawn, and (*b*) improvement of environmental conditions to permit more efficient use of the spawning areas.

To provide basic information on which to design proper procedures for the protection of the existing stock, the Fisheries Research Board of Canada is constantly investigating the life histories of the various species and estimating population abundance. For those species where it is indicated that exploitation may be reaching dangerous levels (for example, Pacfic salmon, Pacific herring, Pacific halibut, lobsters, Atlantic salmon, Atlantic smelts, clams, and in some instances whitefish), pertinent restrictions are applied in the form of minimum lengths, closed seasons, closed areas, catch quotas, and so forth. Improvement of environmental conditions to encourage more efficient spawning and incubation is restricted almost wholly to anadromous and fresh-water fishes, such as salmon, smelt, and trout. This work may be expected to develop greatly in a country such as Canada, where increasing industrialization will more and more tend to put water to various uses and increase the discharge of wastes. At the present time, the main problems are created by water-power developments, and pulp and lumber mills.

MINERAL CONSERVATION

Since minerals fall in the class of nonrenewable resources, their conservation, from the theoretical point of view, presents a problem different from those we have so far discussed. There is no simple criterion by which to determine the rate of exploitation that should be permitted, such as is provided in the case of forest, soil, and fish resources by the goal of sustained yield, because by definition there is no such thing as sustained yield in a nonrenewable resource. The question as to the extent to which the taxpayer should bear the burden of increased production costs necessary to prolong the life of a mineral deposit can be answered only on an empirical basis.

In Canada both federal and provincial governments follow the general practice of encouraging mineral conservation by the indirect method of reducing costs so as to encourage the production of lower grades, rather than by direct controls. Mineral rights, once they are relinquished to private enterprise, generally become the property of the company or individual concerned, and no conservation policies are enforced. An important exception, however, is found in the case of natural gas and petroleum resources in the province of Alberta, where the Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Board exercises strict control over the number of wells and the volume of production.

Financial encouragement to the mining industry is given by favorable income tax provisions during the development and early production stages of a mine and by government assistance in the construction of transportation facilities—railroads, roads, landing fields, docks, and so forth—in remote areas. The government furthermore undertakes geological, topographical, and other surveys which are basic to the discovery and development of mineral resources, and, through the Mines Branch of the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, carries out extensive research in a very wide range of problems concerning the discovery, extraction, processing, utilization, and preservation of minerals.

THE OVER-ALL PICTURE

To sum up, the policy of the Federal Government in Canada is to create an economic climate favorable to the exploitation of natural resources by private industry to the maximum degree compatible with principles of sound conservation. Within provincial jurisdictions the specific policies vary somewhat in detail, depending on the historical background, local conditions, and the ideology of the current provincial governments. Putting all these government policies together with the

activities of corporations, institutions, and individuals concerned, it is not boasting to maintain that Canada realizes her responsibility as one of the world's greatest natural resource storehouses and that she is striving to ensure that these resources are exploited prudently and used wisely.

Major-General Hugh Andrew Young, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Ottawa, Canada, is Deputy Minister of Resources and Development and Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. He is a director of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation; chairman of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee (Defence Research Board); member of the Board of Governors of the Arctic Institute of North America; member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Geographical Society; and member of the Board of Directors of the Pulp and Paper Research Institute of Canada.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

KIEFFER, JOHN E. *Realities of World Power.* Pp. xiii, 326. New York: David McKay Company, 1952. $4.00.

Proudly publicized as a geopolitical blueprint for the layman, with particular reference to the American strategic position, John Kieffer's recent work sets out to combine ambitiously the main principles of geopolitical doctrine with a current appraisal of the world political scene. Although he signally fails in his first objective, his challenging and belligerent observations often hit the mark on the practical side of the picture. The reviewer's principal impression is that the book is extremely uneven, hastily written, and filled with emotional outbursts which not only astound the academician, but which will cause most readers to lose the thread of the author's discussion. The weakest part of the book is the introductory section, the chapters dealing with the historical background and fundamental factors of the pseudo science of geopolitics. The author gingerly sidesteps any attempt to offer a clear-cut and intelligible definition of geopolitics which is mysteriously labelled as an "almost diabolical plot to forestall our efforts" (p. 5). A few pages later a larger and more confused definition is given, broad in its outlines to the point of meaninglessness.

The first hundred pages display a tendency to underestimate the significant theoretical aspects of twentieth-century geopolitics. The reviewer would strongly dispute the statements that "the principles of geopolitics are simple," and that "the global concept is only the application of common-sense thinking to world areas" (p. 6). Based on these oversimplified assumptions, the discussion of the fundamental factors of geopolitics and of geostrategy assumes the form of a superficial primer. Particularly disturbing is the complete absence of documentation which is essential to the interpretation of background-theory. Important works are briefly mentioned by reference to volume, without giving precise quotations or a more exact indication of the source itself. The book, incidentally, has no index, no appendixes; and its entire bibliography consists of eleven generally known textbook titles.

The major part of Kieffer's work is based on a detailed survey of the world's "strategic power areas." This is by far the most useful section of *Realities of World Power*, and the reader will find valuable information in the well-written chapters on the United States, Great Brit-

ain, France, Spain, and Italy. However, the author's analysis of the explosive Spanish situation is lopsided and misleading. The condemnation of Spain in the United States is not the result of pro-Communist propaganda; the *rapport* between the democracies and Franco is indeed a dangerous experiment, even if the author explicitly disregards the moral aspects of an exuberant friendship with the Spanish dictator. Similar political misjudgments mar the chapter on Germany and the geopolitical review of Tito's Yugoslavia. It is probably justifiable to characterize Tito as "a political opportunist whose primary interest is power for Tito" (p. 229). At the same time, much more emphasis should be placed on Tito's determined challenge of the imperialistic structure of Stalinism, and on the strategic value of a Western alliance with the Yugoslav outpost.

On the whole, the author is at his best in the survey of the United States and of Western and Central Europe. The farther he drifts from these well-charted regions, the more lightly does he tread on the dangerous ground of political problem-areas. The Near Eastern and Far Eastern sections are particularly confusing and hesitant. They detract considerably from the over-all value of preceding chapters, which are lively and often informative. The final chapter on "The Common Problem and the Future" reasserts the primacy of power politics and hotly denies the role of moral considerations in the author's own perspective of "geopolitics." He reveals the characteristic theme of this emotionally inclined and controversial work in a closing comment: "We have said much about idealism, and all of it has been in a contemptuous vein."

ANDREW GYORGY

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KORNER, EMIL. *The Law of Freedom as the Remedy for War and Poverty.* Translated from the German by H. Leigh Farnell. 2 vols. Pp. xxiii, 562; vi, 668. London: Williams & Norgate (distributed in U. S. by the British Book Center), 1951. $9.50.

This scholarly and closely-reasoned work defends the thesis that poverty and war are to be overcome, not by democratic or autocratic socialism, but by capitalism operating under conditions of genuine freedom. Perhaps its chief attraction consists not so much in its positive program as in its illuminating attack on both the untruthful foes and the misguided friends of liberalism.

The first volume considers economics in its setting of psychology, philosophy, politics, and history. Besides dealing with popular fallacies, it presents two basic principles in the social economy of "means," or valuable goods. The final *use* of means should be governed by the ethical principle: "Develop your own self as you would that your nearest and dearest should develop his." And the *acquisition* of means should be governed by the economic principle of freedom of choice, but on the understanding that the "law of freedom" is always subject to this limitation: "What you would not have done to you, never to another do, and do not allow it to be done to anyone else." Thus the basic functions of the political state are two: to protect freedom, and to exercise for individuals the precautions which they would exercise for themselves if they could.

The second volume is devoted to a number of problems in economic theory and political practice. Outstanding are the problems of "unemployment" (interpreted as the total unemployment of some workers) and "full employment." The first of these problems can be solved by fixing a minimum wage rate and so varying the maximum hours of work that the total volume of labor demanded at any time is distributed automatically among the total number of willing workers. The second problem, although no satisfactory solution of it is known, may be made less serious by relaxing the existing limits on both consumption and production. Here it is important, not merely to maintain equality, in terms of exchange value, between total productive services and total product, but to do so by means of a monetary standard whose real buying power is stable. For this purpose only one kind of productive service needs to have a stable price, and the most suitable kind is unskilled labor. What we should do, then, is link a fixed minimum money wage with a variable maximum working week. To illustrate, dollars might be issued subject to the condition that not less than forty dollars shall be paid for a working week of, say, forty hours.

It is only within a "world state," Korner holds, that freedom can be realized and war abolished, since any national state can be prevented by another from carrying the law of freedom into effect. If we do not voluntarily construct a free world state, we may have a totalitarian world state imposed on us. Depending on one's concern for freedom in its present struggle with state control, one may or may not approve the vigor with which Korner assails Marx, sometimes Keynes, and occasionally such writers as Drucker and Vaihinger; but in any case the quality of the assault is likely to be respected.

BRUCE KNIGHT

Dartmouth College

MIKESELL, RAYMOND F. *United States Economic Policy and International Relations.* Pp. xii, 341. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952. $4.75.

With this broad-gauged and scholarly treatise, Professor Mikesell has signally contributed to a major field of study which, despite the appearance of numerous technical and theoretical discussions, has long suffered from the lack of a comprehensive survey of our foreign economic policy. Indeed, the prevalence of the piecemeal approach to isolated aspects of this multifaceted subject has tempted occasional observers to doubt the existence of any such policy. Without denying or belittling the significance of numerous inconsistencies and paradoxes, Mikesell shows how historical and analytical techniques can be made to yield a definite rationale which reflects both the fluctuating aims of our foreign policy and our basic traditions of economic liberalism. Addressing himself to the dominant problems and policies of World War II and its aftermath by way of a succinct historic review of interwar developments, the author skillfully highlights the change in the country's international accounts after World War I, its attitudes toward war debts and foreign lending, and the protectionist refusal to adjust to the new realities before and during the great depression. His discussion of international monetary policies during this period compares central bank co-operation in the 1920's with the Treasury's efforts toward stabilization in the 1930's and leads him to the conclusion that the earlier Federal Reserve activities represent "a more substantial contribution" than the actions of the Treasury; this judgment might be somewhat qualified by reference to the depression-born pressures which had made the failure of the 1933 London Conference very nearly inevitable once the proclamation of Empire preferences at Ottawa in 1932 had virtually invited competitive exchange-rate depreciation.

The main part of the book offers a systematic exposition of the principal postwar aspects of international monetary and investment policy. The presentation is marked by commendable restraint and a fitting sense of proportion in assessing the many crosscurrents which left their mark on the emerging institutional and policy pattern of the recent past. This reviewer happens to share the author's view that "the most essential key to the elimination of discriminatory trade and exchange controls lies in the restoration of Sterling-Dollar convertibility"; however, he may perhaps be permitted to ask whether this view would not call for some comment on the failure to deal more realistically with the war-generated sterling balances than was done in the 1945 Anglo-American Financial Agreement. The discussion of exchange rate and gold policy is thorough and lucid, but might usefully have included a reference to the misguided wartime attempts to "aid" occupied areas by fixing exchange rates there according to purist concepts. The treatment of such organizations as World Bank and Fund, Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and European Payments Union (EPU), and of the Point IV and International Trade Organization's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (ITO/GATT) programs is competent and to the point. The struggle over postwar commercial policy forms the subject of a vivid chapter which

illustrates the political shortcomings of our agricultural policies. The book closes with an outline of the new directions which the defense effort has imparted to our foreign economic policy; regrettably, the last two chapters do not mention the East-West trade problem despite its relevance to their subjects. This may, however, not have been possible within the necessarily restricted scope of the "Economic Handbook Series" of which this volume is one. In fact, it is this degree of condensation which makes the book valuable as collateral reading for advanced courses, although its main appeal should be directed to the wide audience of informed general readers.

ADOLPHE J. WARNER
New York City

WARBURG, JAMES P. *How to Co-exist Without Playing the Kremlin's Game.* Pp. viii, 228. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. $2.75 cloth; $1.00 paper.

James P. Warburg is a critic, although a restrained and moderate critic, of the present trend of American foreign policy. He finds it too "tough" with the Soviet Union, too negative and lacking in broad constructive blueprints for promoting peace and disarmament and for promoting a crusade against poverty and distress all over the world.

As a means of "co-existing" with the Soviet Union "without playing the Kremlin's game" he offers "six imperatives" for a new policy, which may be briefly summarized as follows:

Help develop a plan for peace through which universal enforceable disarmament under law would become a practical possibility.

Help develop a worldwide co-operative program of economic development and social reform, aimed at liberating all mankind from hunger, poverty, disease, and oppression.

Do not betray the basic principles of a free society in the name of cold war expediency.

Build up the military power of the free world, but in such a way as to "combine the maximum deterrent with the minimum of provocation" and not to undermine the economic strength and political stability of the nations which are resisting aggression.

However attractive these proposals may sound, the obstacles to their realization are a good deal more formidable than Mr. Warburg seems to recognize. To find a common denominator of "law" which would satisfy both the Communist states and the free states is not difficult; it is starkly, flatly impossible. Given the Communist philosophy of implacable hostility to the "capitalist" world and the Soviet record of international bad faith, it is certainly difficult to conceive any formula that would insure "enforceable disarmament."

The United States is carrying such a heavy load of rearmament expenditure (and there is as yet no assurance that we are ahead of the Soviet Union) that a large-scale plunge into an international giveaway program would be much more likely to bankrupt the United States than to end poverty in "underprivileged" areas of the world.

The author is no doubt sincere in his professed abhorrence of communism. Yet most of his concrete proposals, notably the abandonment of German rearmament and a hands-off attitude toward Formosa, would almost certainly pave the way for big new Communist advances, both in Europe and in Asia.

His suggestions for a united Germany and a united Korea, based on free elections, seem to skip very lightly over the obstacle presented by the frozen indoctrination in Communist mental molds imposed upon East Germans and North Koreans. A general criticism of the book is that the author does not take adequate account of such aspects of the Soviet Communist problem as the inflexibility of the Soviet rulers in pursuing their aims and the range of political and psychological instrumentalities by which they hold in subjection the peoples within their orbit and wage unceasing warfare against the nations outside that orbit.

The force of the book's argument is weakened by a rambling, discursive style, although the author tells one good story on himself. It seems that his career as a publicity man for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad came to a swift end when he came up with the slogan: "Take the B. and O. Between New York and Washington—and Avoid the Crowds."

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN
Cambridge, Massachusetts

HARRISON, JOHN B. *This Age of Global Strife.* Pp. ix, 470. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1952. $5.50.

Professing to eschew a "heavy, technical, fact-crammed" text and "the kind of cynical detachment and moral relativism" that precludes firm conclusions or moral judgments, Professor Harrison has attempted in this book for the college undergraduate and for the general reader "a sound historical account of the major world events of the immediate past which give meaning to most of today's world problems" (p. vii). Such an ambitious and commendable undertaking requires thoroughness and objectivity in studying the data, perspective and good judgment in choosing the themes to be stressed, and nicety of diction in order that the generalities and conclusions reflect, with the least possible distortion, the minutiae omitted. These requirements the author has not sufficiently appreciated, or at least has not always well fulfilled.

He is most open to criticism for Part I, "The Coming of World War II," especially its first three chapters which start with "The Rise of Germany to Dominance in Europe" and carry the story through the settlement of 1919. He exaggerates the iniquity of Germany, betrays a startling ignorance of the outcome of the Balkan crises preceding 1914, and misrepresents the character of the Triple Entente, particularly Great Britain's role in it. Little slips in this section, such as a "wizened" Lloyd George in 1919 and "the international Curzon Commission" (which never existed), suggest imperfect mastery of details. Moreover, the choice of material in this part provides an inadequate basis for understanding the denouement discussed in the last section, half of which is devoted to Soviet-American rivalry, unless we assume that the technology, politics, economy, and ideology of today are mainly the direct result of two world wars.

On the other hand, Professor Harrison has written well, indeed admirably, about World War II and the "Cold War" since 1945. These sections, which constitute four-fifths of the book, reflect a firmer grasp of primary sources, a more satisfactory, though a still too narrow, selection of material, and a more felicitous exposition. Most praiseworthy is his treatment of Soviet-American relations, whose discords he dates from April 1945. Here he is courageously free from the partisan and semihysterical interpretations that recent rivalry has fostered. For this his book deserves high praise and a wide audience.

DWIGHT E. LEE
Clark University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICAL THEORY

GRASSMUCK, GEORGE L. *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy.* Pp. 181, xv. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. $2.00.

In the attempt to develop a more precise political science the techniques of statistical analysis are being applied to many new fields. Studies of voting behavior have contributed new insights and supplied useful correctives to conceptual assumptions of an earlier period. The present volume represents the application of the same techniques to the behavior of Congress in the field of foreign policy.

By measuring roll call votes for and against selected categories of foreign policy legislation during two periods: 1921–1932 and 1933–1941, the author is able to report on the attitudes reflected by party and section on certain foreign policy issues.

Party and section may vie with one another for preponderant weight in any given legislative situation. Party emerges as the single most influential factor although this influence is not expressed as a continuous or consistent adherence to a particular substantive policy. Quite the opposite. For example, during the twenties Republican congressmen tended to support the foreign policy of the Republican presidents,

and this policy favored a strong international position. Throughout this same period Democratic congressmen tended to oppose this position.

In the thirties, however, Democratic congressmen gave generally firm support to the increasingly forceful international policies of the Democratic administration while Republican congressmen shifted to a position of opposition. Party asserted itself in organizational rather than doctrinal terms.

Comparatively, sectional influence seems to be linked more closely to policy predispositions. Dr. Grassmuck discovers a high degree of continuity in the voting behavior of the successive representatives from a particular district or state. He reasons that this tendency toward consistency reflects the fact that the congressman is a constituent of, as well as the representative of, his district. The geographic, demographic, economic, and social factors that condition voting attitudes remain relatively constant. These influences impart a strong local orientation to the congressman's voting behavior on any specific issue.

When this predisposition toward localism is countered by strong administration support of a contrary position, congressmen of the party in power must resolve this conflict. When this occurs such considerations as the differing party mechanisms of the two houses, the strategic power of the executive, and the relation between the foreign policy issue and domestic economic factors will determine the congressman's decision.

These complex interactions receive discerning treatment in this carefully reasoned and well written book. One may disagree with some points of emphasis, but the author has presented a useful analysis that contributes needed refinement to our understanding of congressional voting behavior. More such studies are needed.

LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN
Columbia University

HALLENBECK, WILBUR C. *American Urban Communities.* Pp. xi, 617. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $6.00.

Professor Hallenback has attempted, within the compass of a single book, to present a detailed study of the whole, many-sided problem of the urban community. This is an interesting and provocative account of urban social life (in the United States only) in which hardly a single aspect of this complicated problem is omitted.

In his introductory chapter, "The Study of Cities," Professor Hallenbeck carefully sets down a series of hypotheses and assumptions which serve as guideposts for his presentation of materials throughout the study. Here, too, he lays out the general outline of the work.

It must be admitted that the author has essayed a difficult task, merging, as he must, the findings from a number of fields —history, government, economics, sociology, social work—as they bear upon investigation of the urban community. Considering the breadth and scope of the problems covered, the author has done a very creditable job of research, generalization, and integration of the data used in the study.

The work embraces thirty chapters arranged in seven parts, though limitations of space preclude specific comment on any part except the last. Among the subjects treated are: the historical development of cities, regionalism, the form and structure of cities, municipal government and politics, major social problems (poverty, disease, delinquency, crime), major areas of organized social life (health, education, recreation, religion), changes in structure and function of urban families, city planning, and suggestions for the development of a more ideal community now and in the future.

Throughout the work the author utilizes a vast array of statistics derived from many sources, including the United States Census Reports, and from a myriad of spadework studies carried on by students of urban life in widely distributed cities throughout the United States. Whenever possible statistical correlations are employed in an effort to establish standards of "goodness" for measuring urban communities as well as for many other purposes. Graphs and charts are freely employed to show all manner of measurable changes in urban life, but more particularly to present census data. The student is introduced to and made aware of the vast and growing importance of census tracts as devices for understanding neighborhoods and communities. A wealth of demographic data is presented although a few of these pictorial and graphic accounts suffer somewhat from lack of size and color. The methodology used throughout the work is predominately inductive.

Part Seven, containing three chapters, is devoted to "Cities and the Future." Chapter 28 contains a thorough summary of the history, philosophy, principles, and operation of city planning in United States, with incidental reference to the London County Plan. The author manages to convey a broad picture of the growing impact of such planning, with the principles involved spelled out step by step beginning with community commitment to the planning process and ending with a program of priorities for the execution of the plan.

Chapter 29 is devoted to a review of the almost boundless opportunities for the good life available to people living in urban communities. However, it was deemed necessary to recognize the grievous lack of widespread citizen participation in community affairs and to explain the reasons for this baffling social phenomenon.

Possibly the most interesting and, in a sense, the most controversial part of the work is reserved until last (chapter 30) where Professor Hallenbeck, relying heavily upon the method of statistical calculation for setting urban standards, maintains that within broad limits, the ideal urban community of tomorrow can be created if men but have the will to attempt it. Underlying the whole approach is the assumption that there is urgent need for decentralization of urban areas based upon constellations of smaller cities planned and built around large central cities. Ideally, then, the large central cities and the smaller units would act together functionally to create a more perfect urban community.

The work is thoroughly documented and contains suggestions for supplementary readings at the end of each chapter.

GEORGE S. HART
California State Teachers College
California, Pennsylvania

STEPHENSON, GEORGE M. *The Puritan Heritage.* Pp. 282. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $3.50.

The author of this vigorously written book has been for many years a professor of American History at the University of Minnesota, and presumably the materials in this volume have, through the years, constituted a distinctive emphasis in the author's presentation of his subject. What he has done here is to put the influence of Christianity where it belongs in the stream of American history, quite in contrast to most American historians who have almost completely left it out. It is indeed a strange presumption, in the light of what this book reveals, that American civilization can be understood without taking into enlightened consideration the things of the mind and spirit. Yet, strange to say, that is just what the mine-run of American historians are attempting to do. Professor Stephenson is well qualified to place stress upon this influence. Twenty or more years ago he made a painstaking study of the religious aspects of Swedish immigration, publishing the results of his researches, after spending a year in Sweden on a Guggenheim scholarship. The study is a model of its kind and throws a flood of light upon one great stream of immigration which has enriched American life both in its spiritual and material aspects.

In this compact volume Professor Stephenson follows all the main currents which have gone into the making of our distinctive American heritage. The New England Puritans, the Quakers, the Unitarians, the Methodists, the great colonial awakenings, the part revivalism played in taming the west, the many benevolent agencies which arose to keep the things of the spirit alive on the frontier—the home missionary societies, the tract and Bible societies, temperance societies, all of which are given cogent treatment in several short but adequate chapters. The author does not bemoan the fact, as many less understanding writers have done, that America, by the end of the colonial period, was dotted with numerous "religious experiment stations." It was religious diversity which made these experiment stations possible and put into the Constitution of the

United States one of its finest, if not *the* finest, provision, the guarantee of religious freedom—and "not religious toleration, which assumes a privileged church." Unlike other colonizing nations, the English colonies were open to all, and thus there developed a wide toleration of religious differences.

The book ends with three chapters dealing with two of the most exciting episodes in American history—first, the swarming of the Catholic Irish to these shores and the natural resistance to them and their old world religious pattern, and, second, of slavery and the resistance to it, which created the most tragic era in American history.

WILLIAM W. SWEET
Southern Methodist University

JOHNSON, GERALD W. *This American People.* Pp. xii, 205. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $2.75.

Mr. Gerald Johnson in this suggestive little book takes the ideas about human nature and human society with which the founders of the United States worked and asks how true, how valid, how workable they are today. This is not a new enterprise. Almost all who are concerned with political ideas today have had a try at this problem. Mr. Johnson's originality lies in his deliberately unacademic, man-to-man style. He is writing not for the scholars but for the people. Yet he keeps the discussion at a high level; this intimate colloquy with puzzled Americans just escapes the folksy, the deliberate writing-down, the patronizing. It is a balanced, temperate discussion of our current political problems, seen in the light of our habits, feelings, traditions, dispositions.

The central point Mr. Johnson makes is that government as our eighteenth-century forefathers established it in this country exacts much from many—just possibly too much. Our difficulties spring not from the wrongness of the moral and political basis of the republic, nor even from the alterations time has made in the conditions of life on this earth—though Mr. Johnson admits these conditions have changed greatly—but from the seriousness of the strain our democracy puts upon ordinary human nature. Indeed, the more than half our people who do not even vote in national elections have already given up under the strain. Mr. Johnson refuses to count them as Americans.

He is not, however, basically pessimistic. He thinks the other half, if it will take seriously the duties of government by discussion, if it will live up to the challenge of greatness, can still keep within hailing distance of the ideals of the Founding Fathers. He does not, as do men like Reinhold Niebuhr and the more pessimistic social psychologists, seriously question the fitness of these eighteenth-century ideals to a twentieth-century society.

CRANE BRINTON
Harvard University

DANGERFIELD, GEORGE. *The Era of Good Feelings.* Pp. xiv, 525. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952. $6.00.

Traditionally the term, "Era of Good Feelings," has been used to designate the eight years of Monroe's presidency. Mr. Dangerfield thinks there was little good feeling after the first two years when the Panic of 1819 initiated a bitter depression with consequent social and political repercussions. Here indeed was the seedbed of Jacksonian democracy.

However, this study begins its investigation with the Twelfth (or "War Hawk") Congress which was set ablaze with the news of the Battle of Tippecanoe. With the exception of the battle of New Orleans little attention is paid to the War of 1812, but the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Ghent are detailed. This event is illuminated with the current background of British politics, and one could scarcely find a better account of how the American commissioners—Adams, Clay, Gallatin, and Bayard—wore down the British commissioners and ended an inglorious war without budging on the points their opponents insisted upon and without loss of a foot of American territory. The English recognition of the value of American trade and the imminent decline of mercantilism had been solvents of the impasse.

Also contributing to the termination of good feelings was the "firebell in the night," the bitter sectional controversy over slavery uneasily resolved by the Missouri Compromise. Here the real grievance of the North was not the sin of slavery but the advantage held by the South in Congress and Electoral College due to the three-fifths rule in counting slaves. The twenty-four years of the Virginia dynasty were largely due to this advantage.

Nearly a hundred pages are devoted to the "diplomacy of coal and iron" in explaining the British maneuvering that unintentionally culminated in the breath-taking Monroe Doctrine. This reviewer knows no finer treatment than this up-to-date exposition of that landmark in our foreign policy. The British shift away from mercantilism is again given weight in explaining the event.

This study closes with a hundred pages on Adam's nightmarish administration. Dangerfield seems to accept the "bargain and corruption" charge against Clay and Adams as if proved. The Adams-Clay program was a Neo-Federalism designed to recover the lost dominance by business. Monroe's administration had attempted a definition of agrarian rights which soon found their symbolism in Jackson who as President established these rights by defying the emerging industrialism.

A more comprehensive exploitation of the pertinent sources can scarcely be imagined. The final hundred pages consist of bibliography, citations, and notes. But the enormous mass of material has been sifted with a keen intelligence, and thoroughly digested and assimilated with a resulting admirably integrated treatment of the subject. The author, a naturalized American citizen, may puzzle American readers with such Anglicisms as Louisiana Purchase "stock" instead of the American term "securities" or "bonds." "Gouts of water" is delicious dialectical English. So well is this book written that the reviewer suspects an inherent acumen has here been whetted to rapier keenness by the Oxford tutorial.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY
Ohio Northern University

SHULIM, JOSEPH I. *The Old Dominion and Napoleon Bonaparte: a Study in American Opinion.* Pp. 332. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $4.50.

This is apparently a doctoral dissertation. The subject is Virginian opinion—Republican, Federalist, and Tertium Quid—about Napoleon down to 1809, by which time, according to the author, that opinion in its different forms had become fixed. He says he has tried to make an exhaustive study of it. What he has produced is an exhausting piece of reportorial work supported by 835 footnotes and a 25-page bibliography. The text is dreary reading, for it is full of repetitious quotations that add nothing to our knowledge, and it is almost empty of criticism or interpretation. For all the show of finished scholarship, this is a job of scissors and paste. A doctoral candidate who turns out a thesis of this kind deserves pity rather than blame. The blame should fall heavily on his mentors, who are responsible for seeing that he has a task worth doing and that he does it well.

A. L. BURT
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LEONARD, V. A. *Police Organization and Management.* Pp. xviii, 507. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1951. $5.00.

This book deals almost exclusively with the problems of American municipal police. Forms, procedures, and similar illustrative materials are freely employed and occupy well over one-half of the total bulk. Such materials are largely drawn from Pacific Coast jurisdictions, especially Seattle and Berkeley.

Four pages are devoted to a record of earthquake shocks in western Washington since 1930. Sixty pages, which appear to have been taken in their entirety from an academic catalogue, list the various curricula offered by the Department of Police Science and Administration at the State College of Washington. One-third of the chapter on the police executive is concerned with the announcement circular and application form used in an examination for police chief in Seattle.

Some of the illustrative materials already are outdated. The range of salaries

paid to chiefs of police is for 1946, despite the inflationary changes of the past five years and the ready availability of current data. Swiftly changing practices concerning one-man patrol cars are not well represented by a tabulation for January 1, 1944, when manpower shortages controlled police deployment. *Other examples abound* on every hand.

Editorial and manufacturing standards are low. No uniformity is observed in the length of type pages. If tabular matter requires an entire page, the preceding page breaks off at the point where the table originally was inserted in the text. What appear to be the identifying slugs used by the compositors in each galley of proof have been carried over onto many of the printed pages. The subject index is wholly inadequate and quite useless.

Such strictures should not obscure the fact that Professor Leonard has substantial qualifications for police authorship. He has wide and varied experience with police problems and he has some illuminating and helpful things to say about them.

Ten chapters, six appendixes and a bibliography are concerned with the police executive, organization, selection and training, records administration, patrol and other line units, strategy and tactics, and measurements of police efficiency. We like best his Chapter 7: "Patrol—Major Component of Manpower." It is so clear, coherent, and penetrating in its analysis as to constitute the best treatment of the subject that we have seen.

BRUCE SMITH
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PHARR, CLYDE, in collaboration with THERESA SHERRER DAVIDSON and MARY BROWN PHARR (Translators and *eds.*). ***The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions***. Pp. xxvi, 643. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952. $20.00.

This stupendous, complete, scholarly translation, the combined prolonged effort of over twenty specialists, is one of the most important books published in our generation and should be on the shelves of every college library and every public library.

The *Theodosian Code*, drawn up by a nine-man commission working from 429 A.D. to 438 and unanimously approved by the Roman Senate in the year 438, codifies the legislation of the Roman Empire from the time of Constantine in 313 to the reign of Theodosius II in 438. The *Novels* contain the decrees in both eastern and western empires from 438 to 468. Professor Pharr and his associates, working since 1932 with assistance and subsidies from numerous foundations, universities, and private individuals, and with the generous co-operation of the Princeton University Press, have produced the only English translation of the richest single source and the only official collection of contemporary information on the political, social, religious, and economic conditions of the later Roman Empire.

This book's great importance arises from the fact that the period from 313 to 468 A.D. has taken on high significance among modern social scientists. It was more like our own times in its problems and developments than perhaps any other era in history. This is well pointed out by C. Dickerman Williams of the New York Bar in a brilliant but brief introduction. Sections of the code deal with such modern topics as price fixing, inflation, currency control, black markets, and conscription and regulation of labor. Scores of laws regulate a complicated bureaucracy, so overweening as to be virtually out of control. Page after page of laws and regulations strike desperately at corruption in government bureaus and set up an intricate system of secret service and confidential agents to report upon government officials, upon tax evaders, and upon each other.

This Code presents perhaps the best, certainly the most realistic, picture in all literature of a full-blown socialized state. Henry Charles Lea once wisely said that "the surest basis of investigation for a given period lay in an examination of its jurisprudence, which presents without disguise its aspirations and the means regarded as best adapted for their realization." Modern social, political, and especially economic theorists should keep copies of this great code upon their dasks as an antidote to much loose and wishful thinking, for the Roman State owned and operated both heavy and light industries such as mines, quarries, munition factories, textile mills, the building trade, glass and iron works, shipping, and the public post, and had a passion for regulating everything. Many industries not directly owned by the state were organized into associations controlled by the state. Socialized medicine is clearly outlined.

Imperial interest in education and in freeing liberal arts professors from public obligations will surprise even some members of the American Association of University Professors. The Code reveals a literate society keeping quantities of records, receipts, written contracts, producing a "boundless multitude of books" (p. 487). Today when a college diploma is becoming the *sine qua non* for many occupations and business executives are rediscovering the advantages of a liberal education, it is significant to read in the Code that even a lowly copyist and a fiscal clerk, to hold his job from the year 357 on, must "excel in the practice and training of the liberal studies" and be "so polished in the use of letters that words proceed from him without the offense of imperfections, and it is Our will that all men shall be so informed" (p. 405).

Book VII covers Military Affairs from induction through military clothing, subsistence allowances, the preparing and transportation of food and supplies, quartering, bathing facilities, leaves of absence, deserters, and concludes with elaborate specifications concerning veterans and the Roman equivalents of the G.I. Bill.

No brief review can do more than suggest the vast mine of information and Roman experience that awaits the economist; the sociologist with his interest in marriage, crime, divorce, population, urban and racial problems, all clearly thought out and provided for by the Roman mind; the lawyer; the political scientist; the historian. The *Theodosian Code* and *Novels* reveal a teeming, complex, mature society, a vast "welfare state," and probe unself-consciously into every cranny of it.

Modern Roman and medieval historians have of course for a long time known the importance of this code. They also knew that it was locked away in obscure and difficult Latin. More than one bright scholar has thought of translating it until he looked into it carefully, and only those who have used portions of the code in the original can fully appreciate the gigantic labors which have kept Professor Pharr and his distinguished associates busy almost to despair for the past twenty years. The present excellent and readable translation fully justifies their efforts and unlocks the huge storehouse of Roman experience and legal wisdom for the benefit of all social scientists.

It is ungracious to criticize such a monumental work, but several weaknesses became apparent as I read through the mass of laws. The notes are too brief and their intricate numberings become confusing. Many laws need more historical explanations to make them fully intelligible. The valuable glossary at the end contains pertinent definitions and a mass of information, but a more extensive use could have been made of the great "paratitla" of Jacobus Gothofredus, the first modern editor of the Code and founder of modern Theodosian scholarship, who labored thirty years upon his six-volume edition in the early seventeenth century, upon whose commentary Gibbon, Mommsen, and Dill leaned so heavily with profit. The present volume is dedicated to Gothofredus, but I wish it had drawn further upon his wisdom. The uninformed reader of this book will wonder how the laws worked. No mention is made of the use of the Code by the barbarians in forming their *Leges Barbarorum* and in applying it to Roman citizens, nor of its use during the middle ages.

These shortcomings, however, are trivial in light of the sound, exact, scholarly translation of this great legal code. The book, even though it costs a good deal, is worth any other ten volumes a social scientist could possibly have on his shelves. He should have it where, when any contemporary problem or condition confronts him, he can look quickly by means of the excellent index into the *Theodosian Code* and see what sensible, judicious light the Ro-

mans of the late empire throw upon it. He will find it always vigorous, stimulating, even with touches of humor as in the case of laws which attempt to stop property owners from surreptitiously tapping public aqueducts with six-inch pipes. It is a great aid to perspective; and this last is what most of us need badly. Not the least, he will own a beautiful book, the product of the highest standards of modern workmanship.

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ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

CANOYER, HELEN G., and ROLAND S. VAILE. *Economics of Income and Consumption.* Pp. xvii, 355. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1951. $4.50.

Although not a revision of *Income and Consumption,* portions of this book are based on the authors' earlier book. It was written for two quite different groups of students—those who have had a course in principles of economics, and those who "shy away from the conventional and formal course in principles. . . ." These two groups would seem to include all students. As a consequence the text is not a principles book, in the usual sense, nor is it consumer economics, in the usual sense. The first seven chapters are introductory: a thumbnail sketch of political economy (5 pages); how the economy works (12 pages); definitions (8 pages); standards and planes of consumption (6 pages); specialization (15 pages); exchange, including index numbers, banking, and consumer credit (26 pages); and marketing (16 pages).

"The text then proceeds to its major task of relating economic principles to the many aspects of consumption." Chapters 8–14 include general problems (12 pages); national consumption of food, housing, clothing, recreation (20 pages); personal consumption (18 pages); factors which affect our capacity to consume (14 pages); money income effect on consumption, including causes of inequality (14 pages); effects of habit, health, custom, abilities, attitudes (14 pages); such economic and institutional factors affecting consumption as sales promotion, prices (including 3 pages on the law of demand and elasticity), propensity to save, and leisure (19 pages).

The authors express the hope that chapters 15–20 "will . . . show students how they may govern their *productive* lives more wisely." The contents of this section range from scientific management to comments on the welfare state. Eight pages are alloted to budgeting, six to "wise use of insurance," two and a half to investment, ten to co-operatives, four and a half to labeling, three to advertising, two to testing services, two and a half to Food and Drug Administration, and two and a half to Federal Trade Commission. An average student could complete the text in 10 to 12 assignments.

One must wonder what students who have had principles would find new in these pages, and how much students who "shy away" from principles would learn about governing "their productive lives more wisely."

LELAND J. GORDON
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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. *Conference on Business Cycles.* Pp. xii, 433. New York, 1951. $6.00.

This volume contains papers presented at the November 1949 Conference on Business Cycles and some of the comments thereon made by participants.

It is clearly a sign of our times that about half the volume deals with econometric approaches to business cycles. In "A Test of an Econometric Model for the United States, 1921–1947," Christ of the Cowles Commission presents a revision of those parts of Klein's sixteen-equation model III that fit postwar experience least well. When the revised model is used to predict an additional year and the results are compared with what actually happened, Klein's experiment does not turn out to be very successful. Klein's criticisms of the paper and Christ's rejoinder make one tend to agree with Friedman's prediction that the National Bureau and the Cowles Commission approaches to investigating business cycles "will become more and more alike." Of particular interest is David McCord Wright's comment that no set of econometric models will ever suffice for reliable long-run economic forecasting: "the element of novel social conception is always *breaking in.*"

In "Studies in Investment Behavior," Klein analyzes patterns of investment (chiefly in the railway industry) during the interwar period. His principal conclusions—that investment during any year was heavily influenced by gross operating profits of the preceding year, that the rate of interest played a smaller role, and that one or more powerful trend variables (perhaps the stock of capital) depressed railroad investment—are critically examined by Angell and Leontief, with a reply by Klein.

C. A. Wright, in "Business Cycle Research and Business Policy," outlines some of the fields of business policy in which business cycle research might help to reduce costs, discusses various forecasting techniques, and presents his own interesting method of forecasting business cycle turning points. Miss Mack's comment, that correct anticipation of turns in business might lead to a new type of technological unemployment, deals with a very remote danger, indeed, though her advice not only to improve techniques of forecasting but also to examine how forecasts are used by businessmen is sound.

A very interesting paper is Haberler's "Business Cycles in a Planned Economy." He argues that, while in a planned economy there would be no business cycles as we know them, planning would not avoid the maladjustments and misdirections of resources which produce depressions in a capitalist economy. The discussion by Bergson, Lowe, Wright, and others is most stimulating.

It is an unfortunate duplication that a relatively large part of the papers have been or will also be printed elsewhere. These include Burns's "Mitchell on What Happens During Business Cycles," Christ's article mentioned above, Hultgren's "Cyclical Diversities in the Fortunes of Industrial Corporations," Abramovitz's "Influence of Inventory on Business Cycles," and presumably Gordon's "Cyclical Experience in the Interwar Period: the Investment Boom of the Twenties." The latter paper examines some of the main factors influencing various components of total investment and lends some tentative and qualified support to the "secular stagnation" thesis.

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DAVIS, RALPH CURRIER. *The Fundamentals of Top Management.* Pp. xx, 825. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $6.00.

The purpose of this book is to present a fundamental statement of business objectives, policies, and general methods that govern the solution of basic business problems. The author develops and presents a philosophy of management for the purpose of giving maximum assistance to business executives and management educators. It is the author's contention that a sound philosophy of management is necessary for the continuance of the free enterprise system.

Management is treated as the function of executive leadership and an interesting distinction is made between the professional executive and a business mechanic. Functions of the professional executive are discussed as those of planning, organizing, and controlling. Both the management functions and principles are applied to the organic work areas of producing utilities, distributing utilities, and financing the production and distribution processes. The author's treatment of morale and the integration of interests in relation to the line functions of business are important contributions to our concepts in human relations. All this is presented within the framework of line and staff as the two basic forms of organization structure.

In formulating and developing the fundamentals of top management, the author seeks principles and a system of logical thought that can be applied to all executive problems of organization and operation. Within twenty-one tightly packed and closely related chapters the following topics unfold: Basic Management Prob-

lems; Standards and Standardization; Business Plans and Planning; Business Objectives and Ethical Standards; Executive Leadership and Management.

In discussing the problems which a professional executive must recognize, analyze, and resolve in operating a successful business, the author establishes as essential the necessities of earning a profit, rendering an economic service, and discharging public responsibility. Attention there is given to: business policy; business functions and functionalization; responsibility, authority, decentralization, and accountability; the line organization; staff organization; the attributes of good organization; organizational morale and the integration of interests; operations and the basis of control; preliminary and concurrent control of operations; and business procedure.

In the final chapter on summary and conclusions concerning management, the author recapitulates his philosophy of management. The lazy reader, however, cannot substitute this summary for painstakingly reading the preceding chapters. The book will be widely accepted as a reference book for executives, educators, and students. It may be used as either a reference manual or textbook for advanced management study.

Within the past quarter of a century, there has developed a literature in the field of management and management thought. Collectively this literature has contained the material presented in *The Fundamentals of Top Management*. Professor Davis in this book, his third major contribution, has given to the management field the best and most comprehensive treatment of management philosophy and fundamentals to date.

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STERN, SIEGFRIED. *The United States in International Banking*. Pp. xiii, 447. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $5.25.

The author has performed a distinct service in writing this book. Only a few people will find it of practical use inasmuch as foreign banking is highly concentrated in only a few large institutions; but it contains information which will be found helpful by many others working in the general area of money and banking. Little attempt has been made to analyze monetary theories or to discuss broad economic developments; this is a "factual compendium of notes and sketches on certain interesting phases of American international banking."

The material is based on the author's experience over more than thirty years as head of the foreign departments of various New York banks. It is divided into five parts: a fairly brief historical survey of the development of international banking from 1914 to 1945; a discussion of wartime problems, government corporations, and the role of silver; a detailed account of international banking in different foreign countries; a description of the organization of foreign departments of banks; and a short section on the outlook for international banking after World War II.

This organization occasionally leads to repetition, since material covered in the historical review or in the analysis of specific problems is apt to crop up later in the discussion of individual countries.

This description by countries takes up more than half the volume and is packed with facts—so much so as to make for tedious reading. While it is a good thing, perhaps, to have these facts recorded, the reader will find himself wishing the author had been more discriminating. For example, it is interesting to learn that in Chinese branches of United States banks a native comprador is given such great responsibility that he actually becomes a sort of banker within the bank. On the other hand, the following passage, while suffering from being taken out of context, may nevertheless give an idea of the degree of detail covered:

"Import credits were opened by United States banks to pay for various Mexican crops, such as hennequen, which was grown in Yucatan. Earlier experiences with the financing of sisal hemp back in 1921 had been deeply disappointing for the New York banks involved, but with the Defense Supply Corporation as the buyer the establishment of credits for hennequen and chick peas were transactions devoid of any risk. The hennequen was sold for distribution to United States consumers and fabricators; the peas were payable after inspection on their arrival in freight cars at the American side of the border. Like the Mexican sugar union, the Henequeneros de Yucatan concentrated the sale of their produce in their own hands, using acceptance credits of American banks, secured by the receipts of warehouses in Merida and Progreso in the state of Yucatan."

This is a book for reference, not casual reading.

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SAGE, GEORGE H. *Basing-Point Pricing Systems Under the Federal Antitrust Laws*. Pp. xvii, 381. St. Louis, Mo.: Thomas Law Book Company, 1951. $10.00.

This is an objective, interesting, and useful analysis of basing-point pricing. Its emphasis is legal, and the volume will be of value to practicing attorneys, business managers, and especially to users of industrial products who find themselves disadvantaged and injured by pricing systems.

The study presents fresh, concrete material on the many industries which have used, or are now using, various forms of pricing formulas. Purchasers of a wide range of industrial products are shown to be affected by such systems. Even ultimate consumers have been, or now are, affected in the purchase of such products as corn syrups, corn oils, refined sugar, beer, salt, tire chains, kitchen utensils, galvanized ware, water-mixed paints, crepe paper, paper drinking cups, and cornstarch.

Mr. Sage finds the main explanation for the adoption and use of basing-point systems in the profit-maximizing activities of geographically separate enterprises. A locally separate concern could quote a relatively low mill price and exclude distant rivals from its own "natural-freight rate territory." In competing on price, the locally separate mill could also reduce its mill price to expand its sales area. A distant rival may likewise compete on price to expand its sales area. Thus, Mr. Sage observes, the several geographically separate mills find a common interest in avoiding this marginal price competition by adopting a pricing formula.

From the standpoint of industrial users and final consumers, Mr. Sage states that basing-point pricing means "noncompetitive prices," "arbitrarily high prices," and "identical prices." It deprives purchasers of any choice between sellers on the basis of price. In establishing high local prices, a mill also discriminates against purchasers in its own "pricing territory."

Following each analysis of the various kinds of basing-point pricing, Mr. Sage gives a summary statement of the legal status of the particular pricing formula. Federal legislation which may be applied to basing-point practices consists of: (1) the Sherman Act, (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, (3) the Wilson Tariff Act, and (4) the Robinson-Patman Act.

In reading Mr. Sage's analysis one is impressed with the clarity and certainty of the law *against* basing-point pricing. Basing-point practitioners urging that new legislation be enacted *to clarify* the law should read this book. The fact is that basing-point industries do not like the existing law and its interpretation. They want it changed so that they can continue their monopolistic ways.

Mr. Sage presents no special remedy for the basing-point practice, except the implied one of an enforcement of the law. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person injured in his business or property by a violation of the federal antitrust laws may sue for treble damages. Since winning its land-mark decisions against basing-point pricing (1945–1948), the Federal Trade Commission has done little more than to call upon other industries to comply. Perhaps persons injured by basing-point pricing can make a contribution to law enforcement by bringing actions for treble damages. The immediate problem of enforcement, however, waits upon action by Congress. If proposed legislation to amend the Robinson-Patman Act is adopted, it is probable that industrial users and consumers will be largely helpless

against the stone wall of identical delivered prices. VERNON A. MUND
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SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

PARSONS, TALCOTT, and EDWARD A. SHILS (Eds.). *Toward a General Theory of Action.* Pp. xi, 506. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $7.50.

Despite the authors' masterly analytical skills and despite their heroic pertinacity, this collaborative treatise by sociologists and psychologists, entering boldly upon a terrain where philosophers have made some magnificent but forgotten explorations, has deeply stirred but not persuaded this reader. Students of Freud, Durkheim, and Weber in general behavior psychology will easily verify the editors' modest assertion that any originality in their theory must be found solely in their formal conceptualization of certain presumed "outcomes" of "twentieth century" social science. In any appreciation of the proposed theory given this presumption, everything must depend upon the characteristics of the formalization and upon the fruitfulness of this formalization for inquiry.

A steady stream of overly-general and too unqualifiedly logical-positivist comment on the relation of theory to experience does indeed run through the volume. None of the comments, however, evinces any awareness of the differences which Windleband, Rickert, and Weber carefully pointed out between their type of "model" and that of the mathematical-natural sciences, or, for that matter, of the lacunae in logical-positivist theory concerning the ideal basis of decisions connecting logical calculi with nature and society. Not one step is taken in the entire volume toward the design of confirming experiments or answering inquiries concerning the general theory of Parsons and Shils, with the exception of Stouffer's paper, a paper of marked intrinsic statistical interest but quite obviously separable in technique from the general theory of Parsons and Shils.

There are, nevertheless, excellent things in the papers surrounding, if not exemplifying, the basic theory. Murray's paper is sweetened with classic humanistic wisdom: a breath of Emerson in a sociological desert. Kluckhohn dissects Lundberg neatly, and opens a definite, if somewhat hesitant, attack upon the excesses of cultural relativism. Tolman carefully and honestly maps the terra incognita between animal and human psychology. Allport shows a sensitivity to the dimensions of prejudice not often found in the optimistic literature. Much more could be added in acknowledgment of the merit of the papers surrounding the basic theory, if space allowed.

Waiving all questions of applicability and illustration, we now ask, is there anything dubious or incomplete at the logical heart of the basic theory as such? The root-idea of Parsons and Shils is the thesis that there are precisely five inevitable dilemmas or five kinds of selective choice in all action (pp. 80 ff.). Every selective choice, it is maintained, is necessarily involved in "costs," for costs must be assessed whenever any possible goals, gratifications, or objects are excluded from a selective choice as "physically" or "logically" incompatible with those that are actually chosen. Only praise can be offered to the editors for the brilliant virtuosity with which they trace the impact of their five dilemmas through the dimensions and types of personality, society, and culture. The sobriety and integrity of Parsons' and Shils's exposition of the inevitable costs under any circumstances of maintaining the mutually irreducible systems of personality, society, and culture in required interaction will serve well in counteracting the naïve optimism of "social engineers," utopian Marxists, anthropologizing romantics, and others. But it is all rather grim, too grim to be a pure logical deduction. The editor's assertion that their dilemmas are by *definition* (p. 91) exhaustive and inevitable is simply powerless to legislate for the facts. This reviewer believes, on the contrary, that every achievement of mature culture could be shown to be a transcendence of their dilemmas; for example, "asceticism" can invigorate "immediate satisfaction"; granting universal rights can increase the supply of friends; equity can be incorporated into law; what people could do is by reasonable love known to be part of their character, and so forth.

So far as this reader can discern, the authors' confidence concerning the messy costs of all possible action is really sustained, not by logic, but by three enormous presumptions concerning matters of fact and experiment. Briefly stated these presumptions appear to be the following: (1) contradictions cannot be removed in time and duration by a respecification and reconstruction of what they "inhere" in (a good antidote to this presumption can be found in Bradley's essay on contradiction and contrary in his "Essays on Truth and Reality"); (2) the scientific control of materials and events cannot diminish "scarcity" to that range within which human choice would no longer be essentially economic; and (3) maximized moral value is some basically additive summed aggregate of primitive need-dispositions. These are not analytical truths, but positivist and psychoanalytical superstitions wedded to a derivative Kantianism which has lost contact with experimental science.

We should, if this were the occasion, propose to the authors of the present theory of action an alternative leading idea in proper postulational form that conflict between "alternatives" can be diminished without limit. The postulates of such a view might enable one really to find a difference between spurious and genuine culture. Such at least, we believe, was the impression of Leibniz as he surveyed the pluralities of action systems; it is not likely that the authors or any critics of this essay could rival him either in analytical or combinatorial power or in serenity. Man and his works are, it is a comforting thought, perhaps better than we pretend.

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FESTINGER, LEON, and HAROLD H. KELLEY. *Changing Attitudes Through Social Contract: An Experimental Study of a Housing Project.* Pp. 83. Ann Arbor: Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, 1951. $1.50.

While the Center for Group Dynamics was still at M.I.T., this research was undertaken to contribute to our knowledge of attitudinal change. The subjects of the project were a sample of the adult inhabitants of a hundred-dwelling federal housing project, erected in 1942 to provide houses for shipyard workers adjoining "Baytown," which had a population of 30,000 and was one of the oldest towns in the country. The study was made in 1947, when only 40 per cent of the original project dwellers were still in residence and when only 12 per cent of the project members still were employed in the shipyards. The inhabitants saw their neighbors not only as low-status people but also thought the townspeople looked down on their project neighbors as inferior. The resulting hostility expressed itself not only in poor project-community morale, but also in poor intergroup relations between the project and the surrounding town. To change this situation of hostility, the study was projected. "The persistence of these attitudes in the face of evidence to the contrary seemed to be explained by the scarcity of social contacts occurring within the project and between the project and the surrounding community." To test the hypothesis implicit in this observation a research team, consisting not only of researchers, but also of community workers, came to Baytown and for a period of nine months carried on the action research described in the report.

After making an initial survey of the status-related attitudes of a sampling of project and town inhabitants, the action wing of the research team went to work and helped organize several community programs in the housing project: a nursery school, a program for school-age children (9 to 12), a teen-age project, some adult group activities (men's softball teams and adult evening craft sessions), and finally during the last period of the research program an advisory committee for community problems.

The research findings were based on data collected during the action program, from records kept by the community workers which described the day to day developments of the program and data on contacts, friendships, and attitudes observed by these workers, and from four surveys

which marked the more formal program of evaluation to determine the kind and amount of change occurring during the development of the program. These surveys were taken at intervals of two or three months and covered not only the people in the project but also a random sample of town residents.

Interpreting their findings, the authors offer for further consideration the following communication theory of attitudinal change:

1. "Contacts are effective in producing attitude change only if they entail the transmission of social attitudes, i.e., evaluative statements by other persons about the objects of the attitude." These "evaluative statements" need not be verbal, but may be evidenced in other modes of behavior.

2. "The effectiveness of a communicated attitude in producing change is a function of various aspects of the relationships between the communicator and recipient, e.g., their interpersonal attractions, power relationships, etc." That is to say, if people engage in a project of common concern and in the course of their contacts carry on communication about attitudes and opinions on which they differ, the conditions for attitude change are present.

3. "Contacts will not be effective in producing attitude change if they merely contain information about the objects of the attitude."

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SOROKIN, PITIRIM A. *S.O.S. The Meaning of Our Crisis.* Pp. xi, 177. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. $2.50.

This is one more book in the succession of publications in which Sorokin endeavors to popularize the findings of his "Social and Cultural Dynamics." Here he deals with three phases of the crisis of the last decade: the "murderous trend" it exhibits, and polarization and totalitarianism which accompany this trend.

Evidence of the "murderous trend" is presented in the first three chapters. According to Sorokin, "the Great Destroyer" is at large and He is incarnated in the ruling groups and in their scientific and legal advisers, for these groups have "the highest rate of the most brutal, greedy, selfish, sensual and cynical individuals" (p. 13). In presenting the case against these individuals Sorokin adopts a novel style. He makes a devastating indictment of *everything that* is being done today in *all* fields of endeavor, from politics to science and art, in the form of a supplication from "the Little Mortals to the Big Immortals." It contains the fanciest appellations ever to appear on a printed page. Social scientists will be interested to know that they are, among other things, "Learned Weavers of Words into Meaningless Carpets," "Testophrenics," and "Psychosocial Technomaniacs," and that they study the basic problems of the social and humanistic sciences "with the marvelous techniques of anti-mathematical statistics, anti-logical semantics, anti-observational psychoanalysis, anti-rational operationalism, and by the techniques of the thoughtlessly nondirective interviewing, of the open-and-closed interrogation, of the guided-in-unguided questionnaires of the clinical psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists" (p. 45). In sum, ye "Scholarly Vibrators of Air Waves and Processers of Paper" serve the Great Destroyer "as the ideological parasites of the bloodsucking parasites of humanity" by "confusing our minds and consciences" (p. 49). However, the presently rampant Rule of Perversity is not going to last. Eventually the "re-enthronement of the soul" will shatter the hypnotic power of our present lords and their scientific experts.

The vituperative effusions and exaggerations are not carried into the other chapters of the book. In these Sorokin, with relative calm and in his familiar eclectic manner, discusses polarization and totalitarianism. He sets forth two "laws." The first is "that a crisis, calamity, or frustration tends to make explicit and open the implicit and hidden contradictions, whether in one's mind and conduct, or in a social group and institution, or in a given culture" (p. 100). This he calls the law of polarization. To contradict the effect of this law a reintegration of our culture "along integralist lines" should be instituted.

The second law asserts that "as soon as any important emergency or calamity occurs in a given society, the control and regimentation of its government begins to expand and grow; as soon as the emergency subsides, the government control declines" (p. 144). After a somewhat sketchy inductive verification of this proposition, Sorokin draws the general conclusion that "the medicine against Communism and totalitarianism is neither war, nor rearmament, nor threats, nor propaganda of hate, but peace, and lack of emergency" (p. 169).

The least that can be said by way of criticism of this book is that it shares the fundamental weakness of most other books that deal with the present crisis. It stresses what *should* be, but fails to indicate *how* this can be accomplished.

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HEBERLE, RUDOLF. *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology.* Pp. xiii, 478. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951. $4.00.

Political sociology, the subject of this book, is, it appears, the study of how men act to accomplish political or social ends whether those ends are reconcilable with prevailing community values or not. As it happens, in the disturbed world we inhabit, as much of the material presented and analyzed in this book deals with movements whose ends are realizable only outside the established community—with fascism and communism—as with "normal" political affairs.

Professor Heberle's techniques of analysis represent chiefly a synthesis of pre-Hitler German and American approaches, with side glances at French and British ideas. As he employs them, they produce results which are, generally speaking, illuminating; and they are so clearly explained that they can readily be taken over and applied by others. In this sense the volume is a most successful textbook.

There is, of course, no requirement on textbooks that they be novel in the ideas they convey. This reviewer is far from being a specialist in political sociology, or politics, or sociology. Nevertheless he was forcibly struck that most of the ideas and interpretations offered by Professor Heberle have somehow gained a wide circulation. They seem to have reached numerous persons who, for one reason or another, have had to concern themselves with the whys and hows of politics today. This, then, is not a book to search for unusual insights but rather should be viewed as a valuable epitome of current thought, systematically organized for pedagogical purposes.

However the field is sliced, American politics still comes out *sui generis*. On Professor Heberle's showing we can contract most of the political and social diseases going at any time and yet somehow throw them off before they do irreparable damage. Other nations are not so fortunate. Is this attributable to the formal organization of American politics, which is loose and often pleasantly illogical, or is it attributable to the fact that, all pessimism to the contrary, we possess one of the most soundly viable societies in the world today, so that our community values still outweigh any alternatives thus far propagated? Or are both factors operative? And which is the more important? An essay by Professor Heberle along these lines would make very interesting reading.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN
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HANDLIN, OSCAR. *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People.* Pp. 310. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951. $4.00.

Since all Americans are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants, it is not strange that the vast influx of new peoples into the United States in the nineteenth century has been the focus of much attention. Marcus Hansen and Carl Wittke have enriched our understanding of the role of immigration in American life and culture. The present book, different in content as well as in style, seems worthy of rank beside the works of those two scholars.

Others have written of "the impact of

the immigrant upon the society which received him, of the effect upon political, social and economic institutions" of the more than thirty millions of newcomers in the century after 1820. Dr. Handlin, taking an opposite point of view, is concerned with what immigration did to the immigrants and with the extent to which "their reactions . . . may throw light on the problems of all those whom the modern world somehow uproots."

In his opening chapter, Professor Handlin goes back to the European roots of the great migrations—to the European village with its age-old customs and security, to the peasant family, a tightly-knit social, economic, and cultural unit. In dramatic, moving prose he discusses the changes and problems that beset the peasant villagers. Finally, after the land enclosures, they began to seek, in ever increasing numbers, the New World of Promise.

Seldom in our historical literature have we been offered such detailed, realistic pictures of what it meant to come to the New World. The crossing itself, the struggle to make a living in the New World, the problems of housing, social fellowship, religion, adjustment to democracy—a chapter is devoted to each of these. The social and political pressures, the friction and misunderstanding between generations, the awful realization that the adjustment was too great—this reviewer knows of no book that captures these moods and situations with such sympathy and understanding. In an epilogue titled "Promise," an imaginary and unspoken conversation between an immigrant father and his son, the author probes for the spiritual and moral meanings of the great epic movement.

This is not, in either style or format, conventional or scholarly history. There is no bibliography, index, or footnotes; quotations are paraphrased. The style is not pedantic or heavy. The author is imaginative, sensitive, understanding. A tremendous amount of research and real depth of understanding lies behind the book. Laymen will enjoy this book; specialists will find it provocative and will admire the style and synthesis. This is literary history in the tradition of Parkman, Prescott, and Motley. It should be widely read.

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BUELL, BRADLEY, and associates. *Community Planning for Human Services.* Pp. xiv, 464. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $5.50.

This book resulted from a joint undertaking by Community Research Associates, consultants from the principal fields covered, and many others who contributed particular knowledge. The purpose, as explained in the preface, was to create the framework of a coherent program of community well-being.

Much of it is based upon the St. Paul, Minnesota, project which revealed clear and precise data on a family-to-family basis as well as a community-wide picture of the incidence and interrelationships of basic human problems. This study showed that serious problems of dependency, ill health, and maladjustment tend to cluster in the same family groups, with 6 per cent of the community's families receiving over 50 per cent of the health and welfare services in the city.

The framework of the book consists of separate sections, the four human problems of dependency, ill health, maladjustment, and recreational needs. In each, the problems, service functions, and systems are discussed. Not surprisingly these are uneven in treatment. In spite of the provocative nature of the book as a whole, there are certain inaccuracies, conclusions that seem unwarranted by the findings, and points of view that may be questioned.

In the section on dependency, the statements regarding social insurance are misleading. Much is said about conflicting objectives and the cost of insurance. No clear picture is presented of social insurance as a protection against the common hazards of life such as old age, death of the bread winner, unemployment, sickness, and disability, nor of insurance as a way of preventing dependency.

The section on ill health seems to reflect the thinking of the American Medical Association with no recognition of the views of the Physicians Forum. Fear is expressed that health insurance would give the consumer an official voice in respect to problems governing the practice of medicine! The conclusion is reached (p. 234) that we must choose between "community-wide organization of a purposeful program to prevent, control and reduce disease" and "the expansion of medical services to assure their distribution to individuals who have hitherto been unable to avail themselves of these services." Why?

In the section on "Maladjustment," the term is used to cover a composite of behavior disorders and socially unacceptable conduct. The discussion on community acceptance of responsibility, particularly pages 246–251, seems to be unusually good. The lack of federal leadership in the maladjustment agencies for corrections, mental health, and case work may be significant. Comparison may well be made with the areas previously discussed where major gains have been made in the reduction of need and in lower death rates.

The "Recreation" section points up the need to develop criteria "by which to judge quality of performance in the recreational field or to allocate labor and responsibility among the community agencies." The need for more facts and for a survey of the current use of recreational agencies is restressed. Good suggestions for further research and planning are included. There seems to be some lack of information about the current developments of social group work and the functions of the social group worker.

The authors conclude that a new functional design for the total community would help to prevent and reduce the consequences of these many interrelated problems. The team approach by the different professional groups is required for this.

The book is interesting, stimulating, and thought-provoking largely because it approaches these complex problems of human trouble from the perspective of the local community. The final chapter in the book on the significance of the findings for community-wide planning is an excellent statement.

MARIETTA STEVENSON
University of Illinois

SMITH, T. LYNN, and C. A. MCMAHAN. *The Sociology of Urban Life.* A textbook with readings. Pp. xiii, 831. New York: The Dryden Press, 1951. $5.50.

Systematic treatises on urban sociology like those written during the twenties and thirties seem to be in process of disappearing in favor of collections of papers on special topics, for which the semidemographic term, "urban sociology," may serve as an organizing principle. This shift in emphasis may reflect the shift from an older macrocosmic to a newer microcosmic sociology of interpersonal relations.

The authors of this volume have prepared a pedagogically sound textbook, inasmuch as the divisions into eight parts and 25 chapters are preceded by brief and often perceptive introductions serving to orient beginning students not only to urban sociology but to sociology in general to the extent the readings which have been selected permit this to be done. Selected problems and projects and lists of suggested and of supplementary readings follow each chapter. Many will feel that a content and an organization of this kind are preferable to the treatises by a single author and specialist in his particular field of sociology.

The book must be critized on at least two counts. There are some 68 readings or essays in the volume. Of these 32 could be identified as having been published before 1940. These include 5 selections from *Our Cities,* issued in 1937 by the now defunct National Resources Committee. Included also are 5 selections from the pre-1930 works of Sorokin and Zimmerman. The sociologists Burgess, MacKenzie, Park, Albion, Small, Cooley, Mowrer, and Ogburn are represented by one paper each (two for R. E. Park), and none of these essays are dated later than 1933. Of the total of 68 readings it is possible to identify at least 27 written by nonsociologists or prepared by government agencies. Eleven of the readings were either prepared especially for this volume or were taken from previously unpublished manuscripts. These 11 were written by four authors, all teaching in southern land-grant colleges, of whom at least two have earned distinguished records as rural soci-

ologists. Indeed, at least 4 of these readings in urban sociology are condensed versions of bulletins of Agricultural Experiment Stations, and as such may not provide meaningful insights into the nature of modern American urban culture. Finally, at least 10 of the readings reprinted in this book are excerpts from five readily available sociology textbooks, all published in new or revised editions since 1947.

A more serious objection to *The Sociology of Urban Life* is the exceptionally strong emphasis upon an older formalistic sociology in which institutions and demographic aggregates are the chief objects of study, rather than the social dynamics of interpersonal relationishps. Largely missing are references to the anthropologists' studies of the urban culture of contemporary America, to the structure and function of ethnic groups, and to collective behavior and its phenomena. The readings on ecology do not adequately represent either the past or the current research in this field. Social structure becomes social morphology; the scientific method is the traditionalist "science" of mechanistic positivism, and the social processes are the orthodox assimilation, accommodation, acculturation, conflict, co-operation, competition. Of social process, forerunner of interactionist and situational sociology, the authors say (p. 587): "Social processes are much more difficult to analyze than the morphological and institutional aspects of society. For this reason, no doubt, this part of sociology is not very highly developed." It certainly is not very highly developed in this book.

MYRON F. LEWIS

Washington, D. C.

DUBLIN, LOUIS I., in collaboration with MORTIMER SPIEGELMAN. *The Facts of Life—From Birth to Death*. Pp. x, 461. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $4.95.

In his preface, Dr. Dublin writes that this book has been suggested by a great number of inquiries from all sorts of people, which inquiries have poured into the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company as a result of the company's wide circulation of pamphlets and of the *Statistical Bulletin*. In spite of this explanation, one wonders what the purpose of the book really is. It is not an encyclopedia in the usual sense. It is a set of twenty-five chapters beginning with "Who We Are—The Population" and ending with "The Effects of War." The chapters consist exclusively of questions and answers, totaling about 1,100, with some cross-referenced duplications. The questions range in number per chapter from 38 ("The Conquest of Tuberculosis," VIII, and "Suicide and Homicide," XVII) to 56 ("The Accident Toll," XVI).

Without question, the book is informative, but in an irritating way. The book is written almost completely in a dogmatic style as one would write for children. For example, on page 243: "Are more males than females killed in accidents? . . . The adventuresome male has more than twice the chances of the female of being killed by accident . . ." is followed by a discussion of data for 1946 and a sex-ratio chart. Where was this information obtained? Presumably the reader should be satisfied that Dr. Dublin has put down the right figures, that he knew that the use of 1946 data could be taken as typical with respect to relative frequency among types of accidents and distribution by sex within types of accidents. If one wanted to look further, he could turn to the bibliography on Chapter XVI on p. 431, but he would find there no reference to Vital Statistics in the United States, which this reviewer assumes to be the source of the data. Only the informed could find that reference on page 426 under "General Reports." Most people would not be able to track these things down, and they would therefore have to cite Dr. Dublin as the original source. Worse still, in many instances, the answers come from "one survey," and the only way to find out what that was would be to send further inquiries to Dr. Dublin.

There is an extensive index, and the questions are well set off. It would take a battery of experts to determine whether the answers represent the best current knowledge. In those few fields where this reviewer has had some experience, no major exceptions could be taken, and most of the important points were covered. It is almost impossible to criticize omissions because one does not know how to begin. It may be unfair, for example, to suggest something on the recent important work on ovulation time in a book that claims to start its facts from birth. I would like to have seen some reference to the extensive current data being collected by the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York; and the use of Selective Service data seemed skimpy. These, however, are random thoughts. The main point is that an alternative procedure of issuing something more like an annotated *World Almanac*, where one does find sources cited, would be much more useful to people with real intellectual curiosity in this general field.

E. DOUGLASS BURDICK

The University of Pennsylvania

ERNST, MORRIS L., and DAVID LOTH. *For Better or Worse: A New Approach to Marriage and Divorce*. Pp. 245. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $3.00.

"In the last ten years eight million Americans have walked out of court with a divorce decree, to face . . . what?" is the opening sentence of this popular book for the man on the street and his unhappy wife or ex-wife. The authors proceed to outline the various problems that divorced people face in a series of chapters entitled: Loneliness; Frustration; Sex; Money; Children; Jealousy.

Much of the content of the book is in the form of verbatim excerpts taken apparently from personal responses to questions sent by the authors to men and women divorced at some time previously. There is no statement of the number of respondents, or the length of time since their divorces. As the authors put it, ". . . the men and women who collaborated with us do not constitute a survey. This is not a poll. There is a wide variety of representation, geographical, economic, occupational, age and so on. But these cases are not a sample that can be said to give an accurate or complete cross section of our divorced population. They are simply people who have been divorced" (p. 21).

The treatment of other's work in the field is quite as casual, "Aside from a few magazine articles, a few sociological studies, a novel or two, there is no literature to tell them what the world of divorce has in store for them" (p. 1). Although the subtitle announces this as "A New Approach to Marriage and Divorce," there is no reference to the relevant work of the Interprofessional Commission on Marriage and Divorce Laws; the American Bar Association; the report and recommendations of the Legal Section of the National Conference on Family Life; Divorcees Anonymous; the American Association of Marriage Counselors; the National Committee on Marriage Counseling and the National Committee on Marriage and Family Law, both of the National Council on Family Relations; the marriage counseling that is an inherent part of such courts as those of Judge Alexander of Toledo or of Judge Anna Kross of New York; nor is there mention of the recent studies of William Goode (popularly presented in a series of articles in *The Saturday Evening Post*), or Harvey Locke's *Predicting Adjustment in Marriage: A Comparison of a Divorced and a Happily Married Group* (Henry Holt, 1951).

Chapter X, "Remedies," recommends five points for state concern in the childless divorce:

"1. That the action is not hasty or hysterical.

"2. That the couple have had help in trying to make their marriage work.

"3. That the marriage has every chance to heal itself while divorce is under consideration.

"4. That the wife has not accepted a monetary settlement under duress or through ignorance of her rights, especially if she is untrained for self-support.

"5. That the wife is not pregnant" (pp. 216–217).

For the couple with children, the authors recommend a period of delay and study under the guidance of a competent counselor to protect fully the interests of the children as well as to safeguard the values of the family.

As is usual with books of this kind, there is no index, no list of parallel readings, no documentation, and no listing of sources

of further help. Within these limits, the book is a contribution to the field and to the men and women for whom it is intended.

EVELYN MILLIS DUVALL
Chicago, Illinois

LUZBETAK, LOUIS J. *Marriage and the Family in Caucasia: A Contribution to the Study of North Caucasian Ethnology and Customary Law.* Vol. 3 in "Studia Instituti Anthropos." Pp. xvi, 272. Vienna-Mödling: St. Gabriel's Mission Press, 1951. No price.

This is an ethnographic study based largely on written sources, most of it from rare periodicals and adat collections, and belongs to the so-called Jesuit school of diffusion associated with the name of Wilhelm Schmidt of the Universities of Fribourg and Vienna. The author does not use Soviet sources and is critical of czarist studies but finds them nevertheless often the best available. A bibliography of 635 pre-Soviet items in Czech, Arabic, Russian, Caucasian, and other inaccessible languages, as well as in English, is appended in addition to an ethnographic and linguistic map of the Caucasus.

The emphasis is juridical, the aim being "to trace the history of North Caucasian marriage and family law from the present to prehistorical times." Russian (Soviet and pre-Soviet), Islamic, Christian, Avesta, Armenian, Byzantine, and Roman unifying influences are illustrated concretely and located geographically, and then, figuratively speaking, peeled off. The residual core of marriage and family customary law is taken to constitute "a more or less pure adat-law." Despite the fact that there are no pastoral nomads in the Caucasus the type of marriage and family embodied in the adat law as revealed under the layers of later influence is typically pastoral nomadic, although in varying degrees among the different tribes. The author explains this pastoral nomadic character of the adat law in terms of prehistoric finds which show that this area was the home of a highly developed pastoral nomadic civilization and that it continued to feel the impact of other cultures of this type. "This constant contact with nomadic societies perhaps from the very beginning of pastoral nomadism—certainly since the Scythian period almost 3,000 years ago—throws light upon the intricate problem: Why, how and when did the North Caucasian marriage and family customary laws become so pastoral nomadic?" (196). The author concludes that "a connection between the North Caucasian society and that of Inner Asia is beyond question" (199). Future research will have to determine the nature of marriage and family law before the impact of pastoral nomadism.

This is doubtless an excellent study of the old-fashioned type; it is interesting, but it does not, as more modern studies do, attempt to get at the meaning of social forms to the people who practice them. A good many recent American studies go to the opposite extreme. Is there not a happy medium?

JESSIE BERNARD
The Pennsylvania State College

DONAHUE, WILMA, and CLARK TIBBITTS (Eds.). *Growing in the Older Years.* With a foreword by Everett J. Soop. Pp. 204. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1951. $2.50.

Growing in the Older Years is the last of a trilogy about the problems of our aging population. Like its predecessors, *Living Through the Older Years* and *Planning the Older Years,* it is a collection of intelligent and thought-provoking essays providing up-to-date information for the practitioner and student of gerontology as well as for those concerned with their own aging processes. This book is planned around three subjects: (1) medical health; (2) mental hygiene; and (3) education. It is pleasant to find that all the contributors have the knack of talking intelligibly and interestingly about their special topics.

The four doctors (J. W. Mountin, W. B. Kountz, N. D. Leyda, and M. M. Dacso) who discuss problems of medical services do a comprehensive job in limited space. They consider the kind of community health organization needed to make the best use of existing knowledge; methods of controlling degenerative diseases; the role of the industrial physician; and the techniques of physical restoration. They display a hopeful and constructive approach to the prevention of physical disability in old age and to the restoration of those already disabled.

A similar positive note is struck in the three chapters on mental health. Robert Felix classifies the processes of aging as physical, mental, social, and economic, then proceeds to analyze the supportive factors in personal and community life that contribute to the maintenance of mental health in old age. Moses Frohlich provocatively concerns himself with the changes in emotional needs with aging, specifically with changes in the need for power, changes in the body concept, in aggressive behavior, in social needs, and in erotic strivings. Jack Weinberg discusses recent trends in psychiatric treatment for older people, again emphasizing the new appreciation of the possibilities of psychological rehabilitation.

In all seven chapters we see again and again the recognition of the interrelationship between environmental and personal factors as we age.

The section on education (by Thomas Van Sant, Everett Soop, Ollie Randall, and Roger Heyns) highlights four important topics. Van Sant points to the need for education of the total community about aging and underscores areas of ignorance as well as indicating desirable development of goals and programming. Soop elaborates this theme in reviewing current and proposed educational efforts. In a slightly different vein, Ollie Randall contributes a well-rounded essay on the training of volunteers for older people's programs, and Heyns supplies a basic discussion of the use of groups.

Two more general papers that begin and end this book are written by Clark Tibbitts and Wilma Donahue, the two people who were primarily responsible for all three volumes. They are to be congratulated upon the substantial educational task so successfully undertaken in this trilogy.

ELIZABETH BRECKINRIDGE
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Chicago, Illinois

REDL, FRITZ, and DAVID WINEMAN. *Children Who Hate: The Disorganization and Breakdown of Behavior Controls.* Pp. 253. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951. $3.50.

A bold attempt was made by the authors to experiment with a number of children who exhibited the most serious characteristics of aggressiveness and misbehavior, and to learn what actually produced delinquents. The investigation was distinctly a research project, but the writers preferred the use of the word "exploration."

The appeal of the book is largely to the professional worker or student and makes difficult reading for the ordinary layman. However, from the stratosphere of psychiatric terminology, it comes to earth with such words as "leery," "hog-wild," and extracts from case histories that accurately reveal the boys' delinquent egos but induce painful hysteria in the ostrich-minded book censor.

The project consisted of the establishment and operation over a period of nineteen months of a "group therapy home" known as "Pioneer House." Of the ten children admitted only five constituted the stable population that remained until the close of the study. In order that the control system of a child might be better understood, the factors involved in the causes of his psychological trauma were studied before each boy's admission.

The observation in the "Home" revealed more than twenty types of breakdown of control some of which are described under such terms as: "situational lure," "gadgetorial seduction," "newness panic," and "exposure to competitive challenges." The traditional descriptions of ego functions in terms of basic attitudes toward reality are recognized as inadequate.. Furthermore professional psychiatry provides no satisfactory remedy since the ego must be followed into the scene of daily behavior control. The authors recognize delinquency in terms of its legal and cultural connotation but contend that the clinical concept of delinquency has great relevancy. For example, it can well differentiate between the personality disturbances in the case of two boys who might have committed exactly the same type of offense.

In Chapter IV the numerous techniques of the delinquent ego are enumerated and described. The tyranny of the "group code" is very important and also of great interest to the sociologist. The purpose in presenting various defenses is to show how the aggressive ego tries to excuse itself both in respect to the world and to the individual conscience.

The writers note that the well-known defense mechanisms of current usage are inadequate, and therefore they present techniques that aim to deal with the aggressive ego so as to provide a gradual reduction of ego tensions as well as the elimination of various aspects of impulsivity.

The book closes with the statement that the "details of a total strategy for ego support will be offered by the authors in their forthcoming publication." This leaves the reader at the cross roads not knowing which way to go. Nevertheless the book will be most useful for professional workers with children, and the supplementary volume should be awaited with eager anticipation.

GEORGE B. MANGOLD
University of Southern California

PIERSON, DONALD, with the assistance of LÉVI CRUZ, MIRTES BRANDÃO LOPES, HELEN BATCHELOR PIERSON, CARLOS BORGES TEIXEIRA, and others. *Cruz das Almas: A Brazilian Village*. Pp. viii, 226, 20 plates. Washington: Smithsonian Institution (Institute of Social Anthropology Publication No. 12), 1951. $1.50.

Cruz das Almas, in the state of São Paulo, includes some 2,700 village dwellers and inhabitants of the surrounding area. This population is composed of relatively isolated, nonliterate (or only partially literate) descendants of assimilated Indians. Miscegenation, which began with the arrival of the Portuguese, continued until the indigenous peoples, as a distinct physical type, disappeared. Since amalgamation continued when Africans were brought in, there are few places in the world where the fusion of racial groups has been as continuous and on as extensive a scale. The society is characterized by a high degree of social solidarity, primary relations, and a minimum of social change and social disorganization. The culture is largely a folk culture; personalities are relatively well integrated.

Racial categories have no place in the vital statistics of the community; instead, the color categories of white, black, and intermediate are found. These sociological categories reflect what the local residents consider the terms to mean. A registrar lists a person as white if he looks more like a white than a black, but his reaction varies with degree of friendship and with his current mood. An expected pattern of behavior throughout the community is that of "grading-up." It is bad form not to refer to a black, especially in his presence, as if he were an intermediate and to an intermediate as if he were white. According to the village registrar, no black was born in the district in the period 1931–47, but the authors state that at least twenty-seven persons in this age group appear to be of relatively unmixed African origin. The authors are somewhat inconsistent in their appraisal of color as a prestige factor. On page 190 they state that "prestige definitely attaches to white color," but on page 200 they say that ". . . status is little, if at all, determined by race or color." In any event, in daily association little attention is given to either racial or color variations. Persons of color eat at the white's table, and there is no discrimination in voting, in employment, or at Sunday Masses. People of all colors drink together, play cards together, dance together, hunt together. There are a considerable number of intermarriages, although those involving the opposite ends of the color scale are less common, and there is a tendency to marry a person who is as light as possible.

The family type is patriarchal and the family groups are closely knit. Woman's place is very much in the home, and her inferior status is seen in the authority her husband exercises over her, her lack of participation in politics except to vote as instructed by her husband, and her limited mobility and recreations. Nevertheless, as in many peasant societies, a wife may exert effective control over her husband.

Catholic Masses and prayer services are well attended in Cruz das Almas, but the number who confess and receive Communion is relatively small. Vows to saints at times of personal crisis and pilgrimages to a shrine some distance away are parts of the Catholicism complex in this area. Although their followings are small, a number of recently formed Protestant sects have occasioned some conflict.

Interesting examples of sympathetic magic include subjecting the image of a saint to such indignities as hanging it by the neck in a well, holding it over a fire, or putting it into a mortar and smashing it.

The term "acculturation" does not appear in this volume. Of the five references to "vestiges" of African culture, two are brief and general, two pertain to language, and one concerns the possibility that the present attitude toward illegitimacy "reflects imported Portuguese *mores*, re-enforced by African and Indian cultural heritages, together with the circumstances of colonial settlement in Brazil." In addition to two general *references to* "vestiges" of Indian culture, the following specific items are touched upon: Indian words which have become a part of the country man's speech, the *restlessness* of landless individuals as a possible survival of earlier seminomadicism, the continued importance of the hunt despite the fact that today the basic means of subsistence in this country is agriculture, and the care given to keeping the *terreiro* (space around the house) cleared of vegetation. According to the authors, the assimilation of Indians and Africans has been so effective that "until today the most diligent and persistent research is able to turn up only a few vestiges of either group of cultures." The reviewer suggests that such beliefs as those concerning (a) the crossroads as an evil place (page 169) and (b) the ability of the souls of the dead to return and harm the living (page 168) may be African retentions. One wonders whether an Africanist would discover other Africanisms in Cruz das Almas.

This is a competently executed and interesting community study in which the emphasis is put on empirical data rather than on theoretical problems in sociology and cultural anthropology.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON
Oberlin College

TERRIS, MILTON, and NATHAN A. KRAMER. *General Medical Care Programs in Local Health Departments: A Report to the Subcommittee on Medical Care, Committee on Administrative Practice, American Public Health Association*. Pp. vi, 129. New York: American Public Health Association, 1951. 50 cents.

Methods for the provision of medical care services are subjects for widespread discussion at the present time. The suggestion that many such services may be effectively administered at the local level in health departments has often been made. This suggestion, as with many other matters involving medical care, has both its advocates and opponents. In order to obtain information to determine its validity, a study of existing medical care programs now operating in health departments was undertaken by the staff of the Subcommittee on Medical Care of the American Public Health Association.

In this small volume the authors report and make some analysis of the findings of the study. Programs for medical care were found to be operating in 62 full-time health departments, 23 of which were in the State of Maryland. The scope of services varied greatly—from those in which the health officer also acted as county physician to complex programs aiming at integration of therapeutic and preventive medical services to individuals.

Details for the various plans studied are presented in both tabular and narrative form. The presentation provides to the reader a ready reference source on this type of administration of medical care. The authors conclude from their interpretation of the statistics that they support the contention that the administration of new medical care programs as they are developed can logically be entrusted to the health department.

Because 90 per cent of the plans de-

scribed in the report provide services for the dependent group of the population, some readers may question how much support the survey data give to such a generalized proposition. It is clear, however, that the report amply demonstrates the fact that it is possible to administer medical care programs in health departments and that such arrangements provide interesting opportunities for increased integration of therapeutic and preventive medical practices. The account of these relationships should be of interest to the administrator, student, and observer of health and medical care programs.

JAMES P. DIXON
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

MOLONEY, JAMES CLARK. *The Battle for Mental Health*. Pp. x, 105. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $3.50.

Dr. Moloney is already well known in psychiatric circles for many articles in professional journals on the subject of infant training on the island of Okinawa and in this country and for his book "The Magic Cloak." In the present little book, he writes in a vivid and provocative style in favor of the principles of the Cornelian Corner. This is an organization of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers in Detroit dedicated to the better emotional care of infants. Its principles are quoted thus:

"To promote healthy parent-child relationships . . .

"1. Through research in the fields of child development and family life,

"2. Through the education of parents, especially expectant mothers and fathers, as to the basic needs of the developing child, and

"3. Through the wide promulgation to professional groups as well as parents of all pertinent information regarding the developing child and his environmental needs,

(a) To strongly advocate the abandonment of the artificial practice of separating the newborn child from his parents, and

(b) With the conviction that it is advantageous to both mother and child, . . . [to] encourage breast feeding of the infants with opportunity to nurse whenever the infant is hungry or anxious."

Few child psychiatrists and psychoanalysts would disagree with these aims and means, but some question might be raised about Dr. Moloney's way of advocating them. He implies that by these methods all mental disorders and criminality can be eliminated or markedly reduced. It seems to this reviewer he claims too much. A warmer and more relaxed relation between mothers and infants should make for much better adjusted children and help to reduce the frequency and severity of many of the problems of normal childhood and make behavior problems and neuroses less prevalent. To demonstrate that these simple measures would have much effect on more deeply-seated psychic and social difficulties would require the comparison between a group of children raised by these methods over a period of ten or twenty years and a group raised by more rigid methods.

An obstetrician who reads page 65 and finds himself characterized as having "misanthropic attitudes toward the newborn," as feeling "most liked and most financially secure if they fawn before the mother," and as being in "unconscious conspiracy" and "collusion," will probably never get beyond that page. Less tactless language would gain more readers and adherents.

The adoption of aims and methods which the Cornelian Corner advocates should also help to alleviate those rigidities in our culture which the author describes so well. The help of well-trained members of other professional disciplines is also needed, including sociologists and cultural anthropologists. Our personal and social abnormalities will succumb only to planned and co-ordinated attack from many directions.

ROBERT A. CLARK, M.D.
University of Pittsburgh

ULICH, ROBERT. *Crisis and Hope in American Education*. Pp. xiv, 235. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. $3.75.

The author of this volume presents a thoughtful and thought-provoking appraisal of the American educational system. He finds in it much to be approved and much that is in need of fundamental change. Where adversely critical he feels the moral obligation to propose, in rather concrete terms, the needed reconstructions.

The central educational problem in America—and indeed in all democracies—is "to find a principle of conciliation between the seemingly contradictory trends of equality and individuality." Stated in other terms, how does a democracy devise an educational structure and program that meets its ideals of *equality* and *quality?* An educational structure that avoids division and differentiation, that does not adequately recognize and provide for differences in human capacities, may achieve the ideal of equality but at the price of sacrificing the ideal of quality. "The tension and friction of these contrasts is the essential challenge in the educational situation of democracy."

A very large part of the book is devoted to showing how, in the author's opinion, American education has failed to meet this challenge and how the challenge may be met more effectively. The prolongation of school age with the kind of educational structure and program now provided is indefensible; worse than that it may be a curse unless there goes with it a "revolutionary rethinking of the total program and a restructuring of the total educational system from the secondary school upwards." It is with this "rethinking" and "restructuring" that the author concerns himself.

No brief review can do justice to the author's position. It may be pointed out, however, that in his proposed plan for the reorganization of secondary education he would make intellect the sphere of differentiation and the culture of the emotions the uniting core of the program. The secondary school plant would consist of a group of buildings. The Community House would be a place where all pupils would assemble for their common activities, where the cultivation of the emotions would take place through music, poetry, art, and drama. Here, too, would be housed the general library. Other buildings would take care of the needs of various groups of pupils classified on the basis of intellectual abilities and interests. The proposed classification includes the small number who have true intellectual interests, (1) the humanists and (2) the scientists; other classifications include (3) the executive group, (4) the artisans, and (5) the workers.

Higher education is in no less need of rethinking and restructuring. The necessary directives in the philosophy of higher education may be found in the impregnating with meaning for our time of the traditional ideals of the gentleman and the scholar. The challenge of scholarship is to profit from the work of the specialist but somehow to see universal meaning behind the details of life. The traditions of the gentleman ideal (*humanitas*) and of scholarship (*veritas*) complement each other like two sides of a trangle which has as its base devotion to a universal order (*religio*).

Many readers will challenge what appears to be the author's social philosophy and his theory of knowledge. Even so, this is a book that should be read.

NEWTON EDWARDS
University of Chicago and
University of Texas

WILSON, HOWARD E. *Universities and World Affairs*. Pp. 88. New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. $1.00.

What is the responsibility of the free university in world affairs? How well are American universities fulfilling their obligations in this area? How can colleges and universities more effectively discharge their responsibilities not alone through the programs of a department or two, or the individual efforts of a few faculty members, but more broadly through a general university approach? How can the university, as a university, make the contributions required of it to promote better understanding of international affairs? In an endeavor to supply general answers to these sweeping questions, an exploratory inquiry was undertaken by committees from eight American colleges and universities in cooperation with committees from the American Council on Education and the Car-

negie Endowment for International Peace. This small volume summarizes their findings.

The inquiry began with the formulation of a working paper embodying a systematic statement of ideas, assumptions, and questions regarding the universities and world affairs. This served as a basis for discussion by the survey groups and provided them a conceptual framework for the specific studies of individual college situations. Part I of this small volume presents the major points of the working paper in a concise form. Each college survey committee undertook to evaluate the hypotheses of the working paper by study of its own campus situation. In the process they not only arrived at an appraisal of the soundness of the working paper's assumptions, but brought forth additional ideas and problems as well. Part II of the book summarizes the experience of the eight university groups in their respective campus explorations.

The campus surveys provided both a validation of the tentative conclusions of the working paper and a demonstration of the value of such an inquiry to the universities. As a consequence the first recommendation of the general report is that each institution of higher learning take inventory of its programs, facilities, and plans in the area of world affairs. Part III of the book offers a systematic check list of items which should be covered in any such survey.

The author acted as a rapporteur for the undertaking and has produced a cogent and easy-reading book. Its clear and concise statement of the issues and problems should commend it to university administrators and to those teaching in the field. The book can well serve as a starting point for the kind of audit the author suggests each university might conduct.

The findings and conclusions of the report will probably come as no great surprise to persons in the field. That five "legitimate" areas for university action in world affairs are: instruction, research, encouragement of extracurricular activities, facilitation of student and faculty exchange with institutions abroad, and adult education, few will disagree. Nor will many take issue that education about world affairs is not the sole responsibility of specialists in the field. As universities are generally not too well "co-ordinated," it is also not surprising that co-ordination is inadequate in this particular field and that there are failures in the utilization of readily available university resources.

To this reviewer, the report marks a beginning. The questions which remain are more challenging than those answered. What is the most fruitful way to organize an interdisciplinary program for international studies within a university? Is it really worth the effort to try giving a general orientation on world affairs in a professional curriculum like engineering? Isn't it equally important that the engineer be given orientation in public administration, "human relations," and the like. Where do we draw the line? What is the proper role of the universities vis-à-vis the developing staff colleges like the Foreign Service Institute? Does a mere interchange of students and faculty with institutions abroad actually promote understanding, or is special orientation necessary? And finally, what do the committees and the author mean when they speak of a "world outlook"?

WILLIAM J. RONAN
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HOLLIS, ERNEST V., and ALICE L. TAYLOR. *Social Work Education in the United States*. Pp. xix, 422. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $5.50.

Three years of inquiry and study by an educator, Ernest V. Hollis, Chief of College Education in the United States Office of Education, and by a social worker, Alice L. Taylor, Training Consultant in the Federal Bureau of Public Assistance, are expressed in this report on Education for Social Work in the United States. The authors did their work at the invitation and under the auspices of the National Council on Social Work Education with the understanding that their findings and recommendations would be their own. The study was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

The book starts with a competent review of the half century of education in this field, analyzes the present scope and status of social work, and estimates a considerable future growth. It then explores the undergraduate college in social work education, graduate professional education, the organization and administration of schools of social work, the responsibilities of the professional organizations in social work, and accreditation.

"Both social work and social workers," the authors say, "should be looked upon as evolving concepts that are as yet too fluid for precise definition." They take a practical way of delimiting the field, listing the titles of 155 positions which in 1950 served as the basis of the national survey of salaries and working conditions in social work made by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Against a BLS estimate of a total of 75,000 positions they find only 18,000 members of professional social work organizations. Moreover, "between three fifths and three quarters of public assistance and related social workers" have not had any professional education and nearly half have less than college education.

As a means of enlarging the substantive content of social work education and offering it to a larger number of students they recommend "three separate but articulated functions for the undergraduate college": first, a broad program of general education for prospective social workers which would also serve "for identifying and teaching the basic concepts of social welfare that belong in the common cultural heritage of all college students." With this recommendation there will be agreement throughout the field of social work education and practice.

The second recommendation is offered guardedly and tentatively, namely, that the undergraduate college with proper safeguards offer semiprofessional preparation for social work technicians "if job analyses make it feasible." In this suggestion the authors are influenced largely by developments in medicine and related fields. It is a question, however, whether the analogy applies in social work where the problem is not so much a reallocation of duties within the area of professional practice as a distribution of tasks between social work and clerical activities, accounting, and other nonsocial-work specializations. Where social work itself is concerned the most successful experiments indicate the possibility, within large organizations, of specialization in practice rather than differentiation between professional and semiprofessional functions.

The third recommendation proposes a concentration, equivalent to a broad major, in the arts and sciences that would serve both as a foundation for graduate professional education and as a preparation for persons entering social agencies directly from the undergraduate college. In this connection the report advocates a four-year integrated program, two years undergraduate and two years graduate. The emphasis which the authors place, not only upon the social sciences but also upon the humanities and the biological and physical sciences would probably reduce the danger of an early technicalization of education for social work. It would be important, however, that admissions to the professional school should not be restricted to persons who at the beginning of their junior undergraduate year had decided upon social work as a career. It would be unfortunate to lose to social work the many people who do not make their vocational choices until later. Social work needs the infusion of rich personalities such as in the past it has welcomed from a wide variety of educational backgrounds and life experience.

The recommendation at the graduate professional level is for a generic curriculum, immediately for the first year, with an ultimate postponement of specialization beyond the second year. This plan, with very little modification, is feasible and, in some schools, is close to being in force.

The authors consider social casework, group work, and community organization to be major curricular areas rather than specializations. They would constitute administration, supervision, teaching, and research as fields for special education. Presumably advanced practice would also fall into this category. At this point it is important to recognize the double role of social casework, group work, and research.

All three make their specific contribution to a generic education but are, at the same time, special disciplines which for adequate practice need more than a generic education.

The report expresses concern about the "dichotomy that continues to exist between the classroom and the field work," and seems to be inclined to put the burden of proof on field work. This dichotomy need not exist and, where education for social work achieves its purposes, does not exist. The work in the field provides the specific for the generalizations in class, and the discussions in class bring perspective to the practice in the field. In this process, and in the close working relationship between the field supervisors and the teachers of the seminars in practice, social work is perhaps making its greatest contribution to education. Where professional education is at its best, this integration extends to the teachers in the substantive areas. That the authors of the report have seen field work which is little more than apprenticeship and a dissociation of substantive and methodological teaching does not mean that there are not schools where an across-the-board integration has been and is being attained. Therein lies the essence of education for social work.

The teacher who has the privilege of working in a school in a university where there is a real interplay among the various faculties will endorse the emphasis of the authors upon the importance of the school of social work being a member of the university family. That, however, demands strong leadership in the school and a faculty willing to accept the intellectual challenge of association with its colleagues in other disciplines.

The authors of the report had a most difficult assignment in surveying a field which is still in process of definition and where the profession has yet to clarify its purposes and to agree upon its content. If, in places, the report is difficult to read and understand, in that respect it is a true reflection of the situation of a profession in course of evolution. The authors have struck at the main problems in the field. They have produced a document that is now, and will long be, a taking-off point for discussion in faculties and professional organizations. They have left a substantial and stimulating agenda for the National Council on Social Work Education.

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WIETING, C. MAURICE. *The Progress of Cooperatives; With Aids for Teachers.* Pp. xiv, 210. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $3.00.

This book is an expansion of earlier writings of the same author which treated education concerning the co-operative movement. Despite the expansion, it is all too brief. It is possible however that a longer volume would not prove so attractive to the audience for which it was intended. *The Progress of Cooperatives* does not pose as a scholarly study. It was written as a manual for teachers, and it will serve this purpose admirably.

The book consists of three parts, the first of which gives information concerning co-operatives. Here are discussed the principles of co-operation and the history of the co-operative movement. Separate chapters deal with various types of co-operatives. Emphasis is given to the United States, but there is a brief treatment of the co-operative movement in other parts of the world. Part I closes with an "appraisal of cooperatives." Needless to say, the conclusions are favorable to the movement. Part II is devoted to the educational activities of co-operatives in the United States. Part III, which takes up more than half the book, has to do with teaching about co-operatives. Here the author describes the status of education concerning co-operatives in the schools and makes suggestions for fitting the study of co-operatives into several kinds of curricula.

In his suggestions for teachers who plan their own units the author makes an important contribution to educational literature and to school programs. He presents an outline of content for the study of co-operatives; a list of eighty-seven suggested activities; a twelve-page annotated bibliography, much of it referring to free or inexpensive materials; a nine-page list of teaching films; and a three-page list of organizations and agencies from which teachers may obtain further information. Numerous specific examples of real co-operative activities carried on in particular school systems are discussed.

Mr. Wieting has provided a valuable classroom aid to teachers. The book is an example of the kind of help which should exist in many fields. The treatment of some phases of the co-operative movement is brief and inadequate. But the class which begins with *The Progress of Cooperatives* and goes on, as its author intended, to exploit the sources of information and the kinds of learning activities suggested will find the path to understanding the value and potential of co-operatives for society an easier one.

WILLIAM H. CARTWRIGHT
Duke University

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

WACH, JOACHIM. *Types of Religious Experience, Christian and Non-Christian.* Pp. xvi, 275. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. $3.50.

In this collection of ten scholarly essays, five of which have been previously published in English and one in German, the Professor of the History of Religions in the University of Chicago explores the nature of religious experience and offers criteria for distinguishing it from other types of experience.

The essays fall into three groups. The first group deals with questions of methodology and contains the author's conclusions drawn from analyses of the religious phenomenon in its great variety. The second and third groups contain specimens of the detailed studies of particular types of religious experience and thought on which the general conclusions rest. The second group deals with non-Christian religions. It contains three essays, one on the idea of man in the Near Eastern religions, one on the Sufi movement in Islam, and one on Mahayana Buddhism. The third group is concerned with Christianity. One of the essays analyzes the religious thought of Kaspar Schwenkfeld, a sixteenth-century Protestant spiritualist and a leader of the "Left-wing Reformation," another deals with the role of religion in the social philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville, a Catholic historian and statesman of the nineteenth century who sought to reconcile religious principles with progressive thought. The third paper in this group, on *Church, Denomination and Sect,* is a study of how religion expresses itself in social organization. The fourth is an appreciative analysis of Rudolph Otto's *Idea of the Holy.*

These studies in the history of religion are all interesting and valuable in themselves but their chief importance for their author is for their bearing on the general interpretation of religion given in the essays of Part I. In the first of these, on the place of the history of religions in the study of theology, he argues for "an inclusive concept of revelation according to which the whole history of religion should be viewed as divine self-disclosure" (p. 25). In the second, on universals in religion, he proposes four criteria which together distinguish an experience as religious. It is (a) a total response of the total being; (b) a response to what is regarded as ultimate reality; (c) the experience is "existential," the most intense of which man is capable; (d) it involves an imperative, a commitment which impels man to act. In the expressions of such experience the world over, he shows, there is an amazing similarity of structure.

The general tenor of these essays supports Rudolph Otto's interpretation of religion as rooted in the mystical sense of the "numinous," but they do not illuminate the crucial question which Otto left unsolved—that of the fundamental connection of the mystical and moral elements in religious experience.

A. CAMPBELL GARNETT
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HEDLEY, GEORGE. *The Superstitions of the Irreligious.* Pp. xii, 140. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. $2.50.

Hedley has written a book worth reading because it is full of interesting infor-

mation. Few will not find in it much that to them is novel, tellingly presented. The thesis of the author is well expressed in his title: that the so-called, or self-called, irreligious people oppose traditional religion because they think it impracticable, unrealistic, unprogressive, an opiate, but do not themselves feel any responsibility for informing themselves about what they are denouncing. Such people "discount religion because they suppose it uninformed and irrational. . . . They themselves are uninformed and irrational, and therefore utterly superstitious, until they seek authentic information on the subject and until they do some sober reasoning about it." To combat such ignorant condemnation Hedley marshals a most unusual apologetic, in which he points out the use of the best scholarly methods by biblical critics (one reads with particular sympathy his disparagement of courses in the Bible as literature given by people from departments of literature, who are utterly ignorant of that scholarship), the social activity of the churches in the last sixty or more years, and the basic fact that to try to live a life without ideals is the most idealistic of all approaches to life.

Still, if Hedley has written an interesting book, it is not a profound one. He is seen to be most at a loss in his concluding chapter. He has presented his mass of evidence for the value of religion, while steadily admitting that the churches and churchmen have not always lived up to the ideal of their faith. But his presentation has been as much a special pleading for traditional religion as those of his "opponents" have tended to special pleadings against it. He quotes at the end a "distinguished friend" who disliked religion. Hedley forced the friend to admit that he called anything he did not like "religion." Hedley is doing exactly the same on the other side. The matter is not to be helped by presenting a list only of the virtues of traditional religion to those who can see only its defects. Hedley admits at the end that probably few of those for whom the book was designed will read it, and that the great majority of his readers will be those who needed no convincing. If he really hoped to accomplish his purpose of reaching the "irreligious," one would have thought he would have begun again on a different sort of book.

A still deeper defect in Hedley's thinking is that he calls "the irreligious" those who reject traditional Judeo-Christianity, and says that they should investigate "religion" before they decide against it. But he admits that the people he is talking about "are religious men and women," are indeed "very religious." Where are we, then, and where is Hedley? If "the irreligious" are actually "very religious" there must be other bases and formulations of religion, even in our civilization, than the acceptance of Judeo-Christian creeds and forms of worship. If Hedley wants to meet his audience, he must find these bases and accept them. That is a large task, but someone must do it if the spiritual forces of our age are not to go on calling themselves "irreligious," and so lose much of their power to lead and inspire.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH
Yale University

MILLER, EDWARD. *The Abbey & Bishopric of Ely: The Social History of an Ecclesiastical Estate from the Tenth Century to the Early Fourteenth Century*. Pp. xiii, 313. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951. $5.00.

It has been said that feudalism is extremely complex and fundamentally simple. The simplicities of the feudal age, however, can be discovered only through a multiplicity of particulars. The value of Edward Miller's book is in the abundance of pertinent and interesting facts he uses to establish his general conclusions. This is an important contribution to medieval studies and a most welcome addition to the limited number of works available for an understanding of the medieval social pattern. Social history is, perhaps, the most difficult of all forms of history to define and equally hard to delimit. The truth of this generalization is obvious even for a study of the restricted areas of Ely lands. Since social relationships were political, administrative, and economic, medieval men like the abbots and bishops of Ely were often perplexed when forced to define precisely the nature of specific social types. This admirable study demonstrates this difficulty explicitly on almost every page.

Although he is forced often by lack of adequate sources to present tentative conclusions, the author has faced squarely the challenge of origins and has not turned with fright from "that obscurity which covers all the peoples of the Middle Ages." He shows at least the achievement of the abbots of Ely in acquiring lands between 970 and 1020, which "in virtue both of its magnitude and its rapidity, must have had major social consequences. . . . The work which was done in a brief half-century endured for near six hundred years." A chapter on "The Old English Estate and the Norman Conquest" gives vividly an indication of what the change to a new order could bring. Naturally the survey of 1086 must be relied upon, and we know more than we otherwise could without it "if the words of *Domesday Book* mean what they say. . . ." We are, however, not always sure they do. A chapter on "The Medieval Estates of the Bishops of Ely" will attract the specialist, but one devoted to "The Peasantry" deserves a wide circle of readers. After reading this essay few could retain faith in oversimplified clichés of text-books, for Miller demonstrates incontestably how lines of social status were vague, indeterminate, overlapping, and confused, rather than the clearly marked delimitations that are the lawyers' delight. "'Omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi,' Bracton would say; and that would be true enough in the eyes of the law. But the law, and especially a law so Roman as this, was no very good guide to social relationships."

"The Honour of St. Etheldreda" and "The Liberty of St. Etheldreda" are each examined in separated chapters which can only be noted here. These are important and worthy of careful attention, but they are of less general interest than the concluding section describing "Administration." If the problems and requirements of the earlier days seem relatively simple, the administrative demands of the thirteenth century were great. By then the Bishops of Ely had a kind of permanent civil service. Professionals in administration and the technically trained were available to assume the burdensome functions essential to maintain the integrity of extensive lands.

GRAY C. BOYCE
Northwestern University

BARON, SALO WITTMAYER. *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*. "Ancient Times." Two volumes. Pp. xiii, 415; 493. 2nd ed., rev. and enlarged. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $12.50.

These two impressively documented and indexed volumes, which survey the cultural history of the ancient Jews through the Talmudic Age, are to be followed by possibly five more. Professor Baron has kept alert to historians' and classical archeologists' advances in research; these motivated an enlargement of his earlier three-volume study of 1937. The more than two hundred pages of notes are rich in bibliographic citations and critical comment. Baron's work, which is leveled at scholars, is based upon an almost encyclopedic accumulation of information and on an examination of all relevant secondary sources.

It is a pity that this massive work, the fullest and most up-to-date general study in English on the cultural history of the ancient Jews, has not ventured beyond the outdated canons of interpretation of exotic cultures still found among otherwise excellent historians. The central criticism is that, like so much of contemporary historiography, Baron's phrasings regarding cultures and culture change are of the vintage of the 1920's or earlier in historiography. Baron has remained handicapped by the current academic ailment of specialist self-segregation. Except for classical archeology, he is largely unfamiliar with contiguous social sciences.

An anthropological reviewer notes with horror Baron's speaking (1: 49) of Semitic and other races in the Near East. He says (1: 172) that one cause of Jewish numerical expansion by the time of Christ was partly due to proselytism and partly to

"the natural increase of a highly prolific race," that is, the Jews. He writes repeatedly of a medley of races in the Near East. Even the Phoenicians become a race (1: 176), and finally we read (2: 23) of "racially pure Jews." If we can ignore the ridiculous implication that the Jews were once especially fecund because of their race, the confusion appears to be terminological: by race Baron really means tribal or cultural group.

One of the weak portions of his study is in the discussions of feminine social status (1: 58; 2: 235–241). His criteria of such status are unclear. But he assures us, in an almost Nazi passage, that the "concentration of women's activities upon her home . . . while perhaps prejudicial to her general economic and social standing, had nevertheless great value for the preservation of the [Jewish] nation's physical and moral strength."

He writes confusingly of an ancient precapitalistic system and of precapitalistic forms of exploitation (1: 68–69); of ancient industrialists, proletariat and bourgeois (1: 73–74), when such terms might best be reserved for analyses of social phenomena of modern centuries. He asserts (1: 51) that in early preagricultural seminomadic times, the Jews owned herds communally. This deduction needs documentation in order to controvert the weight of anthropological evidence that herds of domesticated animals are almost always privately owned by individuals or lineages. Time and again he uses the term "nation" for what is much more fittingly called a tribe or federation of tribes. There is still less aptness in his use of "nation" for widely scattered Diaspora groups of most diverse linguistic and cultural features, although such groups shared a religio-cultural heritage and similar historical experiences.

Baron's interpretations of cultural phenomena improve, and his extrapolations of inappropriate concepts and terms that are suitable for modern times lessen, as he moves into the Roman Empire. His comprehension of that culture is better not because the sources for it are fuller but because it is easier to comprehend a culture that is closer to our own. Although he has served specialist scholarship admirably in his monumental assembling of studies of ancient times, his interpretive discussions of ancient cultural phenomena outside of Rome and Greece are largely old hat or do not stand up in the light of cultural anthropology. But the compilation that he has achieved will make interpretations of Jewish culture history easier for historical scholars who are also oriented in disciplines such as cultural anthropology and social psychology.

MELVILLE JACOBS
University of Washington

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *The New Society*. Pp. vii, 119. London: Macmillan & Co. (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company), 1951. $1.60.

We have moved far away from the conceptions and from the conditions out of which the democratic tradition was born. This is the theme for six radio lectures by Mr. Carr for British audiences in mid-1951, the series being reproduced here without substantial change.

While the process of increasing government services is not new, their increasing scope, changing nature, and handling at national levels are remaking contemporary society. The present need for state economic planning arose from (1) the great depression and (2) preparedness programs for war.

The approach to an understanding of problems of our "new society" should be historical. Mr. Carr emphasizes the continuity of history, which "moves constantly and never returns to the same place" (p. 5). There are fashions in writing history; the historian moves with the times (p. 14). Today's looking back, at least to the American, French, and industrial revolutions, should be not for solutions but for critical insights.

In sequence there appeared unrestrained private enterprise, competition, monopoly, and governmental regulation. We are now in the period of the "welfare state," the transition to which the author considers inevitable, if for nothing else than to care for unemployment. The laissez-faire economic whips to force people to make their own way were unemployment and hunger. We now have governmental relief of "the poor and the wretched," health services, and food subsidies. Will guaranteed full employment and other social services weaken the initiative and independence of the worker? The author does not think so. After discarding the former whips what is needed, he suggests, is "the creation of a new philosophy which will furnish an incentive and a reinforcement for the new social habit of work" (p. 53). The inducement of higher living standards might be substituted for economic penalties. He would also nationalize the major part of industry.

The lectures stress British movements but for illustration draw also on many changes in American economic life. The author concludes, "This is an American century in the same sense and with the same right as the last century was a British century" (p. 84).

If sometimes pessimistic in conviction, the always forthright author balances that attitude with a measure of reasonable optimism for the future. Some will dispute the generalization that private laissez-faire capitalism has been dead everywhere outside the United States for twenty years (p. 31). In the lecture contrasting "individualism" with "mass democracy," it might have been shown that individual rights and the "general will" have quite different ends in view. When speaking of individual rights we mean, more often than not, those rights sheltered against governmental encroachment. The general will simply contrasts with an individual will, say that of a sovereign. Majority rule applies within a legislature, moreover, not only for the general electorate. Nowhere do democratic processes require the mass of voters to determine policy that sets technical details. Lincoln probably meant government of the sovereign people, for the people, by the representatives of the people.

VERNON J. PURYEAR
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ROWNTREE, B. SEEBOHM, and G. R. LAVERS. *English Life and Leisure*. Pp. xvi, 482. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951. $4.00.

This volume is an interesting contribution to sociological literature for three reasons: it combines the case-study technique with data derived from statistical reports and interviews; it includes selected cultural aspects of life in England, Wales, and the Scandinavian countries; and it is written with a view to influencing behavior patterns.

The basic data of the analysis are 975 case studies, the facts and judgments in each case procured after sufficient acquaintance to make them a matter of informal conversations. A total of 220 cases are presented in the first chapter. Other data were obtained from reports and from interviews with police officers, social workers, and others.

The areas of cultural life selected for study are: commercialized gambling, drinking, smoking, sexual promiscuity, honesty, the cinema, the stage, broadcasting, dancing, reading habits, adult education, and religion. The last two chapters do not follow this specific approach. One is a community survey of leisure-time activities in an English town; the other is a superficial survey of leisure activities in each of the Scandinavian countries.

The authors are convinced that vigorous steps need to be taken to reverse the current trend, for each analysis leads them to conclude that behavior patterns are below the standards "of higher qualities that distinguish great nations and great individuals within a nation." They concede that the English people have a high respect for law and an enviable tradition of voluntary work with such organizations as youth clubs and the Red Cross but consider these the "unsensational blessings, won by sacrifice and effort in the past and maintained by good sense, and as a consequence of our reasonably civilized outlook."

In spite of the authors' seemingly pessimistic conclusions, they come to a positive proposal in relation to each area discussed. Some would criticize the fact that, while the report is factual, the conclusions

are based upon value judgments. These are primarily drawn from Christian ethics but are justified by the authors not only on moral and spiritual grounds, but, even more, on the grounds of national interest.

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WEDGWOOD, C. V. *The Last of the Radicals: Josiah Wedgwood, M. P.* Pp. 252. London: Jonathan Cape (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company), 1951. $3.00.

It is good to know that the life of the last radical has been written. This seems unbelievable. The way in which the author follows her uncle's request to give this title to his biography is indicative of her devotion throughout the work. She goes so far as to put herself into the story to a minor degree toward the close of the book, giving indications of her uncle's attitude toward her. And yet, she does not violate the canons of good biographical writing too openly.

Josiah Wedgwood, M. P., had the advantages of family and fortune, and the disadvantages. The biographer reveals a man whose life was too easy. Being from the Wedgwood family, he could afford to be outspokenly liberal and increasingly eccentric. He loved a contest with forces of darkness, monopoly, conservatism, or tyranny—so long as the contest needed him. When success approached, he would drop out and take up another cause. He was a leader of lost causes and happy as a warrior in naval, political, or social battles. His daring was his pride and may have inspired others many times; but his liberalism made him see the other side of each cause as well as his own side so that if the opposition became an underdog he might turn to help it. He fought for Zionism, for instance, but while so doing he helped the non-Zionists if they called upon him.

The one passion of his life and the one solution for all of the troubles of our civilization was the single tax reform. Henry George gave him a lifelong cause and gave him an all-inclusive answer. His solution to the vast array of public issues was a bit too simple for lasting results.

The student of history and politics will find in this enthusiastic review of a liberal and a labor leader in Parliament a number of ideas worth getting. "Josh" Wedgwood was a member of Parliament from 1906 to 1942 when he was raised to the peerage and entered the House of Lords, which he had earlier scorned. The reviewer found the struggle for civil liberties in England of value; he enjoyed the story of a life so buoyant that its subject could stand for independence of thought in his own family to the extent that it worried even himself when his two daughters became pacifists; it is good to have the intimate view of the battle at Gallipoli in 1915 and the accounts of Wedgwood's trips to America to talk with Colonel House about peace terms and to Vladivostok to try to hold the Russians in their Allied war efforts after the March revolution of 1917. The part played in the Zionist movement is worth reading, and there are some good sidelights on the colonial reform movements in Nigeria and South Africa. In the main it is just a good story of a dynamic, humanity-loving Englishman who revelled in lost causes and came to think by the time he died in 1943 that he, himself, was a lost cause.

One wonders whether he was ever an asset to the Liberal party or to the Independent Labor party, or later to the Labor party to which he belonged; but he was a colorful figure, a voluminous writer, a champion of civil liberties and of freedom for all men and women of all races and creeds. It must have been exasperating to work with "Josh" Wedgwood, but a continuing inspiration to have felt his daring and reckless optimism. English and American liberalism owes much to such men as Josiah Wedgwood. We trust that he is not the last of the radicals.

W. HENRY COOKE
Claremont Graduate School

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *New Hopes for a Changing World.* Pp. 213. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952. $3.00.

Gilbert Murray once entitled a chapter on the Hellenistic period "The Failure of Nerve." By that phrase he meant the mood of despair which led people to abandon any real hope for a rational solution

of their problems. It may be that future historians—if there should be any—will characterize our age in the same way. We are the creatures of chance and fate, which in the end are the same, blind and inscrutable forces, to which we must reconcile ourselves. In Hellenistic times these post-rational systems grounded on a despair of reason were philosophies such as Stoicism and Epicureanism, or religious cults like those of Mithraism and Christianity. Today, for many people, Existentialism, Thomism, and Marxism perform a similar function. Ours is an age of retreat, one in which nihilism and dogmatism seem the only alternatives. A tragic example is that of H. G. Wells. This heroic and lifelong prophet of the Western philosophy of enlightenment and progress at the last concluded: "A frightful queerness has come into life. . . . The writer is convinced that there is no way out, or around, or through the impasse. It is the end."

This is the problem to which we expect Bertrand Russell, from the title of his book, to address himself, and it is disappointing to find that if the world has changed, he has not. One hoped Russell would apply his trenchant intellect to the causes of our despair, that he would give us some real grounds for hope. Instead, he remains where he was all of fifty years ago. When he wrote the melodramatically eloquent essay, "A Free Man's Worship," he admonished us, like true Stoics, to wrap ourselves in the impregnable mantle of our ideals. Thus do we become immune to the assaults of chance and fate.

Russell's stoical temperament thus makes him incapable of coming to grips with the problem. In a revealing passage near the end of the present work he remarks:

"I have not, however, in this book dwelt much upon the reasons for fear, since I do not think that it is through fear that we shall avoid the dangers that threaten us. Our world has too much of fear, and emphasis upon dangers is apt to lead to apathetic despair. What our world needs is the opposite; it needs rational creative hope; it needs something positive to live for. It needs 'yes' feelings rather than 'no' feelings. If the 'yes' feelings are as strong as a purely rational consideration allows them to be, the 'no' feelings will melt away and become unnecessary. But if we dwell upon 'no' feelings too much, we shall never emerge from despair" (pp. 206–207).

And so the whole book is a series of "if-then" propositions: *If* we were more rational in dealing with population problems, with conflicts of class and nation, of creed and race, *if* we could rid ourselves of obsolete ideas, of groundless anxieties and of irrational fears by instituting a juster society and a more sensible kind of education, *then* we should have peace with happiness and progress unlimited. On this the only proper comment is, "O brave new world, that has such people in't."

Thus Bertrand Russell vacillates between hoping that on an *off chance* events may take this fortunate turn and the compensatory mood of stoic resignation. When he is thinking of these wholly rational creatures, his optimism is unbounded. He says, for instance—and I have no doubt of it either—that "it would be completely possible to make the whole world within fifty years as prosperous as the United States is now." But then he reflects that there is only too much reason to fear that Western civilization as we have known it is poised on the verge of the *fatal* abyss. Resuming the Stoic's mantle, he assures us, "And so long as man continues to exist, we may be pretty sure that, whatever he may suffer for a time, and whatever brightness may be eclipsed, he will emerge sooner or later, perhaps strengthened and reinvigorated by a period of mental sleep" (p. 186). Such is Bertrand Russell's unchanging advice to this changing world. Can a world that is plunging headlong in its furious course be expected to heed it?

GAIL KENNEDY
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DUE, JOHN F. *The General Manufacturers Sales Tax in Canada.* Canadian Tax Papers No. 3. Pp. xi, 202. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1951. $2.00.

The present volume is to be welcomed on this side of the border as well as in its home country. There has been intermittent agitation for a federal sales tax in this country for some years. This clear

orderly history and description of the Canadian tax will be of particular value if a manufacturers' levy is again seriously considered. The usefulness of the book is much broader than this, however. Much of the discussion is pertinent to other forms of sales taxes and to other levels of government.

Canada imposed a 1 per cent turnover tax in 1920 in an attempt to meet heavy postwar expenses. It was changed to a manufacturers' levy in 1924. For the sixteen years from 1936 to 1951, the tax was imposed at the rate of 8 per cent, but was increased to 10 per cent in 1951.

Small manufacturers are exempt, and goods used in production are generally excluded from the tax. Most foods, certain articles for medical use, several major categories of building materials, electric power and fuel, and goods for educational and religious purposes are also exempt. Due to the various exclusions and exemptions the sales tax yield in 1950 with an 8 per cent rate was 3.6 per cent of total consumer expenditures. With a 10 per cent rate it is estimated that the consumer tax burden will be about 4.5 per cent.

The tax has been a productive one. It yielded 31 per cent of federal tax revenues in 1938. Due to heavy increases in other taxes, however, it dropped in relative importance during the war and was down to 10 per cent of tax revenues in 1945 and 1946. The current yield is around 17 per cent. From 1932 to 1943 the sales tax was far more productive than the personal income tax. It has been outstripped by the income tax since then.

Summarizing briefly, the principal findings of the study are that the tax is highly productive and well administered. Collection costs are low. There is evidence of pyramiding since markup percentages are applied to new purchase prices. In general the tax appears to be shifted to consumers. Due mainly to exemption of food, there appears to be only slight, if any, regression below the $4,000 income level. Above that point the burden of the tax becomes less as incomes increase.

Arguments for the tax, in addition to its productivity and administrative feasibility, are that it is less harmful incentivewise than the income tax and that it tends to hold inflation in check. The author feels that a personal income tax falling with the same weight as the sales tax does upon various income groups would be no more injurious to incentives. He does not compare the effect of the sales tax with the corporate income tax in this connection, nor does he compare these two taxes with respect to their influence upon management decisions.

The argument against the tax rests mainly on grounds of equity, since it constitutes a substantial burden upon low income groups. The author does not favor retention of the tax as a permanent feature of the revenue system.

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PERRY, J. HARVEY. *Taxation in Canada.* Pp. xiii, 409. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951. $6.00.

The author is an officer of the Department of Finance with more than fifteen years experience in practical tax matters. *Taxation in Canada* is a description of the current Canadian tax structure—Dominion, provincial, and municipal—and also in part of the Canadian governmental organization and of the nature of the Canadian economy. The fiscal, the political, and the economic are effectively interwoven in nontechnical yet authoritative exposition designed to appeal both to the layman and the tax expert.

Essentially the author's concern is with the provisions of the statutes and with their elucidation. Mr. Perry does not pretend to deal exhaustively with such matters as the shifting and incidence of taxation nor with the broad problem of fiscal policy.

Many chapters conclude with a short separately spaced summary of their content together with a tabular statement of the percentage of tax revenue and total revenue provided by a given tax. An adequate bibliography, chapter by chapter, appears at the end of the book. Various tables throughout and in the appendix enlighten and supplement the text. Frequent and at times extensive reference is made to court decisions. The specific and important problem of tax administration is discussed in concluding chapters.

Mr. Perry makes his work interesting and instructive to the American reader by comparisons or contrasts often made between Canadian and American facts and procedures as for instance the contrast between the concepts of income or between the positions of local assessors in the two countries.

Certain chapters are worthy of especial mention. They deal with the historical development of the Canadian tax system, with certain constitutional aspects of taxation, with budgetary procedures, and, as has been said, with administration.

Some of the material presented is transient in nature as are the facts as to current tax rates, but most of the substance is of fundamental and permanent nature, dealing as it does with the taxes which must support government and with their legal and constitutional foundations.

Mr. Perry has drawn in clear lines an informative over-all picture of the Canadian tax structure. One might wish for a brief concluding chapter to focus the scene, but, although this does not appear, the reader feels that competent workmanship and a sense of symmetry and artistry simply expressed have produced a certain feeling of warmth which works on taxation do not always engender in him.

MARVEL STOCKWELL
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KOTHARI, SHANTILAL. *India's Emerging Foreign Policies.* Pp. viii, 220. Bombay: Vora & Co., 1951. $2.00.

It is obviously valuable to know what Indians are thinking about their policies and ours. Mr. Kothari's small volume, done as a project at the University of California, will be useful in this respect. He has undertaken an exposition and defense of India's major present positions and has suggested what he regards as an imperative next step.

In his view the present world scene represents a struggle between two power blocs led respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States. The struggle, he says, is essentially economic in its origin since it is the clash between communism, represented by Russia, and monopoly capitalism, represented by the United States.

India, in this analysis, faces two dangers, two putative antagonists. The first is Soviet communism, the second is "Anglo-American imperialism." The danger from the first is more acute, he believes, but the second is also a potential threat. India must be on guard against both.

In the event of a shooting war, he holds, India could not be neutral and would inevitably line up with the Western world. In a "cold war," on the other hand, it is his judgment that India should and must remain neutral, the better to serve the cause of peace. This is the explanation of India's policy toward Communist China. It is Mr. Kothari's thesis that it has not yet been determined that Communist China is a Soviet satellite and that, if it is eventually so determined, India's policy will have to be modified.

Meanwhile India will continue to work for better international understanding, independence for all subject peoples, an end to all racial discrimination, and a co-operative opposition to all forms of "imperialism."

The imperative next step, he declares, is the formation of a working South Asian alliance to resist aggression from any quarter. He is opposed to co-operation in any similar Pacific pact since the latter would involve some non-Asian states. He does not believe in nonviolent methods and is critical of Gandhi on this score. He is, himself, a partisan of Subhas Chandra Bose, the Indian nationalist who went over to the Japanese. His argument for the cultural values of such an alliance, which it stresses, is persuasive. His picture of it as a strong physically defensive position falls flat when he states clearly that the security of the area is dependent upon the sea power of the United Kingdom and the United States. He is, nevertheless, opposed to any ties to the West and suggests that India's withdrawal from the Commonwealth is probably imminent.

The Western reader will be informed, but slightly bewildered, by the acute hypersensitivity that is revealed. At times it

amounts almost to a persecution complex. How else could one explain a statement such as this: "European diplomacy, nearly [neatly?] aligned under American leadership in international politics, is active in preventing India from becoming a strong nation." This is in the class with the almost pathological fear of "imperialism" that pervades the book and which, coupled with the total myopia in respect to Soviet imperialism, gives it an air of unreality.

ROBERT AURA SMITH
The New York Times

VAKIL, C. N., and P. R. BRAHMANANDA. *Planning for a Shortage Economy: The Indian Experiment.* Pp. 320. Bombay, India: Vora and Co., 1952. Price Rs 5/8. paper; Rs 7.– cloth.

The old story that India is a land of fabulous wealth is decently buried. The magnificence and grandeur of the Indian princes has also disappeared with the withdrawal of British administration from the country. One hears nowadays nothing but reports of direct poverty of the Indian masses. In Brahmanic philosophy this poverty was once lauded highly. But it is no longer accepted as a source of greatness or spirituality, but rather is condemned as a menace to the physical, intellectual, and moral stamina of the Indian nation and as a threat to the expansion of the democratic ideal in the land. The amelioration of mass poverty is believed to be the greatest problem India has to face now.

To remove the specter of poverty that stalks in India, a group of merchants brought out a plan, known as the Bombay Plan, in 1944. Other people also came out with other plans such as the People's Plan, the Gandhian Plan, the Visvesarya Plan and so on. In fact, so many plans were hatched in so short a time that even the stolid Government of India was accelerated into action and appointed an Advisory Planning Board to look into the matter in 1946. But the partition which took place in the next year set at naught most of the calculations of the Board. The regions which produced a surplus of wheat and most of the cotton and jute fell to the share of Pakistan. A large number of displaced persons who needed immediate rehabilitation further complicated the problem. The new government that came into the saddle appointed a National Planning Commission in 1948. Two years later, it submitted a six-year plan to the Commonwealth Consultative Committee which held its session in Colombo. The desire was to enlist the sympathy of the Commonwealth countries in a large co-operative scheme to rebuild the economy of the war-torn regions of southern Asia. But unfortunately the countries to which the appeal was made were not in a sufficiently financially solvent condition to take up the steps suggested. So the Government of India modified the plan and brought out a new version of it, to reconstruct the economy of the country. Vakil and Brahmananda's book discusses the new Five-Year Plan (1952 to 1957) propounded by the Indian administration.

The plan has many objectives: to solve the problem caused by the shortage of raw materials, essential consumer goods, and housing; to fight the high and rising prices and the growing cost of living; to rehabilitate the persons displaced by partition; to utilize social resources to suppress black-marketing and profiteering; to readjust the economy; and to develop the country. Thus, the problems it sets out to tackle are immediate. It does not consider the nationalization of industries, nor does it suggest any structural change in community life to provide for social justice.

The government sets out with 17,930 million rupees to carry out the scheme, from which it anticipates raising 11,210 million by internal loan, 3,950 million by utilization of the money earmarked in the budget for social services; 2,000 million from various surplus balances; 2,500 from small savings and unfunded debts; and 1,140 million from the organized capital market. When put into effect, agriculture will absorb 13 per cent of the investment, irrigation and power plants 30 per cent, transport and communications 26, industry and minerals 7, social services 17, rehabilitation 5, and miscellaneous items 2 per cent.

The objectives of the plan are limited. The authors believe that if they can be realized within the five years of the program, and the damage done to the economy by the war and partition repaired, the country will have a substantial basis for planning another advance with greater success and less friction. We agree.

It is unfortunate that many of the figures supplied by the Planning Commission have to be modified and changed from year to year. The reason is that the Indian government does not yet have exact statistical data on which sound planning can be based. The authors are aware of the fact and plead for economic research. We again support the plea.

The book is well written and, compared with other Indian publications, well printed. As an exposition of the present five-year plan, it serves a useful purpose.

N. G. D. JOARDAR
Washington, D. C.

FUCHS, STEPHEN. *The Children of Hari: A Study of the Nimar Balahis in the Central Provinces of India.* Pp. xviii, 463, XXII plates. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $7.50.

This work is an anthropological-sociological description of an "untouchable" agricultural group known as *Balahis*, especially those who live in the Nimar district in the southwest corner of the Central Provinces (now known as Madhya Pradesh) of India. These are one of the economically and educationally backward peoples of India. The author, as a missionary work ing among this people and at the same time a trained anthropologist, utilized his opportunity for a long-onctinued field study. The book is one of the most complete accounts we have of any Indian group.

After a brief, too brief, introduction of 16 pages on the geographical, historical, and racial background of the Balahis, Father Fuchs treats their culture in over 400 more pages under the four heads of sociology, the life history of an individual, religion and magic, and material culture. There are 79 illustrations (line drawings and photographs), a glossary (which like the text never gives a transliteration of Indian words that would indicate pronunciation), and an index.

The Balahis appear to have been Hinduized in relatively recent times, and their Hinduization is very imperfect; that is to say, their social customs do not correspond with any exactitude to the ideal demands of the orothodox texts. But since few, if any, low-caste Hindu groups do have institutions that would satisfy the religious and legalistic purists, the Balahis may be viewed as a typical group living by a variety of what is often for convenience called the lower Hinduism. They have "Brahmans," to be sure, but these appear to be by origin Balahis who have taken over priestly functions and not historical Aryan Brahmans, and they are reputed among the Balahis to eat meat as does the community generally. The Balahis' religion is directed toward propitiation of clan gods, of the mother goddesses, and of various demons with the use of special festivals, ceremonies, and cult practices, in all of which the major Hindu deities and epic and puranic mythology have only a vague and fugitive part.

In a final brief chapter the author writes of the future of the Balahis, holding out little hope for them unless the Hindu community as a whole changes its basic attitude toward untouchability. His remarks may be considered applicable to all Untouchables. Mere good will on the part of socially minded reformers like Gandhi or a mere constitutional provision as in the Constitution of 1950, which claims that it "abolishes untouchability," does not appear to him adequate. Presumably Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, himself an Untouchable, chief leader of the Untouchables and principal architect of the 1950 Constitution, had the same opinion last autumn when he resigned from the dominant Congress Party on the ground that it was unwilling to enact enforcing legislation for its social provisions.

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NANAVATI, MANILAL B., and C. N. VAKIL (Eds.). *Group Prejudices in India: A Symposium.* Pp. 223. Bombay: Vora & Co., 1951. $3.00.

Indian society is one of the most complex in the world with its Hindu caste groups and its many other divisions along religious, regional, and linguistic lines. Latent hostilities between many of these

groups have been brought out by self-government. The twenty-nine essays in this volume represent a pioneer attempt to describe the serious consequences to an independent India of these tensions.

The authors of the various articles represent a wide variety of university professors and government officials. They write out of a deep concern for the success of India's new government. A tone of urgency and a desire for immediate reform run through their writing. The editors reflect this spirit in their preface. "All thinking people would agree that the early removal of the prevailing group prejudices in the country is an essential preliminary for moulding free India into a united, strong and democratic nation."

The Indian Constitution contains detailed prohibitions against discrimination on grounds of "religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth." Discrimination is forbidden in public places such as shops, restaurants, places of entertainment, wells, bathing ghats, and temples. These constitutional provisions, though not universally enforced, are outlined by Professor Venkatarangaiya in his article, "The New Constitution and the Removal of Group Prejudices." This essay, however, is brief and general in character, which is true also of the other articles in the book.

This volume is significant in showing the increasing awareness in India of the social and political consequences of group antagonisms. But the authors in their desire for rapid solutions limit themselves to rather elementary and superficial programs, such as the creation of a central university, a national language, higher standards of living, educational reforms, and moral appeals. There is little realization of the extreme complexity and durability of group attitudes. The authors are not familiar with American research in the field of minority groups and culture prejudices. The essays were written before the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) studies of group tensions were initiated in India.

The book has no index.

PAUL F. CRESSEY
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Norton, Massachusetts

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

ZAVALANI, T. *How Strong Is Russia?* Pp. 244. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. $4.00.

This book is an attempt by an Albanian former Communist to assess the successes and failures of the Soviet Five Year Plans. His verdict is almost wholly negative. "The main lesson of Soviet economic planning," he believes, "is to teach us how it should not be done." The Five Year Plans, as he demonstrates, have been pushed home to the accompaniment of mass murder, starvation, forced labor camps, inflation, shortages of consumer goods, and the strictest kind of labor discipline. Given the shortage of skilled labor, they have also been marked by appalling waste and inefficiency.

All this is true, as any serious student of the Soviet Union knows, but it would probably be a mistake to conclude that the Soviet economy is as weak as Mr. Zavalani seems to think. The severest test of the Soviet economy to date was of course the war against Germany. Confronted with the indubitable fact of Soviet victory in this war, Mr. Zavalani attributes it to Hitler's mistakes, to Lend Lease, and to the poorly developed state of Soviet communications (which according to him hampered the Germans more than it did the Russians). He pays tribute to the fighting qualities of the Russian soldier, but this concession is hardly an adequate corrective to his mistakes. His view coincides almost exactly with that of a group of former German generals, led by Halder, who are busily explaining to anyone who will listen that the war was lost through no fault of the German General Staff.

Actually, the Five Year Plans provided the Soviet Union, however brutally and wastefully, with the industrial basis for fighting a major war, something Imperial Russia did not have in 1914–17. The best explanation of the Soviet victory, and the best corrective to the optimism which Mr. Zavalani's excessively negative analysis of Soviet economic planning may inspire in the unwary, is to be found in *Soviet Arms and Soviet Power* by General Augustin Guillaume, a distinguished French officer who served as French Military Attache in Moscow after the war:

"Unity of doctrine, whether realized in enthusiasm or imposed by power from above—unity of direction in the political, economic and military domains insured by the strong personality of Stalin, chief of the Party, chief of government, chief of the armies—with the absolute authority and stability of power insured by dictatorship—amplitude of preparation, industrial and military—application without reservation, once the time had come, of the total human and material resources of the immense country—furious work by a great people under an inflexible discipline—the quality of military cadres insured by rigorous selection—the quality of military units based on strength of manpower and on a carefully sustained morale—and a material strength that was constantly increased and improved—these were the sources of the Soviet victory."

Mr. Zavalani has failed to make use of a number of good postwar works on Soviet economic development, such as the writings of Naum Jasny and Harry Schwartz. These, as well as others dealing with important noneconomic aspects of the Soviet state, ought to be consulted by anyone attempting the difficult task of answering the question posed by the title of this book. A full answer to this question, I fear, would give the Soviet rulers and their economic planners, however regretfully, higher marks than Mr. Zavalani has been willing to allow them.

HAROLD C. HINTON
Georgetown University

SCOTT, ANDREW MACKAY. *The Anatomy of Communism.* Pp. xiii, 197. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $3.00.

Dr. Scott has here performed a valuable service to all students of international affairs by the preparation of this objective, accurate, and critical study of the theory and practice of Russian communism.

The Anatomy of Communism begins with a critical analysis of the Marxian background of contemporary communism, and an appraisal of the Marx and Engels theory of the materialistic conception of history and the class struggle. This section is followed by a careful documentary study of Bolshevik tactics from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present time, as developed by Lenin and Stalin, and as carried out by the Soviet dictatorship.

During the last decade or so, there have been many students of communism who have been bitterly critical of Stalin and his rigid, dictatorial regime, and yet who have had many words of praise for Lenin. If only Lenin were alive today, they have declared, the Russian dictatorship would by now have taken long strides toward a democratic form of government.

Dr. Scott, in quotation after quotation, shows that it was Lenin who laid the foundation for the Bolshevik *coup d'état,* the Stalin dictatorship, and the Machiavellian tactics to which the communist movement has adhered since its beginning.

The author calls attention to Lenin's advocacy not only of dictatorship in general, but to his justification of *one man* dictatorship during a transitional period. Thus, in answering the question as to whether the will of a single individual, a dictator, may fulfill the will of the working class, Lenin is quoted as saying [Lenin, *Selected Works,* Vol. VII, pp. 341–2]:

"The question [of one-man dictatorship] has become one of really enormous significance. First, the question of principle, *viz.,* is the appointment of individual persons, dictators with unlimited powers, in general compatible with the fundamental principles of Soviet government? . . .

"The irrefutable experience of history has shown that in the history of revolutionary movements the dictatorship of individual persons was very often the vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes. . . . Hence there is absolutely no contradiction in principle between the Soviet democracy and the exercise of dictatorial powers by individual persons."

The author likewise shows how Lenin evolved the concept of Russia as the "Socialist fatherland," to which Communists not only of Russia but of all lands should give chief allegiance in time of conflict.

Dr. Scott ends with a suggestive chapter on "The Great Illusion." Russian communism, he concludes, is "a whole fabric of illusions. . . . The responsibility for the fabrication of the majority of these illusions belongs to Lenin, and the ease with which they won wide acceptance is explained, in part, by an illusion having to do with Lenin himself—the idea that he was devoted to freedom and welfare for the working people of the world."

The reviewer, while finding Part I on early Marxian theories suggestive, feels that the author's treatment of the class struggle and economic interpretation of history in this section is too brief to permit of an adequate and well-balanced presentation. Those portions of Part I which are essential to the discussion of communism this reviewer feels could better have been woven into various chapters in Part II on communism proper. On the whole, however, the reading public should be grateful to the author for this clear and thoughtful contribution to the real nature of the contemporary communist movement.

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HARE, RICHARD. *Pioneers of Russian Social Thought: Studies of Non-Marxian Formation in Nineteenth Century Russia and of Its Partial Revival in the Soviet Union.* Pp. viii, 307. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. $4.50.

The revolutionary history of Russia is as full of paradoxes as it is full of interest. The central paradox is brought to light by the interesting study of Mr. Richard Hare. The West hardly knows that the radical idealistic movements of Western Europe and America about the middle of the nineteenth century had a parallel in a similar trend in Russia, one equally imbued with social humanism and equally fertile in ideas for reform. At the same time, as Mr. Hare's individual studies show, the Russian reformers were driven more and more upon themselves. While the Western trend was internationalist and, whether liberal or socialist, was concerned wholly with the urban class, the Russian trend developed a strong Slavophile outlook and a social philosophy, which came to be known as populism, centering on the peasant. That distinction became sharper with the rise of Marxian "scientific" socialism. The Russian reformers called themselves socialists, but most of them rejected the doctrine and implications of Marxism, which in the East was at best an alien importation.

Altogether the rigidity of the Marxist dogma was distasteful to the way of thinking of the bulk of the Russian revolutionaries. Chernyshevsky, for instance, wrote that to talk about natural economic laws made very little sense, nor need what is natural be any recommendation (p. 187). And Herzen, who met Marx in London and came to dislike him heartily, and in a way the ablest of them all, is quoted by Mr. Hare as follows: "I am not a bit frightened of the word 'gradualness,' wretchedly debased though it has been by the unsteady shaky steps of various reforming governments. . . . One learns mathematics gradually, so why should final conclusions and thoughts about sociology be spread like an epidemic of smallpox, or abruptly injected into the brain like medicine forcibly poured down a horse's throat?"; and he added that "to tell all that to the people we live among, demands if not more, at least as much courage and independence as it does to pursue extremes in everything" (pp. 267–68).

The Russian revolutionaries certainly did not lack courage or the spirit of sacrifice. There was always among them however this division between Easterners and Westerners, with the small Marxist group leading the latter. Since the late twenties especially, Soviet policy has completed the circle of paradox. The Communists had taken over a Western theoretical product which proved so arbitrary that, to apply it effectively, they have had to cut themselves off from the West and to act in the way which the Easterners claimed to be inevitable. Whether Soviet communism is truly Marxist or not is for Marxists to decide; but it is patently a highly nationalistic and isolationist policy in the extreme Slavophile tradition. Mr. Hare adds the point that the new Soviet state links up with the despotic czarism of Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible, not with the semiliberal reformist czarism of Alexander II (p. 302).

Mr. Hare has given us a highly interesting study of social thinkers whose lives and works are hardly known in the West. The writing is not always in the same class as the scholarship; and for a volume of disconnected studies an index of names is woefully inadequate.

DAVID MITRANY
Oxford, England

Soviet Legal Philosophy. Papers by V. I. LENIN, P. I. STUCHKA, M. A. REISNER, E. B. PASHUKANIS, J. V. STALIN, A. Y. VYSHINSKY, P. YUDIN, S. A. GOLUNSKII, M. S. STROGOVICH, and I. P. TRAININ. Translated by HUGH W. BABB, with an introduction by JOHN N. HAZARD. Vol. V in "20th Century Legal Philosophy Series." Pp. xxvii, 465. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $7.50.

This volume is "a chronicle of the steps taken in the formulation of a Soviet legal philosophy" (p. xvii). It contains a short lecture delivered by Lenin in 1918 entitled "The State," excerpts from the writings of two legal theorists of the twenties (Stuchka and Reisner), the famous book of Pashukanis on "The General Theory of Law and Marxism" (3rd edition, 1927), two short selections from Stalin indicating the crisis in Soviet political theory in 1929–1930, the 1930 speech of Pashukanis in which he succeeded in bringing his theories through the crisis almost intact, the denunciation of Pashukanis and others by Yudin in 1937 and the more extensive refutation by Vyshinsky in 1938, a short excerpt on the theory of the state from Stalin's 1939 report to the Eighteenth Party Congress, and about 100 pages from Soviet writings of 1940 and 1945 on the theories of the state and of law.

As a supplement to the literature in English on Soviet law (some half-dozen books), this anthology is most useful. However, the reader who is not familiar with the concrete legal developments in the Soviet Union over the past 35 years will be misled if he takes the present volume as a guide to what Soviet jurists have really thought about law. This is not to say that the writers here represented are attempting to deceive anyone, but only that their theories are constructed primarily for the sake of meeting certain practical problems faced by the Soviet state and not primarily for the sake of the truth. Soviet legal theories may be analogized to legal fictions, which are not meant to be believed or disbelieved but which are designed as a means of developing the law. The practical implications must be read—where Soviet eyes are accustomed to read—between the lines.

Taken simply as a series of essays in legal and political philosophy, the present volume has considerable interest. Perhaps its chief merit is that it presents Pashukanis for the first time in English. Pashukanis was a profound legal philosopher, who dominated Soviet jurisprudence (and in some respects Soviet legal development) for some 20 years. His theories were, however, disastrous for the actual development of Soviet law, since he believed that law was based essentially on the market and on the principle of reciprocity or exchange, and that hence in a socialist planned economy law represented a bourgeois survival which should be used, if at all, simply for political purposes. Vyshinsky, with less profundity, but with more common sense, opposes the reduction of law to either politics or economics.

HAROLD J. BERMAN
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Hoover Institute Studies, Series B: "Elite Studies," Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press. No price.

No. 1. LASSWELL, HAROLD D., DANIEL LERNER, and C. EASTON ROTHWELL. *The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography.* Pp. iii, 72. 1952.

No. 2. SCHUELLER, GEORGE K. *The Politburo.* Pp. vi, 79. 1951.

No. 3. LERNER, DANIEL, with ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL and GEORGE K. SCHUELLER. *The Nazi Elite.* Pp. x, 112. 1951.

These booklets open a series devoted to the study of leadership groups as part of a wider exploration of the "world revolution of our time." Whether or not God deigns to chuckle over so full a phrase, its use could hardly detract from the value of scientific inquiry into what is here called "elites." Lasswell recommends the concept as covering "both the leadership and the strata from which leaders usually come." Elites, it is asserted, exist in democratic as well as nondemocratic societies. The leadership groups are thus an inviting object of political analysis.

This idea itself is not unfamiliar. But it cannot be said that much capital has been made of it up to now. The significance of the new series lies in the systematic presentation of basic biographical data about the body of individuals who form or have formed particular elites. The results are a welcome enrichment of political science, both in broadening the empirical base of knowledge and in elaborating a useful methodological approach. The planners of the series and the individual authors deserve the gratitude of all those who seek to come to grips with the elusive essence of the political process.

This is where a brief review might end, ignoring the temptation to show the able authors less than right on particular points. But perhaps they will not mind if some words are added about the limitations that inhere in studying elites on the basis of a *Who's Who*. One thing such study leaves in the dark is the vital matter of internal relationships, above all the lines of effective communication within the elite as a general chart of power and status. Another thing that remains obscure is the relationship between different elite formations in one and the same society. This interplay of different elite formations can be observed even in societies where the supremacy of a particular elite formation is formally acknowledged.

More than ten years ago I suggested the possibilities of getting at the operating realities of totalitarian systems by examination of the "interaction of different hierarchies" within each system. Perhaps it is the focus on membership characteristics that carries into Scheuller's sketch of the Politburo and Lerner's sifting of the Nazi leadership an excessive implication of structural unity, despite the cautions sounded in the introductory discussion of the elite concept.

The set of mirrors so shrewdly employed in this series to look over forbidding walls provides us with intriguing perspectives, but leaves us still guessing at the whole story. One would hope for equally careful experimentation with additional approaches to increase the yield in a field of study that holds great promise.

FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX
American University

FEHLING, HELMUT M. *One Great Prison: The Story Behind Russia's Unreleased POW's.* With a foreword by KONRAD ADENAUER and JOSEF CARDINAL FRINGS. Translated from the German by CHARLES R. JOY. Pp. xvi, 175. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. $2.50.

The sordid story of the mistreatment of war prisoners, the infliction of penal servitude upon the soldiers of vanquished powers, keeping them from the home circle years after the end of hostilities, needs to be told as often and as fully as possible. Nowhere have reparations in human chattels attained such proportions or continued so long as in the Soviet Union, although France strove mightily, within the limits of her reduced capacity, to compile a record of shame, and the United States emerges with anything but clean hands.

Unfortunately, this little book by a German war captive is not an effective indictment of the Soviet record. It is in no sense a study of the problem, but merely a sketch of personal experiences, a relation of horrors in which incidents crowd upon each other with so little explanation as to leave the reader with a confused impression of everything except the nature of the Soviet regime. Less striving for literary effect and more down-to-earth reporting would have strengthened the author's message without detracting unduly from the interest of his narrative.

Embitterment over treatment that will shorten his life and has already claimed that of many of his fellows naturally disposes him to lump people and regime together in one sweeping condemnation—a common failing of our day, and one to which the author's own countrymen have fallen victim. Yet on occasion he succeeds in being fair to the Russian people. The story of the elderly woman physician (p. 54), whom "the hard soil of her homeland will soon cover" because of her devotion to the consumptive prisoners confided to her care, is deeply moving, and more than once an acid comment is made about the German character and a grudging tribute paid the Russian. There is unhappily little reason to think that Fehling has exaggerated conditions; as in the case of other accounts of life in the Soviet Union, the reader will not be able to decide whether cruelty or callousness is the more terrible aspect of Soviet rule, and whether prisoners of war fare any worse than native Russians who have somehow run afoul of this all-embracing system.

The second half of the book presents a useful compilation of documents, notes, and pronouncements regarding the war prisoners issue; when one emerges from the maze of conflicting statements, one is left with the feeling that nothing is certain except that large numbers of prisoners have perished in the Soviet Union and many are still detained despite official assertions to the contrary. Some day a definitive indictment may be drawn; this book does not do it, and it is obvious that it cannot be done at the present time.

OLIVER H. RADKEY
University of Cincinnati

KRYLOV, IVAN. *Soviet Staff Officer.* Translated by EDWARD FITZGERALD. Pp. vi, 298. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $3.75.

Some of the most pertinent questions of the day regarding the Soviet Union find elucidation in the conversations and experiences recorded by Captain Krylov. Are there real differences of opinion in the Politburo? What are Stalin's relations with the Politburo, with the Army? How far is Soviet policy determined by Communist dialectic, and how far by Russian historical aspirations? What is the nature of dissidence in the Party and among the people?

The author begins his story in the spring of 1940. Germany and the Soviet Union had partitioned Poland, and all the Powers except the United States were sparring for the most advantageous positions in the imminent great war. Krylov, as a staff officer with experience as military attaché abroad, a knowledge of French, German, and English, and membership in the Party, enjoyed the sharing of information and misinformation which took place at embassy functions and within the Party elite. Voroshilov invited him to a conference. Marshal Shaposhnikov was his sponsor and hero. As aide to the latter he attended a Kremlin top-level meeting of Politburo and General Staff members, with Stalin presiding, to decide between Shaposhnikov and Budenny on battle strategy. Because of an indiscretion, he was reduced to the ranks. He fought at Poltava, was wounded, decorated with the Order of Lenin, and regained his commission and place in military and political planning. He participated in a "circle" of army officers working for a palace revolution which would substitute the army for Party dictatorship. As a result of wartime acquaintance with peasants, the Cossacks, the Ukrainians, and the Soviet intelligentsia, but particularly in consequence of his study of Russian history, Krylov's convictions led him to shift to another dissident group, which dreamed of a Russian republic with free elections and justice for all.

Stalin appears as a shrewd manipulator rather than as a personal dictator. He draws out the members of the Politburo, seeming to enjoy their personal antagonisms; then, with his secretary, he works out a resolution which constitutes a synthesis for general acceptance. More than once have we learned from "inside" stories that Stalin turns to religion at critical moments. Krylov reports that at the signing of the treaty with Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, Stalin said to Gavrilović, "We are brothers by blood and religion." As the party was breaking up, "Stalin went up to Gavrilović, shook him by the hand and then, before turning to go, made the sign

of the cross in the Orthodox manner . . . as though he were blessing the Yugoslav Minister."

When the war was at its height, the Soviet people became vocal in their hope that "everything will be different" with peace. They "expected political changes, the dissolution of the NKVD, free elections for the Supreme Council without intimidation by the local authorities, and the institution of a second party side by side with the Communist Party to get rid of the dictatorship. . . . Pamphlets were printed for civilian consumption explaining that 'the normal regime will consist of two parties: the Communist Party for the workers in the town, and a Peasant Party for the workers of the countryside.'" But, as victory drew near, the Communist Party resumed its grip, stifled free expression, astutely and mercilessly combined Communist dialectic method with Russian historical aspirations to set the stage for the greater conflict yet to come.

Most of the book is written in the form of conversation. This is a good style for enlivening, sharpening up, and personalizing the record, but it is of doubtful advantage in a field where accuracy is essential. Yet there is a ring of sincerity and authenticity throughout. Krylov's first hand reports on high level conversations are revealing, but his book is more valuable as the autobiography of a reasoning person in an unreasonable society. How many Krylovs are there in the Soviet Union today?

PAUL B. ANDERSON
International Committee of Y.M.C.A.
New York City

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

ZURCHER, ARNOLD J. (Ed.). ***Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II: An Examination of Significant Aspects of Postwar Public Law with Particular Reference to the New Constitutions of Western Europe.*** Pp. viii, 351. New York: New York University Press, 1951. $5.00.

This work is a symposium of timely contributions by specialists in their respective fields: Carl J. Friedrich, "The Political Theory of the New Democratic Constitutions"; Edward G. Lewis, "Electoral Changes after World War II" and "The Position of the Representative Legislature in the Postwar Constitutions"; Joseph Dunner, "Stabilization of the Cabinet System in Western Europe"; Ferdinand A. Hermens, "Local Autonomy in France and Italy" and "Functional Autonomy after World War II"; John Brown Mason, "Federalism—The Bonn Model"; Adam B. Ulam, "The British Commonwealth as an Example of a Multinational State System"; and Robert G. Neumann, "Constitutional Documents of East-Central Europe."

These contributions are treated by Karl Loewenstein to an engagingly piquant rationalization under the all-too-modest title, "Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age." Editor Zurcher's introduction constitutes an able survey of the contributors' special studies, including Professor Loewenstein's Reflections. The book concludes with the texts of the constitutions subject to study; the Statute of Westminster, 1931; Communiqué and Declaration of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference; the Statute of the Council of Europe; and a useful index.

Within the space allotted, only a few over-all observations are feasible. The conception that constitutions, particularly democratic versions, would prove to be the simple and infallible cure-all for the ills of nineteenth- and twentieth-century politically organized society has received a rude shock. The hope that progressive modifications of such constitutions, dictated by changing internal and international exigencies, would eventually produce a workable functional mechanism suitable for the realization of basic moral, social, and political principles, has not fared better. Such hope has given way to the disturbing discovery that the more one changes, the more one is forced to change—an inevitable price to pay for the unpredictability of men, democratic or otherwise.

Some of the contributors see the shortcomings of democratic constitutions and functional processes in the failure to meet

the problem of the modern democratic party state, the absence of agreement on party values, and the lack of social and moral unity in the community. The reviewer suggests that tackling the problems cited by the contributors requires in the last analysis a coming to grips with the lack of moral, social, and political values among the citizenry at large, from which individual membership in parties, parliaments, and public administration issues.

The terms "moral" and "values" are used, without definition, as applied by the contributors, presumably in the meaning of the golden rule.

JOHANNES MATTERN
The Johns Hopkins University

DUVERGER, MAURICE. *Les Partis Politiques.* Pp. x, 476. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1951. 100 fr.

In view of the importance of political parties in the contemporary world, astonishingly little is known about their internal structure, their comparative anatomy and the general principles that condition their development and influence. M. Duverger's book is an important pioneer work in this field. After a brief account of the historical origins of parties, he turns to the heart of the matter. His examination of structural problems, perhaps his most original contribution, includes the originating impulse, whether within or outside of the parliaments, the role of the inscribed members, militants, sympathizers, and voters, the ways of selecting the leaders, their power and relationship to the parties' parliamentary representatives. The second half of the volume deals with party systems, single, biparty, multiple-party, party alliances, and relationships with public opinion and governments. Numerous charts illustrate the text, and the conclusions are presented in a final chapter.

M. Duverger has an extraordinary knowledge of the political scene in many countries, overseas as well as in Europe. Examples shift with dizzy speed from one country or continent to another. Only the Far East and Spain are missing, while French experience is perhaps cited most frequently. Familiar with the technical literature in the important western languages, the author seems to have studied many problems at first hand and to have consulted the appropriate experts. Aware of the many gaps in his information, he repeatedly identifies his conclusions as tentative in character, and speaks of the development of a science of political parties in perhaps fifty years. That future researchers should ask the right questions is the most urgent need, and the author believes that he has formulated them.

These warnings notwithstanding, this book presents a remarkably integrated theory of parties, only one phase of which can be mentioned here. To say that M. Duverger regards the internal structure of parties as the key to all other problems would be unfair, for he attributes much influence to methods of voting (majority or proportional representation) and to party programs. But the trend of his thought lies definitely in that direction. In his opinion, the mass party, founded at the turn of the century by the Socialists, is here to stay with permanent local organizations of various types (including Communist cells and Fascist action squads) integrated vertically under powerful leadership. The United States is about the only exception. While all parties are oligarchical in character, they are becoming increasingly authoritarian under the influence of the mass parties. They form more than they reflect public opinion. M. Duverger nevertheless accepts the party system as indispensable and as justifiable. On the basis of the Turkish experience, he even sees the one-party system as an instrument of progress toward democracy in Asia but not in the Soviet Union where it has become a permanent organ of the state. In general, he values parties, not as an assurance of government "by the people and for the people" which he regards as impossible, but as a means of drawing leaders from the people.

E. MALCOLM CARROLL
Duke University

SCOTT, JOHN A. *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France, 1870–1914.* Pp. 209. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $3.00.

According to Dr. Scott, French republicanism has been characterized by its opposition to the monarchical principle as "irrational and archaic," by the secular spirit which pervades it, by political democracy in a national state, and finally by a "deep concern for the social question." "From the beginning," says Scott, "the word republic has represented to millions of Frenchmen a social as much as a political ideal" (p. 18).

Contrary to James Bryce, the author does not believe French Republican democracy sprang suddenly into being in the eighteenth century. It, he thinks, dates back as far as the Reformation, if not farther, and was the result of generations of struggle against absolutism. Except for some very brief mention of Fénelon, Pierre Bayle, and Jurieu, he makes no attempt to illustrate or prove this important point. Instead the major part of his 44-page introduction is taken up with an interesting discussion of the ideas of the French philosophers of the Enlightenment and of the Girondists and Jacobins so far as these apply to his theme.

The main part of the volume deals first with the republican theories of a nineteenth century Gironde, in two chapters dealing with Charles Renouvier and the philosophic liberals and with Émile Littré and republican sociology, and second with what are termed the Neo-Jacobins, this section likewise subdivided into two chapters—on Clemenceau and the Radical party and on Solidarité, an official philosophy.

Renouvier, says Dr. Scott, took the Girondist tradition of the eighteenth century, too narrowly political to suit the advancing times, and "developed it to meet the special problems raised by the coming of the industrial age" and early socialism.

Littré, while advancing liberal republicanism still farther by his philosophical writings and his membership in parliament, gave a practical bent to its existence. To him, it must rely on the liberal bourgeosie and the peasantry as against the extremes of the Right and the Left. To accomplish its purposes it must advance a policy of national education, social conciliation, and protection of peasant rights.

Perhaps Clemenceau, whose family was thoroughly Jacobin in background, with the family residence "cluttered with pictures of Robespierre, Saint-Just, and other great Jacobin heroes," is most interesting of all both in the vicissitudes of his career and in his personality. He was present in America at the end of the Civil War and in Paris during its siege and the Days of the Commune; he became the champion of popular rights and of the Republic in parliament, the leader of the radical group which held the parliamentary balance of power, first as the workers' spokesman in parliament, and then in fierce opposition to the workers' contention that war in 1914 would be a crime which they must unite to oppose, he strongly advocated *revanche* towards Germany and *rapprochement* with England; and finally he is distinguished by his role as indomitable war dictator in 1917.

In his ideals Clemenceau especially advanced the "concept of the Republic as a lay state." It never could be secure as long as state and church were officially combined. The church must be driven out of politics since in the past the state had been "submerged by successive waves of royalist and clerical reaction." Purged of the influence of royalists and of the church, France should enjoy a stable, democratic regime, while the carrying out of peaceful social reform should satisfy the proletariat and make future revolutions unnecessary.

This latter idea was in accord with Solidarité, the official philosophy founded by Alfred Fouillée and further developed by Léon Bourgeois. "The aim of Solidarité was not social equality, the abolition of capitalism, and the inauguration of socialism. Solidarité stressed the necessity of maintaining the existing bases of society, of making only those social concessions that would avert the danger of revolution" (p. 176). Neither, as Bourgeois saw it, was it state socialism as in Germany. "The state should not interfere in economic life to the extent of challenging or regulating the productive process or the employer-labor relationship" (p. 177). While avoiding both laissez-faire liberalism and revolutionary socialism" it provided a formula for the amelioration of glaring social abuses, while maintaining untouched the existing bases of capitalist society in private property and freedom of business enterprises" (p. 178). It became a philosophical guide for the leading republican intellectuals. It was taught in the schools, became the topic of many articles and speeches, and Solidarité was accepted in the assembly as the promoter of public assistance and social hygiene laws. It became by 1914 "the dominant philosophy of the Third Republic" (p. 179).

It may be said in conclusion that this volume of the Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law is well organized, well written, and thought provoking.

JAMES E. GILLESPIE
Pennsylvania State College

WIESE UND KAISERWALDAU, LEOPOLD MAX WALTER VON. *Gesellschaftliche Stände und Klassen.* Pp. 85. Bern, Switzerland: A. Francke, 1950. No price.

Dr. Leopold von Wiese of the University of Cologne, Germany, whose seventy-fifth birthday is being celebrated by his admirers in the field of social philosophy, gives in his recent study of functional and social classes an interesting insight into German scientific thought. In his brilliantly written book the problem of what determines class membership is historically developed.

Professor von Wiese begins with the "karnine" social system of Blut, where the functioning group is based upon blood ties —the period of Nomadism. Then he describes the "domine" social system of Boden (settlement on land) with its natural consequences of war and conquest, warrior and leader, slavery and serfdom—the period of feudalism. *Reiten und Rauben ist keine Schande; das tun die Besten im Lande.* To ride and to rob is no disgrace; it's done by the best in the land. This system of feudalism is followed by the institution of craft and merchant guilds, patriciate, and township in the "merzine" period of commerce. The ensuing Industrial Revolution produced the "artine" type through technology. The social hierarchy, based upon a differentiating system of values, especially of "individuation"—evaluation of the individual according to his qualifications, social heredity, and economic income, leading to *Klasse*—is historically preceded by the functional class of occupation and profession—*Stand*. The principal of individuation has been replaced in the European sphere of culture by the class struggle in Marxian sense between proletariat and proprietor, which, according to the author, eventually created a system of five classes: the impoverished; the labor class; the small capitalists; the well-to-do; and the plutocrats. Today, after the collapse of National-Socialism, Professor von Wiese sees six classes in Germany: the uprooted (some 15 million expellees, who cannot find a niche in *Klasse* or *Stand*); the old and disabled; the intellectuals; the laborers and employees; the small entrepreneurs and farmers; and the monopolists of coal, iron, textile, and chemical industry, who, however, do not represent the capitalists of the old style, but rather a kind of black or gray marketeers of scarce goods—a moral result of the national disaster.

His book ends with an interesting outlook into the future stratification of society. This last chapter must be especially provoking to a man who spent the first half of his life in German intellectual climate and thereafter has studied American social philosophy for more than a decade in this country.

Von Wiese's rejection of communism as a farce of classlessness and socialization of thought will be generally shared here. However it seems to this writer that the author's blueprint of an ideal society of the future is already reality in the United States today, even in view of much criticized exceptions. Von Wiese's general premise of social stratification is the assumption of hereditary inequality, biologically as well as socially, which consequently and inevitably leads to the hierarchy in social structure. In this connection he thinks of natural inequalities of talent, genes, of mental, emotional, and physical potentialities. As a distant goal, the author visualizes social freedom from limitations, selfishness, and enmities—equality on a higher level. The near goal should be a social

structure in which the different social levels come closer to each other through higher general culture and higher standard of living.

In order to understand von Wiese's argumentation, it should be remembered that deeply anchored in the German mind, historically conditioned in a feudal social order, along with heel clicking in the presence of a member of a "higher" class, is the conscious or subconscious thought that the "higher" class is the socially more valuable one. It is somewhat difficult to disregard the impression that the author is more a student of the French and the Bolshevist Revolutions than of the American Revolution of 1776. Because what are sketched by von Wiese as distant and near goals for an ideal society of the future have become or are in the process of being definite reality in this country. While even Great Britain had legal class privileges until 1945, privileged classes are legally unknown in the United States. The privileged class of nobility and aristocracy has been abolished in this country since 1776. The social distance between individuals here is recognizably smaller. The greater accessibility of the American of even highest functional class stems from the democratic attitude of equality. Even if it must be admitted that there exists a certain rigidity of spatial boundaries within the more intimate central regions of personality, exemplified in exclusive clubs, this could probably be explained as a form of feudalistic atavism.

Lloyd Warner's economic class structure is not identical with European class consciousness, an attitude which separates the proletarian from the capitalist, the poor from the rich. We do not have here class hatred of Marxian vintage between the representatives of the lower economic classes, who do not think of themselves as proletarians, and the lower upper and upper upper classes. There is no deep enmity between capital and labor in the United States, because the well-to-do do not represent a "ruling" class of capitalism in the sense of Marx. American capitalism is not scheming to "exploit" labor, because labor is its best customer in a predominantly domestic market. In Europe political power always has been and still is caste or class power. American government is not partisan. The Democratic party is not the party of the poor, and the Republicans are not the rich—the coal miners' boss Lewis is a Republican. American government has to defend the rights of labor as well as those of capital in order to remain in office. In spite of numerous exceptions, it is American tradition to chose the white man according to his ability rather than according to his pedigree.

Von Wiese's immediate goal of social structure, in which the different social levels would come closer to each other through higher general culture and standard of living, seems to have been achieved here through our high income and inheritance taxes which are closing more and more the gap between rich and poor, and through our vastly improving general educational system which lifts the individual to a higher cultural *niveau*. All the rich, according to the author's dream of a future society, should feel themselves as trustees of funds used in general and public interest. The numerous private foundations for research in our country are ample proof that these dreams are reality in the United States. Classlessness in von Wiese's opinion (page 82) is equivalent to communism. However our own tax and educational system seems to lead to a somewhat real classless society on that higher level von Wiese speaks of. But it certainly will not be communism.

Only once, in the last sentence of his book, is American culture mentioned—in a negative sense. It confirmed for this writer how little understood our social philosophy is in Germany.

ROBERT SCHARF
Georgia Institute of Technology

EINAUDI, MARIO, JEAN-MARIE DOMENACH, and ALDO GAROSCI. *Communism in Western Europe*. Pp. ix, 239. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951. $3.00.

This is a most useful piece of research on the political strategy and tactics, on the organization and strength, on the historical evolution, and on the present prospects of communism in what the authors insist on calling Western Europe, but which is actually only a part, though an important part of it—France and Italy. Neither the Low Countries, Western Germany, Switzerland, nor Austria is examined, not to speak of Great Britain and Scandinavia. This equation of France and Italy with Western Europe is not only a bit parochial but in the present context actually misleading, because it suggests that the conditions discussed in the book are typical of all of Western Europe, whereas in fact in other sections west of the Iron Curtain conditions are extremely different, and the reasons why this is so would merit careful comparison.

On the other hand, the authors are justified in lumping France and Italy together for the purpose of their present study, more so than was Einaudi in describing their constitutional systems together in the collective text on *Foreign Governments* edited by F. Morstein Marx, a feature wisely abandoned in its second edition. For, while the constitutional systems of the two countries are very different, their situation with regard to communism is indeed strikingly alike.

In the full and accurate analysis of this situation the book represents good workmanship of able political scientists, intent on facts first and interpretation next. Jean-Marie Domenach, member of the French Resistance and editor of a periodical dedicated to Catholic thought, presents the French Communist party in some 90 pages; Aldo Garosci, of the Italian "Justice and Freedom" movement, its Italian counterpart in about an equal space; while Mario Einaudi draws general conclusions in a fine 60-page introductory chapter.

Most illuminating are the precise details given on organization and tactics, especially on the cells and their efficient control from above through the inhibition of cross contacts among them; the flexible use of expansive and contractive methods; the simple devices applied in winning domination over other groups that have been allured into some joint front organization or bloc; and above all the analysis of the reasons why people of obviously non-Communist convictions have so generously given their votes to the Communist party in both countries, which they failed to do, for example, in Western Germany or Norway. The role played by trusted, and in the general sense of the term integer, personalities in Communist activities is well illustrated by sketches part caricature and part idealization, which are offered of the leading Communists.

Unfortunately, nonprofessional readers will not readily turn to a book like this which is both difficult to read and bare of sensational coloring. If they did, they would better understand what is going on this side of the Iron Curtain, what the dangers are of ignorance in dealing with an adversary like Communism, and the overpowering importance of positive rather than negative measures in the cold war.

ARNOLD BRECHT
New School for Social Research

GALENSON, WALTER. *The Danish System of Labor Relations*. Pp. xiii, 321. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $4.50.

Having written *Labor in Norway* and *Rival Unionism in the United States*, Galenson is well prepared to analyze comparative differences and similarities in labor movements. The uniqueness of Danish industrial relations appears in part to arise from such features of the Danish economy as great dependence upon international trade, high relative importance of agriculture, the predominance of small-scale industry, and the existence of a sizable entrepreneurial group. Also a spirit of corporatism in all economic matters, a product of the easy absorption of guild traditions in a country which experienced no sudden industrial revolution, has had a profound effect upon labor relations. The result has been two powerful organizations of labor and industry whose equals in strength probably cannot be found anywhere. Yet under a highly centralized collective bargaining system these two movements have been able to live in relative peace.

This Galenson accounts for upon the basis of an interesting set of institutional arrangements which have grown out of the so-called "September Agreement" of 1899 which ended a nationwide lockout at that

time. This agreement defined the position and acceptable tactics of the two groups. Over the years a system of voluntary collective bargaining and state mediators for the settlement of matters of interests and a system of arbitration boards and a labor court for deciding, and rigidly enforcing, matters of rights has been able to keep labor relations on a smoother basis than in such highly regarded "laboristic" states as Norway and Sweden.

Galenson find that Danish labor, while a part of a socialist movement which through coalition has controlled Denmark for several decades, has been far less interested in either socialism or economic planning than the English or other Scandinavian labor movements. Its interests have centered in collective bargaining and welfare state policies. Today Denmark spends a larger percentage of its national income for welfare services than any other state in the world. The labor movement has also been distinguished by a decided cleavage between skilled workers organized largely in compound craft unions and a general union of unskilled labor which has about 40 per cent of total union membership. While the labor movement over a half century does not appear, upon the basis of limited statistical evidence, to have altered the distribution of income between labor and other groups, it does appear to have narrowed wage differentials.

Pressure for higher wages, backed by political power, is beginning, however, in Galenson's estimation to develop some cracks in the collective bargaining system which cannot deliver the desired goods in an economy disrupted by one war and clouded by another. Direct political intervention by Parliament is increasing in labor dispute settlements, and this may augur ill for the continuance of the unique voluntary centralized collective bargaining structure that has been built up.

Meanwhile Danish labor, while hobbling economic mobility and productivity with a rigid apprenticeship system, has shown great interest in increasing production through joint labor-management committees. It has also shown at all times unswerving allegiance to democratic procedures. "If there is any nation that can peacefully adjust the social conflict arising from industrialization, with equal regard to the welfare of the individual citizen, whether he be worker, farmer, or business man, it is Denmark."

In my opinion this book is the best example to date of a study that not only describes the labor relations system of a country, but provides a significant economic analysis of it in terms both of its impact upon the workings of the economy and of the extent to which the movement itself is a product of the peculiar economic problems of the nation. A. MORGNER

Texas A. & M. College

OTHERS

ZINKIN, MAURICE. *Asia and the West.* Pp. xii, 300. London: Chatto & Windus (distributed in the United States by Institute of Pacific Relations), 1951. $3.50.

This lively book should be read by all who are interested in investment and trade in Asia, and in the problems that are created for investment and trade by the complicated political movements of Asia. The author was formerly a member of the Indian Civil Service and is now a representative in India of Unilever, a great British corporation that is active in many countries in both production and distribution. The introduction to the book is by Sir Geoffrey Heyworth, a director of Unilever.

There are some points in Mr. Zinkin's approach to the problems with which he deals that should be of special interest to Americans who are studying the same problems. Mr. Zinkin takes India as the geographical center from which he looks out at the rest of Asia, whereas the more usual American approach is through Japan or China. Mr. Zinkin was formerly an administrative officer of the greatest British imperial possession, and is now an executive of a great British corporation doing business in the same country, which has since become independent. This kind of combined experience is most exceptional in Americans writing about the problems of Asia.

Mr. Zinkin's Indian experience and knowledge give a special edge to his analyses of other countries in Asia; but unfortunately no one man can be equally authoritative about all the countries of Asia. The fact that therefore some of his opinions are decidedly open to challenge, because of insufficient knowledge, must however be offset against the fact that his opinions are always interesting, because he has an open, inquiring, and original mind.

For example, his statement that "it is very doubtful whether the Koreans were in the end any worse off because of Japanese rule" (p. 68) is certainly questionable; in fact, Mr. Zinkin himself provides the material for refuting this statement. With this statement may be contrasted the penetrating observation that politically British law and order in India "provided many of the concepts upon which the new free and liberal India is being developed," but that at the same time "economically it has been an almost unmitigated disaster" (p. 76).

Another statement that can be challenged is that "the most bankrupt countryside in Asia is the Chinese" (p. 111). It is this reviewer's opinion that the rural economy of India is more bankrupt than that of China.

Probably the most interesting statement in the whole book, coming from a representative of risk capital, is that Asia, "outside the Communist area . . . is moving Right at about the same pace as Western Europe, and for very similar reasons" (p. 287). OWEN LATTIMORE

Johns Hopkins University

COATES, W. P., and ZELDA K. COATES. *Soviets in Central Asia.* Pp. 288. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $4.75.

The authors of this book seem very close to the Soviet scene; in fact they are so close that not a critical word is mentioned regarding Soviet policy or the method by which it is implemented. Part I, the first third of the book, is a short historical sketch of a region which has a very long history. A short review of S. N. Tolstov's work on the Khwarzin Culture is new and of interest in understanding the background of Central Asia. However, the main purpose seems to be to set up a picture of desolation, slavery, exploitation, and poverty in order that one may be properly prepared for the sharp contrast of the beneficent Soviet regime. The people of Central Asia had domesticated most of the plants and animals used by the Western World long before any Russian was known in these parts. Also, agriculture and cities were as early here as at Sumer. How about the great achievements in ceramics and textiles? In the realm of ideas, Zoroaster is barely mentioned. The authors speak of liberation in 1917, but is it liberation to have the control of your country shifted from czarist to Soviet rule?

The latter two thirds of the book (Part II) is similar in content to the *Soviet Weekly* and the *Information Bulletin* of the Soviet embassy. All photographs are taken from these sources. The authors state that they were recently in Soviet Central Asia, but no dates were given nor any word indicating under whose auspices they were able to travel there. Obviously they could not photograph freely, or we might have had the treat of a fresh photograph. There is little doubt that some progress has been made under the U.S.S.R., but it is difficult to understand how the land has changed from one of poverty and slavery to milk and honey in a span of twenty-five years. The tone of the book is such as to imply that now Utopia has been reached. The description of achievements in large desert Kazakhstan is the same as in small mountainous Kirgizia and in each case tells that kindergartens, hospitals, and "houses of culture" are everywhere, and that all are working as one happy family.

The author's conclusion is an attempt to refute all argument that forced labor exists in the Soviet Union. To quote the final paragraph: "Forced labour could never produce such widespread feelings of pride and loyalty to their regime. It is only because the peoples of these republics feel themselves to be free and equal citizens with all others in their country, because they feel that they themselves are the masters of their destiny, that their work in the fields, mines and factories is work for themselves, their families and the good

of their own state, that they work with such enthusiasm, and that work in the U.S.S.R. is becoming more and more, in the words of the Turkmenian letter, 'a matter of honour, of glory, of valor and heroism.'"

Obviously, the many statistics in the book are official and must be assumed to be correct. The frequent mentioning of 8,000 kilowatt electric stations and 50,000-ton-capacity coal mines makes dull reading. In contrast to this favorable statistical picture the authors often say that "the sanitary conditions are very primitive but clean."

Soviets in Central Asia adds very little to what is already available in Soviet propaganda literature.

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RILEY, JOHN W., JR., and WILBUR SCHRAMM. *The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul, With Eyewitness Accounts.* Narratives translated by HUGH HEUNG-WU CYNN. Pp. xiv, 210. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951. $2.75.

This volume is a résumé of 90 dark days of terror when the Reds occupied Seoul, capital of the Republic of Korea.

The authors have set forth a realistic account of how the Reds moved into South Korea, not only with military weapons but with tons of leaflets, posters, propaganda materials, and complete dossiers on key Republic of Korea personnel marked for liquidation and of personnel trained to administer the municipal function of a large city.

The blueprint of Communist occupation shown includes a program which runs the gamut between the extremes of the "mailed fist" and the proverb, "One can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar." Thought control, propaganda of the big lie repeated through every medium of communication, attacks on the United States and on the former Republic of Korea, praise for the U.S.S.R., arrests, "voluntary" confessions, trials, executions, lootings, people's courts, cultural meetings, and indoctrinations kept everyone busy every minute of the day and night.

The Reds even attempted to impose a number of long-overdue improvement programs such as higher taxes on business, land reforms, and the giving of more rights to women. However, from their point of view, and they never once lost sight of it, the elimination of the "reactionaries" was their main purpose, and they strove to achieve this objective throughout the entire occupation.

Clearly written by two university professors, the members of an American team of experts, the manuscript contains (1) sufficient background material necessary to understand the occurring events as well as (2) translations from personal eyewitness accounts and experiences of eleven representative Korean Democrats who survived the occupation and who by their dramatic and exciting stories reveal what may be expected by free people who are marked for liquidation or who are a part of the Democratic forces when the Communists occupy a city.

The personal experiences include stories of (1) a congresswoman who writes: "That night in a cell I tried to commit suicide by tying a stocking around my neck, but at the point of tightening, I thought of my children—how could a mother of seven do away with herself? I put the stocking down"; and (2) a newspaper man speaking on the "lack of water treatment": "Once I saw an old man fold a piece of paper, make a cup of it and use it to drink his own water. . . . Later while hiding out, I could no longer stand the thirst. I remembered what I had seen the old man doing, and I, too, drank my own water"; and (3) a professor fleeing, after being marked for liquidation, who stated: "Even to my wife who came out to the gate, I did not turn my head but said simply, 'There is no telling when we will meet again. Maybe after a few days, maybe after a few years. Meanwhile we must survive.' Then I left my family, my house and library."

The foregoing accounts are sad, but the people never lost their staunch opposition to the Reds. It is also interesting to note that the South Koreans were learning the Russian language but did not know it. As a law professor stated: "what the word 'dawai' means or where it originated is not known. However, when Red Soldiers take away the thing that belongs to others, the civilians say that they have been 'dawaied'!" The Reds looted radios, pianos, furniture, equipment, and food under the "dawai" procedure both for home consumption and for shipment to North Korea.

The word "dawai" comes from the Russian language, and simply means "give," but when you say "dawai" it is with the force of authority similar to that of a hold-up bandit who is armed with two six-shooters to enforce his request.

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WISE, GEORGE S. *Caudillo: A Portrait of Antonio Guzmán Blanco.* Pp. xvii, 190. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. $3.00.

The inspiration for this little volume by Dr Wise is a happy one: to study the phenomenon of *caudillismo* as reflected in the career of a typical *caudillo*. The realization is less happy. Guzmán Blanco was Venezuela's best known *caudillo* and one of the more famous ones in all of Latin America. The author promises in his foreword that "We shall see that the various aspects of his rule and the conditions under which he ruled are integrally bound together . . . there are certain features in the rule of this caudillo that manifested themselves again and again in the history of other Latin American countries, and by a detailed analysis of his career we get a more intimate picture of the mechanisms involved than could have been attained by a broad comparative analysis of all or many caudillo regimes in Latin America."

After a treatment of Venezuelan colonial backgrounds and institutional development Dr. Wise discusses in four chapters the career of Guzmán Blanco himself. In four succeeding chapters he discusses the "aspects of a *caudillo* regime": ideological irresponsibility, the unqualified use of force, financial chicanery, and personalism. These chapters logically should provide the heart of the study, but that sort of organization inevitably provides a danger—one the author does not entirely succeed in avoiding—namely, that of repetition of what has already been said in the biographical chapters.

The volume contains no clear-cut working definition of either of the terms *caudillo* or *caudillismo*. In a case study of this highly important Latin American phenomenon and of one of such dramatic actors on the political stage that is a regrettable omission. If the author could have projected the elements which conditioned Guzmán Blanco's career into a general interpretation of *caudillismo* as a whole the study would have gained greatly in value.

Several instances of inaccurate or awkward translation occur. *"Derecho de gentes"* (p. 78) should properly be translated as "international law" rather than as "the rights of the people"; the word "colleges" (p. 83) would appear to have been translated from *colegios,* but that is a misleading translation; it is stated (p. 84) that a "decree created a national direction of primary instruction" but if the key word is translated from *dirección* it is again an infelicitous rendering; the author does not need to invert Guzmán Blanco's words (p. 166) and make him say: "the only one who can think am I, and the only one who does think am I."

We need more studies of *caudillos* and *caudillismo* if those leaders and that condition are properly to be understood. Unfortunately this volume, despite much useful information which it contains, does not give us the best sort of model.

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COON, CARLETON S. *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East.* Pp. viii, 376. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951. $5.00.

This valuable book by a professor of anthropology is a real vade mecum on the Middle East. It is informative and makes fascinating reading; above all, it is full of learning. It provides a convenient summary of life and culture in nearly all the countries touched by Arab civilization, or where Mohammedanism is the dominant religion.

The general course of the narrative is given in the form of "case studies." Such is the detailed description of the society in Fez, the life in a village (Khunik, in northeastern Iran), or the ways of the Bedouins (the Bedawis of the author) in Arabia. Throughout there is a heavy sprinkling of most recent information, in the text and in footnotes, on many phases of most ancient history. Professor Coon disclaims any attempt to be up to date (p. 342), but he is well aware of new archaeological discoveries and linguistic theories. The story of the rise and spread of Mohammedanism has been narrated many times by others, but its impact on the nomadic and seminomadic Arab is most vividly presented by the author. It was just the type of religion which millions in these vast areas adopted, one that did not disturb the prevailing equilibrium.

Perhaps the best parts of the book (Chapters 11, 13, and 15) deal with the unenviable lot of the poor, especially in Iran. There, and in many parts of the Middle East, no matter how hard a tenant farmer works, his income is never more than a fifth of the crop, and that is barely enough to keep him and his family alive. The solution of that most acute problem, the elimination of widespread poverty in relatively wealthy countries, is the paramount task of our age; it is becoming a categorical imperative.

It would seem perhaps unkind to find shortcomings in such a book, but it is incumbent on a reviewer to point out some of them. Professor Coon thinks that the Moslem civilization anticipated and aimed toward the realization of the "One World." His interpretation of Moslem culture and Moslem dogma places other religions, and especially the Christian religion, on a different level. This point of view is open to serious criticism, but this is not the place. It may be that Oxford (England) was a market town (p. 253) when Moslem universities were in full growth, but it is rather misleading to call certain schools of the Middle East in the Middle Ages universities.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST— ALONE OR WITH OTHERS?

Edited by

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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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PHILADELPHIA
1952

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FOREWORD

THIS volume of THE ANNALS contains the addresses delivered at the Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Academy, held on April 18 and 19, 1952, on the general topic: "The National Interest—Alone or With Others?" An article by Frederick L. Schuman in the March 1952 issue of THE ANNALS, entitled "International Ideals and the National Interest," relates to the same topic.

The concept of the national interest is now being subjected to careful re-examination and analysis in the light of the epochal changes that are occurring in the pattern of international society. This re-examination and analysis have probably been more searching and more broadly gauged than at any previous period; but, as the articles in this volume reveal, there is still a wide divergence of views on the nature of the national interest and on the desirable ways and means of reconciling conflicting national interests, both within a state and among states.

This concern with the national interest seems to reflect a growing maturity of approach in this country to questions of foreign policy. The opening remarks of the first speaker at the Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, called attention to this point. "The very fact that a society like The American Academy of Political and Social Science can organize a two-day meeting around the concept of the national interest of the United States," said Professor Morgenthau, "is significant in itself, for it shows the profound change which has come about in American thinking on matters of foreign policy."

The question posed at the Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Academy is, as Senator Sparkman declared, "a basic issue which the policy makers and all the American people must face squarely." We may assume as a matter of course that all loyal Americans sincerely desire to promote the national interests. Doubtless most of them are convinced that these interests can be advanced only "with others" and not "alone." But, as has been suggested, there are many views on the exact nature of the national interest in general and of national interests in particular problem situations. This latter point is a matter of everyday observation. It is reflected in all studies of the subject. Charles A. Beard documented it in his important study of *The Idea of National Interest,* published more than a decade and a half ago. Beard's own views of the national interest obviously did not coincide with those of Franklin D. Roosevelt, as even a casual examination of his bitter volumes on American foreign policy in the months prior to Pearl Harbor will show. The two distinguished members of the United States Congress whose addresses appear in this volume are united in their desire to further the national interests, but they are often far apart in their interpretations of specific policies of the Administration. It is quite clear that on this important question honest and able and patriotic men may profoundly disagree.

Beard advanced the thesis that two interpretations of the national interest were particularly meaningful in analyzing the basic trends and objectives of American foreign policy. These interpretations he called the Hamiltonian and the Jeffersonian. In the concluding paragraph of his book, *The Idea of National Interest,* he wrote:

"Evidently, then, the two inherited conceptions of national interest are in the process of fusion and dissolution. A new conception, with a positive core and

nebulous implications, is rising out of the past and is awaiting formulation at the hands of a statesman as competent and powerful as Hamilton or Jefferson."

No such statesman has yet appeared; perhaps even a Hamilton or a Jefferson would experience difficulty in formulating "a new conception" of the national interest in the present bewildering age.

It may well be, as some critics insist, that in recent years our leaders have not given adequate attention to the national interest. If conceived too narrowly, however, the concept may lead to policies which are dangerously self-centered and myopic. Somehow it must be related to ideals and principles, to considerations of the general welfare, and to a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind," to which the Declaration of Independence referred. "It is possible," as Professor Dexter Perkins has pointed out, "to sketch the history of American foreign policy in terms of principle, as well as in terms of interest, and it is necessary to bear in mind the fusion of these two factors in the actual evolution of policy" (*The Story of U. S. Foreign Policy*, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 90, November–December 1951, p. 4).

Diverse views of the interests of other countries are also presented in this volume. Nearly half of the authors are not Americans. It is a fact of more than passing significance that every one of the six continents is here represented. This is most appropriate and fitting, for other nations too are re-examining their national interests under present conditions of transition and change, and the national interest of every country in this interdependent world must be considered in a global setting and in relation to the interests and policies of other countries.

Recently in the United States the concept of the national interest has been examined most thoroughly by those who belong to what may be called the "realistic" school. The views of this school are reflected in the brilliant article in this volume by one of its leading representatives, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau. Dr. Abraham Feller's article is an equally brilliant criticism of these views, and a defense of the so-called "legalistic-moralistic" approach (an awkward term which George F. Kennan has made popular). Perhaps in no other single publication have both the "realistic" and the "legalistic-moralistic" approaches been presented so clearly and so effectively.

From an international as well as from a national point of view the concept of the national interest may lead into blind alleys if it is interpreted too narrowly. One might profitably examine the "paradox" mentioned by Dr. Charles B. Marshall, "that we can serve our national interest in these times only by a policy which transcends our national interest." In his forceful presentation of the need for European unity Paul-Henri Spaak declared: "It is in forgetting our so-called national interests that we shall be able to create and support . . . a western community." The similarity in viewpoint of a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the United States Department of State and of a leading champion of European unity is striking and suggestive.

On the whole we may conclude that the concept of the national interest provides a useful guide to foreign policy if it is conceived broadly and realistically. The articles in this volume reveal both the possibilities and the limitations of this approach. They also provide an impressive answer to the central question: "The national interest—alone or with others?"

NORMAN D. PALMER

What Is the National Interest of the United States?

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

THE very fact that a society like The American Academy of Political and Social Science can organize a two-day meeting around the concept of the national interest of the United States is significant in itself, for it shows the profound change which has come about in American thinking on matters of foreign policy.

A little less than forty years ago, one of the greatest of American statesmen, Woodrow Wilson, gave a speech at Mobile, Alabama in which he declared, "It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions." Woodrow Wilson, in thus speaking, echoed an opinion which was widespread in his time. Some decades earlier, Gladstone had propounded in Great Britain a similar philosophy in opposition to the policies of Disraeli. Few would be bold enough today to express in so uncompromising terms their disparagement of the national interest. Even so, we have still to cope with a philosophy, very much alive in our midst, which, while it recognizes the national interest and its importance, defines it in terms which take the heart out of the concept and out of the policies intended to support it.

From the very beginning of American history, two irreconcilable philosophies have struggled for predominance over the American mind. One prevailed during the Federalist period of American foreign policy, that is to say, roughly the first decade of American history, and its outstanding representative was Alexander Hamilton. The other conception of the national interest of the United States seems to be the exact opposite of that of the Federalist, and is represented by any number of individuals and policies in recent American history. Woodrow Wilson is the outstanding exponent of it.

THE FEDERALIST CONCEPTION

The Federalist conception of the American interest in foreign affairs was based on three presuppositions. The first was that the interest of the United States in international affairs was fundamentally different from those interests which European nations traditionally pursued. The Farewell Address of Washington is a clear example of this presupposition: the idea that the United States was an experiment in government unique in its essential aspects and that one of the main purposes of American foreign policy was to protect this experiment against encroachments by the traditional ways of the European nations.

This purpose leads to the second presupposition of the Federalist conception of foreign policy, and that is what one might call the isolation of the United States. However, this conception was not similar to that which was propounded by the isolationists of the 1920's and 1930's and is still being defended to a certain extent by the neo-isolationists of today. They believe that there exists something like a natural isolation of the United States from the rest of the world, an isolation which can best be preserved by abstention from an active foreign policy and by retreat into what is now called the "continental fortress" of the United States.

The Founding Fathers had a clear conception of the relationship between the isolation of the United States from the affairs of Europe and an active foreign policy to be pursued by the United States. With the Founding Fathers, the isolation of the United States was not a gift of nature to be preserved by doing nothing. It was rather the result of an intelligent and deliberate foreign policy to be achieved by hard thinking and hard work.

The third presupposition of the Federalists was that, in order to make the United States immune from foreign interference and, more particularly, from being drawn into the squabbles of Europe, its foreign policy had to be a policy of the balance of power. Men like Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, and even John Quincy Adams realized that the isolation of the United States was a mere function of the balance of power in Europe. They realized that only as long as the most powerful European nations were pitted against each other, unable therefore to cross the Atlantic for adventures in the Western Hemisphere, was the United States safe from European intervention and from being drawn into the conflicts of Europe.

THE NEWER CONCEPTION

The other conception of the national interest of the United States has developed since the Spanish-American War. In both its manifestations, it denies the intimate connection between the isolation, that is the security, of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and a discriminating active foreign policy with regard to the other nations of the world.

I implied that there are two manifestations of that conception. One may be called isolationism pure and simple, that is to say, not only a retreat from intervention in the affairs of other continents, but a retreat from an active foreign policy altogether. The other manifestation may be called isolationism turned inside out. It is unlimited, world-embracing interventionism. It is a policy which makes no distinction between the interests of the United States and the interests of other nations, and within the interests of the United States it refuses to recognize a hierarchy of objectives. For instance, it is in favor of collective security as a matter of principle, and hence feels constrained to intervene whenever the security of any nation, regardless of its relation to the concrete interests of the United States, is endangered.

This radical isolationism on the one hand and this radical interventionism on the other are two different manifestations of the self-same underlying philosophy of foreign policy that identifies the national interest of the United States with some worth-while conception of human welfare and certain abstract principles of universal morality. Both derive from a misunderstanding of the Federalist position. They share the Federalist concern about the United States' becoming involved in the conflicts of Europe, but they misunderstand the rationale of that concern.

For the Federalists, the ultimate objective of American policy, domestic and international, was the integrity of the American experiment; the isolation of the United States from conflicts outside the Western Hemisphere was a means to an end, to be replaced by other means if the conditions of American existence should so require. For the twentieth-century isolationists, intervention in non-American conflicts is bad in itself, never to be indulged in; for the twentieth-century interventionist, intervention is always good, never to be refrained from. Both erect the issue of isolation versus intervention into a contest between two abstract moral principles, and hence lose sight

of the subordination of the issue, so brilliantly conceived and practiced by the Federalists, to the interests of the United States conceived in terms of national security and the integrity of the American experiment.

Some of you will not be surprised when I say that I have little sympathy with this new conception of the national interest of the United States, and that I firmly believe in the truth of the Federalist conception. I see in the development of American thinking and American foreign policy since the end of World War II a groping toward the rediscovery of the eternal truths of foreign policy which the Federalists discovered and which later generations tended to neglect and discard.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT

Let me make some general remarks in defense of that realistic conception of the national interest to which I adhere. Certain typical arguments are being advanced time and again against this conception. I want here only to mention two of them. One is a moral argument, the argument to which Wilson referred in the speech which I have quoted. It runs about as follows: It is something base, something immoral, for a nation to put its own interests above the interests of other nations or above the interests of humanity. From this assumption the conclusion is frequently drawn that a natural harmony exists between the interests of the United States and the interests of humanity; that, in other words, whatever the United States proposes to do and actually does in foreign policy is necessarily good not only for the United States but also for mankind.

This is not only, it seems to me, an untrue conception which flies in the face of all the experiences of history; it is also a very dangerous one. It comes dangerously close to the chauvinism of fascism and communism, which have advanced exactly the same pretenses for themselves. In practical policies, it leads of necessity either to national suicide through inaction or else to that unlimited interventionism to which I have referred above. The isolationist who has been challenged beyond endurance by the facts of experience will find it hard to resist the feeling that we should wipe from the face of the earth the nations which refuse to recognize that identity of our own interests with the interests of humanity. This philosophy, then, culminates in the policy of unconditional surrender and in the conception of wars as crusades fought for unlimited goals and waged with unlimited means.

WORLD UNITY AND WORLD DIVISION

The other argument to which I want to address myself for a moment runs about as follows: It may have been correct that in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, or in even more backward centuries, concern wtih the interest of a particular nation was justifiable and necessary. However, in the mid-twentieth century, the interconnectedness of the interests of all nations has become so great that no nation can really stand alone and take care of its own interests without jeopardizing those very interests.

This conception obviously appears to be quite plausible on the face of it; for it is patently true that in view of the technological revolutions in the fields of communications, transportation, and warfare, the technical preconditions for the development of an international community are today much greater than in any previous period of history. I must, however, call attention to the contrast between those technological potentialities, on the one hand, and the moral and political reality, on the other. For while this is, technologically speak-

ing, potentially one world, in actuality, from a moral and political point of view, never in the history of western civilization was the world, at least the politically active world, so divided as at present.

In times past, foreign policy always operated within a generally accepted framework of moral values and ways of life common to all the participants in the struggle for power. Today the two main power centers in the world, Washington and Moscow, are also the centers of two antagonistic political philosophies which have a tendency to transform themselves into political religions. These two power centers profess and act upon two incompatible conceptions of human nature, of society, and of government, and have found it at times hard to resist the temptation to try to make the world over in the image of these conceptions. Thus, while technologically speaking this is potentially one world, morally and politically speaking we live in a world which is separated by a deep and wide abyss from the other world behind the Iron Curtain.

THE ESSENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY

In such a situation it is vain to try to draw certain political or moral conclusions from technological potentialities; for in truth the essence of foreign policy has remained what it has always been, even though its manifestations have greatly changed. As John Quincy Adams put it, "I do not recollect any change in policy; but there has been a great change in circumstances."

This is as true today as it was then, and it has been true throughout history. The basic problems of foreign policy have remained what they were in ancient Greece and what they were in the Middle Ages and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. What has changed are the manifestations of those problems, the circumstances under which we must meet those perennial problems of foreign policy. It therefore follows that, despite the profound changes which have occurred in the world, it still remains true, as it has always been true, that a nation confronted with the hostile aspirations of other nations has one prime obligation—to take care of its own interests. The moral justification for this prime duty of all nations —for it is not only a moral right but also a moral obligation—arises from the fact that if this particular nation does not take care of its interests, nobody else will. Hence the counsel that we ought to subordinate our national interests to some other standard is unworthy of a nation great in human civilization. A nation which would take that counsel and act consistently on it would commit suicide and become the prey and victim of other nations which know how to take care of their interests.

BASIC INTERESTS OF UNITED STATES

Let me then say a word about what, in concrete terms, the perennial national interests of the United States have been —what have, from the beginning of its history, been its unchanging interests that were pursued in different periods of history with different methods because the circumstances changed under which they had to be pursued. It seems to me that from the beginning of American history there have been two basic objectives which have determined the thoughts and actions of American statesmen.

Position in Western Hemisphere

There was, first of all, the security of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. At the very beginning of American history the situation of the United States was precarious, surrounded as it was by the outposts of great European powers; and so the security of the United States became necessarily the prime objective which American foreign policy had to pursue, the prime interest which it had to protect and promote. But even when, after the initial period, those immediate dangers passed, the United States still remained vitally concerned with its position in the Western Hemisphere. As the power of the United States grew and as it developed into predominance in the Western Hemisphere, unchallengeable from within, this concern with security was supplemented by concern with the preservation of American predominance. The Monroe Doctrine and, more particularly, the subsequent interpretations and political and military manifestations of that doctrine are the expression of this development of American concern from mere security to the safeguarding of American predominance.

European balance of power

This first concern leads with logical necessity to the second one, which is the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. The United States was quick to realize that its security and predominance could not be challenged from within the Western Hemisphere. There was no nation in the Western Hemisphere, either to the north or the south, which, either alone or in combination with other American nations, could think of challenging successfully the predominant position of the United States. A danger to that position could arise only if and when an American nation would make common cause with a non-American nation for the purpose of challenging the United States. Thus the security of the United States in the Western Hemisphere was clearly recognized to depend upon conditions prevailing outside that hemisphere. Here we are again in the presence of the American concern for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, which is indeed the second great perennial concern of the United States in foreign affairs.

As long as there existed in Europe a multiplicity of nations of approximately equal strength, those nations had their hands full in defending themselves against their rivals on the European Continent. They had no possibility of making common cause with a Latin American nation for the purpose of challenging the predominant position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. But if one great power would arise to a paramount position on the European Continent, such as the Germany of William II or of Hitler, or as the Soviet Union today, then such a nation, imperialistic in its policies and unchallengeable in its power from within Europe, could and was likely to embark upon adventures beyond the seas. There lay the great prize of the United States, almost irresistibly tempting to the would-be world conqueror, with all its wealth and power—and all its friendless isolation.

It is for this reason that the United States has always opposed the imperialism of those European nations which were most likely to be successful in their imperialistic designs if the United States did not oppose them. During the Napoleonic Wars, even so idealistic a statesman and thinker as Thomas Jefferson used to shift his sympathies in accordance with the shifts in the balance of power. Whenever Great Britain seemed to win over Napoleon, he wished for the victory of Napoleon; and whenever Napoleon seemed to win over Great Britain, he thought that after all Great Britain was not so bad as he had thought her to be. Our interventions in the First and Second World Wars, whatever their moralistic and idealistic justifications may have been, had their firm basis in the national interest of the United States in seeing the balance of power in Europe pre-

served, or, in case of its disturbance, in seeing it restored.

It seems to me that today, too, in our policy of containing the Soviet Union, in our policies of rearming ourselves and our allies, especially those in western Europe, we follow, even though with different concrete applications, the basic conception of the national interest of the United States as it was developed in the initial period of American history. That is to say, we feel that we cannot tolerate the subjugation of all Europe under one power which then will be free to look beyond the Atlantic for further conquests and adventures. And so we again embark upon an attempt to restore the balance of power in Europe, which this time is more radically disturbed than ever before.

Asiatic balance of power

The third basic interest which the United States has in the world is of newer date than the two I have mentioned so far. It concerns the balance of power in Asia. While the principle of the open door in China originally had a merely commercial connotation, certainly since the turn of the century it has been interpreted in primarily political and military terms. The intervention of Theodore Roosevelt in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the policies of Stimson, however ineffective, after the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931—they all had as their rationale the conviction that the security of the United States would be endangered if a great power, Asiatic or European, controlled all of China or a considerable part of it. The catastrophe which has befallen our policies in Asia through the transformation of China from an ally of the United States into an ally of the Soviet Union can be measured by the perennial and fundamental character of our interest in maintaining the balance of power in Asia; for in Asia the balance of power has been destroyed and there is no rational way noticeable at present to restore it short of war.

THE RATIONAL VIEWPOINT

Those are, in necessarily brief outline, the general aspects of the national interests of the United States as I see them. I have said that no moral argument can be presented against a foreign policy which is based upon consideration of the national interest. Let me say now a word in conclusion about the intellectual and political aspects of that problem.

It seems to me that from a merely intellectual, from a rational, point of view, no nation can have a sure guide as to what it must do and what it need not do in foreign policy without accepting the national interest as that guide. One of the great weaknesses of American foreign policy in recent decades has been its inability to follow consistently certain standards of action and judgment in its conduct of foreign affairs. We were against Italy because of its aggression against Ethiopia, but we were against Franco because of his fascism. We seemed to like Mussolini because he made the trains run on time, but when he made an alliance with Hitler we did not like him any more. We did not like Stalin either; but when he was attacked by Germany and was defeating the German armies, we thought he was a somewhat uncouth democrat, essentially not so different from ourselves; and finally we turned around full circle, and regard him now as the incarnation of all evil.

It seems to me this stumbling from one extreme to the other, this inability to steer a clear course in foreign affairs, undisturbed by emotional preferences, results from the lack of recognition of the national interest as the only standard for judgment and action available to a great nation if it wants to pursue a successful and rational foreign policy. So from all points of view I conclude that there is no other standard of action and of judgment, moral and intellectual, to which a great nation can repair, than the national interest.

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Foundations of Current American Foreign Policy

By John Sparkman

THE general topic under discussion —"The National Interest—Alone or With Others?"—is a basic issue which the policy makers and all the American people must face squarely. It is basic because, once faced and once decided, it is not an issue which can be redecided each passing day or by each session of Congress. To try to do so would be to negate the value of the decision—whichever way it went. Secretary Acheson once remarked that a gardener does not pull up his flowers each morning to inspect the roots.

I should have hoped that this issue of "Alone or With Others" or, if you will, "Isolationism versus Internationalism" had been decided some years ago. I should have thought that America's experience in two world wars had forever disabused us of the notion of isolationism. I should have thought that our enthusiastic commitment to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Rio Pact for defense of the hemisphere, and the Mutual Defense Pacts with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan revealed a clear decision on our part. I should have thought that the dollars and the manpower we have expended since World War II in the Greek-Turkish Aid Plan, the Marshall Plan, the Military Defense Assistance Program, and Point Four had furnished proof positive of our firm intention to carry out that decision.

Our Place as World Leader

You will not be surprised to hear that I am a supporter of the fundamentals of our present foreign policy. This does not mean that I approve everything done by the State Department in conducting that policy, nor does it mean that I lack a lively sense of things left undone. But with respect to broad objectives, I believe that our national interest is served by American leadership in building collective security and in looking to basic human rights in a world still showing the scars of two world wars.

When I say leadership, I mean just that—not grudging gestures, but wholehearted dedication to the recovery of mankind and to clearing the way to new plateaus of well-being for all peoples. Our strength puts us in the vanguard. That is our destiny. We must live up to it. I can understand the chagrin of isolationists among us. "Men are not flattered," said Abraham Lincoln, "by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them."

John Hay described our foreign policy as consisting of the Monroe Doctrine and the Sermon on the Mount. That may have seemed sufficient fifty years ago, but it is hardly adequate today. As a matter of fact, Hay's definition was already obsolescent when he made it. It went out of the window when we got into the Spanish War in 1898. We left the monastery of self-containment in world affairs when we acquired the Philippines.

Speaking at Reno, Nevada, during his tragic cross-country crusade for the League of Nations in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson referred to German orders picked up during the fighting, the purport of which was, "Do not let the Americans capture such and such a post, because if they ever get there you

can never get them out." Wilson declared:

> The Americans were under the impression that they had come there to stay, and I am under that impression about American political purposes. I am under the impression that we have come to the place where we got in order to stay. . . . We are going to stay in. We are going to see this thing finished because that is the only possibility of peace; and the world not only desires peace but it must have it.

Wilson was proved wrong about America's intention after World War I. But today, at long last, Wilson's vision is being given form and substance. We are now engaged in proving that, having entered the partnership of free peoples the world over, we intend to stay.

But mere staying is not enough. We must at the same time be as effective as possible. And here we face dilemma heaped upon dilemma. We face the criticisms of experts who question America's capacity to conduct a skillful foreign policy. Dr. Hans Morgenthau has written a book in which he develops the thesis that our foreign policy has worked against the national interest because it is too sentimental and moralistic for the requirements of *realpolitik*. George Kennan has written a book in which he contends that our diplomacy is hampered because sentimentalism and moralism shape the decisions in the kind of democracy we have.

I do not share the pessimism of these experts. I see no clash between a wise idealism and the facts of international relations. I believe that the American system, despite its flaws, is still the best arrangement yet devised to enlarge the scope of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all men. Conceivably, a public opinion which is not so well informed as it might be can intrude harmfully on the shaping of foreign policy. Conceivably, grave and revered members on Capitol Hill can and do throw their weight around with unfortunate results. But I do not despair because of these mishaps. I feel that, just as running water purifies itself, so operative democracy cures its own mistakes. I am for the right admixture of spirit and letter, hope and method, in diplomacy, as in every other human activity.

Need for Patience

I believe the truth is mighty and will prevail—ultimately—if only we add patience to good will and understanding. We Americans are disposed to swift solutions. We are not gradualists. We give first place to the success which is quickly won. That tendency will not help us if it becomes markedly reflected in our foreign policy. It will not help us as we face the long pull of withstanding the Soviet challenge. On this score, Queen Juliana of the Netherlands recently brought us advice which we should take to heart. In her New York speech of April 7 she said:

> One of our western weaknesses is our underrating the value of the factor of time. Of course, acting quickly on the spot is right—in all those cases where one is sure of what one does. But rash and ill-considered action is often wrong. In the terrible hurry in which we live today we are constantly tempted to take rash decisions. A hasty action is dangerous, and forcing a situation is always wrong. Let us take time and cultivate patience and yet always be on the alert.

This is good doctrine for Americans. We have taken our own good intentions so much for granted that we sometimes forget the feelings of the other person. We are prone to forget that what counts is not merely the good purpose we have in mind, but the way in which we press it, the consideration we show to others, the impression we make. That failure

to put ourselves in the other person's place can count against us severely.

NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY

Queen Juliana has given us an inkling of how others see us with respect to one phase of our temperament and policy. Let me suggest another field in which we may be erring. A certain rigidity seems to have set in in our attitude toward the Soviet Union. There is danger of our substituting inflexibility for firmness.

This dilemma is posed acutely in western Europe. The steps taken by the western powers to solidify themselves against the Russian menace are of historic importance. At long last, Europe is giving up its divisiveness. Old jealousies are fading out by reason of a new approach to political, social, and economic values. Western Germany is to become part of the European defense community by contributing, under safeguards, to a supranational army. Western Germany is to have an equal and responsible status within the European community.

This growing cohesiveness of Europe has upset the Soviet apple cart. The Soviet Union wants a divided Europe. She has done everything in her power to keep Germany from regaining unity and stability. Now, completely reversing herself, the Soviet Union proposes a peace treaty providing for a reunited, unoccupied Germany, having its own army, producing its own war matériel, enjoying complete independence except that it is to be pledged to neutrality. To this proposal the Allies have responded with a note which in effect demands proof of good faith before we consider negotiations.

I think the Allied note is justified, but it must not be construed as slamming the door. The last thing we can afford to do is to let the rest of the world conclude that we are not ready to negotiate and to keep on negotiating in the pursuit of peace. The last thing we can afford to do is to spread the impression that we are thinking of armed strength as the only solution for the world's troubles. Yet that is the very conclusion which the peoples of Europe and Asia may reach unless we offer strong proof to the contrary. There is widespread sentiment abroad that America is emphasizing military power too strongly at the expense of other forms of security. This accounts in part for the growth of Bevanism in England and for the continuance of neutralism on the Continent. Bevan is arguing that the Soviet Union is not so great a threat as to justify expenditures on rearming which undermine social services. He maintains that the United States has been gripped by a militarism that threatens to become dangerous.

The outcries of the Bevanites and the other neutralists of Europe should not weaken our firmness of purpose, but we should make doubly sure that our true purpose is known. The one thing we must avoid is the appearance of inflexibility. We must not permit our friends or our critics abroad to believe that America is relying on armed strength as the sole cure for the world's ailments. We ourselves know that we seek peace second only to freedom. Yet we stand in danger of allowing the Soviet Union to gain the title of the true promoter of peace.

APPLICATION OF POINT FOUR

I believe it is vitally important that we stress the positive weapons in our foreign policy arsenal as well as the negative. A modern tank costs a great deal more money than a modern plow. The sum of our expenditures for military defense of ourselves and our allies must of necessity be infinitely larger than the total cost of Point Four. It must take more time in congressional

debate, capture more of the newspaper headlines, consume more of the nation's industrial effort. Yet, who can say with certainty which is more important for the long run? The tank, the gun, the jet fighter, that we build today we hope will some day be relegated to the junk heap; the tractor, the plane spreading DDT to combat malaria, we hope will start a chain reaction leading the peoples of the underdeveloped countries along the peaceful road to progress.

Because our purpose is peace, we must not allow the implements of war to hypnotize us. We are convinced that military preparedness is essential to the maintenance of peace as long as potential aggression holds the world in terror. But surely we can be single-minded in this conviction without having a single-track mind. We must not fail to emphasize our affirmative faith in man—our belief that all men, whatever handicaps they have borne in the past, are capable of rising to higher things.

In Point Four we are confronted with a great need for discretion in administering our programs. We must make sure that technical assistance does not mean that a bad social and political structure is maintained with our acquiescence and approval. That point was made by Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister to the United States, at a recent conference in Washington. He warned against a deepening of social and economic injustice "where it has been wreaking havoc for centuries." Dr. Malik asked, "What are the limits for urging real reforms?" and answered, "If there is real concern, ways and means will always be found for pushing those limits beyond any assigned point."

Later, at the same meeting, Mr. Justice Douglas carried the argument further. He contended that if Point Four is to be meaningful to the people for whose benefit it is intended, something will have to be done to assure social and economic changes. Justice Douglas even suggested that we encourage peasant revolts. I would not go so far as my friend, Justice Douglas, on that point. But I do believe we can be more effective than we have been in making certain that our aid gets down to the levels where it will do some good. Frankly, I am worried about the frequent charges that our aid has merely served to make the few rich ones richer and the many poor ones no better off.

It is a delicate business, of course, to try to impose our will and outlook on other peoples. But there is a difference between imposing our will and making clear our faith. To quote Dr. Malik again,

> Communism in Asia challenges the West to bring forth its *own* faith. Asians and Communists have every right to ask: But what do these people believe, what do they stand for, what are they after, what do they live by, *who are they?* Let the West answer!

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Are Our Present Foreign Policies Promoting Our National Interests?

By John M. Vorys

I AM under a considerable handicap in discussing my topic.

In the first place I once thought I knew what our national interests were; but after reading some of the writings of some of our political scientists, I have concluded that if they understand our interests, I do not. I have heard definitions from certain State Department people and others that amount to about this: Our national interests consist of carrying on our foreign policies. If this is correct, then of course our policies promote our interests, and our interests promote our policies. I think this is not correct.

In the second place, there is so much secrecy and confusion and change going on concerning some of our present foreign policies that I am not sure what they are.

Should the Question Be Raised?

In the next place, the question arises as to whether, in a time of crisis like this, any good American should question whether our policies are promoting the national interests.

One day during the United Nations Assembly last winter in Paris I heard Mr. Vyshinsky read from remarks I had made on the floor of Congress and in Foreign Affairs Committee hearings, and then proceed to make a very villainous and distorted comment on what I had said. Everything we say or do here is grist for the Soviet propaganda mill. This is often used to discourage critical discussion of our foreign policies. There is strong propaganda going on in this country for unity behind our present foreign policy, and the President has said that any discussion of foreign policies in this year's campaign is playing politics.

I know from experience, however, that no matter what we say or fail to say, the Soviets will use our words or silences to suit their own purposes, with appropriate distortions. I know also that unity for the sake of unity may be disastrous. History is strewn with nations that were united, but in the wrong course. I think we need to discover, if possible, and then to discuss our foreign policies this year in the light of our national interests. We should be patriotically temperate and sensible in what we say, bearing in mind that the Soviets and the rest of the world are listening, but there are certain advantages, as well as embarrassments, in carrying on our foreign affairs in a goldfish bowl of public discussion. This tends to prevent the double talk, double dealing, and deceit that go with the old-fashioned Machiavellian balance-of-power diplomacy that is coming into style again with some of our policy planners and their apologists and adherents.

A Minority Viewpoint

I have no authority and no desire to represent my party or anyone but myself in what I say. I am not going to make a stump speech. I am not a political science expert. I confess that I have heard people say that much that is labeled political science is neither good politics nor sound science. I speak merely as a congressman, a practitioner of the art of the possible, a minority member who has labored long and hard

in bipartisan and unpartisan efforts to help write laws involving our foreign policies. I can thus claim a degree of familiarity with certain policies, and a degree of detachment in assessing the results.

On this basis, many of the things we are doing are things that need to be done now. I will help to get them done in so far as Congress is involved. In this connection, there may be workers in factories and professors in colleges who are, like me, members of the minority. The worker thinks he is in a great plant, but disapproves of the present management and feels that it is responsible for turning out an inferior product. He uses his influence to change the management, but meanwhile does his best toward getting out the best product possible under the circumstances. The professor thinks he is in a great institution, but disapproves of the college administration. He will take such steps as he can to change the administration, but meanwhile he will do the best he can in his classes. Such workers, such professors, will sympathize with me in my work in Washington! In general, the net over-all answer to our question is, Our present foreign policies are not promoting our national interests, because of management trouble. But we must all do the best we can until we can change the management.

Our Foreign Policy Outlined

Now we come to the guessing game; what is our foreign policy? Here is the official answer from a pamphlet by the State Department, with a foreword by President Truman, followed by his picture. It is labeled *Our Foreign Policy 1952*, and on the cover is a photograph, not of Secretary Acheson and some diplomats or planners, but of a crowd of good American citizens, men and women, young and old, rich and poor, colored and white. Here are the official "Roots of our Foreign Policy" from page 6:

> Policies are the courses of action taken by a nation in the interests of the welfare of its people. . . .
>
> We are an independent nation, and we want to keep our independence.
>
> We attach the highest importance to individual freedom, and we mean to keep our freedom.
>
> We are a peaceful people, and we want to see the time when war and the threat of war are abandoned as instruments of policy by all nations.
>
> We are a friendly people. We have no traditional "enemies." We want to settle our differences with other peoples as "good neighbors."
>
> We believe in justice. A peace based on justice is the only peace which can endure.

These are noble words. We can all agree. The pamphlet says, "It is the job of government . . . to promote these national interests." Here we have it all—foreign policy, national interests. The trouble is that any connection between these words and the facts of life, what we are facing and what we are doing about it, is purely coincidental. In discussing foreign policies we are not talking about campaign pamphlets or paragraphs in state papers, but a moving picture; not just words, but action —"courses of action," as the pamphlet says. A modern football coach, after a game, runs through the movies of the game with his team and stops the film from time to time to criticize the plays. The stopping is helpful, but only if the players have seen what happened before. We can understand our present foreign policy only by watching it in action for a while.

Our Postwar Record

We are the richest, most powerful nation on earth, with nearly half of the

world's income. Seven years ago we won two wars at once, had a mighty army, the greatest air force and navy in the world, and exclusive possession of the A-bomb. We then reconverted from a war economy without a hitch. We had poured out $57 billion in foreign aid. The Soviet Union had been nearly defeated and was prostrate. The United Nations was founded on American soil. We were on the way, the leader of the world, and for the first time the world had a leader that had not sought leadership and wanted nothing out of it except peace.

Today, seven years later, let us stop the film. After pouring out over $30 billion more in foreign aid, we are in war and rearming desperately in preparation for more war, with the highest peacetime tax burden in history, with our economy subject to hated and ineffective controls; Britain, our so-called most reliable ally, is isolating herself from our efforts toward unity in Europe, and opposing our policies in Asia; western Europe, where we have spent the most money, has not yet taken steps toward that unity that Europe needs in war or peace; our prestige is at a new low in Asia and the Middle East. Certainly anyone who would say that our national interests have been promoted in these seven postwar years would have to answer the question, Promoted from what to what?

Is it fair to pass judgment on such a basis? I think that is the only sensible way to do it—the empirical test of results. Foreign policy courses of action involve a great deal of military and diplomatic secrecy. Congress does not know all that is going on. In congressional hearings dealing with foreign policy, such as on foreign aid, much of the testimony is secret, so neither the public nor all members of Congress know what courses of action have been taken or are intended. When the Executive asks for and receives power and money on such a basis, results are what count. Those who ask authority for action for secret reasons must assume public responsibility for the results of action.

But it will be said that at least we are not in all-out war with the Soviet Union, and that is in our national interest, on the plus side of our balance sheet. I agree, and we must continue courses of action designed to maintain that position. Our people have long recognized the grim and deadly nature of the world-wide Communist threat, and have been willing to take all necessary steps to meet that threat.

In view of this widespread sentiment in the United States, in view of the money and powers granted the Executive for diplomatic and military purposes, in view of our commanding position at the end of World War II, why do we find ourselves in our present situation? Here are some of the reasons:

THE GREAT DESIGN—SOVIET APPEASEMENT

1. The fundamental foreign-policy failure of the Executive has been the long failure to assess the Soviet threat and the way to meet it. Instead of implementing the instinctive suspicions of the American people, the "great design" of the Executive was to woo the Soviets, to secure their good will, to remove their suspicions of us. We required no commitments when we poured lend-lease supplies into the Soviet Union during World War II. Instead of attacking the "soft underbelly" of Europe, thus placing our forces in position to protect western Europe from Communism, we launched our second front as Stalin desired. We held off from taking Berlin and Vienna; we agreed at Potsdam to an isolated Berlin without an agreed corridor.

This "great design," implemented at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, continued at San Francisco when the United Nations was founded. Alger Hiss, as Secretary General, was executing official American foreign policy when he helped to form the Charter as the Soviet Union desired.

It is now the style to blame Congress for our rapid demobilization in 1945–46. With Germany and Japan defeated, there was no need then for large American armed forces, in view of the appeasement policy of the Executive toward the Soviet Union.

At late long last came the realization that our "great design" fitted perfectly into the Soviet "great design" to communize the world, and we started to change our course of action; but by that time the State Department had become infiltrated with those who still believed in the Communist "great design."

TARDINESS IN MILITARY AID

2. When, belatedly, the administration realized that kindness to Communism was not working, it still did not realize the importance of arming ourselves or others. Even after the so-called Truman Doctrine was announced and promptly implemented in the Eightieth Congress by the Greek-Turkish Aid Act, the administration was reluctant to use anything except economic aid.

The European Recovery Program was enacted by the Eightieth Congress. I was sort of House floor manager. I attempted to secure administration approval for military aid to Europe, without success. On March 17, 1948 the President was to come to Congress for a foreign policy address. I had prepared a draft provision authorizing military aid to Europe, feeling that by furnishing economic aid alone we might be merely developing a richer prize for Stalin to take over. The White House sent word that the President would come from the joint session to our committee to confer immediately after his address. Our committee assembled promptly after the speech and, after waiting twenty minutes, found out from a reporter that the President had left for New York for a St. Patrick's Day speech. I have never learned the reason for the appointment or the failure to keep it, but I could get no one to support military aid to Europe then, so it was dropped.

Military aid for China in 1948 was provided by Congress over administration resistance, and was delayed eight months in delivery. Finally, in 1949, $150,000,000 economic aid for Korea was proposed, with no military aid at all, just as our troops were withdrawing.

Now military aid to other nations has been a highly controversial issue, with bipartisan support and bipartisan opposition; but two points are clear: (1) no military aid bill has ever been turned down by Congress; and (2) requests from the Executive for such aid have been slow—tardy I believe; and delivery of such aid to other countries has been slow—in certain cases, disastrously tardy. This is true in China; in Korea, where military aid voted in October 1949 did not reach Korea before the attack in June 1950; and in Europe, where less than one-tenth of the aid voted by Congress has been delivered, and Europeans and American officers in SHAPE have asked me "When is the United States going to send the arms it promised? There are men here ready to be called to the colors, as soon as the promised arms for them arrive."

When the charge is made that this routine tardiness, this course of *in*action, is a deliberate policy, the defense is that it is merely a breakdown in execution of policy. Certainly the practice does not promote our interests.

PREOCCUPATION WITH EUROPE

3. For fifteen years our policy makers have been obsessed with the importance of Europe and have failed to understand the importance of Asia. In 1939 President Roosevelt was refusing to label the Japanese aggression in China as war and referring to it as "the Japanese incident," for fear that he would have to invoke our embargo law. In 1941 we were attacked, not from Europe but by Japan at Pearl Harbor.

After the war we poured relief into Europe; but it required congressional action over administration opposition to include China in the Interim Aid Act of 1947. Meanwhile, the misguided Marshall mission was attempting to force coalition between the free Chinese and the Communists. In 1948 military aid and advice to China was delayed and military guidance was refused. In 1949 the "dust-settling" policy was justified in a White Paper that laid all the blame on our faithful ally, China, and its Chief of State, Chiang Kai-shek. We can stomach Tito in Europe, and have aided various governments that were corrupt and inefficient; but in China we made a whipping boy of Chiang in state papers, as a matter of policy. In Asia, instead of seeking ways to win, we have had a policy of seeking excuses for failure.

This preoccupation with Europe is demonstrated in words and dollars. In his State of the Union Message in 1951, President Truman said, "The defense of Europe is the basis for the defense of the whole free world—ourselves included." European nations heard that, and the reaction was, "If you have to defend yourself in Europe, Uncle Sam, go ahead—we will help." Asiatic nations heard that, and realized that they were second rate. As a cold-blooded matter of national interest, the military defense of Europe or any other place outside our hemisphere is important to us, but not vital. We could live if those places fell. If we made this clear, we might do better in stimulating defense action elsewhere.

This European preoccupation is shown in dollars. The Mutual Security Request for this year is $5.964 billion for Europe including $1.819 billion for economic aid, and $1.936 billion for the rest of the world—the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the American republics—including $655 million for economic aid. Europe, with the highest standard of living next to ours, gets nearly three times as much standard-of-living support as the rest of the world.

Europe has had a four-year recovery plan, financed by us, which should end this year. It was justified and was economically successful, but it should be wound up. Nothing but actual defense money should go to Europe. Instead, economic aid is again in our program for Europe, under a new name. Meanwhile, technical assistance is increasing and becoming a new kind of economic aid, far beyond any modest sharing of know-how. We must cut down for Europe, instead of increasing elsewhere.

On the Mutual Security Agency stationery is a shield saying "Strength for the free world from the U.S.A." Our generosity has been so great that every free country expects to receive something from us. We must realize that we can bleed ourselves white by overspending, and must make other countries realize it, too, particularly in Europe.

SPENDING

4. Our policy, at home and abroad, has been, When in doubt, *spend!* We cannot afford that policy any more. Its practice has given color to Soviet propaganda that we have to spend to prosper. From now on, foreign aid must be clearly tied to some national interest of

ours and so labeled, so that the Soviets and others will no longer consider that spending in itself is our national interest.

We must go slow on Point Four, not only for reasons of economy but also of humility. It is not yet clear that our way is best for all the people of the world. The less-developed countries will gladly accept free supplies, but they may be reluctant, and rightly so, to accept our free advice. Remember this—that nations that do not practice gratitude as a foreign policy will be suspicious of charity as an unannounced foreign policy of another nation.

Foreign aid must become mutual security in fact as well as in name.

COLONIALISM

5. Our obsession with Europe has prevented our taking a clear-cut stand on colonialism, for fear of offending European colonial powers. This is a delicate subject, but it is one issue on which, by taking a constant and consistent position of sympathy for those who wish to do what we did in 1776, we should save ourselves embarrassment in the long run. By a policy of openly urging independence for colonies which can guarantee freedom for their people, we would follow our own great tradition, we would take care of any legitimate interests of our European allies, and we would win friends in undeveloped countries that now have no use for us. By making this a policy without exceptions, we should not be under the embarrassment of deciding what exceptions we needed to make.

INCONSISTENCY AS A POLICY

6. The inconsistencies and vagaries in our policies, the discrepancies between promise and performance, the differences between treatment of similar areas, the secrecy, cause untold uncertainty, confusion, and exasperation here and abroad. The defense is that we do different things at different times for different reasons, as will best serve our national interests. This cult of inconsistency among our planners is based on and excused by the George Kennan plan of playing old-fashioned, realistic, power politics, bilateral diplomacy, unembarrassed by the "legalistic-moralistic approach" or any multilateral foolishness. It sounds very sophisticated. Its practice to date has made us look foolish.

Judging our recent diplomacy by the dictionary concept, "dexterity or artfulness in securing advantages without arousing hostility; address or tact in conduct of affairs," our diplomacy is not working very well. Our officials talk too much, and are too careless about commitments. We have made commitments to Italy about United Nations membership and Trieste that can hardly be fulfilled. Ambassador Bowles talks of a billion in aid to India—an amount that will not be forthcoming. Big talk, that makes even generous action look small, causes disappointment and lowers our prestige.

On the other hand, there have been careless statements about what we will not do. When our President on January 5, 1950, and Secretary Acheson on January 12, 1950, said Korea was not in our security perimeter, that was an implied invitation to aggression in Korea.

Our officials need to be more cautious and guarded in saying what we will or will not do, because everyone is listening.

KOREA

7. Korea will be known in history either as the tragic end of a disastrous series of blunders or as the halting beginning of our reversal of policy in Asia; either as the beginning of Communist aggression by force or as high

tide in such aggression. The demand on Congress on June 8, 1949 for economic aid to Korea by June 30, with the assurance of Secretary Acheson that Korea would fall in a few months if the aid were not forthcoming, echoed the Lattimore line: "The thing to do is to let Korea fall, but not let it look as if we pushed. Hence the parting gift of $150,000,000."

The withdrawal of our troops, the delay in military aid voted by Congress, the disavowals of our President and Secretary of State in January 1950, the overnight reversal when the attack took place, the commitment of forces without congressional approval, the refusal to follow sound military defense principles, the long-drawn-out armistice negotiations, continued until our planes were outnumbered in MIG alley—all of this was overshadowed by the original policy mistake of permitting the mainland behind Korea to go to the Communists.

These mistakes will not be rectified by a patched-up, face-saving armistice, concluded so that we can gracefully bow out of Asia. We face a long-drawn-out period of helping the free Chinese to practice what we preach in the Declaration of Independence, in order to rectify the mistakes we have made, in order to promote our national interests in Asia.

CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM

Does all this sound critical of our foreign policy management? It is intended to be. But if Mr. Vyshinsky and his agents hear about it they will gain small comfort, because they know of the teamwork that goes on in this country in government, not only in spite of criticism but because of criticism. They know of it, but cannot understand it. They probably cannot understand that Senator John Sparkman,[1] whose views differ from mine, is my dear friend, whose character and ability I admire, whose opinions I respect. They ought to understand that there is no prospect of any substantial change in the roots of our foreign policy, no prospect of fundamental changes in the broad areas of action and interest in our struggle against Communism, under present or changed management.

But we need new management, that has had no connection with these diplomatic and military failures in foreign policy; an administration that will carry out every treaty and formal agreement to which we are party, but that can say, when side agreements, understandings, and bad precedents in action are brought up, "No connection with the old firm." A new administration could reassess our policies and courses of action; could restate our foreign policies with caution, clarity, and consistency. Our national interest will still be to go forward, not alone, but with others. We shall be more firm with others who insist on going it alone. We shall make sure that others go forward, too. And we shall have policies that promote—our national interests.

[1] See John Sparkman, in this volume.

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Strength of the Atlantic Community

By W. R. HEROD

IN the present world situation, I think it is recognized that, since the termination of World War II hostilities, the most significant fact on the international horizon has been the continuing and ominous division between the so-called "East" and the "West." The Communist seizure of governments in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere forced a number of the western nations, including the United States, to the reluctant conclusion that a greater measure of military strength was needed to ensure their security. These countries had a more or less common heritage of history and tradition. They held similar views as to the dignity of the individual and the values—material, intellectual, and spiritual—of western civilization. Accordingly, certain western European countries came together in defensive alliance in the Western Union.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF NATO

Then somewhat later, with East-West tension continuing, the United States, Canada, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and Portugal became partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This group, known as NATO, comprehended the Western Union powers and others, and, being larger and potentially far more powerful, soon began to acquire eminence as an Atlantic community.

NATO's purposes, as stated in the treaty and reiterated on various occasions, were and continue to be twofold: first, to preserve peace—not peace at any price, but a respectable peace; and second, to promote free institutions, conditions of stability, and well-being. The preservation of peace is surely a defensive purpose. It is by no means aggressive.

Pursuant to these objectives, rearmament was undertaken by the NATO powers, primarily as a deterrent to aggression, thereby preserving peace, but further so that if peace should unfortunately be lost, aggression could be resisted and victory attained.

The form of rearmament and its level have been determined with a view to the following objectives: (1) to make the deterrent effective through building up defensive but not aggressive military strength; (2) to involve no unbearable burden which might break the economies or destroy the free institutions, stability, or well-being of the West; and (3) through international correlation, to strengthen each NATO nation and to bring added strength to the whole through "mutual reaction."

FACTORS IN COLLECTIVE STRENGTH

But fundamentally, individual and collective strength lies not alone in material elements. Just as important are various other factors, for example, character. There must also be a positive side, with an appeal to the hearts of men involving (1) conviction that their cause is just; (2) resolution and determination, which means a willingness to sacrifice and, if need be, to fight; and (3) hope, first, that war is not inevitable and that a respectable peace can be preserved; second, that a greater measure of spiritual, intellectual, and material satisfactions from life may be expected in the not too distant future;

and third, that if peace should be lost, the NATO West could win through.

Conviction, determination, hope—these intangibles contributing to the make-up of morale are as important as physical strength in battle against external aggression. They are also essential in the fight against subversion. But they must be supplemented by physical strength to ensure security.

Both these intangibles and military might have until recently been at a low level in western continental Europe since World War II. They were considerably lacking immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Their absence was to be noted in all geographical areas of continental Europe and in all strata of western European society.

Today a significant improvement in both is evident. But the future course must be so charted as not only to preserve but to increase both of these elements of strength. We must avoid any course which, for an apparent gain in one, weakens or jeopardizes the other. We must not seek increased strength in guns, divisions, ships, or planes, if such is to be offset by increased dissension, internal difficulties, or sapping of morale. Hence the risk in courses which involve inflationary pressures, depression in levels of living, increased regimentation, or more and more restrictions. On the other hand, we must not neglect to increase military strength because too greatly we want "business as usual." But conviction, determination, and hope we must maintain. If they falter, both NATO objectives and more will be lost.

COMPARISON, EAST WITH WEST

But how about the relative power potentials of the East and the NATO West? It seems that prior to Korea, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was devoting a higher aggregate of man-years of effort and expenditures per million of population to military use than were the NATO nations. Further, it would appear that the Kremlin within the last eighteen months has taken active steps to increase the military strength of its European satellites. With reportedly some 175 to 200 divisions and a considerable air force, the U.S.S.R. has presently a military establishment of greater immediate striking power than has NATO.

This is not surprising, when one considers that the Soviet Union kept up her forces after World War II, whereas the NATO nations generally disarmed. The continental European NATO nations have, in effect, had to "start from scratch" in their rearmament after wartime destruction, military occupation, and dismantling. In this respect as well as in having a defensive sea moat, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States have been considerably better off than their continental allies. But even in these favored nations, the build-up of military power requires considerable time.

But NATO, with the recent admission of Greece and Turkey, now comprises fourteen countries, and NATO's aggregate economic power appears to be considerably greater than that of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. For example, as of 1950–51 it appears that the fourteen NATO countries combined had a population of some 370 million, whereas the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites had perhaps some 300 million. NATO's aggregate of national incomes seems to be three to four times, and its steel and electric power production some four to five times, that of the Kremlin-dominated areas excluding China. The total energy, animate and inanimate, devoted to productive purposes by the NATO countries in 1948 has been estimated at about three times that of the Soviet Union and its European satellites. And in skilled labor force and heritage of technology, NATO greatly exceeds the countries east of the Iron Curtain.

Hence, if NATO were a monolithic unit, it would have overwhelming preponderance in physical resources. Unfortunately, while the U.S.S.R with its European satellites occupies a continuous and comparatively readily mobilizable area, NATO's population and resources are distributed throughout a multiplicity of separate nations on an extensive periphery.

DISTRIBUTION OF POTENTIAL WITHIN NATO

For example, of the NATO population, roughly 55 per cent may be considered as representing the European members. Approximately 50 million of these are in the United Kingdom, and 150 to 155 million on the Eurasian mainland. NATO's Eurasian mainland population is hence considerably less than that of the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites. Furthermore, it is greatly dispersed.

Likewise in terms of steel, electric power, and output of manufactures and of engineering industries, the industrial potentials within NATO are dispersed and unevenly distributed. In rough terms, some five-sevenths to three-quarters of the industrial potential of NATO is concentrated in North America, by far the greater portion being in the United States. The United Kingdom's industrial potential is of the order of one-seventh to one-sixth of NATO's total. And the continental NATO countries together have roughly another one-seventh to one-sixth. Of this last item, France has about one-half and Italy one-quarter.

Hence, in general, the industrial potential of the European NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, is two-sevenths to one-third of that of NATO, and about one-half of the entire European potential west of the Iron Curtain. European NATO's industrial potential is only slightly less than that of the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites. If Western Germany through a European army and a European defense community became associated with the NATO group, European NATO would possess a significant addition in manpower, and an industrial potential in excess of that of the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites. This advantage could be further increased to the extent that the industrial resources of Sweden and Switzerland, whether members of NATO or not, were predominantly available to the NATO group as compared to the Kremlin-dominated countries.

However, even if finances were satisfactorily arranged, except for certain basic items such as coal and steel, it would require two to four years to develop the industrial potential of Germany, for example, to the point of making any really significant contribution in heavy equipment.

Also, as the European portion of NATO's industrial potential is distributed over eleven national sovereignties, it is not integrated. In some cases the NATO nations are not even contiguous. Their individual economies are in many respects as competitive as they are complementary. Hence industrial units, with certain outstanding exceptions, are generally far smaller than in the United States. Industry has developed more "vertically" in Europe as compared to more "horizontally" in the United States. And there is more dependence upon direct labor and artisanship in Europe, with less availability of capital,

tools, and power per worker than here. As a result, the speed with which changes can be effected, such as the introduction of new products, the building of plants, and retooling, is only roughly one-half of that in the United States. And the product generally has a higher component of man-hours than here, perhaps double on the average.

These factors, combined with absence of modern designs, less availability of tools, and a lower limit of acceptability for the devotion of resources to the military, mean that (except in the United Kingdom) any considerable volume production of modern complex weapons is not to be expected within two or three years in western Europe, as compared with what may be expected in the United States.

Particularly is this true today; for new equipment now is highly complex and technically advanced, even as compared with that of World War II. For example, jet planes are now required, whereas we had practically none in World War II. There have been tremendous developments in guided missiles. Radar and electronics now apply to fire control, antiaircraft direction, and many other things. There is also the atomic field. Whereas Europe in many respects equipped American troops in World War I, we supplied the bulk of the munitions in World War II. And now the new armament developments have outstripped the technical and industrial ability of many of the individual European countries to build up equipment of the requisite quality speedily enough, without a violent readjustment of their economies.

SIGNIFICANCE

The significance of this can be illustrated by an example. Let us consider Italy. With roughly one-twentieth of the industrial power of the United States, with a steel production capacity of approximately 3 million tons per year, it is physically impossible for Italy to manufacture within a short period, enough big tanks, heavy bombers, or heavy artillery to make it worth while. The diversion of labor, the requirements of tools, the devotion of raw materials and facilities to these products, that would be necessary for any considerable output in two or three years, would be such that it would not be feasible to expect Italy to produce modern equipment in this field, even if the financial aspects of the problem were solved.

This likewise applies in various other European countries, for equipment such as heavy airplanes, heavy tanks, heavy-duty electronic equipment, heavy artillery, and presumably atomic weapons. In these categories, allowing for attrition, maintenance, and replacement, NATO Europe cannot, without going into a war economy, become self-sufficient within a decade, and perhaps not then. If the next two or three years are taken as being a period of critical risk during which build-up of forces is desired, without a war economy, in my opinion the bulk, by value, of the hard-goods requirements for the continental European NATO forces must come from the United States if the deficiencies are to be met.

RATE OF U.S.S.R.'S EXPANSION

If this is the case in NATO, what do we know about the U.S.S.R.? We must not be oblivious to the recent rate of expansion in economic power of the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites, which may, in percentages, have been greater than NATO's. Statistics are of course not altogether reliable, particularly those relating to areas behind the Iron Curtain. But if those published by the United Nations, the National Industrial Conference Board, and other reputable bodies endeavoring to get reasonably reliable data are taken, the

U.S.S.R. and its satellites have been going forward in a material way at a remarkable pace.

For example, the U.S.S.R.'s steel production in 1951 has been estimated at some 31 million ingot tons (metric). This is apparently an increase of 4 million tons over 1950, or 14 to 15 per cent. In electric power the estimated gain was 11 to 12 per cent. In energy devoted to productive purposes, the U.S.S.R.'s increase between 1937 and 1948 has been estimated as some 95 per cent, compared with about 90 per cent for Canada and 70 per cent for the United States. And in three and a half years, 1947 to 1950, the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites have been estimated to have roughly doubled their percentage of the world's industrial production. Their current output appears to exceed that of the European NATO nations combined, including the United Kingdom.

Of course, in the West also, in both Europe and America, production has increased, and rather remarkable percentages are sometimes cited. But the U.S.S.R. and its satellites probably had a lower starting point, and the percentage rate of expansion has seemingly been at least as high as, and perhaps higher than, that in the West. Furthermore, in the West people have more or less adjusted themselves to an increased level of consumption and investment commensurate with such increased production; whereas in the U.S.S.R. probably a greater proportion of the increased production has been put into investment and armaments, with less going into consumption. This may be important in estimating the psychology of sustaining an armament burden, as well as in estimating economic capability.

Also the Soviets' technological achievements in the armament field must not be minimized. According to reports there have been at least two nuclear explosions, apparently the only explosions of this type except those conducted by the United States. Their MIG airplanes are of high quality, and they seem to have been produced in reasonably large quantities. Their submarines with snorkel designs are said to be of high quality, and likewise are available in quantity. And their tanks appear to be formidable in size, armor, and firepower. U.S.S.R. radar and electronic developments in directed antiaircraft guns, and other applications, also indicate a high order of development.

It is doubtful if the U.S.S.R. story is all increase and improvement. I cannot believe that these Soviet armament developments represent a normally balanced strength. There must be blank spots. But in the field of armaments themselves and in the fundamental basic elements which could be devoted to war, we must not minimize Soviet developments. Particularly is this the case if, as reported from Moscow, with steel, oil, electric power, and basic industrial production rapidly expanding, there has recently been a reduction in the output of automobiles and tractors; for this might indicate an increased diversion of the Soviet Union's manufacturing capacity into weapons.

Hence, up to the present, even since Korea, the more rapid rate of finished equipment build-up may not yet have been on our side. We all have confidence in the United States, but that is only one individual country—though, to be sure, the most powerful of all. But we cannot be certain that for the combined NATO countries, the rates of production of equipment have exceeded those in the U.S.S.R. and its satellites to date, although surely we have the potential capacity to outproduce them. And when the geographical dispersion of NATO's resources are taken into account, we cannot be certain that time,

for NATO as a whole, is even yet on our side.

FACTORS IN APPRAISING NATO'S EFFORTS

In appraising our NATO allies' efforts, we in America are frequently inclined to overlook the rapid development in the technique of modern military equipment which I have mentioned, and the shift in the balance of industrial power so preponderantly in favor of the United States. As indicated, we cannot expect military self-sufficiency from Europe in the modern weapons now considered necessary, in a two-to-four-year period, at a level of military requirements of the order of that contemplated. And even if the build-up is assumed, the load on European industry for repair, maintenance, and replacements, for attrition and obsolescence even without hostilities, will require a high level and broad pattern of activation of industry.

In estimating physical capability to produce, one considers the availability of management, know-how, skills, and facilities such as floor space and tools, applicable to given items. These can be roughly appraised, but expected results cannot be predicted accurately. Capacity or physical capability generally assumes the availability of labor, raw materials, and finance in adequate quantities and at the right times; and these might not all be available at the time of need without serious diversion from other needed activity. Such can hence impose a ceiling to total effort, even where additional plant and tools exist. In general, the assembly and end-item fabricating capacity of European industry which could be devoted to armament is considerably in excess of the production which could actually be acceptably sustained, taking into account the diversion of men, money, and materials into such production.

The ceiling to the over-all envelope of European armament hard-goods production under today's conditions is hence determined more by the politico-economic limits of *acceptability,* than it is by sheer physical capability. In other words, from a physical standpoint, far more armament production could be undertaken on the Continent of Europe than is presently programmed. But economically, politically, and socially it has not been thought feasible or acceptable to devote the money, the labor, the materials, and other resources to it at the expense of diversion of these limited resources from other desired goals. Such a further diversion, if appreciable, has been thought to produce inflationary pressures, further scarcities, and increased tax burdens, all of which are damaging.

The determination of an acceptable limit is hence difficult. It is not merely a financial problem, though that is important; it involves accepting a financial burden and a diversion of resources, and therefore it presents political, economic, and social problems. And these determine the acceptable limit of effort at a given level of risk.

EFFECTS ON NATIONAL ECONOMIES

To illustrate this point, it should be noted that the European national economies are much weaker than that of the United States; and in the grip of world forces such as price fluctuations and material scarcities, the repercussions in Europe are frequently severe. They manifest themselves in internal dislocations and, among other things, difficulties in the balance of payments.

Great Britain

Take for a moment Great Britain. Its 4.7 billion pound three-year program has now been lengthened to some four years. To the extent of 40 to 45 per cent, it represents hard-goods equipment. Such hard goods, in value and labor content, represent a load of approximately 40 per cent of the normal output of Great Britain's engineering industry; and this industry in turn has contributed roughly two-fifths of Britain's exports. Hence, in this particular industry, diversion of money, men, and materials into armaments means probable reduction in exports and increased pressure on the balance of payments.

Further, this constitutes an inflationary pressure accentuating internal difficulties. Also, as a result of world price changes as compared with 1950, imported raw materials of Great Britain had by mid-1951 increased 76 per cent in price; total imports had increased 43 per cent in price; but exports had increased only 20 per cent in price. There was hence a deterioration in terms of trade, so great that if a balance had been effected through additional exports at those levels of prices, the aditional rate of exports in terms of manpower and material would have placed an added load on the economy exceeding Britain's then current rate of hard-goods armament production.

This situation has now changed considerably. Nevertheless, it has left its mark in the reduction of dollar and foreign currency reserves to such an extent as to weaken the pound and necessitate the imposition of severe import controls and a lengthening out of the rearmament production program.

Balance of payments difficulties have similarly been accentuated in France, Italy, and other countries. And although there has been a deceleration in the adverse trend and even an improvement recently in the terms of trade of certain areas, the strain on the foreign currency reserves and the readjustments required have left an awareness of the weakness of the European economies and of balance of payments difficulties and inflationary possibilities which are now quite general in Europe.

Italy

As another example, take Italy. The total engineering industry employment is only some 250 to 275 thousand in a population of about 45 million. Italy's currency, however, has depreciated to approximately one-fiftieth of its prewar value. Italy's total steel production is only about three million tons. Accordingly, with raw materials short, little diversion from essentials into armament is to be expected. With 1½ million unemployed and a million or so underemployed, the situation is difficult. The workers want to work, but finance and raw materials limit orders. In ships, vehicles, and certain other lines, Italy could produce much more for the rearmament program, by a multiple, than she is at present producing, if financial resources and raw materials could be found. We should be able to contribute to the solution of that problem through offshore procurement. This would help to strengthen Italy and the Atlantic alliance.

The Netherlands

Another example is the Netherlands. There industrial production is perhaps one-third greater than it was before the war. The country looks relatively prosperous. However, the Dutch still need and have a billeting law. With the great damage to houses and the expanded population, with only about 55,000 new dwellings being built per year, if one has so many rooms in his house, he must accommodate so many people. One is given thirty days in which to get in someone congenial. Otherwise one is assigned a "roomer." The reaction of the Dutch is the same as ours would be. They are no less against the Russians than are we. But they want to get the stranger out of

their house and enjoy the privacies of their home and family life before undertaking extensive devotion of additional finances, materials, and labor to rearmament. In a similar case I think our reactions would not be greatly different.

DETERMINATION OF ACCEPTABILITY

These examples illustrate various factors which influence the determination by each nation of its acceptable level of armament activity. With narrow political majorities and strong oppositions, with the protest vote frequently siding with the Communists in France and Italy, not so much because the people adhere to Communist philosophy as because they wish to protest against the existing scheme of things, one can see that [illegible] is required in urging increased devotion of money and limited resources to rearmament.

From this standpoint I think it is evident that, over the next two to four years, Europe cannot be expected to produce, within an acceptable limit, the equipment for European forces that are being currently talked about. Even if, through assistance in money, materials, designs, and know-how, the limit of acceptability were raised so as more nearly to approximate the physical capability or capacity limit, short of a war economy, there would still be calls upon the United States for the bulk by value of the equipment requirements in a build-up over the next two to three years.

These facts emphasize the tremendous importance in the scheme of things of United States support. Through our former military aid programs, Economic Cooperation Administration, and so forth, support in one form or another has been given. The present Foreign Aid Bill envisages a continuation of support, somewhat modified as to form, but its magnitude in dollars is roughly comparable to that last year.

THE BIG DETERRENT

In line with the above discussion, and trying to face the realities of the situation, one must query just what are the prospects of success in building a deterrent force to any possible Soviet aggression. I do not know what the Soviet intent may be. But I think it is evident, taking into account the historically expansionist trend of Russia, and the aggressive and subversive activities of the Bolshevik Communist regime, that if there are any political vacuums to be filled at a low price, the Kremlin will endeavor to fill them to its advantage. And if, in the Kremlin's thinking, the Russians have contemplated aggressive action at high price or at the risk of war, I personally am convinced that it is the potential strength and estimated determination of the American people, along with the belief that the United States would follow through if the Soviet Union started aggression with any NATO country, that is the principal deterrent to any such action. This, more than any present actual strength on our part or any strength to be derived from European NATO's efforts, is surely what is being factored into the Kremlin's calculations in estimating the price and risks of aggression. If this is so, we should make corresponding allowances. Such a situation can be used, and with proper guidance, our deterrent effect can be maximized. On the other hand, such a situation can be abused.

I think it is the opinion pretty generally held in continental Europe today that, more or less following the above principle, the "floor" or lowest level to which Europe's efforts must attain is that degree of rearmament which will assure the continuing interest of the United States in Europe. There are also, unfortunately, those who think that such level should be the ceiling of Europe's efforts. That would be an abuse. I do not believe that such opinion is general, but there are some who hold it, and the implications of it could be serious.

PROGRESS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Increased strength in western Europe, as well as the development of real strength in the United States, is essential. The British have realized this and have taken steps accordingly. Others have realized it but have not been in a position to take as many steps. But the increased physical strength which has taken place in western Europe within the last two years can be expressed in terms which appear to be impressive. For example, we hear that the rate of Europe's current production of armaments is a multiple of what it was a year ago, and a greater multiple of what it was two years ago. These ratios sound convincing. Likewise, the lengthened periods of training and the extension of conscription seem favorable. We have correspondingly favorable figures for the United States.

But while these expressions are heartening, we must not be deluded into thinking that even large multiples of a very small starting rate are necessarily satisfactory in relation to the requirements of the situation, if we assume hostile Soviet intent. In terms of progress expressed as multiples, the picture certainly appears favorable; but as compared with requirements and the time to meet them, the story is by no means so reassuring, particularly in physical terms such as trained, equipped troops, actual tanks and planes, and guns and ships in service and actually available for front-line duty, backed by reserves.

LEADERSHIP

But in spite of this, the opportunity is there for far greater progress. With the small economies and former depressed state of affairs in western Europe, external leadership and reliance upon external strength for security were absolutely necessary. With Germany divided and occupied, with France's political stability none too assured, with Britain's minimal mutualization of her interests with those of the Continent (which is completely understandable), and with Italy's economic, military, and political weakness, leadership of western European origin has been lacking. This can perhaps be built in the future. But unless Britain can actually participate more in continental affairs or France can better stabilize her political situation, the expectancy is that Germany will ultimately become the chief contender for western European leadership. Under an administration such as Adenauer's, this would not cause concern; but with two world wars behind them, the prospect of any German leadership for western Europe is not altogether a tranquil one to European countries.

In this situation, leadership has automatically fallen to the United States. And with a feeling that the power, the friendliness, and the determination of the United States were behind them, hope and a feeling of security have been engendered in western Europe. Vergil opened his *Aeneid* with *Arma Virumque Cano*, and in modern parlance one can sing of arms; but General Eisenhower has been the man. Not only has the presence of a man of his stature and personality been inspiring, as we all know, but, of even greater value, he has been the symbol of American friendship, support, and determination in assisting the western Europeans in their efforts. In this respect he has made by far his greatest contribution. But if American support should be withdrawn, or its leadership compromised before European leadership could be developed, in my opinion the structure of western Europe would be jeopardized.

European Attitudes

With American leadership, the change in spirit, particularly in the continental NATO countries, in the last two years has been remarkable. It is in this field far more than in the field of actual build-up of physical strength that the achievement has been noteworthy. Immediately after the outbreak of fighting in Korea, the sentiment throughout practically all western continental Europe was that war was inevitable, and there was almost a fatalistic resignation to defeat; though in Britain, where there had been no occupation and where they have a sea moat, the morale never sank so low as on the Continent. But today the majority of continental Europeans feel that war is not inevitable. That is a noteworthy change. And while they believe that if the Russians should march now, NATO might not be able to stop them at this point or that line, roughly half of them no longer accept the necessity of ultimate defeat.

Further, one finds more spirit today on the positive side. Some Europeans are already of the opinion that the price the Russians would have to pay to march into western Europe under today's conditions would be sufficiently high to be a deterrent to any such action, and that the Russians might not be able to go all the way to the sea. There is a feeling that even with NATO's present strength and spirit, and with the increased strength that could be built up, a stand might be maintained, and ultimately a counter-offensive mounted.

Against this there is now throughout Europe a far greater awareness of the vulnerability of the European national economies and of economic and financial limitations, scarcities of materials, and tax burdens. This has resulted in a great reluctance to expand armament efforts beyond the commitments made eighteen months ago. In fact, in certain significant cases, schedules have been further drawn out since then.

The reluctance may have become more sharply defined in the last eighteen months; but in my opinion, by far the major portion of it is currently based on sincere concern as to the wisdom of additional rearmament effort at the price of economic and social strain. A portion of the reluctance can, to be sure, be attributed to an attitude of wait and see what the United States may do; but I think there is less of this attitude than there was two years ago.

Further, there is a more widespread realization that the division of Europe into separate nationalities handicaps the growth of basic economic strength as well as military strength. Here too, although the mills of history grind slowly, important advances have been made. The Benelux experiment and the Schuman plan are concrete instances of successful negotiation, even though not yet carried to fruition. The importance now attached to the Council of Europe at Strasbourg is evidence of the wider appeal of greater measures of integration. The operations of the European Payments Union, and latterly the discussions regarding a European army and European Defense Community, are all straws in the wind, evidencing progress in this direction. The rate may be too small, but the direction is favorable.

Is Our Effort Worth While?

If the direction is favorable but the rate slow, is the effort worth our while, or should we retire to the defense only of our own geographical frontiers?

A sharp division between Eastern and Western Hemispheres would necessarily close the channels of trade for raw materials and finished products. This would throw upon us extra burdens for defense, which would mean increased regimentation and perhaps a war economy, almost the equivalent of an armed camp. To my mind, such a system offers no acceptable solution for the future. Furthermore, it would permanently cut us off from those great material, cultural, and spiritual contributions which western Europe has to offer. Accordingly, to me any prospect of the loss of western Europe is a threat to our own institutions and mode of life and welfare, which I feel should be resisted by force of arms, if need be.

But unless western Europe can be further integrated and more of its resources made available to NATO, it cannot hope to be able to stand alone at a satisfactory level of security within any short period of years. But with United States support in this intermediate period, there are prospects of its being able to widen its base and ultimately become self-sufficient with minimal future necessary dependence upon the United States.

We must promote such a goal. Our leadership may not always be wise, but our mistakes are not those of malicious intent. They are those of impatience and inexperience, and though they may be irritating to more mature European countries, I think it is generally felt that we are trying to do the right thing.

Hence, what are the prospects today? We in the United States, with a long record of tremendous opportunities and successful achievement, are frequently impatient, and we may expect too much in the way of material output in NATO Europe unless we understand the situation. Although, as a percentage of our national income and on an absolute scale, we in the United States are carrying a much heavier burden of rearmament, the "pinch" hurts more on the other side of the Atlantic than it does here. I know of few friends in America who have been unable to get a television set or a new automobile if they wanted one. But this is not the situation on the other side of the Atlantic. There is less "fat" over there, and "pulling in the belt" hurts more than here.

Summary and Conclusion

Accordingly, to summarize, we have embarked upon a course with allies in the Atlantic community. Those allies are making a real effort in relation to their resources. In certain cases the effort is as much as could be expected. In others, more could be done.

There are indications of growing economic strength in western Europe, but in spite of this, our allies are militarily weak in comparison with the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites. The potential strength and rate of economic expansion of present NATO western Europe do not warrant belief that those countries, unsupported by the United States, will gain sufficient defensive strength within a short period of years to hold western continental Europe against the Soviet Union if the Kremlin intended (and it is by no means certain that it does) direct aggressive action. However, backed by the United States, the over-all strength of NATO is predominant. The improved morale in Europe is not yet self-sustaining, but it can be built to a self-sustaining level if we assist during this transition period.

If the human and material resources west of the Iron Curtain but not presently within the NATO framework can be brought to the support of the NATO cause, the industrial strength of western Europe will exceed that of the Soviet Union and its European satellites. But if these additional resources should become available to the other side, western Europe's self-sufficiency at an adequate level of defensive strength would be indefinitely postponed, with serious repercussions upon the United States.

With continued strengthening of spirit

and an extension of the favorable changes which have already taken place, there is the possibility for increased unity and for a widening of the base of Europe's economy and social structure. This cannot be done over night, as such would result in unemployment and chaos. But done progressively, it can lead ultimately to a self-sustaining western Europe—not with ease, but it can be done. The opportunity and the challenge are enormous. The stakes are high, particularly when the rates of change east and west of the Iron Curtain are considered.

We can contribute to bringing about the creation of a self-sustaining western Europe, but we cannot dictate or pressure it into existence. Although the rate may appear disappointingly slow at times, measured in terms of history it is definitely progressive. And, in my opinion, we should definitely not sell western Europe short. We should continue to work, not alone but with others in the Atlantic community, in our national interest, to help rebuild a world with a self-respecting western Europe, which can through its own efforts, after a transitional period with our help, become self-sustaining and strong, not alone in defensive military power, but also again, as of old, contributing economic, spiritual, and cultural values to civilization, of which we as well as others are the beneficiaries.

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An International Materials Policy

By MANLY FLEISCHMANN

THE general subject under discussion —"The National Interest—Alone or With Others?"—states accurately and succinctly the question to which American policy makers must find the right answer, at the peril of national catastrophe. Our task is made only a little easier because the answer itself is simple, obvious, and indisputable. What is not so simple is, Can that answer be put into effect in the years to come?

WE ARE NOT SELF-SUFFICIENT

The factual material to answer the question posed is clear, known to every responsible American official, and not subject to much debate. We must start by facing the unpalatable fact that America today is a "have not" nation with respect to a majority of the metals indispensable to the attainment of military strength, and consequently indispensable to national survival.

The world being divided, as it is, into two armed camps, it follows by relentless logic that if we are to defend ourselves we cannot go it alone; we must, in fact, import to survive in a universe where for the moment armed strength is the sole guarantee of existence as an independent nation. To pursue the syllogism further, since we must import a major portion of our minimum security requirements in many of the key metals, we must also be prepared to export some of the materials which we produce in substantial volume, even when such action may be uncomfortable, inconvenient, and even damaging to American industry in particular cases.

We cannot expect that foreign metal-producing nations will be responsive to our national needs for the things they produce if we turn a deaf ear to their own requirements. We need a somewhat broader view of this matter of international co-operation than that expressed by one critic of the recent exchange of American steel for British aluminum and tin, when he said that he highly approved of the transaction except for the part where the British were given some of our steel.

How has this very fundamental change in American self-sufficiency come about? In the first place, it should be noted that the theory of American self-sufficiency has always been to a considerable extent a myth, so the change is not so dramatic as might otherwise be supposed. During World War II we had to import many basic raw materials, even during the height of hostilities, when movement by sea was a hazardous and costly undertaking. To cite a single example, many American ships were lost by enemy action in the hauling of bauxite from the Caribbean to American shores during that war.

INCREASED REQUIREMENTS

Moreover, in the later years of World War II and ever since, great scientific changes have been afoot which have now culminated in what can be justly described as four major technological revolutions which have drastically altered military science and therefore the conditions of survival, and which certainly will in the next few years alter to a comparable degree the very circumstances of human life. I refer to the epic discoveries in the fields of atomic energy, jet propulsion, electronics, and petro-chemicals. Each of

these vast changes is or soon will be intimately related to the basic armament programs upon which our security depends, and their cumulative effect can hardly be overstated.

The impact of these tremendous scientific advances, focused as they were in the field of military science, came at a time when the nation was unwilling to accommodate to them. Unfortunately, each of these industrial revolutions inescapably increases our reliance on imported raw materials.

The end of World War II found the nation impatient of the discipline that would have been required to maintain an adequate munitions program, including the indispensable development of military technology. Military budgets were slashed to the bone and beyond. In the years between 1945 and 1950 the nation engaged in a frenzied demobilization which in retrospect seems to have escaped disaster by the narrowest of margins. Few of the materials most essential to our security were stockpiled in any adequate quantity.

As a result, we are in the main as dependent today as we were in 1945 on the uninterrupted importation of columbium, nickel, cobalt, and tungsten to support our jet aircraft program, to cite but a single example. That example might be multiplied many times. Out of thirty-eight important industrial minerals we are self-sufficient in only nine, and for another twenty domestic production provides less than 60 per cent of our requirements. For seven of these twenty we are dependent on other countries for just about 100 per cent of our requirements.

At the same time, the special material requirements of the mobilization program multiply our needs for particular minerals at a fantastic rate.

Thus, when the facts are known, the question posed for discussion becomes merely rhetorical, since the answer is patent. We may profitably turn to the more complicated problem of what to do about the dangerous situation in which we Americans find ourselves.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY

I start with the proposition that the Federal Government has an inescapable responsibility to see to it that our mobilization needs for these imported minerals are met. That responsibility arises from the first and basic duty of any government, namely, the duty of defense and self-preservation. The present administration, or any other administration, would be derelict in its discharge of its constitutional obligations if it did not make every reasonable provision for the solution of these insistent problems.

Let me make it perfectly clear that I am not suggesting for a moment that the government should pre-empt the functions of free enterprise and private trade in any area where such a course is not urgently required. Indeed, it is my conviction that the area of government intervention in this, as in other commercial matters, should and can be held to an absolute minimum. But there is no blinking the fact that when ordinary commercial methods prove inadequate to ensure and protect our supply of these survival necessities, the government must assume the responsibility of making up the deficit. Unfortunately, that is the very situation in which we find ourselves today with respect to many of the materials in question.

The delineation of the proper responsibilities of government and private industry in this condition of international materials shortages is difficult and complicated. Obviously, the United States has the financial resources to set in motion an international auction of materials in which we would be the temporary victors. Such a victory would be a Pyrrhic one at best, however, since it could be won only at the expense of the disruption of the mobilization programs and the economies of our allies whose support we will surely need in the years ahead. Beyond that, such a course would bring in its wake an uncontrollable international inflation whose repercussions would certainly be most severe upon our own domestic economy. In this field, it seems clear to me that the path of wisdom is co-operation, and not cut-throat competition with our friends.

GOVERNMENT METHODS

Let me sketch a few of the methods being used by the government in this emergency period. In the first place, we have encouraged private concerns to expand their production of scarce minerals, here and abroad, by a variety of financial inducements. These have included accelerated amortization with accompanying tax benefits, loans and long-term purchase agreements, sometimes at premium prices designed to bring into production marginal facilities which would otherwise be unworked.

In some cases we have made government-to-government agreements, either for the exchange of materials, as was the case with the British arrangement, or for the unilateral delivery of particular materials by individual countries, as was the case with the agreement made with respect to Chilean copper in 1951 and the recent agreement for the purchase of Indonesian tin.

Finally, we have participated in the International Materials Conference, which is the present-day version of the co-operative arrangements worked out in the comparable emergency of World War II. There has been some criticism of the IMC in the course of recent discussion, on the assumption that there is involved some surrender of national sovereignty to an international agency and some invasion of the prerogatives of free enterprise. I believe that neither criticism is justified.

NATURE OF IMC

In the first place, the International Materials Conference, which consists basically of a meeting of some twenty-six nations of the free world having an interest in the equitable distribution of scarce materials, has no power of any kind, except to make appropriate recommendations to the various participating governments. Our government, and any other government, is free to reject any individual recommended allocation, or all of them, though to pursue the latter course would obviously bring about the speedy demise of the Conference.

The work of the Conference proceeds on the theory that the supply of certain materials is inadequate to meet the needs of all the nations of the free world in a time of international emergency. It is the conviction of those who have studied this problem that the worst way to solve such a situation is by unbridled competitive bidding-up of the short commodity; the best way is by co-operative agreements limiting each nation's consumption of the material until the shortage can be alleviated by restoration of a proper balance between supply and demand.

The IMC is by its very nature an emergency operation, and its existence will surely come to an end when the emergency ends. However, I know of no one who has studied the metals dilemma facing the United States who will predict exactly the date on which all our problems of this kind will be solved.

I should add that the operation of the International Materials Conference is not an allocation system comparable to the Controlled Materials Plan under which domestic distribution of steel,

copper, and aluminum is handled during the emergency period. It does not allocate any material from the source, and no nation or individual is required to sell any material to any other nation or individual.

If the arrangements are subject to criticism, it seems to me that the proper criticism is that their effectiveness is limited by the voluntary nature of the international commitments; but perhaps that weakness is inescapable, lacking the urgency of an all-out shooting war.

EFFECTS OF IMC

Based on the results to date, the IMC has unquestionably performed a useful function in bringing about a proper distribution of such key materials as copper, zinc, and sulphur, and the recent softening of international prices for these and other materials is certainly due in large measure to the success that has attended the operation to date.

I want to point out here, too, that had it not been for the collaborative and voluntary arrangements the United States Government has made with the nations of the International Materials Conference, the United States in my judgment would not have got the large share of vitally needed materials which we in fact did get—unless we had been willing to spend an unlimited amount of money, bid up world prices, and injure our own economy and that of our allies. Through IMC, for example, we have arranged to get a larger share of world supplies of copper than we did formerly, largely in recognition of the needs arising from our tremendous defense effort.

Finally, it should be noted that the IMC has not impaired the normal commercial operations of importers and exporters in the various countries in any manner. No agreements have been made or are contemplated requiring this nation or any other nation to take over exclusive purchasing functions with respect to the materials allocated pursuant to IMC recommendations. Normal trade channels are used and will continue to be used as long as they perform effectively.

The exclusive purchasing arrangements with respect to rubber and tin represented exceptions to the United States policy in this respect, and neither material has ever been subject to the operation of the IMC. As long as private enterprise can do the job, it is my firm conviction that this should be, and I believe will be, this nation's preferred and primary reliance in the field of international trade.

Here, as in many other areas at the very heart of the mobilization effort, cooperative efforts by the government and industry will surely solve our most pressing problems. I repeat the thought with which I started, however: any government that would ensure the survival of this nation must accept the ultimate responsibility for seeing to it that our imports of these vital commodities remain at a level sufficient to provide for the ever increasing appetite of the military production program, at least as long as the danger of all-out war is a real one.

THE CRISIS WE FACE

The years ahead will be, I think, among the most difficult in our history. We are faced with a crisis as great as any since 1776, and of a character which we are little qualified by experience to meet. This is a crisis of many years of tension, now heightened, now lessened, usually by the volition of our potential enemy. Anyone who follows the foreign dispatches must have been struck in recent months by a new note in the Soviet symphony—by overtones of appeasement and peace talk.

We can hope that this represents a true change of heart, but we must not rely on such assumption even for a moment. It must be apparent now to the Kremlin that the major result of its Korean enterprise has been the revitalization of a tremendous American industrial and military effort which already has favorably altered the balance of power between us.

It seems evident to me that the most strenuous attempts will now be made to rectify that costly blunder and to induce another sleep comparable to that which we enjoyed from 1945 to 1950—a sleep which in retrospect seems more like a nightmare.

A wise national policy will surely disregard such siren songs and will continue resolutely on the path of completing and maintaining an effective military establishment in the years ahead until an international settlement of a permanent nature can be reached.

The demands for imported materials which I have detailed will continue as urgently in 1955 and thereafter as today; as the military program reaches a plateau of preparedness, these demands will in all probability decline in volume, but not in their indispensable nature. We may well hope and expect that at such a time there will be less need for government interference and encouragement of extraordinary arrangements to increase international supply, but it is certain that the ultimate government responsibility in this field will not change.

If we are strong and patient and resolute, we shall certainly surmount this gravest of our continuing security problems. We have been burnt twice in less than ten years by national unpreparedness. It is my hope and belief that the nation has now learned the lesson and that it will not again forget.

TEST OF THE FREE NATIONS

Co-operation in the field of materials has provided one of the real tests to the nations of the free world in jointly achieving the mutual objective of security and the economic well-being necessary to that security. To date, with only minor exceptions, that test has been met successfully by the governments of these nations and by their private citizens whose enterprise and ingenuity in normal commercial operations make this possible.

I say to you that the circumstances of the world in which we live present a clear call to all free nations to continue with the greatest possible speed the development of their material resources and co-operation in their use. We must provide ourselves with the materials necessary to forge our defenses. We must share to survive.

Manly Fleischmann, A.B., LL.B., Washington, D. C., has recently resigned as Administrator of the Defense Production Administration. He also served at an earlier date as General Counsel and later as Administrator of the National Production Authority. He formerly practiced law in Buffalo, New York, and during World War II he served with the War Production Board, the United States Navy, and the Office of Strategic Services.

Can Germany Contain Russia Safely?

By Joseph C. Harsch

MAY I say at the outset that I do not know the answer to the question raised in the title of this article, nor do I consider it possible for anyone in the space permissible here even to begin to encompass the problem. All I will attempt to do is discuss some of the many aspects of this problem and come to a few tentative conclusions, all subject to correction by time.

Recovery of Germany

In considering the problem of Germany versus Russia and what we can do with Germany as a means of containing Russia, we should look at the Germany of today. I had the interesting experience of visiting Germany at the end of 1945, again in 1947, in 1949, and last fall. To me, what is happening there is one of the most fabulous stories of our times.

I shall never forget walking into Frankfurt at the moment of the German defeat, with an American Air Force officer who had himself contributed to the condition we saw about us. He looked about him with some pride and remarked with confidence, "It will take the Germans a hundred years to recover from this." I differed with him. I took a very rash stand. I said, "I think it will probably take them about ten years."

In 1947 and even in 1949 there were places in Germany where it seemed that the Air Force officer's guess might prove the correct one; but in November and December of 1951, I felt that my own observations had been fully justified. Germany is going to be recovered within ten years of the end of the war, I am confident. There is no more exciting physical manifestation of nature, human or otherwise, than this recovery of Germany.

In traveling through Europe one sees the manifestation of this recovery. Far down in Istanbul, driving along the highway from the airport into the town, practically every third sign is advertising a German product. In the hotels in Ankara German is spoken widely, freely. In Belgrade Germans come out of hiding. German can now be spoken in public without fear. The German is reclaiming his old trade empire to the southeast.

The recovery is apparent in Germany itself. It is seen in the appearance of the animals on the farms, in the well-tilled fields, in the cleaning up of rubble, in the new factories, in the pace of industrial advancement. The recovery of Germany is, I think, the most vital and most prominent feature of the European landscape of today. Power is blossoming in that country—power and product. It appears in western Berlin, where new individualism shows itself in architecture, in dress, in color, in the way the people live and behave. There is an enormous vitality in that city.

Now, this is one of the great forces of our times which is reasserting its energy, its vitality, and its potential ability to help shape the destiny of this world. Can it be used? Will it be used? Will it exercise itself to the advantage of a balanced, stabilized world, or is it a force which is again going to cause trouble?

Eastern Orientation of Germany

Let us take a look at what history may tell us about Germany and Germans. There is a long, fascinating record.

Germany does not belong entirely to the West. In the town of Cottbus, south of Berlin, a Slovak dialect is still spoken. The eastern Germans are not Germans, not Teutonic tribesmen. They are Slavs. There is a merging of the two races in Germany today and in the German nature. The Roman Empire never extended seriously beyond Trier. The Rhineland was Romanized and Christianized, but eastern Germany was not. There are many cultural currents in Germany which derive from the East rather than from the West.

Germans as Guardians of Frontiers

The Romans used the German tribesmen as guardians of the frontiers of the Empire. The idea of using Hessians as hired troops dates far back beyond the American Colonial period. As far as I know, the Romans invented it; I know of no earlier example. The British themselves, when Rome left them, followed the Roman example and brought Saxons over from Germany to help defend them against the Scots, the Danes, and others.

Those who employed the Germans to defend their frontiers have not always been happy with the results. Perhaps the English are glad that they were conquered earlier by Horsa and the German tribesmen, but the Roman Britons felt that their civilization and their values had been destroyed in the process. Perhaps it can be contended that the German was eventually civilized in Britain and has become part of an amalgamation, which is, I suppose, today better than what would have happened if the Germans had been kept out. Nevertheless, there was a period of considerable turmoil and pain during which the Germans who were brought into Britain to guard the British frontiers took over the country. That was true of most of the Roman Empire.

Is the German, therefore, a reliable guardian of the frontier? If the German were totally westernized in his point of view, I suppose the answer would be Yes. However, we must approach any affirmative answer to the question with restraint, and with some question as to whether it really will work out as we might hope it would.

Germans Favor German-Russian Merger

In the early period of the war when I was in Berlin, I had arguments over and over again with German government officials about the relationship of Germany with Russia. They took the attitude that sooner or later there would have to be a German and Russian merger. The one consistent note in the German propaganda of the early war period (and I suppose throughout the war, but I did not keep in touch with it after I left Berlin) was the complementary nature of the German and Russian areas, their economies and industries. The central thought behind the attempted conquest of Russia by Germany was that the two do belong together. The German, considering himself to be a master race, thought it only fitting and proper that the merger should be brought about through conquest of Russia by Germany, but the essential thing was not the conquest—it was the union between Germany and Russia.

If a Gallup Poll were taken of what is in the German mind, I think we should find that that element is still there—that feeling that Germany's future lies closely associated with that of Russia, that some day, somehow, by methods not yet perfected, there will be a German-Russian merger. Perhaps that does not apply to the Rhineland German as much as it does to the east-

ern German, but it is an element that is deep in the German mind. But any kind of a German-Russian merger, whether it comes about by German conquest of Russia, by Russian conquest of Germany, or by a political and economic partnership, is an extremely dangerous thing for us to have to contemplate.

Political Power of Russia

In the world as it existed up to the nineteenth century, Russia did not have to be considered very seriously in attempting to arrive at a stable political condition. Russia was not well organized, closely knit, efficient, or modern. She was not motivated by a sense of going some place. She was a kind of inchoate mass stirring around, causing trouble sometimes, but easily set back upon her heels by Swedes, Lithuanians, Poles, or others. She was not a major factor in setting up a balance of power in the world.

In the nineteenth century Russia became an important factor, and today she is a major factor in world politics. It is no longer possible to think of the civilized world (using civilization in perhaps an uncivilized way) as ending at the frontier of Russia, because Russia, whatever we may think of her culture, her politics, or her society, is a major power in the world—ideologically, physically, militarily. She has achieved organization and the ability to build power which can be projected beyond her own frontiers. She does project her power by way of ideas and by way of force beyond her own frontiers, and she is therefore one of the great powers of the world.

In the seventeenth century it was easy for Britain to establish a balance of power, because it was merely a matter of balancing France off against Germany. They were the two continental powers. But those days are gone; and when we visualize the world in terms of the power that exists in Russia, the conclusion is inescapable that there is no way of achieving stability sufficient to our interests and our needs if this merger of the Russians and the Germans, of which the Germans think so often, should ever become a reality.

Even if we take the Elbe River as a frontier between east and west, Europe is already dangerously narrow, shallow. The distance from the Elbe to the English Channel is a small thing indeed. The power that exists west of the Elbe is not a balance with the power that exists east of the Elbe.

Can We Rely on Germans and Japanese?

The Russians have been talking lately about letting loose a neutralized Germany. Suppose we agree with them to let this come about; what will happen? If we could trust Germany to be western in concept, if we could trust both Germany and Japan to be the guardians of the farther marches of the West along the frontiers of the Russian realm, we might have some kind of stability. But is the future leader of Germany likely to regard himself as serving the cause of the West—as one whose primary function is merely to protect the West from the "Russian bear"? Will there ever be a leader in Japan who will willingly accept that function, and serve us as our defender along the borders of Russia?

If the leaders of Germany and Japan would accept that function, the prospect would be quite a cheerful one; because I have no doubt that the potential military power of Germany and Japan, if backed by the industrial might of American and Britain, could actually contain the frontiers of Russia. The problem is not whether it can be done physically, but whether we can rely on the Germans and the Japanese to do it. I should like to believe we could, and perhaps we can. Certainly I suspect that we are going to have to try it. My own mind is incapable of coming up with any other solution of the problem.

Accord Despite Differences

The alternative is intolerable. Suppose that Germany were merged with Russia. It does not require the communization of Germany to produce such a merger. There have been many accommodations between Germany and Russia in the past when the ideologies of the two countries were not similar. Russia resurrected Germany at the Treaty of Rapallo at the end of the First World War, despite the fact that Russia was in the beginning moments of the great revolution and Germany had already decided not to go communist. In 1939 Russia was communist and Germany was fascist. That did not prevent the Russians from entering into the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Germans.

There is friction between the two peoples; there is great hatred between them. There is the memory of the many times they have come into conflict; particularly there is today in Germany the memory of the Russian occupation of eastern Germany, and there is personal antipathy that is very deep and probably will last a long time. But I doubt that we can rely on that to keep the German from being tempted by the prospect of the power which would become his if he entered into a partnership with Russia, even though he himself remained a political individual of the right and the Russian remained a political individual of the communist left.

And if the power of Germany, with the enormous ingenuity of its people, its industry, and its resources, were added to the vast manpower and raw materials of Russia, I do not know how the rest of us could contain that force. I do not know how we could continue to live in the same world with it.

I would submit as an unfortunate thesis that the containment of Russia cannot be achieved with certainty without Germany; but, on the other hand, there is the parallel thesis that there is considerable doubt whether Germany will for long participate fully with us in the effort to achieve it.

Possible Neutrality

Now, there is the third possibility, of course, that Germany on the one side of Russia and Japan on the other will make themselves truly independent of both East and West, and will again, like mountain ranges, separate Russia from the western civilization which we know and which we must attempt to safeguard and defend. If only we could believe that Germany and Japan would become solid, motionless mountain ranges, if they would be content to be that and nothing more, if they would not use their positions between East and West to play one off against the other for their own advantage, that would probably be the best thing that could happen.

I often think that the end of the cold war will probably come when there is a revival of a kind of twilight zone between East and West, an area which declines to be dominated by either, which insists upon having its own separate identity, in which both eastern and western influences exist and come into something of a balance. I hope it will work out that way.

An Unsolved Difficulty

But I do feel gravely upset over the idea that a German-Russian combina-

tion would outbalance the world and yet we seem to be having some difficulty to achieve a western combination with Germany. I am not at all sure that the Germans really wish to be part of a western combination. And if we did make all of Germany a part of the West, possibly the Russians would regard that kind of merger as being as fatal to them and their interests as we must regard the German-Russian merger.

I have only posed questions. I am sorry I cannot answer them.

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France Today

By MAURICE FERRO

TO understand the political aspects of present-day France, we must go back to June 17, 1940, when the voice of an old man addressed the people of France in their confusion and distress and announced that Marshal Pétain had asked Hitler for a merciful, honorable armistice, as one soldier to another. As if it were possible to conclude any pact in honor with German Nazism! Or to talk as soldier to soldier with an ex-corporal of the *Wehrmacht*, Adolf Hitler!

BIRTH OF FRENCH RESISTANCE

Twenty-four hours later another voice was heard throughout the world, through the British Broadcasting Corporation. It was a real French voice—that of General Charles de Gaulle. The General proclaimed that France had lost a battle, but she had not lost the war. Beyond the seas (he was referring explicitly to the United States of America) was the arsenal of democracy—immense forces which were not yet developed but which would some day enter into action alongside the other forces of freedom against Nazism and Fascism.

The French resistance was born June 18, 1940, in London. A few months later, on November 11, 1940, a few hundred French students marched along the Avenue des Champs Élysées to lay flowers on the grave of the Unknown Soldier. They were immediately dispersed and arrested by the Gestapo. It was the first manifestation of the spirit of French resistance on the soil of France—not only against the aggressor but also against the internal power of Marshal Pétain. After a war which ends in defeat and occupation, a country tends toward anarchy or toward despotism. Unfortunately, we went toward despotism under the Vichy regime. But a few months later the spirit of freedom was revived in France with the simple gesture of a few hundred students.

Then, little by little, side by side, every faction of French public opinion arose against German power and Vichy power. France is a free country, and every opinion can be freely expressed, from Communism to faith in royalty (for, strange as it may seem, there is still a small sector of the French people that would favor the return of the monarchy). But the main characteristic of the French underground movement was that everybody fought side by side against despotism and tyranny.

AFTER LIBERATION

And in 1944 when France was liberated, thanks to the power of our allies and the French resistance, it seemed that a spirit of co-operation had emerged from the great turmoil in which we had been thrown together for four years. It was thought that the sacred French unity which prevailed on August 4, 1914, when we started the first war against German aggression and imperialism, might be revived. This is why General de Gaulle was acclaimed in every city, town, and village in France as a liberator.

General de Gaulle's forces had grown from a handful in 1940 to about 250,000, resulting in the first French Army. He is represented in this country as a prima donna, the man on horseback, the dictator in being. He could have established a dictatorship in

France. But instead, he told the French people that he had been a trustee for the Third Republic and had kept in force its constitution and laws, and he now asked them to decide, through a plebiscite, whether they wanted to retain the constitution of the Third Republic or adopt a new one; and if they wanted a new one, they should elect a constitutional assembly. The people of France answered that they wanted a new constitution, and they elected their representatives to draft it. The draft was not completed in the seven months assigned by the plebiscite, so the constitutional assembly was re-elected.

STRUCTURE OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT

The resulting constitution is not at all perfect. It represents a compromise between all French trends, from the extreme left to the extreme right. Of course all political elements were united and willing to co-operate to restore to France her sovereignty and her past glory. But the Communists could not refrain from emphasizing the powers of the new National Assembly. We formerly had a House of Representatives, which we called Chamber of Deputies, and a Senate. But the Communists did not want a Senate. They wanted to concentrate power in one assembly, which would be controlled by the people, instead of having an upper chamber—the Senate—which during the Third Republic was much more conservative than the Chamber of Deputies. But the center and rightist parties still wanted two houses and a strong government. So they worked out a compromise constitution, under which the National Assembly, which is the House of Representatives, is empowered with the so-called vote of confidence.

The other house, the Council of the Republic, is merely an advisory body, without legislative power. When a bill is passed in first reading by the National Assembly, if the Council advises against enactment, the bill is returned to the Assembly and it requires a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, instead of the normal majority, to override the Council.

The first vote of the National Assembly was a big vote of confidence in General de Gaulle. He was designated President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, by 555 votes.

THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS

Unfortunately this unanimity did not last. The center and rightist parties had thought that during the fight against Germany and against tyranny the Communist Party had become a *French* party—holding very leftist ideas, but imbued with French sentiments. But it developed that the Communist Party in France was not loyal to French interests, but was taking direction from Moscow. So in 1947 the French Government dissolved the coalition with the Communists, and since then it may be said that the Communists are no longer part of the French community.

It is often thought that since we have in France about four million Communist voters, that means that we have four million Communists in France. I wish to emphasize that that is not true. I assure you that the hard core of French Communists numbers only about 100,000 or 150,000, who in case of war could be controlled and would not hinder French mobilization.

BACKGROUND OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The bulk of the French people cannot bear the idea of having France occupied a third time in less than half a century. Eleven departments [counties] were occupied in 1914, and the whole of France was occupied during World War II. And as we dislike the thought of being occupied again, we also dislike the thought of being liberated; that would mean a great deal of destruction, as it did in 1944. In fact, it would be worse than in 1944, since we are now in the atomic age. Since we do not want France occupied by the Russians, or by anybody else, and do not want the necessity for liberation, we felt it necessary to organize our defenses in common with our allies, especially with our great ally, the United States of America, in order to deter any possible aggression.

After the Communists took control of Czechoslovakia in 1948, just ten years after Hitler's occupation in 1938, France signed the Brussels Treaty with the tiny Benelux countries. Was this really a treaty to stand together to fight aggression? It was merely a moral alliance. We had only three divisions in Germany, the British had three, and the Benelux countries could muster only one division, and that with great difficulty. The Brussels Treaty was concluded mainly to prove to our friends in America that we were morally determined to repel any kind of aggression.

Therefore, just a few days after the treaty was signed, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georges Bidault, conveyed a note to the Department of State asking whether the United States were ready at that time to pledge to stand by her European friends in case of Soviet aggression. General Marshall, who was at that time Secretary of State, felt that public opinion in this country was not prepared for such a pledge. The United States was a member of the United Nations, and so in 1948, even after the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, even after the voting of the very generous Marshall plan, it would have been very difficult for public opinion to sanction a formal guarantee to foreign countries without the establishment of a pact. And so, very wisely, General Marshall and that great American, the late Arthur H. Vandenberg, worked out an agreement.

In 1948, as now, this country was involved in an election campaign, and not much attention was paid to the very explosive, revolutionary content of the so-called Vandenberg Resolution. But a few weeks later, on July 5, 1948, General Marshall and the French, Canadian, and British Ambassadors to the United States held a secret meeting in Washington. This was the first step toward the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on April 4, 1949.

I have outlined this bit of history to show that the people of France, with a will to deter any aggression coming from the East, asked this country to make a pledge. This is what I am saying in my newspaper columns to those in Europe who represent the North Atlantic Treaty as a weapon of American imperialism. One can recognize in this criticism the stooges of the Kremlin.

UNITED STATES AID

For one year, the North Atlantic Treaty, like the Brussels Treaty, was a paper alliance. Then in September 1949, Congress voted the first lend-lease to Europe, and you started to ship to France, Great Britain, and other countries your surplus material. But this was not enough to arm the freshly mustered divisions, and we realized that we had to do something more.

On June 25, 1950, the first armed Communist aggression burst by the invasion of South Korea by the Communist North Koreans at the instigation of the masters of the Kremlin. In August 1950, the French Government, represented by Monsieur René Pleven, sent to the United States Department of State two memoranda, which may be summarized as follows:

Was the United States ready to send more troops to Europe than the three divisions in the occupation force in Germany? If so, what would be the extent of American aid? Could we set up an agreement about these American forces?

No answer came. On September 8, 1950 the White House issued a communiqué in which President Truman said that the United States was ready to send ground forces to Europe to stand by the Atlantic allies, the British and the French. Four days later, on September 12, 1950, at the North Atlantic Council held at the Waldorf-Astoria, Secretary of State Acheson made it clear that this new American pledge to the European North Atlantic allies meant that we had to accept German participation in the defense of western Europe.

FRENCH MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

France at first rejected this point of view, for many obvious reasons, the main one being psychological. The matter was not decided until December 1950, when, at a meeting in Brussels of the new Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, we pledged to the North Atlantic Alliance twenty divisions.

In the press of this country it is pointed out that Yugoslavia has thirty divisions and Spain has thirty-two divisions. But these are divisions of 10,000 men, without any armament, or with obsolete armament. When we speak of divisions in France, we mean not only fighting men but also supporting elements, and every division numbers 45,000 men. That means that by the end of 1953 we should have a permanent force of 900,000 men, out of a population of continental France of 42,000,000 people.

Now I must say a word about the heavy strain of the Indochinese war. Only a few years ago it was tagged in this country as an imperialistic war. Now, since the 1950 aggression of the North Koreans, it is generally recognized that we are fighting Communism in southeastern Asia. We have there 174 battalions, each consisting of 900 men. In this struggle are involved 8,000 career officers and 37,000 noncommissioned career officers.

So, if we are lagging a little behind schedule in rearmament, it is because we are involved in a shooting war—as you are involved in Korea—against Communism. And we have not the huge means of this wonderful country of the United States. We are waging a war of attrition against Communism in southeastern Asia which is costing us every year one billion dollars. That means an average of three or four hundred million dollars more than we received under the Marshall plan assistance.

In closing, I can tell you that the people of France are forever grateful to the people of America for what they have done for France. We will ever stand by the United States, and we too have a saying, as you have, "United we stand, divided we fall." Let us stand united!

Maurice Ferro, Washington, D. C., is Washington correspondent of the French newspaper Le Monde. Prior to World War II he practiced law before the International Court of Appeals in Alexandria, Egypt. After the French armistice in June 1940, he joined the Free French forces and served in the Middle East, the Mediterranean area, and France. He was a first lieutenant in the French Navy at the time of his discharge in October 1945. Turning to the career of journalism, he became a foreign correspondent of Le Monde.

Europe in a Western Community

By PAUL-HENRI SPAAK

THE Second World War ended on a great note of hope, not only because we were victorious, not only because odious forms of government had collapsed, but also because, renewing President Wilson's great and generous endeavor, President Roosevelt was going to try to create a new universal, international institution, the task of which would be to maintain peace with justice and respect for the rights of all.

THE BASIC DELUSION

But the Charter of the United Nations is based on a delusion—that the world today is one.

When we had drawn up the principles on which the Charter was to be built, we agreed with enthusiasm to the text Marshal Smuts had prepared. It is always with emotion that I hear these noble words that eloquently express some of our most cherished ideas. But looking at the whole thing more closely, who can fail to see today the terrible equivocality, not to say the great lie, which made us admit that such a text could be accepted in the same way by democratic nations and by totalitarian nations?

". . . faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person . . .

"to establish conditions under which justice . . . can be maintained . . .

"to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . .

"to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors . . ."

Yes, for us, for the democracies of America and of Europe, this means something—something vital. But have we not cheapened, spoiled, tarnished our ideal in pretending to believe that it was also that of countries where one is arrested without a warrant, deported without judgment, tried without safeguards, tortured without mercy; where freedom does not exist, where religion is persecuted, where elections are a mockery, and where the will of the state is the only law?

It is high time to open our eyes. The world today is more torn apart than it has ever been before. Communism is not only an economic doctrine; it also claims to be a form of civilization, a rule of living. It is in this respect that it is opposed not only to some of our material interests, which after all would not be so important, but also to what is the basis of our spiritual life.

The world today is divided in two, and it probably is going to be so divided for a long time. For these reasons I cannot believe at this moment in a real world community; but at the same time, I strongly believe in a western community, and I even think that our most important duty is to work to reinforce it.

To reach this goal it is absolutely necessary to solve the European's problems, giving back to Europe its strength. In this problem of the western community, Europe is something of a dead weight that has to be dragged along—a body that has to be helped, rather than an active and powerful force.

EUROPE, MUTILATED AND MISERABLE

The Europe we speak about is a terribly mutilated Europe. Since 1939, that is to say in less than fifteen years,

Europe has lost, one after the other, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslavakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Eastern Germany. Dozens of millions of men and women belonging in heart and mind to western civilization, wishing to live according to our moral and political rules, are thrown to the domination of a minority which oppresses them cruelly, both materially and morally.

In that part of the world is being developed one of the most cruel political operations in the history of humanity. We watch it powerless. There lies one of the most manifest proofs of our weakness and our decline.

Our Europe is not only mutilated, it is miserable. It is obvious that if we had not had the benefit of Marshall aid in 1947, we should never have been able to solve the economic and social problems with which we were confronted as an inevitable consequence of the Second World War.

In 1947, the European deficit, expressed in dollars, was 5,800 million. This made it impossible for us to get food or supply our industries with raw materials; it meant, therefore, want and unemployment. Without Marshall aid the whole of the Europe that is still free would have known a situation even worse than during the bitterest years of the war, and we could not have prevented the triumphant spread of communism as far as the shores of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic—a communism which would have been nothing else than the expression of the despair of the peoples.

EUROPE, TIMID AND FACING REVOLT

A multilated Europe, a miserable Europe, but also a Europe which lives in the fear of war, for she knows that she has not the strength to repulse an eventual Soviet aggression. For the first time in their history, even the greatest, the strongest, European countries know that alone, isolated, they can no longer defend their borders, their independence, their freedom. They find themselves in a situation they have never known before. We know well in Europe that even all together, having mustered, co-ordinated, rationalized all our forces, we cannot feel secure without the constant and powerful support of the United States.

In fact, we live in fear of the Russian, and subsist thanks to American generosity. It is neither very pleasant nor very dignified.

Mutilated Europe, miserable Europe, timid Europe, and that is not all: Europe against whom Asia and Africa are in revolt.

In the United States people are quite stern regarding Europe's colonialism—I sincerely feel, rather too stern. This is not the time to look deep into the matter, to admit some abuses and underline a civilizing work that is not without grandeur. I merely want to acknowledge a fact. The people of Asia and Africa no longer accept Europe's domination, and they make no bones about it.

War in Indochina costs France one billion French francs daily, hundreds of officers, and thousands of soldiers. It forces her to an effort which according to all observers is one of the main elements of her present difficulties.

Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco are in an uproar. Yesterday, all these countries were contributing in a very large measure to Europe's might and prosperity. Today, they set formidable problems before her.

EUROPE ECONOMICALLY THREATENED

Mutilated, miserable, timid, facing rebellion—this is Europe today. Alas, that is not all. She is threatened by the most serious economic crisis. There is something really tragic in what is happening to her. The whole successful effort accomplished since 1947, all the progress achieved toward equilibrium and stability, is in question once more.

Let me remind you that in 1947 the European deficit—a but too evident sign of our poverty—was about six billion dollars. In 1950 it had been reduced to 2,700 million dollars, or more than 50 per cent. Success was in sight; American help together with a true effort on the part of Europe had brought good results. Little by little European economy was finding its bearings. Another year or two and Europe could manage without the help of the United States. I need not emphasize what that meant for us and for you.

The Korean war and the necessity of rearming stopped all progress, disrupted once more every factor of the problem, and by the end of 1951 had brought Europe back to a situation even worse than in 1949. The dollar gap has once more reached 4,800 millions. The old problems are set again, and this time under conditions far more unfavorable both materially and psychologically. Every one of the measures taken within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation must be revised. The liberation of inter-European exchanges is once more in question. France and Great Britain are again reducing their imports. The European Payments Union is collapsing.

One goes back, step by step, to the most deplorable bilateral relationship—that which forces European countries to come to the level of the weakest. At the time when we ought to produce more and do it more cheaply, the cost of living is increasing dangerously and barriers more and more numerous are being set, impeding more and more the free circulation of goods.

EUROPE'S RESOURCES

The great question which confronts us is, Can the situation be changed? Personally I think so, because it seems to me that the situation of western Europe, considered in itself, is far from being desperate.

I have often spoken of the power and strength of the United States. However, let us make a comparison between the United States and western Europe of today.

It is true that the territory of the United States is immense, but the combined territory of the states of western Europe—especially if we add to them the African possessions controlled by some of these countries—is not less important than what the United States has. There are 150 million Americans, but there are 270 million western Europeans. There are in the United States considerable wealth and large quantities of raw materials; but there are considerable wealth and large quantities of raw materials in Europe, too.

We have in Europe practically everything we need to live. And yet we witness a difference in might which is really extraordinary. We see in the United States a world which continually develops, springs up, grows; and in Europe a world which shrivels up and stagnates. Why? Each time I use this word "why" I have a slight hesitation, because the answer I am going to give to this immense question is so simple that I wonder if it is not too simple, seeing the importance of the problem. But it is possible, after all, that even for the greatest question the answer can be simple.

A NEW EUROPE ENVISIONED

For me, the answer is simple. What is it that makes the difference between the United States and Europe? Only

this: In the United States 150 million inhabitants have one border, one economy, one market, one currency; and in Europe 270 million inhabitants have fifteen borders, fifteen markets, fifteen economies, fifteen currencies. Let us have the courage, the audacity, to solve the problem on the same lines as the United States, and we can do just as well. Our fifteen borders, our customs barriers, our high tariffs, constitute an impossible obstacle. We must create a wide and single market for our 270 million inhabitants, permitting mass production and cheap production. There, and there only, is the possibility of success.

Mr. Paul Hoffman said one day:

> You have in western Europe 270 million citizens, hard-working and resourceful. Yet, last year, your net national income only totaled 160 billion dollars. In the United States where the population is but 150 million, the net national income totaled last year 260 billion dollars.
>
> Had the individual average of production of the European been the same as that of the American, the global net production of Europe would have been 470 billion dollars.

Actual income, 160 billion dollars; possible income, 470 billion dollars; difference, 310 billion dollars. The sum of 310 billion dollars is what we pay every year in Europe for keeping our borders, our so-called sovereignty, our customs, our selfishnesses. It is a great deal. I contend that it is far too much. Those extra 310 billion dollars would allow us to solve satisfactorily the formidable problem which is now bearing so heavily on our future. But for that a new Europe is indispensable.

IMPORTANCE OF GERMANY

I should now like to draw your attention most closely to the problem set by Germany to western Europe. I do not think I exaggerate in saying that the whole future of Europe, and to a certain extent that of the Western world, hangs on the manner of dealing with that problem.

Germany vanquished in 1945 is, in 1952, a kind of arbiter of the world's policy, whose support is sought by both the Russian and the western sides. Both are indeed fully aware of the decisive importance of having her as an ally.

It is high time for the Western world to settle its German policy, and, having settled it, to carry it out with continuity and logic by accepting everything it involves. A few more hesitations, a few more delays, and events will get out of our control. There will be nothing left for us but to suffer them, not having been able to manage them.

WAYS OPEN TO GERMANY

Several ways are open to Germany today. The most dangerous of all is to accept an alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Is that an altogether improbable hypothesis? I do not think so. The Russians have two choice baits at their command. They can, if they wish, restore unity to Germany and offer her industry a prodigious field of action by associating her with the economy of the U.S.S.R. and her European satellites and particularly her Asiatic satellites.

The price of such an alliance would be for Germany severance from the Western world, the end of democracy, and the loss of human liberties for the Germans. For a generation reaching maturity but politically educated under Hitler, is this too high a price to pay? I am not entirely sure.

The passage of Germany into the Soviet camp would be a moral blow for Europe. The Communists alone can accept such a solution, which I repeat, not without real anguish, is not impossible.

In Europe, the memories left by two wars are such that many right-minded people think that Germany ought to be demilitarized and neutralized. I thought so myself immediately after the war, but since then the Russian danger has become more definite.

To neutralize and disarm Germany means drawing back to the Rhine and the Maas the borders of the Western world. The operation is not without risk for France and the Benelux countries. It means creating in the middle of Europe an immense vacuum into which the dishonest partner (and who can it be?) will at his chosen moment hurl his armored divisions. It also means depriving us of a few hundred thousand excellent soldiers at a time when we do not have too many.

It means to create a political danger more serious than any of the military drawbacks. That neutral and disarmed Germany could be established only with the guarantee of the United States, France, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R.; and since there is more than a fair chance that the last-named would try to do in Berlin what was so successful in Prague, it is almost certain that the situation would lead to the third world war. This solution of compromise must therefore be discarded.

We might perhaps let things go. Germany would resume, little by little, her absolute sovereignty, her full independence, her army, her large military staff, her entirely independent foreign policy, and her economic power without limitations. Then, I put the question: Why would not the same causes bring back the same effects? Why would not that Germany be the replica of that of 1914 and 1939, and why would she not be the same cause of trouble and difficulties in Europe and in the world?

In my opinion, she would be even worse. For, thrown out of balance by the loss of Eastern Germany, overindustrialized, overpopulated with her ten million refugees, she could, this time with some cause, lay claim to a wider living space and try to get it by the worst means. Not a single sincere friend of peace could accept this lightheartedly.

THE POSSIBLE WAY OUT

But then, what is to be done? Only one thing. Try courageously the only chance we have left. Say to Germany: "You will not recover your full sovereignty, your total independence, your autonomous foreign policy, your national army. You are going to make a certain number of sacrifices at the altar of the new Europe. You are going to give up some of your prerogatives, certain aspects of your former power. But at the same time, in the same manner, and in the same proportions, the other countries of western Europe are going to make the same sacrifices, and all together we are going to create a new Europe, where our forces will be integrated, co-ordinated, on every level. We are going to form a great political, military, and economic unity, the whole power of which will be put to the service of the western cause and to its defense."

Honestly, I cannot guarantee the absolute success of such an experiment, but I can honestly say that outside of it, there is only chaos for Europe, a chaos out of which the worst may come.

There are the problems for Europe. What about the future? The future of Europe hangs on the three great projects which will be discussed and perhaps achieved this year: the Schuman plan, the European army, and, over all, the assembling of a European constitutional convention.

THE SCHUMAN PLAN

The Schuman plan is, as you know, the creation of a single market for both

coal and steel, for France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. For these two essential basic products there are to be no more borders, no more customs, no more artificial measures of defense; free circulation is ensured and production brought to its maximum at the lowest prices. It is a decisive step in the right direction.

The Schuman plan is not only important in itself: it is also important and perhaps even more so, by the inevitable consequences it involves. Already the problem of the co-ordination of transports within the continental community is set, and I am convinced that before long the whole of the monetary problem will have to be settled. It is therefore permissible to state that the economic integration of western Europe is in process of formation.

THE EUROPEAN ARMY

The problem of the European army raises greater difficulties. You probably remember how it originated. When, in September 1950, Mr. Dean Acheson announced that American troops would be stationed in Europe in large numbers, he added that Germany's rearming was called for. But the French Government, unable to make the resurrection of a German army acceptable to its public opinion, proposed to integrate the necessary German forces into a European army.

This was at first very guardedly received in the United States. But in the course of 1951 the American authorities came around to adopting the plan, and urged forward its carrying into effect. They understood that it was probably the only way of rearming Germany without causing a serious crisis in France. Let us acknowledge it: the debates on this matter which took place in the various parliaments previous to the recent conference in Lisbon were rather alarming.

In Germany, at first sight, things seem to be going on well enough. Chancellor Adenauer's government and his majority seem resolute. However, one has to ask a very serious question: Are we sure that in this matter the present German Government truly represents the feelings of the German masses? At the last elections the question of rearming had not been put to the electorate. At that time, the rearming of Germany was inconceivable. We were in 1949. Since then, in quite a number of restricted elections, the Socialists have gained victories, often important ones, by passionately opposing rearming, under the present circumstances.

Moreover, the Germans, fully aware of the strong diplomatic position they hold, have presented quite a list of demands. Some are logical and justified, such as equality of rights; others are far more extraordinary and disquieting, such as the liberation of German officers condemned for war crimes.

FRENCH OPPOSITION

In France, the debate revealed the sharp clash in public opinion regarding Germany. On the one hand, many understand the necessity for associating yesterday's enemy with the defense of the West; on the other, many are incapable of forgetting their resentment and their sufferings. A deputy imprisoned by the Nazis during the war, tortured in a concentration camp, cried out his indignation and his grief at the idea that his children and grandchildren might one day serve side by side with the sons of his torturers. The French Assembly, deeply moved, gave him an ovation.

Other deputies (and this is perhaps more serious) have expressed their fear of a situation which increasingly leaves France and Germany confronting each other in isolation. A real inferiority complex on the part of the French, to my mind hard to explain, is beginning to develop. A great number feel that the presence of Great Britain in the European community is indispensable to counterbalance German power; that France alone is unable to accomplish this task.

Lastly, against the project of a treaty for a European army a double opposition has developed: that of the nationalists who deplore the partition of the old and glorious French Army, and that of the advocates of the new Europe who feel that the project is not audacious enough, as it does not create a real supranational authority.

The debate in the French Assembly ended with a rather confused voting. I am not quite convinced that the conference in Lisbon has removed all misunderstandings.

NECESSITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Yet, from all these difficulties something good arose. In discussing the treaty for a European army, the ministers became aware that they were using the wrong method; that there was something basically illogical in wanting to make a European army before having made Europe or at least outlined the legal framework of a new Europe.

They found out, too, that it was dangerous and even impossible to make a single European army if there was not one single foreign policy for Europe. An army is nothing but the instrument of a policy. Whom must the European army obey? What policy must it serve? There is an aggregate of preliminary general problems which must be solved before broaching purely technical questions.

The ministers of the six states concerned have therefore decided that a kind of European constitutional assembly ought to be convened without delay, to propose a draft constitution. I want to stress the point that this return to logic seems to me to constitute the great hope at this moment.

To retain British collaboration, we have been trying, in good faith, for the past three years to employ a very empirical method, which consisted in trying to make Europe without solving the basic problems. This method has failed. Today we must accept the decisive test. We must see if we are capable of creating a real European confederation.

THE COURSE IS CHARTED

The year 1952 is for us something like 1788 was for Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay—a decisive, crucial year. It is clear that it is in the history of the United States that Europe must now seek her reasons for hope. The work for us to accomplish this year is quite clear. We must use every possible means to convoke a constitutional convention and ensure the success of its action. Public opinion must be mobilized to bring about a favorable result.

We are a few men in Europe determined to attempt everything to succeed. We are resolved to organize a big confederacy in continental Europe to support the idea of a constitutional convention. We are resolved to collect millions of signatures from people in all segments of society, asking for the calling of the convention and ready to accept and support the idea of a European federation.

We will work on that for three

months. Then we will organize a big meeting where all the signatures collected will be brought together, and at that time we will discuss a draft constitution which is being prepared.

We sincerely believe that this kind of pressure from public opinion will force the governments to act with some boldness and to keep their word and officially convoke a constitutional convention.

HOPE ON THE HORIZON

In spite of certain appearances and serious difficulties, we may very well be on the eve of a radical change in Europe—a change so deep that in less than ten years the Europe of today which I painted to you, mutilated, miserable, timid, can have regained her economic power, her military strength, and her spiritual radiance. Think of what it would mean for the world and especially for the western community! By the addition of our strength to yours, it is utterly certain that we should be able to contain the aggressive action of Communism and ensure peace.

It is in forgetting our so-called national interests that we shall be able to create and support not perhaps a world community but a western community, our world, and to save our civilization.

Paul-Henri Spaak, a native of Belgium and an advocate of European unity, is chairman of the International Council of the European Movement. He has been a Socialist Deputy in the Belgian Parliament since 1932 and has held various Cabinet posts, including several periods as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was Prime Minister of Belgium in 1938–39 and in 1947–49. He was president of the First Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations; first chairman of the Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation; and first president of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Tensions in the Middle East

By N. SAIFPOUR FATEMI

THE subject I am going to discuss here is the history of what has been happening in Iran during the past one hundred and fifty years, showing that the present tension can be traced to causes in the past. My remarks about the colonial governments are no reflection on the character of the individual people of those nations, for I have great respect for the British and the French. Those nations have contributed much to democracy and to world civilization. What I wish to point out is what imperialism or colonialism can do to a nation, and I desire to suggest one or two remedies for the present situation.

REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

It is a great pity that the question of the Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and Iran, has not been presented to the American public as it is. It is a very simple question. It is a revolution. What is happening over there is no fanatical movement. It is not hatred of the Europeans. It is not a pro-Soviet or pro-Communist movement. It is a movement against foreign exploitation, against misery and poverty, and against those groups of the ruling class who, under the auspices and with the blessing of the foreign governments, have exploited the people. In simple English, it is what you did in 1776.

The people say, Why should we be taxed by foreign governments? Why should foreign companies take out from Iran and other areas what rightfully belongs to us? They say, Since the beginning of the nineteenth century we have been exploited by foreign companies, and after a hundred and fifty years we are the most miserable and the poorest people on the surface of the earth.

You will be surprised to know that in my country—a country which has twenty-five centuries of recorded history, a country which has contributed much to culture, literature, and art, a country which has contributed to science and to the civilization of the world—the national income right now is $100 per capita per annum.

Unfortunately it has been the destiny of the people of the United States to be the uneasy spectators of this supreme drama of history: the revolution in Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. Through all but a small fraction of world history, Iran has dominated a great area of the world, both politically and culturally. Only since the beginning of the nineteenth century has it regressed into impotence, and it is now destined to resume its pre-eminence. Since the end of the Second World War there has been a revolution against foreign exploitation and the corrupt ruling class. Side by side with this revolution there has been a fight between the West and the East for the mind of the people of Iran.

RUSSIAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM

The Persian experience of both Russian and British imperialism has been a bitter one. During the last one hundred and fifty years Iran has been five times invaded by Russia: in 1812, 1827, 1908, 1920, and 1941. All their lives, the people of the northern provinces of Iran have lived in fear of the Russian Empire. They remember the provinces stolen from Iran by Alexander I and

Nicholas I; they remember the threats which drove Morgan Shuster from Iran; they remember that England has been an accomplice in all these crimes, and that twice Great Britain agreed with Russia to the partition of Iran: in 1907 and 1915. Izvolski's mailed fist and Sir Edward Grey's threats sound as a knell in the hearts of the Iranians.

In 1919, after the Russian revolution, England tried to establish a protectorate over Iran. The Foreign Office bribed three members of the Iranian Cabinet to consent to the notorious Anglo-Persian agreement. It was the resistance of the people of Iran and the support of a great American President, Woodrow Wilson, that saved Iran from the fate of Egypt and India.

Since 1870 Iran has been used as a laboratory of British imperialism. For sixty years banking and for fifty years telegraphic communications in the country were British monopolies. In southern Iran, England had a monopoly of oil, the only industry in that part of the country.

THE D'ARCY CONCESSION

In 1901 an Englishman by the name of William D'Arcy got a concession for an area of about 400,000 square miles, or all of Iran except the five northern provinces. Under this concession D'Arcy obtained exclusive rights to the exploitation, production, and refining of petroleum for sixty years, as well as the exclusive right to lay pipelines within the area of the concession. In return, the concessionaire agreed to make a cash payment of $100,000 and also to issue to Iran paid-up shares representing a 10 per cent ownership of the company organized, called the First Exploitation Company. In addition, the concessionaire agreed to pay Iran a royalty of 16 per cent of the profits.

The D'Arcy concession was a simple exploitation contract in which a weak and impoverished nation surrendered control of state resources to foreign interests for an immediate cash payment. This contract had two weaknesses, weaknesses which were bound to cause dissension between the contracting parties. The first lay in the absolute unilateral control of development by the concessionaire. The second was the lack of any provision for the revision or renegotiation of the contract at stated periods or as the concession was developed.

During the last fifty years the Iranian people, instead of being benefited by the oil industry, have been subjected to tremendous pressure from the British Government. To quote Vincent Sheean, the distinguished author of *New Persia*:

> No chapter in the history of British diplomacy would supply a better theme for an Anglophobe than the story of the relation of the British Empire with Persia. Almost every action of the British Government with respect to Persia since the beginning of the nineteenth century can be interpreted as the result of aggressive or acquisitive ambitions. Especially is this so in the present century, when the progress of British influence in Persia has very often appeared to strike at the independence of that unfortunate nation. . . .
>
> Persia was filled with British agents, and bribery was the accepted means of persuasion. The expenses of the British establishment in Tehran were enormous, and British agents quite openly worked in elections, in Parliament, and in every political activity.[1]

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from the very outset, with the aid of British Government officials stationed in Iran, established itself as an independent state within the state of Iran. It established political relations with the tribal chiefs in the southern areas. In 1920, according to Henry Filmer, "Consideration would appear to have been given for a time by the British authorities to the safeguarding of its interests in the south under an independent southern Persia confederation."[2]

[1] Vincent Sheean, *New Persia* (New York: Century Co., 1927), pp. 162–163.

The company, throughout its history, directed, if not dictated, the policy of the British Government in its relations with Iran; few Iranian officials or individuals ever would risk the displeasure of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and those who dared to do so were liable to disgrace or dismissal.

THE FINANCIAL ASPECT

Now let us have a look at the financial page of the company. The total cash invested by the British Government and other shareholders in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is $100 million. In fifty years the company has produced 2,508 million barrels of oil. It has paid to the British Government, in income taxes and discount for all its sales to the British admiralty, more than $2 billion; to the shareholders, including the British Government, $350 million; and has retained for the expansion of its oil empire $2,700 million. On the other hand, the total sum paid to the Government of Iran in fifty years has been $400 million. According to these figures, Iran has received only 9 per cent of the company's profit.

How was this sum spent? From 1909 through 1920 no royalties were received. From 1921 through 1930, Iran received about $60 million. From 1931 to 1941 Iran's royalties amounted to about $125 million, which, however, were earmarked for the purchase of military equipment from England. During World War II this equipment was delivered almost intact to the British and Russian forces which occupied the country. In the last decade the total amount of royalties paid by the company amounted to some $250 million. This money was supposed to be allocated for the development project of the Seven-Year Plan. This project was planned at the behest of His Majesty the Shah of Iran, in order to give better education, better sanitation, a better standard of living to the common man in Iran. Unfortunately the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company torpedoed the whole plan, and the American advisers to the Government of Iran had to leave Tehran, because the British Ambassador there said that the leader of the mission, Max Thornburg, was working for the interest of Iran rather than the interest of Great Britain. He was forced to leave the country because he was *persona non grata* to the British authorities in that area.

[2] Henry Filmer, *The Pageant of Persia* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1936), p. 343.

THE WORKERS

The company has always boasted of its service to the cause of the workers and the establishment of a secure and comfortable life for them. I wish to bring to your attention a report published by the International Labor Organization on the labor conditions in Iran:

> At the end of 1949 about 95 per cent of the salaried staff consisting almost entirely of British nationals had been given accommodation in company houses. On the other hand, out of 31,875 wage earners, only 5,298 or 16.6 per cent were in company houses. The great majority of the oil workers live in the older overcrowded section where more often than not an entire family, or three or four bachelors occupy one room. Rents are very high and an attempt made by the government to fix a ceiling on rents has utterly failed. Finally another group of workers live in huts and tents which the company put up in 1948 to accommodate homeless workers. . . .
>
> Distressing as these conditions are, they are incomparably better than that of the contract labor employed within the company's area who are excluded from all the

schemes which the company operates for its own workers. This exclusion is particularly serious in the field of health and services. Contract workers are not entitled to admission to the only hospital in Abadan, the company hospital.[3]

BRITISH OPPRESSION

This ruthless exploitation, coupled with the rule of a group of foreign stooges in the country, has produced the present tension in that area. The Shah of Iran is both progressive and democratic. He is always trying to do something for the people, and has divided all his property among the peasants. But the British authorities have not paid much attention to his warnings, and have not given much consideration to the good advice of the press and the Parliament of Iran. Instead they have tried to cow the Iranians into obedience and continue the policy of unjust enrichment. For four years the Government of Iran pressed for a settlement, and for four years the Foreign Office and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company stalled a fair settlement. To quote the American Ambassador, Henry F. Grady:

> Great Britain called the signals, and called them very badly. Had I prepared a list when I went to Teheran as United States Ambassador in June of 1950—a list of all the blunders that conceivably could be made in dealing with the Iranian oil dispute—it could not have been more complete than the list of blunders which actually were committed. . . .
>
> Unfortunately, the dangers involved in the Iranian oil dispute were painfully slow to be appreciated either in London or Washington. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, without check from the British Foreign Office, fomented a situation which could not have served Russia's purposes better if she had planned it herself. . . .
>
> The concept that financial pressures would bring the Iranians into line and solve the oil problem in Iran was from the beginning the key to the British blunders which proved so costly. This notion springs from a colonial state of mind which was fashionable and perhaps even supportable in Queen Victoria's time, but is not only wrong and impractical today but positively disastrous. . . .
>
> The British attitude simply failed to take into account the rising tide of nationalist-independence sentiment in formerly colonial or semicolonial countries such as Iran. It led the British to underestimate Mossadegh beyond all reason, for it could hardly be easy to get rid of a man who regularly gets unanimous votes of confidence from both houses of the Iranian Parliament and who apparently has the support of approximately 95 per cent of the country's population.[4]

RISE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

This revolution in Iran is in no way a Communist revolution, but to the contrary it is a revolution against Red imperialism as well as against British Black imperialism. There is now emerging in Iran a third social force—call it a middle class or an urban class—which is definitely altering the balance of power within the country, and is especially challenging the hegemony of the old traditional ruling class and the influence of Communists. In the last election in Tehran it was only this group who defeated the Communists, the crackpots, the Russia-firsters, and the Russian spies who ganged together hoping to be elected to the Parliament. Thus far the coherence of this new group has been largely shown in fighting against the Russian and British encroachment and against the reactionary and extreme elements; but I believe that in the new Parliament this group, which has a majority, will unite on a common ground of social interest to cooperate in the more positive task of introducing reforms so desperately needed in that country.

It is wrong to call the present movement in Iran and other Middle Eastern countries anti-West and pro-Russian. It is neither anti-West nor pro-Russian. It is anti-colonial and pro-Iran. The people of these countries say: "We are tired of being pushed around. For the last hundred and fifty years you have profited by our labor; we have toiled, sweated, and suffered in order that people in England should have a happy and gay life. Our present misery and poverty—they are inconceivable; they could not be worse; our patience is exhausted and we can endure no more. We are prepared to co-operate with the West on the basis of equality and partnership, but the British slogan, 'Just wait until the beggars need the money; that will bring them to their knees' is no longer true. We would rather die than accept British or Russian or any other domination over our fatherland. We are prepared to start with a new slate. We are ready even to forgive our oppressors, and if they are repentant of their past crimes we will accept their apology and co-operate with them in building up a peaceful, stable, and prosperous world."

THE MIDDLE EAST NEGLECTED

This co-operation of the peoples of the Middle East can come only through (1) redress of grievances, and (2) reforms by means of technical and economic aid. How do you expect Iranians and Egyptians and Tunisians to co-operate with you when British and French imperialism has plagued their areas? During the war we all shared the trials and tribulations, but when peace came all the big nations forgot us. My country and most of the other Middle Eastern countries have so far benefited very little from the generous help given by the United States to the shattered world. In Europe you started with the Marshall plan and followed with Eisenhower and military aid. How is it that in the Middle East, where so much is needed in economic aid and reforms, everybody is expecting us to do the impossible?

The Middle East could be turned into a strong democratic bastion only through American aid and Mutual Security aid. In Iran you spent $500,000 last year and you are going to spend $23,000,000 this year. This generosity has already won you many friends and has done much toward the betterment of the life of the common man.

IRAN REJECTS COMMUNISM

Despite the fact that the Iranians have been exploited, impoverished, and oppressed by the British, and in spite of their misery, poverty, and tribulations, they have never asked and will never solicit help from the Soviet Union or any other country that is not prepared to respect their national integrity, independence, and sovereignty. We are not going to jump from the frying pan into the fire. We have always resented Russian aggression and Communist propaganda. We are Moslems, and the Moslems believe that Communism is a replica of Nazism with a touch of Tartar sauce.

The first principle of Islam is the oneness of God. This article of faith has been the rallying point of all Moslems. Belief in God and the oneness of God is the heart of Islam, as is submission to the will of God. Other principles are acceptance of Mohammed as the prophet of God, and acceptance of the Koran as the revealed word of Allah. Still other principles are life after death, and divine justice with rewards for the righteous and punishment for the wicked.

Even a superficial comparison of the

[3] International Labor Office, *Labour Conditions in the Oil Industry in Iran*, Geneva, 1950, pp. 33, 34, and 36.

[4] Henry F. Grady, "What Went Wrong in Iran," Vol. 224 *Saturday Evening Post* (Philadelphia, Jan. 5, 1952), pp. 30, 56, 57.

principles of Islam with those of dialectical materialism and with the trend of Marxism and Stalinism confirms the incompatibility of Islam with Communism. Islam and Communism are like oil and water—the two never mix. In evidence, there is not only Lenin's oft-quoted declaration: "Religion is the opiate of the people," but also the entire trend of Communism, which has been antireligious and atheistic. For example, in 1946 the official organ of the Communist Party stated:

> Dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism and Stalinism, and the theoretical foundation of the Communist Party, are incompatible with religion. The world outlook of the Party is based on scientific data, whereas religion contradicts science. . . . As the Party bases its activities on scientific foundations, it is bound to oppose religion.
>
> The propaganda of atheism has been a vital part of the activities of the educational and cultural organizations in Soviet Russia from the first day of the Soviet regime. The Party will continue antireligious propaganda as the means by which the complete liquidation of the reactionary clergy must be brought about.[5]

It is obvious that in Communism as we know it there is no place for God, for our great prophet Mohammed or his Koran, or for anyone else who has a conscience and believes in God and virtue. Communism is certainly the negation of Islam and all the traditions and principles which the Persians stand for.

Another Communist principle, state ownership of property and the means of production, conflicts with Islam. The institution of personal property and its sanctity are well established by the Koran and Moslem practice. There is, for example, the statement in Mohammed's farewell sermon: "Know ye . . . , that you are now one brotherhood. It is not right, therefore, for any one of you to appropriate unto himself anything that belongs to his brother unless it is willingly given to him by that brother." It is stated very clearly in the Koran that a Moslem is not to be deprived of his property or his liberty on any account.

Another point to be remembered is that Iran has twenty-five centuries of recorded history. She has one of the richest cultures and one of the oldest civilizations in the world. The great principle of our culture and our civilization is tolerance and humanitarianism. You all know the story of Cyrus the Great and his tolerance toward the Jews. He not only allowed the Jews to go back to Palestine but he rebuilt the Temple and appointed a Jewish governor over that area. How can a nation with such a culture and civilization succumb to Communism or any other ism?

Iran has resisted Russian aggression since the time of Peter the Great. It should be remembered that Iran was the first nation to revolt against Russian aggression in 1945. Of all the countries of the world, Iran is the only one that sent away the Soviet occupation force without accepting a puppet Communist regime.

A PARTNER TO THE WEST

It is the great American idea to "live and let live." It is the American tradition to help those who need help and can use it to the best advantage of mankind. If you, in accordance with this tradition, and along the line of Point Four, will accept us as a partner, help us to develop our natural resources, give moral support to the progressive elements all over the Middle East, and support us in our fight against both Black and Red imperialism, we believe we shall be able speedily to set up strong societies and communities which will be a great bulwark against any kind of aggression and will always support the cause of freedom and democracy.

We usually hate to fight for others, but we always fight for ourselves. Whatever aid which you give to the Middle Eastern countries will be a premium on a peace insurance policy.

The British are wrong when they say that we are anti-West. We are friends of all, but tied only to Iran. We desire consideration and respect from those who have always been benefited by us. It is a shame to call us fanatics and extreme nationalists. Iran has always advocated the cause of humanitarianism and internationalism. The most popular poet of Iran, Saadi, many centuries ago stated the fundamental principle of the Iranian belief:

> The sons of men are members
> In a body whole related,
> For of a single essence
> Are they each and all created.
> When Fortune persecutes with pain
> One member sorely, surely
> The other members of the body
> Cannot stand securely.
> O you who from another's troubles
> Turn aside your view,
> It is not fitting they bestow
> The name of "Man" on you.

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[5] *Islam in the Modern World* (Washington: Middle East Institute, March 1951), p. 67.

Problems of Adjustment in the Middle East

By Adam Watson

WHEN an Englishman, especially one in an official position, addresses a group of Americans, there is one sentiment that he feels called upon to express, and that is acknowledgment for what America has been doing for my country in the last few years. I know you do it for almost every other country, too, but you have done a very great deal for us. We regard our war wounds as honorable. It is not our fault that we have been convalescing for so long. But you have really been exceptionally generous. Not merely have you paid money in the form of taxes, which is now helping to alleviate some of the difficulties in Britain, but also you have your string of big bomber bases in our country, which helps to make it more secure. And anybody who lived through the incessant bombing year after year in Britain during the war well knows how much it matters to have friendly bombers there, and planes of all kinds.

Also, you have your armies across the Channel standing between us and our enemies. And if anyone tells you that in Britain this is not appreciated, that person is unaware of how English people really think. English people grumble; and we are irritated by many things that are said and done by Americans here and in England, just as you are irritated by many things that we do. But this type of grumbling and criticism does not indicate any lack of appreciation. I cannot think of any piece of news, short of the announcement of a world war, that would more seriously disturb the minds of Britain than news that American aid and comfort and moral support were to be withdrawn.

Britain's Contribution

Furthermore, I think we are making good use of the aid you have given us. We have taxed ourselves very readily. We have a flat income tax of 45 per cent, with a surtax on top. Cigarettes now cost us 40 cents a pack and gasoline 50 cents a gallon, and we do not live any too well. Of all the European powers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we put out about 40 per cent of the total armament; so I think we do our share. Also, we have more tanks at the moment, more armor, in continental Europe than you. That is reasonable, but it is certainly true.

Altogether—in Korea and Hong Kong and Malaya and other places—I think we are playing as big a part as a still convalescing country like ourselves could reasonably be expected to play. Therefore, I hope you will not feel that what you have contributed so far has been wasted, but that you have made a good investment.

The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East

Now, I want to talk about that part of the world where we have still major responsibility for defense apart from Europe, and that is the area to the south of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To the west of the U.S.S.R. there is Germany and to the east of the U.S.S.R. there is Japan. These are great, powerful, industrial countries—united, strong, rich, capable, with mighty industries, with brilliant warlike traditions, with excellent civil services, and altogether powers of the first rank in the world. My friend Joseph Harsch has spoken of the revival of Germany,[1] and I entirely agree with what he says; and I think that much the same picture could be painted of the revival of Japan.

But this industrial skill, this know-how, this ability to field an army capable of standing up against the major armies of the world, does not exist to the south of the U.S.S.R. In the south there is a decided power balance. In Iran, which has always seemed to me among the most civilized and delightful of Middle Eastern countries, there are many things worth saving. But there is not at the moment the wherewithal to save them.

The crucial strategic problem is really this: The Russians have acquired in Europe a large area of buffer territory around themselves. They have pushed out a long way, and even if they do not keep all they have acquired since World War II, at least they have acquired a great deal of territory as a protecting area. In the Far East they have achieved rather more than they expected. And although we do not quite know what the relations between Moscow and Peking are, yet we do know that on the Soviet Union's southeastern front there is now a great and powerful government which is itself an ally, although its people may not wish to be friendly to the Soviet Union.

In the south, however, there is still nothing the Soviets have acquired. That is partly due to the fact that the power which has always opposed Russia in the south is ourselves, and that we did not, like Germany and Japan, lose the war. It is hard to say we won it, but we came through unbeaten, and that is one reason why the Middle East is still self-governing and tends to be more so.

Let us look, first of all, at the power problem in the Middle East. This is an area much coveted by the Russians. There was an agreement between the Russians and the Germans in which the Middle East was assigned to the U.S.S.R. for general expansion, as Europe was to the German government. I myself was in the midst of the victory celebrations which took place in Moscow, and I was able to have a few words with a member of the Politburo, Mr. Mikoyan. He told me that as a child he had stood on the Russian frontier and looked over into Turkey and Persia, because the place where he was raised was so near those two frontiers. Stalin himself also comes from that area, and so it is an area which interests the Politburo very much.

[1] See Joseph C. Harsch, in this volume.

Lack of Hard Goods and Technicians

The basic problem of the Middle East resolves into this: The whole area produces scarcely a million tons of steel, no aircraft, no tanks or guns or anything like that. All the hard goods must come from the West. Even England, although it is a manufacturing country, is not self-sufficient. But in countries like those of the Middle East, *all* the hard goods must come from the West. Much of it has come from the United States, and some from England.

In the second place, for many years to come, a great deal of the servicing of the aircraft and ships and guns will have to be carried out by western technicians. But one of the problems which faces us in the Middle East (a problem in which you must play an increasing part) is to see that Iranians, Egyptians, and Syrians are trained more and more to service and maintain these extremely complicated and easily upset modern weapons of war.

Third is the question of actual combat troops, many of whom are also technicians. The men who operate a modern jet bomber are really a crew of engineers, not just a crew of brave fighting

chaps. And for some time, therefore, if we are to prevent a power vacuum, we shall have to provide from the West a certain number of the fighting technicians, though perhaps a decreasing number. A basic problem of the Middle East is, What can the people themselves reasonably be expected to do, and what must we still do?

PROBLEM OF IMPERIALISM

Now, the picture is colored, of course, by the imperialistic past of the countries which have been associated with that area from outside, particularly ours. Dr. Fatemi [2] has expressed a viewpoint that is typical of much of the thinking in the Middle East, and that is another of the problems that we face. Fortunately, not all Middle Easterners feel as certain Iranian nationalists feel, and not all Iranians feel as those who compose the present government do.

We have tried in the last few years to alter any imperialistic course we may have pursued. One of the things which most convince English people that we have succeeded in doing this is the fact that India and Pakistan stayed with us when there was no power capable of holding them. And we are fairly popular in those countries today.

And there are other countries, like Iraq, which we took and built into nations, although when we first went in there was no civil service, no administration, not even really a country. And Iraq is a very different country from Iran, for it has decided that oil companies are not so corrupt as some Iranians have found them to be—perhaps because the oil companies in Iraq are partly American. The liberality of Americans and the pleasant green color of your money have definitely helped us to convert Iraq into a country which wishes to enrich its people by allowing the oil to be extracted on an equal basis. I have no doubt that in time other countries, like Iran, will arrive at approximately similar settlements.

[2] See N. Saifpour Fatemi, in this volume.

THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION

I do not think that we should emphasize the differences between one oil company in Iran and the local government as being a major factor in the whole Middle East. Much more important is the problem of general defense in the Middle East. America and Britain and France and Turkey (Turkey being the Middle Eastern member of the NATO team) proposed to the Egyptians, that there should be a Middle East Defense Command and the Egyptians said they could not agree to it as long as foreign troops remained on the Suez Canal. Now, we do not have our troops all over Egypt as you have your troops all over Britain. But we do have them on the Canal because the Canal is the place where the Indian Ocean meets the Mediterranean and where Asia meets Europe, and it is the obvious strategic center for defense.

I think we shall be able to work out with the Egyptians a satisfactory system. It is no longer necessary to have the Union Jack and British troops there, at great expense, to guard British interests. I hope we shall substitute a system, possibly under Egyptian command, which will include association with countries like Iraq and also with countries like yours. When my Prime Minister recently proposed in Washington that it would be a good idea to have American troops on the Canal, I thought I sensed a kind of groan in Congress; but maybe later on you will get used to having what are now called "uniformed technicians" there.

THE CORE OF THE MATTER

In any case, I am sure that the problem which we have in this very difficult and dangerous area is that of adjusting the national spirit of these countries, which is a very real and turbulent thing, to the grim reality of the power vacuum right on the Soviet Union's frontier. And I hope the American people will realize that this load is not something that the British can or will bear alone; that almost certainly, as everywhere else, you will make your contribution to the new system with the usual dollars and the usual GI's and other things that always seem to be necessary if any form of world defense is really to be successful.

This problem worries me very deeply, and I am sure it ought to worry you—How do West and East marry in this business of defense? In closing, I should like to quote a remark made to me by a very distinguished Iranian lady, Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister. I was discussing with her the problem of backwardness in present-day Iran and she said, "You must be patient. You really must be patient. You Europeans have never learned to wait on developments." I explained to her that I thought time pressed, and she said, "But you don't make it any better by all this impatience. You must learn to be much calmer in dealing with people like ourselves."

And indeed I believe that to be true, that we need to be much calmer than we are.

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Report from the Middle East

By Ray Brock

MY viewpoint on the Middle East is that of a fairly hard-boiled American reporter who has been covering wars and the events leading up to wars for nearly sixteen years. I recently returned from the Middle East to complete what I consider an honest, realistic book on the people and the crises of that vast area of two million square miles—*Blood, Oil and Sand*—and now I am going back to continue my work.

In my opinion, the Middle East is going the way of the Far East with terrifying velocity. Postwar disillusionment has very nearly reached its depths in the hearts of teeming millions who had hoped that fumbling but benevolent American policy might succeed where British colonialism has so miserably failed. From the fortress of Gibraltar to the Afghan frontier, the Soviet Union and the increasingly dangerously divided western powers are interlocking in a gigantic struggle that may lead to World War III; for the Soviet pattern of power and conquest is based on the eventual subjugation and exploitation of the peoples and the riches of the mighty Middle East.

Since we are living in an age of moment, of potential mortal combat in a World War III, it behooves every American to know precisely what this area comprises. Militarily, it must be extended beyond the normal geographic confines of what has been loosely called Middle East. It must include Morocco, turbulent Tunisia, the vast stretches of North Africa through Libia to Egypt and down to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It incorporates Saudi Arabia with its immense oil wells and the Arab sheikdoms on the Persian Gulf. Of course it includes Iraq and Iran, Hashemite Jordan, and Syria and Israel. But my concept of the Middle East comes around in a wide circle to encompass the Balkans, which flank the Middle East; and that means Yugoslavia, Greece, and, most specifically, Turkey.

Turkey Our Ally

Because Turkey is so important to our fate in that dangerous area, I want to consider her first, and to remind you that until very recently indeed, and almost too late, Turkey was being forced into the position of a stubborn, neutral stepchild. The belated admission of Turkey, along with Greece, into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was long overdue, and gained for us an incomparable ally—an ally we did not have in the last war, which nearly cost us our victory in that part of the world. To my mind, the Turks are today our only reliable allies in the entire Middle East. The Turks have, technically, twenty-seven divisions; but as military men see it, there are nineteen active mobilized infantry divisions, and seven to nine armored brigades. But these divisions are fully activated divisions of 20,000 men each, and the brigades are full-sized. They have been, and are daily being, superbly trained in air and infantry weapons by the greatest military mission the United States has ever sent overseas, headed by General William H. Arnold and now directed by our able new Ambassador, George McGhee.

Despite assurances of allegiance from the Arab League, despite halfhearted promises from Egypt and Iran, despite willingness of small and struggling

Israel, I repeat that the only reliable allies we have in the entire Middle East are the Turks. Recently I was reassured of this by a talk with a man I believe to be the most able diplomat in the entire United Nations, Selim Sarper, who is the Turkish delegate to the U.N. with the rank of ambassador. He is the man who almost singlehandedly drove through the condemnation of Red China's aggression in Korea, at a time when our British allies were in a very surprising position of abstention, and our Indian friends were in the peculiar political posture of siding *against* condemnation of naked aggression by a Communist nation. The Turks, I repeat, not only stood fast but moved to the attack as they have done so courageously in Korea. Sarper did not have a bayonet at the United Nations, but he is a man whose words are as brilliantly pointed at the enemy as any bayonet can be.

The Arab League

On the other hand, to discuss the Middle East intelligently we have to consider just where the Arab League stands, for it swings much more weight politically than militarily. The Arab League presumes to speak for the Islamic people—all the Islamic people. It presumes to speak for the diverse peoples inhabiting more than a million square miles, differing in rulers, political postures, political systems, and interests.

The Arab League does *not* speak for those peoples. It speaks for a clique, for a combination of the satrapy, the ruling classes, of those nations—a clique which is responsible for the filth and misery and degradation in which nine-tenths of the Islamic people live, and which is equally responsible for the irresponsible chaos and rioting that are racking, and potentially wrecking, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, and many other danger spots in the Middle East.

The Arab League is under the control of Haj Amin el Husseini, former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who from his sanctuary in Egypt has directed the trail of blood and assassinations that has been drawn across the oily sands of the Middle East from Pakistan to Jordon to Egypt, culminating last January 25–26 in the bloody riots in Cairo in which some six hundred people lost their lives. Many, particularly those unlucky British who were in the Turf Club that afternoon, were seized and slashed, their eyes were gouged out, their bodies dismembered, and their remains tossed onto bonfires carefully built on the exact premises of British establishments. Martial law has held down subsequent violence, but that does not mean that violence is at an end.

Communist Designs

This is but a slight indication of what can happen when riot, bedlam, and the beginnings of revolution break loose. We have been told many times, in many ways, that these are spontaneous uprisings of the "people" against the "infidels." "Nationalism" has become a slogan, under whose banner hides Communist infiltration, guided by the crafty hand of ambitious little Haj Amin el Husseini. Riots and revolution serve no purpose but that of the Kremlin. And you may rest assured that the satrapy of Egypt, like that of Iran, is carefully directing, and fomenting, hatred of the West, the "foreigners," the British, thus hoping to turn aside all blame from themselves for the animal-like standard of living forced on their people, not by the British or the foreigners, but by their own corrupt, greedy selves.

These same arrogant, wealthy, and indolent men who control the destinies of these impoverished people insist that

they in turn are controlled by the foreigners—that they are under the thumb of the British. That is not entirely true. They invited the British in. The British came because there was wealth there. The hierarchy of those nations shared in that wealth. A portion of that wealth, it is quite true, went back to Britain; but vast amounts which might otherwise have lain buried beneath the sands of Iran and Iraq and Arabia—those areas where gallant and intrepid and able British engineers and intelligence experts and army went in—were turned into flowing gold. The trouble was that there was a dead spot in there, and that dead spot consisted of the pockets where the money stopped. Except in rare benevolent instances, it never got back to the people themselves.

By and large, the governments of the Middle East today are rotten from the top down. Specifically in Iran, Dr. Mossadegh is represented as being a great statesman, in having satisfied the nationalist aspirations of his people by throwing the British out. But to what avail? Iran has tossed out the British. It has lots of wonderful oil and the greatest refinery in the world. But the people have no tankers, they cannot get any more oil, and they cannot run that refinery. So the flow of wealth stops. And Iran is on the verge of starvation, riot, and revolution, making it prey to the Communist Tudeh Party, and offering an engraved invitation to the Kremlin and the Red Army to march in and take over. And they can do exactly that if revolution breaks out and the British must move in to protect their interests, which still exist despite more than a year of speeches and papers and fainting spells from Dr. Mossadegh.

Indifference and stupidity abroad have teamed up with tireless Communist propaganda to blind the western peoples to the real Soviet aims in the Middle East. Communist penetration is deeper and deadlier than has ever been reported in the western press. The Voice of America is hardly effective against the ceaseless, blaring Soviet radio which disguises itself in whatever form is most palatable to the particular peoples it is directed at. Our overworked, understaffed, and in many cases undertrained and downright uninformed diplomatic corps in the Middle East is hardly a match for the swarms of Soviet agents infiltrating and fanning out throughout the entire Middle East—agents who know the languages, the peoples, the customs, the lifelong hatreds and prejudices upon which they can play their particular tune, a tune aimed solely at dislodging the West in the Middle East. And if we lose the Middle East, we can soon roll up the map of the Mediterranean and Western Europe and start making indentations and marginalia in the Western Hemisphere.

Our Relations with the Middle East

It is still axiomatic that men of good will, or pretended good will, never abandon the fiction of diplomatic maneuvers, even though the logical aide of all diplomacy, force of arms, has received the order of battle. Our ruinous and bankrupt foreign *policies—or* lack of foreign policies—have undermined our relations with the Moslem world, state by state, nation by nation, people by people. Now or never, the West must measure its new neighbors and associates as equals, as human beings, as political peers, as military allies. Catastrophic wartime and postwar mistakes have denuded us today of virtually every bargaining point in the Middle East save naked force, and *money.*

The sickening realization is being driven home to us that money, incredibly, is not enough to elicit the faith and hope and co-operation of inflamed peoples bred on centuries of great-power perfidy, intolerance, exploitation, and arrogance; that sheer force of arms can coerce, but cannot impel, the Middle East's millions to ally themselves with the West against the common enemy, the Soviet Union.

Unless democracy can recapture the imagination of the Middle Eastern peoples, neither America nor Britain nor their handful of allies in the Middle East can hope to withstand the onslaught of implacable Communism.

And how can we recapture their imagination? Point Four and Mutual Security aid, increased and administered honestly and properly, would help. A cleanup of our diplomatic corps' dead wood in the Middle East would help. A true understanding of the peoples of the Middle East, with consequent intelligent planning of our Voice of America and Information Offices propaganda, would help. An informed and interested American public would help.

Whether we can yet quench the flames of internal disorder and bring piecemeal understanding before the oncoming holocaust is still a tossup. The odds are long against us at present. These selfsame peoples, hating the outside world and one another, profess to view with equanimity the oncoming struggle between the West and the Soviet Union, as if this hideous Armageddon were scheduled to be fought under Marquis of Queensberry Rules, or in some forest glade with lances and white chargers and the traditional spirit of noble knighthood. Why? Certainly they are almost as much afraid of war as we are. They have known the face of war down the centuries. They have tasted its dregs in every major conflict and invasion since the beginning of recorded time. But they are being given nothing to fight *for,* and little to fight *with,* except by the Soviets, who promise pie in the sky, and deliver secret small arms and ammunition with which to fight the "foreigners."

Marshal Tito

On the fringes of the Middle East, however, we are trusting a man who cannot be trusted—who is playing upon us the greatest hoax in history. That man is Jossip Broz, Tito, the Communist dictator of Yugoslavia. To me, a Communist is a Communist. There is no difference between Communists. We are faced with fighting the Communist Soviet Union, but we make an ally, so-called, of Communist Tito. He is an ally who takes all he can get from us—money, arms, ammunition, food—but who gives us nothing—no bases, no military mission in his country, not a single written agreement—if one could even trust a written agreement. His expansionist tendencies against Italy in Trieste are obvious; he does not have the support of his own people, particularly of the Serbs; he rules by terror and truncheon and tommygun; he murders his enemies and kills the genuine intellectuals of his country; yet he claims that his brand of Communism is different from Soviet Communism, that he has broken from Stalin and is a true friend of the West.

This, I say, is the greatest hoax in history. I need only remind you how we were told, and told, and told, that Chinese Communism was only agrarian reform; that Chinese Communism was not Russian Communism. Today we fight those same Communists in Korea; today China is a land of terror and murder and greater despair than ever before in her history.

Therefore when you support—and I mean you, the American people, because it is your dollars that are going to Tito—when you support a man like Tito, and you are told he is our friend,

you are being led up and down all the garden paths of the world. It is this very kind of contradictory reasoning in America that is losing us the faith and hope and trust of the peoples of the Middle East.

AN URGENT SITUATION

The western powers can no longer pretend paternal or fraternal interest in the peoples of the Middle East, and fob off these peoples and their own conscience with Korean-styled "police actions." The West must now stand and fight in the Middle East as if its very life depended on it—*which it does.*

Even now it may be too late. Militarily, 1952 is the Soviet Union's year. One year longer, and we may be strong enough to withstand Soviet attack—strong enough in arms, strong enough in international unity. The Soviet Union's fatal miscalculation may be based on the belief that a bankrupt, dreary, and disheartened England will not again unite with an unhappy and internally disunited France and a bemused but angering and incredibly powerful people in the United States to obliterate Communism from the earth in the event of any aggression in an area which cannot and will not be surrendered.

The policy of sweet reasonableness, appeasement, and surrender has been the watchword of western policy toward latter-day Napoleons since this writer has been covering wars and the journeys between them. Invariably, such policies have led only to more journeys and more wars. It is a thing devoutly to be hoped that this forthcoming journey will be the last one, to the last war.

Ray Brock, New York City, author, lecturer, and foreign correspondent, is now in the Middle East, and a few months ago he completed a trip there which took him to eleven countries. As a former correspondent of the New York Times and the United Press, he spent several years in the Mediterranean area, the Balkans, and the Middle East, and covered many international conferences. The results of his personal observations were incorporated in his newspaper columns and in his book—Blood, Oil and Sand—recently published.

Pakistani Principles and Policies

By S. M. BURKE

PAKISTAN is a parliamentary democracy. It is a federation of five provinces and the Princely States which have acceded to it. A full measure of autonomy is left to the units in matters of domestic administration and welfare. The responsibility of the Central Government is confined to foreign affairs, defense, communications, national finance and economy, and other matters of common interest.

INTERNAL PRINCIPLES

A Constituent Assembly is framing the final constitution of the state, and it enacts current legislation as an interim measure. It passed an Objectives Resolution on March 4, 1949 in the following terms:

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful;

Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people to be exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;

Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;

Wherein the Moslems shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Koran and the Sunna;

Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;

Whereby the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan, and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan, shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;

Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association subject to law and public morality;

Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

Wherein the independence of the judiciary shall be fully secured;

Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded;

So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.

The Interim Report on Fundamental Rights of the citizens of Pakistan and on Matters relating to Minorities envisages: (*a*) protection of life and personal liberty and equality before the law of all citizens; (*b*) protection in respect of conviction of offense; (*c*) prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, or sex; (*d*) prohibition of slavery, forced labor, and child labor; (*e*) equality of opportunity in matter of public employment; (*f*) protection

of rights regarding freedom of speech, expression, association, profession, occupation, trade or business, acquisition and disposal of property, and peaceful assembly without arms; and (*g*) freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion.

INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES

In international affairs Pakistan has not pursued a narrow policy only to advance her own interest, but has shown herself anxious to co-operate with other members of the human family in the furtherance of peace and security, in the settlement of international differences by peaceful discussion, and in using her influence on the side of justice for politically and economically backward peoples.

In her differences with others Pakistan has never insisted that her point of view is infallible. She has always declared herself willing to accept arbitration by a third party. She has constantly given her support to the principle of universal membership in the United Nations. She has shown her high respect for the world's premier international organization by invariably deputing her Foreign Minister, Chaudhry Muhammed Zafrulla Khan, personally to lead delegations at its Annual Sessions.

In her advocacy for the uplift of underdeveloped countries and dependent colonies Pakistan has placed the welfare of the human race above selfish gain, and has at times displeased those countries with which it was to her material advantage to co-operate. As soon as she became a member of the United Nations she became a sponsor of Indonesia's case before the Security Council. Her open championship of the cause of freedom in Libia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Morocco, Tunisia, and elsewhere is well known. She has given support to Egypt and Iran in the fulfillment of their national aspirations. Our Foreign Minister declared in the National Parliament recently that "whenever and wherever there is a question of liberty and independence from imperialism or of opposing colonialism, of pushing forward a march towards freedom, Pakistan is always second to none."

In the General Assembly of the United Nations the Foreign Minister described our general policy in these words:

> The ideological conflict continues not only to divide the world but also to harass its peoples and to threaten peace and security. We recognize that the complexity of human problems necessitates approach to them from various angles and that diversities of points of view and differences of approach and method are essential conditions of advancement and progress and should, therefore, be encouraged rather than sought to be suppressed. What is needed, however, is tolerance, which should provide full scope for ideas to act and react beneficently upon each other. Pakistan's view is that every nation must be free to develop its social, economic and political systems and institutions, along lines best suited to its own needs and expressive of its genius. What must be insisted upon is that no force, violence, or coercion, organized or unorganized, should be employed or permitted to be employed, either inside the nation or from outside of it, to force a people to give up that which they desire to retain or to adopt that which they are unwilling or reluctant to accept.
>
> Whatever is attempted to be achieved must be undertaken openly and in the light of day, and carried through by peaceful means. If this could be accepted and put into effect on a world-wide scale, we venture to hope that the suspicion of sinister motives and the fear of secret and violent designs, which are at the moment poisoning international relations and constitute so grave a threat to the maintenance of peace and security, would soon be dispelled, making beneficent co-operation possible between groups of states that are today divided from each other by these suspicions and fears. We believe that one effort that would help to clear the atmosphere would be to foster knowledge in all spheres, and to provide accurate information and to facilitate and promote free intercourse and interchanges across national and international frontiers. The activities of the United Nations directed towards the lowering and removal of barriers restricting the free movement of ideas, information and individuals, must be intensified as these barriers hinder better understanding and deeper friendly relations between the nations. Pakistan may be relied upon to give its fullest co-operation towards the achievement of the ideals and purposes of the United Nations along the lines of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the words of Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah, the father and founder of Pakistan,

> We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations' Charter.

IMPACT ON WORLD POLITICS

In the last Annual Session of the General Assembly Pakistan was elected to the Security Council, to the German Commission, to the Balkan subcommission, and to the Disarmament Commission.

The Daily Mail in its "U.N.O. Round-Up" wrote:

> The emergence of Pakistan in a leading role as mediator in several major issues of international dispute this Session of the General Assembly has impressed United Nations diplomatic circles. Led by Chaudhry Muhammed Zafrulla Khan, the Foreign Minister, the Pakistan delegation has attempted to reconcile divergent views on the following issues: (1) the East-West dispute over disarmament plans; (2) the problem of free elections in All-Germany, and (3) the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Observers here have noted that it was largely on Pakistan's initiative that the Big Four were encouraged to hold a round-table conference on the disarmament issue.

It was Pakistan that suggested that German representatives from both halves of Germany should give their views before the *ad hoc* committee on the responsibility of organizing free elections. Mr. Iqbal Singh, writing in the *Illustrated Weekly of India,* said:

> There was hardly any important public or private move with which Pakistan was not associated. . . . The presence of Chaudhry Muhammed Zafrulla Khan in Paris has been a clear indication that Pakistan has no intention of taking a back seat in world politics.

In the light of the above facts, I leave it for my readers to judge whether the policy of Pakistan is "The National Interest—Alone or With Others?"

S. M. Burke, Washington, D. C., is Counselor of the Embassy of Pakistan. He has been in government service for more than twenty years. He has served as a district officer in Punjab and as a district judge and has been in the Indian Civil Service. In 1946 he was president of the first Elections Petitions Commission; in 1948 he was secretary of the Pakistan delegation to the International Dominion Conferences with India; and from 1949 to 1952 he was Counselor to the High Commission in Great Britain.

National Interests and World Peace

By Norman Thomas

THE general question raised at this conference—"The National Interest —Alone or With Others?"—calls for the answer that in today's world it is not merely a matter of ethics but of common sense to affirm that the true national interest can be served only "with others." There is no nation—not even the United States—that is self-sufficient in its natural resources. All are of necessity vitally concerned with reasonable access to raw materials in other parts of the world.

Nature of Nationalism

It is very easy to make a case that nationalism, in its dominant and dogmatic form, is irrational, divisive, and a foe of peace. The fact that all peoples are thinking in terms of national interest makes it incredibly more difficult to travel than it used to be, as I am finding out in trying to get a passport for a trip that has suddenly become desirable. I am not at all sure that I shall succeed.

Nationalism was not a creation of logic. It has many roots, running back to tribal times. National lines very often fail to correspond to logical lines of geographic differences or economic interests.

Nevertheless, the nation state has an immense emotional response. We are held together by a variety of ties within nations which cannot be ignored, which cannot be dispelled by any process of reasoning, not even by a passion for peace. Nationalism is a fact with which we have to cope.

Moreover, I have lately come to see in nationalism advantages that I was once disposed to overlook or almost to deny. To a very high degree, it has been possible within the confines of the nation state to unite men as citizens and neighbors across lines of race and religious creed and class. It is only as we can extend this concept of unity of human interest to the whole world that we shall have any sound foundation for lasting peace.

Weakness of International Federation

Yet, it does not necessarily follow that internationalism or world government, unqualified and undefined, is the logical road to peace. I have long been a believer in the United States of Europe. I think it a necessity for a solution of Europe's problems. Yet I am keenly aware of the practical difficulties that the existing organization of nations creates, economically and otherwise, and these are not to be ignored in the practical business of working out formulas. It is conceivable that a world government would be so harsh that it would invite wars—possibly civil wars, but nevertheless wars.

There is much to be said for world federation, but it has not yet achieved power as a world force equivalent to that of socialism prior to World War I. Yet in that war Socialists fought Socialists, even as Christians fought Christians; and now, almost seven years after the end of World War II, it is possible for us Socialists sadly to remark, like the Belgian statesman Paul-Henri Spaak, that the thing that Socialists have learned how to nationalize best is socialism.

This situation derives from the fact that the nation state has become the most powerful factor in our social life. Such securities as we have are connected with it. Protections for farmers and workers are organized on national lines. If, in a transition from nationalism to internationalism, their insecurity should be even temporarily increased, they would act on the basis of nationalism. They and their children cannot today eat promises of bread—or cake—in a distant tomorrow. This is a hard fact that we have to consider when we contemplate a transition out of an economic nationalism which threatens both the peace and the prosperity of men.

Religion Is Not the Answer

I am very skeptical about the growingly popular cry that we hear in America that the hope of the world and the hope for us is a return to religion. The triumph of Christianity or democratic socialism is not a basis for peace. There are interpretations which would make the universal acceptance of either or both a boon to mankind. But when Christianity or any other religion is interpreted, as religions have repeatedly been interpreted in history, as the sole or principal possessor of saving truth, religion becomes the passive or active enemy of a general fraternity upon which peace depends. Some of the world's worst wars have been religious wars.

In the long history of cruelty and brutality through which our generation has lived, there has been nothing more disheartening than the wild outbreak of religious strife between Hindus and Moslems when India was partitioned. In that popular outbreak it is estimated that one million were killed or died of hunger, and twelve million were displaced. Nehru's emphasis on the secular state is in the highest degree ethical and essential for the well-being of India. And his dream of an Asian third force for peace is weakened by the fact of the Moslem League.

The great danger in Communism lies in the fact that it, more than any other ism, insists that it is the sole custodian of the truth on which the secular salvation of mankind depends, and that to promote that salvation, any lies, any deceit, any violence, any suffering, ordained by the Communist elite is holy. In short, the "true believer" is the enemy of peace.

Such a "true believer" is also necessarily the enemy of a valid and desirable internationalism. The successor of the internationally minded Lenin manages to be a passionate Russian nationalist at the same time that he is the head of the Communist international movement. Stalin would never consent to any genuine measure of world government unless or until he thought he could control that government. And if he did control it, those of us who want to protect the ideals which western man has painfully and imperfectly evolved would become opponents of a world organization in which there would be no city of refuge for freedom.

We do coexist with the Soviet Union as a nation, certainly, and we must coexist with Communism, but always in terms of conflict. War is a bad means of defense; but by appeasement or submission we should not be able to preserve either peace or liberty. For the break that occurred between Tito and Stalin would occur anywhere if any Communist dictator gained the universal power he seeks, because that power is divisive.

It is against the background of these considerations that the United States must interpret its legitimate interests and determine how far they are or ought to be common to mankind. It is easy to establish the fact that all rational men should be concerned for freedom, peace, and plenty, and that the ultimate

goal can best be phrased as a fellowship of free men who will employ their marvelous technological powers only for the destruction of poverty and preventable disease.

NEED FOR CRUSADING SPIRIT

This faith ought to be taught with a religious intensity. On it abiding peace depends. The chief trouble with us is that we have evolved no crusades (I use the word deliberately) which either fire us or inspire others. We have been astonishingly generous, compared with other nations, but we need some crusading ideas. Internationalism lacks the emotional support that nationalism elicits.

Obviously, the great idea is peace with liberty. The only common interest that I can find now among nations is a desire to avoid an atomic war and end the cold war with its arms race. I would remind you that our present prosperity is peculiarly precarious, based, as it is, on an arms economy. I would remind you of the tragic fate of the world in which, while children in almost every land (some even in ours) cry for bread, there is plenty of money for bombs and all that is economic waste.

The United States has said some correct things and is saying pretty correct things even now before the Disarmament Commission; but there has been a great failure to present ourselves as the lovers of peace. We are pursuing trends toward conflict—not the abolition of atomic war that requires disarmament. President Truman has said it and said it well, but there is no crusade. I assure you that it is one of the dangerous facts of our time that at least a year ago, when I was in Asia, many decent Asians believed that Stalin was more the friend of peace than we. He has at least put on a show, and we have not—at least not adequately.

I do not think that any dictator—certainly not Stalin—will accept forthwith a proposal for disarmament, which, to be effective, must necessarily include very rigid controls and inspection. I have no illusion. But I think a crusade would greatly change the temper of the world and would make Stalin, who is essentially cautious in certain matters, more careful, and in time (for time does march on) Communist tactics might change. It might even seem to the Communist rulers that coexistence would be easier if the weight of the armament race were off our backs, and if we could find other ways to carry on the conflict between rival approaches to life.

ONE WORLD

Our world is so organized that it does have to be one world, as Wendell Willkie discovered. And it is by no means ready to be one world politically. It is nonsense to talk of a peaceful world in terms of the interests, even the accommodated interests, of nations of such size and variety as we now have; for instance, Albania and the United States, both sovereign nations.

Morally it has to be one world. "Patriotism," said Edith Cavell, "is not enough." If we want any peace at all, or any well-being for the world, our interest must be thought of in terms of the interests of others also. We shall always have difficulty in keeping the peace while we have such differences in the economic well-being of peoples as represented by the fact that the new nation of Libia has an estimated per capita annual income of $35 against our $1,450.

IMPORTANCE OF POINT FOUR AID

We need a far more zealous interest in helping people to raise their own standards of living—a bolder and larger Point Four. I was very happy that a recent conference in Washington on the subject was well attended; but, as in most conferences, we worked up a lot of steam and did not do anything with it. We did not even adopt resolutions; there were too many associations there. We did not discuss anything practical, such as the relationship between public and private capital, or how to carry out the two principles which we applauded. The first principle was that the United States must not be the goat; the second was that we must support the American Revolution and not give a red penny to anybody who was very far from our general ideas.

I think there is a certain combination that could be worked out. This is of utmost importance. Democracy is not established on empty stomachs, because people do not eat freedom. We must demonstrate that it is possible gradually but certainly to win victories over bitter poverty and hunger, and we must show that we do it co-operatively; hence we should use as far as possible the imperfect machinery of the United Nations.

These are basic things, and they involve offering aid to many regions of the world as an alternative to the harsh imperialism of Communism.

TO DIRECT OUR COURSE

The sound interest of all opponents of totalitarianism requires provision for co-operative defense against the unquestioned menace of Communist imperialism. Its imposed peace would mean slavery. And then the Communist empire would break up in desperate wars bred by rivalry for power.

Our sound interest in peace with freedom also requires that we shall not fall victim to totalitarianism by imitation of Communism in the name of defense of liberty. That danger is real in America. McCarthyism is an excellent psychological preparation for totalitarianism. If I were a Communist, I should be quite philosophic about the growth of McCarthyism in America.

In world policy, aside from co-operative defense, the United States in its search for peace should set for itself two attainable goals which must be reached if we are to escape the disaster of World War III or a series of wars. These two goals are (1) a transfer of conflict out of the realm of modern atomic war by enough strengthening of the United Nations to enforce an agreement for universal disarmament; and (2) an assault on the world's bitter poverty and inequities, through progressive industrialization and the improvement of agriculture in backward regions.

The struggle for these two related goals will of itself have a corrective influence on an excessive and amoral nationalism and tend to promote an international spirit of fraternity on which the ultimate hope of mankind depends.

GOVERNMENTAL FAILURES

I expect to go shortly to the Far East. I shall go greatly disadvantaged by the decision of our government to abstain in the United Nations from any vote on the Tunisian request to be heard. I think the Tunisian complaints are valid, and we pay a great price, in adverse world opinion, for coddling a valuable ally.

I shall go handicapped by our failure to put our better beliefs and our better action into more obvious form in the war against poverty. I shall go handicapped by our failure to convince people that such moves as we have made for disarmament, which I think are sound, are not merely maneuvers. It does us no good to say that these people are wrong and we are right, because we have to live with them somehow in the interest of peace.

I am very doubtful whether we shall get very far by forcing Western Germany into a European setup with par-

ticipation in a European army, if the Germans believe that it means the permanent division of Germany. That is a dangerous challenge to a legitimate interest in unity. I doubt that we shall get a very good European army as long as the people who are our best friends in Germany and respect democracy—the labor movement, for instance, and the Social Democrats—are rightly or wrongly skeptical of arms on these terms.

If we have to think in terms of national interest, which should be transmuted into national responsibilities for us, we must remember that other nations also, especially some who have known deprivation of national pride, will want to think in terms of national interest, and our approaches to the larger unity must take account of that fact.

In terms of a national program for the protection of our own interests together with the interests of all who love plenty, peace, and freedom, our emphasis should be on co-operative defense by methods appropriate to the cause we are defending, a crusade for disarmament, and a co-operative war on poverty.

Norman Thomas, Litt.D., New York City, is the leader of the Socialist Party in the United States. He was twice Socialist candidate for Mayor of the City of New York, once for Governor of the State of New York, and six times for President of the United States—in 1928, 1932, 1936, 1940, 1944, and 1948. He is author or co-author of many books and of scores of magazine and newspaper articles and pamphlets.

In Defense of International Law and Morality

By A. H. FELLER

ANY reader of the now very popular Science Fiction will of course remember that ever recurring scene in which a group of people are riding in a space rocket which is shot out of the gravitational sphere of the earth and is approaching the moon; at one point, always very carefully defined by the science fiction writer, the passengers suddenly find everything turned topsy-turvy.

Anyone who wants to know that feeling can spare himself the expense and discomfort of a rocket trip to the moon. All he needs to do is read or reread the literature and debates on foreign policy of the last few years. This is the sort of thing he will find:

REVERSAL OF VIEWS

Almost from the moment of its birth, the United Nations has been belabored by some critics as a puny, ineffective creature, crippled by the veto, overridden by an antiquated conception of national sovereignty, and incapable of influencing the national policies of its member states. Now suddenly there is a whole new school of thought which pictures the United Nations as a monstrous supergovernment, endowed with mighty powers of interference in the internal affairs of its members, and intent on hamstringing their freedom of action.

For years the debating platforms in the legislative halls in the United States resounded with calls for the elimination or diminution of sovereignty and the immediate establishment of a world federation or world government. Earnest committees drafted detailed constitutions for a new world order to be set up right away. One state legislature after another called for an amendment to the Constitution of this country to enable it to join the new order. Now suddenly there is a movement to do just the opposite—to amend the United States Constitution to limit the normal and traditional treaty powers possessed and exercised since the foundation of this Republic.

Only a little while ago, all our scholars were calling for increasing world community and strengthened collective security. Now we are told that we must look at power realities and must govern our foreign relations by exclusive devotion to the national interest.

This rocket in which we seem to be riding is apparently not just shooting out into space. It is bobbing and weaving in addition. I think we are all getting slightly dizzy, and it is time we took our bearings before sense of direction is lost entirely.

BASIC FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

There are two basic intractable phenomena of international politics. First, the world consists of separate states, each of them desiring to maintain its national identity and develop its own social and economic order. These states are extraordinarily diverse in size, strength, racial composition, stage of economic development, religious and ideological background, and devotion to the cause of peace. But they are extraordinarily uniform in their adherence to the concept of sovereignty and independence. Every one of them wants just that. The number of these sovereign states has increased in our

generation, and it will continue to increase for at least several decades.

The second phenomenon is that the spread of the western technological system—the development of communication and science, and particularly of the destructive capabilities of modern instruments of war—has rendered every one of these states incapable of living in isolation. This is true of the largest states as well as of the smallest. Moreover, as we are coming to learn more and more every month, belief in the possibility of progress through the conscious development of human and material resources—belief which was once limited to western liberal thought—has broken through ancient incrustations to stir up the ambitions and hopes of hundreds of millions in backward areas.

BASIC VALUE OF U.N.

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 was the most important attempt in history to reconcile these two phenomena of disunity and unity, of sovereignty and community. The Charter was not the product of academic scholarship or visionary idealism; nor was it an opiate brewed by narrow-minded and scheming politicians to deaden the people's desire for true world government. It was drafted and adopted by the responsible representatives of the vast bulk of mankind. Its weaknesses are not due to lack of drafting skill or of devotion or of imagination; they are for the most part inherent in any practicable design for world order in the midst of world tension and conflict.

Whether these weaknesses of detail were inevitable or avoidable, they cannot obscure these two major and enduring accomplishments of the founders: first, a statement of purposes and principles which set forth for the first time a universal creed of aspiration for peace, security, the betterment of life, and the fostering of human freedom; and, second, the creation of an institution, universal in scope, organized to operate continuously on all problems of international concern.

ENTER THE NEO-REALISTS

These great contributions of the Charter have remained virtually unchallenged throughout the long debates which have been raging on the details of the structure and performance of the United Nations system. I find it a disturbing symptom of our present instability and unease that these principles are now being subjected to at least an indirect attack—and from a source from which I think we might expect something better. A number of scholars are telling us that the real trouble with American foreign policy is its reliance on what they call the "legalistic-moralistic approach"—a rather lengthy name for what we used to call idealism. In their view, foreign policy is essentially a struggle for power, waged by sovereign nations for political advantage, and they believe and tell us with great force that American foreign policy has suffered from the misguided belief that this struggle for power can be suppressed by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints.

The spokesmen for this new school, which we might call the neo-realist school, are among the finest minds, among the most accomplished scholars in political science, in this country. But I think it important to examine the premises on which they have built this doctrine; because I fear that the doctrine, if readily accepted, may have fateful consequences for the future of the conduct of foreign relations.

A WORLD-WIDE CONCEPT

To begin with, it is a mystery to me why these able and sophisticated students of diplomacy have fallen into the obvious error of assuming that preoccupation with international law and moral principles is a peculiarity of American foreign policy. In fact, most governments, certainly very many, have shared a similar, if not as intense or consistent, preoccupation.

Just to take the beginning of this century, the Hague Conferences were not initiated by some American lawyer Secretary of State, but by the Czar of Russia. The relations of Latin American states are replete with treaties and declarations proclaiming general principles of law and morality. It is true that a United States President promoted the League of Nations, but more than forty other states carried it forward for two decades when the United States backed away. And there is no evidence that it took much inducing by the United States to get the other fifty-nine members to join the United Nations, and more than a dozen additional states are trying very hard to become members of that organization. Americans may, I think, be proud of the support and enthusiasm which many of them have been giving to the current efforts to create a wider European community, but it is the farsighted statesmen of Europe that are taking the practical steps toward that end.

As recently as November 1951, Anthony Eden, the Foreign Minister of a state whose foreign policy is not customarily thought to be afflicted with fuzzy-minded naïveté, said this:

> I am more than ever convinced that the nations of the world must submit to the rule of law and abide by it. Confidence can only be created and maintained on a basis of respect for international engagements. It is therefore the duty of all nations, as indeed it is their interest, to respect international authority and uphold it.

And at this moment the people of the Netherlands, with centuries of experience of diplomatic methods and balance-of-power politics, are engaged in amending their constitution to provide for the primacy of international organization and international law.

The point is that historically all states except those which were or are openly predatory have professed belief in an international legal order and have normally justified their actions on the basis of legal principle.

LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

This is not to say that nations have always been sincere in their professions, or that the rules of international law have not frequently been broken. We know to our sorrow that they frequently have been broken. The notion that peace could be established forever by the simple proclamation of a world law owes its currency to enthusiastic laymen rather than to international lawyers. These latter have constantly stressed the fragmentary and primitive character of international law and the relatively subordinate role it can play in the conduct of international affairs in a world of sovereign states.

For several centuries there has been an urge to extend the international legal system from the mundane matters dealing with the everyday relations between states to larger political conflicts. Lawyers have frequently cautioned against overambitious attempts to impose such wide-reaching legal restraints without a solution of the underlying economic and social problems and political and psychological tensions. They can only smile wryly when they are now told by one of the outstanding spokesmen of the neo-realists that the incomplete and modest system of international rules which we now have is a "legal strait jacket" impeding the assertion of legitimate national aspirations.

TO FACILITATE PEACEFUL CHANGE

In truth, law is a conservative influence tending toward stability and regularity. And this has been and will continue to be its major function in the international scene. At the same time, it has been the constant concern of international lawyers to reconcile this stabilizing influence with the problem of peaceful change, precisely in order to enable the proper expression of legitimate national aspirations. This is one of the reasons for the creation of institutional arrangements which can introduce the requisite flexibility into the legal order.

There is a perfect case in point in the last few years—the handling of the question of Libia. Here a colonial people has been enabled to fulfill its national aspiration to independence through the legal and institutional mechanisms of a peace treaty and the action of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and has done this without upheaval and with much less violence than has ever before accompanied the birth of an independent state. This is an ideal example of the reconciliation of stability and change, of legal principle and national aspiration.

WHENCE THE CONCEPT OF TOTAL WAR?

This neo-realistic thesis, if I may call it that, which I have been describing, possesses a novelty in that it is urged that the extension of the rule of law is a positive danger to international life. I find this a very startling proposition, and it is supported by imputing to what is called the "legalistic approach" a number of hitherto unsuspected vices.

The most serious charge is that this approach is responsible for the concept of total war and total victory. It is assumed, without proof, that this concept is a sort of American invention stemming from moral indignation over the failure of other nations to conform their behavior to American standards; in short, that Americans become so incensed at the failure of other nations to be as nice as we are that when we go to war with them we desire to annihilate them.

Surely it cannot be so soon forgotten that the concept of total war was first proclaimed by Imperial Germany in World War I and then by Nazi Germany in World War II. If the reaction of American and, one must add, Allied public opinion was a mistake, it must be laid to the character of the war initiated by the enemy, and not to a theoretical moral basis which is peculiar to the American character.

There is nothing inherent in legal principle that requires the imposition of the death penalty for all offenses; and there is nothing inherent in justified indignation against an aggressor state that compels war *à outrance* and the total extinction of the aggressor. A sufficient contemporary illustration is the limited character of the United Nations effort to stem aggression in Korea.

CRITERIA OF NATIONAL CONDUCT

Basically, if I understand the neo-realists, they consider it inherently impossible to judge the conduct of states by moral criteria. This is again assumed to be an American idea which, if I may quote one statement, considers it "implausible that people should have positive aspirations and ones that they regard as legitimate, more important to them than the peacefulness and orderliness of international life." And one spokesman finds "a profound and neglected truth," to use his words, in the dictum of Hobbes that "there is neither morality nor law outside the state."

With all due respect, I feel that these remarks do less than justice either to Americans or to other peoples. For many centuries, men have considered

political communities subject to moral standards of one sort or another. The notion of the inherent amorality of state conduct introduced by Machiavelli is an aberration, and not an immutable truth. The criteria by which the conduct of states may be judged are not necessarily always the same as those by which we judge the conduct of individuals, and the procedure and organs of judgment must be different.

Moreover, an international order must obviously take account of the relative dispositions of power and the natural limitations of law and sanction. The administration of such an order entails many compromises and much painstaking adjustment of conflicting interests which lie outside the legal realm. In that respect it is different in degree, not in kind, from any domestic order, where law and principle also have their definite limitations.

DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

There is a tendency in these scholars to lump together in one concept legal-moral principles and the institutional framework for international action; and these two things, when lumped together, are opposed to what are considered to be the tried-and-true methods of old-fashioned diplomacy.

Now, there is no basic incompatibility between the methods of diplomacy and the institutions of an international organization. Conferences and treaties are as much a part of diplomatic technique as are private meetings of diplomats and the carrying of dispatches between capitals by couriers. When the United Nations deals with a political problem, as for instance Palestine or Kashmir or numerous others that I might mention, it seeks solutions which are compatible with power realities, and it operates through a whole range of techniques from private negotiation to full-dress debate before television cameras.

It has been said that the legalistic belief, the idealistic belief as we have previously called it, refuses to take the awkward conflicts of national interest and deal with them on their merits with a view to finding the solutions which are least unsettling to the stability of international life, but that it tries to find some formal criteria of a juridical nature which can define permissible behavior.

I suppose that what is meant by a statement of this kind is some sort of simple, formalistic notion like the Kellogg-Briand Pact, in which in one sentence all governments on earth undertook to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. Certainly this reproach could not be applied against such an organization as the United Nations, which has devoted its energies to precisely what is recommended—the solution of awkward conflicts on their merits. And anyone who has followed the proceedings of the United Nations knows that that is not easy, and that frequently failure will come where success has been fought for.

It can hardly be discreditable to the United Nations system that, in trying to find solutions to these awkward conflicts, it also operates with some regard for a statement of principles subscribed to by all the nations as their common objective and aspiration.

OBJECTIVE OF DIPLOMACY

To my mind, the basic fault with this neo-realistic approach is that it offers nothing in place of moral principles—nothing, that is, but a return to "diplomacy" and "national interest." What do these mean? "Diplomacy" is merely a procedure. It has no more substantive content than "speaking" or "writing." The techniques of negotiation or persuasion are only a minor part of the

problem of the conduct of foreign affairs. I think it is very important for us to train our young men to know these techniques; but the heart of the problem is the question of objective—to what ends are we going to utilize diplomatic resources?

I certainly am not one of those who would decry the pursuit of the national interests as selfish or petty. A sound domestic economy, firmness in the protection of legitimate rights abroad, and the maintenance of strength to ward off attack are essential to national survival. But we cannot advance a concept of national interest abroad without some ideal standard and at the same time convince others that our purposes are beyond reproach.

A majestic procession of great Americans, most of whom have been lawyers, have been the idealists of foreign policy. To mention only some of these names, there are Root, Wilson, Stimson, Hughes, Franklin Roosevelt, Hull, Vandenberg. These men were quite clear that the national interest of their country could be served, and served well, by asserting the influence of the United States for the maintenance and extension of law and justice. They were neither so naïve nor so unrealistic as to ignore the significance of power in world affairs. They realized that the position of a nation in the world cannot be measured only in terms of the size of its armed forces. Without power, a nation may be impotent; without a moral standard respected by other peoples, it becomes the focus of hostility and fear.

Two Points Conceded

We certainly need to take to heart two lessons which these recent discussions have very properly read to us. One is that we must dispel a notion unfortunately all too prevalent among us, that a single formula-slogan like "world law," "international organization," or "disarmament" can solve the international puzzle. Our "realistic" scholars will forgive me, I hope, if I suggest that many of their readers will have gained the impression that they also have put forward a formula-slogan under such rubrics as "diplomacy" and "national interest."

The second lesson, and a very proper one, is that the empty mouthing of moral concepts without sincerity or intention to implement them can stultify a national policy. On this point there can be no shadow of disagreement.

A Necessary Concept

At the same time I must state my deep conviction that for the long run, the "legalistic-moralistic approach," awkward as those words sound, applied sincerely and with a realistic regard for its short-term limitations, will perforce remain the highroad of a decent and effective foreign policy. And it is only in this way that we shall preserve our balance and our sense of direction.

There are some who would have us believe that by following this road we make ourselves "slaves of the concepts of international law and morality." This is an extraordinary underestimation of the larger aims of foreign policy. The peoples will never believe that true and enduring world peace can be achieved without the eventual creation of a world order based on law and morality. In my view, they are perfectly right in their belief. A foreign policy devoted to the careful adjustment of power interests by professional diplomats may work for a time in a limited sphere, but it will never retain the allegiance of the mass of people who yearn for a better world.

U.N. Embodies Man's Broad Desires

In practical terms, the issue comes down to support of the United Nations idea and of the regional organizations which have recently been created along the same lines. The nations of the world have committed themselves to the Charter, and the United States is in the forefront. While the preservation and advancement of the national interest must be a cardinal aim of any foreign policy, the upholding of the United Nations and of the regional arrangements consistent with the Charter is an integral part of the national interest of every peace-loving state.

The Charter is no mere casual by-product of an American desire for "juridical tidiness." It is the embodiment of the deeply felt desires and needs of millions of people everywhere for peace, economic well-being, and respect for the development of human personality. These are just as significant as, perhaps more so than, the often ephemeral interests and spheres of influence so beloved by traditional diplomacy.

The United Nations system has its share of shortcomings and mistakes. Those voices which have criticized it have in the main demanded a better instrumentality, a surer and quicker way for attaining the same objectives. The objectives themselves are the common ground of mankind's will for survival with decency. It is the task of diplomacy so to conduct the adjustment of affairs between nations as to move toward the accomplishment of these goals.

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National Interest and National Responsibility

By C. B. Marshall

My assignment calls for me to relate the national interest to the problems of the United States in the present world situation.

The National Interest a Valid Concept

Let me comment first on that phrase, "the national interest."

Only a few years ago the economic interpretation of virtually everything was in vogue. Writers of considerable repute were fobbing off the significance of the national interest as a factor in foreign policy, interpreting it as merely a façade to conceal special interests and to deceive the public.

The return of the phrase to respectable parlance, indicating the recognition of a valid national interest paramount over particular interests, is a gain for straight thinking.

Often a decision in foreign policy is inseparable from the question of the domestic consequences of the decision. It is necessary in such an instance to recognize that our national destiny in a world of many nations is more important than the domestic group interests affected by the decision. In settling questions of conflict between the necessities of national security and group interests, the idea of national interest is valid and essential.

The phrase, moreover, indicates a step away from the utopianism beclouding too much the discussion of international affairs in the sequel to both World War I and World War II.

Nations do have interests. In some instances their interests coincide with the interests of other nations. Sometimes interests of different nations harmonize without coinciding. Sometimes they differ, but not incompatibly. Sometimes they are mutually exclusive. Out of these variations comes the real nature of international life. It is useless to try to ignore this by talk about global harmony and the universal state. Such talk, while edifying to those who like it, only hinders—it does not help—the handling of world problems.

So it is good to hear people talk about international problems again in terms of national interests rather than in the abstractions of world government and world law.

Indeed, it would be a blessed thing if all differences among nations could be translated into differences of interest alone and not differences of basic purpose and principle. It is unselfish to compromise on interests. It is unseemly to compromise on one's principles.

Here I myself stray off into utopianism of another sort. The world is nowhere near that stage of adjustment where all national differences can be dealt with as solely differences of interest, and the coming of that day is too remote for prediction.

Weaknesses of National Interest Idea

I have said enough in praise of the idea of national interest; now let me say some things in criticism.

The usefulness and significance of the phrase are limited. It begs more questions than it answers.

In appraising the significance of the national interest, I must distinguish between instances in which the decision turns on weighing our world position as a nation against the claims of particular domestic interests, and instances in which the issue lies simply between different lines of action in the foreign field.

I know of no case of the latter character in which the settlement of an issue of our national policy in the line of responsibility would have been facilitated by injecting the question: Shall we or shall we not try to serve the national interest? The question in the arena of responsibility in handling an issue involving foreign policy alone is not whether, but how, to serve the national interest. That involves the question of what is the national interest in a particular situation.

Indeed, I understand that between and among Republicans and Democrats this year there are considerable differences as to what is the national interest and how to serve it. Anyway, I have never heard Republicans or Democrats argue about whether the national interest should be served.

The question of serving the national interest is always a subtle and complex one in real situations. I am sure all of the following things are clearly in our national interest: to avoid war; to preserve our institutions; to have strong allies; to avoid inflation; to have a prosperous civilian economy; to find common grounds on which to stand with the various nations which have newly come to responsibility; to preserve our access to strategic waterways and vital raw materials; to protect the property and safety of our nationals abroad. I could extend this list by dozens of items.

Now, any matter of foreign policy pertaining only to the realization of one of those items would not present an issue at all. No one would have to work his brains overtime on it. No series of exhaustive meetings would have to be held. No protracted debate about the nuances and contradictions would be necessary. In such an instance the policy decision would crystallize spontaneously.

In any practical question presenting a real issue, the national interest has several aspects. Indeed, there are many national interests, not just one. The difficulties arise in the conflict of one interest with another—for example, in the clash of the interest in peace with the interest in preserving national institutions, in the clash of the interest in having a strong defense with the interest in having a strong civilian economy, or in the clash of the interest in preserving access to a waterway with the interest in eliciting the adherence of another country to one's cause.

I trust I have made my point of the inconclusiveness of the national interest as a guide in any particular policy problem.

Beyond that, I believe the concept of national interest is inadequate and misleading even as a broad concept on which to found a policy. It seems to me that a more appropriate guiding principle is the idea of responsibility. This is a very different sort of idea. I want to devote the rest of this article to the contrast between national interest and responsibility and to examination of the idea of responsibility as it enlightens our present problems.

First I want to discuss our special role in the world today.

Approaches to World Problems

The great political issues of our time revolve around rival approaches to the handling of the problems growing out of such circumstances peculiar to modern times as the massing of peoples—their expanded numbers and their increased concentration; the sharpening of the clash between cultures due largely to awakened consciousness of the disparities in well-being between peoples in relation to the advance or lag of production techniques; and the destruc-

tiveness of modern war due both to the concentration of industry and population and to the greater inherent efficacy of modern weapons—their huge lethal power and the capability for distance and stealth in attack.

One approach would exploit these circumstances for the purpose of widening the scope and strengthening the foundations of a monopoly of political power. The other approach seeks to compose clashes of interest and to work out patterns of accommodation. The difference between these two approaches may be expressed as the difference between organized conflict and conflict organized. The legitimate question of politics is not how to eliminate conflicts of interest—a utopian concept—but how to organize society so that conflicts can be adjusted rather than fought out.

This difference in approach is brought to bear both within and among nations. The lines of difference are intertwined and subtle, for the lines along which great issues form are never as sharp as a razor.

POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION

In so far as the issue has crystallized among nations, however, the Soviet Union stands clearly as the champion of the first approach.

Internal political circumstances cast the Soviet Union in that role. It is ruled by tyrants, who reached the seat of power through conspiracy and, having achieved power, have not dared to risk their hold on it by resort to a valid procedure of consent. They have remained conspirators after becoming governors, combining the usages of conspiracy with the prerogatives of the state. Both at home and in the world at large, the conspiracy that walks like a state requires tension and conflict to maintain its grip. In the service of this purpose it employs a doctrine emphasizing the patterns of conflict—class war, subversion, and the like.

This rule is established over a great range, commanding great resources in people and materials. Huge military forces at its disposal are deployed in positions bearing on northern and central Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, southeastern Asia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. The Soviet Union has auxiliaries in the form of embryonic governments under the guise of domestic political groups in territories beyond its imperium. The Soviet power is such that no combination of nations adequate to cope with it is conceivable without the support and participation of the United States.

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States thus finds itself in the position of leadership among peoples which prefer to work out a method of handling the problems of our times alternative to the pattern offered by the Soviet Union and which are impeded in this effort by Soviet opposition. A failure to exercise this leadership would almost certainly result in a world power situation endangering the survival of our constitutional values. These are the values expressed in the Preamble of our Constitution. I do not doubt that you know them all, but let me enumerate them anyway.

The first is the perfection of our Union, the concept of a nation with steadily growing public values.

Second comes the idea of justice—of power subjected to standards superior to the mere attainment of the ends of power.

Third in the enumeration is domestic tranquillity, conveying the idea of a nation at peace with itself, a nation where issues can be decided by reason, by discussion, by compromise.

Then we come to the common defense—the protection of the nation from penetration from the outside.

The idea of the general welfare is another of the values set forth. It embodies the idea of a government which serves and is not master, which is accountable to all of its people as contrasted to a government which serves the exclusive interest of a dominant group.

Finally we have the blessings of liberty—the situation in which each person can make choices for himself regarding his life, the life of his children, his religion, and his thoughts.

The fundamental and enduring purpose of our foreign policy is to maintain in the world circumstances favorable to the continued vitality of these values in the United States.

I want to stress the novelty in the American consciousness of the responsibilities which the present world situation imposes.

DEVELOPMENT OF OUR POWER

Our power, whence come our responsibilities, has three main foundations: position, political strength, and economic resourcefulness. The circumstances surrounding the development of each of these were such as to conceal their eventual implications.

The diffusion of power among several nations of great magnitude provided the relatively stable and protective situation which enabled the Americans to move onward from an Atlantic beachhead to become a continental nation, singular among the great powers in that it lies in both the Northern and Western Hemispheres, faces on both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and stretches from the tropics to the Arctic.

The same circumstances enabled the Americans to preserve and mature a government based on stipulated principles of accountability and freedom. Their purpose in doing this was purely domestic. The strength of the government thus established is one of the great political facts of our time, important for all the globe.

The Americans developed a fecund agriculture and a productive industry, both without equal, through the expansion of an internal market. That circumstance concealed from them the eventual world importance that American economic strength would have.

Some sixty years ago Lord Bryce described the United States as living "in a world of peace" and as "safe from attack, safe even from menace." Such was the national situation in the historic past, when the United States was a remote and intermittent factor in the ratios of world power and when Americans were concerned almost exclusively with the problems of their own national development. Lord Bryce added: "For the present at least—it may not always be so—America sails upon a summer sea."

RESPONSIBILITY WITH LOSS OF FREEDOM

Within a lifetime the summer sea vanished. The world frontiers closed. Two world wars were fought. Germany and Japan were eclipsed in defeat. Other great powers suffered relative declines. Patterns of empire were sundered. Many erstwhile dependencies attained sovereignty. Revolutionary communism established a power base. Two nations emerged into positions of primary magnitude—the United States as one and the Soviet adversary the other.

So great an accession of responsibility in so brief a span has placed great moral tests on this nation.

One difficulty arises from the sense, as expressed recently by former Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago, that "this country has been thrust against its will into a position of world leadership." True, no

referendum on the issue whether or not to be a nation of such wide responsibilities was ever held. The choice was made unconsciously in many decisions of our past. We were thrust ahead not against but by our wills. The choice is none the less binding for having been made in unawareness of the consequences.

Here we have a paradox—an accession to great power accompanied by a sense of deprivation of freedom.

RESPONSIBILITY WITH LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS

We feel that paradox in another way. In our historic past we viewed our role as that of standing normally aloof from the power balance whose benefits we enjoyed. At most, we would entertain the idea of throwing in our weight only momentarily to re-establish the balance whenever it might break down in general war. We regarded our role as like that of a pedestrian who might choose to vary his solitary walks by intermittently riding with others, without foreclosing himself from choosing to walk alone again.

Now that is changed. Our power makes our interposition essential to the preservation of the causes with which our interests lie. We must go along with others if we are to keep others with whom to go along. Our power is the basis of our essentiality, and our essentiality compels us to replace our historic sense of freedom by a new consciousness of responsibility.

While losing a sense of freedom, we lose also a sense of effectiveness. In the era when we stood normally aloof from the balance of power, our decision to become a world factor for a season had drastic and immediate results in redressing the balance. Now, by having become permanently involved in preserving the balance, we are no longer vouchsafed the opportunity to alter the situation dramatically and radically by sudden action.

This leaves for us the exacting course of seeking a solution in the long pull through persistent effort to make the best of the situation stage by stage in the knowledge that such is the only way of making the situation better.

OUR POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

Let us look for a moment at the foreign policy which this situation imposes. It gives us no promise of arrival at some calculable moment at which we can say that all our troubles are behind us, that everything henceforth will be tidy and easy, and that we have crossed the one last river.

I said this to a group of Texans with whom I was discussing our national policy recently. One of them asked me whether I actually thought coexistence with the Soviet Union was possible. That is a curious question. It makes a matter of speculation out of something known to be true. Coexistence with the Soviet Union is not simply possible; it is a fact. Coexistence with a great power that tries to lead a double life as state and as conspiracy is vexatious, certainly, but it is preferable to the tragedy of general war and its sequel, whichever side might win.

Our policy seeks to avoid the tragedy of war, to abate the difficulties of coexistence by correcting the circumstances affording special advantage to the adversary, and to work with other nations as best we can to guide international life toward the patterns of conduct preferable to us. This policy, often called the policy of containment, is sometimes criticized as if it aimed for a protracted, static confrontation—a sort of perpetually frozen status quo.

Such perpetual equilibrium is foreign to the processes of history. The policy is based upon no assumption of arresting change. It rests rather upon the assumption that the factors of position, population, talents, resources, and moral values redound to the ultimate advantage of the side of our interests, and that in the long pull it will be the adversary who must adjust his purposes.

This is not a foregone conclusion. What we and our friends do will be an essential factor in determining the outcome. This is no cause for disquiet. History presents no foregone conclusions. I know of no way to formulate a policy that will absolve us from the subsequent necessity of exercising resolution and restraint and paying the costs, whatever they may be.

HOW THE POLICY WORKS

The policy works along three general lines.

The first is to make coexistence more tolerable. This calls for improving our armed strength and that of the nations standing with us and combining them more effectively through a system of alliances; for helping the depleted and dislocated economies of our friends to regain a healthy level of activity and for helping the economically lagging countries to improve their production methods; for widening the area of peace by bringing the former enemy countries, Japan and Western Germany, back into collaboration with other countries.

The second line is to prevent serious deteriorations in the conditions of coexistence by avoiding losses in areas of sharp political conflict.

The third general line relates to the development of international usages and institutions of responsibility as instruments of free collaboration among nations instead of the collaboration by intimidation offered by the adversary.

To succeed in these endeavors will require the collaboration of others. They will not work along with us solely on the basis of our national interest. The collaboration must be founded on an identity among their interests and ours. The primary responsibility for discovering and developing that identity of interests is ours because we are in the position of greatest strength.

THE MEANING OF RESPONSIBILITY

This is not a simple responsibility. It is irksome and expensive, and contains no easy formula for complete success in a stipulated interval.

The policy of responsibility lacks the simplicity (here I use the word "simplicity" in the sense of Proverbs 1: 22) of the counsel of unlimited violence, a counsel based on the fallacy of trying to reduce all problems of power to the limits of the problems of force.

The policy lacks the utopian tidiness of the dream of solution by world government.

It lacks the traditional ring of the counsel of solution by default, by which I mean the idea of confining our security to this hemisphere—a counsel put forth by some claiming the mantle of statesmanship even though the formula on which it rests contains a fallacy recognizable to any schoolboy familiar with solid geometry. The fallacy inheres in this: Two points on the earth sphere can never be farther than a hemisphere apart; hence the whole world lies in the same hemisphere with us.

The policy based on the principle of responsibility lacks the crisp appeal of a phrase like "the national interest." It involves this paradox—that we can serve our national interest in these times only by a policy which transcends our national interest. This is the meaning of responsibility.

THE BURDEN OF FREEDOM

No nation could ask more of history than the privilege of coming to great responsibility. To satisfy our American

professions of the values of competition, we have at hand one of the most exacting contests in ideas ever experienced. To test our faith in freedom, we have abundant opportunity to make choices of action that will profoundly affect the course of human affairs. To test our devotion to values, we have the opportunity not simply to proclaim them but actually to support them by gifts and deeds and perseverance.

This juncture in our experience is not comforting for those who take the utopian approach to international problems—those who remind one of Kipling's lines:

Thinking of beautiful things we know;
Dreaming of deeds that we mean to do,
All complete, in a minute or two—
Something noble, and grand and good,
Won by merely wishing we could.

I recall the words opening one of Christina Rossetti's poems:

Does the road lead uphill all the way?
Yes, to the very end.

That is the road which a great and responsible nation must tread. It is an uphill road all the way. For Americans who do not mind walking that kind of a road, this is not a time for misgiving, but a great time in which to live.

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The Bases of Peace

By ALES BEBLER

AS the representative of the country which has, since the end of World War II, had a coalition government led by a Communist party, I think I am well entitled to start my statement with the contention that differences in ideologies or in the social structure of states are not the reason for international troubles in our day.

UNIFORMITY NOT NECESSARY

I consider and we do consider that the very widespread opinion in the West and more particularly in this country that the trouble is with Russian Communism is absolutely wrong. It is wrong not only because Russia is, in our opinion, not Communist, but primarily because it implies that peace is possible only if all nations embrace one and the same ideology.

There has never been a time when all nations had parallel ideologies and similar social structures; and it will be an extremely long time—possibly a few centuries—before the entire world will be on the same economic and social level and have, in the main, similar political and philosophical opinions.

Now, can we postpone a lasting peace in the world for several centuries? I think you will all agree that we must try to make peace, and a stable peace, right now; because the world has become so small and the destiny of nations so closely connected that we can have no more local wars without the perpetual danger of world wars. The two world wars of our time are precisely the best proof that the world has become small, and that it is essential for mankind, if it wants to survive, to make peace right now, and avoid new world wars which might destroy humanity.

Therefore my conclusion is that we must make peace despite the diversity of nations, including the diversity of ideologies; and I contend that this is possible.

We have had peaceful epochs in the world with a diversity of ideologies; we have also had wars and conquest with all kinds of ideological flavor and color. We have had conflicts from the time of the Egyptian Pharaohs to that of the modern conquerors, with all kinds of ideologies. We have found that every ideology can be stretched so as to cover and justify conquest.

We have had armed expansion of Islam at one time, and we have today absolutely peaceful Islamic states. We have had Christian crusades, and we have today very peaceful Christian states. We have had only one point in common in a foreign policy of war, the point being conquest itself, the reasons for which may have been extremely different. We could never analyze all the reasons, artificial and real, which have led nations to seek conquest; for it would be too late to save peace before we finished that analysis.

FIGHT NOT DIVERSITY BUT EXPANSIONISM

We have to find a way to save peace today in the world as it stands. The first thing to do is to embrace the thesis that we should not try to create uniformity in the world, that we should not try to do away with ideologies or social systems or political institutions that we dislike. We must discard the idea that any nation, however right it may later prove to have been at a cer-

tain moment, is entitled to impose its ideology or its political institutions on any other country. This idea leads to advocacy of preventive wars against so-called dangerous ideologies. In our time there is no such thing as a preventive war. There is war or there is peace.

What, then, is the trouble? What and how must we fight in order to preserve peace? We have simply to fight all kinds of expansionist tendencies, be they covered by one or another ideology. We have to avoid, to combat, to restrict, to contain as you say in this country, expansionist tendencies, so as to bring to reason those who want to expand, irrespective of their arguments for expansion.

There is another argument that differences of ideologies are not the trouble, the proof being very close to my heart, because it concerns my country. We have had long disputes with one of our neighbors, with the greatest of our immediate neighbors, Italy, about Trieste. You have read this story during the last few weeks very often. But the situation did not originate in the last few weeks, or even after the last war. It is a very old story, and one of the moments when it was most burning was the time immediately after the First World War.

Historians examining the situation in 1920 will find that Italy and Yugoslavia had exactly the same ideologies, exactly the same social, economic, and political institutions. Both countries had pretty much classic forms of the free enterprise system, as you call it. Both were monarchies with parliaments, and with governments responsible to those parliaments. Now what was the reason for this dispute about Trieste? It was expansionism. Whose expansionism? you may ask. I will tell you a story which you may not know.

History of Dispute with Italy

In the First World War, Italy vacillated about which camp to join, because she recognized the possibility of conquest through the victorious group. In 1915 she found that the price the Allies were ready to pay for Italy's entry into the war was high enough, and she signed a secret pact in London with Great Britain, France, and Czarist Russia. In this document those three powers promised Italy some southern provinces of Austria-Hungary.

When the end of the war came Italy asked for her pound of flesh, and it turned out to be not Austria-Hungary but Yugoslavia; because meanwhile the idea of the self-determination of peoples, which was one of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, had become important. In fact, it was so important that the shaping of the new Europe at Versailles was supposed to be according to ethnic borders, borders of languages and of nationalities. And here was Italy with a paper asking for part of Yugoslav soil, all of Dalmatia, and all of Istria, in addition to Trieste, a bilingual city.

A compromise was finally reached, and the principle of self-determination of nations was not entirely sacrificed. It was sacrificed only to the extent of approximately 50 per cent. Half of what Italy was demanding was given to it, and the other half was included in Yugoslavia.

The trouble started again when Italy occupied Fiume, which was not to be hers, when she claimed the greater part of the Balkans under Mussolini and occupied Albania so as to have a position in the Balkans, and waged war on Hitler's side against Yugoslavia. Dalmatia was foremost in the mind of Rome under Mussolini and before Mussolini, and unfortunately we find it so again today. Officially, Italy claims only Trieste and Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste; but the press—not only the opposition press attacking the government, but the press of the leading party, the Christian Democratic party of Signor de Gasperi—again dwells on Dalmatia and even Albania. It speaks of the Yugoslavs as barbarians who should be driven away from Dalmatia, from the shores of the all-Roman Adriatic Sea.

The Expansionist Spirit

This spirit in Italy is unfortunately an expansionist spirit. We are sorry for it. We are sorry because this spirit becomes so virulent at times. We understand that the ups and downs and the noise made in Italy about this question are connected with internal problems. We know quite well that the noise made in 1948 was connected with the general elections; and the noise is swelling today because again there are elections in Italy—at the moment communal, but with provincial and general elections following.

The question is, Why should Italian political leaders compete among themselves in such a way, demanding foreign soil? Could they not compete and have ideas on how to improve relations with a neighbor?

We are sorry, on the other hand, that the great western powers gave in, to a certain extent, to these Italian politicians. In 1948, when the noise was so great because of the elections, a paper was signed by the three great western powers—Great Britain, France, and the United States—to the effect that the entire Free Territory of Trieste should be given to Italy and not remain a free territory as established by the peace treaty in 1946.

Again today, with a clamor of voices from Italy, we see the three western powers calling a conference in London, sitting around the table with Italy discussing Trieste and seeking a solution to the Trieste issue; but Yugoslavia was not invited to that conference. It is forgotten that Yugoslavia was an ally in this part of the world, that it fought on the side of the Allies throughout the war, that it lost about 11 per cent of its population in the war, and that material damages amount to more than $40 billion. It was an ally that really lost relatively most heavily in World War II, both materially and in human lives.

It is forgotten that Italy's expansionism is extremely dangerous today. It is dangerous because the entire world is faced with the problem of how to preserve peace in the face of the expansionism of one of the greatest powers of our time, and the relations of the world outside the reach of this power should be as amicable as possible.

It is forgotten that such tensions should at all costs be avoided, and they can be avoided for a long period only if expansionist tendencies are repressed. If you yield to this expansionist tendency of Italy, you will have more and newer claims. Once expansionism is appeased, as you say in this country, you know how appetites grow, and we never know where it will stop.

I have said that we all need unity because we are faced with the expansionist tendency of one of the greatest powers in the world today, the Soviet Union. The question is, How shall we face this danger?

Preparation for Defense

When I say simply what is generally said, solidarity, keeping together, preparations for defense, I always feel that an American audience may think,

"Well, it is very easy for you Europeans to speak about solidarity, because we are the ones who pay. We pay and you only receive." I wish to point out that in the two great wars of our time, Europe has had to pay a higher price than the United States for the victory of justice. Furthermore, our present sacrifices in Europe are relatively higher and our standard of living suffers more because of our defense preparations than yours. My colleague from Great Britain has given a few examples of this,[1] and I will give one from my own country. We are sacrificing today for defense 23 per cent, not of our national budget, but of our national income. We have a standing army far greater than such a relatively undeveloped country should have, because it is close to being beyond our material possibilities; but still we have to maintain it.

Again, it may be said, "You do what you are doing for your own defense. You do not care what happens to others. You would do it whether we assisted or not, whether we were interested or not. You do this quite alone for yourselves." My contention is that this also is not quite true. If the one who is in the front line is well prepared, he serves well all the rest.

Besides, without meaning to boast, it is a fact that we collaborate even in the defense preparations of the West according to our possibilities. It may be in a small way, but still we do it as far as we can. Let me give just one example. We provide the United States with very important strategic raw materials—copper, lead, and so on—and we offer them to the United States not at the prices of the world market but at various lower prices, fixed by your government. We consider it a duty.

I hope you will feel that the collaboration in the field of defense between such European countries as mine and many others and yourselves is the main stabilizing policy of our day.

[1] See Adam Watson, in this volume.

NEED FOR UNITED EFFORT

Naturally, preparation for defense is not everything. We must also work towards a situation where invasions and conquests will become more and more difficult. You Americans, in my opinion, have a tremendous task in this respect. You must keep your country aligned with all those who are ready to resist aggression. You must prevent one of the greatest dangers that I visualize today.

If a country like the United States were to become isolationist, this would be, I submit, the most outspoken invitation for aggression in Europe and elsewhere. I hope you will all understand, finally, that isolationism would mean not peace but war, not only for us in Europe and elsewhere, but also for yourselves. In both of the world wars you stayed out only a year or so before you had to join, and the next time you would also have to join; and your isolationism would have alienated quite a number of your friends, your allies.

Therefore it is better not only for us but also for you to be united from the beginning, because this may preserve peace and avoid war both for us and for you.

UPHOLD PRINCIPLES OF U.N. CHARTER

We have to strive for peace in yet other fields. We have to strengthen the United Nations. I do not mean to make the policy of the majority in the United Nations tougher. I think the United Nations must be tough in some respects, and in other respects very wise and mild. We must strengthen its ideas and its consistency in defending the fundamental principles of its Charter. We must be very tough indeed in questions involving fundamental principles such as sovereignty, inviolability of national territory, and equality of nations large and small. In those questions, and in opposing the reverse of them, the use of violence in international affairs, we should not know compromise. But we can be wise and mild in many other respects, in questions concerning peaceful settlement of disputes of all kinds, political, economic, and so on.

We should never even listen to any proposal going against the principles of the United Nations Charter, even if it is disguised as a proposal for saving peace. We have had such proposals.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL

For instance, for several years the Soviet delegation has advocated in the United Nations, and still continues to advocate in most diverse forms in all kinds of congresses and conventions, a proposal to the effect that the five great powers should sign a pact outside the framework of the United Nations or at least without the participation of the rest of its members, for the preservation of peace.

On this question the last Assembly of the United Nations listened again to long speeches of Mr. Vyshinsky, but he never mentioned what that pact should actually be—what provisions, what new undertakings, what new commitments by the five great powers, he proposed.

Once I rose to the rostrum and said, "If you do not tell us what the pact should be, we shall be justified in believing that you propose a new Munich, a new division of spheres of influence of the big powers at the expense of the small powers; that you propose something similar to the pact between yourself and Ribbentrop when Poland was sacrificed 'for peace.' You want to sacrifice other countries 'for peace.' But we know that what resulted was war."

Vyshinsky said my speech was the speech of a traitor and what not, but he did not say a single word as to what that pact should be. Therefore I consider we are still entitled to believe that the idea behind such a proposal is a rotten idea. It is an idea that the Soviet leaders do not dare to explain in public. They would like secret parleys with other great powers and all kinds of arrangements in different parts of the world so that their empire would increase "peacefully" at the expense of the small powers, and they would authorize the other powers to seize some territories or to control some other territories as the price paid for their own expansion. These would be exactly the same type of arrangements as we had between the two wars, and all of them were steps leading to the Second World War.

In spite of rather violent answers that Vyshinsky got in Paris, I understand that this idea of a pact among the five big powers alone still lives in some quarters even in the public opinion of some great countries like the United States. I think that those who sincerely want to prevent a new world war must fight this idea, this way of apparently saving peace.

A WORLD-WIDE FORCE FOR PEACE

All those around the globe who sincerely want to save peace must stick to the principles of the United Nations Charter; because sooner or later we shall all find out that a really lasting peace can only be based on equality,

on what the Charter calls "equal rights . . . of nations large and small."

Fortunately this idea has become very strong in the world. The very fact that such a charter, and not a different one, was signed at the end of the last war is a sign that the conscience of mankind has risen rather high; and since the signing of this Charter, the ideas embodied in it have been embraced by many millions of people around the globe and have become a tremendous force.

It is true that the forces that drive us towards war, whether intentionally or because of a practical policy, are strong; but I think the ideas embodied in the United Nations Charter have become such a great force that they will finally prove stronger than the forces of war, and we shall win our battle for peace.

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The Inter-American System Today

By ALBERTO LLERAS

I WISH to speak of the significance for the United States of the ties its inter-American policy has been forging with the twenty other republics that share the hemisphere with it. It may be surprising that a foreigner should discuss this particular topic; but I feel that because of the very fact of being a foreigner, I may be able to give an impartial opinion (in spite of my affection and admiration for this country), and one that may at least have the merit of presenting a picture of what many Latin Americans think of the various types of relations that have existed between the United States and its Latin American neighbors.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM

The Charter of the Organization of American States entered into effect in December of last year, three years after it was signed at Bogotá in April 1948. A long political and juridical process preceded the legal perfection of the world's oldest association of nations. Its historical genesis dates back to the birth of the new American republics themselves. Many of the Founding Fathers of the nations that resulted from independence from Spain realized the need for a federation of the peoples of the New World, at the time when the republican constitutions were being drafted.

Bolívar wanted to put this bold concept into practice, and he went so far as to call a Pan-American congress in 1826, with the immediate objective of a military and political alliance against any European attempt to dominate part of the hemisphere, including the possibility of joint action to free the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean; and another, more ambitious and nebulous objective, the establishment of a regional American league that might be the first step toward a world association of nations.

Sixty-four years later the United States took the initiative in organizing, cautiously but systematically, and as far as was then possible, the new republican world. The First International Conference of American States was held in Washington in 1890. In 1933 the fundamental obstacle to progress in inter-American relations was eliminated when, at Montevideo, Secretary Hull accepted for the United States the principle of nonintervention.

At the end of the Second World War, the Act of Chapultepec, signed in 1945 at Mexico City, laid the foundations for hemispheric solidarity by recognizing the fact that aggression against one American nation is equivalent to aggression against them all. In 1947, at Rio de Janeiro, the Act of Chapultepec became the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. A year later, at Bogotá, the Charter of the Organization of American States clarified and defined the bases for the permanent association of the republics of this hemisphere, and at the same time the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement introduced an original and advanced method of ensuring proper legal solution for any dispute that might arise among the American states.

As may be seen, the idea that nations can and should live together in harmony, within an organized international society, renouncing the use of force in their relations, just as citizens

live within a country, has arisen with growing vigor at various times in the development of the American republics, until at last that viewpoint achieves definitive acceptance. It was one of the very members of this international society—the United States—that proposed a similar organization to avoid war for the entire world, after it had already been tried in this hemisphere. Wilson, and later Roosevelt, before taking bold action in international affairs, made earnest efforts to strengthen Pan-Americanism. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the League of Nations and the United Nations, whose creation was the sole recompense sought by this country for the decisive part it played in the two greatest wars of our times, were unquestionably inspired by our inter-American organization.

We may also note that the inter-American system was the first significant international political movement of the United States that apparently ran counter to the isolationist advice of George Washington; and that after the First World War, when a disillusioned United States turned once more to isolationism, it went right on practicing with the other states of this hemisphere the principles of international co-operation that appeared to have been repudiated by American public opinion.

THE EXPRESSION OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

Every day, both in this country and abroad, we hear it said that the United States lacks experience in international affairs, lacks a definite foreign policy and good judgment in the management of its relations with other countries. The fact is, however, that in that section of the world in which the United States has had occasion to work out its international course over the longest period of time and under normal conditions, it has produced a genuine masterpiece. In its inter-American dealings are to be found intelligence and elasticity, self-control and tact, and the courage to promote great ideals without fear of the consequences; the difficult thing for a great power to do is to refrain from using its strength, substituting reason for force, without forfeiting its prestige. The inter-American policy of the United States not only has provoked no resistance, but it has been worked out in close co-operation with the twenty other member states in our Organization and has been accepted by them with enthusiasm.

If the rest of the world really wants to know what is the ultimate objective of the United States foreign policy, it need only examine the commitments this nation has made in the Organization of American States and its behavior since 1933 in this part of the world, where every development can vitally affect its own interests and its own security.

A CHANGE IN COURSE

This policy was not arrived at over night, and it has not always been in effect. It is the fruit of experience, and the end result of a courageous rectification. It is not usual for the world's great powers to correct their conduct, or to learn from the experience of others. That is why the inter-American policy of the United States deserves such high praise. In its early days the intercourse between this country and the other republics of the hemisphere started out very much along the same lines as the course followed by other strong states toward weaker neighbors: the use of military force, ruthless territorial expansion, armed intervention, economic penetration, diplomatic pressure. One section of public opinion here applauded these tactics which, in a way, could be construed as a sign that the nation had reached the status

of a world power. Those were the days of "manifest destiny." At that time all the European powers dreamed of empire; and in the United States there were those who sincerely believed that the natural limits of its empire should, for the moment, be the two great oceans and the two poles.

From that point of view, naturally, the imperialistic exploits of this country were very successful. All the more credit is due, therefore, to the reaction in American public opinion that put an end to them. This is why today we are not witnessing the liquidation of one more empire, but on the contrary the United States has twenty sincere friends who feel a sense of political solidarity with this nation. It is thereby relieved of continental cares at a time when it must conserve its energies to decide its own fate as well as that of the world at large at a crucial moment in history.

A NEW CONFIDENCE

I have mentioned that a change of course took place in 1933, because it was at the inter-American conference that met that year in Montevideo that this country accepted, for the first time, the principle of nonintervention which the other American republics claimed as fundamental to their foreign relations. Up to that time the inter-American system had been merely a faint-hearted exchange of pleasantries, with a considerable admixture of justifiable distrust. But from that day on, the American international organization bloomed with new vigor, and all the American states realized that they could sit down and discuss their mutual problems without hesitation, in the comforting thought that juridically they were all equals, whatever their territorial extent, their national population, their material resources, or their military strength.

These countries did not fear that this new deal would be changed, because they counted on its being supported by North American public opinion. That is, they reasoned that the foreign policy of a democracy would necessarily reflect the collective opinion of its people. The negotiation of treaties, conventions, or other agreements with a dictatorship is a waste of time, since there is no guarantee that they will be honored. A dictatorship is bound by no moral scruples either at home or abroad, but is held in check only by force. A democracy, on the other hand, cannot resort to war without first having persuaded the thinkers, the clergy, the army, the mothers, the wives, the farmers, the workers—the whole country, in a word—that no other course is open to it.

The Latin American republics know very well that the present international policy of the United States cannot suddenly trend toward intervention or imperialism, because Franklin Roosevelt did not just invent that policy. It was created, adopted, and supported by the American people, that enduring force that always welcomes righteous ideas with advocates, defenders, and, if need be, martyrs.

THE DEMOCRATIC METHOD

The inter-American system that our Organization administers is not a method of international dealing applicable to our hemisphere alone. It would work equally well throughout the world, and would unquestionably be the most generous boon that could be bestowed on future generations. In this system there are no privileged countries, none that are immune to the consequences of an adverse majority decision. That is, the veto is unknown in the councils of our Organization; not a single nation has the right to employ a veto. It is the democratic way, with all that this implies.

The United States, for example, might be systematically overridden at each of the meetings of the Organization of American States by the votes of just eleven member countries, even the smallest in the group. But this does not happen, in spite of the fact that in many cases the immediate interests of the United States do not coincide with those of its weaker neighbors. It does not happen, because there is a paramount interest in international amity, in maintaining the respect of those other nations with which one must work and live, and in preserving a set of principles and moral and political rules, impelling the member republics to keep faith with one another.

In a real democracy, moreover, the majorities, merely because they are stronger, do not league together against the minorities, even when the latter are wealthier and happier. And none of the Latin American states can find in our deliberations any sign that the United States wishes to follow a course that would be detrimental to the others. They realize that just as they should and do defend their own special interests, the United States must do the same for what concerns it. The result is almost always a compromise, that excellent formula of active democracy which does not permit the imposition of the majority will by brute force, but takes into account the strength, the interests, and the rights of all. One consequence is that the small and weak countries feel very keenly their responsibility to contribute to the common good, and they refrain from deliberately acting as hindrances.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERVENTION

There is one more characteristic of the inter-American system that we do not find in like degree in any other international policy. It is the principle of nonintervention that I have already mentioned. In my opinion, the evolution of international life will be retarded until this principle is adopted for the entire world and followed faithfully, as in the Americas. The nations cannot be won over by merely offering them peace and security, for these can be promised by any power with the physical might to guarantee an alliance of the traditional and well-known sort, like the protectorate. Many nations have preferred, and continue to prefer, insecurity to protectorates.

What would induce all the nations to give their sincere support to the international organizations would be an effective guarantee that no state or group of states would interfere in their domestic affairs. But this assurance, unfortunately, cannot be given as long as the veto is granted precisely to those powers that are in a position to interfere. On the contrary, the veto is a mighty weapon for intervention, an insidious weapon superior to the military pressure of former days, because it is less dramatic and spectacular. Around each nation enjoying the use of the veto is formed a sphere of influence that inevitably attracts other states wishing to share the international advantage, even at the expense of their independence.

Furthermore, collective international action against an act of intervention on the part of a nation armed with the veto is utterly out of the question. The American states, including of course the United States, can offer the world as their greatest contribution to the welfare of humanity the example of a hemisphere from which intervention has been abolished, both in theory and in practice. The totalitarian states are interventionist by definition, by their very nature. They can only conceive of their own type of world, and they fully believe that they must incorporate other nations into their system, whose peak of perfection will be reached when it embraces the entire globe.

The inhabitants of this part of the world see it differently. We feel that every state in its international life, even as the citizen in national life, is entitled to preserve a certain sphere of inalienable liberty, which other states, or even the international agencies, cannot invade under any pretext whatsoever. Within that sanctuary they shall not, of course, conspire against the liberty of the others, or commit any act that might endanger the rights of others. But a nation has its own individual personality, just as a man has, and its preservation from foreign intervention is a standard held aloft by the democracies. They must never lower it if they do not wish to lose it forever.

COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

After the creation of the United Nations, many thought that an organization such as that of the American states had lost much of its significance, and the need for it had been outgrown. This view was held by some of the delegations at San Francisco, when the United Nations Charter was being written. The American nations fought hard to preserve the autonomy of their system, and, thanks to their efforts, Article 51 was included in the Charter, recognizing the right to collective self-defense. On this a little later was built the foremost regional pact, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which in turn served as a model for the North Atlantic Pact.

These are the two regional agreements that link this republic with a group of other powers for their mutual defense against aggression; and, in my opinion, prior to the passage of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations, they constituted the only juridical instruments we could rely upon to contain the aggression of international communism.

It can also be said, fairly and with juridical authority, that one of the foundation stones of that resolution is an amplification of the concept of collective self-defense embodied in Article 51, since it rests on the principle that there must be effective general action to repel aggression when the Security Council is paralyzed by the use of the veto.

MEANS TO A BETTER LIFE

Of course up to now I have only referred to the purely political aspects of the task the Organization of American States has been asked to perform. We can affirm, for example, that the present policy of technical aid to less-developed states is as old, within our organization, as the agency itself. For it was one of the original purposes of the inter-American organization to permit the member states to co-operate with one another by pooling the fruits of their experience and exchanging knowledge and technicians, in order to convert the development of the New World into a collective enterprise of generous proportions.

Were there no other arguments for selecting Latin America as an ideal candidate for technical assistance, there is an elementary one, of a political nature, that is rarely mentioned. The theory implicit in technical assistance, from the standpoint of the more advanced countries, is that the most adverse social conditions can be corrected, anywhere in the world, by the same methods that have produced western cultures with the highest standards of living the world has known. This means, in contradiction to international communism, that we do not need to invite mankind to engage in class warfare, in revolution and the total destruction of all that now exists, fol-

lowed by the eventual loss of all liberties, in order to bring about better living conditions.

Communism seeks as its ultimate aim, by way of bloody dictatorship, the very same thing that the United States has been achieving without dictatorship or anguish or sacrifice, but with a progressive increase in the happiness of the many, chiefly as a result of the marvelous growth of its science and technology. But the less fortunate nations, the oppressed, the poverty-stricken, look upon the American experience as something unique, as a miracle that could not occur a second time; whereas it requires only a minimum of effort for desperate men to take the short step leading to social revolution and communistic tyranny.

PROSPERITY CAN BE REPEATED

What must be demonstrated, therefore, is that the United States way of life is a much better and more exportable product than the communism that Moscow exports; that if the nations make up their minds to it, with a small dose of technical aid to stimulate and organize the latent forces, they will be able to create a prosperous and healthy civilization, protected by democratic standards and preserving for every man the full use of his rights and liberties.

The world would like to believe this, and to try it out. But it is held in check by a doubt arising from an apparent contradiction: what about Latin America? If those countries, in spite of their advantage of being near neighbors of the United States and enjoying its friendship, in spite of their feeling of solidarity from sharing a hemisphere that presents a united political front and from providing most of the raw materials for North American industry for many years, have nevertheless been unable to correct deplorable domestic conditions, what could more distant and less homogeneous countries hope to gain from technical assistance? Nothing could be more dangerous for the security of our hemisphere than to have the rest of the world convinced that North American civilization is but a miracle whose repetition elsewhere it would be futile to expect.

Everything, therefore, points to the need to repeat it, and the sooner the better, in a section of the globe that seems particularly suited for the purpose. That is why the United States Government, recognizing its responsibility for world leadership, has evolved the technical assistance programs, in the hope of arousing in all the less-developed countries a vigorous movement toward self-help. The philosophical core of western civilization is the belief that man and human society are susceptible of constant improvement, and that there are no conditions of injustice, pain, or poverty in the world that are irremediable merely because they are of long standing.

Communism offers a fallacious solution to men who each day become more conscious of their own plight, to a world in which human suffering in the remotest corner of the globe is at once utilized for propaganda purposes and for inviting the solidarity of the masses. It is a formula that appeals directly to the worst in every man, because it stirs up hatred, anger, and a desire to tear down completely all the structure that no longer seems to satisfy humanity's longing for a better life. Hence, no nation can successfully confine itself to the mere offering of its example and its way of life to the world. It must also demonstrate that these can be duplicated under less favorable circumstances than it has enjoyed.

These are the considerations that led to the adoption of the technical assistance program, and that appear to have prevailed in the councils of this nation when it took the initiative in proposing it to the world. They are no longer considerations of national policy alone. Their applicability to all the free countries of the world is obvious, both for the giver and for the recipient of technical aid. But an essential condition for the success of the technical assistance program is continuity; for we cannot expect to change overnight economic and social conditions that have prevailed for centuries in certain areas of the world.

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Liberia: An American Responsibility

By Dihdwo Twe

THE resolution recently passed in Paris by the General Assembly of the United Nations, inviting African chieftains to bring their complaints before it, has raised the hope of a new charter for human liberties in Africa. It spells the doom of domestic dictatorship and tyranny.

Moreover, during World War II the nations of Europe made an important discovery: that because of its vast natural resources and its geographical position, Africa should be linked with all parts of the world and the Africans given full civil liberties for the safety of the Western Hemisphere. The occupation of North Africa by the Germans forced this conclusion upon the United States; therefore, it has since built bases in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa for military security.

French and English Policy

The French, however, were the first to express boldly a new policy of civil liberties and equality. The former subjects of the French African empire were declared citizens of France, eligible even to the presidency of the French Republic.

The English, too, have approached the problem wisely in many ways in their West African colonies. For instance, in Sierra Leone, in addition to other educational activities, they built the Bo School in 1908, especially for the training of the sons of chiefs, supplemented with a continuous program of social services. As a result, a strong intelligentsia has sprung up among the people of Sierra Leone, and today most of the ruling chiefs are literate. They have organized the population into district councils and into a Protectorate Assembly, with powers to manage their local affairs in consultation with the Chief Commissioner. Literate chiefs are periodically elected by the district councils to the Legislative Council in Freetown, capital of the colony. In short, the British have prepared and are still preparing their natives on the West Coast to become efficient and better rulers.

Forced labor is outlawed. Nobody works for the government without compensation. This is not the case in Liberia.

The internal development program in Sierra Leone, which, I understand, is sustained by local revenue, is very encouraging. For example, Bo, a native town, has been given a water system. In reference to a proposed water supply for the town, Mr. H. Childs, the Chief Commissioner, said:

> Government has already initiated action in regard to a water supply for Bo, and a preliminary report from the consulting engineers on this subject is at present receiving consideration. Surveys of the site [have been made] and a sum of £40,000 out of a total preliminary estimate of £218,000 has been included in the 1952 estimates.

The same kind of development as in Sierra Leone is applied in the other British colonies on the coast. Because of their larger areas and ample revenues, the development of the economic and human resources of Nigeria and the Gold Coast is far more extensive.

In short, preparation of the colonial peoples for efficiency and extension to them of the freer political and social institutions of the West seem to be the present-day policy of the European colonial powers on the West Coast.

Liberian Conditions

But how does this compare with conditions in Liberia? The Honorable Joseph C. Grew, formerly United States Acting Secretary of State, understands Liberia and Africa. In a memorandum of conversation between himself and a member of the Liberian Delegation, prepared by him after the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, he expressed the concern of the United States over the extremely primitive and backward conditions in which Liberian natives, numbering about 1,500,000, were kept down by the ruling class of so-called Americo-Liberians, who represent 1 per cent of the total population.

Liberia's native policy was expressed in a nutshell in 1930 by the Honorable Jeremiah Harris, Liberian Secretary of Interior. He said:

> Unless the Government through the Commissioners centralized them [the educated natives], the responsibility of them becoming dangerous to good administration is probable. The instances shown in many of the investigations indicate that the Government should in time take steps towards preventing any confusion in the end.[1]

According to Harris, all literate natives should be separated from their illiterate tribesmen so that they might not breed sedition among them. The most effective way to do this would be to arrest literate men and send them to concentration camps. Obviously, this type of mentality is not confined to Mr. Harris. While Europeans are training their subjects to make them efficient and useful, the independent African republic of Liberia fears intelligence and education in its citizens.

Consequently, during the hundred years of its existence the education of the country has been almost wholly in the hands of missionaries. But they have been handicapped on all sides in their efforts to reach the people, because with the exception of the forty miles of road recently built by the Bomi Hill Mining Company, there is only one motor road from Monrovia to the interior; the rest of the country is inaccessible except on foot. And since most of the towns are far apart, it is impossible for a large number of the children to reach missionary schools in the interior and on the coast. As a result, hundreds and thousands are allowed to remain in ignorance.

However, efforts have been put forth to do something about education. But because of the difficulties already outlined, at the moment most of the activities will be centralized in Monrovia, the capital.

This brings us face to face with the fact that the one and one-half million natives who pay taxes annually receive nothing in return—no schools, no roads, no water works, no health facilities or social services, and no police protection or protection from the police. This and continuous forced labor are the biggest problems in Liberia.

The people in the interior cross and recross into adjoining British and French colonies every day. They see what services taxpayers are getting over there, and naturally they expect some benefit from their own government. The same is true of the coastal tribes who travel up and down the coast every year. The people feel that since they pay taxes every year, they should receive just compensation for their services when

[1] Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into the Existence of Slavery and Forced Labour in the Republic of Liberia, 1930, p. 85.

they work for the government. But this is not always the case.

FORCED LABOR

Compulsory human labor without compensation still exists in Liberia. In the interior and on the coast, government officials who travel are carried in hammocks by the natives without pay. The loads of soldiers are also carried in the same way. Motor road making is one form of forced labor which has done more damage. It has disorganized the economy of the people and has caused depopulation of town after town.

The Sinoe motor road on the Liberian coast is a typical example. All the communities along the beach within the county are taxed so many men per month; yet these men must supply their own tools and food while working on the road. Men collected by their chiefs to work on the road are sent, but are relieved by a new set at the end of every two weeks. In addition, from five to ten or more men are kept in readiness every day in every town to carry the loads of any officials or soldiers who may be passing.

SPAIN HOLDS LIBERIANS IN BONDAGE

Hundreds of Liberian natives are still held in bondage today on the Spanish island of Fernando Po. These had been rounded up in Liberia and shipped to work for the Spanish before the arrival, in 1930, of the League of Nations International Commission of Enquiry into the Existence of Slavery and Forced Labour in the Republic of Liberia. Although this Commission exposed what was virtually a slave trade, the return of the Liberians from the Spanish island to their homes was never arranged for.

In addition to this, the Spanish always recruited stevedores from Monrovia to unload and reload their ships along the coast, but according to the then existing agreement, the men had to be brought back to Liberia at the end of every voyage. But between 1932 and 1933, the captain of one of the Spanish boats actually kidnapped over a hundred Liberian natives, landed them at Fernando Po, and ran to Spain.

This is what happened. After the ship had been reloaded at Fernando Po, the captain told the headman that he had received urgent orders to proceed to Spain directly without touching at any other port; therefore he would land the men on the island to be picked up in three weeks' time, by the next boat, to take them back to Liberia. He landed them, and induced the headman to go with him as far as Las Palmas to return with the next ship for the men. At Las Palmas the company's agent put him on an English boat and sent him to Sierra Leone instead of the island.

No Spanish boat has ever returned for the men. Consequently, the ship's crew plus the first men are all in Fernando Po, held in bondage by the Spaniards on their cocoa plantations. If you go there today you will see them.

Fernando Po is an island; consequently they are cut off from communication with their families. Worse still, it is impossible for any of them to escape. These men have been in bondage for twenty long years, but there is apparently no way of having them released. The families of these men have been crying and are still crying for their return.

LIBERIANS ARE MIGRATING

Liberia, as a nation, was founded by Americans and is still regarded as being within the American sphere of influence. Today, despite the workings of a newly organized Point Four program which promises to be beneficial in the long run, large numbers of Liberian natives are moving into neighboring colonies and protectorates of Britain and France because there they enjoy better and more democratic treatment than they receive in their own country.

Dihdwo Twe, Washington, D. C., is a member of the Kru tribe of Liberia. He was educated in the United States and is a member of The American Academy of Political and Social Science. Early in 1950 he was nominated by the Reformation party, composed of aborigines and Americo-Liberians, to run for President of Liberia. His name was omitted from the ballot, however. After election the incumbent President caused the arrest of Mr. Twe's followers, and Mr. Twe was forced to flee to British territory.

Nationalism and the Asian Awakening

By B. R. Sen

THE ideal of world government has persisted through ages, taking different shapes and forms according to the prevailing circumstances. The present world situation is again compelling western European nations to think in terms of supranational authorities. A purely nationalistic attitude is now regarded in the West as unreal and out of date and an obstacle in the way of international peace and understanding.

Western View of Asian Nationalism

The West has always looked upon world problems in general and Asian problems in particular "from the vantage ground of the community of interests of the western nations." A certain lack of objectivity has, therefore, always been a factor in the western approach to Asian problems. Nowhere has this lack of objectivity been more apparent, or with more unhappy results, than in the appreciation of national movements in Asia which have been slowly gathering force since the beginning of the century and are now reaching a climax across the two continents of Asia and Africa.

There can be no doubt that nationalism is the greatest social and political force in the life of Asia today. But while some countries in the West have already, though somewhat reluctantly, come to recognize and accept the fact, the West has allowed its view of Asian nationalism to be colored by its own history and experience, and to invest it with the same character as its own. Nationalism in India, however, has a different history and has stemmed from somewhat different circumstances. In certain essential respects, therefore, it has assumed a character all its own, which it will be my endeavor here to explain.

Nationalism Defined

Nationalism has been described as an emotional fusion of two ingredients—nationality and patriotism. Nationality as an attribute of human culture and civilization has always existed in a general way, fostered by a common language, by shared historical traditions, by a distinctive complex of institutions, and often by politics and religion. Patriotism has also always existed, whether in its application to a small locality or to a vast empire. Nationalism as a political force is quite a recent phenomenon in the history of Europe.

From the days when Alexander the Great set out to conquer the world, Europe was dominated by the idea of a world empire. In such a world empire, a "national state" in the modern sense, even if it had been conceived of, had no place whatever. The idea was carried forward in the conception of the "Holy Roman Empire," and, when the Holy Roman Empire fell into decay, by individual monarchs who called themselves Caesars in the hope of better days to come.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the attempt to consolidate personal monarchy and make it absolute, and to extend its power over weaker neighbors. Also during that period there emerged the concept of "great powers"—something which is more than the person and prestige of the monarch, something which vaguely

recognizes the growing importance of the common people (but mainly the trading and moneyed classes) as the ultimate source of power of a state.

It has been claimed that it was the French Revolution that first gave to the world the doctrine of national democracy and national self-determination. Others have found the idea of "nation" originating from the struggle of "great powers" in the nineteenth century. The historian H. G. Wells said:

> It greatly helped the diplomatists to carry on their game of Great Powers to convey politics in this form to the doubting general intelligence. To the common man, resentful that his son should be sent abroad to be shot, it was made clear that instead of this being merely the result of the obstinacy and greed of two foreign offices, it was really a necessary part of a righteous inevitable, gigantic struggle between two such dim vast divinities, as Britannia or Hibernia, or France or Germania.

On the conduct of the countries who made use of this idea, H. G. Wells sarcastically defined a "nation" as "in effect any assembly, mixture, or confusion of people which is either afflicted by or wishes to be afflicted by a foreign office of its own, in order that it should behave collectively as if it alone constituted humanity"!

European Nationalism

There can be no doubt that the revolutionary sentiment of liberty, equality, and fraternity, together with the idea that every people had the right to decide its own destiny, has had a profound influence on the course of European history over the last century and a half. The unification of Germany and of Italy, the political freedom of Poland, Finland, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and the Balkan States, and the breakup of the Ottoman, Austrian, and Russian empires, are some of the achievements that can be traced to this source.

It is also true that some of the major improvements in Europe in technology, in the industrial arts, in education, in scientific discovery, in aesthetics and the arts, owe a good deal to this urge of nationalism. The substitution of a secular, democratic ideology for religion as the determining factor in social and political life, the establishment of strong, centralized government working under the rule of law, the furtherance of the spirit of critical examination and experimental inquiry, the importance attached to the growth of human personality and the protection given to it from the hazards of arbitrary dispensation, are also some of the historic achievements of nationalism.

But it is a tragedy of history, if I may call it so, that nationalism in Europe soon lost its true course and found itself involved with quite another set of ideas—the ideas of imperialism, "in which a powerful and advanced nation was conceded the right to dominate a group of other less advanced nations who were expected by the dominating nation to be grateful for its protection and dominance."

This rather fortuitous alliance derived strength from the results which followed the Industrial Revolution. In the later part of the nineteenth century, increase of population in Europe drove European powers to make their colonies more and more a source of their food supplies, and the growth of their scientific industries demanded raw materials in increasing quantities which they could only have from their colonies. Exploitation of the colonies for these purposes, therefore, became increasingly the dominant motive in the administration of the colonies.

Thus, nationalism in Europe, which had very generous beginnings and had found expression in many fruitful directions, came to be inseparable from that aggressive imperialism by which Europe guided her conduct with Asian countries. That attitude unfortunately persists even to this day.

ORIGIN OF ASIAN NATIONALISM

On the other hand, the origin of nationalism in Asia was in the nature of a rebound from the European imperialism of the last century. Before the European incursion, life in Asia, which was organized on a village community basis, was carried on more or less undisturbed while invaders came and went and empires rose and fell. The impact of the western industrial civilization, with its need for raw materials and to sell its cheap machine-made goods, pulverized and disintegrated this community life. A situation was at last reached when regeneration of the mental, moral, and material life, and political liberty to achieve it, became matters of life and death for the people.

The inspiration for this reformist zeal and for conducting the struggle for national liberation was partly supplied by some of the great liberal thinkers of the West. The best illustration is to be found in the case of India, which was the greatest of the European colonies in the East, where both modern colonial government and the process of westernization made their first appearance. India is also significant because our struggle for freedom gave momentum for similar struggles in other parts of the Asian Continent. It may not be fanciful to suggest that the present turmoil for political and economic liberation in the Middle East and North Africa is also not entirely independent of the forces which were set in motion by India.

INDIA'S STRUGGLE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the tangled web of history, four stages may be clearly traced in India's struggle to liberate herself from British rule. The faint beginnings of political nationalism were made by the establishment of the Brahmo Samaj in 1828. This comprised the advanced Hindu intelligentsia who had come into contact with western democratic ideologies through an English education. Although distinguished individuals, the leaders of this movement lacked a popular basis for their work. However, the increasing poverty of the Indian peasantry and the large-scale ruination of millions of artisans and handicraftsmen, together with the liquidation of a number of Indian feudal states by Lord Dalhousie, brought about the Revolt of 1857, which was the first organized expression of antiforeign sentiment. The revolt, as such, failed because it lacked a positive political program, but its bold challenge to British authority continued to serve as a source of patriotic inspiration down to our own time.

The period between 1857 and 1870 was quiescent, although it witnessed two anti-British movements the declared aim of which was the armed overthrow of the British Government. The establishment in 1885 of the Indian National Congress, which became the chief instrument of India's struggle for political freedom, marked the beginning of the third stage. During the early years of its history the Congress was dominated by the Liberals, who believed in constitutional agitation. The organization served as a focal point for the expression of national discontent, particularly of the educated classes. The Liberals did not realize that as an economic colony of British capitalism, India could not be permitted to develop her economy freely. Their main contribution lay in infusing a national consciousness among certain sections of the Indian people and in disseminating the conception of representative institutions.

As most of the important demands made by the Congress remained unsatisfied, there grew up a class of nationalists, led by Tilak, who declared their faith in action as against political argument. These nationalists drew inspiration from India's past, and their nationalism had all the burning ardor of religious experience. The philosophical poem *Bhagavadgita* became the Bible of the rising generation and was issued in hundreds of cheap editions with new notes and interpretations. The aim definitely was to turn away from appeals to the British rulers, and address the common people.

INDIA'S STRUGGLE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY

During the opening years of the twentieth century, educated Indians were studying European history, particularly the American War of Independence, the French Revolution, the national struggles of the Italian people against Austrian domination, and the Irish struggle for freedom. Their favorite authors were Burke, Thomas Paine, Mazzini, and Rousseau. The postwar revolutions in Germany, Austria, and Russia, which led to the overthrow of great and time-honored dynasties, created a profound effect on the minds of the Asiatic peoples.

All this set the stage for the last phase of the Indian political struggle, which may be said to date from 1919 when the promises of self-government given to India for her participation in the First World War were imperfectly fulfilled and the historic tragedy of Amritsar took place, where hundreds of peaceful citizens were killed or wounded at a mass meeting. This is the period when Gandhi came upon the scene and assumed leadership of the struggle, which he retained till the end.

The world now knows how this remarkable man brought freedom to India. He taught the people of India that the force of truth and of selfless suffering was greater than the might of generals and kings. Millions of people suffered punishment cheerfully, crowded the jails, lost their worldly possessions, even their lives, at his bidding. Nothing quite like it has been seen in the history of the world elsewhere. Gandhi's political movement was really an all-embracing social and cultural renaissance for India. He not only told his people to demand freedom but also to deserve it. The latter was certainly more difficult than the former, because it meant purging the body politic of the accumulated lethargy and abuses of several centuries. His program led to the emancipation of women, brought a new sense of dignity to the so-called untouchables and ultimately secured the abolition of this social stigma, and gave to India a new system of education, a new pride in her ancient heritage, a new national language, and above all an abiding dedication to the cause of peace.

GOALS OF ASIAN NATIONALISM

Such has been the course of nationalism in India. If in other Asian countries it has not been quite the same, it has this in common that it is galvanized by the great humanitarian urge to remove the hardships which have taken all zest out of life for the common man. In India, as elsewhere, there is a great demand that freedom should be made real to the great masses of the toiling

people; that the fruits of independence must percolate down and all harmful vested interests must go.

The political changes brought about by national liberation in Asia are so great that they are almost revolutionary. Justice Douglas has remarked that during his travels in the Middle East and India he found that "the spirit that motivates people is pretty much the same as the spirit that inspired the French and the American Revolutions." The abuses against which they are struggling are somewhat different from those that are listed in the Declaration of Independence, but they are just as specific and just as heavy.

From what I have said, it should be clear that nationalism in Asia fulfills purposes and destinies different from those it accomplished in Europe. Its present role is dynamic and creative in the best sense of the term: to set right the wrongs of centuries of predatory nationalism of Europe, to catch up with the technological progress the fruits of which form the basis of the life in the West. Professor Fairbank is perfectly right when he says that

> the true nationalist appeal in backward Asia consists not merely in preserving one's country from outside control, as might be sufficient in the West, but of constructing one's country anew, solving its many problems, uplifting its ragged millions, and making its society in every respect where it is now inadequate. Thus the higher patriotism of the modern Orient is compounded of love of country and belief in its potentialities, faith in its future rebuilding, and determination to carry through great social changes.

The moral and cultural aspect of Asian nationalism is no less important, consisting as it does in a cultural renaissance and a rediscovery of the forgotten values of an ancient tradition. Ultimately, the Asian nations will be better qualified to participate in a future internationalism after they have risen to their full stature through the assimilation of their national inheritance. As Professor Alfred Zimmern has said, "No task is more urgent among backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality and the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character and self-respect."

WESTERN CO-OPERATION

It is a pleasure to record that the United States, which was the first nation in the world to oppose colonialism, has once again assumed the championship of the underdeveloped nations of the world by inviting them to share, on a basis of equal partnership, the technological skills which have been perfected by generations of her scientific and industrial workers. President Truman's Point Four program will go down as one of the greatest acts of statesmanship of this century. To realize that poverty and mass suffering lead to an abrogation of the democratic way of life and to try to alleviate them by help freely sought and freely given, without any strings attached, is an entirely novel concept of international co-operation, but not more than what the times demand. Perhaps this is the only way to solve one of the most difficult political problems of the world—that of holding together in one international organization, without any trace of imperialism, nations which are equal in law but unequal economically and militarily.

In short, the free world must co-operate with Asia in carrying out its national reforms; it must associate with the dynamism of Asia and enable the newly liberated people of that continent to realize the values which are basic to democracy. There is no danger from

nationalism in Asia. What is happening in Asia today is only a natural and healthy development which Europe has already passed through. That some of the colonial powers still see danger in Asian nationalism is because they will not read the clear writing on the wall.

The danger which affects not only Europe and Asia but the whole world is to be found elsewhere—in South Africa, where a fantastic racialism is trying to crush the elementary rights and liberties of man. All eyes in Asia are now watching the outcome of this issue; everybody is anxious to know how the great democracies of the West, nurtured on the principles of the American and French revolutions, are going to throw their weight in the solution of this momentous question. There can be neither peace nor progress in the world if the extension of human liberties in one sphere is counterbalanced by their eclipse in another.

His Excellency B. R. Sen, Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of India to the United States, having previously been Minister of the Embassy of India in Washington from 1947 to 1950. He held important posts in the government of Bengal from 1931 to 1943. From 1943 to 1946 he was Director-General of Food of the Government of India, and in 1946 he served briefly as Secretary to the Food Department of the Indian Government. In 1950 and 1951 he was Ambassador of India to Italy and concurrently Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

NATO and Pacific Security

By Percy C. Spender

WE in Australia see some of the problems of the world with slightly different spectacles from those used by people on the East Coast of America and the people in Europe. It is not, however, to show differences but rather to emphasize a different viewpoint that I address these remarks.

Reason for Security System

In the first place, it is important for us to understand why the system of security, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the new organizations in the Pacific, whence I come, has been built.

Of course, the real reason is not that we have departed from the principles of the United Nations, to which your country and my country are dedicated, but because we realize that the substratum on which the United Nations was created has been destroyed. That substratum unquestionably was that every nation that pledged itself to the terms of the Charter would endeavor to fulfill those terms.

The nation that has destroyed the effectiveness of the Charter and therefore removed the substratum of the United Nations is the Soviet Union; since she has not sought at any time to support the principles of the Charter, but, on the contrary, has determined for her own ends to subvert them.

That is the truth of the position with which we are confronted. It poses the prime problem of how to secure the world today in the circumstances in which we are placed.

I want to repeat, so that there may be no misunderstanding about it, our security system does not mean a departure from the principles of the United Nations. It does mean, however, that when one major nation, such as the Soviet Union, withdraws—not nominally, but in substance—from the discharge of its obligations under the Charter, then the free nations of the world must find supplementary means, within the Charter we hope, to defend themselves.

Nature of the Problem

The second observation I want to make concerns the nature of the challenge which presents itself, because it does seem to us in Australia that sometimes there is an undue urgency to try to solve problems which cannot be solved within a limited space of time. I think the more Western a nation is, the more industrialized a nation is, the greater is its sense of urgency and the more inclined it is to believe that it can find a quick answer to any problem. That is why I want to make an observation about the nature of the problem which confronts us.

The problem is the struggle between democracy and communism. That is the basic struggle. It expresses itself in terms of imperialistic communism directed against the free world. The purpose of the various security arrangements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is not to defeat communism as such, but to defeat imperialistic and militaristic communism, which, in my judgment, seeks to dominate the world—if I may be forgiven for oversimplifying the picture as I see it.

It is true that the actions of the Soviet Union may be attributable not only to the Marxist concept, which is the basis of the communist state, but also

to the imperialistic Russia to which the Marxist regime is heir. I do not doubt that we see today imperialist Russia, distorted and given momentum but retaining the basic concepts of imperialism, reflected in the regime which has been in power there since 1917.

The important point I want to make is that it is impossible for us to meet the challenge of imperialist communism if we imagine that this problem will be solved in a few years and we shall then move into an era of peace. There is a great deal of thinking, in my judgment, which proceeds upon the hypothesis that it is just a matter of dealing with a problem of emergency for a limited period and that accordingly our task is to find ways and means of solving the problem within such a period.

The Long View

All I have to say is this: I do not accept that proposition. I think if we accept it we shall be in grave danger of ultimately destroying our effectiveness to defend ourselves. Let me develop what I mean. In my judgment, the struggle will not find its resolution in one decade; it may require two or three decades. I believe that most of us today will see progress steadily being won, but not the ultimate resolution except over a very long period of time.

I mention that because you must realize that we must be patient in what we do and wise in building the organization to meet the long struggle; because a struggle which has to be waged over a long period of time requires an entirely different technique from, for instance, that required by a war which may last four or five years.

Therefore, the proposition which I wish to present for your acceptance is that we must regard the defensive need of the free world, the need to build up our defenses and to keep them built up, as a normal way of life for a very long period of time. I believe as profoundly as I can believe in anything that if we do see it that way, we shall organize more wisely and we shall witness the progressive destruction of imperialistic communism, and not only the survival of the free world but a widening of frontiers for all mankind.

Australia's Interest in NATO

NATO is the key to the defense of the free world. The continued unity of the North Atlantic group of powers is essential if the world is to be preserved against the catastrophic devastation and misery of another world war. And the strength and unity of that defensive group is in turn primarily and principally dependent upon the maintenance of the closest understanding and coordination of policy between the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Without this, the political, economic, and military co-operation which already has been achieved among the members of NATO would rapidly wither away.

Australia is of course not a member of NATO, but is interested in its growth, development, and operations, just as, indeed, is every other nation of the free world, since the protection it affords and will progressively afford extends far beyond the geographical area covered by its nation members. But Australia has a more direct interest than most other nations outside this group. Twice in less than forty years, hundreds of thousands of Australian men have served on the battlefields of Europe and the Middle East, in the air, and on the oceans of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. We have already agreed in principle to participate in a Middle East Command.

The deliberations and the authority of NATO, bearing as they do on events which may affect not only the world at large but particularly areas of the world where Australians may again have to bear a substantial share of responsibility, underline the fact—which is not sufficiently appreciated—that apart from what is called and at times quite inaptly called "consultation," there is no existing machinery in which the voice of Australia can be heard in the formulation of decisions which can directly bear upon our destiny. Perhaps an opportunity will be provided in the Pacific Council, yet to be established under the terms of the Pacific Security Treaty between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

Scope of NATO's Activities

We have very great and special interests in that part of the world in which our people live. But we are becoming increasingly aware of the extent to which policy in southern and southeastern Asia and in the Pacific may be conditioned by the breadth and effect of the decisions which NATO is making.

We in Australia firmly support NATO and warmly applaud all that has been done to build up its strength. We acknowledge that, because of its geographical grouping, nations outside the area do not logically find a place within it—though the recent and very proper addition of Turkey and Greece has stretched its membership far beyond the areas originally contemplated.

It is inevitable, however, that the importance and extensive nature of its deliberations and planning will affect more and more not only the interests of its members, but those as well of nonmembers. It is not unnatural, accordingly, that Australia is especially concerned to ensure that its interests and the interests of other areas of the world —particularly those affecting the Western Pacific—are not inadvertently overlooked by members of NATO.

Global Requirements

For it is important to emphasize and re-emphasize that the Soviet Union's policy is essentially global in character. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes (and every step it takes to dominate the world gives expression to this recognition) that there is a necessary and inescapable interdependence between European and Asiatic policy. In the case of the U.S.S.R., one is harmonized and geared with the other. I doubt that we have yet sufficiently realized how important it is that we too think and plan in similar terms.

We cannot, of course, in the foreseeable future hope to be strong in every part of the world. However, if we build up powerful striking power wherever we can, which if necessary may be employed quickly to meet aggression; if that striking power is maintained on the assumption that it will not only be necessary for a few years but will require to be on hand for an indefinite period of time; if we balance the demands which rearmament imposes upon the economies of participating countries so as to strengthen them, not weaken them —then, I believe, we shall avoid war.

Interdependence Between Military and Economic Strength

Our policy is to preserve peace. And to preserve peace our strength, both military and economic, must be strong enough to deter aggression, not merely during the immediate years ahead but as long as the present aggressive and expansionist policy of the Soviet Union is pursued. This assumes, as I believe to

be the fact, that the problems presented by the Soviet's challenge to the free world cannot be solved over any short period of time.

It is wise, therefore, for us to plan collectively so as to keep our military and economic strength in balance over a long period. While building up and maintaining our striking power, we must ensure that we do not too greatly distort our economies. For if we do, what avail will be our arms if our economies are not strong enough to support those arms? To increase our armed strength so that we can deter aggression—or if we are called upon to meet it, then ultimately destroy it—remains of course our overriding responsibility. But we must see this necessity not as something of an emergency character, but as part of our normal manner of existence for very many years.

The Western world (and the more industrialized the nation the more this tendency is revealed) is prone to believe that any problem, no matter how complex, can be solved within a limited space of time. What we need is a better sense of historical perspective and a clearer understanding that the conflict between democracy and communism will not be resolved except over a period of long duration. And if this is correct, as I believe it to be, it throws into clear relief the need so to plan the use of our resources, so to integrate our economic strength with our military might, and so to husband each our national strength that we may be able to meet the demands which prolonged preparedness against war will impose upon us all.

Interdependence Between Domestic and Foreign Policy

We have not sufficiently understood the bearing which domestic policy has upon foreign policy. Here again let me draw attention to one aspect of Soviet domestic policy which forms part of its foreign policy. There is no doubt that the U.S.S.R. has given special attention, over the past few years, to building up capital structures and diverting resources into basic industries and developmental works. This it has done by placing great sacrifices upon its peoples.

We have tended to be complacent about the relatively advanced stage of Western industrial development. But the Western world has been depleting its investment reserves, so essential to the maintenance of its strength and its capacity to expand and develop, at a rate which bears upon our ability to maintain the great margin of industrial efficiency which we presently hold over that of the Soviet Union. We must, however, constantly bear in mind—as I have had occasion before to observe—how quickly relative industrial capacities can change when a government, such as that of the Soviet Union, is prepared to impose heavy sacrifices upon its people, by forced labor and otherwise, in order to carry out the specific purposes of its foreign policy.

We Are Engaged in a Many-sided Struggle

The struggle to which we are committed is many sided. It is sufficient, however, to say that it is not merely a military problem. It is as well an economic problem. Each is related to the other. Economic resources, and especially waste of such resources, directly affect our capacity to rearm and to keep armed. The extent and nature of our armaments, especially over a long period of time, can and do affect our economic strength. Each must be brought into harmony with the other.

Such is the problem as I see it. If

we understand it properly and if the people are taken more into the confidence of governments so that they too will understand it and appreciate the demands made upon each of them and why it is necessary to make those demands, I do not doubt that we are so much richer in resources, in intelligence, and in moral strength than those who seek to dominate us, that we shall, if we are wise, witness the progressive decline and ultimate elimination of the evil forces of imperialistic communism and lead the world into security.

His Excellency Percy C. Spender, Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of Australia to the United States. He practiced law for some years before embarking on a political career. He has held high governmental positions in his native country, including those of Vice President of the Executive Council, member of the Advisory War Council and of the War Cabinet, Treasurer of the Commonwealth, Army Minister, and Foreign Minister. He has also been active in Commonwealth affairs and in the United Nations.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

PERKINS, DEXTER. *The American Approach to Foreign Policy.* Pp. 195. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $3.25.

While George Kennan was delivering at the University of Chicago in 1951 the provocative lectures which reached us a short while ago under the title *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950,* Dexter Perkins was lecturing at the University of Uppsala. Now Professor Perkins' lectures are before us in a volume entitled *The American Approach to Foreign Policy.* Perkins' is the more comprehensive treatment; but these analyses, by the practitioner and the historian, respectively, of a good deal the same subject matter bring forth contrasts which are interesting indeed.

Speaking to an audience of Europeans, Perkins is concerned to dispel forebodings of American imperialism and fulfills the task well, disclosing broad erudition and a quiet judgment. As American history has developed so far, the case is strong. Frank Tannenbaum made the case also during 1951 in an article on "The American Tradition in Foreign Relations" printed in *Foreign Affairs* for October.

Had Perkins been addressing an American audience, his emphasis might have been on the dangers of an eventual American imperialism nevertheless. To his European audience he confesses the imperialism of the Mexico War and of 1900 but discusses these instances as one might the measles—a rash of early years which need not be expected to recur. As a practitioner keen to know how the decisions of 1900 were actually reached, Kennan elicits little or no assurance against similar concurrences of personality and circumstance again. Perkins endeavors to distinguish between expansion and imperialism. This is shaky ground, especially when "the expansion of the United States" is described as "a kind of biological process which could hardly have been arrested" (p. 17). One may doubt whether at the end of the Second Punic War the citizens of Rome envisaged imperial sway over the Mediterranean world. They possessed power. One thing led to another.

The safeguard which both Perkins and Tannenbaum see, as American power hovers near the imperial boiling point these days, is the moralistic temper in which Americans have habitually reacted to external problems. In quite another line of thought Kennan opines that "a war fought in the name of high moral principle finds no early end short of some form of total domination" (p. 101); which recalls George Canning's uneasy admonition to the Com-

mons on the French war in Spain in 1823: "This is no war for territory or for commercial advantages. It is unhappily a war of principle."

Certainly moral thinking has so far heavily weighted the course of the United States in world affairs, and Perkins served truth and politics by reassuring Europeans in this sense. It has still to be remarked in Kennan's mood that, with American power not yet diminishing, one broad road to an imperial denouement could be unrelenting insistence upon moral solutions (that is, solutions deemed to be moral) in a surrounding world which remains in large part unmoral.

Protesting to the Commons April 25, 1793 against the idea of pursuing to the death the regicides in France, Richard Brinsley Sheridan observed that to do so would be to embark upon "a war of vengeance," and that would be to arrogate a right which belonged to the Divinity, "to whom alone vengeance ought to be left." Henry Morgenthau had in effect to be reminded of that in 1945.

DEWITT C. POOLE
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LANGER, WILLIAM L., and S. EVERETT GLEASON. *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937–1940.* Pp. xv, 794. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $7.50.

None will question that this is the most thorough, detailed, and systematic account of United States foreign policy for the years 1939–1940 that has yet been written. Another volume presumably of equal merit will bring the story down to Pearl Harbor. Several reasons may be given for this superior performance. In the first place, the authors have demonstrated ability: Professor Langer has established his reputation at Harvard as a foremost European diplomatic historian, and Dr. Gleason, formerly an associate professor at Amherst College, brings to his assignment a specialist's insight. It is also true that source material in the form of unpublished diaries (A. A. Berle and Wm. C. Bullitt), governmental records, and the private files of important statesmen were made available to these privileged investigators. Withal, the study was well financed; the Rockefeller Foundation contributed $139,000, and it has been reported that the Sloan Foundation brought this total up to $200,000.

Except for the introductory chapters, the authors concentrate their attention on diplomatic developments during 1939 and 1940—that is, from the end of the British appeasement policy to the destroyer deal. The detailed analysis that such a close investigation affords contributes a realistic insight into the formulation of foreign policy and an understanding of the relative importance of the several factors which collectively determine this policy. The extent to which conditions abroad and the policies of foreign countries were influential in the determination of United States policy is ably described. Public opinion, responding to traditional policies of isolation from Europe, or the Monroe Doctrine, only permitted the elected leaders to verbalize their displeasure with the aggressors. Finally, international law, at first narrowly and later more broadly interpreted, placed its mark on foreign policy.

The authors themselves would not consider their conclusions definitive. They regret, for example, that so few records of President Roosevelt's intimate discussions with American and foreign officials were available to them. Furthermore, until others have an equal opportunity to read and assess these records, the reader must keep in mind that such distinguished scholars as Professors S. B. Fay and B. E. Schmitt came to quite different conclusions about the origin of World War I. In this regard, it might be recalled that the Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report for 1946 stated that the original purpose of this study arose from the concern "that the debunking journalistic campaign following World War I should not be repeated." However, from the available evidence, the book concludes that President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were far from the dynamic leaders they are reputed to have been, and even dragged their feet those few occasions when American public opinion approved interventionist policies. The book also seems to play down the German threat whether it concerned the challenge of German imperialism in Latin America, occupied France, or the United States. Simultaneously the Russian threat is dramatized, for example, in the criticism of United States nonintervention policy towards the Russian-Finnish War.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS
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STERNBERG, FRITZ. *Capitalism and Socialism on Trial.* Pp. 603. New York: The John Day Company, 1952. $7.00.

This is Fritz Sternberg's most ambitious book published in English. To American readers, too, he is known as a remarkably perceptive politico-economic analyst whose past prognostications have proved to be uncannily accurate.

Dr. Sternberg has undertaken the ambitious project of probing into the mysteries of capitalism and socialism, attempting to forecast their future trends. The scope of the book is so broad that it covers both Europe and America. The factual material is so rich that this book also qualifies as a volume of reference.

European capitalism in its earlier phases is shown here as a very potent force, irradiating the entire globe and vitalizing its way of life. However, gradually it began to exhaust its marginal potentialities, and then it turned toward imperialist expansion.

A few years before the First World War Morocco was brought under the sway of Europe's law, and thereby the imperialist circle closed. There was no more available colonial land, and it appears to have been no coincidence that shortly thereafter the Great War broke out.

Before it the Socialists discounted the ultimate victory of socialism. While capitalism in Europe lost ground during the war, socialism also lost ground. It had lost much of its potency because of its inability to forestall the great conflict. Also, it was weakened by the outbreak of competitive bolshevism. Now it looked as if the end of capitalism might lead to the beginning of barbarism.

In this book Dr. Sternberg elaborates on his noted theory that the Great Depression of the thirties has never been liquidated and that it has been merely forced between the dykes of the *Wehrwirtschaft,* defense economy. Capitalism, according to him, has not been able to solve the problem of modern business depressions, grown enormous on superpower-driven industrial productive capacity.

The productive forces of reconstruction proved to be so strong after World War II that prewar levels were surpassed far sooner than after World War I. But then the United States was faced with the problem of an industry producing more than one-half of the world total. "United States capitalism will have to find the answer to the question which no capitalism anywhere in the world has yet succeeded in answering: How is the problem of the crisis to be solved when external expansion can no longer play a decisive part in the process?"

The Soviet Union was last seen pondering at the fork of the road: one of them leading to imperialist expansion and the other one to its own garden which needs constant cultivation. The decision will be made partly in response to a situation created by the rest of the world.

A democratic socialist solution appears to the author to meet the needs not only of Europe but also of all humanity. A third world power of this nature would have neither the desire nor any reason to endanger the Soviets. In turn, such a European force, not afflicted by the contradictions of an outworn European capitalism, would be strong enough to fill out the Old World political vacuum and would definitely deter any possible Soviet aggressive designs.

EMIL LENGYEL
New York University

VAN ALSTYNE, RICHARD W. *American Crisis Diplomacy: The Quest for Collective Security, 1918–1952.* Pp. xiii, 165. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952. $3.50.

This is a somewhat uneven book. Those portions which describe the maneuvers incident to the birth of the United Nations make fascinating and rewarding reading, as does the discussion of Russia's relation to the war with Japan. Mr. Van Alstyne shows that our policy was dominated by the mistaken conviction on the part of our generals that a land invasion of Japan was necessary. He points out that it was the insistent pressure of our own top brass

which brought Soviet Russia into the Far Eastern conflict, thus fastening on the Pentagon a large part of the responsibility for our present Asiatic predicament.

The book is badly marred, however, by misstatements of fact and by what would appear to be serious errors of conclusion. One is the assertion that India, the Midway Islands, and Dutch Harbor constituted the last line of defense of the free world and that the capture of any one of these outposts by the Japanese "would undermine the immediate independence and territorial integrity of them all [the United Nations]." The United States is visualized as having been on the verge of war with Britain from 1916 to 1921 over the question of who was to command the seas; Czechoslovakia is referred to as "the most strategic and industrially valuable territory in Europe."

Discussing Israel's war for independence, the few hundred revolutionaries of the Irgun Zvai Leumi are described as "illegal Zionist armies operating under the local Jewish agency," and are declared to have conducted a massacre of the Arabs which led to the mass flight of some 600,000. This exodus, he states, enabled the Zionists "to bring practically the whole country, except a portion of Jerusalem, under their control." While one may overlook Mr. Van Alstyne's unawareness that the Irgun Zvai Leumi was at all times in sharp conflict with the official Jewish agency, a glance at the map would have shown him that the country actually was partitioned off between Israel and Jordan, with a small piece to the southwest around Gaza going to the Egyptians.

That a serious political blunder occurred at Yalta is not disputed, yet we find Mr. Van Alstyne declaring, "Yalta was a confession of faith, a catechism of good will between Russia and the West."

The author appears to recognize the provocative nature of Communist policy; nevertheless he accuses the Kuomintang "CC Clique" of seeking to obtain the upper hand "and refusing any compromise with the communists," thus frustrating the American government's well-intentioned ultimatum to Chiang to take the Communists into the government. He states that "repeated warnings to the Generalissimo . . . to reform the Kuomintang and practice good faith toward the communist leadership met with no encouragement."

Mr. Van Alstyne also believes that our action in preventing Mao from supplanting Chiang at Lake Success "caused the Chinese communists to resort to arms" and invade Korea. He is convinced that the Marshall Plan represented a great triumph for American policy, though it would appear to many that our relations with Europe are still in the same equivocal position as they were before, and that it may easily be suspected that the Marshall Plan, by acting as a palliative, actually prevented the only logical step by which Europe's sickness could have been cured, federation.

WILLIAM B. ZIFF

New York City

DENNETT, RAYMOND, and ROBERT K. TURNER (Eds.). *Documents on American Foreign Relations.* Vol. XII: January 1–December 31, 1950. Pp. xxvi, 702. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. $6.00.

Once again the student of international affairs must record his annual debt to the World Peace Foundation and to the editors of this remarkable series. The twelve volumes now afford one of the most complete reference shelves available anywhere on recent diplomatic history. As usual, little but praise can be recorded even by the most critical reviewer.

The year covered in this volume most probably marks the turning point of the cold war with the launching of the communist military adventure in Korea. The pessimist may view this as the event which turned the post-World War II period into the pre-World War III period. The optimist may hope that the vigorous United Nations reaction with the first collective military defense in history may have ushered in a new era of world order. From either viewpoint the year was a crucial one. If the documents here assembled do not make pleasant reading, they at least supply a complete and—in the retrospect of a calendar year—highly informative record.

The organization of the volume follows that of last year's, except that regional security machinery (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States) is shifted here to the general section on International Peace and Security (Chapter V) from the geographic sections which formerly contained it. The reviewer agrees that this is an improvement; indeed consideration ought to be given the idea of transferring even more material from the geographic sections, which necessarily still contain much important information on security, economics, and other functional topics; so that the reader must look in two or more sections for a complete account of the Korean episode, for example. It should be added immediately however that the editors have supplied an eminently usable table of contents and index, which handily remedies any organizational flaw.

This reviewer does not wish to add to the very considerable burden of the editors, nor to carp at a most useful piece of work. He does wish though to repeat his previously expressed hope that they may find it possible in the future to index the names of all the players in their drama—and to supply the names in full. For the reference user, this omission often requires consultation of an additional work. This suggestion is not meant to indicate any dissatisfaction with the work as a whole, which stands as the best document collection on the subject available to the general student.

OLIVER BENSON

University of Oklahoma

ALLEN, JAMES S. *Atomic Imperialism: The State, Monopoly, and the Bomb.* Pp. 288. New York: International Publishers, 1952. $3.25.

There is a hoary admonition to the young attorney at bar that, if he does not have much of a case himself, he would do well to attack that of opposing counsel.

Whether Mr. Allen has much of a case for his obvious client, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, is not clearly apparent, so perhaps the parallel is inapt; but he certainly attacks the opposition with unbridled fury.

It is not necessarily definitive of the nature and substance of this interesting volume that, out of a personal index of over 200 names, he mentions only a few with warm and unqualified approval, among them Andrei A. Gromyko, A. Y. Vishinsky, Josef V. Stalin, and Frédéric Joliot-Curie; but it is unavoidably illuminating.

Briefly stated, the thesis of *Atomic Imperialism* is that the present atomic energy policy and program of the United States "represents the merger of State and monopoly at the highest possible national level . . ."; and that this corporate state "serves as the principal base of reaction with a fascist orientation and as the center of war incitement," marked by "the massing of atomic weapons and the threat to use them for the realization of imperialist objectives."

In support of his thesis, Mr. Allen has amassed a huge body of facts after apparently exhaustive research, and with admirable accuracy. He has ransacked the literature of the Atomic Energy Commission with praiseworthy industry. So far as this writer, with his limited information, is able to determine, there is not a single misquotation.

It is, obviously, in his interpretation of these facts—in the processes of balance and evaluation—that Mr. Allen's objectivity and hence his contribution to one of the most potent politico-economic issues of the day is to be weighed.

Toward the Soviet Union and its policies, Mr. Allen exhibits no objectivity. That requires no truly serious argument. Toward American industry, finance, and politics, he also exhibits none—only bitter and cynical rancor. It would be ingenuous to deny that there have not been—and, indeed, are—voices muttering undertones of jingoistic imperialism. One may hear *sotto voce* whispers of a preventive atomic war against the U.S.S.R. But to bundle these minor and often utterly discredited testimonies into a single package and ascribe to it the genuine purpose of the American people or to their most intelligent spokesmen seems to this writer only narrowly to skirt the ridiculous.

Even accepting his indictment of the American policy would not be too nauseous if the author had just once, in some minor degree—in a footnote, perhaps—conceded

that Soviet policy, as respects a certain imperialist tinge, is by any measure a sizable distance this side of Paradise.

JOHN M. MCCULLOUGH
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VINACKE, HAROLD M. *The United States and the Far East, 1945–1951.* Pp. vii, 144. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952. $3.00.

This slender little book is a slight enlargement of a data paper originally prepared for the Institute of Pacific Relations conference held at Lucknow in October 1950. The material added for purposes of publication as a book consists mainly of a chapter covering developments through the summer of 1951 and discussing, mainly in the form of a brief summary of the MacArthur controversy, the consequences of Communist China's intervention in the Korean war.

Professor Vinacke, the author of many notable works on the Far East, has attempted here to cover a big subject in a small compass. Inevitably, some of his summaries are so brief as to be elliptical. American relations with Southeast Asia are covered in eleven pages. Most of his space is devoted to the tangled China problem of these years and the mutual relations of the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist and Nationalist China, and Japan.

In his attempt to give a concise factual summary, Professor Vinacke makes a manful attempt to avoid controversial analyses. He does not always succeed, especially in some of his paragraphs relating to the civil war in China where he suggests the belief that if the United States "had been willing to act unequivocally and decisively" in support of the Nationalist government, "the outcome might have been quite different."

Even the simplest facts about American-Chinese relations since 1945 have become confusedly controversial. Professor Vinacke has some highly understated remarks to make about the problems created for both the historian and the policy-maker by the fact that Far Eastern affairs have become the hapless object of domestic partisan politics and have, as a result, been grotesquely distorted. What he has tried to do in the face of this situation is to give a dispassionate summary of some of the major developments. In this he is only partially successful. He says too little about too much. The result may add a little to the general reader's information, but it will not add much to his understanding.

HAROLD R. ISAACS
New York City

FISHEL, WESLEY R. *The End of Extraterritoriality in China.* Pp. xv, 318. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952. $4.50.

The story of extraterritoriality in China is a reflection of the Western impact and of the emergence of Chinese nationalism which eventually overcame the earlier imposed forms of Western relations with the Chinese state. Mr. Fishel has studied the latter stage of this struggle in a most thorough and authoritative fashion. He describes the period of the development and decline of extraterritoriality, mainly the period from 1919 to 1943. His study is largely based on unpublished files of the State Department up to the year, 1933. In addition, the author has also used the files of the Department of Justice and of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as well as other sources. Of special importance is the introduction of the material by Silas H. Strawn, who was the chairman of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, and whose personal papers throw light on the problem which faced those who well-meaningly attempted to prepare the basis for the abolishment of the extraterritorial system in exchange for the same Western system instituted by the Chinese.

Aside from its rich documentation and great description of detail, the book indicates the basis of the whole attitude of the Western powers who "by the circumstances of their privileged position, which was bulwarked and buttressed by the weighty complex of Sino-foreign treaties, . . . were forced to adopt a conservative stand" (p. 72). Under the pressure of the nationalist revolution, however, opinion changed. A political reasoning took the place of the insistence on the duplication of Western principles until finally the war with Japan, during which extraterritoriality lost its practical usefulness, brought the end.

FRANZ MICHAEL
University of Washington

TREFOUSSE, H. L. *Germany and American Neutrality, 1939–1941.* Pp. iii, 247. New York: Bookman Associates. $3.75.

This is a study of the development of Germany's policies toward the United States during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war between the two countries. After outlining briefly Hitler's aims, Dr. Trefousse, a professor of history at Brooklyn College, proceeds to a detailed analysis of the evolution and ultimate failure of Germany's neutrality policy toward the United States from the outbreak of World War II to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Three basic theses are presented: (1) war between the United States and Germany was inevitable; (2) Hitler was determined to keep the United States neutral and out of the war until he was ready; and (3) he was thwarted in this determination because "through forceful measures of his own, President Roosevelt had compelled the Fuehrer to involve himself in adventures which wrecked Nazi plans designed to keep America neutral until Germany was ready for her, thus making certain of Axis defeat. . . ."

According to the author, although the United States played a comparatively minor role in Hitler's early plans, there can be no question that the ultimate conquest of this country was an integral part of his grand design. In support of this thesis, which hardly needs support, Dr. Trefousse points out (1) the militarist nature of the Nazi movement was bound to create difficulties for this country; (2) there existed an unbridgeable gulf between "the world's strongest democracy and the avowed enemies of that form of government"; (3) disagreement over fundamental economic policies "had bedevilled business relations between the two countries for years"; and (4) a Nazi victory would have "altered profoundly the balance of power not only in Europe, but also throughout the world."

The method by which Hitler proposed to accomplish his aims with respect to the United States was no different than that which he applied to the conquest of other nations, namely: (1) assurance of peaceful intentions; (2) isolation from potential friends and allies; and (3) striking and conquering when he was fully prepared and his victims were reduced to impotence. Although this timetable was important and effective in his conquest of European nations, it was absolutely imperative in the case of the United States, for under no circumstances did Hitler desire to engage the United States until he had fully liquidated Soviet Russia. In fact, even after realizing fully that the United States and, particularly, President Roosevelt could not be browbeaten into neutrality, Hitler was still loathe to take any action which might result in American entry into the conflict until he felt that the time was ripe.

Thus, during this period, German press attacks were kept at a minimum; diplomatic protests concerning American intervention on behalf of the Allies were few and far between; and a concentrated effort was made to stir up isolationist and anti-Administration forces and feelings in the United States by means of gigantic propaganda activities. In fact, the author emphasizes that Hitler was so anxious to keep the United States out of the war that he ordered the German Navy to leave American vessels alone. Finally, in an all-out effort to insure American neutrality until the time was ripe, Hitler attempted to persuade the Japanese to attack Singapore, rather than American territory.

Dr. Trefousse concludes that despite all of his efforts to keep the United States neutral, Hitler failed "because under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, America refused to be caught unaware and took the liberty of defending herself, building up her own armed establishment and rendering all possible aid to the Allies." "This line of action," says Dr. Trefousse, "was Mr. Roosevelt's great contribution to American foreign policy." He indicates, however, that Hitler's original policy was actually correct. Thus if he had been able to convince or compel Japan to move against the British or the Russians, instead of attacking American territory, President Roosevelt would never have been able "to get the isolationists to consent to a decla-

ration of war." Assured of American neutrality, Hitler could have moved against the United States when he was ready. The attack on Pearl Harbor, however, eliminated the isolationist opposition and so united the country internally as to give the President the strength he so urgently needed. "Consequently," concludes Dr. Trefousse, "they (the Japanese) solved the President's dilemma and contributed greatly to final Axis defeat."

This is an interesting, stimulating, and convincing little book. It is well documented and based largely upon current literature and official documents and records. Coming, as it does, however, more than ten years after the German declaration of war upon the United States, and seven years after Germany's unconditional surrender, it is doubtful whether it adds anything to what we already know. The real value of this work may well lie in parallels which may be drawn between the 1939–41 period and the current period. The lessons to be learned are (1) that appeasement of a totalitarian power in the hope of ultimate peace is an almost certain road to destruction, since the aggressor usually relies upon an appeasement policy; and (2) the alternative is internal physical and moral strength, coupled with a good system of collective security. However, this is a lesson which we appeared to have learned, although at considerable expense, during the past five or six years.

ELI E. NOBLEMAN

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICAL THEORY

MACIVER, ROBERT M. *Democracy and the Economic Challenge.* Pp. 86, ii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. $2.50.

Professor Robert MacIver's slender volume comprises five William W. Cook Foundation Lectures, delivered at the University of Michigan. This reviewer cannot remember ever having seen so much wisdom and understanding of the present-day world compressed into so small a space—and, what is more, compressed without harmful elision and without making the reader uncomfortably aware of being fed a highly concentrated diet. The work expresses with such clarity this reviewer's own conception of the meaning of democracy and of its true relationship to the past, the present, and the future that this review might well consist of the single word, "Amen."

The author shows how, throughout the greater part of recorded history, when human society was predominantly agricultural, "authority, property and position united in a single focus of power" and how this "triple command separated the ruling classes from the masses." He then traces the rise of the middle class and the emergence of "private economic power," dissociated from political power, and shows how "the historical role of the middle classes was to bring democracy to birth." "Private economic power," says Dr. MacIver, "does not mean *laisser faire.* It means that there is always an area in which men can make a living and carry on their business without becoming the agents or employees of the state."

A number of forecfully stated definitions and distinctions will help to clear away familiar confusion. Thus: "The welfare state and the socialist state are quite different affairs. The welfare state is consistent with private economic power. The socialist state is by definition opposed to it." (Incidentally, the author points out that there is no such thing as a socialist state or a capitalist state—that all democratic societies are today "socio-capitalist.")

Tracing the rise of middle class power after the industrial revolution, Professor MacIver deals as remorselessly with *laisser-faire* "liberalism" as he later deals with Marxism. "Liberalism became a flaccid substitute for democracy. The old doctrine (the triple command based upon ownership of land) made democracy unattainable. The new doctrine made it merely impotent" (the new doctrine being the theory of beneficent automatic self-regulation through the free market). This chapter should be read by all worshipers at the shrine of Adam Smith.

The chapter on "Democracy and Planned Economy" should be read by all socialists (and answered, if they can find an answer). It demonstrates how *total* planning inevitably submerges the legislative branch of a democratic government, placing a corrupting power in the hands of a powerful executive, which sooner or later becomes unresponsive to the popular will.

The final chapter on "The Meaning of America" should be read by every thinking American—especially by those who do not realize that the greatest danger to our society emanates from our own failure to understand and live up to the principles of our own society, rather than from Moscow.

From this reviewer's point of view, the chapter on Marxism is the least interesting and the least satisfactory, perhaps because the subject has been so fully and so extensively treated by others; it seems, with all respect to Dr. MacIver, to dispose of the matter a little too easily. Yet this chapter contains two sentences which, alone, should make this book *must* reading:

"Nothing embitters the heart of a man like the brand of inferiority. Treat men squarely as fellow men, whatever be their race or color or religion; do not fasten on any groups the stigma of alienhood or inferiority—and, in a country like ours, communism will shrink to nothingness."

JAMES P. WARBURG

New York City

BIDDLE, FRANCIS. *The Fear of Freedom.* Pp. ix, 263. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1952. $3.50.

This little volume should be read by every thoughtful American but, unfortunately, those responsible for initiating and fomenting fear will not be the ones who will read it. Even if they did, it is unlikely that they would see the parallelisms of history or accept the judicious reasoning by which this recent Attorney General concludes:

"Fears have become familiar ghosts that haunt us as we walk and sleep, outlived but without depth, undefined and because of their indefiniteness more terrible. We clothe our uncertain dread in the hackneyed formulas of familiar words . . . and face away from the real threat, from the ultimate danger, seeing no longer what we love but only that of which we are afraid. Reason is no longer free to combat the false opinion which we are afraid to tolerate."

One of the significant contributions of this book is that it puts the present hysteria into its historical context. Through factual descriptions of events within the total forces then at work, Mr. Biddle reviews the intolerant periods of our own history from colonial times to the Alien and Sedition Acts of the first World War, the Dies Committee of 1938, and the present Un-American Activities Committee. In two brief chapters, he shows their parallels in England, and in France.

In an interesting manner but with the same meticulous care the author reviews state action such as the Ober Law in Maryland and statements presented before state Un-American Activities Committees in Illinois. He also reviews the policies of educators regarding Communists on school and college faculties.

Throughout all the wealth of data, the author is judicious. He points out that the concept of guilt has shifted from action by the individual to guilt by association. But in this shift he blames not only those who foment fear but also the American people who have come to be afraid of resisting the trend.

The last chapter, "The Choice Ahead," is somewhat disappointing. The author himself states that the readers will wish for a positive program. He does present one, but it is so general in its suggestions that it still left this reviewer with the feeling that after so careful an analysis, some more specific recommendation for action could have been presented.

FRANCIS J. BROWN

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TAYLOR, ALLAN (Ed. and interpreter). *What Eisenhower Thinks.* Pp. 186. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952. $2.75.

In this short book Allan Taylor, a veteran newspaperman, has edited and inter-

preted various speeches on public affairs made by General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

There are few surprises. According to Mr. Taylor, a boyhood in Abilene, Kansas contributed to the development in General Eisenhower of such basic characteristics as individualism, co-operation, and ability to work hard. While not born in a log cabin, the General happily possessed a background suitable for a subsequent career in politics. West Point and the Army did not stifle these characteristics.

As enumerated in a speech before the Economic Club of New York on November 20, 1946, General Eisenhower sees three principles as basic to American life (p. 43). These are: first, that individualism is our most precious possession; second, that all of our freedoms constitute a single bundle; and third, that freedom to compete plus co-operation makes our economic system the most productive on earth.

Surely, most Americans would at this point say "Amen." While a similar quality of vagueness seems present in most of the collected speeches, it is only fair to recall that an officer on active duty is far from being a free agent in the American tradition of freedom of expression. Nevertheless, in at least two areas, General Eisenhower has spoken out forcefully whether in or out of uniform. The first of these is the realm of foreign policy.

General Eisenhower subscribes with enthusiasm to the Administration's policy in Korea and in Western Europe. He views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as indispensable to American security and foresees a permanent solution in the eventual creation of a United States of Europe. If world disarmament should be attained, the General advocates a strong United Nations police force. The General is also positive on military matters, where he has recommended preparedness, unification of the armed forces, and the establishment of Universal Military Training. Except for UMT, he takes no sharp stand on domestic issues.

General Eisenhower is in favor of free enterprise and economy in government. He is opposed to regimentation, academic loyalty oaths, and federal aid to education. On specific issues, such as wage-price controls, rent control, the Taft-Hartley Act, the President's civil rights program, tidelands oil, he is silent.

The over-all impression which emerges from Mr. Taylor's selections is that General Eisenhower is as American as apple pie, is a middle-of-the-roader in domestic politics, is irrevocably committed to the continuation of the Truman-Vandenberg-Acheson foreign policy.

MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR.
Swarthmore College

HOOVER, HERBERT. *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover.* Vol. II: *The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920–1933.* Pp. xiii, 405. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $5.00.

Even before he entered on his eight years in the cabinets of Harding and Coolidge, Herbert Hoover had captivated the imagination of Americans as the "Great Humanitarian" and the very incarnation of American liberalism. Both of these can be documented. He was aware "that most of our employers were fighting legitimate development of trade unions." It is refreshing to see him in a Harding cabinet meeting severely denouncing Attorney General Daugherty's savage injunction against striking railway men whereupon Harding ordered it withdrawn. When he gave his views on collective bargaining before the Boston Chamber of Commerce in 1920 "the applause would not have waked a nervous baby." We must "push machines and not men" declared Hoover. Schwab and Gary of United States Steel denounced his condemnation of the twelve-hour day as "unsocial and uneconomic."

He disliked senators Penrose, Watson, Knox, and Lodge and their followers, was a warm advocate of the League of Nations, and the most persistent of conservationists. He advocated health inspection in schools and noonday meals for pupils in some areas. He horrified the National Association of Manufacturers by advocating the Child Labor Amendment. He expressed a deep concern over housing for the lower income groups. We must thaw out "inherited control of the tools of production by increased inheritance taxes" and must "tax earned incomes much lower than interest, dividends, and rent." He hammered persistently against economic practices that worked against the consumer and never forgot to plead the cause of the small business man.

What transformed this great liberal into a symbol of conservatism? Not the great depression but rather the way in which he met its impact. Scarcely had he proclaimed the approaching end of poverty than the dream was shattered by the stock market crash. So incredible was this event that he would balance the budget instead of applying his very own earlier proposal to expedite government construction in times of unemployment. So intensely did he believe in free enterprise that he had been planning unemployment insurance through the private insurance companies when the depression began. Doubtless his phobia of what later came to be called "creeping socialism" hampered adaptation of means to the end of alleviating distress. The encroachment of government on private enterprise he believed due to European ideology not the pressure of events. "I used my last breath in expounding the folly of Socialism," he had declared in 1920. Socialism was not an economic philosophy to be critically examined but a vicious fallacy to be summarily dismissed with the finality of supreme omniscience. Indeed it turns out to be a smear word. Senator Norris was a "devoted Socialist." Al Smith's defeat was partly due to "snuggling up of socialists." Opposition to his Stanford Food Research came from "the conglomeration of professors and intellectuals tainted with mixed socialist, fascist, and antique ideas."

The Great Depression itself was due to "the European economic hurricane that swept over us" rather than stock market speculation. Had he been re-elected he believed "we would have quickly overcome the depression" and saved the nation from the collectivism of the New Deal. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that Herbert Hoover served sincerely in the public interest as he saw it.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY
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HARASZTI, ZOLTÁN. *John Adams & the Prophets of Progress.* Pp. xi, 362. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $5.00.

John Adams was at his best when he wrote informally. There may be some justification for the belief that the prominence of his descendants combined with the profundity of his own formal writings has served to obscure his greatness. This volume again demonstrates that John Adams was himself the greatest Adams.

Mr. Haraszti, Keeper of Rare Books at the Boston Public Library since 1934, has edited and arranged in logical sequence the notes which John Adams made in the margins of his books. It is apparent that Adams clarified his own thoughts by writing, and the margins of many books of his library are literally crowded with comments. The first fifty pages of Mr. Haraszti's volume are devoted to three chapters in which he analyzes Adams' background, education, political and social philosophy, and his character, position, and reputation. This is followed by twelve chapters in which the marginal notes are printed, usually verbatim, interspaced by such brief extracts from the texts as are necessary for an understanding of the subjects under discussion. The principal selections are from the works of Bolingbroke, Rousseau, Frederick the Great, Voltaire, Turgot, Condorcet, the Greek philosophers, and a number of less well-known writers of the eighteenth century.

A few thorough students have recognized John Adams as "the greatest political thinker whom America has yet produced." The annotations in the books of his library now tend to confirm this judgment. It is understandable that his contemporaries of the early Federal period may have gleaned from his conversations, letters, and informal writings more of his wisdom than is now fathomable from his formal writings.

Historians will find a fertile field for research in the Adams notes. Here is evidence revealing what President Adams did at Quincy during the seven full months in 1799 when he left the Capital and returned to his farm at the critical period of the French crisis. Perhaps his peremptory or-

ders for the departure of the French mission, upon his return to the Capital, were not entirely uninfluenced by his comments on the works of Frederick the Great which he had just read. Here, also, are the notes showing the reading which Adams did in preparation for the peace conference at the end of the Revolution, and the formal basis for his successful demand for confirmation of the American claims to the fisheries off Canada and Newfoundland.

Mr. Haraszti not only has called public attention to this rich and relatively neglected collection of source materials; he has also written a very readable volume. It is to be hoped that this revelation of the value of the informal writings of John Adams will inspire the executors of the Adams Manuscript Trust. A more comprehensive edition of the papers of John Adams obviously is indicated. A policy of more general research in the less formal papers of the various members of the Adams family should be encouraged.

CHARLES M. THOMAS
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WOOD, VIRGINIA. *Due Process of Law, 1932–1949: The Supreme Court's Use of a Constitutional Tool.* Pp. xi, 436. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951. $6.00.

Professor Wood presents here a detailed and critical analysis of the attitudes and opinions of some twenty-one justices of the Supreme Court in their interpretation of that spacious and vague constitutional guaranty, due process of law. The years 1932–1949 were selected for this study because in that period new and complex social and economic problems, as well as many other problems involving civil or property rights, were presented to the Court. The situations facing our society forced both national and state action, very frequently restrictive action, in regard to many relationships, while during the depression and the New Deal attempts were made to improve conditions by far-reaching programs of ameliorative legislation. Those whose interests were thereby adversely affected quickly invoked the protection of the nebulous due process clause, as an invasion of a protected domain. Realizing that generalities are often little more than rhetoric, the author has examined the concrete cases in which the Court weighed the conflicting interests to determine if due process of law had been accorded.

Due process is considered from five points of view—the first amendment, socio-economic legislation, criminal procedeings, administrative action, and taxation. This arrangement has permitted a logical classification of the large number of cases decided by the Court. Since *Gitlow* v. *New York* (1925), there has been brought within the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment these guarantees of the first amendment—free speech, a free press, peaceable assembly, and the right of petition. In order to protect the fundamentals of constitutional government, the Court has extended the meaning of "liberty." Restrictive state statutes have been rejected when the judges believed them violative of basic civil rights; but they have been upheld when deemed justified. In this area the protection of property rights became secondary to the rights of freedom of speech and of the press.

In the vast and controversial field of economic and social control the Court, since 1932, has extended widely the domain in which Congress and the several states regulate the uses of property. Commodity price fixing in certain private industries, regulation of farm products prices, comprehensive wages and hours legislation, social security and unemployment insurance laws have been sustained. Professor Wood indicates how the earlier concepts of substantive due process have been overruled or abandoned. The Court assumed that the legislature is the proper judge of policy, and interfered only when the exercise of power was an "arbitrary" one.

It is well known that due process originally involved procedural methods with particular reference to criminal cases. From 1932 to 1946, the Court frequently went behind the record of the trial court to its own independent finding of fact, thus extending materially the scope of the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. This does not mean, however, that there has been read into that amendment all the specific guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Rather the Court has found it sufficient to interpret due process as demanding the "principles of decency and fair play—implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and to make certain that criminal proceedings achieve that result.

In respect of the decisions of administrative bodies, the Court has maintained its authority to review both the law and the facts. A fair hearing must be afforded, and administrative power cannot be so exercised as to ignore civil liberties. In the domain of rate regulation, the Court apparently abandoned the requirement of a fair return on a fair value, and rate making has become a form of price-fixing.

Those who looked to the Court for relief from the burdens of taxation, national and state, will be disappointed. The interpretation of "jurisdiction" in state taxation has been so liberal as to render almost meaningless that limitation. Double taxation, excessive tax rates, and retroactive tax laws are not a denial of due process. Few restrictions on the national taxing power are found.

Two cautious conclusions may be drawn from this excellent and careful volume. The first is that there are no objective standards for the application of due process, procedurally or otherwise. Second, the standards used in applying due process make pertinent the statement of the late Charles E. Hughes (while governor) that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is."

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HELLER, FRANCIS H. *Introduction to American Constitutional Law: A Selection of Cases and Materials.* Pp. x, 691. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $5.00.

Professor Heller, who teaches political science at the University of Kansas, designed this collection of cases and materials as a textbook for a course in constitutional law for political science students. Many important aspects of American constitutional law which are included in the standard casebooks, such as those dealing with problems of jurisdiction, are either omitted altogether, or given very little space. Thus, the whole question of which law prevails in diversity cases in federal courts is discussed merely in a two-page editorial note, and only nine lines are devoted to the *Tompkins* case. The emphasis is upon broad issues of social policy, and approximately half of the book is concerned with civil liberties. The chapter on the Contract Clause has only four cases, but there are nine cases dealing with free speech.

The bulk of this book—I should guess approximately three-fourths—consists of opinions of the United States Supreme Court, including liberal cuttings from dissenting opinions. The "materials" part of the book includes a great many short editorial notes and selections from books and articles written by leading scholars in the field. Professor Heller's chapter on judicial review will illustrate his method. It begins with John Marshall's opinion in *Marbury* v. *Madison*, and that is followed by a chronology of events prepared by the editor to keep the story of the case straight. Then comes a very short cutting from Judge Gibson's celebrated rebuttal of Marshall in *Eakin* v. *Raub*. There follow portions of three essays on aspects of judicial review by Professors Carr, Cushman, and Corwin, and an editorial note briefly describing some of the historical antecedents. Finally three cases illustrating non-justifiable questions (*Luther* v. *Borden*, *Coleman* v. *Miller*, *Colegrove* v. *Green*) are given.

The first and last of the fifteen chapters of this book are designed to introduce the student to the subject and to relate the material to the broader context of public policy and government. In the opening chapter the author discusses the meaning of such basic terms as "constitution," "law," and "constitutional law" and explains how cases arise and how they should be studied. The discussion is conventional, and the observation that "an appellate court does not concern itself with questions of fact" (p. 13) is a dubious oversimplification. The footnote explana-

tion of the old writ of error in Supreme Court practice (p. 20) is completely misleading. The concluding chapter, under the heading "Political Issues and Legal Methods," presents seven cuttings appraising the judicial process and the legal profession. They should provoke students to think about the significance of the cases and materials they have studied.

Professor Heller's selection of cases will of course not please everyone. No casebook ever does. But this book is a judicious collection of the old standard cases one always expects to see, such as the great Marshall decisions, the *Cooley, Slaughterhouse,* and *McCray* cases, et cetera. At the same time, many very recent cases are included, such as the *Dennis, McCollum, McLaurin,* and *Shelley* cases. On the whole the book should give students a good speaking acquaintance with some of the major aspects of contemporary constitutional law.

I think this is an admirable textbook for a one-semester course in constitutional law for undergraduate nonlaw students. There is not enough material for a full year's course, and graduate students and law students cannot very well ignore the important jurisdictional problems which this book leaves out. But Professor Heller says at the outset that his purpose was to prepare a book for undergraduate instruction. For a one-semester undergraduate course there is, in my opinion, no better textbook available at the present time.

DAVID FELLMAN
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TURNER, JULIUS. *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress.* In "The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," Series LXIX, Number 1. Pp. 190, xv. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. $2.50.

Careful empirical studies of American legislatures are unfortunately rare. The recent flood of comment and exhortation concerning the Congress for the most part has not had its source in such research. Professor Turner's excellent study of some of the correlates of voting in the House of Representatives is, therefore, a contribution of great importance.

Building on the work of Lowell, Rice, and others, Turner has worked over a considerable body of historical and comparative material, but the heart of his study is the analysis of roll call votes in four sessions of the House between 1921 and 1944. The author makes no claims for the representativeness of this sample, and he is fully aware of the pitfalls in the path of one who undertakes to examine record votes. Following an introductory chapter in which some of these problems are intelligently discussed, two chapters, nearly one-third of the book, deal with the effects of party identification upon voting in the sample sessions. These are followed by four chapters which deal with the effects upon the voting of representatives of, successively, metropolitan and rural constituencies, the specialized demands from constituencies dominated by "foreign" and native stock, and sectionalism. A final chapter discusses the incidence of legislators' independence of both party and constituency group.

Space will not permit mention of even a few of the insights and ingenious analytical devices in which the book is rich. Important though some of these are, they are not the chief significance of the book in any case. The impact of Turner's study rather lies in his well-documented finding that party affiliation is an independent influence upon legislative voting and that it is consistently more important than any of the other variables that he studied. He satisfactorily demonstrates, moreover, that the issues on which the parties have differed significantly are matters of genuine substantive importance. Many of these, it is well to note, have been issues of social reform—precisely those types of issues on which most of the more strident of recent critics have professed to find Congress and the party system wanting. These findings apply only to the House of Representatives, and in some instances, as the author properly acknowledges, the number of cases which his sample provides is small for purposes of statistical analysis. Admittedly the findings might be altered not only by observation of the Senate but also by the results from a more complete sample. But Professor Turner has come forward with solid evidence with which any serious student of Congress and the party system henceforth must reckon.

DAVID B. TRUMAN
Columbia University

MACDOUGALL, CURTIS D. *Understanding Public Opinion: A Guide for Newspapermen and Newspaper Readers.* Pp. xii, 698. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $5.00.

It is, after all, a simple proposition that a thorough study of what we loosely call public opinion necessarily involves a preliminary study of man, both as an individual and as a member of a smaller or larger group, but especially of his limitations and his weaknesses as a thinking being. For this reason Professor MacDougall's book is both long and formidable; otherwise it would be superficial and without great value. As it is, it may be strongly recommended for the patient reading and thoughtful reflection not only of editors and of those who hope to become editors but of all who have anything constructive to do, for their own profit or for the profit of others, with what we also loosely call public movements.

Professor MacDougall takes the fiasco of the poll takers who predicted a Republican victory in the presidential campaign of 1948 as the starting point for his opening chapter, which is entitled "The Nature of Public Opinion." That the "nature of public opinion" was too complex for the poll takers to understand four years ago—whatever they have learned since—became obvious the moment the returns established the fact that, in spite of their solemn prophecies, Truman and not Dewey had been elected. One of the reasons which Professor MacDougall might perhaps have stated more simply is the multiplicity of conflicting and therefore confusing human interests in modern society.

Since this is a book by a profesor of journalism primarily intended for students and practitioners of journalism, note is to be made of a statement on the first page of the preface which contrasts, in its unsoundness, with the general soundness and very real value of the nearly 700 pages which follow. "With the idiosyncracies of most of those with whom he comes in contact in his quest for news," writes Professor MacDougall, "the reporter need not be concerned." On the contrary, the reporter—a good journalist always remains a reporter—should concern himself with the idiosyncracies of those with whom he comes in contact from the day on which he writes his first "story" until the day on which he writes his last. Only in that way can he extract the most news from them—or, in simpler language, get them to talk freely and to reveal themselves—whether they happen to be presidents of labor unions, presidents of banks, or presidents of the United States. The reticence of different men is to be broken down in different ways. Even Calvin Coolidge could be induced to talk—sometimes until one wished that he would stop.

RICHARD HOOKER
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CARPENTER, WILLIAM SEAL. *The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform.* Pp. 128. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. $3.00.

To use the author's words, this little book sets out "to relate public policy to the civil service." It outlines some of the main characteristics of current merit system administration, drawing briefly upon historical developments, upon the author's seven-year experience as administrator of New Jersey's system, and upon the activities of other jurisdictions—principally the federal service. In the brief compass of this book Dr. Carpenter necessarily paints with a broad brush. He concludes by urging three primary reforms as the "unfinished business": (1) a single commissioner to replace the civil service commission; (2) arbitration machinery to solve the problems of employer-employee relations; and (3) strengthening of citizen organizations interested in the promotion and extension of the merit system.

But these three conclusions do not give a clue to all that is important in the book. For example, one whole chapter is de-

voted to "Education and the Public Service," in which Dr. Carpenter makes a plea for the broad, liberal education as a foundation for public service. He deplores the tendency of civil service unions to oppose increased educational requirements for public employment.

The author also touches on the essentials of the spoils-versus-merit issue, on veteran preference, on salary scales, and on loyalty programs. He stresses the deterrent effect that some of the characteristics of these policies have on recruitment and advancement of able men in the public service.

An example of Dr. Carpenter's forthright treatment of controversial topics is his comment on current loyalty procedures in the federal government: "It is a fantastic situation in which an organization is entitled to a judicial hearing before it can be branded as subversive while an employee can be removed and stigmatized as disloyal without being confronted by his accusers or being furnished with specific charges."

The exact relationship of some of these introductory sketches of public personnel problems to the author's net conclusions is not entirely clear. The book is, to a minor degree, wanting in coherence.

The nearest thing to a central theme appears to be what Dr. Carpenter calls "the paradox of civil service reform"—namely that the merit system "has done much to recruit better people" but "seldom has helped the chief executive to gain control of the administration." This accounts for his recommendation for the single personnel administrator under the chief executive. He criticizes, however, a similar proposal by the Brownlow Committee in 1937.

The author's treatment of employer-employee relationships is not as satisfactory as one would hope. The significant experience of such organizations as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Administration is brushed over too lightly. How his analysis of the subject leads to the conclusion that arbitration machinery is the primary solution is not clear.

These criticisms should not be taken as depriving the volume of its over-all usefulness as a stimulating summary of current public personnel issues.

O. GLENN STAHL

Washington, D. C.

ALLEN, FLORENCE ELLINWOOD. *The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation.* Pp. xxi, 114. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $1.75.

This book discusses an important problem of policy consequent upon the shrinking world and the tendency for the line between subjects appropriate for international legislation and for national and local legislation to become blurred. Judge Allen recognizes the gravity of the problem although she seems unaware of the extent to which treaties in the eighteenth century and earlier dealt with the rights of resident aliens and consequently regulated a subject usually considered local in character. She proposes to meet the situation by procedures which will result in a careful scrutiny of international legislative treaties before ratification and by a constitutional amendment providing that treaties conflicting with the constitution or dealing with domestic matters shall be invalid (p. 105).

Few would question the value of the first of these remedies although some might doubt whether there had been any inadequacy in the scrutiny of treaties from this point of view in the American system with senators always alert to "states rights" and "national sovereignty." The second remedy which is along the line proposed by an amendment introduced by Senator Bricker of Ohio indicates misapprehension of the meaning of the term "domestic jurisdiction" in international law and misapprehension of the position of the treaty power under American constitutional law. Judge Allen is an eminent jurist but her legal discussion of these problems is hardly enlightening.

The World Court has dealt several times with the meaning of the term "domestic jurisdiction" and has indicated that it refers to any topic in which the discretion of a state is not impaired by any international obligation. The Court, however, has also made it clear that sovereign states are competent to assume obligations by making treaties on any subject whatever unless indeed to do so would encroach upon the rights of a third party. Once a state has assumed such an obligation the matter ceases to be within its domestic jurisdiction. It is, therefore, a contradiction in terms to refer to domestic jurisdiction as a limitation upon the treaty-making power of a state.

In the political sense, of course, the situation is quite otherwise. The treaty-making power may regard it as inexpedient to assume obligation in fields where suitable regulation can proceed through local or national legislation. The issue of whether the shrinking world, the interdependence of nations, the relations of reasonable respect for human rights with the preservation of peace, and the developing world opinion favorable to a general protection of human rights has made it expedient for the United States to enter into general engagements such as the proposed Covenant of Human Rights is a political question which cannot be solved by any legal definition of "domestic questions." The issue is whether it is wise to make the protection of human rights an international question and therefore to take it out of the realm of purely domestic questions.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a treaty made by the appropriate procedure is valid if it deals with a matter of international interest and does not violate any specific prohibition or limitation of the Constitution. The Court has further held that, if a treaty is valid, Congress has power to implement its obligations. As a consequence the so-called reserved powers of the states of the Union do not affect the validity of treaties or of implementing legislation, but, on the other hand, the Bill of Rights which limits all agencies of the government does limit the treaty-making power. These principles of constitutional law make it clear that American ratification of a covenant of human rights could not in any way impair the Constitutional Bill of Rights. It would set a universal minimum in the respect for and protection of human rights but would not enlarge the power of Congress to regulate rights beyond what is permitted by the constitutional guarantees. Treaty permissions are not treaty obligations and do not permit action which the Constitution forbids.

It is important that the well established principles of international law and constitutional law bearing upon the growing field of international legislation should be more widely understood. Unfortunately recent discussions of the American Bar Association have not contributed to this understanding, and it is to be feared that Judge Allen's book is similarly unenlightening. The basic problem is not legal but political and consists in the exercise of wise understanding in developing international legislation in fields where the conditions of the world make it necessary and in gearing national legislation into the obligations undertaken by treaties. Constitutional amendment is not needed but rather a wiser statesmanship in understanding the situation of the world and the most suitable method of dealing with its problems.

QUINCY WRIGHT

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CRAVEN, WESLEY FRANK, and JAMES LEA CATE (Eds.). *The Army Air Forces in World War II.* Vol. III: "Europe—Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945. Pp. xxxix, 948. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (for the Air Historical Group, USAF), 1951. $8.50.

This is a worthy companion to the earlier fine volumes. However, there is not quite the same air of detached impartiality as one finds in Volumes I and II, for, although many errors of judgment are freely admitted, there is too often a determined effort to explain away the mistakes and support to the full the doctrine of victory through strategic air power. Most interesting is the brief account of the utter lack of co-operation even to the point of obstruction shown by the Russian government.

Although General Spaatz firmly believed that victory could be won by a *properly* conducted strategic air war alone, those responsible for War Plans regarded the strategic bombing offensive as primarily a preliminary to the invasion of Europe. After that, air power would support land

operations. From April 1943 to April 1944, the main effort of the Allied air forces aimed at the destruction by bombing of the German air-craft industry, ball-bearing plants, and factories manufacturing component parts. Parallel to this was the plan to destroy the Luftwaffe before the invasion of Normandy by shooting down German aircraft that rose to defend the factories.

Throughout 1943, the strategic bombing offensive had been indecisive. Air force commanders grossly exaggerated the amount of serious damage to aircraft production and as greatly underestimated the recuperative power of enemy industry. German aircraft production continued to expand until very late in 1944. In fact, air battles did much more to destroy the German Air Force than did the bombing of factories. By June Allied mastery of the air was complete, making possible the invasion of the continent. This was a major achievement, but it did not knock Germany out of the war.

Until April 1944, the main strategic air attack on German industry had proved disappointing—a failure due partly to the vast dispersal of German factories and the building of underground plants, but due even more to the faulty selection of bombing targets. Up to January 1944, air force commanders omitted from their plans for the strategic air war the bombing of oil production centers. However, in April, plans were changed to make the main priority a bombing offensive against important crude oil refineries and synthetic gasoline plants. This campaign, inaugurated by the Fifteenth Air Force on 12 May 1944, was from then on pressed hard by both the Fifteenth and Eighth Air Forces. In time the results were spectacular. By April 1945 German oil production of fuel and lubricants had virtually ceased with the direct result that transportation and all industry in Germany were thoroughly crippled.

In August another drastic change was made when a great strategic offensive against German factories producing tanks, trucks, and ordnance was placed second on the list of priorities. It was soon evident that the bombing of these factories did little more than cause a huge amount of structural damage which proved to be an annoying minor problem to the enemy but did not seriously affect its war effort.

In November 1944, in preparation for the invasion of Germany proper, the strategic air forces were given as second priority the bombing of the German transportation system for the tactical purpose of "interdiction." In six months, however, the result was an overwhelming strategic victory. By the closing weeks of the war the enemy railroads and canals were practically useless. Although the cost was huge, as the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces expended nearly 900,000 tons of bombs to destroy communications, the campaign proved to be the decisive blow that so completely disorganized and paralyzed German industry that it was impossible for the enemy to continue the war.

Thus, a careful comparison of the material in the second and third volumes indicates to this reviewer that the strategic bombing offensive was not *properly* conducted until the spring of 1944. The tragedy of it all was that the earliest list of target priorities compiled in August 1941 proved in the end to have been the correct one, while later revisions only piled error upon error. As a result much ineffective and extremely costly effort was made down to the spring of 1944, and even as late as January 1945 some air commanders were inclined to regard the strategic air war as almost a failure.

The excuse that "hindsight is better than foresight" (frequently used in this volume) has little validity in this case, for certainly it was the business of Intelligence and the economic "experts" to estimate correctly the most vital German targets. It is now clear that the proper conduct of the air war would have followed the earliest list of priorities (the electrical system, oil, and transportation). A vigorous campaign against chemical plants and the destruction of the five factories making ethyl fuel would have proven disastrous to the German war effort. Such an offensive would have resulted in a German defeat before May 1945.

The most important lesson to be gleaned from the three volumes on the air war in Europe is that victory through air power is largely a myth unless a small list of the most vital targets are attacked. The indiscriminate bombing of factories is not effective, and, moreover, the "victors" after the war have to spend huge sums of money to aid in the economic rehabilitation of the enemy country. It would seem more logical to allow the factories to produce while making it impossible for them to transport the products. If they produce but cannot haul, industrial enterprise is as effectively crippled as if all factories had been destroyed.

Nevertheless, even after all the errors are frankly assessed, it still is certain that Allied air power was decisive in winning the victory over the Axis powers. However, victory through air power alone may be feasible, but it depends on one thing—the air commanders must be omniscient.

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BEAN, WALTON. *Boss Ruef's San Francisco: The Story of the Union Labor Party, Big Business, and the Graft Prosecution.* Pp. xii, 345. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952. $5.00.

In *Boss Ruef's San Francisco* Walton Bean has presented a smoothly written story of the rise of San Francisco's most famous political boss and of the debacle that brought his burgeoning political empire tumbling down in the drama of the graft prosecutions of 1907–1909. For some readers this story will not be really new. Fremont Older, the crusading editor of the San Francisco *Bulletin,* long ago gave the partisan's view of it in his book, *My Own Story;* and Franklin Hichborn has given it a vivid journalistic treatment in *The System.* Lincoln Steffens made the story a brilliant chapter in his muckraking of municipal boss rule at the turn of the century. Professor Bean, the historian, however, with these journalistic accounts at his disposal and having access to several collections of private papers and files of documents, has brought together a fuller and more balanced version, as one would expect from a trained historian. Professor Bean writes with relish of his subject, and with imagination. The result is a very readable book and one that will stand up well under scrutiny.

The rise and fall of Boss Ruef and his hand-picked mayor and board of supervisors covers a period that is rich in political events, not only for a major city but also for the rising state of California. The events were dramatic to say the least, and the particulars were unique in many respects. Ruef himself was unique in several ways. He was brilliant, cultured in many respects, and had a good university education. His political career began in the reform company of such distinguished citizens as Franklin K. Lane and John H. Wigmore.

However, an opportunistic bent led Ruef in a different direction. Shrewdly operating as a political broker, he succeeded in capturing the newly organized Union Labor party in the city's politics and, through that vehicle, came to control the mayor and the local legislative body. At the same time he pyramided a graft structure by collecting legal fees from utility companies that desired city franchises and from the pleasure establishments that found it necessary to have police immunity.

The avarice of Ruef's political associates ultimately proved to be the loose brick in the structure that brought the whole fabric down and led to the fantastic graft trials. Ruef and the mayor were convicted ultimately, the entire board of supervisors was forced to resign under terms laid down by the acting district attorney, and the prosecutor directed the naming of a new set of officials. When the prosecution went on to try to use Ruef as a witness to convict certain business leaders on charges of corrupting the city government the prosecutor was shot down in the court room. A young special assistant prosecutor who stepped in to complete the trials went on to become the trust-busting governor of California and the long-time United States Senator, Hiram Johnson.

This book, as the title would indicate, keeps the boss, Abraham Ruef, and his associate, Mayor Eugene Schmitz, in the spotlight throughout. Other personalities

are dealt with appropriately but kept at the back of the stage. The treatment of events is quite complete; there are no apparent loose threads. The author does not belabor the various implications for political philosophy and ethics that naturally arise from the story; he points them out, discusses them, and then leaves the reader room to draw his own conclusions.

WINSTON W. CROUCH
University of California
Berkeley

BOLLES, BLAIR. *How To Get Rich in Washington: Rich Man's Division of the Welfare State.* Pp. x, 309. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952. $3.75.

Mr. Bolles is a modern day "muckraker" with a journalist's flair for words and the ability to compose an intriguing title. His thesis is simply stated: ". . . the welfare state has been undergoing a subtle change into the rich man's welfare state. . . . The agencies created to end privilege have become bulwarks of privilege. The bureaus which were established originally as balance wheels for segments of the national economy . . . [in fact] unbalance the economy by distributing the riches unevenly" (p. 12). The evidence for this charge Mr. Bolles has found in recent testimony given before Congressional investigations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Office of Contract Settlement, the War Assets Administration, the Maritime Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and in the workings of the tax amortization law. (The RFC occupies four chapters; one chapter is devoted to each of the others.)

Blame for the corruption and irresponsibility which Mr. Bolles finds is placed primarily on the shoulders of Congress and the President: ". . . Truman has hastened the transformation [of the welfare state] by . . . putting the agencies under the control of practical men who do not share the old opinion that the federal government is responsible for the welfare of all. . . . Congress has spread the confusion further by enacting a long succession of unrealistic laws . . . neither of them admits the effect of the tax laws and 'military socialism' on the principle of private enterprise, neither gives serious thought to the implications of the government's rise as the master of finance capitalism . . ." (pp. 13, 14, 27). The ineptitudes and failures of lesser government officials come as no surprise because such men "come to share the attitudes of the utilities they regulate . . . [and develop] an overweening pride in the establishment that employs them . . . [which] gives them confidence that their subordinates are as honest as they are" (pp. 233, 276, 70).

Mr. Bolles is a New Dealer with an ardent belief in the ultimate good sense and strength of the electorate and a faith in competition. While he has in no sense written a scholarly work, his book may be of interest as an example of partisan literature. Mr. Bolles feels, however, that he is presenting more than a partisan viewpoint; he hopes his book will give citizens an "intelligent awareness" of the way in which the government functions today. Furthermore, he hopes it will lead to important reforms in government. Since approximately three-fourths of *How To Get Rich in Washington* consists of anecdotes of corruption and irresponsibility, its impact may be quite different from that intended. Judged as an appraisal of postwar Washington, the book is grotesquely incomplete and biased. It should make money in an election year.

JOHN BUTTRICK
Northwestern University

MOWRY, GEORGE E. *The California Progressives.* Pp. xi, 349. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952. $6.00.

This is an exciting, thorough, and useful work by a professor of history at the University of California, Los Angeles. It is one of a series entitled "The Chronicles of California" covering segments of that state's history and undertaken by the University to commemorate the centennial of "The Golden State."

The purpose of the volume is (p. ix) to "throw as much light upon the nature of national progressivism and recent American 'liberalism' as it may upon the history of the state." "I also hope," the author mentions, "that the book may say something not entirely insignificant about the more general problem of why American reform movements start and why they die" (p. ix). More particularly the quest was to determine "who were the Progressives, what prompted them to act, what were they trying to do, and where did they think they were going?" The book recounts dramatically the rapid rise in California of "progressivism" and its all too speedy decline. Some of the names of those concerned in the movement are themselves assurances of a thrill in reading—Francis J. Heney, Abe Ruef, Eugene E. Schmitz, Hiram Johnson, Rudolph Spreckels, Robert LaFollette, Meyer Lissner, the McNamara brothers, Harrison Gray Otis, Thomas J. Z. Mooney, Warren K. Billings, Frank Norris, Chester Rowell, Theodore Roosevelt, Charles E. Hughes.

What makes this book of special value for the reformer in government is, first, its presentation of the view that conditions in a locality must ordinarily be shocking before citizen revolt ensues. The beginning chapter, entitled "The Southern Pacific's California," limns the complete domination and degradation of the state and of all its parts by that "Octopus." Second, it shows that the uprising occurred and was fought almost simultaneously in both San Francisco and Los Angeles (p. 22). So, then, chapter 2 is entitled "The Struggle for the Cities" and is a welcome illustration of improvements in government starting as local, bipartisan, or nonpartisan, but bringing about ameliorations in the much wider fields of state and even national government. Third, it exemplifies how a citizen revolt need not come from the ranks of existing groups of population. In this instance, it originated with a group of supreme individualists (p. 22):

"The leadership in the battle against the railroad did not come from the ranks of organized business or agriculture or labor. Instead, it was seized by a group of supreme individualists, well educated and bound together by a particularistic point of view, a remembrance of things past, a new code of morality, and more than the normal dash, perhaps, of a sense of indignation and a desire for power. Many of them were not interested, initially, in planning a state-wide campaign against the railroad, but only in a limited struggle for the control of their home cities. The opening skirmishes of the crusade against the Southern Pacific were fought almost simultaneously within the urban confines of San Francisco and Los Angeles. Between the developments in the two cities there was at first little or no connection except for those broad compulsive movements of ideas and material facts that often control the destinies of men."

Fourth, the book contains the warning that reform movements are, in this country, likely to be, as this one was (1910–1916), tragically ephemeral. That the leaders in this movement were more economically independent than the rank and file workers and subordinate leaders in a professional political party meant that the reform chiefs could not be bossed and were so much individualists that rifts were driven in the ranks because of individual opinions, sometimes by personal jealousies and dislikes. The absence of bossism in an amateur political citizens' movement thus may lead and here did lead to many "Mexican generals" and disruption. A fuller analysis of the book would show other causes which contributed to the breakdown and which should be heeded to avoid debacles in similar movements. But such an analysis would transcend permissible limits of this review.

There is a good seventeen-page double-column small-print index. The print and format of the volume are excellent. But very just complaint may be made that the notes appear at the end of the text (p. 307, *et seq.*) and that their numbering begins with 1 in each chapter, so that anyone reading the book has trouble locating the supporting note. The necessary thumbing back and forth and exacerbation would have been diminished had a chapter number and heading appeared at the top of each page of the reference notes. However, no one will regret placing this book high up on the cumulus of one's home work.

MURRAY SEASONGOOD
Cincinnati, Ohio

LENS, SIDNEY. *The Counterfeit Revolution.* Pp. 272. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. $3.50.

Sidney Lens is certainly not the first to state that to become really efficient the struggle against Communism must be inspired not by anti-Communism alone but also by "pro-Something." However, this statement has rarely been presented backed by such a penetrating analysis and such an abundance of supporting evidence as it is in his book. Some of the author's observations and conclusions may appear controversial, but they are always at least stimulating, and most of the book makes fascinating reading.

The Communist revolution revealed itself as a "counterfeit revolution." But how, asks the author, is one to explain the fact that "millions of people this side of the Iron Curtain pay homage to this dictatorship, join its movement, work for it with religious fervor?" (p. 3). As noted on the cover, Sidney Lens traveled through twelve countries in Europe to gather material for his study. And he found that "the scarcest commodity in Europe is hope," whereas "hope is the only thing that can defeat Stalinism" (p. 207). If American aid has not, as yet, produced the expected psychological effects, it has been precisely because such aid has helped to consolidate the status quo which the large masses want to do away with. Very often they have no clear idea of what should be done, but they are looking for a promise; they need a hope. That is the main reason why so many turn to Communism with its promise of change and its "semi-religious" hope.

Many others who do not accept Communism do not have sufficient energy to fight it because they do not know what to fight for. The author asks for a "crusade against poverty and Stalinism" and makes concrete suggestions for the program and methods of this crusade, to be waged now —in peacetime. He recognizes that "military force, unfortunately, may be necessary even in the most idealistic crusade," but even the most complete military victory "without a political victory based on a grand political ideal . . . must in the end result in the loss of the peace" (pp. 245–46). The author's last conclusion is that the world today needs unification into a single economic pattern. The American people, and only they, "do have the wherewithal, the material resources necessary, to accomplish this task smoothly and peaceably. In the process they can destroy Stalinism and other philosophies which place the individual in a strait jacket" (p. 266).

GEORGE DENICKE
Washington, D. C.

FONER, PHILIP S. (Ed.). *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass.* Vol. III: *The Civil War, 1861–1865.* Pp. 448. New York: International Publishers, 1952. $4.50.

This third volume in *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass* examines the period during which the ideas of the abolitionist leader were most fully vindicated in the eyes of the nation. Although once considered a missionary in advance of his times, Douglass lived to witness the fulfillment of his efforts as a result of the emergence of the Civil War and the implications of the President's Emancipation Proclamation.

Frederick Douglass' writings present a broad, contemporaneous commentary on governmental policies and socioeconomic problems during the ordeal of the union. In compiling this work, Dr. Foner has drawn from his subject's editorials in *Douglass' Monthly,* speeches before civic audiences, and correspondence with prominent persons both at home and abroad. The portrait which emerges is that of a multifaceted individual who interested himself in politics, journalism, labor conditions, military affairs, diplomacy and race relations. More accurately than most of his countrymen, Douglass realized that the war and its aftermath would be long and difficult in spite of the North's physical superiority. "We take possession of rebel cities," he wrote prophetically in July 1862, "but not the rebel hearts."

Of special importance to the reader are Douglass' reactions to the major issues of the Civil War. His initial fears that Lincoln might compromise with slavery to preserve the Union, his elation that Sumter had forced the hand of the North, his demands for immediate emancipation and the recruitment of Negro troops, his criticism of colonization, and his stirring appeal for opportunity for the Negro instead of misguided philanthropy or cruel force are vividly recorded in this collection. There are also pertinent excerpts showing the delicate relations within the abolitionist camp, as Douglass, Garrison, Phillips, and Smith attempted to subordinate their past differences for the good of the wartime antislavery cause.

The editor provides an introductory essay in which he outlines the highlights of the Negro leader's public career during the course of the war years. At all times he is intent upon showing that "Douglass' interpretation . . . coincided with that of the fathers of scientific socialism." Nor does he resist the opportunity to project current political views back into history. Commenting upon the 1864 presidential campaign, Dr. Foner unhesitatingly exclaims that "already the reactionary wing of the Republican Party was foreshadowing its later betrayal of the Negro people." Greater care in distinguishing between editing and editorializing would have enhanced the value of this work tremendously.

LEONARD PRICE STAVISKY
Long Island University

TATUM, ELBERT LEE. *The Changed Political Thought of the Negro, 1915–1940.* Pp. 205. New York: Exposition Press, 1952. $3.00.

Those who are searching for a definitive work on the political thought of Negroes in the United States will not find it in Elbert Lee Tatum's *The Changed Political Thought of the Negro, 1915–1940,* for this little volume, contrary to its title, is really a superficial treatment of Negroes in the political life of the United States between 1619 and 1940.

The present study, which is the outgrowth of a doctoral thesis at Loyola University (Chicago), consists of a foreword by President Lawrence A. Davis of Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical, and Normal College, a preface, an introduction, seven chapters, five appendixes (each of which contains one letter), and a bibliography, which the author says does not "include all materials used in this study, but only . . . [those] of most value" (p. 195). There is no index.

The first two chapters (about one-half of the text), which purport to treat the political significance of Negro migration, first to America and then to the North, present a cursory account of the Negro's importance in the political activities between 1619 and 1928. According to the author, the political significance of Negro migration to America lay in the large amount of attention which Negroes received in both the colonial and early state legislatures, as well as at the constitutional convention of 1787. However, Professor Tatum's claim that "More laws were enacted which dealt with the Negro during colonial times than any other subject" (p. 22) is certainly questionable.

The political significance of the "Great Migration" was very notable in the North. To the Negro, it meant an opportunity to participate actively in politics. To the large urban political machines, it offered groups of potential voters, a bonanza which they (the machines) almost immediately captured. Naturally, this new situation required Negroes to make a series of adjustments in both thought and actions. However, the author's claim that this politically immature group of migrants was "alert in realizing that [its] political interest should be local at first" instead of national is to be doubted, for Negroes, just as other politically untutored racial and religious minorities who migrated to northern cities, became pawns of one of the competing political machines.

The last half of the present study treats the political behavior of Negroes in a limited number of areas. (Missouri, the West, and the Northeast are ignored.) It considers their allegiance to the Republican party from 1865 to 1940, their shift to the Democrats between 1932 and 1940, their participation in the extra-party activities (such as committees and conventions), and

some of the public offices to which Negroes were elected or appointed before and after the "Great Migration." The author believes that it was logical for Negroes to stay in the Republican column because of that party's efforts in their behalf. He attributes the defection from the Republicans to: (1) "their tendency to forsake or ignore Negroes in the South"; (2) the failure of that party to keep its campaign pledges; (3) the effective overtures which Democrats made to "a great number of energetic and intelligent Negroes" who had migrated to the North since 1915. This shift in party allegiance, plus a slight tendency of a few Negroes to vote "independent of party labels," is what Professor Tatum seems to regard as "the changed political thought of the Negro" between 1915 and 1940.

It is quite disappointing to find no discussion of the "Negro's attitude toward communism" (except for two sentences on page 184) or toward the other liberal or reactionary politico-economic philosophies which have competed with the traditional political groups for electoral support in the United States since 1930.

Other things which mar the volume are: mistakes in spelling (pp. 10, 62, 77, 170, and in the bibliography), unsupported generalizations (pp. 77, 80, and 159), inconsistent statements (pp. 72 and 111), and inaccurate reporting (pp. 35, 36, 103, 158, 159, and in the bibliography).

Finally, in this reviewer's opinion, the one contribution which the present study makes is that of pointing up the need for a scholarly investigation of Negro political ideas in America from 1619 to 1952.

J. ERROLL MILLER
Lincoln University of Missouri

KNAUFF, ELLEN RAPHAEL. *The Ellen Knauff Story*. Introduction by Arthur Garfield Hays. Pp. xix, 242, 21. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1952. $3.50.

Ellen Knauff dedicates her book, a detailed chronology of her three-year battle to gain admission to the United States after being branded a "poor security risk" and excluded without a hearing, to "the United States of America and her amazing people." Her report is a tribute not only to her own faith in the American principles of justice and fairness, but to the "amazing people" who, once informed of the facts in Mrs. Knauff's case, rallied to her defense and by that most mysterious of group processes—public opinion—forced the Immigration Service to recognize its error, reverse itself, and permit Mrs. Knauff's entry to this country.

Widely publicized, this case of a German war-bride was fought by Mrs. Knauff's indefatigable attorneys, Gunther Jacobson and Albert Feingold, the *New York Post*, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Congressmen Walter and Roosevelt because they believe that the democratic idea of due process—a fair hearing—must be continually defended, even in the face of small-minded and arbitrary thinking in a government agency.

Behind the many legal jousts and infighting between the executive and legislative branches of the government in this case is the theme which symbolizes the moral struggle that the free world is now waging against Communist totalitarianism: that a democratic government can provide a system of fair procedures in which respect for the individual is paramount and in which opportunity is given to disprove charges, and that only through full and impartial hearings can the truth be established. While security safeguards in a time of international tension are understandable, Mrs. Knauff's story points up what abuses can occur when these procedures operate without corresponding concern for individual rights.

The struggle to establish the principle of a full and fair hearing goes beyond Mrs. Knauff's tribulation. The State Department's Passport Division denies passports to American citizens for travel abroad if, in its opinion, such travel would not be in the "best interests of the United States." No specified reasons are given. No opportunity is given the citizen to answer openly whatever evidence the Passport Division may have, or to disprove the charges. All this indicates how far the pendulum can swing toward the side of security and away from liberty when fear, even when understandably grounded, dominates governmental action. The American Civil Liberties Union has recently initiated a test case challenging the constitutional right of the State Department to deny a passport without a hearing, and it is hoped that the Supreme Court will decide the issue soon.

Throughout Mrs. Knauff's book, despite the disappointments, the delays in the legal process, the pettiness of bureaucracy, runs a strong note of optimism and faith in the democratic process. She writes: "I do not wish anybody to be falsely accused. It is a bitter and frightening experience. Yet—if it were possible without the agony, I almost wish every human being could go through a similar experience, a similar, personal method of realizing what's important in this world—as I did on Ellis Island.

"Only when my own human rights and my own freedom were endangered did I realize the importance of freedom. Only when I experienced the deep, natural devotion of other people to justice did I myself become a passionate believer in freedom and justice—and in people. . . .

"For the people of America despise tyrants, be they of the great or the petty variety, and they are fortunate to have inherited a system of protection which makes every little man master in his house and in his country.

"The people of America saw to it that their elected representatives picked up my fight against arbitrary decrees of the frightened. And in turn, an official of the highest tribunal of the land brought the weight of his office to bear in my favor, in order to protect the authority vested by the people in their elected representatives.

"And finally, the Government itself, faced with an aroused public opinion and a relentlessly probing Congress, showed enough fortitude to admit it was not omniscient and could make mistakes."

As long as these forces are free to express themselves, and are willing to take up the cudgels—even for the single individual—when an injustice is committed, our brand of democracy will win out.

PATRICK MURPHY MALIN
American Civil Liberties Union
New York City

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH. *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*. Pp. xv, 217. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952. $3.00.

Dr. Galbraith presents here, with characteristic sweep and verve, a number of interesting and challenging ideas concerning American economic and political life. The first half of the book is devoted to a careful criticism of some of the economic notions prevailing about 1935, especially in their more naïve business and academic forms. Chamberlin's discovery (1931) that economic life seldom conforms to "pure" competition is elaborated, and there is a brief popular summary of Keynes's attack upon "Say's law" that supply creates its own demand.

In the middle of the book, after a somewhat ambivalent but predominantly neo-Veblenite excursion into the "Unseemly Economics of Opulence," Dr. Galbraith develops his very interesting politico-economic concept of "countervailing power" (Chapters IX and X) and applies it to a number of different problems ending with inflation.

The first and last parts of the work are curiously dated in economic analysis with a very spotty coverage of postwar literature and ideas. There are also a number of inaccuracies. Students of economic history will be troubled, for example, to learn (p. 67) that "until 1930 a *really* serious depression was not part of the experience of Americans." Schumpeter's three cycle schema, the panic of 1837, and the fifteen years of "dull times" that followed the panic of 1873 have all alike been passed by. Dr. Galbraith also repeats (p. 75) the usual mistaken charge against Lord Keynes that he considered the rate of interest always and exclusively a purely monetary phenomenon. In addition the recent work of such sincere Keynesians as Professor Lloyd Metzler regarding wages and the "wealth effect" is entirely overlooked. There is nothing in the text to tell the reader that today it is generally conceded by most Keynesians including Samuelson, Klein, and Metzler that the

Keynesian unemployment "equilibria" must depend upon price rigidity; and further that, while we still may not favor money wage reduction as the best way to get full employment, writers like Metzler now concede that it is undoubtedly *a* way.

Turning, however, to the main issue, what does Professor Galbraith mean by countervailing power? Essentially the phrase seems to mean the *second* wage of organization. It does not merely mean "monopsony" (strong buyers) though one is apt to get that impression at first (p. 118). But Dr. Galbraith's very pregnant distinction between "original" and "countervailing" power (p. 143) shows that this is too simple. His main idea seems to be that when *either* side of the market falls into a few powerful hands those on the *other* side will tend to organize against them. Thus the farmers organize against the "middle-men," the unions against "oligopoly." But the concept is a bit elusive, because the chain stores are also spoken of as examples of "countervailing power." Can it be said that they merely organize against oligopoly? Rather in their case, I submit, it is also power used against standard marketing practice often obsolete and inefficient, rather than (universally) against small numbers.

Using his new concepts Dr. Galbraith makes a number of valid and intelligent suggestions. He points out the often-overlooked role of the large *retailers* in restraining the market power of manufacturers (but is this always a case of organization against small numbers?), and in his chapter on "Countervailing Power and the State" he indicates the role of the state as a fosterer of countervailing organization. He admits unequivocally, furthermore, that the job can be overdone (pp. 156–157) and almost seems to be gliding into a good word for the Taft-Hartley Act. Again Chapter IX has an interesting discussion of the economics of the housing industry and a still more suggestive treatment of the limitations of countervailing power as a regulator (it does *not* work, he says, in inflation, but rather in times of some slack).

We thus see that Dr. Galbraith has here offered a number of valuable ideas. It is not, however, entirely clear just how much is new in fact and how much is merely terminology. "Countervailing power" and "workable competition" seemed to me to keep gliding into one another. The basic weakness of the book, from the point of view of this reviewer, is, however, much more fundamental. It does not seem to me that Dr. Galbraith ever clearly distinguishes between the checks and balances of a *stalemate* and the decentralization and incentive which make for *adjustment*.

The ideas of *social turnover* and *independent opportunity* appear to be largely lacking in this book. Dr. Galbraith tells us (p. 39) that the "present generation of Americans, if it survives, will buy its steel, copper, brass, automobiles [and so on—a long list] from one or another of the handful of firms that now supply these staples. A moment's reflection will establish, there hasn't been much change in the firms supplying these products for several decades." But why? A hint can be found in Galbraith's text. He tells us (p. 37) that it is "indeed significant that the new arrivals" in many fields have had help from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. But the book contains no mention of the effects, often cited, of our equalitarian income tax upon opportunity, mobility, competiton, and equity capital. Surely the point ought at least to have been mentioned.

Dr. Galbraith in some of his chapters (for example, VII) clearly appears to be advocating development and growth. Yet I suggest that he is also still, though more or less subconsciously, largely an adherent of the Veblenite philosophy of a smoothly flowing, but stationary, bureaucratic, and equalitarian world. I suggest that, without exactly realizing it, he is still largely the foe of those dynamic but unstabilizing creative forces in American life which have led people to refer to it as the "permanent revolution," and that he has discovered that the "permanent revolution" can be ended as well by complacent *business* socialism as by the socialism of the left. Therefore he is for business socialism. This verdict is perhaps oversimplified, but that seemed to me the essence of the book. However, such a society is scarcely capitalism. And the massive stalemate of a few big security-minded unions and a few big security-minded firms, which to me Galbraith seems to be advocating, leaves little room either for growth or true democracy.

DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT
University of Virginia

LINCOLN, JAMES F. *Incentive Management: A New Approach to Human Relationships in Industry and Business.* Pp. 280. Cleveland, Ohio: The Lincoln Electric Co., 1951. $1.00.

The basis for the arguments advanced by Mr. Lincoln in this book is the phenomenal success enjoyed by the Lincoln Electric Company in Cleveland, Ohio. Through adaptation of the systems of piece-work pay and profit sharing to win the enthusiastic participation of the labor force (ranging from 404 employees in 1934 to a high of 1,245 in 1943 and numbering 1,005 in 1950), Lincoln Electric has achieved remarkable records of production per employee and an average annual wage level of $7,701 in 1950, while demonstrating that higher wages can mean lower costs. Lincoln Electric manufactures arc welding equipment and arc welding electrodes.

Mr. Lincoln was at one time captain of the Ohio State University football team. He praises the efforts which amateur athletes put forth and throughout his discussion urges transplanting the teamwork and superior individual effort of amateur sport to the work situation. He stresses that the head of an industry should be the leader—the captain rather than the boss. Many of the observations and injunctions propounded could well be read and pondered by anyone who occupies a position of supervisory responsibility; certainly he has touched on many of the barriers which hinder successful and productive relationships in the world of business and industry.

Mr. Lincoln declares frankly that he is advocating a second industrial revolution. There are few of the accepted practices, usages, and mores of industrial management, labor-management relations, and other social arrangements which he does not challenge during the course of his exposition. What has been accomplished at the plant in Cleveland is, in fact, set in the background. Mr. Lincoln gives attention to most of the problems of the nation and of the world as they appear to him, offering solutions from his philosophy, based on his own experience.

The author does not leave the reader any doubts as to his dislikes. It is difficult to judge, however, whether he has stronger feelings against government or against organized labor. Despite his advocacy of increased productivity, he seems certain that no means would succeed in increasing the productivity of government employees. Despite his interest in enlisting the participation of the work force, he never allows the thought that highly successful labor-management co-operation leading to active worker participation and rising productivity can and is being achieved in situations where unions speak for the work force, as evidenced by the numerous applications of the "Scanlon Plan," for instance.

Certainly Mr. Lincoln has a remarkable achievement from which to prescribe. His prescription, however, impressed this reader much as those advanced for the remaking of society 150 years ago by that successful cotton spinner of New Lanark, Robert Owen, who, too, did not hesitate to urge that the world should be remade according to his philosophy.

JOHN NEWTON THURBER
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Washington, D. C.

LINDHOLM, RICHARD W. *Taxation of the Trucking Industry.* Pp. xv, 141. Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University, 1951. No price.

This volume is more than a study of the taxation of the motor-carrier industry. Two chapters deal with fundamental questions about financing highways through user taxes. In fact, the greatest value of this book lies in the thoughtful analysis of this problem.

The practice of tying highway use payments to gasoline consumption, the author points out, tends to destroy the possibility of applying strictly economic tests to the provision of highways. The contribution to highway support paid with the purchase of gasoline is incidental to the purchase of the gasoline and the utilities to be derived therefrom, and the total contributions of highway users from such a tax is no measure of the highway services for which they are willing to pay. Such revenues might contribute more or less than highway users would be willing to pay directly for highway facilities.

The author also makes some observations about the relation of revenues from particular highways to highway expenditures which should be of interest to those concerned with the application of economic criteria to highway building. "The idea that roads should pay for themselves is apt to bring about an undesirable use of resources," he says (p. 46). Under the prevailing system of highway user taxation, the tax revenues produced by main highways are used to support secondary and tertiary roads which do not produce enough tax revenues to finance themselves. Although it may be asked whether it is equitable to make persons who utilize certain highways pay for highways which they do not use, the distribution of highway expenditures on the basis of the tax revenues which they produce would result in excessive expenditures on the main roads and wholly inadequate expenditures on less used roads.

Turning to matters in the volume which are more strictly embraced within its title, we find that between 1940 and 1949 the operating taxes and licenses paid by for-hire motor carriers of property varied from 4.43 to 7.26 per cent of their operating revenues. The author points out that taxes on motor carriers, over the period considered, increased less rapidly than their operating revenues. It is difficult, however, to accept his statement that the failure of operating taxes to move upward as rapidly as operating revenues "has, in a real sense, provided a subsidy to the motor-carriers of property" (p. 10). A chapter on what truckers think of taxes brings out both the advantages and limitations of the various types of taxes levied upon motor carriers.

D. PHILIP LOCKLIN
University of Illinois

CHILDS, MARQUIS. *The Farmer Takes A Hand: The Electric Power Revolution in Rural America.* Introduction by Senator George D. Aiken. Pp. 256. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1952. $3.50.

Marquis Childs has written about the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) and American farmers with sympathy for the electric co-operative movement under REA aegis. The effect of electrification on American rural life is an engrossing story of human struggle for improved working and living conditions. REA's contribution as adviser-financier to rural electric development since 1935 is today legend in many farm communities. But for most city readers and many rural folk this book is an eye-opener.

The Farmer Takes A Hand challenges the contention that REA is an ignoble instrument of federal bureaucracy and a symbol of state socialism. Initially a New Deal relief agency, the REA has become a permanent lending agency providing funds for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy in rural areas. This book describes the events leading to the establishment as well as the operation of REA. However, its main focus is upon the history of REA's chief borrowers, the electric co-operatives. Mr. Child's thesis is that the electric co-op movement—even though backed by federal funds—strengthens free enterprise. He maintains that REA co-operatives have been supported by the essentially conservative American farmer. The utilities' high service charges and their cream-skimming practices originally gave rise to demand for cheaper rural electricity. Once REA was established, most private companies and municipalities were unable or unwilling to expand electrification with REA funds. This propelled the co-op into position as REA's leading borrower. The author cites the competition between REA and the co-operatives on the one side and the monopolistic utilities on the other to support his generalization that free enterprise has prospered from the activities of REA and the co-ops. He describes the early utility opposition to the co-operatives as well as to the REA and shows that recently the utilities have been trying to keep ownership of generation and transmission facilities away from the co-ops and to take over faltering co-operatives. In random fashion, he describes the areas of conflict. While keener organization and analysis by the author would have strengthened his argument, he has told the story well enough to prompt the general reader to discount the utility propaganda against REA and the co-operatives.

As a text, however, the book does not adequately tell the story. Some significant aspects of the REA and co-operative experience appear to be beyond its scope. These include the effects of the rural electrification program on the rural economy, the future of REA activities including evaluation of its newest responsibility—rural telephone development—and the role of REA in the expanding area of federal administration. Moreover, in presenting statistics and in quoting remarks, Mr. Childs provides precise citations for only a portion of the material; there are no footnotes to fill in the rough corners, and the book has no index. Nonetheless, as a spade in the scholar's hand, the volume has substantial merit in its description of REA and the electric co-operatives. This narrative should invite scholarly inquiry into the desirability of further experimentation on the REA pattern as a means of bolstering sound free enterprise in other businesses and industries.

MARVIN HENRY MORSE
New Haven, Connecticut

ROSE, ARNOLD M. *Union Solidarity: The Internal Cohesion of a Labor Union.* Pp. xx, 209. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952. $3.00.

Through the method of the questionnaire survey, Professor Rose has systematically studied a random sample of the 8,500 members of Teamsters' Local 688 in St. Louis. The attitudes of the members with regard to participation in and evaluation of their union, the extent of opportunities for democratic control of the local, attitudes toward employers, incentive pay, job seniority, political action, and workers' education are some of the many significant areas probed into.

That the study is subject to the limitations imposed by the questionnaire survey method, as the author clearly indicates, should be recognized by the reader. Nevertheless, some of the descriptive findings have important practical and theoretical value. For example, the conclusion that there is a strong loyalty to the principle of unionism despite criticisms of its specific policies and practices is one that can assure the union leader that he has a firm foundation upon which to build even if part of his superstructure is faulty. Professor Rose does not point out, however, that the limits of membership loyalty may be considerably lessened where the local leadership is less given to democratic procedures than is Local 688's Hal Gibbons. The conclusion that loyalty to the union does not mean disloyalty to the employer can be noted by social psychologists to indicate, as the author points out, that individuals can have conflicts of attitudes when the attitudes are at different levels.

The conclusion that union loyalties of the members are attached to the local union and not to the International or Federation would indicate that the leadership at those levels has failed to impart to the rank-and-file membership the significance and role of the International or Federation. In a different area of the study, the author examines membership attitudes toward minority groups and concludes that the union is least effective in changing the attitudes of its members when the changes run counter to the basic values or deep-seated cultural patterns of the society as a whole. These are only a few of the more significant conclusions reported in the study.

The study would have been generally more readable if less of its content had been devoted to charts and tables and more given over to interpretation of findings and general description of the internal functioning of the local union.

Though this is only one study of a sample of the membership of a single one of the 65,000 to 75,000 local unions in something like 209 Internationals which com-

prise the American labor movement, it is an important contribution to a vast literature on trade unionism which has thus far all but completely overlooked the rank-and-file member in his local union.

BERNARD KARSH
University of Chicago

DAVEY, HAROLD W. *Contemporary Collective Bargaining.* Pp. xi, 532. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951. $5.50.

The promotional materials advertising Professor Davey's book refer to it as "a work that will not quickly become dated since it does not merely describe current conditions. Instead, it comes to grips with concrete, major problems of continuing significance in the vital area of collective bargaining." Happily enough, this assertion is substantially correct. I think I would be fair in recommending this text very highly as an introductory text in a course on collective bargaining.

The chapters which yield the most in terms of the above promise are "Managerial Authority and the Scope of Collective Bargaining" and "Wage Determination Under Collective Bargaining," for these two chapters provide the reader with a schematic perspective into the many factors which necessarily pervade the bargaining process. Since collective bargaining is a complex mixture of situational relationships rather than a controlled experiment between labor and management, a catalogue of the many factors which must be considered in examining the motivations and behavior of the participants is welcome. Other chapters of the book including, unfortunately, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Jurisprudence" give an almost overwhelming emphasis to the content or substance of labor contracts. Too little attention in these other chapters is given to the role of precedent, policy considerations, and community pressures.

The last hundred pages of the book contain the latest collective bargaining agreements drawn up by General Motors and the Swift Packing Company as well as the text of the Labor-Management Relations Act. These appended materials will be useful for classroom work. More revealing, however, would be transcripts of the bargaining negotiations which led to these agreements.

ROBERT C. SORENSEN
College of Law, University of Nebraska

GALENSON, WALTER (Ed.). *Comparative Labor Movements.* Pp. xiv, 599. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. $6.50.

In this symposium, seven scholars have reported on the history, organization, and operation of labor movements in Great Britain, Scandinavia, Australia, Germany, France, Italy, and the Soviet Union. In a discerning introduction the editor states his convictions that the future of democracy is closely bound up with the fate of trade unionism—"The greatest economic institution of our time"—and that a most fruitful approach to an understanding of this institution is the method of comparative analysis. A major purpose of these seven essays is to stimulate further research in the area of comparative labor systems, and the editor modestly declares that more intensive work will have to be done before valid generalizations can be made.

Yet at least suggestive hypotheses and tentative generalizations flow from these reports which were written independently by authorities living in different countries. For example, the historical descriptions indicate that the development of trade unionism is especially influenced by the type, timing, and tempo of industrialization. The metamorphosis of trade union structure in each country reveals that there is an irresistible tendency toward the growth of industrial unionism as economic aggregates become larger and skills are broken down by the machine. But the trade union structure, molded by diverse socioeconomic environments, varies from the highly centralized federations of Norway and Sweden to the loosely organized British Trades Union Congress.

In addition to an analysis of wages and wage trends, each chapter contains a description of collective bargaining processes. Beside adding to our understanding of collective bargaining, it should be useful in clearing up misconceptions especially in reference to industry-wide bargaining. Mr. Walker's discussion of compulsory arbitration in Australia also serves to clarify another much abused subject.

In discussing the influence of labor ideology on the trade union movement, Professor Flanders explains the impact of the Fabian Society on British workers, and Professor Taft shows the effect of a social democratic philosophy on the German trade unions. In the chapters on France by Mr. Lorwin and on Italy by Professor Adams consideration is given to the significant question as to why communism dominates the major trade union organization in each country. Knowledge of labor ideologies is valuable in understanding the role of trade unions in relation to the state which is constantly increasing its control over the national economy. An extreme example of such control appears in Mr. Deutscher's study of Russian trade unions which have been completely absorbed by the Soviet State.

With the increasing interest in comparative labor movements, this up-to-date, authoritative text book meets a genuine need of college teachers and scholars. It should also be helpful to governmental and trade union officials concerned with international labor.

MELVIN J. SEGAL
Michigan State College

BRADY, ROBERT A. *The Citizen's Stake in Price Control.* Pp. 161. Paterson, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1952. $1.50.

Any price control is some control of people. This book reflects the judgment that, in the interest of people affected, we need now both more effective control of prices by government and more effective breaking of private price control. The latter objective comes out in the author's apparent feeling that pressure groups—business, farm, labor—have warped existing controls so badly that the main purpose is getting lost in the shuffle.

Professor Brady provides a pointed sketch of policy on defense controls and of requisites in price control. However, the very statement on such requisites as civilian control, emphasis on production, promotion of competition, and maximum public participation shows his basic concern with an essentially political hope, namely, for an organized citizenship to hold the pressure groups in check.

It seems hardly debatable that the present price control law reflects group buck passing—perhaps more than it reflects coherent controls in the common defense. Where the citizens predominantly do stand or might stand with respect to a revamped plan seems less certain.

Do the citizens generally want effective price controls? The only previous trial of extensive controls was when without doubt there was war. Now, differences of judgments about the likelihood of another war are obvious. Our commitment of the economy to defense is far less than it was when we went grudgingly into World War II price controls. Western Europe is not occupied. Is there not considerable likelihood that the hesitant and divided congressional action on this problem has been about proportionate to the hesitant and divided temper of the country?

But if the citizens do want controls and should make their wants known, what kind of controls should we expect? Most citizens have been taught, formally or by social exposure, to buy freely for as little as possible and to sell freely for as much as possible. That simple doctrine, acceptable in peacetime for the buyer or the seller too small to affect the market significantly, has been stretched in many seats of power to include wartime and to include corporate "persons" of whatever dimensions, except where gross collusion is proven. When the defense program makes the government the biggest of all market giants, the citizen, seeing that collusion is not relevant, has to learn some arithmetic of size before he can understand the emergency need. And since that might have peacetime repercussions without respect to collusion, the lessons come slowly.

J. P. WATSON
University of Pittsburgh

CASSELMAN, PAUL HUBERT. *The Cooperative Movement and Some of Its Problems.* Pp. xiii, 178. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $3.00.

This is a much needed and useful analysis of the consumer co-operative movement.

Consumer co-operative literature is remarkable for its enthusiasm and for its dearth of critical evaluation. Through the first nine chapters the author, a professor at the University of Ottawa, Canada, demonstrates a fine objectivity, but in his final chapter his restrained enthusiasm is revealed.

In a foreword Dr. Coady says: "Scientific thinking involves much more than enthusiasm and zeal for group action—it is rather the possession of a sound philosophy, and the ability to apply it." The author does not regard co-operation as a panacea. Although he is a labor economist he thinks the consumer function is a fundamental approach to economics and one which has been neglected. "Cooperation is an economic system with a social content. Its idealism penetrates both its economic and its social elements." Its principles have evolved from the experience of common men and have been tried by a century of use. By contrast the principles of socialism and communism are the products of theoretical thinking. The well-known principles of co-operation are regrouped around the more basic principles of universality, democracy, liberty, fraternity and unity, self-help, economy, and equity.

Lack of planning has been a disadvantage to the co-operative movement. For example, most of the credit union movement in the United States operates outside of the regular co-operative movement. A planned co-operative movement would develop in this order: first financial co-operatives, then retail co-operatives, then wholesale co-operatives, and finally processing co-operatives.

In discussing co-operatives and the state Professor Casselman expresses the view that the policy of political neutrality has stood the test of time, but he would use a lobby to defend consumer interests. He rejects the co-operative commonwealth ideal as utopian and one which hinders the movement. Co-operatives are the most effective means of controlling monopoly, fraud, and false advertising. Co-operation resists communism by the force of ideas rather than by the force of arms.

Although the co-operative movement has been promoted as an alternative to socialism it is neither a form of socialism nor a type of capitalism, though it may possess characteristics of both. The author thinks that co-operative leaders who espouse socialism will lead the co-operative movement into difficulty; they must make up their minds whether they want a consumer economy or a worker economy. The greatest obstacle to the co-operative movement in its second century may well be socialist political regimes.

Professor Casselman analyzes the status of co-operatives with reference to taxation objectively and ably. Failure to see the difference between profit business and co-operative business as regards motive, role of capital, ownership, and control is the root of the tax problem. Far from having a competitive advantage, co-operatives are in an inferior position in Canada and in the United States.

LELAND J. GORDON
Denison University

NEWMAN, PHILIP CHARLES. *The Development of Economic Thought.* Pp. xiv, 456. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. $5.00.

This book begins with mercantilism, but its treatment of writers before about 1850 is sketchy and unoriginal. The consideration given to economic thinking since that time, apart from the general background of thought movement, is somewhat disjointed but otherwise well done. How Marx's ideas on production and the business cycle compare with what is now taught on these subjects, and what is the nature of the Walrasian theory of mathematical equilibrium which lies behind the *Value and Capital* of Hicks, are explained satisfactorily here. To students who want a survey of recent writings from this viewpoint Newman's book is recommended.

But this reviewer questions whether an adequate understanding of economic literature is obtained if developments in associated areas of thought receive so little attention as they do in this volume. Adam Smith's work in economics was a logical consequence of the Enlightenment, of the works of Hobbes, Locke, Voltaire, and others, in a wider territory. His *Theory of Moral Sentiments* dealt at some length with the subject matter of Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class,* a point of which some of Newman's comments suggest he is unaware. Welfare economics and Keynesianism are not only things of themselves but parts of a general thought-trend away from laissez faire. Price control and social security will appear in a different light to students who have been familiarized with medievalism than they do to those to whom they come as novelties. Newman's book largely ignores all this.

A welcome feature is the inclusion of accounts of individuals whose writings are studied, although some comments are made which appear in poor taste. It is an unkind judgment of James Mill to explain his views in terms of personal dependence on the "dominant employer class," and teachers may feel that the remarks on Mrs. Veblen are objectionable. Readers of the later essays in Hayek's *Individualism and Economic Order* and *The Road to Serfdom* may be surprised to see that "in 1937, Oscar Lange delivered the *coup de grace* to the anti-socialist critics," although other books than Newman's have said this. The theory of comparative costs in international trade appears to be attributed to the younger Mill, despite Ricardo's famous prior statement. It is said that Marshall "began the diagrammatic method," when probably "began with" is meant, a difference which may mislead students. A number of other slips of various kinds suggest inadequate checking.

EDMUND WHITTAKER
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SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

BARKER, ERNEST (Ed.). *Golden Ages of the Great Cities.* Pp. xx, 340. London and New York: Thames and Hudson, 1952. $5.00.

Sir Ernest Barker in his introduction to this symposium explains that "the plan of each of its chapters is to provide . . . a synoptic view of each age of culture as it reached its height in some great city—a view which takes account at once of the city's history and its political and economic structure, of its art and literature and manners and customs, and of the general pattern of its social system and the general nature of its social life."

Nine of the cities "show to America what Europe has given in the past to the accumulated treasure of civilization." They are Periclean Athens; Rome, first under the Antonines, again under the Popes; Christian Constantinople; Paris, first as the center of medieval European learning and then in the *Grand Siècle* of Louis XIV; Medicean Florence; the Venetian Republic; Madrid under the House of Austria; Vienna under Metternich; and the London of Victoria's Jubilee. Twentieth-century New York is included "to show Europe what America is already giving and will continue increasingly to give," thus serving "as a link (or intellectual 'Atlantic Union')." Ten of the authors are British scholars, *litterateurs,* or journalists; two are French historians. Even the chapter on New York is by the Washington correspondent of several English periodicals.

An urbanist will applaud the premise that a portrait of a great city will be the noblest reflection of the golden age of a culture. But it is a tall order to provide the "synoptic view" in twenty-five to thirty pages, and the results in this collection are not uniformly good. The Greek cultural heritage may be adequately portrayed in a short essay on classic Athens with its 200,000 citizens; but there is an inevitable confusion of focus in Mr. Robert Waithman's attempt to picture New York—its skyline, the standard of living of its workers, its local government—and at the same time its "modern culture marked with its own unmistakable stamp." Of eleven novelists, poets, and painters named as the most distinguished representatives of this culture, not one is a New Yorker; they are identified with and identify themselves with New England, the Middle West, California, or the South.

The three contributors who picture a city *and its life* most vividly are Jérôme Carcopino (Antonine Rome), Steven Runciman (Byzantine Constantinople), and Roger Fulford (Jubilee London). Cecil Sprigge

seems to find no focus for his Papal Rome; Sir Maurice Bowra remains largely in the Olympian realm of philosophy, drama, and art rather than portraying life in Athens.

The uniformities and differences that appear are both of interest. It is perhaps to be expected that all great capitals have been cosmopolitan, that they are centers of trade, that they have a pulsating life in the streets. We expect to find governmental responsibility for social welfare and economic stability in nineteenth century Vienna and London. But it is unexpected when we read of public aid to dependent children in Antonine Rome and of the regulation of the height of buildings both in ancient Rome and in Constantinople. Students of cultures and of cities will find a majority of the essays in this collection rewarding, each in terms of his own interest.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
Brooklyn College

REINHARDT, JAMES M., PAUL MEADOWS, and JOHN M. GILLETTE. *Social Problems and Social Policy*. Pp. ix, 590. New York: American Book Company, 1952. $4.50.

Although the jacket states in large type that this book is "new" and the copyright date is 1952, on the copyright page the following words also appear: "Based on *Current Social Problems* and *Problems of a Changing Social Order* by Gillette and Reinhardt, copyright, 1933, 1937, 1942." There is some evidence in the present volume that the older material has been revised, but evidence also exists that this has not been thoroughgoing. For example, out of twenty-nine reading references at the end of Chapter 2 only two bear a later date than 1940; out of twenty-eight references at the end of Chapter 9 all except five are dated earlier than 1936 and the latest is dated 1938; with respect to Public Health dealt with in Chapter 15, all the references at the end of the chapter are old (between 1928 and 1932). This situation is likewise found at the end of other chapters and also with respect to some of the tabulations. In the matter of child welfare much has been accomplished in the last twenty years, and yet for the greater part of Chapter 11 dealing with that subject, the discussion is highly utopian and based largely on a so-called "Children's Charter" formulated at a Conference on Child Health and Protection held in 1930. A similar condition is found in Chapter 14 which deals with crime, in which much of the discussion is based upon reports of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement published in 1931.

The following statements are also out of date: "Between one and two per cent of our national population are engaged in some governmental occupation" (p. 55). In 1951, general government employed at least 4 per cent of the population. Likewise, during a time when government spending for military purposes has risen from $17.8 billion in fiscal year 1950 to $26.4 billion in 1951 and is estimated at $49.7 billion for 1952 and $65.1 for 1953, arguments in the book are based on an estimated expenditure of only $2.5 billions for such purposes (p. 571).

In a book as comprehensive as this one, it is unavoidable that generalizations be stated briefly without much discussion. In less than 600 pages and in twenty chapters such problems are treated as the nature of democracy, resource utilization, technology, economic insecurity, city and rural problems, population change, migration, family adjustment, problems of the child, education, racial minorities, crime, public health, defective groups, eugenics, alcoholism, internationalism—all of them related to public welfare and social control. Despite this broad sweep, however, it would seem unnecessary that dogmatic statements be substituted for open-mindedness where controversial issues are concerned; and the number of controversial questions covered in this book are legion. The following are samples of statements with which many readers will undoubtedly take issue or about which will at least raise a question as to meaning or significance:

Regarding social problems it is asserted: "During thousands of years, no doubt, if problem conditions existed, there were no persons sufficiently intelligent to see them; and so, practically, there were no problems" (p. 7).

"If all material structure and goods were destroyed, culture would remain, and men could rebuild and replace the material things" (p. 25).

"Anything that becomes different in society represents social change. . . . Social evolution is an aspect or result of social change. . . . There is a tendency to conclude that social evolution always means improvement or progress. Probably this conclusion is generally true" (pp. 26–27).

Under the heading "An Economy of Abundance in the Offing," after stating that "we may have enough to go around, but it fails to get around democratically," and after failing to catch an important typographical error regarding the size of our national income, the authors state that "a democratic realization of the division of wealth and income would go far to make the economy of abundance a reality" (pp. 44–45).

"Government must be as resilient as rubber, as resourceful as the mother of a big family on a small income, as pliable as a plastic figure, and as adjustable as a chameleon. If it endures at all it is fortunate; and it is bound to change" (p. 41).

"'Be not anxious about tomorrow' was an injunction of an agricultural society which knew little about business cycles, cut-throat competition, iron-curtain communication, or imperialistic rivalries. It is hardly a fitting social philosophy for the vast, congested, poorly-articulated, diseased, impersonal, swift, expensive, wasteful, megalopolitan culture centers of the twentieth century!" (p. 116).

"Technology is fundamentally a new, a modern methodology of social adjustment. . . . The personal imbalances of insecurity and fear are the tribute money we pay for the privilege of technological exploitation of our physical and social worlds" (pp. 102, 115).

"Urbanism fosters economic insecurities through its monetarization of human relations, its job dependence, its business irregularities, its industrial conflicts, and its rapid technological changes" (p. 188).

"Planning is essentially the foresighted and cooperative adaptation of means to ends" (p. 190).

"Population, at the human level, . . . is a socio-biological fact" (p. 198).

"The most important functions of the family seem to be reproduction and the care of children and the provision of a money income sufficient to buy the services expected by a culture-patterned and high standard of living" (p. 251).

Most of the book, though interesting and readable, is in the form of a brittle superficiality such as is illustrated in the examples given above.

JOSEPH MAYER
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HERBERTSON, DOROTHY. *The Life of Frédéric Le Play*. Edited by VICTOR BRANFORD and ALEXANDER FARQUAHARSON. Pp. 120. Ledbury, Herefordshire: Le Play House Press, 1951. 12s. 6d.

As the literature of a discipline becomes more and more voluminous, it becomes less and less possible for any one person to read all the classics first hand; we become increasingly dependent on cursory digests, brief summaries, and textbook sketches. Authors become typed and the richness of their actual contribution is lost sight of.

Frédéric LePlay is generally known as the father of monographic surveys based on careful field studies of families. But the usual statement of his contribution overlooks many other aspects of his thought. He was an occupational sociologist and, in a sense rivaled Marx as a philosopher of history. Compare, for example, Marx's materialistic interpretation of history with LePlay's occupational interpretation as summarized by the author of the book under review: "He saw . . . that every occupation leads to the development of a certain type of family, adapted to the nature of the occupation. Around this family type spring up religious, moral and ethical ideals which become part of the soul of a nation and make it what it is" (p. 48).

Few modern students of social surveys surpass or even equal LePlay in the breadth of conception which they bring to

the analyses of data. The appendexes of one of his monographs—on a Sheffield cutler—deal, for example, with such topics as: "(1) the social transformation of England since the middle ages; (2) the elements of social disorganisation introduced within the last century into English industrial life by the opening up of the coalfields; (3) the misconceptions current in England during the last century of the social relations of masters and servants; (4) English Friendly Societies; (5) Sheffield Trade Unions" (p. 26). Other monographs were similarly broad in their scope, including such topics as differential fertility among classes, and relief policies. The publication of this biography of Le-Play, which includes a sympathetic account of his theories as well as of his life, is a favor to the sociological public. It is more appreciative than critical; it is amateurish in flavor; but it is a useful contribution for which students of family, of community, and of research methods will be grateful. There is a portrait of the subject.

JESSIE BERNARD
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LOEWY, HERTA. *The Retarded Child.* Pp. 160. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $3.75.

The emergence of organized groups of parents of mentally deficient children has been a noteworthy development in this field during recent years. With spontaneous initiative and under wise direction and guidance many such parents who were bewildered, ashamed, and heartsick have found some hope and encouragement through banding together to further the care and training of their handicapped children. There has been an initial public enlightenment and growing progress in this movement, but parents themselves implore means of better self-education which will help them to understand their children and suggestions as to practical tools of child training.

In *The Retarded Child* Herta Loewy is partially fulfilling this need. The subtitle states that this is "A guide for Parents and Teachers," and the author obviously has had considerable intimate experience in teaching and training the backward child. Published originally in Great Britain where Miss Loewy has worked, this book translates rather successfully for the parents (a) the dynamics of the retarded child and (b) the techniques of the teacher who understands these dynamics.

A practical combination of lay psychology and specialized teaching is offered. Psychologically, parents may profit by the author's over-all approach to the child—her emphasis upon total personality development, her explanation of abilities and goals, her caution against overclassification, and above all her sympathy with and sensitivity to the retarded child as an individual who cannot be collectively grouped as the "garden type of amentia." Psychologically, too, parents should entertain appropriate reserve when the author becomes somewhat pseudopsychiatric in her interpretations of fear, obsessions, insight, and sex. The positive factors, however, far outweigh the negative ones. The glimmer of false hopes which has appeared in certain contemporary writings may be dimly seen here in stressing progress, primarily among the higher grade mentally handicapped, implying that, as a whole, they can be developed into almost normal adults.

Pedagogically, parents should welcome the simple, practical training lessons which Miss Loewy translates into games and so clearly explains. These programs of sense and habit training, set forth in separate chapters, are precisely what parents have been requesting. Though the author speaks of "my system," neither methods nor materials are new, for they have been employed in special classes since the days of Itard, Seguin, Montessori, Decroly, Binet, and other exemplary teachers. However, Miss Loewy presents them clearly, dispassionately, and with unusual understanding of the nature and characteristics of the retarded child. The techniques described will probably be of greatest value to parents in helping them to meet most pressing needs. *The Retarded Child* is a worthy addition to the undernourished literature in this field.

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Woodbine, New Jersey

POLLAK, OTTO, and collaborators. *Social Science and Psychotherapy for Children.* Pp. 242. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952. $4.00.

Occasionally an idea, a person, and a situation unite in achievement. This book describes one of those instances. It is a kind of landmark in applied social science.

The idea, in this instance, is that the relation of research to practice in the disciplines and professions concerned with social behavior should be improved. This is the central emphasis of the Russell Sage Foundation as pointed out by Dr. Donald Young in the Foreword. The person is Dr. Otto Pollak, the principal author of this book. The situation is that afforded by the personnel and the practice of psychoanalytically oriented child guidance at the Jewish Board of Guardians (JBG) as described by Bertram J. Black in the Introduction. The achievement consists in adapting several social science concepts (family of orientation, social interaction, socialization, cultural relativity, culture conflict, social roles, status, youth culture, and reinforcement from stimulus-response-learning theory) so that they correct and supplement psychoanalytic theory to help social caseworkers with "(a) a new type of perceptivity and (b) tools for an ordering of reality."

The various chapters, save the first and last, were written in collaboration with caseworkers from the JBG to show the implications for practice of one of these concepts and to illustrate the implications with case material. These chapters, beautifully written, show clearly the value of theoretical concepts for an art of practice when they are properly integrated. For them this book should become a widely used reference for courses in child guidance under whatever academic or institutional auspices they may be given.

The last chapter is an evaluation from the psychiatric point of view. In it Dr. M. R. Friend points out that one of the things which "social science at its present state of development can do for psychotherapeutic processes is to break down the concept of environment into its various components. The individual chapters of this book demonstrate the diversity and plurality of factors which fall under this blanket term" (p. 225). One gathers that the collaboration was judged to be successful, for he also points out: "Neither emphasis on social science concepts alone nor emphasis on psychic mechanisms alone can be considered adequate attempts at diagnosis and therapy. Only their integration can make constructive therapy" (p. 230).

In the first chapter, Dr. Pollak, the social science consultant and principal author, describes the successive decisions that led from directive to operation. These include his conception of the role of a consultant (by definition not a decision maker). He also outlines the steps used in establishing liaison between social science and child guidance practice: (a) months devoted to the consultant's getting acquainted with the work of the clinic and learning the technical terminology used by the practitioners, (b) the formulating of a tentative list of ideas about how social science could be adapted to child guidance, (c) the recognition that the body of psychoanalytic knowledge upon which the clinic staff depended was deserving of respect, (d) the effort to show how a synthesis of psychoanalytic knowledge with social science could be achieved, and (e) the choice of those areas of professional discomfort about the clinic's diagnostic and therapeutic procedures as the places to focus these efforts at synthesis. The pages devoted to these points (24–36) comprise a "book of etiquette" for consultants. They should be read by all novices attempting to play the role. The fact that Dr. Friend, clinical director of the Child Guidance Institute of JBG, recognizes (last chapter) that a social scientist entering a field of practice as a consultant can do much to "give new impetus to the expression of clinical concerns which had been somewhat dormant" attests the success of this etiquette and the spirit which must underlie it.

Dr. Friend also remarks that the effectiveness of a consultant is threatened by "the narcissism natural to every professional discipline." He, the other administrators of the JBG and the staff of the Child Guidance Institute also deserve to feel satisfaction that they were able to

achieve such "a degree of freedom from defenses that the study was possible."

It would be interesting to know if the proportion of "treatment failures" is reduced as a consequence of this broadening of the conceptual base of child guidance. But this is another venture. Whether it is reduced or not, this book describes an interesting and valuable instance of successful collaboration between social science and practice in child guidance. It should be widely read.

J. McV. HUNT

University of Illinois

SLOTKIN, J. S. *Personality Development.* Pp. x, 401. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952. $4.50.

This is a book about personality by a social anthropologist. It is a very curious book. Most of us in the field of personality investigation would agree with Professor Slotkin's statement in his preface, "The field of personality development is in its infancy" and would find the age of the works he cites a bewildering contradiction. Half of the references are to works written or published in 1928 or earlier. Of the (by rough count) 684 references, fewer than 10 per cent (66) are to works published between 1942 and 1951, while on the other hand an equal number of references are to works dated 1600 or earlier.

Authors *not* cited by Slotkin make a list little short of a twentieth century "Who's Who in Social Psychology, Anthropology and Personality Research." For example, K. Horney, E. Fromm, A. Kardiner, C. H. Cooley, W. I. Thomas, H. S. Sullivan, M. Sherif, F. Allport, T. Newcomb, E. Hartley, K. Young, G. Murphy, K. Lewin, K. Davis, R. Merton, S. Stouffer, R. Benedict, and M. Mead are among the scores who are nowhere mentioned in this book. The lone reference to Ralph Linton is not to his stimulating and provocative little *The Cultural Background of Personality* (1945) but to *The Study of Man* (1936).

Probably the foremost publication representing the collaboration of cultural anthropologists with specialists in other disciplines in the study of personality is the symposium edited by Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture* (1948). This book is not mentioned in the Slotkin volume. Thirty-seven authors contributed to the Kluckhohn-Murray volume. Of these only six are cited by Slotkin. By contrast there are *over twenty* citations of Thomas Aquinas, *fifteen* of Erasmus, and there are references to such great scientists of human behavior as Augustine, Boccaccio, Byron, Cervantes, Samuel Clemens, Descartes, Emerson, John Donne, Fichte, Hobbes, Horace, Hume, Jerome, John of Salisbury, Leibniz, Leo Hebraeus, Machiavelli, Maine de Biran, Montaigne, Nemesius, Petrarch, Rousseau, Saxo Grammaticus, Seneca, Spinoza, Swift, Thomas à Kempis, Vives—to mention only a few of the writers of earlier centuries.

It comes to this, that Professor Slotkin has every right to write a book on personality drawing chiefly on what the scholastics and other prescientists had to say about human behavior, but at least the book ought to be titled in such a way as to make clear to the purchaser what he is getting. And it is either naïve or dishonest of the author to say in the opening sentence of the preface of this book, "In this volume I have tried to develop a systematic theory of personality development, out of the hypotheses and evidence from various relevant sciences." Nowhere else in the volume that I could discover did he mention science, or give its tenets or its criteria for the admissibility of evidence—and his unqualified and indiscriminate use of materials leads one to wonder whether he is acquainted with the distinctions between scientific and folk knowledge, either in the differential manner in which each is derived or in the differential dependability of each in prediction and control. For example, there are fourteen quotations from the Itard account of the Wild Boy of Aveyron without one single question raised regarding the authenticity or dependability of the account.

The four main parts of this volume are entitled "Inheritance," "Socialization," "Culturization," and "Individualization." Socialization, however, does not mean what it usually means as employed by the social scientist, but instead the two terms —socialization and culturization—refer to the differential impact on personality of society and culture. While the distinction between society and culture is most useful for the analysis of groups, institutions, and civilizations, the distinction seems to have little if anything to offer in the way of clarifying problems in the scientific study of personality. For example, this reviewer finds it impossible to see how we might differentiate between "social selves" and "cultural selves" (Slotkin's terms) in any empirical study of self-attitudes. The whole thing moves toward absurdity when, in addition, we must differentiate "the biological selves" and "the particular selves."

The book is written in a most trying style. One or a few sentences written by the author are frequently followed by several lengthy quotes, each with its own peculiar frame of reference, often centuries and civilizations apart in context. The author does no interpreting of these quotations. This puts the reader in an almost unstructured situation.

It is possible that the use of this book as a textbook in an undergraduate course in personality would *not* develop in the student a trained incapacity to be a scientist in the study of personality. But it would come very close to it.

MANFORD KUHN

University of Iowa

GLUECK, SHELDON, and ELEANOR GLUECK. *Delinquents in the Making: Paths to Prevention.* Pp. viii, 214. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $3.00.

Delinquents in the Making is a condensation for the general reader of the authors' recent technical report *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency.* Both present findings of a ten-year inquiry into the causes of juvenile delinquency based on an analysis of the characteristics of 500 institutionalized delinquent boys and a like number of nondelinquent boys. Separate substudies were made in the fields of social work, constitutional medicine, psychology, and psychiatry.

The Gluecks, from these studies, have reached the conclusion long ago accepted by the majority of observers whose approach to delinquency research has not been warped by excessive professional myopia, that there is no unitary cause but rather that delinquency is the product of converging adverse forces. They have, however, gone beyond most of their forerunners by bringing a variety of professional disciplines into the actual research team, and they have also avoided a weakness of many other studies which gathered a wealth of data about delinquents only to discover that data about nondelinquents, necessary to filter out the traits more or less particular to delinquents, were lacking. The sample group of nondelinquents which the Gluecks studied provides this highly desirable safeguard. The Gluecks have also gone further than others in appraising the apparent causal effect of hundreds of conditions which others have considered "causes of delinquency," rejecting some so-called causes and accepting others.

In summary, the Gluecks see delinquency as being the product of defects in temperament uncontrolled by adequate parental guidance and not offset by constructive community forces. The aggressive, restless boy is more likely to get into trouble than is his more sedate neighbor, but he is less inclined to neuroticism. Given two boys of equal general intelligence, the boy whose slant is toward the concrete is a poorer risk than the boy who shows superiority in the solution of abstract problems. Chunky, muscular boys (mesomorphs) are more likely to become delinquent than are boys of other body types. Boys who have both older and younger siblings are more likely to become delinquent than their oldest or youngest brothers or than only children or children from two child families. The Rorschach test is believed to be an effective tool in identifying potential delinquents.

Agreeing with the general conclusions reached by the authors, other scholars have challenged details of the work. The structure of the sample (with the possibility that the limitation of the delinquent group to institutionalized boys created certain biases in the statistics), the depth of the psychiatric interviews, and the extent to which correctional experience has produced some of the attitudes revealed in psychiatric interviews and in the Rorschach responses, were among the aspects of the

study which reviewers of the original report *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* tended to question.

The Gluecks themselves make no claim of finality or conclusiveness. Their work, in its present stage, points the way to further research and deeper correlations both within the materials of their own studies and in parallel studies by other students of delinquency problems.

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Community Services for Older People: The Chicago Plan. Prepared by the Community Project for the Aged of the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago, Project Director Elizabeth Breckinridge; with a foreword by Ernest W Burgess. A Wiebold Foundation Project. Pp. xv, 240. Chicago: Wilcox & Follett Company, 1952. $3.00.

This is the record of four years of searching effort to deal with the unmet needs of older persons in metropolitan Chicago. It may be compared to the report of an exploratory mission abroad digging into rather unknown territory. The mission has returned from its investigations with an array of facts, assumptions, tentative plans; also with a substantial list of suggestions for additional fact-finding, and some changes in program.

The material is grouped around the six focal points of: Community Education (Ch. 1); Unemployment and Retirement (Ch. 2); Housing and Home Services (Ch. 3); Health (Ch. 4); Recreation and Education (Ch. 5); and Casework and Counselling (Ch. 6). In each of these areas the needs of older people, verified in different ways, are presented briefly; major attention is given to a survey of all existent community programs, actual and potential resources for older people. In most areas, and this is the rather unique aspect of the Project, some service activities—in line with tentative recommendations—were developed under Project auspices (or at least stimulated by Project findings), with some aid by Project staff.

The research aspects of the Project, obviously, had to be limited by its multiple objectives with simultaneous translation of fact-finding into community education and action consuming a substantial part of staff time. Project staff also gave some direct service to older people in an effort to meet urgent demand, largely brought into the open by the Project's widespread publicity and educational services. These activities yielded, as an important by-product, additional insight into the range of acute problems as they trouble older persons and their relatives and friends.

The report reflects these live contacts and the growing awareness of the interrelatedness of most of the needs. An initial study of the case records of 550 people (of sixty years and over), who in the spring of 1948 were actual clients of public and private social agencies in metropolitan Chicago, concentrated on defining the range and frequency of problems as brought to the agencies. Many of them were not met because the client would not "cooperate." In other instances, solutions were unknown or doubtful, but on the whole agencies showed considerable ingenuity in using a combination of community resources to meet the felt needs.

"The difficulties that agencies had in meeting the needs showed that community recourses are far from adequate in relation to all the problem categories in this Study. This conclusion is no new discovery. It has been expressed time and time again by agency workers, and by the Study Committee in the course of this research" (p. 230).

Each section of the record lists next steps and specific recommendations, often reflecting excellent common sense, for strengthening local resources. A final chapter repeats and integrates slightly all the recommendations of the Chicago Plan. It attempts, at the same time, to establish three types of priorities, but even those of the lowest ranking category "must be met before the Chicago Plan can be considered to have grown into a minimum community program" (p. 193).

The book is an interesting supplement to the growing list of field studies dealing with the aged. As a community survey with consistent attention to needs and resources of one age group only, it provides Chicago agencies with a valuable and suggestive guide for further planning and concrete program adjustments, which may also prove pertinent to a few other metropolitan areas.

Smaller communities, and those fortunately less tradition bound or less weighted by a competitive system of innumerable independent agencies, may find it possible to approach the same problems in a simpler, more organic, and more direct form. Instead of releasing their own civic creativity, they might become rather discouraged in studying the Chicago Plan.

The report should be read with care as a stimulating experience, rich in tentative plans. It will be of special advantage to those interested in community organization for social welfare. Could we possibly learn to do any better in rendering "technical aid"? If so, might the labors of this devoted group have produced more results for helping the aged, here and now? Meanwhile, we should make full and critical use of all findings, tangible products of four years of faithful co-operation between leading citizens, researchers, and professional workers—with the benefit of a one hundred thousand dollar grant of a generous foundation.

HERTHA KRAUS
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CARR, LOWELL JUILLIARD, and JAMES EDSON STERMER. *Willow Run: A Study of Industrialization and Cultural Inadequacy.* Pp. xxii, 406. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $5.00.

This book is a study of forced social change—a study of how one community readjusted to the impacts of industrialization and population invasion in wartime. Both authors took bomber jobs for several weeks in the winter of 1943–44 and lived in the area as participant observers. There was a readjustment lag involving the living conditions of the workers explained by the fact that American culture, handicapped by power politics, has no pattern of procedure for dealing with social change.

There is a description of Willow Run before the bomber plant invasion. This description goes back to the Indian days when the Potawatomies kept reappearing to "bedevil nervous housewives." Willow Run was a "semirural" community when it was invaded by "the biggest bomber plant in the world—and some tens of thousands of hillbillies, C.I.O., unionists, and transients from the end of the continent!"

Fifty-four pages were given over to appendixes including data tables, wartime population movements, statements on permanent housing, selected bibliography, and an index. Chapters 5 to 8 include the diaries of workers and investigators. Chapter 9 is the statement of "The Little Typist Who Hated Her Job." There are more than one hundred pictures, charts, graphs, and tables, but these are not listed by pages in the front of the book.

This book will have a limited value for courses in sociology on social change, the community, and methods of research. There is more criticism of conditions than objective description of interactive factors within the community.

There is some unusual terminology rarely found in social research. "Technology: outside the town more or less went to pot" (p. 9); ". . . the nation's rubber supply went glug-glug down the drain!"; "The idea . . . turned a seasick green"; "housing and community building turned out to be a mess" (p. 14); "banks flat on their faces" (p. 16); " . . . transportation facilities, a pain in the neck" (p. 16); ". . . lived where they darned pleased" (p. 65); ". . . thumbed his nose at trailer-camp law and the Washtenaw County Health Department" (p. 75); "In a community developing à la Robinson Crusoe or Herbert Spencer, low morale gets built in as inevitably as redheads get freckles" (p. 86); ". . . parked cheek by jowl with hillbillies from Tennessee and urban foreign-born mechanics from Weehawken and St. Louis" (p. 89); "in summer they fried all over" (p. 91); ". . . Willow Run Mess" (p. 203); ". . . a replica jazzed up and headlined from coast to coast" (p. 207); ". . . sent absenteeism through the roof" (p. 210); ". . . sent labor turnover likewise through the roof" (p. 210); ". . . 'the halt, the lame and the blind' from the Tennessee and Kentucky hills" (p. 211);

". . . these people bodied forth" (p. 200); ". . . Community . . . found itself pockmarked with some of the less desirable stigmata" (p. 221); ". . . technological castration" (p. 349).

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STEIN, CLARENCE S. *Toward New Towns for America.* Introduction by LEWIS MUMFORD. Pp. 245. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1951. $5.00.

That one architect-planner should be intimately associated with most of the significant plans for community building in his country and generation may seem surprising if viewed as coincidence. Clarence Stein's book reveals the reason: the intellectual and social leadership of a strong, sensitive, and inventive personality consistently following an ideal and developing a principle. That ideal is the building of an appropriate setting for the lives of people, well adjusted to their ways of living in modern times.

The principle of community design which Mr. Stein unfolds cannot be stated simply, for it is not a formula. Its growth and change can be followed in this volume from the early experiment at Sunnyside Gardens in Queens, New York, where houses were turned around to face upon a garden court within a hard, rectangular street pattern, through a succession of communities to Baldwin Hills Village on the other side of the continent. Radburn, in New Jersey, conceived and partly built as a "town for the motor age"; Chatham Village of Pittsburgh, so beautifully married to the site that it remains one of our loveliest developments; Phipps Garden Apartments and Hillside Homes in New York—all were proving grounds for components of the principle. The Greenbelt towns of the Resettlement Administration: Greenbelt, near Washington, Greenhills near Cincinnati, and Greendale near Milwaukee, taking their inspiration from the British Garden City idea, added the element of a permanent "green belt" of open space to protect the planned community and integrate it with the natural environment.

But to Stein, the ideal remains not yet fully attained and the principle is still growing and developing. He challenges the future, and, at the same time, helps its accomplishment through clear-eyed analysis of the intentions and the assumptions, the accomplishments, and the limiting circumstances, which were a part of the experience in these communities.

Both narrative and evaluation, the book illustrates techniques of analysis valuable to students and practitioners; and it is richly illustrated with plans and photographs. A foreword by Lewis Mumford, ostensibly to portray the setting of Stein's work from the point of view of a close friend and associate, is a worthy essay in the philosophy of community building.

The remarkable and fortunate fact is that Clarence Stein has set down and evaluated his experience in what Mumford called the "preliminary studies for the new towns that a bolder and more humane generation, less victimized by the false gods of finance, will eventually build."

ROBERT B. MITCHELL
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WINSLOW, C.-E. A. *The Cost of Sickness and the Price of Health.* Pp. 106. Geneva: World Health Organization (Monograph Series No. 7), 1951. $1.50.

A sound health policy combined with resolute steps for the improvement of socioeconomic conditions offers immense opportunities to reduce economic losses as well as human suffering caused by illness, to increase man's vigor and productivity, and to promote national prosperity. The heart and center of a forward-looking health program is prevention of the occurrence of those diseases which can be prevented with the knowledge at our disposal and prevention of serious stages, complications, and prolonged illness through early diagnosis and prompt treatment of any condition. The cost of a well-conceived and properly organized preventive health service is small compared with the staggering financial burden imposed on the human race by needless disability and death. These are the major themes of Professor Winslow's monograph prepared for the World Health Organization.

In four brief and concise chapters the author reviews and summarizes estimates on the cost of sickness, the methods employed and achievements attained in reducing the burden of disease, the problems of planning national health programs and their costs, and the available information on the interrelationships of poverty and disease. He offers a wealth of illustrative material drawn from a large number of countries. The leitmotiv "prevention is not only better than cure; it is also cheaper than cure" (p. 10) reappears in each of these four chapters and is carried to a climax in the concluding section dealing with the development of international co-operation in promoting organized health service under the Technical Assistance Program.

A book covering such a vast ground and, naturally, containing much technical matter might be criticized by narrow specialists for weaknesses in detail. Such an attitude would be utterly unfair. Professor Winslow does more than submit a technical report both on the striking accomplishments in some countries and on society's sins of omission in applying available scientific knowledge to the control of preventable diseases. He interprets and re-emphasizes fundamental concepts and principles of prudent action, displaying remarkable breadth of erudition and skill of presentation. He refrains from painting fluffy silver-clouds only and, realistically, shows the heavy fog of ignorance, indifference, and defeatism as well. Again and again Professor Winslow admonishes the experts to ponder anew and where indicated offers constructive criticism of his own. Forcefully he exhorts those responsible for the public health in every nation to do what can be done today to preserve and enhance modern society's most precious capital, man. FRANZ GOLDMANN, M.D.
Harvard University

EARLE, CLIFFORD J. *How to Help an Alcoholic.* Fifth publication of The Westminster Pastoral Aid Books. Pp. 96. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952. $1.50.

Clifford Earle, secretary of the Division of Social Education and Action of the Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, now presents his second book dealing with the problems of alcohol, this one on alcoholism. The present volume describes a few typical alcoholics and their problems, notes the extent of alcoholism and the proportion of alcoholics and problem drinkers to all drinkers. There follow chapters dealing with the manifest behavioral symptoms accompanying progression in the illness, probable factors in its development, current treatments, what the friends and relatives should avoid doing, useful steps they may take, the role of religion in recovery, and reports of members of Alcoholics Anonymous.

This little book has several advantages over many volumes published in the past five years on alcoholism. It is brief, modest, written in simple style, not argumentative, and it promises to be of help to family and friends of the alcoholic as well as to ministers who meet the problem in their parishes. Some criticisms might be made on rather technical grounds, but only one would appear to this reviewer as meriting comment—namely, the thesis that more than half of all alcoholics become such because of their drinking.

Scientifically such a proposition is invalid for the reason that drinking manifestly does not have this effect on more than 90 per cent of all drinkers; the drinking of alcoholic beverages as a single factor obviously cannot explain alcoholism. Therapeutically such a statement is most unwise since it implies that more than half the alcoholics need only stop drinking to recover from the condition—an implication the author has denied by the entire tenor of his book. Other criticisms are not only minor but somewhat irrelevant. This is not a scientific treatise and makes no pretensions in this direction. It is intended to help people, and this it will do.

The book will be a surprise to those individuals who may feel that American Protestant churches are by definition "Dry" and furthermore are prone to emotional intemperance and intellectual rigidity in their adherence to that position. This book is only one evidence among many that caricatures of Prohibitionists of 25 to 100 years ago are quite inapplicable to the

greater part of church thinking and action today. There is full realization of the complexity of problems related to alcohol, a discriminating perception of differences among those problems, a mature understanding of the need for greater knowledge and for patience, a recognition of pertinent resources of the church as well as recognition of the appropriate resources of other institutions and groups in meeting these problems. The position of voluntary individual abstinence is urged on grounds of prudence for the self and, more importantly, of responsible care for others in the Christian community—others who may be hurt by the example set by moderate drinkers.

In viewing the serious and extensive fact of alcoholism as a challenge and responsibility for which the church has both general and specific resources, Clifford Earle has made a contribution not only to the meeting of the problems of alcoholism but also to the church in its application of religious strength to the solution of problems of our time.

SELDEN D. BACON
Yale University

TAX, SOL, and members of the Viking Fund Seminar on Middle American Ethnology. *Heritage of Conquest: The Ethnology of Middle America.* Pp. 312. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952. $5.00.

This is an unusual volume, embodying the efforts of a group of students of the cultures of one area of the world to present not only some conclusions about those cultures, but also to make clear the manner of arriving at their agreements and to give us the stimulating loose ends of thought and interpretation which the summary conclusions do not reveal. It is to be hoped that it sets up a model for publications of similar type in other social science fields, for it tells more about the existing state of knowledge and represents more truly the method of science than do the usual neatly packaged symposia.

The book is in large part a summary of the large amount of ethnographic description and anthropological interpretation which has been carried out in central and southern Mexico and in Guatemala during the past quarter century. Most of the Latin American and North American investigators who have participated are among the contributors: Ralph Beals, Julio de la Fuente, Paul Kirchoff, Wigberto Jimenez Moreno, J. Alden Mason, Robert Redfield, Sol Tax, Alfonso Villa Rojas, Nathan L. Whetten, and twenty-three others. There is a chapter each on economy and technology, ethnic relations, social organization, the supernatural world, religious and political organization, the life cycle, ethos and cultural aspects of personality, and acculturation. The whole is preceded by a chapter on "General Characteristics of Present-Day Mesoamerican Indian Society" by Redfield and Tax. This eight-page summary is a remarkable item —as dry and nearly as abstract as a mathematical formula, and useful in a similar way. It in itself is indicative of the scientific coming of age of cultural anthropology.

This is a specialists' volume, not a simplified account of a field of knowledge for laymen. Its great value lies in its delineation of the problems by which the ethnologists and social anthropologists who are carrying on work in Middle American cultures orient their research. They seem to be concerned ultimately with explaining the variations which exist as between central Mexicans and highland Guatemalans, between Yucatecs and the people of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and so on. To explain the differences they have first to define precisely the varying cultural patterns and next to determine the factors making for the differences. It is in the definition of the patterns that they succeed best, but they also agree more or less that three sets of factors explain the differences: (1) the habitat whether highland or lowland, (2) the influence of the early distinct cultural heritages from Mayas and Aztecs, and (3) the nature of the contact continuum between Spaniards and Indians. They emerge with the beginnings, but only the beginnings, of a sort of classification of the varieties of cultural systems in terms of which the modern peoples live. In doing this they offer a basis for understanding economic, political, and other events in nonurban Middle America.

As John Gillin, one of the participants, said at the close of the seminar: "This Seminar has been primarily concerned with modern Indian cultures, but this is only one kind of culture. We have at least half the population of Guatemala and probably two-thirds at least in Mexico who are modern Latin American, or whatever we want to call them. This culture has to be understood too, and it will probably be soon because of international policy . . . if anthropologists do not take the responsibility of trying to define the basis of modern Latin American cultures, someone else will have to do it. I don't think anthropology can do the job alone. My plea is for several approaches to be used so that we can understand what this whole culture situation is now and in what direction it is moving. Studies of modern area are now under way in Japan; several of the modern contemporary cultures of Europe are under study . . . Russia, for example—and in all of these, not only traditional ethnological material but everything that can be gathered from the social sciences and the humanities is centered or concentrated on the focal problem."

EDWARD H. SPICER
University of Arizona

FENLASON, ANNE F. *Essentials in Interviewing: For the Interviewer Offering Professional Services.* Pp. xiii, 352. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $4.00.

This text is one of the "Harper's Social Science Series" under the editorship of F. Stuart Chapin. It is divided into two parts of almost equal length; the first part deals with the theory of interviewing, and the second part presents some illustrative material for class discussion.

Although the author, who was a professor of social casework at the University of Minnesota, describes interviewing as "a tool common to many professions" and uses documentary material from other professions, the text is obviously intended for students in social casework. The interview is presented as a "purposeful conversation," therapeutic in itself rather than a method of obtaining accurate and verifiable data upon which to form professional judgments. In some treatment situations, as for instance child guidance clinics or family service agencies, this concept of the interview may be sound; however, the question may be raised as to whether it is the proper orientation for the prospective public assistance worker whose first objective is the prompt establishment of eligibility.

The understanding and feeling of the interviewer are emphasized. Chapter four explains how the "worker's attitude plays a major part in the success or failure of an interview," and that "working with human beings demands that the worker have an articulate and integrated personal and social philosophy. His practice involves both theoretical and practical ethical considerations." Since the "interviewer does not observe in the scientific sense of observing," there is practically no mention of the possibilities of improving the methods of interviewing through research of the process.

The insight needed by the interviewer, according to the author, comes from accepting a series of nineteen concepts, presented in chapter one on cultural backgrounds and in chapter two on the dynamics of human behavior. Many of these concepts are not scientifically proven generalizations and do not have universal acceptance among anthropologists, psychologists, and social caseworkers.

In chapter three entitled "Essentials of the Interviewing Method," two edited interviews by teacher counselors with disturbed adolescents are analyzed. In neither case is it clear that the interview achieved its purpose or that the method of interviewing was sound or unsound. It would seem to have been sounder pedagogically if the author had analyzed interviews of an experienced, professionally trained social case worker with expressed judgments as to the soundness of the method employed.

The second part of the book consists of illustrations of some of the concepts mentioned earlier in the text and examples of conferences and interviews. These are interlarded with questions designed to draw

out the student as to how he thinks and feels about the material.

RALPH CARR FLETCHER
University of Michigan

BOWER, WILLIAM CLAYTON. *Moral and Spiritual Values in Education.* Pp. xv, 214. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1952. $3.50.

During the past decade thoughtful persons throughout the United States have manifested a growing concern about the emphasis on values in education. They recognize that the secularization of the public schools has been due chiefly to sectarian competition and divisiveness, not to hostility to religion as such. Accepting as they do the principle of the separation of church and state, they are searching earnestly to fill in the vacuum which has been created in the entire realm of values.

There are encouraging developments which begin to point toward a solution. In 1944 the American Council on Education appointed a representative committee of leaders interested in both religion and education. The first report of the committee, *The Relation of Religion to Public Education: The Basic Principles, 1947,* presents a sound orientation to the secularization of Western civilization and stands forthrightly for study *about* religion and religious institutions in the regular school curriculum.

Perhaps the document which has arrested the widest attention of the public, however, is that of the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association. Its *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools, 1950,* asserts that no society can survive without a moral order, delineates the major values upon which virtually all Americans are agreed, and presents in broad outline the role of the schools in inculcating these values.

William Clayton Bower's *Moral and Spiritual Values in Education* is the most important contribution to this growing literature which has appeared since the pronouncements of the American Council on Education and the Educational Policies Commission. Here is an inspiring account of what has been done in Kentucky where the State Department of Education, the University of Kentucky, a number of public schools, and many citizens have developed a program of action research in education for values.

Dr. Bower's book states the problem admirably and in terms which are understandable to citizens and teachers. He proposes and analyzes a basic philosophy which is true in every aspect to the American scene. He says "the discovery and development of moral and spiritual values is not something that can be done *to* pupils or *for* pupils. It is something that can be done only *with* pupils." Here we have an insight which is sound psychologically and true to the democratic ideals. One is not surprised, therefore, to find as a central emphasis that moral and spiritual values are inherent in the school environment and curriculum.

Moral and Spiritual Values in Education is not a blueprint of a plan to be adopted uncritically by a community and its schools. Nevertheless, Part III, "Techniques of a Program of Emphasis," which reports the developments in the Kentucky experiment, is replete with ideas and suggestions which no community concerned with improving its program of moral and spiritual values—and what community isn't?—can afford to overlook.

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MONROE, WALTER S. *Teaching-Learning Theory and Teacher Education, 1890–1950.* Pp. vii, 426. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952. $6.50.

Students who used Monroe's famous *History of Education* as a text will remember the author's careful organization of the material and his meticulous care in citing and relating varying points of view. This volume is of the same high quality of scholarship but limited to the two related fields: the theory of learning and teaching and the evolution of purposes and practices in teacher education. Although the major portion of the work is devoted to the period 1890 to 1950, a sufficient amount of earlier developments are described to put this period in its historical perspective.

One of the significant contributions of this volume is its comprehensiveness in covering the literature in the field and analyzing it in terms of basic controversies and resulting trends. For example, in the author's analysis of the development of the learning-teaching theory, he quotes from many writers to illustrate the conflicts among the four general ideas: (a) developing powers of the mind; (b) teaching subject matter; (c) directing learning activities; and (d) guiding pupil experiencing.

An interesting analysis is given of some of the heated controversies such as: teaching as an art vs. teaching as a science; the subject-matter specialist versus the expert in methodology; and the separate courses versus an integrated program of teacher education.

Not only does Dr. Monroe summarize the publications of individuals, commissions, special committees, and organizations, but he includes also excellent analyses of the development of teacher training institutions and of courses and programs at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. The only omission, and that by design, is the development of in-service education of teachers.

After analyzing so many points of view, it is interesting and significant that the author concludes as follows as to whether or not a sound teacher education program has developed:

"We may note the tendency during recent years to get away from the either-or point of view in our thinking. . . . The present writer is inclined to characterize the current status as that of the 'unanimity of the wise' or at least as the beginning of that stage. In practice, however, there is still 'disagreement of the inquiring.'"

FRANCIS J. BROWN
American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

VON WRIGHT, GEORG HENRIK. *A Treatise on Induction and Probability.* Pp. 310. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952. $5.00.

In the history of philosophy two major crises have emerged: the first arose in connection with Zeno's paradoxes of motion, and the second was provided by David Hume's attack upon the idea of necessary causal connections. Ever since the appearance of these two destructive arguments, philosophers have been trying to refute the negative positions of Zeno and Hume. In connection with the second crisis, some writers have described the status of empirical logic as a "scandal," and have sought to escape the "intellectual suicide" of Humean skepticism by developing a logic of induction that restores our confidence in the possibility of a methodology of natural science. To this category of investigation the present work belongs.

The author of this book, a professor of philosophy at Cambridge University, hopes to contribute to the opening of a new era in the development of the logic of induction. He believes that the main defect of most investigations into the nature of scientific thinking is that of oversimplification. In correcting this defect, von Wright employs the methods of modern symbolic logic in the analysis of inductive reasoning. Starting from the traditional division of human knowledge into two branches—formal truth and material truth—Professor von Wright examines how we proceed in the field of material truth in deriving those propositions which are anticipations of the future, including here those general applications which are called "laws of nature."

The author does not agree that the "logic of induction" implies the possibility of a "logic of discovery"; this is a mistake that has its roots in the history of the subject. After isolating the major problems, (1) the psychological problem of the origin of inductive inferences, (2) the logical problem of analyzing the inferential mechanism of induction, and (3) the philosophical problem of the justification of induction, the author proceeds to examine the various views held, especially the probabilistic approach in its various forms as promulgated by Keynes, von Mises, Reichenbach, Carnap, and others.

The author follows this viewpoint but develops further the idea that increase in

probability reflects an underlying process of elimination. He provides a thorough analysis of the logical mechanism of the elimination of alternatives and develops an extended form of the Bacon-Mill logic of induction.

The treatment in this book is quite abstract—singularly lacking in concrete illustrative material from the natural sciences—but the author promises to compensate for this "narrowness" in later studies. One must therefore reserve judgment concerning the validity of this approach until the full story is in. It seems unfortunate, however, that the possibilities of a multivalued logic (as an alternative to the two-valued logic of "true" and "false") is not explored, especially in relation to the calculus of probabilities. One may also express regret that there is no reference to Dewey's approach in his *Logic, The Theory of Inquiry*, where the whole problem of the relation between formal and material logic (deductive and inductive inference) is restated and many traditional issues are circumvented. The author's views will be important to the professional logicians, but of little help to the practicing scientists.

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WILLIAMS, GARDNER. *Humanistic Ethics.* Pp. xii, 223. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $3.75.

Professor Williams has written a breviary of positivism as the religion of modern man. The tenets of that creed are put together into an orderly sequence. Brief arguments expound rather than prove the articles of a radically secular faith. Hardly an attempt is made to render them plausible by defending them against possible objections. In the place of demonstration an appeal is made to the reader's willingness to believe.

A credo need not shrink from absurdity, and assuredly the one before us does not. Yet it differs from most other creeds by its insistence on its own alleged rationality. This is its peculiar absurdity. "Hedonic individual relativism," a kind of Epicureanism, is laid down as a first law. At the same time altruism is called a duty. This, however, is no reason for alarm to the practitioners of the maxim "good is what pleases me." The word duty as used here does strike us with that familiar harsh and demanding ring. It is reassuring to learn that helping others is a moral imperative for the individual only "whenever it will satisfy him most deeply in the long run" (p. 33).

Positivistic or "naturalistic" philosophy, as the author conceives it, provides the means of formulating the principles of "Basic Religion." Teaching that religion seems to him a matter of great importance, and he thinks that "Churches are especially designed for it" (p. 213). But churches, in our part of the world, are generally designed for Christian worship, a religion brushed aside by the authoritative assertion: "The alleged supernatural is fictitious" (p. 213). According to a conviction widely shared by philosophers both pagan and Christian, the good, in order to be truly good, must be done for its own sake. The writer disagrees: an individual "will help others as means to getting help from them in return. This is ethical" (p. 33).

So we arrive, however reluctantly, at the conclusions that the writer's rationality is not sufficiently reasonable, his ethics not quite ethical enough, his religion the abrogation of religion, and that the modern man for whose benefit he preaches his gospel belongs to a nearly extinct and little regretted race.

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WILLIAMS, DAVID RHYS. *World Religions and the Hope for Peace.* Pp. xiv, 221. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. $2.75.

This popular exposition by a religious liberal of the lives and teachings of some of the significant prophets of mankind and founders of its faiths may be construed as an inspirational presentation of the elements of comparative religion through significant personalities. The volume purports to discover a spiritual dynamic as the basis of world understanding and cooperation. Dr. Williams' endeavor springs

out of the faith basic to religious liberalism that in the diverse religions there are enough common elements to "enable the nations of the world to understand one another's systems of values and to lay upon them the moral obligation to keep on striving for a just and durable peace." Thus this explication of the postulate of a great accord vibrating through the world's religions constitutes a tract for the times. At its heart is a deep conviction that such knowledge of basic ideals and professions of the various peoples of the earth is indispensable if world co-operation is to be achieved.

Eighteen charismatic personalities from a variety of world cultures are studied, not all of whom, incidentally, are in the category of religious prophets or founders (for example, Socrates, Asoka, Marx, and Gandhi). Yet all of them have contributed to the great world religions somehow or have set into vibration profound currents of historical change comparable to those stimulated by religion. The Chinese culture complex is revealed in three great spiritual powers: Confucius, apostle of reasonableness, Lao-tzu, exponent of the inner life, and the political philosopher, Mo Ti, who stressed the will to peace. India is revealed through Buddha and his eightfold path, Krishna and the law of compensation, and King Asoka, author of the rock edicts. Ikhnaton, Zoroaster, Socrates, and Marcus Aurelius speak for their respective civilizations. Judaism is reviewed in a chapter on the Hebrew prophets and the heart of religion. The contribution of Christianity is revealed in analyses of Jesus and Francis of Assisi; and Islam is expounded in a review of Mohammed. More recent religious movements are surveyed in chapters devoted to Bahaullah and world federation and to Mary Baker Eddy and the conquest of fear. The great quasi-religious dynamic of communism is delineated in an analysis of Karl Marx and the religion of communism; and the *élan* of the twentieth century nationalism of colonial peoples receives exposition in the treatment of Gandhi and the power of soul force.

Stress is laid on the universality of certain religious strivings—the golden rule and the hope of immortality—as the basis of unified effort in behalf of a united world. On the other hand Dr. Williams notes that religious liberalism, based on the operation of the free mind principle, is the only foundation for a new world order. The final chapters of the volume are devoted to a lucid summarization of the essence of religious liberalism. Throughout Dr. Williams displays a large-minded internationalist perspective made possible by liberal religious faith, which enables a reasonable, functional approach to problems. At the heart of his attitude is the principle of universal toleration—the will to respect one another's rights in spite of all differences as the minimum requirement. Dr. Williams expresses the profound conviction that the religious (or philosophical) foundation of New World Order involves some such envisagement of common needs of mankind and expanding vision; and that this is the inevitable philosophy behind any step toward federation and international action.

As the goal of the book is to serve as a popular inspirational introduction to comparative religion and as an appeal for the affirmation of world unity, one must not seek in it any far-reaching sociological or metaphysical analysis. Welcome must be accorded it as a genial, aspiring treatment by a religious liberal of the great theme of the possible unification of mankind. Were it possible to demonstrate that nine-tenths of the human race is familiar with the religious ideals dominant in the North American culture pattern, it would be an encouraging argument in behalf of expanding world unity. Yet the basic thesis as to the identity of values in the world's religions may be challenged. Dr. Williams himself admits that the cleavage between communist and noncommunist worlds is difficult to transcend, and that the cleft between liberalism and totalitarianism may even be less possible to bridge over. Indeed, may not the question be raised—without implying that religion is the sole or primary factor in historical causation—to what extent some of the religious values construed by Dr. Williams as the basis of

world unity are themselves the *fons et origo* of various totalitarian, antidemocratic, and antiliberal trends abroad in the world today?

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O'NEILL, JAMES M. *Catholicism and American Freedom.* Pp. xii, 287. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $3.50.

There is an old story coming from the early days in the West, where a judge, having heard an eloquent plea from the plaintiff's lawyer, turned to the other side and said: "The Court has no desire to hear from the defendant; to hear both sides has a tendency to confuse the Court."

O'Neill's book, *Catholicism and American Freedom,* is an answer to Paul Blanshard. Society owes a debt to O'Neill for having written this book, for obviously the intelligent way to meet opposition is by the presentation of the other side, and it is clear that O'Neill was the man to make this presentation. This is particularly so, not only because O'Neill is a Catholic and a scholar, but because his general attitude toward democracy is emphasized by the fact that he was at one time chairman of the Academic Freedom Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union.

When, a few years ago, the schools of New York refused to renew their subscriptions to the *Nation* on the ground that articles of Paul Blanshard (later, his book *American Freedom and Catholic Power*) might offend Catholics in the community, there were strong protests from many sources. My own view was that the Catholics, instead of attacking the publisher, should answer the Blanshard articles. This Mr. O'Neill has done, and done effectively.

At times O'Neill writes with considerable heat and bitterness on the assumption that Blanshard attacked the patriotism or the "Americanism," whatever that might mean, of Catholics. Blanshard denies this. He contends that the Catholic hierachy engages in politics and that many of the doctrines of the Catholic Church are contrary to what Blanshard and a good many of the rest of us regard as best for the country. However, any fair-minded man must realize that we are talking of our own brand of Americanism, and of what *we* may think is best for the country. Mr. O'Neill and some of his fellow Catholics have their own brand of Americanism which, in some respects though not in fundamentals, is different from ours.

Mr. O'Neill questions the authorities on which Blanshard relies, many of them men and Catholics of eminence. More effective, however, it seems to me, is his emphasis on the fact that the very differences among the Catholics show the unfairness of a claim of universal approval by the Church of many of the things which Mr. Blanshard attacks. O'Neill points out that the Catholic Church takes an authoritative stand only on matters which it regards as involving moral questions.

It is unfortunate that because of these differences anybody would question the loyalty, the patriotism, or the good faith of those with whom he differs. The health of our country and its institutions will continue only so long as we recognize that the law concerns acts, not views or opinions, and that all individuals and groups under a democratic system have a right to use such pressures as they can to make their views prevail.

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KAGAN, HENRY ENOCH. *Changing the Attitude of Christian Toward Jew: A Psychological Approach Through Religion.* Pp. xvi, 155. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $2.75.

Rabbi Kagan's study of ways that Christian misconceptions about Jews may best be transformed into constructive understanding is an original contribution. It is a guidepost for religious leaders and educators. Dr. Kagan tested the tools that may repair interreligious prejudice and has given us evidence of which are the most effective.

Roger Williams Straus, in the preface of his thoughtful book of essays on *Religious Liberty and Democracy*, pointed out how necessary it is "that proper techniques be developed to advance the cause of brotherly love." This book heeds this admonition.

In his study, Rabbi Kagan reports the results of work with 525 young men and women belonging to the Methodist and Episcopal churches. Working with these young people in summer camps, Dr. Kagan tested the effectiveness of several techniques intended to reduce the prejudice of Christian toward Jew. In the process of his study a special test was given to each Christian young person to identify his attitudes toward Jews. After administration of the test, three different methods were used experimentally in attempting to reduce revealed prejudice. After these methods had been applied, attitudes were again tested in order to determine which of three approaches appeared to yield the best results in terms of constructive understanding.

Rabbi Kagan called his three approaches the indirect method, the direct method and the focused interview. The indirect method called for traditional, factual teaching *about* Jews and the Jewish heritage. No effort was made to discuss anti-Semitism or attitudes toward Jews. The second method, termed direct, brought into the study group a frank discussion of contemporary anti-Jewish attitudes and opportunities for students to discuss their own feelings and possible hostility toward Jews. The third method, the focused interview, called for supplementing the indirect approach with individual interviews between the Jewish teacher and the Christian student in which a direct discussion of anti-Semitism was undertaken. Rabbi Kagan has described these methods in detail, providing case histories, records of discussion, and detailed statistics.

From his study of these three methods, the author derived strong evidence in favor of the direct method. Certainly Rabbi Kagan's study with a small number of cases must withstand the scrutiny of critical examination by all who are interested in the improvement of intergroup relations. It seems clear, however, as Professor Gordon W. Allport has said, that "the results already create grave difficulty for those who hold that the most effective way to handle prejudice is to overlook its existence or to engage merely in factual education that will blanket—and presumably smother—hostile attitudes."

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COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

CONE, CARL B. *Torchbearer of Freedom: The Influence of Richard Price on Eighteenth Century Thought.* Pp. 209. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1952. $3.75.

The obituary notice in the *Gentleman's Magazine* on the death of Dr. Richard Price predicted that his name would be recorded with those of Franklin, Washington, Lafayette, and Paine. Condorcet spoke of him as "one of the most formative minds of the century." And yet Dr. Price would probably be completely forgotten today if he had not been the subject of Burke's attack in his *Reflections on the French Revolution.* We are therefore indebted to Professor Cone for resurrecting the memory of an important eighteenth century character.

The younger son of a substantial Welsh family with strong dissenting beliefs, Richard Price entered the ministry and spent his life in London as a preacher (usually a dull one), a moral philosopher, and a political and financial pamphleteer. This combination of interests would be strange indeed, were it not for a unity of purpose which inspired all his work—a passionate devotion to human liberty.

His theological position, stated in his first book which appeared in 1758, contains the basis of his political views. The virtuous man obeying God's law had freedom of action and will. It would therefore follow that he must be free in his political life. So also a mathematical flair made it possible to take an interest in life insurance and the national debt, for the benefit and the greater freedom of his fellow-men.

Most important was Price's fearless advocacy of the American and French revolutionaries. His pamphlet, *Observations*

on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America, was published in 1776. It was a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic; but unfortunately it had no effect on government policy. Price's famous sermon delivered at the Old Jewry Chapel on November 4, 1789, did not even have popular support. Instead, it led to Burke's more famous reply. Fortunately for his peace of mind, Dr. Price died six months after the publication of his sermon.

To his contemporaries he was known as "good Dr. Price" and as the "Father of Mankind." He was indeed a loving husband and a loyal friend, and, in the words of Joseph Priestley, he possessed "the most amiable simplicity of character." Professor Cone, avoiding undue adulation, has written a sympathetic account of a man with strong liberal opinions and a courageous heart. In eighteenth century terms, Dr. Price "deserves well of posterity," and his biographer has given him that due.

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FORBES, DUNCAN. *The Liberal Anglican Idea of History.* Pp. x, 208. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. $4.00.

"A conception of history which was practical, yet not Rationalist . . . which was Romantic, yet concerned with general laws and based on critical scholarship, which was related to an organic conception of the state, and which was deeply religious, the Liberal Anglicans discovered in the German historical movement, and in Vico who stood behind it." In these words Mr. Forbes characterizes a distinct school of British nineteenth century historians, including Thomas Arnold of Rugby, Richard Whately, the Hares, Connop Thirlwall, and Henry Hart Milman, who have never before been given detailed consideration as a group; though, of course, they have been discussed as individual practitioners of history, both ancient and ecclesiastical. Like the Anglican Church itself, they took the middle path between extremes, avoiding the abstract theorizing of the eighteenth century rationalists and the refusal to generalize of the mere factual chronicler, though Mr. Forbes deals rather with their philosophy of history than with their success or failure as narrators of events. In many ways they seem highly modern and pragmatic, and Arnold, in particular, is rescued from Lytton Strachey's too familiar "caricature" (p. 111).

One of the most interesting aspects of the Liberal Anglican approach was its rejection of the conventional division of history into ancient and modern, and the substitution of primitive and sophisticated phases for *each* culture. To them, history went in cycles of barbarism, civilization, and decadence—inevitable for nations, though Christianity could rescue individuals, and perhaps humanity as a whole, from this fate (pp. 56–60). The Old Testament is not a model to us, for its virtues and vices were those of a crude and primitive age (pp. 76–77), and it is unjust to judge Abraham and Joshua by nineteenth century standards. The Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was, on the whole, a great good to mankind; but it was better suited to the "childhood" of the Teutonic nations than for their present manhood. As Arnold put it, "The mere change of time and circumstances may alter the character of the same party, without any change on its own part; its triumph may be at one time an evil and at another time a good" (p. 90). Thus democracy is neither good nor bad in itself; one can only say that it is well- or ill-adapted to a particular stage of social development.

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FINBERG, H. P. R. *Tavistock Abbey: A Study in the Social and Economic History of Devon.* Pp. xi, 320. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. $5.00.

This volume is the second in the new series of "Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought." The first series was inaugurated by the late G. G. Coulton in 1920. It contained fourteen volumes. The new series is being edited by Professor David Knowles.

The abbey of Tavistock was founded in 968, when the old monastery at Exeter was revived under Abbot Sideman. It was an old English foundation, established by King Edgar and his ministers as one of numerous Benedictine houses scattered throughout the realm. Here learned and pious monks would contribute much to religion and scholarship, while at the same time this institution could be depended upon to administer a large estate in close relation to the Crown. It was situated across the river Tamar from the County of Cornwall in the extreme western portion of Devon, the third largest county in England.

The author has reconstructed not only the first history of an important abbey but also of the social and economic developments in Devonshire from the second half of the tenth century until the dissolution of the abbey in 1539. He was obliged to study a large number of separate accounts, since the register of the abbey disappeared in the eighteenth century and a chronicle, if ever written by the monks of Tavistock, is also missing.

This monograph has been carefully written and published. Its index and documentation are excellent, while the map provided for the convenience of the reader and the two helpful illustrations render the volume highly useful. Among the topics treated in the ten chapters are the endowments of the abbey, the agrarian landscape, the social structure, the monastic economy, and the final dissolution at the order of King Henry VIII. Numerous tables in the text indicate how much grain was produced by the monks and how cattle flourished there. The whole study is a credit to both author and editor. It should also be noted that among the four admirable appendixes there is one which deals with the printing press at Tavistock. This alone is a significant contribution to our knowledge of English civilization in early modern times.

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DE JOUVENEL, BERTRAND. *The Ethics of Redistribution.* Pp. ix, 91. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. $1.75.

The new book by Baron de Jouvenel, author of *Power* and of *Problems of Socialist England,* contains again an eloquent defense of the conservative point of view. The little book is based on a number of lectures given by the author at Cambridge University in the fall of 1949. The first lecture treats of "The Socialist Ideal," the second of "State Expenditure." There is an appendix on "The Potentialities of Pure Redistribution." The work by no means supersedes the great antisocialist documents of our generation: Mises' monumental treatise, now thirty years old and again available in a new edition, and the prophetic essay on "The Era of Tyrannies" by Élie Halévy, the Frenchman who was so profound a student of British institutions.

The welfare state, as it has emerged in Britain, provides subsidies for education, housing, and food, as well as a comprehensive social-security scheme. The resulting reduction of pronounced inequalities in consumption standards is accompanied by drastic taxation. Mr. de Jouvenel intentionally does not concern himself with the effects of such taxation on incentive and production. His critique of the redistributive aspects of the welfare state is based on the identification of the latter with a socialism of inferior variety. The ideal of more equal consumption appears to him as a perversion of the "original socialist ideal" of "fair rewards and brotherly love," where "material goods are shared without question *because* they are spurned." This seems to me an interpretation more germane to the austerity of Plato's ideal state and similar types of social organization than to the utilitarian wellsprings of British socialism. As to fairness of rewards, the author is critical of the leveling tendency afoot in modern societies, contrasting it with rewards proportionate to individual endeavor as well as with rewards proportionate to the services received by the community. He does not inform the reader, however, how a conception of justice other than one of equality could be made operational.

Mr. de Jouvenel then goes on to distinguish between relief—"an unquestionable social obligation . . . laid on the State for want of any other agency"—and the raising of median working incomes, and he

questions whether policies of redistribution are the best means of dealing with the latter problem. His discussion brings out a number of interesting points: the small amount of income available for redistribution, the need for investment in élites as well as in capital, the increasing power of the government if it is to assume functions formerly fulfilled by people of large means. Last but not least, there are a number of illuminating remarks on the role of the modern corporation.

The book is well written, and teachers of courses on current economic problems, contemporary economic systems, and the like will want to consider it for inclusion in their list of collateral readings.

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GRENFELL, RUSSELL. *Main Fleet to Singapore*. Pp. 238. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $3.75.

The book under review is a story of three tragic disasters for Great Britain in World War II: (1) the sinking of the *Repulse* and the *Prince of Wales* by Japanese aircraft; (2) the loss of the great bastion of Singapore upon which 20 million English pounds had been spent; and (3) the loss of Malaya to the Japanese. It is pointed out that had the Japanese known the true situation after the fall of Singapore, they could have controlled the Indian Ocean, and invaded India.

There is set forth with clarity the chronological sequence of events leading to the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*. In particular, stress is laid on the lack of air cover for the battleships and the failure by Sir Admiral Tom Phillips to report the first Japanese air attack. A prompt request could have effected the arrival of British land based planes that might have averted at a critical time in world history the loss of the powerful ships.

The superb torpedo plane attack doctrine of the Japanese, firing torpedoes at a comparatively high level, ever pressing home the attack in waves, with the superior performance of Japanese planes, was an "eye opener" to the British and to the world. The "too little and too late" story of the Allies is accentuated. The general mission in that theater was the defeat of the Japanese sea-borne invasion of Malaya. As Grenfell phrases it, "This was one of the main reasons for the existence of the Navy: to protect British territories everywhere against sea borne attack." But the small force sent out by the Admiralty, with no carriers, and with little hope of adequate shore-based air support, had the odds against them from the start.

The Battle of the Coral Sea and the decisive Battle of Midway are clearly and tersely described.

To both Churchill and Roosevelt he ascribes a share in the disaster of Malaya—Churchill for his faulty global strategy and Roosevelt for endeavoring, as the author alleges, to provoke the Japanese into firing the first shot that would mean war but not hurt us too much.

Most informed American readers will agree that in those confused times Roosevelt and the American Asiatic Fleet receive from Grenfell a shade more than their due of criticism.

It is a brilliant, thought-provoking book by a British expert of interest to the expert, the amateur strategist, or the general reader, all told with vividness, accuracy, and an unusual command of language.

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SLAVIC COUNTRIES

MAZOUR, ANATOLE G. *Russia—Past and Present*. Pp. vii, 785. New York: D. Van Nostrand & Company, 1951. $9.00 trade; $6.75 text.

The author, an associate professor at Stanford University, made an interesting attempt "to construct a topical rather than a strictly chronological design of Russian history." He is not the first who tried to find a new approach to the complicated problems, so numerous, in Russian history. B. H. Sumner, in his *Survey of Russian History* (London, 1944), went even farther than A. Mazour.

This new method has its advantages but also its great disadvantages. It is true that a mere enumeration of political events makes Russian history uninteresting to American students. I would still rather prefer a more chronological study, of course with detailed description of the degree of civilization reached by the nation at successive periods.

The study of different aspects of civilization is often omitted in books on Russian history. It should be stressed that the author did not commit this mistake. He incorporated into his book studies on modern Russian literature, music, theater, and painting. He devoted also many pages to the economic evolution of modern Russia. In general the part of the book dealing with Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gives abundant information and will be of good use to students.

The main defect of the book is its disproportion. The author devotes more than four hundred pages of his book exclusively to the history from 1855 to 1951. As he speaks of modern evolution also in many of the preceding chapters, there is not much discussion of the medieval evolution of Russia. He does not omit it completely. While he gives some general indications, for example, on the literary activity in the Kievan period, yet he omits completely the early Muscovite period and continues his survey of literary evolution with A. Radishchev (1749–1802). He says a few words on Krijanich (1617–1680) in the chapter on ideologies and orientations.

He also devotes a few pages (pp. 44–73) to the Russian Church, but these are the weakest part of the book. He would have been able to correct some of his errors if he had consulted my book, *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe*, published in London in 1949. He would have found there, also, more bibliographical material on the Kievan period.

Again, he devotes to the war of 1939–1945 almost a hundred pages. His description is useful, but could it not have been condensed and more space devoted to the Kievan and early Muscovite periods? The same could be said on Russia in World War I (pp. 387–472). The student can find this information elsewhere, but is at a loss when trying to discover, for example, how it happened that a nation which had a democratic political structure at the beginning of its history accepted meekly the autocratic regime which had grown up in Moscow. He gives only a few indications of the solution to these problems (pp. 76–90).

The book will be helpful to students of the modern history of Russia, but we still need a good English survey of medieval Russian history and civilization and of the Russian Church.

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NYARADI, NICHOLAS. *My Ringside Seat In Moscow*. Pp. 320. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952. $3.75.

In Hungary's first postwar elections (November 1945) Communists fared badly, polling only 17 per cent of the votes cast, but, thanks to the Allied Control Commission Chairman Marshal Voroshilov, a coalition government was imposed upon the country and the Communists secured three key cabinet ministries—interior, communications, and public welfare. The non-Communist author of this book became the minister of finance in that government, and in that capacity he led a Hungarian delegation to Moscow for the purpose of settling the $200 million bill which Russia had presented to Hungary as the value of German assets in that country. During his seven months' stay in Moscow (May–December 1947), and in his conferences often lasting ten, twelve, and sixteen hours (p. 103), he became thoroughly inured to the Soviet method of "sweating out" opponents, and at the end he was able to reduce the original claim to about $21 million, a superb accomplishment for the representative of any country negotiating with the Soviets.

As memoirs, Mr. Nyaradi's work is of uneven value. His ringside seat was in the office of General Merkulov, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade. He did not get inside the Kremlin, and of course he did not see Stalin (except at a sports festival at Dynamo Stadium). He had nothing to do with the highest Soviet officials except Mikoyan, and the latter saw

him rarely. But Mr. Nyaradi did pay the price of a ringside seat for each day's stay at Hotel Moskva: $31 for room alone, and almost $400 for a simple dinner for seven. To this reviewer the better parts of the book are the author's views and comments on Soviet communism and on certain postwar international developments. Our ignorance of the situation in Eastern Europe made it easy for Stalin to win political control over that region at Yalta and economic control at Potsdam (p. 47). Later, whenever we protested against what seemed to us Soviet outrages, we were restrained by these agreements. Today we cannot hope to enlist the wholehearted support of satellite peoples unless we "admit that trusting the Russians at Yalta was a mistake" (p. 141).

Mr. Nyaradi scorns the idea of keeping the West-East trade route open. As everything sold to the satellites goes to Russia, so everything in Russia goes to Stalin's war chest. Nations anxious to trade with Russia seem to be ready to dig "their own graves in the interests of a quick dollar" (p. 210).

We of the West, combating communism as an idea, often forget that the real problem is not only communism but Russian brand of communism. Today Russians are pro-Russian. Therefore, "we must become pro-Western, firmly, staunchly, passionately" (p. 296). The last quotation may be the key to our problem. When the battle for one's soul rages from the Bay of Finland to the streets of Tokyo, we must show honest conviction and passionate faith in the soundness, even in the sacredness, of our Western heritage, for without that we are in danger of losing much.

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Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

JASNY, NAUM. *Soviet Prices of Producers' Goods.* Pp. vii, 180. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952. $2.00.

This little volume is the third in a series of essays by the same author, dealing with various aspects of prices and pricing in the Soviet Union. While the earlier essays, published in 1951, dealt with "Pricing in the Plan Era" and "The Soviet Price System," the present volume contains an evaluation and interpretation of "Soviet Prices of Producers' Goods."

Although admitting at the outset that there is a kernel of truth to the unanimous reaction "that such a study is impossible for lack of data," the author nevertheless attempts to do the seemingly impossible. But it is debatable whether his painstaking investigation and research have brought much order out of what he considers Soviet planned "price chaos." He contends that his explorations have made him lose his feeling "of navigating without a compass in the ocean called Soviet socialist economy when [his] findings began to take shape." But it is doubtful whether many fellow navigators would share this feeling with him. The limitless array of assumptions, premises, guesses, and conjectures are as confusing and unconvincing as the cited source materials themselves. Yet he seems to feel that with the aid of the price indexes which he has put together "the size of investment and its rate of expansion during the Plan era can be established with reasonable certainty."

The indexes computed by the author, based on his interpolation of the official prices of Soviet producers' goods, reflect price level changes in many series of items, such as industrial construction, civilian machinery, and housing. He concludes his study by observing somewhat apologetically that, in general, "fully reliable conclusions seem impossible to attain, at least within reasonable time. If one seeks the whole hog or nothing, he will have nothing." His relative proximity to either the whole hog or nothing in this study must be left to the judgment of the critical reader.

The author appears to derive considerable satisfaction from his exposé of alleged Soviet falsification and manipulation of statistics. He feels that the findings of this study, in spite of shortcomings, "may prove useful to those who are not satisfied merely with staying excited over Soviet phenomenal achievements."

Any objective interpreter of the Soviet economy, analyzing official data, would scarcely show any more excitement "over Soviet phenomenal achievements" than does the author of this essay. The anti-Soviet bias revealed in this study by frequent caustic critical remarks tends to detract from an otherwise meticulous piece of research.

KARL SCHOLZ
University of Pennsylvania

ULAM, ADAM B. *Titoism and the Cominform.* Pp. ix, 243. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $4.00.

Among the latest studies of the rift between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Ulam's scholarly volume is one of the clearly and ably handled contributions to this controversial field. In the sense that Ulam has produced an orderly account of the origins and development of a highly complex situation, the author has compiled a skillful piece of work. One is, in fact, inclined to say that his is a more useful survey than Hamilton Fish Armstrong's *Tito and Goliath,* which covers much of the same ground. Ulam has added somewhat to the documentary evidence available on this topic and has tried to handle his material with more objectivity. He deals more carefully with the background of the problem and hence induces the reader to understand the crisis with more understanding.

But from another point of view, Ulam's book resembles that production of Hamlet that was so fine—except that Hamlet himself was left out of it. After pointing out that "the history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is not materially different from the histories of many other Communist Parties" and that it "offers no clear clues to the Party's eventual rebellion against Moscow" (p. 3), he concentrates on the events leading to Titoism and the actual break between Tito and Stalin in 1948. But, in this respect, Ulam tends to underplay such glaring factors as the basic attitudes of the Yugoslav people and their leaders; they are treated merely as pawns in the game of power politics. Ulam seems to feel that the Yugoslavs themselves are unaware of the basic cause of their break with the Soviets. Furthermore, he appears little concerned with the question of what alternatives were open to Tito within the framework of power relationships of the chaotic postwar world and the huge task of rebuilding the shattered social and economic structure of the country.

Ulam's conclusion that Titoism is, in essence, merely Stalinism transplanted successfully (and hence, to the Russians, intolerably) to non-Russian soil (p. 222) should be clarified. It is certainly not necessary to agree with Tito's system; but some important recent changes in Yugoslavia should not be overlooked, since it is only in this light that a solution can be sought for the enigma of having the anti-Communist America help a Communist country like Yugoslavia. Specifically, Tito has supported the United Nations concept of collective security in Europe and has denounced Soviet imperialism and aggression—steps which have benefited Tito in his relations with the free world. On the domestic front, we must note Yugoslavia's trends toward greater political and economic decentralization, the curbing of bureaucracy, and the comparative enlargement of the area of individual and social freedoms.

Ulam's bibliographical "note" (pp. 235–236), however, is quite inadequate. There are several other studies not noted by the author—in addition to "the most useful" materials he has found in writing about "Communism in Eastern Europe" (p. 235), Andrew Gyorgy's *Governments of Danubian Europe* and Hugh Seton-Watson's *The East European Revolution.*

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

KAZEMZADEH, FIRUZ. *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921).* With an introduction by Michael Karpovich. Pp. xv, 356, map. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. $5.75.

Dr. Kazemzadeh's monograph fills an important gap in our knowledge of a significant period of Transcausian history—that of the revolutionary era of 1917–1921, when, for a brief moment, it seemed that the peoples of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia might emerge into independent statehood and federation. Strategically, the area with which the author deals is an important one, for it lies between the

Caspian and Black Sea, between the Soviet Union and Iran, and has received rather little attention in specific and detailed studies since the November 1917 revolution.

By way of beginning, the author provides appropriate historical backgrounds for an understanding of the revolutionary period of 1917, treats of both the March and November revolutions in the Caucasus region, and then plunges into the development of events which led to the establishment of independent states in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and both their internecine struggles and their fight to maintain themselves. One by one, of course, and completely so by the spring of 1921, they all fell to the "liberating" forces of the Russian Bolsheviks, although in all cases the "native" Bolshevik parties were decidedly in the minority. In part, the war situation itself, together with the tragic aftermath thereof in the area, and the fact that the Western Powers were too distant from the scene, however much interested at times, explains both the development of the Transcaucasian states and their downfall. But, as the author well points out, national sentiment had been most highly developed among the Armenians; the Armenians and the Georgians had lost their independence to the Ottoman Empire before the sentiment of nationalism had become "all-consuming"; and Azerbaijan had never existed as an independent nation. Georgian nationalism had been preserved by the nobility, which lacked wide popular support, although the Socialist party, strangely enough, provided an organization around which the nationalists could rally against foreign domination. In the author's view, it was during this tragic era that "probably for the first time in their history the Georgian, the Armenian, and above all the Azerbaijani masses realized their national and cultural separateness, though their independent political organizations had to give way before the overwhelming might of their northern neighbour" (p. 330).

Born of Iranian parents in Moscow, Dr. Kazemzadeh comes to his study well prepared linguistically and otherwise. His research has been based on a wide variety of sources, much of it obtained from the Hoover Library at Stanford University. He appears to have missed very few items, although his chapter on the Paris Peace Conference (Ch. XVII) could have been filled out more had he used the Miller Diary, the thirteen volumes of the Paris Peace Conference Documents, published by the Department of State (which contain some significant materials especially on Armenia), and the King-Crane Report. Moreover, the famous six-day speech of Kemal Atatürk (1927) contains useful material about some of these events. The volume contains a fine map of the area and an excellent bibliography. It is very well written, and all those who seek a detailed knowledge of the period must consult this volume.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Arlington, Virginia

TENENBAUM, JOSEPH. *Underground: The Story of a People.* Pp. ix, 532. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $4.50.

This book is a very valuable contribution to the history of the martyrdom of the Jews in Poland under Nazi tyranny. Many books dealing with this subject have already appeared during the last few years, but this appears to me superior to them all in various respects. It is more comprehensive and detailed than any of them, and the descriptions of outrages are supplemented by interesting accounts of the life, activities, and cultural achievements of Polish Jewry as a whole and of its previous numerous thriving communities, which enable one to appreciate the magnitude of the castrophe and the loss it has entailed both for the Jewish people and for the world in general. It is a damning indictment of the unparalleled wickedness of Hitler's Germany, the severity and cogency of which indictment consist not in rhetorical phraseology but in the cumulative effect of a series of narratives of appalling barbarity based upon a prodigious amount of inquiry and research.

This volume is the product of a journey through Poland by Dr. Joseph Tenenbaum, a well-known American physician born in that country, who was well qualified by his knowledge of its peoples and languages, and also by his own experience as a public worker, to gather the maximum amount of information about the most terrible calamity of modern times. He has presented the results of his laborious investigation in a methodical manner and in readable style, without straining after effect, but also without concealing his strong feeling in relating some particularly tragic episodes.

This is not only a circumstantial record of the organized orgy of sadism, whereby the Germans reduced the 3½ million Jews in Poland to fewer than 100,000 within about two years. It also constitutes an epic story of Jewish heroism, which in many respects surpasses many a lauded exploit on the battlefield. Nobody can read the thrilling account of the battle of the Warsaw Ghetto, which lasted much longer than is generally supposed, without feeling the highest admiration for the Jews who fought against overwhelming odds. Nor was Warsaw the only place where the Jews offered resistance, with such limited weapons as they were able to obtain, against the powerfully armed thugs bent upon their destruction. Dr. Tenenbaum describes many other desperate struggles, both in ghettos and in extermination camps, and also the means by which the Jews in one city were informed of what was happening in others. Especially noteworthy are his numerous sketches of individual acts of bravery, by which many girls as well as men distinguished themselves. He throws considerable new light upon the part which thousands of Jews played among Polish and Russian partisans and does not mince matters in writing about Poles who attacked or betrayed them (although there were others who helped them) or in giving instances of Jews who were informers against their own people. What will surprize many readers is the author's description of the varied cultural activities conducted by Jews in inferno-like conditions, and what must sadden all is his account of the murders of Jews by Polish fascists after the war. He gives credit to all authorities, sources, and individuals, from whom he collected parts of his mass of information, and he provides a selected bibliography and an index.

ISRAEL COHEN

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WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

TALMON, J. L. *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy.* Pp. xi, 366. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. $4.00.

The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy is conceived as a three-volume work analyzing the origins of totalitarianism in France, in western and eastern Europe, and in the Far East. This first volume, which deals with eighteenth century France, is a book of great wisdom which I recommend to anyone who not only wants to broaden his knowledge of the French revolution but also wishes to understand the basic—that is the intellectual—causes of the modern world crisis. Dr. Talmon's work meets the highest academic standards.

Almost from the inception of modern democratic thought, there was a bifurcation of the concept into liberal and totalitarian branches. Early totalitarianism was elaborated in France by thinkers like Rousseau, Morelly, and Mably, by practical politicians like the Jacobins, Robespierre, and Saint-Just, and by conspirators like Babeuf and Buonarrotti. The liberal democrats assumed politics to be a matter of trial and error, a pragmatic endeavor to find specific solutions to practical and ever-changing problems. They recognized that many spheres of life must remain outside the field of politics. "The totalitarian democratic school, on the other hand, is based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics. It may be called political Messianism in the sense that it postulates a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to arrive. It recognizes ultimately only one plane of existence, the political. It widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of human existence. Politics is defined as the art of applying this philosophy to the organisation of society, and the final purpose of politics is

only achieved when this philosophy reigns supreme over all fields of life."

In tracing the development of the totalitarian ideology, Dr. Talmon points up the far-reaching implications of the inconsistent and fallacious "general will" concept, the inadmissibility of opposition and political parties in a regime based on allegedly incontrovertible truth, the inevitability of terror in such a regime of metaphysical contention, and the necessarily oppressive and dictatorial character of a government which is convinced that it not only possesses all the true answers but also that it is imbued with rationality and virtue.

Highly interesting are the economics of political messianism. While most of the eighteenth century thinkers and politicians ambiguously upheld the right of property, they ultimately came to believe in expropriation and bureaucratic economic planning. Yet none of these thinkers "thought of economics in terms of expansion and increase of wealth and comfort." To them trade and industry were the "excrescence of the acquisitive spirit on the part of a small, selfish and unscrupulous class: not a possibility of improvement for the workers, but a new way of degrading and enslaving them."

Without specifically treating this aspect of the matter, Dr. Talmon's book bares the remote origins of bolshevism. It becomes painfully evident that most of the so-called "new" bolshevik ideas were born in the France of the *Ancien Régime* and the revolutionary *Terreur*. Bolshevism and democratic totalitarianism, therefore, have their roots in preindustrial society. This they have in common with the American Constitution which also reflects the conditions of an agricultural economy. But while the American Constitution merely outlines general principles of government which, by and large, could be applied in any modern country, the revolutionary doctrine prescribes concrete solutions to problems the existence and nature of which it does not even recognize. In Dr. Talmon's words, "there is no more baffling feature in French eighteenth-century social philosophy than the almost total lack of presentiment or understanding of the new forces about to be released by the Industrial Revolution. Few saw in the expansion of trade and industry a promise of increased national prosperity." To this day, revolutionaries preoccupy themselves with the egalitarian distribution of wealth rather than with the dynamic concept of expanding productivity.

Dr. Talmon, a professor at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is to be congratulated on a first-rate performance. It is to be hoped that the American academic world will give full recognition to his penetrating volume.

STEFAN T. POSSONY
Georgetown University

MASON, HENRY L. *The Purge of Dutch Quislings: Emergency Justice in the Netherlands.* Pp. xii, 199. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. No price.

Collaboration with the Nazis, during the German occupation, was in the eyes of the Dutch people a despicable crime. Those who were known to be guilty of it were treated as outcasts. There may have been some who were actuated by a perverse idealism, but most of them were prompted by ignoble motives: vanity, thwarted ambition, greed, envy, revengefulness, cowardice. The Dutch hated those traitors worse than they hated the Germans, and as the dark months under the Nazi terror lengthened into years the pent-up wrath found vent in dire threats against their disloyal compatriots. The day of liberation would be *Bijltjesdag*, that is Hatchets Day. The word was not a new coinage. In the annals of the Netherlands the fifteenth day of November is designated by that name. The news of Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig was the signal for a popular uprising at Amsterdam. But no hatchets were swung at the heads of Frenchmen and Gallophile traitors. The men who started the revolt were themselves called *Bijltjes*. They were the carpenters of the shipyards. By a common transfer of meaning they were known by the name that belonged to the tool of their trade. That historical *Bijltjesdag* was a bloodless revolution; the one that the Dutch, in the early forties of this century, were looking forward to was to be a day of reckoning in dead earnest.

The clamor for merciless retribution caused deep concern to the government in exile. It admonished the nation over the radio to leave the punishment of the guilty to the law courts. The angry people's bark proved worse than their bite. When the day of reckoning came the avengers showed remarkable self-restraint. Immediately after the German capitulation between 120,000 and 150,000 suspects were taken into custody, and, although the arrests were made by local units of the erstwhile underground resistance, revengeful bloodshed did not occur anywhere.

The authorities were anxious to see impartiality and fairness observed and drew nice distinctions between the defendants' motives for their actions. To that end they set up various kinds of courts and tribunals and introduced a novel element into the jurisdictional system: the use of lay judges. Two of the three judges of each tribunal were nonjurist representatives of the people. War had opened the way to various forms of unethical and treasonable conduct for which existing criminal law had not provided proper punishment. It was widely felt that treason deserved the death penalty, but this had been abolished in the Netherlands in 1873. It was reintroduced by Royal Decree, contrary to the time-honored principle *nullum delictum nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali*, which the Penal Code itself had incorporated in its article 3. A public opinion poll showed that 73 per cent approved the death penalty for the worst Quislings, and it is more than probable that without this safety valve the popular craving for revenge would have resorted to lynching. The purge of the collaborators was emergency justice and bore all the earmarks of a makeshift. It elicited from all sides more criticism than approval, which is perhaps an indication that the judges did their work impartially.

Mr. Mason has carefully avoided the temptation to turn his subject matter, which is rich in excitement and romance, into a thriller. He has done his work conscientiously and accurately in a matter-of-fact, dry-as-dust manner as befits a candidate for the doctoral degree. He has even avoided mistakes in the spellings of Dutch words, a rare achievement in American publications, as this writer knows from long and irritating experience.

ADRIAAN J. BARNOUW
Columbia University

MAYER, KURT B. *The Population of Switzerland.* Pp. xiv, 336. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $5.00.

While this book deals primarily with demography, its contribution goes beyond that field. Swiss vital statistics are among the best available, and thus a person like Professor Mayer who is equipped to make comparisons and evaluations has the material for making an excellent study. The author has made comparisons of the Swiss population trends with trends in other European countries. Of particular value has been the presentation of social problems in Switzerland in the setting of variations in language and religion. It was found that the cultural and religious equilibrium has remained relatively constant notwithstanding the high degree of industrialization and the presence of four national languages.

Professor Mayer has given us a very excellent and clear-cut analysis of the demographic organization of the Swiss population which helps to explain the stand of the people of the country on internal and external problems. This volume should serve not only as a valuable help in understanding Switzerland but as an example of the type of study which could be made of other countries as an aid to international understanding.

M. C. ELMER
University of Pittsburgh

GATHORNE-HARDY, G. M., A. G. SPENCER, AGNES H. HICKS, and G. TURVILLE-PETRE. *The Scandinavian States and Finland: A Political and Economic Survey.* Pp. viii, 312. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952. $4.00.

"A glance at a map should be sufficient to bring home to everyone the fact that the importance of the Scandinavian countries in world affairs has lately increased to an extent which is almost startling," G. M. Gathorne-Hardy writes in the preface to this exceedingly competent report on Scandinavia, which was initiated by the

Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and prepared by four scholars: A. G. Spencer, Agnes H. Hicks, G. Turville-Petre, and Gathorne-Hardy, who acted as chairman.

This opening statement sets the tone of the book; the material is grouped around its theme; the elements of the national power of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland have been carefully selected to support the report's fundamental proposition that here is a region of the world well worth attention because of its strategic importance "in a world divided, as at present, by an 'iron curtain.'"

With few variations, these elements of national power—"land and people," "agriculture," and "industry"—are included in the study of all five of the Scandinavian states. In this comparative analysis the reader is able to comprehend the relative strength of the five states; he gets an excellent view and review of the strong and weak points in their political, industrial, and military armor; it is perhaps the best guide to a unified understanding presented so far of these minor powers.

The keen interest with which both the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics follow developments in Scandinavia—their mutual interest, for example, in keeping this area of the world "pacified"—confirms the conclusion of the authors that "in these circumstances it is natural that [we] should have thought the preparation of a report on these countries . . . desirable."

Of the five states, Sweden undoubtedly is the most interesting, as well as the most important one; for one thing, she is the most powerful of them all. What she does at home and abroad is of greater consequence, comparatively; her decisions, for example, to continue her traditional policy of neutrality (now called "non-alliance") rather than joining NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has had more far-reaching consequences than Norway's and Denmark's choice to ally themselves with the so-called North Atlantic states. This decision has seriously impaired NATO's "Scandinavian" program; it excluded the strongest member of this bloc, the only state in this area which is in a position to offer effective resistance to Russia in the Baltic region; at the same time, Sweden's decision prevented Finland from moving closer towards the Western camp; and Finland, though small and demobilized, would be, next to Sweden, the most valuable Scandinavian member of NATO. But a tradition of peace nurtured for more than a century by a people chronically opposed to international risk-taking combined with a national attitude that "neutrality" is tantamount to political wisdom, has made it unsafe for any Swedish cabinet to defy a national doctrine so inbred in the Swedish character.

Without editorializing in the above manner—for which the reviewer alone is responsible—the authors observe: "Most Swedes at present hope that their current foreign policy may keep them out of a future war."

As long as such a state of mind prevails in the largest and strongest of the Scandinavian states, a successful containment of Soviet ambitions in this part of the world is problematic, to say the least.

Among the chief virtues of this highly concentrated report (less than 300 pages of reading matter devoted to the study of five allegedly important countries) is the best introductory chapter on Scandinavia this reviewer has ever read. And it is only seven pages long!

Little known facts about these states are brought out; for example, Sweden's Boliden mine alone produces more gold than the rest of Europe; more than 90 per cent of the Norwegian farms are owned by the farmers; Iceland's parliament—the Althingi—is the oldest in the world, dating back to 930; Finland's economy as a whole has never been in better shape—in spite of heavy war reparations to the Soviet Union; Denmark is the only Scandinavian state with a colonial "empire"—Greenland, except for Australia the largest island in the world.

Within its narrow frame, this report has crammed more facts and figures and significant data than any other report or work on Scandinavia to date presented by "outsiders." It deserves to be read in every college and university (including those in Scandinavia) where courses are given or planned in Scandinavian government.

AKE SANDLER
Los Angeles State College

KOCH, HAL. *Grundtvig.* Translated from the Danish with Introduction and Notes by Llewellyn Jones. Pp. xx, 231. Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1952. $3.50.

We have here the first competent study in English of a leading figure in modern Danish history, Nicolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783–1872). The author of many of Denmark's most popular hynms, the severe critic of the schools in which he had studied under protest, the indefatigable advocate of reforms that aimed to make the state religion (Lutheran), and the church which proclaimed it, living forces in the citizen's daily life, the tireless awakener of interest in his country's heathen past and its great literature, the scholar who translated the ancient chronicles of Saxo and Snorre because of a conviction that through history man might "reveal his substance and true shape" and approach the solution of the riddle of his own existence, the reformer who laid the groundwork of his country's significant contribution to adult education—this versatile genius has become, as Mrs. Olive D. Campbell found thirty years ago, a legendary figure. (See her *The Danish Folk School,* New York, 1922.) Hal Koch, professor of church history at the University of Copenhagen, has undertaken here to present to modern readers the man behind the legend. As one of the editors of a monumental edition of Grundtvig's work still in progress, he is eminently qualified for the task. Moreover, he writes a vigorous and readable Danish prose to which the translator has given an acceptable English rendering.

After soul-stirring personal experiences, involving a narrow escape from an unfortunate love affair, Grundtvig found himself in Copenhagen just when his country was involved on Napoleon's side in a war with England. He found solace in a prolonged study of Denmark's ancient history which bore fruit in an essay on "The Asa Doctrine" (1807) and in *Northern Mythology* (1808), his "first and greatest scholarly contribution" (p. 33). By making a careful distinction between the elder poetic Edda and the later Snorre's Edda, Saxo, and the Sagas, he helped inaugurate a long series of scholarly studies by other men that were to probe deeper into the problem of the boundary between Danish mythology and history.

His theological studies while preparing for the clergy raised doubts as to the efficacy of the church in awakening the Danish people to live Christian lives. His arguments and verbal duels with the university theologians, waged through books and pamphlets, and even in libel suits, helped prepare him for his mission as "awakener" of church and people.

The campaign for a written constitution that was waged during Christian VIII's reign (1839–1848) was not to Grundtvig's liking; he was after all born in the era of the Enlightened Despotism. When, as he wrote in 1848, "the reign of peasants [*bönder*] and the masses is at our door," he entered politics as a member of the Lower House and became "a fanatical champion of freedom in all spheres of life, not merely in church and school but in business and trade as well, in government and legislation" (p. 113). Once the 1849 constitution was adopted, he was determined to do all that he could to make it work. He was more successful outside of the chamber than within it. By his poems, psalms, and stories of Danish folk life and traditions, he reached a large and appreciative public and thus blazed the way for much of Denmark's future social program.

His great contribution to popular education was the folk high school calculated to reach the adults through the "living word," to reach—in Grundtvig's words—the "nation's root and trunk, the tenants and freeholders both great and small, artisans of all kinds, seamen and traders," especially since in homogeneous Denmark "the same aptitude for culture is found in huts and in high-ceiled halls." The basic idea of the folk high school was Grundt-

vig's, though its realization was the work of many men, such as Christian Flor (1844), Kristen Kold (1851), and others.

To an understanding of modern Denmark, Hal Koch's penetrating study of Grundtvig provides an excellent introduction.

WALDEMAR WESTERGAARD
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Los Angeles

OTHERS

BATES, MARSTON. *Where Winter Never Comes: A Study of Man and Nature in the Tropics.* Pp. 310. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. $3.50.

What are the distinctive characteristics of the tropics in contrast with other parts of the world? Particularly, what do the tropical lands of the world mean to the people who live there and to us who do not?

Marston Bates's latest book is a readable and informative answer to these questions. The author has good professional standing as a research worker in a branch of tropical biology (concerning mosquitoes), has good amateur standing in a wide range of other tropical subjects (especially concerning people), and has facility of expression for popular reading.

Though nontechnical and informal the book is accurate and well-balanced, not overloaded with details, but filled with sound and sensible ideas and coming to valid conclusions on tropical people, tropical culture, occidental civilization in the tropics, climate, clothes, disease, food, forest, seas, government, and current problems.

Among large ideas about the tropics the following are clearly stated: (1) that rain forest is not a jungle of tangled undergrowth but a shady place of fairly open ground under the dense crowns of tall trees; (2) that ways of life in the tropics are not the result of natural environment, nor of racial biology, but have arisen in the wayward course of culture history; (3) that our difficulties and failures in the tropics are due to maladjustment of our middle-latitude occidental tools and practices, not to inherent shortcomings of tropical nature; (4) that we have only hacked away at the margins and have hardly begun to utilize the indigenous resources of the tropics; and (5) that nationalism and colonialism are outmoded in the age of global contacts and that neighborhood understanding is needed.

This all deserves praise except for one small fault. That fault deserves adverse mention because it slips often unnoticed into scientific popularizing and needs to be exposed and avoided for the benefit of all concerned. The book gives an impression that the author has reached his conclusions intelligently and accurately in contrast with academic scholars who hold foolish contrary views—"the anthropologist," "the historian," "geographers like Ellsworth Huntington."

Actually his views are held by anthropologists, historians, and geographers. In quoting from older works that do not agree with these views the author is raising a dead issue. He resurrects the old theory of environmental determinism as if this were held by modern geographers, and he fails to identify as a geographer one of those from whom he has gained contrary ideas (Carl Sauer), who can speak for modern geography far better than the Huntington of a previous generation.

The author's major theses (paraphrased above) have been stated earlier by other writers and accepted widely by their readers. They could be presented as common knowledge among modern scholars rather than as original findings of the author.

Thus sharing in the findings of science, the author seems also to share in a vague belief common among highly specialized scientists: that the salvation of the world is to be found within science itself. This appears only in the closing pages as an attempted flight of faith which fails to rise from the ground. It hardly detracts from the book as a contribution to popular scientific understanding and is unnecessary as an aid to ultimate faith, for which we can look elsewhere more reasonably and hopefully than within the range of modern science.

ROBERT S. PLATT
University of Chicago

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. *Vocational Training in Latin America.* Pp. iv, 320. Geneva: ILO (distributed in the U. S. by ILO Washington Branch), 1951. $2.00.

For over three decades the International Labor Organization has been providing us with very valuable source material on labor conditions and labor problems in various parts of the world. Sometimes this material is presented in such dry and unimaginative form that it makes rather difficult reading. This is unfortunately the case with regard to the present publication.

Vocational Training in Latin America is the result of a one-man mission sent to Latin America by the ILO early in 1949 to study this subject, and of certain other materials collected by the Economic Commission for Latin America. The body of the report consists of six chapters which include a discussion of "Basic Factors"; the "Organization and Administration" of vocational training in the region; the training of young people; the training and retraining of adults; "Training Abroad and Technical Assistance"; and a chapter of "Conclusions." Appendixes present more detailed information on vocational training in thirteen different countries of the region and resolutions on the subject by the 1946 and 1949 American ILO Conferences.

In reading the report one is struck by the rather extensive facilities which are already available for vocational training in the region, as well as with the rather hodgepodge way these have come into existence. In the process of industrialization, employers have realized from time to time the necessity of training their own workers or the children of their workers. This has been done in an attempt to build up not only a well-trained work force but a steady one. The provision of adequate skills for workers by an industrial employer will not only raise the output of those workers but will also in most cases assure their continuance in the employ of the industry which has trained them.

On the other hand, training the sons of first-generation industrial workers to take the more skilled jobs in an expanding factory tends to insure for the employer a much smaller labor turnover than might otherwise be the case.

As the report points out, governments in the region have also become aware of the fact that one of the great stumbling blocks in the path of industrialization in the region is the lack of adequate training for the factory work force. They have attempted to meet this lack with a variety of training schools and apprenticeship programs. Perhaps the principal criticism that can be made of efforts in this direction, is their lack of over-all planning. Such planning is among the recommendations made in this volume.

The report notes the resistance of many of the older educational institutions, particularly those of university level, to penetration of the more mundane industrial subjects into their curricula. In Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and some other countries progress has been made in the direction of integrating the vocational training program into the general educational system. However, as the report points out, and as any student of the labor situation in Latin America can testify, educators and industrialists alike are still amazed and perhaps a little shocked at the willingness of "respectable" educational institutions of both secondary and university grade in this country to accept "practical" subjects in their courses of study.

Although it reviews the extensive vocational training facilities already available in Latin America, this report notes the great need for more such resources. The job of turning the rural semi-serfs who are flocking into the towns to man the new industries of the region into trained, disciplined industrial workers is a large one. The present volume indicates the need not only for expansion of present training facilities in Latin America, but the need for help from outside the area.

This ILO volume is certainly not intended for that mythical character "the general reader." However, for one who is interested in educational problems in Latin America, or in the problems of economic development of the region, it is undoubtedly something which he should read. It is an exceedingly valuable source of infor-

mation concerning the educational aspects of the great movement toward economic diversification and industrialization which is under way in Latin America.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER
Rutgers University

TOWNSEND, WILLIAM CAMERON. *Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexican Democrat.* Pp. xiv, 379. Ann Arbor, Mich.: George Wahr Publishing Company, 1952. $4.00.

General Cárdenas sought to dissuade Mr. Townsend from writing this biography saying that as a friend he was apt to be prejudiced in his favor. It is the present reviewer's impression that the general's fears proved to be well founded. Evidence of bias was probably noted by Professor Frank Tannenbaum, for in his foreword to this book he states that "it is difficult for anyone who has known General Cárdenas to write about him dispassionately."

General Cárdenas is represented as a man of honor, nobility, integrity, tact, idealism, moderation, modesty, sincerity, liberalism, tolerance, vision—and countless other virtues. As page after page was read, and as the number of the virtues mounted, this reviewer sought anxiously for some confession of shortcoming, some fall from virtuous grace. On the very few occasions when the fact of error was conceded, this was defended by the author as an extenuating circumstance. For example, when President Cárdenas, who stood for honest elections and noninterference by the Executive (*sic*), winked at the fraudulent counting of the votes after the Almazán-Camacho election, it was because Almazán's threat to revolt had caused the President "to lose concern about the counting of the votes."

William Cameron Townsend, who has spent most of his adult life among Indian tribes of Mexico and Guatemala, first became acquainted with Lázaro Cárdenas in 1935 when the President of Mexico discovered Mr. and Mrs. Townsend living in an Indian village in Morelos teaching the Indians to read in their native Aztec language. A long and intimate friendship developed, affording Mr. Townsend an excellent opportunity to become well acquainted with Lázaro Cárdenas, the man. The particular value of this book, therefore, is to be found in the warm, sympathetic character delineation of General Cárdenas rather than in the sketchy, disjointed, and thoroughly inadequate chapters on the Cárdenas administration. For a more penetrating, comprehensive, and orderly view of the problems and achievements of the Cárdenas administration we must still rely on the Weyls' *Reconquest of Mexico.*

Mr. Townsend is at his best when describing Lázaro Cárdenas on his many trips of personal inspection into the far back country of Mexico. These numerous tours, indicated on maps on the inner covers of the book, constituted a new technique of government, the circuit-riding system. The President, seemingly distrustful of others, felt that he had to go himself direct to the people, not only to acquaint himself with their problems, but whenever possible, to solve them on the ground. According to Mr. Townsend "the peasant-loving president" radiated "a paternal joy from his close contact with the masses." But Mr. Townsend does not tell us that this unique method of administering justice, reminiscent of that of benevolent sovereigns of old, short-circuited the local authorities and was bad for their morale and prestige. Moreover, it perpetuated the harmful tradition of viewing the government as an individual.

The book contains a number of factual errors. A few of these follow. The *jéfe politico* was not "federally appointed" (p. 15); this was a state officer appointed by the governor. Cárdenas did not "give the Church her constitutional rights" when he threw off the yoke of Calles (p. 341). This attempt to excuse Cárdenas of responsibility for the vigorous attack on the Church is novel; Cárdenas persisted in the anticlerical, if not antireligious, campaign until the crisis of the oil expropriations forced him to desist. Also, we are told that, following the adoption of the constitutional amendment requiring socialistic education, "some church schools closed" (p. 80). These schools did not exist, for they had been abolished many years before by the original Article 3 of the Constitution.

On September 17, 1939, President Cárdenas referred to the recently declared war in Europe as "an *international conflict* between ambitious, unscrupulous, and imperialistic interests"—the communistic line. Mr. Townsend makes no reference to this statement. At the least it detracts somewhat from the stature of Lázaro Cárdenas as "a man of vision."

J. LLOYD MECHAM
The University of Texas

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *Report on Cuba.* Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950, Francis Adams Truslow, Chief of Mission. Pp. xxiv, 1052. Washington, 1951. $7.50.

This massive report is primarily an encyclopedic survey of the Cuban economy. It also analyzes the problems and policies affecting the economic progress of Cuba, and it suggests a long-term strategy for future development.

The fifty chapters of the report are grouped in ten books. Book I outlines the report and highlights its major findings and recommendations. Book II is a capsule description of the economy. Books III through VIII, including some 700 pages, contain a detailed description of the major sectors of the economy. Each book, and usually each chapter, includes a general survey, the major problems, and recommendations. Book IX, which outlines a strategy for Cuban economic development, is presumably the climax of the report. Book X, dealing with technical problems and possibilities, is really a glorified appendix.

The report poses Cuba's primary economic problem as the reduction of dependence upon sugar. Diversification is feasible because of Cuba's financial position, as well as because of its unused human and material resources. Such development will not be easy, however, for the Cuban economy has long been static and top-heavy, and growth will be impeded by unsuitable attitudes, a widespread lack of confidence, and inadequate institutions.

The report's "strategy for development" is directed toward four specific objectives, each of which involves reducing Cuba's dependence upon sugar exports. Twelve criteria to guide development are suggested, most of these stressing Cuba's resources and needs. A course of action to foster development, encompassing expanded applied research, improved education, better labor-management relations, government policies encouraging "dynamic development," and government reforms is proposed. A number of actions to increase agricultural and industrial production are outlined, and lastly, five specific projects are urged as "most essential, most immediately feasible and most likely to benefit Cuba as a whole."

As a painstaking and comprehensive description of the Cuban economy, this report should be a standard reference book. As a set of recommendations for development, it should also be useful, for its suggestions seem practical and make good sense. They are also, however, cautious, piecemeal, and perhaps not overly imaginative. The report envisages, incidentally, a very limited and conservative role for the Cuban government. This role may be more appropriate for the prosperous Cuban economy than it would be in other underdeveloped countries not so blessed by a booming sugar industry. In this, as in a few other respects, Cuba may be somewhat atypical. Yet, this report should be of value not only to those interested in the Cuban economy per se, but also as a case study for the larger public concerned with economic development throughout the world.

C. ADDISON HICKMAN
University of Illinois

PENDLE, GEORGE. *Uruguay—South America's First Welfare State.* Pp. viii, 100. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952. $2.50.

This book is a timely addition to the relatively scarce literature regarding Uruguay—a gallant little nation to whom a lack of signposts has been a challenge rather than a deterrent to social and political experiment.

Actually, *Uruguay* is not so much a study of "South America's First Welfare

State" as it is an orderly and illuminating encyclopedia, in capsule form, of the essential facts and characteristics of the country and its people. The author has not attempted much by way of interpretation or comment, and as a result his book is slightly heavy reading in spots. Nevertheless, the flaming spirit of an intensely democratic and aggressive people is evident behind every fact and figure.

Chronic disorder, political and otherwise, characterized Uruguay's early history. By the turn of the present century, however, the people apparently had begun to get their fill of anarchic individualism. A forceful and farseeing leader in the person of José Batlle y Ordóñez not only helped them reach this conclusion but was successful in focusing energies, which theretofore had been dissipated in strife, on a long-range program of social and political reform.

Batlle contended, the author tells us, "that the employer should always set the public welfare above private gain; that the employer should pass on a greater share of his profit to his employees; and that the employer and the State should aid the poor, the sick, the old, and the young." Acceptance of these ideas seems clearly reflected in Uruguay's welfare legislation which is outlined in the book. Hours of work have been controlled since 1915; minimum wages were set for some workers beginning in 1926; a family allowance program with funds derived from a tax on payrolls was established in 1943; workmen's compensation started in 1914; and unemployment compensation was started in a limited way in 1939. The old age pension law was passed in 1919 and provides benefits for those who have "reached the age of sixty and to anyone (regardless of age) who is totally incapacitated and in poverty." Uruguay has no national system of health insurance but, as the author points out, through no lack of agitation on the part of the Batllistas who are still vocal and well organized despite the death of their leader in 1929. They regard their program of social reform in no sense complete.

Uruguay also summarizes the country's experience with state ownership of a number of industrial and commercial undertakings. Many of these, whether successful in paying their own way or not, are no longer regarded as experimental. The educational system is briefly described. Religion is dispatched with a brief mention. The facts of finance, production, transportation, communications, and foreign trade follow with the grim and uncompromising inevitability of a government yearbook.

The author concludes his work, after a brief excursion into lighter topics such as radio and sports, with a statement on foreign relations and party politics with politics properly predominating.

WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
Social Security Administration
Washington, D. C.

WALES, NYM. *Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists, as told to Nym Wales.* With an introduction by Robert Carver North. Pp. xiv, 238. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952. $5.00.

Red Dust is a collection of twenty-four "autobiographies" orally recited to Miss Wales during her five-month visit to Yenan in 1937. The individual stories vary greatly in length—from two to twenty pages—and are also uneven in intrinsic value and importance. They do, however, tell what twenty-four Chinese Communists thought about themselves, their movement, their leadership, and their personal reasons for identifying themselves with the Chinese Communist movement. This handsome volume therefore incorporates a great quantity of autobiographical raw material of historical and psychological value—even if many of Miss Wales's characters have dropped from sight during the intervening years, and the passage of time has deprived their stories of current topical interest in 1952.

The personalities prevailed upon by Miss Wales to tell their stories include politicians, militarists, educators, propagandists, industrial proletarians, medical and professional workers, and cultural workers (including writers, artists, and actors). With few exceptions, these people represent lower leadership levels. A few currently prominent personalities in Communist China are included: one Politburo member (Tung Pi-wu), a regional political-military commander (Lin Piao), the head of the youth federation (Liao Ch'eng-chih), a provincial governor not identified as such (Wang Shou-tai), and one Central Government minister (Hsieh Chüeh-tsai)—but their stories are not brought down to date, and in three instances the stories are too brief to be revealing or of great significance.

Robert North makes two important contributions to the volume. His introduction (pp. 3–22) is an informing and perceptive essay on Chinese Communist history by a leading American student of the subject. He has also compiled, in an appendix, brief statements in the style of *Who's Who* about twenty-seven of the most important Communist leaders in contemporary China, a feature that adds notably to the utility of the volume.

Why did these Chinese go Communist? Not from intellectual conviction or from conversion following a study of the basic Marxist texts. In nearly every instance, the individual reacted to an adolescent emotional situation or experience of his private life, and thought he found in communism a solution for his own personal problem, as he saw it. The real mystery is that individuals who could protest on independent personal grounds against the circumstances in which they found themselves could also embrace with such apparent enthusiasm the total discipline (and negation of personal choice or judgment) imposed upon them by the Communist Party.

H. ARTHUR STEINER
University of California at Los Angeles

LEHRMAN, HAL. *Israel: The Beginning and Tomorrow.* Pp. v, 358. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1952. $3.75.

Mr. Lehrman's report on the first few years of Israel's life adds to the impression that the tiny new state is the most hopeful and interesting spot in the world today. An excellent reporter, he senses the drama behind life in Israel and knows how to transmit his impressions to others. His book makes absorbing reading.

Mr. Lehrman is not a blind admirer. He never was and apparently is not now a Zionist. He sees a great many faults which, if not rectified soon, may weaken the new state to the point of endangering its existence. Some of these faults are due to inexperience; and Mr. Lehrman has much to say which is both amusing and disconcerting about the new officialdom as well as about the new government's lack of diplomatic skill. More basic are his criticisms of social and economic policy. He doubts the wisdom, though he admires the fact, of the "ingathering of the exiles." Hard-headed policy should have stopped the influx of immigrants far short of the vast accretion which has placed an unbearable social and economic burden upon a new state and an underdeveloped country. Sentiment has prevailed, though the author thinks it was not sentiment alone, but that defense needs have been equally compelling. Admittedly, however, neither age nor ailment has kept immigrants out of the country.

The economic problems would have been serious enough without these immigrants. The country desperately needs a more favorable trade balance and the rapid development of new industries. Here a different kind of sentiment has stood in the way. Israel has not been able to shake off the socialistic doctrines which most Palestinian settlers during the past half century had brought into the land along with their hopes and Zionist ideals. Mr. Lehrman discusses at some length the difficulties which Mapai, the dominant party in the government coalition, has placed in the way of American capital eager for investment in Israel. Concessions have come late and there is still, Mr. Lehrman thinks, ground for suspecting the economic ambitions of Histradut, the Israel federation of labor, closely allied as it is with the government.

Israel cannot avoid a religious problem. The newcomers from Moslem lands have no understanding of a secular state, while a good many of the older settlers from Eastern Europe are opposed to the slightest deviation from religious orthodoxy.

Mr. Lehrman has no sympathy for any such viewpoint. He shows no evidence of appreciating the part played by Judaism in the fate and experience of the Jewish people either in the Diaspora or in the Palestine settlement. Nor does he appear to understand that for many Jews a secular Jewish state is a contradiction in terms. He is more objective in his discussion of the problem presented by the Arab population within Israel and the refugees outsides its borders. Finally, he offers an excellent discussion of the relations between Israel and the United States, as well as between the Jews building their state and the American Jews eager to do all they can to help in this new experiment.

Mr. Lehrman's book is among the best of many which have dealt with this subject during the past few years.

SOLOMON GRAYZEL
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

FREEMAN, KATHLEEN. *God, Man and State: Greek Concepts.* Pp. vii, 240. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. $3.25.

Ancient Greek thinkers had unbounded confidence in the powers of the mind. Pure reason, either unaided or illumined by divine intelligence, sufficed for the ascertainment of truth—eternal truth that transcended mere erudition.

Today, when classical studies and philosophy receive ever-diminishing attention, the content and spirit of Greek thought are virtually esoteric lore for scholars trained in the humanistic tradition.

Kathleen Freeman knows all that is important about ancient Greece. She has made the thinking of the Greek masters so completely her own that she is able to accomplish a difficult task of condensation and exposition with lucidity and perspective that merit the admiration of scholars. From the Homeric epics; the works of the scientists of the "Atomic School"; the teachings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; and, to a lesser degree, the Neo-Platonists, Epicureans, and Stoics, she has distilled the essence of the Greek concepts of God, man, society, education, and law.

Greek religion the author characterizes as "beautiful and rich in emotional appeal, but with little moral and no intellectual content, and with many elements both stupid and ugly as well as cruel" (p. 9). Such appraisal is indeed a welcome contrast to the banalities of the usual "appreciation" literature. Again, the Greek concept of the nature of man is aptly summarized in the statement that the philosophers "analyzed Man's nature into component parts; they tried to show him how these could best be used, what was his place in the universe, and what was the right way for him to live" (p. 72).

Another pithy summary is the author's remark that for Plato "This life . . . is nothing but a training-ground for the soul or mind, where it learns to ignore all else but the pursuit of reality, and so to fit itself for the world where only reality exists" (p. 103).

The fundamental question, however, is whether the volume achieves its purpose. To this reviewer it seems that too much detail is presented to interest "ordinary intelligent men and women" who may know little and care less about Greek philosophy. Of course, one must agree that "Greek philosophy with its passion for truth, its rational method, its belief in intelligence allied to goodness, can and must be called in to help the Christian ethic and love of humanity to save the world" (p. vi). But something more intriguing than this almost textbook-like work must sound the call.

CHARLES EDWARD SMITH
Louisiana State University

STAVRIANOS, L. S. *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity.* Pp. ix, 246. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952. $3.25.

Professor L. S. Stravrianos' book on Greece, dealing with the period from 1936 to 1950, gives the general reader a clear-cut and objective account of the complexities of Greek politics and of their entanglement with the power politics of the Great Powers. The author vividly describes the Metaxas dictatorship which increased the vigor of those liberal, socialist, and communist groups which played so important a role in the resistance movement during the German occupation. The analysis of the nature of the resistance movement, showing how a united front known as the National Liberation Front (EAM) created an effective National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) in both of which organizations the Communists played an important role, is admirably done.

The author throws light on the civil war in Greece between the Royalists and EAM during the Nazi occupation, on the mutiny in the Greek navy at Alexandria and in the Greek military units in Egypt due to British meddling in Greek politics in support of the Royalists and the Monarchy.

What is most revealing, and may prove shocking to the reader, is the author's explanation of how British intervention in Greek affairs was largely responsible for the Communist revolution. He claims that the Churchill government helped to put in power and continued to support corrupt, inefficient, ruthlessly oppressive Rightist governments determined to restore the monarchy and crush all resistance be it centrist, liberal, socialist, or Communist.

The fiasco of Churchill's policy and the ineptness of Bevin are effectively exposed and the reasons for Britain's failure in Greece are carefully analyzed. The description of the situation thus created, which faced the United States when it assumed responsibility for Greece under the Truman Doctrine, prepares the reader for the main thesis of Professor Stravrianos—the American dilemma and opportunity.

It is discouraging to note that the author is of the opinion that after an expenditure of some $700 million in Greece "between March 1947 and June 1949," four years after the United States assumed its present role and two years since the destruction of the guerrilla forces, "we have made no progress in Greece except in the military sense. The Greek army is larger, but the same politicians control Athens and the same poverty grips the country." The author warns fellow Americans "that our military victory will quickly evaporate and that we will find ourselves fighting a second 'Democratic Army' a few years hence" if we repeat the mistakes of the British.

WILLIAM YALE
University of New Hampshire

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

The review of Howard W. Odum's *American Sociology* by Dr. Howard Becker, which appeared in your March issue (pp. 204–205), contains such sharp criticism of the book's publishers that we feel a rebuttal is justified.

Dr. Becker writes: ". . . Odum has placed American sociologists permanently in his debt. Words similarly appreciative cannot be bestowed, however, on the publishers. To have forced Odum to eliminate 300 pages, presumably with an eye to textbook sales, means that Odum himself has suffered through inadequate presentation of his views and that every instructor and student using the book will suffer with him."

Without any prompting from the publishers, Dr. Odum desired to have his book priced so that it would be readily available to students, and, in order to gain this wider distribution, he voluntarily reduced his original manuscript to the appropriate length.

As for the material eliminated from the original manuscript, this consisted, as Dr. Odum states in his Acknowledgments, of a limited "Who's Who" of some four hundred sociologists, which "logically grew too big" for the book; "segments on definitions, concepts, and specialisms; critical appraisals of special 'theories' of individual sociologists; the rich periodical literature; the bibliography of borderline sociology; and the history of sociology in specific institutions." Dr. Odum was the sole judge of what was to be left out, and he obviously retained the more important and eliminated the less important. One may well doubt that the elimination of this less important material has hampered the author in the presentation of his views, or that instructors and students using the book will suffer appreciably.

The publishers of Dr. Odum's book are primarily commercial, not academic, publishers. Whether the publishers are "crassly commercial" is a matter of opinion, but, as Dr. Becker well knows, during the 228 years of the firm's continuous ex-

istence, it has published some notable contributions to sociology including, among many others, the works of the Hammonds, the Webbs, Rowntree, Havighurst, and now Odum. Credit for a worth-while contribution in any field belongs primarily to its author; the publisher is certainly of secondary importance. The contribution, if good enough, will almost always find a publisher. Unless he is endowed, any realistic publisher hopes at least to break even, and the author hopes to gain either an enhanced reputation or a money profit, and perhaps both, since neither publisher nor author is fed by the birds. Any tangible gain to either depends largely upon the activity of the publisher in marketing the books produced, for, like automobiles and television sets, books must be "peddled." Dr. Becker would doubtless be annoyed if his publishers made no effort to sell his books.

In the December 1951 issue of *Social Forces*, Dr. Read Bain closed his review of Odum's book with this sentence: "Well, it won't make either Odum or Longmans rich, but it should make all sociologists grateful to both of them." We regret that such a strong dissenting voice has been raised against part of this sentiment.

ROBERT L. STRAKER
College Editor
Longmans, Green and Co., Inc.

Dear Sir:

The only adequate reply to Mr. Straker's letter would be one written by Dr. Odum himself, and under the circumstances, this can hardly be expected.

Where my own comment is concerned, I can add little to what I have already said in the review with which issue is taken. If the reader will refer to that review, he will find that it is precisely with regard to the material eliminated, listed in paragraph four of Mr. Straker's letter, that the adverse judgment was made. Therefore, nothing need be added to that paragraph; Mr. Straker has stated my case.

In conclusion, let me say that I am quite sympathetic with the plight in which publishers now find themselves; namely, high costs of labor, paper, and binding. Whether the smaller publishers, such as The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, have been able to diminish their difficulties by cutting down on overhead is a question that I am not prepared to answer. I can only say that in the entire course of my teaching experience I cannot recall ever having adopted a book because it was called to my attention by a publisher's sales representative. I am also appreciative of the free entertainment provided at sociological conventions by such representatives; I have thoroughly enjoyed myself at many such gatherings. Here again, however, it is to be doubted as to whether the entertainment policy really produces favorable results on the publisher's balance sheet. Does it increase the cost of books to the purchaser?

HOWARD BECKER
University of Wisconsin

Dear Sir:

If space permits, I should like to comment on the recent review by Professor Theodore Abel of my *Through Values to Social Interpretation*. It is not my purpose to take issue with the opinions advanced by Professor Abel, but rather to correct certain errors of fact.

1. Professor Abel asserts that various essays included in the collection have all been published previously. A comparison of texts, such as a careful reviewer might be expected to make, would show that in almost every case the two versions previously published were drastically abridged. Two of them, in fact, included only two-fifths of the versions made available in the present collection. Whether there is any merit in presenting, in readily available form, the full texts of the essays is an open question, but Abel's statement as it stands is not strictly accurate.

2. It follows from this that his assertion that the essays "are easily available in their original form" is somewhat untrue. Over and above this, however, is the fact that two of the more important essays appeared in a book now out of print. The plates were melted for war metal after only 1,500 copies had been printed. Here again, reasonable care would have prevented the reviewer from making a misstatement.

In conclusion, I should like to point out that in the review as printed there is nothing specific about what the book includes or does not include. Moreover, one half of the brief review is devoted entirely to the expression of opinion about the worthwhileness of collections of essays issued while the authors are still alive. Here the reviewer doubtless had in mind the recently published volumes by Parsons and Merton as well as the present writer's efforts. I am flattered to be included in this trio, but it is with some hesitation that I call attention to the fact that collections of essays by Giddings, the older Faris, and several other sociologists far more distinguished than those of the recent vintage to which I belong, were published without the services of a literary undertaker. If, however, Professor Abel would like to volunteer for the task indicated by his remark on "the undoubtedly more critical and discriminating selection of some future editor of his [Becker's] posthumous work," I shall certainly be willing to mention him in my last will and testament.

Sincerely yours,
HOWARD BECKER

Dear Sir:

In the March issue of THE ANNALS you have a review of my *The Impact of the Labor Union* by Mr. Sar A. Levitan containing a number of strikingly inaccurate statements concerning the contents of the book.

Mr. Levitan says, "Wright, the editor of the volume, contributes two papers dealing with aggregate wage problems," and he goes on to say *"The Impact of the Labor Union* is limited to the economic aspects of union activities and fails to deal with their socio-political effects."

May I say that Mr. Levitan either has not read my book or else is deliberately misrepresenting its contents. The first of my papers deals explicitly and exclusively with the "socio-political effects" of the labor union. The second paper deals with aggregate wages, but the first deals with precisely the questions which Mr. Levitan says I ignore.

In addition to my paper, the various discussions by Boulding, Samuelson, and others contain many references to the socio-political activities.

May I point out that this is the second time in which my work has been libeled in THE ANNALS within the last year. My book on *Capitalism* was entrusted to the notorious pro-Communist, Paul Sweezy, with results which your readers are now familiar with. It is perhaps a compliment to my work that my critics are invariably forced to resort to misrepresentation, but I do not see how THE ANNALS can expect to retain its scholarly reputation and continue to publish slanted reviews of this type.

On the merits I suggest that Mr. Levitan was anxious to minimize a book which contained the following jingle concurred in by all participants, including Samuelson and Boulding:

"We all or nearly all consent
If wages rise by ten per cent
It puts the choice before the nation
Of unemployment or inflation."

I would deeply appreciate it if you would publish this letter.

Yours very truly,
DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT

Dear Sir:

A rechecking of Professor Wright's first paper confirms my original belief that the book fails to deal with socio-political effects of trade unions. For purpose of accuracy I might have stated that it fails to deal *effectively* or realistically with the problem. In my brief review I referred to the more significant of Professor Wright's two papers, the other seven participants in the symposium having contributed one paper each.

Mr. Wright is quite correct in stating that other contributors made reference to socio-political activities of unions, but these references were in the nature of parenthetical remarks and did not attempt to discuss any aspects of the subject with any degree of completeness.

I therefore conclude:

Alas this reviewer cannot reneg,
For a single socio-political leg

Hardly begins to fulfill the need
Of an economic centipede.

Sincerely yours,
SAR A. LEVITAN

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
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VOLUME 283 SEPTEMBER 1952

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH, *Associate Editor*



MEANING OF THE 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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PHILADELPHIA
1952

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Identification of the Principal Issues

By CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON

THE issues in every Presidential campaign call forth millions of words, spoken and written, yet there are usually public questions of significance that are discussed but little, and some that may be considered not at all. An issue may be stressed, played down, or ignored, candidly met, obliquely handled, or distorted, depending upon the convictions, moods, attitudes, and techniques of candidates and upon the overall plans of the party strategists. Yet, on the whole, questions of governmental policy do play an essential part in political campaigns, and the campaign of 1952 will probably be no exception. From what source do issues arise? How are they developed? What are the main issues for 1952? Will the campaign and election bring a decision on them, or on any of them?

ORIGIN OF THE ISSUES

Whence come the issues? It is elementary to say that few of them originate with the party in national convention assembled. The party in convention is a sort of clearing house for the issues, a broker of plans, projects, ideas, and policies. Issues are commonly introduced by economic and social groups —organizations which may have no strong affiliation with any political party. Such organizations often carry on a program of public education simultaneously with their approach to party leaders and party organizations, their purpose being to win the support of the party by demonstrating their strength among the voters.[1]

The time that may elapse before a movement is strong enough to win the endorsement of a political party may be long or short, depending upon the popular strength of the proposal and the inclination of party leaders toward the policy advocated. It is probably doing no violence to the facts to say that the temperance and prohibition movements for many years made relatively slow progress with political conventions, not so much because they failed to win substantial popular support but rather because they ran counter to the personal inclinations, interests, and convictions of so many party organization men. The same may be said of the movements for the direct election of United States senators and the national income tax.

On the other hand, policies that are more palatable to party leaders—policies like restrictions on immigration and aliens, the assertion of the rights of the United States abroad, and the care of veterans—find easy acceptance with party organizations. Indeed, on such matters politicians may actually run ahead of those groups who would ask for consideration of their programs. Only a few citizens will speak *for* the aliens, and fewer still will stand *against* the sovereignty of their country or the interests of the veteran.

Issues are presented or may present themselves at any time. Pressure groups watch for opportunities to influence the

[1] Of course not every group desiring recognition of its interests by a political party would carry on a campaign of propaganda for public support. For example, an association seeking an opportunity to exploit a valuable natural resource might well decide that an effort to win the public to its side would have an effect adverse to its interests, would serve to remind the public of the issue of conservation.

President, Congress, and other agencies and officers of the government, and their campaign to educate the public through the press, radio and television is a continuous process. The President may make a variety of issues by the use of his constitutional powers to conduct foreign relations and to command the Army and Navy. The action of a foreign power may pose a question that must be faced, and a diplomatic blunder on the part of our government may with dramatic suddenness present an issue. A great management-labor dispute may push the question of labor relations to the fore; industrial depression and unemployment may creep upon us and take the center of the stage of issues; a disastrous flood may give the control of waters a leading place in the public mind; and inadequate medical and hospital care may raise the issue of national health insurance. Issues, then, are arising all the time, some selected by public authorities or precipitated by the action of such authorities, others consciously shaped by private groups, still others resulting from forces beyond control.

There are issues that are not always clearly discernible—dormant issues at the "grass roots," perhaps accumulated grievances, or unfulfilled aspirations. Or there may be among the people a vague general feeling of helplessness and apathy. The party that can diagnose the trouble and offer a promising remedy will profit greatly. In such cases, however, the people are more likely to find release in a person than in a party, for only a personality can show the understanding, the warmth, and the spirit necessary to make articulate the basic social needs of the millions. Such men as Jefferson, Lincoln, Bryan, and the Roosevelts expressed the unformed thoughts of sturdy men, giving them issues and self-respect. Party leaders who neglect to look to the base of democracy for issues are missing not only a chance to profit for themselves but also the much greater opportunity to do their country a splendid service. If responsible leaders fail here, the demagogue will exploit the opportunities they have neglected.

PARTY PLATFORMS

It is in the year of the Presidential campaign, of course, that the issues, from whatever source derived, are given a somewhat systematic examination and evaluation by the public. Each political party (our concern here is with the major parties only) is supposed to state its position on the issues of the day in its platform. On this document the public has become rather too cynical, so cynical that not a third of the voters read any part of it, and probably not one per cent read it in its entirety. Even the party leaders often fail to take their platform seriously, but at other times and on specific issues they show no lack of conviction and sincerity. Thus, in 1920, the Democratic convention took an unequivocal position in support of the League of Nations; the Republican party has often stated its position with relative clarity on the tariff; and in 1948 both parties took intelligible positions on the Taft-Hartley Act.

Platforms are not wholly without value as guides to party policy. They sometimes declare for a particular course on a specific issue, and they very commonly indicate the general direction of the party. The platform may also serve as a mild restraint on the President or on congressmen who would ignore the party's announced program. It must be admitted, however, that, in general, the platforms are disappointing. On some subjects the platforms of the major parties are usually in substantial agreement, and on controversial matters they often make broad statements signifying nothing. For example, in 1920, the Republican platform, dodging the issue of the League of Nations, declared for "agreement among the nations to preserve the peace . . . an international association."

The major parties frequently adopt several virtually identical planks because the two parties must appeal to millions who hold essentially the same views on public questions. It is a commonplace that many Republicans whose parents rejoiced in the Square Deal of Theodore Roosevelt have lived without dismay through the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Fair Deal of Harry S. Truman. Equally well known is the affinity of hundreds of thousands of Democrats, especially in the South, for the domestic policies of the right wing of the Republican party.

On what great issue during the last fifty years have Democrats and Republicans lined up and fought as parties? Did all the Republicans at the turn of the century favor "sound money"? Did all the Democrats favor "16 to 1"? Have there not always been both high tariff and low tariff Republicans and Democrats? Did the Democrats unanimously support and the Republicans solidly oppose acceptance by the United States of membership in the League of Nations? Were the Democrats Wet and the Republicans Dry? Was the New Deal legislation the exclusive work of the Democrats, or did most of it have the support of a strong Republican minority? The obvious answers to these questions contain the explanation for the Janus-faced generalizations of the typical party platform.

Suppose the Democratic platform of 1932 had declared for the policies it later put into effect: under the conditions obtaining, the Democrats might still have been victorious, but what Democrats would have dared present such a platform in July 1932? It remained for the Socialist platform to advocate, among other things, appropriations of $10 billion for relief, slum clearance, and public works; unemployment insurance and old-age pensions; legislation to protect farmers and small home owners from mortgage foreclosures; the guarantee of the right of labor to organize; and the recognition of Soviet Russia. Thus, a minor party with no hope of office in the immediate future, and not seeking to attract voters by watering down its program, more nearly stated the policies the successful major party was to carry into effect than did that major party.[2]

CANDIDATES MAY CLARIFY PLATFORMS

If the platforms of the major parties run to generalities and sameness, the Presidential nominees have on more than one occasion given specific issues a clear meaning and emphasis. Thus in 1920, James M. Cox developed more fully the Democratic platform declaration favoring the League of Nations. In 1928, Alfred E. Smith practically changed the Democratic platform pledge from "an honest effort to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment" to an earnest campaign to remove it from the Constitution. Franklin D. Roosevelt's first campaign gave substance and scope to a New Deal not elaborated in his party's platform. In 1940 Wendell Willkie approved a peacetime selective draft, a point on which the Republican platform was silent. Four years later, Thomas E. Dewey went beyond his party's platform in his endorsement of the reciprocal trade program.

It may happen, however, that a candidate will do little to explain and interpret a party platform. Perhaps the best modern example of a candidate's

[2] Charles Edward Merriam and Harold Foote Gosnell, *The American Party System* (4th ed., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 60.

failure to clarify an issue occurred in 1920 when Warren G. Harding "interpreting" the Republican plank in favor of "an international association" seemed always to oppose *the* League, and at times appeared to be for and at other times against *a* league. Neither the position of the party nor that of its nominee for the Presidency was clarified by a statement of 31 distinguished pro-League Republicans to the effect that the election of Harding would be the surest way to "bring America into an effective league to preserve peace."

THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES IN 1952

Foreign policy

Foreign policy probably holds first place as an issue in 1952. It may develop either as a partisan or a nonpartisan issue. The bipartisan policy in reference to European affairs, the policy of the Vandenberg days, has come to grief. It is by no means improbable, however, that we may return to such a policy. A Republican President who is in general accord with our present foreign commitments might easily hold Democratic support, or a conciliatory Democratic President might by skillful and patient consultation with like-minded Republican leaders win support for a bipartisan policy. But there seems to be some doubt as to whether the leadership of an isolationist or near-isolationist President could bring a sufficient number of Republicans and Democrats together to promote a bipartisan policy.[3]

A discussion of a foreign policy of isolation appears to be almost academic. What responsible leader of either party advocates complete isolation? The nearest approach to it is Mr. Herbert Hoover's proposal that we withdraw to the Western Hemisphere. There is, however, a modified isolationism for which Senator Robert A. Taft is the principal spokesman. This policy appears to favor limited obligations and responsibilities in Europe as distinguished from our broader commitments of recent years; to advocate a stronger line in eastern Asia, suggesting from time to time the use of Chinese Nationalist troops; to minimize the danger of Russian aggression; to show a marked lack of confidence in the United Nations; and to take a skeptical view of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The difference between the policy thus briefly sketched and that of the present administration is sufficiently wide to present definite alternatives.

Internal security and civil liberties

The drive against communism and disloyalty in the United States raises the fundamental question of how we can maintain internal security and at the same time preserve our civil liberties, retain or regain "the happy privilege of an American, that he may prattle and print, in what way he pleases, and *without any one to make him afraid.*"[4]

Is the McCarran Act, or a slightly modified McCarran Act, the best possible legislation for dealing with the threat of some thirty thousand Communists in the United States and seven or eight times that number of persons

[3] Professor James L. McCamy very seriously questions the advisability of a bipartisan foreign policy, maintaining that it "removes the proper testing of executive proposals, leaving this function to the chance opposition that might possibly come from individuals who typically will not have as much standing as would a political party." *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 345.

[4] Quoted in John C. Miller, *Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1951), p. 83, from James T. Callender, *The History of the United States for 1796* (Philadelphia, 1797), p. 39.

who are able and ready to do the party's work? Does the McCarran Act in any unnecessary manner menace loyal Americans? Is the Federal Loyalty Program properly balanced between protecting the public service from subversives and guarding the rights of individuals? Have some committees of Congress and a few individual members thereof in their zeal to eradicate Communists and other subversive elements greatly damaged the reputations and impaired the usefulness of certain intelligent and patriotic citizens?

As long ago as 1777, Edmund Burke, in a letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, conceding that liberty must have some restraints, gave this caution: ". . . it ought to be the constant aim of every wise public counsel, to find out by cautious experiments, and rational, cool endeavors, with how little, not how much, of this restraint the community can subsist; for liberty is a good to be improved, and not an evil to be lessened."[5] Dispassionate, nonpartisan discussion of civil liberty is needed in 1952. Such discussion we probably shall not get.

One of our standing issues is that of racial and religious discrimination. Long an announced policy of the Republican party, in the last score of years antidiscrimination has been a Democratic principle also. The parties might even be accused of "nursing the issue," although it should be said that there are constitutional obstacles to be overcome and sectional bitterness to be removed before equality of rights can make any marked progress. As the issue now stands it is one on which we may continue to expect a wide difference between party promises and performances. In both major parties there are large elements that hold to the theory that removal of discrimination is the responsibility of the individual states, and in both parties there may be individuals who believe that a little discrimination is a good thing.

[5] *The Works of Edmund Burke* (London: George Bell and Sons, 8 vols., 1891–1897), Vol. II, pp. 30–31.

Government finance and fiscal policy

The issue of government finance assumes large proportions because of the cost of national defense and aid to the free nations. Whether the present defense policy is continued or an alternative one is adopted, the question of how to meet the cost will remain. Is a "pay as we go" policy possible? How would the proposed constitutional amendment that would limit personal and corporate income taxes to 25 per cent of income affect the revenue system and individual taxpayers? Would a constitutional amendment limiting the amount of government expenditures in any one year to a certain percentage of the national income constitute a realistic approach to the problem of expenditures? Should government borrowing be subject to constitutional limitations? Then there is the question of how to resist or control inflation. How much can be accomplished by wage and price controls; and how much reliance should be placed upon monetary controls by the Federal Reserve System? Can fiscal policy be made an effective instrument for keeping business on an even keel? These are some of the questions the voters should hear discussed. On the whole they are nonpartisan matters, and our political leaders ought to discuss them objectively.

Labor relations

The labor issue continues to be a leading one, particularly the problem of labor disputes in large industries. The Taft-Hartley Act does not appear to be the complete answer. Its 80-day injunction to prevent a strike that would threaten the national health or safety

does not of itself bring about a settlement. What are the alternatives to Taft-Hartley? What is the basic impact of government intervention in major strikes? How can the government intervene in a labor dispute without favoring one side or the other? Is it possible to devise a penalty system that will hit both sides with equal severity? Is compulsory union membership ever justified? Such questions are ever with us in times of emergency, but only a few experts are competent to deal with them, and the public has difficulty in understanding the problems, not only because of their complexities but also because the public is often emotional on labor questions. Decisions on specific labor questions must of necessity be left to our duly chosen officials, but campaign discussion of the basic problem should be profitable to both voters and candidates.

Agriculture

Both major political parties seem committed to price supports for agricultural commodities, although many Americans would like to hear a discussion of the merits of continuing this depression-born device. If such supports are to be continued, should the parity concept be retained? Does it adequately serve agriculture and the national economy? In the matter of foreign trade in agricultural products, questions are raised as to the wisdom of continuing the Wheat Agreement and as to the sense and justice of imposing barriers against the importation of dairy products. What are the best ways and means by which the federal government can support soil conservation? Despite present surpluses we shall later need more production. What should be the relative places of irrigation and soil improvement in meeting this demand? Agricultural economists raise another significant question: What should be done to get young people out of agricultural areas, particularly in the South, where they are not needed and where wages are low to areas where they can find better employment? What suggestions do our political leaders have to offer on this and other essentially nonpartisan questions on farm problems?

Conservation

There is practically no dissent to the proposition that our natural resources should be conserved, but there is considerable disagreement on what constitutes the best type of conservation. Should the states or the United States have title to the oil lands beneath the marginal seas? In other words, should a few coast states have this property, or should it belong to the whole country? This is an urgent question, involving not only millions of dollars but also the broader question of conservation. It is one specific question in relation to conservation that might be directly considered in the campaign and possibly even settled by the election. Another conservation question, one that will probably be a subject of debate for some time to come, is that of the multiple-purpose water resources projects. How far should the federal government go to improve the navigation of our rivers, control their floods, utilize their water for irrigation and their power for generating electricity? Under what system or plan should such enterprises be administered? And what part in hydroelectric development is to be left to private organizations?

Social security

Government responsibility for the aged, the unemployed, and others who might be dependent upon charity seems now to be generally accepted in principle. The issue is on how inclusive such programs of insurance and assistance should be and how substantial the benefits. The outstanding issue at this time appears to be that of national health insurance. Perhaps a single basic question on social security could be phrased in this way: Considering the rapid strides we have made, have we gone far enough to stop for a time and take our bearings?

Ethical standards in government

Surely all political parties and practically all sorts and conditions of men endorse integrity in the public service. But such universality of approval does not preclude public ethics as an appropriate political issue. In the practical world of affairs integrity is often a relative matter. Eternal vigilance is the price of an integrity that goes beyond ordinary money honesty to include such traits of character as the eschewal of "honest graft" and abstention from harmful gossip and slander even to accomplish a noble purpose. Ethical standards maintained in a political campaign are by no means the least significant evidence on which the voter may make his decision respecting the claims of men and parties to public office.

Presidential power

A President may stretch the powers of the office gaily and with gusto, or he may exercise wide powers with reluctance, or he may hesitate when he should act, giving rise to the complaint: Why doesn't he do something? In the twentieth century, however, the complaint is more commonly made against an executive for alleged excessive use of power. Even the normal course of development would gradually change and reshape the executive power, sometimes making it an issue. A crisis, a period of stress, usually forces executive action and hence the issue of power. What are the limits of the executive power to make international agreements, engagements that have practically the same force as treaties? Do the President's powers as Commander in Chief extend to any civilian activities related to the national defense? The President has the Constitution and the statutes for guides, but his actions under them depend upon his understanding of his office.

It is probable that the duties and powers of the President will never be exactly defined. They may be expanded, delimited, and refined by law, judicial decision, and custom, but there will remain areas in which power is in doubt. How could it be otherwise in a country moving rapidly on its own motion and as a result of outside pressures? As the situation changes, the nature of the issue changes, and in consequence its discussion in campaign after campaign is more than a formality. The American people seem generally able to grasp the larger aspects of this problem. It would therefore seem to be a most appropriate one for campaign discussion.

WHAT CAN THE CAMPAIGN DECIDE?

Whatever the issues of a campaign may be, the voter will usually find himself confused. In the first place, candidates and their backers commonly fail to meet some issues squarely. Understandably they want to appeal to as many voters as possible. Consequently, the tendency of party spokesmen is to take a middle course, or at least to avoid specific declarations. Furthermore, public men no less than some of our newspaper publishers and entertainers seem to underestimate the capacity of the public to distinguish, to appreciate, to understand. It is the belief of this writer that the average voter is capable of grasping, indeed eager for, much more solid reasoning than the typical political orator puts into a speech. The intensity with which the people have hung onto the words

of able and sincere men who have "known what they were talking about" —men like Woodrow Wilson, Charles Evans Hughes, Alfred E. Smith, George W. Norris, and William E. Borah—would seem clearly to indicate that the electors will stand for, even prefer, a much richer campaign diet than they usually get.

In the second place, the issues present a problem to the voter because he is often unable to find the party or the candidate who represents his views on all the leading issues. Suppose the voter favors minimum commitments abroad and a very aggressive anti-subversive program at home, a program that calls for a narrow interpretation of the civil liberties guarantees of the Constitution in order that all possible disloyal persons may be located and rendered ineffective. And suppose one party favors this voter's foreign policy and the other party favors his views on internal security? Obviously the voter will have to cast his ballot against one of the policies he favors. The situation of course becomes further complicated as the issues increase in number. If the voter is a good party man he resolves his doubts on the issues in favor of his party. But, if he is of the 25 or 30 per cent of voters with independent leanings, he may be troubled. He must make his choice of party and candidate on the basis of their standing on the main issue or issues.

Possibly the candidates may be more significant in the voter's mind than the issues. The candidates themselves, or one of them, may be the main issue. Or the principal issue may be: "Do we want a change?" or, "Time for a change." Many factors help the voter make up his mind—the traditions of the parties; the issues of the day; personalities; and general impressions. An individual may "feel somehow," and with considerable intelligence, that this is the man or the party for the time. Without having given the matter systematic thought, the American voter knows that compromise, accommodation, and contentment with less than full satisfaction are essential to the operation of free government.

An election may settle one or two principal issues immediately or in months to follow; or it may settle practically nothing. The election of 1896 amounted to an immediate decision *against* gold and silver coinage at the ratio of 16 to 1 and *for* the protective tariff. In 1912 the people seem to have voted for the progressivism of the New Freedom rather than for any specific policy or policies, and in 1920 they resoundingly recorded that they had had enough of it. The election of 1932 proved that the American people, not knowing what to do, were willing to try a bold experiment in government.

Other elections since 1896 would seem to represent general trends rather than hard and fast decisions. The suggestion that burning issues are not settled in every election is no indication of disease in the body politic. Since our elections must come every four years whether or not there are significant issues for consideration, and since issues may arise and be settled between elections, it is not at all to be wondered at that campaign issues are sometimes less than epoch-making.

What issues may we hope to see settled in the campaign and election of 1952? It does not seem probable that the Korean "police action" will be or can be settled by an election. It is possible, even probable, that the political activities of this year will indicate whether co-operation with and aid to the free nations should be continued in their present proportions or substantially reduced. Such issues as civil liberties, labor relations, agricultural promotion, and public finance will probably not be settled. They are continuing issues demanding legislative attention from year to year. We should not expect this election to mark any particular break with the past, as did those of 1920 and 1932. The most that we have reason to expect is that the voters will indicate a general approval of present policies or a preference for some modification of them.

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How Can We Secure Dependable Allies?

By D. F. Fleming

IT is hard to think of a more difficult question than the one raised in the title, or a more urgent one, for the kind of future we are to have depends on finding the right answer.

Can we get and hold enough allies to keep our way of life alive and flourishing in a large part of the world? Or are we doomed to alienate our allies and lose them in a crisis?

Our *volte-face* on the subject of alliances is one of the swiftest and most sweeping developments in our history. Down to 1914 we rejected the very thought of "entangling alliances." We were careful never to call ourselves an ally during World War I, always an "associated power," and afterwards the "no alliance" principle was our slogan for instant retirement into isolation. In World War II we welcomed allies, even Red Russia, and actually called them by that name; but it is only since 1947 that we have actively sought allies.

Our Western Alliance Structure

During the past five years we have accumulated allies at a phenomenal rate. We started with a backlog of some twenty Latin American allies which had stood by us well during both world wars, with the notable exception of Argentina. The addition of Canada, our too often forgotten ally, accounted for all of the Western Hemisphere.

The Truman Doctrine

Greece and Turkey were added on March 12, 1947, when the Truman Doctrine for the containment of both the Soviet Union and communism was proclaimed. This doctrine, which applied throughout the world, expressed our resentment at the Soviet organization of eastern Europe, and our conviction that the land bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa was a strategic position which must be held.

This was during the period of our atomic monopoly, when we believed that we had a decisive weapon which could make our will effective on this planet. President Truman had made up his mind after the first abortive Council of Foreign Ministers, in September 1945, to contain the Soviet Union. Frequently dissuaded from issuing his doctrine, he insisted upon its proclamation in connection with our assumption of Britain's role as the defender of Greece.[1]

In accord with the law of world politics that what seems strictly defensive to one side always seems highly offensive to the other, the Soviets considered containment to mean encirclement. They replied by organizing the chief Communist parties of Europe into the Cominform in September 1947, and the Czechoslovak Communist party seized control of Czechoslovakia in February 1948.

NATO

This act loosed the first real wave of fear throughout the West and led in rapid succession first to a defense treaty between five west European states and then to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, in which twelve Atlantic states contracted to defend each other against attack. The new allies were

[1] See the two authoritative articles by Arthur Krock in *New York Times*, March 23, 25, 1947.

the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had little military substance until the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, coupled with the Soviet achievement of the A-bomb, deeply alarmed the United States. The Truman administration, which had found no way to prevent a gigantic breach in the Truman Doctrine in China, now felt compelled to fight for South Korea. Americans in general feared having to fight a long series of debilitating wars with Soviet satellites without ever being able to strike at the Soviet Union, and the western Europeans feared that this development in Asia would leave them open to Soviet absorption.

German rearmament

France promptly sent two lists of searching questions to Washington, on August 5 and 17, 1950, asking if we would defend Europe on the ground. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff said yes, but insisted on the rearmament of Western Germany and its inclusion in NATO,[2] a demand which surprised the French and British Foreign Ministers when presented suddenly by Secretary Acheson on September 12, 1950. Both demurred, urging the prior development of NATO forces, but after a few days they capitulated to "great pressure."[3] Though they yielded, "the urgency the United States felt over the European and world situation had not been sold to the European powers," and some of them felt that they were "becoming not much better than satellites."[4]

[2] James Reston, *New York Times*, March 2, 1952.

[3] Harold Callender, *New York Times*, September 17, 1950.

[4] Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, December 20, 1950; Daniel Schorr, *Christian Science Monitor*, December 22, 1950.

Effects of our arms drive

Simultaneously the United States launched an enormous military program, calling for 100 billions in two years, applied full pressure on our NATO allies to act accordingly, and launched an intense program of buying raw materials for military use and stockpiling. These moves helped Britain's dollar balances, but made it extremely difficult for our allies to get their share of the needed materials in competition with us, while inflation soared internally among them in response to the rearmament pressures.

Painfully achieved European recovery was distressingly set back, and a new financial crisis began in Britain which no palliatives can solve. Britain must reduce the drain of the Malayan war and her other imperial commitments sharply, along with rearmament, or suffer a slump in her low standard of living that would have incalculable consequences.

Likewise, France must cut the losses of her Indochinese war, both in manpower and in money, if she is to have any chance of balancing Germany in Europe. During the two years since the French proposed the Schuman plan and the European integrated army, the Germans, unburdened by any rebellious colonies, have forged far ahead of France economically into a position of prosperity and ability to finance a new army,[5] while France faces a further reduction in her standard of living which would add to the quarter of her voters who already vote communist.

NATO extended

Meanwhile NATO has been extended to include Greece and Turkey, neither of them Atlantic powers. In July 1951

[5] Theodore H. White, "Germany and the Allies Great Gamble," *The Reporter*, June 24, 1952, pp. 9–14.

the State Department abruptly announced that it favored the entrance of the two Mediterranean powers, and our NATO allies reluctantly acquiesced at the Ottawa Council Meeting on September 20, after exacting promises that the nonmilitary functions of the organization would receive greater attention.[6] "Rightly or wrongly the Western European allies believe Washington has overemphasized the military aspects of the Soviet problem"—a feeling which "reached the proportions of a quiet but stubborn revolt" at Ottawa.[7]

Spain

However, Allied protests have not prevented the United States from taking the ultimate step in alliance-making, the decision to make an ally of Franco Spain which was signalized by Admiral Sherman's visit to Franco in July 1951. After a careful investigation in Washington, Demaree Bess decided that the Franco alliance signified a conclusion by Acheson that "all-out war is almost inevitable."[8] It remains to be seen whether our insistence can gain admission to NATO for Franco over the nearly unanimous moral repugnance of our NATO allies, Portugal excepted, to such an association.

ALLIES IN THE EAST

Concurrent with these developments in Europe we have erected a complete structure of alliances in the Pacific centering in Japan, a peace treaty for her being negotiated through diplomatic channels and ratified by a conference at San Francisco in September 1951.

The terms of the treaty elicited indignant protest from the Philippines, which resented its loss of reparations. This loss was partly compensated by the United States. Burma protested, and India requested three important revisions. Indonesia asked that Communist China be a party. Australia voiced strong objections and joined with New Zealand in vainly requesting that Japan be forbidden to have an air force or a navy.[9]

Britain objected to our desire to have Chiang Kai-shek sign the treaty, but finally accepted an agreement that neither Peking nor Formosa should sign, Japan being free to choose either later.[10] Six weeks afterwards a group of our Senators revealed that John Foster Dulles, the architect of the treaty, had promised them that Japan would sign with Formosa, and she did. Later she recognized the Nationalist government as the government of all China.[11]

The ample provisions for making Japan an American military base aroused resentment in Japan itself. Many Japanese felt compelled to take sides in an explosive world situation. A public opinion poll showed well over half opposed to the continuance of American forces in Japan, and the press almost universally described Premier Yoshida's trip to Washington as "the mission without honor."[12]

Like the Germans, great numbers of Japanese who had just accepted with relief the American teaching that they must abandon armaments and war now learned with shock that the orders were reversed and that the pains of conscription and armaments must now be accepted again.

During the summer of 1951 some thirty changes were made in the treaty draft, all of them comparatively minor. The concessions did not meet the main objections of Burma and India, both of whom refused to attend the treaty signing.

Australia and New Zealand were reassured by a mutual defense treaty with the United States, and a similar pact was signed with the Philippines.

Reference to the treaty "ceremonies" having led to renewed criticism, it was decided to allot four days for discussion, though without any right of amendment. Then the Soviet Union suddenly caused alarm by accepting her invitation to attend. A set of drastic rules of procedure was hastily adopted which allotted to each of the invited delegates a single hour in which to express his views. The Chairman, Secretary Acheson, was given full power to decide all points of order, and he gaveled the Russian and Polish delegates so firmly that he won national applause from the television audience. Even Senator McCarthy agreed that Acheson "did a good gavel-banging job."[13]

Our technical triumph was unquestioned. We had made the former barbaric enemy, Japan, into the apparently docile ally of the present. Yet it was a strange victory. We made a peace deeply affecting Asia in which all of Asia that mattered would have no part. The Soviet Union, China, and India, representing a full billion Asians, were outside the treaty and opposed to it. Even Carlos Romulo, of the Philippines, said at San Francisco: "It is straining credulity to believe that Japan has been completely transformed from the aggressive, feudal, militarist police state which it has been for centuries into a thoroughgoing democracy." James Reston agreed that this was the consensus at the conference. He wrote: "Nobody here has any illusions about the democratization of Japan. Nobody thinks Japan is going to be happy with a United States dole and a United States policeman in the corner."[14]

WEST GERMANY INTEGRATED

Japan having been tied into the American alliance system, Secretary Acheson pursued the drive of our Joint Chiefs of Staff to do the same thing with Germany. At the Rome meeting of the NATO Council, in November 1951, it was made plain that the United States would have a German army, even if it was necessary to "go ahead with some alternative plan for German participation," in the teeth of French opposition.[15] This threat was renewed in February, with the backing of both the Pentagon and the Congress.[16]

The integration of Western Germany into the European Defense Community —with France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—was steadily pushed at the Big Three meeting with Chancellor Adenauer in February 1952 and at the Lisbon meeting of NATO, which set up a permanent secretariat and indicated for NATO a status overshadowing the United Nations.

In the United States the Lisbon con-

[6] *New York Times*, July 20, August 22, September 21, 1951.

[7] James Reston, *New York Times*, November 9, 1951. By that time the pro-American London *Economist* thought that "American policy has become less restrained, less comradely in matters of vital interest to the whole commonwealth." It could not forget that the culminating factor in all defense planning, the atomic weapon, was "treated as an American monopoly." The *Economist*, November 17, 1951, pp. 1165–66.

[8] Demaree Bess, "How Close is War with Russia?" *Saturday Evening Post*, November 24, 1951, p. 25.

[9] *London Times*, July 13; *New York Times*, September 3, 1951.

[10] *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, June 15, 1951.

[11] *New York Times*, August 30–31, 1951, April 28, 1952; *Nashville Tennesseean*, June 19, 1952.

[12] *London Times*, August 16, 17, 20, 1951.

[13] *The Nation*, September 22, 1951.

[14] *The Nation*, September 22, 1951, p. 226; *New York Times*, September 4, 1951.

[15] Edmund Stevens, *Christian Science Monitor*, December 1, 1951.

[16] James Reston, *New York Times*, February 13, 1952.

ference was celebrated as a great victory; but in London the *Times* asked, on February 26, what purpose was served by the talk of fifty divisions in 1952 and a hundred still more imaginative divisions in 1954. This kind of "mock publicity" which attempted "to combine military security with political propaganda" indicated that the military planners "do not really know what they want or what they need." The *Economist,* on March 1, deplored the "round figures, flat assertions and high aspirations tumbled into print together," and bluntly termed it a dishonest practice to pretend "that Franco-German difficulties over a European Defense Community are not so serious after all."

French reluctance to accept German rearmament was expressed in the warning of *Le Monde* that the "autocratic and militaristic apparatus which was responsible for two devastating wars and the ruin of Europe would rise again."[17] Attempting to explain the difficulty in bringing German rearmament about, Reston wrote that behind the resistance to "Mr. Acheson's sudden diplomacy" lay the fact that "the French and Germans had never really accepted the United States estimate of the meaning of Korea, on which the proposal was based in the first place."[18]

On March 10 the entire venture was imperiled by the receipt of a Soviet note proposing the creation of a unified Germany with an army and an air force of its own, neutralized to the extent that it would agree not to join NATO. This offer led to renewed determination in Washington that the negotiations with Germany must be speeded to conclusion before still more attractive Soviet offers could arrive, and both the peace contract with Germany and the European Defense Treaty were signed on May 27, 1952.

The strong pressure of American diplomacy had made another great enemy state into an ally, if the agreements could be ratified by deeply troubled German and French parliaments.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE U.N.

This was recompense for the difficult victories won by the United States in the 1951 U.N. General Assembly meeting at Paris, where Foreign Secretary Eden's opening address contrasted so sharply with the harsh, implacable speech of Acheson that he received warm applause and continued appreciation.

The Soviet motion that the United States was guilty of intervention in the Cominform states, because of the provision in our Mutual Security Act of 1951 that $100,000,000 be spent to aid refugees from those states and help to form them into armed units, was defeated, 42 to 5 with 11 abstaining; though the *London Times* of December 22, 1951 thought it hardly surprising that the Soviets took the provision for organizing and helping "selected persons residing in" those countries to mean spies and saboteurs.

An American proposal which would allow NATO to take command of United Nations forces and those of nonmembers was watered down with a shower of amendments until it had little substance left in it.[19]

The election of a successor to Yugoslavia on the Security Council led to an even more Pyrrhic victory for the United States, which sponsored Greece against the Soviet candidate Byelorussia. Most of the members of the Assembly felt that the gentleman's agreements of 1946, allotting seats geographically, should hold, and all our most dependable allies united in believing that no good could come from insisting on the absolute isolation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Security Council.

These convictions gave Byelorussia a majority on all the early ballots. She led on the eighth ballot 32 to 27, December 6, but by December 13 American pressure reversed the vote 36 to 23. The nineteenth ballot, on December 20, eventually produced the required two-thirds majority for Greece. The vote was 39–16–4. The full power of the United States had been required to compel the Assembly to reverse itself.

On the issue of admitting new members we had a still closer call. "Over bitter United States opposition" the Political and Security Committee voted for the Soviet resolution to admit thirteen waiting applicants to the United Nations, instead of Italy alone, as we desired. The vote was 21–12–25, the 25 abstentions being especially significant. In the Assembly itself the vote was 22–21–16, though the Assembly saved the United States from defeat by accepting its contention that because of the far-reaching importance of the Soviet resolution a two-thirds majority was required.[20]

The extreme difficulty of averting defeat in these cases indicated clearly that future Assemblies are likely to break away from our leadership principle of total hostility to the Soviet bloc.

WHY OUR ALLIES FEAR US

Can we have loyal and dependable allies? We can if our allies feel, and continue to feel, that the alliance gives them two things: military protection, and acceptable living standards. They may accept a reduction of standards for a short time if convinced that their security is really at stake, but it will be extremely difficult to maintain the alliance if standards are depressed in the long run.

Today a large proportion of the people in all the states allied with us believe: (*a*) that the Soviet danger is not so great or so urgent as we think it is; (*b*) that our insistence upon heavy armament at the earliest possible moment unduly imperils and reduces their standards of living; and (*c*) that our rashness and impatience are driving them rapidly toward a world war which will destroy them, whatever it does to ourselves and the Soviets.

These are grave and growing fears; and unless we can remove them, we cannot expect that the vast and complicated structure of alliances which we have so hastily built will hold together. We are a young, impatient people which has suddenly, historically speaking, acquired half the economic power of the world. We have won every war in our history, the late ones bringing us vast increases of wealth and prosperity. No nation has ever successfully defied us, and we are in no mood to permit the Soviet Union to do so. It is therefore very hard for us to examine the fears of our allies objectively, especially when we are subsidizing them very heavily. Yet it is imperative that we should know where we are headed.

Our failure in Korea

In trying to see where we are going, the first step is an understanding that we have woefully mismanaged the Korean war. We went into South Korea, under the banner of the United Nations, to defeat the North Korean aggression. We did that relatively soon, and with

[17] Quoted in *Foreign Affairs,* April 1952, p. 361.

[18] *New York Times,* February 20, 1952.

[19] *New York Times,* September 12, 1951, January 5, 9, 1952.

[20] *New York Times,* January 26, February 2, 1952.

comparatively small loss of life and treasure, thereby winning a great and precious victory for the principle of collective security. Then we decided to invade the North Korean Republic and abolish it, gambling on the extremely long chance that two great communist powers would permit us to establish a model American democracy on their most sensitive and strategic frontier. Another eight months of heavy fighting ensued, resulting in more than a million casualties and ending in a stalemate.

At the end of the first year of war a Soviet offer of a cease fire at the 38th parallel led finally to negotiations, but not before we had decided that the fighting must continue until we had a more defensible line, a little north of the 38th parallel—a decision which set the contest of wills that blocked peace for another year.

When the truce talks eventually got under way, we insisted on "an artificial separation between military and political considerations" which led to intermittent Communist propaganda successes and "resulted in a halting and uncertain approach" to the desired cease-fire objective.[21] Eventually, our mismanagement of the prisoner-of-war question made it the sole issue preventing an armistice, undermined the confidence of our allies in our ability to manage either the larger or smaller issues involved, and left them hanging on the precipice of constant danger that a vastly expanded war in Asia would break out. The mission of Lord Alexander, the British Defense Minister, to Korea in mid-June 1952 to find out for the British Government where it was being led, underlined to the world the fact that the Korean war had become a strictly American deadlock.

[21] Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times*, May 15, 1952.

It did not help, either, that we bombed the Yalu power plants, without notifying our allies, while Alexander was in Washington. The resulting storm in Britain aroused the entire Labor party and deeply embarrassed the Churchill government. "Almost without exception" the principal organs of British public opinion "deplored the failure of the United States to inform and consult Britain in advance," and France complained officially.[22]

By that time it was apparent to everyone that there was no good way out of the Korean war for our side. Simultaneously, it became clear that we had lost the war politically by backing the reactionary regime of President Syngman Rhee, who had been overwhelmingly repudiated by the South Korean people in the election held only a month before the Korean war broke out.

In May and June 1952, with a Presidential election by a hostile National Assembly at stake, Rhee jailed twelve Assemblymen, declared martial law, and threatened to dissolve the Assembly. Flying visits from Generals Van Fleet and Clark apparently induced him not to take troops from the front to enforce his will, but a personal telegram from President Truman expressing "shock" and a similar message from U.N. Secretary General Lie did not resolve Rhee's feud with the Assembly. Instead, he denounced the United Nations, banned the Voice of America from his radio, and heavily censored all foreign publications which criticized his government.

A German Korea?

This record in Korea does not incline our allies in Europe to certainty that the American prescription for Germany and Europe is infallibly right. If

[22] Clifton Daniel, *New York Times*, June 29, 1952.

the Americans have so plainly overreached themselves in Asia, may they not also do it in Europe?

There is a great deal to be said for our effort to force the unification of western Europe around Western Germany. The whole area is a deficit and declining region; unification might save it. But there is not much historical warrant for believing that we can compel federation in order to create a powerful bulwark for our defense.

The quick arming of Western Germany also opens up the immediate prospect of a vaster Korea in the heart of Europe. A new army in West Germany means a rival army in East Germany. The East Germans have already laid waste a border zone down the center of Germany, preparatory to closing the border. The West German enclave in Berlin has a sick economy which must grow gradually weaker even without a new blockade, which the Soviets are now in position to impose without fear of any effective reprisal short of a world war.

There is no reason to believe that the West Germans will give up their passion for unity, and our plan gives them no prospect of achieving it except by building up such superior armed strength that, with the support of the United States, they can enforce the unification of Germany upon the Soviet Union. This is the direction in which our policy plainly points, and the successful development of West German military power would enable us eventually to take down the Iron Curtain, as we did the 38th parallel, at the cost of another world war.

This is the logic of a world split evenly in two, with every important country which is not a satellite of the Soviet Union or China committed in alliance to the United States. Such an organization of the world is logical and thoroughgoing, but it leaves small hope of survival to our democratic allies in western Europe. For this reason they must try to draw back somewhere short of that complete and frightful destruction with which the forcible unification of Germany threatens them. Our allies know that Japan was not a matter of life and death to the Soviet Union, but that Germany is.

East-West trade

Another reason powerfully impels our allies to break with us—the stern insistence, expressed in our Battle Act, that they must cease to trade with the communist half of the world in any goods which might have military value. This act required the Mutual Security Director to terminate aid to our allies who sell "strategic" goods to the communist bloc countries.

Our allies agree to the principle. The difficulty comes in deciding which of thousands of items are really strategic. There is great leeway for disagreement; our interpretation is strict, and theirs in favor of trade.

This is a crucial matter to countries like Germany and Japan, which might develop a large trade with the expanding industrial systems of the Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and China. Indeed, no one has ever explained how Japan is to live permanently without renewing economic intercourse with the Asiatic mainland, and it is equally impossible to foresee expanding markets for a swiftly resurgent Germany outside of the communist lands. Without such trade, these two highly industrialized powers must cut increasingly into Britain's precarious world livelihood, to mention only one consequence.

Our European allies need to restore trade with the East. It is vital to some of them, and it becomes increasingly so as the current drive in this country to

raise tariffs and keep out their goods gains momentum. Our allies have a powerful long-term interest in restoring East-West trade, in order to live, to raise their standards of living, and to gain independence from us.

For these reasons our drive to throttle trade between the two worlds will be self-defeating if continued much longer.

What price defense?

It is essential to our future safety and security to recognize that we have let the Korean war throw us, and the entire world of our allies, dangerously off balance. Instead of conducting a careful and prudent police operation, we not only got ourselves into an impasse in Korea, but jumped to the conclusion that we and our allies must and would prepare at forced draft to fight victoriously in every part of the globe, on land and sea and in the air. This cataclysmic decision brought our allies face to face with the acceptance of inevitable war, and it misread the long-term nature of our world struggle with communism, which is mainly an ideological and political conflict, not a military one.

SOME REQUISITES FOR DEPENDABLE ALLIES

We can have dependable allies if we will do these things:

1. *Moderate the arms race*

The evidence is overwhelming that we have overburdened our allies. Harvard economist Sumner H. Slichter summed it all up in his article in the January 1952, *Atlantic,* "Rearmament: Too Much, Too Soon." The living standards of our allies have been undermined in three ways: by leaving less goods for consumption, by raising the price of Europe's imports faster than her exports, and by inflation. Even more serious, our feverish arms drive is reversing the spirit and the policy of the Marshall plan. It is time, says Slichter, "to halt the retrogression in the quality of thinking on national security and foreign policy that has characterized the United States for more than a year."

We should pause to consider that "security has meaning only to nations whose peoples have social gains to preserve." [23]

The economic effects of our intense pressure for arms have already produced a rightist government in France, and the rightist parties are growing in Italy. "If across all Europe the Atlantic alliance has to be imposed by governments of the Right against the opposition parties of the Left and the working classes, the alliance will lose greatly in prestige and strength." [24]

Surely this is an understatement. It is too late for a neofascist Europe to succeed. But developments may not go that way. Excessive prosecution of the cold war by us may produce a leftist government in Britain and a de Gaullist regime in France, both dedicated to emancipation from us—along with a growth of communism in France, Italy, and elsewhere.

2. *Negotiate settlements as we go*

The Acheson policy of no negotiation

[23] Quoted from the excellent study by William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, *Britain and America in the Era of Total Diplomacy,* Princeton Center of International Studies, March 1952, p. 39. The best economic study is *Rearmament and Anglo-American Relations,* The Brookings Institution, January 1952. See also the entire issue of the *Columbia Journal of International Affairs,* "American Foreign Policy: a Critique from Abroad," Winter, 1951.

[24] Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiger, "Premier Pinay and the Men of Vichy," *The Reporter,* June 24, 1952, p. 9. See also in the same magazine, "Italy: A Fighting Chance," by Claire Sterling.

with the U.S.S.R. until we have developed "situations of strength" is heavy with the implication that we will not negotiate until we are strong enough to impose our will. Do we really believe that the Soviets would yield East Germany when we had mere parity of strength? And what kind of predominant power would it require to compel her to abandon eastern Europe to us?

The idea that we can have a grand settlement with the communist world, all around the globe, when we are finally "strong enough," is a complete illusion. The result can only be world war, as all our European allies, old in experience with alliances, know well. Either the weaker side will strike while there is time, or the dominant side will eventually dictate its will on the battlefield.

There is no hope whatever in amassing power for a final diplomatic showdown. There is hope only in Foreign Minister Eden's formula of building peace "gradually, agreement by agreement." That means the liquidation of profitless wars in Asia, and it means an early German settlement which will remove the nightmare of another German-Soviet war from the minds of the Germans, the Soviets and their allies, and all of *our* allies.

If this means a united and neutralized Germany, armed for defense but belonging to neither side, who is to say that this would be worse than another war? There would be dangers; there will always be dangers; but would they not be more manageable than those involved in a plunge toward the Koreanization of Germany? That prospect is likely to lose us all of our European allies, for they can survive only if war is avoided.

3. *Welcome third forces and promote deviations in the communist world*

Our ruling dogma that everybody must choose sides and belong to one alliance system or the other is self-defeating. The bulk of the Arab-Asian world is determined to be neutral. There are European states which will not abandon their neutrality, and others which can be pushed into it.

It is an illusion, also, to insist that Moscow can control indefinitely the vast Chinese people, now coming swiftly into the modern age. Moscow has already lost one important satellite, Yugoslavia, and when the current wars subside it should be our policy to give others, especially China, alternatives to a tight embrace with Moscow, and an atmosphere conducive to greater independence.

In a world balanced among several powers, all of them on speaking terms in the United Nations, we should not have to have scores of allies everywhere. It may well be wiser to stop with NATO and the British Commonwealth than to seek sure supremacy and perhaps get universal disaster.

4. *Accelerate economic aid to our allies and the depressed peoples*

The question of economic aid is the most difficult transition facing us. Our military complex leads us to make economic aid the handmaiden of military policy. That is one of the main reasons why we lost the Chinese people; they did not wish to be our bulwark. And the Europeans may come to the same conclusion. There is weighty evidence behind the statement of Dr. George B. Cressey that no other country is as alarmed as we are, and he adds: "Since World War II, we as a nation have deliberately tried to buy friendship and have failed." [25]

We shall continue to fail, also, as long as we try to get credit and returns for ourselves. Only when we seek to help the depressed peoples for their

[25] George B. Cressey, *Foreign Policy Bulletin,* January 15, 1952, p. 2.

own sakes, and preferably through the United Nations, will we achieve real headway in making friends and averting communism. A Chilean delegate to the U.N. has warned us that because of depressed living standards "90 per cent of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America are indifferent to the struggle against Communist aggression." [26]

It is vital, also, that we should increasingly buy the goods of our allies. Doles and subsidies are no substitute for the satisfaction of earning one's own way. Our long-term penchant for selling much more to the world than we buy may finally cost us the loyalty of our allies.

5. *Substitute prodemocracy for anticommunism*

The ideological conflict is another area where emphasis means everything. We cannot advance our cause merely by excoriating and fighting communism. Nor can we protect our way of life by bolstering all the reactionary, feudalistic elements in the world. That is a losing struggle. Only by living, believing, and practicing democracy, at home first, can we recover the dynamic appeal which will extend our way of life in the world, not merely "defend" it.

6. *Resolutely strive to avoid war*

Avoidance of war is the decisive te: by which all our allies will ultimatel judge us.

There is a world morality whic transcends all racial and national boun daries, and it is coming to the conclu sion that modern war is ridiculous senseless, and intolerable. No nation however mighty, can any longer affor to let the old cycle of rivalry, fear arms race, and war grind through to its appointed conclusion. It has become absolutely imperative that national "defense" be kept from mushrooming over into disaster in the ancient manner.

It is essential to remember constantly, also, that our reservoir of good will in the world is already considerably diminished. For example, no single American believes for a minute that we have waged germ war in Korea; but it is not necessary for us to be guilty of bacteriological war to be convicted of it, since our use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, plus our bombing in Korea, has prepared the mind of the Asiatic world, and beyond, to believe that we are capable of anything. Our free use of napalm in Korea deepens that impression.

The Council of the Federation of American Scientists pointed out, on May 9, 1952, that "the question raised in the world's mind is not so much whether we did *use* BW in Korea, but whether we are in fact *prepared* and *willing* to use it in the future." [27]

We need to bear in mind incessantly that the nation which is believed by world opinion to be responsible for another world war will be such an anathema to mankind that all its lethal weapons are likely to fail. The nation which has ready the vastest quantities of these frightful weapons, and is believed to be willing to use them, is also the one most likely to be held responsible by world opinion if they are used.

[26] *The Nation,* December 8, 1951, p. 493. There is growing resentment among our Latin American allies over our long-continued absorption with the problems of other continents, which the July visit of Secretary Acheson to Brazil will hardly remove. Our southern friends feel neglected, and they are resentful over our sternness in fixing the prices of their raw materials, while the prices of their imports from the United States soar. They also fear that NATO is swamping U.N., and are apprehensive about being involved in war. Some are considering an increasingly independent attitude in U.N. Robert M. Hallett, U.N. correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor,* May 19, 1952.

[27] *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* June 1952, p. 130.

THE FUTURE

Beyond these changes of tactics in our search for security and peace, it is equally essential that there should be an accompanying moderation of methods in dealing with our allies.

Our great power gives us a duty to lead, but it does not give us the right to win every vote, and make every decision and enforce it on the small fry in our camp. We cannot treat our allies as satellites, since we do not have the totalitarian power to enforce our decisions. Ours must often be the deciding voice, but a fixed habit of insisting that our voice be equal to our paying power will be fatal to our alliances. Wisdom does not always go with wealth.

In a world which is sick to death of war and the fear of it, the preservation of loyal allies requires a great deal of patience, prudence, and tolerance, as well as some firmness. It means the acceptance of less than ideal solutions, and the sinking of our national will in the common good. We must learn both to lead and to collaborate. We cannot afford to continue to appear to our allies as "a young giant whose impetuous and headstrong intervention in Old World politics appears to follow no predictable pattern." [28]

The game of balance-of-power politics has always been very dangerous, but the current version is the riskiest of all. We had better play it cautiously, coolly, and with iron restraint, for it cannot be played through to its usual end without giving western civilization its death blow. Communism thrives on war and chaos, as its conquest of half the world during the past two world wars amply proves; neither democracy nor capitalism does. Our need for peace and order and slow evolution is negated by the anarchy of ever more colossally destructive wars.

We cannot really look forward to the future with confidence until we have disposed of the chief bones of contention in the cold war and returned to belief in a universal United Nations with enough moral authority to alleviate and regulate the stresses and strains in an ever changing world society.

[28] Fox and Fox, *op. cit.* note 23 *supra,* p. 14.

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Policy of Containment

By David J. Dallin

THE American popular attitude toward foreign affairs at the present time is governed by a set of controversial impulses. There is indignation about what we politely call the "dynamism" of the Soviet government—its course of action and line of propaganda—and at the same time there prevails a deep-seated urge to appease, not to offend, and not to provoke the opponent. On the one hand, the conviction is general that preparation for defense on a large scale is the only way to avoid a hot war; but simultaneously the American people and the United States Congress seek to avoid new, heavy expenditures in order to prevent inflation, and thus they retard the process of remilitarization. That help must be given to Europe has become an almost universal precept in this country; on the other hand, there is a growing disappointment with Europe's insufficient efforts and anti-American sentiments. Finally, there is the juxtaposition of Europe and the Far East: shall we concentrate on Europe and try to solve the Far Eastern conflict in a compromise, or shall we pay more attention and send more men and supplies to the sore spot of international affairs, Korea and Japan?

Public opinion is torn between these extremes. On the solution of the questions involved depends the course of foreign policy of the future administration—indeed, in view of the present role of the United States in world affairs, the fate of the world.

The situation is unprecedented, not only for the United States but for Europe as well. Europe has known Russia as an expansionist power for two centuries. A state of great tension, a kind of cold war, has often existed in the relations between St. Petersburg on the one hand and London and Paris on the other. But the Kremlin of our day is not the simple heir to St. Petersburg of the nineteenth century, nor is Washington merely the successor to London in the family of the great powers.

Background for Stalin Foreign Policy

Stalin's course in international affairs since the end of the war has been part of his general concept of Soviet foreign policy. And the basis of his general concept is essentially a modified theory of Lenin and Lenin's predecessors about the so-called "marschrout"—the itinerary of the Social Revolution.

From Karl Marx, from Friedrich Engels, from the Socialist International, and from his Russian teachers, Lenin had inherited the old, classical concept of the transformation from a capitalist to a socialist society. Dependent on her history and her present social setup, the theory went, each country, sooner or later, enters a period of political tension which more often than not will assume forms of political violence. At the end of this revolutionary path will stand a society renovated in a political as well as in a social sense.

However, the bell does not toll for all nations at the same time; rather, revolutions will develop without logical or geographical regularity. Today they will flare up in central Europe, tomorrow in the Far East, then in America, then perhaps in Europe again, and so on. This drawn-out process of social revolution will be like summer lightning at night, flashes occurring in any part

of the darkened sky without visible order—in the north and south, east and west, in a sequence close to chaos. Only at the very end of this protracted critical stage will the great transformation, engulfing the whole globe, be completed and the battered strongholds of capitalism be replaced by the edifice of Socialism.

Even after Lenin and his party had attained power in Russia this concept prevailed for a long time. Russia's influence in world affairs was based on ideology rather than on force, and Lenin saw no reason to credit the first Soviet country with more than secondary importance in the conflict between the old order and the new. His Russia was poor and weak, its army badly trained and badly supplied. He looked to other nations not only for economic assistance but even for new revolutionary initiative. He saw Russia as only the source of inspiration and a haven for its standard-bearers.

Lenin died without revising the inherited concept. Trotsky, who died sixteen years after Lenin, remained faithful to it until his very end.

The Stalin Doctrine

The Stalin doctrine, which was ripening in the first stage of Soviet history, deviated from these concepts. Stalin had seen the first Communist government in Hungary suppressed by Admiral Horthy while his Russia stood by unable to help. A little farther to the west a Communist government emerged in Bavaria; no outside assistance was forthcoming, and it was destroyed. On the other hand, wherever the Red Army was able to arrive in time and fight, the chanoes of a Communist victory appeared high. Independent Georgia was quickly transformed into a Soviet republic in 1921; so was the "Far Eastern Republic" when the Japanese withdrew in 1922. Socialist transformation will be successful—Stalin drew the conclusion for himself—only if and where the military force of the first Soviet fatherland is able to penetrate.

In other words, only revolutions in areas adjacent to Russia can be assisted to the extent necessary to achieve victory. Once transformed into Socialist organisms, these territories can either be formally incorporated into the Soviet Union or, for special reasons and for a certain time, allowed to retain their formal status of sovereign nations. "History has shown," Stalin told the Party Congress in 1921, "that single nations, if they set up the Soviet system, are not able to live as separate units while imperialism reigns outside the Soviet sphere and to defend themselves successfully without the economic and *military assistance of the adjacent Soviet republic.*" A year later Stalin announced that "access to the Soviet Union is open to all Soviet Republics: to those that exist and those that will emerge in the future."

In this concept, the role of Russia, of the Russian state, of Russia's military power, of Russia's government is raised to such a height that Russia overshadows all other nations, great or small, advanced or backward. Russia is the great center of the expanding Socialist community. This community expands in *concentric circles*. There is no longer any trace of the old theory of spontaneous and irregular social revolutions. In the new conception, the Socialist world grows like an ink spot on blotting paper. The role of popular movements, barricades, and revolutionary fighting diminishes almost to the vanishing point. The military might of the great Socialist Fatherland now does the job.

Furthermore, it is the duty of the Soviet government and of every Russian Communist, the Stalin doctrine says, to promote the expansion of the great Socialist community until it embraces at

least all the great nations. No respite is permitted so long as the roads are not blocked and progress is possible. This basic precept of Stalinism underlies the "dynamism," or relentless expansion, which we have been witnessing for the last thirteen years.

The notion of Russia's new *grandeur* and decisive role in the abolition of capitalism makes it necessary to preserve her from all danger, and this is the other side of the medal. To the adherents of this doctrine Russia's downfall today would be a catastrophe. To prevent this, and for this purpose to make concessions to foreign powers, is just as reasonable and necessary as it is to expand by leaps and bounds when the possibility offers.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Here is precisely where the Truman Doctrine stepped in. If, out of apprehension for its very life, the dynamic Soviet regime can become cautious and moderate, then a different policy by the United States might produce what the earlier pro-Soviet attitude had failed to achieve. In a direct challenge to Moscow, President Truman called on the nation, on March 12, 1947, "to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them *totalitarian regimes*." Three months later the Congress took the first steps to increase the United States military forces. What the lofty principles of all the charters had failed to achieve—Washington was saying by implication—must be won, in Dean Acheson's words, by a "situation of force."

The task in Washington now was to find the most vulnerable spot in the Soviet armor and then to let loose on it a rain of cold war arrows. This search became a continuous groping that lasted several years.

Moscow was not much impressed by the first American moves and marched consistently on. The Soviet radio and press, of course, accused the American government of aggressiveness, of preparation for war, of a capitalist-profit motivation. But Moscow refused to revise its course, because, in its view, no real force was behind the "Truman threats." Never had the preponderance of Soviet military power over that of the United States been as great as in 1947 when the doctrine was announced in Washington.

Challenges to the Truman Doctrine

Two months after the announcement came the first real Soviet reaction. This occurred in Hungary. In May 1947 the Communist Party, having won only 22 per cent of the votes in the elections, overthrew the democratic state structure and seized all power. President Truman described the upheaval as an "outrage" and promised that "the United States would not stand idly by." As a matter of fact, the United States had to stand idly by because it had no weapon other than words.

The second challenge to the Truman Doctrine was sounded in February 1948, when governmental power in Czechoslovakia was actually seized by the Communist Party. This was followed, as usual, by a reign of terror and the tightening of ties with Moscow. On March 17 President Truman, in his message to Congress, termed the situation "crucial." Again no action could be taken.

The next Soviet challenge in Europe came a few months later. This was the blockade of Berlin, the brain child of Vyacheslav Molotov, and approved, of course, by Stalin. The temptation to oust the Western powers from Berlin was very great. If it succeeded, the prestige of Soviet Russia, her superiority over her Western opponents, her invincibility, and the utter emptiness of the Truman Doctrine would be demonstrated to the peoples of Europe with such convincing force that subsequent successes would be easy—or so it seemed to Moscow.

The conflict developed between July 1948 and April 1949. It proved to be a failure for Moscow—in fact, the first telling defeat in Russia's postwar drives. It must be recognized, however, that this failure was not due to America's policy alone. Other events played a prominent role in the developments of 1948–49, and among them the defection of Tito in Yugoslavia was of primary importance. Yugoslavia, highway to industrial northern Italy, a Communist stronghold, was also the base of support of the Communist rebellion in Greece. With her army, then the best among all the satellites, Yugoslavia initially was the great hope of Moscow as far as the southeast of Europe was concerned. That was why Moscow postponed the first break with Belgrade for almost two years.

When the break did come, it meant that new limits had to be set to the Soviet drive. The Communist campaign in Greece was doomed; Italy's precarious situation improved overnight; the Yugoslav conflict with Austria ended. The whole situation became unfavorable for the Soviet offensive. The loss of Yugoslavia and Greece and the defeat in Berlin were the high lights of the European situation in 1948–49. The consequence of these failures, apart from the demotion of Molotov, was a shifting of Soviet attention and Soviet forces to the Far East, at least for the time being. Now the logical fields for Soviet "dynamism" were China, Korea, and Japan.

Soviet expansionist drives

The four years from 1944 to 1948 were that unique period in Russian history when a Russian government was in a position simultaneously and successfully to engage in expansionist drives in Europe and the Far East. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has been one of the few nations (Germany is another) with both its western and eastern frontiers dangerously vulnerable. While such a situation opens great new vistas, the policy and strategy of a two-front power are inevitably complex and difficult. In fact, her two fronts have often been a source of trouble for Russian governments in the past. Strong resistance in Europe (such as the Russian defeat in the Crimean War in 1856) would have the effect of diverting the attention of St. Petersburg to central Asia or the Far East; failure in the Orient (for example, the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5) would bring increased Russian activity in Europe.

It would have eased the tension considerably if the diversion of Soviet activities to the Far East in 1949 had been consistent and systematic and part of a great concept. At least, Europe would have been secure from new offensives for the foreseeable future; stability would have returned to the Continent, and whatever conflicts might loom in the Orient, they would not compare, in bloodiness, in destruction, in their impact on civilization, with total war on the plains of Europe.

The Soviet "German Problem"

Yet the shift of Moscow's particular attention to the Chinese-Korean-Japanese triangle was purely empiric, not programmatic, and it was provisional, not constant. Things had reached such a stage that, even if Moscow wanted to,

it could not simply recede from central Europe. Retreat from East Germany would mean more than the loss of an industrial area with its millions of skilled and intelligent inhabitants. If Germany were reunited, it would border on the satellite states of Poland and Czechoslovakia, while Austria, Germany's neighbor and natural ally, borders on southeastern Europe. A reunited Germany with her 66 million population, the first nation in Europe after Russia, would exert the strongest influence on the long belt of Soviet satellites. Stalin does not believe in an effective and durable demilitarization of Germany. He has stated that, in his view, a period of twenty years is about the maximum of effectiveness of forcible demilitarization, as far as Germany is concerned.

In the complex relationship of neighboring nations there develops something that might be called "Radiation of Power." It is the case of a small state adjacent to a great power with a strong government; the former complies with the wishes, interests and demands of the strong neighbor and submits to it without a shot being fired. Through trade, propaganda, bribes, and in devious other ways, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia both have been in a position to influence the fate of their smaller neighbors. The same was true of old Austria-Hungary and Imperial Russia. Today even Finland and Sweden, though free and non-Communist, cannot adhere to the Atlantic community and cannot fight their Communist parties as they wish because of the influence radiating from the Soviet capital.

As soon as an independent Germany is reunited and its waves again strike at the borders of the east-European satellites, a new situation will arise for the Soviet Union.

The stronger Germany grows as an industrial and war-potential nation, the more shaky will become Moscow's hold on its satellites. The very existence of the Soviet empire in Europe will be put in question. Either the Kremlin will abandon its proud edifice of its own accord or it will be forced to do so. Either development would mean a defeat of the first magnitude. After the sky-high hopes of the last decade, such a retreat might imply, for the first time, a profound internal crisis.

This is the real meaning of the "German problem" for Russia today. It is also the reason why the Soviet government, which, as we have seen, was not disturbed by the Marshall plan or the Truman Doctrine, nor even by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty,[1] has reacted violently to the first real steps toward a resurrection of Germany and the creation, under any form, of a non-Soviet German armed force.

After the meager success of all its past attempts to "contain" Russia, the United States has cautiously, almost timidly, seized the lever capable of upsetting the balance.

GERMANY IN THE SOVIET TREATIES OF ALLIANCE

The Soviet satellite bloc is based on a number of treaties between Moscow and each of the satellite governments. In every case, with no exception, the German danger is advanced as the reason for this international coalition. According to the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Alliance (1945), the two nations will take all necessary steps "to prevent the menace of aggression *on the part of Germany or any other state uniting with Germany* directly or in any other form"; in case of such aggression, the partner is required to enter the war as an ally.

The Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Alliance (February 1948) aims "to remove the menace of renewed aggression on the part of Germany or of any other state uniting with Germany in whatsoever form"; in case one of the two allies is involved in a war with Germany "or with another state acting with Germany," the other party is under obligation to assist.

The same wording was chosen for the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty (February 1948) and the Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty (March 1948).

Germany as the source of danger has been the most convenient pretext for treaties actually pointed at the United States and Britain. There was, however, more than merely a propaganda motive in this reference to Germany: in Stalin's political concepts, as well as in Russia's traditional strategical blueprints, Germany is the only country with whom a war in Europe can be fatal for the Russian nation.

From the events of the last fifteen years, from the Soviet-Nazi Pact, the German-Russian war, the Soviet-American conflicts on the German issue, the West could have learned much concerning the place Germany occupies in the Soviet concept. To Russia in general, no other country and no other international issue can be as important as Germany.

As an ally, Germany is a shield; it makes Russia invincible. As Russia's enemy, Germany is ominous; war with Germany in coalition with the West would be fatal. The slogan of a Soviet Germany inspired the Communist International for two decades because it was actually Stalin's main blueprint. Stalin's fateful delusion that Hitler's advent to power in 1933 was the brief prelude to a Soviet Germany was responsible for the passivity of the Communist Party in the face of the Nazi danger.

In December 1931 Emil Ludwig, the German writer, asked Stalin in the course of an interview:

"Everywhere in Russia I have observed an extraordinary respect for everything American, even a worship of everything American. Is this impression correct?"

"You exaggerate," Stalin replied. "We have no special respect for everything American. . . . If one is to speak about our sympathies for any nation or, to be more correct, for the majority of any nation, one would, of course, speak of our sympathies for the Germans. There can be no comparison between these sympathies and our feelings for the Americans."

SOVIET MILITARY CONCEPTS

In Russia's military concepts as well, Germany occupies a most prominent place. The view that mainly land forces will have to resolve the East-West controversy is part of the traditional Russian conception, as it is of the specific Communist ideology. The possibility of victory by air power alone has no place in Russia's blueprints; her great expanse would reduce the effectiveness of air attacks. Still less importance is ascribed to atomic weapons. Nor do Soviet military authorities accept the notion that sea power can be decisive. Russia's continental nature makes her almost invulnerable in a naval war unless it is coupled with an offensive on land. In addition, a land army is "the people in arms," "the masses," whose great role better accords with Marxist ideology.

Thus Moscow does not believe that the Anglo-American bloc, mainly—at least initially—a sea-air force, can inflict a great defeat on the Soviet Union. Germany, on the other hand, is the one nation that can rival Russia in Europe.

In some respects the situation in the Far East is similar to that in central

[1] When the treaty was signed it was announced that the new Defense Community would not be enlarged to include Germany.

Europe. In all of the Soviet conceptions of the Orient, priority goes to Japan—Japan's policies, Japan's military forces. Not Korea, not Indochina, not even China herself, occupies first place in the Soviet blueprints. It has always been Japan. Even the Korean war of 1950–52 is actually a war about Japan.

The situation in the Far East since 1945 is reminiscent of the great Russian drive toward Manchuria and Korea at the start of the present century. The Siberian railroad had just been completed, and the Russian armies newly dispatched to the East were so overwhelming a force that no nation was expected to resist. Britain, the dominant power of that period, was forced to stand aside. A solution was reached by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, followed by the war in 1904–5; the court cabal, which actually ruled at St. Petersburg at the time, was not intelligent enough to foresee Russia's inevitable defeat in a war.

The present Russian government is more enlightened and better prepared than was its predecessor fifty years ago. It may retreat before it engages in a hopeless military affair. It will not retreat, however, before an American or a United Nations force alone; and a Formosa-Chinese force cannot attain sufficient status as a military power. This is why Russia will employ every means to prevent the rearmament of Japan.

The treaty of alliance between Soviet Russia and Communist China, signed in February 1950, contains essentially the same formula as the satellite treaties of Europe, but here Japan replaces Germany as the convenient pretext for the anti-American combination. The two allies, the treaty says, will take all necessary steps to prevent a new "aggression and breach of the peace on the part of Japan or of *another state which would directly or indirectly combine with Japan* in acts of aggression." In such case the two nations are required to render one another military assistance.

In the Far East the Russian government is apprehensive of no Western power unless it acts in alliance with Japan.

TECHNIQUES OF DIPLOMACY

As far as the techniques of American-Soviet relations are concerned, considerable revision is urgently needed—with the clear understanding, however, that no kind of technique can play more than a secondary role; that the relations of the two nations unfold against a background of power relationships; and that therefore nothing fundamental can be achieved so long as the "situation of force" remains unchanged.

Long-drawn-out international conferences and propaganda speeches by Soviet delegates have become a standard method of Soviet foreign policy; invective and insults are hurled broadside at the Western nations. In this connection it is important to remember an agreement concluded between Maxim Litvinoff and Joachim von Ribbentrop at the end of 1938 (when Nazi Germany had already grown strong and Moscow feared her power) to the effect that the press, the radio, and, in general, the propaganda line of the two countries should refrain from attacking or insulting the two respective Leaders. Another instance of amazingly fast work was the Soviet-German conference in Moscow on August 23, 1939, when, in the course of 24 hours, two agreements were concluded which shook the world to its foundations.

There is room for much revision in the techniques practiced by the United States at the present time. It is not necessary, for example, to accept every Soviet suggestion of a conference, for fear that refusal might be interpreted as a hostile move. Normal diplomatic channels can often serve better than parleys.

Flaws in American techniques

Too often the propaganda angle is overlooked by the West in dealing with these conferences and with diplomatic notes; Moscow has been more skillful in this respect. Not only have the diplomatic documents emanating from Washington been restrained in their language, but, in general, they are too matter-of-fact and businesslike. Their effectiveness would be considerably increased if their influence on public opinion were taken into consideration.

There is also need for a degree of synchronization of public statements made by the President, members of the government and members of Congress as well as support from the press. The amount of uniformity is limited, of course, by the very nature of a democratic system. Within the framework of a democratic setup, however, better-organized publicity on international issues would greatly strengthen Western policy.

The "bacteriological war" campaign against the United States was launched by Moscow as early as January 1952, but the American side simply overlooked it until it reached tremendous proportions three months later. It would have been possible to turn the tide of propaganda against the Communists if the meaning of the drive had been grasped earlier. It should have been pointed out that ever since 1925 the Soviet side has shown a great interest in methods of germ warfare, and that it was the intention of the Communist Korean-Chinese Command to use bacteriological weapons in a new offensive under the cover of "retaliation."

Reciprocity is another principle that should be applied with greater vigor in the West's relations with the Soviet bloc. For example, the United States Government publishes the magazine *America* in Russian and allegedly has distributed some 20,000 copies in Russia, but, in exchange, the embassies of Moscow and its satellites have made abundant use of America's printing resources. Whether *America* reaches the Russian readers is doubtful; that Soviet satellite propaganda is flourishing is a fact. It was only recently that, for the first time, a publication by the Polish Embassy in this country was banned.

The Soviet bloc has a large staff, diplomatic and other, in this country, while American personnel in the respective satellite countries has been cut to a minimum. Certain members of the Soviet-satellite staffs (military attachés and others) serve openly as the chiefs of espionage for their countries, relying on their diplomatic immunity.

The American diplomatic personnel in Moscow and in the satellite capitals are closely watched in every move they make, their travel is restricted, their opportunities for contact with the population are almost nil. The first steps toward reciprocity were taken by the State Department early this year, but a more consistent policy is possible.

"Containment"—long-term implications

For several years "containment" was just a notion, the abstract term "doctrine" being the most appropriate word found to define the new political course of the United States Government. The notion was empty; a long experimental period was needed to learn how best to give it content.

The inference drawn after a few years that limited revival of the defeated nations is advisable is further proof that no essential parts of the global setup can be simply eliminated, and no arbitrary international structure

can be imposed by the will or whim of any one group, not even by the victors in a great war. A world built around a certain number of great nations cannot find a balance unless the other nations continue to exist and to function. Political nature, too, seeks to avoid a vacuum.

This principle, which is slowly becoming a maxim of American policy, does not imply, of course, that the great and bloody conflict of 1941–45 can be forgotten or that the potential aggressiveness of the defeated nations should be overlooked. Once the great threat from the Soviet empire has been removed, it will be the first and most urgent task of the pacified world to prevent a resurrection of aggressive, bellicose, and expansionist movements in other parts of the globe. The ideas, principles and charters of a united world, discussed at such length in the United Nations during the last seven years, will then attain significance and purpose. The question of disarmament will be placed on the agenda, and the ghost of the United Nations itself will return to real life. And then, perhaps —but not until this stage is reached— the noble dream of a world government will become a reality.

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Is Isolation Possible and if Possible Desirable?

By FRANK M. RUSSELL

ON a June day in 1914 at Sarajevo a Bosnian student shot and killed Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife. One month later Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Under the system of alliances of the day a chain reaction resulted, and shortly the great powers of Europe were at war.

The first reaction of President Woodrow Wilson to these developments was one of startled dismay. It was also authentically American. To him, the war was "this incredible European catastrophe." [1] Likewise, to Americans in general it was the latest of "Europe's wars," the resultant of the "European system." And it was a "catastrophe" which could only mean death to millions of men, widespread destruction, and the disruption of civilized life.

It was inevitable that the outbreak of a general war should bring painful disillusionment to millions of sincere pacifists on both sides of the Atlantic. Many had confidently expected that the spread of democracy would bring an end to war; and throughout the nineteenth century, democracy had been steadily on the march, autocracy in retreat. War was the "sport of kings," but peace was the natural order of things in a democratic world. Moreover, in the economic sphere many American pacifists had observed the unprecedented growth of international trade during the nineteenth century and had drawn the unwarranted conclusions not only that the resultant "interdependence" in the fields of trade and finance would range bankers and traders against war, but that their influence would be powerful enough to prevent it. Now, without warning, as far as most Americans were concerned, "Europe" had betrayed these high hopes.

It was therefore unthinkable to most Americans that the war was any of our business, however much we might deplore it. Only President Eliot of Harvard at the outset took a different view of the matter when he wrote President Wilson suggesting that the United States should co-operate in an immediate blockade of Germany and Austria-Hungary in order to paralyze their war efforts and stop the conflict before it got fully under way.[2] At that time even ex-President Theodore Roosevelt took the position that we should remain neutral, although by October 1914 he had changed his mind and called for our joining other neutral nations in guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium which had been violated by Germany.[3]

THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY

That President Wilson, on the other hand, should proclaim the neutrality of the United States and seek to maintain it was quite in accord with the American tradition and with the current desire of the overwhelming majority of the American people. To be sure, there were millions of Americans with ancestral ties ensuring their sympathy with one or the other side in the terrible struggle that was engulfing most of Eu-

[1] Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters* (5 vols., New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1927–1933), Vol. IV, p. 461.

[2] Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (4 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), Vol. I, pp. 287–89.

[3] Simeon Strunsky, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Prelude to 1914," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. IV, p. 151.

rope and spreading beyond the Continent as well; but though to George Bernard Shaw "America . . . seemed mad with British patriotism, Polish nationality, and Belgian freedom"[4] a shrewd observer on the scene could understand that it was the "madness" of spectators who might applaud their respective sides but wanted to remain on the side lines.

Under these circumstances President Wilson might hold the government to a neutral course of conduct, although his admonition to Americans to be neutral in *word* and *thought* as well, demanded more than could be expected. Moreover, the German Government and German officials were singularly obtuse in the conduct of their diplomacy, as well as unimaginative in their failure to take account of imponderables in the waging of the war. Thus American public opinion, more exposed and more vulnerable to British propaganda in any event, was constantly shocked at German deeds and the amoral attitude of the German Government in explaining them.

For example, Germany, at the beginning of the war, violated Belgian territory in disregard of a treaty bearing her signature. But Bethmann-Hollweg reacted in pained surprise when Great Britain declared war on Germany merely because of "a scrap of paper." The sinking by a German submarine of the passenger liner *Lusitania* on the high seas without warning, and the consequent drowning of noncombatants, including women and children, was another "incident" which German officials could charge off against the English blockade which, they asserted, was starving German civilians. But American public opinion and the American Government were thoroughly aroused, and eventually the resumption of submarine warfare brought the United States into the war. Thus the attempts to remain isolated and aloof failed.[5]

The war ended in a clear-cut victory. The Allies meantime had formally accepted most of President Wilson's Fourteen Points peace program, including the far-reaching injunction that "a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." In this Fourteenth Point the American President revealed that he had traveled a long way in his thinking about the needs of an international society from that day in August 1914 when he proclaimed American neutrality; for in that single sentence he sought to proclaim the end of American isolation, and the continuous association henceforth of the United States with other nations for the maintenance of international peace and justice.

THE RETURN TO ISOLATION

That President Wilson would not have the country solidly behind him in this implicit repudiation of the long-held assumptions and the hitherto almost universally accepted dicta upon which American foreign policy had been based had already been made clear to him. His resolute policy toward Germany after the sinking of the *Lusitania* had resulted in the defection of his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who regarded the President's policy as unneutral and likely to lead the United States into war.[6] And of even more significance were the signs of defection at the White House "sunrise conference" of 1916. On this occasion Speaker Champ Clark, House Majority Leader Claude Kitchin, Senator William J. Stone, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative Henry D. Flood, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, reportedly warned the President that the continuance of his policy toward Germany would meet with their resistance in Congress.[7]

These events were dramatic foreshadowings of the bitter opposition which President Wilson was shortly to encounter in his efforts to have the United States become a member of a League of Nations. One may grant that the Republican opposition under the leadership of Senator Lodge had fretted under what they regarded as the dictatorial methods of this Democratic war President, and were glad to have the opportunity to humiliate and discredit him. To be against what the President was for was also a temptation with a national election in the offing. But it is probable that in any event the country as a whole was so tired of war, so fearful of "involvement" abroad, and so anxious to get back to "business as usual," that it was quite ready to acquiesce in a repudiation of any policy which would or might lead to new "entanglements."

The succeeding administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover reflected and encouraged the disposition of the country to cut loose politically, as far as possible, from the remainder of the world and seek peace through authentic American prescriptions. They promoted disarmament and the Pact for the Renunciation of War, but shied away from implementing peace through such institutions as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. Our attitude seemed to Europeans to suggest that we regarded ourselves as possessing sounder judgment than they, which they did not believe, and greater rectitude, which they were even more unwilling to acknowledge. We seemed to be saying: "We are for peace; if you likewise sincerely desire it, follow the American example, cut your armaments, abide by the Kellogg Pact and discourage aggressors not through the employment of physical sanctions against them, but by refusing to recognize the validity of territorial acquisitions in violation of the Kellogg Pact."

CONCENTRATION ON THE HOME FRONT

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt entered the White House, the paralysis of a world-wide depression was prostrating the country and working havoc in international trade and finance. He decided to deal with the situation confronting him as one requiring primarily a domestic solution, rather than one involving a restoration of international trade and financial stabilization by international agreement.

In this decision President Roosevelt was to find widespread support. Dean Wallace Brett Donham, of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, declared that Americans must first of all put their own national house in order; and that if they would be free from world wars and realize prosperity,

[4] Quoted from Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: Crofts and Co., 1940), p. 611.

[5] It is not suggested that the resumption of submarine warfare by Germany, which precipitated President Wilson's War Message, was the sole or even necessarily the chief cause of the entry of the United States into the war. For various viewpoints on this question see Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States,* Third Edition (New York: Holt, 1950), p. 615; Walter Lippmann, *United States Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943); Charles Seymour, *American Diplomacy during the World War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), pp. 207–11; Charles Callahan Tansill, *America Goes to War* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1938), p. 657.

[6] Tansill, *op. cit.,* pp. 332–36. See also *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan* (Chicago: John C. Winston Co., 1925), Chap. XV.

[7] See Alex M. Arnett, *Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1937), pp. 183–92.

they must work out most problems at home.[8] Our concern should be to seek to restore the buying power of the American people, for they constitute 90 per cent of the market, and the home market is not subject to the disturbing influences, quite beyond our control, which make foreign markets undependable and hazardous. We should give up trying to solve the problems of a world we neither control nor understand.[9]

Another academician, Charles Beard, took a similar position. We should reverse our policy of opening doors and pushing trade in all parts of the world, with all the risks involved, and follow that of opening doors at home, substituting "an intensive cultivation of its [our] own garden for a wasteful, quixotic, and ineffectual extension of interests beyond the reach of competent military and naval defense." [10]

Among the popularizers of this thesis, Samuel Crowther and Garet Garrett reached millions of readers in the thirties through their articles in the *Saturday Evening Post*. It was reiterated that

> the first problem is that of mending the internal economy of nations, each one to find how it shall balance its own budget, reëmploy its own people, restore its own solvency . . . no one need worry about foreign trade. It will come back in due time, as the nations severally need it and can afford it.[11]

Samuel Crowther, admonishing Americans to "Sell America," reduced the process of international trade to such simple terms that he could rule out the import of foreign manufactures altogether:

> If we export manufactured goods and get paid for them in manufactured goods, we have done nothing whatsoever unless the manufactured goods we receive are such as we cannot make. Practically speaking, there are no such goods, so the import of manufactured goods is out.[12]

On the eve of the meeting of the World Monetary and Economic Conference in London in June 1933, President Roosevelt cabled that the Conference should seek to stabilize currencies, revive world trade, and take "international action to raise price levels"; but it soon became evident that he had concluded that this was the wrong emphasis. Repudiating the compromise proposals of the American delegation designed to effect an agreement between the "gold bloc" and the "off gold" countries, he declared in favor of planned national currencies and a "sound internal economic system." And under the National Industrial Reçovery Act, designed to implement these views, the policy was to raise prices and wages, the President being empowered to protect such increases, where necessary, by raising customs duties.[13]

[8] See "National Ideals and Internationalist Idols," *Harvard Business Review*, April 1933, pp. 391–93.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 394–98, 401; see also Donham's earlier *Business Adrift*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1931.

[10] *The Open Door at Home* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), Chap. VII; see also his *The Idea of National Interest*, New York: Macmillan, 1934.

[11] Garet Garrett, "This Thing of Trade," *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 206, No. 1 (July 1, 1933), pp. 5–7.

[12] *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 205, No. 44 (April 29, 1933), pp. 6–7, for quotation and arguments for substantial economic self-containment. Among others of the self-containment persuasion were Lawrence Dennis, *Is Capitalism Doomed?* New York: Harper, 1932; Stuart Chase, in *Scribner's*, September 1933; and John Maynard Keynes, *The Yale Review*, Summer issue, 1933.

[13] John Holladay Latané and David W. Wainhouse, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, Second Revision (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1940), pp. 824–26. Thirteen years earlier, under the influence of Woodrow Wilson, and as a candidate for Vice President in the campaign of 1920, Roosevelt emphasized the importance of foreign trade, and in general the necessity for the United States to

REACTION TO FOREIGN DISORDER

If national policies related to the world-wide depression were not such as to promise a restoration of international trade and an easing of economic tensions during that period, there were even more disquieting developments in the area of international politics. In 1931 Japan resorted to unilateral military action in Manchuria, contrary to treaty obligations, and defied the efforts of the League of Nations and the United States to have her take her grievances to the Council table. In 1935 Mussolini, likewise in violation of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, attacked Ethiopia.

The reaction of the American Government to these illegal acts and those that were to follow was influenced by a rather widespread popular conviction of the futility of once more attempting to win a durable peace by taking up arms against aggressors, and by the hope that whatever course others might choose, we could remain at peace if resolved to do so, and if we "minded our own business." Consequently, beyond admonishing the Mussolinis and Hitlers not to attack their neighbors, and seeking by diplomatic pressures to restrain the Japanese, the Roosevelt administration adopted at the outset a policy of great caution. Likewise Congress, anticipating an Italo-Ethiopian war, hastily devised neutrality legislation prohibiting the export of "arms, ammunition, or implements of war" to any belligerents. This was the beginning of the policy, which was further implemented in successive acts, of attempting through domestic legislation to insulate the United States against war.[14]

In the Act of 1936 all long-term loans and credits to belligerents were forbidden. This, our legislators felt, would not only save us from building up a stake in the victory of either side, as they asserted we had done during the First World War, and help us to preserve a firm neutrality; it would also serve to discourage necessitous belligerents from waging war. Peace was our passion. But when it was proposed to embargo all trade with belligerents in order more completely to insulate the nation against war, Congressmen drew back. What effect would this have upon our economy? Eventually, however, they hit upon the cash-and-carry expedient, which was written into the Neutrality Act of 1937. Under it belligerents could purchase in the American market what they needed, other than arms and ammunition, by paying cash-on-the-barrel-head and taking their purchases away in their own ships. Senator Borah described this ingenious device as follows: "We seek to avoid all

participate actively in world affairs. ". . . modern civilization," he pointed out, "has become so complex and the lives of civilized men so interwoven with the lives of other men in other countries as to make it impossible to be in this world and not of it." (Quoted in Emil Ludwig, *Roosevelt* [New York: Viking Press, 1938], pp. 84–85.) By 1943 the administration-sponsored Reciprocal Trade Agreements revealed that the President and Secretary Hull were anxious to promote international trade insofar as it would not adversely affect the domestic economy.

[14] In the Ethiopian conflict Mussolini was well armed for aggression against a weak African state, and was not embarrassed by our neutrality legislation. If all the nonbelligerent states had passed similar legislation, Italy would still have been able to prosecute the war, but Ethiopia, weak and relatively unarmed, would have been struck down even more quickly by the attacker. It may be observed, parenthetically, that if the most important consideration is to *shorten wars* in such cases, a universal arms embargo (which the American Government obviously would have welcomed at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict) may well make a powerful contribution to such a result by contributing to conditions which will enable the armed aggressor to win quickly against the weak or unarmed victim.

risks, all danger, but we make certain to get all the profits." [15]

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DETERIORATE

In the meantime, international relations steadily deteriorated east and west. Japan proceeded with fire and sword to establish her co-prosperity sphere program in the Far East. Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, seized Austria in 1938, and first blackmailed the powers to acquiesce in his occupation of the Sudetenland, and then took over Bohemia and Moravia to provide Germans with *Lebensraum*. It became clear that if he were to be stopped it would have to be with something stronger than protests.

Until October 1937 President Roosevelt sought, as he said in an address to Congress on January 3, 1936, "through adequate defense to save ourselves from embroilment and attack, and through example and all legitimate encouragement and assistance to persuade other nations to return to the ways of peace and good will." [16] And as late as August 1936 he declared: "We shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the political activities of the League of Nations. . . . We are not isolationists except in so far as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war." [17] But by the summer of 1937 Japan was waging a full-scale war against China in violation of her commitments under the Nine-Power Treaty negotiated at the Washington Conference of 1921–22, and the President's advisers believed it would be helpful if he were to advise the nation on the deterioration in international relations.

The "Quarantine Speech" of October 5, 1937, which originated from their suggestions, somewhat dismayed the President's advisers, however; for by implication, at least, it called for an abandonment of American neutrality and the acceptance of the principle of collective security:

> Peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality. . . .[18]

Apparently the President did not have in mind the imposition of physical sanctions against treaty violators, but seemingly was thinking of an international agreement which would define aggression and pledge the signatories to cut off intercourse with an aggressor.[19] In any event, the reaction in the country to the suggestion that an abstentionist policy was not enough was distinctly unfavorable, and President Roosevelt cautiously refrained from repeating or elaborating it.[20]

THE PRESIDENT EXHORTS THE AGGRESSORS

The President, however, was not denied the right to exhort the aggressors to mend their ways. When the Munich crisis developed, and war seemed imminent in spite of the concessions made to Hitler by Great Britain and France at the expense of Czechoslovakia, President Roosevelt made an appeal both to Hitler and to Beneš to remember their obligations under the Pact of Paris, and not to break off negotiations. Hitler rejected any responsibility for the crisis, and a second appeal from the President met with no success. Hitler's demands were substantially met by the French and British on September 29, 1938; and Hitler, having the Sudetenland and the strong Czech fortifications, was good enough to refrain from invading Bohemia and Moravia until the following March, when he made them a protectorate of the German Reich.

Next on the German timetable were Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Once more President Roosevelt made a direct appeal to Chancellor Hitler to refrain from attacking or invading the remaining continental nations, at the same time suggesting that the United States would be willing to participate in a disarmament conference to relieve the peoples of the world of the burden of paying for heavy armed establishments, and to explore the question of restoring international trade. Hitler made no reply, but stepped up his propaganda against the Poles.

Further appeals were addressed by President Roosevelt to the King of Italy, the President of Poland, and once more to Hitler. These pleas were obviously without benefit of bayonets, and were couched in language which probably amused the author of *Mein Kampf*.

On September 1 the German legions marched into Poland, Great Britain and France announced that they would come to her assistance, and another war engulfed the nations of Europe.

Several months prior to this, President Roosevelt asserted that the arms embargo was unwise and should be repealed. Its practical operation, he said, was to take away from Great Britain "the one great advantage which it had built up over the years . . . to offset other advantages which the land and air power of Germany had created against Great Britain." [21] Nor did he believe that the arms embargo would keep the United States out of war, for things going into the manufacture of war implements were being sold by United States citizens under the Neutrality Statute. On the other hand, he declared that the arms embargo played into the hands of aggressor states, since the latter knew that their intended victims, being less well prepared, could not expect to buy the means of resistance from us.[22] But Congress was strongly isolationist, and was not impressed by the President's arguments at the time. Senator Borah warned that repeal would bring us into the war, and undoubtedly he expressed the feelings of a large majority in Congress.[23] However, when war actually broke out in Europe, the President called an extraordinary session, and succeeded, after protracted debate, in getting the arms embargo repealed.

PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST INVOLVEMENT

That Congress reflected rather faithfully the strong antiwar feeling of the country during that period, as far as public opinion polls could measure that feeling, is evident. Even after Hitler's blackmail tactics had opened a path for him to overrun Czechoslovakia, the Gallup polls indicated that about two-

[15] *Congressional Record*, March 1, 1937, p. 1677.

[16] Excerpt from text as reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 4, 1936.

[17] As quoted in William L. Langer and Everett S. Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation 1937–1940* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), p. 16.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[20] For American opinion for and against the "Quarantine Speech" see Charles Callan Tansill, *Back Door to War—The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933–1941* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), pp. 344–47. The author marshals evidence in support of the position that President Roosevelt's policy was increasingly pointed toward war. The volume is therefore to be contrasted with that of Langer and Gleason.

[21] Franklin Roosevelt, *Public Papers and Addresses, 1939* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1941), XXXXIII.

[22] *Ibid.*, XXXIV.

[23] The *Springfield Weekly Republican* (Springfield, Mass.), October 5, 1939; see also the *San Francisco Examiner*, October 23, 1939 for excerpts from radio address of Senator Gerald Nye in which he declared that the repeal of the arms embargo would end American neutrality.

thirds of those interviewed continued to believe that Congress should retain the arms embargo, and that close to 95 per cent were opposed to the participation of the United States in another European war.[24]

A breakdown of this sentiment in terms of population groups cannot be presented precisely, but it became clear, for example, that several German-American publications in the United States were able to marshal the sentiments of millions of Americans of German descent against being drawn into war against Germany. The propaganda machine of Goebbels sought to take advantage of and intensify this sentiment; and after Hitler's dazzling successes in his campaigns against Poland, the Low Countries, and France, it was understandably strengthened. Among chronically anti-British elements of the population, the Irish, in general, were almost pathologically opposed to being drawn into a war on the side of England, the hereditary enemy.

Liberals and pacifists in large numbers felt that we had been bilked in the First World War, that we had spent billions, were owed more billions by our defaulting European debtors,[25] and had been betrayed in the peace settlement. Moreover, they had memories of the intolerance and bigotry in this country which constituted one of the ugly by-products of the First World War, and they feared that another war would bring the same result.[26]

As for the Communists, they, of course, derived their inspiration from Moscow. As soon as the Soviet Government signed itself out of war with Germany in August 1939, and Germany attacked Poland and found herself at war with the Western powers, the American Communists declared that the war had been made in Downing Street, that Wall Street and Roosevelt were seeking to push the United States into it, and that we should remain neutral.[27]

Organized labor, whether under CIO or AFL leadership, was also for the maintenance of American neutrality. Both groups were strongly anti-fascist, and both were fearful that should the United States enter the war, American workers would lose the gains they had achieved under the Wagner Act and would have to work longer hours and pay higher prices, so that their real wages would be less than before. Moreover, the great majority of those who would do the fighting and dying would be from the working class.

ATTITUDES OF BUSINESSMEN

In general, business, big and little, was opposed for various reasons to our becoming involved in the war as an actual participant. Some businessmen expected Hitler to win, and argued that we should leave the door open so as to do business with him after it ended. They also observed that in Nazi Germany there was no trouble with labor unions, and we might actually learn something from Hitler. On the other hand, many did not want to see us in a war on the side of England, which they expected to go socialist when peace should come. Finally, business in general realized that our participation in a costly war of long duration might well bring government controls over prices and profits, as well as higher taxes on business.[28]

By far the most active, far-flung, and influential organization carrying on propaganda designed to counter William Allen White's Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies[29] was the America First Committee, organized late in 1940. Its Acting Chairman was General Robert E. Wood, chairman of the Board of Sears, Roebuck and Company; and among its business supporters was Max W. Babb, president of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Charles A. Lindbergh, by then a wealthy businessman, made speeches at mass meetings throughout the country under its auspices.[30] He believed that "France and England courted disaster when they, unprepared, declared war over the German invasion of Poland," and that "for us to enter the conflict in Europe at this time would result in defeat and humiliation." [31]

Henry Ford also counseled the American people to stay out of the conflict, since he saw "no righteousness in either cause." On the other hand, we should give "both sides the tools to keep on fighting until they both collapse," after which the United States could "step in and help them both make a just peace. . . ." [32]

Herbert Hoover, who at the end of the First World War spoke out on behalf of the League of Nations and American membership in it, likewise testified to his disillusionment. We should stay out of the war in Europe, strengthen free institutions in the Western Hemisphere, and prepare ourselves along with the other twenty nations of the Americas against invasion or successful attack. Hitler's forces would eventually collapse, after which we would be in a position to aid in peaceful reconstruction.[33]

OTHER VOICES AND THE PROPULSION OF EVENTS

On the other hand, the consequences of the cyclone-cellar doctrine of the isolationists were pointed out by other Americans as the Axis legions callously snuffed out the freedom of one nation after another in the late thirties. Henry L. Stimson in a letter to the *New York Times* on March 6, 1939 declared, "Our foreign policy cannot with safety be geographically limited to a defense of this hemisphere or of our own continental boundaries." To him the relentless advance of these powers represented "a radical attempt to reverse entirely the long evolution out of which our democracies of Europe and America have

[24] Langer and Gleason, *op. cit.*, p. 36. See also "American Opinion about the War; the Evidence Gathered by the Gallup Poll since 1939," *Harper's Magazine* (April 1941), pp. 550–52.

[25] The Act of April 13, 1934, the so-called "Johnson Act," reflected in its title the bitterness felt toward these debtors: "An Act to prohibit financial transactions with any foreign government in default on its obligations to the United States."

[26] Prominent among the intellectuals who in general subscribed to these views were Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago. See his address of March 30, 1941: "The Proposition is Peace," and Charles A. Beard's "Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels," Appendix to the *Congressional Record*, Vol. 87, part 12, p. A 3351.

[27] Even after the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 was passed, the Communists continued to sabotage aid to Britain, and advised the American people to put a stop to measures calling for the execution of the act, since they would be supporting a "Washington and Wall Street" war. *Daily Worker* (New York), March 12, 1941.

[28] It might also be observed that munitions manufacturers, publicized in the thirties as "merchants of death," probably calculated that they would make more money if the United States stayed out of the war, since Congress had repealed the arms embargo, and since if we entered the struggle the forces who sought to "take the profits out of war" might push through the necessary legislation.

[29] See Walter Johnson, *The Battle Against Isolation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), for its organization and activities.

[30] For full account of various addresses by Lindbergh, see *San Francisco Examiner* for May 4, 11, July 2, and October 5, 1941. See also text of address of another American millionaire and isolationist, former Ambassador to England, Joseph P. Kennedy, as reported in the *San Francisco Examiner*, May 25, 1941.

[31] Charles A. Lindbergh, "A Letter to Americans," *Collier's* (March 29, 1941), p. 76.

[32] As reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 1941.

[33] *Ibid.*, September 18, 1941.

grown. . . ." The question was how best to try to prevent the outbreak of a general war which in any event would be difficult.

> Shall we bury our heads in the sands of isolationism and timidly await the time when our security shall be lessened and perhaps destroyed by the growing success of lawlessness around us? Or shall we use our present strength and security from attack to throw our weight into the vacillating scales in favor of law and order and freedom? [34]

Mr. Stimson left no doubt as to his own answer, but the American public still clung to the hope that if we would only "mind our own business" while others were losing their freedom, the power-drunk dictators would graciously permit us to continue to cultivate our own garden in our own way.

The blitzkrieg against the Dutch and the fall of France began, for the first time, to raise doubts among large numbers of Americans as to whether we could longer afford to rely entirely upon our own rectitude and Hitler's forbearance. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, taking account of the strong isolationist sentiment in the country, sought to point out the real danger which now threatened our peace and security, and the necessity of taking all measures "short of war" to aid those countries still resisting him, in order to give the United States time to prepare. In particular the point was stressed that American aid must be rushed to Britain in order to prevent her defeat and the possible surrender of the British and French fleets to Hitler. Should this happen, our own security would be in great jeopardy.

Slowly the country and Congress responded. We were still not ready to "go to war," but more and more people began to feel that the war was "coming to us." Under these circumstances the President, by September 2, 1940, was able to conclude the destroyers-bases transaction with relatively little congressional criticism.[35] And early in 1941 the United States escaped from the "strait jacket of isolationist legislation" [36] by the passage of the Lend-Lease Act. These "provocative" measures did not embroil us in war with Germany, as isolationists predicted they would. However, a few months later we were bombed into the war by the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.

Is Isolation Possible or Desirable?

A glance at history reveals that the idea of isolation as a state policy is not of recent origin and not particularly associated with the American experiment in government. Ancient Sparta, relatively isolated by geography from other states, tried it with unhappy consequences, by expelling foreigners and forbidding Spartans to trade with or travel in other countries. Plato's ideal state was envisioned as one so situated that it would not be tempted to seek commercial intercourse with other states. As far as possible, it should be economically self-contained. Thus it could be free to perfect its own institutions and provide the conditions necessary for its citizens to live the good life without distracting wars and outside influences.[37] The Chinese long assumed and acted on the assumption that they were "all under Heaven," and foreign devils were not thought worthy of intercourse. Until Admiral Perry's "black ships" entered Japanese waters, the Land of the Rising Sun likewise sought a good life apart from the rest of the world. And yet these things could not be. Human energy, curiosity, the spirit of adventure, and man's inventiveness were all against them.

It is understandable that Americans, with their rich, separate—though not isolated—experience should in their turn harbor the illusion that they are set apart by destiny to build an ideal commonwealth. It is equally comprehensible that they should want to be insulated against world wars. But if past history may be relied upon, and the full significance of recent technological developments is understood, the ideal of a closed state today is fantastic.

Moreover, in a "cold war" era like the present, it is dangerous to formulate policy on assumptions of national or hemispheric self-sufficiency, whether economic or political.[38] According to estimates of the Bureau of Mines for 1951, the United States had "a lowered self-sufficiency in 25 commodities, including such materials as copper, lead, zinc, and iron ore. . . ." [39] In others, of course, it is largely dependent upon importations from foreign countries outside as well as inside the Western Hemisphere.

In the political sphere, surely it is becoming clearer each day that it is at best a counsel of despair to talk about writing off our European allies and withdrawing our lines of defense to the Western Hemisphere. To abandon western Europe would be to sacrifice western civilization, its peoples, and their resources to the suffocating grip of Communism. And after that, what? We would then, without allies, be in the not altogether enviable position of being swallowed last.

Policy, however, must look to the future as well as take account of the present. Crisis policies may preserve the existence of a nation; they do not provide a foundation for a healthful coexistence with others in the future unless courageous and imaginative parallel efforts are made to hold the line and advance it as far as possible in the area of international co-operation. Specifically, this means, among other things, that the United Nations—at present admittedly the imperfect embodiment of nations' hopes and aspirations for the preservation and improvement of their common civilization—should be regarded and continuously utilized as the ultimate forum before which all nations may present special claims as well as voice common interests. This is the minimum price of their survival.

[34] Reprinted in *International Conciliation*, May 1939, No. 350, pp. 255–62.

[35] Langer and Gleason, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXII.

[36] R. A. Billington, B. J. Loewenberg, and S. H. Brockunier, *The United States: American Democracy in World Perspective* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1947), p. 715.

[37] See Frank M. Russell, "Isolation or Collective Security," *The United States Among the Nations*, a series of lectures arranged by the University of California Committee on International Relations (University of California Press, 1937), pp. 160–62.

[38] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Isolationism," *The Atlantic*, Vol. 189, No. 5 (May 1952), pp. 34–38; also Samuel Lubell, "Is America Going Isolationist Again?" *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 224, No. 49 (June 7, 1952), pp. 19–54.

[39] Department of the Interior, Information Service, Bureau of Mines, Press Release, August 19, 1951.

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Defense Expenditures and the National Economy

By Robert A. Brady

ON the available evidence we seem to be entering a defense economy which is likely to be sustained on an unprecedented scale—short, even, of an ever possible "all-out war"—for an indefinite period of time. No one has yet suggested any terminal dates for the program other than to name certain provisional maximum points of direct military defense outlay, currently placed between 1953 and 1956. Yet patently neither the upper figure nor the date expresses anything more than an unsubstantial hope. It is a way of saying that at best we "see through a glass darkly," and that what we see is mostly menacing and baleful. Even the European defense pact is welcomed as a possible addition to strength which barely outweighs the complex dangers that underlie it. Its very existence, with its concomitant more careful delineation of the Eurasian territorial lines of interest and conflict, provides an occasion for mounting emphasis on our own enhanced military power.

The Central Conflict

The most optimistic have difficulty in finding signs more favorable to peace on the horizon. A culling of news, comment, and opinion on the United Nations and its multifarious activities will show that most of those who do not skeptically view its future in terms of another League of Nations see ahead an organization that is coming more and more to be conceived as the core of a grand alliance of the noncommunist world against the ecumenical communist threat. All in all, the proper analogy for this global "time of troubles" might be something like the Thirty Years' War which ruined the Germanies between 1618 and 1648 and which provided such a terrible starting point for this century of carnage: long drawn out, but intermittent and desultory, conflict where the issues in process of appearing to become more definite yet become ever more difficult to define, and where the doctrinal emphasis upon rational differences over time shades insensibly into ever more bitter, irrational, and fanatical ideological confusions.

Nationalism, political and social reform, cultural conflicts, racial hostilities, economic development, waxing and waning imperial controls, religious controversies—all these and more, and in endlessly varying combinations, are mixed into the Korean and Vietnamese wars; into the impending civil wars in Morocco, Egypt, Iran, and the vast areas of western, central, and southern Africa, where the Malan policies of *apartheid* are being viewed by the Negroes as an augury of a menacing future; into the various movements which threaten either to crystallize against the West or to fraction into petty warring principalities the Arabic and Hindu areas; into what only outsiders believe to be the petty internal squabbles of South American republics.

All these issues, nevertheless, are everywhere being drawn into, and somehow or other related to, the central conflict between the communist and noncommunist global power blocs, and the significant thing is that very few see any hope of any short-run lessening of the tensions. On the contrary, official and expert opinion generally speaks of increasing, not decreasing, danger of

war. To cite a single example, after extensive hearings in which dozens of organizations and expert spokesmen from virtually all walks of American life had testified and offered their own recommendations, the Committee on Banking and Currency probably summarized the general sentiment pretty well in its final recommendations for revision of the Defense Production Act when it said that "with the passage of time the chances for an all-out attack upon us increase." [1] From this the Committee drew the conclusion that the huge expansion of industrial capacity that accompanied and largely dominated the first two years of defense production not only took logical priority over direct military outlays, but was also the necessary precondition to anticipated future military production on a still more extensive scale.

Fear of American Depression

There are still further reasons for supposing that we are facing a long-run prospect of high, and possibly mounting, military expenditure. Among these, two seem particularly important. First, business, labor, and economists and other experts in this country, and similarly posted persons in foreign countries whose economies are closely interlaced with ours, share a deep and abiding worry over the possibility of another major business depression. Outside the Soviet-dominated areas, the United States is clearly the key to this problem. A depression in one of the European countries might be successfully resisted elsewhere, and particularly might be overcome by prompt aid from the ample resources of the United States. But a depression in the United States would be catastrophic for the rest of the noncommunist world.[2] On this point there is universal agreement, including that in the entire Communist-dominated areas, where spokesmen have been predicting such a depression ever since the war, and where they are sensitive to the enormous propaganda victory to be scored from fulfillment of such a Marxian prophecy.

The fear of an American depression is one of the principal sources of "Bevanism" in Britain—a sentiment, incidentally, which has been gaining, rather than losing, support on the continent of Europe.[3]

Fear of Allied Unrest

Behind the scenes, more is actually made of this danger by European countries than of the related fear that their own rearmament programs will mean a serious slowing down of the increase, or an actual curtailment, of their domestic standards of living.[4] Yet even the lat-

[1] Senate Report No. 1599, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, "To Amend and Extend the Defense Production Act," May 27, 1952, p. 4.

[2] "Mr. Harriman pointed out that in 1947, when this country experienced a 6 per cent decline in its industrial output, imports dropped 20 per cent, with those of some nations falling by as much as 70 per cent and those of the Marshall Plan countries averaging a 37 per cent drop. . . . The MSA chief said that the United States, although it has only 10 per cent of the population of the free world, produces one-half of its goods. This, he pointed out, gives this country a tremendous responsibility which it cannot afford to overlook." Thus "even a slight drop in American business activity" might unstabilize the entire economies of "countries furnishing us raw materials," and these countries include most of the noncommunist areas throughout the world. *Journal of Commerce*, May 20, 1952.

[3] "France will soon announce that its promise of 12 divisions by the year's end will have to be cut to 10. Dutch sources report Holland is having trouble filling its quota, too. Britain earlier slashed its projected defense spending by more than one-third." *Wall Street Journal*, May 5, 1952.

[4] "By the middle of 1951 industrial production of the western European countries had . . . by now mounted above prewar levels by

ter plays a role in promoting our own defense expenditure, for the resulting internal unrest places those countries in a position to demand that the United States carry a part of the increased armament load imposed on them by the new military program. In critical underdeveloped areas, such as Iran and Pakistan, this argument possesses even greater potency.

Since any internal unrest whatsoever is now likely to be viewed in this country as preparation of a possible seedbed for communist ideas and actions, we must now at least stand ready to shoulder a larger share of the burden the instant such situations arise. The possibilities of what is scarcely more than mere blackmail, as indicated in the cases of Iran, Spain, and the Argentine, are tremendous, and it is exceedingly difficult to see how, in terms of present American foreign policy, further possibilities of this sort can be avoided in the future.

SELLING PROGRAM PROMOTED

Blackmail or not, it becomes easier, in the second place, to view the prospect of high or mounting defense expenditures with complacency for the reason that enhanced production of military supplies, and of plants specialized to produce them, siphons off output which might appear to be increasingly in excess of the domestic capacity to consume or reinvest. It has long been an *idée fixe* in the business community that capacity to produce tends constantly to outrun the propensity to consume, and that a situation is bound sooner or later to occur where a goods glut will have disastrous consequences for the economy as a whole.

For a quarter of a century at least, one or another version of this common superstition has provided the standard justification for increased business appropriations for advertising and high pressure salesmanship. Since the afflatus of Keynesian doctrine, however altered or vulgarized by various economists and governmental officials, a similar idea has caused economic *expertise* to rally to the cause.[5] In a recent series of articles *Fortune* has been attempting to unite experts, businessmen, labor, and government officials in a common drive to save the American economy from the disaster of depression by promoting a vast selling program.

This program is being promoted in face of the huge military outlays summarized below, and with an eye to the thesis that failure of salesmen to mop up such savings as may still remain after paying the huge new tax levies will bring on such a depression that it will not only weaken the American economy internally, but will also cost this country its capacity to lead the world against communist forces. It is argued that this will everywhere undermine the willingness of old or new allies to accept American leadership at the very point in human history when this leadership is seen as the only hope of stemming the Red tide.

Under these circumstances, the prospect of a peace which might result in general disarmament would appear as a disaster. Contrariwise, armament at the current (or an expended) level seems to guarantee sustained full, or close to full, employment.[6] This means jobs for labor, profits for business, markets for farmers, power and stability for the country as a whole, leadership, and capacity to back up leadership, throughout the world in the common struggle.

about 40 per cent, and their total production by more than 15 per cent. On a per capita basis, the increase in their total production has been more than 5 per cent above prewar levels." The bulk of the increase appears, however, to have been in the field of producers', not consumers', goods, and would be, accordingly, available for future increase in real national income if not absorbed by rearmament. *The Midyear Economic Report of the President*, July 1951, p. 7.

[5] "Yet Keynes concludes that *so long as classical principles stand in the way of something better*, gold digging, burying and unburying old bottles with banknotes, pyramid building, earthquakes, wars, etc. all will add to the community's wealth." Seymour E. Harris, *The New Economics*, pp. 411–12. Italics in the original.

ALTERNATIVES EXAMINED

To be sure, there are other ways of accomplishing economic stability, but they are generally and increasingly looked upon with distaste. We might, for example, give away surplus to needy countries, as with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (consumer goods) or the Marshall plan (primarily industrial goods). Or we might go in for a vast program of overseas Point Four economic development. Or again we might attempt to sell more to reluctant and already oversupplied domestic consumers.[7] Or still again, we might wait until decline begins and then shore up the economy with public works, reinforced with deficit spending and appropriate changes in monetary and fiscal policies.

But in general, such alternatives are currently disapproved. Of the above, the first is coming to be viewed by powerfully placed persons as charity "at the expense of the American taxpayer" extended to people who are forgetting "how to work." The second is dependent upon the creation of a "climate favorable to free enterprise," and the weather prophets of history offer little but inclement times ahead on this score. The third may well be impossible. And the fourth is commonly seen as a variant of, when not a prelude to, "socialism," and this dangerous un-Americanism has effectively been labeled as a sort of "pink communism." But paradoxically, defense expenditure spreads wholesome benefits with a free hand throughout the economic system at large.[8]

All these trends and elements combine to promote large-scale and possibly expanding military expenditures for an indefinite period of time.[9] We are involved in a gigantic arms race. All the evidence points this way. The Soviets are matching us step by step. Every new "position of strength" is lost the instant it is matched. Neither party can rest at any given point. Al-

[6] "The expenditure of $43 billion on military rearmament during the coming fiscal year will probably forestall any possibility of a general business recession in the country for the next 12 months." Summary of a speech of Nelson A. Miller, Office of Civilian Requirements, before the Linen Supply Association of America. *Journal of Commerce*, May 20, 1952.

[7] "A large part of our production goes into goods and services which consumers can pass up without any very severe inconvenience . . . some estimates place this as high as 40 per cent of total production." Robert A. Weaver, chairman of the Board of the Ferro Enamel Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio, from a speech reported in *Retailing*, December 7, 1951.

[8] "Direct Government defense spending in the first three months of the year climbed to an annual rate of over $47 billion. This was about 14 per cent of the total national output of goods and services, called the gross national product, which almost reached an annual rate of $340 billion. But, in addition to direct Government spending, the defense program spurs the economy in many other ways. For example, defense accounts for a large part of the estimated $24 billion which private industry plans to spend for plant expansion this year. About six million of the nation's 60 million employed civilian workers are working in the defense program. These payrolls, plus military payrolls, give a boost to almost all private business . . . up to one-third of the nation's total business activity now springs from the defense buildup." *Journal of Commerce*, May 20, 1952.

[9] "Larson says stockpiling is planned 'in terms of years or even decades.'" Editorial heading, *Journal of Commerce*, November 1, 1951.

ready the Soviet Union appears to have overreached us in direct strategic air and ground armament.[10] An arms race must continue to mount expenditure. But take, first, the present actual burden. How heavy is this burden, and how well may it be borne?

ACTUAL SCALE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Mr. Wilson testified in March 1951 that the peak of defense expenditure would be reached in 1953 at a figure of about $65 billion, and would thereafter taper off for an indefinite number of years to an annual outlay of some $50 billion. The latter expenditure, he said, "probably is about the right figure to produce the degree of might that we ought to have in the foreseeable future."[11] Actual expenditures have lagged behind. Thus, by March 1952 only $26 billion of military goods had been delivered over the period of some twenty months following the outbreak of the Korean war, and of the total of $94 billion previously appropriated by Congress, only $71 billion had been obligated. In the intervening year the whole security program had been slowed down.[12]

The principal reason for the slowdown has been given in some quarters as a "triumph of Bevanism" in the United States. It is actually nothing of the sort. Mr. Wilson attributed delay to the problem of "lead time," or the lengthening time "it takes to complete the designs and also the tooling requirements for the new designs." A supplementary reason, less clearly stated in the official literature, is the heavy early emphasis on creation of additional industrial capacity, principally in steel, certain nonferrous metals such as copper and aluminum, and machine tools. It has been argued that once the new plant has become available, actual deliveries can be correspondingly increased so as to meet any defense need, however high. To defense in depth, accordingly, is to be added defense in breadth.

Is the burden, per se, too heavy to be borne indefinitely? There are many possible answers to this question, and some of the answers would require summary of vast quantities of data and at points some intricate reasoning. Avoiding these complications as far as possible, it seems entirely accurate to say that certain conclusions are virtually beyond dispute. Consider the following three.

STANDARDS OF LIVING MAINTAINED

First, defense expenditure has not thus far curtailed over-all civilian consumption, and there is no clearly visible reason for anticipating that it will, short of all-out war. "Considering the increase in consumers' stocks of durable goods since the end of the war, and the steady improvement in housing accommodations, it seems clear that living standards have thus far been rising."[13] The May 1952 issue of the *Survey of Current Business* shows a slow but steady increase in personal consumption expenditure from the beginning of the Korean outbreak.[14]

[10] On June 16, 1952 (A.P. dispatch), Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett said, "the Russians are outbuilding us—we are falling behind, relatively speaking, in the arms race."

[11] Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, 82nd Cong., on S. 2594 and S. 2645, pp. 12, 20.

[12] Senate Report No. 1599, *op. cit.* note 1.

[13] *Economic Report of the President*, 1952, p. 6.

[14] Other data would indicate a slight decline in constant dollar terms. But this may be due to a buyers' strike on high-cost items, particularly in the field of durable goods.

Furthermore, a special study of the Department of Commerce shows that "real consumption expenditures per capita have been . . . expanding substantially since the mid-nineteen thirties."[15] The expansion continued uninterrupted during the entire span of the Second World War, and this includes the year 1944 when "nearly one-half of our total national output was used for war purposes." In contrast, "the present national security program will at the peak take about one-fifth of the nation's output of goods and services."[16] At the same time, there has occurred a vast diversion of national resources into the expansion of plant. It is hard to say how great this addition may be, but it seems quite probable that by 1955 it will lift capacity to produce in both essential military and civilian lines to rather more than 50 per cent above the pre-Korean level.[17]

When alongside these data are placed the tax figures, running currently somewhat less than increases in disposable income before taxes, it is clear that the country is not suffering any material diminution of real income. And with shorter working hours, vacations with pay, numerous and increasing "fringe benefits," and the already "highest standard of living in the world," it has not shouldered any very heavy burden. Most Europeans would be amused at the suggestion. Rather have the people of the United States acquired more "butter" while acquiring both "guns" and additional "tools" (plant).

[15] *National Income and Product of the United States 1929–1950*, Department of Commerce, 1951, p. 13.

[16] *The Midyear Economic Report of the President*, July 1951, p. 5.

[17] "Since the Korean outbreak, private investment in producers' equipment and nonresidential construction has averaged 37 billion dollars a year, compared with 32 billion dollar rate from 1947 through the middle of 1950, 14 billion in 1939 and 22 billion in 1929, all measured at the 1951 level." Agricultural output is up 50 per cent over 1939, and is capable of further rapid expansion. In the single year of 1951 steel capacity increased by 4 per cent and electric power by 10 per cent, while output of steel increased by 10 per cent and aluminum by 17 per cent. *Economic Report of the President*, January 1952, p. 6.

UNUTILIZED PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY

A second general conclusion is that we are not currently producing anywhere near the totals of which the productive capacity of this country is potentially capable.

For one thing, restrictionist policies, affecting both output and capacity, have been slowly permeating the American economic system. Without going into this complex subject, or consulting the voluminous historical records, a mere recital of application of such restrictionist policies over the past six months would astonish the average citizen who has become accustomed to viewing the country as more or less fully mobilized. Thus cutbacks in either or both production and plant expansion are currently being reported for steel, oil, several lines of synthetics including rubber and textiles, some chemicals, cotton textiles and wool, shoes and leather goods, canned foods, paper, consumer durables, lumber, plywood, and other items.

To deliberate restrictionism should be added large-scale wastage of both plant and manpower. We will note but two examples. With respect to plant, there are huge structural malproportionings in textiles, where the government has been supporting and encouraging expansion of synthetic fibers, when natural fibers (especially cotton and wool) are already suffering from vast overextension of plant. Again, the combination of railroad and road haulage capacity must now be 50 per cent or more beyond what the country requires on

the basis of any consistently carried through national road-rail rationalization program—even such as visualized in the various rather mild schemes that have come before the Interstate Commerce Commission over the past twenty-five years.

Also, there has been general failure to make extensive use of certain new lines of technological development which, taken together, offer possibilities of enormous increases in output with comparatively little additional investment costs. Thus standardization, when coupled with plant specialization, opens the way for complete plant automatization. As a recent article [18] makes quite plain, these methods may now be employed in an astonishingly wide range of processes; yet relatively little has been done by any of the defense agencies to exploit the possibilities inherent in such methods.

PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF ALLIES

A third general conclusion regarding the American burden of defense expenditures is that most of our industrial allies are rapidly getting to the place where they are ***able, if willing***, to produce much, if not all, of their own defense needs. As pointed out above, in western Europe industrial capacity is now close to 50 per cent above that prior to World War II, in the very industrial lines of greatest importance to defense programs. Meanwhile there has been added thereto the very great, rapidly expanding, and strategically located industrial capacity of Western Germany and Japan. Furthermore, there has also occurred a very great expansion, percentage-wise, in the capacity to produce both industrial goods and essential raw materials in Canada, Latin America, Australia, and even Africa (minerals; agricultural products). A net result is that it is conceivable that the overall western defense program might be greatly expanded from present levels without adding very much to the demands made upon the resources of this country.

[18] "The Factory of the Future," *Factory Management and Maintenance*, Vol. 110, April–May 1952.

ON THE SURFACE AND DEEPER

Conclusions such as these are pleasant and reassuring. From them one might well infer that the current level —or, indeed, a considerably expanded level—does not threaten to become a serious ***net*** burden on the national economy. One might go even further and endorse an argument that is becoming very general that on balance the country has gained more in terms of real standard-of-living increases from the program itself than it has lost by the burden the program appears to impose.

Yet there is reason for disquietude. Indeed, reverting to the first section of this article, the more one looks behind the superficial facts, the greater the uneasiness becomes. In fact, the case for a conclusion regarding the long run which is as pessimistic as the summary of the immediately felt direct burden is optimistic for the short run is so strong as to be almost compulsive. It is all the more important that it be faced with utter lack of illusion.

THE REAL LONG-RUN EXTERNAL BURDEN

In considering the probable scale of the long-run burden of defense expenditure, it is important to ask what the expenditure is intended to accomplish. By common agreement, it is *containment* of communism. There are three aspects of this policy which have a direct bearing on our problem—the strategic, the morale, and the economic.

The strategic aspect

As for the strategic aspect from the purely military point of view, four problems may be mentioned briefly—there is space for no more in this article. First is the geopolitical matter of the geographically strategic location of the contending forces. One might wonder what Mackinder, Kjellén, or even Haushofer would have to say at this point. The Soviet Union is the "heartland" area that fits almost all versions of this general formula, including the German. When it is realized what Germany was able to do in both world wars against vastly superior military and economic resources because of possession of a central position, where its internal lines of transportation and relatively short distances made possible quick and powerful shifting of its military resources to meet any threatened front, one wonders about the military potential of the Soviet position. Given ten more years, it might be at least three or four times as great as that of the Germans at the peak of their power, and it may well be even greater than this.

At the same time, the advances in military technique have not weakened the forces of defense. Possibly developments such as radar, supersonic airplane speeds, flak techniques, and dispersion of industry (which is apparently much farther advanced in the Soviet Union than anywhere else, and which largely nullifies the effectiveness of atomic bombing) have made the defense relatively stronger. The geopoliticians in general reckoned the inner position to be militarily (that is, man for man and resource for resource) from two to three or four times as strong as the outer or peripheral position. That is to say, in so far as *defense* plans *anticipate war* as at least a possibility, every new Russian or Chinese or Communist-dominated regiment must be militarily matched by two to four allied regiments; every airplane, every airplane field, every industrial plant behind the Iron Curtain will have somewhat the same relative power leverage.

A second aspect of the geopolitical positions has to do with relative economic potentials. However expansive we may feel about the preponderating strength of the United States and its allies, it is still true that the relative rate of plant expansion in Soviet-dominated areas is at least as great as the average in the combined economies of the United States and Europe, and it may be even greater. As for China, such scattered information as is available indicates that it is undergoing a rapid overhauling preparatory to the inaugeration of a vast economic development program similar to that launched in the Soviet Union under the Five-Year Plans. Uninterrupted, it may well be possible that China can within ten years approach the relative level of development reached by the Soviet Union in the early thirties. Furthermore, it also seems probable that she will be helped in this direction by trading—open or surreptitious and on an expanding scale—from Japan, and possibly from other industrial and raw materials areas.

It must further be pointed out that the position of both Japan and Germany is such that if they do not trade with the enemy, the whole structure of their respective national economies must increasingly be reoriented in such a way that they become more and more dependent upon American assistance. (1) For both countries the curtailment of East-West trade separates them from former supplies of basic raw materials and vast natural markets. (2) Competition for new markets brings them into direct conflict with England, France,

and other allied countries, with possible disastrous results in the form of competing demands for protection, international price wars, languishing industries, unemployment, and social unrest. (3) Zooming population rates multiply international interdependence. These and related factors enhance their capacity to demand assistance on the formula, "assistance or else."

Finally, there is very great danger that the type of military thinking which appears to be behind the case for a 143-wing air force will win out. This means a gigantic armament which must quickly become obsolete. The combination of advance in the scale of armament with rapid obsolescence is capable of adding a multiplier to defense requirements which overnight could lead to demands for expenditure beyond the wildest dreams of current planners. With such obsolete heavy armament we would then be in danger of becoming militarily like certain gigantic South Sea tortoises whose huge and unwieldy carapaces are rendered immediately and completely useless once an accident has turned them upside down.

The morale aspect

As for the second aspect—that of morale—it is scarcely necessary to comment that our ideological position has thus far remained almost entirely negative, and no generally negative program has ever in human history had much of a chance of commanding widespread popular support for any long period of time. James Warburg has put the contemporary case against this negativism in such trenchant words that it requires no elaboration:

1. It surrenders all initiative to the enemy.

2. It pre-empts the resources which might be used in furthering our own purposes.

3. It causes us to choose our friends and allies solely on the basis of the wartime yardstick—are they against the enemy. Once again we find ourself talking about a fight for freedom and attempting that fight hand in hand with such enemies of freedom as Tito and Franco. Worse than that, we find ourselves imploring the Germans to forget all about our democratic, anti-militaristic teachings of the past six years and to rearm themselves as quickly as possible.

4. Finally, and worst of all, our preoccupation with stopping evil instead of accomplishing something good tends to make us become more and more like the evil we are fighting. It tends to make us adopt not only the methods, but the premises of the enemy, thus leading us to betray at home and abroad the cardinal principles of the free society we seek to defend.[19]

The economic aspect

Furthermore, on the economic side, the negative policy generally precludes positive development and assistance, and renders us immune to even an understanding of its need. Thus, as a highly placed Indian economist put the matter last year on a visit to the University of California, "We will either have large-scale economic development in India within the next ten years, with or without foreign assistance, or we will have moved to a place where sooner or later we will have communism." While $50 billion is being spent to arm ourselves and $6 billion to arm our allies, real economic aid to all the rest of the underdeveloped areas of the world is less than $1.5 billion, "less than ½ of 1 per cent of our national product—the greater part . . . to be used to bolster the rearmament of Europe and for the procurement of strategic raw materials." [20] Meanwhile, the Indian story may be reproduced in all of Africa and Asia and in most of South America, the Near East, and elsewhere.

[19] Quoted by Wm. G. Lightbowne, in opening a panel discussion on American foreign policy with a speech entitled "Our Negative Foreign Policy," *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, June 5, 1952.

In general, the failure of economic aid, coupled with the failure to stand firmly and eloquently for long overdue social reform in these areas, is speedily preparing most of the underdeveloped peoples for conquest by propaganda from Moscow. Suppose all Asia and Africa were to go the Chinese way; what then of the depths of our fears and the scale of our military expenditures? But suppose that on top of this our policies give rise to fears that rearmament among our allies will undermine their standards of living (as in England), or to fears of aggression from other quarters (as in France from a rearmed Germany), or to justification for the estoppage of needed liberalization and social reform (as in Spain). What then becomes of the mettle of these allies? Will much of Europe "go Italian"—become, that is to say, inwardly lacking in any strong will to fight, as were the Italian troops in both world wars? What then of our security? our defense needs? the scale of our burdens?

It does not follow that there are no solutions; but it does follow that these issues cannot be ignored, postponed, or evaded without increasing the scale of our military expenditures, or without lengthening the shadows of fear which move us closer to the brink of all-out war. More than that, these issues cannot be dealt with in isolation and separately. They are interrelated by the stern facts of the current historical situation. Neglected they can operate against us, and they can do so in combination with terrifying effects. It is the crassest kind of self-delusion to suppose that this is not so. Yet this national self-delusion has gone so far, partakes so much of what Charles Mackay in an old classic dealt with under the heading of *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds*, that one risks the spirit of the Inquisition in even questioning the policies that it engenders. A further by-product is equally total neglect of the incidence on our national future of the manner in which the defense burden is being distributed and managed internally.

[20] *Ibid.*

THE LONG-RUN INTERNAL BURDEN

Enough has been said of the direct burden of military expenditures at the current level. These may, despite all complaints to the contrary, still be borne with relatively slight national effort. But the *manner* in which the program is being conducted has certain "side effects" of a most extraordinarily serious character. All such effects would be exaggerated with either a lengthening of the time of high military expenditures or any increase in the scale thereof—both of which are probable, if not inescapable, on the basis of present policies. All are far too complex in their operations, interconnections, and effects for elaboration here. A few of the more important may, however, be called to mind.

Effects of high price levels

First, continuation of current high price levels over an indefinite period of time will consolidate them into a new price plateau which may not readily be lowered. Such a price plateau would involve a permanent rewriting of all previous debt obligations to the benefit of the debtor. This means reduction of all past savings accounts and fixed-value securities. Thus all depositors in savings and loan institutions, all private and social insurance policies, all holders

of government and corporate bonds, all owners of mortgages and similar debt obligations—in short, all savings for old age, retirement, or security will, depending upon the time when such savings were deposited or invested, have the value of their accumulations reduced by the extent of the general price advance. Such a gigantic forced transfer of property as this would involve has probably not been witnessed since the days of the enclosure acts or the Russian Revolution of 1917. Here is massive expropriation without compensation, with a vengeance.

A "ratchet effect"

Second, this condition is worsened by the fact that the means being taken to consolidate the individual prices that go to make up the price level are of such a character that they make any possible adjustment relatively easy upward, but very difficult downward. There arises what might be called a "ratchet effect" from any success in the use of (1) the parity price formula with respect to agricultural prices, supported by virtually all farm organizations; (2) the combination of minimum wage legislation with wage scales adjusted to cost of living with respect to wages, supported by virtually all organized labor; and (3) fixed dollars-and-cents or percentage margin cost-price formulas of the Office of Price Stabilization with respect to prices at the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail levels, supported by virtually all organized business. Furthermore, these separate ratchet effects not only may operate singly to force prices upward, but they may be compounded one on another.

Finally, the very structure and outlook of the special interest organizations operating to promote the use of these formulas is of such a character as to promote efforts to stimulate upward price movements by resort to (*a*) every known device of economic manipulation over the price-influencing factors of production, plant capacity, and technological innovation; (*b*) further implementation of policies by laws lobbied through legislatures in support of such programs, and by the demand—increasingly successful on both the national and the state and local levels—for the right to have like-minded people placed in administration of these special interest laws; and (*c*) advance inter-pressure-group (trade associations, labor unions, and so forth) collaboration in securing these results on the widest possible scale.

Toward the corporate state

Third, while the general effect is massive advance of monopolistic forms, tactics, and ideas, yet the advance is now being subtilized in such a way that it may not readily be seen or understood, even by the experts. It is less monopoly in the "antitrust" sense of the term, and more wholesale cartelization in the German sense of the term. But the term "cartel" is also misleading. It is more the slow drift toward the legally compulsory cartel policy, independently administered by the pressure group against the background of resort at need to the implementing sanctions of favorably drawn law when administered by persons coming from the industry or group and expecting to return to it. That is to say, we are moving with startling rapidity toward the forms and ideas of the corporate state.

Against this background, for example, the paradox of OPS is readily explained. Senator Aiken was unquestionably correct when he said,

> It is safe to say that for the last year and one-half, the prices to consumers have, on the whole, been higher than they would have been if no price controls at all had been applied or if there had not been any stimulation by Government officials or panic buying by consumers.[21]

OPS has acted not as an agency for curtailing the level of prices, but as an agency for stabilizing *interprice relations* in such a way as to supersede and render obsolete even the cartel-minded but so-called Fair Trade Practice laws of the country. The critical term is not "price control," but "price stabilization"; stabilization means *minimum* price fixing; minimum prices can advance, and all the *idola theatri* of modern times are set against decline. The OPS, in short, is coming insensibly to serve as a midwife in the accouchement of a cartelized and corporative-minded economy, self imposed by the vested interests of business, labor, agriculture, and other sponsoring groups, where private collusive decisions are made enforceable by public law. It can scarcely do otherwise.

Economic implications of peace

Fourth, in the mosaic of agencies which go to make up the over-all defense administration, there is a general disposition to see the long-run task in terms which visualize a vast expansion of the producer goods industries. So rapid has this expansion already been in the United States that, as pointed out above, bearish sentiment has been rising in Wall Street, even despite the current scale of military diversion of economic resources. Should peace "break out," as certain writers have so engagingly put it, this capacity would immediately hang over the market as a gigantic economic Tyrannosaurus. As Mr. Lightbowne has put it, "At the peak of an arms race there are so many people who have an economic reason for NOT making peace that the job becomes doubly difficult." [22]

But now these same people can argue that it is not the private interests alone, but, forsooth, the entire national interest—in terms of full employment, avoidance of depression with all its disastrous consequences—that requires the maintenance of these same levels of expenditure. But how? If not by a vast leveling up in the distribution of income which encourages a corresponding increase in spending for consumption, then shall it be accomplished by an enormous program of foreign investment?

As pointed out above, all organized business is set against the first; the second has few supporters in business or out of it.[23] Restrictionist policies could not yet cope with the excess plant that would then be left over. What remains is the easiest solution of all: continue, and if need be expand, the military program. If the alternatives appear to be high or expanding defense spending on the one hand or world-wide economic depression on the other, who doubts what the answer will be—particularly with such a *casus belli* as this?

THE END OF THE ROAD

Finally, there is occurring throughout all this defense activity a series of moves which are designed, purposely or not, to deprecate or make impossible criticism of either the causes which seem to occasion defense expenditures on a mounting scale, or the manner in which they are spent. Critical evaluation of *basic* policies is swiftly becoming unpatriotic. Economies are seen by

[21] *Congressional Record*, May 29, 1952, p. 6320.

[22] "Our Negative Foreign Policy," *op. cit.* note 19. Capitals in original.

[23] For a notable exception see Benjamin A. Javits' "trillion dollar" Point Four program in *Peace by Investment*, with a Foreword by Charles E. Wilson, New York, 1950.

military spenders—by us in both world wars, but also by military requisition systems in all armament races or wars of recorded history—as possible only on the domestic front.[24]

Sustained, the end of this road is the "garrison state."[25] It is bound to be expensive.

[24] "We must continue to hold back on the construction of hospitals. Total construction for schools, although at record levels, must be held below the real need. New natural resource development projects, including flood control, navigation, and reclamation projects, are being postponed unless they are essential because of electric power or other urgently needed features." *Economic Report of the President,* 1952, p. 12. In discussion of economies, already being debated by Presidential candidates, two things may be noted: (1) economies are possible on a big scale; (2) military expenditures must not be curtailed.

[25] Clippings gleaned from the commercial press for the past year show increasing reference to the "garrison state," the "regimented economy," and synonymous expressions. It is rarely questioned as an impending fact; the only problems have been "when" and "how much."

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Are Taxes Too High?

By HAROLD M. GROVES

THERE are many intriguing aspects of this assignment which we shall be obliged to mention rather than discuss. Should we spend the huge sums projected in current budgets? Should we spend so much *if* we are not willing to tax accordingly? Should we maintain (or increase) taxes only if something new and different can be added to the tax system by way of diversification? Can we get the revenue to avoid new taxes or reduce existing ones by plugging loopholes and improving administration? Can we avoid high taxes and still have adequate services by eliminating waste?

These questions we shall have to dismiss except for one comment. Students of public finance have reason to know that too many people castigate taxes when public expenditures are the real villain in the piece. They also know that security in our kind of world comes high and its cost is infinitely elastic. We can do without the good things of life, but we cannot have them (in times of full employment at least) without paying for them.

Are taxes too high? An affirmative answer could rest upon either of two economic grounds: (1) that taxes are undermining incentives and thus hindering economic progress; and (2) that taxes are causing inflation. To these may be added a third possible ground: (3) that taxes are so high as to hamper unduly the effectiveness of administration. The first and the third of these grounds might lead to the conclusion that more revenue could be raised with a lower schedule of rates. We shall consider each of these approaches in the order named.

INCENTIVES AS AFFECTED BY TAXES

What do we mean by incentive? We mean the price that it is necessary to pay in order to draw forth production. On the farm it is necessary to feed "the old gray mare" a certain amount of oats in order that she can and will pull. And so it is with the economic factors of production such as capital and labor. This all goes back to the fact, it is said, that working, saving, and risking are irksome and grow more irksome as more of these "sacrifices" are expected. The sacrifices are induced by certain rewards, and if taxes take a large share of these rewards, people will not work, save, and risk—or will do so on a reduced scale. It is true that man does not live by bread alone, but economic incentives are powerful and necessary.

Now there are certain advantages of the taxers over the taxed which support the conclusion that incentives are nowhere near as sensitive to taxation as one might a priori suppose. One is that a general tax like the net income tax can be so arranged that the relative rank of the taxpayer will not be disturbed. Prestige may depend upon income before tax or on relative rank in disposable income (after tax), but in either case it will remain as a motivation. It is said that what makes the most difference to the individual is whether his income is higher or lower than the general level. Much of the cost of the factors of production is "opportunity cost"—that is, the price that must be paid to attract them from competitors. But the income tax circumvents opportunity cost by taxing all competitors.

Another factor in the sensitivity of incentives to taxation is that taxpayers receive something in exchange for their so-called tax burden. They may not be satisfied with their *quid pro quo*, but the case would differ greatly if no return were forthcoming. A good many discussions of taxation and incentives talk as though the money one paid to government were dropped into the bottom of the sea. Or, as one writer put it, "taxation is like the hail which destroys part of the crop." But there is ordinarily a wide difference between taxes and tribute. For example, the largest part of our taxes are now going to stop aggression in Asia and to prepare to stop aggression in other parts of the world. The blindest taxpayer cannot fail to realize that he has some equity in this program. When we have a draft of manpower to carry out the military program, no one, no matter how bitter his criticism, can fail entirely to perceive that any contribution he may make in dollars is a mere token compared with contributions made by others in the flesh.

Of course the quality as well as the quantity of public expenditures has a bearing on incentives. Wholesale waste in government can be more damaging than high tax rates.

Work and risk incentives

A further point about incentives is that a taxpayer will fight to preserve a standard to which he has become accustomed. This *may* mean that taxes will induce him to work all the harder. As farm prices and farm incomes fell during the Great Depression, farmers sought to compensate not by planting less but by working nights. Of course, the degree of the levy is of some importance here. It probably is true also that men rebel less against a gradual rise in taxes than against increases in large installments. The greatest problem in the relation of taxes to work incentives occurs where an expanded labor force is needed and must be induced through overtime or through an appeal to wives of workingmen.

Labor's work incentives are of course protected to some extent by the fact that the tax rates applicable to them are the low bracket rates. Business executives have no such protection. However, we have the evidence of Dr. Thomas H. Sanders, after substantial interviewing, that executives are in considerable part driven by nonmonetary motives and that, while taxes may make them somewhat less willing to move from one job to another, "for the most part, with considerable exceptions, businessmen are currently working as hard under high tax rates as they did under low tax rates." [1]

Risk incentives appear even more vulnerable to taxation than work incentives. The differential return from risky investments, it would seem, is cut down to the point where no one could afford to take a risk. But investment is protected to some extent by the fact that risk is not irksome to all people. John Maynard Keynes summed this up as follows: "If human nature felt no temptation to take a chance, no satisfaction (profit apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, a mine, or a farm, there might not be much investment merely as a result of cold calculation." [2] Moreover, investment decisions take account of the probability of loss as well as that of gain. And the income tax, in effect, often promises to share the investor's loss as well as his profit.

[1] Thomas H. Sanders, *Effects of Taxation on Executives*, Boston: Harvard University, 1951.

[2] John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (London, 1936), p. 150.

Reflection in economic progress

Perhaps these factors account for the fact that the global statistics offer little support for the view that the tax burden is a drag on economic progress. Taxes were rising during the thirties, and it could then have been argued plausibly, perhaps, that high levies were the cause of unemployment and low output. But the greatest acceleration of tax burdens has occurred during the 1940's and 1950's, an era which has been characterized by heavy investment, very high output, relatively full employment, and satisfactory increases in productivity. President Truman seems to have been well within the bounds of the evidence when he recently remarked: "This growth of the productive sector of our economy indicates that neither the size of the military build-up nor the high level of taxation enacted to finance that build-up has repressed business investment initiative. Instead, the problem has been to hold the expansion down to non-inflationary proportions." [3]

Whatever may be the effect of taxation on economic progress, one may subscribe to the view that certain other positive factors have a great deal to do with the latter. Among them are a favorable ratio of resources to population; a wide free-trade area; a high interest in and adequate support for technological research; willingness to scrap old techniques and equipment; adequate competition; wide educational opportunity and open ladder for the advancement of talent; and avoidance of war.

The author has no disposition to assert that taxes have no effect on incentives. The question is at what point the effect becomes a matter of vital or overwhelming concern. As to the personal income tax, the view recently expressed by Dr. Blough,[4] that the political limit to taxation is reached considerably before the economic limit, seems convincing. As to the corporation income tax and excess profits tax, where the marginal rates on profits can go as high as 82 per cent, the conclusion seems warranted that we are now at or near the economic limit.

Whether or not the above opinion be accepted, there can be no doubt that taxes should be so ordered, other things being equal, that they weaken incentives no more than necessary. In this respect, the more generous postwar allowance for losses is a genuine gain.

INFLATION AS AFFECTED BY TAXES

Let us next consider the bearing of high taxes upon inflation. A convenient point of departure will be Colin Clark's widely circulated thesis that whenever taxes rise above 25 per cent of the national income they ipso facto become inflationary.[5] Undoubtedly our present tax load is well above Clark's danger point.

Clark bases his hypothesis largely upon an analysis of the historical experience of several countries at several times. His cases are far from conclusive, as he himself acknowledges. Indeed it is doubtful if they are even persuasive. In at least most of the instances cited, inflation could be explained without bringing in the factor of high taxes at all. War deficits, excessive borrowing, war damage, and other causes would suffice for an explanation. One surely may not jump to the conclusion that the inflation would

[3] *The Economic Report of the President*, Jan. 1952, p. 6.

[4] *Business Week*, Dec. 16, 1950, p. 38.

[5] Colin Clark, "Public Finance and Changes in the Value of Money," 55 *Economic Journal* (Dec. 1945), pp. 371–389; and "The Danger Point in Taxes," 201 *Harpers Magazine* (Dec. 1950), pp. 67–69.

have been less had high expenditures been accompanied by lower taxation and higher deficits. It follows that it was expenditures rather than taxes which were the root of the trouble. Now it is generally conceded that a sharp rise in public expenditures (whether or not accompanied by a parallel rise of taxes) is, in times of full employment, inflationary. Undoubtedly our economic problem would be easier if we did not find it necessary to augment the expenditure side of the budget so rapidly and so much. One is less secure in the conclusion that a high level of expenditures, as such, must forever exert an inflationary influence. Quite possibly a new equilibrium can be reached where the effects of the acceleration will have spent themselves.

Clark is on strongest ground in his suggestion that a democratic people will not legislate to provide taxes that yield more than 25 per cent of the nation's income and that, therefore, high expenditures will lead to inflation. The evidence does not support this thesis very consistently either. But even if it did, the conclusion would not follow that we cannot (rather than will not) exceed his limit.

But even conceding the proposition that high expenditures, as such, are inflationary and that this will be so even if budgets are balanced, the Clark thesis, in this modified form, still requires important and extensive qualification. Surely some of the following factors will make an important difference:

(1) the policy toward and the volume of private bank credit;

(2) the attitude of taxpayers toward the adequacy of the *quid pro quo* received in return for their outlay;

(3) the kind of taxes employed to balance the budget;

(4) the per capita income.

The author finds it very hard to believe that no country at any time or under any circumstances can make a decision to spend collectively more than 25 per cent of the national income without incurring insuperable monetary problems.

If high taxes, as such, are inflationary, they would have this effect mainly because they impair incentives (and thus output) or because they exert a direct upward pressure upon prices. We have considered the matter of incentives in the previous section of this article. With regard to the upward pressure on prices, we confront first the question of the incidence of various taxes. This is too large an order to examine in detail here, but it will suffice to say that there is very little support for the view that all taxes are passed on to consumers. And even if they were, their effect on prices need not be one of permanent upward pressure. Thus it is the acceleration of taxes (or, more properly, of expenditures) that causes the trouble. The high level, as such, is not the problem.

ADMINISTRATION AFFECTED BY TAX RATE?

It can be argued that taxes—at least specific taxes—have reached so high a level that they cannot be administered with tolerable effectiveness. There can be no doubt that high taxes, whatever may be their effect on other incentives, do sharpen the incentive to avoid and evade. M. S. Howard offered one explanation of this phenomenon as follows: "When both the taxpayers and the community consider the rates of tax fair, the taxpayers find two formidable obstacles to their circumventing the tax: (a) their own conscience, and (b) the conscience or disapproval of their fellows." He adds that "the state should never throw away these two powerful assets by imposing excessive rates." [6]

No one will deny, of course, that this line of thought has some validity. It would be happier for administration if taxes need not be so high. But it may be doubted if present administrative difficulties are in any sense prohibitive. It should be recalled that we are very far from exhausting the available remedies for weak administration. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is now getting the reorganization which has been long overdue. The Revenue Act of 1951 extended information at the source to cover all dividends paid by corporations. It might have gone further to apply withholding to dividend and interest payments. The Bureau, at long last, is embarked upon a research program to determine by intensive auditing of a sample of returns how large the enforcement problem is and where it can apply its resources most effectively. The Bureau is, and always has been, inadequately manned. Study of 1948 returns indicates that the Bureau has the personnel to examine only one quarter of the returns that are in error.[7] Moreover, the data show that even in working the small returns, where recovery of taxes is least, an auditor can earn $9,400 per year, well above the salary required to enlist him.

Moreover, it is in the area where taxes are lowest that administrative problems are greatest. The returns of farmers, small businessmen, and professional men are particularly difficult to check for accuracy. It is true that the average size of error increases sharply with the size of the return, but the percentage of error (to tax liability) decreases as one goes up the brackets. The large returns, according to the Bureau, pay sufficiently well to warrant regular processing. As rates increase, the margin of profitability, presumably, is pushed downward. And it is yet to be demonstrated that we could not afford to audit all returns as thoroughly as the Bureau has worked its samples. Certainly we cannot conclude that the income tax at present levels is incapable of administration until we have made a decent effort to administer it.

Bad administration could constitute adequate reason for convicting present tax levels on either of two grounds: (1) that administration is so weakened by high rates that more could be collected with low rates; or (2) that the inadequacies of collection seriously undermine the equity of the tax. As to the first, such evidence as we have of the quantity of error indicates no such amounts as to suggest a point of diminishing returns. The second is a much more serious problem. An income tax, which in theory is a highly equitable tax instrument, can become a most capricious affair if the administration is riddled with holes. But again, the situation calls for closing the holes rather than acknowledging defeat on the score of administration.

CONCLUSION

Reviewing the argument concerning the specific grounds on which it might be concluded that taxes are too high, we come out with a largely negative answer. On the matter of incentive, it is hard to believe that any disinterested appraisal of the evidence can lend support to the view that taxes are seriously impairing our economic effort. Corporation taxation, where political protection is small, does indeed seem to have been pushed to the practical limit.

[6] Mayne S. Howard, *Principles of Public Finance* (New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1940), p. 275.

[7] Marius Farioletti, "Some Results From the First Year's Audit Control Program of the Bureau of Internal Revenue," V *National Tax Journal*, No. 2 (March 1952), pp. 65–78.

But personal taxes and excises are quite another matter. Here the levies in the lower and middle lower brackets are still modest compared with those in some European countries that have made a very impressive postwar recovery. Our excises are also low compared with many; the Canadian cigarette tax is twice ours (taking account of state additions), and the British tax is nearly four times as high. Our per capita net income—more than half again as high as that of any other nation—would enable us to raise much higher taxes without incurring as high a real burden as that of our allies. This is not to deny that all taxes do weaken incentives nor to argue that incentive aspects of taxation need be of no concern. But it is to say that in the case of most federal taxes, the limits are much more political than economic. The political nerve is much the more sensitive of the two.

As to the inflationary aspect of high taxes, we have suggested that the root of the trouble is in the acceleration of expenditures in time of full employment. There probably are cases where taxes are more inflationary than borrowing, but they are rare.

High taxes are difficult to administer, but we should use up our reserve administrative powers before we conclude that we are stopped in this direction.

Taxes are too high only in the sense that they are extremely painful to pay.

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Take-Home Pay and Levels of Living

By EWAN CLAGUE

IN times of business depression, the attention of the average man and his family is firmly fixed on the dangers of unemployment and destitution. The emphasis is on job protection and social security. During the long depression of the 1930's, these issues began to assume paramount importance in public policy, and far-reaching new social programs were adopted as a result.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PROSPERITY

In times of business prosperity, the picture is reversed. Jobs are plentiful, prices are rising, wages are increasing, and security becomes secondary to opportunity. For more than ten years now, the American economy has enjoyed sustained prosperity and comparatively full employment. Minor recessions, such as those of 1945–46 and 1949, have been scarcely more than surface waves on a deep sea. In addition, the normal characteristics of a peacetime business boom have been intensified by the requirements of war and mobilization. The productive capacity of the American economy under forced draft has proved to be tremendous; yet there has scarcely been a time during this period when there were not serious shortages of one kind or another.

People in general have not yet forgotten the meaning of depression. For millions of adult Americans it remains as a memory of a horrible economic nightmare. Even the young workers coming to maturity remember their experiences as children in the families of the unemployed. It would take another decade to rear a new generation of workers with no experience and no memories of what depression and unemployment can mean.

At the same time, the problems and experiences of prosperity are now impressing themselves firmly upon the minds of working people in general. Jobs are plentiful and easy to get. Labor turnover statistics emphasize the freedom which workers feel to quit their jobs voluntarily and seek better ones at higher wages. Wages and salaries are increased from time to time. From the point of view of an unemployed worker in the depressed 1930's, the nation's economy of 1952 would seem like the millennium.

For example, in 1934–36 the Bureau of Labor Statistics made studies of the family expenditures of some 12,000 families of wage earners and lower-salaried clerical workers. The income of the average family at that time was about $1,500. A similar survey made by the Bureau for 1950 showed that the income of the average family was approximately $4,000. In neither case were unemployed families included. In 1934–36 unemployment averaged about 20 per cent of the nation's labor force, while in 1950 it was less than 5 per cent.

However, to the average American family in 1952 this is not the way it looks; something is missing. The answer is, of course, that high wages and full employment have been only partially translated into higher levels of living.

Let us take as an illustration the average weekly earnings of production employees in manufacturing industries as compared to the Consumers' Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE 1—AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS COMPARED TO CONSUMERS' PRICE INDEX

Date	Average weekly earnings in all manufacturing		Consumers' price index (1939 = 100)
	Amount	Index (1939 = 100)	
August 1939	$23.77	99.6	99.2
January 1941	26.64	111.7	101.4
January 1943	40.62	170.2	121.5
January 1945	47.50	199.1	128.1
November 1945	40.77	170.9	130.3
September 1948	55.16	231.2	176.3
June 1950	58.85	246.6	171.2
May 1952	66.32	278.0	190.1

Table 1 brings out the fact that the manufacturing worker's real wages have increased. In May 1952 his earnings index was 278 when the price index was 190, a differential of 88 points. At the wartime peak in January 1945, his earnings represented a potential increase in real buying power of over 50 per cent as compared to prewar. However, his actual level of living did not rise to anything like this extent. The reason, of course, was that large amounts of this purchasing power were set aside for war purposes. Higher taxes and voluntary purchase of war bonds drained off a considerable portion of this purchasing power at the source; rationing restricted the purchases of American families even beyond the purchasing power they had left. This was all clearly understood by the public, although there were some vigorous wage disputes during the war period.

It was after the brief flurry of reconversion that the wage earners and others began to reach for the fruits of their high wages and high incomes. Unfortunately, the shortages created by world war could not be made up in a few months, so when controls were removed in 1946, the effort to convert current income and wartime savings into refrigerators, washing machines, automobiles, and other consumer goods brought mostly higher prices. At the peak of prices in September 1948, the purchasing power of the wage earner's weekly dollar was no higher than it had been at the end of the war.

But two full years of peacetime production had created a flood of consumer goods, and in 1949, when output finally caught up with demand, the purchasing power of the wage earner's dollar increased—the level of living really began to rise. This rise would surely have gone on during the business prosperity of 1950 had normal peacetime conditions continued. But the Korean crisis brought about new mobilization requirements, and so once more, as in the early days of World War II, large amounts of labor and materials had to be diverted to war production. With memories of wartime shortages in their minds, consumers rushed to buy goods during the second half of 1950, and succeeded only in raising prices about 10 per cent. In an effort to limit the rise in the cost of living, government controls were instituted in January 1951. But about the same time taxes were increased, so during the past year and a half there has been little change in current real income.

PUBLIC BEWILDERMENT

Thus, in summary, the average factory worker in 1952 is far ahead, from an economic point of view, of where he stood in 1939. He has a better job, a higher income, and a higher level of living; but it is not as much higher as he thought it was going to be when he got his last raise. To him, money is constant in value and is the true standard of measurement. It is only the sophisticated student of social sciences that gauges the purchasing power of the dollar itself with a coldly calculating eye. And even in an economist's family, a salary increase seems at first blush to be a gain in purchasing power which should somehow be translatable into better living conditions. Practically everyone confidently expects a rising income to be reflected soon in a higher level of living. It is only on second thought, and after some experience in the markets, that one realizes how relative all things are. The small salary increase may turn out to be a loss, because others gained more and can buy more.

So the plentiful jobs and the rising incomes make promises which are not fully delivered in the market place. During the war, this was accepted and understood; in the inflation of 1946–48, it definitely was not understood; and now in 1952, the American worker is not sure what, if any, sacrifice is required in the goods he can buy.

Public understanding is clouded by further complications in this whole subject of consumer buying power. At the present time, perhaps 3,500,000 workers in this country have their wages or salaries changed every three months in accordance with changes in the Consumers' Price Index. Other millions of workers and salary earners are affected by general wage stabilization policies which are related in part to the behavior of the Consumers' Price Index. So there is probably no single statistical figure in the country that is more widely known or more closely watched than the Consumers' Price Index. The average citizen knows that it is about 190, even though he may not always know exactly what 190 means. He gauges its fluctuations with his own experiences in buying, and at times it seems to him to be out of accord. What is the matter?

The fact is that the Consumers' Price Index, like the average man, is itself an average. It is designed to represent all the multitude of expenses that the average family incurs. The index represents the average of such price changes. But, of course, some commodities and services have risen much more than others. For convenience, the Bureau of Labor Statistics classifies family purchases into six main groups. Thus, at a recent date when the index was 189.0 (1935–39 = 100), the figures for the major groups were as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2—CLASSIFICATION OF FAMILY PURCHASES

Foods	230.8
House furnishings	205.4
Apparel	202.3
Miscellaneous	171.4
Fuel, electricity, and refrigeration	144.6
Rent	141.3

First, note that the food group has risen far higher than any other group. Food prices make a strong impression on the consumer's mind, partly because food costs make up about one-third of the average family's budget, and partly because most food purchasing is by the week, so the cost of food is forced upon the consumer's attention regularly and frequently.

Furthermore, among the foods, meats —with an index of nearly 272—have risen more than the average. Beef and veal are at 311 and fish at 345. Chicken at 175 is better priced from the consumer's point of view. However, any family which eats meat regularly is convinced that this part of the cost of living has tripled.

Fresh fruits and vegetables are another item that attracts consumers' attention with high prices. The index for this group was recently 283. Canned fruits and vegetables at 164 are much lower priced, but they cannot compete in public attention with the prices of potatoes, tomatoes, cabbage, and beans.

At the other extreme, the rent index is only 141, so many families can make savings on this item of expenditure.

However, rent controls do not exist throughout the country, and in some cities where they have been removed, the rent index is over 200. In addition, even where rent controls exist, many families are not able to find apartments and houses for rent, so this is a cause of dissatisfaction. Finally, rent is paid once a month, so the advantage of low rent does not offset in the consumer's mind the disadvantage of high prices for food which is bought almost every day.

THE UNAVERAGE FAMILIES

Just as the Consumers' Price Index represents an average of price changes covering a wide diversity of prices, so, too, the income of the average family does not reflect the situation of all families. In addition to families with incomes of $4,000 a year, there are others with $2,000 and $10,000 and, of course, beyond these in both directions. In general, the higher the income of the family, the lower the proportion of the family budget which is spent for food. This is because food is a necessity which must come first. Automobiles, refrigerators, and other household appliances come after food.

Now it is clear from Table 2 that the pressure of food prices on the family budget is much more severe among low income families. Such families are not only more acutely conscious of the rise in the cost of living, but they are in fact actually squeezed more than the average family by high food prices. It is true that many of these families may have been among the unemployed in time of depression, and may have subsisted for years on a Work Projects Administration budget. But now they have jobs at good wages, and at the same time they are strongly affected by the high cost of living.

This group should theoretically be offset by a higher income group which should be getting some of the advantages of higher income, namely, less expenditure on food and more money for the amenities of life. In actual fact, this is the situation even of the average family. When the Bureau of Labor Statistics made its family expenditure studies in 1934–36, the weight of the miscellaneous group in the total family budget was only about 22 per cent—less than one-fourth. The postwar studies during the last few years show that this group has risen in importance until it comprises fully one-third of the family budget. In this group is included a wide variety of items such as personal care, amusements, transportation (including automobiles), television and radio sets, and medical and hospital care. The expansion of these expenditures reflects a rising income and a higher standard of living. Is not the average family, then, better off than it was before?

FUTURE INCOME MORTGAGED

In one sense the answer is, "Certainly yes." The number of automobiles registered in the United States, the number of television sets bought in recent years, the purchase of medical care on an ever larger scale—all these are clear evidence of the fact that these families are using their incomes to raise their standards. Yet this does not prevent many of these families from feeling pinched in their budgets. The purchase of a car or a television set represents a heavy capital expenditure for the average family. Most of these things are bought on the installment plan, with monthly payments running over extended periods of time. While installment selling enables the purchaser to have his commodity immediately, it also commits him to future payments which reduce his remaining disposable income. Hence the family budget is squeezed, even with a higher income.

A short spell of unemployment or a rise in current expenditures can throw the family budget out of balance and make the family feel poor. It is this factor that makes many higher income families feel that their income is not adequate to cover the cost of living.

There is no doubt that the system of installment selling has had a tremendous influence in raising the American family's standard of living, and in bringing pressure for higher incomes to meet that standard. By contrast, in some western European countries, such installment selling is unknown. The family has to save its money until it has sufficient funds to pay cash for the costly items in the budget. Statistics of sales of consumer durables in such countries show what a marked effect this has on consumer buying.

In fact, one can imagine what the effect in the United States would be if each family had to save $2,000 to buy a car or $300 to buy a television set. Some families probably would never have the will to save such amounts in anticipation of a major purchase. Others would certainly require a long period of time to save such an amount. And finally, by the time it was obtained, the family might have acquired such saving habits that it would not go through with the planned expenditure. These are factors which seem to be present in the psychology and the practice of European families.

The ease with which an American family can achieve a new level of living by mortgaging future income has undoubtedly served to quicken the rise in the American standard. It helps to convert wage and salary increases into immediate improvements in living conditions. The result is a strong pressure of expenditures on income. This system also causes a rise in the standard to spread quickly throughout the American economy. Television was unknown in 1939; it was unique in 1946; it is commonplace in 1952. Without installment selling, it could never have acquired such status in the average family budget. At the same time, this expansion produces an urge for higher income in order to balance that budget.

THOSE WHO LAG BEHIND

No mention of averages and divergencies would be complete without some reference to the classes and groups of people who have not kept pace with the procession, either in income or in expenditures. It is quite clear that a family which does not have approximately double its 1939 income has not gained much in its level of living during the past decade. Yet there are many groups in the population which have not achieved this. There is no need to elaborate this point, and it is sometimes difficult to define exactly the groups which are behind.

Curiously enough, some of the least skilled and lowest-paid workers—such as domestic servants and farm laborers—have done better in wage increases than the average worker. There is nothing abnormal about this. These are the groups which suffer most from unemployment and low wages in depression periods. Their gains are proportionately greater in times of good employment. Yet they may still be, in absolute terms, somewhat low in the income scale. In general, under conditions that have existed in this country during the past ten years, there has been a definite telescoping in the range of incomes, with the lower incomes crowding closer to the higher ones.

It is the white-collar workers' families, such as teachers, clerks, and various other types of middle-class occupations, that have been losing out relatively. Some of them may have actually suffered declines in their level of living. Also (while this has nothing

to do with the problem of the take-home pay of wage earners), there are large groups of people living on pensions, public assistance, annuities, and dividends, whose level of living is steadily falling under rising costs.

EFFECTS OF TAXES

There is another item which vitally affects the average American family; that is taxes. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, in constructing the Consumers' Price Index, follows the practice of pricing articles at retail with sales and excise taxes included. A package of cigarettes in a certain city would be priced at 22 cents, not 14 cents, or whatever it might be if all such taxes were excluded.

One reason for this practice is the difficulty of actually segregating the taxes which are imposed in the process of manufacture and distribution, although this technical difficulty might be overcome with some statistical effort. The Bureau has made a study in one city to find out how important all such sales and excise taxes are in the price index for that city. However, apart from these technical questions, there is a simple, logical reason for including such taxes in the index. Commodities or services on which taxes are specifically laid cannot be obtained at all without the payment of the tax. The consumer would not recognize the price of cigarettes without taxes, nor could he obtain them at the price so calculated.

This practice of the Bureau was approved by the Steed Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Education and Labor Committee, which studied the Consumers' Price Index in the spring and summer of 1951. Thus, to some extent, changing taxes are reflected in the Consumers' Price Index, and their influence on family budgets is reflected in the preceding analysis.

However, direct income and withholding taxes are not included in the Consumers' Price Index, but are considered as a deduction from income. This is in fact the situation of the average family, since the bulk of these taxes are withheld at the source. Furthermore, such taxes are not attached to any particular goods or services. And finally, such taxes fall unevenly on families of various incomes and sizes. A single worker without dependents is in a very different situation from one with five or six dependents. A low income worker is affected less by changes in income taxes than one with higher income. So, for all these reasons, it is more logical to treat income taxes as a subtraction from wage and salary incomes.

TABLE 3—GROSS AND NET AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS

Year	Gross average weekly earnings	Net spendable average weekly earnings			
		Worker with no dependents		Worker with 3 dependents	
		Current dollars	1939 dollars	Current dollars	1939 dollars
1939	$23.86	$23.58	$23.58	$23.62	$23.62
1941	29.58	28.05	26.51	29.28	27.67
1944	46.08	38.29	30.28	44.06	34.84
1946	43.82	37.72	26.88	43.20	30.78
1948	54.14	47.43	27.43	53.17	30.75
1951	64.88	54.18	29.02	61.41	32.89

TABLE 4—ANNUAL COST OF LIVING FOR A FOUR-PERSON FAMILY

Date	Washington, D. C.			New Orleans, La.		
	Total cost of budget	Cost of goods and services alone	Difference	Total cost of budget	Cost of goods and services alone	Difference
June 1947	$3,546	$3,180	$366	$3,092	$2,806	$286
October 1949	3,773	3,467	306	3,295	3,064	231
October 1951	4,454	3,965	489	3,812	3,441	371

For a number of years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has prepared statistics on this point. Table 3 shows the gross average weekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing industries and the net spendable average weekly earnings, first for a worker with no dependents, and second for a worker with three dependents.

What this demonstrates is that the worker with no dependents has come out after a dozen years at a relatively different position from that of the worker with three dependents. Note that in 1939 there was an insignificant difference (only 4 cents per week) between the two workers. In 1951, a gross average weekly earning of $64.88 would result in take-home pay of $54.18 for the worker with no dependents and $61.41 for the worker with three dependents—a difference of over $7.00 per week. When converted into 1939 dollars, this differential amounts to nearly $4 a week. The gain over 1939 in real net spendable earnings is substantially greater for the worker with dependents than for the worker with none.

THE COST OF LIVING

Another type of comparison is that involved in the City Worker's Family Budget prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This is the annual cost of a "modest but adequate" level of living for a four-person urban family in each of thirty-four large cities. The budget shows the cost of goods and services, as well as the total for all costs, including personal taxes, social security deductions, life insurance, and occupational expenses. This type of budget was undertaken by the Bureau at the request of the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in 1945, and was first prepared for the two periods, March 1946 and June 1947. Later pricings of this budget were obtained in October of each of the last three years —1949, 1950, and 1951. Among the cities of the country, Washington, D.C., has usually showed the highest cost, while New Orleans, Louisiana, has always been the lowest. A comparison of the costs in these two cities is shown in Table 4.

No prewar comparisons are possible, since no such budget is available for those years. However, it is of interest to note that for this particular type of family, it required an income of $3,546 in Washington, D.C., in June 1947 to cover not only the $3,180 needed for the goods and services in the budget, but also the $366 for state, federal, or local income taxes, social security deductions, minimum life insurance, and occupational expenses. Tax reductions by October 1949 had brought down these latter costs to $306, but by October 1951 they had increased to $489. Some part (but not all) of the rise was due to tax increases since the outbreak in Korea. The figures for New Orleans show similar trends.

The significance of this budget for our discussion here is that it emphasizes the diversity in living costs in different parts of the country, and also shows the importance of some of the factors which affect the level of living which are not directly related to the purchase of goods and services.

This type of budget should not be compared with average incomes, because the particular type of family—man, wife, and two children ages 13 and 8—is not exactly average for the American people. In several places it has been possible to compare the incomes of this type of family with the budget estimates shown here. In all such cases, something like two-thirds of these families had actual incomes in excess of this budget, while an additional proportion had incomes not far below it. Nevertheless, there was a minority of families of this type which had incomes sufficiently far below this budget to indicate a failure to sustain this minimum standard of living.

WHERE WE ARE TODAY

On the whole, it is clear that the wages and salaries of the average American worker have risen more during the last ten years than the cost of living. This is true even when income taxes and other types of income deductions are included in the calculations. There is also unmistakable evidence that the level of living of the average family in the United States has risen significantly during the past ten years. The level in the United States today is higher than it has ever been before, even though we are in the midst of a rearmament program. Thus far, at least, the American people have been able to have both guns and butter.

But at the same time, there are classes, groups, and segments of the population which have not shared equally in this general advance. Some indeed have lost ground; others have gained something, but have lost in relative position. These dissatisfied elements are sufficient to make up a comparatively large minority who have some reason to question the gains of the past decade. The fact that they see others getting ahead of them only intensifies their dissatisfaction and their sense of unequal treatment.

These lagging groups will eventually be in a better position. Some of the lag is due to the slowness with which certain types of wages and salaries move—in federal, state, and local governments, for example. Compare the frequent and precise adjustment of wages to the Consumers' Price Index in some collective bargaining contracts with the more cautious and infrequent adjustments made by certain state and local governments. Furthermore, most collective bargaining agreements of this kind include a factor for productivity and the rising standard of living, whereas no governmental legislation makes any such provision. And the great majority of governmental bodies—federal, state, or local—have no automatic provision at all for salary increases. Nevertheless, such salaries are eventually adjusted upward and will be so again. So time may bring about some amelioration in the incomes and the living conditions of the lagging groups.

EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE BUSINESS DECLINE

What is the import of all this for the future? The expanding American economy has created and sustained rising standards and levels of living for American families. They have met new standards to some extent through installment buying and consumer credit which have mortgaged future incomes. A sharp contraction in the economy sufficient to produce a considerable volume of unemployment and part-time work would have serious consequences for the American consumer. With his income partially mortgaged for past purchases, any reduction in earnings would hit his current expenditures. The effect would be to put a tight squeeze on the family's budget. Two things would happen immediately. First, the consumer would be compelled to cut his current purchases, and all types of business dependent on those would find their markets sharply reduced. Second, many consumers, faced with the hazards of possible unemployment, would try to increase their savings, and would thus further reduce the demand for current production. The effect would be to make the consumer, more than ever before, a factor in the business cycle.

It would not take long, however, for the worker and his family to become deeply and vitally concerned about proposals for maintaining employment and earnings. The pressure to prevent a business readjustment from proceeding very far would be very great. The depression of the 1930's has already produced many protective devices—unemployment insurance, guarantee of bank deposits, and others—designed to provide some security against these hazards. However, these would not in themselves reverse the economic forces of declining employment, once the latter got well under way. Hence, there would almost surely arise an insistent demand for new policies and concrete measures for preventing a depression. The fears of the American worker have been allayed by a decade of prosperity, but they will be easily and surely aroused by any substantial decline in business. This is a factor which any future administration in power in Washington will have to take into account.

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Labor and the Distribution of the National Income

By Gordon S. Watkins

ELECTIONS, whether presidential or congressional, revive office seekers' interest in the economic status of the laboring population in general, and in labor's share of the national wealth and income in particular. The reason for this solicitude is clear: the workers are not likely to be responsive to the appeals of any political party or candidate unless, in pre-election platforms and speeches at least, there is expressed a serious concern for the well-being of the wage-earning class. How the national income is being distributed and what factors determine the division of its shares among the various agents of production, subjects which are of perennial interest to the economist, thus become problems of immediate concern.

In discussions of the problems of our national economy one invariably discovers a more compelling interest in the distribution of wealth and income than in production and consumption. This is quite understandable. In the first place, there is a quite general conviction that the United States, with its phenomenal scientific and technological discoveries and inventions, has to a considerable extent solved its problems of production, and that developments in the science of psychology have given us adequate answers concerning the motives that govern the behavior of consumers. Secondly, the problem of distribution continues to be something of a terra incognita which the economist has not yet explored with sufficient success to warrant any degree of certainty as to exactly what and how income shares are determined.

Distribution—Theory and Fact

In their analyses of the distribution of wealth and income, economists have devoted their principal attention to the determinative forces that are responsible for the division of shares among the several factors of production—land, labor, capital, and the entrepreneur. In recent years there has been a tendency to shift the emphasis in this analysis away from the refinements of the distributive process to causal relationships between levels of consumption and the increase of the national income, and the influence of private investments and public spending on the stability of the economy.[1] However, the division of the national income in the form of rent, wages, interest, and profits continues to be the central problem in economic analysis. This is because the income of every individual in the national economy consists of one or more of these payments. This area of "functional distribution" always constitutes an intellectual challenge to the economist.

On the other hand, "personal distribution," which commands the interest of economic and social statisticians and provides such abundant grist for the reformer's mill, is the problem with which labor is most vitally concerned. This is because personal distribution has to do with the division of the national income among individuals and family units. Statistics rather than economics is the instrument of analysis here. Apportionment is measured quantitatively to indicate the relative income status of classified groups and individuals.

[1] See L. Reed Tripp, "Labor's Share in the National Income," The Annals, Vol. 274, March 1951, pp. 47–56.

The question frequently is asked: Why, in view of our miraculously enhanced productive capacity, does the problem of distribution claim so much attention from economists and statisticians? The answer is, of course, that even in the most advanced and efficient economies, the output of commodities and services is inadequate to satisfy all the wants of the entire population. Shares must therefore be apportioned, either by arbitrary social control, as in collectivistic societies, or by natural forces, as presumably they are in purely competitive economic systems. There is nothing to which individuals and groups are more keenly sensitive than the failure of the distributive process, whatever its nature, to provide complete satisfaction of their desires. Consequently, there is persistent inquiry as to why some toil so much and receive so little, while others toil so little or not at all and receive so much. This dissatisfaction manifests itself in social reform movements designed to secure a redistribution of wealth and income, and perennially appears in election campaigns.

Acceptable Formula of Distribution Lacking

Despite the confidence of social reformers in the practicability of dividing the national income equitably, the most impartial and objective plan of apportionment of income shares would in all probability fail, partly because of the persistent factor of scarcity, and partly because of the absence of a generally acceptable and workable formula of equitable distribution. Thus far, neither economists nor moralists, much less social reformers, have been able to construct a set of distributive criteria acceptable to everybody or even fulfilling the rudimentary requirements of justice and providing simultaneously the necessary stimulus to economic effort. Divergent in the extreme are the formulas suggested. Some would apportion income according to contributive effort, others on the basis of equality, and still others according to individual and family needs.

Any arbitrary apportionment of income shares according to the criteria of equality or needs does violence to the fundamental principles of economic philosophy based on a belief in the adequacy of competitive forces, functioning under the aegis of natural law, as the final determinants of distribution. Economists generally believe that rent, wages, interest, and profits are best left to the arbitrament of the free market in which buyers and sellers, motivated by self-interest, decide what is the value, and consequently the just share, of each productive factor. The forces of marginal utility and marginal productivity, bringing to focus the interacting influences of demand, supply, and price, determine income shares according to the essential requirements of equity and incentive. As far as labor is concerned, economists have not yet successfully related theory to fact in this domain of distribution.

Labor's Basically Practical Interest

Theories of distribution not only are generally unintelligible to the leaders and the rank and file of the laboring population, but command little attention from them. Labor's view concerning the division of the national income is predominantly practical. This fact does not, of course, invalidate theoretical income analysis, but it is relevant to any discussion of the practical problem of

distribution. Labor's interest is realistic and pragmatic; it is concerned with *more here and now*. Higher wages, fewer hours of work, improved physical conditions of employment, and numerous other items that enter into collective bargaining negotiations are the center of attention. Group interest dominates labor's approach to the distribution of national product and national income. Even if they were interested in the intricacies of distributive theory, the workers would hardly accept the conclusion that natural law, functioning independently of the free will of men, determines their wages.

Viewed historically, the gains of labor have been the result of varied forces: the enlightened policies of progressive employers, increasing productivity resulting from science and invention, the sympathetic intervention of friendly governments, labor legislation, and, above all, effective collective bargaining implemented through strong unionism. What has been appropriately described as "business unionism" has constituted a notable influence in labor's increasingly large share of the national income of the United States.[2] Collective bargaining is described by labor leaders as a "never ending struggle to make human progress"; but viewed more objectively, labor's interest is group-centered rather than broadly socially centered.

Specifically, labor's interest in the distribution of the national income is articulated through demands for higher wages, fewer hours of work at the same or increased pay, improved job environment, and a seemingly inexhaustible list of so-called "fringe benefits." The last-named include such gains as seniority rights, time and half for overtime, double time for Sundays and holidays, cost-of-living escalator clauses in trade agreements, graveyard and night shift premium pay, paid vacations, company-financed pensions and health programs, with hospital and medical care, and a guaranteed annual wage. This is accurately described as labor's "progressive and dynamic program."[3]

Labor's "dynamic wage policy," designed especially to procure for the workers an increasing share of the annual national income, stems partly from the belief that the relationship between wages, prices, and profits is in a state of imbalance. Consequently, correction is believed to consist in the continual increase of real wages which yield for the workers a larger share. Automatic wage adjustments to keep pace with increasing productivity are viewed as indispensable. The guaranteed annual wage, which is destined to become an increasingly general demand by organized labor, is looked upon as a means of assuring full and sustained employment, as well as of achieving the desired measure of economic justice and stability. Such a wage, it is believed, will contribute much to production planning, thus enhancing the shares of both industry and labor.

Collective bargaining is thus seen as a means to diversified ends, all of which are translated into terms of a more equitable division of the national income and ultimately expressed in a progressively higher standard of living for workers and their families. Political action, as we shall see later, is a major ally with economic action in the attainment of these objectives.

A Revolutionary Trend

When one turns from the more general considerations of the distribution of the national income to the specific facts of America's increasing productivity and its effect on distributive shares, some extremely interesting data come to light which may have great significance for management and labor, as for the owners of capital and land. In this connection the following comment is pertinent:

> . . . few Americans and still fewer Europeans are aware of the transformation in the distribution of our national income that has occurred within the past twenty years—a transformation that has been carried out peacefully and gradually, but which may already be counted as one of the great social revolutions of history.[4]

In the recent economic growth of the United States, which has surpassed the increase in population, the central facts indicate an extraordinary increase in productivity per worker and a significant rise in real income per capita between 1929 and 1950. The population increased by one-fourth, from 122 million in 1929 to 152 million in 1950, and the number of gainfully employed persons increased in similar proportion. The gross national product amounted to $283 billion in 1950, as compared with $104 billion in 1929, a change which, of course, reflected the combined influence on current market value of a greatly increased volume of output and a considerably higher price level.[5] Because of the inflation incident to World War II and postwar economic activity, the general level of prices in 1950 was more than 50 per cent above that for 1929. But even allowing for this factor, the physical volume of national output, as measured by the gross national product in constant dollars, rose 80 per cent over the twenty-two year period. In terms of real output per capita the increase was 44 per cent, and the annual rate of expansion was in excess of 2.75 per cent.

The national income rose from $87 billion in 1929 to $239 billion in 1950, an increase of 175 per cent. Here, too, the rise reflected not only expansion of physical volume of production, but also the sharp rise in prices prevailing in 1950.

Shares of Productive Agents in National Income

The compensation of employees in private industries registered a rise from $45.5 billion in 1929 to $130 billion in 1950, or from 55 to 60 per cent of the total national income. In prosperous peacetime years employee compensation represented over three-fifths of the total income originating in regular business entreprises, but only a minor fraction of the total from rent (excluding that represented by owner-occupied homes) and interest.

Of considerable importance is the fact that there was an internal shift in the compensation of employees to a somewhat lower proportion of wages and salaries and to a higher proportion in the form of supplements to wages and salaries. This doubtless was a result of organized labor's successful demands for "fringe benefits." These supplements were an inconsequential element in 1929, consisting chiefly of accident compensation. The growth to a significant proportion (nearly 3 per cent of private national income in 1950) is attributable to various social insurance programs and

[2] See Robert Franklin Hoxie, *Trade Unionism in the United States* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1917), Ch. III.

[3] For an analysis of this program, see Walter P. Reuther, "Practical Aims and Purposes of American Labor," THE ANNALS, Vol. 274, March 1951, pp. 64–74.

[4] Arthur F. Burns, "Looking Forward," National Bureau of Economic Research, *Thirty-first Annual Report*, New York, 1951, pp. 3–4. Supporting evidence for this optimisttic view is found in Simon Kuznets, *Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings* (in press), National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1952.

[5] The data presented here are from the U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *National Income and Product of the United States, 1929–1950*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1951.

to the marked growth in recent years of private pension and welfare funds. Employers' contributions to these funds, both public and private, are viewed as supplementary compensation to employees.[6] The current trend in union demands clearly indicates that such supplementary payments are likely to increase substantially in the future.

There may be considerable social importance in the fact that the percentage of income taken by profits and interest together was not significantly higher in 1950 than in 1929. The combined share manifested remarkable uniformity throughout the period. Corporate profits increased from $10.5 billion in 1929 to $36 billion in 1950, or from 12.5 per cent to nearly 17 per cent of the national income; but to a considerable extent this increase reflected the greatly reduced burden of corporate debt and did not reveal a commensurate expansion of the property share of current income. In combination, profits and interest originating in corporate business rose in this period by only half as much as profits alone in relation to total private national income.[7]

The distributive share of net interest was the only one to show absolute decline from 1929 to 1950. It fell from $6.5 billion, or 8 per cent of private national income, to $5.5 billion, or 2.5 per cent. This drastic change was attributed chiefly to a nearly 50 per cent reduction in interest rates and the relatively small expansion of private debt.

Rental income showed a sharp proportionate decline over the twenty-two year period under consideration. The $5.75 billion paid to persons in this form in 1929 constituted 7 per cent of private national income, while the $8 billion received in 1950 represented about half that much, percentagewise.[8]

[6] *National Income and Product of the United States, op. cit.* note 5, p. 7.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Expansion of Personal and Family Income

The increase in personal income showed a favorable advance in the period 1929–50, the total in the former year being $85 billion and in the latter $225 billion. On a per capita basis, the total increase was from $700 to $1,480, or more than 100 per cent. Even per capita real personal income was 50 per cent higher in 1950 than in 1929, the figure for 1929 being $699 and for 1950 (in 1929 prices) $1,053. However, because of higher taxes in 1950, per capita real disposable income was only 41 per cent above that in 1929, the exact figures being $677 for 1929 and $957 (1929 prices) in 1950. After deducting taxes, there remained disposable personal income of $204 billion in 1950, as compared with $82.5 billion in 1929, or, on a per capita basis, approximately $1,350 in 1950 as compared with $680 in 1929. With consumer prices averaging about 41 per cent higher in 1950 than in 1929, the increase in real disposable income per capita was thus about 40 per cent.[9]

Available information on the incomes of families in the United States indicates some interesting changes since 1939. In 1939, the median wage or salary income of primary families was $1,200. In 1944 this figure had doubled. With the end of World War II wage incomes leveled off, but they resumed an upward trend as the United States economy converted to postwar full employment. From $2,400 in 1944, the median rose to $2,900 in 1947, and advanced to $3,200 in 1950. Between 1939 and 1950 the wage or salary of the average employee increased greatly, from $800 to $2,100.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

In 1939 three out of four families in the United States had incomes under $2,000 a year, whereas in 1949 only one family out of three fell within this classification. The others had moved into higher income groups. Even when the rise in the cost of living is accounted for, some five million families had, by 1949, moved up out of the lower income groups into brackets with a purchasing power equivalent to the 1939 level of $2,000 or more.[11]

From the standpoint of the wage-earning class, these and other data on the shift in the distribution of the national income are a source of considerable interest and encouragement. A study completed by Professor Simon Kuznets for the National Bureau of Economic Research shows that whereas in 1929 the highest 5 per cent of the income recipients obtained 34 per cent of the total disposable income of individuals, by 1939 their share had dropped to 27 per cent, and by 1946 to 18 per cent. This was a decline of 16 points in the 17-year period. On the other hand, Professor Leo Wolman has found that straight-time hourly earnings in manufacturing in the United States show that money wage rates of factory employees rose from 22 cents to $1.44 in the period 1914 to October 1950, or more than sixfold, and that even real wages rose about threefold.[12]

Other studies reveal that during the past thirty-five-year period the share of the top 1 per cent of income receivers has shrunk from 16 per cent to 9 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of families in the lowest income brackets declined by almost two-thirds. There is an evident tendency for middle income groups to grow most, while the highest and lowest income groups are tending to shrink.

The distribution of families (including single individuals) by income groups in 1950 was as follows:

Amount in Dollars	Per cent
Under 2,000	26
2,000 to 3,000	16
3,000 to 4,000	18
4,000 to 5,000	13
5,000 to 10,000	23
Over 10,000	4

The median income in 1950 was $3,400, compared with $3,100 in 1949 and $3,120 in 1948. The mean income for these three years was $3,990, $3,750, and $4,020, respectively.[13]

The United States Department of Labor's estimate of the minimum income adequate for a decent standard of living for a family of four (worker, wife, and two children) in the United States at the end of 1951 was $4,095, inclusive of federal and social security taxes. A very large number of families have fewer than four members, and there are a great many single individuals in wage-earning and salary groups. On the basis of this fact, it has been estimated that about 85 per cent of the wage and small-salaried groups in the United States currently receive incomes adequate to provide a standard of living equivalent to the Department of Labor's *City Workers Family Budget*.[14]

[10] See U. S. Department of Commerce, "Income Families and Persons: 1950," *Current Population Reports: Consumer Income*, Series P-60, Washington, D.C., March 25, 1952.

[11] American Federation of Labor, Research Staff, "Changes in Distribution of National Income" (typed report), March 22, 1952, p. 1.

[12] Arthur F. Burns, *op cit.* note 4, pp. 4, 35.

[13] Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, *1951 Survey of Consumer Finances* (reprinted from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, June-December 1951, inclusive), Washington, D.C., 1952, p. 14.

[14] American Federation of Labor, Research Staff, *op. cit.* note 11, p. 3. For the contents of such a budget, see Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statsitics, Bulletin No. 927,

LABOR'S VARIABLE SHARE AND REAL GAINS

Contrary to a common impression, there is an evident tendency for wage and salary shares of the national income to rise during depression and to fall during prosperity. All estimates clearly indicate that labor's relative share in the net national income goes up when business is bad and goes down when business is good, and further, that on the average the distributive share of the workers as a class constitutes about two-thirds of the net national income. Employees' share of the national income in 1949 absorbed about 65 per cent of the total, a ratio almost identical with that of 1939, which was 66 per cent. A decade earlier, in 1929, the share of employees accounted for 58 per cent of the national income; but in 1933, at the bottom of the Great Depression, it rose to 74 per cent of the total.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange contradiction. The evidence shows, however, that in periods of great economic activity and prosperity, the share of the national income going to businessmen in the form of profits and to other propertied agents in the form of rent and interest invariably increases, so labor obtains a relatively smaller share of the larger total product. On the other hand, in the midst of a depression, losses rather than profits characterize entrepreneurs' participation, and even rent and interest decline sharply, with the result that employees obtain a larger share of a smaller national output. As already indicated, some significant changes may be taking place in this historic pattern of distribution.

Workers in general are much more interested in the actual conditions of prosperity and depression than in relative shares of the national net income. Absolute income in terms of purchasing power, rather than proportionate division of the national product over a period of marked economic fluctuations, is the focus of labor's attention. During World War II and the postwar period of prosperity (1939–1948) the national income rose rapidly from about $72 billion in 1939 to approximately $223 billion in 1948 but there was a slight decline to $217 billion in 1949. In the same period (1939–1948) the average annual wage or salary income increased by 150 per cent, a figure reflecting both the rise in wage rates and the increased working time incident to emergency production needs. This distinction between wage rates and earnings is of basic importance in the measurement of labor's share of the national income. Increased working time and premium pay for overtime may cause workers' incomes to rise sharply, as between 1939 and 1950 when the differential due to these factors was about 40 per cent.[15]

Significant also, of course, is the distinction between money wages and real wages, the latter being defined as the purchasing power of nominal or money wages. Thus, while average weekly earnings increased 141.9 per cent in the period 1939 to May 1950, real weekly earnings, with allowance for cost-of-living changes, increased only 42.6 per cent.[16] This explains why in recent years organized labor has become increasingly interested in escalator clauses in trade agreements.

The median income of consumer spending units rose 11 per cent in 1950,

Workers' Budgets in the United States: City Families and Single Persons, 1946 and 1947, Washington, D.C., 1948.

[15] Ewan Clague, U. S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics, "Summary Statement of Wages and Salaries as a Part of the National Income" (typed paper, read before the Workshop on Economic Education, Indiana University, July 24, 1950), pp. 2–3.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

and aggregate personal income in 1951 was nearly 12 per cent above that in 1950. These gains in average money incomes represented real gains, inasmuch as they were only partially offset by 1 per cent rise in consumer prices and in the proportion of income going for federal personal income tax.

Equally important is the fact that the rise in average money income was accompanied by an increased frequency of high incomes and a reduced frequency of low incomes. The data reveal that 20 per cent of all spending units had incomes of $5,000 or more in 1950, compared with only 16 per cent in the previous year. In 1946 the proportion was only 10 per cent. Incomes of less than $2,000 declined in frequency from 40 per cent in 1946 to 33 per cent in 1949 and to 30 per cent in 1950.[17] The increase in personal income in 1951 was especially pronounced in the wage and salary sector. The result is that there has been a significant increase in the proportion of spending units having annual money incomes of $4,000 or more, which, despite some offset in prices and taxes, suggests sustained progress for working groups.

CONTRIBUTING CAUSES OF IMPROVED DISTRIBUTION

It is impossible to determine exactly what have been the most inportant contributing factors in this improved distribution of national income in the United States during recent decades. Among the major determinants one must certainly recognize the acceleration of technological improvements issuing from education, research, and invention; progressive managerial policies; increased industrial productivity due to a combination of factors; the friendly co-operation of government; full employment occasioned by war and preparation for war; and the impact of increasingly powerful labor organizations. Perhaps the most reassuring fact is that this gratifying progress has taken place within the framework of the free enterprise system, without the compulsions and regimentation of totalitarian regimes.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Considerable pessimism prevails in the business community, as among the workers, as to whether our national economy can indefinitely sustain its capacity to provide for wage earners and other groups in the population an increasing measure of economic well-being, as was done in the period 1929–50. The dynamic quality of our economy has been amply demonstrated throughout our economic history, and there is every reason to expect that its remarkable record will be maintained or surpassed, with probable setbacks of a temporary nature due to business dislocations, recessions, and depressions.

It has been estimated that the population of the United States will increase from approximately 153 million in 1952 to a total of 175 million in 1960, and will continue this sort of growth in foreseeable decades. Also, it is estimated that, assuming continuation of the 2.5 to 3 per cent annual growth in national productivity, a net annual national product of over $400 billion (in terms of 1951 dollars) may be expected in 1960, representing an increase of over $100 billion.[18]

An increase of one-third or more in the total output of the national economy

[17] Federal Reserve Board, "Consumer Plans for Spending" (reprinted from the Federal Reserve Bulletin for April 1952), Washington, D.C., 1952, pp. 1–2.

[18] Sumner H. Slichter, "Prospects for Growth in the American Economy" (reprinted from *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, April 3, 1952), p. 1.

is bound to yield to American labor, as to other groups in the nation, a considerable increase in material well-being.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

The dynamic quality of the American economy, reflected in the extraordinary increase in productivity and unprecedented growth of the national income, may have significant immediate and long-run political and social consequences. The immediate consequence will probably appear in the results of the 1952 Presidential election, in which labor, organized and unorganized, may play a decisive role. The more remote consequences may be revealed in the outcome of the ideological conflict between the free world and the unfree world. Our interest here is in the former result.

It is an interesting question whether a party in power in the midst of so general prosperity as is currently enjoyed in the United States is in serious danger of losing the labor vote. That vote can assume significant proportions in view of the approximately 15,000,000 unionized workers, who, with their families, constitute so large a percentage of the adult population. There are many who speak of the current economic status of the American wage earners as "an illusion of prosperity" that disregards rising prices and greatly increased taxes. If the increase in the real income of the working class in the United States during the past two decades has been an "illusion," it has been a welcome and pleasant one.

LABOR VOTES DEMOCRATIC

The direction of the labor vote is never absolutely predictable in any election, whether local, state, or national. Senator Robert M. La Follette's campaign of 1924, the John L. Lewis episode of 1940, and Senator Robert A. Taft's notable victory of 1950 are conclusive evidence of this fact. It is true that during the past two decades organized labor has consistently voted Democratic, and that it is likely to do so again in 1952; but no party can foretell with certainty the trend of the labor vote. One can, however, safely hazard a guess that, the economic situation being what it is, a significant switch in the labor vote from Democratic to Republican in 1952 is hardly to be expected. As one worker put it, "Labor never had it so good."

The contention that union officials can deliver the labor vote has little factual or experiential support. Indeed, the evidence is on the other side.[19] There is no assurance that endorsement by union officials of a particular party or candidate will swing the labor vote in a desired direction. The workers do not vote en masse in response to official union recommendations. John L. Lewis discovered this fact in 1940 when, as head of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, he sought to swing substantial labor support away from the Democratic party. Not only did he fail to defeat Mr. Roosevelt, but a post-election American Institute of Public Opinion poll indicated that of the members canvassed, fully 79 per cent had voted contrary to Lewis' advice.

A further illustration of the difficulties facing union officials who believe they can chart the direction of the labor vote is found in Senator Robert A. Taft's victory in the Ohio senatorial race of 1950. Although he was among the Senators and Congressmen whom organized labor sought eagerly to defeat, Mr. Taft, co-author of the Taft-Hartley Act which is bitterly hated by labor leaders, received a majority of 430,000

[19] See George Gallup, "How Labor Votes," THE ANNALS, Vol. 274, March 1951, pp. 123–24.

—this despite the fact that organized labor had spent a very substantial sum of money to defeat him. Altogether, the evidence indicates that American workers are quite independently minded in political matters, no matter how responsive they may be to the counsel of their leaders on the economic front.

The labor vote invariably will follow the dictates of group interest. The election of labor's friends and the defeat of labor's enemies is still a persuasive slogan among unionists. The sympathetic policy of the Democratic party, which many believe is reflected in the 1952 crisis in the steel industry, has doubtless been effective in influencing the labor vote. In 1944, for example, not fewer than 78 per cent of the members of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and 69 per cent of the American Federation of Labor voted Democratic. In 1948, both the AFL and the CIO support went almost entirely to Democratic candidates, a fact which doubtless was partly responsible for the re-election of Mr. Truman and the transfer of both House and Senate control from the Republicans to the Democrats.

DOUBTFUL LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE

Despite these evidences of political strength, the legislative influence of organized labor is always doubtful and uncertain, partly perhaps because union labor constitutes not more than 25 per cent of the gainfully employed in the United States. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that such so-called "antilabor" laws as the Smith-Connally Act of 1943 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 were passed when organized labor was at the height of its power. Whether the CIO's Political Action Committee and the AFL's Labor's League for Political Education can change this situation remains to be seen.[20] Perhaps greater co-operation and unity between the CIO, the AFL, and the Railroad Brotherhoods would provide the answer.

[20] See Avery Leiserson, "Organized Labor as a Pressure Group," and Jack Kroll, "Labor's Political Role," THE ANNALS, Vol. 274, March 1951, pp. 108–117, 118–122.

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Is Your Subsidy in the Public Interest?

By J. P. Watson

A SUBSIDY of direct form is commonly thought of as a special payment, in cash or equivalent service or goods, by a national government to another national government for its support, or such payment to a domestic business to induce production of designated kinds of goods supplemental to what might be expected from the market without that stimulus. The possibilities of indirect forms of course are numerous. We have had some experience with foreign aid and with federal subsidy of business. Our experience with subsidies, however, is such as to require expansion of that common definition. Our states may, and do, subsidize business; they may, and do, empower their local governments to do so. Federal aid to states and state aid to local governments are of the subsidy family. We have public subsidy of private nonprofit agencies, including churches. And we have very diversified and extensive private subsidy of these nonprofit agencies.

Because of the diversity of names and of forms, it would be most difficult to prepare a comprehensive statement of past and present uses of subsidies and of closely kindred interventions. There is certainly no intent here to do so. But the sentiment in favor of re-evaluating our interventions is surely such as to justify examining them; and subsidies are among the significant forms of interventions. Let us merely sketch the types.

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid is associated mainly with the defense plans. One becomes easily confused in trying to piece together our attitudes toward the Atlantic area, the Far East, and the various intervening spots involved in the containment policy. Sometimes the loud protests against England, France, Germany, or India seem to add up to an irresistible chorus of opposition. On the other hand, apparently the heat of congressional objection is concentrated mostly against, say, about the upper tenth of the defense budget, not against its major items. But even with general consensus on need for defense, are we at all clear on whom we are aiding, and with what? Do we see clearly that the old protectionist ideal of keeping foreign goods out is hardly suited to the development of strength among our allies? Do we have understood and accepted policies of frankly providing positive inducements?

A special part of the program of foreign aid is associated with the Point Four concept—of technical aid and highly selective material aids in sections that include peoples far removed from recognized military threat. In view of the numerous materials of great importance, such as tin, copper, chromite, manganese, and graphite, which we must obtain in whole or in part from various corners of the world, it is clear that we need friendly populations in and around the areas producing these things. Helping them to help themselves is thought by many to be a worth-while gamble for their friendship. Can we recognize this as a mutual aid program without trying to make it into mere *quid pro quo* bargaining?

Federal Aid to the States

Until about the middle of the 1930's, federal aid to the states was mostly for highways, agricultural colleges and experiment stations, agricultural extension, and vocational education. Those types of aid have continued to grow, but others have shown more spectacular growth, in recent years. In 1950, for example, more than half of the aggregate of federal grants-in-aid to the states was made up of "welfare" items —mostly old age assistance and aid to dependent children and the blind.[1] Within recent years there has been increasing intensity of popular debate on general federal aid for education.

There is no uniform basis of allocation, but such aids are considerably loaded to help weaker states. That fact is singled out in the objection against alleged transfer from the haves to the have-nots. It is likewise recognized in the favorable argument that such aid is a useful and flexible device for federal promotion of services beyond some local abilities.[2] In the developing defense effort, we can hardly ignore the weaker spots. But how can we reconcile our wish to preserve some state autonomies with the requisite of relying on central government in the defense program? There are fears that conditions attached to federal aid will undermine the rights of the states in the federal system. Might there not be fears that state weakness would jeopardize central defensive strength?

One of the major needs in mounting defense is manpower. One of the characteristics of the weaker states is relatively poor opportunity in employment and earnings, reflecting relatively high ratios of labor to resources and equipment. What form of aid carries least risk of perpetuating essentially uneconomic conditions? In our tariff argument, we readily justify aid to certain industries for defense reasons. Might not certain areas likewise be aided for defense reasons? Might not excess labor in the weakest area be aided in moving? And how, if not by some subsidy-like device, can aid be funneled into specific chosen areas?

To some extent we have had the appearance of direct federal aid to local governments—especially in emergency relief, in wartime housing, and in airport construction. In view of the necessity of state enabling acts, however, this seems to stand merely as a variant to grants-in-aid to the states.

State Aid to Local Governments

We have had a strong tradition of depending mainly on the property tax for revenue to local governments. With increased industrialization and urbanization the concentrations of taxable property often were poorly matched, were even freakishly unrelated, to the location of citizens, school children, highway needs. With rising requirements for local governmental funds, there has been an increased dependence on other taxes.

As the struggle for other sources of revenue developed, the conviction spread more and more that the fruitful alternative taxes—such as those on personal income, business net income, and sales —could be administered by the state better than by the local government. To some considerable extent, then, what came to be called state aid was an arrangement for sharing taxes collected by the state. But increased use was made of grants-in-aid—that is, allocations on some basis assumed to be more nearly in keeping with the purpose of raising minimum standards.[3] Thus enters the

[1] United States Department of Commerce, *Compendium of State Government Finances, 1950.*

[2] For a very useful record and evaluation, refer to Council of State Governments, *Federal Grants-in-Aid,* 1949.

[3] Council of State Governments, *State-Local Relations,* 1946.

kinship with subsidy, in that this scheme makes net withdrawals from the denser concentrations of income and makes net payments to the weaker local areas.

State aid to local governments does not affect the constitutional structure of government, but it may strain the customary structure. In problems raised by increased state control of localities, some see reason for fears about grass-roots (or pavement) democracy.

In such aid, as in federal aid to the states, one crucial consideration is the risk of perpetuating uneconomic conditions by encouraging people to stay where they cannot in truth be self-supporting.[4] One of the best local examples of this possibility is the ghost town abandoned by industry or the ghost community left after exhaustion of forests or minerals. This danger may not be of major proportion so long as the aid is primarily for highways and schools and is not concerned with local efforts to offer such inducements to business as low-interest loans, low rent, or tax exemption.

PUBLIC AID TO PRIVATE NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS

Perhaps the more important instances of direct state aid to private nonprofit institutions are appropriations to universities and hospitals in that category. The merit of state support of higher education is not here in question, but there are questions about conditions that maintain and promote educational standards, and there are risks of involvement in controls by religious sects, not in keeping with separation of church and state. The problem of maintaining good standards and of assuring equality in the right of access and treatment is basic in state aid to private nonprofit hospitals.

The far greater prevalence of the subsidy effect lies in the provision of public services to agencies not having ordinary tax liability, considered later.

SUBSIDY TO BUSINESS

Initiation or increase of a subsidy to business may be taken to induce market reactions different from those which might reasonably be expected without the change in subsidy. Such market changes represent favorable treatment for some and unfavorable treatment for others. Continuance of a series of constant subsidy payments tends to support continuance of market conditions different from what might reasonably have been expected without the subsidy and perpetuates the favorable and unfavorable relationships. Presumably in a large measure what can be said of the outright subsidy can be said of the more roundabout aids that stand in the category of positive inducements, such as low-interest loans, tax preferences, and guarantees of prices above the market.

But of course it seems equally true that initiation or increase of a protective tariff induces market conditions different from what might reasonably be expected without the change, and this also favors some and is unfavorable to others. And continuance of a protective tariff unchanged surely must be taken to support continuance of market conditions different from what might reasonably have been expected without the protective tariff, thus perpetuating the favorable and unfavorable relationships. And presumably the same thing may be said of other measures which, like the tariff, are repressive of competition—such as buy-American or prefer-American-ships.[5]

So, if we are disposed to act against the subsidy, we might, for consistency, remember the tariff. If we choose to reduce or abolish either, we encounter the fact, which often seems forgotten, that reduction or abolition of preferred treatment also has the effect of favoring some and of being unfavorable to others. But minimizing such intervention minimizes discriminatory treatment for the future.

The predominant economic judgment in this country is against unnecessary intervention. However, there seems to be a solid economic judgment also that the free market is not a machine for defense or war. And at this point we encounter a neglected point on much of our recent use of subsidy. During World War II we experimented with subsidy on certain commodities—for example, copper, lead, and zinc. In general, these experiments came in a period of price control. Since price increases of the magnitude likely under the circumstances were not permissible, special inducements in the form of subsidies were offered to maintain or increase production in spite of price control.

Because of the obvious need for general fiscal and monetary measures to control inflation, there is some tendency to dismiss specific controls entirely. It might be that general fiscal and monetary controls, plus necessary allocation of industrial supplies and materials for defense, plus allocation of consumer supplies by rationing, would solve the more crucial aspects of the problem. But these general controls and allocations simply do not solve the extraordinary price pressure created by a war program on many of the required materials. And if price controls become necessary, subsidy also may be required.[6]

AID TO FARMERS

We hear much of aid to farmers. Facilitating farm credit was a developing plan in the twenties. Subsidy provisions were in the McNary-Haugen bills in 1927 and 1928, vetoed by President Coolidge. With later developments, such as the parity idea, soil conservation payments, and the surplus-disposal method, the beneficiaries were not always identifiable, but it was reasonably well understood that the measures were designed to aid farmers—even if others also profited (as in surplus disposal). When the Office of Price Administration was set up, it was authorized to buy or sell, to fix prices, and to pay subsidies. There was a sort of preferential arrangement, however, under which farm price controls were tied to parity. Whether or not the earlier unfavorable terms of exchange for the farmers were justifiable, they probably affected the arrangement.[7] In part subsidies were paid to processors of farm products in the hope of keeping rollbacks from dropping to the farmer level. Other payments were made directly to producers. Since the war, probably most of the discussion of farm protection has been with reference to price guarantees in relation

[4] This risk and others are indicated at various points in a distinguished group of British studies by the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, entitled *The Economics of Full Employment*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1944.

[5] Cf. Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, *Tax and Expenditure Policy for 1952*, especially pp. 16–17.

[6] On these tangled problems, the most concisely comprehensive treatment seems to be in two Twentieth Century Fund publications in 1951, namely, Albert G. Hart, *Defense Without Inflation*, and Albert G. Hart and E. Cary Brown, *Financing Defense*.

[7] Cf. Theodore W. Schultz, *Agriculture in an Unstable Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945), p. 123.

to the parity concept. Alternative proposals widely discussed have been of the income guarantee type.[8]

SUBSIDY IN HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE

Subsidy in housing and real estate has been a measure of some significance in recent years. The vast holding operation symbolized in the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, despite its method of recording surplus, seems, on full accounting, to have carried a subsidy effect traceable to substantial interest-free advances on stock.[9] We have hardly begun to evaluate the subsidy involved in mortgage guarantees, public housing, and urban redevelopment.

TRANSPORTATION SUBSIDIES

Ocean shipping has long had perferential treatment, first of the protectionist stripe, but later inclusive of subsidy combined with legitimate pay for hauling the mail.[10] Recent stories of the financing of our new record-breaking ship, the *United States*, suggest that we have that kind of confusion confounded with major defense features. The extent of subsidy in inland waterways is any man's guess. But the considerable possibilities are suggested by the enormous volume of bulk freight moving in channels made navigable and kept so mainly at public expense.

Back of railroad construction lay, especially, aid in the form of great land grants. Whether it was then helpful is hardly a question, although the railroad companies are now disposed to feel that those early lifts should be considered water over the dam. The heavy investment of public money in airports adequate for the public carrier lines is common knowledge. The wrangle over mail subsidy to airlines is also a familiar story.[11] As to commercial motor vehicles, the argument never ends over indirect subsidy represented in our enormous highway development.

We need not here extend the record or labor the point of business subsidy. If we try to explain the why of subsidies we get caught in a record of defense emergencies, logrolling, attempts to balance out some effects of protectionism, and some attempts to counter the devastation we have wrought against our resources.[12] It may be hoped that occasionally we shall haul out the record for review to see whether and how subsidies and kindred special measures, along with the protective devices and similar measures, add up to mere hodgepodge or fit into some semblance of policy.

TAX EXEMPTION OF PRIVATE NONPROFIT AGENCIES

Concerning subsidy to religious and charitable institutions in the form of significant public services without general tax liability, one rarely hears objection. Questions are being raised, however, about tax exemptions on investment properties and business holdings acquired in the process of accumulating endowment. For churches, the usual constitutional provision concerning property used for public worship is hardly confusing enough to cause honest men much worry. But it might cause worry if allegedly new modes of worship should appear as claimants. As for exemption for private nonprofit educational institutions and hospitals, there are problems on investment properties, but the central question is on nondiscriminatory service to the public.

[8] A useful quick reference of able and diverse statements of description, history, and evaluation is found in *Subsidy for Farmers*, compiled by Robert E. Summers, New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1951.

[9] Rosalind Tough, "Life Cycle of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation," XXVII *Land Economics*, No. 4, November 1951.

[10] Paul M. Zeis, *American Shipping Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938.

[11] Cf. *New York Times*, June 8, 1952, editorial page, letter to the editor from Langdon P. Marvin, Jr., and others, stressing the need for determining openly whatever subsidy is to be paid.

[12] The latter point is developed in K. William Kapp, *The Social Costs of Private Enterprise*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.

PRIVATE SUBSIDY OF PRIVATE NONPROFIT AGENCIES

It may seem strange in a discussion of subsidy to consider private donations to nonprofit institutions when we take so much pride in great privately endowed educational institutions, hospitals, and research organizations. But beyond the direct question of tax exemption for the agency itself lies the question of deductibility of donations in determining the tax liability of the donor. If about the same proportion of income year by year enters the deductible list of donations, there is no substantial change of impact on income tax due. But actually there are vigorous drives to increase such donations on the basis of the general fact that the increased donations are effectively tax exempt. If the public budget were balanced and a substantial increase in such giving took place with no change in income levels, the budget balance would disappear, and, for a given expenditure level, increase of income tax rates or other rates would be required.

Such problems are not solved by the "sacred-cow" formula. These exemptions result from social decisions. If we look squarely, we might continue them, we might increase them, we might reduce them.

SUBSIDY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

We have seen so much of the world collapse in antagonisms that we ought to aspire for some peaceful solutions. On many of our tangled economic issues we have had quite too much emoting. Surely most of us do not want chaos, even of the unplanned variety.

At the heart of the democratic procedure is deliberative discussion, in mutual respect, aimed at finding bases of agreement which we can reasonably expect to keep on observing. Surely one topic for frank consideration is the array of economic interventions; and, in the process of such consideration, subsidy and its cousins should be scrutinized for their varied relationships with the public interest.

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The President as a National Symbol

By Wilfred E. Binkley

IN a flash of intuitive insight the late Henry Jones Ford perceived

that in the Presidential office as it has been constituted since Jackson's time, American democracy has revived the oldest political institution of the race, the elective kingship. It is all there: the prerecognition of the notables, and the tumultuous choice of the freemen, only conformed to modern conditions.[1]

Had he chosen to give details, Ford might have mentioned the elaborate ritual of the inauguration, suggestive of the coronation, the twenty-one-gun salute on arrival and departure of the President, and the throngs that gather to see and hear him. It is all significant of a deep-seated human longing for symbolism. However, this was not just the work of the Founding Fathers. Their efforts were frustrated by a long generation of resolute resistance of the Jeffersonians to the investing of the office of President with any trace of symbolism.

British Attachment to Royalty

Whoever has observed the behavior of Britons with respect to their monarch will have some conception of the profound significance they attach to the "oldest political institution of the race"; nor is this significance confined to the unthinking masses. The writer recalls the sober conviction of an internationally known Oxford don, expressed in a casual conversation, that the United States ought to establish a monarchy. Imperturbable and indomitable as the British are, one can only wonder what might be the effect of the sudden loss of the myth of royalty, especially when incarnate in the lovely personality of Elizabeth II. That is something we shall never know, but it is conceivable that the blasting of London by the *Luftwaffe* was but a mosquito bite in comparison. Sir Ivor Jennings writes:

Certain it is that democratic government is not merely a matter of cold reason and prosaic policies. There must be some display of colour, and there is nothing more vivid than royal purple and imperial scarlet. During the present century, therefore, we have placed almost intolerable burdens on the royal family. They must not only head subscription lists and appear on State occasions; they must, also, inspect this and that, open this and that, lay this stone and that, and undertake a thousand other dull tasks in a blaze of publicity. We can hardly blame Edward VIII if he preferred to make toffee in the kitchen.[2]

Of course, the Queen does not have to open a baseball season by tossing out the first ball, or shake hands with interminable lines of people. But the fact that custom has imposed upon the President extra official burdens similar to those of royalty is indicative of the symbolism of the President. By and large, he symbolizes the American Government to the American people. How many Americans have proudly declared, "The President shook this hand of mine." President Hoover reported that after these daily ordeals his hand would be so swollen that for days he could not write.[3]

[1] *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York, 1898), p. 293.

[2] *The British Constitution* (Cambridge, England, 1950), p. 116.

[3] *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 1920–1933* (New York, 1952), p. 323.

Early American Loyalty to the King

When Washington was inaugurated in 1789, all adult native Americans had been subjects of George III; and they did not suddenly, on a particular day, cease to be such subjects. The transition was somewhat gradual. For months after Bunker Hill, American chaplains were reverently remembering the King in their prayers. Even as late as 1776 and not so many months before the Declaration of Independence, the King's health was still being toasted nightly in the officers' mess presided over by General Washington.[4] Fortunately there was no Un-American Activities Committee in that day.

Nor were these professions of loyalty to the King inconsistent. The grievances of the patriots were over ministerial policies, and Washington was battling the "ministerial troops," as his letters then expressed it. So professions of loyalty to the King persisted for nearly a year after the first shot had been fired at Lexington.

Loyalty to the King evaporated rapidly in the spring of 1776. The shift in the attitude of patriots toward King George found expression in a pamphlet published with perfect timing. In Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* not only was King George denounced with savage ferocity, but the symbolism of royalty was covered with obloquy. The Norman Conquest as a foundation stone of British monarchy was given a breathtaking reinterpretation.

A French bastard, landing with an armed banditti, and establishing himself king of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain terms, a very paltry, rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in it. . . . Let them promiscuously worship the Ass and the Lion, and welcome. I shall neither copy their humility nor disturb their devotion. . . . The plain truth is that English monarchy will not bear looking into.

Nearly every literate patriot read *Common Sense* while the ink was still fresh, and its ideas struck a responsive chord. Thomas Jefferson's indictments in the Declaration of Independence were consequently directed against the King, not Parliament.

Undoubtedly the destruction of the symbolism of the King created a psychological vacuum. However, it scarcely mattered, since there was then little sentiment of nationality that needed to be symbolized. It was state independence, not national, that had apparently been declared. The Continental Congress was an assembly of ambassadors lacking in prestige, and at its best, a congress can scarcely constitute an impressive national symbol. When the Constitution of 1787 invested Congress with specific legislative powers, the opponents of ratification cried out, "We did not dethrone King George only to enthrone King Congress."

Ingrained Monarchal Tendencies

The inauguration of President Washington, as well as the later procedures and etiquette introduced by the Federalists, precipitated a controversy over appropriate symbolism of the President. Vice President John Adams declared, "Take away thrones and crowns from among men and there will be an end of all dominion and justice."[5] Accordingly, while presiding over the Senate, Adams was urging an elaborate and high-sounding title for President Washington and was horrified when the simple title prescribed by the Constitution

[4] S. E. Morison and H. S. Commager, *Growth of the American Republic* (New York, 1937), Vol. I, p. 77.

[5] *Gazette of the United States*, March 1790; quoted in V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents of American Thought* (New York, 1927, 1930), Vol. I, p. 311.

was retained precisely as set down. "What," he asked, "will the common people of foreign countries, what will the sailors and soldiers say, 'George Washington, President of the United States'? *They will despise him to all eternity.*" [6]

In the Constitutional Convention Hamilton had avowed a preference for monarchy. Soon President Washington was being maneuvered into something of the separateness of a monarch under the management of public affairs by his vigorous Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton assumed the role (secretly even the title) of prime minister, recommended measures to Congress, and pressured Congressmen to enact them, with the consequence that the legislative program of the first administration still stands as Hamilton's, not Washington's. If the precedent then set had not been battered to bits by the opposition, the President might never have become, as he did, a combination of king and prime minister.

UTILITARIAN VIEW OF THE PRESIDENCY

Adams' and Hamilton's "aping of monarch" brought about a strong emotional reaction on the part of the agrarians. Jefferson coined a word "monocrats," and, to the glee of his partisans, applied it to the Federalists.[7] Even Washington's inauguration, thought Jefferson, had been "not at all in character with the simplicity of republican government and looking, as if wistfully, to those of European courts." So when the time came for Jefferson's inauguration in 1801 he walked unostentatiously from his boarding house over to the Capitol to deliver his inaugural address to the two houses assembled in the Senate Chamber. He was, as he said, putting the ship of state on its republican tack. The Puritans had not been one whit more determined to eradicate popish symbols from their churches than were the Jeffersonians to divest the President of the trappings of royalty. Deprived of its symbolism, the office of President was to be nothing more than a purely utilitarian agency of government, merely a means to an end.

During the twenty-four years of the Virginia dynasty, not only did the President lose his symbolism, but the very prestige of the office sank to its nadir. Congress took charge of the Executive, nominating the candidate for the presidency by congressional caucus, and, under the prevailing one-party system, nomination was equivalent to election. Madison, for example, was so completely the prisoner of Congress that he could scarcely have been less a factor in the government if he had spent the eight years of his Presidency at home on his plantation.[8]

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY AS A SYMBOL

It was the upsurge of the recently enfranchised masses and their election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency as their champion in 1828 that terminated the purely utilitarian conception of the Presidency and made the President peculiarly the symbol of the national government. State legislatures had been selecting Presidential electors, but this ceased in 1828, and Jackson was practically the first popularly elected President. In the then prevailing classical vogue he was proclaimed a "tribune of the people," one who would check a patrician Senate by shouting his veto against measures granting special privileges, as indeed

[6] James Hart, *The American Presidency in Action, 1789* (New York, 1948), p. 36.

[7] See *The Oxford Dictionary* and Jefferson's *Writings* (1859), Vol. III, p. 494.

[8] See R. V. Harlow, *The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825* (New Haven, 1917), p. 196.

he did in vetoing the Bank Charter. To this day, a Presidential veto tends to strengthen the prestige of a President. The idea of the tribuneship persists, no matter what Congressmen may think of it.

A generation after Jackson's election, so exalted had the President become as the symbol of the Federal Government that the symbolism became a major factor in the secession movement. Secession could scarcely have been based on a cool calculation of the results of the election of 1860. The fact is generally overlooked that, although the Republicans had elected Lincoln (with a popular minority vote of about 40 per cent), they had nevertheless lost both houses of Congress. They had only 31 of the 66 Senators and 105 of the 237 Representatives. Had the southern Senators and Representatives maintained their position, Lincoln could not have made one important appointment —not even of his Cabinet members— without the consent of opposition Senators. When the southern Senators and Representatives walked out they turned the government over to Lincoln, and thus paid an unconscious tribute to the symbolism that had become attached to the office of President.

Day after day English newspapers and periodicals must feed the insatiable public appetite for pictures of the Queen and her family. This has its counterpart in the President and his family. Since the first Roosevelt, the White House family has belonged to the nation as an essential element in the symbol of the Presidency. Theodore Roosevelt's children running bareheaded out of the White House on their way to school, Quentin riding his pony into the Executive Mansion and getting it on the elevator, the vivacious young Alice keeping Washington agog with her quips and her unconventional and unpredictable ways, were all part of the first Roosevelt regime. The death of Coolidge's son touched the heart of every American parent. As the barometer registering Truman's popularity strikes a new low, one wonders how much more it might fall if Bess and Margaret were out of the picture. What would happen to the Presidency if Governor Warren and his bevy of daughters should ever move into the White House? The President's family is part of the national symbol which constitutes the Presidency.

PARTY LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

A Presidential nominee becomes the titular head of his party. In the case of candidates such as Blaine, McKinley, and the two Roosevelts, the position may be actual as well as titular. Vice Presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, and Harry Truman attain the titular role upon succession to the Presidency. One would scarcely consider William Taft, Warren Harding, and Herbert Hoover party leaders before their nominations. Even as Presidents their leadership was titular, unless one would except Truman. Franklin Roosevelt, however, had already attained outstanding party leadership before his first nomination as a Presidential candidate.

Because of the extraordinary economic crisis of March 1933, Franklin Roosevelt's inauguration constitutes the most striking instance in American history of a transition from party to national leadership. The desperate condition then prevailing provided precisely the opportunity for a President endowed with imagination and daring. President Roosevelt galvanized a panic-stricken people, paralyzed with the fear of social disintegration, by his confident assertion that there was nothing to fear but fear itself. During those first hundred days, even party lines disappeared.

One nationally known Republican businessman said "he had voted for Hoover and hoped God would forgive him and that he believed Franklin D. Roosevelt was the greatest leader since Jesus Christ."[9] Before Franklin Roosevelt had been President two years, there were Republican Congressmen campaigning for re-election on the ground that they had supported the President in his legislative program combating depression. The President as a symbol had attained its zenith.

The President as a symbol of national leadership is not a persisting one, even in the case of Franklin Roosevelt. Crises are temporary, and other means are needed to sustain the leadership—even party leadership. Presently patronage was being dispensed by Roosevelt to deserving Democrats, and the test of desert was starkly realistic. "What was your preconvention position on the Roosevelt candidacy?" was put to patronage-seeking Congressmen.[10] A quarter of a century earlier another President Roosevelt had busied himself rounding up southern delegations to make sure that William Howard Taft would succeed him. President Woodrow Wilson made a frank partisan appeal for the election of a Democratic Congress before the guns had ceased booming on the western front. President Truman "gives them hell" in a successful whistle-stop campaign and stands ready to repeat the performance for the Democratic candidate in 1952.

The transition from party leader to national leader is not so very deftly done, and sometimes scarcely at all. As to the reverse, the transition from national to party chief, few Presidents have done it. The party has a new chief when the President makes his final exit from the White House, except perchance when the opposite party has captured the Presidency. Then the retiring President, if a defeated candidate, may and theoretically does retain a titular leadership of his party until the next Presidential campaign.

[9] James T. Flynn, "Other People's Money," *New Republic*, December 11, 1935.

[10] Pendleton Herring, "The First Session of the 73rd Congress," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, p. 67.

PRESIDENTIAL LAWMAKING

The Presidency is pre-eminently a political office; that is, it is concerned with the formulation of policies even more than with the execution of law. The Constitution invests Congress with lawmaking powers, but directs the President to give Congress information from time to time on the state of the Union and recommend measures for its consideration. The Constitution gives him the veto power over acts of Congress, and thereby, in effect, makes him a third house whose negative vote is equivalent to two-thirds the vote of the House and of the Senate.

These provisions of the Constitution, together with the forceful leadership of several Presidents, have so intimately tied the President with the lawmaking process that the late Howard Lee McBain denominated him a "Chief Legislator." It has been said that whenever President Franklin Roosevelt urged Congress to enact a law, lying right under the message would be a bill with the last "t" crossed and "i" dotted, and Congress came to expect it. A President campaigns for re-election on his legislative achievements, or, as in the case of President Truman in 1948, attacks Congress for failing to enact his program. This is but a frank acceptance of the role that public opinion has assigned the President.

POPULAR DEMAND FOR LEADERSHIP

"We can symbolize our national unity in the Presidency, our sectional interests in the Senate and our localisms in the House" wrote E. Pendleton Herring.[11] But in the absence of co-ordination of these three, confusion inevitably ensues. There are those who would seek to solve the riddle by clapping a parliamentary system on us, ignoring the fact that political systems are natural growths—folkways and mores translated into stateways. Madison's *Notes* make abundantly clear that the framers of the Constitution understood this, and sought diligently to discover what practical devices the states had developed that might be adapted to the needs of a federal government. The late Alexander Johnson pointed out that

> the Presidential electoral system was almost the only feature of the Constitution not suggested by state experience, almost the only feature which was purely artificial, not a natural growth; it was the one which met with least criticism from contemporary opponents of the Constitution and most unreserved praise from *The Federalist;* and democracy has ridden right over it.[12]

Whatever Senators and Representatives may think of Presidential leadership, the American electorate seems to sense intuitively the need of it. The voters serenely ignore the charge of dictatorship. The four elections of Franklin Roosevelt indicate that he was looked to pre-eminently as a national leader. Truman's breath-taking re-election signified an electoral approval of the championing of public policies. The campaign of 1952 signifies a popular search for a strong leader, a symbol of vigor and strength in the national government, a promoter of policies in the public interest. It is simply inconceivable that the American people would today seriously consider the candidacy of a Calvin Coolidge, satisfactory as he may have been in the placid twenties. Not one of his type was among the numerous candidates seriously considered as potential nominees this year.

[11] *Presidential Leadership* (New York, 1940), p. 14.

[12] Alexander Johnson, "What the Federal Constitution Owes to the Constitutions of the Several States," *New Princeton Review*, September 1887.

In a year tense with the dread possibility that a cold war could, in a single moment, become red hot, the American people are in dead earnest, and no mediocre candidate will do. The delegate strength developed by Kefauver was indicative of the hope that a new dependable leader had been discovered. The delegate strength acquired by Eisenhower, even without an active campaign, was another indication of the passionate search for one who might measure up to the symbolism that is the President.

THE QUESTION OF RE-ELECTION

The Twenty-second Amendment may yet prove to be a piece of tragic folly. It went through with a minimum of publicity and discussion—a near conspiracy of politicians venting spite against one no longer living. In effect the amendment says, "We of this generation elected one President four times, but we propose to see to it that no future generation ever has that privilege. This generation assumes a guardianship over those who come after us."

Here is a matter in which the wisdom of the fathers might well have been consulted. In the 72nd article of *The Federalist,* Alexander Hamilton argued cogently the wisdom of the Constitution's unlimited re-eligibility of the President. The possibility of re-election he considered an inducement to good behavior and a reward for fidelity, and reasoned that it would give the nation the advantage of the President's experience. "There is no nation," he declared, "which has not at one period or another experienced an absolute ne-

cessity of the services of particular men to the preservation of its political existence." Hamilton doubtless envisaged some future able and revered ex-President who commanded popular confidence and in a critical time would need to be recalled to service as President. The Twenty-second Amendment would forbid the re-election of a Washington or a Lincoln, no matter how great the crisis, after a second term.

Hamilton could not have the advantage of what we know today confirming the wisdom of his opinion. The President is now a chief legislator, as the legislative product of the first term of Theodore Roosevelt, for example, abundantly demonstrates. But his second term was quite barren because of the error he committed on the night of his election for a second term. He pledged himself not to seek another term, with the consequence that he thereby reduced himself to relative legislative impotence. President Coolidge prudently delayed until late in his elective term his decision not to seek re-election; and President Truman revealed his decision not to seek re-election only when the tumult of the campaign for delegates to the National Convention made it difficult to delay longer. In limiting the President to two terms, the Twenty-second Amendment means that Presidential leadership will be significant only in his first term. Thus in an age when Presidential leadership is more important than ever before, it is practically cut down 50 per cent.

PRESIDENTIAL MATERIAL

It is because the Senate symbolizes sections and the House our localisms that Congress is incapable of providing a focus of the national interest. The House, with its overrepresentation of rural population and the habitual rise through seniority to leadership of only Representatives of practically one-party districts, develops anything but habits of search for norms of national welfare. It is no accident that only one Speaker of the House ever reached the Presidency—James K. Polk—and he was chosen because of a successful experience as Governor of Tennessee. In the last hundred years, six Senators have attained the presidency: Pierce, Buchanan, Johnson, Benjamin Harrison, Harding, and Truman—scarcely a list of notable Presidents. Truman may turn out to be the best of the list.

Long service in either house does not necessarily incapacitate one for the Presidency, but it does compel conformity to the complex of interests of a limited geographical area, and tends to develop habits different from those essential to the Presidency. Finding the common denominators, or points of equilibrium, in the multigroup society of the nation is an art developed by the governors of some of our states that have a complex of group interests resembling that of the nation. Since the Civil War the state governors elected to the Presidency have been Hayes, Cleveland, McKinley, Wilson, Coolidge, and the two Roosevelts. It is interesting to compare them with the non-governors elected President in the same period: Grant, Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, Taft, Harding, Hoover, and Truman.

It is not just the big electoral vote of New York that accounts for the Presidents that state has provided. The group structure of the state's voters is almost as complex as that of the United States. A governor accustomed to finding his way about in New York's maze of economic, religious, ethnic, and social groups is a pretty normal candidate for the Presidency. Why should anyone have been surprised that Dewey had a program as a Presidential candidate similar to that other governor of New York, Franklin Roosevelt? The vocabulary, the voice, and the delivery were different, but the program in each case was what it takes to be elected governor of New York. It ought not to be a bad program for the nation. Nor should it be overlooked that Dewey came nearer winning the Presidency than any other Republican since 1928.

THE PRESIDENT AS CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

The time is long past when any President or Presidential candidate can ignore with impunity the interests of enfranchised group-conscious minorities. Civil rights is an issue that cannot be hushed, because the groups concerned have learned the art of throwing their weights as needed—the balances that decide Presidential elections.

These minorities tend to concentrate in the metropolitan centers of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, and Los Angeles. Because these cities can overwhelm and have overwhelmed the trend of the rest of the voting in their respective states, the Presidential candidate who can carry conviction to the mass of the voters in these cities, voters largely interested in civil rights, can tie up 185 electoral votes—no mean advantage in a Presidential election.

In the competition of the Presidential candidates of the major parties for these electoral votes, both of them become pledged to the advocacy of a program of civil rights. No matter which candidate wins, a champion of civil rights will occupy the White House. Whether Congress can be persuaded to follow his leadership cannot be predicted.

THE EMOTIONAL PRONOUNCEMENT

If anyone asks for conclusive evidence of the symbolism of the President, let him recall the extraordinary demonstrations of personal grief manifested by ordinary people when President Franklin Roosevelt died. Unforgettable are the pictures of these people with streaming tears as they looked at the passing funeral procession. It is conceivable that Americans mourned as profoundly the passing of President Franklin Roosevelt as the English people did the death of King George VI.

Nor is such grief anything new. The writer can never forget how he found his father, just after the news of McKinley's assassination had arrived, weeping as bitterly as if he had lost a child. So it was to others when Lincoln, Garfield, and Harding died in office. The son who protested Harding's lack of merit to his mother whom he found weeping over news of the President's death got this significant response: *"Ach, aber er ist doch der Präsident."* [18] Here we have the essence of the symbolism. No matter what hard-boiled public officials and politicians may think of such conduct, it is the feeling of the rank and file of Americans, their emotional reaction, that determines the matter of the President as a symbol of the nation.

[18] Henry Reiff, "We Live by Symbols," *The Social Studies*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, p. 103.

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The President as Legislator

By Lawrence H. Chamberlain

HOWARD LEE McBAIN was probably the first person to use the term "Chief Legislator" in his trenchant book *The Living Constitution*. He wrote in 1927, six years before the Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Professor McBain used the term to bring out the fact that the measure of a President's stature is to be found in the legislation enacted during his incumbency, rather than in his executive or administrative actions.

Politics is more concerned with *what* shall or shall not be done than with *how* it shall be done. This is merely another way of saying that people are more responsive to issues of policy than to details of administration. Voters are remarkably indifferent to the quality of governmental management. They respond apathetically to allegations of waste and corruption. Even less attention is paid to demonstrated excellence in administrative matters. Recent Presidential elections have served to emphasize the public indifference to campaign appeals grounded on nothing more substantial than avowals of good administration.

Importance of Legislative Role

Interest in Presidential elections indicates the importance the American public attaches to the Presidency. This concern is based chiefly on the policies which the various candidates can be expected to follow, if elected, with respect to foreign aid, governmental expenditures, taxation, labor-management policy, farm policy, and civil rights. These are essentially matters of legislative policy. It is not surprising that the voter associates these problems with the Presidential election, because the past half-century has left little doubt that the President is the chief legislator in our governmental system. This is not to say that he is the lawmaker, or that his legislative views always prevail. It is a recognition that if he holds strong convictions and if he possesses the skill to utilize the various resources available to him, the President can achieve much success in translating his program into law.

Although the President's legislative role has always been important, it has become increasingly so as federal legislation has permeated all tissues of our economic and social structure. When so much of the life of the individual is influenced by federal legislation, the attitude of the President toward this legislation and his skill in gaining legislative approval of his proposals are matters of practical interest to millions of people for whom federal action formerly meant relatively little.

This may help to explain the two decades of Democratic success, because the Democratic program has been one of mass appeal and the masses have felt that the differences between the two parties were clear enough and important enough to warrant action on election day. If reform means expansion rather than retrenchment of governmental activity, and if reform programs are demanded by the voters during periods of social and economic unrest, can a party or a candidate whose platform is basically one of retrenchment hope for electoral success? There is no clear answer to this question, but a little history may cast some light on the general problem.

Only once in the twentieth century has the Republican party nominated a man who might be classified as an expansionist: Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. Even here, the case is not clean cut. The Roosevelt legislative program, while indubitably expansionist or interventionist when compared with that of other Republicans of the period, was in no sense as radical in its socioeconomic proposals as the Democratic platforms of the same era. Moreover, Roosevelt carried the Republican label, but he had in a sense sneaked in by the back door. The accident of his elevation to the Presidency by McKinley's death enabled him to nominate himself in 1904 notwithstanding the fact that many regular Republicans had little enthusiasm for the move. When he attempted to reidentify the Republican party with his political program in 1912, without the leverage of Presidential power and prestige, he found to his disillusionment that his cherished policies were not Republican. Since then the Republican party has not nominated other men who have been strong advocates of governmental intervention, and the voters have tended more and more not to elect any other kind.

A longer glance backward, however, suggests that in the surging ebb and flow of political advantage the pendulum has swung from periods of popular (here used in the sense of mass appeal) ascendancy to periods when property holders and entrepreneurial groups held the advantage. It has been true, moreover, that popular government has tended to coincide with strong executive leadership, but the eras of property-oriented government have appeared during those spans when the Presidents yielded or lost the legislative initiative and Congress dominated the legislative process. Though the record is not entirely consistent on this point, it is worthy of note that the periods of strong executive leadership (mass-oriented government) have generally occurred when the Democrats were in power, but the periods of congressionally dominant (business oriented) government have coincided with Republican periods of political success.

President's Philosophy of Government

The success a President may enjoy as legislator will depend upon a number of variables, including his own personal philosophy of government and his conception of his relationship with Congress. A brief look at some of our most vigorous Presidents will illustrate.

Andrew Jackson, although a champion of the common man and an outspoken exponent of executive independence, added little to the stature of the President as legislator because his own conception of national legislative power was limited. His veto of the Second United States Bank bill reflected his deep conviction that power and responsibility for regulating the financial and commercial functions of the nation should rest with the states rather than the national government. To him the important obligation was to protect the President's independence by repelling any legislative action which might threaten executive prerogatives. It is not surprising, therefore, that his chief contribution to the development of the Presidential office took the form of a much expanded use of the veto power. This basically defensive contribution is characteristic of both the man's personal qualities and his philosophy of governmental authority.

Abraham Lincoln also entered the White House with a negative conception of the President's legislative prerogative—and responsibility. Early in his administration he declared:

By the Constitution the Executive may recommend measures which he may think proper, and he may veto those he thinks improper, and it is supposed that he may add to these certain indirect influences to affect the action of Congress. My political education strongly inclines me against a very free use of any of these means by the Executive to control the legislation of the country. As a rule, I think it better that Congress should originate as well as perfect its measures without external bias.

This unequivocal statement of principle is hard to reconcile with Lincoln's actions when he was confronted with the critical problems raised by the Civil War. Less than any other President before or since did he look to Congress to "originate as well as perfect its measures" in the fashioning of policies to prosecute the war. On the one hand, he submitted his bill for compensated emancipation of the slaves with the request that it be enacted without alteration. Furthermore, to an extent then unprecedented and never since duplicated, he frequently chose to attain his objectives by executive decree without recourse to Congress, except to report his action ex post facto with the suggestion that Congress could, if it chose, approve his action by clothing it with statutory authority.

Lincoln's second method had the merit of being both simple and effective, but it so patently transgressed both the letter and the spirit of our Constitution that it has not been repeated as a basic operating principle by succeeding Presidents. Occasional incidents involving sweeping executive orders unsupported by legislation have occurred in a number of administrations, but there has been no general and sustained attempt to bypass Congress.

Grover Cleveland's claim to recognition as a strong President lies chiefly in his resolute use of his executive powers. He did not present a dynamic legislative program, but he employed the veto more vigorously than any President up to that time.

William McKinley is not regarded as a President who by philosophy, temperament, or inclination wished to assume the role of legislative leader. He had little desire to lead Congress through the rigors of an ambitious legislative program. Such was not his conception of the Presidency. Whether at least part of the explanation lay in his congressional background is not clear, but McKinley was not the focal point of national legislative policy. He was by no means impotent in his relations with Congress, however. Although he did not take a strong hand in shaping legislative proposals, he was directly responsible in several instances for legislative acceptance of important measures formulated by other executive officials. Of his effectiveness in this regard, Secretary of War Elihu Root observed, "He had vast influence with Congress. He led them by the power of affectionate esteem, not by fear."

At the other extreme was the experience of Herbert Hoover, who, whatever his economic philosophy, had the greatest desire to function as the key figure in the legislative program of his administration, yet found himself frustrated almost from the beginning. Even during the first two years, before he lost his party majorities in 1930, he experienced painful difficulties and embarrassments with his Congress.

PARTY MAJORITIES

Party majorities may be accepted as among the more fundamental conditions antecedent to harmonious Presidential leadership of Congress. Other things being equal, a President can count upon a more friendly reception for his legislative proposals when he is looking to

fellow party members to pilot his program through the parliamentary shoals. Significant exceptions may be noted, however. During Woodrow Wilson's first two years in office, he did not have a Democratic majority in the Senate. Nevertheless, virtually his entire legislative program was approved in substantially the form in which he proposed it. Included in this program were the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, and the Underwood Tariff Act, the latter embracing a field in which congressional influence has traditionally been dominant.

Conversely, Franklin D. Roosevelt suffered some of his most striking defeats in the Seventy-fifth Congress (1937–38), with its enormous Democratic majorities which had been swept into office with his overwhelming reelection in 1936. Not only was he repudiated on the Supreme Court bill and his undistributed profits tax proposal; his veto was overridden on the War Risk Insurance Act, the Veterans Bonus Act, and the Farm Mortgage Interest Rates Act. Presidents Coolidge, Hoover, and Truman also found that party majorities provide no guarantee of congressional acquiescence.

DIVISION BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

Because the President is elected on a national basis with a program—expressed in general or specific terms, depending upon the subject and the degree to which public opinion has crystallized on a particular subject—he is thought of as focal point of legislation. But Congress is also elected to govern. Each Congressman is elected, by his particular constituency, to work for a program. He may be a member of the President's party but elected on a program quite different from that of his party chieftain. Or he may belong to the other party, elected on a platform which harmonizes or conflicts with that of the person elected President. Just as the President accepts responsibility to *his* constituency, so does the individual Congressman. There is nothing in our Constitution or in our political and governmental traditions to suggest that the individual Congressman's obligation to the President's program is paramount to his obligation to his own constituency.

To this *political* obstacle to a unified program between President and Congress must be added a *governmental* factor that operates as a divisive rather than a unifying influence: the organic separation of the executive and legislative departments. The Constitutional separation of powers which establishes the Congress as an independent organ of government is a stubborn fact that cannot be ignored, although at times the President may believe that his mandate from the entire country entitles him to press for a particular bill or legislative program and urge Congress to adopt his legislative proposals promptly and with little change.

The volume of popular support the President may enjoy in his advocacy of a particular legislative program will depend upon a multitude of factors and will vary greatly from one time to another. Similarly, the reaction of Congress will probably be influenced by the same factors. In a crisis situation, decisive action is at a premium. Public opinion tends to crystallize momentarily, and Congress is both a reflection and an embodiment of this opinion. Congressional behavior under such circumstances may be unduly precipitous. Unable to process the President's legislative proposals through its conventional, time-consuming machinery, Congress may yield to public pressure and "rubber stamp" the bill he presents.

THE CONGRESSIONAL VIEWPOINT

Such uncritical action is not popular with Congress, because it amounts to legislative abdication, with all the distasteful consequences that follow. Eventually the onus for such defects or shortcomings as the legislation may reveal will fall upon Congress. A rubber-stamp Congress does not enjoy high prestige. Furthermore, congressional self-esteem requires that the national legislature retain its freedom of action. Each time that it accepts a clearly subordinate role in the lawmaking process weakens commensurately its ability to recapture its Constitutional position as a full co-ordinate partner in legislation.

It follows that congressional jealousy of its legislative prerogatives may ordinarily be expected to assert itself in the form of congressional refusal to accept Presidential dictation except in crisis situations. Normally the President's legislative proposals will receive attention, but they will be subjected to searching if not systematic scrutiny and weighed against congressional counterproposals before they are approved.

In the course of this ponderous and frequently protracted process, the bill in question is likely to undergo such extensive amendment that it emerges quite different from the way it entered. What originated as an administration measure ends up as a congressional one. Whether it is a better piece of legislation than the original is problematical, but this is the way our legislative system works, and the cause is to be found in both our party system and our Constitutional framework.

Much discussion has centered around the desirability of providing mechanisms or procedures for achieving greater co-operation or co-ordination between the executive and legislative departments in their common task of formulating our laws. But although there seems to be general agreement between the President and Congress concerning the need for greater harmony of action, there is much less unanimity on the form this unifying action should take. Here deep, almost fundamental, differences exist.

Some hold the view that Congress should be limited to discussing and approving, with little or no amendment, the legislative proposals of the President. This point of view has many able supporters. There has, for example, been an increasing tendency among administrators to believe that the initiative in proposing legislation should rest chiefly with the executive branch, and that Congress should limit its activity in this respect. In the words of Paul Appleby, a well-known authority on public administration, "Congress would retain the right to initiate, but use it less and less frequently."[1] Many students of government accept this view as sound principle, but it is safe to say that few of them are members of Congress. It seems desirable, therefore, to look more closely at the actual working relationships between the two governmental organs that share the lawmaking power under our Constitution.

PRESIDENT'S RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

A President must necessarily deal with Congress through its duly selected leaders. Only rarely is he able to do much in choosing or influencing the choice of these key figures. Occasionally a President has been instrumental in dictating a Speaker or a Majority Floor Leader, but such instances are exceptional. It is even doubtful whether he has been the gainer in such instances, in view of the resentment and antagonism engendered because of the feeling in Congress that such intervention was

[1] Paul H. Appleby, *Big Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 163.

an unwarranted invasion of its prerogatives.

Even when comfortable party majorities exist in both houses, there is no certainty that the party leaders who hold the vital parliamentary and committee posts will share the policy preferences of the President. With the premium on seniority, the patriarchs of the legislative houses are likely to come from states or districts where the ferment of bipartisan politics is less marked. As stated earlier, the character of their constituencies may differ markedly from that to which the President owes his legislative mandate. The New Deal and Fair Deal programs of Roosevelt and Truman have thus had to contend with the political conservatism of many southern Democratic leaders. Republican Presidents have not escaped this dilemma. Theodore Roosevelt found his strongest opposition among the leaders of his own party, notably Speaker Cannon in the House and Senators Aldrich and Hale. His only recourse, in his own words, was "by appealing over the heads of the Senate and House leaders to the people, who were the masters of both of us."

One of the hard realities probably not adequately appreciated by the average voter when he casts his ballot for President is the complication of the legislative process and the degree to which the Chief Executive must depend upon the faithful and abiding assistance of his legislative leaders in translating his proposals into completed legislation. Unless there is to be virtual congressional abdication of its legislative responsibility, the process of drafting and perfecting a major piece of legislation is intricate and laborious and offers many opportunities for delay, not to say emasculation of vital provisions.

When his party lieutenants fail to sustain the pressure necessary to keep a measure moving along the legislative transmission belt, whether because of their lack of enthusiasm for the bill itself or through personal or political disaffection, a President may find his program stalled despite his mandate from the people. Congressional party leaders have achieved their posts of influence only after long years of legislative service. It is not surprising that they manifest some reluctance to accept the role of parliamentary expediter for a newcomer in the White House. If the newly elected President also happens to be a political neophyte, the tendency toward congressional skepticism may be magnified. For this reason, the experience of those Presidents who have attained office without extensive political experience and party relationships has not been notably happy.

THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY POSITION

Legislation is not a one-man affair. The synchronized efforts of many individuals requires some kind of propulsive energy to maintain momentum. Party harmony is an important generative force, but the wellsprings of party lie deep and are not always easily tapped. The President's party position is anomalous. Perhaps it can best be understood by a brief comparison with party politics in Britain. There we find two national party organizations. Each party functions with a strong central organization and a recognized party leader. The leader of the party in power is the head of the government. His opposite number in the other major party is the officially recognized leader of the opposition. To him will fall the responsibility of heading the new government when his party succeeds to power.

When the wartime coalition government headed by Prime Minister Churchill was voted out of office in 1945 it was a foregone conclusion that

the cloak of government would fall upon the shoulders of Clement R. Attlee, who for many years had been the duly elected leader of the Labor party. Similarly, when in 1951 the Conservative party was returned to power by the British electorate, everyone knew that its long-time head, Mr. Churchill, would again become Prime Minister.

Each party has its leader, and, conversely, each leader has his party. When the legislative program which he and his party associates agree upon is drawn up, he can reasonably assume that it will be enacted into law by the party majority which elevated him to office. Should individual members of his party find themselves out of sympathy with his legislative program, they have little choice but to go along, because they know that the Prime Minister can terminate their period of office by dissolving Parliament, and, more important, he can use his power as head of the party to deny them party support in the new election. Without this support, chances of political survival are negligible. Thus it is that the chief executive in Britain *can* coerce his legislative body to support his legislative program.

All this is quite alien to the American system. Presidential coercive power is virtually nonexistent. This is chiefly so because of our different party situation and the Chief Executive's different position in that system.

Here we find no highly disciplined national party organization with a program and an officially designated leader. Here party leadership is titularly assigned to the party nominee for the Presidency. The temporary holder of this title may or may not have had a record of service in his party. His claim to the title of party leader depends, however, upon his success at the polls. If elected to the Presidency, he continues to be recognized as the official leader of his party, although the capital that he can make of this designation depends more upon his personal qualities than upon any prerogatives that inhere in his political post.

Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that the position of the American President with respect to party and government is the exact opposite of that of the Prime Minister in Britain. Here, his possession of governmental power gives him some political influence. There, his position as party leader, with the political power it carries, gives him the governmental power to achieve his legislative program. His political power invests him with coercive leverage which his legislative colleagues cannot safely resist. Our President has no comparable arsenal of weapons with which to wage his legislative campaign. Governmental authority to dissolve Congress does not exist. Political leadership with its opportunity to employ the sanction of withdrawing party support is not his to wield. His only recourse is the people. If he can marshal public opinion behind his proposal, and if he succeeds in arousing active and enthusiastic popular support, he may persuade an otherwise reluctant or inert Congress to acknowledge his leadership and enact his program.

PRESS RELATIONS

In his reliance upon the people to supply the solid underpinning for the legislative program he presents to Congress, the President is fortunate when he can count on a favorable and friendly press. The appearance of radio and television has undoubtedly reduced somewhat the President's dependence upon the newspapers as a means of retaining contact with the people, and both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman have made frequent use of these media to counteract what they have regarded as inaccurate and unfair treatment at the hands of the nation's press.

Despite the possibility that some of the harmful effects of a poor press can be overcome, the value of fortunate press relationships can hardly be overstated. There is nothing coincidental in the fact that throughout our history successful press relations have gone hand in hand with the popular favor which the President has enjoyed and capitalized upon in his dealings with Congress.

In this era of ballyhoo, mass communication, and high-powered public relations counsels, we tend to assume that favorable press relations have only recently come to be looked upon as a vital component of successful statecraft. The historical record does not support this assumption, however. Presidents Washington and Adams writhed under the lashings of unfriendly journals; but Jefferson, the first politician to serve as President, characteristically took positive steps to utilize the power of the press constructively as an instrumentality of political support. During his Presidency there appeared for the first time an official administration organ financed through public funds.

Succeeding Presidents for the ensuing half-century retained the policy of employing an official newspaper to ensure accurate and favorable reporting of governmental news. The practice was discontinued by Abraham Lincoln because he felt that it had outlived its usefulness; but it is not to be supposed that Lincoln placed any less importance on the power of the press or on maintaining friendly press relations. No occupant of the White House before his time and few if any since have sensed more deeply the importance of public opinion or contrived so effectively to win its support.

Franklin D. Roosevelt was credited with great astuteness in his skillful utilization of newspapermen in his own administrative family. As in so many other shrewd political moves which paid off handsomely, Roosevelt's role here was that of the adapter rather than the innovator. That other great man of the people, Andrew Jackson, who perhaps surpassed all other Presidents in his vigorous use of the press for partisan purposes, was the first to adopt a systematic policy of appointing newspapermen to public office.

THE PRESS CONFERENCE

Another practice which Franklin D. Roosevelt took over and, for a time at least, exploited with almost phenomenal success was the Presidential press conference. In this instance Mr. Roosevelt was following in the footsteps of another New York Democratic Governor who had transferred his base of operations from Albany to Washington, D. C. After his election in 1884, President-elect Cleveland broke precedent by holding daily press conferences. He did not adhere to the daily schedule after his inauguration, but he did continue to hold occasional conferences for the press throughout his administration.

The custom of the press conference was advanced one step further during the McKinley administration, when the President's secretary met daily with press representatives. The Presidential press conference as we have come to know it today made its appearance when Woodrow Wilson formalized it as a twice-a-week regularly scheduled meeting.

As the record of the last three or four decades has revealed, Presidential incumbents have had varying success in utilizing the press conference to their own advantage. To some it has been nothing less than a recurring ordeal, frequently a nightmare; to others, a sometimes diverting battle of wits and

words. It is probably true that all Presidents have found these periodic exchanges wearing and worrisome, but they regard them as one of the unavoidable concomitants of the office, to be endured with as little pain and embarrassment as possible. Let each new President enjoy his honeymoon while he may. Sooner or later the idyl will be dispelled, and for the remainder of his term the Chief Executive will be fortunate if he can emerge from the conference room without having put his foot in his mouth.

GAINING POPULAR SUPPORT

Legislation at the national level is in large part dependent upon factors which lie outside the realm of narrowly partisan politics. Party majorities, though normally helpful, do not alone guarantee the President's success in achieving his legislative program. The demands of localism and the pressures of conflicting interest groups place a high premium on inertia, and Congress is unlikely to move unless the President can find extra leverage to keep his program moving when progress seems about to be halted. If he can summon it to his aid, the persuasive power of public opinion is well-nigh irresistible, and Congress cannot long withstand its force. Quite independent of party considerations, the President who can marshal enthusiastic popular support for a particular issue can approach Congress with bargaining strength that cannot be ignored or repulsed.

In the contest for public attention and the popular support essential to the successful realization of a particular legislative objective, the President enjoys real advantages. Through his use of the special message he can always gain national attention. If he wishes to do so, he can go to the people directly, and he is assured of a nation-wide radio audience. Nothing Congress can do will command quite the same kind of attention. Nowadays, when Congress tends to remain in session almost continuously, the President's leverage is perhaps even greater than formerly, because the average Congressman is less able to counter Presidential pressure than he was in the old days when he could have long periods at home to poll and cultivate local opinion.

There is nothing automatic about the President's ability to generate a popular ground swell which will sweep Congress off its feet. He must use this weapon wisely and sparingly, else it will lose much of its potency. Experience has demonstrated that too frequent or ill-considered resort to the people is self-defeating. Nevertheless, in skillful hands the special message probably remains the single most effective Presidential instrument for achieving a legislative objective.

USE OF THE SPECIAL MESSAGE

Special messages have been used since the founding of our government; but the conscious exploitation of this device as a strategic weapon of great value is distinctly a twentieth-century phenomenon. Theodore Roosevelt was truly innovative in his use of the annual message to dramatize his dynamic conception of federal power. His annual messages in point of length and coverage have probably never been surpassed before or since. The first Roosevelt seems to have missed a bet, however, in his failure to foresee the possibilities of the special message. Only a half-dozen or so special messages are listed among the voluminous collection of his communications to Congress.

Interestingly enough, it was Mr. Taft, a President not famous for his success as a legislator, who first made deliberate and consistent use of the special message. During his four years in the White House, he sent twenty special messages to the Congress. He employed the device primarily for the purpose of urging action upon specific bills. It remained for Woodrow Wilson to capitalize upon the strategic potential of the special message. Because he chose to deliver all but one of his thirty-one messages—regular and special—in person, he achieved a dramatic effect that contributed significantly to his effectiveness as legislator. Since Wilson's day the special message has been accepted as one of the most potent legislative instruments in the possession of the President, although succeeding Executives have revealed wide disparity in their skill in using it.

THE PERSONAL MESSAGE

The same must be said for the personal message. Wilson's practice of delivering his messages in person pleased Harding's sense of pageantry, and he continued the custom, with no particular result one way or the other. Coolidge, from what motive it is not known, decided to retain the tradition. In his first annual message he called attention to thirty-three different items of suggested legislation. Congress responded by passing only one. Whether this rebuff was too painful or whether for other reasons, this was the first and last message Coolidge delivered in person. All his subsequent communications were read in the houses by the clerks. Their reception was something less than cordial if legislative results may be accepted as a criterion of judgment. In his biography of Coolidge, Mr. C. M. Fuess quotes a newspaper editor's comment, "Congress has devoted itself to bloodying the President's nose, boxing his ears, and otherwise maltreating him." [2] The record seems to bear him out.

VARIED CONFIGURATION

Presidential leadership in legislation remains a fascinatingly speculative topic. As the foregoing account demonstrates, there is striking variation among different Presidents in the influence they wield in legislation. Constantly changing combinations of factors, including the personality, the attitude, and the philosophy of office of the incumbent, and such external considerations as party composition, contemporary conditions, and the conjuncture of events, bear directly upon the President's legislative achievements. Even the weakest is far from being totally without influence, while the strongest is by no means omnipotent. The man who enters the White House with no well-defined philosophy of office cannot remain there long without being compelled to formulate at least a few rule-of-thumb precepts with which to meet his legislative problems. Similarly, he who takes with him into the high office a well-formulated theory of executive leadership must soon find situations which do not lend themselves to the deductive method.

To paraphrase a great Chief Justice who was also a one-time candidate for the office of Chief Legislator, the Presidency of the United States is what the incumbent conceives it to be—provided he can persuade Congress to accept his view.

[2] Claude M. Fuess, *Calvin Coolidge* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1940), p. 342.

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The President as Administrator

By Herman Miles Somers

IT may be that full performance of the duties which have accrued to the President is impossible. William Allen White, who knew the job in less frenetic days, thought "the devil invented the Presidency by combining all the futile despairs of Sisyphus with the agony of Tantalus and shaking in a jigger of the nervous irritation of a man with ants in his pants."

Too Big a Job?

Even in days when the nation and its government were smaller and simpler, Presidents cried for help. Almost every President in this century has publicly complained that he could not fully cope with his administrative responsibilities. More than fifteen years ago, President Roosevelt transmitted to Congress the historic study of the Federal Government made by the Committee on Administrative Management, and added:

> . . . they say, what has been common knowledge for twenty years, that the President cannot adequately handle his responsibilities, that he is overworked; that it is humanly impossible, under the system which we have, for him fully to carry out his Constitutional duty as Chief Executive, because he is overwhelmed with minor details and needless contacts arising directly from the bad organization and equipment of the Government. I can testify to this. With my predecessors who have said the same thing over and over, I plead guilty.[1]

Twelve years later, the celebrated Hoover Commission reported as its first findings: (1) "The executive branch is not organized into a workable number of major departments and agencies which the President can effectively direct. . . ." (2) "The line of command and supervision from the President down through his department heads to every employee . . . has been weakened, or actually broken, in many places and in many ways." (3) "The President and the heads of departments lack the tools to frame programs and policies and to supervise their execution." [2]

More recently *Fortune* reported that "according to old hands around the White House, the job of the Presidency has doubled in scope even since the peak effort of World War II." [3]

Under the best of circumstances, the proper management of the executive branch alone, now numbering 2,500,000 civil servants, plus the military organization of which the President is also administrative chief, would be a back-breaking ordeal (quite aside from the President's other full-time jobs); but neither the Congress nor the American people seem interested in helping to create the best of circumstances. On the contrary, a formidable array of obstacles, nettles, and mousetraps has been thrown in the President's path. These are frequently called "safeguards"; but just what or how they guard has never been made clear. In fact, they are in part the painful expression by Congress of its own frustrations. In part they represent the normal compromises, concessions, and contradictions of conflicting forces in a highly pluralistic society.

This discussion attempts to: (1) enumerate some of the impediments unnecessarily hampering the President, (2) appraise the internal co-ordinating machinery available to him, (3) describe the difficulties in departmental organization, (4) suggest the manner of man who might best meet the challenges of the job, and (5) suggest some initial and practicable reforms for the new administration.

[1] The President's Committee on Administrative Management, *Report* (Washington, 1937), p. iv.

[2] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *General Management of the Executive Branch* (Washington, February 1949), pp. 3–5. All subsequent quotations from the Hoover Commission relate to this volume.

[3] *Fortune*, February 1952, p. 76.

Impediments

A legislative assembly cannot govern. Consequently, the Constitution wisely gives the President indivisible executive authority. "The unity of the executive," advocated in *The Federalist* papers, remains a cardinal principle of the formal Constitution (and of most theories of organization), but has never been achieved in practice. Congress and the courts have diffused executive authority and fragmented the executive branch into relatively autonomous units at several levels. The pressure groups also promote an atomized bureaucracy, which, like a disorganized Congress, they find much easier to manipulate.

The Constitution charges the President with the responsibility "that the Laws be faithfully executed," but the doctrine is not supported by the necessary machinery.

1. The President is denied authority to determine the organization and structure of the executive branch for which he is responsible. The first recommendation the Hoover Commission made to Congress was that the President be given authority to initiate reorganization plans, subject to veto by joint resolution of Congress. This resulted in a grant of authority which expires in April 1953.

2. A substantial portion of the executive functions of government has been placed completely out of the reach of the President in a category often referred to as a "headless fourth branch of government."

3. Committees of Congress, themselves fairly independent of Congress, have undertaken to direct the affairs of individual departments or bureaus through direct relations with them. The United States Corps of Engineers, for example, which neither the Secretary of the Army nor the President of the United States has been able to control, likes to refer to itself as "the engineer consultants to, and contractors for, the Congress of the United States." [4] As far back as Jefferson's administration, Fisher Ames complained that congressional committees had become "ministers." [5]

Because of its internal anarchy, the Congress has itself become imprisoned by the usurpation of power by individual committees. Agency officials, trained to smell the sources of power, sometimes form alliances with congressional committees against the fulfillment of portions of the President's program. This has led one of our most acute students of government to observe that "the real issue is then between the executive bureau and the congressional committee, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the Congress as a whole and the President." [6]

4. Personnel policy and personnel administration lie at the very heart of top executive management. This indispensable tool has been denied to the na-

[4] For an able account of this unofficial revision of Constitutional doctrine, see Arthur Maass, *Muddy Waters: the Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951.

[5] Leonard D. White, *The Jeffersonians* (New York, 1951), p. 29.

[6] Don K. Price, *The New Dimension of Diplomacy* (New York, 1951), p. 13.

tion's Chief Executive, despite the urging of every important study of the Federal Government. The Committee on Administrative Management charged that the United States Civil Service Commission was no exception to the rule that "board administration tends to diffuse responsibility, to produce delays, and to make effective co-operation or vigorous leadership impossible." It recommended unification of responsibility in a Civil Service Administrator. Congress refused. The recommendations of the Hoover Commission twelve years later did result in the allocation of administrative authority to the Chairman of the Commission, but the recommendation that he become part of the President's Office was not followed.

5. Although the executive budget is almost universally accepted as a sine qua non of effective administration, the President does not have the power of "item veto," which has been demonstrated to be a primary source of economy and good management in many state governments. Also, appropriations are often made in such great detail that administrative form and process are strait-jacketed.

6. In practice, Presidents have found that their ability to handle the most difficult administrative job in the world depends, in large degree, upon the same factor conditioning their capacity to cope with the "built-in" rivalry of Congress: political strength, based on popular and party authority. Recently even this resource of popular Presidents has been abridged. The Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution assures sharp curtailment of Presidential leadership, at least during the latter half of a second term.

The word and intent of the Constitution notwithstanding, without adequate control of the bureaucracy the President cannot meet his administrative responsibilities. Administrative integrity cannot be achieved without Presidential control of the organization and personnel of the government and its internal co-ordinating machinery.

Clearly, the problems of Presidential administration go far beyond legal authority and procedural mechanics. Perspective requires that the issues be recognized as reflecting the composite of political, social, and economic relations of our society. And much depends on the caliber of the man. But the *possibility* at least of securing co-ordinated and responsible administration rests in giving adequate administrative authority to the Chief Executive.

Co-ordinating Machinery

Only recently have we recognized that while executive accountability is ultimately centered in a solitary individual, the *Presidency* is an institution. It is an organization, a group enterprise, of which the President is in charge, setting the pace and determining its character. Only through the effective operation of this institution, which furnishes the staff tools of executive co-ordination and control, can the President be expected even to approximate his Constitutional obligations. Were it not for some structural continuity in the institution, a new President would hardly stand a chance.

The issue of staffing the Presidency is old (Congress resisted importunities for assistance made by Presidents in the early nineteenth century); but the modern conception of an Executive Office of the President dates back only to 1937 and the Report of the Committee on Administrative Management, though in a germinal sense one might look to the discussions surrounding the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The Committee's signal contribution was its sharp portrayal of the Presidency as the pivot of federal administration, all other aspects being secondary. As a consequence, the Executive Office of the President was formally established in September 1939, one of the great landmarks in the administrative history of this nation.

Structural weakness and changes

The passage of years, however, revealed some impressive shortcomings in the original structure as well as in the Committee's recommendations. By present-day standards, the Committee construed "administrative management" narrowly. It concentrated upon personnel management, fiscal management, planning management, and administrative reorganization of the government. Little consideration was given to the broader administrative responsibility for program and policy co-ordination on a systematic basis. Partly because of this omission, no provision was made in the Executive Office for any form of staff integration or internal co-ordination. The Office was an amorphous array of separate units.

It may be that the Committee was placing reliance on the Cabinet for such policy co-ordination. It is, however, the uniform judgment of close observers and the testimony of former Cabinet officials that the Cabinet has never been an effective instrument for formulating policy or for co-ordination. In its present form, it is unlikely so to develop.

World War II dramatized both the tremendous assets of an organized Presidency and the shortcomings of existing arrangements. Throughout the period of defense preparation and the early part of the war, there were widespread demands for an "over-all czar" to cope with the apparent lack of adequate machinery for central policy and program co-ordination. A series of improvisations culminated in creation of the Office of War Mobilization in 1943, which satisfied immediate needs and, in large degree, furnished necessary staff leadership in the Executive Office.

Since that time, important changes have been made in the design of the Executive Office. The postwar additions reflect the growing recognition of the need for better facilities for policy and planning control at the pinnacle.

The Council of Economic Advisers (1946) and the National Security Resources Board (created 1947; added to the Executive Office in 1949) may be broadly construed as replacements for the ill-fated National Resources Planning Board (eliminated by Congress in 1943). The National Security Council (1947) was created in an attempt to obtain better policy and program co-ordination of military and diplomatic goals, through the long-advocated device of an active Cabinet-level committee with a secretariat.

In June 1950 the President appointed Averell Harriman "Special Assistant" in connection with matters requiring "the integration of the various interests of the departments and agencies concerned with the development of government-wide policies related to our international responsibilities." The title lapsed with the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which created the office of Director for Mutual Security in the Executive Office, and Mr. Harriman moved over into the new post.

Within a few months after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the President created the Office of Defense Mobilization (December 1950) in the Executive Office, with direct authority over all phases of governmental activity related to economic mobilization.

Present setup

At the present time the Executive Office is composed of the following units:

1. The White House Office (includes the President's secretaries, aides, and administrative assistants);

2. Liaison Office for Personnel Management (technically separate, but in practice always occupied by one of the administrative assistants);

3. Bureau of the Budget (the oldest and largest unit in the Executive Office, and its institutional core);
4. Council of Economic Advisers;
5. National Security Resources Board;
6. National Security Council (whether it is, in fact, the Council or its secretariat that is in the Executive Office might be argued);
7. Central Intelligence Agency (operates under the direction of the National Security Council and therefore is perhaps improperly shown as a separate unit);
8. Office of the Director for Mutual Security;
9. Office of Defense Mobilization;
10. Office for Emergency Management (not presently in operation, but the President can bring it back to life any time he wishes. It proved an important legal convenience during World War II for the quick establishment of emergency agencies through Executive order).

Hoover Commission's findings

The Hoover Commission's approach to problems of the Executive Office was generally similar to that of the Committee on Administrative Management. It too recognized that the effectiveness of the Government of the United States rested on the ability of the Chief Executive to provide "firm direction to the departments and agencies" and orderly "organization for development and execution of policy." It found the President still dangerously "handicapped" for the performance of his responsibilities. In its first report the Commission submitted specific recommendations and valuable conceptual principles regarding the Office. It said that the President must be boss of his own office and "should be given complete freedom to adjust the internal relationships." It also said, "Statutory authority over the operating departments should not be vested in any staff or staff agency of the President's Office."

It appears that Congress does not intend to follow these recommendations. In 1951, for example, it legislated that a Director for Mutual Security, who would serve as co-ordinator in this entire field, should be located in the Executive Office and that the same man who held this post should be the administrator of a large operating agency, the Mutual Security Agency. Congress thereby flew in the face of the Hoover Commission precepts and violated other elementary principles of organization by making a single official both protagonist and umpire in interagency disputes.

The Hoover Commission enunciated the principles that multiheaded bodies, in the nature of full-time boards, could not serve effectively as Presidential staff, and that the heads of staff agencies in the President's Office "should be appointed by the President without confirmation by the Senate, except the Civil Service Commission." It specificially pointed to the Council of Economic Advisers as an example of violation of both principles, and recommended that it be replaced by an Office of the Economic Adviser with a single head. This was not done. The authority of the National Security Resources Board was transferred from the Board to its chairman, but his appointment still requires Senate confirmation.

The Commission took cognizance of the lack of organization within the Executive Office, pointing out especially that there is no place in the Office where the President can look for a current summary of principal issues on staff work or assignments to departments and agencies. Its recommendation to meet this deficiency indicated that it is much easier to determine what is wrong than to reach agreement upon a solution. The compromise proposal was a new staff secretary whose prescribed functions suggest a high-class clerk for clearing and assembling papers for the President. Some of the Commission's members apparently hoped that such a position, once established, might grow into a more affirmative and influential role of "staff leader."

Deficiencies and progress

Meanwhile, the crucial issues of coherent organization and internal staff relationships in the Executive Office remain unresolved. This affects more than the adequacy of assistance. A Chief Executive can become a prisoner of the imbalances in his own organization. Ultimate decisions must rest upon the solitary figure of the President. He must therefore be sure that when issues reach him for decision they have had staff appraisal from all the different aspects of Presidential responsibility, and that all viewpoints on vital controversies reach him through persons representing such different views. This protects the President's judgments and his position.

The present deficiencies of the Executive Office should not, however, becloud the remarkable progress made during the last decade. The Executive Office is only thirteen years old. Large sectors are post-World War II developments. That it has not yet shaken down to a cohesive and orderly structure should not be discouraging. More informal coordination has been achieved internally than the formal structure suggests. In part, such institutions tend to achieve balance through an evolutionary process. For example, more and more of the legislative clearance function, basically located in the Bureau of the Budget, is passing into the hands of the White House staff without any formal ordering.

The general competence of the Executive Office is high. Acceptance of its Presidential functions are being achieved throughout the government. The present Chief Executive appears to make broader use of staff assistance than did his predecessor, and it may be as *Fortune* has optimistically noted, that this development "has provided the President of the United States for the first time with the machinery and manpower necessary to run an orderly government in these complex days." [7]

DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION

Proper staffing of the Presidency will not alone provide a solution of the President's organization problems. Departmental organization is also vitally important. Three issues stand out:

1. The existence of commissions executing some of our most important statutes, claiming virtual independence of the Chief Executive, mocks attempts at meaningful co-ordination of government policy and administration. The independent agencies are generally regulatory in nature. Regulation is essentially political, concerned with the formulation of public policies. Independence of the Executive and, in some cases, even of the legislature, makes these agencies essentially irresponsible. There is indeed "very great danger in any doctrine that pretends we can preserve democracy and still vest economic powers in a governmental agency that is not clearly subject to officials who in turn are responsible to the people." [8]

2. There are entirely too many agencies for effective direction from the top. According to the Hoover Commission:

> At the present time there are 65 departments, administrations, agencies, boards and commissions engaged in executive work, all of which report directly to the President—if they report to anyone. This number does not include the "independent" regulatory agencies in their quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions. It is manifestly impossible for the President to give adequate supervision to so many agencies.

[7] *Fortune*, February 1952, p. 79.

[8] James W. Fesler, "Independent Regulatory Establishments," in F. Morstein Marx, Ed., *Elements of Public Administration* (New York, 1946), p. 228.

The Hoover Commission, like its predecessor Committee on Administrative Management, made useful recommendations for an orderly combining of agencies to reduce the total number. It is now clear that for the most part, Congress cannot heed such recommendations.

Recently, interesting proposals have been made for creation of a new echelon of command, between the departmental and Executive Office levels, through grouping of departments and agencies with particularly related activities.[9] If modeled after the integrated structure of the Department of Defense in which are combined three administrative departments, as distinguished from its predecessor the National Military Establishment which had statutory authority only of a holding-company character and proved to have no basis of strength, such redesigning may have administrative merit. But, in any event, it is unlikely to appeal to congressional committees.

3. Authority within departments is diffused and uncertain, partly because of statutes through which Congress has too frequently spelled out the internal organization of departments and agencies and has given authority directly to subordinate officers. In part, the situation is due to the informal power relationships which align bureaus and agencies more closely with congressional committees than with their organizational superiors.

In greater or less degree, all three of these impediments to unified executive administration reflect the congressional-Presidential rivalry within our system. Even more, they reflect the lack of organization within Congress. As long as Congress remains a congeries of warring factions, its committees are encouraged to usurp powers properly belonging to the whole of Congress, and to divide up the executive branch into colonial empires directly subject to committee domination.

The danger is great on many scores. As one distinguished scholar recently warned,

> It is extremely doubtful if government by congressional committees can be justified on either democratic or expediential grounds, because the standing committees of Congress are very nearly the *least representative* institutions in the government.[10]

It is insufficiently recognized that the proper organization and functioning of the executive branch is greatly dependent upon the internal organization and management of the legislature. As long as Congress is disorganized, it will continue to promote the disorganization of the executive branch. As long as the executive branch is fragmented, it will be difficult if not impossible for the Congress to hold it accountable. Only by strengthening the control of the Chief Executive, with whom it can deal in direct and unitary fashion, can the Congress ever assure to itself administrative accountability of the bureaucracy.

PRESIDENTIAL QUALIFICATIONS

Adequate administrative machinery is indispensable, but it will not do the job alone. The office of President properly remains flexible and keeps being recreated in the image of the man who occupies it. The character of the President will be foremost in determining the quality of leadership which will be exercised and the quality of personnel which will be attracted to and selected for key positions. The best of formal equipment can remain unused or misused. What manner of man appears most promising for the most complex administrative job in the world?

[9] For one such proposal, see George A. Graham, "The Presidency and the Executive Office of the President," *Journal of Politics*, November 1950, p. 619.

[10] E. E. Schattschneider, "Congress in Conflict," *The Yale Review*, Winter, 1952, p. 189.

As White House correspondent Merriman Smith put it a few years ago, "A President is Many Men." Other aspects of the job are discussed in other essays in this volume. Although it is convenient for analysis to distinguish the facets of total responsibility, it would be an error to suppose that these can really be compartmentalized in practice. Long experience has demonstrated that a President is likely to succeed in most of his jobs or in none. They are mutually dependent. A President who is not a skillful political leader is not likely to be able to rise above his administrative handicaps. The President is not politician *and* administrator; he is rather a *political administrator*. His administrative success will depend not alone on management skills in the more conventional sense, but also on his skill in political manipulation and on his popular support.

The "pros" have done well

The task of the Chief Executive is thus essentially a job of good management made possible through political leadership and inspiration. It is therefore not surprising that, with few exceptions, the men who have most ably filled the job have had a long nurturing in party politics. Of the six American Presidents voted "great" by a poll of fifty-five scholars of American history and government,[11] four were professional politicians—Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, Jefferson, and Jackson. A fifth, Wilson, had served with distinction as Governor of New Jersey (and it is perhaps incorrect not to count his previous presidency of a university as toughening political experience). Only Washington falls in a special class. Of the four Presidents voted "near great"—Theodore Roosevelt, Cleveland, John Adams, Polk—all were professional politicians.

On the other hand, the men who were relative strangers to party politics and party leadership when they entered the Presidency have a much lower average. Grant, for example, strictly a military hero before his first nomination, is one of the two American Presidents acknowledged as "failures," while Zachary Taylor, who had never voted before he moved to the Presidency, is generously graded "below average."

The "great" Presidents were great leaders of their parties.

> Washington aside, all the titans had their hearts set upon becoming President and, defying the adage that the office should seek the man, spared no effort to bring it about. Elected as political chieftains, they continued, moreover, to function in that capacity in the White House, one badge of their greatness being the ability to advance their country's interest at the same time as their parties'. Scratch any of these demigods and you find a party man—a fact which tends to be forgotten in later years when the heat of partisan strife has cooled and the men themselves have become wax images in school histories.[12]

Former governors

Among the politicians, the tendency is for former governors to be most at home in the political administrative duties of the White House. The governorship of a large state is, on a smaller scale, the job most nearly resembling the Presidency. Although this is not the primary reason Americans have in this century chosen more Presidents and Presidential candidates from among state governors than from any other group (even though there are obviously twice as many Senators from whom to choose), this appears to have been a course of wisdom. There have been thirteen election campaigns in this century. Fifteen of the twenty-six candidates of the two major parties were former governors (not including W. H. Taft, who was governor of the Philip-

[11] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present* (New York, 1949), pp. 93–111.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

pines). Of the nine men who have occupied the office of President, five were former governors. Of the other four—Taft, Harding, Hoover, and Truman—only two had served in the Senate. Former governors have been in the Presidential seat more than thirty-four of the fifty-two years in this century.

Type of leadership

The combination of training in the school of electoral politics and experience as political executive appears generally to work out best. The successful administrator in business enterprise or in military combat generally finds that his skills are not directly transferable or convertible to political administration. The different kinds of administration not only represent different habit patterns, but seem to require different types of personality. The man accustomed to giving orders with the expectation that subordinates will automatically follow or bear the consequences will find the Presidency frustrating and baffling. The man who operates by making up his mind what is "right" and then driving ahead accordingly, irrespective of opposition, is likely to find the Presidency a strait jacket with taunting shackles.

The political administrator makes his leadership felt by media of persuasion, by winning wide public support, and by being a successful "lubricator of human relations." He cannot be doctrinaire or unyielding. He must be a man who can elevate compromise and draw out of it a creative principle. The necessity of harmonizing conflicting interests of functionally divergent groups in a pluralistic society is the most crucial task of top-level administration, just as it is of politics.

The President undertakes to coordinate not only the activities of an array of federal agencies but, through them, the conflicting tendencies and desires of our whole socioeconomic system. The basic conflicts cannot be "ordered" out of existence. Their reconciliation, issue by issue, is the keynote of democratic administration. And experience has taught us that "democracy is more efficient than efficiency."

Yet the great Presidents have also been strong and affirmative leaders. All were regarded as relatively "radical" in their own day. Each made the office as big as he could, and each left it more influential than he had found it.

A variable formula

However, it would be a mistake to attempt to fix the most desirable background for the Presidency into a mold, just as it is to fix the "right" procedures for him to follow. Human personality is flexible and unpredictable. Not every political background or business background or military background is the same as every other, nor does it have the same effect upon every man. For example, detractors of one of the possible candidates of 1952 (this is being written before either nominating convention), General Eisenhower, allege that he never was a real combat general, but rather a "chairman-of-the-board" commander or a political organizer in the military field. If true, this illustrates that intended derogation in one field may be commendation for another, as such talents are greater assets for the Presidency than those ordinarily associated with combat effectiveness.

Moreover, as President Franklin Roosevelt said of the Presidency, "It is pre-eminently a place of moral leadership." The consciousness of this fact and the searing responsibilities of the office have had a remarkable influence in molding the personality and the ability of men after they have assumed office. Presidents have often surprised themselves and their generations by their growth in office.[13]

[13] For a perceptive discussion of this phenomenon, see Eric F. Goldman, "The Presidency as Moral Leadership," THE ANNALS, March 1952, pp. 37–45.

THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

The Presidency is today the prime motive force in our Constitutional system. Our political and economic evolution and the nature of our party system have focused upon the President responsibility for the origin of major policies and programs and for the implementation and effectuation of policies approved by Congress. The American system, in which the Presidency is a representative institution—elected by universal suffrage—emphasizes the fact that co-ordination of politics and administration is necessary in a democratic nation.

In our complex society, responsible leadership must have the means of ensuring that policy will not be distorted in its administration, and must have control of the ever broadening areas of decision-making and policy determination which are implicit in the administrative process.

Presidential administrative difficulties are intertwined with the fundamental issues of political organization facing American society, including the complex problems of deficient party organization and party discipline. The basic factors are the same as those which encourage increasingly dangerous stalemates between President and Congress, which make the legislature and the bureaucracy unduly vulnerable to powerful private interests, and which give to extremists in Congress a disproportionate influence. The fate of the largest share of even so popularly dramatized reforms as those proposed by the Hoover Commission and endorsed by the leadership of both parties illustrates the unreality of treating administrative revisions as things distinct from the political environment.[14]

Suggested improvements

Nevertheless, there are several administrative improvements which, on the basis of precedent or related experience, appear to have a chance for practical achievement if demanded by a new and popular President during his "honeymoon period." Among them are four points which ought to be regarded as a minimum program for early achievement.

1. The President should be given permanent authority to initiate plans for internal reorganization of the executive branch, such plans to take effect unless rejected by joint resolution of both houses of Congress within a specified time. Presidents have already been given similar authority for temporary periods. Congress has demonstrated that its power of veto under such an arrangement is amply adequate. Such permanent executive initiative would go far toward correlating authority and responsibility and would offer some operational basis for workable reordering of the executive branch structure. Considerable useful reorganization has already been achieved in this manner which could never have been accomplished otherwise; for example, placing the collectors of internal revenue under the merit system.

2. The highly successful operation of the National Security Council has provided a case study of how the Cabinet may be made a viable instrument for executive policy co-ordination and how the Executive Office may be molded into a coherent organization without the monolithic dangers of a single "chief-of-staff" arrangement.

The NSC has demonstrated that Cabinet-level committees, given a circumscribed area of jurisdiction and continuing responsibility, with members selected because of direct functional

[14] See Avery Leiserson, "Political Limitations on Executive Reorganization," *American Political Science Review*, February 1947, pp. 68–84.

relationship to the committee's jurisdiction, can be effective instruments for Presidential counsel and co-ordination. One of the elements in its success has been the continuous efficient staff work of an able professional secretariat. The experience argues for similar Cabinet committees for other large areas of governmental responsibility which cut across departmental lines, each to be served by a full-time secretariat.

3. The various Cabinet committee secretariats should be interlocking and all attached to and assigned from the Executive Office, where they would be part of a central Presidential secretariat. The central secretariat would co-ordinate the work of the several committee secretariats, and, thereby, of the committees themselves. It should serve as a continuous channel of communication to the President, to whom it would be responsible. The Executive Office would thereby acquire the integrating amalgam it has long needed.

4. The administrative structure is composed of people. If the President cannot reasonably control, within the law, the personnel system of government, it is difficult to conceive how adequate democratic control can be achieved. The merit system, now covering over 90 per cent of federal personnel, can become a boomerang, and is itself endangered, if it is independent of the political officers of government. The objective must be a reconciliation of the principle of merit with the principle of administrative control. Progress toward such an objective can begin by creating a director of personnel, directly accountable to the President. A continuing civil service commission or board should act only in an advisory capacity.

Importance of reforms

Such reforms are within the realm of possible realization by a new administration. Important in themselves, they can also serve as a vehicle for Presidential leadership in continuous administrative reform, with the target of bringing the total job under control. We must all realize that "the reality of responsible government is dependent upon the ability of the President to control the executive branch." [15]

What I am placing before you is not a request for more power, but for the tools of management and the authority to distribute the work so that the President can effectively discharge those powers which the Constitution now places upon him.[16]

This is the type of plea the next President of the United States, whoever he is, is also likely to make. It would be well that he be heeded. It is tempting fate to continue to play the game of challenging greatness to surmount unnecessary and unreasonable barriers. The stakes of government are now too high!

[15] Paul H. Appleby, "The Significance of the Hoover Commission Report," *The Yale Review*, Autumn, 1949, p. 8.

[16] *Message*, The President of the United States to the Congress, January 12, 1937.

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Congressional Contests and the Presidential Election

By JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS

THE conduct of congressional campaigns this fall will reflect the wonderful diversity of American life. In the big cities, candidates for Congress will operate through an elaborate network of strongly entrenched party organizations. In midwest rural areas they will work through loose alliances of local and county party wheel horses controlling "courthouse" machines. In industrial areas many candidates will link themselves closely with labor organizations and will direct their appeals to workers at the factory gates. In the South most of the candidates, having fought their main battles in the Democratic primaries, will have easy coasting against Republican opponents. And in California, with its "wide-open" primary, a few candidates, having won both the Democratic and Republican nominations, will do virtually no campaigning at all.

Will there be any common denominator in the 435 congressional campaigns and 32 senatorial races across the country this fall? To what extent will legislative candidates, chosen locally, campaign on national issues? How will the winners balance the claims of their states and districts against the claims of the general welfare? What "correctives," if any, are desirable in Washington, in the form of Presidential leadership, congressional reorganization, or changes in the rules of the game, to offset "special" claims? These questions involve not only the elections of 1952 but the shape of American government and of American democracy for years to come.

All these questions embrace in one way or another a classic issue of American domestic statecraft—the scope to be left for decisions at the grass roots. This issue, also couched in terms of federalism or decentralization, is old enough to have demanded close attention by the authors of *The Federalist*, old enough to lie at the heart of John Calhoun's doctrines, and new enough to be heard a thousand times this year as politicians orate about "states' rights."

THE CONGRESSMAN'S RELATIONSHIPS

Members of Congress cannot but represent the hardy localism of American society. Ernest S. Griffith, in his informed study of Congress, says:

> The congressman cannot escape the fact that he is a product of [a] dispersive society—elected by his state or district as its representative, elected in all probability because he is "one of them," believing as these voters believe, his opinions the product of their social milieu, his mores theirs. If his subsequent education and experience have given him a broader view, a deeper insight, he must not openly stray too far from the pattern of thought of his district or he will not return after the next election.[1]

And as George L. Grassmuck has emphasized in his searching study of sectional factors in congressional foreign-policy making,[2] the Congressman is not merely a representative of his constituency, but also a constituent himself.

It would be misleading, however, to look at the problem only in terms of

[1] Ernest S. Griffith, *Congress: Its Contemporary Role* (New York: New York University Press, 1951), p. 108.

[2] George L. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951.

national versus local pressures. Actually the candidate for Congress and the member of Congress operate amid a complex set of pressures and vacuums, only a portion of which can be comfortably included within the "national versus local" rubric. Many local influences are also national influences. The local Legion post that has an eye cocked for veterans' legislation, the local doctors who are mobilized against "socialized medicine," the local unions that pass resolutions against Taft-Hartley, cannot be separated from the interest groups operating nationally and focusing their attention on Washington. Our social and economic structure is interlaced by too complex a web of interests to allow us to deposit one set of influences in a compartment marked "local" and a second set in a compartment marked "national."

It is, indeed, impossible for the local candidate to pick up any one strand of action or policy without finding himself enmeshed in a tangle of relationships stretching from his district to Washington, other national capitals, governors' offices, state legislatures, interest group headquarters, and many other places. If and when the candidate goes to Washington as Senator or Representative, moreover, he will become fully enmeshed in the "web of government" in all its intricacy. Less than ever will he find himself involved in a simple locality-versus-nation duality, except perhaps in the case of some straight pork-barrel legislation. Usually he will find himself balancing the assumed interests of certain minorities against those of other coalitions of minorities. Just where the interests of his district fit into the constellation of interests involved, just where any general interest lies, is often far from clear.

Institutional and psychological influences in Washington, moreover, tend to pull the member of Congress away from a total concern with the particular interests of his state or district. In the first place there is the influence of Washington itself, a politically cosmopolitan city, with its opportunities for rubbing shoulders and drinking cocktails with foreign envoys, bureaucrats, military officials, Cabinet members, lobbyists, specialists of all kinds, and so on. Second, there is Capitol Hill, a center of national debate and a nerve apparatus attuned to the slightest tremors in opinion. Third, there is the system of reciprocal personal obligations in each house, which compels a legislator to recognize the interests of his colleagues if he wishes to advance his own. Granted that this system has received far less attention from scholars than it deserves; granted, too, that it often dissolves into a kind of legislative feudalism under the principle of mutual back-scratching; still, its cumulative impact on the legislators cannot be ignored.

COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEMS

This emphasis on the multiplicity of influences affecting the member of Congress, rather than on the simple local-versus-national duality, has significant implications. It compels a shift of attention from a smaller and perhaps more difficult problem to a bigger and perhaps simpler one. The smaller problem is the extent to which the Congressman should represent and act for his constituents regardless of the relation between his behavior and the national welfare. Admittedly this is a difficult problem, both because the local and the national good are inextricably mingled, as indicated above, and because the relation between locality and nation is a problem of ethics and of values as well as a question of politics.

Yet this remains the smaller problem; for our system was peculiarly well designed to perform the task of assigning "local" problems to local government. The federal system does not work perfectly. It has shown unfortunate rigidities and some hardening of the arteries. But in its own clumsy way it has managed to sift out the problems that imperatively demanded national attention from those that could be handled with some effectiveness at the state or local level. Moreover, a whole battery of ingenious devices—from grants-in-aid "with strings" to co-ordinating and research agencies like the Council of State Governments—has helped to prevent the federal system from becoming a constitutional strait jacket.

It is at the national level that the problem becomes far more urgent. The domestic and international demands facing our national government during this time of cold war simply overshadow the less grave—although often knotty—problems besetting states and localities. Our problem, in short, is one involving the separation of powers among branches of the national government, not one involving the division of powers among different levels of government (to the extent that the two are separable).

The paramount problem at the national level is a relatively simple one: Can government act? To be sure, government must act wisely, and it must act in response to—or at least with a sense of responsibility toward—popular needs and expectations. But an even prior question with our system is the elementary one of whether the national government can summon its resources flexibly and persistently in the face of an endless tide of problems demanding quick and effective action.

DIFFUSION OF POWER

The main obstacle to effective national action is a familiar one: the fragmentation of power and responsibility. This fragmentation takes many forms: conflict between President and Cabinet members, among Cabinet members themselves, among rival bureaucracies, between military and civilian establishments, and, to a less extent these days, between judges and elected officials. Behind much of this conflict, inspiring it and intensifying it, are the 531 members of Congress who reflect in their actions and views the pushing and hauling of diverse economic, social, and ideological interests.

Legislators not only reflect the heterogeneous group life of the nation and the internal group life of the legislature; they are themselves members of a multiplicity of overlapping groups, as David B. Truman has made clear in his important recent study, *The Governmental Process*. He says:

> A prime reason for the complexity of the legislative process in the Congress and various of the state legislatures is the absence of an integrated and continuing leadership. The diffusion of power within the legislature, the multiple lines of access, and the diverse means of leverage make an inherently complex process still more complicated. Under such circumstances, logrolling and alliances between groups—inevitable elements in a process that relies upon the device of majority rule to settle differences—become a means for compensating for the diffusion of power.[8]

As Truman emphasizes throughout the study, the diffusion of power exists not only in Congress but throughout the whole governmental system. The institutional source of this diffusion, however, lies chiefly in Congress, largely because of its legislative power and its control of appropriations.

What is the significance of this fact for 1952 and the years ahead? It has

[8] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 392.

been argued that Congress will be a fatal chink in our armor in the event of all-out war. Slow-moving parliamentary institutions, it is said, are incompatible with the demands that would be imposed on a government mobilized to resist a large, industrialized nation. This argument is not wholly valid. As Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Truman have demonstrated, in time of war (even of limited war, as in Korea) the President can resort to a plethora of emergency powers. Congress will not stand in the way. To be sure, the Commander in Chief will be subjected to heckling, investigations, and occasional flank attacks from the congressional ranks; but Congress will not fatally handicap the mobilization of military and economic power.

OUR BALANCE-OF-POWER POLICY

The problem is not one of war, but of preventing war while maintaining national security. Our present foreign policy, supported in broad principle by both political parties, is designed to prevent all-out war and to protect our security by means of balance-of-power methods operating through an elaborate system of alliances. The balance-of-power methods embrace economic and ideological techniques as well as military. The system of alliances covers much of the free world.

Whatever may be said about the wisdom of this kind of foreign policy, one thing is clear: it is the most difficult of all types of foreign policy to carry out. Compared with it, strategies of isolationism such as the United States pursued in the 1920's, of aggression such as Hitler pursued in the 1930's, or even of "neutralism" such as Switzerland pursues today, are child's play. Balance-of-power policy calls for the most careful evaluation of shifting power relationships, and for a capacity to move quickly on different geographical fronts and with different instruments of power, to mobilize economic and military power quickly and selectively, and to maintain political leadership and "followership" for a program that seems to many voters to be neither one of peace nor one of war. And it calls for a delicate balance between firmness and restraint that would tax any democratic polity.

A balance-of-power foreign policy also calls for ample governmental power and for effective governmental mechanisms through which that power can be channeled quickly and focused on the problem at hand. It requires not one mighty effort intended to solve a foreign policy problem once and for all, but rather a series of actions day in and day out, year in and year out, perhaps over a period of decades. These actions are addressed to a tremendous variety of specific problems, from a military action in Greece to a famine situation in India, from a trade relationship with Denmark to an ideological tactic in the Far East. The essence of the handling of all these activities, however, is the co-ordination of them; for careful blending of all our policies, economic, diplomatic, military, and ideological, is by definition the cardinal requirement of a balance-of-power policy.

CENTRIFUGAL NATURE OF CONGRESS

It is precisely in this respect that Congress is put to the most exacting tests and often fails to meet them. As virtually every study of our national legislature has indicated, Congress expresses not a concentration of power, but its dispersion. Operating amid a swirl of influences, it embodies superbly the pluralism of America, but by the same token it reflects our separatism and disunities.

The difficulties are well known. The leadership has some centripetal influence on the members, but not very much. Party organization and discipline, which do the job of integration in some legislatures, are largely lacking in Congress. Both Senate and House have machinery capable of central direction, such as caucuses and steering or policy committees; but these lack real power. The important existing machinery, such as the committee system and the seniority rule, works toward diffusion rather than integration. The parliamentary rules, such as those permitting filibusters in the Senate, both reflect and exacerbate these dispersed-power arrangements.

A mere listing of the recent cases in which these arrangements in Congress have disrupted or threatened to disrupt our foreign policies would take many pages. Examples could be cited such as the interminable delays in appropriating for foreign aid money previously authorized by Congress; the inclusion in legislation of arbitrary requirements responsive to "special" interests; the McCarthy type of attack on foreign-policy makers—attacks almost as embarrassing to responsible opposition leaders as to the administration itself; the disruptive pressures exerted by Congressmen on individual agencies; the tendency of Congress to respond to the alternating popular moods of frenzied concern with foreign policy and apathy toward it so well analyzed by Gabriel Almond in his study of *The American People and Foreign Policy*.[4]

It must be stressed again that many of these failures involve matters that may not reach the headlines. For example, an epic battle was fought in Washington following World War II over the question of the sale of some tankers to foreign nations. The problem was not of urgent concern compared, say, to establishing the Marshall plan or to building adequate air power.

[4] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950.

Yet it was typical of the kind of recurring issue the successful resolution of which may well determine the long-term success or failure of our foreign policies. The handling of the tanker sale (well described in one of the case studies of the Inter-University Case Program), reflecting both bureaucratic and congressional breakdown and finally consummated only after months of delay, confusion, bickering, and waste motion, raises serious questions as to the governmental and political resources we can mobilize behind our balance-of-power foreign policies.

DOMESTIC POLICIES

So much for the international aspects of the problem. Equally grave questions can be raised about the handling of domestic policies (if they are separable from foreign policies) in 1952 and the years to come. Here again the indictment of Congress cannot be a blanket affair. Congress has repeatedly shown its capacity to meet individual economic or social problems, as indicated in recent decades by labor legislation, social security provisions, agricultural programs, and the like. The rub comes in matters involving action to meet general economic problems cutting across groups and geographical sections.

The dimensions of this broader economic problem, which received considerable attention in the depression and New Deal years, have been obscured in recent years, largely for two reasons. In the first place, we have been enjoying unprecedented prosperity except in a few sectors of the economy such as textiles. Second, there is a general feeling, aided and abetted by certain economists, that in the event of recession or depression the authorities need only open the sluice gates of governmental spending in order for the economic ship to right itself.

This hope may be a valid one. Yet in the opinion of some observers, the economic crises of the future may call for more complex recipes. Such crises may demand highly co-ordinated programs involving carefully timed action on a number of economic fronts: spending, taxes, wages, prices, investment, profits, building development, resources, and others. If this expectation is correct, the same factors that cripple Congress in the face of the demands of modern foreign-policy making will cripple it in the face of domestic economic policy. Action would be piecemeal, spasmodic, unco-ordinated, reflecting day-to-day shifts in public opinion rather than comprehensive and long-term planning.

AVENUES OF REFORM

If this is a valid diagnosis of the fundamental problem of Congress as it faces the 1952 elections, what can be done about it? Scholars, politicians, businessmen, and many others have devoted a good deal of attention to the issue of reform. Some have stressed the need for Constitutional reform. Others have called for mechanical reforms in the operations of Congress or in the relations between legislators and President. Still others have urged changes in the organization of political power in the party system.

Each of these approaches has its advantages, but each suffers from some crippling weakness. Proposed Constitutional changes, such as those calling for the election of the President by Congress and the power of Presidential dissolution of the legislature, have the advantage of going to the heart of the central problem, namely, the chasm between the Chief Executive and the lawmakers. The trouble with them is that such Constitutional changes would be immensely difficult to achieve, given our amending processes, and even if achieved, they might give us unity between Capitol Hill and White House only at the expense of a grave contraction of Presidential power and initiative. This would be a dangerous experiment at this juncture of our affairs.

Organizational and mechanical changes would help. Indeed, a few minor ones have been put into effect in recent years, with some success. Yet they would do little more than scratch the surface of the problem; for that problem involves not simple communication among legislators or between President and Congress. It involves not merely the flow of work and the need for efficient handling of the colossal pile of business. It involves essentially the organization of power—the problem of who gets what, when, and how.

The power situation of the average Congressman turns largely on his relations with the voters back home. Those relations in turn depend on the multiplicity of pressures and vacuums amid which the legislature operates, as noted above. Organizational and mechanical changes will not deeply touch those relations, for they lie largely outside the ambit of congressional structure.

To be sure, such changes might reorganize the pattern of influences operating on the Congressman in Washington, and these influences are not unimportant. Still, such influences are not central compared to the broader forces at work in the state or district, and in any event, attempts to change them by frontal attack might bring some unforeseen results.

PARTY REFORM

It is for these reasons that many students have considered political party reform to be by far the most promising way to bring the President and Congress together and to enable the national government to act. A great virtue of party reform is that no formal Constitutional change is called for. Another virtue is that party activity is so extensive and pervasive that it could be applied to the multitude of governmental joints that need greasing, rather than being limited to one or two. Party reform, for example, would be designed to invigorate the party caucus in House and Senate, to strengthen congressional leadership, and to reduce the powers of congressional committees, minority blocs, and filibusterers. Such reforms would aim at unifying the bureaucrats to an extent hardly observed so far in our era of big government. Such reforms would seek to link Congress and the President without depriving the Congressmen of Constitutional powers, and to stabilize Presidential leadership without stifling it.

Party reform, however, faces many practical difficulties. Perhaps the most serious one is the popular belief in the independence of the Congressman and the popular fear of party discipline. It is significant, for example, that some of the ablest political scientists have opposed party reforms advocated by their brethren (especially by a committee on political parties established by the American Political Science Association), largely because of a fear that party reforms would not allow the necessary adaptability of party ideology and organization to local conditions. Specifically, they have suggested that centralized party control would make it impossible for local organizations to exist effectively in certain parts of the country.

It is probably true that such fears do not take into sufficient account the fact that *any* reorganization of the two-party system would still allow tremendous discretion for local parties in program and action, because of the diversity that would have to be tolerated within any major party, however organized, under the conditions of American life. Still, the very existence of the fear is an index to the depth of the feeling involved.

THE PRESENT ISSUE

Does all this seem far removed from the hurly-burly of the 1952 elections? It should not. If there is any common denominator in the hundreds of congressional races this fall, it will consist of a common recognition by virtually all candidates that the key issues for Americans in the mid-twentieth century are the maintenance of peace and security abroad and of widely distributed economic well-being at home. Not one candidate will take a stand against these goals. The issues of the 1952 election, as far as the role of Congress is concerned, will not be the candidates' position on these questions, or their sincerity in wanting to realize these goals. The issue will be whether our national legislative arrangements will allow Senators and Representatives to help translate popular aspirations into practical realities.

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Present Party Organization and Finance

By Dean E. McHenry

UP to the eve of the national conventions of 1952, no striking innovations marked either party organization or finance. The same customary national party structure prevailed. In the states, with few exceptions, legislation dictated the form of party organization in considerable detail. Money raising continued in the familiar pattern, with major stress on relatively large contributions from well-to-do individuals, businesses, and groups. Federal law regarding campaign finance remained static, despite overwhelming evidence that it is ineffective and as much honored in the breach as in the observance. Recent developments, however, have changed emphasis and have provided new insight into old problems.

Permanent Organization

Much has been written about the formal organization of political parties. The permanent organization consists of the tiers of committees that reach from top to bottom of the party hierarchy. The periodic organization includes the party primaries and conventions, which take place annually, biennially, or quadrennially, and which decide highly important questions of party policy and structure.

Once in four years, in the Presidential campaigns, these party bodies achieve their greatest activity, beginning when the national committees set the time, the place, and the apportionment of the national conventions, and ending after the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in the exhilaration of victory or the despair of defeat. After the national convention has produced the nominees, the Presidential candidate makes known his choice for national chairman, and the new national committee ratifies it as a matter of course. The chairman, acting under the authority of the national committee and through an executive committee of his own choosing, manages the party's campaign and the party national headquarters. The campaign committees—senatorial and congressional—direct campaign efforts to elect party nominees to national legislative posts.

Below the national level, all states have party state central committees, but their composition and role vary considerably. Some state central committees bear the principal responsibility for conducting the campaigns of the party tickets. In other states, leading candidates may prefer to run "lone wolf" campaigns separate from or parallel to a general campaign under official party committee auspices. State committeemen are chosen in a variety of ways, by election or by appointment, and represent legislative districts, counties, or some other subdivision of the state. They range in size from a handful in some states to more than seven hundred in California.

Informal Organization

Since the primary has become almost universal in the United States, and because in many areas nomination is tantamount to election, attention ought to be concentrated upon organizing and financing primaries. Data on primary operations are difficult to obtain. Official party structure plays little or no

part in the nominating process in most states. The federal corrupt-practices law does not apply to primaries,[1] although such application would probably be held valid in the courts.[2] There are no primary candidates' financial returns on file in Washington inviting analysis. The most recent investigation of campaign expenditures by a House of Representatives committee showed that congressional candidates reported raising and spending more in the 1950 primaries than they did in the general election.[3] The vast area of activity indicated by this expenditure is not ordinarily covered in general descriptions of party activity.

Whether it be a Presidential aspirant working for pledged delegates or a strong vote in preference primaries, or a candidate for state or congressional office, an initial step usually is the formation of a committee in support of the candidate. For the higher offices, such committees often are incorporated as nonprofit corporations in order to free the candidate and his supporters from individual financial liability. Varying widely with state law, the purposes and objects of the corporation may be stated in terms of promoting the candidacy, co-operating with other bodies, developing interest of the electorate, receiving and expending money, suing and being sued, contracting and being contracted with, and other purposes. The candidate himself normally is not a member of the corporation, and is thereby free to disclaim responsibility for the financial transactions of the entity.

The unofficial political committee, while usually free to choose its own internal organizational pattern, often develops one similar to those of official bodies. The top echelon is made up of a general chairman and perhaps a strategy committee composed of chairmen of various staff-type committees, such as finance, organization, and publicity. As in all forms of organization, especially those hastily improvised, strong personalities stand out, and when the campaign ends, someone who was never assigned a regular position may be in de facto charge of some of the most important operations.

The Volunteer Worker

The enthusiasm and energy of the volunteer workers rank with money in importance in building an effective campaign. In many instances, it is dislike or hate of an opposition candidate that provides the initial impetus for the volunteer to offer his services. His transformation into an effective, positive campaign worker generally depends upon the qualities of the candidate and the skill of those whose job it is to put volunteers at constructive work. Although the layers of inertia that blunt the civic consciousness of urban man may be penetrated by hate, his full usefulness after being aroused requires an affirmative cause in which he can believe.

Many experienced campaigners have noted that men and women are increasingly hard to interest in political activity. Preoccupied with his own job or family responsibilities, and absorbed by the opiate of mass entertainment reaching within the home itself, the voter demonstrates unprecedented unawareness of the necessity for widespread political participation in a democracy. In 1952 many a political

[1] Since Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).

[2] Under United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

[3] U. S. House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, *Report of the . . .*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., House Report 3252 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 19. Hereafter cited as *1951 Report*. Committees, however, spent more in the general election.

meeting went unattended and many candidates' work went undone because of habits of listening to or viewing particular programs on given nights on radio or television. The voter appears to be far less informed than he was a generation ago. The proportion of real political activists is declining alarmingly. Can democracy survive with political fertility as monopolized as is reproductive capacity in a beehive? [4]

The able, energetic volunteer passes along some of his enthusiasm as he works through the lists of voters and makes personal contacts with them. In the street canvass or on the telephone he encounters the callous and the timid, the "don't know" and the "don't care." To many he brings their only direct contact with the world of politics. His work is at once invaluable to his candidate and a great contribution to the working of democracy.

WHO CARRIES THE TICKET?

Insufficient attention has been given in the past to the interrelationship of nation-wide campaigns with those of state and district candidates. It has been assumed rather widely that the national ticket carries along with it candidates for state and congressional office. So it does when there is a landslide victory for a Presidential candidate. In given states or districts, however, the state and local candidates may save the day for the national slate. Without strong candidates for governor and senator like Adlai Stevenson and Paul H. Douglas, one could doubt President Truman's ability to carry Illinois in 1948. Great figures like Franklin D. Roosevelt carry in their wake many fellow partisans who otherwise could not have been elected. A lesser Presidential candidate may have to lean heavily upon state and district candidates who are relatively stronger in their own bailiwicks.

The interrelationship between campaigns wholly within a particular state deserves study, also. Weaker candidates, sometimes for higher offices and sometimes for lower, may attempt to sweep to victory holding onto the coattails of those stronger in money-raising or vote-getting power. The technique, carried to the extreme, may be designated "Operation Cowbird," after the bird that lays its eggs in other birds' nests and thereby receives free hatching service. In primary campaigns, and sometimes in finals, candidates that team up for slate operations ought to be able to make relatively equal contributions to the joint effort.

Strategy of a given campaign must, of course, be determined on the basis of the fullest possible information regarding the product to be marketed—the candidate—and the circumstances under which the sale must be made, including an assessment of buyer resistance. A final election in a predominately one-party state presents no special difficulty; the job is to get out enough partisans to make sure that the opposition, such as it is, pulls no surprise. In November 1952, with the American electorate about equally divided between Democrats and Republicans, the national strategists will try both to get out the converted and to attract independent voters. The independent must be cultivated assiduously, for he holds the balance of power, and victory for either side will require his conversion.

CAMPAIGN SPENDING

The best information we have on campaign finance comes from the investigations made by committees of either or both houses of Congress after

[4] In summertime one queen to 200 males to 80,000–100,000 immature females.

elections. Armed with the power of subpoena and the ultimate sanction of punishment for contempt, these committees have built up a great mass of facts and figures upon which some generalizations may be based. Unfortunately, however, Congress did not study expenditures in the 1948 campaign. Reliance must be placed upon the figures reported to the Clerk of the House and to the Secretary of the Senate.

In 1948 the national committees ostensibly conformed to the Hatch Act limitation that restricts spending to $3,000,000. The Republicans reported expenditures of $2,828,651 and the Democrats $2,127,296. The Republican senatorial campaign committee reported spending $500,254, and the Democratic only $49,273. On the Republican side there were also the expenditures of the congressional campaign committee, the National Farm Committee for Dewey and Warren, the National Patriotic Dewey for President Committee, and many others. The Democrats were aided by their congressional campaign group, a National Truman-Barkley club, the National Citizens Committee for the Re-election of President Truman, and others. Labor political organizations reported 1948 expenditures that aggregated $1,291,343, much of which went to help Democratic candidates.

The objects for which campaign money is spent show little change from campaign to campaign. The House committee that studied the 1950 congressional campaign finance reported that the average candidate spent money for the following (in declining order of amount): newspaper and magazine advertising, radio and television time, salaries and expenses of campaign workers, and billboards and signs. Increasing emphasis is being placed on radio and television. Chairman McKinney of the Democratic National Committee announced that $1,000,000 of the committee's budget of $2,800,000 would be spent for broadcasting and telecasting.

SOURCES OF FUNDS

In examining sources of funds, legal restrictions must be taken into account. Federal law and most state laws forbid corporation contributions, but this is easily evaded by paying bonuses or other extra compensation to officers and having them contribute to campaigns. Since 1943 trade unions have been forbidden to contribute, and under the Taft-Hartley Act they are forbidden to spend union funds on political objectives. These restrictions do not apply to sums from unions' political funds that are raised through voluntary gifts. The Hatch Act restricts individual contributions to $5,000 per year to each political committee. This is evaded by contributing $5,000 each to a large number of committees.

The individual contribution from the well-to-do person remains the mainstay of party finance. Large sums are raised indirectly from the same source through high-fee dinners and advertisements in party papers and programs.

It is impossible to assess with any degree of certainty the amount of money that flows into politics from businesses and unions despite the limits on corporate and labor union sources. Not only is the prohibitory law evaded regularly, but the government also loses tax revenue when these concerns pay printing or other bills on behalf of candidates and obscure it in their books as a business expense.[5]

[5] See U. S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, *Report and Recommendations on Federal Lobbying Act*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., House Report 3239 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951) for many examples of money sought in this way for political propaganda.

FAILURE OF FINANCE REGULATION

Most of the existing federal laws relating to campaign funds are archaic and ridiculous. Sometimes they do more harm than good. For example, the $3,000,000 limitation imposed by the Hatch Act and the $5,000 ceiling on individual contribution have induced the proliferation of political committees, which has decreased responsibility for spending. The existing maxima on spending by Senate candidates at $25,000 and by House candidates at $5,000 are so far below realistic levels that even the conscientious candidate in a large state or district finds himself referring matters of campaign finance more and more to committees that often do not report their expenditures under federal and state law.

Ceilings on expenditures are unworkable under present enforcement provisions. The honest step is to repeal all limitations on amounts, as California did recently. The main purpose of our corrupt-practices law should be to turn the light of publicity on spending. Consequently, primary emphasis ought to be placed on getting full reports and fixing responsibility for spending. The outstanding weakness of our law can be corrected only when expenditures on behalf of a candidate can be made legally only by that candidate or his appointed agent.

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Campaign Methods of Today

By HUGH A. BONE

PERHAPS the first question posed for candidates and their managers is the intensity of campaigning by the nominees themselves, often contrasted in the extreme by the terms "front porch" or "swing around the circle."

THE FRONT-PORCH CAMPAIGN

In the first case, the candidate does a limited amount of traveling and his workers carry the burden of the campaign. In a sense, this technique is the strategy of a superior position of an incumbent, a position gained by reason of a record known and commended to large numbers of voters. It has worked well for many nominees for local office.

On a national scale, Roosevelt in 1940 and in 1944 attempted a stay-at-home campaign, pointing out that the war emergency was keeping him from the usual partisan campaign. On both occasions, however, the President ended by delivering a few speeches outside Washington, D.C. Herbert Hoover in 1932 likewise had to abandon, at least partially, his front-porch campaign. Many of his managers felt that his last-minute tour across the country was a case of too little and too late.

Nonincumbents Abraham Lincoln and William McKinley in their first Presidential campaigns, and Warren Harding in 1920, successfully used the front-porch technique. In each instance they were favored with certain fortuitous circumstances making speechmaking and widespread appearances unnecessary. In each case the country was in a strong mood of protest against the incumbent party, and minor parties promised to siphon off what might normally be some Democratic votes. General Dwight Eisenhower was able to capture many delegates and voters in Presidential primaries in the spring of 1952 by simply remaining on the job in Europe and leaving the management of his campaign to his supporters.

RIDING THE CIRCUIT

Most of the time, however, Presidential candidates "ride the circuit" and make one to several cross-country tours. In certain of the larger doubtful and pivotal states a large number of appearances are made. Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire and those states south of Mason and Dixon's line are seldom favored with extensive appearances of Presidential nominees. Often the candidate fails to make a single speech in those areas, on the theory that they are "safe" either for himself or for the opposition, and that campaigning there will not change the outcome. With the South in some mood of revolt, Presidential nominees may pay more attention to that section in 1952.

A barnstorming campaign may be the only type holding any promise of success for an "unknown" or for an "underdog." Wendell Willkie, for example, was almost unknown, inasmuch as he had never before run for public office. It became necessary for him to "be seen" and get out and talk to the people. President Truman, though well known, entered the 1948 campaign as an "underdog" with virtually no one giving him any chance for election. His only hope seemed to rest with touring the country, making "whistle stops," and conducting a fighting campaign in language understood by the thousands who flocked to crossroads to see him in brief

rear-platform appearances. It was indeed, as the *New York Times* phrased it, "a miracle of electioneering" based on an informal "off-the-cuff" style.

"Riding the circuit" probably helped Harry Truman to snatch victory from defeat and greatly aided Jackson in 1828, Wilson in 1912, and Roosevelt in 1932. On the other hand, the record-breaking barnstorming campaigns of Bryan and Willkie were unsuccessful. Neither the front porch nor the intensified campaign is a sure thing. Conditions, the personality of the nominee, and the nature of the opposition will govern the selection of one strategy or the other. With both parties running new candidates for President in 1952, it may be safely predicted that each nominee will make widespread appearances.

OFFENSE OR DEFENSE?

Another factor entering into over-all strategy is the balance between offense and defense. Where an incumbent seeks re-election against an opponent who has little in his record to attack, the incumbent will probably have to wage a defensive campaign. For the party in power, sometimes attack is the best defense. In 1948 the Democrats vigorously attacked the record of the Republican Eightieth Congress; in fact, Truman made it the central issue of the campaign. Governor Dewey, though having no connection with this Congress, nonetheless was forced into a position of having to run, at least in part, on its record. For a time Dewey maneuvered Truman into a defensive position, but in the closing days the President was able to get on the offensive with his attack on Republicans in Congress.

To politicians, at least, the politics of protest offers promising strategy. This is based on the assumption that people would rather vote against than for something—that a candidate's liabilities are more important than his assets. They point to the pent-up discontent against the Wilson and Hoover administrations as the reason for their being voted out of office. Many popular Democratic congressmen were retired in 1946 as a protest against price controls, meat shortages, and other inconveniences. Undoubtedly protest is a formidable motivation, and it is sound politics for the "outs" to center some of their fire around the shortcomings and mistakes of the party in power. At the same time, it appears unproved as yet that a purely negative approach is necessarily a winning one. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman succeded in campaigning on the basis of positive programs already "delivered" or promised, which benefited farmers, workers, and various minorities.

Numerous campaign managers believe in the wisdom of evasion. In essence this means avoiding issues about which there is sharp controversy and where to take a specific stand or position might alienate blocs of voters. Campaign managers very carefully select the issues and often ghost-write speeches for their nominees which deal in the most general terms. To a considerable extent Wilson's "New Freedom" and Roosevelt's "New Deal" were first spelled out in general language, and the Dewey-Warren "unity" campaign likewise avoided being too specific. Many observers felt that this method was the reason for the latter's defeat, especially when Mr. Truman countered by specifically endorsing measures in which certain groups were interested.

In many respects the principle underlying campaign methods and strategy is that campaigns cannot be based upon principles. Broadly speaking, campaign arguments grow out of the political and economic environment of the moment, the character of the nominees themselves, and the imagination of their managers. There are, however, two or three "reliables" or issues considered perennial and axiomatic. An incumbent will probably warn or attempt to raise fears of the danger of changes. For over a hundred years, the challenger has campaigned against the "extravagance" and "bureaucracy" of the party in power. Both sides usually employ "guilt by association" techniques. Republicans are associated with "Wall Street" and moneyed lobbies, and Democrats with socialists and left-wing labor leaders. Beyond this, the key words in campaign management are flexibility, adaptability, resourcefulness, and opportunism.

THE BIG SHOW

Campaign managers for Presidential nominees are convinced of the value of a good show. Even as recently as a half-century ago, torchlight parades were common campaign methods. About the only modification of this today is the absence of torches and the use of motor caravans and motorcycle escorts. Many Chicagoans still remember the Michigan Boulevard parades staged by Mayor William ("Big Bill") Thompson, replete with cowboys, cowgirls, and donkeys, and "Hizzoner's" sombrero. Wendell Willkie rode hundreds of miles in cities standing up in an open automobile waving at crowds and pushing from his eyes the showering confetti. Soldier's Field, Chicago, and the Los Angeles coliseum provide typical sites for monster outdoor rallies, as do New York's Madison Square Garden and hundreds of armories for indoor events. Some of the most impressive rallies have been staged in California with the appearances of well-known Hollywood actors and singers.

On the local level, rallies are still a part of the campaigners' stock in trade. Prior to the arrival of the candidate for the state's major office, a build-up has been prepared by bands, songs, entertainers, and political smaller fry. Sometimes incidents are staged to drive home a point. Frank R. Kent's classic story about Congressman Hill's campaign centering about the repeal of prohibition offers an excellent illustration. Walking onto the platform where, under the candidate's instructions, a pitcher of water and a glass had been placed, he would start to take a drink.

> Suddenly and dramtically he would throw the water out of the window or dash the glass to the floor. "What is this," he would shout, "water? We don't want water in this district. We want beer; and boys if you send John Phillip Hill to Congress he will get it for you." Then he would grab an American flag (also planted), the band would strike up, and the crowd would go crazy.[1]

For the most part, rallies are attended by loyal partisans for whom the rally becomes a "pep" session. It is doubtful that many votes are changed as a result of the rally. The seasoned manager of a campaign recognizes that the election is going to be won by the side that gets the large measure of the independent votes and the votes of the lukewarm partisans of the opponent. These voters generally do not attend rallies in large numbers, and must be reached by radio, press, and brief but extensive public appearances.

The last-mentioned dictates that the nominee be seen by some and photographed for those not present, doing things which "humanize" him and strike a responsive chord in the heart of the viewer. Candidates are photographed gaffing a salmon in Washington State, pitching hay in Illinois, picking apples in New England, or washing dishes in Sauk Centre. Senator Taft was shown wearing a big sombrero in Texas, Dewey being initiated by loggers in Oregon, Roosevelt fishing, and Alf

[1] *Political Behavior* (New York, 1928), p. 99.

Landon roughriding. Eisenhower forces brought an accordion player, a hook-shot basketball artist, and a Broadway show troupe to New Hampshire to conduct the primary campaign for their candidate *in absentia*. The coonskin cap of Senator Kefauver brings color to his campaigns. A few candidates have found that traveling about in a helicopter is certain to attract crowds. The sound truck is used to muster groups for street-corner rallies, a technique which is becoming increasingly popular. In politics the show must go on; the show must be taken to those who do not attend rallies.

GROUP APPEALS

Not all voters can be be won by friendly handshakes, by seeing in person the candidates with their attractive wives and children, or through demagogic or near-demagogic speeches. Strong attachment to certain groups and programs is a characteristic of millions of American voters. The strength of this attachment is a moot point and open to debate, but it is common to speak of the Negro vote, the Irish vote, the veterans' vote, the Catholic vote, and so on. An important characteristic of campaign methods today is the energy and the money spent on appeals to special interests.

From an organizational standpoint, this may be facilitated by (*a*) auxiliary agencies within the party and (*b*) by nonparty groups. In the former case special divisions are created within the party organization which will determine and execute policies designed to strengthen the cause with the various groups. In larger cities it is not uncommon to find Italian, Negro, Polish, veterans', labor, and other divisions within the campaign headquarters. Specially prepared literature, sometimes in a foreign language, is distributed among these groups setting forth the party's position on programs of interest to the minorities.

Materials of this kind must be judiciously handled, lest they backfire and stir up racial, class, and religious antagonisms.[2] In a Maryland election an incumbent seeking re-election for a state-wide office circulated literature in Negro districts in Baltimore purporting to show all the jobs which Negroes obtained under his administration. His opponent immediately took all available copies and distributed them among white voters on the Eastern Shore, with the explanation that the incumbent sought to destroy "white supremacy." It was widely believed that this unpolitic error of an overly enthusiastic appeal for Negro votes cost the nominee the election.

In numerous states having large "melting pot" populations, parties often prepare their slate of candidates on the basis of a "balanced ticket." This calls for the placing of at least one person representing a sizable ethnic or religious group, on the theory that Jews, Catholics, Poles, the Irish, and so on are likely to vote for their "own" candidate and for the rest of the ticket as well. This assumption has often been incorrect, but continues to enjoy acceptance among many if not most professional politicians.

A second method of seeking the vote of minorities is through existing and specially created organizations outside of the party. In the case of the former, friends of the candidate in various business, labor, agricultural, and fraternal groups arrange to have the candidate appear before their clubs, give out campaign literature, or engage in other activity. A sizable number of these groups are now creating "political" arms

[2] The writer has included many specimens of this type of campaign literature in his *Smear Politics: An Analysis of 1940 Campaign Literature*, Washington, 1941.

or adjuncts during campaigns. The Political Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and Labor's League for Political Education of the American Federation of Labor are probably the most widely known of these campaign auxiliaries.

These action committees remain intact between campaigns and conduct an educational program, lobby, and study the voting records of legislators. During campaigns they register voters, ring doorbells, publish campaign literature, and electioneer in much the fashion of a political party. The American Veterans Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, and adjuncts of the medical and dental societies are other groups engaging in increased political activity. Where in the past actual electioneering was done by the candidates and the party organization, the political arena today is filled with rival activities by nonparty associations. Organizationally, the role of these groups is one of the most distinctive characteristics of current campaigns.

It might also be pointed out that various temporary political committees are also enjoying much vogue. These are associations of persons who for one reason or another prefer not to channel their political activities—and their campaign contributions—through the party organization. One sees literature and paid newspaper advertisements over self-styled "Italian-Americans of Middletown," "Glenwood Friends of Freedom," "Mothers of America," "Business Men for Dewey," "Veterans Committee for Truman and Barkley." The "Win With Willkie" clubs formed all over the nation had much influence in securing Willkie's nomination, and carried a sizable burden of his campaign. Eisenhower clubs likewise sprang up all over the nation in 1952.

The success of both the permanent and the temporary nonparty groups is dependent in part upon their ability to prove by appeals either to emotion or to reason that "we" businessmen, "we" workers, "we" independents had better get on the bandwagon and support the candidate who is for "our" best interest. To the objective observer and to many nominees, there remains a question as to how much aid these groups are in helping one to be elected. The role and the success of independent, nonparty groups in campaigns, and the implications of their place in the party system, offer one of the most fertile areas for research and thought.

THE WOMEN'S VOTE

Potentially the largest single bloc of votes is cast by women. Here again there is little evidence that there is such a phenomenon as the "female vote." Indeed, an authority in public opinion polling finds the division of sentiment among women almost identical with that among men.[3] This is not to argue that a husband and wife, for example, may not have different motivations for supporting the same candidates. Also, in school elections and on certain referendums one may find occasions where men and women show marked differences. In campaigns, however, elections are often won by a few percentage points or by a fraction of a per cent. It is here that the women's vote may be important. There is at the outset the need for activating the women to come to the polls. The CIO-PAC and League of Women Voters regard the women's vote as especially important for this reason.

In the next place, women are extraordinarily helpful in routine work at campaign headquarters and in speaking to women's clubs. In several communities their energetic campaigns by telephone (each women calls at least ten other women on or just prior to election

[3] See William Lydgate, *What America Thinks* (New York, 1944), pp. 116 ff.

day) have swelled the total vote. For these and other reasons the parties now have established women's divisions at almost every level of party organization both during and between campaigns. There is a growing number of precinct committeewomen and women delegates to the party conventions.

With women now in the majority, will campaign methods be gradually revised? If one were to believe the claims of the suffragists made a generation ago, the answer would be in the affirmative. During the first thirty years of universal women suffrage there is no striking evidence that the vote of women has substantially affected the methods of campaigning. Women's activities, however, are being felt in the party organization, in campaign organization, in registration of voters, and in local elections on such matters as school bonds. Politics is no longer the preoccupation of the males, and the increasing part played by women in campaigns is one of the most significant developments in the history of American politics.

RADIO AND TELEVISION

Radio has come into its own as a campaign device. Several types of programs are used. One of these, inexpensive by comparison, is the spot or station-break announcement, running from a few seconds to a minute and attacking the opposition or extolling the wares of one's own candidate. The spot announcements often feature testimonials of prominent journalists, lawyers, political bolters, and civic leaders. Many campaigners feel that this is a more effective, if not more economical, way to campaign than to purchase fifteen to thirty minutes for speechmaking which will compete with popular programs on other stations.

One enterprising candidate for United States Senator purchased a fifteen-minute spot on a dozen stations simultaneously; so the listener had the choice of hearing the speech, turning off the radio, or trying to locate a program on a distant station. The candidate in a sense had a "captive" audience. The candidate could have a captive audience also where a community has only one television outlet. It may be, therefore, that candidates will reach more people where there is only one channel than where the televiewer can switch to another program.

In terms of showmanship, radio and television are becoming established campaign methods. An indication of this may be found in the growing use of entertainers in political campaigns, especially in broadcasts. The Hollywood for Roosevelt Committee put on self-styled "million dollar" two-hour network shows both in 1940 and in 1944, as did the Dewey-Warren committee on election eve in 1948. The top names in screen and radio appeared to put on skits, read patriotic addresses, and give testimonials. Serious appeals were interspersed with gags from comedians, songs from favorite crooners, and music from well-known orchestras. Studies conducted on these programs plus the huge volume of mail revealed the existence of large listening audiences. It is in this realm of only partly political shows that television may see its greatest use and exploitation in campaigns.

The most frequently asked questions with reference to political campaigning today are likely to center around the use of television. Is television an effective vote-getter? What kind of TV show will gain the largest audience? During the preconvention campaign, Robert A. Taft's managers in seeking national convention delegates for the Ohio Senator laid great stress on the fact that Taft is a "great personality on television." Undoubtedly campaigners and their managers and adherents, as well as the student of elections, would like to know the results which might be expected from extensive use of television.

Definitive answers cannot be provided at this time. The 1952 campaign is likely to be to television what 1928 was to radio, a year of extensive experimentation with a new method of communication. Radio increased the costs of campaigns and intensified activities, but it failed to bring about a great revolution in campaign methods. Such may very well be the case with television. Television will be added to the existing methods of reaching the voter, but it seems doubtful that it will replace methods which politicians still regard as tried and true.

Television, especially in the 1952 Presidential campaign, is unlikely to take the place of older forms of campaigning, for several reasons. At this writing there are only 108 television stations and some 15,400,000 sets in the United States, and there will be no drastic increase in these figures by November 1952. Not all of the stations can be brought together for a network program which will blanket the entire nation simultaneously. Moreover, there are thirteen states and parts of several others which have no television stations. However, nearly all the larger metropolitan areas now have at least one station. The expensiveness of television time is bound to have profound effects on campaign finance, especially on minor-party and independent candidates. For this and other reasons, television will not be practical for most candidates for the state legislature and other minor offices.

THE PRESS

The press has long been a stand-by in political campaigns. Candidates avidly seek newspaper coverage of their speeches, meetings, and activities, and, if possible, editorial and cartoon support. Presidential candidates now make provision for newspaper correspondents in their entourages, and the latter are supplied with advance copies of speeches and abundant opportunities to take photographs. Both major national committees maintain high-powered publicity divisions which furnish mats, press releases, and proof forms to weaklies and dailies. R. D. Casey estimates that 361,000 press releases were distributed by the Republican publicity division in 1936.[4] Parties try also to get the support of newspaper columnists whose reading audience is presumably much larger than for ordinary editorials. In addition, the advertising columns of newspapers are usually open to all candidates. Many campaign managers today are skeptical of political advertising, and it seems doubtful that the candidates for national offices are purchasing as much space as in former years. For local elections, however, advertising in newspapers remains one of the frequently used methods of getting the voters' attention.

One should not ignore the publications of special interest groups, such as the farm journals, labor union periodicals, and business magazines. Many of these print specially prepared messages of the aspirants, roll-call votes, or other aspects of the records, and often make endorsements. Some of these journals have circulation running into seven figures.

It is difficult to determine whether the press of these associations has more influence on the voter than do the ordinary newspapers. Class or occupational journals probably confirm more than they convert. The same may be said for the not too well developed party newspapers in the United States. The

[4] "Republican Propaganda in the 1936 Campaign," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, April 1937, pp. 27–14. See also his "Party Campaign Propaganda," in THE ANNALS, May 1935, pp. 96–105.

Republicans have published a monthly newspaper intermittently for several years. The *Democratic Digest*, also a monthly, has been published for several years. Both go mainly to party workers, local headquarters, and rabidly loyal partisans. The magazines are profusely illustrated and popular in content, but have little appeal for the independent voter.

Newspapermen, social scientists, and campaigners have studied the influence of the press on the outcome of elections. In Presidential elections, the majority of the press appears to have been on the winning side less than 50 per cent of the time. President Truman had almost no press support in 1948. In 1944, according to *Editor and Publisher*, dailies with 64 per cent of the total circulation supported Dewey, 14 per cent endorsed Roosevelt, and 22 per cent refrained from taking a position. In the matter of the Presidency, the voter apparently does not always follow the press. In local elections, however, there is some evidence that the recommendations of the press may be followed to a greater extent. The same is true on technical matters, amendments, and other propositions appearing on the ballot.

The question as to the influence of the press in getting one elected is not of real concern to us here. What is important is that the press is one of the most prominent devices by which to reach the voter. Campaign managers will continue to pour money into schemes to get newspaper publicity on their causes and nominees. Radio and television have not resulted in any appreciable lack of attention to the press on the part of those who seek to be the people's choice.

One comparatively new development is the growing importance of the widely circulated picture and news magazines. Both of these are becoming increasingly important in the build-up of candidates prior to the primaries and conventions, as well as in the general elections. The combined circulation of *Time, Life, Look, Newsweek*, and a host of similar magazines is almost fantastic. These appear to be featuring more pictures and more comment on the 1952 election than on any previous election. The lively, fast-moving, jaunty style of commentary is more inviting to many, if not most, readers than the front page and other stories in the daily newspapers. The "personal touch" as revealed in masterful shots of the candidates or in picturesque phraseology does much to humanize and dramatize the campaign. The reader was better able to view Governor Warren in Wisconsin snowdrifts campaigning for delegates, Kefauver by a stove in a little New Hampshire town hall, Taft on an Illinois farm, and so on, in these magazines than in most country or even urban newspapers. Supporters of a candidate reprint these photographs by the millions for general distribution, showing the belief that this constitutes an effective campaign method.

CAMPAIGN LITERATURE

Perhaps the one staple in the campaign pantry which seems assured of immortality as a device is literature. No matter how many rallies or radio and television programs or how much press publicity a candidate has, he will still prepare some literature for distribution. For the lowly coroner or sheriff, literature is often about the only method used to reach the voter.

Over a hundred million pieces of campaign literature were shipped from the Chicago headquarters of the Republican party in 1896 on behalf of William McKinley, and four years later six million copies of his acceptance address were printed. The "Cross of Gold" and other speeches of William Jennings Bryan were distributed by the millions and translated into eleven different languages. Charles Michelson said that at least one hundred million pieces of literature were distributed by the Democrats in 1936, and the CIO-PAC in 1944 distributed over 85 million items. Many of these were translated and placed in foreign language presses. When one adds all of the pieces of literature issued by national, state, and local parties and by various nonparty groups in a given election year, the figure assumes astronomical proportions.[5]

The diverse sizes, shapes, and forms of campaign publicity reflect great ingenuity and unbelievable imagination on the part of the designers. Originally, handbills, dodgers, leaflets, pamphlets, and fly sheets were probably the most common; these were often sent through franked mail. In time many other means of conveyance were added, such as "open" and personal letters, windshield and envelope stickers, automobile bumper signs, and calling cards. Billboards first came into effective use in 1916 and have been widely employed ever since. Lithographs, widely used in 1920 by Harding supporters, are probably used much less today, but candidates' pictures still adorn telephone posts, campaign headquarters, some stores, and numerous taverns.

The newest type of literature is the color picture book fashioned after the Walt Disney publications. In a search for the origin of these books, the writer finds the first large-scale experimentation in New York City only a decade ago. One suddenly saw persons reading the books in the subways. In "superman" fashion, the life of Candidate-for-Mayor William O'Dwyer was portrayed. The Democratic National Committee sent out millions of a fourteen-page colored magazine on Harry S. Truman in 1948. In a considerable number of contests for the United States Senate in 1950, the books appeared. Not all of them extolled the life and "great" accomplishments of their candidates. One was issued against Senator Taft in Ohio, which in caustic if not libelous fashion portrayed the Senator as a tool of the "exploiters," a foe of the consumer and of the less privileged. The love for comic books remains undiminished, and in 1952 we can expect further extension and experimentation with these mass magazines.

One candidate for the state legislature gave out paper caps bearing his name to children in his district. Another put the same thing on free kites for the kiddies. Liquor interests in one state put a message on beer bottle caps to carry appeals to defeat a hostile initiative sponsored by the "drys." In Seattle a highly popular method of political advertising is the "traveling billboard." This consists of placing large signs on the city-owned transit buses. One hundred such signs carry the message 90,000 miles per week, with a million stops. There is great demand for the space, and the transit system makes a good deal of money on the proposition. All candidates are treated fairly, in the sense that the system takes orders on a first-come, first-served basis.

Much more space could be given to naming unique campaign literature and contrivances. For a nation treated daily to radio, press, second-class mail, and high pressure salesmanship, there is undoubtedly a good deal of resistance to the attention-catchers employed by candidates. It remains doubtful that any substantial amount of campaign publicity is carefully read and studied,

[5] Casey hazarded the guess that 400,000,000 pieces of literature flooded the country for Landon in 1936. "Republican Propaganda in the 1936 Campaign," *op cit.*

or that it wins votes. Much of it never reaches the voter's eye. A "throw-away" left on a man's front porch is usually thrown away. Yet a candidate seeing literature being put out by an opponent feels that he must do likewise. For minor offices on a bewilderingly long ballot, some of the literature may help the voter to identify a nominee enough to feel that he can vote for him.

At the risk of oversimplification, perhaps we might conclude that the success of campaign literature depends in part upon an attractive format with an easily understood message. Too many campaign leaflets are overcrowded. The real key to effectiveness, however, is distribution. A good piece of publicity reposing in campaign headquarters or in a precinct captain's home wins no vote. The technique of getting the material to the voter at a time and a place where he will read it is of prime importance. Candidates for local offices, particularly, feel that, however expensive, mailing the item to the voter's home is the most effective type of circulation.

SMEAR POLITICS

By means of campaign literature the party can deliver a sharper mailed-fist blow at the opposition than is possible through newspapers or over the radio or television. Even the most rabidly partisan newspapers will not carry personal and other attacks on the opponent in as uninhibited style as is possible through campaign literature. In recent years committees of Congress have become concerned over "scurrilous" campaign publicity.

One such type is the use of the composite photograph. This was used against Mr. Roosevelt in 1940. And in 1950 Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland was shown, by means of trick photography, talking with Earl Browder, one-time Communist candidate for President. Opponents of General Eisenhower in the New Hampshire primaries in March 1952 attempted to represent him as pro-Communist by means of a photograph purporting to show him drinking with Russian Marshal Zhukov. The caption ran "Zhukov, Communist general, decorates drinking partner Eisenhower at Frankfurt, Germany." These tactics are widely denounced, but nevertheless continue to be employed.

Personal attacks on the candidates and his family date back to Andrew Jackson, if not even to George Washington. During the present generation, Willkie's ancestry was attacked as German and therefore pro-Nazi, and Roosevelt was alleged to be Jewish, having changed his name from "Rosenfeld." Maps purportedly prepared by Alfred E. Smith were distributed to show non-Catholic voters that upon election Mr. Smith planned to move the Vatican to Chevy Chase, Maryland, next to Washington, D.C. The accusation that a candidate is a "nigger lover" is also a recurring motif, especially in some parts of the country. It should be noted that a great many but by no means all of these attacks appear on anonymous campaign literature or through the channel of the whispering campaign. Methods which stir up hatreds among ethnic and religious minorities or which promote deep personal rancor against opposing candidates do not further the purposes of democracy or of the election.

Another technique found in certain campaign literature is the use of an exaggerated guilt-by-association and name-calling. It seems perfectly ethical to point out the financial and other backers of one's opponent, but many campaigners do not stop there. Republican candidates in recent years have been identified as "tools of Wall Street," "Nazi sympathizers," and proponents of "slave labor." Even the Democratic candidates for President have been labeled "pro-Communist," "tools of the fifth column," and "warmongers."

Most of these charges result from taking a portion of an opponent's speech out of context or from "card-stacking" in one form or another. The misuse of statistics, quotations, circumstantial evidence, and innuendo are likewise tricks of the campaign propogandist. Personal defamation and slander of an opponent are old political devices.

Many persons are rightly incensed at the tactics of smear politics, barefaced lying, and outright misrepresentation in American elections today. Yet there is considerable improvement over the slanderous campaigns of yesteryear. Ridicule, sarcasm, and name-calling are used much more judiciously today than during the nineteenth century, especially by the candidates themselves. A decade ago, Charles Michelson, former Democratic publicity director, stated:

> Nobody has ever been able to formulate a code of political ethics. Despite the fine altruistic language of party platforms, the habit has always been to smite the opposition, regardless of Marquis of Queensberry rules, whenever and however the opportunity offers.

Very few campaign managers would take issue with this description of the philosophy of campaigning. At the same time, the objective observer and many candidates would like to see a decline of those campaign appeals obviously designed to elicit nonrational responses and to arouse group prejudices and hatreds. In 1952 many suggestions appeared in Congress for the development of a code of ethics for campaigns or for the creation of a Fair Elections Commission which would investigate defamatory literature, malicious misrepresentation of facts, and excessive expenditures. Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of formulating objective criteria, most congressmen showed little interest in these proposals. Public opinion probably offers one of the best ways to control excesses, but investigations remain useful in focusing attention on unethical practices.

WHAT WINS AN ELECTION?

Anyone attempting to discuss campaign methods is invariably invited to reveal the "secret" of those methods which are likely to be the succesful ones. There is, of course, no sure formula, and the cautious observer will seldom feel that he can diagnose the reasons for victory after an election, let alone point out in advance the techniques for winning it. Sometimes slogans offer a concise explanation or hypothesis. Lincoln's "Vote Yourself a Farm," Wilson's "He Kept Us Out of War," Harding's "Back to Normalcy," and the opposition party's brilliant 1946 slogan, "Had Enough? Vote Republican!", at least expressed in concise terms the mood of the country.

This suggests that conditions will have much to do with defeat and victory, and the party which can best identify itself with the temper of the electorate has taken a long step toward victory. "Taft Can't Win," the slogan used by Eisenhower supporters, undoubtedly hurt the Senator in many Presidential primaries. But did voters support other Republican hopefuls out of a fear that Taft could not win, or because of his attitude toward foreign and domestic issues or for other reasons? Slogans and catch phrases do not necessarily win elections.

A vigorous grass-roots organization with plenty of canvassing and doorbell ringing may, in a close election, turn the tide. One Congressman who has been re-elected many times believes this is

the most effective of all methods. "I'd rather have two line workers than a $1,000 contribution," he said; "and by workers, I mean guys not too proud to canvass, ring doorbells, and make a sales talk." To help with the "sales talk," most parties now prepare campaign "manuals" and "textbooks" for their workers, telling them how to approach voters, and providing answers for commonly raised questions.

At election time the electorate broadly falls into four groups. First are the workers and the hard-core following of the party and the candidate. Second are the loyal partisans who seldom aid the party, but who can practically always be depended upon to vote a straight ticket. A third group may be thought of as party sympathizers, or persons who have a nominal party attachment, but who can be enticed away from time to time. Finally there are the complete independents with little or no sentiment for party labels, who gravitate from one party column to another in order to vote for "the best man." In two-party states, the first two classes of voters numerically almost cancel each other out at the polls. The problem with these two groups is largely one of reinforcement. Rallies, speeches, and flamboyant literature help them to keep up their courage and enthusiasm and rationalize the rightness of their views.

Since the party sympathizers and the independents will, in the final analysis, determine who will be elected, common sense dictates that most energy be directed toward them. Party sympathizers need to have their loyalties renewed, and symbols and propaganda devices are methods bolstering this. At the same time that one is trying to activate and hold one's own nominal adherents, an attempt must be made to drive a wedge between the nominees and the nominal adherents of the opposition party.

Public opinion polls indicate that there are more Democratic than Republican sympathizers today.[6] Republican strategy, then, will try to get former Roosevelt supporters, Democrats critical of the Fair Deal, and Democrats disturbed over corruption and over foreign and domestic policies of the Truman administration to vote Republican in 1952. Democrats, on the other hand, must try to keep their sympathizers from straying and momentarily following the Republican party. Thus both activation and conversion will be necessary techniques for winning the votes of this group.

The job confronting the campaign manager with the independents is similar. It consists in getting them registered and stirred from their lethargy so that they will vote. Although many so-called independents are indifferent, a great many are not. Appeals to party loyalties and symbols and slogans are not likely to win many converts. In local elections a "pocketbook" appeal to property owners and taxpayers, a school appeal for parents, a recreation program for sportsmen, and so on are likely to be more effective than demagogic appeals to "Americanism."

In the 1952 national elections Republican campaigners will undoubtedly try to win independents by keeping the "corruption" issue alive, criticizing the Democratic foreign policies, and emphasizing high living costs and the need for a change. While "Communism in government," "bureaucracy," "socialism," and similar appeals may bring great applause before loyal partisans, the appeals have worn thin with many independents who have heard them for many years. Democratic strategy will probably point to the high standard of

[6] In March 1952 the Gallup poll estimated that there were 21,500,000 Democratic voters, 18,500,000 Republicans, and 15,000,000 independents.

living which will be "endangered" by a change, and will defend the administration's foreign policy. It will continue to assert its friendship for farmers, workers, and ethnic groups.

All of this suggests that the cardinal rule of campaigning is adaptability, flexibility, and opportunism. Methods that will elect a man mayor in New Orleans will not necessarily be effective in Boston or Boise. The campaign practices in the Democratic primary for governor in South Carolina are quite different from those in Minnesota. The tactics will be conditioned by the abilities of the candidate and the social environment of his constituency. Hence, a careful analysis of both must be made and expediency followed.

Notwithstanding the success of Truman in 1948, the majority of students of politics believe that comparatively few people are converted during a campaign. In a close election, however, the converts may determine the outcome. Campaign methods which fail to induce the already converted to appear and vote on election day may result in the loss of election by default. Activation, therefore, is a basic objective of the campaign. A campaign may provide a clue, though an imperfect one, to candidates and issues and may focus the attention of the citizen on his government. The voter believes that on the whole the great debate has been healthy and has resulted in a satisfactory collective judgment. These psychological and intangible values are perhaps more important than the question whether campaigns determine the outcome of elections.

SUMMARY

Campaign methods have not changed drastically in the past century. The parade, street banners, rallies, curbstone speeches, and slogans and shibboleths remain with us. Where our forefathers referred to "Old Hickory," "Old Rough and Ready," the "Little Giant," and "Honest Abe," we have spoken of the "Happy Warrior," "F.D.R.," "General Ike," and "Mr. Republican." Music and songs probably enjoy a little less vogue, but they have not disappeared, and campaign verse continues to appear. The great developments in the press have enabled marked increase in the amount and forms of literature. Where only a handful of citizens heard the voices of men who would be their representatives, virtually everyone is now able to hear the candidate speak, thanks to the microphone.

The most interesting aspect of the 1952 general election from the point of view of methods will be the great experimentation with television. It seems somewhat dubious that it will completely revolutionize campaign methods, but it will, like radio, make electioneering more extensive and expensive and will increase the dramatic and showmanship aspects. The increased role of women and of nonparty groups during the present era is especially noteworthy; these have also accelerated the tempo and broadened the basis of the campaign.

The great proliferation of campaign methods and the means of rapid communication to conquer the nation's magnificent spaces should have had the result of reducing the length of Presidential campaigns. Unhappily this has not happened. Presidential preconvention campaigns start at the beginning of the year. From the time of the first Presidential primaries and state conventions in March until early November there is virtually a continuous campaign. In recent years the national parties have waited until about September 1 to begin the actual Presidential speechmaking, even though acceptance speeches were made at the national conventions. A few states have

put their primaries in September, thus drastically reducing the length of campaigns for state offices. This practice seems altogether meritorious. The Republican national convention in 1952 was held in July, two weeks later than usual, but, with the primaries as early as usual, there is no noticeable reduction in the length of the 1952 campaign. The fact that Roosevelt in his last two elections waited until about the last three weeks before campaigning would indicate that long months of wearying speechmaking is not always necessary.

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Racial, Religious, and Sectional Interests in 1952 Election

By HAROLD R. BRUCE

THERE is considerable reason for the belief that racialism and sectionalism may prove vital factors in the Presidential election of 1952. Basically, they are really two phases of one political situation: the contest for the 128 electoral votes of the eleven states of the so-called Solid South. There are ramifications, however, that reach out far from the Southland into many industrial centers of the North.

It has been a traditional proud boast of American political analysts that, as compared with foreign governments, the American party system has been free of sharp cleavages along economic, class, sectional, racial, and religious lines. Like all generalizations, this is only partly true, though more true than false, for our major parties have sought followings and voter support in all economic groups, all religious bodies, all sections, and all social strata.

HISTORICAL PARTICULARIZED PARTIES

The exceptions have projected interesting temporary organizations into the party scene. The Know-Nothing party polled eight electoral votes for Millard Fillmore in 1856 on a narrow program that opposed the election of naturalized citizens to office and the alleged influence of the Roman Catholic Church in American government. At no other time has the religious question been injected so vigorously into a national campaign as in respect to the Democratic party candidacy of Alfred E. Smith in 1928. The fact of his Catholic faith was used strongly against his selection in the Democratic national convention and unquestionably weighed heavily against him in the election.

The most distinctive and most nearly successful venture in a national party organization erected on an economic-sectional foundation took place during the period 1876–96. First it was the Greenback party of the newly settled West, an agrarian discontent movement, seeking the retention of the greenbacks (national currency) in circulation and demonstrating its strength by the election of thirteen of its members to the House of Representatives in 1878, only to disintegrate shortly thereafter.

A second vehicle of western and southwestern agrarian discontent moved in to threaten the stability of the biparty political system, beginning in 1892. The Populist or People's party soon gathered sufficient voting strength to constitute a serious challenge to the preeminence of the eastern financial and commercial interests in the councils of the two major parties. James B. Weaver, its candidate for the Presidency in 1892, polled one-twelfth of the national popular vote. It is a matter of very interesting speculation as to what the party might have become or accomplished had not Bryan swung the Democratic convention of 1896 to such a liberal reform position as to cut the ground from under the Populists and enlist their support of his own candidacy. This campaign marked the party's demise.

NATIONAL APPEAL NECESSARY

In stressing the generalized character of the major American parties, no intent is implied of overlooking the par-

ticularism of their appeals and followings. There are some special Republican appeals to people of wealth and property, and some special Democratic appeals to industrial workers and the debtor class. There has been a clearly discerned tendency for the more prosperous classes to vote Republican and for the less prosperous and labor to vote Democratic. There are also geographical areas of Democratic and Republican dominance, as the South and upper New England, although no section of the country can be called as strongly Republican as the Solid South is Democratic. But each of the two parties is broadly national and comprehensive in its program, interests, and activities, if for no other reason than that no party can concentrate its appeal upon a distinct social or economic class and hope to win the election.

The consequences of this situation are inescapable and give to the parties some of their most distinctive characteristics. Only one course of action is possible if each party is to seek a following among all groups of voters and endeavor to encompass a multiplicity of national interests: compromise, concession, and avoidance of disruptive or alienating factors. One result is the fashioning of platforms that are frequently colorless and evasive. American politics is not a matter of mobilizing one homogeneous economic, social, or geographical group against another homogeneous group, but rather of building up the largest aggregate of heterogeneous supporters against another similarly nondescript aggregate.

Even though the sectional aspect of the major parties be stressed, as is often done in analyses of them, a realistic picture will be obtained only as they are both viewed as sectional coalitions. A complete sweep of one section alone is not enough to enable a party to put its nominee in the White House or hold control of either house of Congress. Republican victories have been contingent upon combining the midwestern grain and dairy farmers with the eastern business interests. Bryan almost succeeded in capturing the great prize in 1896 on a more integrated combination of the agricultural South and West, but the possibilities of this union faded immediately thereafter. Since 1932 the Democratic party has won by uniting the support of the agricultural South with that of the urban states of the Northeast.

It thus appears that our major parties must each appeal to a great variety of clashing sectional, class, and social interests. They cannot appeal too concentratedly to any one of these without antagonizing the others. A party that stakes all on the labor vote will lose the farmer and middle-class votes; one that devotes itself to the industrial East will alienate the West and the South. The combinations of groups and sections essential to victory produce the complex political pattern and the indistinctness of the American party scene.

That "politics makes strange bedfellows" is an old, hackneyed American saw, but never more true than in the present. It would be difficult to find a more curious political combination than the Democratic party of the past twenty years: a coalition of conservative, agricultural, antilabor, anti-Catholic voters of the South with the liberal (radical?), urban, prolabor, Catholic voters of the North and Northeast. Roosevelt was able to mold and hold it together as a working force (with defections in the Senate), but the precariousness of its unity was shown by the Dixiecrat secession in 1948. Were it not for a similar incongruity of unified action among eastern business interests and western farmers, the Republicans could be more sanguine of their chances in this year's November election. Almost as if thumbing their noses at their party leaders, Republican and Democratic conservatives in Congress vote together on controversial legislation in opposition to the combined vote of the liberals of both parties. The whole testifies to the lack of cohesion and unity within each party.

GROUP INTERESTS IN ENGLAND

The party systems of Great Britain and western European countries provide a much closer identification of special interest groups with particular parties. During the long Conservative-Liberal division of English voters, the Conservatives defended the institutions of the monarchy, the Established Church, and the empire, the social and political status quo, and the nation's political traditions, with the voting support of the nobility, the landowners and their workers, the big business and financial interests, and the upper social class in general. The Liberal party amassed the votes of the middle and labor classes in a campaign for social, economic, and political reforms, and thus the lines were sharply drawn.

When the Labor party moved in on the scene, the first effect was to draw off the vote of the trade unionists, to confuse the issues between that party and the Liberals, and finally to pre-empt the anti-Conservative field as the Liberal party dejectedly slumped to a bad third-place position. During the past decade the Labor party's comprehensive socialist program and its nationalization legislative record of 1945–50 have intensified the cleavage between right and left.

Each of the currently major English parties characterizes the other as a "class" party—with good reason and factual proof. The Labor party was founded as the political vehicle of the labor movement; the trade unions are officially ensconced within it. Despite the important role played in it from the beginning by the intellectuals within its ranks (the Fabians, notably) and the large support won from the middle classes since it broadened its program in 1918, the party continues to appeal primarily to the urban working class, and organized labor provides the solid core of its party strength.

Currently, the Conservative party has not forsaken its defense of capitalism, although it has accepted most of the nationalization put into effect by Attlee's Labor government. In its efforts to thwart the further extension of socialism in British economic life, it seeks to add the support of the middle class to its traditional clientele among the people of property, of wealth, of business and industrial interests.

As compared with the American political situation, sectionalism in Great Britain is less important, the class pattern is less complex, the economic divisions are more explicit, and the programs and leadership of the parties are much more important to the voters. The party program offered in an election becomes a legislative mandate to the successful party, and the party leader automatically becomes Prime Minister and actual chief executive of the government. The voter is naturally, therefore, more party conscious and more impressed by the party programs than by the personality of the parliamentary candidates in his election district. Also, party unity and discipline among the members of the House of Commons are infinitely more conclusive and rigid.

GROUP INTERESTS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

The multiparty system of twentieth-century France precludes the sharp delineations of French parties along economic and class lines that characterize British parties: there are not fifteen to

twenty different social classes to be severally represented by this number of parties that commonly participate in parliamentary elections.

One party feature that stands out in contrast with the American and British political situations is the persistent existence of a party closely identified with the interests of the Roman Catholic Church. The prolonged and bitter struggle in republican France over the relations of church and state, spectacularly presenting the issue of clericalism at the turn of the century, produced a nation divided politically among ardent Catholics, nominal Catholics, and anticlericals. The Center party of the Third Republic era was the Catholic party, right of center and in the conservative bloc.

The interests of the church have been promoted in the contemporary Fourth Republic, first by the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) and now by the Rally of the French People (RPF). The MRP had the largest single party group in the second (1946) constitutional convention and elected the second largest group of Deputies to the first National Assembly in 1946. The Catholic hierarchy openly urged Catholics to vote the MRP ticket in these elections. When de Gaulle withdrew from this party in 1947 to found his present RPF party, he took most of the party following with him into what is quite distinctively a conservative, urban, Catholic party. The labor vote is dispersed among the Communist and several Socialist parties.

Characteristic of those continental countries in which free elections have been and are permitted is the existence of a Catholic party in Germany. During the imperial era it was the Catholic Center party, strongest in the Catholic sections (Bavaria, Silesia, and Rhineland), vigorously hostile to socialism, defensive of the monarchy, and maintaining a conservative position on all public questions. In the present postwar period the Christian Democratic Union, successor to the old Catholic Center party, occupies a prominent place in the politics of the Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany. It provides leadership in the dominant conservative bloc, and its chieftain, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, has been the Chancellor of the new republic from its establishment.

FOCUSING ON 1952 ELECTION

Now, what of these particularistic factors in the American Presidential election of this fall? What bids fair to be the impact of these upon the outcome of the election? How are they serving as influential forces in the party plans and in party councils, and how did they serve in the strategies of individual aspirants for the nominations?

The religious factor can be summarily dismissed: there is no indication that it will be injected into this year's campaign, any more than it has been in the past. It does not seem likely that the President's ill-fated effort to send an Ambassador to the Vatican can be inflated into a campaign issue now. But the racial, sectional, and economic factors are extraordinarily prominent.

During the last several elections the voting strength of the Democratic party has rested on a combination of organized labor, big-city political machines of the North, and the assured votes of the eleven Solid South states. This won elections for the party but it represented a fundamentally inharmonious coalition and aroused the resentment of the traditional major element in the party—the southern Democratic leaders and forces. Prior to 1936 the southerners possessed a veto power over party nominations, in the party rule that set a two-thirds majority vote in the convention as the requirement for nomination. The southern bloc of delegate-votes was sufficient to block a nomination unacceptable to that element in the party. But the abrogation of the rule, at Roosevelt's instigation, in the 1936 convention fundamentally altered party control and aroused deep southern resentment.

No Democratic candidate can hope to win the Presidency today apart from the combined support of the three above-named elements: organized labor, Northern urban machine forces, and the South. What is present to endanger this unity? True, the labor forces of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and southern planter aristocracy have far more of inherent conflict than of agreement, but clever party leadership and the quest of the spoils and power of national government control have held them together for the past twenty years. A new issue, however, based on a long-standing one, now projects a breach within the party that has the party leaders floundering and apprehensive.

THE DIXIECRATS

The almost impromptu organization of the States' Rights (Dixiecrat) party in 1948 was the handwriting on the wall that is striking terror in the hearts of Democratic chieftains today. Persistent and energetic efforts on the part of President Truman to have Congress enact a compulsory Fair Employment Practices statute were blocked by a filibuster in the Senate organized by the Senators from the southern states that would have been most affected by the legislation.

Southern opposition and fears were whipped to a new height of bitterness by the adoption of a strong FEP plank and the renomination of the President by the 1948 Democratic convention. Southern party leaders would not accept the party action and they would not switch to the party of Lincoln and Grant, so their only recourse was independent action. The election results were not important to the 1948 outcome: four states (39 electoral votes) were carried by the ticket that consisted of two relatively obscure state governors. But the dynamite in the situation that threatens the victory of the party in 1952 is quite something else!

The President has not relinquished his advocacy of his Negro civil rights legislation, especially of a compulsory Fair Employment Practices law. He is undoubtedly honestly motivated, sincere, and acting on principle in his stand, but political strategy is also assigned by those who are critics of his leadership and of this program. Negroes have given the Democratic party the margin of victory in key northern industrial states since 1936. Coincidentally, Negro demands for faster progress toward equality and civil rights have become an important factor in Democratic politics. The result is a puzzling dilemma: To hold the northern Negro vote, the party must continue to advocate the Truman FEP and civil rights programs; to do so, however, will consolidate, enlarge, and intensify the southern Dixiecrat secession; and the party needs both groups (the southerners, positively) to win!

Southern Democratic leaders are keenly aware of the strategic position that their section occupies in the party's fortunes this year. They are under no necessity of arguing that their protests are no idle threats, because the Dixiecrat action of four years ago serves adequately as an object lesson to northern leaders of what can be done this year on a larger scale with more direful consequences to the party.

[LATER: The motivation in the naming of Senator Sparkman, of Alabama, to be the running mate of Governor

Stevenson on the ticket is so obvious as probably to make the move of little effect.]

THE RUSSELL CANDIDACY

The whole southern pattern of action revolved about the candidacy of Senator Richard B. Russell, of Georgia, for the party Presidential nomination. Russell's candidacy was originally a strategic move against President Truman's renomination. The President, personally, was a principal target for southern criticism. He symbolized what the South disliked in the civil rights program and northern dominance in the party councils. After the failure of the Dixiecrat bolt at the 1948 convention to alter the course of the convention's actions, opposition to the President and his FEP program intensified in the South.

In effect, the Russell candidacy announcement for 1952 was an ultimatum to northern Democrats. There was little likelihood of Russell's selection as party standard-bearer at Chicago, but he constituted a living threat of a much more serious defection of party strength unless the South was appeased. The price of a South that would be solid and sure in 1952 was a compromise or more moderate civil rights plank in the Democratic platform, and a candidate acceptable to that section of the country. If Truman and FEP could not be stopped inside the party, the South would bolt, run another and stronger Dixiecrat campaign, and wind up throwing the election to the Republicans. Truman, if nominated, would have been confronted with a Southern revolt; without those Deep South 128 electoral votes and possibly 48 more in the border states, he never could have been elected.

How much the Russell announcement had to do with the President's decision not to run is not known, but the chronological sequence of the two announcements and the inferences freely drawn in political circles indicate an influential causal relationship between the two. A third-party ticket (no idle threat this year) headed by the powerful and respected Senator Russell, supported by an immensely better organized and directed, much wider, Dixiecrat movement, and building on a vastly greater popular opposition to the President, would bring the tenuous Democratic national coalition smashing down to ignominious defeat.

Certain it is that the Truman withdrawal hit a hard blow at Republican anticipation of an easy victory. The revolt that was seething all over the Southland was anti-Truman, not anti-Democratic; and Truman's retirement opened the way, at least, for the South to close ranks and give its votes to the Democratic party nominee again. The big question (at this June date of writing) is what will happen in the South if the party at Chicago selects a candidate with Mr. Truman's backing to run on a platform endorsing his civil rights policies?

THE NORTHERN NEGRO VOTE

Closely correlated with the civil rights issue as it affects the Democratic party unity in the South and the November polling in that section is the dilemma faced by the party in respect to the Negro vote in the North. This is another bequest to the party by the New Deal–Fair Deal administrations. It sounds strange indeed to be speaking of the Negro Democratic vote, after the long identification of party lines in the South with the color line there. But a changed racial-political condition now exists that adds confusion and perplexity to Democratic planning.

The change was inaugurated by the large wartime northern migrations of Negro workers. They first congregated in the industrial centers of the East and

the Middle West; but as the movement has continued (nearly a third of the Negro population now lives in the North) they have spread out more widely, as seen in the large numbers now settled in West Coast industrial areas. Local political machines quickly saw the political potential in these new arrivals, and Democrats vied with Republicans for their affiliation. That they were breaking down the post-bellum color line in the party deterred Democratic urban bosses and machines in Harlem, Detroit, and South Chicago not at all. Then came the New Deal appeals for equal rights, followed by Truman's "President's Committee on Civil Rights" report and his dogged pressure for a compulsory FEP program. Results followed activity; some say political strategy paid off in a new bloc of Democratic votes.

In any event, developments now point up the importance of the Negro vote in the North. Originally a Republican vote below the Mason and Dixon's line, it began to shift to the Democrats in the early New Deal days and by 1940 had become largely a Democratic vote. It is said that by 1944 the Negroes were voting Democratic two to one in the North, and that in 1948 the proportion for Truman was even greater. The potential Negro vote, outside of the South, is estimated now to be in excess of 3,000,000 and steadily increasing. But its real significance does not lie in the total figure. It lies rather in its strategic diffusion in normally close congressional districts and states. Its vote could be pivotal this year in a dozen or more touch-and-go states in the North. It was held to have been a vital factor in the election outcome of some seventy-five non-South congressional districts in 1948.

CAN THE BREACH BE HEALED?

Thus it is true that race is a continuing, or even a newly vital, issue in American politics. While southern Democratic leaders and the Dixiecrats remain adamant in their opposition to lowering the party barriers to the Negro forces, northern Democratic leaders continue to woo the Negro vote with advocacy of civil rights, FEP, removal of local racial discriminations, and social welfare and housing programs. The fashioning of any semblance of effective party unity this year calls for most skillful political wizardry and artistry. The question is, can *compromise* within the party, on the candidate and the civil rights platform plank, do the trick? If failure results, if the Dixiecrat threat is revived in more vigorous and broader operations, the Republicans will be in a very favorable position.

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Measurement of Voter Attitude

By Charles W. Smith, Jr.

EVERY four years the great game of politics reaches a climax in the United States as the sovereign voters pass judgment on the achievements and promises of the major parties and elect a President. In the weeks and months preceding the election, all over the United States, at country stores, in little towns, and in big cities, interested Americans discuss the campaign and speculate about the outcome. The process by which a President is nominated and elected filters the people's will through a kind of irregular filter, but it is as American as a Missouri country school. It is what the people desire, and in that sense it is democratic. The election is the authoritative expression of the people's will.

Government by Sample

Aristotle described democratic government as government in which important decisions were made by the general body of citizens, and officials were chosen by lot. As far as the officials are concerned, this might be called, in the technical language of opinion pollsters, government by probability sample. In our vast modern state where the mass of the citizens cannot serve collectively as a legislative body, if we followed Aristotle we might extend the application of the principle of government by probability sample. Occasionally an opinion pollster grown enthusiastic about public opinion polls suggests that government officials would do well to follow the polls. This would amount to government by a sample of the population chosen by the pollsters.

Americans thus far have given little evidence that they want to be governed by sample. In fact, when the polls conspicuously fail to predict election outcomes successfully, the expressions of pleasure indicate the existence of some positive hostility toward anything like government by sample.

When the polls failed in 1948, many Americans believed that their failure was wholesome for democracy. The "terrific licking" taken by pollsters, newspapers, and radio commentators "was a splendid thing for the country," declared the *Raleigh News and Observer*. "The people alone should decide elections." The *Philadelphia Inquirer* said: "Perhaps it's a healthy thing that the polls were so convincingly off base. Any feeling that they offer a reliable substitute for the ballot box in determining American political sentiment must disappear." The *New York Times*, seeing in the election results a demonstration of the independence and unpredictability of the voters, said, "Power still resides in the masses of the people, where it belongs." When President Truman happily told the 1952 convention of Americans for Democratic Action that the 1948 election results "set back the science of political forecasting for a full generation," he received a sympathetic response.

Not all political forecasting arouses the unfriendly feeling which was reflected in the President's statement and in the comment of the newspapers. This feeling is inspired by polls which achieve such scope and reputation that they seem to rival the electoral process as channels for the expression of the popular will, and to serve as instruments for influencing opinion as well as for reporting it. As predictions merely, they are interesting to citizens who like to speculate about probable election results, or follow the scores of the game of politics.

Opinion Measurement by Political Leaders

A well-managed political organization has at hand machinery for keeping in touch with public opinion in a way that may be superior to the commercial polls. This type of opinion measurement, on which political leaders base analyses and predictions, is very old. How well it works depends upon the efficiency of the organization and the astuteness of the leaders.

Early in March 1800, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison a letter in which he analyzed the prospects for the coming election. He said that, leaving out Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, the states seemed to be about equally divided. He had had favorable reports from members of his party about prospects in these three states. He wrote:

> Still these are the ideas of the republicans only in these three States, and we must make great allowance for their sanguine views. Upon the whole, I consider it as rather more doubtful than the last election, in which I was not deceived in more than a vote or two. If Pennsylvania votes, then either Jersey or New York giving a republican vote, decides the election. If Pennsylvania does not vote, then New York determines the election. In any event, we may say that if the *city* election of New York is in favor of the republican ticket, the issue will be republican; if the federal ticket for the city of New York prevails, the probabilites will be in favor of a federal issue. . .

This was a keen analysis of the situation. In the election New Jersey went Federalist, Pennsylvania's electoral vote was divided, and, thanks to a Republican victory in New York City, New York's electoral vote was Republican.

More recently, Jefferson's political descendant, James A. Farley, has stated that in every campaign in which he participated as manager with Franklin D. Roosevelt as top candidate on the ticket, he made a practice of sending to Roosevelt a documented report on the probable outcome of the election, usually on election eve.[1] Mr. Farley's most remarkable prediction was that of 1936, when he predicted that Roosevelt would carry every state except Maine and Vermont, at a time when the *Literary Digest* poll was predicting a Republican landslide, and the newer polls, although indicating a Roosevelt victory, were far from predicting the sweeping victory that occurred.

Even such an astute political field marshal as Mr. Farley could not be expected to foretell election results with 100 per cent accuracy every time; but as long as he headed the party organization, his predictions were always worthy of high respect. Like Thomas Jefferson's, they were the products of a combination of art and scientific method. Information was gathered from local areas, and the discerning mind of the master politician interpreted it as no mere statistician could.

Those of us who are not Thomas Jeffersons or Jim Farleys, or who do not have their facilities for gathering information, must depend more upon evidence gathered by others if we wish to try to foresee the political future. Ordinarily we cannot place complete reliance upon the public predictions of political leaders who may be keeping their fingers on the public pulse, because their statements are likely to be overly optimistic, issued primarily to influence opinion rather than to inform it. We may turn then to the com-

[1] James A. Farley, *Behind the Ballots* (New York, 1938), p. 324.

mercial public opinion polls and get reports on voter attitudes that purport to be more objective every few days as the election approaches.

HISTORY OF POLLING

The general public first became widely interested in polls largely as a result of the publicity attending the *Literary Digest* poll. The *Digest* method of polling was to mail ballot cards to millions of people whose names were drawn chiefly from telephone directories. It was successful in predicting the winner of Presidential elections until 1936, when it indicated that the Republican candidate would win by an electoral vote of 370 to 161. In the election he actually received only eight electoral votes. That ended the *Literary Digest* poll.

The chief weakness of that poll was that it did not reach a representative cross section of the electorate. Particularly in the depression years, many people in the lower income groups did not have telephones, and were therefore not listed in the telephone directories. For this reason the ballots were not mailed to a representative cross section. The ballots that were returned seem to have been even less representative. Apparently the collecting of ballots by mail was an even greater defect in the polling technique than the unscientific choice of a cross section in the first place.

Three polls using more scientific methods entered the business of forecasting Presidential elections in 1936. They were associated with the names of George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald M. Crossley. In 1936, 1940, and 1944 they were successful in picking the winning candidate. However, the Gallup and Crossley forecasts of state-by-state electoral votes were not as impressive as their predictions of the national popular vote, and they almost always overestimated the Republican vote.

Mr. Roper's *Fortune* poll predicted popular vote results with remarkable accuracy, but avoided the more difficult task of predicting state-by-state electoral votes. After Roper's 1940 sectional figures were made available, Daniel Katz pointed out that the error in one section of the country was as high as 12 per cent, and in no section of the country was the error less than 4 per cent.[2] The relatively large Roper errors had canceled themselves out. This seems to be a hazardous way to arrive at accuracy.

By 1948 the pollsters had outgrown the caution that had been reflected in their pre-election statements of earlier years. The Gallup poll stated flatly that Governor Dewey would "win the Presidential election with a substantial majority of electoral votes." Mr. Roper said that his inclination was to predict the election of Governor Dewey "by a heavy margin," and added that the validation of public opinion testing in political areas was complete; "it is known that a scientifically conducted and antiseptically clean survey will coincide with the actual choice of the voters within a close limit of error."

The election that followed was a disillusioning affair. In 1948 there was a Dewey landslide of pollsters and journalists, but not of the voters; or it might be more appropriate to say that the pollsters and journalists got their feet off the ground and simply floated up into the clouds together. The election brought them down with a dull thud.

Under such circumstances, when a pollster wants to believe, and wants others to believe, that his poll was not really so great a failure as it seemed,

[2] Daniel Katz, "The Public Opinion Polls and the 1940 Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (Mar. 1941), pp. 52–78.

one of his first rationalizations is that public opinion must have changed between the time when the last poll was taken and the time the election was held. Shortly after the election results became known in 1936 the editor of *The Literary Digest* was quoted as saying:

> We may not have reached a representative cross section of the population in distributing the ballots. On the other hand, the last returns were received some weeks ago, and there may have been a shift in voting sentiment since then.[3]

In February 1949 Dr. Gallup told the Iowa Conference on Attitude and Opinion Research, "The biggest error which we and other polls made was in not taking a last-minute poll." Mr. Crossley said, "We did not catch the late Truman upsurge because we assumed campaigns do not change many votes and stopped polling too early."[4]

VOTERS DECIDE EARLY

Apparently most voters do make up their minds well before the end of the campaign, in an ordinary election year. An intensive study of an Ohio county during the campaign of 1940 led Paul F. Lazarsfeld to conclude that in a sense "modern Presidential campaigns are over before they begin." The study indicated that only a small percentage of the people were so undecided that campaign propaganda could convert them, and the decisions of these voters would not considerably alter the ratio of Democratic and Republican vote intentions which existed before the campaign began.[5]

Of course this conclusion, drawn chiefly from a study of the electorate of one county in one campaign, may not always be applicable. However, in the absence of some unusual factor, the changes in the last few weeks of a campaign are probably ordinarily inconsequential in their effect on the election result. If a steady trend toward one candidate is in progress, the polls should be able to discover it, and they should report it with some suggestion as to its probable effect on the election results. Although a trend of this kind is likely to have only a negligible effect on the voting balance in the few days intervening between the last pre-election polls and the election, a failure to interpret it correctly is a polling failure.

WHAT POLITICIANS THINK OF POLLS

The attitudes of politicians toward the commercial polls seem to vary greatly. President Truman holds them in contempt; but Charles W. Van Devander reported in 1944 that Governor Thomas E. Dewey had "never run for office without employing the private services of the Gallup poll to assay his chances of election."[6] Charles Michelson once expressed the view that the polls had a claim to validity comparable to that of astrological charts.[7]

In their public statements during campaigns, politicians tend to be particularly critical when the polls are going against them. Politicians consider it good strategy to try to create the impression that they are winning, and incline to minimize anything that tends to create an adverse impression.

ACADEMIC VIEWS

After the election of 1948 the pollsters were not left to the mercies of the politicians, nor were they left to evaluate their own mistakes without

[3] *New York Times*, November 4, 1936.

[4] Norman C. Meier and Harold W. Saunders (Eds.), *The Polls and Public Opinion* (New York, 1949), pp. 180, 164.

[5] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "The Election is Over," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 8 (Fall, 1944), pp. 317–30.

[6] Charles W. Van Devander, *The Big Bosses* (New York, 1944), p. 77.

[7] *New York Times*, May 23, 1944.

assistance. Individual academic authorities on public opinion presented diagnoses, and the Social Science Research Council appointed a Committee on Analysis of Pre-election Polls and Forecasts which recruited a technical staff to carry on an intensive investigation. Out of the research and cogitation of this staff and committee came a fat volume entitled *The Pre-election Polls of 1948* containing information on the polling procedures used, discussion of problems involved, conclusions as to the sources of error, and recommendations for opinion measurement procedures in the future.

One of the chief criticisms by the academic authorities was directed at the use of the quota sampling method by the commercial polls.[8] When the quota sampling method is used, the procedure is somewhat as follows: The managers of the poll find out that the total adult population of the country contains a certain percentage of such elements as men, women, farmers, urban dwellers, people in different income brackets, Democrats, and Republicans, and then they send interviewers out to interview a given number of people containing the same proportion of each of these elements as the general population.

The academic authorities contended that better cross sections could have been obtained by a procedure called probability sampling, in which the final determination of the particular individuals to be polled is left to chance, and the element of choice by interviewers is eliminated. When the probability sampling method is used, the country is broken into geographical units and subunits, until finally the interviewers are directed to interview adult inhabitants in every third house in each block, or whatever is the desired proportion, in selected areas.

The theory of probability sampling is that such a procedure "is in conformity with statistical laws"; therefore "it is possible to calculate precisely the probability that the margin of error in any given sample will not exceed a given amount."[9] This should not be interpreted to mean that when the polls report the answers which respondents in such a cross section gave to the strangers who interviewed them, the statisticians can calculate precisely the probability that the margin of error in the opinion reported will not exceed a certain amount. What it means is that theoretically the sample will contain the correct proportion of white persons, the correct spread of persons of different ages, persons with typical amounts of education, and similar characteristics, subject to a calculable margin of error. There is no way by which the margin of error in the report of opinion can be calculated.

Dr. Gallup objected to dogmatic assertions that probability sampling was superior to quota sampling for use in election polls, and cited evidence which indicated that it had not proved superior in practice.[10] At the Iowa Conference on Attitude and Opinion Research he said that random sampling "has certain definite advantages under certain definite conditions," but he added that it was not "a cure-all." He stated that the Gallup poll had carried on experimental work through the years to prove its techniques, and that a new department was being established which would have the sole function of carrying on experimental work and trying out new suggestions for the improvement of polling techniques.[11]

[8] Rensis Likert, "Public Opinion Polls," *Scientific American*, Vol. 179 (December 1948), pp. 7–11; Frederick Mosteller and others, *The Pre-election Polls of 1948*, staff report of the Social Science Research Council (New York, 1949), pp. 115–18.

[9] Rensis Likert, *op cit.*, p. 9.

[10] George Gallup, Letter to *Scientific American*, Vol. 180 (February 1949), p. 2.

COMPARATIVE RELIABILITY

In a period when the polls are thrust into public attention, as they were in 1936 and in 1948, questions are raised as to their reliability and their social usefulness. When they are evaluated with such criteria in mind, one of the basic facts to be remembered is that Presidential election polls, as a rule, are considerably more reliable than polls on public questions and issues.[12] This is true primarily for two reasons: (1) Presidential election polling is done with more care, one feature of which is the use of larger samples; (2) most of the people being polled have heard about the candidates, have formed fairly definite opinions about them, and the question they are asked is clear and definite.

In contrast, when a poll is on an issue, replies come from people who are at all stages of forming opinion, and who have widely different degrees of interest in the subject and widely different degrees of knowledge about it. Under such circumstances different polling agencies may get very different results on similar questions. A slight variation in the wording of the question may make a considerable difference in results. When the opinion that pollsters are attempting to measure is such that a slight difference in the wording of a question will cause a significant change in the results, the interpretation of results should be made with great skill and caution. Most newspaper readers who read the reports of polls do not make that kind of interpretations.

[11] Norman C. Meier and Harold W. Saunders (Eds.), *The Polls and Public Opinion* (New York, 1949), pp. 221–22.

[12] See Robert Cobb Myers, "Vital Part of the Poll Question," *New York Times Magazine*, January 2, 1949, pp. 8, 31; Rensis Likert, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

SPECIFIC HAZARDS

Behind the replies, the degrees of knowledge and interest of the people who give them are highly important. In this connection a statement made by Angus Campbell, University of Michigan Survey Research Director, is pertinent. He said:

> We have consistently found in our studies of the adult population that not more than a quarter of the people of this country are sufficiently familiar with world affairs to converse readily in terms of specific people, issues or events. . . . At the other end of the scale is a fraction of about equal size who seem virtually oblivious to such matters. They do not follow the news and their knowledge of such monumental developments as the Marshall Plan, the NATO, or even the United Nations is virtually nil. Between these high and low quartiles are the remaining half of the people, having some general acquaintance with what is going on in the world but little specific knowledge.[13]

Nevertheless, commercial pollsters report issue poll results in a tone of certainty, sometimes even to the tenth of a per cent! Stuart Chase wrote in 1948 that none of the commercial pollsters really liked to do polls on Presidential elections. "Mr. Gallup, indeed, complained of stomach ulcers every four years," he said.[14] None of the pollsters complain of getting stomach ulcers from conducting polls on issues, because nobody can come up next

[13] Third National Conference U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, January 29, 1952, press release.

[14] Stuart Chase, "Are the Polls Finished?" *The Nation*, Vol. 167 (December 4, 1948), p. 626.

Wednesday morning and prove definitely that their results were wrong.

Even though Presidential election polls are likely to be considerably more reliable than polls on more abstract subjects, they involve particular problems. Many persons who are legally qualified to vote will not vote on election day, and the pollster has no way of finding out certainly which ones will vote. People vote for various reasons. One of Mr. Dooley's characters said: "'I'm with Clancy's candydate,' he says. 'He niver offered to enlist for th' war,' he says, 'but 'twas Clancy put Terence on th' polis foorce an' got th' school f'r Aggie,' he says." [15]

Whether because the citizen is grateful for a job, or because he is a farmer who wants farm subsidies continued or a worker who remembers a time when government was less friendly to labor or a businessman who wants favorable legislation, or for some other reason, some voters will take the trouble to vote and others will not. Those who have a vital interest at stake, those who are angry, those who have a crusading spirit, are more likely to vote than those who feel no strong emotional urge. Furthermore, they are likely to count for more in their influence on others. An efficient organization will get out some voters who would not otherwise vote.

Another problem, one not peculiar to election polls, is that of getting correct information from respondents. The average individual likes to go along with the crowd. If he thinks he is not going along with the crowd, he may give a noncommittal answer when a stranger comes around and asks him how he is going to vote. A pollster may also find it difficult to get revealing information from some respondents when they have little enthusiasm for either candidate. Doubtless a number of voters in 1948 simply voted for the candidate whom they considered the lesser of the two leading evils.

[15] Finley Peter Dunne, *Mr. Dooley in Peace and in War* (London, 1899), p. 90.

INFLUENCE OF THE POLLS

A few critics of the polls consider them an unmitigated evil. A few would like to see them abolished, or at least regulated by the government. One of the charges brought against them is that they influence elections because of bandwagon psychology. How much influence of this kind they exert in Presidential elections is problematical. In 1948 they may have had more influence in the opposite direction, causing the Republicans to develop a debilitating self-confidence.

The influence of preconvention polls, when candidates are struggling for the party support which will give them the nomination, is another matter. Because party leaders are anxious to nominate a candidate who can win the election, they may pay considerable attention to the polling reports which purport to show the relative popularity of the candidates with the electorate. Democrats may be a little less inclined than Republican politicians to pay attention to such polls. They have had the experience of winning elections when the polls were against them. They have been accustomed to having the newspapers against them in both national and local elections, and they have found that such opposition need not be fatal.

Actually, the preconvention polls are less reliable than the pre-election polls. They are somewhat comparable in accuracy to polls on issues.

The preconvention poll must be considered an agency which may influence the nomination, and which may be used in an attempt to influence the nomination as a newspaper attempts to influence the nomination through its editorials and its treatment of the news.

In the period preceding the 1952 Republican national convention, the myth that "Taft Can't Win" was largely a creation of the polls. Except for the polling reports, no very substantial evidence was presented to justify such a conclusion. Consider the following bombardment of releases: On February 13 a poll report was that Taft and Eisenhower were running "neck-and-neck" among Republican voters; March 2 that Taft polled 34 per cent and Eisenhower 33 per cent among Republican voters, but that Eisenhower held a big lead among independent voters; March 5 that the voters would prefer Kefauver to Taft if they were pitted against each other; March 7 that the voters would prefer Eisenhower to Kefauver; March 19 that Eisenhower led Kefauver, but Kefauver led Taft in thirteen southern states; April 9 that Eisenhower led Taft by a slight margin among Republican voters and was preferred by independent voters by more than three to one; April 12 that Eisenhower was the favorite Republican candidate among veterans; April 18 that Kefauver led Taft; April 20 that Eisenhower beat Kefauver; April 25 that Democratic county chairmen thought either Governor Adlai Stevenson or Senator Kefauver could beat Taft; May 1 that Eisenhower was favored over Taft by both Republicans and independents.

Such polling bombardment constituted one of the most serious kinds of opposition that Senator Taft had to face in his campaign to win the Presidential nomination, the success of which depended upon the support of victory-famished Republican politicians.

THE REMEDY

To say that the polls are wolves in sheep's clothing would be a harsh and unjustified characterization, but they are not all sheep. Their influence has not been wholly good, but they have contributed to the development of improved techniques of opinion measurement—a desirable development. As Jane Ace says, "We have to take the bitter with the better." The polls should not be destroyed or taken over by the government, and we should be wary of government regulation. The remedy for the potentialities for harm in the commerical polls lies in the development of more sophisticated readers.

The citizen who desires to speculate perspicaciously about the outcome of the election will find the polling reports useful. He should consider them as evidential rather than prophetic, and he should make some allowance for their tendency to overestimate Republican strength. He may familiarize himself with Louis H. Bean's studies of election trends and Mr. Bean's estimates for the coming election, remembering always that the trend curve may make a bobble in its upward, or downward, course this year. He may also get enlightenment from history in regard to the relative weight of prosperity and corruption as campaign issues, and the types of candidates that have been elected and have failed to be elected in the past. When the intelligent citizen has done all of this, if he wishes to know the outcome of the election at the earliest possible moment, he will still have to sit up on election night and listen to the returns coming in over his radio.

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Participation in the Forthcoming Election

By Harold F. Gosnell

RECENT surveys show that the highest participation in voting is to be found among the well-to-do, the business executives, the best educated, the professional people, men; the lowest participation is to be found among the women, the young people, laboring people, people with only grade education, Negroes, and those in the lowest economic levels.[1] In the last thirty years the general pattern of electoral participation has not changed much.[2] There has been a gradual trend toward higher participation among women, laboring people, and Negroes, but these groups still have considerable indifference and apathy to be overcome. It may be expected that the proportion of adult citizens who will vote in November will not be much larger than in recent Presidential elections.

Analysis of Pre-election Polls

To their great grief, the polling organizations found it extraordinarily difficult to forecast the size of the vote in 1948. An examination of their figures will show the size of the problem. We are indebted to the Social Science Research Council for the most elaborate analysis of the pre-election polls that has yet been made.[3] The staff report by Mosteller and others furnishes some of the raw figures which we have never had before.

For instance, Crossley gives the number by states of those whom he excluded as nonvoters. This gives us the basis for estimating from his figures the percentage of probable turnout. As compared with the estimates of the other pollsters, Crossley did a very careful job. He showed considered ingenuity in working out his so-called filter questions which he used in estimating turnout.[4] When we compare his estimates with the average turnout as calculated from the census figures by Key, Crossley's percentages do not look very well.[5] In the eleven southern states that Key studied, Crossley's error in percentage points varied from 10 in Alabama to 56 in South Carolina. In the two northern states that Key studied, Crossley's error in percentage points was 7 in Ohio and 12 in New York.[6]

Roper did not give his state-by-state figures, so it is possible only to make a nation-wide analysis of his estimate of turnout. In the poll which he conducted October 25–28, he included a category of "won't vote." Of the 3,501 interviewed, only 8.7 per cent said that they would not vote. The estimated percentage of adult citizens voting in 1948 was about 52.[7] Roper's participation would be 92 per cent, or an error of 40 percentage points. This would be reduced 5 percentage points if half of the "don't knows" were included.[8] This would still leave an error of about 35 percentage points.

Gallup also failed to give his state-by-state figures on his estimated turnout. In his October 15–29 survey he interviewed 2,972 persons, of whom 314 said that they would not vote.[9] This gives an estimated turnout of 89 per cent, and if we make the same allowance for those who said they were undecided that we did for Roper, we reduce Gallup's estimate to 84 per cent. This would give Gallup an error of 32 percentage points in estimating turnout, which is not much less than Roper's.

The pollsters were certainly far off in their estimates of probable turnout in 1948. If they use substantially the same methods, it is doubtful whether they will do much better this year. People will not tell an interviewer frankly that they will not vote. Probable nonvoters cannot usually bring themselves to give a candid answer to the casual interviewer.

The unsatisfactory character of the polling data on the question of participation makes it necessary to use these data with caution in estimating total vote to be cast. On the other hand, even though the estimates of turnout may be off by a considerable margin, the surveys will still show considerable about the character of those who will not vote.

Turnout by Party Preference

As far as the two major parties are concerned, nonvoting has been and probably will be more prevalent among persons with Democratic leanings than among those with Republican leanings. Considering the trends in the economic composition of the parties, this is to be expected. The Democrats draw more heavily from the laboring people, Negroes in northern cities, young people, and those with only grade education.[10] Since these are the groups with the lowest voting records, it follows that if the proportion of the eligible voters that came to the polls should increase, this would benefit the Democratic party under present circumstances.

The Republican party in the past twenty years has lost its majority position, but the minority who now classify themselves as Republicans are a more active political group than those who classify themselves as Democrats.[11] The greater intensity of the convictions of the Republicans is indicated in Woodward and Roper's study, which showed that the Republicans were more active and used more emotionally tinged words in describing their political views on selected topics than did the Democrats.

Republicans are in the minority, but they fight harder; they feel more intensely about politics. They are older men and women, and some of them have become bitter about the events of the last two decades. Even the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt has not soft-

[1] Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of American Citizens," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIV (December 1950), pp. 872–85.

[2] C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control*, Chicago, 1924; J. K. Pollock, *Voting Behavior*, Ann Arbor, 1939; Edward H. Litchfield, *Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Community*, Ann Arbor, 1941; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, 1944; G. M. Connelly and H. H. Field, "The Non-Voter—Who He Is, What He Thinks," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. VIII (Summer, 1944), pp. 175–87; George Gallup, "Don't Stay Home On Election Day," in John Kieran (Ed.), *The New Information Please Almanac 1948* (Garden City, N. Y., 1948), p. 114.

[3] Frederick Mosteller and others, *The Pre-election Polls of 1948*, staff report of the Social Science Research Council, New York, 1949.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 176–83.

[5] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949), p. 503; Mosteller and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 319–24.

[6] Crossley's estimate for New York was 80 per cent and Key's average for the state was 68 per cent.

[7] George Gallup, *Political Almanac*.

[8] Mosteller and others, *op. cit.*, p. 362, gives Roper's figures showing that 47 per cent of those who said "don't know" also said "won't vote."

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 346.

[10] Lazarsfeld, *et al.*, *op. cit.* note 2; Woodward and Roper, *op. cit.* note 1; Mosteller and others, *op. cit.* note 3.

[11] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, New York, 1952.

ened their attitude toward the chief architect of Democratic politics during the thirties and forties.[12]

The independents have about average interest in politics. In the scale worked out by Woodward and Roper, the persons who classed themselves as independents showed about the same proportions of very actives, fairly actives, fairly inactives, and very inactives as the total adult population. The independents thus fall between the self-styled Republicans and the self-styled Democrats. Gallup found the participation of the independents about the same as that of the Democrats. Since those who tell the interviewers that they are going to vote Republican are more active politically than the other groups, it follows that the Republicans must make deep inroads into the so-called independent vote if they wish to win Presidential elections.

In the 1948 election Gallup's surveys showed that those who told the interviewers they were leaning toward Wallace, the Progressive party candidate, were just as little likely to say that they would not vote as those who were leaning toward the Republicans. In other words, Progressives were apparently about as active as Republicans.

GETTING OUT THE VOTE

Political scientists have never agreed about the significance of the size of the poll.[13] Is a small poll a bad sign? Does a large participation indicate a healthy democratic process?

There is no definite answer to these questions. Under some circumstances a small vote may not be alarming. In council-manager cities the election of a council-at-large has never brought out as many voters as mayoralty elections have. Yet, the council-manager cities have in general been well governed and the voters have been satisfied.

A high participation may reflect unusual strain in the body politic. Before the advent of Hitler, the Germans showed a great interest in voting. They were torn by dissension. In spite of the New Deal and Fair Deal haters, American politics has never reached such a high level of tension.

Woodward and Roper found that only 1 per cent of their sample of respondents got a score of 10 or higher out of a total possible score of 12 for political activity.[14] Nearly 40 per cent were classified as very inactive. The very active ones were those who voted regularly, discussed public issues with others, belonged to organizations that took stands on public issues, wrote or talked to Congressmen or other public officials to give their own opinions on public issues, worked for election of political candidates within the last four years, and contributed money to a party or a candidate within the last four years. Nonvoting is thus part of a person's total attitude toward politics. Those who did not vote did not do the other things regularly.

As the level of education rises, we would expect the level of participation in government to rise. The number of college graduates is still small in proportion to total number of adults. Within

[12] See my forthcoming volume on *Champion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt*, to be published by Macmillan Company.

[13] W. B. Munro, "Is the Slacker Vote a Menace?" *National Municipal Review*, Vol. XVII (February 1928), pp. 80–98; E. P. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940), pp. 31–36; F. G. Wilson, "The Inactive Electorate and Social Revolution," *Southwest Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. XVI (1936), pp. 73–84; H. J. Abraham, "What Cure for Voter Apathy?" *National Municipal Review*, Vol. XLI (July 1952), pp. 346–50, 357.

[14] Woodward and Roper, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 876.

the educational system itself, more concerted efforts can be made to prepare students for active political life.[15]

As various economic pressure groups become interested in politics, they may be expected to aid in getting out the vote. For many years, business groups have been heavy contributors to party campaign funds, and businessmen are among the most active voters. During the past twenty years, trade unions have shown an increasing interest in politics, and labor organizers have been active in getting out the vote.[16] If consumers were better organized, they would become more active voters.

In the United States the political parties are still the backbone of the vote-getting machinery. The parties raise funds and recruit workers to bring the voters to the polls. The Kefauver and other investigations have shown that the parties in the great urban centers find it easier to obtain funds from the underworld than from other groups. Party precinct workers expect rewards in the form of political patronage and special favors. The citizens in the lower income groups who wish to enter politics are faced with unpleasant choices. If they do not line up with the party machines, their chances of success are small. If they become members of the party organization, their voices are silenced on many reform issues.

Should the government lighten the burden of the parties in mobilizing the electorate? In what ways might the government aid candidates without interfering with freedom of choice?

[15] T. H. Reed and D. D. Reed, *Preparing College Men and Women for Politics*, New York, 1952.

[16] Lubell, *op. cit.* note 11, points out that in the 1950 senatorial campaign in Ohio the labor leaders assumed that a large vote would be an anti-Taft vote. It did not turn out that way.

Some forty years ago it was proposed in the United States that the government itself undertake to give financial aid to candidates for elective office.[17] Except for a limited amount of free radio time, little has been done to implement such a proposal in this country.

CAMPAIGNING SUBSIDIZED IN JAPAN

In postwar Japan, however, a full and logical application of the government's responsibility to promote freedom of candidacy has been made. With the elimination of the former militarist and expansionist leaders, it was necessary to encourage the participation in politics of those who were without organization support and who lacked the funds necessary to conduct a modern election campaign. It was assumed that in a democracy all persons, regardless of means or status, should be accorded equal opportunity in seeking public office.

For the 1947 elections a National Election Administration Commission was established, with nine members named by the National Diet.[18] This Commission's duties included the administration of the appropriation which paid subsidies to candidates for the conduct of their campaigns. The subsidies were in the form of gasoline ration coupons, free passes on public transportation facilities, free radio time, payment for newspaper advertisements, space in the election gazette, free postage, a limited supply of free paper, and an opportunity to take part in the free competitive speech meetings.

[17] President Theodore Roosevelt, in his annual message to Congress in 1907, recommended that Congress provide an appropriation "for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties."

[18] National Election Administration Commission Law (Law No. 152, December 7, 1947) and Handbook of Laws for Japanese Diet Elections, 1947.

Judging by the size of the polls, the Japanese election laws have been quite successful. In 1947 some 68 per cent of the eligible vote was cast; in 1949 it rose to 74 per cent, and in 1950 to 80 per cent.

A corollary of the limited subsidy plan in Japan has been a limit on the total amount of money that each candidate can spend on his own account. According to American standards, a low limit is applied.[19]

The Japanese laws have brought about a wider participation in running for elective office. In the 1947 elections a considerable number of farmers, teachers, labor leaders, journalists, doctors, and housewives were elected to the House of Representatives.[20]

COMPULSORY VOTING

Compulsory voting is an older device which has been used by a number of European and other countries to see that the voters perform their duties on election day. It has been particularly successful in Australia.[21]

If compulsory voting were to be used in the United States, it would mean that the registration and voting laws would have to be strengthened and made more nearly uniform, and that voting administration would have to be centralized. The most ignorant citizens would probably cast blank ballots, but they would be under pressure to inform themselves and make the most intelligent choices that they could. Compulsory voting would probably help the Democrats more than the Republicans under present circumstances. As far as the tone of politics is concerned, compulsory voting would be an improvement, since it would reduce the need for large political organizations, large campaign funds, and patronage rewards for party canvassers who round up voters. The parties would have to concentrate on winning the support of the voters, not merely bringing out the faithful.

[19] It is $220 at the prevailing exchange rate for each candidate for the House of Representatives.

[20] Report of Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Brief Progress Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan*, Tokyo, 1949.

[21] Henry J. Abraham, "One Way to Get Out the Vote," *National Municipal Review*, Vol. XXXIX (September 1950), pp. 396–99.

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1952 Republican Platform
Adopted by the Republican National Convention
July 11, 1952

PREAMBLE

We maintain that man was not born to be ruled, but that he consented to be governed; and that the reasons that moved him thereto are few and simple. He has voluntarily submitted to government because, only by the establishment of just laws, and the power to enforce those laws, can an orderly life be maintained, full and equal opportunity for all be established, and the blessings of liberty be perpetuated.

We hold that government, and those entrusted with government, should set a high example of honesty, of justice, and unselfish devotion to the public good; that they should labor to maintain tranquillity at home and peace and friendship with all the nations of the earth.

We assert that during the last twenty years, leaders of the Government of the United States under successive Democrat administrations, and especially under this present Administration, have failed to perform these several basic duties; but, on the contrary, that they have evaded them, flouted them, and by a long succession of vicious acts, so undermined the foundations of our Republic as to threaten its existence.

We charge that they have arrogantly deprived our citizens of precious liberties by seizing powers never granted.

We charge that they work unceasingly to achieve their goal of national socialism.

We charge that they have disrupted internal tranquillity by fostering class strife for venal political purposes.

We charge that they have choked opportunity and hampered progress by unnecessary and crushing taxation.

They claim prosperity but the appearance of economic health is created by war expenditures, waste and extravagance, planned emergencies, and war crises. They have debauched our money by cutting in half the purchasing power of our dollar.

We charge that they have weakened local self-government which is the cornerstone of the freedom of men.

We charge that they have shielded traitors to the nation in high places, and that they have created enemies abroad where we should have friends.

We charge that they have violated our liberties by turning loose upon the country a swarm of arrogant bureaucrats and their agents who meddle intolerably in the lives and occupations of our citizens.

We charge that there has been corruption in high places, and that examples of dishonesty and dishonor have shamed the moral standards of the American people.

We charge that they have plunged us into war in Korea without the consent of our citizens through their authorized representatives in the Congress, and have carried on that war without will to victory.

FOREIGN POLICY

The present Administration, in seven years, has squandered the unprecedented power and prestige which were ours at the close of World War II.

In that time, more than 500 million non-Russian people of fifteen different countries have been absorbed into the power sphere of Communist Russia, which proceeds confidently with its plan for world conquest.

We charge that the leaders of the Administration in power lost the peace so dearly earned by World War II.

The moral incentives and hopes for a better world which sustained us through World War II were betrayed, and this has given Communist Russia a military and propaganda initiative which, if unstayed, will destroy us.

They abandoned friendly nations such as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to fend for themselves against the Communist aggression which soon swallowed them.

They required the National Government of China to surrender Manchuria with its strategic ports and railroads to the control of Communist Russia. They urged that Communists be taken into the Chinese Government and its military forces. And finally they denied the military aid that had been authorized by Congress and which was crucially needed if China were to be saved. Thus they substituted on our Pacific flank a murderous enemy for an ally and friend.

In all these respects they flouted our peace-assuring pledges such as the Atlantic Charter, and did so in favor of despots, who, it was well known, consider that murder, terror, slavery, concentration camps and the ruthless and brutal denial of human rights are legitimate means to their desired ends.

Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam were the scenes of those tragic blunders with others to follow. The leaders of the Administration in power acted without the knowledge or consent of Congress or of the American people. They traded our overwhelming victory for a new enemy and for new oppressions and new wars which were quick to come.

In South Korea, they withdrew our occupation troops in the face of the aggressive, poised for action, Communist military strength on its northern border. They publicly announced that Korea was of no concern to us. Then when the Communist forces acted to take what seemed to have been invited, they committed this nation to fight back under the most unfavorable conditions. Already the tragic cost is over 110,000 American casualties.

With foresight, the Korean war would never have happened.

In going back into Korea, they evoked the patriotic and sacrificial support of the American people. But by their hampering orders they produced stalemates and ignominious bartering with our enemies, and they offer no hope of victory.

They have effectively ignored many vital areas in the face of a global threat requiring balanced handling.

The people of the other American republics are resentful of our neglect of their legitimate aspirations and co-operative friendship.

The Middle East and much of Africa seethe with anti-American sentiment.

The peoples of the Far East who are not under Communist control find it difficult to sustain their morale as they contrast Russia's "Asia First" policy with the "Asia Last" policy of those in control of the Administration now in power.

Here at home they have exhibited corruption, incompetence, and disloyalty in public office to such an extent that the very concept of free representative government has been tarnished and has lost its idealistic appeal to those elsewhere who are confronted with the propaganda of Communism.

They profess to be following a defensive policy of "containment" of Russian Communism which has not contained it.

Those in control of the party in power have, in reality, no foreign policy. They swing erratically from timid appeasement to reckless bluster.

The good in our foreign policies has been accomplished with Republican co-operation, such as the organization of the United Nations, the establishment of the trusteeship principle for dependent peoples, the making of peace with Japan and Germany, and the building of more solid security in Europe. But in the main the Republican party has been ignored and its participation has not been invited.

The American people must now decide whether to continue in office the party which has presided over this disastrous reversal of our fortunes and the loss of our hopes for a peaceful world.

The Republican party offers, in contrast to the performances of those now running our foreign affairs, policies and actions based on enlightened self-interest and animated by courage, self-respect, steadfastness, vision, purpose, competence and spiritual faith.

The supreme goal of our foreign policy will be an honorable and just peace. We dedicate ourselves to wage peace and to win it.

We shall eliminate from the State Department and from every federal office, all, wherever they may be found, who share responsibility for the needless predicaments and perils in which we find ourselves. We shall also sever from the public payroll the hordes of loafers, incompetents and unnecessary employees who clutter the administration of our foreign affairs. The confusions, overlappings, and extravagance of our agencies abroad hold us up to the ridicule of peoples whose friendship we seek.

We shall substitute a compact and efficient organization where men of proven loyalty and ability shall have responsibility for reaching our objectives. They will reflect a dynamic initiative. Thus we can win the support and confidence which go only to those who demonstrate a capacity to define and get results.

We shall have peace-building objectives wherever this will serve the enlightened self-interest of our nation and help to frustrate the enemy's designs against us.

In western Europe we shall use our friendly influence, without meddling or imperialistic attitudes, for ending the political and economic divisions which alone prevent that vital area from being strong on its own right.

We shall encourage and aid the development of collective security forces there, as elsewhere, so as to end the Soviet power to intimidate directly or by satellites and so that the free governments will be sturdy to resist Communist inroads.

In the balanced consideration of our problems, we shall end neglect of the Far East which Stalin has long identified as the road to victory over the West. We shall make it clear that we have no intention to sacrifice the East to gain time for the West.

The Republican party has consistently advocated a national home for the Jewish people since a Republican Congress declared its support of that objective thirty years ago.

In providing a sanctuary for Jewish people rendered homeless by persecution, the State of Israel appeals to our deepest humanitarian instincts. We shall continue our friendly interest in this constructive and inspiring undertaking.

We shall put our influence at the service of peace between Israel and the Arab states and we shall cooperate to bring economic and social stability to that area.

Our ties with the sister republics of the Americas will be strengthened.

The Government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements. It will be made clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Congress, that United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence of those captive peoples.

We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will penetrate the dark places. That program will give the Voice of America a real function. It will mark the end of the negative, futile and immoral policy of "containment" which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and Godless terrorism which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon for our destruction.

We shall support the United Nations and loyally help it to become what it was designed to be, a place where differences would be harmonized by honest discussion and a means for collective security under agreed concepts of justice. We shall seek real meaning and value for our regional security treaties, which implies that all parties shall contribute their loyal support and fair shares.

We shall see to it that no treaty or agreement with other countries deprives our citizens of the rights guaranteed them by the Federal Constitution.

We shall always measure our foreign commitments so that they can be borne without endangering the economic health or sound finances of the United States. Stalin said that "the moment for the decisive blow" would be when the free nations were isolated and were in a state of "practical bankruptcy." We shall not allow ourselves to be isolated and economically strangled, and we shall not let ourselves go bankrupt.

Sums available by this test, if competently used, will be more effective than vastly larger sums incompetently spent

for vague and endless purposes. We shall not try to buy good will. We shall earn it by sound, constructive, self-respecting policies and actions.

We favor international exchange of students and of agricultural and industrial techniques, and programs for improvement of public health.

We favor the expansion of mutually advantageous world trade. To further this objective we shall press for the elimination of discriminatory practices against our exports such as preferential tariffs, monetary license restrictions, and other arbitrary devices. Our reciprocal trade agreements will be entered into and maintained on a basis of true reciprocity and to safeguard our domestic enterprises and the payrolls of our workers against unfair import competition.

The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of their end.

Our nation will become again the dynamic, moral and spiritual force which was the despair of despots and the hope of the oppressed. As we resume this historic role, we ourselves will come to enjoy again the reality of peace, security and solvency, not the shabby and fleeting counterfeit which is the gift of the Administration in power.

National Defense

On the prudent assumption that Communist Russia may not accommodate our own disgracefully lagging program for preparedness, we should develop with utmost speed a force in being, as distinguished from paper plans, of such power as to deter sudden attack or promptly and decisively defeat it. This defense against sudden attack requires the quickest possible development of appropriate and completely adequate air power and the simultaneous readiness of co-ordinated air, land, and sea forces, with all necessary installations, bases, supplies and munitions, including atomic energy weapons in abundance.

Generally, we shall see to it that our military services are adequately supported in all ways required, including manpower, to perform their appropriate tasks in relation to the defense of this country and to meet our treaty obligations.

We shall co-ordinate our military policy with our foreign policy, always seeking universal limitation and control of armaments on a dependable basis.

We shall review our entire preparedness program and we shall strip it clean of waste, lack of co-ordination, inertia, and conflict between the services. We shall see that our fighting men in Korea, or wherever they may be, shall not lack the best of weapons or other supplies or services needed for their welfare.

Communism

By the Administration's appeasement of Communism at home and abroad it has permitted Communists and their fellow travelers to serve in many key agencies and to infiltrate our American life. When such infiltration became notorious through the revelations of Republicans in Congress, the Executive Department stubbornly refused to deal with it openly and vigorously. It raised the false cry of "red herring" and took other measures to block and discredit investigations. It denied files and information to Congress. It set up boards of its own to keep information secret and to deal lightly with security risks and persons of doubtful loyalty. It only undertook prosecution of the most notorious Communists after public opinion forced action.

The result of these policies is the needless sacrifice of American lives, a crushing cost in dollars for defense, possession by Russia of the atomic bomb, the lowering of the Iron Curtain, and the present threats to world peace. Our people have been mired in fear and distrust and employees of integrity in the government service have been cruelly maligned by the Administration's tolerance of people of doubtful loyalty.

There are no Communists in the Republican party. We have always recognized Communism to be a world conspiracy against freedom and religion. We never compromised with Communism and we have fought to expose it and to eliminate it in government and American life.

A Republican President will appoint only persons of unquestioned loyalty. We will overhaul loyalty and security programs. In achieving these purposes a Republican President will co-operate with Congress. We pledge close co-ordination of our intelligence services for protecting our security. We pledge fair but vigorous enforcement of laws to safeguard our country from subversion and disloyalty. By such policies we will keep the country secure and restore the confidence of the American people in the integrity of our government.

Small Business in a Free Economy

For twenty years the Administration has praised free enterprise while actually wrecking it. Here a little, there a little, year by year, it has sought to curb, regulate, harass, restrain and punish. There is scarcely a phase of our economic and social life today in which government does not attempt to interfere.

Such hostility deadens initiative, discourages invention and experiment and weakens the self-reliance indispensable to the nation's vitality. Merciless taxation, the senseless use of controls and ceaseless effort to enter business on its own account have led the present government to unrestrained waste and extravagance in spending, irresponsibility in decision and corruption in administration.

The antimonopoly laws have been employed, not to preserve and foster competition but to further the political ambitions of the men in power. Wage and price controls have been utilized, not to maintain economic stability, but to reward the friends and punish the enemies of leaders of the party in power.

Neither small nor large business can flourish in such an atmosphere. The Republican party will end this hostility to initiative and enterprise.

We will aid small business in every practicable way. We shall remove tax abuses and injurious price and wage controls. Efforts to plan and regulate every phase of small business activity will cease. We will maintain special committees in Congress whose chief function will be to study and review continuously the problems of small business and recommend legislation for their relief. We shall always be mindful of the importance of keeping open the channels of opportunity for young men and women.

We will follow principles of equal enforcement of the antimonopoly and unfair competition statutes and will simplify their administration to assist the businessman who, in good faith, seeks to remain in compliance. At the same time, we shall relentlessly protect our free enterprise system against monopolistic and unfair trade practices.

We will oppose federal rent control except in those areas where the expansion of defense production has been accompanied by critical housing shortages. With local co-operation we shall aid slum clearance.

Our goal is a balanced budget, a reduced national debt, an economical administration and a cut in taxes. We believe in combating inflation by encouraging full production of goods and food and not through a program of restrictions.

Taxation and Monetary Policy

Only with a sound economy can we properly carry out both the domestic and foreign policies which we advocate. The wanton extravagance and inflationary policies of the Administration in power have cut the value of the dollar in half and imposed the most confiscatory taxes in our history. These policies have made the effective control of government expenditures impossible. If this Administration is left in power, it will further cheapen the dollar, rob the wage earner, impoverish the farmer and reduce the true value of the savings, pensions, insurance and investments of millions of our people. Further inflation must be and can be prevented. Sound tax and monetary policies are essential to this end. We advocate the following tax policies:

1. Reduction of expenditures by the elimination of waste and extravagance so that the budget will be balanced and a general tax reduction can be made.

2. An immediate study directed toward

reallocation of fields of taxation between the federal, state, and municipal governments so as to allow greater fiscal freedom to the states and municipalities, thus minimizing double taxation and enabling the various divisions of government to meet their obligations more efficiently.

3. A thorough revision and codification of the present hodgepodge of internal revenue laws.

4. Administration of the tax laws free from politics, favoritism and corruption.

We advocate the following monetary policies:

1. A Federal Reserve System exercising its functions in the money and credit system without pressure for political purposes from the Treasury or the White House.

2. To restore a domestic economy, and to use our influence for a world economy, of such stability as will permit the realization of our aim of a dollar on a fully convertible gold basis.

AGRICULTURE

The good earth is the food storehouse for future generations. The tending of the soil is a sacred responsibility. Development of a sound farm program is a high national duty. Any program that will benefit farmers must serve the national welfare. A prosperous agriculture with free and independent farmers is fundamental to the national interest.

We charge the present Administration with seeking to destroy the farmers' freedom. We denounce the Administraton's use of tax money and a multitude of federal agencies to put agriculture under partisan political dictation and to make the farmer dependent upon government. We condemn the Brannan plan which aims to control the farmer and to socialize agriculture. We brand as unscrupulous the Administration's manipulation of grain markets during the 1948 election campaign to drive down farm prices and its deliberate misrepresentation of laws passed by the Republican Eightieth Congress which authorized a long-range farm price support program and provided for adequate grain storage.

We condemn as a fraud on both the farmer and the consumer the Brannan plan scheme to pay direct subsidies from the Federal Treasury in lieu of prices to producers.

We favor a farm program aimed at full parity prices for all farm products in the market place. Our program includes commodity loans on nonperishable products, "on-the-farm" storage, sufficient farm credit and voluntary self-supporting crop insurance. Where government action on perishable commodities is desirable, we recommend locally controlled marketing agreements and other voluntary methods.

Our program should include commodity loans, on all nonperishable products supported at the level necessary to maintain a balanced production. We do not believe in restrictions on the American farmers' ability to produce.

We favor a bipartisan Federal Agricultural Commission with power to review the policies and administration of our farm programs and to make recommendations.

We support a constructive and expanded soil conservation program administered through locally controlled local districts and which shall emphasize that payments shall be made for practices and improvements of a permanent nature.

Flood control programs should include the application of sound land use, reforestation and water management practices on each watershed. These, so far as feasible, should be decentralized and locally controlled to insure economy and effective soil conservation.

We recommend expanded agricultural research and education to promote new crops and uses, new markets, both foreign and domestic, more trustworthy crop and market estimates, a realistic trade program for agriculture aimed at restoring foreign markets and developing new outlets at home. Promotion of world trade must be on a basis of fair competition.

We support the principle of bona fide farmer-owned, farmer-operated co-operatives and urge the further development of rural electrification and communication, with federally assisted production of power and facilities for distribution when these are not adequately available through private enterprise at fair rates.

We insist that an adequate supply of manpower on the farm is necessary to our national welfare and security and shall do those things required to assure this result.

The Republican party will create conditions providing for farm prosperity and stability, safeguarding the farmers' independence and opening opportunities for young people in rural communities. We will do those things necessary to simplify and make efficient the operation of the Department of Agriculture, prevent that Department from assuming powers neither intended nor delegated by Congress, and to place the administration of farm programs as closely as possible to state and local levels.

LABOR

The Republican party believes that regular and adequate income for the employee together with uninterrupted production of goods and services through the medium of private enterprise are essential to a sound national economy. This can only be obtained in an era of industrial peace.

With the above in mind, we favor the retention of the Taft-Hartley Act, which guarantees:

To the working man:

The right to quit his job at any time.

The right to take part in legal union activities.

The right to remain in his union so long as he pays his dues.

The right to protection against unfair practices by either employer or union officials.

The right to political activity of his own choice and freedom to contribute thereto.

The right to a job without first joining a union.

The right to a secret ballot in any election concerned with his livelihood.

The right to protection from personal financial responsibility in damage cases against his union.

To the labor unions:

The right to establish "union shop" contracts by agreement with management.

The right to strike.

The right to free collective bargaining.

The right to protection from rival unions during the life of union contracts.

The right to assurance from employers that they will bargain only with certified unions as a protection against unfair labor practices.

We urge the adoption of such amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act as time and experience show to be desirable, and which further protect the rights of labor, management and the public.

We condemn the President's seizure of plants and industries to force the settlement of labor disputes by claims of inherent Constitutional powers.

NATURAL RESOURCES

We vigorously advocate a full and orderly program for the development and conservation of our natural resources.

We deplore the policies of the present Administration which allow special premiums to foreign producers of minerals available in the United States. We favor reasonable depletion allowances, defense procurement policies, synthetic fuels research, and public land policies, including good faith administration of our mining laws, which will encourage exploration and development of our mineral resources consistent with our growing industrial and defense needs.

We favor stockpiling of strategic and critical raw materials and special premium incentives for their domestic exploration and development.

We favor restoration to the states of their rights to all lands and resources beneath navigable inland and offshore waters within their historic boundaries.

We favor protection of our fisheries by domestic regulation and treaties, including safeguards against unfair foreign competition.

PUBLIC WORKS AND WATER POLICY

The Federal Government and state and local governments should continuously plan programs of economically justifiable public works.

We favor continuous and comprehensive

investigations of our water resources and orderly execution of programs approved by the Congress. Authorized water projects should go forward progressively with immediate priority for those with defense significance, those in critical flood and water shortage areas, and those substantially completed.

We favor greater local participation in the operation and control, and eventual local ownership, of federally sponsored, reimbursable water projects.

We vigorously oppose the efforts of this national Administration, in California and elsewhere, to undermine state control over water use, to acquire paramount water rights without just compensation, and to establish all-powerful federal socialistic valley authorities.

PUBLIC LANDS

We favor restoration of the traditional Republican public land policy, which provided opportunity for ownership by citizens to promote the highest land use. We favor an impartial study of tax-free federal lands and their uses to determine their effects on the economic and fiscal structures of our states and local communities.

In the management of public lands and forests we pledge the elimination of arbitrary bureaucratic practices. To this end we favor legislation to define the rights and privileges of grazers and other co-operators and users, to provide the protection of independent judicial review against administrative invasions of those rights and privileges, and to protect the public against corrupt or monopolistic exploitation and bureaucratic favoritism.

VETERANS

We believe that active duty in the armed forces of the United States of America during a state of war or national emergency constitutes a special service to our nation and entitles those who have so served to aid and compensation in return for this service.

Consequently we propose:

That the aid and compensation given to veterans of previous wars be extended to veterans of the Korean conflict;

That compensation be fairly and adequately adjusted to meet changes in the cost of living;

That aid be given to veterans, particularly disabled veterans, to obtain suitable employment, by providing training and education, and through strict compliance with veterans' preference laws in federal service;

That the Veterans' Administration be maintained as a single, independent agency in full charge of all veterans' affairs, and that the Veterans' Administration manage veterans' affairs in an efficient, prompt and uniform manner;

That the Veterans' Administration should be equipped to provide and maintain medical and hospital care of the highest possible standard for all eligible veterans.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Inflation has already cut in half the purchasing power of the retirement and other benefits under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance system. Sixty million persons are covered under the system and 4.5 million are now receiving benefits.

The best assurance of preserving the benefits for which the worker has paid is to stop the inflation which causes the tragic loss of purchasing power, and that we propose to do.

We favor amendment of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance system to provide coverage for those justly entitled to it but who are now excluded.

We shall work to achieve a simple, more effective and more economical method of administration.

We shall make a thorough study of universal pay-as-we-go pension plans.

HEALTH

We recognize that the health of our people as well as their proper medical care cannot be maintained if subject to federal bureaucratic dictation. There should be a just division of responsibility between government, the physician, the voluntary hospital, and voluntary health insurance. We are opposed to federal compulsory health insurance with its crushing cost, wasteful inefficiency, bureaucratic dead weight, and debased standards of medical care. We shall support those health activities by government which stimulate the development of adequate hospital services without federal interference in local administration. We favor support of scientific research. We pledge our continuous encouragement of improved methods of assuring health protection.

EDUCATION

The tradition of popular education, tax supported and free to all, is strong with our people. The responsibility for sustaining this system of popular education has always rested upon the local communities and the states. We subscribe fully to this principle.

CIVIL RIGHTS

We condemn bigots who inject class, racial and religious prejudice into public and political matters. Bigotry is un-American and a danger to the Republic.

We deplore the duplicity and insincerity of the party in power in racial and religious matters. Although they have been in office as a majority party for many years they have not kept nor do they intend to keep their promises.

The Republican party will not mislead, exploit or attempt to confuse minority groups for political purposes. All American citizens are entitled to full, impartial enforcement of federal laws relating to their civil rights.

We believe that it is the primary responsibility of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions, and this power, reserved to the states, is essential to the maintenance of our federal Republic. However, we believe that the Federal Government should take supplemental action within its constitutional jurisdiction to oppose discrimination against race, religion or national origin.

We will prove our good faith by:

Appointing qualified persons, without distinction of race, religion or national origin, to responsible positions in the government.

Federal action toward the elimination of lynching.

Federal action toward the elimination of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting.

Appropriate action to end segregation in the District of Columbia.

Enacting federal legislation to further just and equitable treatment in the area of discriminatory employment practices. Federal action should not duplicate state efforts to end such practices; should not set up another huge bureaucracy.

CENSORSHIP

We pledge not to infringe by censorship or gag order the right of a free people to know what their government is doing.

EQUAL RIGHTS

We recommend to Congress the submission of a Constitutional amendment providing equal rights for men and women.

We favor legislation assuring equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.

STATEHOOD

We favor immediate statehood for Hawaii.

We favor statehood for Alaska under an equitable enabling act.

We favor eventual statehood for Puerto Rico.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

We favor self-government and national suffrage for the residents of the nation's capital.

INDIAN AFFAIRS

All Indians are citizens of the United States and no longer should be denied full enjoyment of their rights of citizenship.

We shall eliminate the existing shameful waste by the Bureau of Indian Affairs which has obstructed the accomplishment of our national responsibility for improving the condition of our Indian friends. We pledge to undertake programs to provide the Indians with equal opportunities for education, health protection and economic development.

The next Republican Administration will welcome the advice and counsel of Indian leaders in selecting the Indian Commissioner.

CIVIL SERVICE

We condemn the flagrant violations of the Civil Service merit system by the party in power.

We favor a personnel program for the federal career service comparable to the best practices of progressive private employers. Federal employees shall be selected under a strengthened and extended merit system. Civil servants of ability and integrity shall receive proper recognition, with merit the sole test for promotion.

DELIVERY OF MAIL

We pledge a more efficient and frequent mail delivery service.

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

We pledge a thorough reorganization of the Federal Government in accordance with the principles set forth in the report of the Hoover Commission which was established by the Republican Eightieth Congress.

We denounce the duplicity in submitting to Congress for approval, reorganization plans which were represented as being in accordance with the principles of the Hoover Commission recommendations but which in fact were actually intended to further partisan political purposes of the Administration in power.

CORRUPTION

The present Administration's sordid record of corruption has shocked and sickened the American people. Its leaders have forfeited any right to public faith by the the way they transact the Federal Government's business.

Fraud, bribery, graft, favoritism and influence-peddling have come to light. Immorality and unethical behavior have been found to exist among some who were entrusted with high policy-making positions, and there have been disclosures of close alliances between the present government and underworld characters.

Republicans exposed cases of questionable and criminal conduct and relentlessly pressed for full investigations into the cancer-like spread of corruption in the Administration. These investigations uncovered a double standard in federal tax law enforcement—lenient treatment to political favorites including even some gangsters and crooks but harassment and threats of prosecution for many honest taxpayers over minor discrepancies.

Besides tax fixes and scandals in the Internal Revenue Bureau, investigations have disclosed links between high officials and crime, favoritism and influence in the RFC, profiteering in grain, sale of postmasterships, tanker ship deals in the Maritime Commission, ballot box stuffing and thievery, and bribes and pay-offs in contract awards by officials in agencies exercising extraordinary powers and disbursing billions of dollars.

Under public pressure, the Administration took reluctant steps to clean house. But it was so eager to cover up and block more revelations that its cleanup drive launched with much fanfare ended in a farce.

The Republican party pledges to put an end to corruption, to oust the crooks and grafters, to administer tax laws fairly and impartially and to restore honest government to the people.

REPUBLICAN EIGHTIETH CONGRESS

The Republican party does not rest its case upon promises alone. We have a record of performance which was grossly defamed by the party in power. The Republican Eightieth Congress lanuched the program to stop Communism; unified the armed services; authorized a seventy-group Air Force which the President blocked; enacted a national service law; balanced the budget; accumulated an eight-billion-dollar surplus; reduced taxes with 70 per cent of the tax savings to those with incomes under $5,000; freed 7,400,000 wage earners in the lower brackets from having to pay any further income tax at all; allowed married couples to divide their incomes for tax purposes, and granted an additional $600 exemption to those over 65 years of age and to the blind; enacted the Taft-Hartley law for equitable labor-management relations; passed the first long-range agriculture program; increased social security benefits; and carried out every single pledge they made to the voters in the 1946 election.

CONCLUSION

Upon this statement of truths and this pledge of performance, the Republican party stands confident that it expresses the hopes of the citizens of America and certain that it points out with integrity a road upon which free men may march into a new day—a new and better day—in which shall be fulfilled the decent aspirations of our people for peace, for solvency and for the fulfillment of our best welfare, under the guidance of Divine Providence.

Report of Committee on Platform and Resolutions to the Democratic National Convention July 23, 1952

Preamble

Our nation has entered into an age in which Divine Providence has permitted the genius of man to unlock the secret of the atom.

No system of government can survive the challenge of an atomic era unless its administration is committed to the stewardship of a trustee imbued with a democratic faith, a buoyant hope for the future, the charity of brotherhood, and the vision to translate these ideals into the realities of human government. The Government of the United States, administered by the Democratic party, is today so entrusted.

The free choice of the Democratic party by the people of America as the instrument to achieve that purpose will mean world peace with honor, national security based on collective pacts with other free nations, and a high level of human dignity. National survival demands that these goals be attained, and the endowments of the Democratic party alone can assure their attainment.

For twenty years, under the dedicated guidance of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, our country has moved steadily along the road which has led the United States of America to world leadership in the cause of freedom.

We will not retreat one inch along that road. Rather, it is our prayerful hope that the people, whom we have so faithfully served, will renew the mandate to continue our service and that Almighty God may grant us the wisdom to succeed.

Twenty years of progress

Achieving prosperity. An objective appraisal of the past record clearly demonstrates that the Democratic party has been the chosen American instrument to achieve prosperity, build a stronger democracy, erect the structure of world peace, and continue on the path of progress.

Democratic party policies and programs rescued American business from total collapse—from the fatal economic consequences of watered stock, unsound banks, useless and greedy holding companies, high tariff barriers, and predatory business practices, all of which prevailed under the last Republican administrations. Democratic policies have enabled the Federal Government to help all business, small and large, to achieve the highest rate of productivity, the widest domestic and world markets, and the largest profits in the history of the nation.

The simple fact is that today there are more than four million operating business enterprises in this country, over one million more than existed in 1932. Corporate losses in that fateful year were over $3 billion; in 1951, corporate profits, after taxes, reached the staggering total of $18 billion.

Democratic policies and programs rescued American agriculture from the economic consequences of blight, drought, flood and storm, from oppressive and indiscriminate foreclosures, and from the ruinous conditions brought about by the bungling incompetence and neglect of the preceding twelve years of Republican maladministration. Economic stability, soil conservation, rural electrification, farm dwelling improvement, increased production and efficiency and more than sevenfold increase in cash income have been the return to farmers for their faith in the Democratic party.

Democratic labor policies have rescued the wage earners in this country from mass unemployment and from sweatshop slavery at starvation wages. Under our Democratic administrations, decent hours, decent wages, and decent working conditions have become the rule rather than the exception.

Self-organization of labor unions and collective bargaining, both of which are the keystone to labor management, peace and

prosperity, must be encouraged, for the good of all.

Unemployment is now less than 3 per cent of the labor force, compared with almost 25 per cent in 1932. Trade union membership has reached a total of 16 million, which is more than five times the total of 1932.

The welfare of all economic and social groups in our society has been promoted by the sound, progressive and humane policies of the Democratic party.

Strengthening democracy. We are convinced that lasting prosperity must be founded upon a healthy democratic society respectful of the rights of all people.

Under Democratic party leadership more has been done in the past twenty years to enhance the sanctity of individual rights than ever before in our history. Racial and religious minorities have progressed further toward real equality than during the preceding 150 years.

Governmental services, democratically administered, have been improved and extended. The efficiency, economy, and integration of federal operations have been advocated and effectuated through sound programs and policies. Through co-operative programs of federal aid, state and local governments have been encouraged and enabled to provide many more services.

The Democratic party has been alert to the corroding and demoralizing effects of dishonesty and disloyalty in the public service. It has exposed and punished those who would corrupt the integrity of the public service, and it has always championed honesty and morality in government. The Loyalty Program of President Truman has served effectively to prevent infiltration by subversive elements and to protect honest and loyal public servants against unfounded and malicious attacks.

We commend the relentless and fearless actions of congressional committees which, under vigorous Democratic leadership, have exposed dereliction in public service, and we pledge our support to a continuance of such actions as conditions require them.

The administration of our government by the Democratic party has been based upon principles of justice and equity, and upon the American tradition of fair play. Men who are elected to high political office are entrusted with high responsibilities. Slander, defamation of character, deception and dishonesty are as truly transgressions of God's commandments when resorted to by men in public life as they are for all other men.

Building peace with honor. The Democratic party has worked constantly for peace—lasting peace, peace with honor, freedom, justice, and security for all nations.

The return of the Democratic party to power in 1933 marked the end of a tragic era of isolationism fostered by Republican administrations which had deliberately and callously rejected the golden opportunity created by Woodrow Wilson for collective action to secure the peace.

This folly contributed to the Second World War. Victory in that war has presented the nations of the world a new opportunity which the Democratic party is determined shall not be lost.

We have helped establish the instrumentalities through which the hope of mankind for universal world peace can be realized. Under Democratic leadership, our nation has moved promptly and effectively to meet and repel the menace to world peace by Soviet imperialism.

Progress in the new era. The Democratic party believes that past progress is but a prelude to the human aspirations which may be realized in the future.

Under Democratic party leadership, America has accepted each new challenge of history and has found practical solutions to meet and overcome them. This we have done without departing from the principles of our basic philosophy that it is the destiny of man to achieve his earthly ends in the spirit of brotherhood.

A great Democrat—Franklin Delano Roosevelt—devised the programs of the New Deal to meet the pressing problems of the 1930's. Another great Democrat—Harry S. Truman—devised the programs of the Fair Deal to meet the complex problems of America in the 1940's. The Democratic party is ready to face and solve the challenging problems of the 1950's. We dedicate ourselves to the magnificent work of these great Presidents and to mold and

adapt their Democratic principles to the new problems of the years ahead.

In this spirit we adopt and pledge ourselves to this, the Democratic platform for 1952.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY

Our goal is peace with honor

Peace with honor is the greatest of all our goals.

We pledge our unremitting efforts to avert another world war. We are determined that the people shall be spared that frightful agony.

We are convinced that peace and security can be safeguarded if America does not deviate from the practical and successful policies developed under Democratic leadership since the close of World War II. We will resolutely move ahead with the constructive task of promoting peace.

The Democratic program for peace and national security

Supporting the United Nations. Under Democratic leadership, this country sponsored and helped create the United Nations and became a charter member and stanchly supports its aims.

We will continue our efforts to strengthen the United Nations, improve its institutions as experience requires, and foster its growth and development.

The Communist aggressor has been hurled back from South Korea. Thus, Korea has proved, once and for all, that the United Nations will resist aggression. We urge continued effort, by every honorable means, to bring about a fair and effective peace settlement in Korea in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Strong national defense. Our nation has strengthened its national defenses against the menace of Soviet aggression.

The Democratic party will continue to stand unequivocally for strong, balanced defense forces for this country—land, sea and air. We will continue to support the expansion and maintenance of the military and civil defense forces required for our national security. We reject the defeatist view of those who say we cannot afford the expense and effort necessary to defend ourselves. We express our full confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We voice complete faith in the ability and valor of our armed forces, and pride in their accomplishments.

Collective strength for the free world. We reject the ridiculous notices of those who would have the United States face the aggressors alone. That would be the most expensive—and the most dangerous—method of seeking security. This nation needs strong allies, around the world, making their maximum contribution to the common defense. They add their strength to ours in the defense of freedom.

The Truman Doctrine in 1947, the organization of hemisphere defense at Rio de Janeiro that same year, the Marshall plan in 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Point Four program, the resistance to Communist aggression in Korea, the Pacific Security Pacts in 1951, and the Mutual Security Programs now under way—all stand as landmarks of America's progress in mobilizing the strength of the free world to keep the peace.

Encouraging European unity. We encourage the economic and political unity of free Europe and the increasing solidarity of the nations of the North Atlantic community.

We hail the Schuman plan to pool the basic resources of industrial western Europe, and the European Defense Community. We are proud of America's part in carrying these great projects forward and we pledge our continuing support until they are established.

Support for free Germany. We welcome the German Federal Republic into the company of free nations. We are determined that Germany shall remain free and continue as a good neighbor in the European community. We sympathize with the German people's wish for unity and will continue to do everything we can by peaceful means to overcome the Kremlin's obstruction of that rightful aim.

Support for the victims of Soviet imperialism. We will not abandon the once-free peoples of central and eastern Europe who suffer now under the Kremlin's tyranny in violation of the Soviet Union's most solemn pledges at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. The United States should join other nations in formally declaring genocide to be an international crime in time of peace as well as war. This crime was exposed once more by the shocking revelations of Soviet guilt as disclosed in the report filed in Congress by the special committee investigating the Katyn Forest massacre. We look forward to the day when the liberties of Poland and the other oppressed Soviet satellites, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia and other nations in Asia under Soviet domination, will be restored to them and they can again take their rightful place in the community of free nations. We will carry forward and expand the vital and effective program of the "Voice of America" for penetration of the "Iron Curtain," bringing truth and hope to all the people subjugated by the Soviet empire.

Support for the nations of the Middle East. We seek to enlist the people of the Middle East to work with us and with each other in the development of the region, the lifting of health and living standards, and the attainment of peace. We favor the development of integrated security arrangements for the Middle East and other assistance to help safeguard the independence of the countries in the area.

We pledge continued assistance to Israel so that she may fulfill her humanitarian mission of providing shelter and sanctuary for her homeless Jewish refugees while strengthening her economic development.

We will continue to support the tripartite declaration of May 1950, to encourage Israel and the Arab states to settle their differences by direct negotiation, to maintain and protect the sanctity of the Holy Places and to permit free access to them.

We pledge aid to the Arab states to enable them to develop their economic resources and raise the living standards of their people. We support measures for the relief and reintegration of the Palestine refugees, and we pledge continued assistance to the reintegration program voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in January 1952.

South Asia: A testing ground for democracy. In the subcontinent of South Asia, we pledge continuing support for the great new countries of India and Pakistan in their efforts to create a better life for their people and build strong democratic governments to stand as bastions of liberty in Asia, secure against the threat of Communist subversion.

Collective security in the Pacific. We welcome free Japan as a friendly neighbor and an ally in seeking security and progress for the whole Pacific area. America's security pacts with Japan and with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand are indispensable steps toward comprehensive mutual security arrangements in that area. Our military and economic assistance to the Nationalist Government of China on Formosa has strengthened that vital outpost of the free world, and will be continued.

Strengthening the Americas. In the Western Hemisphere, we pledge ourselves to continue the policy of the good neighbor. We will strive constantly to strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation with our Latin American allies who are joined with us in the defense of the Americas.

Disarmament remains the goal. The free world is rearming to secure the peace. Under Democratic leadership, America always stands prepared to join in a workable system for foolproof inspection and limitation of all armaments, including atomic weapons. This nation has taken the leadership in proposing concrete, practical plans for such a system. We are determined to carry on the effort for real, effective disarmament.

We look forward to the day when a great share of the resources now devoted to the armaments program can be diverted into the channels of peaceful production to speed the progress of America and of the underdeveloped regions of the world.

Helping other people to help themselves. Even though we cannot now disarm, we will go forward as rapidly as possible in developing the imaginative and farsighted concept of President Truman embodied in the Point Four program.

We will continue to encourage use of American skills and capital in helping the

people of underdeveloped lands to combat disease, raise living standards, improve land tenure and develop industry and trade. The continuance of even stronger and more vigorous Point Four programs—sponsored both by this country and by the United Nations—is an indispensable element in creating a peaceful world.

Upholding the principle of self-determination. In an era when the "satellite state" symbolized both the tyranny of the aggressor nations and the extinction of liberty in small nations, the Democratic party reasserts and reaffirms the Wilsonian principle of the right of national self-determination. It is part of the policy of the Democratic party, therefore, to encourage and assist small nations and all peoples in the peaceful and orderly achievement of their legitimate aspirations toward political, geographical and ethnic integrity so that they may dwell in the family of sovereign nations with freedom and dignity.

Expanding world trade. The Democratic party has always stood for expanding trade among free nations. We reassert that stand today. We vigorously oppose any restrictive policies which would weaken the highly successful reciprocal trade program fathered by Cordell Hull.

Since 1934 the United States has taken the lead in fostering the expansion and liberalization of world trade.

Our own economy requires expanded export markets for our manufactured and agricultural products and a greater supply of essential imported raw materials. At the same time, our friends throughout the world will have opportunity to earn their own way to higher living standards with lessened dependence on our aid.

Progressive immigration policies. Solution of the problem of refugees from Communism and overpopulation has become a permanent part of the foreign policy program of the Democratic party. We pledge continued co-operation with other free nations to solve it.

We pledge continued aid to refugees from Communism and the enactment of President Truman's proposals for legislation in this field. In this way we can give hope and courage to the victims of Soviet brutality and can carry on the humanitarian tradition of the Displaced Persons Act.

Subversive elements must be screened out and prevented from entering our land, but the gates must be left open for practical numbers of desirable persons from abroad whose immigration to this country provides an invigorating infusion into the stream of American life, as well as a significant contribution to the solution of the world refugee and overpopulation problems.

We pledge continuing revision of our immigration and naturalization laws to do away with any unjust and unfair practices against national groups which have contributed some of our best citizens. We will eliminate distinctions between native-born and naturalized citizens. We want no "second-class" citizens in free America.

OUR DOMESTIC POLICY

Economic opportunity and growth

The United States is today a land of boundless opportunity. Never before has it offered such a large measure of prosperity, security and hope for all its people.

Horizons of even greater abundance and opportunity lie before us under a Democratic Administration responsive to the will of the people.

The Democratic Administration has had a guiding principle since taking office twenty years ago: that the prosperity and growth of this nation are indivisible. Every step we have taken to help the farmers has also helped the workers and business. Every improvement in the status of the worker has helped both farmers and business. Every expansion of business has provided more jobs for workers and greater demand for farm products.

A stabilized economy

Combating inflation. The Democratic Administration early recognized that defense production would limit the amount of goods in civilian markets, and subject our economy to heavy inflationary pressure. To prevent this from resulting in ruinous inflation, the Administration proposed pay-as-we-go taxation to keep the national debt as low as possible and to prevent excess money pressure on scarce goods and services.

Direct controls were also proposed to channel scarce materials into highly essential defense production, and to keep prices down.

In 1951 and 1952 Republican Congressmen demonstrated their attitude toward these necessary measures when they sponsored amendments which would have destroyed all controls.

Prices. We shall strive to redress the injury done to the American people—especially to white-collar workers and fixed-income families—by the weakening amendments which the Republicans in Congress have forced into our anti-inflation laws.

We pledge continuance of workable controls so long as the emergency requires them. We pledge fair and impartial enforcement of controls and their removal as quickly as economic conditions allow.

Rents. We strongly urge continued federal rent control in critical defense areas and in the many other localities still suffering from a substantial shortage of adequate housing at reasonable prices.

Full employment. The Democratic Administration prudently passed the Employment Act of 1946 declaring it to be national policy never again to permit large-scale unemployment to stalk the land. We will assure the transition from defense production to peacetime production without the ravages of unemployment. We pledge ourselves at all times to the maintenance of maximum employment, production, and purchasing power in the American economy.

Integrity in government finances

We solemnly pledge the preservation of the financial strength of the government. We have demonstrated our ability to maintain and enhance the nation's financial strength. In the six full fiscal years since V-J Day, our fiscal policy has produced a $4 billion budget surplus. We have reduced the public debt $17 billion from the postwar peak.

We have demonstrated our ability to make fiscal policy contribute in a positive way to economic growth and the maintenance of high-level employment. The policies which have been followed have given us the greatest prosperity in our history. Sustained economic expansion has provided the funds necessary to finance our defense and has still left our people with record high consumer incomes and business with a record volume of investment. Employment and personal incomes are at record levels. Never have Americans enjoyed a higher standard of living and saved more for contingencies and old age!

Federal taxes. We believe in fair and equitable taxation. We oppose a federal general sales tax. We adhere to the principle of ability to pay. We have enacted an emergency excess profits tax to prevent profiteering from the defense program and have vigorously attacked special tax privileges.

Tax reductions. In the future, as in the past, we will hold firm to policies consistent with sound financing and continuing economic progress. As rapidly as defense requirements permit, we favor reducing taxes, especially for people with lower incomes. But we will not imperil our nation's security by making reckless promises to reduce taxes. We deplore irresponsible assertions that national security can be achieved without paying for it.

Closing tax loopholes. Justice requires the elimination of tax loopholes which favor special groups. We pledge continued efforts to the elimination of remaining loopholes.

Government expenditure. We believe in keeping government expenditures to the lowest practicable level. The great bulk of our national budget consists of obligations incurred for defense purposes. We pledge ourselves to a vigilant review of our expenditures in order to reduce them as much as possible.

The American farmer and agriculture

We know that national prosperity depends upon a vigorous, productive and expanding agriculture.

We take great pride in our party's record of performance and in the impressive gains made by American agriculture in the last two decades. Under programs of Democratic administrations the net agricultural

income has increased from less than two billion dollars to almost fifteen billion dollars. These programs must be continued and improved.

Resource conservation. The soil resources of our country have been conserved and strengthened through the Soil Conservation Service, the Agricultural Conservation Program, the Forestry and the Research programs, with their incentives to increased production through sound conservation farming. These programs have revolutionized American agriculture and must be continued and expanded. We will accelerate programs of upstream flood prevention, watershed protection, and soil, forest and water conservation in all parts of the country. These conservation measures are a national necessity; they are invaluable to our farmers, and add greatly to the welfare of all Americans and of generations yet unborn.

Grass-roots administration. We will continue the widest possible farmer participation through referenda, farmer-elected committees, local soil conservation districts, and self-governing agencies in the conduct and administration of these truly democratic programs, initiated and developed under Democratic administrations.

Price supports. Under the present farm program, our farmers have performed magnificently and have achieved unprecedented production. We applaud the recent congressional action in setting aside the "sliding scale" for price support through 1954, and we will continue to protect the producers of basic agricultural commodities under the terms of a mandatory price support program at not less than 90 per cent of parity. We continue to advocate practical methods for extending price supports to other storables and to the producers of perishable commodities, which account for three-fourths of all farm income.

Abundant production. We will continue to assist farmers in providing abundant and stable supplies of agricultural commodities for the consumers at reasonable prices, and in assuring the farmer the opportunity to earn a fair return commensurate with that enjoyed by other segments of the American economy.

The agricultural adjustment programs encourage the production of abundant supplies while enabling producers to keep supply in line with consumer demand, preventing wide fluctuations and bringing stability to the agricultural income of the nation. We pledge retention of such programs.

We pledge continued efforts to provide adequate storage facilities for grain and other farm products with sufficient capacity for needed reserves for defense, and other emergency requirements, in order to protect the integrity of the farm price support programs.

Research. We are justly proud of the outstanding achievements of our agricultural research. We favor a greatly expanded research and education program for American agriculture in order that both production and distribution may more effectively serve consumers and producers alike, and thus meet the needs of the modern world. We favor especial emphasis on the development of new crops and varieties, on crop and livestock disease and pest control, and on agricultural statistics and marketing services.

Marketing. We must find profitable markets for the products of our farms, and we should produce all that these markets will absorb. To this end we will continue our efforts to reduce trade barriers, both at home and abroad, to provide better marketing and inspection facilities, and to find new uses and outlets for our foods and fibers both in domestic and foreign markets.

Farm credit. We have provided credit facilities for all agriculture, including means by which young men, veterans of military service, and farm tenants have been encouraged to become farmers and farm home owners, and through which low-income farmers have been assisted in establishing self-sustaining and fully productive farm units. We will not waver in our efforts to provide such incentives.

Crop insurance. Crop insurance to protect farmers against loss from destruction of their crops by natural causes has been created and developed under Democratic administrations into a sound business operation. This program should be expanded as rapidly as experience justifies, in order that its benefits may be made available to every farmer.

Rural electrification. Democratic administrations have established the great Rural Electrification Program, which has brought light and power to the rural homes of our nation. In 1935, only 10 per cent of the farm homes of America had the benefits of electricity. Today 85 per cent of our rural homes enjoy the benefits of electric light and power. We will continue to fight to make electricity avaliable to all rural homes, with adequate facilities for the generation and transmission of power. Through the Rural Telephone Program, inaugurated by the Democratic Eighty-first Congress, we will provide the opportunity for every farm home to have this modern essential service. We pledge support of these self-liquidating farm programs.

Co-operatives. We will continue to support the sound development and growth of bona fide farm co-operatives and to protect them from punitive taxation.

Defense needs. We will continue to recognize agriculture as an essential defense industry, and to assist in providing all the necessary tools, machinery, fertilizer, and manpower needed by farmers in meeting production goals.

Family farming. The family farm is the keystone of American agriculture. We will strive unceasingly to make the farm homes of our country healthier and happier places in which to live. We must see that our youth continues to find attractive opportunity in the field of agriculture.

The Republican Party Platform is loud in its criticism of our great farm programs. We challenge Republicans and other enemies of farm progress to justify their opposition to the program now in operation, to oppose the improvements here proposed, or to advocate repeal of a single vital part of our program.

A fair deal for workers

Good incomes. There can be no national prosperity unless our working men and women continue to prosper and enjoy rising living standards. The rising productivity of American workers is a key to our unparalleled industrial progress. Good incomes for our workers are the secret of our great and growing consumer markets.

Labor-management relations. Good labor-management relations are essential to good incomes for wage earners and rising output from our factories. We believe that to the widest possible extent consistent with the public interest, management and labor should determine wage rates and conditions of employment through free collective bargaining.

Taft-Hartley Act. We strongly advocate the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act.

The Taft-Hartley Act has been proved to be inadequate, unworkable, and unfair. It interferes in an arbitrary manner with collective bargaining, tipping the scales in favor of management against labor.

The Taft-Hartley Act has revived the injunction as a weapon against labor in industrial relations. The act has arbitrarily forbidden traditional hiring practices which are desired by both management and labor in many industries. The act has forced workers to act as strikebreakers against their fellow unionists. The act has served to interfere with one of the most fundamental rights of American workers—the right to organize in unions of their own choosing.

We deplore the fact that the Taft-Hartley Act provides an inadequate and unfair means of meeting with national emergency situations. We advocate legislation that will enable the President to deal fairly and effectively with cases where a breakdown in collective bargaining seriously threatens the national safety or welfare.

In keeping with the progress of the times, and based on past experience, a new legislative approach toward the entire labor-management problem should be explored.

Fair labor standards. We pledge to continue our efforts so that government programs designed to establish improved fair labor standards shall prove a means of assuring minimum wages, hours, and protection to workers, consistent with present-day progress.

Equal pay for equal work. We believe in equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex,

and we urge legislation to make that principle effective.

The physically handicapped. We promise to further the program to afford employment opportunities both in government and in private industry for physically handicapped persons.

Migratory workers. We advocate prompt improvement of employment conditions of migratory workers and increased protection of their safety and health.

Strengthening free enterprise

The free enterprise system has flourished and prospered in America during these last twenty years as never before. This has been made possible by the purchasing power of all our people and we are determined that the broad base of our prosperity shall be maintained.

Small and independent business. Small and independent business is the backbone of American free enterprise. Upon its health depends the growth of the economic system whose competitive spirit has built this nation's industrial strength and provided its workers and consumers with an incomparably high standard of living.

Independent business is the best offset to monopoly practices. The government's role is to insure that independent business receives equally fair treatment with its competitors.

Congress has established the Permanent Small Business Committee of the Senate and the Special Small Business Committee of the House, which have continued to render great service to this important segment of our economy. We favor continuance of both these committees with all the powers to investigate and report conditions, correct discriminations, and propose needed legislation.

We pledge ourselves to increased efforts to assure that small business be given equal opportunity to participate in government contracts, and that a suitable proportion of the dollar volume of defense contracts be channeled into independent small business. The Small Defense Plants Administration, which our party caused to be established, should retain its independent status and be made a continuing agency, equipped with sufficient lending powers to assist qualified small business in securing defense contracts.

We urge the enactment of such laws as will provide favorable incentives to the establishment and survival of independent businesses, especially in the provision of tax incentives and access to equity or risk capital.

Enforcement of antitrust laws. Free competitive enterprise must remain free and competitive if the productive forces of this nation are to remain strong. We are alarmed over the increasing concentration of economic power in the hands of a few.

We reaffirm our belief in the necessity of vigorous enforcement of the laws against trusts, combinations, and restraints of trade, which laws are vital to the safeguarding of the public interest and of small competitive business men against predatory monopolies. We will seek adequate appropriations for the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission for vigorous investigation and for enforcement of the antitrust laws. We support the right of all persons to work together in cooperatives and other democratic associations for the purpose of carrying out any proper business operations free from any arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions.

Protection of investors and consumers. We must avoid unnecessary business controls. But we cannot close our eyes to the special problems which require government surveillance. The government must continue its efforts to stop unfair selling practices which deceive investors, and unfair trade practices which deceive consumers.

Transportation. In the furtherance of national defense and commerce, we pledge continued government support, on a sound financial basis, for further development of the nation's transportation systems, land, sea and air. We endorse a policy of fostering the safest and most reliable air transportation system of the world. We favor fair, nondiscriminatory freight rates to encourage economic growth in all parts of the country.

Highways. In co-operation with state and local governmental units, we will continue to plan, co-ordinate, finance, and encourage the expansion of our road and highway network, including access roads, for the dual purposes of national defense and efficient motor transportation. We support expansion of farm-to-market roads.

Rivers and harbors. We pledge continued development of our harbors and waterways.

Merchant Marine. We will continue to encourage and support an adequate Merchant Marine.

Our natural resources

The United States has been blessed with the richest natural resources of any nation on earth.

Yet, unless we redouble our conservation efforts we will become a "have-not" nation in some of the most important raw materials upon which depend our industries, agriculture, employment and high standard of living. This can be prevented by a well-rounded and nation-wide conservation effort.

Land and water resources. We favor sound, progressive development of the nation's land and water resources for flood control, navigation, irrigation, power, drainage, soil conservation and creation of new, small family-sized farms, with immediate action in critical areas.

We favor the acceleration of all such projects, including construction of transmission facilities to load centers for wider and more equitable distribution of electric energy at the lowest cost to the consumer with continuing preference to public agencies and REA co-operatives.

The Democratic party denounces all obstructionist devices designed to prevent or retard utilization of the nation's power and water resources for the benefit of the people, their enterprises and interests.

The wise policy of the Democratic party in encouraging multipurpose projects throughout the country is responsible for America's productive superiority over any nation in the world and is one of the greatest single factors leading toward the accomplishment of world peace. Without these projects our atomic weapons program could never have been achieved, and without additional such projects it cannot be expanded.

The Democratic party is dedicated to a continuation of the natural resources development policy inaugurated and carried out under the administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and to the extension of that policy to all parts of the nation, North, South, East, Midwest, West and the territories to the end that the nation and its people receive maximum benefits from these resources to which they have an inherent right.

The Democratic party further pledges itself to protect these resources from destructive monopoly and exploitation.

River basin development. We pledge the continued full and unified regional development of the water, mineral, and other natural resources of the nation, recognizing that the progress already achieved under the initiative of the Democratic party in the arid and semiarid states of the West, as well as in the Tennessee Valley, is only an indication of still greater results which can be accomplished.

Fertilizer development. Great farming areas, particularly of the Midwest and West, are in acute need of low-cost commercial fertilizers. To meet this demand, we favor the opening of the nation's phosphate rock deposits in the West, through prompt provision of sufficient low-cost hydroelectric power to develop this great resource.

Forests and public lands. We seek to establish and demonstrate such successful policies of forest and land management on federal property as will materially assist state and private owners in their conservation efforts. Conservation of forest and range lands is vital to the strength and welfare of the nation. Our forest and range lands must be protected and used wisely in order to produce a continuing supply of basic raw materials for industry; to reduce damaging floods; and to preserve the sources of priceless water. With adequate appropriations to carry out feasible projects, we pledge a program of forest protection, reforestation projects and sound practices of production and harvesting which will promote sustained yields of forest crops.

We propose to increase forest access roads in order to improve cutting practices on both public and private lands.

On the public land ranges we pledge con-

tinuance of effective conservation and use programs, including the extension of water pond construction and restoration of forage cover.

Arid areas. In many areas of the nation assistance is needed to provide water for irrigation, domestic and industrial purposes. We pledge that in working out programs for rational distribution of water from federal sources we will aid in delivering this essential of life cheaply and abundantly.

Minerals and fuels. The nation's minerals and fuels are essential to the national defense and development of our country. We pledge the adoption of policies which will further encourage the exploration and development of additional reserves of our mineral resources. We subscribe to the principles of the Stockpiling Act and will lend our efforts to strengthening and expanding its provisions and those of the Defense Production Act to meet our military and civilian needs. Additional access roads should be constructed with government aid. Our synthetic fuels including monetary metals research program should go forward. Laws to aid and assist these objectives will be advocated.

Domestic fisheries. We favor increased research and exploration for conserving and better utilizing fishery resources; expanded research and education to promote new fishery products and uses and new markets; promotion of world trade in fish products; a public works and water policy providing adequate protection for domestic fishery resources; and treaties with other nations for conservation and better utilization of international fisheries.

Wildlife recreation. In our highly complex civilization, outdoor recreation has become essential to the health and happiness of our people.

The Democratic party has devoted its efforts to the preservation, restoration and increase of the bird, animal and fish life which abound in this nation. State, local and private agencies have co-operated in this worthy endeavor. We have extended and vastly improved the parks, forests, beaches, streams, preserves and wilderness areas across the land.

To the 28,000,000 of our citizens who annually purchase fishing and hunting licenses, we pledge continued efforts to improve all recreational areas.

Atomic energy

In the field of atomic energy, we pledge ourselves

1. To maintain vigorous and nonpartisan civilian administrations, with adequate security safeguards;

2. To promote the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the interests of America and mankind;

3. To build all the atomic and hydrogen firepower needed to defend our country, deter aggression, and promote world peace;

4. To exert every effort to bring about bona fide international control and inspection of all atomic weapons.

Social security

Our national system of social security, conceived and developed by the Democratic party, needs to be extended and improved.

Old-age and survivors insurance. We favor further strengthening of old-age and survivors insurance, through such improvements as increasing benefits, extending them to more people and lowering the retirement age for women.

We favor the complete elimination of the work clause for the reason that those contributing to the social security program should be permitted to draw benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility and still continue to work.

Unemployment insurance. We favor a stronger system of unemployment insurance, with broader coverage and substantially increased benefits including an allowance for dependents.

Public assistance. We favor further improvements in public assistance programs for the blind, the disabled, the aged and children in order to help our less fortunate citizens meet the needs of daily living.

Private plans. We favor and encourage the private endeavors of social agencies, mutual associations, insurance companies, industry-labor groups, and co-operative societies to provide against the basic hazards of life through mutually agreed-upon benefit plans designed to complement our present social security program.

Needs of our aging citizens

Our older citizens constitute an immense reservoir of skilled, mature judgment and ripened experience. We pledge ourselves to give full recognition to the right of our older citizens to lead a proud, productive and independent life throughout their years.

In addition to the fundamental improvements in old-age and survivors insurance, which are outlined above, we pledge ourselves in co-operation with the states and private industry to encourage the employment of older workers. We commend the Eighty-second Congress for eliminating the age restriction on employment in the Federal Government.

Health

We will continue to work for better health for every American, especially our children. We pledge continued and wholehearted support for the campaign that modern medicine is waging against mental illness, cancer, heart disease and other diseases.

Research. We favor continued and vigorous support, from private and public sources, of research into the causes, prevention and cure of disease.

Medical education. We advocate federal aid for medical education to help overcome the growing shortages of doctors, nurses, and other trained health personnel.

Hospitals and health centers. We pledge continued support for federal aid to hospital construction. We pledge increased federal aid to promote public health through preventive programs and health services, especially in rural areas.

Cost of medical care. We also advocate a resolute attack on the heavy financial hazard of serious illness. We recognize that the costs of modern medical care have grown to be prohibitive for many millions of people. We commend President Truman for establishing the nonpartisan Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation to seek an acceptable solution of this urgent problem.

Housing

We pledge ourselves to the fulfillment of the programs of private housing, public low-rent housing, slum clearance, urban redevelopment, farm housing and housing research as authorized by the Housing Act of 1949.

We deplore the efforts of special interests groups, which themselves have prospered through government guarantees of housing mortgages, to destroy those programs adopted to assist families of low income.

Additional legislation. We pledge ourselves to enact additional legislation to promote housing required for defense workers, middle-income families, aged persons and migratory farm laborers.

Veterans' housing. We pledge ourselves to provide special housing aids to veterans and their families.

Education

Every American child, irrespective of color, national origin, economic status or place of residence, should have every educational opportunity to develop his potentialities.

Local, state and federal government have shared responsibility to contribute appropriately to the pressing needs of our educational system. We urge that federal contributions be made available to state and local units which adhere to basic minimum standards.

The Federal Government should not dictate or control educational policy.

We pledge immediate consideration for those school systems which need further legislation to provide federal aid for new school construction, teachers' salaries and school maintenance and repair.

We urge the adoption by appropriate legislative action of the proposals advocated by the President's Commission on Higher Education, including federal scholarships.

We will continue to encourage the further development of vocational training which helps people acquire skills and technical knowledge so essential to production techniques.

Child welfare

The future of America depends on adequate provision by government for the needs of those of our children who cannot

be cared for by their parents or private social agencies.

Maternity, child health and welfare services. The established national policy of aiding states and localities, through the Children's Bureau and other agencies, to insure needed maternity, child health and welfare services should be maintained and extended. Especially important are the detection and treatment of physical defects and diseases which, if untreated, are reflected in adult life in draft rejections and as handicapped workers. The nation as a whole should provide maternity and health care for the wives, babies and preschool children of those who serve in our armed forces.

School lunches. We will enlarge the school lunch program which has done so much for millions of American school children and charitable institutions while at the same time benefiting producers.

Day care facilities. Since several million mothers must now be away from their children during the day because they are engaged in defense work, facilities for adequate day care of these children should be provided and adequately financed.

Children of migratory workers. The nation as a whole has a responsibility to support health, educational and welfare services for the children of agricultural migratory workers who are now almost entirely without such services while their parents are engaged in producing essential crops.

Veterans

The Democratic party is determined to advance the welfare of all the men and women who have seen service in the armed forces. We pledge ourselves to continue and improve our national program of benefits for veterans and their families, to provide the best possible medical care and hospitalization for the disabled veteran, and to help provide every veteran an opportunity to be a productive and responsible citizen with an assured place in the civilian community.

Strengthening democratic government

Streamlining the Federal Government. The public welfare demands that our government be efficiently and economically operated and that it be reorganized to meet changing needs. During the present Democratic Administration, more reorganization has been accomplished than by all its predecessors. We pledge our support to continuing reorganization wherever improvements can be made. Only constant effort by the Executive, the Congress, and the public will enable our government to render the splendid service to which our citizens are entitled.

Improving the Postal Service. We pledge a continuing increase in the services of the United States Postal Service. Through efficient handling of mail, improved working conditions for postal employees, and more frequent services, the Democratic party promises its efforts to provide the greatest communication system in the world for the American people.

Strengthening the civil service. Good government requires a civil service high in quality and prestige. We deplore and condemn smear attacks upon the character and reputations of our federal workers. We will continue our fight against partisan political efforts to discredit the federal service and undermine American principles of justice and fair play.

Under President Truman's leadership, the federal civil service has been extended to include a greater proportion of positions than ever before. He has promoted a record number of career appointees to top-level policy positions. We will continue to be guided by these enlightened policies, and we will continue our efforts to provide federal service with adequate pay, sound retirement provisions, good working conditions, and an opportunity for advancement.

We will use every proper means to eliminate pressure by private interests seeking undeserved favors from the government. We advocate the strongest penalties against those who try to exert improper influence, and against any who may yield to it.

Democracy in federal elections. We advocate new legislation to provide effective regulation and full disclosure of campaign expenditures in elections to federal office, including political advertising from any source.

We recommend that Congress provide for a nonpartisan study of possible improvements in the methods of nominating and electing Presidents and in the laws relating to Presidential succession. Special attention should be given to the problem of assuring the widest possible public participation in Presidential nominations.

Strengthening basic freedoms. We will continue to press strongly for world-wide freedom in the gathering and dissemination of news and for support to the work of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in furthering this and other freedoms.

Equal Rights Amendment. We recommend and endorse for submission to the Congress a constitutional amendment providing equal rights for women.

Puerto Rico. Under Democratic party leadership, a new status has been developed for Puerto Rico. This new status is based on mutual consent and common devotion to the United States, formalized in a new Puerto Rican Constitution. We welcome the dignity of the new Puerto Rican Commonwealth and pledge our support of the Commonwealth, its continued development and growth.

Alaska and Hawaii. By virtue of their strategic geographical locations, Alaska and Hawaii are vital bastions in the Pacific. These two territories have contributed greatly to the welfare and economic development of our country and have become integrated into our economic and social life. We therefore urge immediate statehood for these two territories.

Other territories and possessions. We favor increased self-government for the Virgin Islands and other outlying territories and the Trust Territory of the Pacific.

District of Columbia. We favor immediate home rule and ultimate national representation for the District of Columbia.

American Indians. We shall continue to use the powers of the Federal Government to advance the health, education and economic well-being of our American Indian citizens, without impairing their cultural traditions. We pledge our support to the cause of fair and equitable treatment in all matters essential to and desirable for their individual and tribal welfare.

The American Indian should be completely integrated into the social, economic and political life of the nation. To that end we shall move to secure the prompt final settlement of Indian claims and to remove restrictions on the rights of Indians individually and through their tribal councils to handle their own fiscal affairs.

We favor the repeal of all acts or regulations that deny to Indians rights or privileges held by citizens generally.

Constitutional government. The Democratic party has demonstrated its belief in the Constitution as a charter of individual freedom and an effective instrument for human progress. Democratic administrations have placed upon the statute books during the last twenty years a multitude of measures which testify to our belief in the Jeffersonian principle of local control, even in general legislation involving nation-wide programs. Selective service, social security, agricultural adjustment, low-rent housing, hospital, and many other legislative programs have placed major responsibilities in states and counties and provide fine examples of how benefits can be extended through federal-state co-operation.

In the present world crisis with new requirements of federal action for national security, and accompanying provision for public services and individual rights related to defense, constitutional principles must and will be closely followed. Our record and our clear commitments in this platform measure our strong faith in the ability of constitutional government to meet the needs of our times.

Improving congressional procedures. In order that the will of the American people may be expressed upon all legislative proposals, we urge that action be taken at the beginning of the Eighty-third Congress to improve congressional procedures so that majority rule prevails and decisions can be made after reasonable debate without being blocked by a minority in either House.

Civil rights

The Democratic party is committed to support and advance the individual rights and liberties of all Americans.

Our country is founded on the proposition that all men are created equal. This

means that all citizens are equal before the law and should enjoy equal political rights. They should have equal opportunities for education, for economic advancement, and for decent living conditions.

We will continue our efforts to eradicate discrimination based on race, religion or national origin.

We know this task requires action, not just in one section of the nation, but in all sections. It requires the co-operative efforts of individual citizens and action by state and local governments. It also requires federal action. The Federal Government must live up to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and must exercise the powers vested in it by the Constitution.

We are proud of the progress that has been made in securing equality of treatment and opportunity in the nation's armed forces and the civil service and all areas under federal jurisdiction. The Department of Justice has taken an important part in successfully arguing in the courts for the elimination of many illegal discriminations, including those involving rights to own and use real property, to engage in gainful occupations and to enroll in publicly supported higher educational institutions. We are determined that the Federal Government shall continue such policies.

At the same time, we favor federal legislation effectively to secure these rights to everyone: (1) the right to equal opportunity for employment; (2) the right to security of persons; (3) the right to full and equal participation in the nation's political life, free from arbitrary restraints. We also favor legislation to perfect existing federal civil rights statutes and to strengthen the administrative machinery for the protection of civil rights.

CONCLUSION

Under the guidance, protection, and help of Almighty God we shall succeed in bringing to the people of this nation a better and more rewarding life and to the peoples of the entire world, new hope and a lasting, honorable peace.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

HILL, NORMAN. *International Organization.* Pp. 627. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $5.00.

Professor Hill, well-known scholar of international relations and administration, has added this general text and collection of documents to the now rapidly growing body of postwar treatises on international organization. He offers a sound, if conventional, description of the major agencies of international co-operation, including both regional and global institutions. Emphasis is placed on procedures of consultation and conference, with particular reference to the handling of international disputes.

This book lacks the broad legal and sociological perspective of Eagleton's *International Government;* and it does not bring the student as intimately into the operational dynamics of international organizations as L. Larry Leonard's recent volume. Nevertheless, it gives a lucid, well-expressed survey of the historical development, constitutional features, and methods of action of the League of Nations, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, and, briefly, of diplomatic and technical international conferences. A full chapter is devoted to the International Court of Justice.

Professor Hill realistically interprets the powers and functions of these agencies as essentially nongovernmental, recognizing that most national governments still insist, in the name of "sovereignty," on retaining the actual power of decision over their international relations. The author consequently questons whether a reliable system of collective security can be constructed, based on compulsive international sanctions. He properly envisages the primary political task of international organizations as the promotion of peaceful settlement of controversies by methods dependent on the voluntary consent of the disputing states.

The serious shortcoming of the book is its neglect of the vast range of international activities devoted to the improvement of economic and social welfare, the development of international commerce and communications, and the protection of human rights—the whole field of "functional" international co-operation. The most notable achievements of international organizations to date have occurred along these lines; and so long as powerful states continue to rely on Machiavellian precepts in their political relations, effective collaboration among them will probably be limited to mutual interests which nations are willing to consider "non-political."

It is unclear why Professor Hill avoided careful consideration of these aspects of international organization, for in previous works he has demonstrated great interest in them. Perhaps he now questions whether the functional and the political can be sufficiently separated in the conduct of international relations to permit the growth of international organization along one line, while it is largely frustrated along the other. But in the immediate future, the implementation of *common* national interests, rather than the manipulation of outright conflicts of interests, is more likely to be the crucial significance of international organization in the struggles to establish a peaceful world order.

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STONE, I. F. *The Hidden History of the Korean War*. Pp. xviii, 364. New York: Monthly Review Press (distributed by The Citadel Press), 1952. $5.00.

For the most part, Mr. Stone's book consists of heavily belabored "evidence" naming the United States as the aggressor in the Korean War and alleging a deep-dyed plot on the part of Messrs. MacArthur, Dulles, and others to bring about World War III.

This reviewer does not feel that the Western powers are necessarily all angels, with the Soviet bloc all devils. However it is difficult to view soberly the author's contention that a peace-minded Kremlin "was more surprised than Washington by the outbreak of the war" and that "there is also reason to believe that the North Koreans were taken by surprise." Nor can this reviewer consider as more than pure calculated rubbish Mr. Stone's evaluation of the purposes of American policy: "The Soviet bloc was to be treated with hostility, subjected to political boycott and economic blockade, and forced to divert its energies from reconstruction into an ever greater arms race, in the hope that the pressure would cause the Soviet regime to collapse from within . . . or to sue for peace on any terms. . . . The settlement of the Korean question by peaceful means would inevitably create a burst of good feeling Washington wished desperately to avoid."

We are told by Mr. Stone that the South Koreans were actually the aggressors in the current war. The circumstance that it was the North Koreans who invaded the South is explained on the thesis that the gullible Reds "were deliberately provoked by Syngman Rhee in the hope that they would retaliate by crossing the Parallel. . . . The Northerners for their part, fell neatly into the the trap."

This is a tiresome and tedious book, in which statements of evidence are continually pulled out of context, and their meanings warped and distorted. But like all fantasy it contains certain grains of truth, though in ways apparently unsuspected by the author. The United Nations command, for example, is seen as a papier-maché instrument which bears little relation to any organically constituted authority. Neither is it "obligated to consult the United Nations, [nor] to report to it regularly or otherwise." Thus the conclusion is irresistible that the United States became party to a procedure of pretense and diplomatic mumbo-jumbo which in the end would see her compelled to wage the war in Korea virtually alone.

It seems to this observer at least that Mr. Stone's manuscript takes little away from the argument that General MacArthur's analysis was the correct one, and that the war in Eastern Asia could have been ended expeditiously had the Chinese ports been immediately blockaded and had China's vital communications, airfields, and marshaling grounds been destroyed while the overwhelming preponderance of attack power was still in our hands.

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MANNING, CLARENCE A. *The Siberian Fiasco*. Pp. 210. New York: Library Publishers, 1952. $3.75.

In view of the continuing inability of Western diplomacy, American in particular, to grapple with Oriental problems, notably Russian, Chinese and Japanese, there is a melancholy timeliness, not to say timelessness, in the study of an early and conspicuous failure in the relations of West with East. The Siberian venture, 1918–1920, is, in fact, peculiarly instructive, though it is doubtful that a government which could accept as guides in Far Eastern affairs the men who progressively lost all of East Asia to the Reds, and which still harbors some of them in most exalted stations, would pay much heed, even were Professor Manning to speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and to sound his warning on "an instrument of ten strings."

This small book is so compact with information that its lesson can be only sketchily conveyed. Throughout, one notes the hamstringing effect of a sort of schizophrenia between War and State Departments in the United States government. Their refusal to co-operate intelligently left General William S. Graves, commander of the Siberian expedition, even more confused than he need have been from his original instructions, conveyed as an *aide-mémoire* by the Department of State, but drafted obviously by Woodrow Wilson in his most mystifying style of transcendental idealism, remote from the ordinary facts of life and peculiarly devoid of any understanding of Oriental barbarism.

Nevertheless, a competent general and some 8,000 good soldiers did accomplish something. They were of undoubted assistance to the Czechoslovak forces in their escape from Russia, they guarded a considerable segment of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and, negatively but most importantly, they averted a major war in the Far East which would have cost the West even greater loss of prestige than actually occurred.

From the vantage of experience, the author suggests that a basic error in the entire Western concept was the endeavor to prop up the Russian Empire (not, of course, the Czarist) as a whole. Its dismemberment should have been a prime objective. Even Winston Churchill, a quarter century later, preoccupied with Germany, missed this lesson as completely as did F. D. Roosevelt (pp. 190–191).

But gloomy as is the picture he presents, the author closes on a hopeful note. He calls the Siberian adventure a mistake but not a crime, and he trusts that even yet it may teach the West a lesson.

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FFRENCH, YVONNE (Ed.). *Transatlantic Exchanges: Cross-Currents of Anglo-American Opinion in the Nineteenth Century*. Pp. 255. New York: Library Publishers, 1952. $3.75.

In compiling a book of extracts of American writers on England and of English writers on America, Yvonne ffrench is, it must be admitted, plowing a well tilled field. Most of the authors cited are well known for their opinions about the other shore of the Atlantic; the comments of Sydney Smith ("Who reads an American book?"), of Mrs. Trollope, of Charles Dickens, of Matthew Arnold, of Oscar Wilde, on the one hand, and of Washington Irving, Emerson, and Hawthorne, on the other, are familiar to many. Even the idea of such an anthology is not new, as witness Allan Nevins' *American Social History as Recorded by British Travellers and R. B. Mowat's Americans in England*.

Even so, the book is welcome. The extracts are brief, interesting, and arranged in the form of a transatlantic debate in chronological sequence from Tom Paine and William Cobbett to Henry James and Bernard Shaw. For every insult from either side there is a "countercheck quarrelsome" from the other; for every compliment (much rarer), a return bouquet. The editor's introduction, though not so analytical as Nevins', is well balanced and good tempered. If any complaint must be made, it is that the range of authors cited is too narrow. For example, there are a score of passages cited from Frances Trollope, but not one from Anthony Trollope, who also wrote copiously on the American scene, and much more fairly. One may also venture to hope that some day a companion volume will appear on Anglo-American exchanges in the twentieth century, surely as numerous and as significant as those of the nineteenth.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICAL THEORY

DOUGLAS, PAUL H. *Economy in the National Government.* Pp. vii, 277. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. $3.75.

Anyone who looks on the government as an efficient and economical spender of the taxpayer's dollar will find this a disheartening book. Of course, not many such persons exist. But even those who believe government expenditures are made in a passably honest, competent, and coordinated manner will be discouraged.

In effect, this is a sort of handbook, based on Senator Douglas' personal research and effort, of federal financial inefficiency. An enormous range of material is touched on, as must be the case, since the federal budget is only one of the matters covered. Examples of waste, graft, ineptitude, and corruption range all the way from procedures in budget-making to the government's method of granting civil servants vacations with pay, the 5 percenters, and the Navy's 11,000 dozen oyster forks. It is an impressive indictment. Yet several issues fundamental to this whole range of topics are not dealt with, such as the government's (almost) unbelievable accounting *system* and the fact that the sum total of government appropriations is not, in the process of budget-making, compared with the estimated sum total of revenues.

Issues deeper, however, than the financial defects of the federal government are involved in this volume. One is the fact that the legislative branch of the government has very nearly lost control of the purse—a cause of more than one revolution. While the Senator hints at this here and there, he never quite faces up to the situation. Another is the moral difference, if any, between a dollar wasted in a depression (which creates purchasing power) and one wasted in a boom (which creates inflation). A third is whether the results of the government's financial activities are better, or worse, than can normally be expected from any type of large-scale bureaucratic government operation. So far as this reviewer is concerned the types of criticism directed at federal taxing, budget-making, and spending could be directed almost equally well at any facet of the government's activities and at big government or socialism in any form. For basically the volume is an arraignment of bureaucracy, big government, and the whole governmental process, not merely an account of the obstacles in the way of economy. And finally, it is an indictment of the morals and the sense of responsibility of the American people—since it is their government, and they tolerate it.

CHARLES C. ABBOTT
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LUBELL, SAMUEL. *The Future of American Politics.* Pp. viii, 285. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. $3.50.

This is perhaps the most penetrating and most readable analysis of recent and current American politics that has appeared for some time. It is replete with pungent and quotable passages, yet manages to achieve a commendable degree of balance, restraint, and objectivity.

Mr. Lubell describes the growing economic and political importance of recent immigrant groups, the movement of both Negroes and whites from the South to northern industrial centers, the industrialization and urbanization of the South, and the mechanization of agriculture in the South and in the West. This, he finds, has forced a political realignment, has transformed a normal Republican *majority* into a normal Democratic majority, has changed the race problem from a purely sectional one to a truly national one, and has revived the struggle for the establishment of a two-party system in the South. He notes that our current political controversies are expressed in terms of civil rights versus state rights, big government versus little government, the welfare state versus free enterprise, and internationalism versus isolationism—as talking points if not always as genuine issues.

He points out, however, that both major parties are coalitions of diverse interests and are usually unable to take a clear-cut stand on these questions. This has resulted in "border state politics"—a state of mind as well as an expression of geography—encouraging, if not forcing upon us a policy of compromise and stalemate. Despite the dissension growing out of our economic, sectional, ethnic, and religious rivalries, he finds the American government to be the most stable in the world. He feels, however, that we must somehow resolve our underlying struggle for national unity, achieve a better integration of the diverse elements in our population, and develop political parties and leaders that are capable of more decisive action, since stalemate cannot continue indefinitely.

The meticulous reader may criticize Mr. Lubell's reference to Frances Perkins, former Secretary of Labor, as "Mrs. Perkins." Hopeful Southerners may question his assertion that the political and economic revolution in the South has made the South more conservative (instead of merely bringing conservatism into sharper focus by challenging it). Those who fear the drift toward big government may object to the statement that "The real need is to strengthen government—not to protect either business-as-usual or social-gains-as-usual, but to discipline both to the national interest." None, however, can question the timeliness of this book or the contribution which it makes to an understanding of our political dynamics.

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STROMBERG, ROLAND N. *Republicanism Reappraised.* Pp. 93. Washington, D.C.: The Public Affairs Press, 1952. $2.00.

This book is a vigorous essay on the recent history of the Republican party with an analysis of its current prospects, "from a viewpoint," says its author, "sympathetic to the Republicans." If Republican politicians should ever read the book they would conclude that sympathy is much harder to find in its pages than many cutting criticisms, such as "The Republicans in the Senate with only a few exceptions hated Wilson primarily, and not the League; and they hated Wilson not primarily because he was Wilson, but because he was a successful Democratic President. They were encouraged in their long, dogged fight to defeat the Treaty and the League because at the end of the trail lay political gold. So the Republican party began its post-war career under a cloud, with a victory tainted by the bad odor of demagoguery and abandonment of principle."

On domestic issues, with the election of Harding the party turned conservative, and, writes the author, "A conservative, defensive party produces no great leaders, and no ideas." Such a generalization seems to this reviewer too broad, but for the period of the twenties we may agree that "while Republicans proclaimed the economics of pure competition, their deeds encouraged an ever-growing rigidity in the economic system, cartels and quasi-monopolies in big industry." The debacle came when "A complicated but decidedly not self-steering economic machine shot off the tracks at better than 80 per, while engineers and switchman were fast asleep, dreaming of a world where trains run themselves." Professor Stromberg feels, however, that the Republicans have still not learned their lesson: "Not long ago a decrepit Southern Democrat raised a voice against 'statism' and hordes of Republicans staggered to their feet, hoarsely cheering."

The only hope for the Republican party in domestic affairs, the author believes, is a return to Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism, which was "authentically Republican." This reviewer is inclined to believe that too much water has gone down the Potomac since 1932 for such a program, even if revived, to suffice to win. Too many liberal and independent voters have advanced too far beyond Roosevelt's position. Even if this were not the situation it is unlikely that the Republican party would go liberal, for, in our author's words, "Reactionary and/or confused the Republican party has been most of the time since 1932."

For the Republican position on foreign affairs Professor Stromberg uses such phrases as "irresponsible," "lack of intelligence," and "confused." He regrets the Republican attacks upon General Marshall and Secretary Acheson and the

McCarthyism that pervades their foreign policy speeches.

The great difficulty for the Republican party in 1952 is that there are too many Democrats. In seeking to wean some of them away, the Republicans are in the same dilemma they have been in since 1932: neither me-tooism nor conservatism can win. The party must have a program, as the author says, "both new and *different.*" If it fails to develop one, it is likely to pass "quietly away into whatever Valhalla is reserved for the ghosts of defunct political organisms." Such a program is not offered in this book, but nonetheless any one who follows American politics will find the discussion extremely interesting. There is no index.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN
University of Colorado

BALDWIN, RAYMOND E. *Let's Go into Politics.* Pp. 179. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $2.75.

This volume is largely a political autobiography—and it is indeed fitting that its author, distinguished in the field of practical politics, should draw on his own rich experiences for the background of a book whose main purpose is to encourage wider participation in politics. Few men in public life today have had a more varied political career than our author, who began on the local level and continued on the state level, with further experiences on the national level. He has served in the lower house of the Connecticut legislature and later as a member of the United States Senate. He has had executive experience as a three-term governor and is now gaining judicial experience as a member of the supreme court of his state. In spite of this enviable record he speaks frankly of the frustrations that came with political defeat —first in local politics as described in his early chapters, and later by his failure to be re-elected after his first term as governor (followed, however, by two later elections).

Although this book is truly a success story, it is nevertheless written with a candor that admits mistakes, and with a spirit of fairness toward supporters and opponents alike. All this adds to its effectiveness as a document aiming to stimulate the recruiting of citizens into the ranks of active politicians.

The author does not hesitate to become rather elementary on occasion, as, for example, in his description of the mechanics of passing a bill, but such occasions are rare, and even these add to the realism which the volume portrays.

One of the best chapters in this very readable book is that which deals with campaigning for office. His comments on such things as campaign promises, handshaking, mud-slinging, and putting on airs reveal the genuineness of the author. One intimate paragraph describes the reactions of the members of the author's immediate family at the time of his only significant defeat (in the gubernatorial race in 1940). Another very interesting chapter tells, in an intimate fashion, about the reactions of members of the U. S. Senate to various pressures, including letters and telegrams.

Perhaps the most dramatic parts of the book are those which deal with the national nominating conventions. Judge Baldwin pictures the interesting details of a conference with Wendell Willkie during the 1940 convention in which it appears that Willkie looked with great favor upon Baldwin as a running mate. Equally fascinating to any one interested in the "inside" workings of a convention are the comments on the maneuvers which took place within, and in connection with, the Connecticut delegation immediately previous to the nomination of Dewey as the presidential candidate in 1948.

Repeatedly the author stresses the need of compromises in politics—not compromises between right and wrong but rather compromises between differing or opposing views. His breadth of view and his stature are shown by his pertinent and illuminating comments on such topics as lobbying, filibustering, seniority, and patronage. Very objectively he makes well-balanced statements comparing the divergent views held by public men on these matters.

His closing chapter Judge Baldwin devotes to the duties and obligations of the citizen rather than to his rights. Among other things the author warns against the careless use of labels. He shows great discrimination at this point. One is surprised, however, to find the statement that we do *not* live in a democracy, but in a republic. The author points out, with accuracy, that we do not live in a pure democracy, but overlooks the fact that a republic is one kind of democracy—indirect and representative.

As one who, for many years, has urged college-trained men and women to enter politics as *part-time* workers, this reviewer wishes that this stimulating volume had included some pointed and direct suggestions for *part-time* participation for those not interested in a full-time political career.

Judge Baldwin has made an important contribution to the literature in the field of practical politics. It is reasonable to hope that many other public-spirited citizens, influenced by his example and by his precepts, will take his suggestion seriously when he says *Let's Go into Politics.* It would be a great thing for America to have many more Raymond E. Baldwin's in public life.

BEN A. ARNESON
Ohio Wesleyan University

HEARD, ALEXANDER. *A Two-Party South?* Pp. xviii, 334. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952. $4.75.

This volume, good in style and accurate in fact, addresses itself to a problem which appears to worry students of politics continually—can the South break away from its thick-and-thin, for better-for worse devotion to the Democratic party. Heard appears to think it can and will, although most of his book is given over to an analysis of the formidable obstacles in the way of Republican party growth in the South.

This book is an outgrowth of the project at the University of Alabama through which V. O. Key, with Heard's assistance, produced *Southern Politics.* It is divided into sections which consider the background (the One Party South, the Dixiecrats), the case of the Southern Republicans, the revolution which is gradually changing the South, the new politics of the Negro, and a final chapter on the future. The outlines of the material presented here are generally familiar to students of Southern politics, but, by statistical summaries, investigations of Negro pressure groups, and brief excursions into local politics, Heard has added a realistic documentation. Generally, the scene is still one of devotion to traditional alliances springing from the middle of the last century. Heard thinks this traditional alignment may be modified by the growth of cities, a possible change in the method of electing the President, the need of the conservatives to move out of the Republican horde (I had thought of saying "phalanx," but "horde" seems a more appropriate term than one which implies a closely knit military unit), and the rise of labor. Yet, if a two-party politics is to become serious in the South (Heard shows very well that Republicans *do* exist), some really stiff hindrances must be overcome—the corruption and internal division of the Negroes and the inertia, hopelessness, and contentment of the existing Republicans, many of whom like the status of "big fish in little ponds," not to mention the legal mechanics which contrive to make a mockery of theory of majority rule. Indeed, if anything could be questioned in this volume, it would be the two-party hopefulness of the last chapter in view of the thorough probing of the obstacles to which most of the book is devoted.

The author writes and thinks very well. His book deserves the wide reading which it will undoubtedly receive.

LEE S. GREENE
The Community Services Commission
Nashville, Tennessee

DILLON, MARY EARHART. *Wendell Willkie, 1892–1944.* Pp. 378. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1952. $4.00.

In this year of the resurgency of the amateur in politics, Mary Earhart Dillon of Queens College has brought forth a highly readable biography of the outstanding amateur of the present era, Wendell L. Willkie. In this story of the 1940 nominee, from his Elwood childhood through his struggles against the Tennessee Valley Authority and both political parties to his final demise as titular head of the G.O.P., Willkie's paradoxical personality and in-

consistencies, as well as his tremendous energy and devotion to any cause at hand, are treated with understanding and objectivity.

On the related topic of the struggle by the private utilities against the Tennessee Valley project, however, Miss Dillon in *1952* stands four-square with the Wendell Willkie of 1935 devoted to the "cause of utilities privately owned." Against "the bright young men of the federal government who essayed to reform the country but created chaos," the author presents a one-sided case in that she fails to record the many questionable tactics by which the privately owned companies sought to undermine the co-operative and municipal power facilities.

In picturing the rise of Willkie, the potential nominee, Dr. Dillon's work bears the fruit of more impartial political insight and extensive research. The behind-the-scenes conversations and actions which resulted in the spectacular Willkie build-up are important contributions to the literature on the making of Presidential candidates. Of additional interest is the evidence she presents for the need of co-operation between the candidate and the party professionals, though some students of politics may disagree with her conclusion that Willkie's "detachment from the party was a fatal blunder." Willkie, to be sure, erred in utilizing career politicians as infrequently as he did, but the fact that he received more votes than any Republican candidate to this day would indicate that he did obtain the regular Republican votes while attracting legions of new voters to the polls. Many will agree with those observers who asserted that Willkie lost in 1940, not because he did not have the support of the traditional Republicans, but because he was unable to convince enough liberals and independents that he would be a superior substitute for President Roosevelt.

After the election, Willkie made his impact on history, and Miss Dillon pays vivid tribute to Willkie's role in the making of the bipartisan foreign policy. Her description of his "One World" flight is illuminating both for its study of the Willkie character and its evaluation of his contribution to international understanding. The final chapter is devoted, with little comment, to Willkie's political position as illustrated by his writing after the 1944 Wisconsin primary—a position somewhat removed from that of his utility days in regard to social security, labor relations, and monopolies. Miss Dillon has done a thorough job in her timely presentation to the American public of the fascinating and controversial individual who indeed "contributed to saving freedom at a moment of great peril."

DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON
State University of Iowa

BURNS, JAMES M., and JACK W. PELTASON. *Government by the People: The Dynamics of American National Government.* Pp. xvii, 946. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. $5.50.

This is a college textbook which earnestly tries to get away from dry exposition of structures and powers in order to "picture American government as an alive and dynamic thing." In this regard it succeeds at least as well as any and far better than most. Though the authors avoid minutiae they nevertheless employ abundent homely and concrete examples and illustrations. The student ought to feel at home both with the style and with the attitudes expressed.

The method of the book is to play up problems and areas of controversy in the functions of the federal government. The defenses for methods and practices are clear and fulsome, and the questions of critics are amply represented. The authors for the most part maintain a properly objective attitude, though their tone is "liberal." Only in the case of civil rights do they adopt a positive position—supporting federal legislative programs.

The book is very long, offering enough material for the basic reading in a year course, and there do not appear to be any significant omissions. It is directed to the average student, so that inevitably some of the better students will become impatient with repetition and overelaboration. This may well be the defect of a virtue, however. In brief, Professors Burns and Peltason have done well what they set out to do and have made an important contribution to the undergraduate teaching materials.

This reviewer would like to add, for what it is worth, that students will never be led by this book to reach down for the roots of the problem of the relation between liberty and security. The tacit assumption throughout is that big government and big power, as means for the advancement of the general welfare, are inevitable and that administrative process is the characteristic development of modern democracy. In this sense *Government by the People* moves in the main current of liberal thought prevalent during the past twenty years. Whether liberals may not before long have to reconsider this current in the light of encroachment on citizen liberties and prerogatives is an important question here left almost untouched.

STUART GERRY BROWN
Syracuse University

LEEK, JOHN H. *Government and Labor in the United States.* Pp. ix, 336. "American Government in Action Series." New York: Rinehart & Company, 1952. $3.00.

The writer on government and labor can adopt various approaches. He may assume the role of historian and tell from the best manuscript and related sources the story of organized labor's relationship with selected governmental units over a given period of years. On the other hand, he may try to analyze legislation and court decisions and present material descriptive of administrative procedures. The present author, professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, has chosen the latter course.

The heart of Professor Leek's book rests in its capable analyses of laws and cases on collective bargaining, wages and hours, the injunction, immigration, working conditions, social security, and arbitration. A good chapter summarizes recent anti-union legislation by the states. Three introductory chapters trace the historical background to the New Deal era, however, in a general and colorless fashion. Two final chapters discuss government as an employer and comment lamely on labor in politics. A well selected bibliographical list for student use shows the mature teacher at work.

This book lies in the field occupied in part by the detailed but often subjectively defensive account of Millis and Brown, the learned and readable legal survey of C. O. Gregory, the serious policy analysis of Harold W. Metz, the propagandistic and influential pioneer contribution of Frankfurter and Greene, and the textbook of Glenn W. Miller. The author profited from these and numerous other studies. His own intention was to provide students in government and economics courses with a survey volume for out of class reading. He has succeeded in his declared object, aided by the publisher's wise decision to forego a cloth binding and glossy paper in favor of a reasonable price.

A calculated effort was made in this book "to shift the emphasis from economics to political science" and thereby invade the domain of the labor economists. Analysis remained the basic tool, however, and this reviewer failed to observe any striking improvement in the result. Analysis is not enough. Labor history, regardless of the disciplinary framework within which it may be created, is still part of the stream of *human* history. Those who write about twentieth century labor legislation, court decisions, and politics are obligated to demonstrate in their prose that living people once participated in the events they describe. No labor leaders, employers, politicians, or judges live again in the pages of this book. The author's research method largely excluded such sources as manuscript correspondence, newspaper editorials, interviews with surviving participants, nearly all union journals, and both trade papers and the radical press. Without liberal doses of the spoken and written word in direct quotes historical writing can be somewhat soporific stuff.

Government and Labor in the United States belongs on appropriate collateral reading lists, nevertheless, because it provides on the whole a reliable introduction to its subject.

VAUGHN D. BORNET
Institute of American History
Stanford University

ANDERSON, EUGENE N. *Process Versus Power: Studies in Modern Culture.* Pp. vii, 137. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1952. No price.

This study synthesizes evidence from all the social sciences in dealing with certain basic issues of our time. Primarily it is a comparison of societies identified, respectively, with industrialism, the Old Regime, communism, and nationalism (fascism). The first of these are societies of process, the others, societies stressing the concentration of power.

The author argues that process has been carried farther in this country than elsewhere. Indeed, except for minor flaws and qualifications, our culture is about as perfect as a changing process will allow. Everybody participates actively in the formulation of policies in various fields; we and others like us are far ahead of power-ridden countries in the capacity to conduct war; in the United States at least people can develop well-rounded personalities.

All this is interdependent with freedom, equality, and fraternity, which are more advanced here than elsewhere. Even the corporations are conducted democratically, being governed by their stockholders (page Berle and Means). Freedom of the consumer implements freedom in other fields. No mention is made of consumers themselves being conditioned to want what private enterprises can sell them at a profit. In line with these views, the author is dubious about federal bureaucracy, and about public ownership except as it aids private enterprise to develop.

Much of this I do not believe. But you should see the author take out after the societies of power and rigidity—the communistic, fascist, and pre-industrial. He scarcely has a good word to say for them. He says, for instance, that science along with the arts is stifled in Russia. But a recent report rates Russia as the third highest nation in scientific achievement, with our country coming first, and Britain second. I fear Dr. Anderson trusts our newspapers too much. Well, I feel about the same way regarding communism, fascism, and other totalitarian systems. We are inevitably ethnocentric in such matters. Still, we should try to give the devil his due.

Many will not share my criticisms, and the study challenges the views of those who do, which is a good thing. The little paper-covered volume will thus be found stimulating by many, and will lead some of them at least to re-examine their positions.

There is no index.

SEBA ELDRIDGE
University of Kansas

Hoover Institute Studies, Series C: "Symbols," Nos. 1–4. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. No price.

No. 1. LASSWELL, HAROLD D., DANIEL LERNER, and ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL. *The Comparative Study of Symbols: An Introduction.* Pp. v, 87. 1952.

No. 2. DE SOLA POOL, ITHIEL, with the collaboration of HAROLD D. LASSWELL, DANIEL LERNER, and others. *The "Prestige Papers"—A Survey of Their Editorials.* Pp. vii, 146. 1952.

No. 3. DE SOLA POOL, ITHIEL, with the collaboration of HAROLD D. LASSWELL, DANIEL LERNER, and others. *Symbols of Internationalism.* Pp. 73. 1951.

No. 4. DE SOLA POOL, ITHIEL, with the collaboration of HAROLD D. LASSWELL, DANIEL LERNER, and others. *Symbols of Democracy.* Pp. xi, 80. 1952.

The first four numbers in this Hoover Institute series provide a theoretical introduction and three comparative analyses of symbols. The series "undertakes to describe the world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy." The Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace conducted these studies as part of its research project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR Project).

In the first monograph, one of the most significant points made by the authors is that statistical content analysis "should begin where traditional modes of research end. The man who wishes to use content analysis for a study of the propaganda of some political party, for example, should steep himself in that propaganda." He should first learn the propaganda's characteristic mechanisms and devices, its vocabulary and format, the party's organization and personnel, and its social and historical roles. This is such a large order and leaves such a minor role for the symbol counters that one is not surprised to find these investigators short on public affairs analysis, especially on the analysis of the struggles in which their symbols have parts.

The "Prestige Papers" reports a content survey of editorials in a few leading newspapers in Great Britain (*The Times*), Russia (*Novoe Vremia, Izvestia*), United States (New York *Times*), France (*Le Temps, Le Monde*), and Germany (*Norddeutsche allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Zeitung, Völkischer Beobachter*), for periods of various lengths between 1890 and 1949. The third and fourth monographs deal with the symbols of internationalism and democracy in part of the same "prestige" newspapers in these five major countries.

As far as symbol analysis can take us on this high level of ritualistic expression, the monographs present careful and useful summaries of trends in symbol usage. As Bernard Berelson notes in the introduction to the second publication, "The temptation is always to interpret the content data, even from a sample as restricted as the 'prestige papers,' into application to 'people's attitudes' or 'the ideology of the times' or something similar." This common error of historians and other students of literary materials is, by and large, carefully avoided in this series. The more precise assignment of significance to the use of symbols in "prestige paper" editorials awaits, however, more detailed and sharp historical and contemporary affairs analysis than is now available, but the present studies aid in the process.

Statements on the fourth study's first page are arresting: "The heyday of the symbol DEMOCRACY has been a short one. A century ago democracy was a favored symbol for small extremist plebeian groups only. But since 1870 this term . . . has become respectable and comfortable." Sweeping statements about a symbol are dangerous. Democracy's "heyday" in the eighteenth century was different from its "heyday" in the nineteenth or twentieth. The symbol had and still has many contents, each a function of an interest group with a more or less developed ideology. To dismiss the successful eighteenth-century revolutionists in the United States and France as "small extremist plebeian groups" is not accurate. This fourth monograph in particular seems to suffer from being a patchwork of committee-member ideas. The "increasing concern with the notion of democracy," noted by the ten collaborators, is symptomatic of the active use of the democratic aegis by leaders of underrepresented popular groups, not of a decline either in the acceptance of the symbol or in whatever might fairly be so labeled.

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE
Brooklyn College of the
City of New York

BERELSON, BERNARD. *Content Analysis in Communication Research.* Pp. 220. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952. $3.50.

A dozen years ago, in writing a book on public opinion, I became aware of the need for a monograph summarizing the studies and methods of content analysis. I referred to a number of the studies which had been done up to that time, most of them unsubtle and crudely quantitative in counting units of questionable validity. The need for such a monograph has continued increasingly through the years, as I would estimate that three-fourths of the content studies have been done in the last decade.

Now Bernard Berelson has very ably covered the field and performed a valuable service not only for all of us in communication research, but also for social science; for political scientists, historians, and literary analysts might well engage in many

kinds of content analysis in translating their craft from impressionistic accounts to social science. On the other hand, one may expect to see in the immediate future an enormous waste of energy in poorly selected, maldirected, undefined projects in this field, carried on with ill-defined units. But not when directed by social scientists such as Berelson or his mentor, Lazarsfeld.

This volume has chapters on the uses of content analysis, qualitative content analysis, the units of content analysis, the categories of content analysis, and a summary of technical problems. The assumptions are that: (1) content analysis assumes that inferences about the relationship between interest and content or between content and effect can validly be made; (2) that the content analyst assumes that the "meanings" which he ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain categories, correspond to the "meanings" intended by the communicator and understood by the audience; and (3) that content analysis assumes that quantitative description of communication content is meaningful. Content analysis began with newspaper content studies, was stimulated by Lasswell and others in the 1930's, and was greatly broadened in the areas of its use in the activities of the war agencies and in the period from the war to the present.

A brief review does not permit of even a summary of Berelson's able organization of studies of content form, content effects (which I believe to be a related but different field), qualitative content analysis, and the central problem of categories and units. This is a book for research men, classes on social science method, and the large body of those labeled social scientists who are skeptical of social science methodology.

The book concludes with an extensive bibliography of the studies in this area, a bibliography so useful to me that I should have purchased the book for that content alone. This monograph is an excellently organized, critically incisive, and very useful social science contribution.

WILLIAM ALBIG
University of Illinois

BERNAYS, EDWARD L. *Public Relations.* Pp. x, 374. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952. $5.00.

The first part of this volume (13 chapters) deals with the growth of public relations, interpreted very broadly to include the story of propaganda, promotion, and press agentry from earliest times. The influence of Mr. Bernays himself upon the evolution of public relations during the last forty years is clearly shown. The second part of the book (chapters 14 to 33) is designed to show how Mr. Bernays deals with specific public relations problems, and consists mainly of speeches and articles he has prepared for various organizations such as the National Society for Crippled Children, the American Nurses Association, the House Magazine Institute, the League of New York Theatres, the Mail Advertising Service Association of New York, and the Territory of Hawaii.

Mr. Bernays' position in the public relations field remains intact. He has had many imitators, but few peers. Public relations for him is something far more profound and challenging than mere press agentry. It means using "overt acts" to dramatize appeals, using opinion leaders, creating "institutes, talking about the public interest, using public opinion surveys, and rationalizing client objectives in scientific terms. No one has been more zealous than Mr. Bernays in trying to raise the social status and academic prestige of this ubiquitous activity. And one lays his book aside with some answers as to why the task has been so difficult. One reason is that only a minority of public relations counselors seem to grasp the full public service opportunities and responsibilities of their work. Moreover, in serving many and varied causes the public relations counselor tends to lose his own ideological identity, his own place in the value system of the community. And finally, in acquiring a widespread reputation for cleverness in the arts of public opinion management, the expert in public relations somehow succeeds in bringing upon himself a considerable amount of resentment and suspicion from the great masses of humble, inferior, and unslick. Public relations still has a big job of public relations to do for itself.

HARWOOD L. CHILDS
Princeton University

WISH, HARVEY. *Society and Thought in Modern America: A Social and Intellectual History of the American People from 1865.* Pp. xii, 618. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952. $6.50.

This is the second of two volumes in which Professor Wish traces the character and development of society and thought in America from colonial times to the present. The first volume carried this task through the year 1865, and the second one completes it by covering the period from 1865 to 1950. It is a work that is both reliable and readable. Beginning with the Reconstruction period, it gives an illuminating account of the efforts of the Southern Bourbons to regain power, and charts the appearance of the New South. The author has some interesting things to say about Woodrow Wilson as a product of the New Southern Liberalism. Succeeding chapters provide balanced and well-documented discussions of the growth and impact on American society of urbanism, industrialism, the labor movement, immigration, and inventions between the years 1865 and 1917.

Wish has a flair for portraying the influence of new ideas on the intellectual climate of a particular time. This is evident in his treatment of American reactions to Darwinism, pragmatism, and scientific determinism. In addition, he gives the reader a most useful account of the growth of realism in American literature and of the beginnings of modernism in our national architecture. The author is very skillful in showing the meaningful relationships between artistic and intellectual currents and relevant economic and political circumstances. His wide range of interests includes also a brief, but absorbing, discussion of the influence of Mahan's conceptions of naval strategy on both American and European conceptions of foreign policy.

Concluding chapters discuss with discernment the Business Civilization of the roaring twenties and the place of the Lost Generation in the literary life of this period. However, as the author approaches the contemporary present, he manifests less inclination to interpret events and falls into the role of one who simply records and recounts. This is not surprising because the objective historian requires the screen of time to discern interrelations and significance in the march of events. Those steeped in doctrinaire philosophies of history are immediately willing to assign causal significance to events, ideas, and human activities, but, fortunately, Professor Wish is not one of these.

JAMES H. BARNETT
University of Connecticut

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD. *The Irony of American History.* Pp. ix, 174. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. No price.

This small volume of philosophical essays has grown out of two series of lectures, one given at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, and the other at Northwestern University under the Shaffer Lectureship. "Both lectureships," the author says in his preface, "dealt with the position of our nation in the present world situation, as interpreted from the standpoint of the Christian faith." And they do, indeed, pass moral judgment upon the politics and the economics of both the United States and Russia. He juxtaposes the two nations and seeks to discern the valid criticisms that each makes of the other. Although he is harsh in his moral judgments against the bourgeois Philistine qualities of the contemporary American business society, he is devastating in his attack upon the pretensions of Russia, for "communism changes only partly dangerous sentimentalities and inconsistencies in the bourgeois ethos into consistent and totally harmful ones" (p. 15). It is clear from such criticism that Mr. Niebuhr has taken upon himself the mantle of Elijah in order to warn against, and anathematize, the Ahabs of the present. He is so eager to pronounce his moral aphorisms that he rarely descends from his pulpit to the academic

level of careful definition of terms and the exposition of a theme.

In two of his essays the author strives toward a Christian interpretation of history; for him the key that unlocks the storehouse of mysteries is irony. He says "irony consists of apparently fortuitious incongruities which are discovered, upon closer examination, to be not merely fortuitious" (p. vii). He finds a comic situation to be ironic "if a hidden relationship is discovered in the incongruity. If virtue becomes vice through some hidden defect in virtue . . ." (p. viii). This view of history suits his mental processes very well for he is on an unending quest after paradoxes and contradictions. This quest results in a dialectic which baffles as well as provokes thought. His ceaseless movement from thesis to antithesis is a type of reasoning which may revivify old patterns of thought; it also confuses simple patterns.

Mr. Niebuhr's methodology will not bear the scrutiny of a critical historian. He has read widely and discriminatingly from the works of such authors as James Bryce and De Toqueville, and he has selected from the *smörgåsbord* of his reading those morsels that satisfy his appetite for moralizing. He too readily extracts historical generalizations from their context and transforms them into absolutes; for example, he treats social classes almost as rigidly as do the Marxians. He also attributes personality, and even a conscience, to the nation. This social Darwinism does not enhance a book that has many penetrating observations. In spite of its faulty methodology, it has the great merit of passing moral judgment upon wrongs and pretentions which cause hate and lead to war. Mr. Niebuhr is fully cognizant of the tradition of Christian morals; and he uses this plumb line to measure the crooked walls and shallow wells of our society. For this reason his book deserves many readers.

R. G. COWHERD

Lehigh University

WITTKE, CARL. *Refugees of Revolution: The German Forty-Eighters in America.* Pp. ix, 384. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952. $6.00.

Occasionally a book comes from the press which not only adds to the knowledge of the reader but leaves him with a comprehensive sense of understanding a certain period of history. Carl Wittke's book *Refugees of Revolution* describing the German Forty-Eighters in America has added greatly to our knowledge of this interesting period in American life and has made various phases of the turbulent nineteenth century more distinct and clear.

There is no question about the intellectual vigor and force which refugees of the various revolutions in Europe brought to this country. There has been considerable debate as to the value of their ideas and as to their effective accomplishment in the American scene. Carl Wittke deals with these men very objectively. He points out the shortcomings of such men as Karl Heinzen who could never conform to the new environment and spent his life in bitter writings. On the other hand, he credits Carl Schurz, Frederick Hecker, and a large group of vigorous men who found a new destiny in a new world. He credits the stimulation of thought and the devotion to principle that was characteristic of the sixth decade of the nineteenth century culminating in the Civil War, after which there was little evidence of any particular contribution from the refugees of revolution.

One of the saddest chapters is devoted to the failures. Men who fought with devotion and sometimes with distinction in Europe met a tragic fate in America. Occasionally this was due to an inability to apply talents to useful ways in the new world, often it was due to the unsatisfactory adaptation of intellectuals trying to wrench a life as Latin farmers from the land, and again it was due to luckless chance.

The divisive effect of European freethinkers is laid bare in Dr. Wittke's book. The rift between the "Grays" and the "Greens" and particularly the drive of the free-thinkers against American sabbatarianism and the Catholic Church led to neighborhood clashes and to the antagonism of entrenched religion.

Many "fighters of the barracks" were content to dream of the battles of the past rather than to share the pulsing life of America. Similarly many migrants at the turn of the century always thought of Germany as the land of Bismarck, a country of flower-boxes and captivating music. In strange ways the freedom of America dampened the fires of revolution. Dr. Wittke has written a resource book crediting the valuable contributions of an interesting generation and listing those debits which made subsequent history more understandable. His work carries the mark of thorough scholarship.

HOWARD W. ELKINTON

Philadelphia, Pa.

HAND, LEARNED. *The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand.* Collected, and with an introduction and notes, by Irving Dilliard. Pp. xxx, 262. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. $3.50.

Irving Dilliard has performed a valuable service in bringing together these 34 nontechnical papers from the pen of Learned Hand; for Judge Hand, like all great judges, is far more than a legal scholar and technician. The breadth of his learning, the urbanity of his thought, and the felicity of his style combine to make even his brief occasional pieces both charming and instructive.

Hand resembles Holmes, whom he so much admired, both in the form and the substance of his writing. The loving and proficient care of the linguistic artist is evident in every sentence. Even more reminiscent of Holmes is Hand's philosophy. His insistence that ultimate values cannot be proved in no way qualifies his faith in liberal principles. His recognition of the wide gap between ideal and reality leads him neither to discouragement nor cynicism. "In a world where the stronger have always had their way, I am glad if I can keep them from having it without stint. It seems to me, with all its defects, our system does just that" (p. 98).

Although the title essay occupies but two pages, its subject continually recurs throughout the volume. A careful definition of liberty Judge Hand wisely eschews; but no one can read these pages without directly absorbing much of its essence. Liberty is based on the spirit of tolerance and of modesty. It must find its ultimate support in forebearance; for, as Hand, the Holmesian realist, insists, "liberty is so much latitude as the powerful choose to accord the weak" (p. 71). In the final analysis, he declares, "it is man's inherent willfulness that I would preserve, and in which I wish to set the stronghold of that Liberty I prize" (p. 151).

This concept of liberty provides the key to his attitude toward the role of the courts. The institution of judicial review as it relates to the separation and distribution of powers he considers implicit in the nature of constitutionalism. But liberty can not be preserved by laws and courts. It must be enshrined in the hearts of the people. Without that, courts will be of no avail; with it, legislatures may be trusted and courts may confine themselves to the interpretation and application of the laws as enacted.

Mr. Dilliard has performed his editorial functions carefully and skillfully. One can only wish that he might have felt free to expand his introduction beyond its modest limits.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK

Swarthmore College

SEAGLE, WILLIAM. *Law: The Science of Inefficiency.* Pp. x, 177. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $3.50.

Three long centuries ago complaint of "the law's delays" was voiced by the greatest of the Elizabethans. Legal delay, and its consort, inefficiency, are familiar to every tutored person and have become a staple of criticism. Charles Dickens, whose study of *Jarndyce v. Jarndyce* in *Bleak House* constitutes the literary classic on the subject, was moved to remark: "The one great principle of the English law is, to make business for itself." The most distinguished living American judge, surveying the contemporary legal scene, recently confessed that "as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death."

This book is a popular and well mounted exposition of legal inefficiency. It de-

scribes, analyzes, and pursues the details of the subject in a series of chapters devoted respectively to particular provinces of the law: The Dictionary Theory of Justice, or the problem of interpretation; The League of Timid Men, or the lawsuit as a judicial duel with the judge in the negative role of umpire; The Ordeal of Procedure, or the complexities of pleading and procedure in litigation; The Bogus War on Crime, or the difficulties in the administration of criminal justice; and so forth.

The presentation is provocative; the style, crisp and clear. Mr. Seagle's pen turns out epigram and paradox like an untiring lathe. These pages are, indeed, a small thesaurus of quoted and quotable material. The items quoted range from the literary mockery of Rabelais to the august pronouncements of eminent jurists. Among Mr. Seagle's verbal impertinences are the following: The judicial machine "will always remain a tinkered and painted jalopy," and "law and politics are fuller of double talk than baseball is of double plays." That cherished predilection of the law, impartiality, he dispatches with Anatole France's celebrated dictum: The law is magnificent in its impartiality, for it forbids the rich and poor alike to steal a loaf of bread or to sleep under the bridges.

It is the author's thesis that law is doomed to inefficiency by its very nature and structure. This observation may be made of all legal "systems" alike. The code system of the Civil Law fares no better and no worse, in this connection, than the Anglo-American system of common law. A code requires judicial implementation and, in the last analysis, is "no more a body of laws than a skeleton is a man." The pages of Gibbon remind us that even the Roman law under Justinian, for all the encomiums it has received, was "a mysterious science and a profitable trade."

Furthermore, in democratic societies legal inefficiency is maintained and preserved "with painstaking deliberation," for it "actually serves a useful social purpose." The paradox means that inefficiency in law, like that in government, is one of the prices which must be paid for the democratic order and constitutional liberty thereunder. This is especially apparent in certain legal areas, such as the administration of the criminal law. The Star Chamber, dread tribunal and "curious eye" of the Tudor state, is cited as an example of a legal institution which had to be abolished because it became a model of efficiency.

As a natural corollary of this thesis, the author regards with little patience attempts at "law reform." He considers such attempts destined to be fruitless and refers contemptuously to "the process of tinkering known as law reform."

Some members of the legal fraternity will find in this small volume matter for offense; others will find in it ample room for disagreement; but surely no reader will find it dull.

BERNARD F. CATALDO
University of Pennsylvania

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

HATT, PAUL K. (Ed.) *World Population and Future Resources.* The Proceedings of the Second Centennial Academic Conference of Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, March 1951. Pp. xviii, 262. New York: American Book Company, 1952. $3.50.

The problem posed to the Northwestern symposium was "the relation of the potential growth of world population to resources for human sustenance."

Like so many previous efforts in this field this book does not in fact come to close grips with the problem of the *relation between* population and resources. It is a symposium of twenty contributions from experts in the fields of demography and the physical sciences, each an authority in his own field. A first section, by leading demographers, discusses "The Population Factor," especially possible future trends in population growth. Three other parts deal with "Food Resources," "Material Resources of Industry," and "Energy Resources."

The demographers are pessimistic. They correctly point out that the present and prospective rates of increase, carried on long enough, will ultimately outdistance any conceivable resource development and that a doubling or tripling of human numbers will not only call for a grandiose application of science but also for much more effective social organization than we now have for achieving long-run economic goals.

The experts on resources are generally hopeful. In the few cases in which they relate their findings to population growth they evince a faith that a proper application of inventiveness and technology can keep ahead of the needs of a growing population. Dennis Fitzgerald, for example, states "a deep conviction that for years to come, physically and technically, agricultural production can be increased twice as rapidly as any foreseeable increase in population" (p. 136).

Similar optimism is promoted by the somewhat parochial focus of several contributors who deal only with the resource problems of the United States rather than with the much more serious problems of other parts of the world or the world as a whole.

At best the contributors had difficulty in attaining the world view originally planned for the symposium. The problem posed is too broad for careful analysis. The world can scarcely be considered in significant terms as an economic unit. The realistic question is not "Can the world support its future population?" but, rather, can economic development outstrip prospective population growth in India, in Japan, and in other specific areas of population pressure.

While the book did not achieve what it set out to do, it should serve a useful purpose in bringing together in a small volume authoritative statements on a wide range of resource problems. In general the contributions are brief, interesting, and nontechnical.

DUDLEY KIRK
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

HARRIS, SEYMOUR E. *The Economics of New England: Case Study of an Older Area.* Pp. xvii, 317. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $4.75.

The major question posed in this volume is whether New England is destined to occupy an increasingly unimportant place in the national economy. The thesis of the author is that while the region may continue to fall behind relative to certain other areas in the United States, there are no insurmountable obstacles to keep New England from enjoying a healthy economic growth in absolute terms. In developing this thesis Professor Harris has analyzed the major factors that have affected the New England economy.

To the consternation, no doubt, of numerous local chambers of commerce, he has frankly listed the region's present limitations: unfavorable labor conditions compared to the South, a paucity of raw materials, a social climate unfavorably oriented to business, backward management and investment policies, and unsatisfactory relations with the federal government. While little can be done to remedy a lack of raw materials or to change New England's geographic position vis-à-vis the rest of the nation, the others on the list are amenable to change and improvement. To implement a program of reform, it will be necessary to obtain the co-operation of management, labor, investors, and public officials; it will involve an abandonment of New England's traditional protectionist point of view, a re-examination of the circumstances affecting labor productivity, a more alert management, and a new attitude toward federal expenditures in the region. This last point is especially noteworthy. New England's contributions to the federal budget have long exceeded the sums spent in the area by the government. Professor Harris suggests the possibility of a more equitable distribution of federal funds which would serve to lessen the disadvantage of New England relative to other parts of the country.

While this book is concerned with New England, the problems raised and the proposed remedies are relevant to any region that has suffered from or may be faced with a decline in its relative economic position. For this reason, the volume represents a welcome addition to a general subject that still needs many more such studies.

HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON
Northwestern University

STUDENSKI, PAUL, and HERMAN E. KROOSS. *Financial History of the United States: Fiscal, Monetary, Banking, and Tariff, including Financial Administration and Local Finance*. Pp. x, 528. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952. $6.50.

This is the second altogether new general textbook on the history of American finance since the first of the numerous editions of Davis R. Dewey's *Financial History of the United States*, which appeared fifty years ago. The other is William J. Shultz and M. R. Gaine, *Financial Development of the United States*, published in 1937, or three years after the last edition of Dewey. The three volumes by Albert S. Bolles (1879, 1885, 1886) covered only the years 1774–1885 and are too outdated for comparison. Alexander D. Noyes, *Forty Years of American Finance, 1865–1907* (1909) could be compared only to the third volume by Bolles. Thus, the book under review is the only one even comparatively up to date covering the maze of financial involvements of the past fifteen years.

The authors acknowledge their heavy debt to Dewey, which, they declare, "will continue to be a classic in the field." The greatest difference between Dewey and the Studenski-Krooss book is in the much heavier stress of the present authors on finances of a nonfederal nature and in the abbreviation of the earlier period of American history, thus giving far more space to the later periods. A full half of the book is devoted to the first half of the twentieth century and well over a quarter to the years since 1929.

The authors properly assume that the readers should learn the general facts of economic and political history elsewhere, but here and there a few additional words of explanation would be most useful. For example, it is somewhat puzzling to read on page 250 that by 1902 "The agrarian groups which had been whole-heartedly opposed to soft money disappeared." Also, the cryptic reference to Eugene V. Debs on page 223 needs a little explanation. Again, who will believe the assumption on page 436 that there was no curtailing of civilian consumption during the war years of 1941–1945?

In other instances the authors seem to have mislaid their own knowledge of general American history. To take a very early instance, any student of the life of Patrick Henry, of the background of the American Revolution, and of the celebrated Parson's Cause of 1763 will be utterly mystified by these authors' statement on page 14 that by 1700 the use of commodity money "was confined almost wholly to the frontier."

Probably the most mysterious statement in the whole book appears on page 179: "But even over short periods, national-bank currency did not expand and contract with the needs of business." So far, so good, but this follows. "In periods of prosperity, when the business community wanted more money, national-bank circulation invariably declined. . . . In periods of recession, the situation was reversed, and currency expanded even though the demand for it was lacking." This is peculiar economics, queer logic, and such poor history that the authors have to refute it twice in the next ten pages, particularly in the table on page 189.

While the authors are eliminating the puzzles in a later edition, they should also correct the numerous liberties they took in alterations of people's names.

FRED A. SHANNON
University of Illinois

PATTERSON, JOHN C. *Association Management, with Special Reference to Trade Associations*. Pp. xiv, 230. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $3.00.

The author is a professional public relations counsel and formerly was assistant director of public information, National Association of Manufacturers. The book is a combination manual and social analysis, aproximately one-half being devoted to technical problems of trade association management and the other half to the role of trade associations in the modern economy. This review is concerned solely with the latter subject.

In 1900 there were about 100 national trade associations; today the number exceeds 12,000. There have been two great boom periods in the formation of trade associations: the 1920's and the 1930's following the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933. The author regards NRA as "the greatest stimulant to organization that industry has ever had" (p. 4). These 12,000 associations have as members more than a million business firms; they employ over 16,000 executives and clerical workers; their aggregate budgets exceed $100 million annually.

The trade association is "an instrument of social and economic action" (p. 2). It wields significant, though not decisive, power through its influence on public opinion, legislation, and administration. No association, or group of associations, can ever make "a bid for total power" because "no single interest can be pursued very far in group activity until it is curbed by conflict with other interests within the membership itself" (p. 14). Beyond this internal check, there are three external restraints on the possible abuse of power: public opinion, rival business groups, and government. The author lacks confidence in the ultimate efficacy of "natural" checks and warns association management against seeking to "get away with all it can" lest it invite governmental control.

Mr. Patterson's general theory is that a trade association is a "quasi-public" activity. Though organized to promite private interest its "responsibility to society as a whole transcends the self-interest of the group" (p. xiii). "Service to mankind" takes precedence over financial gain (p. 16). He visualizes the trade association executive as a professional broker operating as a middle-man between the frequently hostile forces of government and business; his function is to induce better understanding between them and co-operation for the common good. The ultimate objective is always the public interest.

This argument is plausible but unrealistic. The voluminous public record of the past thirty years—which Mr. Paterson ignores—fails to establish any identity between trade association activity and the public interest. On the contrary, it is replete with evidence of restraint of trade, dissemination of propaganda, attempts to influence legislators and administrators, clamor for special privilege, anti-labor activity, and opposition to progressive social legislation. Such activities are scarcely consonant with public interest. The author deplores these manifestations of private selfishness and seeks to persuade the business community to a more socially responsible way of life, but he fails to reckon with the realities of organized power inherent in trade associations.

HORACE M. GRAY
University of Illinois

BEHRENS, CARL F. *Commercial Bank Activities in Urban Mortgage Financing*. Pp. xix, 131. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952. $2.50.

This study is one of a series sponsored by the Urban Real Estate Finance Project of the National Bureau's Financial Research Program. It is a painstaking effort and one which, because of the nature of the data it sought, encountered numerous stumbling blocks. The author and the Bureau deserve much praise for their perseverance and ingenuity in utilizing many avenues of approach to their goal.

An outline of the legal framework of urban mortgage financing by commercial banks prefaces the statistical analysis which forms the core of the book. The law, of course, is an important consideration in the interpretation of the statistics, and it is referred to repeatedly. This outline is followed by a description of the scope of commercial bank real estate financing. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation data and other government agency statistics are presented to illustrate the kinds of loans held by various types of banks, the relative importance of mortgage financing to the different classes of institutions, and the importance of banks in the mortgage market over the last twenty years.

The main portion of the study deals with the characteristics of bank mortgage loans and the degree to which they are related to loan experience. The author does not state it, but the basis of the analysis appears to be an attempt to describe and rationalize the mortgage lending

policies of commercial banks as well as to shed additional light on the composition of banks' mortgage portfolios. The limitations of his study did not permit Mr. Behrens to discuss the implications of his findings for the banks themselves and for public policy; but much relevant material is here and in such form that useful inferences may be drawn readily by the reader. Loan-to-value ratios, amortization practices, amounts of loans by types of properties, interest rates—all these and more are carefully reviewed over a period of years, related, and sometimes classified by region. Data on the cost of lending operations, while based on few cases, are nevertheless interesting.

The source of the data on loan characteristics and lending operations was a sample survey. An illustration of the author's difficulties is the fact that of 496 banks selected to give a cross section of commercial bank mortgage loans, only 170 returned usable loan samples, and some of these were not completely satisfactory. Independent checks on certain of the data are favorable, however, and, while some of the detailed information must be used with caution, there is little chance that the important results can be seriously misleading.

Since this study was completed, additional statistical material on bank mortgage lending has become available through the June 1950 call report, the Census Bureau's Survey of Residential Financing, and the Federal Reserve's Regulation X registration statement. In unfinished form, Behrens' works and the new questions it raised contributed to the formulation of these later studies.

This is a work for the specialist in real estate financing. In its proper place among the other studies in the field which the National Bureau has sponsored, it must be considered a thoroughly worth-while contribution.

DAVID C. MELNICOFF
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

ABRUZZI, ADAM. *Work Measurement: New Principles and Procedures.* Pp. xviii, 290. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $6.00.

The author of this interesting book begins his text with the sweeping statement that "Most of the procedures now used for work measurement do not perform their intended functions yet nothing of any consequence has been done to correct the situation." He reviews the work of many well-known workers in this field, discusses the old problem as to whether work measurement can be considered scientific or not and proposes some new methods. He believes that work measurement should be conducted entirely apart from the problem of compensation with which it is so often connected.

His experiments were conducted largely in factories manufacturing ladies' garments and in which the operations are controlled largely by the worker as contrasted with industries where the machine dominates the operations. In such factories also, it is more difficult to obtain accurate time measurements for the reason that the worker can set his own pace without the timing of a machine. Dr. Abruzzi introduces a new term, namely "statistical stability" instead of "statistical control," and reclassifies the term as "local stability" and "grand stability." "In the case of local stability the production rates involved represent a *continuous* series of items produced during a period of several hours. In the case of grand stability the production rates represent items produced over a protracted period."

In chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 he demonstrates his methods of securing these results, using Shewhart diagrams and mathematical formulas. The remaining chapters are devoted to such topics as Developing Standard Data, Comparing Work Methods, Measurements and Estimates, Delay Factors, and Fatigue. The text is illustrated with 25 figures and 55 tables, and there is a very good bibliography. The book is scholarly and is not particularly easy reading. Whether the author's claims that most of the work done in work measurement to date is faulty if not inaccurate and that he presents the only accurate method remains to be seen. To the reviewer at least it does not seem possible that the vast amount of work done in this field can be wasted energy.

DEXTER S. KIMBALL
Cornell University

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

COATES, ADRIAN. *Prelude to History: A Study of Human Origins and Paleolithic Savagery.* Pp. xviii, 289. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $4.75.

One of the most significant features of Coates's digest of prehistory is its parallel attention to human and cultural development in the early centuries of time. This will be a boon for readers who have wanted to see both aspects of man's growth treated in co-ordinated fashion between a single pair of covers.

Prelude to History is not a popularization of prehistory, nor is it for the advanced student. With admirable thoroughness the author, who is not a professional archeologist, has studied a mass of materials describing paleolithic finds in their geological setting. Without offering the reader humorous bribes he sets data out carefully and assesses the reasonableness of the hypotheses which seek to explain the facts. On debatable issues Coates generally takes a point of view shared by the majority of anthropologists as, for example, in postulating a late and tangential status for the Australopithecoids. He defends his position with careful reasoning.

Unfortunately, logical impeccability need not accord with empirical truth. In the last sixty pages the author moves away from skeletal or lithic data and tries to reconstruct "primitive mind" or "primitive society." His method is one of analogy. Fear predominates in the rites of contemporary primitives; hence, early man was dominated by fear. What evidence is there for saying that this pattern existed with paleolithic artifacts? The method of analogy has given way to functional interpretation in contemporary prehistory. Coates apparently never studied this aspect of V. Gordon Childe's work and does not know Julian Steward's painstaking attempt to find *predictable* associations between, for example, a type of food production and a pattern of social structure. Only if specific connections hold in a series of contemporary world cultures can they safely be postulated to have existed in remote times.

JOHN J. HONIGMANN
University of North Carolina

MARDEN, CHARLES F. *Minorities in American Society.* Pp. xiv, 493. New York: American Book Company, 1952. $4.50.

This textbook deals with the relationships between minority peoples in the United States and the norm-setting "native" group with which they interact. The interactional process is conceived as one between subordinate and superordinate groups occupying inferior and superior statuses in the larger, total society by virtue of the differential degrees of power that each commands. The development of the process is through various stages toward assimilation, and the method of treatment is therefore historical. In the case of each minority discussed, special attention is paid to the role of the superordinate or "native" group (which Marden felicitously calls the *dominant*) in the intergroup situation under consideration.

While the avowed aim of the book is to present minority-dominant relationships objectively and to provide an accurate description of relevant group interactions, it is also recognized that the processes involved constitute one of America's most acute social problems. When such problems are considered, it is virtually impossible to avoid the intrusion of a value system. Marden faces this fact frankly and quite properly declares that it is desirable to make one's valuational point of view explicit. His is that of Myrdal's American Creed, holding that all Americans, regardless of race, religious affiliation, or national origins, hold equal rights of justice, freedom, and opportunity. The discussions of minority-dominant interactions taken as social problems are therefore strongly colored by this set of value concepts; and it is greatly to their credit that these pages are both so lively and yet so free from the earmarks of the doctrinaire. If there is no temporizing with these basic tenets of democratic values, neither is there any blindness to the difficulties that must be dealt with if such ideals are to be instrumented.

And the problem of instrumentation brings us back to the descriptive and objectively interpretive bulk of the book. One of the major requisites for translating ideals into reality is well grounded under-

standing. Understanding is arrived at, by and large, through sensitive, perceptive observation and trenchant, hard-headed analysis. On the observational side, *Minorities in American Society* stands up well. The coverage is broad, the amount of information pertaining to each group is extensive, and the sources examined seem impressive in their variety and authoritativeness.

On the analytic or theoretical side, however, one is inclined to wonder if more steps could not have been taken toward furnishing students with a conceptual framework that would allow for a more useful organization of the facts of intergroup relations. One searches in vain for statements relating the phenomena of prejudice, for example, to the theory of the authoritarian personality. One finds virtually nothing on the development of prejudicial attitudes through childhood or on the importance of frustration and displaced aggression as an important set of factors determining the course of minority-dominant relations. One is hard put to account for the *maintenance* (not the existence) of stereotypes as they affect intergroup situations. In short, one regrets that so little attention has been given to the theoretical contributions that psychology might have made to the theoretical aspects of this ambitious and otherwise well-executed volume.

But a criticism of this kind reflects more the general problem in social science of developing more adequate cross-disciplinary communication. Until a more unified method of social science inquiry has come into being, *Minorities in American Society* must be judged a useful and lucid text, the democratic direction of which is always supported by close attention to facts and a genuine effort at conceptual comprehensiveness. EDWARD JOSEPH SHOBEN, JR.
Columbia University

GRUENBERG, SIDONIE M., and HILDA SIDNEY KRECH. *The Many Lives of Modern Woman: A Guide to Happiness in Her Complex Role.* Pp. 255. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1952. $3.00.

The American woman is not what she used to be; we are all sure of that. Just what she is, and why, has been the object of much discussion in recent years. Philip Wylie dipped his pen in her blood and dashed off a caricature of modern woman in his *Generation of Vipers* a decade or so ago. Then, Dr. Strecker blamed her again for the infantilism of her children in his *Their Mothers' Sons.* President White joined the chorus in a minor key a few years later with his *Educating Our Daughters.* None of these was of much help to the girl or woman caught in the web of confusing choices of what she wants to be and do. It has remained for a couple of women themselves to come out with a clear-headed analysis of the problem with positive suggestions for its solution.

As Director of the Child Study Association of America for many years, Mrs. Gruenberg has worked closely with women and the experts who know them best. Her writings addressed to women as mothers have contributed to the literature of parent education. In this book, her daughter Hilda, married and a mother herself, joins her effectively as collaborator.

The contribution of the book is in its realistic acceptance of women as persons, as marriage partners, as mothers, and as citizens in a changing world. The variety of women's roles is traced without an effort to blame or to pass judgment. Some of the fruitful ways in which real women are working out their lives are described. The point of view is positive and hopeful. The approach is realistic and courageous. The plea is for marriage as a growing partnership of man and woman coming to terms with their potentialities within the world as it is and may become. As the authors say in conclusion,

"The good life, the rich, full life—it is different for each of us. Yet certain aspects, certain values are universally cherished. It seems to us that a happy marriage and having children are such values. . . . we would like to see more husbands and wives develop their comradeship and spirit of sharing, so that the life of the couple becomes far richer, more meaningful, and more satisfying than the life of either individual alone could ever be."

EVELYN MILLIS DUVALL
Chicago, Illinois

SMITH, M. B. *The Single Woman of Today.* Pp. xiv, 130. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $2.75.

In her introduction Miss Smith points out that the title of her book is "misleading in its suggestion of comprehensiveness." Nevertheless in its 127 pages she treats at least briefly some 39 major aspects of the single woman's problem and adjustment. She has dug deeply into psychology, and possibly somewhat less deeply into sociology and philosophy in her attempt to analyze the problem and to offer some possible adjustments. For illustrations and evidence of attitudes of and toward the single woman she has drawn upon literature (as far back as Herodotus) as well as upon real life situations. One cannot doubt the wealth of material and the seriousness of purpose that Miss Smith has brought to this report. The difficulties, however, of selection and elimination are apparent, and sometimes the text is less logical and coherent than one might wish. Nevertheless it is full of food for thought—and the careful reader can supply transitions and make connections that are not always clear.

The thesis of the book is that there is definitely a husband shortage in Great Britain, in Europe, and—to a lesser degree—in the United States of America. Simple statistics prove this. In European countries women exceed men numerically "on an average of 7.5 per cent." The plight of the United States, she points out, is somewhat less acute, but, even here, in 1940 we had a "surplus of a half-million females [21 and over] whereas ten years before there had been a surplus of 100,000 males instead." The question Miss Smith raises is, "what are we going to do about it?" She discusses the biological and psychological effects on the single woman and the sociological aspects of the problem which concern (or should concern) everyone. She admits that the unbalance has been much greater in other epochs. In Europe of the Middle Ages, for example, the "numerical superiority of women varied from 10 to 25 per cent." But the problem of today is different because the world is different. In the Middle Ages many women banded together partly for protection, partly to do "good works." The growth of convents was rapid. These women pledged to celibacy were believed by their society to have chosen a role vastly superior to marriage —each became the "spouse of Christ." Others were welcomed into homes of friends or relatives because household tasks, making of clothes, and other chores, without benefit of machinery, could keep many women usefully occupied in every home.

Industrialization changed all that. The modern home has, as a rule, no room or use for grandmother—not to mention the maiden aunt. This, Miss Smith believes, is as it should be; the family should consist of father, mother, and minor children. The maiden aunt or adult daughter should have a home of her own. But this presents problems, partly because of the individual's loneliness and partly because of social attitudes. Our society accepts wholeheartedly the idea that women are for marrying. A girl's whole thinking is directed toward marriage as the goal in life. Even the woman who has made an unsuccessful marriage and is divorced feels superior—and is generally regarded as superior—to the spinster.

Miss Smith offers a number of possible solutions for the single woman of today, most of which, she admits, are unsatisfactory. One—and we believe the most important one—is the *solution of maturity.* "Maturity," she says, "implies an ability to walk alone and be unaffected by it." She states her belief that "a single woman may often be immature emotionally." We could not refrain from a marginal note there: "What about the married woman? Does marriage insure maturity?" Frequently it fosters immaturity and dependence. As a matter of fact, it seems to us that Miss Smith is a bit idealistic about marriage. The ordinary marriage does not guarantee biological, psychological, and spiritual fulfillment. In fact, even the companionship which she stresses is frequently lacking. Many a married woman must "go it alone."

The one place in the book where one senses a sharp and slightly critical note of the human male is in her discussion of the "inferior" type of woman he allows to lure him into matrimony. She suggests that

the "eugenically superior" are frequently among "the surplus women." In this connection she discusses "marriage by arrangement" and concludes, "There should be some sort of compromise between Chance and the Marriage Bureau." This critical attitude would not stand out so sharply were it not for her dedication:

"The frequency with which the desirable woman is committed to the ranks of the surplus, whilst the less worthy is chosen in marriage, is one of the social injustices of our time.

"To these desirable women this book is sympathetically dedicated."

That statement and discussion later in the book seem to us to detract from what is otherwise a pretty scientific and objective study.

There is a very fine three-page bibliography for people who would like to pursue the subject further.

JEAN AND JESS OGDEN
University of Virginia

HAVEMANN, ERNEST, and PATRICIA SALTER WEST. *They Went to College.* Pp. x, 277. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952. $4.00.

This well-publicized, widely distributed, best selling book makes some distinctive contributions to our knowledge about the impact of higher education on the approximately 6 million college graduates in the United States. Begun as a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, the study probes the reactions to their college days of a representative sample consisting of 9,064 graduates from almost all of the degree-granting institutions that existed in 1947, when the study was made. The data, processed in Columbia's Bureau of Applied Social Research, have been cast into highly readable form by a news magazine editor. Fifty-two excellent charts, appropriately distributed throughout the text, highlight significant facts and trends.

Following a note on what the book is about, the story of the United States college graduate is told in six parts. The "Portrait of the Old Grad (Masculine Division)" reveals that, whatever else he may be, he is financially well off. In fact, on all counts except the production of large families, male graduates over 40 are doing very well, indeed. The "Portrait of the Ex-Coed" is less cheerful in some respects. For example, for 31 coeds out of 100, college was an education for spinsterhood, the incidence of which fell most heavily on Catholic girls, 48 per cent of whom have never married.

"The Group Portrait" reflects predominant political conservatism. A detailed discussion of the graduates' beliefs regarding religion, civil rights, internationalism, and party politics makes rewarding reading. The group looks back on its collective college experience with a purr of contentment, although some provocative comments about curriculum, teaching, guidance, and education for citizenship add spice to the analysis.

The section called "College as the Road to Success" focuses attention on the Greasy Grind, the All-Around Student, the Big Man and Woman on Campus, and the Student Who Just Sat There; the generalist and the specialist; the rich man's son and the boy who worked his way; the student who attended distinguished Ivy University and the one who went to East Widespot College. Although the statistics only hint at why who is successful, vigorous opinions are not lacking when "The Ex-Student Speaks to the Student" and offers "Some Advice to the Colleges" in the concluding sections of the book.

Anyone who is interested in what college education does to people should enjoy this book. But the authors are the first to admit that while they have answered some questions, they have raised many others. So educational researchers should note this study well, also.

CLAUDE E. HAWLEY
Washington, D. C.

BLOCH, HERBERT A. *Disorganization: Personal and Social.* Pp. xv, 608, x. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. $5.00 text.

Through a frame of reference the author makes personal and social disorganization primarily a matter of social change and places the person or group in a crisis partly because of latencies. These latencies are individual or social organizations that tend to maintain the status quo. This maintenance of status quo may result in a crisis which may be met in five different ways (p. 125).

Instead of starting at once to deal with social problems in this framework the author digresses to review "the basic materials in sociology ordinarily offered in the introductory course." If the student does not already have a good foundation in the principles of sociology it would take a full semester to explain all the points introduced by the author in this connection.

The framework in this text is designed to consider: "(a) the conditions of social change, (b) the reciprocal relations between individual and social change, and (c) the way in which personality develops in the changing social structure." This makes personal and social disorganization a matter of social change.

Is this a genuine frame of reference—something that will be found in every instance of personal and social organization? There is a great deal of disorganization without social change or latencies being involved. Some types of social disorganization are cultural patterns, a part of the American way of life. Criminality, for example, is an ancient cultural pattern as well established in society as education or any other socially approved cultural pattern.

Law-abiding behavior is related to social change in the same sense that criminality is related to social change. Both mental health and mental ill-health are achieved during social change. Sex pathologies and sex normalities have a common origin in social change. This is true of all personal and social disorganization. As a matter of fact, social disorganization is a type of social organization. Personal disorganization is a type of personal organization.

Instead of placing criminality as a universal cultural pattern in the frame of reference, the author reviews the whole field of criminology and penology. If all of this is to be understood by the student there would be no need for courses in criminology. In a basic text in social disorganization, criminality should be placed in a universal frame of reference merely as a type of disorganization.

The last chapter, "Prospectus and Conclusions," does not deal with conclusions about the proposed frame of reference but considers such topics as "Family Disorganization" and "Can Science Save Us?"

There is a Glossary but no bibliography. Appendixes follow Chapters V and VI. Chapter X is the analysis of a case document. The author has not included lesson assignments, thus showing his respect for the maturity of those who will use this text.

L. GUY BROWN
University of Rhode Island

REDL, FRITZ, and DAVID WINEMAN. *Controls from Within: Techniques for Treatment of the Aggressive Child.* Pp. 332. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952. $4.50.

This account of the treatment of five aggressive boys who were residents (15–19 months) of Pioneer House, a residential treatment center for severely disturbed adolescents, is a sequel to *Children Who Hate,* which describes the boys and their clinical background. It seeks to show how internalized behavior controls were substituted for controls from without.

The general plan is revealed by the chapter titles: "Structure and Strategy of a Treatment Home," "Programming for Ego Support," "Techniques for the Antiseptic Manipulation of Surface Behavior," "Techniques for the Clinical Exploitation of Life Events." Examples of a few section titles such as "Routines which relax," "Leeway for regression and escape," "Group psychological hygiene," "The cultivation of interest-contagion," "Tension decontamination through humor," "Promises and rewards," illustrate the approach used.

Verbatim materials from recordings of interviews and observations are used to illustrate the extensive and verbose interpretations of the authors. Many generalizations are made. Some are obvious platitudes in very fancy language. Some are presented as scientific principles without supporting evidence other than observation. There is no quantitative evidence, no control group, no check. The authors who use many scientific terms loosely, fail to present a design or to give precise tests of their hypotheses.

The result is a detailed description of treatment procedures in a psychoanalytic frame of reference. A scientist hesitates to wade through pages and pages which describe procedures in minute detail in order to secure small amounts of questionable generalization. A practical worker may find in such reading suggestions on procedures to be used with disturbed children. A skillful writer selects detail in terms of its relevance to a major theme. These authors seem to be interested in detail as detail.

The epilogue which gives the therapeutic gains following the closing of Pioneer House is quite unsatisfactory when examined for specific evidence that the treatment procedures permanently improved the relations of the children to their environment. The way out for the authors is "Thus our *children who hate* went back into the limbo of *children that nobody wants*"—that is, to their old environment. One would expect that such intensive handling of children over many months, with a staff of two skilled adults per child, would produce some reorganization of children's adjustment that would manifest itself later, even in their old environments. At least one or two of the five children should have shown persisting improvement. But the outcomes were negative. If, after such long and expensive treatment, a child cannot maintain a better balance in the face of a hostile world, the outlook with regard to the practical use of the procedures described in this book seems quite hopeless.

JOHN E. ANDERSON
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University of Minnesota

SCHEIDLINGER, SAUL. *Psychoanalysis and Group Behavior: A Study of Freudian Group Psychology.* Pp. xviii, 245. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1952. $4.00.

Psychoanalysis and Group Behavior is not completely without merit. It is an earnest effort to bring out the concern of Freud and his followers with the phenomena of group behavior as an extension of their interest in individual behavior. The book has two sections, one entitled "The Freudian Concepts of Group Relations" and the other "Implications and Applications."

Section One spells out in some detail the processes operating within individuals and among individuals in groups as first postulated by Freud. Here the author leans heavily on Freud's major work in this area *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* although he draws upon a number of people who would come under the heading of psychologists, psychoanalysts, sociologists, and other "ologists" in the social sciences. He discusses some of the dynamics involved in the role of the leader and of group conflicts.

Section Two explains how the above are perceived, or applied, or misapplied in other fields of group study and suggests some of the implications for educational practice and group psychotherapy. This section has a number of real incidents which enliven and point up the moral of the text. They might conceivably provide teachers a meaningful framework within which to see the children of their classrooms as both individuals and group members.

The book as a whole was disappointing to this reviewer. Although replete with quotations, many of them trivial, footnotes, and all the academic trappings of a dissertation, it does not satisfy the demands of intellectual rigor nor linguistic precision that such a structure implies. For the social scientist familiar with Freud's work nothing new has been added. There would appear to be neither new facts nor a new synthesis of the old. The laymen unfamiliar with the vocabulary and with higher literary standards than the social scientist would have very hard going indeed.

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HURWITZ, STEPHAN. *Criminology.* Pp. 442. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952. 50 shillings.

According to its preface, this book, which was first published in Danish in 1947, the second edition appearing in 1951, is being used in the Universities of Copenhagen and Aarhus and in other Scandinavian Universities. Its author, Stephan Hurwitz, is Professor of Penal Law and Criminology at the University of Copenhagen. In the foreword of this English edition, Professor Thorsten Sellin explains that although the teaching of criminological subjects has been going on in some European universities for several decades, usually in "institutes" attached to law schools and "set up to offer instruction to prospective officials in the public services, police, prosecutors, judges, prison administrators, etc.," few general textbooks on criminology have been available. Professor Sellin informs us, however, that a few European texts have appeared during the last fifteen years, and that among these, in his opinion, this book by Professor Hurwitz "occupies a front-rank position."

In accordance with European tradition, the author regards criminology as "*the part of criminal science illustrating the factors of criminality through empirical research,* i.e., the individual and social factors underlying criminal behavior" (p. 13). His book, therefore, represents an attempt to provide a critical analysis of our knowledge of the causes of crime.

Professor Hurwitz, in carefully summarizing and critically analyzing a great deal of material drawn from both European and American sources, manifests not only an impressive familiarity with the many complex aspects of his controversial subject, but also an admirable balance, restraint, and objectivity in the treatment and presentation of his facts. Furthermore, by making his textbook available in English, he has placed the findings of much European, and especially Scandinavian, research within the reach of many students of criminology who otherwise might not have had access to them. Finally, it should be pointed out that his book forcefully reminds the reader that criminal behavior can be successfully studied only through the co-operation of many disciplines, each using its own concepts and specialized techniques. This, unfortunately, seems to have escaped the understanding of some American sociologists who have come to look upon criminology as exclusively within their province of teaching and research.

Since Professor Hurwitz's book confines itself primarily to the causation of crime, it will probably not be adopted as a textbook for undergraduate courses in American colleges and universities. However, it will provide American criminologists, and all others who are interested in the field, with an excellent reference book in the etiology of criminal behavior.

ROBERT G. CALDWELL
State University of Iowa

STRAUS, NATHAN. *Two Thirds of a Nation: A Housing Program.* Pp. xiii, 291, xvii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. No price.

This little book ought to be widely adopted by colleges and adult education groups throughout the country as the most readable introduction to the problem of housing. The author is the first Administrator of the United States Housing Authority—long before its establishment in 1937 and ever since one of America's most earnest and well informed housing experts. Ten chapters he has written himself; four are by other leaders.

Mr. Straus's book is not only a plea for the effectuation of the excellent federal housing law of 1949; it is also a criticism of administration and a call to the states and larger cities to do their part. The FHA (Federal Housing Administration) comes in for the most severe criticism directed at the administration of its mortgage insurance, though Mr. Straus begins this chapter with the highest praise for its solid achievements. His main point is that the agency serves the speculators (land developers, mortgage bankers, and builders) more faithfully than it does the home user and buyer. He is convinced that, if certain FHA practices were moderated or dropped, housing could be made available at considerably lower cost. Charles Abrams (Chapter XII) places a heavy burden of blame on FHA for its long-time practice, officially abandoned in 1950, of encouraging racial segregation through restrictive covenants. But Abrams is today more alarmed about the racial segregation that urban redevelopment under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 in his opinion bids fair to produce, holding that redevelop-

ment ought to be abandoned unless it can be "brought under the fold of the constitution."

As may be gathered from these illustrations of criticism, *Two Thirds of a Nation* is a book of positive opinion. There is no soft-pedaling of the basic issues. Controversial aspects of housing, such as public housing, are forthrightly discussed; and some practices generally considered beyond argument are presented in a new and controversial light. But neither Mr. Straus nor his collaborators seem to be careless of the facts. The book is intended to be not only informative, which it is, but to be provocative—on the theory, no doubt, that discussion of pros and cons increases the public intelligence. Mr. Straus's own chapters are distinguished by a challenging brevity and conciseness of style that should arouse much interest and argument.

BRYN J. HOVDE
Pittsburgh Housing Authority

THAYER, V. T. *The Attack upon the American Secular School.* Pp. x, 257. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. $3.00.

That the problem of Dr. Thayer's book is becoming chronically alarming is exemplified by the fact that, even in the brief time since its publication, organized religion has won another important victory over the autonomy of public education. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in finding that the released time program in New York does not violate the First Amendment to the Constitution virtually negates its earlier decision in the famous McCollum case which ruled that religious instruction may not take place upon school premises. If the learned Justices had read Dr. Thayer's careful analysis of the released time issue, their decision might have been otherwise. As the law now stands, religious groups are free to widen their operations. They will undoubtedly do so.

For, if this book proves anything, it proves that the attack upon the secular school is becoming increasingly organized, increasingly obtuse, increasingly set upon its objective of breaking down the traditional wall of separation between church and state in America. Dr. Thayer, whose earlier book *Religion in Public Education* prepared the ground for his present one, has gathered systematically the most substantial evidence available in support of his thesis. Beginning with an historic survey which indicates that the problem has seldom if ever been wholly quiescent in American history, he covers such topics as "practices that undermine," "opposition to the secular idea in education," and the effort—especially of the Roman Catholic Church—to block federal aid to education unless portions are earmarked for parochial schools.

The author's positive views follow those characteristic of liberal, progressive educators. He sees no objection to public financial support of health measures for parochial children provided that it is administered by public agencies, and he finds no serious difficulty in similar support of transportation facilities so long as these are not provided for the exclusive convenience of such children. As for religious instruction, however, he reiterates the suggestion of his earlier book that the most the public school can safely allow is teaching "about" religion in a strictly "objective" fashion, and then only in the upper grades or secondary school. Study of comparative religion should be delayed for the most part until college. His chief emphasis is upon "moral and spiritual values" as these permeate the entire learning process of young people—values that emerge from their own experience as well as from living cultures of the past and present.

Dr. Thayer applies Dr. T. V. Smith's apt phrase, "strategic obfuscation," to the religious question by noting that a majority of critics of secular education are really concerned, behind the façade of their frequently professed devotion to the public school, to force their own predetermined religious faiths down the throats of children. It is for this reason, more than all others, that Dr. Thayer opposes any effort to bring sectarian teaching into the curriculum.

It is one thing, however, to recognize such an intent among most sectarians and another to offer no better solution than Dr. Thayer gives us. Granting his sound empirical approach to moral and spiritual values as the ideal, one may still inquire whether he himself does not obfuscate strategically in proposing further an "objective" teaching "about" religion—a proposal that contradicts a crucial principle in his own theory of learning. For, according to progressivist psychology, even teachers are human beings with feelings, habits, and beliefs; hence, good teaching is not the kind that tries at the cost of suppression or hypocrisy to conceal these characteristics, but rather is the kind that encourages teachers to reveal themselves as they genuinely are even to the point of their political, moral, *and* religious preferences.

What is needed, if the contradiction is to be removed, is a fresh approach that, on the one hand, enables teachers to be completely honest and frank with themselves and with their students, and, on the other hand, safeguards the classroom from indoctrination of every preconceived bias or dogma. The way to accomplish this in religious education is through carefully planned projects, conducted by co-operating panels of teachers holding a variety of beliefs (including, of course, humanists and atheists as well as theists and deists). Such projects should probably be attempted, certainly at first, in the upper levels of the secondary school. They should draw freely upon outside experts, include frequent visits to religious institutions of every possible type, and encourage utmost discussion and criticism by all participants of every belief or practice. Toward their close, group consensuses should be sought inductively as to any similarities and differences that are found among the several religions studied, as well as to any preferences that a majority of students might agree upon with due respect always for every dissenter.

Admittedly this proposal could not be attempted immediately in many communities. Nor could it succeed without in-service training on the part of the teacher panels, or without parental support. But these are by no means insurmountable obstacles. Once the proposal began to take hold, moreover, we can be quite sure that many sectarians who were originally hostile would find reasons to reconcile themselves rather than be left outside. Most important, the proposal has the virtue of meeting the attack upon secular schools, not by building a fence around one of the most vital areas of life, nor by an "objectivity" made no less spurious by calling it "benevolent neutrality," but by a method of social learning that is genuinely public, free, and uncoerced while recognizing the legitimacy of conviction. Dr. Thayer's great contribution toward clarifying the issue of religion and education would be enhanced still further were he to give such a plan serious consideration, and to share in its implementation as an experimental venture.

THEODORE BRAMELD
New York University

JARMAN, T. L. *Landmarks in the History of Education: English Education as Part of the European Tradition.* Pp. viii, 323. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1952. $4.75.

The professional study of education is replete with a literature which concerns itself primarily with recounting the educational thinking of great teachers and assaying their significance to educational growth. The contributions to education of historical periods in Western civilization are rehearsed in varying degrees of competence and depth. It is possible that a fully adequate history of education can never be written by one author for the reason that one man's knowledge is hardly adequate to so gigantic a task. The history of Western education is, of course, the history of Western man. Perhaps from the standpoint of students of education, close and intimate contact with the great wellsprings of our educational heritage is of far more worth than the study of commentaries and histories. In other words reading Plato sheds far more light on the flow and ebb of Greek educational thinking than a score of commentaries and descriptions compiled by pedagogues. The vitality and freshness of a profound thinker transmits in his struggle with ideas something more valuable than a diluted, chronological narration can possibly convey. The tendency, widespread among teachers, to read about the thinking of education's keenest minds and

to avoid coming to grips with these men through their own writings is to be deplored. Easy recourse to a history of education is not enough.

However, a useful service is performed by histories of education if they lead the student to the stimulation and growth which comes from the study *of* (not about) creative, productive thinkers. It is in this light that T. L. Jarman's *Landmarks in the History of Education* is to be viewed. There is much merit in Jarman's book. His task in selecting significant *landmarks* for inclusion was not easy. In the main he has discharged this responsibility satisfactorily. The author endeavors to trace the historical development of European education from ancient Greece to contemporary British policy and practice.

Jarman's treatment has the earmarks of an eclectic, scissors and paste-pot, arrangement of data, and is at times weak in a critical appraisal of materials. Excellent and readily available references are an encouragement to further study of topics and issues raised by Jarman's book. *Landmarks in the History of Education* is not to be regarded as a substitute for careful and penetrating study of the roots of Western educational tradition; nor for that matter is any other history of education.

FREDERICK E. ELLIS
Tufts College

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

MCKEON, RICHARD. *Freedom and History.* Pp. 95. New York: The Noonday Press, 1952. $2.50.

At a time when "current fashions of thought" are so diverse and conflicting, it is a real achievement and contribution to clarify so much of the current confusion in philosophy by this brilliant essay on historical semantics. For this is semantics at its best and philosophical analysis at its best.

The purpose of the essay is to study the varying interrelationships between the concepts of freedom and history by examining and explicating their basic presuppositions in philosophy. In part this is most ereditely illustrated in the first chapter where we are treated to a sketch of the "history of the fashions of philosophizing." Out of this flux of thought McKeon discerns three basic methods: the dialectical, the logistic, and the problematic or method of *inquiry*. These are also designated as "epochal" or universal history, "causal" history, and "disciplinary" history.

Before proceeding to an elaboration of these three basic analyses, the author points up certain distinctions and oppositions within semantic anlaysis and notes its limitations and its values. After a masterly general review of the interrelationships of the three basic analyses of history with freedom, McKeon devotes successive chapters to a more detailed anaysis of each. Brief but excellent analyses of the Hegelian and Marxian dialectic are given. Also included in the chapter on dialectic analysis are such philosophers as St. Augustine, Plato, Rousseau, Kant, Spinoza, and the Stoics. This may seem to be a somewhat questionable inclusion but it is partially dispelled by the very incisive analysis of the place of freedom with the philosophy of each of these men.

The explications of the logistic and the problematic analyses of history and freedom do not compare in my opinion to the dialectical analysis. There is a fine account of Hume in the chapter on logistic analysis, but Cournot is dealt with inadequately, and the revival of Buckle is questionable. There are excellent studies of the problem of freedom in Aristotle, Mill, and Dewey in the chapter on problematic analysis, although I wonder if there is not an inadequate specification of this problem to the interrelating concept of history.

On the whole I found this a highly stimulating and provocative essay, but I remain somewhat haunted by the thought that the semantic analysis has superimposed upon it the pattern if not the substance of the dialectical method. There is a tendency to proliferate "triads" which often represent keen insights and fine illustrations, but occasionally seem to falter dialectically as in the concept of "fraternity." Curiously Comte is omitted entirely. None of these minor criticisms should detract, however, from the very real contribution of the author to the advancement of philosophical understanding both in thought and in action.

JOHN A. MOURANT
Pennsylvania State College

BAINTON, ROLAND H. *The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century.* Pp. xi, 276. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. $3.75.

Years ago James Harvey Robinson, one of the most distinguished of American historians, made a plea for the "humanizing of knowledge." He exhorted his fellow historians to desert the copying and verification of references for a period and write, not just for one another, but for the rank and file of intelligent people.

This volume by an outstanding authority on the Reformation reads like an endeavor to answer Robinson's plea. It has plenty of scholarship behind it, but it is designed specifically "for the general educated reader." Here are great figures of the Reformation: Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Knox, and Cranmer. Here are great events: the Diet of Worms, the institution of the Holy Commonwealth of Geneva, Henry VIII's break with Rome, William the Silent's struggle for Dutch independence. Here are great doctrines that created or grew out of the Protestant revolt: justification by faith, predestination, the priesthood of all believers, the authority of the Scriptures as against that of ecclesiastical decrees, freedom of conscience, and the separation of church and state. But nothing is left in isolation. Figures, events, and doctrines are made part of an absorbing story of what was a powerful movement that flowed in the sixteenth century from primary centers in Germany and Switzerland out across northern and western Europe.

Some of the impressions left by this story of the Reformation have contemporary relevance. For instance, the Reformation began in religious experience. But it could never have come to triumph—where it did triumph—without the cooperation of many other factors—political, economic, and social. As an illustration, one may speculate on what might have happened if the Emperor Charles V, when he had Luther on his hands, had not been at odds with the Pope, and if the balance of power in Europe had not made Catholic monarchs as well as Protestant princes jealous of Charles. Here is Bainton's description of the Emperor's predicament: "Charles for twenty-five years was not in a position to throw full weight into the struggle for the extermination of heresy in Germany. . . . During the long period of vacillation Lutheranism gained such a footing that in the end conciliation was the only live alternative." The reader may make such applications to our own day as he chooses.

Would that we had more history like this, so well-proportioned in its emphasis, and so pertinent to the understanding of history now in the making.

JUSTIN WROE NIXON
The Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

HERSHBERGER, GUY FRANKLIN. *The Mennonite Church in the Second World War.* Pp. xii, 308. Scottdale, Pa.: Mennonite Publishing House, 1951. $3.50.

The Mennonite Church, like the Quakers and the Church of the Brethren, has for centuries been pacifist and nonresistant in attitude and program. Like all religious groups, it was sorely tried during the two world wars. Mr. Hershberger, professor of history and sociology at Goshen College, and others have detailed elsewhere Mennonite experiences before 1940. In this volume, Mr. Hershberger covers only the period of the Second World War.

Throughout the book the author is disturbed over the impact made by modern life, and particularly war, upon members of the Church. Forty per cent of their men of draft age entered military service; some of their members bought war bonds; some of their children purchased war savings stamps; some of their members participated in tin and scrap metal drives; "too many" Mennonites worked in war industries; and Mennonite businessmen often succumbed to temptations "to violate the principal of nonresistance."

On the other hand, church leadership held firm to historic principles. The greatest weakness was at the point of "home training, ministerial teaching, and the pas-

toral care of the congregation." The war brought shortcomings to light, deepened determination to live by Christian principles, and opened up new avenues for service.

A large proportion of the book deals with Mennonite administration of civilian public service camps for drafted conscientious objectors. The author accurately records the experience and points up the difficulties. His survey indicates that Mennonite administration was reasonably satisfactory, at least until the last year. He also concludes that camp administration for the Mennonites was less difficult than it was for the Quakers and Brethren. So far as the campers themselves are concerned, his postwar poll reveals that the great majority of the nearly 5,000 men entering Mennonite-sponsored camps and projects thought the church had not made an unwise decision in undertaking administration under Selective Service. Equally large majorities thought their experiences had given them new religious insights and deepened their devotion to nonresistance principles. The author is certain objectors were more humanely and wisely handled than during the First World War, and he suggests a program for the future designed to make conscription even less rigorous.

Throughout the book the author goes into much detail mentioning names, pieces of literature, dates, figures, and the like. The detail is likely to bore non-Mennonite readers, but those who want a full and careful record and appraisal will find it here.

JOHN H. FERGUSON
Pennsylvania State College

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

SIEBERT, FREDRICK SEATON. ***Freedom of the Press in England, 1476–1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Controls.*** Pp. xiv, 411. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952. $7.50.

As a contribution to social, legal, and journalistic history, Professor Siebert's detailed study of the evolution of press freedom in England is of exceptional value. Through an exhaustive investigation of court cases, Parliamentary discussions, and official papers of such agencies as the Stationer's Company, the author has put together a step-by-step history of the rise and decline of the concept of governmental control over the circulation of ideas. The period covers English practice from the time when the printing press first came into general use in the country until the outbreak of the American Revolution. Since the Revolution expressed as it did the antipathy toward authoritarian government which was growing on both sides of the Atlantic, the period after 1776 in both England and the New World witnessed a rapid decline of press controls until these reached the vanishing point.

The study of English jurisprudence and political philosophy bearing upon the freedom of the press, therefore, is an important addition to our knowledge of the Anglo-American idea of practical democracy in general. Professor Siebert's research, in fact, suggests to him two propositions as relevant to modern political science as to the three centuries covered in his book: first, that "the extent of government control depends on the nature of the relationship of the government to those subject to the government"; and second, that "the area of freedom contracts and the enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and of the structure of society increase." With the progressive rise of a middle class democracy in England from the absolutism of Henry VIII to the predominance of Parliament in the last of the eighteenth century, the relationship of government to citizenry became expressed in the principle of reserved or delegated power while the right of the government to exercise greater authority in times of emergency has been limited in practice by the Jeffersonian ideal of absolute individual freedom.

The press has figured in both the cause and effect of this Anglo-American political development. As a medium for the exchange of basic political ideas among the people, the press has been a prime mover whose importance has been recognized from Edmund Burke to Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. Conversely, as popular liberty increased, the press has been a direct beneficiary. In English history the turning point in the struggle for freedom, Professor Siebert concludes, was in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as the fight for religious liberty was transformed into a fight for economic liberty. John Milton and his immediate predecessors demanded unrestricted press freedom in the conviction that "there was a definite, discernible and discoverable truth in religious doctrine, the presentation of which could not fail to convince the unbeliever." Those who followed Milton—and the Cromwellian Revolution—were more concerned with the wide circulation of the new theories of political independence.

Licensing, copyright, censorship (under the Commonwealth), prosecution for criminal or seditious libel, taxation, and subsidy were the successive barriers to press freedom which the English press surmounted in the course of three centuries. Through an exhaustive analysis of contemporary materials Professor Siebert has documented the course of governmental control. The result is a thoroughgoing study of the evolution of the idea of free expression which has been a peculiarity of Western political conviction.

WILLIAM F. SWINDLER
University of Nebraska

CHESSER, EUSTACE. ***Cruelty to Children.*** Pp. 159. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1952. $3.75.

The author of this book gives us an impressive account of cruelty to children in England. He bases his discussions largely on case reports taken from the files of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and on analysis of 600 cases brought before the English courts. Some of the forms of cruelty perpetrated are unbelievably atrocious and fantastic such as partially suspending a boy from a clothes wringer with his toes securely wedged between the rolls. Although the writer says human nature is derived from animal nature, in many cases the arrival never was achieved!

Cruelty to children is regarded as a disease of industrial and urban civilization and is rarely found among the so-called "backward nations"—a sad commentary on the quality of Anglo-Saxon enlightenment.

More than 40,000 cases involving almost 100,000 children have been reported in a single year. During the period of childhood approximately one child out of sixteen becomes the victim of cruelty or neglect. The unwanted child, representing 37 per cent of the court cases, is the most frequent victim. Oversized families, illegitimacy, inadequate housing, parental instability, and infidelity develop attitudes of antagonism and under-love that make children their unfortunate victims.

Low intelligence also produces similar results. Unfavorable economic and social conditions over many years of time, plus inbreeding, are considered chief causes of parental inhumanity. Mental unbalance and emotional stability likewise cause parents to wreak their spleen on helpless children.

The author emphasizes the need of removing the obstacles to wholesome family life and recommends both public programs and voluntary measures.

One woman who achieved the awesome distinction of procuring 20 abortions represents the need of knowledge of planned parenthood, training in mothercraft, and higher family incomes. Smoking, drinking, and gambling cost more than the outlay for food in the household budget. Life in our modern cities is tame unless "thrills" are provided or manufactured. Better leisure and recreational facilities and a higher quality of commercial entertainment would give people an opportunity to make substitutions for these excessive costs.

Ignorance in respect to human nature in man, woman, and child should be overcome and an enlarged program for what we in the United States call "sex education" adopted. A children's charter is needed, and a Ministry for children should be established. Efforts to reach borderline cases can then be made and neglect in part prevented.

The frequent references to living in "one or two tiny rooms" reveal a story of

cramping that must be overcome. Instruction in the art of homemaking and child care would greatly reduce unjust punishments. The author believes that many of the artificialities in our neurotic civilization can be eliminated. The book should be helpful in producing these results.

GEORGE B. MANGOLD
University of Southern California

MOUNTFORD, CHARLES P. *Brown Men and Red Sand: Journeyings in Wild Australia.* Pp. xvi, 184. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. $4.50.

It is fortunate that Mr. Mountford is an excellent photographer, for this book contains some of the most striking pictures on film ever to come out of Central Australia. The word pictures, on the other hand, in the opinion of this reviewer are somewhat less distinguished.

The presentation is in the form of a narrative of travel mainly in the region of the Mann and Musgrave Ranges along the border between South Australia and the Northern Territory. Although there are some purple passages about the beauty of the scenery, there is little of that incisive characterization of members of the party which holds the interest of the reader in a true story of adventure. The author sets forth many observations on the "aborigines" and provides interesting material on folklore, native art, and ceremonies. Some of these data are original contributions to knowledge. But they are not treated systematically within the context of the known ethnography of the region. Furthermore, although the author was in personal contact with the "natives" at mission stations, cattle camps, and the like, it is obvious that he spent no extended period living *with* the aboriginal people and getting to know their ways "from the inside." For these reasons the book is not entirely satisfying to the student of ethnography or social anthropology.

Nevertheless, the work is sympathetic to the native culture, it gives one a certain feeling for the wide open, nearly empty spaces of Central Australia, and it is excellently illustrated. JOHN GILLIN
University of North Carolina

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

MACKIEWICZ, JOSEPH. *The Katyn Wood Murders.* Pp. viii, 252. London: Hollis & Carter (distributed in the U. S. by The British Book Centre), 1952. $3.00.

The mysterious Katyn forest massacre of Polish war prisoners has become one of the most controversial questions of World War II. It is the most cruel crime in history involving the killing of war prisoners.

The basic facts are well known: As a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact the Soviet army invaded Poland in September 1939 and captured about 11,000 Polish officers. When, after the German attack on Russia in 1941, a new Polish army was organized in the Soviet Union, these officers could not be found, and Soviet officials, including Stalin himself, could not produce a satisfactory explanation of their disappearance. The matter considerably clouded Polish-Soviet relations in 1942–1943.

Then, in April 1943, the Germans discovered in the Katyn forest nearly 5,000 corpses of Polish officers who were identified as those who had disappeared in Russia. The remaining 6,000 have not been accounted for up to now. The Germans accused the Russians of this crime and the Russians replied promptly with an accusation of the Germans. The Russian explanation: The Poles were in labor camps near Smolensk and after the German attack in June 1941 had to be abandoned to the advancing German army. A Polish demand for an investigation by the International Red Cross met with a definite refusal on the part of the Russians. Thus the case was handled by a Commission of internationally known experts in criminal medicine and by the Polish Red Cross.

On the basis of these facts, Joseph Mackiewicz has written a documentary account which was published in London as a somewhat abridged translation of an earlier Swiss edition in the German language. (Joseph Mackiewicz, *Katyn—ungesühntes Verbrechen.* Zurich: Thomas Verlag, 1949.) It is a transcript of a huge amount of documents into an easily readable journalistic report on the whole affair. The author had the advantage of having witnessed the exhumations in Katyn and of having interviewed the local populace. Combining his own observations with the vast documentary material, German, Russian, and Polish alike, Mr. Mackiewicz has put together all the pieces of evidence and information into a complete presentation of the Katyn crime. With the skill of a crime reporter, the author has tried to find an answer to the crucial question: *When* was the crime committed? He presents overwhelming evidence indicating that the officers were murdered in March–April 1940. By having the time of the crime established, the criminal becomes obvious —the Soviet NKVD.

The book will be useful to anyone who intends to study the complicated Katyn affair. It indicates and discusses additional details which are not in the documents but which make the documents better understandable.

According to the author's statement (*Der Monat,* March 1952), the English publisher eliminated from the Zurich edition the essential material concerning the treatment of the Katyn matter by the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg. This was a mistake because precisely these strange machinations in Nuremberg precipitated the inquiry recently undertaken by a special Committee of Congress. The publisher should have known that censorship never remedies political errors. W. S. SWORAKOWSKI
Stanford University

ROUNAULT, JEAN. *Nightmare.* Translated from the French by Vera Traill. Pp. xvii, 267. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952. $3.50.

It seems extraordinary that it should be necessary for an intelligent man to go through the frightful experiences recorded in this book in order to arrive at any conception of Soviet forced labor in particular and of the Soviet economic and social system in general. Yet, the sad fact is that the great mass of intelligent and well-informed persons in the Western World are quite incapable of forming any idea of what is going on behind the iron curtain. In order to do so they have had to divest themselves of preconceived ideas and moral standards which are a part of Western civilization and return to primitive concepts which find no place in the modern age. Perhaps the simplest analogy to this would be a return to the age when barbarian peoples swarmed into Western Europe and destroyed much of ancient civilization.

The author of this book is of French origin, having been born, as he tells us, in Transylvania in the old Austria-Hungary, and sent to France for his education. He served in the French army during the unfortunate campaign of 1940 and, after the defeat of the French, left France for Rumania and a post in the *Institut Français des Hautes Etudes* in Rumania. When the latter country was overrun in 1945 by the Soviet armies he was caught up in a vast deportation of foreigners into the Soviet Union and transported to the Donbas. Here he served in labor gangs in connection with the coal mines till 1949 when he was released and returned to Paris.

His account of his experience is written with complete detachment yet with sympathy. The characters that emerge in the course of his story are well sketched; their thoughts and actions mirror the traditions and feelings of the multitude of social groups which were submerged in the cataclysm of war and later in the unprecedented mass deportations which have made the history of Eastern Europe since 1945 an almost unparalleled human tragedy.

Mr. Rounault was a careful observer and thoughtful interpreter, and many of his conclusions are valuable. One feels, however, some doubt that even he has grasped the full significance of what he has recorded—that is, the transformation of the countries behind the iron curtain into a vast prison, the life of whose inmates is devoted exclusively to one end—the accumulation of an overwhelming potential of war with its diverse weapons, propaganda, terror, and military might calculated to overawe and subdue the free world. The plan is on so vast a scale and so complex that it almost transcends the power of imagination, and thoughtful per-

sons would do well to ponder the full meaning of what they see here described.

STUART R. TOMPKINS

University of Oklahoma

DEWAR, HUGO. *Assassins at Large.* Being a fully documented and hitherto unpublished account of the executions outside Russia ordered by the GPU. Pp. x, 203. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. $3.00.

This book sounds, in parts, like a collection of detective and mystery stories. Actually it is a well-documented, though far from complete, report on political murder and kidnapping cases perpetrated by Soviet secret agents all over the world that have become known during the last fifteen years. Some of them, like the murder of Leon Trotsky in Mexico City, or the mysterious suicide in Washington of Walter Krivitsky, ex-leader of Soviet intelligence in Western Europe, are known in this country. But many others, that took place on the other side of the Atlantic, are hardly known here, and combined in one book they represent highly instructive and fascinating reading.

With one exception, "the case of a missing General," that caused a great deal of noise and scandal in France in 1937, and where an object of the Soviet kidnapping had been a White Russian General Miller actively engaged in anti-Communist struggle, this book deals with the Stalinist defectors, regardless of their nationality. Most of them were convinced Communists who for various reasons did not like Stalin's brand of communism; some of them were highly secret Soviet officials abroad who tried to run away from the Kremlin's rule and later were caught and liquidated. The author, quite justly, brushes off the argument that "a Russian citizen, himself a part of the Soviet Military Intelligence . . . is a traitor of his country . . . and that his death therefore is really an internal affair of the Soviet Union" even if a man is killed in the territory of another sovereign state—the argument that might be used by some people who might like to see the Communists of various brands kill each other.

The author's concern, however, is "to show that political assassination is resorted to by Russian secret police agents abroad, and that these agents are aided and abetted by the Communist Party." The author, who apparently has been close to the Communists in the past and thus is well informed, proves his point in a very convincing way. As testified by Walter Krivitsky before the Dies Committee on October 11, 1939, "Soviet Military Intelligence has approximately the same functions as the same services of other countries. Its most unique feature is that it can enlist and recruit members of the Communist Parties in countries in which it operates . . . who consider it their duty to aid Soviet Military Intelligence in their work." And this work is not limited, as the book shows, to gathering of secret information; it includes also the physical liquidation of the most dangerous, in Stalin's opinion, enemies of his totalitarian empire. Thus reading the book one can find some interesting indications as to whom the Soviet government fears the most. Mr. Dewar furnishes some proof that the main concern of the Kremlin gang has been not so much the "capitalist imperialists" as the Communist deviators and oppositioners who dared to stand up against Stalin's rule.

Probably, the chief conviction one might get after reading *Assassins at Large* is that there is no law, national or international, that a devoted foreign Communist would not readily break on the first order from his superiors in Moscow.

VLADIMIR PETROV

Yale University

BAUER, RAYMOND A. *The New Man in Soviet Psychology.* Pp. xxiii, 229. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $4.00.

Were this book simply a history of Soviet psychology, illustrative of the rather high correlation between changing theory and the changing "party-line," it would have filled an important gap in our knowledge and would have been of interest to most psychologists. But it is much more than this. As Jerome Bruner states in his enthusiastic foreword, "The book is at once an essay in psychological history and a study in political control." It most pertinently raises the question: should social science in its positive findings determine the nature of the social-political order, or should the social-political order determine the nature of social science?

Everyone knows that the Soviet Union was supposedly founded on the first premise, namely, "The first truly scientific society based on the Marx-Leninist Science of Society." But as Bauer shows, the second premise began to take over in the early 1930's. The author is both realistic and remarkably objective considering the current world political climate. Specifically and through inference he points out that our own social science is caught on the horns of the same dilemma, albeit with us these are currently not so sharp. The book should be a *must* for everyone interested in the broader aspects of social and political psychology. Further it is lucidly written and well documented not only from the literature but from the author's own field observations.

It seems to me that the chief positive findings of modern social science may be subsumed in the following slogan: *Our traditional belief that normally man's rational mind controls his animal body and determines the nature of the culture in which he lives, must be replaced by the belief that to some extent the nature of man's rational mind is determined by his animal body on one hand and by his culture on the other hand.* This slogan is undoubtedly valid, but the rub arises in connection with the words "to some extent." How much is "some"?

To begin with, the Soviets defined "some" practically as "everything" regarding the environmental-cultural factors, and these were emphasized to the exclusion of all others. Interestingly enough the Freudians originally took an almost diametrically opposed position, using our slogan but greatly over-emphasizing the unconscious id forces in psychology. Bauer points out clearly how the practical failure of naïve environmentalism and the survival needs of the Politburo both dictated the need for a changed picture of human nature. The emergent "New Man" is dialectically the almost complete antithesis of the "Old Man." He is "responsible, rational, individualistic." Current Soviet theorists almost go back to the traditional rational mind, controlling the animal body in a culture which to be sure is rational and "rationalized." Interestingly enough this "New Man" differs chiefly in his lack of an unconscious from the "Ego-Strong Man" of the contemporary Freudian psychoanalists. The Soviet psychologists' complete rejection of the psychodynamics of the unconscious places them, I believe, at a decided disadvantage. Bauer's history of the return to "rationalism" is an important and fascinating story. I recommend it without reservation to all students of the social sciences.

One final point: Bauer's trenchant comparison of contemporary Soviet psychology with Nazi psychology should do much to dissipate the increasingly widely held opinion that "Soviet Communism is nothing more than Red Fascism." This prevalent opinion seems to me is not only erroneous but scientifically and politically dangerous.

J. F. BROWN

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PUTNAM, PETER (Ed.). *Seven Britons in Imperial Russia, 1698–1812.* Pp. xxxiv, 424. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. $7.50.

A unique profile of Russia in the eighteenth century is presented in this anthology of the writings of seven British travelers. Chosen because of their representative character or their special interest from the writings of some twenty-six British observers in this period, these carefully edited selections permit one to see the Russians through the eyes of the Western peoples with whom they were at this time most closely associated.

Mr. Putnam points out in his introduction that between the reigns of Peter the Great and Alexander I Russia developed from a backwater of Western civilization to a mainstay of the European political system, and this change is clearly reflected in these various writings. Even in the relatively brief period between the visits of the hydraulic engineer John Perry, 1698–1712, and of the merchant Jonas Hanway, 1743–50, a significant transformation in the status of Russia is evident.

Where Perry complains of the difficulties of living in St. Petersburg and criticizes the ignorance of the Russian people and the oppressiveness of their institutions, Hanway refers to the capital as "an elegant and superb city" and praises Russia for the "great strides in the improvement of her commerce." Even after allowing for the prejudices of a disappointed engineer and a successful merchant, the development of Russia is clearly enough reflected.

The purpose of this volume is less to illustrate the transformation of Russia than to illuminate the development of Anglo-Russian relations in all their aspects, however, and this it accomplishes with great skill. Whether in the extracts from the *Anecdotes of the Russian Empire* (1784) of William Richardson, who observed Russia as secretary to the British ambassador, 1768–1772, from the dispatches of Sir James Harris, who served as ambassador from 1777 to 1783, or from the *Travels* of William Coxe, scholar and tutor who toured Russia in 1778–1779, the achievements and shortcomings of Russia in the age of Catherine II stand out clearly. The final emergence of Russia under Alexander I as a leader among European states is likewise vividly depicted in selections from the writings of Robert Ker Porter, court painter in 1805–1807, and from the *Private Diary* of Sir Robert Thomas Wilson, who as brigadier general served with Kutusov's army against Napoleon in 1812.

While the extracts from these various writings form the heart of this anthology, their value is greatly enhanced by the interesting introductory essays of the editor. Incidentally, this volume also deserves special mention as an example of fine publishing.

C. E. BLACK

Princeton University

HARCAVE, SIDNEY. *Russia: A History.* Pp. xiii, 665, xxxiv. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1952. $6.00.

As most teachers of Russian history are sadly aware, the existing texts in the field by Pares, Sumner, Vernadsky, and others are unsatisfactory from various and several points of view. Pares put us off by a great prolixity of style (among other faults); Sumner organizes his material in a way that is above the heads of beginners; and Vernadsky's treatment of the early centuries of Russian history is, paradoxically enough, too sketchy.

Now Professor Harcave of Champlain College, New York, has attempted another "concise presentation of Russian history." Unlike the product of the writers cited above, his work makes no claim to any great originality of concept or scholarship. The author has, however, enriched his understanding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a result of participation in interviews with displaced Russians in Germany, a project sponsored by the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

The book is divided into five main sections of unequal length and merit. Less than 10 per cent of the content is devoted to pre-Petrine Russia; about 15 per cent to the period from Peter's time through the end of the reign of Paul I; and about 30 per cent to the decades subsequent to the Bolshevik Revolution. In other words, the work is heavily weighted on the side of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

No discernible underlying theme or point of view exists within these pages. On the contrary, an essential eclecticism, a certain "conventionality" of thought, pervades the work. However, the writing is clear, with helpful chronological charts and maps, pertinent illustrations, a good bibliography, and a serviceable index.

As has been made evident, the most substantial part of Professor Harcave's book deals with "modern Russian history." In general, the threads of political, diplomatic, economic, and intellectual development within imperial Russia are carefully presented. The treatment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century revolutionary, nationalist, and liberal movements in Russia is first-rate.

All in all, Mr. Harcave's book should be welcomed by students as a more than competent effort to produce a usable one-volume text. It will, however, have to be used with caution, principally because of its skimping on the earliest times in Russian history. Hence, Vernadsky's text still probably remains our best standby.

DAVID HECHT

New York City

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *The Bolshevik Revolution. 1917–1923.* Pp. vii, 400. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $6.00.

Professor Edward Hallett Carr of England has done it again. The second volume of his "A History of Soviet Russia" series on *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* is impartial, scholarly, carefully documented, and brilliant. He has divided the treatment into three periods: that of the Revolution, of war Communism, and of the first stage of NEP. Within each of these periods he has discussed: (a) agriculture, (b) industry, (c) labor and trade unions, (d) trade and distribution, and (e) finance.

Anyone who reads the book will note the great contrast between this factual treatment and the hysteria and fear of Russia broadcast by our press, radio, and television. Reading this scientific analysis one can see that given the cultural and international forces of the period, the rise of Bolshevism was inevitable.

The book shows that Russian policies have not been the strict result of ideological theory but have rather been the product of trial and error. Whenever dogma interfered with concrete results it was reinterpreted! Socialists had not in their theoretical writings, prior to the Revolution, envisaged a direct transition from capitalism to communism and when they found themselves in power had to discover the precise pathway by experimentation.

This book shows quite clearly that the actions of foreign governments helped forward the complete nationalization of the basic means of production and distribution. War is shown to be the pathway to communism even when it is used by the United States or any other country ostensibly to destroy communism.

The author might have made a little clearer his references to political events. Nowhere does he refer to Lenin's offer to continue the war against Germany if the Allies would give assistance and to the effect of this refusal on the economy. Again in mentioning the outlawing of the Left Social Revolutionists he mentions Mirbach's murder but fails to refer to the fact that the Social Revolutionists attempted to seize the entire government by force. But these are minor omissions.

These two volumes should be compulsory reading for all officials of the State Department who want to understand the realities of the Russian Revolution. If we could have similar scientific volumes analyzing Russian actions down to 1952, we would then no doubt realize the extent to which Allied foreign policy has failed to take into account the causative factors making inevitable the Russian reactions of our time.

JEROME DAVIS

West Haven, Connecticut

CONDOIDE, MIKHAIL V. *The Soviet Financial System: Its Development and Relations with the Western World.* Pp. xiii, 230. Columbus: The Bureau of Business Research, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University, 1951. $4.00.

JASNY, NAUM. *The Soviet Price System.* Pp. 179. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951. $2.00.

Jasny's book is one which I would not recommend either to a layman or to a specialist in the Soviet economy. For the layman, it would be extremely tedious to read, since the technical-statistical material (material of which non-specialists will be unable to form any independent judgment), is presented in a scattered, unsystematic way. For this type of reader it will be sufficient to read the introduction in which he will be assured that "It is not an exaggeration to say that the Soviet price system was in a chaotic state through the whole Plan era" (p. 8), that "the club law of administrators who know Stalin's speeches by heart and are less familiar with economic planning appears in Soviet prices with the greatest clarity" (p. 10), and that "certain enthusiasts for planning, and specifically for Soviet planning, in this and other non-Soviet countries, seem not to realize two things: that good planning in the U.S.S.R. might spell peril to the world,

and that good planning is fortunately incompatible with dictatorship. It is a blessing that while Soviet conditions greatly facilitate planning they make possible only very poor planning" (p. 12).

The whole book is in the main devoted to the task of proving these statements, but after pursuing these "proofs" the layman will find himself even less informed about the real Soviet price system than before. This book is not written by an academically trained economist but by a crusader against the Soviet Union, whose task is not to describe and analyze the Soviet price system, but to condemn everything that is being done by the Soviet government in the economic field—every aspect of economic policy and economic development. A few quotations will suffice to illustrate this attitude.

"The habit of getting something for almost nothing seems to have become firmly fixed in the Soviet Government" (p. 59); "fake official figures," "even moderately experienced planners are very scarce in the U.S.S.R." (p. 16); the U.S.S.R. is "a country where around half of the national income is confiscated by the State for new investment and aggression" (p. 78). Every statement of facts well-known to specialists in the Soviet economy is accompanied by the refrain—Look what bad things they are doing. This tedious refrain and his biased interpretations may prevent the objective reader from doing justice to the painstaking collection of some factual statistical material which would otherwise be useful for reference. The author's extreme bias may arouse the suspicion that even this factual material is not an objective collection of facts, but manipulated evidence produced in order to prove the author's thesis that everything is evil that comes from the Soviets—especially as Mr. Jasny is very unscrupulous in his method of selecting quotations when he wants to discredit authors who differ from him in their interpretations of statistical material or of government measures.

For the specialist in Soviet economics this book is very disappointing reading. He will not find in it anything that is not know to him—with the exception of some scattered information on the prices of certain goods—while nearly all the author's main interpretations and "findings" are not only questionable, but very often cause astonishment (to put it mildly) at the methods used by Mr. Jasny in his "analysis" and polemics.

Mr. Condoide's book is not a scholarly work, but a very general compilation of material assembled from more competent studies of the same subject, which are only very superficially sketched by him. In this book Mr. Condoide repeats the mistake which he made in his book on Russian-American trade, in which he tried to cover too large a field in a very short study. He again starts with a description of "Soviet Economic Organization," dealing with it in 20 pages, 9 pages more than he devoted to "the Soviet Economic System" in his previous book. To the analysis of "The Soviet Banking and Credit System" he allocates another 24 pages, and the same space is devoted to "Soviet Foreign Economic Policies 1941–50," a subject which it would have been more advisable not to include in this study. The rest of his text (a total of eighty-six pages) is devoted to the description of "Soviet Money," "The National Budget," and "Soviet Financial Relations with the World and Foreign Trade," no more and no less!

The result of this attempt to discuss everything in such a condensed way is a very superficial compilation, full of generalities, with quite a number of inaccuracies of description. In the chapter "Summary and Conclusions" we are, for example, enlightened by the following statements: "The State owns the means of production and distribution. It finances the expansion of industry and the distribution of goods"; "The Soviet currency is an internal currency only and is not available abroad. In settling foreign accounts the Soviets use foreign exchange or gold"; "In April 1918, the Soviet Government took over foreign trade and since that time the foreign trade of the Soviet Union has been operated by the State"; "During World War II the Soviet Union received substantial assistance from the U.S. under Lend-Lease"; and "Barring far-reaching changes in international relations, the U.S.S.R. will continue to control, both politically and economically Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania" (pp. 158–164).

If the reader is innocent of any knowledge of the Soviet financial system, he might read Mr. Condoide's book with some profit to his general education. But to the serious student of the Soviet financial system this book has nothing to offer.

ALEXANDER BAYKOV

The University
Birmingham, England

GLUCKSTEIN, YGAEL. *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*. Pp. 333. Boston: The Beacon Press. 1952. $4.50.

Gluckstein's book gives a realistic picture of the economic and social changes that have taken place in the shadow of the Red Star since the second world war. It contains a wealth of useful although not quite integrated and not always evaluated material. The author is an economist, and the first part of the book dealing with the methods of Soviet economic conquest is far superior to the second and third parts commenting on political developments and on the problems of Titoism.

Comprehensive material on the agrarian reforms, changes in property relations, and the various means of direct and indirect Soviet exploitations are well presented. The author shows how the chief means of production and exchange were concentrated in the hands of the state. Several chapters include selected illustrations of corresponding developments in Soviet Russia and in some cases in Nazi Germany. In these cases of state capitalistic systems the various means of economic exploitation, such as recourse to extreme piece-work wage policies, aim at the establishment of a strict control over the individual in all facets of human relations. The author correctly pointed out that the primary goal of social and economic reforms in the satellites was to subordinate the individual to the state and to subordinate the state to Moscow. Soviet Russia intervened actively to implement changes, but the Communist recipe was a changing pattern. For example, in the difficult postwar period capitalist production was encouraged and nationalization came only later. Today the Russian and joint companies are the only capitalistic enterprises in the satellites. Through these the Soviet Union has been draining satellite economy. For similar reasons the Soviet Union has been opposing nationalization in Austria and Finland.

The second part of the book describes how the totalitarian police regimes were established, the methods of direct Russian action, the liquidation of actual or potential opposition, and Soviet manipulation of the various conflicting national aspirations. The long report on Czech atrocities committed against the Sudeten Germans (pp. 195–200) does not fit into the general framework of the book, and the presentation of antichurch measures reveals some lack of knowledge of facts and understanding of the Eastern European situation. There are some gratuitous statements, like the remark that Cardinal Mindszenty "had welcomed the extermination of millions of Jews by the Nazis" (p. 217). On the fate of the Hungarian Jews and on the attitude of the Catholic hierarchy in Hungary, there are Jewish publications in English from which the author could have ascertained the facts before passing judgment.

The third and least integrated part examines the Tito-Stalin conflict and the epidemic of Titoism in Eastern Europe. The author ends with the optimistic conclusion that Stalin's empire has no future. He supports this thesis with the internal contradictions of Stalin's empire and especially with the latent antagonism existing between the satellite Communist parties and the Kremlin. In the light of various historical examples, the author considers the mass terror and the extremely exaggerated leader cult as symptoms of decline of a reactionary doomed society. His examples, however, do not support his conclusions in view of contemporary world conditions. Modern technology enables a totalitarian dictator with a relatively small group of well rewarded collaborators to terrorize and control millions of people. The era of popular uprisings is over, and only a clash between the various ruling groups—such as party, police, or army factions—or external intervention may expedite the dictator's fall.

All in all Gluckstein's work is a useful

contribution to the literature dealing with Stalin's captive states.

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

TAYLOR, O. R. *The Fourth Republic of France: Constitution and Political Parties.* Pp. ix, 221. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951. $3.00.

This little volume provides a useful guide through the labyrinth of French politics since the advent of the Fourth Republic. The antecedents and significant provisions of the Constitution of 1946 are first briefly and clearly explained. Next comes a survey of the organization, strength, and programs of national party groups—a score in number—which have appeared on the political stage in recent years. A third section of the book summarizes the composition and policies of the nine successive cabinets which held office from 1947 to the spring of 1951.

For the student of French politics, the most striking impression conveyed by this account is the extent to which traditional habits and practices have reasserted themselves within the context of a Constitution which, like its predecessor of 1875, satisfies nobody: Unstable, short-lived governments are still the captives of an all-powerful legislature; the right of dissolution is on the way to becoming a dead letter; the new Council of the Republic, shorn of the powers possessed by the former Senate, shows signs of acquiring substantial influence in the policy-making process; the system of *décrets-lois,* though now constitutionally barred, seems to be "creeping back under the new name of *pouvoir réglementaire";* and so on. Except for the rigidly disciplined Communists, political groups continue to shift their bases, to splinter, to coalesce, and to realign themselves much as before.

There is, however, one new and disturbing feature. This is the very much greater difficulty of forming effective governing majorities loyal to democracy. French cabinets, whether of the Third or Fourth Force, have since 1947 fallen less because of adverse votes in the National Assembly than because their own members have been unable to agree among themselves on major policy questions—at least in the domestic if not in the foreign field. Only the grave threat of Communism from the Left, and, until recently at any rate, the pressure of Gaullism from the Right, have held together the moderate but heterogeneous coalitions sufficiently to deal on a makeshift basis with one crisis after another. Whether the current swing toward the Right, which has occurred since Mr. Taylor's volume appeared, will usher in a little more stability remains to be seen; but the odds are against it.

The mass of detail presented by the author does not make for exciting reading: an interpretation of political trends with a broader sweep of the brush would have made the book a more interesting contribution. Nor are the English translations of French terms always well chosen. Even so, the study will remain for some time a valuable handbook of reference for those concerned with the beginnings of the latest attempt of France to function as a national democracy.

WALTER R. SHARP
Yale University

JORDAN, Z. *Oder-Neisse Line: A Study of the Political, Economic and European Significance of Poland's Western Frontier.* Pp. 133. London: The Polish Freedom Movement, "Independence and Democracy," 1952. No price.

In 1950 the Polish Freedom Movement formed a study group to examine the significance of the Oder-Neisse frontier for Europe as a whole. Dr. Zbigniew Jordan has sumarized the work of this group around three main arguments: (1) the disputed territories are far more important for Poland than for Germany; (2) these territories are essential as an industrial base for East-Central Europe; and (3) a strong East-Central Europe is necessary "in the building of a peaceful integration of Europe as a whole."

As a preliminary part of his study Jordan discusses the international agreements which led to the establishment of the Oder-Neisse line. He shows conclusively that these go back to the Teheran Conference of 1943 although they were not formalized until the Potsdam Conference of 1945. Likewise Great Britain, the United States, and Russia had long before Potsdam accepted the expulsion of the German population from these territories. There was, of course, always the formal stipulation that final determination of boundaries must be reserved for the peace treaties. As occupation problems developed and relations between the Western Powers and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics grew less friendly voices were raised for a revision of this frontier. Secretary Byrnes led off in his Stuttgart speech on September 6, 1946, soon to be followed by Mr. Bevin, and now constantly by the statesmen of Western Germany. To counter this "revisionism" the book under review was written.

The argument is advanced that Germany does not need this arable land, since in normal times it produced a negligible agricultural surplus and fed little more than its own population. The increased density of population in Western Germany because of population transfers is held to be little more than would have occurred if the natural growth 1934–49 had continued (p. 59). Two pages later the author cites figures for 1921–33 to show that "the population in Germany was not replacing itself" and argues that Germany has no surplus population to repopulate her former Eastern provinces. Here as in other places the statistics presented do not inspire confidence.

The main thesis of the book, however, is that the present fear of communism should not cause us to forget "the German menace." The only way to curb Germany is to establish equally strong economic areas outside her borders. The Saar Basin must therefore be attached to France and the Silesian industrial area, with its outlet at Stettin, united to give a strong economic basis for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Such an industrialized East-Central Europe, when finally freed from Russian domination, is necessary for an integrated Europe. The author's assurance that the development of the Silesian-Oder region (an Eastern Ruhr) will unite Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, even after the unifying coercion of Moscow is removed, seems somewhat optimistic in view of past history. Perhaps this is the correct vision of the future, but Jordan seems on firmer ground for the present when he reiterates that to support Germany's claim for territorial revision in the East will only increasingly alienate the Poles and the Czechs from the West.

E. C. HELMREICH
Bowdoin College

ROBERTSON, PRISCILLA. *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History.* Pp. xi, 464. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. $6.00.

This delightfully brilliant work by Priscilla Robertson, daughter of Preserved Smith, is in its keen analysis of the social conditions of the 1848 revolutionary era well worthy of the distinguished father to whom it is dedicated. The book presents not only a penetrating interpretation pithily expressed, but vividly portrays the experiences and thoughts of the people of those troubled times, derived to a large extent from the memoirs not only of participants but of disinterested observers—especially American envoys. The author likewise regards the Russian, Alexander Herzen, as "the greatest commentator" of all. "His memoirs," she says, "read as if a twentieth century intelligence had somehow been sent back to record for us the meaning of those struggles that seem in so many ways the birth pangs of our modern era" (p. 8). Her book deals with the 1848 revolutionary movements in France, Germany, the Austrian Empire, and Italy.

The Revolution of 1848 was feared, she says, "because sixty years of the swiftest industrial progress the world had ever known" had created a violently explosive element, a proletariat whose miseries presented an unsolved problem. Should the "strait-jacket" in which the Treaty of Vienna had placed Europe be broken to allow this new class a vote, or would they use this franchise for immediate overthrow of the industrial system which had given them their livelihoods, or would they tamely obey the wishes of their employers?

Or was the problem rather a need for guarantee of food and steady employment?

Businessmen likewise "resented the eighteenth century restrictions which limited their nineteenth century opportunities" (p. 4).

Intellectuals failed to realize that the workers would not be far-seeing and generous about social reorganization, believed that all classes would benefit together. "Only after the liberals won power did they discover that they were afraid of the workers; when the workers found this out they turned to the Marxian gospels" (p. 6).

As for nationalism, it "could give character and mission to every people." "Internationalism was made to seem materialistic and selfish, while the petty jealousies of Balkan nationalities, which have caused so much strife in a century, were made to seem like holy wars" (p. 6).

The chapters of this book teem with interesting comments on the classes, the personages, the ideas, and the places associated with the revolutionary movements of the time. In the chapter entitled "A Crown From the Gutter," the vain efforts of the Frankfurt Parliament to form a truly united liberal empire for the German states are vividly recounted.

Of rather unique interest in this are the businessmen's concern after having attained the Zollverein and 3,000 miles of railway, to abolish the "oldfangled confederation" with its confused jumble of "weights, money and commercial law." The Frankfurt Parliament's sessions, held in St. Paul's Church and reported by German, English, and French journalists, were long and arduous. Not only were political questions discussed, but also the creation of a national army and a navy, for which one ship was contracted for at the Brooklyn navy yard.

It was not only fear of Prussia's power that led some to favor an Austrian as emperor of the new nation, but also desire to provide through Austria a path for German expansion towards the Black Sea as well as to Venice and the Adriatic. However, King Frederick William IV was chosen for the post, which choice as well as the constitution itself was approved by most parliaments and rulers throughout Germany. Afflicted with autocratic ideas, though acknowledging that his great ancestor Frederick the Great would doubtless have condescended to a crown at the hands of parliament, Freedrick William utterly rejected it as plebeian, terming it "a dog's collar," "a pig's crown," "a fictitious coronet baked of mire and clay" (p. 163).

"In the end Bismarck took over some of the 1848 Assembly's ideas without its idealism, either for liberalism or for Pan-Germanism and without its weakness" (p. 166).

Both the chapters dealing with France and with Austria, "The China of Europe," are filled with intensely interesting comments and characterizations.

JAMES E. GILLESPIE
The Pennsylvania State College

EUCKEN, WALTER. *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik* (Principles of Economic Policy). Pp. xix, 396. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1952. DM 21.—.

As Friedrich Lutz points out in his foreword to this magnum opus of the late Walter Eucken, the study of economics in Germany has long suffered from certain basic deficiencies: for one, the prevalence of a historic-contemplative approach has often favored a neglect of the analytical processes known to the liberal mind; for another, significant methodological shortcomings stem from traditional fixed concepts of vested authority which seem to represent the inevitable dogma of German economic rationale. As in other Continental schools of thought, this latter tendency has, in turn, forced German theorists into extremes of either economic interventionism or laissez-faire which appear archaic to the present-day observer. The inability of the German academicians to explain, let alone cope with, the hyperinflation after World War I gave rise to a degree of reorientation which might, in time, have bridged the gap between German and other, more advanced economists; but the intellectual vacuum of the totalitarian thirties and the war made this impossible to the point where, after World War II, isolation had become complete.

Thus, many German economists who had been able to cull from Keynes's work only that which seemed to fit the Nazi program for pump priming through military preparedness began to appreciate the true significance of his work only after his death. By that time, however, large parts of Europe, including areas directly contiguous to Germany, had turned into regimented economies and, in the case of those situated to Germany's East, had lost their political freedom as well. It is against this historic background that Eucken propounded his neoclassical theories, first in his *Principles of Economics*, published in 1940, and now in the present volume edited posthumously by his widow and K. Paul Hensel.

To the American reader, the book's principal significance lies in its frank and cogently advanced advocacy of a liberal economy, free of centralized planning and controls and based on a functioning price mechanism similar to the one which has prevailed in Germany since currency reform. In this, Eucken follows Roepke and von Mises while, at the same time, making full use, in what might be termed a generalized European version of macroeconomics, of marginalism, aggregates, and similar tools developed by Anglo-Saxon scholars. However, Eucken posits a more typically continental concept of an economic "order" which links the criteria of general equilibrium to certain of the political and social postulates found in Schumpeter and which is not always free of dogmatism. Used in German universities, this book should do much to advance the discipline past the narrow bounds of tradition, despite some relatively minor misinterpretations and errors (it could hardly be maintained that New Deal economics derive from Fascist economic concepts (p. 56)); the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1933 (p. 176).

ADOLPHE J. WARNER
New York City

KRUSE, VINDING. *The Community of the Future*. Pp. 828. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $12.00.

The Community of the Future, as seen by F. V. Kruse, Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Copenhagen, is a blueprint for an ideal society consisting of men of a new type and built up in accordance with the author's attempt "to place morality and justice on a scientific basis." This attempt depends on the classification of sciences in "descriptive" (including the theoretical) or "experimental" (applied). Ethics, individual and social, belong to the second of these classes; but the term as used by Professor Kruse connotes not so much experiment, as the trial-and-error procedure. After a rather lengthy discussion of various theories about the ultimate good, the author decides in favor of utilitarian ethics, style Bentham and J. S. Mill. He hopes however that the men of a new type will reach such a state of social unselfishness that all the regulating and leading positions in the community will be fitted by those who are best fitted for them in abilities and other qualities.

There follows a study of the nature and purpose of the law through which the new community is to be engendered. Here he stands on the solid ground of "the general theory of law" as taught in continental Europe prior to Kelsen. He who is familiar, say, with Korkunoff's work (available in English translation) will find little new. This study serves as a starting point for the discussion of personal rights and property rights which, in the author's new community, will have approximately the same shape as they have now. But, in his opinion, a new division of law must emerge to take care of "the right to earn." He dislikes both the liberal and the socialist solutions of the problems of industrial relations and offers a third way which, surprisingly, has nothing in common with the middle way of the Scandinavians based on co-operative societies. What he suggests is the institution of "courts of industry" to fix wages and prices and to solve industrial conflicts. Strikes, lockouts, and boycotts would be forbidden.

The whole edifice is to be crowned by a new constitution. The author rejects both autocracy and democracy since they result in the rule of incompetent persons. He

suggests the institution of a parliament elected by persons holding positions in the local administration, professional men (particularly university professors), and delegates of national leagues of agriculture, industry, handicraft, shipping and banking. This parliament would share power with a president (or a prime minister) elected by persons possessing higher professional training and by farmers, clerks, and skilled workers with at least ten years of experience. No name is given to the system; but this is obviously a new variety of technocracy.

Professor Kruse seems to ascribe to his plan universal validity. Though Scandinavian institutions and developments are in the forefront, long chapters are devoted to English, German, and American affairs. In the present reviewer's opinion, the author's conclusions express merely his personal predilections justified ex post facto by a vague and by no means original system of ethics.

N. S. TIMASHEFF
Fordham University

WALEY, DANIEL. *Mediaeval Orvieto: The Political History of an Italian City-State, 1157–1334.* Pp. xxv, 170. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. $4.00.

The political histories of such great Italian city-states as Florence, Venice, and Genoa are comparatively well known for the late medieval and Renaissance periods. Often such independent cities, with their fierce rivalries within and without, serve as illustrations for the whole Italian scene. There was, however, another group of cities, small in comparative population but with as involved civic politics, which was faced with the additional problem of integration within the States of the Church. Such cities had their own peculiar set of foreign relations as well as the development of party politics.

Mr. Waley has made a minute analysis of such a town in medieval Orvieto. While his main objective has been to trace the political emergence of a small commune of tradesmen, craftsmen, and farmers, he has been led inevitably to consider Orvieto's position as an indication of fluctuating papal temporal power. He has made an admirable study of the commune, tracing its internal development with the growth of factions designated as Guelf or Ghibelline, factions ever ready to forget the quasi-national political platforms in favor of local power and issues, much as modern political parties often find their local units with aims bearing little resemblance to those of the national organizations with which they are affiliated.

Orvieto, recognized as a self-governing commune in the middle of the twelfth century by the papacy, found its principal internal problems to be the rivalry between two powerful families and the effort to extend and strengthen her control over the surrounding countryside and villages. Such problems were more or less indigenous to every commune, large or small, of the time. The author carefully traces the effects of each on Orvieto's foreign policy, on her relations with her papal overloads, and on the rise and decline of her internal independence. Of particular interest is the commune's part in the great Guelf-Ghibelline struggle during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, in which her position in the Papal States was basic. Here we get a glimpse of the efforts of the popes to maintain in miniature the temporal power they sought to acquire over the wider domain of the continent. Orvieto's ability to act independently was, as with other communes within the Patrimony, circumscribed by strong popes and almost unfettered by weak ones. This phase is well done, including thorough documentation on the economic and external as well as on internal affairs.

The author is to be congratulated on his treatment of the development of Orvieto as a small commune whose political life was, perhaps, more representative of the general run of communes in Italy than were the great cities. The book has several appendixes containing material which could, except for the genealogical detail, be more properly incorporated in the text. There is an exhaustive bibliography and a usable index.

M. NICKERSON HARDWICKE
Bellflower, California

OTHERS

KEMÉNY, GEORGE. *Economic Planning in Hungary 1947–9.* Pp. x, 146. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952. $2.50.

The author's experience as instructor in economics at the University of Budapest and on the editorial staff of the *Pester Lloyd,* as well as his position as Under-Secretary for Finance in the Hungarian Coalition Government, 1945–1948, makes him eminently qualified to survey and examine recent economic developments in Hungary. The work is a concise and authoritative study of the Hungarian Three-Year Plan, 1947–1949, based on extensive statistical data. It opens with a brief statement on the economic and social background in Hungary, and then launches into the examination of the antecedents of planning and industrialization and economic nationalism. It also deals with the change in economic and financial structure, planning, and policy, and treats administration of the Plan.

The Three-Year-Plan constituted a period of transition, "shaping economic life towards a full use of productive resources," an objective to be attained through the second Plan inaugurated in January, 1950. It entailed full nationalization of the manufacturing industry and wholesale trading. Capital programs were subject to licensing and were for the most part "centrally directed." The aim of the Plan was to reconstruct and re-equip the Hungarian economy, and to raise the standard of living. The first objective was achieved. Reconstruction in industry and transport was accomplished. Industrial capacity in important sectors was enlarged. In the village too, despite much tension, progress was made. But in regard to the second aim there is a question whether the increase in well-being was proportionate to the efforts made. The improvements in the standard of living were conspicuous if the comparison is made with the low level of 1946–47. It must be remembered, however, that these improvements were results not only of the increasing supply of consumer goods but also, to a certain extent, of the redistribution of incomes. Furthermore, the raising of the social and economic status of the workers had its counterpart in the deterioration of that of the middle classes.

The author wonders about the soundness of the economic policy underlying the Plan. The government set out to increase production at all costs. It failed to realize reduction in costs of production but found a new way toward higher production through availability of cheap labor. This accounted for lack of balance in the execution of the Plan. While production programs were reached or slightly exceeded, the improvement in the productivity of labor fell short of the estimates. The investments moreover went beyond the requirements for the planned level of production and were not accompanied by a commensurate rise in production (pp. 125–126).

The reviewer was especially struck by the statement that the Three-Year Plan was formulated as a "national plan," and that, while economic co-operation with the Eastern countries was encouraged, it was done by promoting closer trade relations and not by attempts "to co-ordinate planning." Indeed the author writes that the Supreme Council for Mutual Aid, established in Moscow in the beginning of 1949, was not, as some believed, a nucleus for supernational planning. A possible exception to central conception might have been the rapid development of heavy industry. Within the Three-Year Plan some 8 per cent of industrial (or 25 per cent of total) investment served the expansion of the capital-goods industries—the Soviet Union supplying much of the iron ore and coke. The author says the second Hungarian Plan is also a national plan. This interpretation seems inconsistent with much evidence readily available in Soviet publications. The fact that the Hungarian planning has a national character does not necessarily imply that it was not co-ordinated with the over-all Eastern planning.

Needless to say, this work is a useful compendium not only because it offers an expert analysis of the Hungarian Three-

Year Plan, but also because it is a competent study of economic planning in a "People's Democracy."

WAYNE S. VUCINICH
Stanford University

BROCK, RAY. *Blood, Oil & Sand.* Pp. 256. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1952. $3.50.

This up-to-the-last-minute book undertakes, on the basis of wars past and problems present, to show the shape of things to come in the Middle East. It is in this area, the author is convinced, that the world struggle of Communist Russia and the non-Communist powers for a variety of reasons is most likely to break out into uncontrolled war. The reader gathers on the run, while trying to keep up with the breathless pace of the book, that these reasons are, mainly, the strategic position occupied by the Middle East countries in the global struggle, the importance of Middle East oil both to the Western Allies and to "desperately oil-hungry" Russia, the legacies of World Wars I and II in terms of unsolved problems, with particular emphasis on the rise of Israel, and incredible bungling in very recent years on the part of Great Britain and the United States.

These points are brought out in the course of twenty-five untitled chapters which describe the contemporary Middle East scene in its Balkan, North African, Mediterranean, Pakistani, and Indian setting. The author, a veteran observer of international double-dealing in these areas, regards the relations between most of the Middle East states and the West as steadily deteriorating. He is concerned with the depth of Communist penetration in Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Communist elements have insinuated themselves into nationalist activities on a large scale. Iran and Egypt he sees as the present danger areas and 1952 as the year of decision on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to a military move in the Middle East. He envisages no firm barrier to a sudden thrust from Russia other than a not overly strong Turkey. In this area, which is characterized on the whole by weakness and ineffectuality, he entertains a high regard for the Turks both as fighters and as diplomatists.

Most of the historical snatches used as background are familar enough, as is the title of the book itself which, with a slight change in word order, was employed by Robert L. Baker a decade ago in dealing much more sedately with approximately the same area. Nevertheless, if the reader is able to take Brock's sensational style of presentation with enough salt, he is likely to find *Blood, Oil & Sand* usefully thought provoking.

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

COUGHLIN, WILLIAM J. *Conquered Press: The MacArthur Era in Japanese Journalism.* Pp. 165. Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1952. $3.00.

Mr. Coughlin, a professional journalist, writes of the system of public communication in Japan before and after the MacArthur conquest. He pictures the Japanese journalist, in phase one, as the pawn of the militaristic clique which used the press to create a false world in which lived the Japanese masses largely ignorant of the brutal and aggressive military adventure in China and the suicidal war with the United States.

In phase two, the Japanese journalist is being waited upon by his military captors who expect him, overnight, to recognize the errors of the Tojo government and Japanese militaristic society and to turn upon them in wrath and vengeance. To facilitate the quick change of mind, the captor introduces a system of press supervision, curiously misnamed freedom of the press, in which the journalist is encouraged to denounce his old rulers and is protected against reprisal either by the Japanese government or by the stockholders of publishing houses.

In phase three, the journalist has quaffed so deeply of the new wine of freedom and protection from reprisal that he is dangerously friendly with communism. The American GHQ is saved from using its bayonets by the emergent conservatism of the journalists and the leadership of the staff of *Asahi*. The journalism of Japan is then allowed to settle down and combat severe economic handicaps and a post-publication supervision which keeps radicalism under control.

The American journalist in Japan writing for the home audience had his difficulties with postpublication supervision, and Mr. Coughlin outlines a system of rewards and punishments which he says General MacArthur's staff used to stifle criticism of the occupation.

Mr. Coughlin's narrative is packed with color and interest and moves rapidly and effectively. There is some tendency to preoccupation with incidents at the expense of broad and intensive investigation which would afford a solid basis for judgment. Thus Mr. Coughlin attributes the decision to drop the atomic bomb and intensify the war against Japan to the single circumstance of the mistranslation of a Japanese word used in an English language broadcast describing the attitude of the Japanese government toward the Potsdam declaration. The book is a personal narrative based primarily upon observation and experience and is valuable to the social scientist in search of insight into the MacArthur GHQ.

J. EDWARD GERALD
University of Minnesota

BERGER, ELMER. *A Partisan History of Judaism.* Foreword by Paul Hutchinson. Pp. xvi, 142. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951. $3.00.

Rabbi Berger is Executive Director of the leading American Jewish group opposed to Zionism. He supplements his *The Jewish Dilemma* (1945) with this series of lectures which further documents his views with an interpretation of Jewish history and an evaluation of the worth of various aspects of the European Jews' religio-cultural heritage. He urges that Jews who value the advances of modern democracy should retain only the ideology and ethics of the pre-Christian Prophets. He fails to discuss or dismisses as valueless almost all other Jewish religio-cultural traits developed later in Europe, and he undertakes no consideration of the religio-cultural heritages of Sephardic and non-European groups of Jews. The motivation for writing the book is to polemicize against the central and northern European Jewish tribalists, ghettoists, and Zionist nationalists.

Whatever the book's worth may be for the purposes of advocates of the anti-Zionist cause who need historical support for their stand, it is an interesting psychological document. It evidences the kind and intensity of feeling, as well as the rationalizations, that characterize many Jewish liberals in their opposition to their Zionist coreligionists. There may be regret that Berger is not better versed in dynamic social psychology, because he could have then penned a more effective polemic. He could have pointed to psychological and historical processes that account for the emotional needs and the personalities of tribalists. He could have shown why his preference for individualistic self-realization and surrender of tribal affiliation is also the desirable choice for modern-minded Jews. His group needs a writer who can phrase the way such Jews may attain maximal personal freedom with a minimum of emotional hostility to Zionists.

In short, the case is weakly stated because of overemotionality and lack of psychological insight. Presumably few synagogues and Hillel foundations on college campuses will therefore encourage serious consideration of Berger's currently unpopular ideas. Berger quite rightly suggests that during the past two decades many antitribalistic liberals among American Jews have been almost terrorized into inaction or pressured into support of the Zionists' efforts to maintain a post-Prophetic north-European Jewish religio-cultural heritage. But I doubt that Berger's arguments will now do much to lessen his opponents' prestige and power among Jews, because his social psychology is so feeble that he cannot reveal to Jews why the tribalists feel and think as they do, nor is he able to phrase to any notable extent the means by which Jews may attain dignity and self-fulfillment by rational adherence to an antitribalist position. So worthy a cause ought to recruit a more effective active protagonist.

MELVILLE JACOBS
University of Washington

COLBERT, EVELYN S. *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics.* Pp. xii, 353. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952. $4.50.

Serious students of Japanese government are indebted to Mrs. Colbert for this painstaking, albeit overly annalistic, narrative of the rise and experience of the Socialist, Communist, and certain other parties, and of labor unions and federations which have, in greater or lesser degree, supported one or another of these parties or sought similar objectives through parallel action. The major portion of the book is devoted to the occupation years up to October 1948, but this period is introduced by a brief historical survey and followed by a sketch of developments to June 1950. Not the least valuable section is an appendix containing biographical notes on 126 leaders; a second useful appendix contains lists of party officers.

The author eschews any general thesis or expression of her own judgment upon acts or motives of parties or unions or upon their relationships with one another. Limiting her sources almost entirely, for the occupation years, to Japanese news releases, she makes a highly creditable effort to write a dependable factual account of events, party structure, and political issues. Had she chosen to make use of articles of opinion from Japanese reviews and to give more intimate vignettes of personalities, her book would have gained in interest without loss of reliability. One is inclined also to look for much greater attention to the effects of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) upon party shifts and pronouncements. Mrs. Colbert has given us a considerable amount of sifted data. Why, one asks, has she not done more about interpretation? No quarry is more elusive than the nature of a Japanese party—the qualities that distinguish one party from another and one faction from another within a party. Possibly Mrs. Colbert will pass to this endeavor in another volume.

The relevance of a descriptive term that is broad enough to comprehend Tokuda Kyuichi and Isoo Abe may well be questioned. If Abe was a "leftist," Tokuda may well be something else. There may be grave danger of doing injustice to individuals so widely divided in their views by calling them both "leftists" or "radicals." When does a leftist become an extreme leftist; when is a leftist a rightist? Faced by the plethora of organizations, which spring up in Japan with no regard for the analyst's problem of classification, an author is forced to use popular categories in an effort to simplify problems that may not be subject to simplification. This reviewer mentions this problem without disparagement of a book which is the product of very serious, mature, and conscientious research.

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY
University of Minnesota

LAKDAWALA, D. T. *International Aspects of Indian Economic Development.* University of Bombay Publications, Economics Series No. 5. Pp. vii, 191. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. $2.50.

Dr. Lakdawala's scholarly study of India's economic needs is most interesting and most important in the light of what it reveals about changing attitudes in India. The precise figures at which he arrives by a series of mathematical computations are less significant than his considered judgment that there has been a considerable reappraisal of India's position in India itself.

Immediately after India became independent, he notes, there was a deep mistrust of foreign investment. Nationalism was highly self-conscious, and it was feared that foreign capital, either of the loan or the risk variety, might somehow involve an impairment of Indian sovereignty. This attitude is not singular; it has been seen repeatedly in new or emerging nationalisms. In India's case it reached perhaps its climax, at least officially, in the response to the United Nations canvass of dollar needs in "underdeveloped" countries.

"It is interesting to recall," Dr. Lakdawala writes, "that when in an inquiry, the United Nations Secretariat asked the Government of India to state her dollar needs, along with other Governments, no answer was given on the ground that she had no such needs. This policy is slowly changing under the impact of events."

The word "slowly" could now be taken from the economist's cautious statement, made more than a year ago. India is now making a definite effort to enlist and attract foreign economic assistance, and the degree of her progress in the next few years will be largely dependent upon the success of this effort.

Of the several billion dollars that will be required in the immediate future to keep pace in industrial development and improved food production with the increase in population, Dr. Lakdawala believes that about 60 per cent can and should come from loans either on a government-to-government basis or from recognized international agencies. The other 40 per cent, he holds, should be supplied by private venture capital.

In the first category, he believes, there should be no great difficulty since India's credit position is and has been sound. In the second it will be necessary for India to adopt and follow policies that inspire confidence. India must, he says, "make all efforts to create the proper environment" for this needed development.

While this book has thus a strong political implication it is not a political book. It is a technical work, thoroughly documented, and is written for technicians. The cause of better international understanding will be served if the same materials can be presented, also, in a popular form and gain a wide readership.

ROBERT AURA SMITH
The New York Times

DAVIS, S. *Race-Relations in Ancient Egypt: Greek, Egyptian, Hebrew, Roman.* Pp. xiii, 176. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $4.50.

This little volume addresses itself to a big subject, at least in so far as its title is concerned. Actually, however, the subject of the book is limited to the period stated in the subtitle, namely, the Hellenistic-Roman age. By that time the career of Ancient Egypt had come to an end, after nearly three thousand years of highly individual history. What followed was no longer Egypt proper but a curious cultural blend in which outside elements predominated. Yet the native forces, while by no means dynamic, remained unassimilated nevertheless, except on the surface. The Hellenistic veneer proved relatively thin. In the end, native tradition triumphed in more than one significant instance over the foreign importations.

Against such a background the social scientist finds himself at a great disadvantage. He operates on a two-dimensional plane whereas the subject calls for a three-dimensional investigation. The author covers the Greek and Roman periods in Egypt with admirable thoroughness. But that juncture was merely an epilogue to the story of Egypt proper. This is not to say that the period in which Mr. Davis is interested lacks importance in its own right. But it cannot be fully understood and interpreted without an intimate knowledge of the normative past. The author's attempts to reach back, which he is often compelled to do, are on the whole unsuccessful. The usefulness of the book is thus distinctly limited. Within its limits, however, the volume constitutes a welcome contribution.

The results of the study, which is richly documented, may be summed up as follows: The Egypt of the Graeco-Roman period provides a fascinating illustration of the interaction of culture and politics. Political expediency may seize upon the racial factor in a multicultural society and raise it to undue prominence. But claims of racial superiority on the part of one group cannot in themselves affect the cultural balance or persuade older groups that they are inferior. This is false anthropology, unconvincing theology, and in the end ineffectual political theory. Hellenistic Egypt accommodated several distinctive societies; but racist explanations could not then, and cannot now, account for the underlying differences.

It is perhaps not without interest these days that the author of this work is a member of the faculty of the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and that the publication was made possible by a grant from that University.

E. A. SPEISER
University of Pennsylvania

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

Joseph Mayer's review of my book *American Imperialism* omits the central theoretical approach of the book. This is that imperialism is a definite stage of capitalism, when large monopolies dominate economic life; when they concentrate on the export of capital to find further sources of profits, when they divide up the world through cartels and other devices, and involve their governments in wars for redivision of the world. United States monopoly capital, having attained the greatest development long ago, has now obtained the greatest degree of control over other peoples. The approach is supported by reference to Lenin and to the British liberal economist Hobson.

According to Mayer, my central theme is that "Wall Street imperialist masters" have pursued a consistent and set plan to dominate the world ever since the War for Independence. This is a gross distortion. While internal capitalist expansion during the nineteenth century is briefly noted, the book definitely dates the period of expansion abroad from the end of that century (p. 10). The goal of world domination is set as developing only during World War II (p. 126). It has been operative less than 10 years, instead of 175 years. The phrases "Wall Street imperialist masters" and "tool of Wall Street," carried in quotations in Mayer's review, do not appear in my book. Use of these phrases in quotations helps Mayer's attempt to portray the book as a collection of clichés, but it is hardly honest criticism.

Four of the eleven chapters are devoted to a detailed accounting of the methods of rule and the amount and forms of profits derived by large United States corporations from various parts of the globe, and from the Negro people in the United States (Chs. II–V). Mayer ignores this entire section. He does indicate the central conclusions of another group of chapters (Chs. VII–X), which detail the post-World War II expansion of U. S. economic and military interests, principally in Europe. However, Mayer discards the conclusions as a travesty without rebutting a single one of the voluminous details cited in evidence, or any of the analysis and argument.

Mayer pictures my book as an attack on the United States. Such an attack is explicitly denied at the outset:

"The American people are not imperialists. The imperialists are only the tiny group of those who own and control America. . . . They are not only different from, but they are the bitterest enemies of, the people of the United States. . . . Thus it is essential to bear in mind throughout this book that the exposures of United States imperialism or imperialists are not attacks on the United States as a nation, or on its people" (p. 8).

It is a sad sign of our times when a reviewer for a scholarly magazine can denounce attacks on monopolies and imperialism as foreign propaganda. Have professors forgotten the grass-roots antimonopoly movements which played such a prominent part in American political life since the 1880's, or the powerful Anti-Imperialist League which sprang up after the War of 1898, or the classic exposés of monopoly and of U. S. imperialism abroad which enrich our literature?

Mayer makes only passing—and sneering—references to the book's documentation. He expresses his opinion about my research methods in the following sentence:

"Is it too much to assume that the Kremlin is systematically culling, from newspapers, periodicals, and books, every derogatory remark that has ever been made about the United States, classifying these tidbits, and making them available to its agents of slander, double-talk, and intimidation for most effective propaganda use, whether behind the iron curtain or on this side of it?"

I did every bit of research for this book personally from the cited sources, with the single exception of certain facts about Brazilian coffee supplied me by an American university student who did research in this field under my guidance. Mayer's description of the documentation as consisting of derogatory remarks and tidbits is inaccurate, since its central content is detailed official and financial statistics and policy statements. References cited in the notes to my book fall into the following classifications: U. S. government documents, 111; international agency and foreign capitalist government documents, 50; speeches, articles, of U. S. government officials and prominent business men, 35; corporation and trade association reports and business magazines, 45; books and scholarly periodicals (not left-wing), 34; general circulation newspapers and periodicals (not left-wing), 52; labor and left-wing United States sources, 17; left-wing foreign sources, 15; total 359.

The purpose of my book is to expose the forces leading this country to a disastrous war, and I conclude with a favorable discussion of those forces in the United States working for progress and for the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, socialism and capitalism (pp. 242–243). Mayer concludes his review with the remark that my book is the kind of caricature "the Kremlin will continue to dish up for us until its evil power is finally destroyed." He thereby implies his partisanship with the war camp, from which a writer on behalf of peace can hardly expect an honest review.

Yours sincerely,

VICTOR PERLO

Dear Sir:

Two rather significant background factors are omitted from Mr. Perlo's letter: one, his identification by confessed Soviet agents as the leader of a Russian espionage ring in the United States; and the other, his persistent portrayal throughout his book of Russia as lily white and the United States as sordidly black.

In my review I quote from his book (p. 15):

"Imperialism is military, political, and economic domination of subject nations. The forms of domination include incorporation into the home territory of the conqueror, establishment of colonies, and establishment in the subject country of nominally independent governments actually controlled by the imperialist power."

To any objective observer, these words from Perlo's book certainly characterize Stalinist Russia today. But naturally, to a Stalin lover and a follower of the "central theoretical approach" of Lenin (and Marx), it is rank heresy to have Russia placed in such a position. For Perlo expostulates elsewhere (p. 204) that Soviet imperialism is a "myth"—in fact, "a logical absurdity"!

To what he really objects, in his second, third, and fourth paragraphs, it is hard to see. In the book he mentions Wall Street scores of times. Chapter II is entitled "Wall Street's Empire"; and Chapter IV "The Stake of Wall Street in the Jim Crow System." One of the sections (p. 164) is headed "Turning European Industry over to Wall Street." American imperialism, United States imperialism, capitalist imperialism, moribund imperialism, the American empire, and Wall Street imperialism are used synonymously. "The tiny group . . . who own and control America" (*sic*, p. 8) are the Wall Street imperialist masters. All our leaders and government officials (including Senator Taft, p. 214, and General Eisenhower, p. 238) are either imperialists of their stooges, engaged in superexploitation and the gathering of "tribute," "loot," and "booty" for their masters. All are spoken of in highly derogatory terms.

The book and its hocus-pocus might well have been dubbed "Wall Street Imperialism." Its central theme may be gleaned from the following excerpts out of the book starting with the "tiny group" of imperialist masters who allegedly "own and control America":

"Bureaucrats carry out their orders" (p. 8). "The United States government set out to build an empire" (p. 11). "It launched an imperialist war for redivision of the world in 1898" (p. 12). "British or Spanish exploiters were replaced by Wall Street exploiters" (p. 13).

"The new masters engaged in wars of conquest" (p. 13). "Such is the pattern of superexploitation and repression carried out by the U. S. Army, acting as the front for the finance capitalists" (p. 81).

"The South was converted virtually into a semicolony of Wall Street" (p. 83). "This led to superexploitation of the Negro people" (p. 84). "Wall Street set its terms. . . . President Franklin Roosevelt . . . was the head of a Wall Street state apparatus . . . controlled by finance capital" (p. 122).

"Into the mouth of the flat-voiced politician from Missouri are placed the noblest sentiments. . . . The monopolists put this unctuous wrapping of God and the Bill of Rights around the President's speeches . . . all for the purpose of whipping up chauvinist and aggressive moods" (p. 128). "A procession of Wall Street leaders took the decisive Washington posts" (p. 132). "Wall Street dominates" (p. 168). "The new masters" (p. 170). "The Pentagon-Wall Street Group" (p. 203).

"But this strategy of world domination is bankrupt" (p. 214). "Lined up in opposition are 800 million people of the U.S.S.R., the People's Democracies [*sic*], and China, with their first-rate armies" (p. 216). "American imperialism, under the false slogan of 'American leadership,' tries to establish swiftly a world empire, the goal of all imperialists. Can Wall Street succeed where others failed?" (p. 241).

As for "partisanship with the war camp," Perlo simply drew the wrong conclusion. The evil power of the Kremlin could of course be destroyed, not from without, but from within—from its fifteen to twenty million slaves rising up and striking off their chains. They indeed "have nothing else to lose."

Yours sincerely,

JOSEPH MAYER

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FOREWORD

THE American Law Institute has recently undertaken the task of preparing a model penal code. In discussing the many issues that demand consideration by the drafters, Professor Herbert Wechsler wrote a few months ago:

> Should the death penalty be retained as the highest sanction? Viewed nationally there have been in recent years between 100 and 150 executions annually. Can the dispatching of these individuals, their selection determined by incalculable chances, make sufficient contribution to prevention to outweigh the brutalizing and sensational factors involved in taking life? Is it meaningful upon the issue of prevention that Rhode Island is an abolition state without its homicide rate comparing unfavorably with that of Massachusetts or that Michigan's does not suffer by contrast with that of Illinois? This is an issue that merits a larger hold upon the mind and conscience of the country than it has received in recent years. [Herbert Wechsler, "The Challenge of a Modern Penal Code," 65 *Harvard Law Review* (May 1952), pp. 1097–1133, at p. 1124.]

There is something unique about the death penalty. No one today seriously objects to fines or to imprisonment as punishments, even though there are differences of opinion concerning the manner in which they are executed or concerning the classes of offenses or offenders to which they are to be applied. But when the death penalty is discussed, many persons object to its very existence, claiming that it is improper and should therefore be removed from our list of punishments. The debate has been going on for at least two centuries—at least since the young Italian jurist Beccaria challenged the validity of capital punishment in the middle of the eighteenth century. Since then many countries have abolished it. A number of the states of the Union have also done so, some of them only temporarily.

There is a considerable literature on the death penalty in the United States, but nevertheless Justice Felix Frankfurter, in his testimony before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1950, decried the fact that so little factual information about it and its effectiveness had been assembled. This issue of THE ANNALS attempts to meet this deficiency in a small degree. The reader will determine for himself whether or not the authors have succeeded in presenting their data in an objective manner, thus contributing to our knowledge of the question. There are no doubt many aspects which have not received adequate treatment, for lack of space. Some important gaps will also be noted, especially the absence of an article which clearly shows what crimes are made capital in the various states and in federal law. Such an article had been promised but was not delivered to us.

THORSTEN SELLIN

Extent and Trend of Capital Crimes in the United States

By George B. Vold

THE problem suggested by the title is a *difficult one, both* from the standpoint of terminology and from that of basic data. Capital crimes are presumably those offenses the commission of which calls for the death penalty. But with few exceptions, there are no consistent definitions as to what kind of offenses call for the death penalty.

The exceptions are negative; that is, some states specify that no offense calls for the death penalty. At the present time, six states do not permit the death penalty, namely: Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Several other states have at one time or another abolished the death penalty and then reinstated it.

On the other hand, until very recently five states have specified death as the mandatory penalty for first degree murder, *namely:* Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Vermont.* In the rest of the states the penalty for first degree murder may be either death or life imprisonment. In practice, obviously, this choice of penalty leads to the familiar procedure of charging something less than first degree murder in order to avoid the death penalty, and sometimes to avoid a sentence to life imprisonment as well.

These widely divergent legal practices and penalties operating for the control of the same crime—namely first degree murder—simply reflect the fact of inconsistent and confused notions as to the real nature of capital crime.

Statistics Not Clear

Criminal statistics also reflect this confusion of attitude and practice. There are no general statistics available as to the number of offenses committed per year for which death is the required penalty, or even as to the number of persons convicted per year of first degree murder.

Some statistics are available on "offenses known to the police" in the *Uniform Crime Reports*, published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Washington. But the uniform crime classification gives no breakdown of the general category "murder and non-negligent manslaughter" from which may be deduced the probable number of first degree murder offenses included under the more general category.

The same general difficulty obtains in connection with the now discontinued series on *Judicial Criminal Statistics* (formerly published by the Bureau of the Census), which reported on the activity of the criminal courts and the disposition of criminal cases before these courts. The classification used for offenses makes it impossible to separate the number of cases of deliberate, premeditated killing from other types of murder.

Another source is the records of the National Office of Vital Statistics, United States Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, in which homicide is included as one of the

* In four of these states the laws were changed to a permissive death penalty in 1950 and 1951, leaving only Vermont with a mandatory death penalty at the present time.

recognized standard causes of death. The homicide classification, however, is not the same as the police designation of "murder and non-negligent manslaughter." It includes justifiable homicide (for instance, the killing of a felon by the police in line of duty, and some other types of killing in self-defense) and incendiarism, but does not include legal executions. Practically speaking, it means any violent death that is neither a suicide nor an accident. Homicide rates, therefore, offer only an approximate index of the amount of murder, depending upon the constancy of such elements as the proportion of justifiable and nonculpable homicides in the total number reported.

None of these statistical sources throw any direct light on the number of capital crimes as such. Some scattered information is available on the distribution of murder charges as between those designated first degree and the several possible lesser charges. There are also available reports on the annual number of executions, by states. These fragments may be taken, perhaps, as straws in the wind giving some basis for estimating the probable number of capital crimes included in the available indexes for any given year. But such approximations are hardly of sufficient accuracy to warrant attempting to assemble a trends table for capital crimes.

SPECIFIC COMPARISONS

Before attempting any estimation of probable numbers of capital crimes for any given year, it will be helpful in the understanding of the whole problem of murder and capital crime to examine some of the sources in some detail and from the standpoint of several different kinds of problems.

Trends in murder and homicide rates. Full coverage of the United States in death registration was not obtained until 1933. By that time the *Uniform Crime Reports* had also obtained a reasonably extended national coverage, though the southern cities were still underrepresented. Table 1 presents a comparison of these two principal indexes of murder and killing for the time span of 1933–51. The *Uniform Crime Reports* for 1933 included 1,264 cities with a total population of 49,471,000; in 1951 there were 2,421 cities reporting, with a total population of 69,980,000. This increase in the number of cities participating—which means also a considerable increase in the number and proportion of southern cities and towns reporting—may be the principal factor accounting for the relatively close approximation of these two indexes during the last decade.

TABLE 1—COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN MURDER AND HOMICIDE RATES, 1933–51

(Rates per 100,000 general population)

Year	Murder	Homicide
1933	7.1	9.7
1934	6.7	9.5
1935	6.0	8.3
1936	6.2	8.0
1937	6.1	7.6
1938	5.3	6.8
1939	5.4	6.4
1940	5.4	6.2
1941	5.4	6.0
1942	5.5	5.8
1943	4.7	5.0
1944	4.9	4.9
1945	5.5	5.6
1946	6.4	6.3
1947	6.1	6.0
1948	5.9	5.8
1949	5.7	5.4
1950	5.1	4.6
1951	4.9	4.5

Sources: Murder and non-negligent manslaughter rates from *Uniform Crime Reports* for respective years; homicide rates from *Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1900–1940* and other *Special Reports* of the Office of Vital Statistics, U. S. Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency.

The general tendency to a downward trend during this period of uniform reporting is unmistakable. There was a brief upturn in both indexes in 1945 and 1946, with continuous decreases since that time. The rates for 1951 are again at the all-time low levels.

Regional differences in murder rates. A general murder rate for the United States as a whole has no very close relation to the actual rate of any specific area or section. The rates for individual states are widely divergent. Thus, in 1951 *Uniform Crime Reports* shows a rate of .41 per 100,000 general population for New Hampshire as compared with one of 18.23 for Georgia; Minnesota had a rate of .80 per 100,000, Alabama one of 15.27; and so on. These extreme differences between states

TABLE 2—REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MURDER RATES, 1933–51

(Rates per 100,000 general population)

Year	New England[a]	Middle Atlantic[b]	East North Central[c]	West North Central[d]	South Atlantic[e]	East South Central[f]	West South Central[g]	Mountain[h]	Pacific[i]
1933	2.0	4.5	6.1	7.1	14.6	23.4	15.7	7.4	4.5
1934	1.1	3.0	4.7	5.5	11.1	19.4	13.8	3.3	3.0
1935	1.2	4.4	5.0	4.3	13.9	23.9	13.5	7.0	4.0
1936	1.0	4.0	4.8	4.4	17.5	21.3	17.1	7.5	3.5
1937	1.3	3.8	4.6	4.4	17.7	22.7	15.2	4.7	4.2
1938	1.1	3.2	3.7	3.6	15.5	22.1	12.9	5.1	3.8
1939	0.9	3.3	4.2	3.9	15.9	20.3	12.2	3.7	3.6
1940	1.2	3.1	4.1	3.1	15.2	21.6	11.4	3.7	3.7
1941	1.7	2.9	4.2	3.4	16.3	18.9	12.2	3.9	3.2
1942	1.3	2.9	4.2	3.3	15.5	19.7	12.8	3.8	3.9
1943	0.9	2.5	3.8	3.1	12.5	14.8	12.3	4.5	3.9
1944	1.2	2.4	3.9	3.1	13.1	15.3	11.3	3.0	5.4
1945	1.2	2.9	4.5	3.3	13.9	16.9	12.8	4.1	5.5
1946	1.5	3.6	5.0	4.8	15.9	19.4	15.9	5.6	5.9
1947	1.2	3.4	4.9	4.2	14.3	18.7	14.1	4.7	6.3
1948	1.4	3.4	5.3	4.3	13.8	19.0	12.7	4.8	4.6
1949	1.2	2.7	5.1	3.3	13.4	15.0	12.4	5.0	4.7
1950	1.1	2.6	4.2	3.7	10.9	14.4	5.6	3.1	3.1
1951	1.2	2.5	4.3	3.1	10.3	12.4	9.1	2.7	3.2

[a] *New England*—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut.
[b] *Middle Atlantic*—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
[c] *East North Central*—Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin.
[d] *West North Central*—Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas.
[e] *South Atlantic*—District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida.
[f] *East South Central*—Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi.
[g] *West South Central*—Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas.
[h] *Mountain*—Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada.
[i] *Pacific*—Washington, Oregon, California.

Source: Murder and non-negligent manslaughter from *Uniform Crime Reports* for years indicated.

TABLE 3—TRENDS IN MURDER RATES IN SELECTED STATES ARRANGED IN GROUPS OF CONTIGUOUS STATES, 1933–51
(Rates per 100,000 general population)

Year	Group I			Group II			Group III		
	Mich.[a]	Ohio[b]	Ind.[b]	Wis.[a]	Minn.[a]	Iowa[b]	R. I.[a]	Mass.[c]	Conn.[c]
1933	3.3	7.8	4.9	1.1	2.1	2.9	1.7	2.5	1.2
1934	2.4	5.7	6.6	0.7	2.6	2.9	0.6	1.3	0.8
1935	3.3	7.0	4.7	0.9	1.6	2.8	1.7	1.2	1.7
1936	2.9	6.5	5.5	1.2	1.4	1.2	0.7	0.9	1.4
1937	3.4	5.6	5.6	1.5	1.6	2.4	1.6	1.3	1.2
1938	2.3	4.6	5.1	1.4	1.1	1.7	0.8	0.8	1.9
1939	2.8	5.0	4.7	1.1	1.6	1.6	0.6	0.8	1.6
1940	3.2	4.8	4.0	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.0	2.1
1941	3.7	4.8	3.4	1.3	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.5	1.9
1942	3.6	5.1	3.9	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.0	2.2
1943	3.7	4.7	3.5	1.1	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.6	1.2
1944	4.1	4.3	3.5	0.7	1.2	1.7	0.5	1.0	2.3
1945	4.1	5.4	5.1	1.3	1.2	1.6	0.8	1.2	1.4
1946	4.6	5.9	5.2	1.0	1.4	3.7	1.1	1.5	2.1
1947	4.8	5.6	6.3	1.6	1.3	1.9	0.5	1.3	2.2
1948	4.6	5.3	5.2	1.1	1.8	1.4	2.3	1.2	1.9
1949	4.5	5.3	4.9	1.2	0.8	1.0	0.5	1.1	1.8
1950	4.1	4.1	4.6	0.8	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.3
1951	4.4	4.3	4.7	1.3	0.8	1.5	0.9	1.1	1.7

[a] Death penalty abolished.
[b] Death penalty optional or permissive for first degree murder.
[c] Death penalty mandatory for first degree murder during period given; law changed in 1951.
Source: *Uniform Crime Reports* for years indicated.

are relatively consistent, and states in the same area have generally similar magnitudes in murder rates. Moreover, these regional differences have been strikingly consistent for many years. These general relations are clearly indicated in Table 2.

States that have and have not abolished the death penalty. In the long years of debate about the effectiveness of the death penalty in controlling or reducing the crime of murder, comparisons have often been made between some of the states that have and some that do not have the extreme penalty. Unless the states involved are in the same area or region, such comparisons are likely to be meaningless. As a matter of fact, it seems clear that the presence or absence of the death penalty makes no particular difference in the amount of murder in any given state. Its murder rate will be closely parallel to that of adjoining states, where conditions of life and social-cultural attitudes are similar. This general point of view was elaborated by the present writer in an earlier study,[1] and the same basic fact is even more strikingly evident in the trends data presented in Table 3.

[1] G. B. Vold, "Can the Death Penalty Prevent Crime?" *Prison Journal*, October 1932, pp. 3–8. (Published by the Pennsylvania Prison Society, 311 South Juniper Street, Philadelphia, Pa.)

The important fact in this is the persistence of the differences between sections and regions, regardless of whether the states have abolished or retained the death penalty.

Racial differences in homicide rates. The uneven distribution of various racial groups other than white often bedevils and complicates comparisons of rates on a regional or sectional basis. The much higher homicide rates of racial groups other than white, in the United States, mean that differences in regional figures inevitably reflect in part the relative presence or absence of such groups in any particular region.

Table 4 has been assembled to illustrate some of these problems. The New England States have low homicide rates, generally speaking, while the states listed from the South Atlantic and East South Central region have uniformly some of the highest rates in the United States. The high rates in this section are obviously due in part to the extremely high homicide rates of racial groups other than white which are present in large numbers in these states. The homicide rate for such groups in Maine, for example, is also extremely high; but since their numbers there are insignificant, the effect of such high rates on the rate for the state as a whole is very slight.

TABLE 4—RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN HOMICIDE RATES, 1940
(Rates per 100,000 population of same race group)

	All Races	White	All Other Races
New England			
Maine	1.5	1.4	37.3
New Hampshire	1.4	1.4	0.0
Vermont	0.8	0.8	0.0
Massachusetts	1.5	1.4	11.8
Connecticut	1.8	1.7	8.9
Rhode Island	1.4	1.4	0.0
South Atlantic and East South Central			
Georgia	20.0	5.6	47.1
North Carolina	10.8	4.0	28.3
South Carolina	13.2	5.0	24.0
Virginia	10.5	5.0	27.2
Alabama	16.4	6.9	34.4
Kentucky	14.3	10.4	61.6
Tennessee	16.6	7.1	61.5

Source: *Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1900–1940*, Table 20, pp. 366–401. (National Office of Vital Statistics, U. S. Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, 1947.)

Lest anyone conclude from the above that regional differences in homicide rates are equivalent to, or due only to, differences in the proportions of the total population classed as other than white, attention is invited to the similar consistent and large differences in the rates as between regions for the white group alone.

When comparisons are made between the states of Massachusetts and Georgia, the following will be found to obtain: The homicide rate of the white group in Georgia (5.6) is almost exactly four times as high as that of the white group in Massachusetts (1.4); the Georgia "other than white" rate (47.1) is likewise almost exactly four times the "other than white" rate (11.8) for Massachusetts. This basic regional or sectional difference must be recognized and taken account of independent of and in spite of the obviously important differences between the several major racial groups. Thus, the rate for Massachusetts "other than white" groups (11.8) is more than eight times as high as for the white group (1.4); similarly, the rate for the "other than white" groups of Georgia (47.1) is more than eight times that of the white group of that state (5.6). When comparisons are made across both racial and regional lines, the differences are intensified, of

course. Thus as between the two states, the rate of the Georgia "other than white" group (47.1) is approximately thirty-four times that of the white group in Massachusetts (1.4).

Illustrations from other states and regions could be taken, but the general import of the above analysis would nevertheless be sustained. Presumably factors of these various kinds will operate in a similar manner in connection with the more specific problem of differences in frequencies of first degree murder in different states; or in capital crimes, if information could be had directly on such offenses.

FRAGMENTARY GUIDES

It was said earlier that there were various fragments of information at hand that might be used as a basis for estimating the number of capital crimes, as opposed to murder and homicide as general categories. A few of these straws in the wind should be noted in a little more detail. Thus, VanVechten reported results of a study of procedural outcome and criminal case mortality for 1939.[2] With his best data from the District of Columbia and Minnesota, he found in both of these jurisdictions, for the offense "murder and non-negligent manslaughter," a surprisingly similar relation between the number of offenses known to the police (as shown in *Uniform Crime Reports*) and imprisonment for murder. For the District of Columbia the number imprisoned was 9.2 per cent of the offenses known to the police; for Minnesota it was 12.3 per cent.

In a somewhat different connection, Professor Sutherland considered various aspects of this general problem and concluded that "perhaps not more than one-tenth of the persons committed to prisons for homicide have been found guilty of premeditated murder."[3]

A quarter of a century ago, Hall concluded that "less than 10 per cent of the known murders result in executions in England."[4]

The criminal statistics of Canada for the ten-year period 1940–49 show 450 cases charged with murder; 177 death sentences; and 91 executions. In other words, the number of death sentences was about 40 per cent of the number charged, and those executed were about 20 per cent of those charged.[5]

In the United States for the period 1930–50, there were 3,029 executions, of which 87.3 per cent were for murder, 11.1 per cent were for the offense of rape, and 1.6 per cent were for other offenses. For the year 1949 there were 119 executions; for 1950, only 82.[6]

During the past several years, the prisons and reformatories of the United States have received from the courts approximately 1200–1300 prisoners per year sentenced to life imprisonment. Somewhat more than half of these represent life sentences as an indeterminate maximum. It seems clear that many of these life sentences cannot be taken as representing capital offenses. During these same years the prisons have received from the courts approximately 1600–1800 persons per year sentenced for the crime of murder.[7]

With these fragments as a guide, some

[2] C. C. VanVechten, "Differential Criminal Case Mortality in Selected Jurisdictions," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 7 (December 1942), pp. 833–39.

[3] E. H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (New York: 1939), p. 566.

[4] J. W. Hall, "Some Aspects of Capital Punishment," *Howard Journal*, Vol. 1 (April 1925), p. 237.

[5] See annual reports *Statistics of Criminal and other Offenses* for the years indicated (Judicial Statistics Section, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, Canada).

[6] "Executions 1949–1950," *National Prisoner Statistics*, No. 5, April 1952, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington.

[7] See the annual reports *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories* through 1946; after that date see *National Prisoner Statistics* for year desired.

approximations and guesses may be made as to the probable number of capital crimes in the United States in 1951. Following VanVechten's findings with an estimated total of offenses known to the police in the classification of "murder and non-negligent manslaughter" of 6,820 for the year 1951,[8] one would expect that there would be approximately 1,658 persons sentenced and entering the prisons from the courts for the crime of murder. Of these, perhaps 179–200 represent the most extreme first degree murder, premeditated and deliberate; another 750–800 should be considered to be capital crimes, though somewhat less positively so.

No such figures can be verified at this time for the year 1951. They are merely this writer's best guess as to the present. The figures seem consistent with what is known about relations between offenses and capital crimes in other years.

[8] *Uniform Crime Reports*, Vol. 22, No. 2, Annual Bulletin for 1951, p. 70.

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Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment

By Frank E. Hartung

TRENDS in the use of the death penalty cannot be separated from trends in the use of punishment as a whole. The trend in punishment for about the past 275 years is from the corporal, bloody, and severe sanctions developed through the medieval period to the predominantly nonphysical forms of today. The movement has been to abandon the gallows and the stake, the butcher knife, the branding iron, and the whip, and to adopt some form and degree of fines and imprisonment.

Perhaps the most important single influence behind this movement is the secularization of thought which became evident with the development of modern science at the opening of the seventeenth century. If one accepts the position that the criminal must be made to suffer for and to expiate his offense, then the forms of punishment which held almost undisputed sway in Occidental and other countries for centuries prior to 1682 will perhaps seem necessary. If, however, one accepts the position that crime is as natural as any other form of cultural behavior, it will seem reasonable to attempt to control it through a program based on an understanding of the sociocultural processes leading to criminality.

The inroads of science upon the theological notion of expiation and retribution are so great that the advocates of capital punishment have been on the defensive for about two centuries. The argument on the death penalty has changed from an axiomatic acceptance and justification on the part of those who support it to a search for factual evidence that will demonstrate its efficacy in controlling those few offenses to which it is now sometimes applied. It is a search which opponents of capital punishment hold, on the basis of available evidence, is fruitless.

There are seven trends in the use of capital punishment which support the widespread acceptance of the conclusion that it is not an efficient means of dealing with the few capital offenses of today, and that it certainly was not adequate to deal with the many crimes that once were capital but are no longer so.[1] These trends indicate a prolonged secular and international movement toward abandoning the concept of the capital offense in peacetime law. The present discussion will deal only with the death penalty as an instrument of civil law (as contrasted to military law). It does not, therefore, deal with treason or with the temporary resort to capital punishment in dealing with collaborators, which occurred after World War II in some countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Finland, which had otherwise abolished the death penalty.

Abolition of Capital Punishment

One trend of the past century, and more, away from capital punishment is the tendency to abolish it completely. In some thirty countries the death penalty has been abolished completely by law or tradition.

There is a fairly common belief that a revival of capital punishment follows a war. This notion was popularized by Clarence Darrow and Lewis E. Lawes in their campaigns against this penalty.

[1] Frank E. Hartung, "On Capital Punishment," Detroit: Wayne University Mimeographing Dept., 1951.

The postwar survey made by Deets in 1948 [2] and a similar one made by Viscount Templewood in 1951,[3] however, indicate just the opposite. The restoration of capital punishment in Italy, Austria, and Rumania was a fascist measure which remains on the statute books only in Austria. Switzerland extended the abrogation of the death penalty from fifteen cantons (1874) to the entire country in 1942. Iceland eliminated capital punishment in 1930 and confirmed this upon achieving independence in 1944. Brazil liberalized its law in 1946 by limiting the death penalty to wartime military offenses. England began a trial period of no executions in 1949.

Deets's study showed that more jurisdictions had abandoned the death penalty for murder and other heinous civil offenses in 1948 than was the case in 1939. England and France are the only democratic European countries outside the Iron Curtain sphere that still have capital punishment for a few peacetime crimes.

Fluctuations among states

The example of those states in this country which have restored capital punishment after abolishing it is sometimes cited as evidence that capital punishment is enjoying a revival. The preceding discussion indicates that just the opposite is revealed by an international survey. As to this country, it appears that there is a fluctuating tendency to abolish it. Michigan was the first state to do so, in 1847. Four other states prohibited it in 1907 and 1911, and seven more between 1913 and 1918. Five of these restored it after an average period of about three years. Maine abolished it in 1876, reinstated it in 1883, and abolished it again in 1887. South Dakota restored it in 1939, with no discernible effect upon its homicide rate. Only one man was executed in that state (in 1947) from 1939 through 1951. The state of Michigan has executed no one since 1830.

There are periodic attempts to restore the death penalty in those states that have abolished it, and to abolish it in those retaining it. In Michigan, for instance, capital punishment has been an issue before the legislature no fewer than twenty-five times since 1885. It was defeated twenty-three times, vetoed once, and rejected by the people once. There has been a systematic attempt in Ohio to abolish it for persons less than 21 years of age. The Connecticut legislature in 1951 considered a bill to abolish it, the Connecticut Legislative Council having approved such a bill in 1950. There have been attempts to abolish it in Pennsylvania, with some newspaper support. The Philadelphia Bar Association Committee on Criminal Justice issued a report in 1951 in favor of abolition.

Reduction in the Number of Capital Offenses

The second long-term trend away from the death penalty is the reduction in the number of capital offenses.* It began much earlier than the complete abolition of the death sentence, and dates from the Great Law of the colony of Pennsylvania adopted in 1682. In this code, capital punishment was retained only for first degree murder. At that time the principal methods of punishment were death, mayhem, branding, flogging, transportation, and public humiliation. This code was undoubtedly the most important single innovation in centuries in the treatment of convicted criminals. Since its promulgation prac-

[2] Lee Emerson Deets, "Changes in Capital Punishment Policy Since 1939," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 38, No. 6 (March–April 1948), pp. 584–94.

[3] Viscount Templewood (Samuel J. G. Hoare), *Shadows of the Gallows*, London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1951.

tically every country in the world has followed its example in great degree. It set the pattern for the use of fines and imprisonment with labor, the predominant means of punishment today.

The English penal code was instated in Pennsylvania the day after Penn's death, May 30, 1718. This restored not only religious offenses, from which Penn's code was happily free, but also the death penalty for fourteen offenses. The English colonies in this country had from ten to eighteen capital offenses. After independence, Pennsylvania again took the lead in reducing the number of capital crimes, with the state constitution of September 28, 1776 directing the legislature to effect a speedy reform of the penal code. The death penalty was abolished for witchcraft in 1791, and for all offenses save first degree murder in 1794.

The other states have followed Pennsylvania to a great degree in this respect. There are in the forty-eight states only seven capital crimes, excluding treason (for which no one has ever been prosecuted, let alone executed). No one state has all these seven offenses on its statute books. The distribution of capital offenses in the states is as follows: 6 states have no capital crimes; 14 states have 1; 8 have 2; 9 have 3; 6 have 4; 3 have 5; 2 have 6.

The seven capital offenses for the various states are first degree murder, kidnaping, rape, armed robbery, burglary, arson, and train wrecking. It is not possible to give the legal definitions of these crimes here, but it should be understood that some degree of physical assault or personal injury is required in these offenses in order to make them capital. It is a safe generalization to say that the trend away from capital punishment has eliminated this penalty for offenses directed against property only.

TABLE 1—CIVIL EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, BY OFFENSES: 1930–50

	Number	Per Cent
All offenses	*3,029*	*100*
Murder	2,645	87.3
Rape	335	11.1
Armed robbery	17	
Kidnaping	12	
Burglary	10	1.6
Espionage (all in 1942)	6	
Aggravated assault	3	
Not reported	1	

Source: *National Prisoner Statistics*, No. 5, April 1952, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D. C.

Kidnaping is the most recently adopted of the capital crimes. There are six states with train wrecking carrying the death penalty, but as far as this writer has been able to ascertain, there have been no executions for this crime in these states, as far back as there are available records.

If train wrecking be excluded, there are sixteen states with only first degree murder as a capital crime. Ohio and New Mexico are the two states with only first degree murder and train wrecking carrying the death penalty. Rape ranks second to first degree murder as leading to execution. This is a penalty directed primarily against Negroes in southern states, as will be seen in the discussion of the selective enforcement of the death penalty.

National figures on executions show that *in practice*, the only capital crime is first degree murder, except in the southern states which also execute Negroes for rape. Table 1 shows executions in this country for the period 1930–50. More than 87 per cent of the 3,029 executions in this 21-year period were for murder, only 11.1 per cent for rape, and 1.6 per cent for other offenses.

England's course

England furnishes perhaps the best example of the long-term trend away from capital punishment through the abolition of the death penalty for crimes. England's course in this respect has been dramatic—from 1780 with about 350 capital crimes, the penalty being ruthlessly enforced on minors as well as men and women, to 1948 with murder as the only capital offense, with adult males sometimes being executed for the crime. This story has been told several times, and as engrossing as it is, it can be stated here only in its barest factual outline.

England had 17 capital crimes in the early part of the fifteenth century. This number was rapidly increased about the first quarter of the seventeenth century, reaching a peak, according to Radzinowicz, of some 350 capital crimes by 1780! Practically all the capital crimes added after 1500 were offenses against property, most of these crimes being trivial. This number was drastically reduced in the nineteenth century: to about 220 by 1825, to about 17 in 1839, and to 4 in 1861. This number was further reduced by the time capital punishment was suspended by the Parliament in 1948.

The English revolt against capital punishment began in the second quarter of the eighteenth century. Juries either acquitted the accused or found them guilty of stealing 39 shillings (the theft of 40 shillings was capital) regardless of the sum they confessed to stealing or were proved to have stolen. Banks appealed (in vain) to the government to abolish the death sentence for forgery, as the law against it became practically inoperative. Victims refused to prosecute, witnesses to testify, and juries to convict.

Murder is the one crime in England today for which, *in practice*, capital punishment is put into operation. The death penalty is on the books also for treason, piracy with violence, and setting fire to arsenals and dockyards. But even the law on murder is very restricted in its application. A series of laws beginning with the Children Act, 1908, abolished the death penalty in all cases in which the murderer was less than 18 at the time of committing the murder. Much the same is true of women, so there is a wide field of homicide open to women, free from the death penalty. During the period 1900–48, there were 935 women committed for trial on the charge of murder. Of these, 126 were sentenced to death, but only 11 were executed. In the decade 1939–48, of 140 women committed for trial on murder charges, only 18 were sentenced to death, with but one of these being executed.

Only the passing of the Roman Inquisition, the greatest single source of executions for heresy and witchcraft and other religious offenses in western civilization, can compare with the English development in dramatically demonstrating the trend toward the progressive reduction in the number of crimes carrying the death penalty.

In 1949 a Royal Commission on Capital Punishment was appointed, with the following terms of reference:

> To consider and report whether liability under the criminal law in Great Britain to suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited or modified, and if so, to what extent and by what means, for how long and under what conditions persons who would otherwise have been liable to suffer capital punishment should be detained, and what changes in the existing law and prison system would be required; and to inquire into and take account of the practice in those countries whose experience and practice may throw light on these questions.

It will be noted that these terms of reference preclude the Commission from recommending the abolition of capital punishment. They do, however, empower it to propose any reduction it

may think fit in the scope of this punishment.

DEATH SENTENCE PERMISSIVE RATHER THAN MANDATORY

There is a third trend which is of importance as leading to the actual abolition of capital punishment. This is the increasingly adopted practice of giving the jury or the court, or both, the power of deciding whether the convicted person must be executed or whether he may be given a lesser sentence than death. This is done partly by establishing different degrees of homicide, and partly by prohibiting a mandatory death sentence and making the death sentence permissive. In 1918 the death penalty was mandatory upon conviction of a capital crime in twelve states. By 1930 there remained only five states with a mandatory death law. In 1951 Vermont was the only state with such a law, Massachusetts having passed its "Alternative Bill" in that year.

It required seventy years for the Massachusetts mandatory law to be modified, the first attempt having been made in 1881! Juries may now recommend life imprisonment rather than death in first degree murder cases, with their recommendation binding the court. One of the persons effective in achieving this permissive clause writes in a personal communication:

> Because of the bitterness engendered in Massachusetts by criticism of the Sacco-Vanzetti case this Bill was fought as bitterly as if it were one completely to abolish capital punishment. It is a slight change in the law. In almost any other state it would have gone almost unnoticed. However, I think it marks an important direction in Massachusetts penology.

There is no doubt that the permissive provision has tended to reduce the number of death sentences and actual executions. Of the 42 states with capital punishment, an average of 14 states each year have no executions, even though they report their usual number of annual homicides in *Uniform Crime Reports*. One can thus say that every year 14 states with capital punishment take advantage of the permissive clause so as to avoid execution. In 1949 and 1950 (the last years for which figures are reported at the time of this writing), 18 states and 21 states, respectively, failed to perform any executions! This provision therefore appears to be a method of abolishing capital punishment in fact while retaining it on the statute books in theory.

It also appears that the alternative of life imprisonment to death has increased the proportion of convictions of those charged with murder. This seems to be because juries appear to be more likely to convict when life imprisonment is involved, but more likely to acquit when execution is involved. This, however, is a point which needs additional investigation before more than tentative conclusions concerning it can be drawn. There is no doubt whatever about its validity as far as the death penalty in relation to offenses against property is concerned. English juries for about 150 years prior to 1861 were refusing to convict, and deliberately disregarding incontrovertible evidence, when conviction for burglary, robbery, forgery, or counterfeiting made a death sentence mandatory.

NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS REDUCED

The fourth trend away from the use of capital punishment is the reduction in the annual number of executions. This trend has been clearly evident for about 150 years. The practice in England in this respect has already been mentioned. Persons charged with capital offenses were arbitrarily found guilty of other and lesser charges by juries. An incomplete and impressionistic survey shows that to some extent a similar situation obtained in continental countries. No data are available in tabular form for executions performed by the federal government, but a partial survey shows that no one was executed for decades prior to 1892 for most of the 17 capital offenses which in that year were reduced to 3 in number.[4] There was one federal execution in 1945. However, in 1945 federal courts sentenced 130 men to federal prisons for murder; in 1946 there were 220 men and one woman so sentenced. Of these, 168 received life sentences, 28 received sentences of 20 to 99 years, and the remaining 24 received sentences of 19 years or less.

The number of executions varies annually among the 42 states having the death penalty. An average of 14 states fail each year to hold an execution, although their prisons receive persons convicted of murder. It is, unfortunately, often not possible to distinguish between those sentenced for first degree murder and those committed for less than first degree.

The late Edwin H. Sutherland studied the trend in Ohio for the period 1896–1930. He found that the proportion of death sentences to commitments for first degree murder decreased very greatly during the period. In 1896–1900, of those committed for first degree murder, 58 per cent entered under the death sentence. By 1926–30 this proportion had steadily dropped to 26 per cent, although the absolute number of admissions for first degree murder had increased several fold. In addition, not all of those sentenced to death were executed. The percentage of death sentences fulfilled varied from 45 to 82, with an over-all percentage of about 60.[5]

[4] Information supplied by Mr. Henry C. McIntyre, of Kansas City, Missouri.

[5] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (4th ed., 1947), p. 562.

TABLE 2—PRISONERS EXECUTED UNDER CIVIL AUTHORITY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1921–50

Year	Number
Total	*4,048*
1950	82
1949	119
1948	119
1947	152
1946	131
1945	117
1944	120
1943	131
1942	147
1941	123
1940	124
1939	159
1938	190
1937	147
1936	194
1935	199
1934	168
1933	159
1932	140
1931	153
1930	155
1929	87
1928	132
1927	118
1926	104
1925	123
1924	95
1923	106
1922	124
1921	130

Sources: 1921–29: Harry Elmer Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology*, First edition (1942); 1930–50: *National Prisoner Statistics*, No. 5 (April 1952), Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D. C.

Additional evidence of the trend away from capital punishment in those states having the death penalty is seen in the annual number of executions for the country as a whole. Table 2 shows the figures, including those of the federal government, for the period 1921–50.

The average annual number of executions for the thirty-year period is about 135. The number increased during the depression years, and began to drop drastically in 1939. Only two years in the 1940 decade exceeded the average, and the decrease has continued into the 1950 decade.

In the twenty-one-year period 1930–50, there were 3,029 executions. Idaho conducted no executions; New Hampshire and South Dakota (1939–50) had one each; Vermont and Nebraska had 2 each; New Mexico had 4; and Kansas, Montana, and Wyoming had 6 each. The eight states at the other extreme of this period, however, performed 52.5 per cent of the 3,029 executions. They are, in the order of their executions, Georgia (280), New York (270), North Carolina (248), Texas (207), California (195), South Carolina (129), and Pennsylvania (124).

Lewis E. Lawes, warden of Sing Sing for many years, showed some twenty years ago that capital punishment was practically abolished in this country through indifferent enforcement:

> Not more than two per cent of the murderers ever reach the death chamber. The ratio of convictions in prosecutions for murder throughout the country is less than 17 per cent. In the eight states of the Union where capital punishment has been abolished [in 1932] there have been no excessive murders. . . .
>
> Capital punishment in the United States may be regarded as practically abolished through indifferent enforcement. But, by retaining the death penalty in its penal codes, it necessarily goes through the theatricals of the threat of enforcement. These very theatricals lend glamor to the accused fighting for his life. The offense, no matter how heinous, is frequently disregarded in the new drama portrayed in the courtroom where prosecutors demand death for the prisoners and counsel pleads for mercy. These theatricals reach out beyond the courtroom and weaken law enforcement all along the line.[6]

SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT

The selective fashion in which the death penalty is enforced is a point usually cited by its opponents and usually ignored by its proponents. This trend can be very briefly summarized: the death penalty is in this country predominantly and disproportionately imposed upon Negroes, the poor and the less educated, and men. Lawes commented upon the 151 executions he had supervised from 1920 through 1931:

> In the twelve years of my wardenship I have escorted 150 men and one woman to the death chamber and the electric chair. In ages they ranged from seventeen to sixty-three. They came from all kinds of homes and environments. In one respect they were all alike. All were poor, and most of them friendless. To what end or purpose were these victims sent to their premature deaths? Ordinarily the answer would be simple. They killed, therefore they had to die. A logical point of view, indeed, if it were applied equally to all who committed unjustifiable homicide.[7]

Lawes has explained what he means by the last sentence quoted. He says that the death penalty is inherently selective:

> Not only does capital punishment fail in its justification, but no punishment could be invented with so many inherent defects. It is an unequal punishment in the way it is applied to the rich and to the poor. The defendant of wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or to the gallows. Juries do not intentionally favour the rich, the law is theoretically impartial, but the defendant with ample means is able to have his case presented with every favourable aspect, while the poor defendant often has a lawyer assigned by the court. Sometimes such assignment is considered part of political patronage; usually the lawyer assigned has had no experience whatever in a capital case. Even after death, distinction prevails. Where there are relatives who can afford to do so, the body may be claimed and taken away. The law states that the unclaimed body shall be buried on prison ground and in quicklime.
>
> . . . Thus it is seldom that it happens that a person who is able to have eminent defense attorneys is convicted of murder in the first degree, and very rare indeed that such a person is executed. Incidentally, a large number of those who are executed were too poor to hire a lawyer, counsel being appointed for them by the state.[8]

[6] Lewis E. Lawes, *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing* (1932), p. 336.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

TABLE 3—PRISONERS EXECUTED UNDER CIVIL AUTHORITY, BY RACE AND OFFENSE: 1937–50

	All Offenses	Murder	Rape	Armed Robbery	Kidnaping	Other
Total	*1,861*	*1,564*	*261*	*13*	*8*	*15*
White	775	730	26	4	8	7[a]
Negro	1,065	815	233	9	—	8
Other	21	19	2	—	—	—

[a] Includes 6 executed for espionage by federal government, 1942.

Source: *National Prisoner Statistics*, No. 5, April 1952, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D. C.

Data relating to death sentences actually executed confirm Lawes's assertion concerning its selectivity. Sellin made a study of homicides occurring in 1930, and found that most of those executed were Negroes and immigrants:

> How many of [the homicides in 1930] were capital crimes it is impossible to say, but in that year there were 1,011 persons committed for life to state and federal prisons and reformatories in 45 states on the charge of homicide, most of them undoubtedly for capital offenses, at least in the 37 of these states in which the death penalty exists. In that same year there were 155 executions. . . . Ten states with the death penalty did not execute a single prisoner. Sixty-nine of the executions were in six states: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, California, Arkansas, and North Carolina. Little is known of those executed. They were mostly Negroes and immigrants.[9]

Supporting figures

North Carolina published a study of the executions in that state during the years 1910–28.[10] In this period 199 men and one woman were committed to the North Carolina state prison after conviction of capital crimes. Of these, 149 were Negro and 51 were white. Of the 200, there were 94 electrocuted: 71 for murder, 21 for rape, and 2 for "burglary in the first degree." Of the 94 executed, 81 were Negroes and 13 were whites. Thus, 86 per cent of the persons executed by the state of North Carolina in approximately twenty years were Negroes. The proportion of convicted Negroes executed was more than twice as great as the proportion of whites: 54.4 per cent of the Negroes and 25.5 per cent of the whites. Of the total 200 sentenced to death, 142 were wholly illiterate. Of the 51 condemned whites, 22 were illiterate.

National figures on execution for the period 1930–50, by race, show that of the 3,029 executed, 1,356, or 44.8 per cent, were white; 1,636, or 54.0 per cent, were Negro; and 37, or 1.2 per cent, were "other." Considering their proportion in the total population, this means that Negroes are overrepresented among the executed by about 550 per cent.

This is the same figure as found in the period 1937–50, the period for which

[8] Lewis E. Lawes, *Life and Death in Sing Sing* (1928), pp. 155–56, 160.

[9] Thorsten Sellin, "Common Sense and the Death Penalty," *Prison Journal*, October 1932.

[10] North Carolina Board of Charities and Public Welfare, *Capital Punishment in North Carolina*, Special Bulletin No. 10, Raleigh, N. C., 1929.

national figures are available by both offense and race for the individual states. Table 3 presents the data for the 1,861 persons executed during these fourteen years. Of this total figure, 41.6 per cent were white, 57.2 per cent were Negro, and 1.1 per cent were "other."

All the executions for rape occurred in the South with the exception of 3 in Missouri. Nevada and the federal jurisdiction, in which rape is also capital, had no executions for such a conviction during this period.

There were 13 women executed during the period 1937–50. Of these, 4 were white and 9 were Negro. For the period 1930–50 there were 21 women executed in a total of 3,029. It thus appears that, although Negro women are executed about twice as often as white women, the disproportion in favor of women as a whole is overwhelming. It seems that in this country, capital punishment has simply fallen into disuse for women. This appears also to be the case for all the American and European countries, and for others too numerous to list.

The selectivity of the death penalty on a racial basis is shown again in the matter of minors executed. During the seven years 1940–46 there was a total of 81 persons executed shown as "less than 20 years old." Of these, 20 were white and 61 were Negro. In March 1951, when the present writer visited the Florida State Prison at Raiford, there were 2 white and 9 Negroes in the death house awaiting execution. In April 1951 the United States Supreme Court ordered a retrial of two of the Negro youths. One of these was shot to death and the other seriously wounded, by the sheriff, as he was transporting them from the State Prison to jail for retrial.

States charged with racial penalty

The executions on convictions of rape have led to the charge that this is a racial penalty directed against Negroes. A recent notorious case which occasioned this charge was that of the "Martinsville Seven," or "Martinsville Rape Cases." Seven Negro youths were found guilty in 1950 of raping a white woman in Martinsville, Virginia. They were sentenced to be electrocuted in February 1951. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People conducted the defense. It filed a brief in the Supreme Court of Virginia and in the Supreme Court of the United States, in which it argued that execution for rape is a racial penalty in Virginia directed against Negroes.

The association's figures were never questioned. These figures showed that no white man had ever been executed in Virginia for rape, although 809 white men had been convicted of rape since 1909. One of these men received the death sentence, but this was commuted to a life sentence by the governor; he was later pardoned. During the period 1909–49 Virginia executed 52 Negroes on conviction of rape, not including the "Martinsville Seven," who were executed in 1951 after an adverse decision by the United States Supreme Court.

A similar charge has been made against the state of Louisiana on the basis of its selective enforcement of the death penalty for rape. Negroes are prosecuted on a charge of "aggravated rape," which carries the death penalty. Whites are charged with "simple rape," or "carnal knowledge," which can carry a sentence as short as one year. During the period 1900–50 there were 40 Negroes and 2 white men executed in Louisiana for rape, with no execution of whites on this charge since 1907, and no death sentences imposed upon whites for this offense, to be commuted, since 1918.[11] These comparative figures have led to the claim that Louisiana operates under a concealed "Black Code."[12]

The District of Columbia

The discussion of the tendency to the selective enforcement of the death penalty can best be summarized by a quotation from the House Committee on the District of Columbia, which reported favorably on a bill to abolish the death penalty in the District:

> As it is now applied the death penalty is nothing but an arbitrary discrimination against an occasional victim. It cannot even be said that it is reserved as a weapon of retributive justice for the most atrocious criminals. For it is not necessarily the most guilty who suffer it. Almost any criminal with wealth or influence can escape it, but the poor and friendless convict, without means or power to fight his case from court to court or to exert pressure upon the pardoning executive, is the one singled out as a sacrifice to what is little more than a tradition.[13]

PRIVATE EXECUTIONS

The sixth trend away from capital punishment is the exclusion of the public from executions. Executions were public spectacles until 1862 in England, and until the 1930's in several American states. The crowds often assumed the characteristics of a mob, and often indulged in the wildest and most unrestrained orgies. These exhibitions have often been described.[14] Long before executions were made private, it had become abundantly clear that public executions had completely failed in their avowed purpose, which was simply to deter others from the commission of murder and other capital crimes.

In this country, the state of New York was the first to discontinue public hangings, in 1835. One by one all the states have followed this example. Kentucky appears to be the last state to have taken this move. Federal executions are not public; it is not clear when this policy was adopted, but it was some decades ago. The Parliament abolished public hanging in England in 1868. Executions in France are technically public. The spectators, however, are kept at such a distance from the scaffold by a police cordon that but little of the proceeding can be seen.

In the various jurisdictions of this country, in Canada, Great Britain, and many other countries, the number and the type of witnesses to executions are highly restricted, according to the provisions of the statutes establishing the various crimes.

A few years ago the executioner of the states of New York and Pennsylvania urged that the prosecutors and judges involved in death sentences be obliged to attend the execution of those sentenced through their efforts and in their courts. His opinion was that

[11] Oakley C. Johnson, *Is the Punishment of Rape Equally Administered to Whites and Negroes in the State of Louisiana?* New Orleans, mimeographed, no date; probably 1950.

[12] There were 335 recorded lynchings in Louisiana during the period 1882–1948. About one-quarter of these involved allegations of rape. Lynching cannot, of course, under any circumstances be equated with a legal execution, but there are these figures available: there are about 84 illegal killings of Negroes with an allegation of rape, and 40 executions of Negroes upon conviction of rape, in contrast to 2 executions of whites on this charge, with no execution since 1907. It may be significant that one of these two white men was a foreigner to the United States, and the other a "foreigner" to Louisiana.

[13] House of Representatives, 69th Cong., first sess., *Report No. 876* (April 14, 1926. To accompany H. R. 4498).

[14] See, for example, William M. Thackeray, "Going to See a Man Hanged," *Fraser's Magazine*, Vol. XXII, August 1840; George Ryley Scott, *The History of Capital Punishment*, London: Torchstream Books, 1951.

even fewer than at present would be given the death sentence. Perhaps the legislators who enact the laws should also be required to attend the executions resulting from their legislative activities. On this point, Lawes says:

> Strange to say, I have never received a request from a district attorney to witness the execution of the man whom he prosecuted, or from a judge to attend the execution of the man whom he sentenced. Under the law, invitations must be sent to the judge and the [New York] Supreme Court of the district from which the condemned man was sentenced, also to the district attorney who prosecuted, as well as the sheriff of the county. It is not, however, obligatory for them to attend. As a rule, they do not.[15]

If capital punishment is to have the deterrent effect it is alleged to have, it is surely illogical to kill the convicted person in private, witnessed only by persons who are in the least need of seeing such a spectacle in order to deter them from murder or from the other capital offenses:

> . . . is it necessary as an example to others to kill the murderer? If it is, why surround the act with so much secrecy? It is surely not a deterrent example to perform an act furtively. If the state really believes that execution is necessary to deter others, it should execute openly and unashamed. Does not this furtiveness carry the suggestive thought that the spectacle of legalized killing by the state breeds on the part of the unthinking masses a hardened outlook toward murder which is harmful rather than effective as a deterrent? [16]

SWIFT AND PAINLESS EXECUTION

The seventh pronounced trend in the use of capital punishment is the adoption of relatively swift and painless methods of execution in place of prolonged torture. Of the 44 jurisdictions in this country which authorize the death penalty,[17] the following means are used: electrocution 25; hanging 9; lethal gas 8; choice (shooting or hanging) 1; Federal, means adopted by state in which execution occurs, 1.

It is unnecessary here to picture again in any detail the often-described, revolting, and sadistic methods of execution which man has used during his history. It can be credited to democracy that its development in the past two to three centuries has resulted in the complete discard of these bloody means of execution. In many cases the old laws remained on the books for decades, dead statutes whose enforcement was resolutely refused by the courts.

Such, for example, was the case in England prior to the revision of its penal code in 1835. Samuel Romilly vainly tried to persuade Parliament in 1814 to adopt simple hanging as the cost of treason in place of the then penalty of hanging, cutting down alive, disemboweling, decapitation, and quartering the body. This penalty had not been imposed for more than a century prior to 1814, but Parliament refused to legalise the change, because its members feared that treason would increase if the law were formally modified.

Today, a hanging is completed within a half-hour. Formerly, hanging was not limited to the period necessary to produce death. The custom was to hang the corpse in irons, to allow it to decay and be eaten by birds. Sometimes the corpse was dipped in tar prior to hanging it, so as to preserve it from the elements. In such cases parts of the skeleton would hang in chains for years. Hanging corpses were so common that they were part of the scenery, and landscape painters often included them in the background in their paintings. The prolonged hanging of corpses was formally abolished in England in 1835.

A partial inventory of methods of capital punishment includes burning at the stake, boiling in oil, boiling in water, the iron coffin, burying alive, breaking on the wheel, drawing and quartering, decapitation, impaling, hanging, crushing, flaying, shooting, exposure to insects, poisoning, throwing to animals, stoning, drowning, torturing, electrocution, asphyxiation. All of these methods were ingeniously varied. Mayhem, such as the amputation of one or both legs, was often a means of capital punishment.

Electrocution

In contrast to the prolonged agony of the older methods, electrocution is completed in five minutes. Here is Warden Lewis E. Lawes's description:

> It takes but a matter of a minute for the executioner to apply one electrode to the calf of the right leg and another to the crown of the head, while three prison keepers fasten the straps pinioning the arms, legs and torso. The final strap adjusted, the executioner—who has now taken his place in the alcove—throws the switch which sends a killing current of man-made lightning hurtling through the prisoner's body.
>
> As the switch is thrown into its socket there is a sputtering drone, and the body leaps as if to break the strong leather straps that hold it. Sometimes a thin grey wisp of smoke pushes itself out from under the helmet that holds the head electrode, followed by the faint odour of burning flesh. The hands turn red, then white, and the cords of the neck stand out like steel bands. After what seems an age but is, in fact, only two minutes, during which time the initial voltage of 2,000 to 2,200 and amperage of 7 to 12 are lowered and reapplied at various intervals, the switch is pulled and the body sags back and relaxes, somewhat as a very tired man would do. As a rule, the switch is thrown only once, but sometimes a second shock is given if the attending doctors think it advisable.
>
> Thus I have seen the tragedy enacted that has taken the lives of 114 men and one woman. There is a difference of less than five minutes in the time between the first step down the death corridor to the pulling of the switch, but it is enough to snuff out the God-given spark of life, without which what was a sentient human being is no more than a mere mass of clay.[18]

It seems that whatever deterrent effect the death penalty might have is largely lost because of the modern means of execution. The painless, rapid, solemn, and occasional execution of a murderer in the privacy of the death house is hardly designed to keep alive the terrors of death in those against whom the death penalty is theoretically directed.

SUMMARY

The trends in the use of the death penalty are solidly established in history. A study of them during the past 250 years can be summarized briefly: the over-all, international trend is toward the progressive abolition of capital punishment.

[15] Lawes, *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing* (1932), pp. 324–25.

[16] Lawes, *Life and Death in Sing Sing* (1928), pp. 153–54.

[17] Forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government.

[18] *Life and Death in Sing Sing* (1928), pp. 170–71.

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Murder as a Sociological Phenomenon

By John L. Gillin

HISTORICALLY among most peoples the murderer has been looked upon as perhaps the most dangerous member of society, certainly not rivaled by any other offender unless it be the traitor. As discussed by most criminologists, the murderer is one who kills a fellow member of his society not by accident or negligence but with purpose or to defend himself in connection with an attempt to commit another crime, such as robbery, or to shield himself from accusation by a person whom he has offended or abused. Therefore the term "murder" is more restricted than the term "homicide." That is the sense in which the term is used in this paper.

Did the limits of this paper permit, it would be worth while to trace in some detail the attempts of the various schools of criminology to explain the murderer. That survey, however, will have to be forgone.[1]

My own study of murderers was part of a larger project—a study of a sample of 486 out of about 1,700 prisoners in the Wisconsin State Prison at Waupun.[2] This study of ninety-two murderers, begun in 1930, included all the lifers in that institution save some who were discharged before the entire group was interviewed, a few who were in Central State Hospital, the institution for the criminal insane, and a few who were unable to be interviewed without an interpreter.

[1] For a brief survey of these theories see John L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology*, 3rd ed. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1945), Chaps. XIII–XV.

[2] The complete analysis of the data gathered is to be found in my book, *The Wisconsin Prisoner*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946.

This study of the murderers was, in a sense, a pilot enterprise, in that I had few precedents to guide me, and these were single case histories with little or no explanation as to the methods used in securing the data. Until I had tried, I did not know whether the prisoners would co-operate, or, if they did, whether I could rely on what they told me, whether I could check adequately on their statements from other informants, or just what items to look for.

Comparison showed that the murderers differed from their brothers in the following eight particulars: (1) The murderers left school earlier. (2) They had a full-time job before the age of fourteen in significantly greater numbers. (3) Fewer remained on a job for more than a year. (4) Significantly more of them (43 versus 12 per cent) felt that they were favorites of someone (mother, father, or someone else). (5) More of the married murderers and their wives lived disharmoniously than their married brothers and their wives. (6) A significantly greater percentage of the married murderers than of their married brothers had wives with more education than themselves. (7) They showed greater appreciation of their mothers than did their brothers. (8) Fewer of the murderers were farmers.

Family Background

Here is a brief listing of the most distinguishing features of the ninety-two murderers in my study.

The murderer's home was a farm home in 56 per cent of the cases. The family participated in church activities as a whole in 72 per cent of the cases, and in recreation as a whole in 53 per cent.

In seven cases out of ten he came from a family in which there were unfavorable conditions. For example, his mother worked outside the home in almost twice as many cases as the average for all the mothers in the United States during the time of his boyhood. He was thirty-four times as likely to be born a Negro, and eleven times as likely to be born an Indian, as to be born a white. Moreover, taking into account the relative proportions of these three races in the population, as compared with the other men of his age in the population of the state, he stood one and a half chances to one of being born in a home of foreign-born parents.

The murderer contributed to the family budget early. The chances were three in five that he and his brothers and sisters contributed to the family's support before they were fourteen years of age, and over four in five that they contributed before they were of age. The prisoner himself contributed in wages to family support before fourteen years of age in seven-tenths of the cases, and before he was of age in over nine-tenths of the cases. In other words, he came from a home in which the children were early shouldered with economic responsibility. This situation led him to drop out of school for economic reasons much earlier than other children.

The murderer stood not more than one chance in two of feeling that his parents were affectionate towards him. In at least one case in five he felt that his parents were cruel, fault-finding, moody, domineering, or indifferent.

There was more than one chance in three that in his family there was a history of intemperance. There was at least one chance in six that in his ancestry he knew of a history of insanity, epilepsy, mental defect, or queerness. This is about the same as the proportion found by Glueck in his study of reformatory cases in Massachusetts (17.4 per cent). He had almost one chance in four that in his family history there was some type of pathological condition.

Personal History

So much for the murderer's family background. Let us look at his own history.

He was sentenced to the state prison for life at the age of 32, an age slightly higher than that of other prisoners at Waupun. While his economic status was low, it was not lower than that of other Wisconsin prisoners. His education was about the same as that of all prisoners in the United States committed for grave homicide, but less than that of males committed for all crimes. While the Wisconsin lifer was born a farmer to a greater degree than the statistical average of all people in the state, he had less than one chance in seven of being a farmer at the time he committed the crime. In fact, in over seven cases out of ten he was either a skilled or unskilled laborer.

The Wisconsin lifer was not a professional criminal. In two cases out of three he had never had an institutional experience, not even that of an orphanage. In only two cases in twenty-two had he been in a workhouse or jail before being sentenced for murder; in only one in forty-six had he been in a prison, or in an industrial school and a reformatory; in only one in thirty-one had he been in both a reformatory and a workhouse; and in only two cases in twenty-three had he been in both a workhouse and a prison. But there was a little less than one chance in two that he had been in court for some offense, or had been arrested before. However, there was about one chance in four that he had been arrested more than twice before.

There was one chance in three that the Wisconsin lifer was single; not quite

one in two that he was married; about one in eight that he was divorced; and one in fourteen that he was widowed. Significant of the domestic situation is the fact that of the forty-two married lifers, eighteen had killed their own wives.

If married, there were almost two chances in five that the Wisconsin lifer had no children; one in eight that he had one; one in seven that he had two; the same chance that he had three; one in nine that he had five; and little more than one in twenty-five that he had either four or eight children.

In two cases out of five this Wisconsin lifer committed murder as an incident in connection with some other crime; in more than one in five, as the result of an immediate quarrel; and in almost two in five, as a result of long-standing marital difficulties or of a long-time grudge. Hence, the Wisconsin murderer is largely a criminal by passion.

Abnormal mental conditions characterize the Wisconsin lifer to a much greater degree than the other people of the state or even the other inmates of the prison. In over one case in four he was committed as insane or became insane after incarceration. Moreover, there was not quite one chance in three that his intelligence quotient was over 70.

There was more than one chance in four that he was drunk at the time he committed the crime.

CASE HISTORIES

A brief summary of a few case histories may aid in seeing the flow of events in individual lives leading up to murder in a crisis.

Loss of status

The first is the story of a young man who had come to consider himself outside the pale of society. The members of his family were the only persons he could meet as equals. All others were above him. The standards of conduct and the reaction patterns inculcated in this individual in his childhood were of such a nature as made it impossible for him to adjust himself to life outside the family group. He always carried with him an attitude of rebellion against authority. At the same time he submitted to what he considered the inevitable, not of justice but *of retaliation*. He had come to conceive of society as his natural enemy. He had no sense of a heritage in our social institutions. Revenge and the commission of antisocial acts were his method of asserting the self and realizing his dream of a complete personality.

This young man's father finally refused to have anything more to do with him. This led to the severing of a tie which hitherto had given him a sense of belonging to a family. After that he felt that the group in which alone he had status had disowned him. As a consequence, from that time on his antisocial acts grew in number and seriousness. These acts were methods he employed of compensating for the feeling of losing status.

Economic insecurity

The next case illustrates the effect of the loss of economic security. This man's parents had been well-to-do farmers in a neighboring state. They were thrifty, church members of good standing, and well thought of in their community. The son inherited the farm when he was twenty-two years of age. Through mismanagement he got into debt and a few years later lost the farm. By that time he had a wife and two children to support. After losing his position as assistant foreman in an industrial plant in southern Wisconsin he did odd jobs, earning from $10 to $15 a week.

Under the economic pressure and the lure of two acquaintances, this man assisted in the holdup of a small-town store. He sat at the wheel of the car while his two companions entered the store. The storekeeper resisted, and one of the two shot and killed him. The prisoner probably did not intend to engage in what turned out to be murder, but with the other two he was sentenced to prison for life.

The two other men had a different history. They likewise were business failures, and had been engaged in holdups for some time. One of them was an ex-convict, and the other had drifted into what he considered an easy way of making a living.

Immigrant culture conflict

In two cases we see the influence of the conflict of cultures in the case of the immigrant. One of these had a dependency record for his family for seven years before the crime occurred. He was slowly losing economic status chiefly because of a growing family and low wages. Furthermore, according to the standards of the immigrant group to which he belonged, the crimes of which he had been guilty before, like bootlegging, were not looked upon as crimes. He had lost his self-respect through a continued hand-to-mouth existence, had become dependent upon social agencies, and had become quite negative and resistant to the efforts of the social agencies to solve his problem. Crime was the means he employed to regain the respect of his small social group of nationals. Here is the conflict between the standards of a group within society and those of the larger society.

Bad temper and marital conflict

The following case throws light upon the early development of one of the lifers. In this case the home was economically good. This boy lived on a farm, in a family which enjoyed a good reputation. The home was more cultured than that of most others in the community. The record shows that because he dressed better than other boys in the community he was teased a good deal. The mother especially was an unusually cultured woman for the neighborhood. She was a university graduate.

This boy's early recreational interests were wholesome, chiefly of the out-of-doors sort. In his later boyhood his father and mother did not get on very well, and the boy was very much closer to his mother than to his father.

When the United States entered the war this young man enlisted in the Navy. This gave him a broad experience and introduced him to women of his own age. He did not bear the discipline of the Navy well, and got into trouble a number of times while in the service. He had always had a quick temper and was often in personal difficulty with his associates.

After discharge from the Navy the subject married a widow, with whom he had constant difficulties. His wife became pregnant, and, not wanting a child, induced him to secure a doctor for abortion. This caused a great emotional upset in the husband. Other serious quarrels occurred and separation took place for a time, but he returned later to live with his wife.

The wife's sister seems to have interfered in the situation, and was partly responsible for the outburst which led to the crime. The man was served with a notice by the deputy sheriff to vacate his wife's apartment, and was so angry that he took a gun which was in the house, intending to shoot his wife and then himself. He shot at his wife but the bullet struck and killed the little son of the wife's sister and seriously wounded his wife.

The violent temper which this man had shown all his life, the incompatibility between his wife and himself, due to the different way in which each had been raised, the clash between their respective religious and emotional backgrounds, his contempt for education and her desire for it, their differences with respect to the matter of children, all brought to a crisis in the attempt to oust him from the apartment, led to the crime. To all intents and purposes this man was a wife murderer. His emotional involvement with his mother, his erratic temper, and the provoking circumstances of his married life formed a combination which inevitably led to the crime.

Degeneracy

In the next case also, murder grew out of a sexual situation. However, the background was entirely different. This man was of very low grade intellectually and was physically a very unattractive person. He grew up in a home environment economically poor and without many of the cultural advantages. His father did not believe in education, and the boy attended school only a part of the winter for three or four years. His father was a strict disciplinarian and seems to have been rather savage in his punishment of the children. The father was a drinking man and seems not to have been of much higher intellectual capacity than his son. There is no question that this boy with an I.Q. of 55 was handicapped for proper social adjustment.

Because of his poor physical appearance and his lack of intelligence this youth was an easy prey of loose and designing women in his community. The evidence shows that he lived for a time with a degenerate woman in the neighborhood who used him as a kind of servant. After leaving her he formed an attachment with a widow who had a grown son and a brother who owned some property. There is evidence that this woman used this feeble-minded man to kill her brother in order that she might get the latter's property. Not only was this man feeble-minded, but he was subject to light epileptic seizures. His confession, however, shows that he killed the woman's brother partly because he did not like him, but more especially because the woman told him to do it. Clearly this is a case of feeble intellect and physical unattractiveness—both preventing normal family life—irregular sexual relationships, drink, and suggestion by another.

Social inadequacy

A final case is that of an individual somewhat mentally deficient. He was born in Germany and at the age of four years came to this country with his parents. When he was five years old his father was killed, leaving three small children for his mother to care for. Two years later she remarried. Her second husband was a man with two children. This boy did not get on well with his stepfather, who worked the children long hours and denied them many of the pleasures and advantages that other children in the community enjoyed. He objected to their going to school, and when they got old enough he was constantly trying to dissuade them from going to dances, parties, and other amusements in the neighborhood.

At the age of about thirteen or fourteen this boy left his home and went to work for a nearby farmer. Thereafter he was home only occasionally, simply for visits. After working for farmers in the neighborhood for some time he went to work in a sawmill and then proceeded to deal in real estate, buying land, improving it, and then selling it. He was a hard worker, and since he was unmarried, he kept house for himself. At the time of his trouble he had cleared $5,000 through his real estate operations.

In the communities in which he lived and worked, this youth had always been regarded as queer. He got along, however, better with children than with older people. He was unattractive physically, and his low mental development probably led to his remaining single. However, in compensation for his inability to attract the attention of young women, he developed an interest in young girls. He drank a good deal, usually brewing his own beer. He pleaded guilty to a charge of killing his sister-in-law, although he claims that he was drunk at the time and does not remember anything about it.

This case illustrates a murder growing out of the reactions of a boy with an I.Q. of only 60 to a social situation which his feeble mind prevented him from analyzing carefully. It also prevented him from foreseeing the consequences of his acts. In addition to that biological deficiency, the home conditions were unfavorable to the development of wholesome reactions. Led to feel that he did not belong to any family and that somehow he lacked something which would make him attractive to the opposite sex, he found an outlet for his sexual nature in attentions to young girls, which attentions were resented by his brother's wife. With that combination of unpromising conditions there was linked an addiction to alcohol which precipitated the attack upon the woman who interfered with the fulfillment of his fundamental wishes.

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Study in Murder

By Ralph S. Banay

EVER since Cain earned "the primal, eldest curse," society has grappled ineffectively with the perennial problem of murder. Felonious murders or other types of homicide occur in the United States at the rate of at least one every forty-five minutes. In spite of the threat of capital punishment or long imprisonment, the toll of homicide continues to grow.

Public Is Conditioned to Murder

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that, except for maintaining the traditional legal penalty for taking another's life, the society we live in almost reaches out to encourage murder. What is the commonest topic in the so-called comic books which children read? What is the focal event in the mystery stories sold by tens of millions annually? What is the very stock in trade of television and radio drama and, to a less extent, of film and stage "thrillers"? The gun is perhaps the commonest toy; a travesty of killing, the most popular form of play. "This will kill you" is a polite conversational cliché. "Drop dead!" is a devout injunction heard constantly. A psychologist studying our culture might fairly deduce that we are obsessed with the idea of sudden, violent, and retributive death.

Murder, of course, is the very essence of drama; book and play have always found dalliance with death a sure formula for profitable popularity. But no generation prior to ours has taken so intimate or universal a role in foreshortening doom, in fact or by fantasy. It would seem that the decreasing percentage of the population that is not actively engaged in killing is occupied a good part of the time in musing upon the murder theme. The mind being the delicately suggestible mechanism it is, can we wonder that people so often carry into effect the violent action pattern that is so persistently entertained in thought?

Cultural Classification

Classifications of murder lend themselves to such variety that the nature of homicide and the motives for killing can be assigned to an infinity of divisions. However, it is helpful to approach the questions of motivation and explanation first by considering that violent actions, like murder, are carried out on one of three levels—subcultural, cultural, or supercultural.

By subcultural one means that level of feeling, thought, and action in which the individual is accustomed to, and perhaps is incapable of adjusting to, the criteria of our culture. He has the mental equipment to gauge his situation accurately, but the ethical perception is dulled or remains undeveloped because of his family or community setting, which entered into the formulation of his personality. A person in this subcultural group is perhaps more likely to get into situations where violence may occur, and has less innate equipment for keeping his violent tendencies in check, than most of us.

The cultural level is that of people whom we euphemistically and empirically consider to be normal: persons with a fair endowment of physical and mental attributes and sufficiently fortunate to have good home breeding and a fair education. These are the people who might rationally be expected to be law-abiding and to live according to high ethical standards, since they presumably are accustomed to the cultural restraints and codified inhibitions of an intelligent society. Yet this is precisely the group that is being conditioned, from childhood onward, to accept murder as an amusing, intriguing, or challenging topic and to palliate the prohibitions and punishments set up against it. On the cultural level, therefore, the restraint on spontaneous violent impulses becomes less effective and the indulgence of explosive behavior tends to become more common.

The supercultural group is made up of those persons whose natural endowment and social and educational privileges put them above the crowd; they are men and women of achievement and superior intellect, members of professions, business executives, successful artists and artisans, and the people attached to their set.

Here again, social station is no proof against explosive behavior. In many of these persons the plexus of inhibitions by which their lives are regulated is so rigidly maintained that little or no outlet is left for the natural impulses of aggression. The time may, and often does, come when these pent-up forces are suddenly liberated by accidental circumstances, resulting in a violent act or train of conduct quite inconsistent with the person's ordinary nature. Among these people, too, an attitude toward murder of objective detachment, amounting almost to callousness or indifference, may tend to facilitate a lowering of the threshold of effective inhibition.

A Subcultural Case

First let us see a few pages of the analysis of a man of the subcultural group. He was serving a prison sentence for homicide when he came to the psychiatrist for aid:

I am in terrible distress concerning my family and I hope to God that you will be able to help me. My mother and father died when I was a small boy and all of my life I wanted to love someone and someone to love me and have something to live for. As sinful as it may be, through my common-law wife God has granted me that opportunity. When I was outside I suffered and sacrificed and my heart and soul was crushed more than once to hold it. My wife has fallen back into her sinful life again through her wicked mother. When I tried to correct her, the best I could from here, she stopped writing me, and I wrote her three letters begging her to please write me about my kids, and if she didn't want to write me any more, to go by my friend and tell him to write me about my kids. But she wouldn't even do that.

My mother-in-law was a prostitute from the old school which her police record will show. She wants her daughters to be the same. She has two. One was successful, which her record will show. She sent my wife to me for that purpose, but as I could see she was a nice girl and didn't belong in that racket, I explained to her what she was and what her mother was doing to her. She cried and thanked me and told me she would never do that again, and she didn't as long as I could keep her from her mother.

I asked her to marry me before our baby was born. She told me yes, but when she told her mother about it, her mother asked me out of the house. I asked her to come with me, because I loved her and wanted to marry her. She wanted to come, but her mother started crying and she stayed. Unknown to us all, she was with child. She sent for me and I went to her house to see her. She was four months, and her mother told me she wanted me to destroy that baby. If I didn't I would be sorry as long as she lived. I told my wife I still loved her and wanted my baby. Her mother cursed her with some awful name but she left with me, and never wanted to see her mother again. I talked her out of that to my sorrow.

Her mother hated me from that day and never ceased to do me harm, by making my wife do wrong and by teaching her never to trust a man. She even made my wife forsake my kids once to meet a man and while she was gone the house caught

fire and no one was with the kids. Some people that knew me told the firemen about my kids and after two of them got hurt, they saved them. I came home from work once and she was in an empty apartment with the janitor laying on the floor. Her mother had told her his sister wanted to see her down there. Her mother told her about a fellow once next door who wanted to meet her and had plenty money. She met him in his kitchen on his washtub.

So after her mother left my house we were very happy until I got into this trouble and she had to go live with her again. When I last saw her she promised me that she would stay nice and leave her mother's house as soon as she could. She is very weak and will do good as well as bad when she is asked. She hasn't any power at all over her mind or body and is a very pitiful person. She has broken her promise to me and is running around with people that she did wrong with before. Because they come to her mother's house to drink whiskey and have a good time. One Sunday I was supposed to meet her at church at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I waited for her until 9 o'clock. She didn't come, so I went past her mother's house. She was drunk. All of her family was drunk, and she was in the room with my kids with someone else.

She is one of the strangest persons in the world. I believe there is nothing in the world that she wouldn't do if you would ask her, even commit murder. But if you spoke harshly to her it almost killed her, even when she had done wrong. As long as a man gives her a few pennies to play "numbers" with, he can do anything in that house to anybody, even my kids.

Analysis

This man, although belonging to the inferior cultural group which his style of life testifies, was physically and mentally sound. He was credited with average intelligence and made a good economic adjustment by working as a laborer, porter, and longshoreman. He was highly sensitive from early age. This condition probably arose from the fact that he lost his parents when he was very young, and that his schoolmates passed remarks regarding his long head and also his stuttering. He tearfully remarked that he was chided with a well-known sadistic rhyme, "Kelly, Kelly, big head and no belly." This also explains the fact that he was touchy and easily provoked. He had definite inferiority feelings which he sublimated in two directions—the normal one, which is shown by his great sense to do justice and reform others, and the abnormal one, which was expressed through his assault when provoked.

The circumstances of the homicide were subconsciously related to his problem with his common-law wife, his efforts to reform her, and his frustration. He was working on the docks, and coming home from work one night he was approached on the street near his home by a woman who asked for a cigarette. After he gave her the cigarette she tried to solicit him. He called a policeman. The next evening, coming home from work, he saw the same woman with a male friend apparently waiting for him. The male friend jumped on him and struck him. Our man, in fury, stabbed his assailant to death with a knife.

The incident that led to homicide released a displaced anger about his prostitute common-law wife, whom the other prostitute symbolized, and he saw the male protector in the role of the protective mother-in-law, whom he subconsciously wanted to kill.

SUBCULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

In the subcultural group fall most of the acquisitive or felonious murders where killing is done for purposes of robbery or gain—murder committed in the course of robbery or to forestall detection of guilt, violent murders by organized criminal groups of rival gangsters, of offenders against the gangland code, of persons in a position to betray gangs or their members to the law, of others who may get in their way during the commission of crimes, and of victims for whose removal the gang or its members may be hired.

A significant finding in this group was that among twenty men convicted of murder in the first degree, eleven had mental ages of 9.6 to 11.5, the I.Q. ranging from 65 to 77; while the mental ages of nine were from 12.3 to 19.1, with I.Q. from 82 to 127. The percentage of borderline or less intelligence among all other criminals in the same prison was 25, while the group of first degree murderers in the prison produced 50 per cent borderline intelligence in the same group.

The other relevant finding was that ten of the twenty were excessive alcoholics, and sixteen of the twenty were unemployed at the time of the crime and none of them were skilled in any trade. All of them showed low educational levels, only two having progressed beyond the eighth grade of public school. Combined figures show that these individuals fall below the intellectual, occupational, and educational standards of the total prison population.

Even in this so generally accepted grouping of organized crimes and gang activities where murders are systematically carried out, even the executioners of the notorious Murder, Inc., as shown by psychiatric studies, had their individual determinants which predestined them, within their cultural setting, for the specific function they performed.

THE SECOND LEVEL

Murder committed by the average man in the street—a product of our culture—belongs to the second level. It is usually a result of an emotional smoldering which suddenly flares up into a violent explosion. There is an accumulation of hostility to the saturation point on the conscious level. The superego, which censures the action of the ego, is weak as a result of the lacking or rejected authority symbol. In this case the road is wide open to the primitive forces of the subconscious, which enhance the aggressive ego drives and effect a violent act.

A salesman, described as a happy-go-lucky type and so competent that his employer was able to dispense with the services of several other employees, one day killed five of his in-laws and wounded four others in a bloody attempt to wipe out his wife's family. At the trial, the counsel for the defense told the jury in his summation that he had called no psychiatrist to the stand because he agreed with the prosecution that "the offender was sane."

The psychiatric study of this case, however, found a foreboding chain of events in the personality, practically from birth to the commission of the act, indicating the psychodynamic development of this eventual massacre. The case may appear unusual or uncommon only because the focal points are in such dramatic relief. However, these elements—the long-standing frustration, anxiety, and building up of the aggression—are common characteristics of homicide in this group.

Preschool and school life

A series of unforgettable impressions entered this man's character formation. He was told that at birth, while his mother hovered between life and death, he had been given up as dead. He had been revived from asphyxia and his mother had recovered, but the story of his birth became an unforgettable memory.

Home surroundings increased the intensity of the horror aspects of this birth story. The lower part of the

house in which the family lived was used by the boy's father as an undertaking establishment, where as a child of four or five he watched, horror-stricken, as his father and uncle embalmed the dead. The impression of lifeless bodies, the tears and wailing of mourners, the foreboding atmosphere of the mortuary, conditioned his mind to the presence of death long before he was able to learn the alphabet, let alone understand death.

Other aspects of the home situation set the boy apart, in his own mind, from his brother and sister. His brother, subject to frequent illness, was favored by the mother, while his older sister was his father's pet. As a result, he felt forlorn and rejected. This feeling was intensified when, as he grew older, his father beat him for the slightest infraction. By the time he was ten he struggled to free himself from unhappy home surroundings and father authority by running away. At the age of twelve he was picked up in a New York railroad station—miles from his home—asleep, penniless, hungry, and cold.

The preschool childhood unhappiness was greatly increased by the lad's early school experiences. Try as he would with his studies, he could not keep up with other boys. Although he was their equal in mathematics, he could not learn to read and write as well as they did. This failure became more acutely tormenting when his teacher, unaware of the reaction it created in his mind and emotions, called upon him to read aloud to the class. When he faltered, the class laughed. This embittered and humiliated him to such a degree that he often burst into tears and ran out of the classroom and home to the comfort and sympathy of his mother.

In school the unhappy boy's defensive steps to avoid the sneers and laughter of classmates turned to truancy. Sent to a disciplinary school for punishment, he was eventually returned to his own school, bearing the new stigma of having been sent away. Friendless and rejected by his social group, he tried to compensate himself in illegal and aggressive actions. Having gone through a great deal of abuse and humiliation from his classmates, he learned that the only way he could defend himself was to beat them to the punch. He developed a provocative and pugnacious attitude, taking pride in his physical power. In one fight his nose was broken, and in another he fractured the metacarpal bones of his right hand in striking a blow to the head of an opponent. He said: "I used to go to school and never bother anyone. A lot of the people thought I was a sissy and picked on me. I didn't like to fight. I was afraid I'd hurt somebody."

Marriage and army life

The feeling of rejection persisted. At the age of seventeen (he falsified his age to get the license), in his blind search for love, home, and recognition, this youth married a sixteen-year-old girl. This immature, impulsive act brought, in time, serious results.

When he was inducted into the Army at the age of eighteen he established a pattern of aggression and belligerence. He could not accept the rigor, discipline, and hardship of army life. Two months after his induction he went AWOL, returned home, but gave himself up almost immediately. On his return to army life he became involved in even more serious infractions of regulations. More and more he felt that he was surrounded by a hostile world in which people took advantage of him unless he stood up and fought for his rights—"beat them to the punch." With confidence in his physical power, he was unable to restrain himself when authority demanded that he live in a highly disciplined environment. On the slightest provocation he went into a rage; everything went black before his eyes, and before he realized what he was doing, he was involved in assaults upon his superiors.

His immature and impulsive marriage became his dominant irritation, increasing his feeling of rejection and failure. His wife had given birth to a child some time after his induction, and he learned that she had gone to live with another man. He began to wonder about the paternity of his child, and the doubt became more acute after his wife divorced him.

Second marriage

Shortly after his release from service, while working on the house of his future father-in-law, he became acquainted with his future second wife, a girl for whom he felt a very deep affection. At the invitation of the girl's mother, he began working on their farm, receiving only a nominal salary. After working there several months he married the girl, but, at his mother-in-law's insistence, remained in the in-law's home, where he continued to work. But now the $15 salary he had received was stopped to pay for his and his wife's lodging and food. He was forced to ask for every dollar he got. It was given only after belittling remarks, grumbling, and dissatisfaction. "If I'd wanted $1.50 I'd have to go ask for it. If I'd go ask her, she raised hell. She said I didn't do anything but smoke, but I used to work."

He was unable to adjust himself to the closely knit and ruled home of a matriarchal mother-in-law. The authority was so complete that after his marriage the mother-in-law went along with him and his wife to Atlantic City to select the room in which they were to spend their honeymoon.

Two children were born of this union, and as they came along he felt more and more trapped. When he expressed a desire to get away and establish a home for his wife and children, his mother-in-law would say: "You can go, but my daughter and the children will stay." Dissatisfaction grew into an open break when he obtained a job in an electrical outlet store and moved away. He tried to rent a place for his family and entice his wife and children to come and live with him. All his efforts failed, however, and instead he was ordered not to visit either wife or children. He appealed to his father-in-law, but was warned: "If you come home I'll blow your head off." His wife, as an obedient daughter, followed her parents' instructions and rejected him.

He turned to his relatives and asked them to keep him company in the store, but even this afforded no relief. He brooded more and more. Eventually he was unable to eat, and sustained himself on coffee alone. At times even that would not stay down. He began to tell his employer that he wanted to quit his job. Then one morning he stayed home from work and sat on his bed or walked up and down in his room, brooding. He was afraid that if he did not see his children they would forget him. All the emissaries he had sent to intervene in his behalf had failed; four attorneys he had consulted could do nothing. Everything had failed.

The climax

Suddenly on this day, as he paced the floor or sat brooding on his bed, an upsurge of hostility and frustration told him to take matters into his own hands. If he could not see his children he would at least frighten his in-laws. He put three revolvers in his pockets, threw an army carbine into his car, and drove to the house where his family lived. There was a short conversation with his father-in-law. "No," he could not see the children. "Throw him out," urged the

mother-in-law. Then his wife appeared and he pleaded: "Do you love me?" "You are crazy," she answered.

That was the fatal moment. He pulled his guns and shot several people in the house; chased his mother-in-law to another house, shooting at anyone who came between them, and shot her. Then he drove to other relatives of his wife and shot them. The love that he claimed he had for his wife turned to hate, and its volcanic explosion engulfed her whole family in a mass murder.

Psychiatrically this catastrophic occurrence is no different from the murder in hot blood of one person who was loved; but instead of one fatal wound, thirty or forty are inflicted in an upsurge of fury. In this case, the homicidal fury was spread from the beloved to the beloved's whole family. They were one.

THE SUPERCULTURAL LEVEL

In the supercultural group, when murder is committed, it is done in a triggerlike action as though short-circuiting the higher cerebral centers. The impulse strikes without warning, with lightning speed, and against a person one would least expect. In contradistinction to the earlier group, there is no conscious building up of hostility to the point of saturation. The drama is enacted within the depths of the personality, where inhibitions have been universally repressed; so when liberation occurs, it does so with the force and destruction of an earthquake.

When the drama of the act and the subsequent trial dies down, a psychiatric study can painstakingly reconstruct the forces that were responsible for the act and can bring into focus the proper relationship of cause and effect.

How can one understand a murder so puzzling as the case of the 53-year-old president of a great industrial firm who shot and killed his friend and partner whom he had known from boyhood and with whom he had been associated practically throughout their lifetime? They and their families maintained a most amiable and cordial business and social relationship. He himself could not account for the act, except that the partners had had some discussion concerning the settlement of a compensation award granted to one of their employees. The president felt that his partner had not represented him potently enough at the compensation hearing.

The discussion took place in the inner office of the president, in the presence of two other partners, who testified that neither the nature nor the vehemence of the discussion had been excessive. At one point the president left the room, went to an adjoining office, and asked for a revolver which was kept in the safe as a precaution against payroll robbery. When it was handed to him, he fired a shot in the outer office, then returned to his room, shouting that he was "going to show" his partners. With that he fired three bullets into his friends, who succumbed immediately. He walked out and went to a neighborhood bar, had several drinks, and returned to his home. The next day he surrendered to the police.

This man came from a highly respected middle-class family, received a good preparatory and college education, went into business for himself, and became very successful, attaining both social and business prestige. At the age of 23 he married, and he was described as having been particularly devoted to his wife until her death a few years prior to the offense. This loss shook him emotionally so much that his relatives and friends became concerned about his outlook. He turned to extreme religious devotion for solace.

In this state he received another blow when his son developed schizophrenia and was committed to a mental hospital. He became morose and despondent and began to drink to occasional excess. He was, however, able to attend to his business, but his income dropped considerably in comparison with his earnings of the preceding years.

A detailed psychiatric study of the case traced down his psychological failure. Shortly after the death of his wife, on whom he had been very dependent, the commitment of his son to a state hospital further shook his confidence and outlook. His sexual life had been at a standstill for a number of years, and he began to feel a physical decline. His generous and openhearted attitude began to change to a more scrupulous one, and he became overconcerned with finances. His shrinking income symbolized the waning of his power, influence, and potency. He began to transfer his dependence from his wife to his friend and partner. The feeling of impoverishment and infidelity, which so often is part of the involutional state, began to be projected on his partner. Therefore, a relatively small incident acted as a fuse for the underground explosion. The fear, resentment, and feeling of being betrayed by the beloved, accompanied by his unreleased sexual aggression, propelled him to reach for the gun in the performance of a symbolical assault and defense against the psychological problems that were closing in on him and were dramatized in the attitude of his partner.

PSYCHIATRY NECESSARY TO UNDERSTANDING OF MOTIVATION

The true nature of the psychological phenomena of violence which cause one human being to inflict death upon another will remain shrouded in mystery unless a detailed psychiatric study traces down the inner motivations.

The legalistic thinking expressed in the criminal law gives extensive definition and classification. Murder, homicide, manslaughter, with their subdivisions, denote the quality and the consequences of the act from the viewpoint of responsibility and culpability. Determination is based primarily on the discovery of the motive or motives, the method, the circumstances, the attitude before and after the act, and the relationship of the individual to the victim, whether the person was an outsider, a friend or relative, an enemy or an innocent victim, and whether the removal of the person was an advantage or a disadvantage to the individual. By the establishment of a motive, an understanding of the crime, at least in the legal sense, is achieved, and no more official effort is extended from or charged to the authorities to go beyond and find a deeper insight into the true motivation of the mind of the man who kills.

Acceptance in legal procedures of the motive at large is based on the presumption that, unless it is proved otherwise through the intricacies and formalities of the court trial, the individual is like any other person, who could exercise at pleasure any function he chose. There is no recognition of the fact that if he had been in possession of such perfect powers of reasoning and such ideal forces of will, he could have prevented the occurrence of the fatal act. In reality, he is in his predicament for the very reason that he was incapable of behaving like a complete man, the master of himself. However, people in general refuse to look upon him as an invalid, and find considerable gratification in obtaining for society a maximum security and protection by imposing a maximum retribution.

It is understandable that, for the protection of the community and the individual, stringent defensive measures should be applied against danger that might come from another individual or individuals. But the best defense is a more profound understanding of the in-

dividual, which can lead to adequate preventive measures against the occurrence and recurrence of threats and violence to individual life and public safety.

A scientific evaluation and classification of violent destruction of one human being by another can be made in broad lines, but beyond that diffuse grouping a true understanding of a perpetrator of a violent act against life can be achieved only in individual terms and reactions. The psychological profile of the individual murderer varies as greatly as the physical profile, and the forces that operate the personality are so varied and variable that a complete understanding of the action can be evaluated only by the study of the individual in his total functioning. It is little appreciated that the functioning of the mind, through an aggregation of perceptive and reactive tendencies, produces a multitude of combinations of sensations and movements, to a different extent and quality in different cases, and creates a diversity of psychological phenomena not measurable with other individual reactions.

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The Murderer in the Mental Institution

By BERNARD A. CRUVANT and FRANCIS N. WALDROP

THE popular conception of the primary role of the psychiatrist in medicolegal questions is his appearance in court as an expert witness when insanity has been raised as a defense against a charge of first degree murder. Actually, this is an infrequent part of the psychiatrist's contribution to legal processes, but such instances predominate in public awareness because of the attendant notoriety and because in occasional cases rather brutal crimes have attracted a great deal of public attention and resentment. Despite our awareness of this popular fallacy, we must have been in part influenced and misled by it, for we were surprised, on surveying the literature, to discover nothing dealing with the specific question, What happens to the murderer who is sent to a mental hospital?

This essay is intended as a statistical and descriptive study of the fate of all of the individuals committed to Saint Elizabeths Hospital [1] while under charges or conviction of homicide in any degree during the period July 1, 1925 to July 1, 1951. As can be seen from Figure 1, less than 3 out of each 1,000 admissions had been accused of some variety of homicide. Chance played some role in these figures; a number of our patients had committed serious assaults, and only the inefficiency of the aggressor or the hardihood of the victim prevented a fatal outcome.




FIG. 1.—Admissions to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, July 1, 1925–July 1, 1951.

To avoid infringing on other discussants in this symposium on capital crimes and the death penalty, we shall confine ourselves, insofar as possible, to a statement and discussion of our statistical findings, including a few representative cases to illustrate certain points.

The selection of data to be memorialized by tabulation is ever subject to inherent error on the basis of bias, interest, or accessibility of the facts to be tabulated. We attempted to select such material as could be reasonably objec-

[1] Saint Elizabeths Hospital is a mental institution of more than 7,000 beds, now a bureau in the Federal Security Agency. It was established by Act of Congress in 1855 under the name of The Government Hospital for the Insane. The name was changed to Saint Elizabeths Hospital by Congress in 1916. Its purpose, in the words of Dorothea Lynde Dix, who wrote the bill, was to provide "the most humane care and enlightened curative treatment of the insane of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the District of Columbia." Primarily, the hospital provides services for the District of Columbia in lieu of a "state" mental hospital. In addition, during the period of this study, patients were admitted from the entire United States and its territories, and included insane nationals abroad, insane Indian wards of the federal government, persons from the armed services, the Merchant Marine, federal prisons, and federal enclaves, and individuals accused of crimes on the high seas.

tive, avoiding clinical interpretations or speculative conjectures whenever possible. We shall present first the statistical data under the headings of the three types of homicide, and, because one can readily overextend the conclusions drawn from statistical particularization, in the commentary that follows we shall present only the most obvious conclusions to be drawn from the material.

FIRST DEGREE HOMICIDE

In the category of first degree homicide there were 57 patients, of whom 44 were sent to the hospital prior to trial. Fifty-three were males and four were females. Ages at time of the crime ranged from 21 to 50 years, with a modal age of 34. Our patients accused or convicted of first degree murder are about equally divided between white and Negro. It is difficult to draw generalizations from these findings, since, as indicated in footnote 1, during the period surveyed, Saint Elizabeths Hospital received patients from a variety of sources.

Educational attainment did not seem statistically significant, all levels of achievement being represented, ranging from no formal schooling to college graduation, with a concentration of individuals in upper elementary school level. The majority of our patients were single; and of the seven who were widowed, all had murdered the spouse. In only sixteen cases was there an unequivocal history of excessive use of alcohol for a number of years preceding the crime. A preponderant number had made only a marginal economic adjustment. Fourteen patients had had a definite history of previous mental hospitalization.

Although our information in most of these cases is quite meager, we feel justified in stating that in extremely few cases was there anything that would enable the psychiatrist to predict accurately the subsequent capital offense. It is our opinion that the discipline of psychiatry has not yet developed valid criteria of sufficient degree of predictive reliability to justify hard and fast distinction *before* the act between the individual who is likely to commit a crime of violence, such as rape or homicide, and the one who will not ever translate his emotional conflicts into aggressive, destructive behavior. In this area psychiatric opinion represents only an informed and educated guess, but nevertheless constitutes the most reliable index presently available. It has been our experience that in no other field has the disclaimer of infallibility been met by others with so much enthusiastic approval or irritable resentment. Thus, 31 of these patients had no record of antisocial behavior, and in 17 cases there was a record of only minor offenses prior to the homicide. In just nine cases was there a record of a major offense such as a felony involving even a mild to moderate degree of aggression.

Shooting was the most popular method of causing death, possibly for a number of deeply buried psychopathological reasons, but more likely because it is simple, easy, and frequently accomplished by a weapon purchased in advance, often for protection in response to insane delusions. Next most frequent was stabbing, followed closely by bludgeoning. Strangulation and poisoning were rare.

The classification by diagnosis of patients in this group not unexpectedly shows that slightly more than half were afflicted with schizophrenia. The established diagnoses ran the gamut of psychotic and psychoneurotic conditions, but showed predominantly functional as contrasted to organic disorders.

Half of this group were equally Baptist or Catholic, the remainder belonging to various Protestant denominations or claiming no religious affiliation. There were no individuals in the entire group of patients known to be Jewish.

Disposition

At the time of this writing, 21 of this group remain in Saint Elizabeths Hospital, 7 have died while hospitalized, and 7 were returned to prison to continue serving a sentence. Eleven were returned for trial, of whom 4 were exculpated, 5 received sentences for a lesser included offense, and in 2 cases the final outcome is unknown. Six patients were transferred to other psychiatric institutions, and in 5 instances the patient was discharged from the hospital subsequent to dismissal of the charges and improvement or recovery from his illness.

The decision as to disposition of the accused or convicted murderer who is committed to a mental hospital as insane is obviously complex and difficult. The psychiatrist may be understandably reluctant to return to possible enlargement in the community an individual who has demonstrated his capacity for aggressively destructive behavior by the commission of a crime so serious as first degree murder. Thus it may have been, perhaps, that most of these individuals either remained in our hospital or were returned to prison to continue a sentence, particularly in instances where the sentence was for life or a protracted period of years.

While such conservatism as to disposition might appear justified on a common-sense basis, we have discovered no scientific validation for arbitrary rigidity. Of the limited number who were returned to jail following recovery and were subsequently acquitted or had charges dismissed and who returned to the community, there is no record of their having subsequently committed any serious crime.

Historically, there has been a change in emphasis in hospital policy toward individuals accused or convicted of murder and sent to the hospital for treatment. During the first twenty years of the twenty-six-year period under consideration, the dictates of the ancient talionic law were followed. A person accused of murder was considered to have forfeited his liberty, and, once having been found mentally incompetent and committed to the hospital, he was continued in the hospital virtually without regard to any subsequent changes in his mental condition. With the institution of a program of intensive therapy in the maximum security division of Saint Elizabeths Hospital in 1946, a considerably increased liberality with relaxation of previous rigid standards occurred. Thus, practically all the patients who were listed as returned to prison to continue sentence or returned to jail to await trial represent cases on which such disposition was made in the past six years. In no case was a hospitalized patient accused of murder returned directly to society from the hospital prior to the past five years.

In our review of the records of this group we considered that there was definite or highly suggestive evidence that the patient was of unsound mind at the time of the crime in 42 instances. This is comparable—but not identical—with the finding that 44 of these patients were sent to the hospital prior to trial. Of the 13 who were hospitalized while serving a sentence in prison, 2 became recognizably ill during the first six months of confinement, 5 between one and three years, and 6 after three years of confinement.

SECOND DEGREE MURDER

In the classification of second degree murderers there were 12 patients (10 males and 2 females), ranging in age at time of the crime from 18 to 45 years,

with a modal age of 25.5 years. Eighty per cent were in the third decade of life. All patients had had at least four years of formal education and nearly a half had finished high school or attended college. Four were married, the remainder were single or widowed; again, the three widowed patients had killed the spouse.

Less than half of this group had a definite history of excessive use of alcohol. In none of these cases were we able to establish any connection between a state of intoxication and commission of the crime. This is considered significant in that intoxication is often an element in reducing an accusation of first degree murder to a lesser included offense.

None of the patients in this group had a record of previous mental hospitalization. Six had no known previous antisocial record, two had a record of minor offenses, and four had a record of felonies. Few had an antisocial record which would have occasioned premonition as to the subsequent homicidal behavior.

Two-thirds of the cases were diagnosed as schizophrenic; the others had functional psychoses or were considered sane.

Again, as in the previous group, half of the patients claimed either Catholic or Baptist religious affiliation, and the remainder were listed under various Protestant denominations or professed no religious connections.

In this group shooting and stabbing were equally popular techniques of committing the homicide. There was one instance of bludgeoning and one of murder by strangulation.

Regarding disposition, three patients in this group remain in the hospital, one has died, and three were returned to prison to continue a sentence. Two were returned for trial, one of whom was found guilty and one acquitted. Charges were dismissed on two patients who were subsequently discharged from the hospital into their own custody as recovered from their mental illness. To our knowledge, they are adjusting satisfactorily.

In contrast to the previous group, only half in this category were sent to the hospital prior to trial. In our study of the case records, however, we considered that only a third had shown definite or highly suggestive evidences of mental unsoundness at the time of the crime. Of those who were convicted and sent to prison and then developed mental illness, in only one instance was the illness apparent during the first few years of imprisonment, and five cases in this category had been imprisoned more than three years before the illness developed.

MANSLAUGHTER

The manslaughter group included 10 patients (8 males and 2 females), ranging in age from 19 to 65 years at the time of the crime, with a modal age of 41. Significantly, the modal age here was seven years higher than for the first degree murder group and sixteen years higher than for the second degree murder group.

Educational attainment in this category was somewhat lower; three had no schooling, but four had completed elementary school, and one had finished high school. Half were married, and again the widower had killed the spouse.

In only two cases was there a history of excessive use of alcohol, and in no case was inebriation approximate to the crime.

Ninety per cent of the cases had no record of prior mental hospitalization, and half had no known previous record of antisocial behavior. In contrast, however, the five with previous antisocial records had committed offenses of a nature indicating possibly an increased proclivity toward violent behavior.

Diagnostic groupings showed a marked contrast to preceding categories in that the preponderant number were afflicted with organic brain disease, such as syphilis, cerebral arteriosclerosis, and mental deficiency. This accords well with the higher modal age.

In religious affiliation there were four Baptists and one Catholic, the remainder belonging to various Protestant denominations.

Once more, shooting was the most frequent technique of accomplishing the crime, but there was one homicide by poisoning and one by use of an automobile.

Only half of these patients were sent to the hospital before trial, but in our review of the records we believe that 80 per cent had shown almost unequivocal evidences of mental unsoundness at the time of the crime. This is suggestively validated by the fact that of the five convicted and sent to prison, three were committed to the hospital as insane in less than a year after the trial, and only two remained in prison for three years or longer before hospitalization.

Of this group only one remains in the hospital. One has died, three were returned to prison to continue sentence, two were returned for trial, and three were discharged from the hospital into their own custody after dismissal of the charges and improvement in their mental condition. None of those discharged has been readmitted to date.

DISCUSSION

What we suspect to be the popular conception of the "insane murderer" as a person who suddenly runs amuck and strikes down an unknown and unprovocative bystander is not supported by our study. It is frequently noted in the literature that the murderer's victim is seldom an "innocent participant" in his own demise. This observation seems to us to be as valid for our group, in which the murderer was adjudicated of unsound mind, as it is for the instances where the murderer was not considered insane. Thus, in our 57 cases charged with first degree homicide, the victim was previously known to the patient in 39 cases; in 12 cases accused of second degree murder, the victim was known to the patient in 9 cases; and in 10 cases accused of manslaughter, the victim was previously known in 7 cases. Even in many situations where the victim was previously unknown, his death occurred by ill chance, as, for example, the circumstance of a husband returning home, finding his wife in bed with a stranger, and killing both.

Parenthetically, none of these cases illustrates the conception of the "homicidal sex maniac." We readily concede that there are instances of "berserk insane murderers" and "insane sex killers," but these cases are extremely rare exceptions in our experience.

In connection with another popular conception, there was little evidence in our entire group that alcoholic inebriation directly precipitated the crime of homicide. In fact, the percentage of those even with a history of excessive use of alcohol, though fairly high, is not significantly different from that of the general hospital population.

Preponderantly, the patients under study had made only a marginal or dependent economic adjustment. This is in contrast to some reports about murderers in general.

Among our 81 patients, there were two who did not fit into any category, inasmuch as they had killed a nurse or physician in another mental hospital and were transferred to Saint Elizabeths Hospital without charges.

Approximately 70 per cent of the victims were of the same sex as their murderer. Therefore, males were predominantly the murderers and the victims.

Again in contrast to what we believe to be the popular notion, the "insane murderer" does not execute his crime with a more conspicuous lack of planning, motivation, or rationale than the murderer whose mental faculties are not in question. For example:

CASE 1

A 38-year-old colored male was described as timid, shy, and seclusive. His behavior was always exemplary and he had never been arrested except for a traffic violation. Drafted into the Army in 1941, he became tense and emotionally upset while in England in 1943 and was discharged for disability. Hospitalized in a Veterans Administration Hospital, he was signed out by his mother against advice.

For some time prior to admission he was noted to be increasingly sullen and suspicious, seemed unable to hold a job, and complained about the "delicacy" of his health. Following his mother's death he began to brood and expressed feelings of hopelessness. He moved into the home of his sister and brother-in-law, but lived on very poor terms with them. On one occasion the brother-in-law came home drunk and consumed some food the patient had placed in the icebox. An argument ensued, during which the brother-in-law behaved in a threatening fashion. The patient seized a .22 rifle and shot the brother-in-law five times, with fatal consequences. Immediately the patient became tense and agitated, repeating over and over "What have I done?" and proceeded to call the police and an ambulance.

In the hospital he initially made a fairly good adjustment but gradually showed more severe impairment, with the development of marked aggressiveness, alternating with states of seclusiveness and untidiness. After a few years he began to dress consistently in a bizarre fashion and kept his ears constantly stuffed with paper in an effort to prevent auditory hallucinations which had not been obviously manifest on admission.

Even in instances of what were apparently completely "senseless, insane crimes," there was often more than a thread of emotional continuity. For example:

CASE 2

A 32-year-old white male seemed to become progressively upset in anticipation of his appearance before his draft board. Three months prior to the crime he began to exhibit "antiwar religious fanatacism." On the day before he was scheduled to report before his draft board he was noted by his sister to be praying, reiterating constantly "Thou shalt not kill!"

While his sister was writing a letter she looked up suddenly and noticed that the patient had a knife poised above her head. She screamed and jumped up with such force that she tore the arm from the chair, and the patient was shoved backward. The noise awakened her husband, who grappled with the patient. After inflicting several wounds on the brother-in-law, the patient broke away, chased one of the children, who managed to elude him, and then dashed out into the street and fatally stabbed an innocent passerby. He was chopping senselessly at the top of an auto with his knife when he was finally subdued with great difficulty by an auxiliary policeman.

In the hospital he was resistive, negativistic, inaccessible, incontinent in his habits, and made repeated attempts to choke other patients. There has been a progressive increase in severity of his illness to the point of complete disorganization of behavior and mentation.

There were only five patients who had committed apparently senseless crimes. Much more common was the following:

CASE 3

A 34-year-old white male college graduate of comfortable economic status was accused of the murder of his four-year-old daughter. For some months prior to the tragedy he had been depressed and contemplating suicide. With increase in severity of his illness, he became hopeless about the future and began to worry that his illness had "contaminated" his wife and daughter.

Despite his complete obsession with this delusional belief, he evidenced careful planning in inviting them for a drive through scenic mountain country with intention of killing them and himself. When he stopped the car to permit his family to enjoy the view, he came up behind his wife and daughter with a hammer, beating them with it until the handle broke, and then struck them repeatedly with a car jack handle. When they were both unconscious, he dragged them back into the car, got in and drove off the cliff. When he regained consciousness in the wreck, he realized he had not been killed, kicked a window out of the car, took a piece of glass and cut his throat and wrist and the throats of his wife and child. When he still survived, he found a broken bottle which he also used to cut himself. When found by policemen from a state patrol car, he was attempting to set fire to the upholstery with a cigarette. Amazingly, he and his wife survived.

In the hospital he was at first quite depressed and retarded, but under treatment improved considerably and remained in good contact at all times.

In second degree murder one would, by definition, commonly expect the exhibition of marked impulsivity with evidence of great emotional turmoil and obvious mental distress as factors mitigating the degree of the crime. Yet only half of the cases in this group were considered a priori as mentally ill and sent to the hospital before trial, as compared to approximately 75 per cent in the group accused of first degree murder, the prototype of a crime involving *mens rea*. Further, although we believe that there was fairly clear clinical evidence of mental unsoundness at the time of the crime in 80 per cent of the patients accused of first degree murder, we found such evidence in only a third of the records of patients sent to the hospital in the category of second degree murder. However, where mental illness was present in this group, the crime tended to be more obviously bizarre or irrational than homicides in the other groups. For example:

CASE 4

A 25-year-old Catholic female with a sixth-grade education was accused of killing her year-old daughter. Following the birth of her second child, she had become nervous and easily upset by the infant's crying. On the day of the homicide, she impulsively seized the infant, took her into the bathroom, and there repeatedly cut her throat with a knife. Upon psychiatric examination she was confused, depressed, and disoriented. The patient had had no record of any previous mental illness or any antisocial behavior.

An even more bizarre crime was the following:

CASE 5

A 25-year-old Negro male was riding in a streetcar when one of the passengers stepped on his foot. An altercation ensued which was terminated when the patient pulled a pistol out of a small bag that he was carrying, and shot and killed the other passenger. He then calmly left the streetcar, and was not arrested until a month later. He was released on bond, and, without knowledge of the authorities, went to a Veterans Hospital in another jurisdiction, where he received electric shock therapy. He was eventually identified and sent to Saint Elizabeths Hospital.

In the group of patients accused of manslaughter, a substantially larger number were obviously of unsound mind at the time of the crime. This is consonant with the statistical finding of higher modal age and the preponderance of organic brain disease. In most instances the homicide was the result of mental confusion or defects in judgment. For example:

CASE 6

A 42-year-old white male became confused while driving his car, and, in attempting to pass a streetcar on the wrong side, he ran down and killed a prominent

banker. Upon examination he was discovered to have syphilis of the nervous system. Previous to the crime there was no record of hospitalization or antisocial behavior. The charges against him were dismissed. After intensive treatment for his syphilitic infection, he improved greatly and was discharged as a social recovery.

CASE 7

A 65-year-old white male, who had been making a marginal adjustment as a street vendor, was employed by a housewife to install a gas pipe. He was not aware of a defect in the pipe or a regulation requiring such installation to be made by the gas company. With the leakage of gas, the woman died of asphyxiation and her husband was rendered unconscious. On examination the patient was found to be suffering from marked confusion and clouding of consciousness, the result of advanced cerebral arteriosclerosis.

It is our clinical impression that mentally ill people who have committed violent and serious offenses against society are not a group apart from other mentally ill persons who have not translated their emotional conflicts into overt assaults upon others. The psychotic patients who have committed a homicide run the gamut of psychiatric disorders, and as a continuum are not clinically distinct from psychiatric patients in general. Some mentally ill patients who exhibit the most acutely disturbed and destructive behavior have never demonstrated sufficiently directed and organized aggression to kill another, while others who are quite meek and inoffensive have on occasion killed suddenly.

Further, it is our experience that the psychotic murderer responds to the same methods of care and treatment as other mental hospital patients. Maximum security and other extraordinary precautions need to be determined for each patient individually, and not on the arbitrary basis that he has been accused of a crime. One of us in a pilot study of several years' duration [2] has demonstrated that many of the security measures previously deemed so necessary for patients of this category have been based largely on preconceptions of physicians and hospital staff rather than on actual experiences with patients.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In the period July 1, 1925 to July 1, 1951, there were 32,295 persons admitted to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, of whom only 81 had been accused of some variety of homicide. These latter cases were studied on a statistical and descriptive level.

2. Homicide is an infrequent consequence of mental disorder. However, many mentally ill people may commit serious assaults and fail to kill only by chance or through inadequate design, itself also the result of the mental illness.

3. Because of the limited number of cases, few sweeping conclusions can be drawn as to the importance of such factors as educational attainment or economic or marital status. Interestingly, however, all those who were widowed achieved this status by their own hand.

4. Only 15 patients had a history of previous hospitalization for mental illness. Careful study of these case records indicated little that would have been useful, in the present status of our knowledge, for accurate prediction of the subsequent homicide, when they were compared with the unselected records of thousands of other mentally ill patients, except by *post hoc* reasoning. Similarly, the record of antisocial behavior was not considered of substantial value in predicting the specific crime. None of the patients had committed a previous murder, and only a small number had records of major offenses.

5. Alcoholic inebriation was not indicated as an immediate precipitant of the crime in any instance, and the frequency of a history of excessive intake of alcohol was not significantly different in these patients from that found in other mental patients or in the general population.

6. Most of the patients accused of first and second degree homicide were afflicted with one of the functional mental disorders, predominantly schizophrenia. In contrast, most of the patients accused of manslaughter were afflicted with an organic type of psychosis, and were, by and large, much older at the time of the crime than were the other patients.

7. Statistics as to the disposition of the mentally ill patient accused of homicide can be better understood from a study of the attitudes of the psychiatrist, or the community in which he lives, than from an objective evaluation of the patient distinguished as a distinct clinical psychiatric entity primarily on the basis of his having committed a homicide.

8. If there exists a popular conception of the "insane" murderer as a person who suddenly runs amuck and strikes down a perfect stranger, it is not confirmed by our studies. Such cases do occur, but they are extremely rare, as is also the frequency of the "maniacal sex killer" as conceived in the popular press.

9. Mentally ill people who commit a homicide do not constitute a psychiatric entity as distinct from other mentally disordered patients, and they respond in the same way and in the same degree to the identical methods of care found useful with mentally ill patients in general. Special precautions as to security and management, when indicated, must be individually prescribed for each mentally ill person, and cannot be arbitrarily decided on the basis of the previous occurrence of a homicidal transgression. That special precautions are frequently arbitrarily prescribed is, in our experience, more often than not the result of preconceptions entertained by the psychiatrist, or of social pressures, expressed, implied, or assumed.

[2] B. A. Cruvant, "Maximum Security and the Therapeutic Milieu," *Mental Hospitals*, June 1952.

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Why Is the Death Penalty Retained?

By ROBERT G. CALDWELL

THE arguments for and against the death penalty have been analyzed, dissected, lacerated, mangled, and pulverized, in legislative halls, forums, churches, classrooms, newspapers, journals, and pamphlets, by lawmakers, orators, clergymen, lecturers, journalists, pamphleteers, and schoolboy debaters. It seems that everything that can be done to these arguments by all kinds of people in all kinds of places has already been done; and yet the controversy goes on, now and then bursting into flames as prison riots and heinous crimes deeply shock public opinion and provoke indignant protests and clamorous demands for action. In the face of this, we must conclude that the controversy has many more sides than it appears to have at first glance, and that many who have engaged in it have tended to give simple answers to problems that are very complex.

In our discussion of the death penalty it will be helpful to remember that both crime and punishment are functionally related to the culture in which they occur. That crime is so related and that it varies in kind and incidence from society to society is usually recognized; but that punishment likewise has such a relationship and that the efficacy of its methods is affected by what the people in a particular society feel, want, and believe is sometimes overlooked. We shall therefore seek to conduct this analysis with reference to the following important tendencies that exist in various degrees in many countries of Europe and the Western Hemisphere: (1) the spread of humanitarianism with its emphasis on the value of the individual, the protection of human life, and the reduction of human pain and suffering; (2) the increase of the impersonality of social relationships; and (3) the growth of the belief in the powers of science.

Capital punishment is a subject on which many people are likely to have very decided opinions, and both opponents and advocates are inclined to express their views in vigorous and emotional language. However, despite this, some arguments susceptible of analysis are used to defend capital punishment, and to these we shall now turn our attention.

THE ARGUMENT OF RETRIBUTION

An argument which is persistently advanced in support of the death penalty is that the criminal ought to die because he has committed a terrible crime and perhaps killed or seriously injured someone else. If this is not done, say those who employ this argument, friends and relatives of the victim, as well as the general public, who demand and expect satisfaction, may take the law into their own hands and try to lynch the criminal.

It is recognized that the desire to "get even" is a natural human tendency and that it exists in almost everyone, but we must inquire about the extent to which this feeling should influence our actions against the criminal. Should we be satisfied with a mere execution? Why not torture the criminal first—put out his eyes, cut out his tongue, beat him into insensibility and then revive him so that at last he will know the agony of being flayed alive and boiled in oil? If it is pain that is wanted,

why should we not make sure that we get as much as possible?

Now as a matter of fact, in harmony with the humanitarian movement, the tendency has been to make the method of execution as swift and painless as possible. Thus, in the United States by the beginning of 1951, the District of Columbia and twenty-four of the forty-two states which used the death penalty had adopted electrocution. Eight other states had provided for execution by lethal gas, and in one of the ten states where hanging was still used, the convicted person was permitted to choose shooting instead of hanging.[1] The trend away from hanging, which we see here, is due largely to evidence that it may cause a slow and painful death.

But, an advocate of the death penalty may insist, the punishment must be made to fit the crime. Well, if this be true, which crimes should be punishable with death? Should an offender who is convicted of armed robbery be so punished? Apparently only a few of the states in the United States believe so. Indeed, in 1950 only eighteen states prescribed the death penalty for so revolting a crime as rape, and only in the case of first degree murder do we find the death penalty prescribed by all states that have capital punishment. Furthermore, of the 42 states whose laws provide for the execution of criminals, 20 prescribe it for only one or two crimes, 29 for only one, two, or three crimes, and only 1 for as many as seven crimes.[2]

Thus, it can be seen that the argument for retribution in defense of the death penalty is not strongly supported in practice in the United States. In fact, it seems to be of declining influence not only in the United States but throughout western civilization.[3] However, this does not necessarily mean that public opinion no longer wants to keep the death penalty in the criminal code. On the contrary, the public strongly supports its retention in some countries. For example, this is apparently true in both Great Britain and the United States, where all but six states still use it.

Lynching and other considerations

But do the facts support the contention that if certain types of offenders are not executed, people will take the law into their own hands and lynchings will result? Although the experience of Colorado, where lynchings increased after the abolition of the death penalty and then decreased after it was restored, has been cited to substantiate this view, it is probable that the increase of lynchings there was a mere coincidence, and that the presence or absence of capital punishment had nothing to do with it. Certainly, none of the other states had a reign of lynch law after the death penalty was abolished,[4] and the number of lynchings actually decreased in Washington, Oregon, North Dakota, and Arizona after the death penalty was removed from their codes. Besides, in general, lynchings have been most frequent in the states which have continued to execute criminals.[5] It appears, therefore, that lynchings are correlated with factors other than the death penalty, and that, furthermore, since they now occur so seldom, they no longer constitute a serious problem. Thus, the possibility of lynchings need not be considered as an obstacle to the abolition of capital punishment.

Finally, it should be obvious that the demand for retribution cannot be permitted to control the policy of the state in its treatment of criminals, for this would tend to encourage and strengthen the very motives that might destroy all collective action. Of course, the injury to the victim of the crime and the interests and desires of the public must be considered, but so must the causes of criminality and the rehabilitation of prisoners; and since the abolition of the death penalty does not mean that the offender escapes all pain, any desire that the victim, or his friends and relatives, and the general public have for the suffering of the offender can be taken into consideration even if the criminal is not executed.

THE ARGUMENT OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

Another argument in favor of the death penalty is that an execution constitutes a spectacular exhibition of law and order which helps to unify society against crime and criminals. By providing a symbol around which law-abiding citizens can rally, the infliction of the death penalty, it is claimed, gives them renewed strength and courage to carry on the fight against crime and to furnish greater support to law enforcement officials.

Even if we grant, for the moment, that an execution does accomplish this, we may inquire whether there are not better methods of increasing social solidarity. War also helps to unify a people, but there are few who will advocate plunging a nation into war to achieve this purpose. Opponents of the death penalty may well ask, Wouldn't it be better to increase social and economic opportunities for all persons so that greater loyalty and respect might be fostered for the established standards? Furthermore, it can be seriously questioned whether executions unify society against crime and criminals. Executions are closed to the public, and no special effort is made to give them publicity. Then, too, since there is an increasing impersonality in western civilization, particularly in the United States, even serious crimes often attract little attention, and directly affect or injure only a few people. Under such circumstances, an execution can hardly be expected to exert a major influence in modern society.

And here another point may be raised. The humanitarian movement has made many conscious of the suffering of their fellow human beings and filled some with an earnest desire to reduce pain and suffering everywhere. Is it not possible, therefore, that among those who are aware that a criminal has been sentenced to death, there will be a tendency to reduce rather than solidify opinion against the condemned prisoner? May this not cause many, who would otherwise be strongly in favor of the criminal's punishment, to rush to his defense? Does an execution thus actually divide rather than unify the law-abiding members of society?

THE ARGUMENT OF ECONOMY

Some who favor the death penalty claim that it is cheaper than the cost of maintaining a prisoner for life, or for a long period of time, at the taxpayers' expense. Even though this can be shown to be true in some cases, the argument should be carefully examined. One may ask, for example, whether it is not more of an argument against the

[1] From *National Prisoner Statistics*, Federal Bureau of Prisons, April 1952 release.

[2] Harry Elmer Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 353.

[3] Lee Emerson Deets, "Changes in Capital Punishment Policy Since 1939," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, March–April 1948, pp. 584–94.

[4] Raymond T. Bye, *Capital Punishment in the United States* (Philadelphia: The Committee on Philanthropic Labor of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends, 1919), p. 66.

[5] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947), pp. 567, 568.

poor management of our correctional institutions than against the abolition of the death penalty. Might it not be possible, at least in many cases, to modify our correctional policies in such a way that if a person were imprisoned instead of being executed, he could not only pay for his maintenance, but actually contribute to the support of his dependents and, if necessary, make payments to the victim of his crime or to the relatives of the victim?

Furthermore, how far should this argument be pressed? If it is valid in the case of those who now may be condemned to die, may it not also be applied to all prisoners—yes, even to all types of persons who are being maintained at public expense in our federal and state institutions? At the close of 1950 there were 167,173 in state and federal prisons and reformatories for adult offenders.[6] Thousands of these prisoners undoubtedly were not self-supporting, and therefore, on the basis of the economy argument, might have been selected for execution. Obviously, the possibility of such executions cannot be seriously considered. The humanitarian feelings of our country would be outraged, and public opinion would shrink in revulsion from the procedure.

Then, too, there is still another side of this argument that should be scrutinized. Is it really cheaper in most cases to execute the prisoner than to imprison him? In the first place, it must be recognized that although a prisoner may not be self-supporting, he can usually contribute something to his upkeep. And in the second place, it should not be assumed that the process in sending a man to his death is inexpensive. When the penalty may be death, the legal battle is often fierce and prolonged as each side struggles for an advantage. Much time and money may be spent in the selection of jurors acceptable to both sides, in the employment of experts and witnesses, and in the successive new trials and appeals that may ensue. Add to this the cost of constructing, maintaining, and staffing a suitable place of detention for those awaiting execution, and it can be seen that the cost of inflicting capital punishment may be very great—greater, in fact, than it may be to keep a person in prison "for the remainder of his natural life." [7]

Thus, an examination of the argument of economy causes much of its effectiveness to vanish, and one is left with the conviction that it cannot be given a great deal of weight in the controversy over the death penalty.

THE ARGUMENT OF PROTECTION

A fourth argument for the death penalty is that it protects society from dangerous criminals. This it accomplishes, according to those who reason in this way, by ensuring that they will never return to society to commit other crimes and to spread their undesirable hereditary traits. This is a complex argument and requires careful analysis. However, at the very beginning, we must admit that a state has the right to take the life of a criminal who threatens its security from within, just as it has the right to send its soldiers to their death in battle in order to defeat those who threaten its security from without. But we must also point to various reasons which compel us to ask whether the state should exercise this right to execute prisoners.

For example, it is clear that the possibility of releasing dangerous prisoners into the community could be reduced by improving the rehabilitative facilities of our correctional institutions and by strengthening our pardon and parole procedures. An execution, it is true, absolutely eliminates this possibility; but since it is to be prescribed as punishment for a crime, one can hardly maintain that in a given case it should be used not so much because a certain offense has been committed but because we are too lenient and inefficient in the operation of our correctional systems. To do so would appear to place one in the position of arguing that all persons who have recidivistic tendencies, regardless of the crimes that they have committed, should be executed. Such drastic action, of course, would not be tolerated by public opinion. Moreover, on the basis of our present knowledge, we cannot be sure that a person is incorrigible. Many persons who might have been executed for their crimes, but instead have been imprisoned, not only have caused little trouble while incarcerated, but have become law-abiding citizens after their release.

The late Warden Lawes, writing in opposition to the death penalty, stated:

> Murderers make the best prisoners. They are least troublesome to any warden, and often they accomplish a great deal behind bars. I know of none released during my wardenship at Sing Sing who reverted to crime. Furthermore, it is not true—at least in New York State—that a murderer whose death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment can easily obtain his freedom. The average period of incarceration among those who receive the second commutation is about twenty years. Granted that other states are too lenient, that would be an argument for a better administration of justice, not for putting people to death. Furthermore, if some murderers (the accidental types, particularly) gain their freedom, after competent officials are certain that they will never again menace the community, certainly that is far more sensible than keeping them behind bars.[8]

The eugenic aspect

Now let us look at the part of this argument which claims that capital punishment exerts a eugenic influence. Unquestionably, many of the criminals who commit capital crimes have mental or physical defects; but, it should be added, so have many prisoners who have been convicted of crimes that are not capital. Besides, it is one thing to say this, but quite another to say that such defects are the cause of criminal activities. Sometimes physical and mental defects do contribute to crime, but on the other hand, many persons who have them never come into conflict with the law at all. The fact is that crime is a very complex phenomenon, and is produced in the individual by the interaction of many factors as he seeks adjustment with his environment. Further complicating this situation is the fact that although heredity may cause a certain type of defect in one individual, environment may cause the same type of defect in another; and at the present time, science in many cases cannot determine which caused the defect.

Moreover, since many persons who are apparently normal may carry recessive defective genes, and consequently may have defective children, it is clear that even if all persons who have hereditary physical and mental defects could be identified and were killed, the next generation would produce a whole new group of defective individuals. And here we are assuming that public opinion would sanction the killing of all such defective persons, regardless of whether they have been convicted of capital crimes or not—indeed, regard-

[6] From *National Prisoner Statistics*, Federal Bureau of Prisons, November 1951 release.

[7] See Frank E. Hartung, "On Capital Punishment" (an unpublished mimeographed monograph, Wayne University, 1951), pp. 33–36.

[8] Lewis E. Lawes, "Capital Punishment," *Encylopedia of Criminology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 44.

less of whether they have been convicted of any crime or not. This, it is clear, public opinion is not prepared to do.

However, if a program of eugenic executions were instituted, the overwhelming complexity of the problem would provoke a public demand for nothing less than a very carefully planned and administered series of examinations based on the best knowledge that science can provide. And here one should not overlook the possibility of using sterilization as a substitute for execution in many cases, since sterilization would be just as effective as death in preventing procreation.

Our system does not protect

But it is obvious that we are not condemning prisoners to death on the basis of their hereditary traits. Our courts, of course, are neither designed nor equipped to do this. In fact, they are not condemning many prisoners of any kind to death. The available records indicate that in the United States we are executing only a small percentage of the persons who have committed capital crimes. For example, although it is estimated that in 1949 there were 6,990 cases of murder and non-negligent manslaughter and 16,380 cases of rape in the United States,[9] in that year we executed a total of only 119, of which 107 were for murder and 10 for rape, and in the following year a total of only 82, of which 68 were for murder and 13 for rape.[10] In view of this, we can hardly say that our system of criminal law is contributing in a significant way to the elimination of the "undesirable" or the "dangerous" from our society.

Furthermore, the death penalty may not be imposed equitably upon all offenders. The man of wealth, education, and position can secure able attorneys and use every legal device and technicality for delays and mitigation of penalties, while the poor, the illiterate, and the friendless can avail themselves of no such resources, and so suffer from greater exposure to the death penalty. Thus, factors other than those which make prisoners a threat to society may determine whether or not they are executed.

There is always present, also, the possibility that an innocent man may be sent to his death.[11] Mistaken identification, perjured testimony, fallibility of the senses, lapses of memory, errors in judgment, undiscovered evidence, public clamor for a conviction, inordinate zeal on the part of investigators and prosecutors—all these and many other factors contribute to the miscarrage of justice. And yet the death penalty is irrevocable. How can a life once taken be returned? How can the relatives of an innocent man be recompensed? How can the public's faith in justice be restored? Even though it can be shown that the execution of an innocent man rarely occurs, the very possibility, when measured by the humanitarian standards of western civilization, compels us to consider it in an evaluation of our use of the death penalty.

THE ARGUMENT OF DETERRENCE

The most frequently advanced and widely accepted argument in favor of the death penalty is that the threat of its infliction deters people from committing capital offenses. In analyzing this argument, we must admit at the outset that human behavior can be influenced through fear, and that since man tends to fear death, it is possible to use capital punishment as a deterrent. We must admit, also, that many who have had contact with convicted criminals have testified that almost all of them fear the death penalty. Virtually every trial involving a capital offense becomes a desperate struggle to avoid this punishment, and petitioners continually urge governors to reprieve condemned prisoners.

But the real question is whether individuals think of the death penalty *before* they act, and whether they are thereby deterred from committing crimes. If for the moment we assume that the death penalty does this to some extent, we must also grant that certain human traits limit its effectiveness as a deterrent. Man tends to be a creature of habit and emotion, and when he is handicapped by poverty, ignorance, and malnutrition, as criminals often are, he becomes notoriously shortsighted. Many violators of the law give little thought to the possibility of detection and apprehension, and often they do not even consider the penalty. As a matter of fact, it appears that most people do not regulate their lives in terms of the pleasure and pain that may result from their acts, and obviously, the mentally deranged, the mentally deficient, and those who commit crimes in the heat of passion are not in any significant way influenced by thoughts of the future.

Human nature, moreover, is very complex. A criminal may fear punishment, but he may fear the anger and contempt of his companions or his family even more, and the fear of economic insecurity or exclusion from the group whose respect he cherishes may drive him to commit the most daring crimes. Besides, fear is not the only emotion that motivates man. Love, loyalty, ambition, greed, lust, anger, and resentment may steel him to face even death in the perpetration of crime, and impel him to devise the most ingenious methods to get what he wants and to avoid detection.[12]

However, if the death penalty were surely, quickly, uniformly, publicly, and painfully inflicted, it undoubtedly would prevent many capital offenses that are being committed by those who do consider the punishment that they may receive for their crimes. But this is precisely the point. Certainly, the way in which the death penalty is being administered in the United States is not fitted to produce this result.

Factors hindering deterrence

In the first place, in addition to the uncertainty of detection and apprehension, long delays often occur in court procedures as each side, spurred on by the fact that a human life is at stake, furiously fights for victory. It is also true that when the penalty may be death, some juries are not inclined to convict, and some witnesses are not willing to testify. Furthermore, there has been a tendency to give the jury or the court, or both, the power to decide whether the prisoner should receive the death punishment or a lesser penalty. In fact, at present only one state—Vermont—makes the death penalty mandatory by law, and then only in the case of first degree murder.[13] Moreover, comparatively few criminals are exe-

[9] *Uniform Crime Reports, Annual Bulletin*, 1950, p. 74.

[10] From *National Prisoner Statistics*, Federal Bureau of Prisons, April 1952 release.

[11] See, for example, Edwin M. Borchard, *Convicting the Innocent* (Garden City, N. Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., 1932); Raymond T. Bye, *Capital Punishment in the United States* (Philadelphia: The Committee on Philanthropic Labor of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends, 1919), pp. 74–93; Julia E. Johnson (Ed.), *Capital Punishment* (Julia E. Johnson, Compiler, New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1939), pp. 38–44, 111–19.

[12] Robert G. Caldwell, *Red Hannah* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947), p. 92.

[13] Until 1950 there were five states with a mandatory death penalty.

cuted each year in the United States. The greatest number of executions for any one year in the United States during the period 1930 to 1950 inclusive was 199, in 1935, and the smallest number was only 82, in 1950.[14]

Thus, it can be seen that today the infliction of the death penalty is not an important method of punishing criminals in our country. Besides, as we have already pointed out, the executions that do take place are closed to the public, and the tendency has been to make them as swift and painless as possible.[15]

And yet, if we know how to make the death penalty more effective as a deterrent, why do we not take the necessary steps to do this? Indeed, if this is all that is needed, why do we not increase the number of capital offenses? The reasons are to be found in the complexity of our society, which makes quick action in the detection, apprehension, and conviction of criminals impossible, and in the fact that our society is less inclined than ever before to support a program of severe punishment. Our impersonal social relationships do not demand such a program. Our scientific attitude cannot sanction it. Our humanitarianism will not tolerate it. In other words, as Professor Sellin has concluded: "*The death penalty probably can never be made a deterrent. Its very life seems to depend on its rarity and, therefore, on its ineffectiveness as a deterrent.*" [16]

But do the facts substantiate the line of reasoning that has led us to the conclusion that the death penalty as it is administered in the United States is not an effective deterrent? Although the results of the best statistical studies are not entirely conclusive, they do indicate that capital punishment in our country does not have any significant effect on the frequency of crimes punishable with death. Similar studies conducted throughout western civilization point to the same conclusion regarding other countries.[17] Since the problem of deterrence will be given special treatment elsewhere in this issue of THE ANNALS, an analysis of these studies will not be presented here.

CONCLUSION

Punishment is an art which involves a balancing of reformation, deterrence, and retribution in terms of not only the court and the offender, but also the values of the society in which it takes place; and in the balancing of reformation, deterrence, and retribution, first one and then another of these receives emphasis as the accompanying conditions change. It is clear, therefore, that a form of punishment which is suitable today may have been unsuitable in the past and may become unsuitable in the future. In the United States, with its humanitarianism, increasing impersonality in social relationships, and growing belief in the powers of science, the death penalty has become an unacceptable and ineffective method of punishment and has been largely replaced with imprisonment, in which the emphasis is being put more and more upon a scientific program of rehabilitation.

But more important than this, there is a growing recognition that it is the desire to find love, respect, and security among relatives, friends, and business associates, rather than the fear of legal penalties, that keeps the majority of persons from violating the law. This is the principal form of social control, and it will always exist, regardless of what methods are used in dealing with criminals.

[14] From *National Prisoner Statistics*, Federal Bureau of Prisons, April 1952 release.

[15] Fred E. Haynes, *Criminology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1935), p. 216; Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947), p. 561.

[16] Thorsten Sellin, "Common Sense and the Death Penalty," *The Prison Journal*, Volume XII, No. 4 (October 1932), p. 12.

[17] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947), pp. 563–66.

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The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty*

By Karl F. Schuessler

THIS article analyzes certain statistical material as it bears on the question of how much the death penalty deters people from committing murder. This material, consisting principally of United States homicide and execution data for the period 1925–49, has been organized around six topics expressed for the most part as questions: (1) the adequacy of United States statistics for purposes of measuring the deterrent influence of the death penalty; (2) the deterrence viewpoint as an explanation of murder and punishment trends in this country during the last twenty-five years; (3) whether fewer murders occur in places where murder is punishable by death than in places where it is not; (4) whether differences in the use of the death penalty correspond to differences in the relative occurrence of murder; (5) the consistency between the deterrence viewpoint and differentials in the murder rate by sex, race, and other population classifications; and (6) a general appraisal of the deterrent value of the death penalty.

This analysis in a sense represents a continuation of similar work done intermittently in this country during the last thirty-five years.[1] These previous studies have uniformly concluded that the death penalty is inconsequential as a deterrent and that the relative frequency of murder in a given population is a function of the cultural conditions under which the group lives. Deficiencies in United States data that handicapped earlier investigations of this kind have been remedied somewhat during the last twenty years, but many difficulties still face the analyst who wishes to generalize about murder and the death penalty. Before going to the data and their interpretation, the belief in the death penalty as a deterrent is briefly set forth.

The Deterrence Viewpoint

In brief, people are believed to refrain from crime because they fear punishment. Since people fear death more than anything else, the death penalty is the most effective deterrent, so runs the argument. It is further alleged that the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent depends both on its certain application and on knowledge of this fact in the population; hence, the argument continues, regular use of the death penalty increases its deterrent value. It was largely on grounds of this sort that the death penalty was recently (1950) restored in New Zealand after a ten-

* This paper was aided immensely by Professor Thorsten Sellin who made available to the author his extensive *Memorandum on Capital Punishment* prepared in 1950 for the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. The author is also indebted to Professor Clifford Kirkpatrick who read this paper critically but who is, of course, in no way responsible for its contents, and also to Mrs. Vada Gary who assisted with the statistical work.

[1] See, for example, Raymond T. Bye, *Capital Punishment in the United States*, Philadelphia: Committee on Philanthropic Labor of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends, 1919; Edwin H. Sutherland, "Murder and the Death Penalty," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 15, 1925, pp. 522–29; Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Capital Punishment*, Philadelphia: Committee on Philanthropic Labor of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends, 1925; George B. Vold, "Can the Death Penalty Prevent Crime?" *Prison Journal*, October 1932, pp. 3–8.

year period of abolition, demonstrating that the deterrence line of reasoning still has considerable practical force.

Involved in the deterrence argument is the assumption that men deliberately choose among rival courses of action in the light of foreseeable consequences, the criterion of choice being personal gratification. This psychological hedonism, needless to say, is not in accord with modern psychology and sociology, which see human behavior as largely unplanned and habitual, rather than calculated and voluntary. The belief in the deterrent value of the death penalty is thus seen not as a scientific proposition, but rather as a social conviction widely used to justify and reinforce existing ways of treatment that perhaps rest mainly on feelings of vengeance. Consequently, this study does not constitute a test of a carefully drawn sociological hypothesis that intends to explain differences in the prevalence of murder among human societies, but rather assembles factual evidence to test the validity of a popular belief. We now return to the topics posed in the introduction to this article.

United States Homicide and Execution Data

The homicide statistics collected by the United States Census Bureau [2] are ordinarily used as an index of murder, figures on murder being generally inaccessible as well as fragmentary. The use of homicide statistics for purposes of estimating the deterrent influence of the death penalty has been criticized on the grounds that (*a*) they include justifiable and excusable homicides and (*b*) they do not distinguish among differing degrees of murder. The reasoning behind this criticism is that the proportion of nonfelonious homicide and the relative amount of different kinds of murder may vary in time and space in such a way as to make unreliable regional comparisons and time trends.

Over against these reasonable objections is the fact that the homicide rate closely corresponds, both geographically and temporally, to the murder figures given in *Uniform Crime Reports*,[3] which exclude nonfelonious homicide, though they include non-negligent manslaughter. Also, the homicide rate is closely correlated, on both a geographic and a temporal basis, with murder conviction rates given in *Judicial Criminal Statistics*, and with murder commitment rates based on information in *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories*.[4]

This consistency among four independent indexes of murder is probably due to the fact that the relative occurrence of different kinds of murder is similar among states and fairly constant during the last twenty-five years. If this interpretation is correct, then the homicide rate is a reliable index of murder in general and first degree murder in particular, during approximately the last twenty-five years.

National statistics on executions have been readily available in this country only since 1930, when they were reported in *Mortality Statistics* and also in *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories*. From the standpoint of measuring the temporal relation between execution and murder, these figures are of limited value be-

[2] *Mortality Statistics*, Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C. Also, *Special Reports*, National Office of Vital Statistics, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D. C.

[3] *Uniform Crime Reports*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

[4] Both publications issued by the Bureau of the Census. The results of this correlational analysis are omitted because of lack of space, except to say that the correlation coefficients were uniformly high ($r \geqq .8$).

cause they cover such a short period of time. The fact that executions-by-offense were not published for the period 1931–36 adds to this difficulty, although for certain states it may be safely assumed that all executions during that period were for murder.

Some material on murder convictions and death sentences is available in *Federal Judicial Statistics*. But for purposes of relating conviction and punishment trends to concurrent trends in murder, this source is limited as follows: (*a*) this series covers only a thirteen-year period, 1933–45; (*b*) the largest number of states reporting in any single year was thirty; (*c*) only eighteen states (including the District of Columbia) reported each year during the entire period; and (*d*) except for the first few years, the number of persons convicted of murder is not given, but rather the number of murder indictments resulting in conviction.

In spite of the forenamed shortcomings in murder statistics for the period 1925–49, they are probably more adequate than data hitherto employed as a check on the alleged deterrent influence of the death penalty. In consequence, conclusions based on this study are less vulnerable to the objection that murder data are so unreliable as to make worthless generalizations about the death penalty as a deterrent.

UNITED STATES HOMICIDE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TRENDS

The United States homicide rate moved steadily upward from 1900 until the middle of the thirties, dropped sharply during the next ten-year period, and then at the close of World War II started an upward swing. Although homicide statistics are not available for 1950 and 1951, national police statistics indicate that the upward trend was checked in 1951; in any case, the rate is still far below the high levels of the late 1920's and early thirties.

State trends in the period 1925–49 generally correspond to the national trend, although there are several exceptions, important from the standpoint of an explanation of murder. (1) Vermont exhibited an almost constant rate during this period. (2) By 1949, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina had returned to or exceeded the high level of the depression years. (3) Michigan, Nevada, and Florida started their downward trend before 1930. (4) At least one state—Connecticut—continued to climb until 1940. The homicide rate continued to exhibit large regional differences, the highest rates persisting in the South, the lowest in New England.

Also, the homicide rate continued to display large differentials by sex, race, ecological area, and season, the effect of each classification being conditioned to a certain extent by its relation to the others. These differentials suggest at once that murder is a complex sociological event rather than a simple response controlled altogether by the deterrent influence of the death penalty.

Two somewhat contradictory capital punishment trends in the United States characterize the period 1925–49. On the one hand, a trend to extend capital punishment, starting just after World War I, continued with the restoration of the death penalty in Kansas (1935) and South Dakota (1939). The move to re-establish capital punishment in Michigan in 1951 exemplifies the persistence of this trend. On the other hand, a tendency to make the death penalty permissive rather than mandatory on conviction of first degree murder continued. By 1951 the death penalty was mandatory in only one state, in contrast with 1924 when it was mandatory in eight states.

The speculation has been advanced that nowadays a smaller proportion of persons sentenced to death for murder are executed than formerly, the tendency to administer clemency being in line with a general trend to moderate punishment. This was not borne out by an analysis of available judicial and penal statistics, although this evidence is very scanty. Of those sentenced to death for murder in the courts of 25 states during the period 1933–39, 80 per cent were executed; during the period 1940–45, 81 per cent were executed—practically no change. The idea of a downward trend in the use of the death penalty is also opposed, though indirectly, by the fact that the decline in executions from 1930–39 to 1940–49 was roughly proportional to the drop in homicides. The number of executions for murder dropped from 1,507 in the period 1930–39 to 1,063 in the following decade, a 29 per cent drop, while homicides dropped from 107,514 to 78,443, a 27 per cent drop.

By way of summary, capital punishment policy and practice in this country was fairly stable in the period 1925–49; consequently, the movement of the homicide rate and differentials in the homicide rate by various population classifications cannot be attributed to changes in the use of the death penalty. This suggests once again that differences in the homicide rate correspond to differences in social structure and culture setting, and that murder and the death penalty are unrelated except in the circular sense that more murder involves more death penalties.

COMPARISON OF DEATH PENALTY AND ABOLITION STATES

A comparison of states that provide the death penalty for murder with those that do not shows the homicide rate to be two to three times as large in the former states as in the latter (Table 1). Such a comparison is usually declared invalid because the two groupings are not uniform with respect to population composition, social structure, and culture pattern. This criticism, though methodologically sound, affirms indirectly that the relative occurrence of murder is the result of a combination of social circumstances of which punishment is only one, possibly an immaterial one.

TABLE 1—HOMICIDE RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION IN DEATH PENALTY STATES AND ABOLITION STATES[a] FOR FIVE SELECTED YEARS

Year	Abolition States	Death Penalty States
1928	4.2	8.8
1933	3.7	10.5
1938	2.2	7.6
1943	2.1	5.5
1949	2.2	6.0

[a] These two groupings include all states in the national registration area in any given year. All states were in the registration area after 1932.

To meet the foregoing objection, the usual practice is to compare the homicide rate in states that have abolished the death penalty with their neighbors where the death penalty is legal. This comparison is illustrated in Table 2, and it will be seen that Rhode Island, an abolition state since 1852, is very similar to Connecticut, where the death penalty has been retained. Maine also, though not shown in the table, has been abolition since 1887, and is quite similar to the New England states which have the death penalty. The homicide rate in Michigan, where the death penalty was abolished in 1847 (except for treason), closely resembles Indiana and Illinois homicide rates, while Wisconsin, an abolition state for practically a hundred years, has a rate significantly below Michigan, indicating that the homicide rate is indifferent to the presence or

TABLE 2—ANNUAL AVERAGE HOMICIDE RATES IN FIFTEEN STATES SELECTED ACCORDING TO CONTIGUITY

State	1931–35	1936–40	1941–46
Rhode Island [a]	1.8	1.5	1.0
Connecticut	2.4	2.0	1.9
Michigan [a]	5.0	3.6	3.4
Indiana	6.2	4.3	3.2
Wisconsin [a]	2.4	1.7	1.5
Illinois	9.6	5.7	4.4
Minnesota [a]	3.1	1.7	1.6
Iowa	2.6	1.7	1.3
Kansas [b]	6.2	3.6	3.0
Colorado	7.5	5.5	3.7
Missouri	11.1	6.6	5.3
Nebraska	3.7	1.7	1.8
Oklahoma	11.0	7.2	5.6
Arizona	12.6	10.3	6.5
New Mexico	12.5	8.4	5.3

[a] Abolition state.
[b] Abolition between 1931 and 1935.

absence of capital punishment. Homicide rates in Minnesota, where the death penalty was abandoned in 1911, and in Iowa are very nearly alike with respect to both level and trend during the last twenty-five years. Similarly, homicide rates in Arizona and New Mexico, both death penalty states, have been practically identical both in level and movement during the period 1930–50, although Arizona executed 27 and New Mexico but 4 in this period.

Kansas and South Dakota are of special interest because they make possible a before-and-after comparison, though extremely limited in scope. Kansas abolished the death penalty in 1907 and re-established it in 1935. The annual average homicide rate in Kansas for the period 1931–35, as shown in Table 2, was considerably higher than the average rate for the following five-year period, giving plausibility to the deterrence argument. However, an identical trend characterized the states bordering on Kansas (Table 2), and these states had the death penalty throughout this period. The experience of Kansas, then, when viewed in context, merely emphasizes that homicide trends are the resultant of social conditions rather than the resultant of changes in death penalty policy.

This notion is borne out by a comparison of homicide trends in South Dakota, an abolition state between 1915 and 1939, and North Dakota, where the death penalty has not been in force since 1915. The annual average homicide rate in South Dakota dropped from 1.8 for the period 1930–39 to 1.5 for the following ten-year period, while in North Dakota the rate dropped from 1.8 to 1.1. If changes in the homicide rate were due solely to differences in capital punishment policy, then North Dakota's greater proportional drop in homicides must have been due to the fact that the death penalty was not restored.

EUROPEAN DATA

Since the middle of the last century there has been a sustained though uneven movement among European countries to abolish capital punishment by legal annulment or by allowing it to fall into disuse. Certain European statistics therefore bear on the question of whether the removal of the death penalty has a perceptible effect on the incidence of murder. Several examples [b] are cited primarily to illustrate the fact that the independence between the murder rate and the death penalty is not a peculiarity of American culture.

Sweden formally abolished the death penalty in 1921; but the last execution occurred in 1910, this being the only one since 1900. During the preceding period, 1869–1900, there were 12 executions, roughly averaging 4 per decade.

[b] Taken from Thorsten Sellin's *Memorandum on Capital Punishment*, London, 1951.

TABLE 3—ANNUAL AVERAGE HOMICIDE RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION OF SWEDEN FROM 1754 TO 1942

Period	Homicide Rate
1754–1763	.83
1775–1792	.66
1793–1806	.61
1809–1830	1.09[a]
1831–1845	1.47
1846–1860	1.24
1861–1877	1.12
1878–1898	.90
1899–1904	.96
1905–1913	.86
1914–1916	.72
1920–1932	.52
1933–1938	.46
1939–1942	.47

[a] Exclusive of 1814 and 1818.

There is nothing in the Swedish homicide series (Table 3) to suggest that its movement has in any way been conditioned by the abandonment of the death penalty during the twentieth century.

The death penalty in the Netherlands was not used after 1860 and was formally abolished in 1870. Although there was an upward trend (Table 4) in the murder and attempted murder conviction rate in the twenty-year period immediately following abolition, during this period the rate never attained the level of 1860–70 when the death penalty was still legally in force. The rate reached its lowest level in the 1920's when the death penalty was, of course, not in effect. Moreover, the decade immediately following abolition, 1870–79, was the lowest but one in the approximately eight-decade period covered by this series.

TABLE 4—ANNUAL AVERAGE MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION RATES PER MILLION INHABITANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS, 1850–1927

Period	Homicide Rate
1850–1859	.96
1860–1869	1.46
1871–1880	.83
1881–1890	1.17
1891–1900	1.41
1901–1910	1.25
1911–1920	1.32
1921–1927	.60

CERTAINTY AS A DETERRENT INFLUENCE

The point has often been made that it is not so much the legal existence of the death penalty that deters potential murderers, but rather the certainty of its being used. In fact, a common criticism of the death penalty is that juries do not convict readily if the punishment is death, thereby reducing the certainty of punishment, and, in consequence, its deterrent value. The problem as to whether differences in the use of the death penalty are in some way related to variations in the homicide rate may be approached by correlating execution and homicide data distributed geographically or temporally.

That the risk of execution is not uniform among the states that have a death penalty for murder is demonstrated by the lack of consistency between homicide and execution rates. The correlation coefficient of a homicide rate based on the period 1937–49 and an execution rate for the same period was .48 for 41 death penalty states.[6] The question therefore arises as to whether the relative occurrence of murder decreases regularly as the risk of execution increases, since, under deterrence theory, the value of the death penalty as a deterrent is thought to depend on its certain application.

To test this idea, though somewhat crudely, the risk of execution, opera-

[6] Includes states that had a death penalty for murder during the period 1937–49, except South Dakota where the death penalty was restored in 1939 and Idaho where no executions occurred during this period. The product-moment correlation method was used throughout this analysis, not because it necessarily gave the best fit in all cases, but rather because its limitations and signification are well known.

tionally defined as the number of executions-for-murder per 1,000 homicides for the period 1937–49, was statistically compared with the homicide rate in 41 death penalty states. The correlation between these two indices was −.26, indicating a slight tendency for the homicide rate to diminish as the probability of execution increases. Next, as a check on consistency in this trend, the ratio of the average execution rate to the average homicide rate was computed for four groupings of states according to size of the homicide rate, as shown in column 3 of Table 5. This

TABLE 5—AVERAGE HOMICIDE AND EXECUTION RATES IN 41 STATES GROUPED ACCORDING TO SIZE OF HOMICIDE RATE

Quartile by Homicide Rate	Average Homicide Rate (HR)	Average Execution Rate (ER)	$\frac{ER}{HR}$
Highest	15.4	.32	.21
Upper middle	7.8	.14	.18
Lower middle	4.2	.08	.19
Lowest	2.0	.05	.25

analysis shows that the homicide rate does not consistently fall as the risk of execution increases.

To illustrate: the average homicide rate for the ten states having the highest homicide rates is almost twice as large as the average homicide rate for the states in the next quartile, but the risk of execution is slightly greater in the former group of states than in the latter group. This evidence, included primarily because of its suggestiveness, must be classed as negative from the standpoint of deterrence theory, since (*a*) the homicide rate does not drop consistently as the certainty of the death penalty increases, and (*b*) the geographic correlation between the risk of execution and the homicide rate is not impressive, failing to reach the 5 per cent significance level and statistically accounting for only 7 per cent (r^2) of the variability in the homicide rate.

To investigate further how differences in the use of the death penalty affect the homicide rate, the relationship between homicide and execution data as time series was measured within certain death penalty states. States which displayed little variability in executions for murder from year to year were not included in this analysis; also, states not having execution-for-murder figures complete for the period 1930–49 were omitted. This left a total of eleven states. On the assumption, implicit in deterrence theory, that a large number of executions relative to the frequency of murder should be followed by a reduction in the murder rate, a one-year time lag was established, with the execution risk, defined as the number of executions-for-murder to 1,000 homicides per year, as the forerunner.

The most general finding is that the homicide rate and the execution risk as time series move independent of one another. None of the correlation coefficients reached .35, and the number of negative correlation coefficients, 4, was less than the number of positive coefficients, 7, but not significantly so. This evidence, like that just preceding, fails to substantiate the belief that the deterrent influence of the death penalty is enhanced by its frequent use, as changes in the homicide rate do not correspond in a systematic way to variations in the probability of its being used.

DIFFERENTIAL HOMICIDE RATES AND THE DEATH PENALTY

A final problem is whether the deterrence viewpoint is consistent with certain population classifications. First, the death penalty is hardly ever used with women in the United States, but women, in contrast with men, seldom commit murder. Very likely the conditions of life surrounding women in most human societies operate to develop and sustain lawful attitudes and habits. Lawfulness in the female population, specifically the fact that women generally refrain from committing murder, is probably due to these positive sociocultural influences rather than to fear of the death penalty.

Second, the number of Negro murderers is relatively larger than the number of white murderers; yet it is doubtful whether the death penalty is used less often with Negro murderers than with white murderers. Suggestive in this connection is the fact that white executions for murder, 166, were 1.1 per cent of all white homicides, 15,494, in the period 1946–49, while Negro executions for murder, 265, constituted 1.5 per cent of all Negro homicides, 18,327, during the same period. The environmental factors influencing Negroes are analogous but opposite to those influencing women. The circumstances of life surrounding large numbers of Negroes in the United States generate violence, assault, and murder,[7] and this kind of behavior, to a certain extent socially expected and socially sanctioned among Negroes, is indifferent to the use of the death penalty.

Finally, the homicide rate exhibits differentials by age, social class, ethnic background, community size, and season, but in no instance can these differences be ascribed to corresponding differences in the application of the death penalty.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results of the foregoing analysis are consistent with the results of previous investigations of this kind. The findings of this study, then, sustain the conclusion that the death penalty has little if anything to do with the relative occurrence of murder. Studies of this sort have been criticized on the ground that they do not *prove* that the death penalty is completely without deterrent value. Although logically sound in a very strict sense, this objection is unrealistic, since there is no way at present of contrasting personal and social situations so as to assure that all differences in murder behavior are due solely to differences in the use of the death penalty. As usual, inferences have to be based on evidence collected under conditions that most nearly approximate the methodological ideal. Moreover, the inference drawn from statistical data that the death penalty is inconsequential as a deterrent is borne out by case studies and expert opinion, material not surveyed in this paper but now briefly noted.

The alleged deterrent influence of the death penalty is contradicted by the following recurrent case study data, expressed as four rough generalizations: (1) In the events preceding murder, the murderer is usually preoccupied to the point that reflection over future consequences is virtually impossible. (2) The fear of death is relative to the situation; consequently, the death penalty may appear on reflection to be a necessary though unfortunate sequel to murder. (3) Certain cultural circumstances (underworld, marital, and others) often make murder imperative, thereby nullifying the supposed deterrent effect of the death penalty. (4) The relation between murderer and victim is usually primary, hence, one that is likely to be suffused with emotionality. This emotionality, probably heightened during a crisis, doubtless interferes with the objective assessment of future consequences. The indifference of the murderer to the death penalty is well illustrated by the following conversation between Lawes and a prisoner.

[7] Gunnar Myrdal, *The American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), pp. 558–60.

Before Morris Wasser's execution, when I told him that the governor had refused him a last-minute respite, he said bitterly: "All right, Warden. It doesn't make much difference what I say now about this here system of burning a guy, but I want to set you straight on something."

"What's that?" I asked.

"Well, this electrocution business is the bunk. It don't do no good, I tell you, and I know, because I never thought of the chair when I plugged that old guy. And I'd probably do it again if he had me on the wrong end of a rod."

"You mean," I said, "that you don't feel you've done wrong in taking another man's life?"

"No, Warden, it ain't that," he said impatiently. "I mean that you just don't think of the hot seat when you plug a guy. Somethin' inside you just makes you kill, 'cause you know if you don't shut him up it's curtains for you."

"I see. Then you never even thought of what would happen to you at the time."

"Hell, no! And lots of other guys in here, Harry and Brick and Luke, all says the same thing. I tell you the hot seat will never stop a guy from pullin' a trigger." That was Wasser's theory, and I've heard it echoed many times since.[8]

To summarize: statistical findings and case studies converge to disprove the claim that the death penalty has any special deterrent value. The belief in the death penalty as a deterrent is repudiated by statistical studies, since they consistently demonstrate that differences in homicide rates are in no way correlated with differences in the use of the death penalty. Case studies consistently reveal that the murderer seldom considers the possible consequences of his action, and, if he does, he evidently is not deterred by the death penalty. The fact that men continue to argue in favor of the death penalty on deterrence grounds may only demonstrate man's ability to confuse tradition with proof, and his related ability to justify his established way of behaving.

[8] Lewis E. Lawes, *Meet the Murderer!* (New York, 1940), pp. 178–79.

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The Alternatives to the Death Penalty

By ARTHUR LEWIS WOOD

IN a study of the death sentence some space should legitimately be given to a discussion of its alternatives. At the outset, it is necessary to say that little is actually known on what happens to capital offenders who do not pay the final penalty. What kind of prisoners do they make? How frequently are they paroled? What is their behavior while on parole; after parole? What is their after-parole conduct? How frequently do they commit further capital offenses? Can "science" rehabilitate them? We lack conclusive evidence on most of these questions. It would be far easier to design research projects for their answer than to summarize and analyze the inconclusive facts at hand.

There appears to be some merit, however, in bringing together the knowledge we have of these alternatives and in assessing their relevance to the practical considerations of the administration of justice. The presentation here does not argue *for* an alternative to the death penalty. The facts can be stated and their relative significance can be assessed, but in final analysis the question, Should an alternative to the death penalty be used? is answered by individual morals and social values. On the other hand, we can indicate roughly to what extent alternatives *are* used, and the possible meaning that these facts have for social action.

SOCIETY AND PUNISHMENT

It is quite obvious that the forms of punishment for particular crimes in a society are related to the social conditions and institutions of that society.[1] For instance, where political or other ideologies are strongly held, flagrant acts against the dominant interests tend to call for the most severe penalties; death may become, from the social and social-psychological point of view, the only choice in terms of the politico-social ingredients of the situation. Even persons who otherwise espouse humanitarian ideals will support the death penalty when survival of the political community or beliefs is at stake. There are many historic and social conditions, which range from the well-institutionalized procedures which pronounce the death penalty to the conditions of mob violence where death or its equivalent by eradication from the community is the only possible choice.

On the other hand, in the case of murder, which is considered a capital offense in the penal codes of many of our states, the death penalty is not the only possible course from the point of view of the sociology of the situation. The fact that the pros and cons of capital punishment have been argued in public by the political and intellectual leaders of the nation for over a century is perhaps the best evidence for this statement. Alternatives to the death penalty are possible in the social climate of most of the Western world.

LIMITED USE OF DEATH PENALTY

Whether one be strongly for or against the death penalty, or whether one wishes to evaluate critically the effectiveness of its use as an instrument of justice in American penal procedure, it is conspicuous by its infrequent use as a form

[1] The most authoritative treatise on this subject is Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, *Punishment and the Social Structure*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

of punishment. Granted that it becomes an important issue for those who under all circumstances deny the state the right to take a life, capital punishment plays an infinitesimally small role in criminal procedure. On frequent occasions it appears to be a penalty of last resort for those few who do not escape this judgment through the many avenues that both the law and those who administer the law provide.

There are undoubtedly well over 8,000 criminal homicides each year in this country. Not more than a fourth this number are ever convicted as originally charged, and only approximately 150 executions take place each year in the United States. Many states having capital punishment go for years without an execution; most of the executions are concentrated in a few states—New York, California, Pennsylvania, and the southern states.

In relation to the extent and the total cost of crime in this country, the use of the death penalty is certainly of minor importance. Though some believe that capital punishment must remain on the statute books for its deterrent effect (although its efficacy is seriously questioned—dealt with extensively elsewhere in this volume), such effect is all but negated by the infrequency of its use. In actuality, life imprisonment and long-term sentences are used as punishment for all but a few of the "hardened" and most serious offenders. Execution is practically never exacted except in cases of first degree murder.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the limited use of the death penalty in the United States was shown in a study of criminal statistics made by Alfred Harries.[2] Taking those prisoners convicted of first degree murder, he tabulated the type of "release" from prison during a twelve-year period, 1926–38, in five states which had capital punishment.[3] Forty per cent were executed; 18 per cent died in prison; 38 per cent were pardoned, released on parole, or had their sentence commuted; and 4 per cent received a court order release, were transferred, or escaped.[4]

Social Significance of Death Penalty and Alternatives

Of what significance are these social facts? Extremists on one side would have it that this is a sign of our weakened, decadent society. Another view, that which probably appeals to a larger number of American intellectuals, is that the social fiber of American society is strong enough to afford a more humane treatment of its criminal element. Whatever the truth of this argument, we resort to long years of imprisonment for over half of our murderers. Possibly the long years of incarceration are not particularly humane, and surely they are not desired by those incarcerated. Our "weakness," if relative weakness it is, may lie more in the public indifference to ineffective agencies of law enforcement than in the punishment of our worst offenders.

Another "weakness," though one of a different order—one concerning instrumental policy rather than integration of the society—is the extent to which the processes of legal procedure allow potentially serious criminal offenders to go undetected until they perpetrate more heinous offenses against persons and the community.

Traditional criminal procedure is largely designed to govern the state's action *after* the crime has been committed, and for the purpose of revenge or deterrence. In the broadest sense of the "alternatives to the death penalty," a constructive approach would give considerable attention to the identification of potential murderers and other serious offenders with a view to treatment and/or long-time incarceration *prior* to their final commission of more serious acts. One authority who bases his comments on the detailed case histories of many murderers, Doctor Joseph Catton, believes that 40 per cent of our homicides could be predicted and prevented by proper treatment when the offender first comes into contact with the law.[5]

It is undoubtedly true that many psychotic and psychopathic persons, those who commit crimes of physical assault, and those who prey upon society armed with deadly weapons, are among tomorrow's murderers. Whether detection and treatment of these individuals would decrease the murder rate by 40 per cent is not known; but certainly the application of modern psychiatry and other means of diagnosis to such cases could diminish the "errors" in criminal justice which are now being made.

By comparison with the infrequently used death penalty, what is more commonly done with our most serious offenders is an important consideration. Rather than a deterrent to murder, the death penalty, as demonstrated in the records of criminal prosecution, has everywhere proved to be a hindrance to the administration of efficient justice. Court officials hesitate to participate in the procedure of finding a man guilty when the death penalty is mandatory. Substitutes for the death penalty tend to free court personnel from such considerations, and therefore allow the determination of guilt or innocence to be more readily decided on the evidence in the case. For such reasons, the alternatives to capital punishment become an important aspect of the administration of justice.

Substitutes for the Death Penalty

Alternatives to the death penalty are well-established procedures in many of the states. Capital punishment is completely abolished in six of them, and a sentence of life imprisonment is given.[6] In Washington the jury may decide between death or life imprisonment, and in several states the jury may recommend the punishment, or death is not a mandatory sentence. A death sentence may be commuted to life imprisonment in virtually all states, and in some at least (including Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas), it can be directly commuted to less than life.[7] A life sentence usually can be recommuted to less than life.

Again from a legal standpoint, those serving life sentences which were commuted from death are eligible for parole in a majority of the states. In some states, however, this is specifically not possible, as in Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, New York, and Ohio, unless the life sentence is recommuted to a term of years. In California a

[2] "How Long Is a Life Sentence for Murder?" *Proceedings* of the American Prison Association, 1939, pp. 513–24.

[3] Connecticut, New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.

[4] These percentages are recomputed from the published data to exclude Michigan and Kansas, which were without capital punishment at that time. If the latter two are included, the proportion executed among the seven states is, of course, decreased, as follows: 29 per cent were executed; 20 per cent died in prison; and 41 per cent were pardoned, released on parole, or commuted.

[5] *Behind the Scenes of Murder*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1940.

[6] Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.

[7] Information on the commutation of death sentences and the subsequent parole of the offenders was obtained through a questionnaire sent to the attorneys general of the states. The author wishes to thank members of these offices and those of the offices of pardons and paroles who helped in this survey. Replies were received from thirty-five states.

distinction is made between commuted death sentences which allow parole and those under which the man is not eligible for parole. Where parole of lifers is possible, the minimum time which must be served (minimum sentence less good time) varies among the states from seven to about fifteen years.

In Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, where the death penalty has been abolished, those serving life sentences may be paroled. Maine and North Dakota do not allow the parole of these prisoners, although the sentence presumably could be commuted to a term of years.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT

The administration of these various procedures dealing with capital offenders and lifers has historically had its authority lodged with the highest office of the state. The governor retains the pardon power in most jurisdictions, and it is usual for the power of commutation to be formally held by this official.

Not infrequently the commutation of sentences or the parole of serious offenders such as murderers requires special procedures for approval not used for other offenders. In one extreme example of this from a southern state, the law provides that any person serving a life sentence may not be paroled unless the sentence is further commuted on recommendation from the warden of the state penitentiary and approved by the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, and the trial judge, or any two of them, and then approved by the governor. An example is found in Minnesota (without the death penalty) where the parole board must obtain the written permission of the members of the pardon board if they wish to parole a man convicted of first or second degree murder.

As pardon and parole boards are removed from direct political influence and made permanent professional agencies, there appears to be a trend toward placing in these boards some authority which was formerly exclusively a matter of executive clemency. The most frequent indication of this trend is seen in the extent to which actual decision in these clemency matters is made by such nonpolitical boards, while only nominal authority is exercised by the executive. Where lifers have been made under the law automatically eligible for parole, however, parole is granted such persons without the necessity of executive clemency.

The trend referred to above is more explicit in matters of commutation and where legislative enactments have changed the legal procedures. For instance, a Georgia act of 1942 removed the clemency power (including the power to commute sentences) from the office of the governor and placed it in the board of pardons and parole. During 1951 an act went into effect in the state of Washington which made it possible for the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles to parole those serving life sentences, thus making commutation of the sentence by the governor unnecessary for paroling such prisoners. And in Michigan (a state without capital punishment) the "lifer law" which permits the parole of all those sentenced to life terms, except prisoners convicted of first degree murder, has been in operation since 1942.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD LIFERS

Casual observation would indicate that the public is generally apathetic to what happens to the average person receiving a death sentence who is pardoned or whose sentence is commuted to life. These events take place without more than incidental mention in the press. In fact, the parole of such persons, as with all parolees, is not reported to the press in many states, as a result of the policy of protecting the subject from unnecessary public attention.

Exceptions to this lack of interest now and then come from those who are particularly insistent on the necessity for rigorous crime prevention measures and who sometimes focus their attention on the extent to which dangerous criminals are being released from our prisons. Persons in high authority, and journalists who are uninformed about the total picture, have presented the public with misleading information in these matters.[8] Contrasted with this, an occasional Horatio Alger account appears which tells the true story of how a released murderer makes good.[9]

Detailed case histories of lifers whose sentences have been commuted from death are not available. Nevertheless, the evidence clearly indicates that neither of the extremes presented above accurately portrays what is happening through commutation of death sentences and the parole of lifers. Lifers are nowhere being indiscriminately released; and many lifers would certainly not become successful parolees. Generally speaking, procedures dealing with these offenders are still matters of executive clemency, and the facts show that these powers are infrequently exercised and then only in particularly meritorious cases.

The study by Alfred Harries to which reference has already been made did show that in five states having capital punishment, only 40 per cent of those convicted of first degree murder were actually executed. In only two of the states included, however, was a death sentence mandatory; therefore these data include many cases (probably a majority, although this fact is not available) where the original sentence was life imprisonment and not death. The 40 per cent does not reflect leniency on the part of pardon, commutation, and parole authorities as much as "leniency" (if it may be called such) on the part of prosecutors, juries, and judges, who probably more closely respond to the pressure of public opinion.

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE LIFER?

The survey conducted by the writer reveals to some extent what is happening to those who originally received a sentence of death. In replies from 28 states out of the 42 in which the death sentence is a legal possibility, the following results appeared.[10] During the ten years 1942–51, among all those who had previously and currently received an original sentence of death, only 5 persons were pardoned; 198 had the original sentence commuted to life imprisonment; only 3 were commuted to less than life imprisonment; [11] and 63 were paroled.

The above figures indicate roughly the relative frequency with which various procedures are used for the type of offender originally given a sentence of death. Pardon, which is almost completely a matter of executive action, is practically never used. If we recall that there are over 100 executions in the country each year, or from 1,000 to 1,500 in each ten-year period, we have some estimate of the infrequency with which such persons receive any form of special consideration. Although this comparison with the number of execu-

[8] See Alfred Harries, *op. cit.*

[9] "Portrait of an Ex-lifer," *American Mercury*, Vol. 69, No. 312 (Dec. 1949), pp. 727–36.

[10] These data are based on replies from the attorneys general and other officials in the following states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. For five of these states, the figures were estimates.

[11] Two of these 3 commuted to less than life were commuted to 99 years.

tions is not directly comparable, as it includes all 42 states in which capital punishment is possible, our figures do include the larger states of California, New York, and Pennsylvania, as well as most of the southern states in which clemency appears to be more often used because of the more numerous death sentences.

It is evident that the great majority of cases in which the death sentence is not carried out first receive consideration through executive clemency—commutation to life imprisonment. This procedure is conservative, while at the same time permitting ample opportunity for review of the case prior to further action. The study by Alfred Harries showed that the time served by the average lifer convicted of first degree murder was approximately thirteen years prior to release from prison, and of course many such prisoners serve a longer sentence. Sixty-three cases in our survey, or less than one-third the number whose sentences were commuted from death, were granted parole. The larger proportion of the remaining two-thirds undoubtedly die in prison before additional consideration, while some cases are granted further executive clemency or change in sentence by the original court of jurisdiction.

To summarize the available information, a large proportion of those sentenced to death are executed. Where natural death does not occur in prison, more than twenty persons have their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment each year, and about a third of these cases are paroled. What is the rationale of "leniency" for men sentenced to die? To what extent do these cases receive adequate study prior to parole, and how successful are these parolees? Is there a trend toward paroling a larger number of such cases? These and other questions cannot be given definitive answers, but there is sufficient evidence to outline some general considerations.

IMPRISONMENT AND TREATMENT OF SERIOUS OFFENDERS

There is some evidence that the trend is in the direction of using imprisonment as a substitute for death. Whether or not in the final analysis this is more desirable, is a matter of opinion. But wherever alternatives to death are used, it is of some merit to evaluate the meaning of these procedures.

The substitute procedures for capital punishment are pre-eminently congruous with the logic of modern penology. Here it is assumed that each individual criminal case is in some fashion unique and must be dealt with in terms of these individual factors. With respect to our concern here, the essential elements of this penology are the insistence that treatment or segregation rather than punishment for its own sake serves to protect society most adequately, and that the form of treatment must be designed to fit the individual case rather than predetermined and prejudged by rigid legislative acts which are intended for all those committing particular crimes.

Although the proportion of cases eligible for probation or short sentences among our most serious offenders is no doubt considerably limited, the logic of dealing with serious offenders in terms of their individual characteristics is the same. It is equally unreasonable to suppose that all those who commit certain offenses require forty years, life, or even death, as it is to assume that all those who pick pockets must be imprisoned one year. Not so much the social scientist, but the law itself and those who have administered it have been forced to grant that there are individual differences among serious offenders. This is evidenced by the laws which have voided the mandatory death penalty, and by the commutation of sentences and the parole of lifers discussed above.

No investigation has been made of the parolability of prisoners serving life terms, to say nothing of the lack of information on the potentialities for rehabilitation of those who were executed. It is known by anyone familiar with prison administration that most institutions have one or more lifers assigned to some of the most trusted duties. Many times the observation has been made that lifers are among the best-behaved prisoners. Although these observations certainly have a basis in fact, they say nothing concerning the extent to which lifers as a group possess these characteristics, and, realistically speaking, they say little about the actual parolability of such persons. Since these comments are usually made with reference to prisoners who have already served many years in prison, it seems likely that these characteristics may often be the result of the subduing effect which comes from such imprisonment. Although some of these prisoners may be capable of adjusting as law-abiding citizens to certain community situations, it certainly cannot be said that resignation to the confining authoritarian prison environment is necessarily an indication of parolability.

PAROLE OF LIFERS IN MICHIGAN

The two states of Michigan and Washington have adopted procedures for experimenting rather systematically with the release of long-term offenders. It appears to the writer that they constitute steps in the direction of dealing with the more serious offender on an individual and professional basis which may foreshadow a trend toward this type of procedure in other states.

Several states allow the parole of lifers without the necessity of executive clemency. The new legislation adopted by Michigan in 1942 was not, therefore, entirely new. Since Michigan is a state without the death penalty, this experiment is not, strictly speaking, an alternative to the death penalty for this state, and the legislation excluded those convicted of first degree murder. At the same time, the Michigan legislation represents a trend in the direction of individualizing the treatment of the more serious offenders. With a fourth-offender law, a large number of prisoners serving life terms had accumulated in the state's prisons. It seemed apparent to many that some of these prisoners, having been incarcerated for a long time, were as eligible for parole as short-term offenders, and their further imprisonment was not serving the state any useful purpose. The Michigan "lifer law" made it possible to parole these prisoners after serving a minimum of ten calendar years, with the approval of the sentencing judge (if still alive), and a public hearing held by the parole board with the attorney general's office representing the people.

The experience gained from the operation of this law supplies us with some information pertinent to our topic of discussion.[12] During the operation of the lifer law, the ten years from 1942 through 1951, 138 persons were paroled after serving an average time of seventeen years. In addition, 32 were discharged by court order, 25 died in prison, and 2 escaped. As a result of the operation of the lifer law, the number of annual discharges by court order is now on the decrease. With the new commitments to prison and the return of violators and escaped prisoners, the operation of the law reduced the "lifer

[12] Information on the Michigan lifer law was graciously supplied by Roy H. Nelson, Parole Board member and for five years the parole eligibility examiner handling lifer cases for the Parole Board; and Ayres R. Raymond, supervisor of research and statistics, Michigan Department of Corrections.

law prison population" by 78 (from 325 to 247) during the ten-year period.

Parole procedure

High standards of administration of the Michigan lifer law have been maintained. Each prisoner eligible for parole has his case reviewed each year. After an interview with a parole examiner, a detailed analysis of those cases considered by the board good parole risks is forwarded to the sentencing judge and prosecutor of the original court of jurisdiction and the attorney general. Meanwhile, a pre-parole investigation is made by the board. If no objections have been raised, a public hearing is held and parolability is determined. It is reported to the writer that only three or four judges have ever objected to the parole of a case recommended by the board. Most judges admit that they have only the vaguest recollection of the case after the lapse of years, and they are willing to accept the recommendation of the board.

Now that the best parole risks have been discharged, it is reported that the policy of the board will be to maintain the conservative standards. This means that in the future it is expected that a larger proportion of parole discharges will be cases which have recently become eligible by meeting the ten-year minimum requirement; and it is probable that fewer paroles will be granted each year.

There has been no substantial criticism of the actions of the board in the administration of the law. Adverse news articles and editorials have not been evident in the state. The board has successfully resisted private pressures for the parole of individual cases.

Experience with parolees

It has been reported to the writer that without exception, the parole officers of the state have found the lifer much easier to supervise and handle than the ordinary parolee. Of course this is in large part the result of careful screening practiced by the board, but also it probably reflects the subduing effect of long-time incarceration and the aging of the prisoners. In any case, the experience demonstrates that there is considerable individual variation in parolability among men who are serving life under statutory and court-imposed sentence.

Of the 138 lifers paroled, 8 have been returned for parole violation—6 received new sentences and 2 incurred technical violations; 5 died on parole; 5 were deported; 1 was discharged on a retrial; and 72 have been discharged from parole. In one case a new sentence was received after parole discharge. The remaining 46 are still on parole (as of July 1952).

Although a prisoner serving a sentence for first degree murder in Michigan is not eligible under the lifer law, this state's experience with these cases is specifically relevant to an evaluation of the alternatives to the death penalty. Some members of the Michigan Parole Board feel that their experience with the lifer law warrants the experimentation with similar legislation for first degree homicide cases after serving twenty years in prison. A bill providing for this procedure has been introduced in the legislature, although for the present the advocates of capital punishment have successfully staved off such a proposal. Nevertheless, since recent governors have been more willing to commute the sentences of these prisoners (who otherwise would not be eligible for parole), 49 were paroled during the ten-year period ending with 1951. In addition, 98 were discharged by court order and 67 died in prison.

With 2 cases commuted and discharged and 1 case pardoned, a total of 217 separations of first degree murder cases occurred during the ten years. This enabled the first degree murder prison population of 586 to be reduced to 566 in 1951. New commitments and return of parole violators numbered 197. The present tendency is toward the substitution of parole of first degree murderers for discharge by court order. These policies are expected to prevent an increase in the first degree murder prison population of the state, which now approaches the high figure of 600.

Since 1937, when the present Michigan Parole Board was organized, 68 first degree murder cases have been paroled after serving an average term of 22½ years. Of these only 2 became parole violators, by receiving sentences for burglary and indecent liberties. No known instance of homicidal assault occurred among these parolees. In spite of the fact that parole violation rates based on the information presented above are crude, it may be pointed out that the first degree murder parolees had a violation rate of less than half that of the lifer law cases—rates of 3 and 7 per cent, respectively.[13] These rates are substantially lower than the usual official parole violation rate of 15 per cent for ordinary offenders.

PAROLE OF LIFERS IN WASHINGTON

A similar experiment with the parole of lifers has been started in the state of Washington. As reported above, as recently as July 1951, a new law gave the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles the authority to consider lifers (including those sentenced to death for first degree murder whose sentences have been commuted to life) for parole after serving a minimum of 13 years and 4 months (20 years less good time). Like the situation in Michigan, Washington evidently had come to the position in which a relatively large number of lifers were serving time in the state prison.

In spite of the fact that the board followed a very conservative policy, about 30 lifers were paroled during the first year.[14] At least 2 of these men had been originally sentenced to death and the sentence had been commuted to life by the governor. These parolees have been subjected to rather searching investigations every three months, and during this time no case has got into sufficiently serious trouble to warrant a revocation of his parole.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Whatever ultimate value may be assumed to exist in the death penalty, the statutes, the administration of justice, and public opinion tend to limit its use to relatively few cases in the United States. The life sentence is, of course, the most commonly used alternative to the death sentence. This practice has caused an excessive accumulation of inmates in many of our state prisons. The pressure of this condition and perhaps the increasing acceptance of individualized treatment have encouraged, at least in some states, the more frequent use of the traditional powers of executive clemency and court discharge by selective release of these prisoners. In more recent years it is apparent, specifically in Michigan and Washington, that there is a trend toward the placement of this power in the parole authority of the state. From the point of view of administrative efficiency, this appears to be pre-eminently desirable. Except in the rare cases in which it ap-

[13] Based on 2 in 68 cases and 9 in 138 cases, respectively. In the latter instance of lifer cases the 2 technical violation cases and the 1 case which was resentenced after discharge have been included to give the 9 violations. Note that this is a conservative basis of computation for comparison with ordinary parolees.

[14] The writer is indebted to Dr. Norman S. Hayner, member of the Washington Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, for this information.

pears necessary to rectify a miscarriage of justice through executive pardon, a professional parole board is best qualified and specifically staffed to make investigations and decisions regarding alternatives to life imprisonment.

Available information would seem to bear out expectations based on the knowledge of psychology and the social sciences that not all prisoners who happen to have been sentenced under statutory laws which demand the death sentence or life imprisonment are equally incorrigible. It seems reasonable to expect, assuming continued and increasing support of the idea of individualized treatment and the existence of competent correctional authorities, that the future will see further use of selective forms of treatment for even the most serious offenders.

Although the life sentence is the only available alternative to death as a maximum "penalty" for the most serious offenders, there is a great deal of room for more permissive powers than exist at present. From one point of view, there are offenders from whom society would receive greater protection if a life sentence were legally possible. On the other hand, there are those persons originally sentenced to life imprisonment for whom even a term of ten years may be *unnecessarily long* for adequate protection of society. Ten years of penitentiary life can evidently induce significant changes in the social attitudes of some prisoners.

Knowledge of human behavior indicates that a minimum sentence of ten years is arbitrary. Arbitrary as it may be, however, ten years or more is perhaps understandable in light of the prevailing incompetence of correctional authorities in some of our states, and in light of the inability of even the most competent professional persons to predict human behavior accurately.

Considering the latter point, the alternative to parole from the penitentiary direct to community supervision is the diversified correction system in which gradual release and observation of conduct under conditions of increasing individual responsibility is the most adequate test of final parolability. Under these conditions genuine treatment programs can be substituted for more punitive incarceration in the more hopeful cases.

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The Death Penalty and the Administration of Justice

By HERBERT B. EHRMANN

ARMCHAIR criminology is among the least reliable of the social sciences. It is, however, one of the most popular. To qualify as an expert on crime one needs only to be a legislator, a lawyer, a prosecutor, or a judge. Such persons may actually be authorities in the field. Generally, however, they have had no scholastic preparation and no special experience beyond a few sporadic episodes. All too often the opinions of individuals in such positions are accorded a factitious authority merely because of the office which they hold. Unfortunately, the public does not understand the meagerness of experience and inadequacy of data on which such views are so frequently based.

IRRATIONAL VIEWS

Discussions concerning the death penalty have been especially confused by the voices of unqualified "authorities." For nearly a century and a half change has been delayed and the acquisition of real knowledge hampered by sonorous pronouncements of the eminent, but uninformed. When in 1810 Sir Samuel Romilly introduced a bill in Parliament to abolish capital punishment for stealing five shillings or more from a shop, it was unsupported by a single judge or magistrate.[1] Speaking for the unanimous opposition to the bill by his judicial colleagues in the House of Lords, Lord Ellenborough, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, predicted that the repeal of this law would lead to abolition of the death penalty for stealing five shillings from a dwelling house, in which case no man could "trust himself for an hour without the most alarming apprehensions that, on his return, every vestige of his property will be swept away by the hardened robber." [2]

These and similar laws were eventually repealed without any increase in *the number of offenders in the particular class of crime.* In fact, the absolute number of such offenders diminished.[3] As lawyer and judge, Lord Ellenborough was no fool. Although inclined to be harsh in criminal cases, he did much to bring the civil law into harmony with mercantile practice. He was a profound legal scholar. He knew the value of evidence. Yet, when it came to the death penalty, he felt qualified to pronounce an authoritative judgment without the aid of any evidence whatsoever other than his own emotional reflexes. His contemporaries accorded his words the respect due his high position; but history has proved that the great Lord Ellenborough, in discussing capital punishment, was talking nonsense.

The efforts to remove or modify the death penalty for the crime of murder have run a similar course. Fortunately, there has now been enough experience with abolition and curtailment to establish as a fact that the repeal of capital punishment is not followed by an increase in the number of murders, nor does its restoration result in a diminution. Whatever other purpose the death penalty may serve, it is now obvious that, in a settled community, it is not needed to protect society from murderers.

[1] *Hansard*, May 1, 1810.

[2] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1810.

[3] Second Report on the Criminal Law by His Majesty's Commissioners, 1836, p. 21.

Nevertheless, even in this narrow area where data are abundant and easy to obtain, pronouncements of the Ellenborough variety continue to confuse the public. As late as 1950, the legislative halls of Massachusetts still rang with dire predictions that the passage of a bill to give juries a chance to designate life imprisonment as a penalty for murder in the first degree would result in loosing upon the people of the Commonwealth a horde of savage murderers. This was at a time when 38 other states and the federal government already had some form of the alternate penalty and 6 states had abolished capital punishment!

ALTERNATE AND MANDATORY AREAS COMPARED

A similar disregard of experience frequently marks discussion of the effect of the death penalty on the administration of justice. For instance, it was claimed that the giving of the power to impose the alternate penalty of life imprisonment would result in the complete disuse of capital punishment. Those making the claim seemed to think that this would be very bad indeed. In 1948 the then governor of Massachusetts vetoed the proposed bill granting juries the right to choose life imprisonment instead of death on conviction in murder cases, stating in his veto message that such a law would abolish capital punishment by "indirection"; that it pays "lip service to capital punishment" and then "effectively proceeds to destroy it."

Coming from the governor, the veto message was treated with respect;[4] but it was only another example of armchair criminology. For the ten years ending with 1946, Massachusetts, under a law making death a mandatory punishment for first degree murder, had 12 executions. For the same period, alternate-penalty states had the following record: New Jersey, with a slightly smaller population, 16 executions; Pennsylvania, with something more than twice the population, 50 executions; and New York, with about three times the population, 118 executions. For the same period, North Carolina, a mandatory state, had 118 executions, and its neighbor, Georgia, somewhat smaller in population, under the alternate penalty, had 102.

There are too many variables—such as homicide rates, population characteristics, police efficiency, prosecution standards, jury attitudes, executive clemency—for any quantitative comparison of states within these groups, but the figures indicate clearly that capital punishment continues to flourish in states which provide the alternate penalty.

On the other hand, the residents in certain areas have, in practice, virtually abolished capital punishment in both mandatory and alternative penalty jurisdictions. Vermont, a mandatory state, has had only 2 executions in 28 years; New Hampshire, an alternate state, has had only 1 execution in 28 years; South Dakota, an alternate state, has had only 1 in the 10 years since it restored the death penalty; Nebraska, an alternate state, has had only 2 in 28 years.[5] In Massachusetts during a period of 50 years under the mandatory penalty, Worcester County, with a half-million population, had only 2 executions; Bristol, a sizable county, only 1; Berkshire County, of moderate size, none; and some of the smaller counties, none. The failure to use the death penalty in certain counties of Massachusetts is dramatically shown in Table 1.

[4] Not, however, by the dean of the Harvard Law School, who commented on the fact that the message ignored available data.

[5] Data from *Memorandum on Capital Punishment*, prepared by Thorsten Sellin for the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1951, pp. 657–60.

TABLE 1—CONVICTIONS ON MURDER INDICTMENTS, CERTAIN MASSACHUSETTS COUNTIES, 1925–41

County	Indictments for Murder	Convictions			Executions for Murder
		1st Degree	2nd Degree	Manslaughter	
Berkshire	11	0	5	1	0
Bristol	36	0	16	3	0
Essex	26	1	12	2	1
Hampden	27	1	12	9	1
Hampshire	8	1 (commuted)	1	4	0
Plymouth	21	0	10	4	0
Total	129	3	56	23	2

Data compiled from records in State Prison and reports of the Attorney General by Sara R. Ehrmann, executive secretary Massachusetts Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty.

DEATH PENALTY AND ACQUITTALS

A closely related problem is presented by the claim that the mandatory sentence of death upon a finding of guilty of murder in the first degree results in more acquittals. Some of those who express this opinion are extremely well informed penologists.[6] The reason given is that the infliction of death is so repugnant to most people that juries tend to avoid a conviction if possible. Curiously enough, proponents of the death penalty seem to confirm this tendency in a backhanded sort of way. In arguing that the danger of a miscarriage of justice is slight in a capital case, they frequently urge that the evidence must be overwhelming before a jury would vote to consign a fellow being to his death.

Convincing data on this subject are not available. We may, however, accept the reasoning and observations that the reluctance of jurymen to convict, where death is the penalty, leads, in some cases, to acquittal. Nevertheless, one may well question the conclusion that the net over-all result is a larger percentage of acquittals. There are complicating factors working in the opposite direction. For instance, numbers of prospective jurors are frequently excused from serving in capital cases because of opposition to the death penalty. Sometimes the numbers are so great that the judges assail the veniremen for "jury dodging," and these denunciations reach the newspaper headlines.[7]

[6] For instance, Lewis E. Lawes, former warden of Sing Sing Prison, *Man's Judgment of Death* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), p. 58; Austin H. MacCormick, formerly Commissioner of Corrections, New York City, then executive director of the Osborne Association, in *Boston Sunday Herald*, December 11, 1949.

[7] See for instance the quoted remarks of Chief Justice Higgins in the *Boston Daily Record*, November 5, 1942; those of Judge

This process of weeding out jurors who will not serve because of the death penalty tends to produce an unbalanced jury. Those most likely to lean emotionally toward the defendant are eliminated. No doubt the great majority of those who remain view the death penalty with considerable distaste, but their emotional attitude is likely to be negative. Inevitably, however, on some juries there will be those who favor the use of the death penalty. These people are occasionally forcefully articulate and capable of swaying jurors with less positive attitudes. They are not counterbalanced by those most reluctant to inflict death. Thus hostility toward the death penalty may actually, in some cases, produce juries which are most likely to convict the accused.

EMOTION AND PREJUDICE

There are other factors which work for conviction rather than acquittal in a capital case. Of all crimes, murder is most likely to produce a violent emotional public reaction, a demand for vengeance, a feeling that the perpetrator "deserves" to be put to death. Jurymen cannot help sharing this feeling. The idea that a jury "weighs" the evidence in a criminal case to decide whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, conveys a wrong picture of the process. In many cases it is merely a question of what evidence the jury chooses to believe. If the government's case rests largely on identification testimony and the defense is an alibi, the jury does not "weigh" one against the other. If it believes the identification testimony, the alibi is thrown out of the scales of justice entirely, and vice versa. Where there is conflict of testimony, people tend to believe that which they would like to believe. The emotional drive to punish someone for an atrocious murder frequently plays an important part in conditioning a jury for believing the evidence which proves the guilt of the accused.

In a recent Massachusetts case the only issue was the criminal responsibility of the defendant, who had killed his wife. According to the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, the evidence portrayed "the sudden destruction, while in apparent good health, of one member of a harmonious and cultured household by the only other member, in a series of acts paradoxically done, it is confessed, solely in kindness to benefit the victim, yet revoltingly achieved in the grossest barbarity with the crudest of weapons."[8] Two eminent psychiatrists testified that the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the killing. There was no medical testimony that he was responsible. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The conclusion that the accused was sane beyond a reasonable doubt can be explained only on the ground of emotion aroused by the sheer horror of the deed itself. Although there was no error of law, the Supreme Judicial Court ordered a new trial under a statute passed in 1939 for the review of capital cases.[9] The defendant was tried a second time, found insane, and committed to a mental institution.

When prejudice is added to the emotional reactions induced by a slaying, the jury finds even greater difficulty in believing evidence offered for the accused.[10] If the jury is composed of the dominant or "in-group" and the defendant and his witnesses belong to an "out-group"—as they frequently do—the defendant's evidence is often discounted to zero. The jury tends to believe that foreigners, Negroes, or members of any minority group will lie for one another and "stick together" under all circumstances.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized this human failing, in holding that the exclusion of Negroes from a jury trying a Negro is a denial of equal protection of the laws.[11] Massachusetts had a case where a Chinese, arrested and tried with others for a tong killing, was convicted of murder although no witness identified him or implicated him in the affair.[12] In Kentucky it used to be said that if a Negro killed a white man it was murder, if a white man killed a Negro it was unfortunate, but if a white man killed a white man it was self-defense, unless the affray was over a woman, in which case the cause of death was apoplexy.

PUBLIC HOSTILITY

If to a brutal killing and prejudice there is added the element of public hostility against the accused, the jury listens to the defendant's evidence with ears that are stone-deaf. This is the combination which produces most of our *causes célèbres* subsequently believed by many to be miscarriages of justice, such as the cases of Leo Frank, Tom Mooney, and Sacco and Vanzetti. In the last-named case, the jury, after thirty-five days of trial, received the case in the afternoon and returned a verdict of guilty in the evening. According to one of the jurymen, his colleagues were ready to vote a guilty verdict immediately at the close of the case, but he forced an hour's discussion because he thought such precipitate action was improper.

Regardless of the eventual verdict, the jury could not possibly have considered the mass of testimony in favor of the defendants or weighed the improbabilities in the government's case in so brief a time. Even without the benefit of the subsequent revelations which threw new doubt on the defendants' guilt, a relaxed and unprejudiced jury would have debated at great length the validity of the fleeting and even silly identifications and would not have lightly assumed that a large number of reputable Italian alibi witnesses were perjurers.

Strip the case of the then current antiradical hysteria, change the defendants into Massachusetts veterans of World War I, the identifying witnesses into Italians, and the alibi witnesses into native New Englanders, and it becomes inconceivable that the weaknesses of the prosecution and the massive evidence for the defense would have received such brief consideration by the jury.

DEATH PENALTY AND SECOND DEGREE CONVICTIONS

Whether or not the mandatory death penalty results in more acquittals, there seem to be some general data indicating that it produces a smaller proportion of convictions for first degree murder and a larger proportion for second degree murder.[13] Opponents of capital punish-

Warner in the *Boston Herald*, June 7, 1933; and those of District Attorney Foley in the *Boston Herald*, April 10, 1930.

[8] Mr. Justice Wilkins in Commonwealth v. Cox, 1951 A. S. 857; 100 N. E. 2d 14.

[9] Mass. St. 1939, Sec. 341; G.L. (Ter. Ed.) C. 278, Sec. 33E. This case was an unusual one for Massachusetts, where, under the Briggs law, so-called, insanity is usually determined before trial. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) C. 123, Sec. 100A.

[10] See Arthur Garfield Hays, *Trial by Prejudice*, New York: Covici Friede, 1933.

[11] Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 760 (1939); Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879).

[12] Related by Wendell Murray, Esq., of the Boston Bar, called in as counsel for Wong Duck after the trial. Three of the defendants were executed, but Wong Duck was among those granted a new trial.

[13] Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,

ment claim that this is due to the fact that juries shy away from the infliction of death; proponents allege that the possibility of the extreme penalty produces more pleas of guilty to murder in the second degree, for which the sentence is imprisonment. Without further and more precise research, it is impossible to draw any general conclusions. People and conditions differ. Doubtless both theories are valid, but it is not known to what extent.

How difficult it is to generalize about these questions may be seen in the contrasting experience with the death penalty of the two most populous counties in Massachusetts—Suffolk and Middlesex. These two counties are contiguous, being separated, for the most part, only by the Charles River. During the test period they were approximately the same size in population [14] (Middlesex was actually about 5 per cent more populous). The criminal courts handling murder cases are presided over by judges who rotate their sittings in the various counties, so they are not indigenous to either Suffolk or Middlesex. Nevertheless, respective records of the two counties for disposing of murder cases are strangely different.

State Prison records for the years 1900 to 1949 inclusive show that 23 individuals were executed for murder in Middlesex, and only 10 for the crime in Suffolk. More detailed reports of the Attorney General for the years 1925 to 1941 inclusive indicate that of 113 indictments for murder in Middlesex, 19 were convicted of first degree (of whom 17 were executed), 23 of second degree, and 30 of manslaughter; of those not guilty, 18 were insane, 10 received a verdict of not guilty, and 13 were nol-prossed, meaning that the district attorney refused to prosecute. For the same period in Suffolk, 3 were convicted of first degree (of whom 2 were executed), 16 of second degree, and 24 of manslaughter; of those not guilty, 10 were insane, 22 received a verdict of not guilty, and 4 were nol-prossed. The approximate percentages are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2—DISPOSITION OF CAPITAL CASES MIDDLESEX AND SUFFOLK COUNTIES, MASSACHUSETTS 1925–41

By Percentage of All Cases

MIDDLESEX COUNTY	
Convicted	
First degree	16.8
Executed	15.0
Second degree	20.4
Manslaughter	26.4
Total	64.0
Not convicted	
Not guilty	9.0
Nol-prossed	11.4
Not guilty and nol-prossed	20.4
Insane (not tried)	16.0
Total	36.0
SUFFOLK COUNTY	
Convicted	
First degree	3.9
Executed	2.55
Second degree	20.2
Manslaughter	30.4
Total	54.0
Not convicted	
Not guilty	27.8
Nol-prossed	5.0
Not guilty and nol-prossed	32.8
Insane (not tried)	12.65
Total	46.0

Compiled from data collected by Sara R. Ehrmann.

The period covered by Table 2—seventeen years—and the number of cases involved are sufficient to smooth out any substantial distortions due to unusual cases. From these figures it appears that one indicted for a capital offense in Middlesex stood nearly a 17 per cent chance of being convicted of first degree murder and a 15 per cent chance of being executed; whereas if the murder were committed in Suffolk, he would stand only a 4 per cent chance of being so convicted, and only a 2.5 per cent chance of being executed. Those guilty of second degree murder, whether by plea or after trial, were approximately the same in percentage in both counties, as were those guilty of manslaughter. The accused had three times the chance of being acquitted after trial in Suffolk that he would have had in Middlesex, but in the latter county the district attorneys may have nol-prossed weak cases more freely than their opposite numbers in Suffolk.

Explanations may be offered for these startling differences. Suffolk contains a larger percentage of more recent immigration; its racial, religious, and ethnic proportions of population vary substantially from those in Middlesex; its residents, on the whole, are on a lower economic level; they are less suburbanite; there is a tradition of "hanging" prosecutors in Middlesex. The very nature of these explanations, however, indicates the complexity of the problem. If citizens of the same state, living in adjoining counties, operating under the same administration of justice, differ so drastically in their attitude toward the death penalty, how is it possible to generalize for an entire state or nation?

DEATH PENALTY AND NUMBER OF TRIALS

Again, it is claimed that fewer trials are required in abolition states because obviously guilty defendants are more likely to plead guilty where they do not have to battle for their lives. There are, indeed, some instances where this appears to be the fact. On the other hand, there are those who claim that it is harder to secure pleas of guilty in abolition states because the prosecutor has less inducement to offer the guilty defendant. The answer necessarily depends upon the attitude of prosecutors in a death penalty state. If, for instance, the prosecutor insists on first degree with death as the penalty, the accused has nothing to lose by trial; if the prosecutor is willing to trade for a plea of guilty in the second degree, the defendant has much to gain by not risking a trial. How do we know, however, what prosecutors will do?

The application of armchair psychology to forecast the conduct of prosecutors—or any other public authority—is no easier than the Ellenborough method of predicting the reaction of criminals. For instance, as early as 1900, Hosea M. Knowlton, then attorney general of Massachusetts, recommended the commutation of the death sentence of a seventeen-year-old murderer whose crime was particularly vicious, on the ground that Massachusetts public sentiment would not tolerate the execution of so young a boy.

In 1942, after forty years' development in the field of handling juvenile delinquency, another Massachusetts prosecutor insisted on the death penalty for a seventeen-year-old offender despite the suggestion of the judge that the case was a proper one for a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree. The boy's previous record had been good, and there was a conflict of medical testimony as to whether the cause of the victim's death was the wound or a heart ailment, since the victim lived for seven weeks and his injuries had apparently healed. Nevertheless, the lad was allowed by the governor to be electrocuted, with the assent of the parole board acting in an advisory capacity.

A few years later, in another case involving a seventeen-year-old boy, another Massachusetts judge took the initiative and accepted a plea of guilty to second degree on the ground that no Massachusetts governor would ever al-

Thirtieth Day, Thursday, 1st February, 1951. Witness: Professor Thorsten Sellin. (Pp. 647–678) London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1951.

[14] The 1940 Census gave Middlesex, 958,855; Suffolk, 912,706.

low so youthful an offender to be electrocuted!

A very conscientious district attorney will sometimes secure a conviction which the facts require, in the belief that the governor will take care of mitigation. Such a case was *Commonwealth v. Desatnick*,[15] where the father of an illegitimate child, plagued by accusing parents and a religious sense of guilt, murdered the infant. Instead of commuting, however, the governor sent for clerics of the defendant's faith and asked them whether illegitimacy was a more serious offense than murder. On the basis of the obvious answer, the young man was electrocuted. Within a short time, however, another Massachusetts district attorney, regarded by many as more hard-boiled than the one who prosecuted Desatnick, nol-prossed the case of a mother who had abandoned her illegitimate child to die, on the ground that, although the crime would ordinarily be murder, "society needs no penalty for this, unfortunate as it is."

These instances are sufficient to indicate the futility of generalizing on insufficient data. Research alone, in a wide area and covering a period of years, could establish what prosecutors tend to do in the death penalty states by way of accepting pleas of guilty to second degree murder.

DEGREES OF MURDER

Degrees of murder present such a confusing problem that they create a further obstacle to predictability in the administration of criminal justice. In states where capital punishment has been abolished, the situation is not too serious. An intelligent parole board may ultimately adjust any gross errors in the jury's verdict or in the pleas. But where the penalty is death, a confused jury may eternalize its mistakes.

[15] 262 Mass. 408 (1928).

The principal variety of "first degree" murder is generally defined as including "malice aforethought," and involves "premeditation" and "deliberation." However, judicially defined "malice" does not necessarily involve malice against the victim in the ordinary dictionary sense. Moreover, the courts have explained "deliberation" and "premeditation" in such a way that these words also have lost their usual meaning. Under judicial definition, "premeditation" and "deliberation" can both occur within a few seconds of the killing itself. In the now rather celebrated case of *Fisher v. United States*,[16] a Negro of low-grade intelligence, suddenly feeling that he was insulted by his victim, struck her, and then killed her "to stop her from hollering." The jury by its verdict found deliberation and premeditation, essential to first degree murder.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion in the United States Supreme Court, referred to the judge's charge on the subject as the "dark emptiness of legal jargon." According to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the insult "pulled the trigger of Fisher's emotions." We shall never know how many defendants have been hanged or electrocuted for a "deliberate" and "premeditated" killing where some unexpected incident "pulled the trigger" of the accused's emotions.

"Is it possible," asked Sir Ernest Gowers of Mr. Justice Frankfurter at hearings held by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1950, "to express premeditation clearly and logically without mumbo-jumbo entering into it?" Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought that it was possible, but conceded that "the charges given by trial judges in the United States are often not very helpful." The Royal Commission appeared

[16] 328 U. S. 463, 66 S. Ct. 1318, 90 L. Ed. 1382 (1946).

to think this observation to be an understatement.[17]

Another type of first degree murder is usually defined as a homicide occurring in the act of committing a serious felony. Here again the situation may be far from clear. If the jury believes that the accused, at the time of the killing, had given up all intention of committing the felony, and killed the victim because of fear for his own safety, the crime is not first degree murder. In a close case, how is the jury to read the defendant's mind in order to apply the instructions of the judge?

It would be unfair, however, to blame the judges for their inability to explain clearly the different degrees of murder. The fact that so many do not succeed suggests that the real blame rests with the rather fanciful distinctions between first degre and second degree murder. Mr. Justice Cardozo himself found it difficult, if not impossible, to draw a satisfactory line:

> I think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in our law. . . . The statute is framed along the lines of a defective and unreal psychology. . . . The present distinction is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected to assimilate and understand it. I am not at all sure that I understand it myself after trying to apply it for many years and after diligent study of what has been written in the books. Upon the basis of this fine distinction with its mystifying psychology, scores of men have gone to their deaths.[18]

Degrees of murder were introduced into the law originally in order to give juries an opportunity to mitigate the harshness of the death penalty. No doubt in many cases they have accomplished their purpose. Some juries find second degree despite the facts and the judge's instructions; other juries, more conscientious than merciful, find first degree where warranted; still others muddle through the "mystifying psychology" to a bewildered finish. In conjunction with the death penalty, these degrees of murder have created a combination which tends to produce a most haphazard application of the criminal law in capital cases. Once the death penalty has been abolished, however, the criminal law may safely drop such metaphysical distinctions and relate the period of imprisonment to modern penology for the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the convicted.

[17] See Testimony of Mr. Justice Frankfurter before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1950, pp. 580–82.

[18] Benjamin N. Cardozo, *Law and Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), pp. 99–101.

MENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

Another cause for the haphazard application of the death penalty is the submission of the issue of mental responsibility to juries under legal definitions of insanity which are completely at variance with medical science. Most jurisdictions still apply the century-old rule in M'Naghten's case, namely: Did the defendant know that his act was morally and legally wrong? The rule has been somewhat qualified by such exceptions as the "irresistible impulse" test, but on the whole, M'Naghten still dominates judicial charges and decisions.

Under this definition of insanity, the lowest-grade morons and the most disturbed psychopaths are repeatedly convicted because they "knew the difference between right and wrong." It has also provided astute defense counsel with a handy means of getting guilty clients off without any penalty whatever, through a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity," and a subsequent speedy cure of a nonexistent mental disease.

In Massachusetts, under the Briggs law, the issue of insanity in capital

cases is now usually decided before trial by the report of two impartial psychiatrists. In most states, however, the juries must continue to choose between contending alienists who are paid for their opinions by the side which calls them to the stand. Since there can be no reconciliation between the legal test for insanity and a conscientious psychiatrist's ideas about mental disease, the expert testimony from the witness stand is given under conditions which often confuse rather than assist a jury in reaching a verdict.

If imprisonment or confinement were the result in any event, then a finding of either sanity or insanity would provide opportunity for further study and possible treatment. Under the present system, a mistaken finding of guilty or not guilty where insanity is pleaded may result in irrevocable error. It is the presence of the death penalty that hinders a new approach to the entire question of mental responsibility.

DEATH PENALTY AND COST OF TRIAL

Whether there is actually a larger proportion of pleas of guilty without trial where capital punishment has been abolished is also largely unexplored territory. The trial of murder cases is an expensive process. The ordinary murder trial may cost the county thousands of dollars, and some of the more bitterly contested cases may run high up in five figures. In Massachusetts, the trial of the Millen brothers and Abraham Faber in 1934 for murder in the commission of robberies ran for nearly eight weeks at very great cost to the county. These criminals and their lawyers knew that the government's case was overwhelmingly strong and that public feeling ran high against them. Slim as their chances were, however, they went to trial because no prosecutor in a mandatory death penalty state, on the facts of their outrageous crimes, would have accepted a plea of second degree. Under the same conditions in an abolition state, would the accused have pleaded guilty? [19]

California was put to a great expense in the trial of the sensational Hickman case involving the fiendish sex killing of a child. Would the defendant have pleaded guilty in an abolition state? Shortly after the Hickman trial, Michigan had a murder case almost exactly the same in its gruesome details, apparently induced by the lurid press treatment of the California crime. The accused, one Hoteling, promptly pleaded guilty, thereby sparing the state much expense and the public a recital of the macabre details.

The money spent on the trial of capital cases would pay the salaries of a substantial number of additional parole officers, badly needed in a constructive effort to reduce crime. It might repay any state to investigate the probability of saving the cost of these expensive murder trials through repeal of the death penalty.[20]

[19] Cf. *Boston Globe*, October 14, 1930. "Battle Creek, Michigan [an abolition state]. Only a little more than 12 hours following their capture after the killing of a state policeman and the robbery of a bank, Thomas Martin and James Gallagher were sentenced to life imprisonment in Jackson Prison." The Millen-Faber cases are notable for reasons other than great expense. At the time of the arrest of these criminals, two innocent men, Beret and Molway, were being tried for one of the murders committed by the Millen gang. The trial was nearing a conclusion, and eight reputable witnesses, with good opportunity to observe, had identified Beret and Molway as the robbers, when the real criminals were apprehended, bringing confessions and ballistic evidence to the rescue. No one familiar with the Beret-Molway trial has ever doubted that these men would have been convicted—and executed—but for this timely occurrence.

[20] Commenting on the execution of Irene Schroeder by the State of Pennsylvania in 1931, Dr. Harvey M. Watkins, of Reading, a social worker, is quoted in a bulletin issued by the American League to Abolish Capital Punishment as saying: "It cost the State of Pennsylvania $23,658 to prosecute, convict and electrocute Irene Schroeder at the Western Penitentiary. If one twentieth of this sum had been spent 10 years ago by any social workers on that 22-year-old girl, that electrocution would have been prevented."

Whether or not capital punishment increases the expense of administering justice by forcing to trial a greater number of murder cases, there can be no doubt that the cost of cases actually tried is greatly increased because of the reluctance of jurors to serve where they may feel compelled to decree death to the accused. This is a universally observed phenomenon. Where the cases are notorious, the delay in securing a jury may be fantastic. In the trial for the murder of "King" Solomon in Boston, only one of 90 veniremen failed to disqualify himself on the ground that he was opposed to capital punishment. After 160 had been interrogated, there still were not enough to make up a jury.[21] In the case of Sacco and Vanzetti, four days were consumed in impaneling a jury.[22] These instances may be extreme, but they underscore a fact which should properly be considered in any evaluation of the death penalty in the administration of justice.

DEATH PENALTY AND SENSATIONALISM

Expert observers also agree that the trial of murder cases where death may be the penalty tends to be more sensational than where imprisonment is the only punishment. The spectacle of a human being fighting for his life is stirring drama inside and outside of the courtroom. Frequently, in order to sway a jury toward the fatal verdict—and possibly to reassure his own conscience—a prosecutor will inflame the jurors against the accused by playing upon every prejudice and ghastly detail. It is generally recognized that some prosecutors, because of political ambition or simple vanity, are not above deliberately seeking the headlines.

Of course, noncapital cases may also tend toward sensationalism; but where this occurs, it is because of reasons other than the penalty involved. Generally speaking, the trial of cases where the penalty may be death is surcharged with an emotional tension not present in other prosecutions. Defense counsel, witnesses, judges, and even prosecutors have been visibly affected by the strain. This atmosphere, created by invoking the specter of death to destroy the life in the dock, is hardly a help to calm consideration of the evidence.

DEATH PENALTY DISTORTS ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Indeed, the one conclusion on which practically all criminologists agree is that the death penalty tends to distort the course of the criminal law. In the phrase of Professor Sheldon Glueck, it "bedevils the administration of justice." [23] Data may indicate that in some instances it may result in acquittals or findings not merited by the accused; in others, in convictions and executions not justified by an unemotional consideration of the evidence. In either case, the normal is deflected. The penalty is erratically inflicted at different times in different places. It retards progress in the criminal law by maintaining concepts which should have little to do with the process of ascertaining guilt, innocence, or responsibility.

Just as the death penalty is a para-

[21] *Boston Herald*, June 7, 1933.

[22] Record published by Henry Holt & Co., 1928.

[23] Minutes of Faculty Meeting on Capital Punishment, Twentieth Century Club, January 18, 1936.

doxical block in a modern system of penology, so does the fear of its finality hinder reform in the administration of criminal justice. Professor Sam Bass Warner, then on the faculty of the Harvard Law School, declared to the Joint Judiciary Committee of the Massachusetts Legislature in 1935 that "the existence of the death penalty for first degree murder is one of the principal reasons, if not the main reason, why it is extremely difficult to get judges and legislators to remove procedural barnacles from our law."

It may be said that all human processes are imperfect, and that those of justice are no different; but the fact of human fallibility is not a good reason for increasing it. If to err is human, then it becomes all the more important to reduce the probability of errors—especially fatal ones. On the massive evidence now available dealing with the use and disuse of the death penalty, there would seem to be no sufficient compensating advantage in retaining it. Its disappearance could only improve the administration of justice.

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The Paroling of Capital Offenders

By G. I. GIARDINI and R. G. FARROW

THIS survey was conducted by correspondence. A questionnaire was sent to each state, asking for information about commutation of death penalty and the procedure for subsequent parole of commuted capital offenders, and requesting statistics on this group. Forty-six states responded to the questionnaire. When the information was summarized, the resulting statements were submitted to the respective states for approval or correction.

Following is the current practice in the paroling of capital offenders in forty-six states as revealed by this survey.

ALABAMA. Prior to 1951, prisoners whose death sentence had been commuted by the Governor to life imprisonment were eligible for parole at discretion of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Since 1951, the law requires that the commuted "lifer" must serve fifteen years before he is eligible for parole consideration by the Parole Board. Parole continues for life unless a pardon is granted by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Parole may be revoked by action of a quorum of the board.

ARIZONA. Parole of prisoners with death sentences commuted to life imprisonment is granted by the Governor on recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. The board itself has power to terminate or revoke parole.

ARKANSAS. After death sentence has been commuted to life, further commutation to a specific term is required for parole purposes. A prisoner is eligible for parole consideration when he has served one-third of the specific term imposed. Expiration of the minimum sentence of the specific term ends parole. Parole is granted and may be revoked by the Board of Pardons, Paroles and Probation.

CALIFORNIA. Parole may be granted after the prisoner has served seven years of the life sentence commuted from the death penalty, unless the Governor's commutation order stipulates that parole shall not be granted. The Governor may remove this stipulation through further clemency. Parole on life sentences continues for life unless terminated by the Governor, or unless revoked by the Adult Authority for violation.

COLORADO. Capital sentence may be commuted to life by the Governor. The Parole Board has authority to parole a life prisoner only after the Governor establishes a minimum sentence and this sentence is served. Further clemency by the Governor is needed to terminate parole, but the Parole Board may revoke for violation.

CONNECTICUT. The Board of Pardons, prior to July 1, 1951, had power to commute death sentences to life and later to commute the life sentence or grant conditional pardon to lifers, subject to further action and conditions of the Board of Parole. Lifers were eligible for parole in twenty years if they had earned the time given for good behavior. Since 1951, juries are permitted to recommend mercy in cases of conviction for a capital offense. The judge *must* sentence the offender to life imprisonment. This sentence cannot be reduced, and the offender does not have the privilege of applying for commutation or parole. However, capital sentences will still be subject to commutation by the Board of Pardons, but the possibility of subsequent clemency from

a life sentence has not been determined.

DELAWARE. Capital offenders serving life sentences can be paroled by the Board of Parole after serving fifteen years in prison. Paroles can be terminated by commutation action of the Board of Pardons, or by revocation order of the Board of Parole after violation.

FLORIDA. Parole consideration may be given to lifers, including commuted capital offenders, after six months have been served on the sentence. The Parole Commission can release the parolee from supervision or return him for violation; but only the Pardon Board, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, can restore civil rights lost through conviction for felony.

GEORGIA. Since 1943, commutation from death penalty to life imprisonment is a power of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, rather than of the Governor. Prisoners serving life sentences are eligible for parole consideration after serving seven years. Parole on life sentences can be terminated after five years, through application for commutation and restoration of civil and political rights. The board may order return to prison of a parolee who violates.

IDAHO. The Board of Pardons may commute the death penalty to life in prison. In order to be eligible for parole, a life prisoner must serve ten years. Parole may then be ordered by the State Board of Correction, which, incidentally, has the same membership as the Board of Pardons. Parole may be terminated after one year by the Board of Correction, which may also order return for violation.

ILLINOIS. Commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment is effected by the Governor, acting upon recommendation of the Parole and Pardon Board. Parole of commuted capital offenders may be ordered by the Parole and Pardon Board. This same body may order the return of a parolee to the institution for violation, and may discharge a parolee from supervision after he has served honorably on parole for five years.

INDIANA. The Governor has authority to commute a sentence from death to life. He may then grant parole by executive order or may commute the life sentence to a minimum term of time-served. In the latter instance, the Parole Board may grant parole.

IOWA. Parole of capital offenders serving life sentences through commutation of the Governor appears to be a legal possibility, provided commutation of sentence to a definite term is later effected by the Governor. However, the reply from this state reports no known paroles in such cases in the past twenty years. Termination of parole would have to be through action of the Governor.

KANSAS. The Governor may commute death sentences to life imprisonment. Legally, the Governor could parole such cases or could commute the sentence to an indeterminate sentence, after which the Parole Board could take jurisdiction; but no paroles have been granted to date. Paroles on all sentences can be terminated only by the Board of Administration which grants them, except in cases of Governor's parole, which may be revoked by the Governor.

KENTUCKY. Commutation of the death penalty is a power of the Governor. Capital offenders may be paroled by the Division of Probation and Parole after serving eight years. Parole may be terminated only by pardon or by executive clemency restoring citizenship. A life parolee may be returned to prison as a parole violator, but if he is again released, the act is a reinstatement, not a reparole.

LOUISIANA. No reply received.

MAINE. The death penalty is not imposed in this state.

MARYLAND. The Governor may commute death to life sentences. Commuted capital offenders serving life sentences are eligible for parole consideration after serving fifteen years. The Parole Director automatically reviews each case at that time. He must make a favorable recommendation to the Governor before the Governor may grant or refuse parole. An unfavorable decision by the Director is final. Paroles on life sentences are not terminated short of life except by revocation by the Parole Director for violation of parole. The Governor may grant a conditional pardon, which also may be revoked for violation.

MASSACHUSETTS. The Governor, with consent of the Council, may commute the death penalty to life imprisonment. Parole may be effected through a Governor's conditional pardon or a subsequent commutation by the Governor with release power exercised by the Parole Board. Parole may be terminated by a complete pardon or by revocation order of the Governor and Council for conditional pardon cases, and by the Parole Board for commutation cases.

MICHIGAN. The death penalty may be imposed for treason only. There is no known case of its use.

MINNESOTA. There is no death penalty in Minnesota.

MISSISSIPPI. No reply received.

MISSOURI. Capital sentences may be commuted to life imprisonment by the Governor. After commutation, parole may be effected at any time by the State Board of Probation and Parole. Termination of parole requires further commutation by the Governor. Return to prison for violation may be ordered by the board.

MONTANA. The State Board of Pardons may commute death sentences to life imprisonment, upon recommendation of the Governor. A prisoner serving life may be paroled when he has served twenty-five years less possible "good time" of eleven years and three months. Parole must be approved by unanimous action, in writing, of the Board of Pardons. There is no provision for termination of parole, but the Board may order return for violation.

NEBRASKA. The Board of Pardons may commute death to life imprisonment. Parole may be granted by further commutation to a definite number of years. Parole may be terminated by the Board of Pardons after satisfactory completion of the required period —usually nine months. Revocation may also be effected by the board if the parolee violates.

NEVADA. Commutation of death to life sentences is effected by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, consisting of the Governor, three Supreme Court judges, and the Attorney General. A prisoner serving life is eligible to apply for parole after seven calendar years. Parole may be terminated or revoked at the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

NEW HAMPSHIRE. The Governor and Council can commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. Parole may be effected by the Governor and Council's granting conditional pardon which may later be changed to complete pardon to terminate sentence. Return of the parolee to prison for violation may be ordered by the Governor and Council.

NEW JERSEY. Capital sentences may be commuted to life imprisonment by the Governor, who may extend further clemency in order to permit release on parole. Parole is ordered by

the State Parole Board and supervised by the Parole Division of the Department of Institutions and Agencies. No capital case has been released under the present system, which was adopted in 1947. Parole for capital offenders can be terminated only by further clemency by the Governor, but the State Parole Board may order return for violation.

NEW MEXICO. The Governor has power to commute death to life sentences. A life prisoner who is not a fourth offender, has not escaped or attempted to escape, and has not violated parole may be granted parole by the penitentiary warden. Such parole is terminated only by violation, with return ordered by the warden. However, capital parolees report for only one year and are then placed on probation for life without any requirement to report or be supervised.

NEW YORK. The Governor has commutation power in capital cases except for the offense of treason, which is subject to the State Legislature. In commuting the death sentence, the Governor may establish a life term or he may set a minimum and maximum term to the sentence. If the term is life, subsequent commutation to a shorter time is needed before parole may be considered by the Parole Board. Parole extends for life or for the duration of the sentence as set by the Governor. The Parole Board may order return for violation.

NORTH CAROLINA. The Governor may commute death sentences to life sentences. No further commutation is required before parole. However, it is customary to reduce life sentences to a definite term of years before parole is granted by the Governor. Paroles are terminated through further commutation order or through revocation by the Governor.

NORTH DAKOTA. There is no commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment and therefore no parole of capital offenders. The only capital offense is murder while serving a life sentence for murder.

OHIO. Prisoners serving life sentences after receiving commutation of the death sentence are not eligible for parole without extension of further clemency by the Governor to reduce the offense from first degree murder to a lesser offense, such as second degree murder. A prisoner serving life for second degree murder is eligible for parole consideration after serving ten years. Paroles of first degree murder cases reduced to second degree by executive clemency can be terminated only by action of the Governor. Return for violation may be ordered by the Parole Commsision.

OKLAHOMA. Capital offenders serving life sentences are in the same category as other prisoners with life terms and are eligible for parole consideration by the Pardon and Parole Board after serving fifteen years. The Criminal Court of Appeals has the power to modify sentences in cases on appeal. The Pardon and Parole Board has authority to recommend clemency to the Governor. Paroles may be revoked on application from the Pardon and Parole Officer to the Governor. The Governor has authority to grant pardons after same has been recommended by the Pardon and Parole Board.

OREGON. Capital sentences may be commuted to life imprisonment by the Governor. All persons serving life sentences are eligible for parole consideration by the Board of Parole and Probation after serving seven years. By law, any parolee is eligible for discharge after one year, but by rule of the Board of Parole and Probation this period is extended to ten years for life sentences. In the past twenty years, only two commutations from death to life have been granted. There have been no paroles granted to capital offenders.

PENNSYLVANIA. The Governor, on recommendation of the Board of Pardons, may commute death to life. Further commutation is required before the prisoner may be paroled by the Board of Parole. The life maximum stands unless reduced by commutation. The Board of Parole may revoke for violation.

RHODE ISLAND. This state has the death penalty for only one offense, murder committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life.

SOUTH CAROLINA. The Governor has power to commute death sentences to life terms, and to grant reprieves. The Probation, Parole and Pardon Board may parole capital offenders serving life sentences after ten years of imprisonment. The board may terminate parole for a capital offender by granting a complete pardon.

SOUTH DAKOTA. Death sentences may be commuted by the Governor to life imprisonment, but capital prisoners in this status are not subsequently paroled. The Governor has authority to parole and could terminate parole by revocation or by extending further clemency.

TENNESSEE. The Governor can commute the death penalty to life imprisonment. The commuted capital prisoner is eligible for parole by the Board of Pardons, Paroles and Probations after serving thirteen years and seven months. Parole cannot be terminated except by revocation by the board for violation.

TEXAS. The Board of Pardons and Paroles recommends various forms of executive clemency which the Governor may grant or refuse. Commutation from death to life is granted by the Governor on recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. All other executive clemency may be granted and terminated through the same procedure. Executive clemency may take the form of reprieve and stay of execution, conditional pardon, reprieve, emergency reprieve, commutation of sentence, or full pardon.

UTAH. The Board of Pardons may commute the death penalty to life imprisonment, and later commute the life sentence to a definite period of time at expiration of which parole may be granted by the board. Parole may be terminated by the Board of Pardons. No paroles were granted to commuted capital offenders from January 1920 to January 1952.

VERMONT. The Governor may commute a death penalty to life imprisonment. He may extend further clemency in the form of pardon or conditional pardon to release the prisoner. However, in the past twenty years the only prisoner whose capital sentence was commuted to life has not been paroled. During this same period there was one other capital conviction, which resulted in execution. If a conditional release is granted, the Governor has power to revoke or terminate it.

VIRGINIA. Death sentences can be commuted by the Governor to life imprisonment. The Governor may also grant a pardon or conditional pardon to prisoners serving life sentences. The conditions of the pardon may be set by the Governor and may be the conditions of parole, including supervision by a parole officer. Such conditional release can be terminated by a specification in the pardon designating a definite period at the end of which the conditions of the pardon will be satisfied, or by absolute pardon or revocation by the Governor. Parole supervision may be ended at the discretion of the Parole Board, usually after five years.

WASHINGTON. The Governor holds the power to commute death sentences to life imprisonment. Prior to 1951 a life prisoner could be released only by full pardon or conditional pardon. Since 1951 the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles has jurisdiction over life prisoners and may consider them for parole after they have served twenty years less earned good-time allowance. This cannot be less than thirteen years and four months. Parole on life sentences can be terminated only by full pardon or by final discharge and restoration of civil rights, both actions being solely in the Governor's power. The board, however, may, at its discretion, issue a conditional discharge from supervision, eliminating the reporting requirement of parole. Other conditions of parole remain in effect.

WASHINGTON, D. C. No reply received.

WEST VIRGINIA. Prisoners whose death sentences are commuted by the Governor are eligible for parole after serving ten years, unless they have had two prior felony convictions, in which case they must serve fifteen years. Release from parole can be effected only by clemency action of the Governor.

WISCONSIN. There is no death penalty in the state of Wisconsin.

WYOMING. There is no commutation of the death penalty to life imprisonment. Death sentence is mandatory for certain offenses unless the jury specifies "without capital punishment," in which event life term is imposed. These life sentences may later be commuted to an indeterminate term by the Governor on recommendation of the Board of Pardons, making parole possible on expiration of the minimum sentence. Parole may be terminated by expiration of maximum sentence less good-time allowances, and by further commutation action of the Board of Pardons.

STATISTICS ON PAROLING OF CAPITAL OFFENDERS

In Table 1 are presented the data received from twenty-two states on the paroling of capital cases. The table does not include five Pennsylvania cases whose life sentences, after commutation from the death penalty, were terminated by full pardon. Nor does it include several cases whose life terms were commuted to permit deportation to foreign countries. Statistics from five other states had to be excluded for various reasons.

The table shows that 197 capital cases were paroled in 22 states over periods ranging from 1 to 38 years. Eleven cases violated parole by the commission of new offenses, 7 violated by breach of rules, 11 died while on parole, 5 absconded from supervision, 129 are still on parole, and 34 were discharged from parole. Combining the three forms of violation of parole, we have 23 cases or 11.7 per cent of the total. This figure compares favorably with violation rates usually reported by parole agencies for all categories of offenders, but its reliability is to be seriously questioned. The small number of cases reported by each state and the wide differences between the states in the laws and policies governing the processing of these cases make any conclusions extremely hazardous.

Of the states that submitted statistics, Pennsylvania and Texas furnished data sufficiently comprehensive to warrant separate treatment. The period covered by the Pennsylvania statistics extended from June 1914 to March 31, 1952. In 1913 a law was passed providing for the abolition of hanging capital cases in the separate county seats and for the substitution of electrocution of all such cases in a newly built prison in the center of the state. Since that time an

TABLE 1—CAPITAL CASES PAROLED AND THEIR PRESENT STATUS

State	Years Covered	Capital Cases Paroled	Number of Violators			Died	Still on Parole	Completed Parole
			New Offense	Breach of Rules	Absconded			
Arizona	20	2	0	0	0	0	1	1
Colorado	22	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Connecticut	25	3	0	0	0	0	3	0
Delaware	20	27	0	4	1	0	22	0
Florida	10	12	2	0	0	1	8	1
Idaho	20	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Illinois	20	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Indiana	20	3	0	0	0	0	3	0
Kentucky	21	10	0	1	0	0	9	0
Maryland	32	5	0	0	0	0	5	0
Missouri	20	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Nebraska	20	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Nevada	20	3	0	0	0	0	3	0
New Hampshire	20	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
New Mexico	20	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
New York	20	18	0	0	2	1	14	1
N. Carolina	20	32	5	0	0	0	20	7
Pennsylvania	38	36	3	1	1	7	17	7
Texas	28	21	1	0	1	2	14	3
Virginia	20	3	0	1	0	0	2	0
Washington	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
Wyoming	20	3	0	0	0	0	1	2
Total		197	11	7	5	11	129	34

electrocution docket has been kept by the warden of the prison. This docket was the principal source of our data.

The Texas statistics cover the period from February 8, 1924 to March 31, 1952. It should be recalled that in Texas capital punishment applies to the crimes of murder, rape, and robbery with arms, whereas in Pennsylvania it applies only to murder in the first degree.

Table 2 shows the number of cases executed and the number commuted to life imprisonment for each of the three crimes for which capital punishment may be imposed. Of 269 cases sentenced to die for murder, 21 per cent were commuted to life. Only 7 per cent of those charged with rape, and five of eight cases of robbery, were commuted to life. Of the total of 350 cases sentenced to die, 19 per cent were commuted to life imprisonment.

In Table 3 we have presented the same cases segregated according to offense and race or nationality. For the sake of brevity we will use the term "race" loosely.

TABLE 2—EXECUTIONS AND COMMUTATIONS TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN TEXAS FROM FEBRUARY 8, 1924 TO MARCH 31, 1952

Offense	Executed		Commuted		Total Numbers
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
Murder	213	79	56	21	269
Rape	68	93	5	7	73
Robbery	3	37	5	63	8
Total	284	81	66	19	350

TABLE 3—CAPITAL CASES BY OFFENSE AND RACE—TEXAS

Offense	White		Negro		Mexican		Indian		Total
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
Murder	88	32.7	147	54.6	33	12.3	1	0.4	269
Rape	12	16.4	56	76.7	5	6.9	0	0.0	73
Robbery	5	62.5	3	36.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	8
Total	105	30.0	206	58.9	38	10.8	1	0.3	350

In Table 4 we have the number of executions and commutations to life imprisonment for Pennsylvania and for Texas. During the period covered by the statistics, Pennsylvania executed an average of 8.6 capital cases a year as compared with Texas' average of 10.1 cases. If we consider only the murder cases for Texas, the average drops to 7.6 cases per year. If we consider only murder we find that Texas commutes 20 per cent of the cases as compared with Pennsylvania's 18 per cent. The difference is not significant.

TABLE 4—EXECUTIONS AND COMMUTATIONS TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR PENNSYLVANIA AND TEXAS

State	Executed		Commuted		Total Number
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
Pennsylvania	327	82	72	18	399
Texas	284	81	66	19	350
Total	611	82	138	18	749

In Table 5 we note that of the 399 Pennsylvania capital cases, 64.2 per cent were white, 35.6 per cent were Negro. One was Mongolian. When all the Texas cases are considered, regardless of offense, we find that 30 per cent were white, 59 per cent Negro, and 11 per cent included 38 Mexicans and 1 Indian. If we consider only the Texas cases convicted of murder, we have 33 per cent white, 55 per cent Negro, and 12 per cent including 33 Mexicans and 1 Indian.

Table 6 shows the disposition of the

TABLE 5—PENNSYLVANIA AND TEXAS CAPITAL CASES BY STATE, CRIME, AND RACE

State	White		Negro		Others		Total Numbers
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
1. Pennsylvania	256	64.2	142	35.6	1	0.2	399
2. Texas: all crimes	105	30.0	206	59.0	39	11.0	350
3. Texas: murder	88	33.0	147	55.0	34	12.0	269
Total (1 and 2)	361	48.0	348	47.0	40	5.0	749

TABLE 6—DISPOSITION OF CASES AFTER COMMUTATION

Disposition	Number	
	Penna.	Texas
Pardoned	5	0
Conditionally released	41	22
Transferred to mental hospital	7	1
Died in prison	7	8
Transferred to county prison	0	1
Escaped from prison	0	4
Discharged	0	2
Still in prison on March 31, 1952	12	28
Total	72	66

cases whose death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, as far as it is known. Texas does not use the pardon in the fashion used in Pennsylvania. Of the two cases discharged in Texas, one was by order of court and the other by order of the Governor.

The 41 cases conditionally released in Pennsylvania include five that were released for deportation. Only one case was released for deportation in Texas.

Of the 41 Pennsylvania cases that were conditionally released, 31 were white and 10 Negro. Of the 22 Texas cases, 8 were white, 11 Negro, and 3 Mexican.

The question of what became of the capital cases conditionally released was answered in Table 1. Of the four cases that were returned for violation in Pennsylvania, two were reparoled. One of these was discharged from parole by commutation of maximum sentence; the other is still on parole. Thus 18 of those originally sentenced to die are still on parole.

One of the questions frequently asked about persons sentenced to serve life terms is how long they actually remain in prison before they are released. With the data at hand it was possible to give a tentative answer to this and other questions. For example, how much time usually elapses between the sentence of death and commutation to life? How long does the capital offender serve on parole before discharge? How long does he remain before he dies? These questions are tentatively answered in Table 7. We have included some data from Kentucky.

It is significant that there are 17 cases in Pennsylvania, 14 in Texas, and 9 in Kentucky that have been on parole

TABLE 7—TIME LAPSES BETWEEN DISPOSITION STAGES IN CAPITAL CASES

Time and Stages	Pennsylvania		Texas		Kentucky	
	Number of Cases	Average Time	Number of Cases	Average Time	Number of Cases	Average Time
Time served before death sentence was commuted to life	72	9.6 mos.	No data		12	15.2 mos.
Time served before release from prison	46	14.3 yrs.	22	11.4 yrs.	10	10.0 yrs.
Time served on parole before discharge	7	10.5 yrs.	3	8.2 yrs.	No data	
Time served on parole before death	7	4.0 yrs.	2	2.3 yrs.	No data	
Time served on parole as of March 31, 1952	17	8.1 yrs.	14	8.5 yrs.	9	6.8 yrs.
Time served by those in prison as of March 31, 1952	12	13.9 yrs.	28	7.3 yrs.	No data	

on an average of more than seven years without violating in a degree to warrant return to prison. On the basis of the statistics usually published by parole boards the likelihood of violation by these persons in the future is very remote, for it has been shown time and again that more than 95 per cent of violations occur within the first three years of parole.

The statistics we have presented point up the need for more thoroughgoing research in this relatively neglected area of criminology.

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The Pardoning Power[1]

By AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.

THE substantive criminal law—concerning itself with the technical problem of what act combined with what mental state is necessary to constitute any of the various crimes in our criminal jurisprudence—has been aptly described as "an island of technicality in a sea of discretion."[2] Thus, before trial, the police have broad discretion as to whether to arrest, and the prosecutor as to whether to prosecute, and if so, for what crime. After conviction, the trial judge (or, less frequently, the trial jury) has discretion as to what sentence, within limits, to impose or whether to suspend sentence and place on probation; the parole board has discretion as to the duration of penal treatment; and the pardoning authorities have discretion as to the use of the pardon power.

The technical and inflexible nature of the problem of guilt or innocence of crime (inherited largely from the historical fact that in England, when the criminal law was being developed, so many crimes were punishable by death) makes desirable the placing of a good deal of discretion in the groups concerned with criminal law enforcement—police, prosecutors, judges, juries, parole boards, and pardon authorities. If this discretion is taken away from any one of these groups, the burden becomes correspondingly greater on the others to make wise use of their discretionary powers.

Thus in capital cases it has in the past been not uncommon to deprive judges or juries of their normal discretion as to sentence, by making the death sentence mandatory. The trend in recent years has been, if not to abolish capital punishment, at least to abolish the mandatory death sentence. Accompanying this movement has been something of a decline in the importance of the pardon power in capital cases. But as long as capital punishment continues, power to pardon in capital cases is bound to remain an important element in the administration of criminal justice.

The broad power vested in pardon officials to pardon, to commute sentences, and to grant reprieves, applies, of course, to many crimes other than capital crimes. In this article, however, we shall limit ourselves to a consideration of these powers in relation to capital cases where the death penalty has been imposed.

WHO MAY EXERCISE PARDON POWERS

All civilized countries make use of some form of the pardon power to give flexibility to the administration of justice in criminal cases. In England this power historically is vested in the Crown. But in the United States it is vested in the People, who can delegate

[1] Much of the material in this chapter on the *powers* of pardoning authorities in capital cases has been derived from the Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures, Vol. 3 on *Pardon*, published by the Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., 1939. The material on the *policies* of pardoning authorities has been derived mainly from two sources: (1) the annual reports of the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, on *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories*, a series of reports which were discontinued in 1946; and (2) reports of various state pardoning authorities giving data and reasons for granting pardons, commutations, and reprieves.

[2] Livingston Hall and Sheldon Glueck, *Cases on Criminal Law and its Enforcement* (St. Paul, Minn., 1951), p. 3.

the power to whomever they please. As a matter of practice, the People have found it most convenient to give the power to the executive branch of the government. Thus, under the United States Constitution the pardon power in federal cases has been delegated to the President; and practically all the state constitutions have delegated this power in state criminal cases to the governor, either alone or in conjunction with advisers.

A large majority of state constitutions originally gave the power to pardon to the governor alone. The more recent trend has been toward putting more power in the hands of a board. Simplifying matters somewhat, we find that today there are in general three different arrangements among the states. First, in about one-quarter of the states, the executive pardon power is vested in the governor alone; some of these states, however, furnish a pardon attorney to aid the governor in these cases. Second, about half the states have provided for advisory boards whose function is to hold hearings on pardon applications and make recommendations to the governor, who alone may make the final decision; in practice, the governor usually adopts the recommendations of the board. Third, in about a quarter of the states there are boards which, instead of acting simply in an advisory capacity, have the final decision about pardons; in all these states, however, the governor is a member of the board.

TYPES OF PARDON IN CAPITAL CASES

In discussing the power to pardon in cases where the death penalty has been imposed, it will be well to consider separately three different types of executive clemency: (1) full pardon; (2) commutation of sentence to imprisonment for life or a term of years; and (3) reprieve, or stay of execution.

FULL PARDON

In only a rare case does one sentenced to death for crime receive a full pardon. Usually the best he can hope for is a commutation of his sentence to life imprisonment. But there is one type of case, fortunately quite rare in capital cases, where justice demands a full pardon—namely, where subsequent events prove that the convicted person is innocent.

There is some dispute as to how often innocent persons are convicted of serious crimes. Some enthusiasts assert that the many procedural safeguards which are afforded criminal defendants in this country—the right to a jury trial, to counsel, to be informed of the charge, to call witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, for instance—make it impossible to convict an innocent person. The District Attorney for New York County reports that only 3 out of 27,288 persons convicted in that county of felony during the years 1938–49 were later shown to be innocent.[3]

On the other hand, Professor Edwin M. Borchard, in his book, *Convicting the Innocent,*[4] has collected and discussed at length 65 cases of innocent persons convicted of crime, mostly in this country, of which 29 are murder cases. He says that these 65 were chosen from a much larger number.

Borchard's cases show that innocent persons are sometimes convicted of crime on mistaken identification by the victim, who is often emotionally disturbed by his experience; sometimes on erroneous inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence; sometimes on the basis of perjured testimony of hostile witnesses. Prosecutors, expected by the public to produce convictions, are seldom as impartial as they are ideally supposed to be, although they do not often stoop so low as intentionally to use perjured testimony against the defendant or to suppress evidence favorable to him. Public pressure for revenge sometimes leads juries to convict innocent persons. If the jury learns that an accused person has previously been convicted of an earlier crime, his chances of being convicted of this later crime are considerably enhanced, so much so that he often refuses to testify in his own behalf for fear the jury will learn of his former conviction.

Thus it is clear that for one reason or another an innocent defendant is sometimes convicted and sentenced to death, a fact which obviously constitutes one of the strongest reasons for abolishing capital punishment. In such a case it is only right that the defendant should be given a full pardon. It seems odd, but in most cases of innocence established some time after conviction, a pardon is the only effective way to rectify the wrong, since courts generally have no power to grant new trials because of newly discovered evidence after a relatively short period of time following conviction.

[3] Report of the District Attorney, County of New York, 1946–48, p. 143.

[4] New Haven, 1932.

COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE

Commutation is the substitution of a lighter for a heavier punishment. Unlike pardon, it does not mean forgiveness, and does not effect a restoration of civil rights. Most state constitutions specifically include in the pardoning power the power to grant commutations. In those states whose constitutions do not specifically so provide, it is held that such a power is included in the grant of the pardoning power, for the reason that the greater power (to pardon) necessarily includes the lesser power (to commute).

The power to commute sentences is exercised in a great many cases other than death cases, usually to make eligible for parole a prisoner whose term has not expired. Here we shall consider the power only as used to avoid the death sentence, an important but far less common use of commutation. In practice, the power is generally exercised by commuting death sentences to life imprisonment, although occasionally the sentence is reduced to imprisonment for a term of years.

To prevent the arbitrary or dishonest exercise of the pardoning power by pardon authorities, most of the states require regular annual or biennial reports to the legislature by pardon authorities concerning the granting of pardons, commutations, and reprieves. A study of these reports gives us some indication as to the reasons why commutations are granted in practice. Often the recommendation of the judge who tried the case, the district attorney who prosecuted it, or the state supreme court which reviewed it, is emphasized. Frequently the fact that, of several joint participants in the crime, only one received the death sentence (particularly if this one was not the moving spirit behind the commission of the crime) is given as a reason for commuting the sentence to life imprisonment.

Sometimes the evidence against the defendant, although sufficient to sustain a conviction, is conflicting or is based on circumstantial evidence alone, in which cases the pardon authorities may decide to commute the death sentence. Commutations (or even occasionally full pardons) are sometimes granted because of prior promises made by prosecutors, which the state feels bound to honor, of lighter punishment or immunity in return for turning state's evidence. Sometimes there are extenuating circumstances which do not

affect the technical legal question of guilt or innocence of a capital crime but which do call for the exercise of mercy, as for instance in the famous lifeboat cases which are so well known to law students.[5]

A variety of other reasons have been given as well, including such matters as the youth of the condemned person, the evil influence exercised over him by his stronger or older companions, his good prison record, or the fact that this was his first offense. At times the reasons are suggested very vaguely: "because of the peculiar circumstances of the crime" or "because it is considered that justice will be satisfied without the taking of this man's life."

Factors influencing pardon officials

Without doubt there are motivating forces which lead pardon officials to grant pardons or commutations but which are not given as reasons for acting. At times the condemned man is a member of a group which exercises great pressure on pardon officials to grant clemency; conversely, the victim of the crime may be a member of a group which just as vigorously opposes clemency. Politics is an important factor, too, especially where the governor alone exercises the pardoning power without being insulated by a board of pardons. As an elected official, he is not impervious to the display of public opinion for or against a condemned prisoner.

An interesting question arises as to how the governor's private views on capital punishment affect his commutation of death sentences. We may expect, for instance, that one who strongly disapproves of such punishment would be more prone to commute death sentences than would others. A number of years ago, the Governor of Oklahoma announced his view that the death penalty was legalized murder and stated that he would commute all death sentences to life imprisonment. The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals thereupon denounced the Governor's position in angry tones, stating that the law forbade him to "allow his scruples to influence him in the least."[6] But since it is uniformly held that the exercise of discretion by pardon officials is a matter not to be reviewed or interfered with by the courts, it is difficult to see how, as a practical matter, there can be any effective way of preventing pardon authorities from letting their views on capital punishment influence their decisions on commutations of death sentences.

Extent of commutation

One last problem is the extent to which pardoning officials have in fact exercised their power to commute death sentences. Figures are not directly available on a national basis as to the number of cases where the death penalty was imposed but sentence was commuted. However, we can learn something by comparing the number of prisoners received by federal and state prisons each year under sentence of death with the number of prisoners executed at these same prisons during the same period. Those not executed must

[5] Thus in one of these cases, Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, L.R. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), two men and a cabin boy were cast away in an open boat with almost no food, 1,600 miles from the Cape of Good Hope. On the eighteenth day, having been without food and water for almost a week, the two men killed the cabin boy and ate his flesh. They were picked up four days later. Probably none of the three would have survived if these extreme measures had not been taken. The two men were convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but their sentences were subsequently commuted.

[6] Henry v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. App. 369, 136 Pac. 982 (1913).

have either received commutation, died (either naturally or by suicide), escaped, or had their cases reversed by a higher court. The latter three possibilities are not very common, however.

For the seven years 1940–46 inclusive, 771 condemned prisoners were received, of which number 587 were executed. Most of the 184 unaccounted for undoubtedly received commutations.[7] It would seem, then, that, taking the country as a whole, commutations are granted in about 20 to 25 per cent of the cases where the death penalty is imposed. This statement is somewhat confirmed by the earlier assertion of the Select Committee on Capital Punishment that "over a given period, the percentage of death sentences carried out to execution is 71.9 in the United States."[8]

Statistics are available in some of the individual states as to the numerical relationship between those executed and those whose sentences were commuted. Thus in New York from 1920 to 1936 there were 252 executions and 83 commutations.[9] In New Jersey from 1907 to 1937 there were 119 persons electrocuted and 27 granted commutation.[10] Texas granted 7 commutations out of 64 cases in the four years 1947–51.[11]

It seems safe to say that of the many persons who are convicted of crimes whose maximum punishment is death, comparatively few receive a death sentence. Of those who are sentenced to die, most are executed, but about one in four or five obtains a commutation to life imprisonment.

[7] U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories*, annual reports for the years 1940–46 inclusive. These reports were apparently discontinued after 1946. In a few states executions do not take place in prisons; instead, prisoners are executed by local sheriffs. The figures in the text are not quite complete, therefore, since they do not take into account the comparatively few prisoners sentenced to death who were not received by or executed at state prisons.

[8] Report of the Select Committee on Capital Punishment, England, 1930, p. 67. This report, however, does not cite the source of this information or indicate the "given period" involved.

[9] Select Committee on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, 1930, p. 551.

[10] Emil Frankel, "One Thousand Murderers," 29 *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 672, 678 (1939).

[11] Texas Board of Pardons, annual reports for years 1947–48 to 1950–51.

REPRIEVE

A reprieve in the case of one sentenced to death is merely a postponement of execution. In general, the power to pardon carries with it the power to reprieve, whether or not the reprieve is expressly mentioned in the constitution among the other forms of clemency. While reprieves are sometimes granted in noncapital cases, they are most important in capital cases, to stay execution of death.

The reports of pardon authorities indicate a variety of different reasons for granting reprieves in capital cases. They are often granted—as of course they should be if the law does not provide for an automatic stay of execution—pending the appeal of the case to a higher court or to allow the condemned man to apply to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari or to allow him to pursue other procedural remedies in the courts. If newly discovered evidence bearing on the case is found, reprieve should be granted pending an investigation into the matter. A reprieve may be granted a woman prisoner who is pregnant. It is a well-settled rule of law that an insane person cannot be executed, so reprieves are often granted to determine the question of insanity; and, if insanity is found, to postpone execution until sanity is regained. Reprieves are sometimes granted for less

important reasons, such as the fact that the date of execution is a holiday or a Sunday or the prisoner's birthday.

CONCLUSION

Pardon authorities are given broad and almost unrestricted discretion over pardons, commutations, and reprieves. This fact is one of the elements of strength in the proper administration of criminal justice. But it has sometimes led to abuse, especially in those states where one man has the final determination over clemency. Unscrupulous governors may build up their political careers by using the pardoning power to please people with political influence. Others, more honest, are influenced by the effect of their decisions on the electorate, rather than by the merits of the particular case.

While the discretion of pardon authorities is so broad that there exists no definite standard by which to determine whether the discretion is being abused or not, yet some situations have arisen which clearly show an abuse of discretion. The most notorious of these cases is that of a former Governor of Oklahoma, who was impeached because he frequently exercised his power to pardon, not on the merits of the case, but rather as an accommodation for friends or for financial rewards for himself.

In spite of occasional abuse, however, it seems obvious that the power to pardon is a necessary part of American criminal jurisprudence, in capital as well as noncapital cases. As long as a conviction cannot be reversed after a period of time for newly discovered evidence proving the defendant's innocence, we need the power to pardon for innocence. There will always be cases of technical guilt but, because of extenuating circumstances, comparatively little moral fault. The pardon power, in other words, is necessary in cases where the strict legal rules of guilt and innocence have produced harsh or unjust results. Doubtless the administration of the pardoning power can be improved, as the Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures, including Pardon, has concluded. But the power to pardon will continue to play an important part in the ultimate disposition of capital cases as long as capital punishment remains with us.

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The Death Penalty in Washington State

By NORMAN S. HAYNER and JOHN R. CRANOR

LIKE a woman changing her mind, the sovereign state of Washington has wavered in attitude on capital punishment. The death penalty was in effect for fifty-nine years, was abolished for six, and now has been in effect again for thirty-three. Why was it abolished? Why was it restored? What is the validity of the argument for restoration in terms of later results?

The statutes enacted by the first legislature of the territory of Washington which met in Olympia in 1854 included a capital punishment law. Any person who either purposely, or in connection with a rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, killed another would upon conviction be guilty of murder in the first degree and suffer death. Such person might, however, be pardoned by the governor or have his sentence commuted to life imprisonment.[1]

It was forty-three years later before any attempt to abolish the death penalty was made. This proposal "to prohibit capital punishment in the state of Washington" passed the House by a vote of 37 to 31 with 10 absentees; it was killed in the Senate. Unsuccessful efforts were again made in 1899, 1901, and 1907. In 1911 Representative Frank P. Goss introduced in the legislature a bill to make first degree murder punishable by life imprisonment in the penitentiary instead of by death. "The House spent most of the afternoon debating the Goss bill for abolition of capital punishment, killing it finally by indefinite postponement, 53 to 40."[2] The measure was also defeated by a small majority in the Senate.

Finally, on February 20, 1913, after two hours of argument and oratory, a similar measure did pass the House by a vote of 70 to 25. During these two hours it was alleged by Mr. Goss that the existing law not only had failed to lessen crime, but was unjust and inhumane. Opponents said that abolition would increase crime and add an economic burden. Religious arguments were put forth by both sides. It was stated that convictions were hard to secure under the existing law: "Many guilty persons go free because jurors do not wish them hanged." After the long debate, "announcement of the vote was received with loud applause in which the packed galleries joined."[3]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESTORED

Attempts to revive capital punishment were made as early as 1915 and again in 1917. Fear of a crime wave following World War I was used as a reason. When in 1917 John Van Dell murdered E. W. Olson, industrial insurance commissioner, and boasted that the state could do nothing to him but board him for the rest of his life, sentiment for restoration of the death penalty flared up. This resulted in passage of a capital punishment statute by the House. The passage of this measure, which was later approved by both Senate and Governor, created one of the most exciting sessions of the 1919 legislature. The *Morning Olympian* for March 12 of that

[1] L. 1854, p. 78, sec. 12.

[2] *Olympia Daily Recorder*, Thursday Evening, January 26, 1911.

[3] *Ibid.*, February 21, 1913, p. 5, column 5. The bill was later approved by the Senate, 22 to 17, and was signed by the Governor.

TABLE 1—EXECUTIONS AND FIRST DEGREE MURDERS PER 100,000 POPULATION IN WASHINGTON STATE BY DECADES

Decade	Estimated Population[a] at Mid-decade	Executions[b]		First Degree Murders[b]	
		Number	Rate	Number	Rate
1. 1902–12	954,824	15	1.57	34	3.56
2. 1912–22	1,292,232	1	.08	72	5.57
3. 1922–32	1,501,364	17	1.13	90	5.99
4. 1932–42	1,687,353	21	1.24	113	6.66
5. 1942–52	2,186,130	12	.55	63	2.88

[a] 1907, 1917, 1927, 1937, and 1947.
[b] Data are for periods from October 1 of the first year in each decade to September 30 of the last year.

year reported the discussion as follows:

The House, by a vote of 75 to 18, passed S. B. 255 by Senators Kuykendall of Garfield, Cox of Walla Walla, and Johnson of Stevens-Pend Oreille, restoring the death penalty for first degree murder. The bill provides that in bringing in a verdict in a first degree murder case, the jury shall, if it finds the accused guilty, bring in a second verdict, deciding whether or not the murderer shall be hanged or shall serve a life sentence in the state penitentiary. Mrs. Haskell of Pierce, the only woman in the Legislature, voted for the bill. Shattuck of Kitsap moved to indefinitely postpone the bill. Shattuck's motion lost by a 78 to 15 vote. "There are too many brutal murders," declared Thompson. "We must reestablish the death penalty. We must send murderers to the gallows." Davis, Pierce, denied that murders had increased in the state since the abolition of the death penalty. He said the records in the Board of Control office showed that murders had not increased. "Do you remember two years ago when Van Dell, the murderer, went into the office of Industrial Insurance Commissioner Olson, on this very floor, and murdered him? Do you remember that Van Dell boasted that he would be sent to the pen for life to be fed and cared for?"[4] asked Reed of Mason. "Yes, I remember that and there was a lot of sentiment about it, too," replied Davis. "They used to burn witches in the olden times," said Shattuck (Sheriff of Kitsap County), closing the debate. "I tell you that I have shot at men and I have hit them. I have taken bad men to the penitentiary and have had them threaten to kill me when they got out. I don't want this Legislature to pass a law to hang the man that killed me. If he is quicker than I am and if he gets me, he is welcome. I tell you no man ever deliberately killed another unless his brain was diseased. Murderers are all crazy. Lock them up for life and take away the pardoning power of the governor. That is the right way. If you vote to pass this law, remember that next time a murderer is hanged in this state, you helped drive a nail in the scaffold. You helped to hang him."

[4] John Van Dell, WSP 8286, was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the first degree on March 17, 1917. Since he died June 23, 1921 of natural causes, the state did not have an exorbitant board bill in his case.

WHAT ARE THE FACTS?

Now, after thirty-three more years of experience with capital punishment, what can we say about the validity of these arguments? What has been the trend of executions during the past fifty years? Does this seem to have any relation to the rate for first degree murders? Do all counties use the death penalty? What is the warden's attitude toward executions?

Table 1 shows the number of executions per 100,000 population by decades and the number of first degree murders which resulted in commitment to the penitentiary.

It will be noted that the relation of executions to population remained fairly constant except for the period when the death penalty was abolished and during the last decade, when hangings dropped sharply. Although the murder rate increased during the second ten-year period when there was only one execution, it remained high in the third and fourth decades when hangings were frequent, and decreased with the execution rate in the fifth. These data suggest, but do not prove, (1) that executions have no clear-cut deterrent effect on murders and (2) that the incidence of both executions and murders is a product of other, more basic factors.[5]

TABLE 2—COMMITMENTS FOR CAPITAL CRIMES FOR THREE SUCCESSIVE SIX-YEAR PERIODS BEGINNING MARCH 1907

Period	Total Commitments	Capital Crime Commitments	
		Number	Percentage
1907–13	2,397	16[a]	.7
1913–19	1,904	37	1.9
1919–25	2,001	35[b]	1.7

[a] Seven executions.
[b] Five executions.

Executions became a function of the state penitentiary in 1904. Prior to May 6, 1904, when the first person was hanged at the Walla Walla prison, the counties had performed that duty. Since then there have been sixty-six of them. Twenty of the thirty-nine counties in the state have never sent an individual to Walla Walla for execution. Six counties have sent one; six counties, two or three; five counties, four or five; one county, nine; and one, fourteen. This means that, while the penalty is available to all courts, thirty-two counties are either not using it at all or using it to a limited extent.

The death penalty was repealed March 22, 1913 and restored March 14, 1919. Records available at the prison indicate that there was an increase in the number of capital crimes committed during that period. The higher rate continued, however, after capital punishment was restored.

One of the authors is a penologist who has spent more than twenty years in penal and correctional administration. His first experience with capital punishment occurred three years ago when he came to the Washington State Penitentiary. Two adjacent counties had suffered from almost identical murders. Because of a sharp difference in penal philosophy, the murderer who had many undesirable characteristics was given life, while the other, a fine-appearing fellow who seemed to have much more promise for rehabilitation,[6] had to be hanged. To those who are responsible for the execution of the death penalty, it is no pleasant task. We have never talked with a prison warden enjoined with this duty who was favorable to the death penalty. The late Warden Lewis E. Lawes, perhaps responsible for more executions than any other official in our country, concluded: "My experience has convinced me of the futility of capital punishment."[7] To such wardens an execution seems even less hu-

[5] First degree murders do not, of course, include the many instances where the charge accusing a person of first degree murder has been amended to read second degree murder on condition that the defendant plead guilty. It would be interesting to know whether such arrangements have increased or decreased in frequency during the past decade.

[6] A 1948 study of the 89 first degree murderers released from the territorial and later the state prison between 1882 and 1947 showed that only six were known to have gotten into trouble again.

[7] *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing* (New York, 1932), p. 1.

mane to the man's family than to the convicted person himself.

Although any group that has changed its mind twice could conceivably do so once more, it is probable that the people of Washington State will retain the death penalty. An occasional special case, like that of Van Dell, will tend to prevent abolition of capital punishment again.

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Abolition and Restoration of the Death Penalty in Missouri

By ELLEN ELIZABETH GUILLOT

THROUGHOUT the nineteenth century and up to the present time, there has been in the state of Missouri a more or less academic interest in the subject of capital punishment. Various articles for or against the practice have made their appearance in the press from time to time. The matter was, however, of crucial importance in the spring of 1917 when the legislature abolished the death penalty, and again in 1919 when it was restored. As far as Missouri is concerned, the most significant interest in this subject is confined neatly within this period. It is possible, therefore, to present a fairly comprehensive account of the history of capital punishment in Missouri within the limitations of those two years.

THE MOVEMENT FOR ABOLITION

In connection with the act abolishing capital punishment passed by the Missouri Legislature in 1917, it is to be remembered that the movement for the reform of prison life and the reformation of individual criminals was at that time nation-wide. It is therefore natural to believe that the Missouri act was a part of this greater movement.

The basic idea was that capital punishment forestalled the possibility of reformation. In addition, it had become increasingly difficult to get properly qualified jurors to serve in cases of capital crime, because of their conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty. For example, Judge Nick T. Cave,[1] now of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, told the writer that in 1914, while he was Prosecuting Attorney for Callaway County, he prosecuted, for first degree murder, a colored man who was accused of shooting and killing a white boy. The case was opened on Monday and went to the jury on Wednsday afternoon. The jury did not report until Saturday afternoon, when it was called into court by the presiding judge. It was learned later that on the first ballot the jury was unanimous in its verdict of first-degree murder, but on the question of inflicting capital punishment the jurors failed to agree; seven were for hanging and five for life imprisonment. A decision by the jury regarding punishment was therefore impossible.

The movement for the abolition of capital punishment is described as gradual and as characterized by a sensible approach. A good many reforms in the treatment of prisoners had already been carried out, such as establishment of night classes at the penitentiary, exercises out of doors, dedication of a new playground for prisoners with facilities for playing baseball, elimination of the contract labor system, and the purchase of a prison farm along the rich Missouri River bottoms where quantities of fruits and vegetables were raised and the prisoners given opportunity for work in the out-of-doors; severe punishments (such as hanging up by the thumbs) had been done away with, and the parole system had been rewritten.[2]

[1] The writer is indebted to Judge Cave for much of the material for this article. Judge Cave was a member of the Judiciary Committees of both houses of the Legislature during this decade.

[2] *Kansas City Star*, April 4, 1917, p. 2.

THE ACT OF 1917

The bill for the abolishment of capital punishment in Missouri was introduced in the Forty-ninth General Assembly in 1917 by Representative O. B. Whitaker of Hickory County. Whitaker was a man of importance in the state; he had been president of three small colleges, and had written a number of books on Christian fellowship and social problems.[3] The revised statute as adopted read as follows:

An Act to Abolish Capital Punishment in the State of Missouri. From and after the taking effect of this act it shall be unlawful in this state to take human life as a punishment for crime, and no court shall enforce capital punishment as a penalty for crime. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent or in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.

The act was approved on April 13, 1917. It never appeared in the Revised Statutes of Missouri, since it was repealed before the codification of 1919.

It will be noticed that this important enactment was made just when this country was entering the First World War. There was probably little opposition to the law; so occupied were the people and the newspapers with the war that the enactment was hardly noticed in the press. There were, however, some brief comments expressing satisfaction that the spectacle of public execution, with its attendant debauchery, would no longer take place.[4]

The matter was perhaps exaggerated, since the number of criminals put to death was certainly not large. The *Kansas City Star* reported that there were in Jackson County nine victims in twenty-six years,[5] and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* noted that not a single execution had taken place in St. Louis County during the fourteen years previous to the passage of the act.[6]

OPINION FOR AND AGAINST

There were certain serious misgivings and difference of opinion as to what would result from the repeal of the law inflicting the death penalty. Hunt C. Moore, then prosecuting attorney of Jackson County, declared that the new statute was a humane law and that the abolition of capital punishment would have no effect on the spread of crime. It would also, he thought, make it possible to secure better juries in first-degree crime cases.

Judge Ralph S. Latshaw of the same county, however, was bitterly opposed to the new enactment. He thought it had been made by softhearted legislators who allowed their sympathies to overpower their reason. He believed that the penitentiary held no terror for the rapist, the robber, or the murderer, and that life sentences were a joke. He said that there was but one man in the State Penitentiary at that time who had been there over ten years, and that he was a poor, unknown, friendless Hawaiian who would also have been free if he had had a single friend. Judge Latshaw also said that kidnaping and train robbery were so rare since they had been punishable by death that not a single instance had come to his attention. He quoted the Bible as his authority: "Whosoever sheddeth the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed."[7]

Dissatisfaction among law enforcement agencies with the new law abolishing capital punishment seems to have grown during the two years following its enactment, for we find that Prosecuting Attorney McDaniels of St. Louis County issued early in January 1919 an appeal for the re-enactment of the older statute.[8]

This was possibly in some measure provoked by a situation described by Judge Cave, who records the commission of a serious crime shortly before the abolition act was repealed. Men from St. Louis came to Fulton, in Callaway County, where copper wire was stored preparatory to the construction of certain electrical installations. Copper wire was very valuable at that time. The robbers cut the wire into short lengths and loaded it into their truck. They carried it to St. Louis, and it was reported to the police that the truck was to be stored in a garage behind an apartment building. Police officers were stationed at the garage to await the arrival of the robbers. The men drove the truck into the alley leading to the garage, and when officers attempted to put them under arrest, a battle followed. Two policemen were killed. Later the men were caught and came to trial. They were sentenced to the penitentiary for life.

There was a hysterical reaction to these murders. People who had been previously opposed to capital punishment were outraged, and newspapers that had supported its abolition now advocated the restoration of the death penalty for murder. It was argued that the criminal element had no fear of the law and that criminals could "shoot their way out." If they surrendered to the police, they would be sent to the penitentiary; if they murdered the police, they would also merely be sent to the penitentiary. The law thus gave no protection to the police. Law enforcement officers throughout the state urged the restoration of capital punishment.

THE ACT OF 1919

The consequence of McDaniel's appeal and of the situation just described was the introduction in the Missouri Senate, Fiftieth General Assembly, by Senator Mayes of Penobscot County, on January 20, 1919, of Senate Bill 84, entitled

An Act to repeal an Act of the Forty-ninth General Assembly, approved April 13, 1917, entitled "An Act to Abolish Capital Punishment in the State of Missouri" and to enact a section reviving all former laws providing for capital punishment.

The bill went through the ordinary routine of legislative procedure in the Senate and, on April 3, 1919, was passed by a vote of 26 yeas, 8 nays, absent 3. However, when the bill came up in the House, at a time when it was next to impossible to keep more than a bare quorum in their seats, it lacked three votes to pass that body.[9]

One does not know how long the bill abolishing capital punishment in Missouri might have remained on the statute books had it not been for a series of crimes that greatly disturbed the public mind. In the jail at Lamar, in Barton County, there was confined a man ominously named Jay Lynch. It is believed that his wife or mother or both of them delivered to him a package containing a pistol. Lynch, so equipped, made his dash for liberty and in so doing killed the sheriff and the sheriff's son. He seems to have been tried and sentenced to life imprisonment. A mob broke into the jail and seized and lynched him early in June 1919.[10] Representative Chancellor of Barton County

[3] *Missouri Historical Review*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (July 1942), p. 310.

[4] William M. Reedy, "Hanging is a Lost Art," *Kansas City Star*, April 19, 1918.

[5] *Kansas City Star*, April 15, 1917, p. 8A.

[6] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 5, 1919, p. 14.

[7] *Kansas City Star*, April 15, 1917, p. 8A.

[8] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, Jan. 26, 1919, p. 2 Editorial Section.

[9] *Journal of the Missouri Legislature*, 50th General Assembly, Regular and Extra Sessions, Senate, p. 50; *Kansas City Times*, July 3, 1919, p. 13.

[10] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 18, 1919, p. 17.

told his fellow legislators that this lynching would not have occurred had it not been for the law of two years previous abolishing capital punishment.[11] Also, at the same time, peace officers of Lafayette County were murdered.[12]

But the most disturbing event of this kind was in connection with the robbery of the Meramec Trust Company in St. Louis County, June 12, 1919, on which occasion one patrolman was killed and another wounded. A number of "Letters from the People" appeared in the *Post-Dispatch,* some of which are extremely interesting in their reflection of public sentiment. On June 17 one correspondent quotes from a recent editorial in the *Post-Dispatch,* "the stolen money was speedily recovered, and two desperate principals were by arrest permanently removed from the class of those who prey on the community." He then goes on:

> The *Post-Dispatch* is slightly mistaken. First, they were not desperate. Desperate men fight to the last. Secondly, they will not be permanently removed, at least so long as there is a workable parole board. They will probably be at liberty in three or four years as is usual in such cases. A short time ago I read in your esteemed paper where five hundred or so murderers were let loose in society. All paroled by the board. Will they commit murder again? . . . It is truly marvelous that we do not have more lynching than we do. The people of Missouri deserve credit for it. If the law don't protect, who will? Shall we have to go back to the day when every man carried his own legislature and his justice strapped to his belt?

Another letter writer on June 28, however, declaring himself opposed to capital punishment, quotes Genesis 9: 6, as given above, and adds, "This would exterminate the race."

[11] *Kansas City Star,* July 3, 1919, p. 13.
[12] *Ibid.*

ACTION BY SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Significant action connected with the settlement of the issue came from the Tenth Ward Improvement Association of St. Louis.[13] It happened that a special session of the Missouri Legislature had just been called by Governor Frederick G. Gardner to convene July 2 to consider and ratify the amendment to the federal Constitution granting suffrage to women. The Tenth Ward Improvement Association joined in the current demand on the Governor to issue a supplemental message to the legislature calling upon it to consider a bill restoring capital punishment in Missouri. The association complained that St. Louis had been overrun with crime during the past year, and said that crime had been violent because criminals knew that capital punishment was no longer law in Missouri.

Governor Gardner, in his reply to the Tenth Ward Improvement Association, stated that he had not included the question of the restoration of capital punishment in his call because the legislature meeting in regular session had opposed restoration. A new legislature would be chosen in eighteen months, and it might view the matter differently. He added that he had been in communication with the governors of eleven states in which capital punishment had been abolished, and they had been asked if crime had increased. "None said that it had increased, and eight declared that it had not." The Governor was thus reluctant to have the matter of the restoration of capital punishment considered at the special session of the legislature.[14]

[13] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* June 16, 1919, p. 12.
[14] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* June 24, 1919, p. 14.

A petition was circulated by Representative Chancellor of Barton County that requested the Governor to send a special message to the legislature submitting the question of restoring capital punishment. This petition was quickly signed by 78 members of the House, six more than a constitutional majority. The Governor was anxious to hold down the expenses of the special session and to confine the members to action on the issue they had been summoned to consider. However, he met with four or five petitioners, discussed the matter with them, and demanded of them statistics. In spite of the fact that none of them had any statistics, he yielded to their argument that public sentiment among their constituents was most decidedly in favor of restoring the capital punishment law for the purpose of discouraging highway robberies, bank robberies, and attendant murders.

The Governor thus gave his consent, but the session that restored capital punishment in Missouri was a stormy one. The friends of the Governor resorted to obstructive tactics to prevent the matter from coming to a vote, and the debate was complicated by the proposal of an amendment to substitute the electric chair for the noose.[15]

The legislature at this special session repealed the act of 1917 and re-enacted sections of the revised statutes of 1909, so that treason, rape, kidnaping for ransom, perjury committed in the trial of any indictment for a capital offense, train robbery of certain sorts, and murder in the first degree remained punishable by death at the discretion of the jury.

[15] *Kansas City Times,* July 6, 1919, p. 1.

CONCLUSION

The abolishment of capital punishment in Missouri thus came about as part of a general movement for the amelioration of the lives of the condemned that was nation-wide, and capital punishment was restored by an urgent public sentiment of fear and indignation brought about by crimes following the First World War.

It has been said that the race question entered into the matter of the reenactment, but this seems not to be true. Indeed, Judge Cave assures the writer—and his assurance is supported by examination of the press of the state—that the race question did not enter into the issue of capital punishment as it arose in Missouri, since the crimes were those of whites against whites and were not reflective of race prejudice.

By way of completion it may be said that it was not until 1937 that the administration of lethal gas was substituted for hanging, and the place of execution transferred from the counties to the State Penitentiary at Jefferson City. Since that time there have been twenty-seven executions, distributed as follows: Colored: rape, 3; murder first, 15. White: murder first, 9.[16]

[16] Letter dated June 23, 1952, from R. N. Edson, warden of Missouri State Penitentiary.

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Capital Punishment in Oregon

By Robert H. Dann

CAPITAL punishment was mandatory in Oregon until 1914, when, by a very narrow margin of voter expression, the state substituted life imprisonment for the death penalty. In 1920 capital punishment was re-established, but made subject to the discretion of the jury.

Place of Execution

Prior to 1903, executions were more or less public demonstrations, carried out in the yards of the county jails or in public squares. In that year Governor George E. Chamberlain, in his inaugural address to the legislature, recommended that "all executions should take place within the wall of the penitentiary." In the same year a law was passed requiring that all executions take place at the State Penitentiary at Salem, and two years later Governor Chamberlain said he was sure this law would "be most beneficial in its results."

The Death Penalty Abolished

Governor Oswald West, in his first message to the legislature in 1911, opened the campaign to abolish capital punishment. He denied the validity of the doctrine of an eye for an eye, and called attention to the unreliability of circumstantial evidence and to the reluctance of juries to demand the death sentence. He concluded that the "desperate criminal, relying on the reluctance of the average juror and the caution of the court, in the imposition of the capital sentence, is more willing to take a gambler's chance with death . . . than he would be to face the greater certainty of life spent behind the bars." He also recommended that restriction be placed on the pardoning power of the governor.

In 1912 an initiative petition to abolish capital punishment appeared on the ballot in the November election but failed to secure a majority vote.

A second attempt, led by Governor West, was made in 1914, against the judgment of many, who felt that it was too soon following a defeat. There were thirty-one items on the ballot, but the abolition of capital punishment received a majority of 157.

In 1915 the necessary legislation was passed, repealing three sections of Lord's Oregon Laws and amending the state constitution. The repealed sections, which had been adopted in 1903, were Section 1598, "Warrant to Enforce Judgment of Death"; Section 1599, "Death Sentence, How and Where Executed"; and Section 1600, "Warrant Issued to Sheriff Where Action Commenced." The amendment to the constitution became Section 36 of Article I, and read: "The death penalty shall not be inflicted upon any person under the laws of Oregon. The maximum punishment which may be inflicted shall be life imprisonment."

In his address to the legislature in 1915, Governor West said, "the old barbarous system of capital punishment has been abolished." He proposed that pardons should be granted only upon the recommendation of the court in which the case originated.

The Death Penalty Restored

The matter rested only until 1917, when a House Joint Resolution was introduced with the proposal that it be referred to the people in the election

of 1918. The resolution was to amend the constitution to read: "The death penalty shall be inflicted upon any person under the laws of Oregon, who is convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree." The proposal was referred to the Committee on Resolutions and was indefinitely postponed.

In 1919 Governor James Withycombe, in his address to the legislature, called attention to the fact that since the repeal of capital punishment the state was without any punishment for treason. He hoped the legislature would remedy the situation, even though treason was a concern of the federal government. He was worried about "I.W.W.ism and other forms of disloyalty." He died shortly after his re-election, and the Secretary of State, Ben W. Olcott, succeeded him.

Governor Olcott called a special session of the legislature in 1920, and in his address he said:

> Since the adjournment of the regular session in 1919 a wave of crime has swept over the country. Oregon has suffered from this criminal blight, and during the past few months the commission of a number of cold-blooded and fiendish homicides has aroused our people to a demand for greater and more certain protection. . . . Because of a series of dastardly homicidal offenses a distinct public sentiment has developed that the people of the state should once more be given an opportunity to pass upon the question of the restoration of capital punishment and that there should be no unnecessary delay in bringing this question before the electorate.

At the special session, the legislature passed for reference to the people an amendment designed to re-establish capital punishment. The proposed Section 37 of Article I was to read: "The penalty for murder in the first degree shall be death, except when the trial jury shall in its verdict recommend life imprisonment, in which case the penalty shall be life imprisonment." Section 38 was to re-establish the former sections 1598, 1599, and 1600 as found in Lord's Oregon Laws.

The Voters Pamphlet

Prior to each election the state publishes what is known as *The Voters Pamphlet*, in which candidates set forth their claims to office, and bills initiated by or referred to the public are explained. In the pamphlet issued for the 1920 special election, which was also the primary election, pro and con articles regarding the death sentence appeared.

The article supporting its restoration was sponsored by Senators B. L. Eddy of Douglas, K. K. Kubli of Multnomah, and David E. Lofgren of Clackamas counties. They argued that "to punish cold-blooded murder with death *naturally* has a tendency to deter" even the hardened criminal, while a term in prison "is no serious hindrance." The death penalty marks murder as a "heinous offense," and the psychological effect on the young must be of "greatest deterrent value." "We naturally come to rate an offense as serious in proportion to the weight of the penalty."

The article recognized that crime waves are associated with other factors in the social situation, but pressed the issue of the dangerous criminal who is beyond hope, "whose restraint amounts to no more than holding in leash dangerous beasts who may at any time break away." The authors quoted the Old Testament to support their position, and concluded: "Let us not be weakly sentimental. . . . Sentiment should not outweigh Justice. . . . A person who willfully commits murder writes his own doom—the state merely executes the judgment."

The negative argument was prepared by W. H. Strayer of Baker, and Mrs.

Alexander Thompson and Eugene E. Smith of Multnomah counties. They argued that changing the constitution was a serious matter, and that the forthcoming election was designed for other matters. They doubted the wisdom of leaving much discretion to juries, because they are subject to influence. And they regretted that space did not allow a full discussion of the weakness of capital punishment as a deterrent. "A person seldom kills another with the expectation that he will be punished at all, and if he does kill with a knowledge that he will be punished, the condition of the murderer's mind is such, and his passions are so aroused, that no punishment will act as a deterrent." The article did not carry enthusiasm or show deep conviction.

The Oregon Voter

The Oregon Voter is a weekly publication, edited by C. C. Chapman, which has considerable political influence. In the issue of May 8, 1920, a letter appeared from Rev. W. J. McElven, in opposition to the death penalty. His position was that restoration of the death penalty would be a step backward for Oregon, from its place as a progressive state to the demand for revenge; that criminologists are opposed to the death penalty; that figures do not support the contention that it is deterrent; that there is a tendency to punish those who cannot afford an adequate legal battle; that the executed man is likely to become a hero; that the requirement of death often prevents conviction when the jury has no choice; that capital punishment is unchristian, and a sin is no less a sin when committed by the whole state. He commented on a recent "heinous" murder. A man had been sponsored on parole from the penitentiary by a woman whom he subsequently murdered, and he was reported to have said he would not have committed this murder had there been capital punishment in the state. McElven doubted the value of this man's testimony. He concluded that Oregon needed strict and impartial law enforcement and a limitation on the pardoning power of the authorities.

The next issue of *Oregon Voter*, May 15, 1920, contained a reply from Senator B. L. Eddy, in much the same language as that of the positive article in *The Voters Pamphlet*. He said: "More sophistry and misinformation could hardly be combined in a single article." He criticized McElven for failure to quote criminologist authorities, and then quoted Baron Raffaele Gorofalo, the Italian criminologist, who said: "The death penalty is a defensive measure and based on analogy of the operation of the Darwinian principle of natural selection." Punishment should either eliminate the offender or make reparation for the harm done. He accused McElven of neglecting the Old Testament and espousing theories of human progress. He claimed to be an understanding Christian who believed both Old and New Testaments to be the Word of God.

Pre-election debate

The issue of *Oregon Voter* for May 22, 1920, circulated just prior to the election, contained a strong article against the proposed constitutional amendment, preceded and followed by strong editorial comment. The editor compared a murderer to a rattlesnake that should be killed to defend mankind. He wrote: "And if the duty were upon us [the editor] we would not hesitate to slay a human rattlesnake to protect innocent human beings from murder."

Space was then given to an article prepared under the sponsorship of Norman F. Coleman—listed as president of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, but not as a professor at Reed College, of which he later became president—Ben Selling a prominent Portland businessman, Bishop Sumner of the Episcopal Church, George Rebec the revered professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon, Sarah H. Evans, Millie R. Turnbull, Frederic K. Howard, and C. S. Kohs.

This article, bounded "fore and aft" by editorial comment, argued against restoration of capital punishment. To the proposition that the jury should have power to decide in favor of hanging, the authors replied that juries more often gave the life sentence when given a choice. They referred to the problem of circumstantial evidence and unjust convictions. They held that the certainty of punishment was more deterrent than severity, and that the Biblical quotations so often used did not fit in with the spirit and teachings of Jesus. They referred to psychological evidence that criminals are sick but that coddling is not the best method of dealing with them. "Sound psychology is not against the death penalty, if it is the best method . . . but it denies that hanging and electrocution are the best methods, but they are the easiest." They advocated individual treatment of each case, and were opposed to classification until a complete diagnosis had been made. They believed that "weakly sentimentality" did not agree with the idea that "brutality begets brutality," and raised the question why we did not execute all misfits. They concluded that the fact that one man had stained his soul with murder was no reason why the whole state should do the same.

This article was followed by quotation of an editorial by George Putnam, editor of the *Capital Journal* of Salem, Oregon. With reference to the famous "California Bluebeard" who under pressure had confessed and saved himself from the death penalty, the editorial commented: "Had this modern bluebeard been apprehended in Oregon, the confession would not have been forthcoming, for there would have been no fear of the gallows to extort it." The editor concluded: "As long as society breeds bluebeards and degenerates of this type, just so long will the gallows be needed as a protection to society. While not a preventive of crime the noose is certainly a deterrent." He failed to comment that California, where the bluebeard operated, had the death penalty, and it did not deter him from his crimes.

TABLE 1—RECORD OF VOTING ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN OREGON

Year	Number Voting	For Capital Punishment	Against Capital Punishment	Majority		Did Not Vote
				For Capital Punishment	Against Capital Punishment	
1912	144,113	64,578	41,951	22,627		37,584
1914	259,868	100,395	100,552		157	58,921
1920	171,592	81,756	64,589	17,167		25,247

The result

At the election held in May 1920, the voters adopted the constitutional amendment proposed at the special legislative session. Table 1 gives the details of the election returns.

WHAT WARDENS AND CHAPLAINS SAY

There is a dearth of reference to the death penalty in the biennial reports of the wardens to the Secretary of State.

Superintendent C. W. James reported in 1910 that eighteen men had been executed in Oregon in the last seven and a half years, "the greatest number ever executed in any similar period in this state." He said: "It does not appear, however, that the increasing number of executions in this state has operated as a deterrent to the crime of homicide; . . . I am fully convinced that capital punishment should be abolished." During his administration, capital punishment was the only sentence for first degree murder.

The next reference in the biennial reports appears in 1925, when three men are listed as being executed. The following years show a constant change in wardens, none of whom make any reference to the death penalty.

The only reference to our topic in the chaplains' reports occurs in the report of Protestant Chaplain Carl H. Bryan in 1923, when he wrote: "I have visited death row as often as I thought wise and rendered what assistance I could to the condemned men, which was always appreciated by them."

RECORDS OF STATE PENITENTIARY

The statistical records of the penitentiary reporting the population of the institution offer very little information, and do not reflect the changes that took place in the law. Table 2 gives the data as presented in the biennial reports.

TABLE 2—POPULATION OF OREGON STATE PENITENTIARY

Year	Manslaughter	Murder	First Degree Murder	Second Degree Murder	Executions
1907	15			24	1903-10, 18
1909	14			32	
1911	20			40	
1913	15			33	
1915	12	7		44	
1917	7	14			
1919	7	16			
1921	10	15			
1923	12	7		7	
1925	7		7	3	3
1927	11		3	5	4
1929	12		12	3	4

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented here does not warrant much conclusion, except perhaps that a majority of 157 is not sufficient on which to stabilize a constitutional change, and the further comment that there is need for objective data that can be presented to the voting public in clear and convincing terms.

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The Errors of Justice

By OTTO POLLAK

I shall ask for the abolition of the penalty of death until I have the infallibility of human judgment demonstrated to me. —Lafayette

TO recognize the fallibility of human judgment and still to act, but act wisely in the light of such fallibility, is one of the great challenges of mankind. For this reason the fact of irrevocability has always been among the arguments for the abolition of the death penalty. It was brought up in the French National Assembly of 1791.[1] In 1948 it was brought up in the debate on the Criminal Justice Bill in the British House of Commons.[2] It was brought up on all conceivable occasions in the time span between these two cornerstones of legislative consideration of the abolition of capital punishment. In all probability it will continue to be brought up until capital punishment has disappeared from the practice of civilized society.

The strength of this argument is revealed by the counterarguments which it has evoked. Apparently very few opponents of the abolition of capital punishment have had the courage to say: Yes, errors of judgment have led to the execution of innocent persons and may do so in the future, but this is a necessary item of social cost. Significantly enough, many efforts to meet the argument have followed other lines. They have resorted to avoidance or to the denial of the obvious. Thus they have shown reactions typically associated with fear, and it is this fear which suggests that the argument is considered as serious even by those who try to deny its validity.

RISK OF ERRONEOUS EXECUTION MINIMIZED

The records show that French, English, Belgian, German, and American lawyers have repeatedly made statements to the effect that because of the safeguards of the jury system, because of the protection furnished by the pardoning power, or because of the possibility to resort to the alternative punishment of lifetime imprisonment, the risk of executing an innocent person did not exist or almost did not exist.[3] A district attorney in Worcester County, Massachusetts is reported to have said in the 1920's: "Innocent men are never convicted. Don't worry about it, it never happens in the world. It is a physical impossibility."[4] Sir John Anderson, for ten years permanent Head of the Home Office, said in the British House of Commons on April 14, 1948:

It is fair to say, and there was a wealth of testimony to that effect in the evidence before the Select Committee, that the risk,

[1] Charles Lucas, *Recueil des débats des Assemblées Législatives de la France sur la question de la peine de mort* (Paris, 1831), Part I, p. 38.

[2] *Hansard*, 5th Series, Vol. 449, Col. Nos. 1000–1002.

[3] Erich Sello, *Die Irrtümer der Strafjustiz und Ihre Ursachen* (Berlin: R. V. Decker's Verlag, 1911), pp. 6–7; M. Liepmann, *Die Todesstrafe* (Berlin: J. Guttentag, 1912), p. 127; Gabriel Tarde, *Penal Philosophy* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1912), p. 539; Edwin M. Borchard, *Convicting the Innocent* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), p. vii; *Hansard, loc. cit.*

[4] Borchard, *loc. cit.*

under the conditions as they exist in this country, of the capital penalty being executed on any one who was not in fact guilty of the crime of which he had been convicted is so small, indeed so infinitesimal, that that consideration can be dismissed.[5]

Statements of similar nature have been made not only by practicing lawyers in the heat of public pronouncement, but also by professors of criminal law. Even a man of the international reputation of Wilhelm Kahl asked, on the occasion of a lawyers' convention, where those cases of executing innocent persons had occurred which justified stressing the argument of human fallibility in discussing the pros and cons of capital punishment.[6] Interestingly enough, in 1910 the *American Journal of Sociology* contained an article in which the following statement can be found:

> It is said that the death penalty is irrevocable and thus an innocent man might suffer it. It is well known to prison officials and the police that such instances are mostly mythical and seldom, if at all, can be proved beyond a doubt.[7]

If such denials can be made by practitioners and scholars alike, the argument apparently cannot be countered with Bentham's question: "Is there, or could there be devised, any system of penal procedure which could insure the judge from being misled by false evidence or the fallibility of his own judgment?"[8] The obvious must be corroborated by facts, and such attempts have been undertaken repeatedly and in various countries.

[5] *Hansard, op. cit.*, Col. 1000.

[6] Liepmann, *loc. cit.*

[7] Arthur McDonald, "Death Penalty and Homicide," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 16, pp. 91–92.

[8] Jeremy Bentham, *Works* (Bowring edition, Edinburgh, 1843), Vol. I, p. 447.

REPORTS OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE

Actually, by the time Kahl and McDonald made the statements quoted above, they could have found books devoted to reports of miscarriages of justice. The number of these books is large enough to make their disregard or lack of knowledge by these scholars an interesting psychological phenomenon. Certainly McDonald might have been expected to be acquainted with the writings of Charles Phillips and Alfred H. Dymond.[9] Equally, Kahl might have been expected to be acquainted with the works of Mühlfeld, Katscher, Lailler and Vonoven, and Péan.[10]

Since McDonald's and Kahl's statements were made, there have appeared Sello's careful analysis of 153 cases,[11] and Borchard's classic *Convicting the Innocent* which carries the identification of erroneous verdicts in the United States into the first three decades of the twentieth century.[12] To be sure, these works show some overlapping in their reports and show various degrees of reliability. However, they contain a sufficient number of solidly documented reports on actual executions of innocent persons to make the questioning of the real risk in this respect a hardly tenable position. They contain, further, a large number of cases which show to what degree life imprisonment, because of the time element involved and because of the continued interest in the victim

[9] Charles Phillips, *Vacation Thoughts on Capital Punishment*, 4th edition, London, 1858; Alfred H. Dymond, *The Law on its Trial, or Personal Recollections of the Death Penalty and its Opponents*, London, 1865.

[10] Julius Mühlfeld, *Justizmorde*, Berlin, 1880; Leopold Katscher, *Schuldlos Verurteilt*, Leipzig, 1895; Lailler and Vonoven, *Les erreurs judiciaires et leurs causes*, Paris 1897; Gaston Péan, *L'erreur judiciaire*, Paris, 1895; Liepmann, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 129 and 137.

[11] Sello, *op. cit.* note 3.

[12] Borchard, *op. cit.* note 3.

which such life terms safeguard, permits the discovery of errors in convicting a person of a capital crime. They show, finally, that the sources of errors in judgment are frequently the same whether the error has led to an actual execution or to a life sentence. Thus they dispel the notion that errors may have occurred in the past but do not occur in the present, and also the notion that errors might occur in the cases of sentencing a person to a life term but do not occur in the cases of actual execution.

Meaningful examples which might illustrate all this can, of course, be taken only from a time span in which the principles of procedure and the rules of evidence were sufficiently close to the present to make the risk which these cases demonstrate a still plausible one. Because of this consideration, the illustrations given below do not go beyond the period of the French Revolution. In order to show the persistence of the same sources of error over the time span, the procedure followed in this paper will be to give for each source of major error an example from the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century on the one hand, and one from or close to the twentieth century on the other.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

As might be expected, circumstantial evidence is a frequent source of error in judgment. This category might be illustrated by the two following cases.

Case 1

On January 31, 1811, the barns of the mayor of a French village, Noyelles, were destroyed by a fire which had all the appearances of arson. Public opinion directed suspicion immediately at Maximilien Flament, who was a relative of the mayor. He was known to have lived in enmity with the latter, and some witnesses reported that three days before the fire Flament had voiced threats against him. Others reported that at the time of the fire the wind had blown in a direction such as to drive away the flames from Flament's house, which was situated close to the barns which were consumed. Flament increased suspicion against himself by repeatedly declaring himself innocent before a direct accusation had been made. Finally, the detectives discovered in the hedge which separated Flament's property from that of the mayor's a hole big enough to permit the arsonist to get through; and close by were footprints which fitted Flament.

On the basis of this circumstantial evidence Flament was arrested. He attempted to establish an alibi by only one witness, who first supported him but later showed uncertainty in his depositions. During the trial thirty-one witnesses testified against Flament; only the one produced by him in his defense supported him, and that one only weakly. On that basis he was found guilty and sentenced to die. Clemency was denied to him by the Emperor, and he was executed. Six years later his innocence became manifest in the following manner.

On October 20, 1817, a certain Felix Moreau was executed for murder in the same place. Immediately before the dropping of the knife Moreau, who was attended by the same priest who had stood by Flament at his last hour, confessed having committed the arson for which Flament had been executed, and asked for forgiveness. In recognition of the error in judgment which had sent his father to the guillotine, the National Assembly of 1850 granted Flament's son a pension.[13]

Case 2

On the morning of October 17, 1901, a railroad engineer, H. E. Wesson, was found dead in the shop yard of the Florida Southern Railway at Tilgham's Mill in Palatka, Florida. He had been shot at close range in the back of his head and his pockets had been turned inside out. Close by a

[13] Condensed from Sello, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 346–48.

.38 caliber pistol was found from which one shell had been fired. Under the pressure of public indignation the authorities right away rounded up a number of suspects and put them into jail. Among them was a yard night watchman, Lucius Crawford. Apparently on the afternoon after the arrest, the jailer observed a colored man approach a crack in the fence of the jail yard and call for Lucius Crawford who happened to be in the yard at that time. The jailer reported that the colored man was J. B. Brown and that he had heard him say to Crawford, "Keep your mouth shut and say nothing."

Brown was arrested and a chain of circumstantial evidence began to form against him. First of all it was reported that two months earlier Brown had had a fight with the murdered man and had threatened to kill him. On October 16, the day before the murder, Brown was reported by one witness as having been without money and having tried to borrow a quarter from him. In answer to the witness' refusal of his request, Brown was reported to have said "Never mind, I'll catch 209 away from here tonight, that is the train going south to meet 208." Two hundred and eight was the train on which the murdered man had worked as an engineer. On the morning after the murder, Brown had been observed to have money when he joined in a card game with a number of men, among whom there was one by the name of Johnson. Brown was reported to have been excited when he arrived for the game and to have taken Johnson aside for a whispered conversation.

After these items of apparent evidence had been collected against Brown, the other suspects were released. The clouds over Brown thickened further when two cell mates of his reported to the authorities that Brown had confessed to them that he had, together with Johnson, committed the murder for purposes of robbing Wesson of his money.

On the basis of all that, Brown and Johnson were indicted for murder in the first degree and Brown was brought up for a separate trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to be hanged. His appeal for clemency having been denied, he was finally led to the gallows. However, at the last minute, the rope having been put around his neck, the executioner was interrupted because of an almost unbelievable event. When the death warrant was read in the course of the execution procedure it was found that by mistake it ordered the execution, not of Brown, but of—the foreman of the jury which had found Brown guilty. Brown was returned to jail, and under the impact of this occurrence his capital sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The prosecution seemed to have lost the taste for continuing against Johnson, for the case against the latter was nol-prossed.

More than ten years later, Johnson confessed on his deathbed that he alone had committed the murder and that Brown had not been connected with the crime at all. On October 1, 1913, Brown, on the basis of Johnson's confession, was granted a full pardon, and in 1929 the Florida legislature granted him "For faithful service . . . during the period of his wrongful imprisonment the sum of $2,492 to be paid in monthly installments of $25." [14]

FALSE IDENTIFICATION

Another possible source of errors in judgment of criminal cases is false identification of the accused by witnesses. This phenomenon of faulty perception is well known to lawyers, and on occasional instances also reaches the awareness of the public because of the weight of tragedy with which its consequences may strike an innocent person. One of the earliest cases of this kind which falls within the time span here considered is the execution of Joseph Lesurques.

Case 3

In the year 1796, a mail coach was attacked by robbers on the road between Paris and Melun. The coachman and his assistant were killed. Only five persons could be considered as the criminals, the only passenger of the coach and the four members of the group of horsemen who had attacked it. The four horsemen had left Paris on the day of the crime in the early morning. During the day they had stopped at two inns where they had spent enough time and behaved conspicuously enough to be observed by many persons. Seven of these recognized Lesurques as one of the four riders who had committed the crime.

The identification convinced the jury of Lesurques's guilt in spite of the fact that he presented fourteen witnesses in support of his statement that he had spent the whole critical day in Paris. Unfortunately, one of these witnesses, Legrand, referred to a business entry in his ledger as the reason for his remembering the day. When the ledger was produced in court it was found, however, that this transaction had first been booked for the day following the day of the crime and that the date had been corrected later on. When, because of this, another witness who was supposed to have met with Lesurques and Legrand on the day of the crime became uncertain of the date, the jurors disbelieved also the twelve other witnesses for Lesurques's alibi.

After the jury had retired, a woman asked to be seen by the presiding judge and told him that Lesurques was the victim of a resemblance to her lover who had been one of the real criminals. The judge, however, told her that it was too late because the jury had already retired. After the verdict, Couriol, one of Lesurques's co-defendants, stated repeatedly that Lesurques was innocent and asserted this even on his way to the place of execution. After Lesurques had been executed, two other persons, Laborde and Roussy, were found guilty of the crime in separate trials and both asserted the innocence of Lesurques. If some question could still be raised as to whether Couriol had not lied in order to save Lesurques, no such question can be raised with regard to the other two, who made the statements regarding his innocence years after he had been executed.[15]

Roughly a hundred years later a case of mistaken identification caused the sentence to death by hanging of a youth who escaped his fate and lived to see his rehabilitation only because the knot around his neck untied after the trap was sprung.

Case 4

In 1893 the Whitecaps, an organization formed to suppress criminality among the Negroes by private action, took punitive measures against the servant of one of its own members, in Marion County, Mississippi. His employer, a certain Will Buckley, decided to denounce the organization before the Grand Jury of the County, which led to an indictment of three members of the organization. On his way back, Will Buckley, who was accompanied by his brother Jim and the Negro servant who had been flogged by the Whitecaps, was killed from ambush. After he saw Will Buckley fall from his horse, the murderer jumped out into the lane and fired one more shot at the companions of his victim, but they managed to escape.

Close to the place of the murder was the home of the Purvis family. Two days after the murder, bloodhounds picked up a scent which led them in the direction of the Purvis place; and a neighbor, who was an enemy of the family, directed suspicion at young Will Purvis. He was arrested and while in jail admitted that he had been a member of the Whitecaps, but insisted that he was innocent of the murder. However, Jim Buckley, the brother of the murdered man, positively identified Will Purvis as the killer. This, together with the admission of the accused that he had belonged to the organization which Will Buckley had exposed, made the defense, which was based on an alibi, unconvincing although it was supported by creditable witnesses. Will Purvis was found guilty and sentenced to capital punishment.

[14] Condensed from Borchard, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 33–39.

[15] Condensed from Sello, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 327–43.

As already indicated, the execution was attempted, but the rope did not tighten around his neck when the trap was sprung. This was a public execution, and the onlookers made it unmistakeably clear that they would not let the executioner make another attempt to hang Purvis. Purvis was taken back to jail, and a new execution was ordered to be carried out on July 31, 1895. Public indignation about this court order ran high. On the eve of the execution Purvis was liberated by a group of friends and hidden from the authorities. This case played a role in the following elections for state governor of Mississippi, and the candidate in favor of commuting the sentence won. When he assumed office Purvis surrendered himself, and the governor commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.

Two years after this commutation, Jim Buckley, who had been the principal witness against Purvis, admitted that he might have made a mistake in his identification of the accused, and Purvis received a full pardon on December 19, 1898. Roughly nineteen years later, that is twenty-three years after the execution which Purvis escaped by so gruesome an incident, an old man, Joe Beard, experienced a religious conversion at a revival meeting and confessed himself a terrible sinner, without, however, revealing the details. Shortly afterwards, when grievously ill, Beard confessed that he and another man, Louis Thornhill, had been chosen by the Whitecaps to punish Will Buckley, that they had been in the ambush, and that Thornhill had fired the deadly shot. In 1920 the legislature of Mississippi granted Will Purvis a compensation of $5,000 "for service done and performed . . . in the State Penitentiary under the provision of an erroneous judgment." [16]

FALSE CONFESSION

It is probably true that nothing alleviates doubt in jurors and judges as much as a confession on the part of the defendant. It is probably even more true that nothing is harder to believe than the possibility that a person accused of a capital crime would wrongly confess to having committed it. Yet this seems to have happened a number of times. Spurious confessions led to death sentences in the frequently mentioned case of Jesse and Steven Boorn.

Case 5

In the year 1812 these two Vermont farmers once worked together with their brother-in-law, Russel Colvin, in the fields. They were observed to quarrel with him. That was the last that was seen of Russel Colvin. Since he was known to have the habit of disappearing for periods sometimes as long as eight or nine months, no suspicion was aroused at first. In the ensuing years, however, a fantastic chain of events seemed to point to the two brothers as the probable killers of their sister's husband.

An enumeration of the individual items of occurrence which led to the formation of this suspicion would take up too much space and it would not be pertinent to the point which this case illustrates. At any rate, seven years after the disappearance of Colvin, the suspicion which had accumulated against the brothers led to their arrest. In the course of the proceedings, first one and then the other brother—probably despondent under the weight of the apparent evidence speaking against them and hoping for mercy—confessed their guilt. Although the confessions were made piecemeal and were in part contradictory, the brothers were sentenced to hang.

Jesse's sentence was commuted to a life term, but Steven's plea was denied. Under the threat of the apparently certain execution he marshaled his powers of defense and asked his attorney to advertise for the whereabouts of his brother-in-law. This was done, and Colvin was located in Dover, New Jersey. Due to the fortunate coincidence that a person knowing him happened to learn about the advertisement and managed to pursuade Colvin by ruses to return home, the innocence of the brothers was established.[17]

For the twentieth century, mention might be made of the case of Louise Butler and George Yelder, which occurred in Alabama in 1928.

Case 6

Louise Butler was a Negro woman who lived with her daughter Julia aged twelve and a small son, as well as two nieces, Topsy Warren aged fourteen, and Anne Mary aged nine. Louise Butler had won the affections of George Yelder and she was very jealous of his attentions. One day upon returning home she learned that George had visited in her absence and had found in the house only Topsy, who was now in possession of a new one-half-dollar piece. Louise Butler's jealousy was aroused and she beat the young girl severely, even threatening to kill her. After this incident Topsy was seen no more.

Rumors that Louise Butler had killed her niece brought the police into action. Incredible as it sounds, the two children, Anne Mary and Julia, accused Louise Butler and George Yelder of having killed Topsy, and gave many gory details. First Louise denied having killed Topsy, but later she confessed and even showed the authorities the spot where she said that she and George had thrown Topsy's body into the river. Afterwards she withdrew her confession but found no credence from the jury, in true accordance with the frequent experience that a prisoner is believed when he incriminates himself but mistrusted when he asserts that he is innocent.

Both Louise Butler and George Yelder were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. Shortly after their having been sent to the penitentiary, Topsy was found well and alive, staying with some relatives in another county. The sheriff later learned that the children had been coached by an enemy of George Yelder's to make the false accusations. The sheriff suggested that Louise Butler might have felt in her ignorance that she would curry favor by doing what the "white folks" wanted her to do, and had confessed for that reason. One cannot help wondering how the authorities would have felt about the reappearance of Topsy if a death sentence had been pronounced and executed in this case.[18]

Examples could easily be furnished also for the occurrence of cases in which a wrongly accused person was forced into spurious confessions by mistreatment or promises at the hands of the police. As already pointed out, such confessions, once made, tend to be believed even if the defendant later withdraws his statement.[19]

EXTENT OF RISK OF ERROR

Examples could further be furnished which show that both the hostility of a prosecutor against the psychiatric expert and the mistake of the psychiatric expert himself have led to the conviction and execution of persons who were suffering from severe mental disorders.[20] Space, however, does not permit any further illustrations. In any case, the necessarily limited number of examples which can be given in a single paper cannot convey any impression of the real extent of the risk of errors in convictions for capital crimes. These are crimes which, by their very nature, arouse strong emotions in the general public as well as in the officers of the law. Where such emotions are aroused, failures in perception are likely to occur.

For an evaluation of the quantity of risk of executing an innocent person, we must turn to the following consid-

[16] Condensed from Borchard, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 210–17.

[17] Condensed from Borchard, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 15–22; Sello, *op. cit.* note 3, p. 317, and others.

[18] Condensed from Borchard, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 40–45.

[19] Liepmann, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 159–60.

[20] Sello, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 110–28, 291–95; Liepmann, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 171–72.

erations. As far as the nineteenth century is concerned, a survey of the literature shows that the collections which have been made of such instances fill books. This, of course, was a period of time in which the number of capital crimes and the number of executions were more frequent than they are today.

For the twentieth century, no such collection has come to the attention of this writer except Borchard's book, which has for its emphasis the problem of indemnification of persons who have been erroneously convicted. This work, therefore, is concerned also with offenses other than capital crime. As the examples presented above show, even this work, with its different focus, contains material showing that the danger of executing innocent persons has not yet completely passed from the American scene. On the other hand, if reports published in the literature are taken as an index of the extent of this problem, executions of innocent persons for capital crimes in this country must have become very rare indeed during the last few decades.

It is the opinion of this writer, however, that no collection of cases known to have been miscarriages of justice can reveal the true extent of such occurrences.

FACTORS IN CONCEALMENT

The effort of the truly guilty person to escape punishment is in itself a force which may lead to error in judgment by keeping correct information away from the courts. Furthermore, if crime goes together with strenuous efforts at concealment, so does erroneous judgment in a capital case. If it has led to the execution of an innocent person, the feelings of guilt and regret on the part of those involved in such a judgment cannot but work against the acceptance of the fact of error. Borchard reports that pardons are granted on occasion "without indication or admission of an erroneous conviction probably in order to save the prestige of the prosecuting officials."[21] If such face-saving comes into play where a measure of reparation to the innocent person is still possible, how much stronger must the same factor be in cases when reparation can no longer be made! We are justified, therefore, in assuming that the efforts of the police and of a district attorney's office cannot be relied upon to reveal executions of innocent persons to any extent which might approximate reality.

Even in cases where innocent persons have been sentenced to a life term, it is usually the deathbed confession of the murderer or some effort of an outside person which brings about the elucidation of the facts. However, if an innocent person has been executed, the interest of outsiders will probably be much less active than it will be in cases where there is still the motivation of saving a person from the continuation of his wrongful punishment.

CRITERIA OF RELIABLE REPORTING

It is now accepted theory in criminal statistics that a crime in order to be reliably reported must have three characteristics: (1) it must be considered serious enough to ensure intensive effort on the part of law enforcement officers to elucidate it; (2) it must ensure the co-operation of the victim, or those interested in the victim, with the police; and (3) it must leave public traces.[22]

If one were to apply these criteria to the question whether executions based on errors in judgment are likely to be reliably reported, it is clear that the answer would be negative on all three counts. Such cases will not arouse law enforcement officers to great effort, because that would mean enthusiasm for professional self-indictment. Obviously, they cannot ensure the co-operation of the victim. Furthermore, the impossibility of reparation to the victim of the error will probably weaken the effort also of those who were interested in him as long as there was hope. Finally, the efforts of the actual killer to remain undetected, together with the fact that the case has been decided and led to the punishment demanded by the law, tends to conceal a miscarriage of justice rather than leave public traces of its occurrence.

Thus it is highly probable that erroneous convictions for capital crimes are greatly underreported. This does not mean, however, that we have to assume any considerable number of occurrences every year. The actual figures, absolutely taken, are probably very small—as are the figures of actual executions at present.

[21] Borchard, *op. cit.* note 3, p. viii.

[22] Thorsten Sellin, *Research Memorandum on Crime in the Depression* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937), p. 70.

THE ETHICAL ASPECT

However, this does not meet the core of the problem, which is ethical and not utilitarian. Ethics cannot be argued in figures. It shows the strange humor of history that the essence of the ethical position involved has never been better expressed than by Robespierre in the National Assembly of 1791. Participating in the debate on the abolition of capital punishment, he said:

> Listen to the voice of justice and of reason! It tells us and tells us that human judgments are never so certain as to permit society to kill a human being judged by other human beings. . . . Why deprive yourselves of any chance to redeem such errors? Why condemn yourselves to helplessness when faced with persecuted innocence?[23]

[23] Lucas, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 85.

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Movements to Abolish the Death Penalty in the United States

By Louis Filler

THE struggle against the death penalty has been carried on parallel to, though not necessarily hand in hand with, that for better treatment of prisoners. There were no early movements, in the organized sense, to reduce the number of capital offenses. The abolition of death for witchcraft, for example, resulted from a general revulsion against the witchcraft frenzy and its abettors. In the eighteenth century the American colonies averaged about a dozen crimes for which death could be asked. This was very few when compared with England, the common law of which they had taken over, where more than two hundred crimes carried the death penalty. The relatively low number of such crimes in America was due to the scarcity of labor; that there were a dozen was due to a lack of prisons for keeping convicted criminals. With county jails inadequate and insecure, the criminal population seemed best controlled by death, mutilation, and fines.[1]

The "Great Act" of William Penn (1682) showed some concern for prison conditions, and broke with precedents by prescribing death for premeditated murder only. Such extreme mildness offended official sensibilities. In 1718, as a by-product of a serious clash between colony and crown representatives, the harsher penal code of England was adopted in Pennsylvania, and included thirteen capital offenses. As William Bradford was to observe, there was no evidence that the earlier, milder regime had resulted in more frequent or more "flagitious" offenses in that state than had occurred elsewhere.[2]

In 1764 Cesare Beccaria published his *Essay on Crimes and Punishments*, translations of which profoundly impressed American readers. They were also influenced by the writings and example of John Howard, the English prison reformer, as well as by the writings of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Bentham, among others. In 1776 the Philadelphia Society for Relieving Distressed Prisoners was organized, but in that year of revolution it was not able to get under way. Largely spurred by Quaker interest, however, the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons began its work in 1787, with a membership including Dr. Benjamin Rush, Caleb Lownes, Tench Coxe, Thomas Wistar, and other notables of state and nation, some of whom furnished descendants to carry their work in prison reform down to modern times, with the same organization, since 1833 named the Pennsylvania Prison Society.

Benjamin Rush

As early as 1787, Dr. Rush read a paper at the home of Benjamin Franklin entitled *An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals and upon Society*. His paper expressed, in part, the dissatisfaction of Pennsylvania reformers with the penal law of 1786, which had been expected to reform the 1718 law mentioned above, but had embodied evils of its own, including provisions for "infamous" prison clothes, shaved heads, degrading work and conditions, and public humiliation.

Rush's paper, moreover, contained the first reasoned argument in America favoring the abolition of capital punishment. For this reason it drew criticism and rebuttal. Rush was engaged in open controversy which he summed up in his *Considerations on the Injustice and Impolity of Punishing Murder by Death* (1792). Here he cited (as he had earlier) the arguments of Beccaria, joined issue on what constituted the Christian view of the death penalty, and referred to the experiences of Russia, Germany, Sweden, and Tuscany with abolition. Here were arguments which were repeated, with additions, numerous times in the next hundred years and beyond.

William Bradford

More moderate, yet one of the most influential pamphlets in the entire abolitionist literature, was that prepared by William Bradford, attorney general of Pennsylvania and later of the United States, at the request of the governor of Pennsylvania. As expanded and published in 1793, it contained the valuable addition of Caleb Lownes's "Account of the Gaol and Penitentiary House of Philadelphia, and of the Interior Management Thereof."

Turning to the constitutions of the several states, Bradford observed that New Hampshire's warned against too sanguinary punishments, that Vermont's enjoined hard labor to lessen the necessity for capital punishment, and that the 1776 Pennsylvania constitution had asked for a revision of the penal laws so that penalties would be in proportion to offenses. Maryland's constitution explicitly stated that capital punishment ought to be avoided as much as possible.

Bradford was satisfied that capital punishment, as such, did not stop crime: for example, horse stealing, though capital in Virginia, was the most frequent crime in that state. Nor was it easy to obtain a conviction in such a case: the severity of the penalty was its own undoing. If a law could not be enforced, it was worse than useless. Bradford concluded, with Beccaria: "A mitigation of punishment ought, therefore, to be accompanied, as far as possible, *by a diffusion of knowledge and a strict execution of the law.*"[3]

Bradford was not for abolishing the death penalty, necessarily, and thought it would be rash to abolish it entirely. In analyzing such capital crimes as counterfeiting, rape, arson, manslaughter, and petit treason, he considered each on its own merits. In 1794 he was instrumental in persuading the Pennsylvania legislature to make legal the distinction between first and second degree murder: thereafter only premeditated murder would occasion capital punishment.[4]

Influential, too, was the account by Caleb Lownes of the work of the Philadelphia Society to provide sufficient prison facilities and conditions encouraging criminal reform. As Lownes wrote: "It is a strange kind of oeconomy, to hang our fellow-creatures to avoid the expence [*sic*] of preparing a proper place of confinement."[5] Because of the Society's efforts in both respects, it received inquiries from other states concerning its work and ideas—the most famous and controversial being its system of solitary confinement—

[1] John B. McMaster, "Old Standards of Public Morals," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1905* (Washington, D. C., 1906), pp. 67 ff.

[2] William Bradford, *An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in Pennsylvania* . . . (Philadelphia, 1793), pp. 14 ff.

[3] Bradford, *op. cit.* note 2 *supra*, p. 43.

[4] Ohio preceded Pennsylvania by accepting this distinction in 1788. See Raymond T. Bye, *Capital Punishment in the United States* (Philadelphia, 1919), p. 5.

[5] Bradford, *op. cit.* note 2 *supra*, p. 91.

and, in turn, made efforts to secure information about experiences in other parts of the country, by corresponding with prison wardens.[6]

REFORMERS IN EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

During the early decades of the nineteenth century, individual reformers made efforts to advance the cause of abolition. In New York, Governors George and De Witt Clinton and Daniel D. Tompkins at various times urged the New York legislature to modify or end capital punishment.[7] Nevertheless, popular understanding of the subject did not advance markedly. A New York beam-maker, of Quaker persuasion, perched his views precariously on Biblical texts, his practical cure for murderous impulses being an "enormous duty" on all kinds of strong liquor. A New York clergyman linked his pacifist convictions with those opposing capital punishment.[8]

Reflections Occasioned by a Public Execution, at Boston, April 25, 1822, anonymously issued, was filled with confused sentiments about the awfulness of the spectacle and a strong concern with the hereafter, which cannot be classed as favorable or unfavorable to the death penalty. Perhaps the most influential of all prison reformers of the time, Thomas Eddy, a Philadelphia Friend whose major work is identified with New York, does not appear to have given deep thought to the problem, though he did to all other problems in penology. The first decades of the century, to be sure, did see progress in prison organization and a general reduction in the number of death penalties.[9]

EDWARD LIVINGSTON

Perhaps the most distinguished of all American reports involving capital punishment was issued in 1821. In 1803, Edward Livingston, at a turning point in his extraordinary career, had emigrated from New York to Louisiana. In 1821, the future Secretary of State and Minister to France under Jackson was appointed a commissioner by the legislature of Louisiana to revise its criminal code. Influenced by the Code Napoleon, he set out to compile the penal law of Louisiana, which he prepared with introductory reports on codes of crimes and punishments, procedure, evidence, and reform and prison discipline. He dealt at length with the death penalty (a subject which had long and actively interested him) as a deterrent to crime and an instrument of justice.

> A great part of my task [Livingston believed] is rendered unnecessary, by the general acknowledgment, universal, I may say, in the United States, that this punishment ought to be abolished in all cases, excepting those of treason, murder and rape. In some states arson is included; and lately, since so large a portion of our influential citizens have become bankers, brokers, and dealers in exchange, a strong inclination has been discovered to extend it to forgery, and uttering false bills of exchange.[10]

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 75; Negley K. Teeters, *They Were in Prison: a History of the Pennsylvania Prison Society, 1787–1937* (Philadelphia, 1937), pp. 149 ff.

[7] Marvin H. Bovee, *Christ and the Gallows; or, Reasons for the Abolition of Capital Punishment* (New York, 1869), pp. 237–38.

[8] John Edwards, *Serious Thoughts on the Subject of Taking the Lives of Our Fellow Creatures . . .*, Seventh Edition, New York, 1812; Rev. Samuel Whelpley, *Letters Addressed to Caleb Strong, Esq. . . .*, New York, 1818.

[9] Samuel L. Knapp, *The Life of Thomas Eddy*, New York, 1834; Blake McKelvey, *American Prisons: a Study in American Social History* (Chicago, 1936), p. 7.

[10] *The Complete Works of Edward Livingston on Criminal Jurisprudence . . .* (New York, 1873), Vol. 1, p. 37.

Livingston developed a systematic rebuttal of all arguments favoring capital punishment. The official nature of his report, its breadth of argument and illustration, and its well-constructed character gave it great prestige, influenced penal legislation in some South American countries, and inspired the legend in America and abroad that it had been adopted in Louisiana. Its wide influence cannot be questioned, and it inspired abolitionists for generations after, who circulated it with enthusiasm. It was, however, too far advanced for acceptance in Louisiana proper, and Livingston's many concerns left him no time to press for its acceptance by that state.[11]

THE ERA OF REFORM

The 1830's were a time of rising reform, politically, socially, intellectually, and for abolitionists, as well as others. Pennsylvania led the way in 1834 by abolishing public executions.[12] Petitions asking for the termination of the death penalty were now regularly received by the legislatures of the several states. In 1832 a report to the New York legislature citing Beccaria, Franklin, and Livingston, as well as the standard Bible arguments, and the usual appeals to precedence, in this case Russia, Tuscany, and periods in Egyptian and Roman history, introduced a bill to end capital punishment.[13]

In 1835, Robert Rantoul, Jr.—worthy son of a pioneer abolitionist destined to outlive him—an antislavery Democrat and a vigorous leader in Massachusetts reform, reported to the state House of Representatives the first of his abolitionist bills. The next year saw a lengthier report by Rantoul, the most famous, which excited partisan attention and called forth a third from him —the most eloquent and varied of the three.[14]

Thus, Rantoul exhibited what seemed to him the best defense of capital punishment which he had seen, one prepared in 1831 by a Frenchman, Urtis, whose *Necessité du Maintien de la Peine de Mort* defended suicide and concluded that the state ought to be atheistic. Ingenious arguments and illustrations strengthened the propaganda value of Rantoul's work and aided the movement which he led to force modifications in Massachusetts law.[15]

THE "MAINE LAW"

The *Report on Capital Punishment Made to the Maine Legislature* (1836) capped a long period of agitation in that state, accompanied by the usual petitions and memorials. Leaders in

[11] William B. Hatcher, *Edward Livingston* (University, La., 1940), pp. 245 ff.

[12] The United States was the leader in this movement; see Bye, *op. cit.* note 4 *supra*, p. 6.

[13] *The Report of the Honorable S. M. Stillwell, Chairman of a Select Committee . . . [Inquiring] into the Expediency of a Total Abolition of Capital Punishment*, Albany, 1832.

[14] *House [Document] . . . 36 . . . January 14, 1835*, Boston, 1835; *House . . . No. 32, Report Relating to Capital Punishment, January 12, 1836*, Boston, 1836; *House . . . No. 43, Report and Bills Relating to the Abolition of Capital Punishment, January 12, 1837*, Boston, 1837; Arthur B. Darling, *Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824–1848* (New Haven, 1925), p. 215.

[15] See *Senate [Document] No. 58 . . . Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1846* (Boston, 1846), for evidence of the pressures put upon the legislature. In 1839 the penalty for armed robbery and for illegal entry into a house at night was reduced from death to life imprisonment. Rantoul also labored for the separation of first and second degree murder, by then accepted in eleven states. See also Benjamin Dole, *A Circular Addressed to the Citizens of Massachusetts* (Cambridge, 1846), which gives an antagonistic account of Rantoul's efforts over eleven years to make "proselytes" to what are deemed his evil views on capital punishment.

the Maine movement included the author of the Report, Tobias Purrington, of Cumberland, a senator in the Maine legislature, and chairman of the investigating committee. A bulwark of the movement, too, was Professor Thomas C. Upham, since 1824 in charge of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Bowdoin College, a pioneer in psychology, and author of *The Manual of Peace* (1836).

As a result of the controversy in Maine, where there had not actually been an execution for some years (the execution of one Joseph Sager in Augusta, in 1835, bringing the matter to a head), a law was framed which in effect abolished capital punishment, or was thought to do so. Governor Dana, in his annual message to the legislature in 1849, referred to the "general impression" that capital punishment had been practically abolished in Maine, and "to the impropriety of enforcing the death penalty while such an impression exists."[16] The "Maine Law" did not permit the executive to issue his warrant for an execution within one year after the criminal had been sentenced by the court; and its discretionary character, so opposed to the imperative of former laws, was responsible for the interpretation given it.

The influence of the "Maine Law" was considerable, extending into all New England, though with various results,[17] and being held responsible for the impulse which made Michigan the first state to abolish capital punishment officially.

THE HIGH POINT OF REFORM

The rising sentiment against the death penalty, the fact that juries were prone to acquit and governors to override convictions, gave new incentive to abolitionists and a new urgency to those who favored the retention of capital punishment. The 1840's were the high point for reform in the pre-Civil War decades, and were filled with effort and debate. As with the antislavery movement, reformist ranks were filled with clergymen; as one defender of the death penalty bitterly charged:

> Who are its [capital punishment's] most fierce antagonists? . . . On the Sabbath, in edifices built to imitate the temples of Jehovah, they reiterate the doctrine preached to our first parents in Paradise—"Ye shall not surely die." The law of God is the great castle at which all their weapons are aimed.[18]

But if the Rev. Charles C. Burleigh, famous among antislavery partisans, issued his dissident *Thoughts on the Death Penalty* (1845), the Rev. George B. Cheever, also firm in opposition to slavery, and even more famous, was the author of two works defending capital punishment which Burleigh himself thought "written with an ability worthy of a better cause."[19] As with other reforms of the time, not a little of the controversy was based on interpretations of Biblical passages presumed to be directives to mankind. Debates were earnestly attended and were influential in organizational campaigns. Thus, a sermon preached in Philadelphia in 1842 favoring capital punishment resulted in a town meeting of dissenters who appointed a committee of twenty-five to examine and report upon it. The abolitionist committee was still extant three years later.[20]

ABOLITIONIST SOCIETIES

In 1844 antigallows societies were formed in Massachusetts and New York, with formidable sponsors. In Massachusetts, among many others were Rantoul, Wendell Phillips, John G. Whittier, and John A. Andrew, who was to become wartime governor of the state. The society's indefatigable secretary was Rev. Charles Spear, one of its founders and author of *Essays on the Punishment of Death* (1844), dedicated to Professor Upham, a large-scale work which was in its fourth edition eight weeks after publication. Spear also founded, in 1845, *The Hangman*, which the next year became *The Prisoner's Friend*. It continued until 1859. Spear was also favorable to pacifism, a movement which provided a quota of active abolitionists; though some pacifists, like William Ladd, did not feel it necessary to "attach" other causes to their major one.[21]

The New York Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment claimed so influential a figure as Horace Greeley, such dedicated reformers as Rev. William S. Balch and Rev. Samuel J. May, and a host of sympathizers, among whom were John Quincy Adams, William H. Seward, and former Vice Presidents of the United States Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky and George M. Dallas of Pennsylvania. John L. O'Sullivan, talented young editor of the *United States Magazine and Democratic Review*, coiner of the phrase "Manifest Destiny," and author of a highly esteemed report to the New York legislature asking for the abolition of the death penalty,[22] was corresponding secretary.

The meeting in May 1845 of the New York abolitionists resulted in the formation of a national society, which met in the fall of that year in Philadelphia. But before it convened, a Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of the Death Penalty had been born. By 1850, state societies existed also in Tennessee, Ohio, Alabama, Louisiana, Indiana, and Iowa.[23]

FEDERAL LAW AND THE DEATH PENALTY

Of distinctive importance was the agitation, in 1852, for commutation of

[16] T. Purrington, *Report on Capital Punishment Made to the Maine Legislature in 1836*, Third Edition, Washington, D. C., 1852. See also *Remarks of John L. Stevens, in the Senate of Maine, February 11 and 12, 1869, on an Order Instructing the Judiciary Committee to Report a Bill Abolishing Capital Punishment*, Augusta, 1869.

[17] Thus, in 1852, Massachusetts adopted the policy of giving the executive discretionary authority (see Purrington, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47). This did not, however, in fact or in theory, end capital punishment in that state.

[18] Rev. Timothy Alden Taylor, *The Bible View of the Death Penalty; also a Summary of the Webster Case* . . . (Worcester, 1850), p. 23.

[19] The abolition issue also brought together dissimilar personages; thus, in Ohio, outstanding advocates of abolition included not only Amasa Walker, then of Oberlin College, an antislavery partisan, but the Hon. Clement L. Vallandigham, at that time a brilliant young state representative, partial to the south, later notorious as a defeatist during the Civil War; see Albert Post, "The Anti-gallows Movement in Ohio," *Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, Vol. LIV (1945), pp. 109–10.

[20] Albert Post, "Early Efforts to Abolish Capital Punishment in Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 68 (1944), p. 48; *The Impropriety of Capital Punishments: or the Report of a Committee on Dr. Cuyler's Sermon* . . . , Philadelphia, 1842. For actual debates, see introductory remarks to *Capital Punishment. The Argument of Rev. George B. Cheever in Reply to J. L. O'Sullivan, Esq., in the Broadway Tabernacle* . . . (New York, 1843), and also *An Exercise in Declamation; in the Form of a Debate on Capital Punishment* . . . , Boston, 1849.

[21] Merle Curti, *The American Peace Crusade, 1815–1860* (Durham, N. C., 1929), pp. 83–84.

[22] John L. O'Sullivan, *Report in Favor of . . . Abolition . . . April 14, 1841*, Second Edition, New York, 1841.

[23] Albert Post, *op. cit.* note 20 *supra*, pp. 48–49. For a progress report, see [James H. Titus] *Fourth Annual Address of the New York State Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment* (New York, 1848), and *Reports and Addresses of James H. Titus, upon the Subject of Capital Punishment*, New York, 1848.

the death sentence upon a marine, under United States law, for a murder which was asserted to have been unpremeditated. Basing his appeal on an opinion of Attorney General William Wirt in 1820 and another by Attorney General John Y. Mason in 1845, that the President was empowered to commute sentences, Purrington, of Maine, petitioned Millard Fillmore to prevent the execution. With officers of the Marine Corps, as well as clergymen, adding their pleas to Purrington's, Fillmore acceded to their requests and changed the sentence to life imprisonment.[24]

ABOLITION AND MARVIN H. BOVEE

In 1847 Michigan distinguished herself by becoming the first state legally to abolish capital punishment. Early liberal in her penal enactments, with capital punishment limited to murder as far back as 1820, and the death penalty actually a dead letter since 1830, her proponents of abolition were active and persistent, and skillful in parliamentary procedure.[25] Two other states joined Michigan in abolishing the death penalty in the pre-Civil War era: Rhode Island in 1852 and Wisconsin in 1853.

The latter fight brought to the fore one of the most vigorous of all fighters for abolition, whose work has been inadequately appreciated. Marvin H. Bovee, born in New York in 1827, removed with his family in 1843 to Wisconsin, and later, as a state senator, was chairman of the select committee which reported the abolition bill of 1853. Working without pay, and at personal expense, he traveled through half the states lecturing on capital punishment and co-operating with anti-capital-punishment societies. About 1860 he established a state reformatory which aimed to surround youthful criminals with wholesome influences.[26]

Bovee's efforts took him to New York, where ardent campaigns in 1860 won an equivalent of the "Maine Law." This prevented executions for two years, but was then overthrown. Bovee first visited Illinois for reform purposes in 1859. In 1867 he and his co-workers were able to abolish public executions in that state and give juries discretionary powers in sentencing murderers to death or prison. He then turned his attention to Minnesota, where a similar victory was won.

In 1869 Bovee published a major work: *Christ and the Gallows; or, Reasons for the Abolition of Capital Punishment*.[27] In this he collected a vast number of arguments, endorsements, and new illustrations of the inadequate operations of the death penalty (which included the hanging of a ten-year-old child for murder), and summed up the "Progress of Penal Legislation in the United States" in a fashion which reflected the accomplishments of the time, as well as the too-sanguine hopes of crusaders like himself.

POST-CIVIL WAR TRENDS

In fact, the period of the Civil War and, even more, the temper of the post-Civil War era did seem, at first glance, encouraging to reformist enterprises in abolition. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts in 1861 addressed the legislature on the subject, strongly urging it to do away with the death penalty. Three years later, the governor of Maine made vain efforts to pass a law instituting the death penalty and thus to end the state's abolitionist tradition.[28] Fugitive arguments for and against capital punishment continued to appear, and legislatures to be memorialized on the subject.

Maine added the letter to the spirit of her long experience with abolition, making it legal in 1872. Restored in 1878 following the attack of an insane convict on a keeper, capital punishment was again abolished in 1887. Iowa abolished the death penalty from 1872 to 1878, and Colorado in that same year of 1872 began an erratic career of abolition and restoral. Kansas, too, in 1872 began a long tradition on the abolitionist road,[29] which was only to be stopped, at least temporarily, in the 1940's.

In addition, the subject was debated elsewhere, and gains were recorded in connection with first and second degree sentences, public executions, the shortening of the list of capital crimes, and other aspects of the question. But positive accomplishments appear more as end products of earlier eloquence and seasoned agitators. New progress and interest centered in the larger area of prison reform and administration. As Frederick Howard Wines, himself one of the outstanding reformers of the post-Civil War decades, observed in 1895, the state of American prisons twenty-five years before had been far from satisfactory.[30]

PRISON REFORM AND THE DEATH PENALTY

It was due to the energy and vision of Frederick Wines's father, Rev. Dr. Enoch C. Wines, that a congress of reformers actively interested in prison work convened in Cincinnati in 1870 and formed the National Prison Association. They were interested in the novel aim of influencing the criminal for the better. Many of them knew of the experience of Sir Walter Crofton with the Irish "convict prisons," where notable progress had been achieved; and the creation of the New York State Reformatory at Elmira gave them their opportunity to try out humane approaches to the prisoner.

At this and subsequent meetings they heard of the "indeterminate sentence," developed in this country by Zebulon R. Brockway as early as 1860. This stipulated a minimum and maximum sentence upon a convicted person, and left for future determination how long he would actually serve. And though Massachusetts was not in the forefront of abolition, she did pioneer the system of probation which spread through the other states.[31]

The significant fact for abolitionists was that the new approach emphasized a more scientific view of crime and criminals, and thus seemed to prepare the way for a more reasonable consideration of the value of the death penalty. As Colonel Brockway—who was no gentle hand as a prison administrator—himself concluded by 1890:

[24] Purrington, *op. cit.* note 16 *supra*, pp. 33 ff.

[25] Albert Post, "Michigan Abolishes Capital Punishment," *Michigan History*, Vol. 29 (1945), pp. 44–50. The law abolishing capital punishment retained it for treason. Since treason, however, could only apply to an offense against the United States, Michigan's priority as an abolitionist state is unaffected.

[26] *Appleton's Annual Encyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1888*, Vol. XIII, Whole Vol. XXVIII, New York, 1889.

[27] *Op. cit.* note 7 *supra*. Reprints of this work, published in all three cases by the author, appeared in 1870 and 1876.

[28] William Tallack, *The Practical Results of the Total or Partial Abolition of Capital Punishment in Various Countries* (London, 1866), pp. 18–19.

[29] Bye, *op. cit.* note 4 *supra*, pp. 8–9.

[30] Frederick H. Wines, *Punishment and Reformation* (New York, 1895), p. 192.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 192 ff., 197–98, 292 ff.; Mary Carpenter, *Reformatory Prison Discipline . . .*, London, 1872; Amos W. Butler, "The Operation of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole Law," *Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy*, New Series, No. 55 (March 1916), pp. 56 ff.; Helen D. Pigeon, *Probation and Parole in Theory and Practice* (New York, 1942), p. 84.

My experience with prisoners and their disciplinary governing has effected in my mind a depreciated estimate of the value of deterrents. Punishments applied to deter . . . are, usually, pernicious. . . . The strongest argument against capital punishment is not either the uncertainty of convictions, the cruelty of it or the sacredness of life; but rather the injury of it to the public tone. . . .[32]

Prison discipline, then, seemed increasingly to provide an opportunity to abolitionists to move in step with other reformers. At the 1870 meeting in Cincinnati, William Tallack, secretary of the abolitionist Howard Society of England, spoke vigorously in favor of humanitarian treatment of criminals, with many a hint that capital punishment was undesirable. The milestone 1878 meeting of the International Penitentiary Congress in Stockholm was heartily supported by abolitionists. And in 1883 a reorganized National Prison Association heard Alfred H. Love, of the Pennsylvania Prison Society, a pacifist and opponent of the death penalty, who in that period made earnest and unsuccessful efforts to turn his organization to active support of abolition.[33]

[32] Comment in answer to an inquiry from Torajiro Mogi, quoted in Mogi's thesis, *Capital Punishment: Historically, Philosophically and Practically Considered* . . . (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1890), p. 40.

[33] William Tallack, "Humanity and Humanitarianism," *Transactions of the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline,* edited by E. C. Wines (Albany, 1871), pp. 204 ff.; E. C. Wines, *The Actual State of Prison Reform Troughout* [*sic*] *the Civilized World* . . . , Stockholm, 1878; Bovee, *op. cit.* note 7 *supra,* pp. 241 ff.; Alfred H. Love, "Our Duty to the Prisoner and the Community," *Proceedings of the National Prison Congress* . . . (Chicago, 1887), pp. 92 ff. In 1898 Love embarrassed his organization by writing to the Queen of Spain in a pacifist effort, and resigned his vice presidency of the organization; see Teeters, *op. cit.* note 6 *supra,* pp. 398–400.

Early in the 1880's the impending execution of Guiteau for the assassination of President Garfield provided a point of public controversy, permitting the intransigent Cheever and Wendell Phillips, among others, to speak their opposing minds. Late in the decade the advent of the electric chair offered a novelty and renewed debate on the relative merits of the several modes of execution.[34]

FEDERAL REFORM

One of the strongest arguments of the abolitionists had always been that the conscience of mankind revolted against the death penalty, and that therefore it could not be enforced; in other words, that the death penalty assured the complete freedom of most murderers. In the post-Civil War era, with the high incidence of unpunished killing in the cattle country of the West and with the rise of lynch law in the South, to say nothing of the actions of susceptible juries in the North, the situation came close to being scandalous. As William Tallack pointed out, for the year 1894, in the United States, there were 9,800 murders, which were followed by only 132 legal and 190 "illegal" executions; that is, 29 out of 30 murderers escaped capital punishment.[35]

This, too, was the burden of what was the most important of all abolition crusades of the 1890's. The Hon. Newton M. Curtis, a Civil War general and New York reformer, who had written and spoken against capital punishment for years, now, as a member of the House of Representatives, undertook to per-

[34] [Symposium] "The Death Penalty," *North American Review,* Vol. 133 (December 1881), pp. 534 ff.; George F. Shrady, "The Death Penalty," *Arena,* Vol. XI (October 1890), p. 53.

[35] Tallack, *Penological and Preventive Principles with Special Reference to Europe and America* . . . (London, 1896), pp. 252–53.

suade Congress to define, in the words of his proposed bill, "the crimes of murder in the first and second degree, and manslaughter, and providing punishment therefor, and to abolish the punishment of death."[36]

In the material which he prepared for the consideration of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Curtis attempted to show that "in the first thirty-seven years of the Republic the letter and spirit of the criminal laws were supported by public sentiment, which is essential to the successful enforcement of criminal statutes," but that a great change had taken place. In the earlier years of the Republic, about 85 per cent of those tried had been convicted, as compared with more recent figures of less than 20 per cent in the federal courts and a still lower percentage in the state courts.

Other statistics were calculated to show that those states having the greatest number of offenses carrying the death penalty suffered the greatest number of homicides, and that lynchings had increased at the expense of legal executions. Curtis brought up to date facts concerning laws of the then forty-one states, and the increasing experiences abroad.

By 1897 Curtis had modified his bill "to reduce the cases in which the penalty of death may be inflicted," and this became law that year. The sixty federal offenses previously punishable by death were reduced to treason, murder, rape, and capital offenses enumerated in the articles of war for the Army and Navy. In addition, in instances of murder and rape, juries might qualify their verdicts by adding "without capital punishment," and the penalty would be changed to life imprisonment at hard labor.[37]

[36] N. M. Curtis, *Capital Crimes and the Punishment Prescribed Therefor by Federal and State Laws and Those of Foreign Countries* . . . (Washington, D. C., 1894), [3].

THE PRE-WORLD WAR I ERA

The reformers of the 1900–1914 period, who concerned themselves so sensationally with all aspects of local and national affairs, did not forget the problem of crime. Organizationally, however, the abolition movement lagged behind that of penal reform. Charles Edward Russell, a leader of the muckrakers, wrote effectively on the question, and maintained an interest in abolition to the year of his death. Maynard Shipley, a California penologist, prepared learned articles on aspects of the subject.

One of the most active of all the reformers was Brand Whitlock, whose interest in abolition dated back to 1893, when he met Clarence Darrow in connection with an effort to save from execution a youth who had assassinated Carter Harrison.[38] As Mayor of Toledo, Whitlock worked earnestly to end the death penalty in Ohio. He wrote in a letter in 1906: "I have been, as perhaps you know, conducting a sort of guerrilla warfare against capital punishment." However, a bill which he engineered through the Ohio legislature failed of passage. His novel, *The Turn of the Balance* (1907), a powerful indictment of backward prison practices

[37] "The Death Penalty in the United States," *Harper's Weekly,* Vol. 41 (January 30, 1897), p. 107. This general rule has persisted to the present. McKinley's assassination resulted in a statute making it a capital crime to attempt the life of a high federal official (*Nation,* Vol. 84 [April 25, 1907], p. 377); and the Lindbergh law added kidnaping as a capital crime. The statement in Teeters, *World Penal Systems, A Survey* (Philadelphia, 1944), p. 180 fn., that "the Federal government resorts to capital punishment (hanging) for treason only . . . ," is inaccurate.

[38] Brand Whitlock, *Forty Years of It* (New York, 1925), pp. 82 ff.

and capital punishment, was harshly criticized, and his unsuccessful efforts appear to have exhausted him.[39]

Yet the 1910's began as a period of brilliant promise. Minnesota abolished the death penalty in 1911. In 1913 the state of Washington followed suit, and after her Oregon, North Dakota, South Dakota, Arizona, and Missouri. Tennessee abolished the death penalty for murder (retaining it for rape) in 1915, but restored it in 1917.[40] As instruments of reform and agitation, a number of organizations and agencies were created during that period.[41] Typical of developments which seemed about to carry abolitionists to a broad victory was the fact that the Pennsylvania Prison Society, without flagging in its zeal for prison reform, and after having avoided the issue of the death penalty for over a hundred years, finally took its stand directly against it.[42]

THE YEAR 1917

The year 1917 promised to be the wonder year of abolition. True, the *Survey* thought that legislators did not "seem to be as favorable to the abolition of the death penalty as the recent spread of humanitarian ideas in the prison field might indicate." In Colorado, Utah, and Vermont measures had been killed outright. A bill had been lost in Massachusetts.[43] But twelve states were already in the abolitionist column, and only twelve states still made the death penalty mandatory for convicted murderers. West Virginia, Indiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York, New Hampshire, Illinois, and Nebraska were considering the subject, and, in addition, many other bills relating to prison reform as such were under debate.

Nevertheless, 1917 was destined to be catastrophic for the abolitionist cause. Under the nervous tensions created by American entrance into World War I, four of the abolitionist states returned to capital punishment. Promising movements in other states were repulsed.

Typical of the spirit which set back abolition was that which prevailed in Pennsylvania, where the Prison Society, aided by the Prison Reform League, worked to pass an abolition law. It passed the Senate, and was expected to pass the House "with votes to spare." Unfortunately, "A day or two before the vote was taken, there was an explosion in a munition factory near Chester, which was at first thought to have been caused by spies or alien enemies.[44] As a result of this misadventure, members of the Assembly changed their minds and the bill was lost.

FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I

Although there were distinguished advocates of abolition as America entered the 1920's, conditions did not appear promising for them. Governor Harry L. Davis, of Ohio, showed himself as earnest and energetic as Whitlock before him.[45] Dean George W. Kirchwey, Clarence Darrow, Thomas Mott Osborne, and other opponents of capital punishment wrote or presented their views before such influential bodies as they could reach. It was the Loeb-Leopold case that revitalized the movement and gave it direction. The arguments of Clarence Darrow and the prosecutor were both largely based on those deriving from the question of abolition. The new interest in the subject was indicated by the preparation of a bibliography specifically to satisfy demands.[46]

In August 1925 the League for the Abolition of Capital Punishment opened its offices in New York under the active working leadership of Miss Vivian Pierce, and prepared to start a nation-wide campaign. The following February it opened its campaign in Wallack's Theater in New York, its speakers including Warden Lewis E. Lawes, of Sing Sing, a convert to abolition, Darrow, Dudley Field Malone, and Kathleen Norris. The following day, Darrow spoke before Congress on the subject.[47]

In 1927 the Sacco-Vanzetti case, or rather its climax, resulted in the formation of the Massachusetts Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, and in that year Mrs. Herbert B. Ehrmann, wife of one of the counsel for the condemned anarchists, began her long services in behalf of abolition.[48]

RECENT TRENDS

Since then, the movement, through organizations more or less vigorous, more or less adequately staffed and supported, has continued to press for reform measures, including abolition, has kept alert to possible reversals in states already free of the death penalty, has prepared bills, distributed educational materials, and directed its crusade through such channels as have been available to it. In the 1930's it gave up its appeal to sentiment and religious opinion, and presented its arguments in more practical and pertinent form.[49] It printed leaflets, brochures by such stalwarts as Lawes and Darrow, and reprinted the arguments of widely known sympathizers. A major campaign aimed to abolish the mandatory death penalty, and today it prevails only in Vermont and the District of Columbia.

To those concerned with the pro and con of the subject, developments in the states have been neither encouraging nor dismaying. World conditions have undoubtedly confused the picture. In 1939 South Dakota re-enacted capital punishment, but authorized no funds for the purchase of an electric chair. In 1942 an appropriation for the purpose was made, but there appeared to be no materials available for the construction of such a chair! In 1944, after Kansas had re-enacted the death penalty, three executions took place at the State Penitentiary. Feeling was high, and the warden of the institution resigned, refusing to enforce the penalty.

A promising token to one protagonist of abolition lay in the fact that capital punishment was no longer a major

[39] Allan Nevins (Ed.), *The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock* (New York, 1936), pp. 49, 69 ff., 155.

[40] Bye, *op. cit.* note 4 *supra*, p. 9.

[41] These included the International Anti-Capital Punishment League in San Francisco and Los Angeles; the Anti-Capital Punishment League, headed by Charles H. Ingersoll, in New York; the Anti-Capital Punishment Society of America, headed by George W. Hunt, in Chicago; the Massachusetts Prison Reform Association, headed by Mrs. Florence Spooner; and the Anti-Capital Punishment Society, headed by George Foster Peabody, in New York. I am indebted to Mrs. Herbert B. Ehrmann, executive director of the American League to Abolish Capital Punishment, for information and material about modern abolitionist movements.

[42] Teeters, *op. cit.* note 6 *supra*, pp. 397–98.

[43] "Capital Punishment and Prison Reforms," *Survey*, Vol. 37 (March 10, 1917), pp. 670–71.

[44] *Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy*, New Series, No. 57 (March 1918), p. 52.

[45] Harry L. Davis, "Death by Law," *Outlook*, Vol. 131 (July 26, 1922), pp. 525 ff.

[46] Maureen McKernan, *The Amazing Crime and Trial of Leopold and Loeb*, Chicago, 1924; "Capital Punishment, 1910–1925 (a Selected Bibliography)," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 17 (May 1926), pp. 117 ff.

[47] "Abolishing the Death Penalty," *Literary Digest*, Vol. 86 (August 22, 1925), p. 29; "Attacking the Death Penalty," *ibid.*, Vol. 88 (February 13, 1926), pp. 7–8.

[48] *Boston Sunday Herald*, March 9, 1952, p. 38.

[49] Vivian Pierce, *Annual Report of 1931* (New York, n.d.), p. 4.

means for dispensing justice. Only in New York, North Carolina, and Georgia did it play an important role. In 1943 there were 135 executions in the United States, one-third of which took place in these three states. Of these executions, 118 followed instances of murder, 17 of rape. There were no executions for any other offenses.[50]

WHERE WE STAND

"There is reason to believe," thought one expert on capital punishment in 1926, "that in the course of the present century the use of the death penalty will finally pass away." [51] However, the partisans of capital punishment have not retreated from their position, and those who advocate abolition have been required to take into account two levels of opposition. First, there is the intellectual defense of capital punishment: the argument that there is a moral and legal right to kill, and that capital punishment is a deterrent to crime.[52]

Much challenging, in some ways, is the spontaneous reaction to murder on the part of emotion-stirred people. Much of the essence of the controversy may be found in such responses as the following to the recent murder in New York of a young girl by a psychopathic stranger, who had obviously been released prematurely from hospital care. Her parents were quoted as having taken a "Christian attitude" toward the killer: "They were glad he had been caught and hoped he would be 'put away' so that no one else might be harmed. Some of the neighbors . . . were less resigned and called for vengeance." [53]

[50] Mabel A. Elliott, *Coercion in Penal Treatment: Past and Present* (Ithaca: Pacifist Research Bureau, 1947), pp. 34–35.

[51] Raymond T. Bye, "Recent History and Present Status of Capital Punishment in the United States," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XVII (August 1926), p. 245.

[52] A convenient summary of opinion, pro and con, may be found in *Capital Punishment. The Reference Shelf*, Julia E. Johnson, compiler, Vol. 13, No. 1 (New York, 1939).

[53] *New York Times*, July 18, 1952, p. 21.

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The Death Penalty Abroad

BY PETER P. LEJINS

THE main issue with regard to the death penalty in the world today is the conflict between the humanitarian abolitionist movement—with a corresponding actual trend to limit or give up altogether the use of capital punishment—and the tremendous increase in outright executions and veiled, slower methods of exterminating persons for political offenses and divergent political views.

BEFORE WORLD WAR I

Up to approximately the First World War, the issues involved in the controversy over the death penalty were relatively clear and simple. On one side there was the camp of the abolitionists. They were the humanitarians, the liberals, the progressives. Their movement, started in its contemporary form by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, was intrinsically connected with the development of the ideologies of the western society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their argument ran along very clear-cut lines: capital punishment is below human dignity, functionally it does not do enough good to justify itself, and it leads to evil consequences.

Opposing the abolitionists were the conservatives, the old-fashioned, the less-educated people, who either did not worry about the executions of criminals or even felt that these were indispensable to keep the human race in line. Now the abolitionists, now the conservatives, had the upper hand; but on the whole, the abolitionists seem to have better expressed the spirit of the epoch, and step by step the number of capital offenses listed in the criminal codes, the number of death sentences imposed by the courts, and the number of executions actually performed steadily diminished in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The issue of capital punishment for so-called political offenses was also quite clear. Except for some debatable borderline cases, the distinction between a criminal act and a political offense was pretty well established and generally agreed upon. The abolitionists attempted, of course, to expand also into the area of political offenses, but although they were in all probability responsible here too for some decrease in executions, they found the governmental tendency to exterminate the opponents of its political power an especially tough nut to crack. As a result, the abolitionists concentrated on the ordinary crimes and partly closed their eyes to political executions, which, by the way, were not very frequent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries except for the outburst of the French Revolution.

The abolitionists had a hard time also with offenses within the military machine of the state and offenses in wartime. Here, as in the case of the political offenses, they met with the hard fact that the military simply would not give up the death penalty, usually arguing that, since the military personnel is professionally exposed to the threat of death, no effective control is possible without a like threat. Likewise, in time of war, when martial law was introduced, the threat to the very existence of the state and the lives of its people was successfully employed

as an argument for using *summum supplicium*.

Whichever of the western countries we take, the situation was very much as just described, and the arguments and issues were very similar. Whether we take the abolition of the death penalty in Imperial Russia in 1753–54—incidentally the first instance of this nature in the Western world—or turn to western Europe for de facto abolition of the death penalty in 1765 and abolition by law in 1786 in Tuscany, or take the more recent parliamentary debates of 1948 in England, the picture is very much the same.

"THEIR MILD VICTORIAN LAMP"

Although the picture just sketched was typical for the Western world at the time of the First World War, the same views, social movements, and patterns of social action to a considerable extent are present also today, and in many respects the above characterization is still valid. On the other hand, since the First World War new developments have changed western society profoundly and have placed new problems before the people concerned with capital punishment, leading Mr. Winston Churchill to comment that the abolitionists "stand against the storm and hold their mild Victorian lamp in the blackness of the twentieth century."[1] This epithet, "mild Victorian lamp," brings into focus the present status of the capital punishment issue. Just what were these trends which set in after the First World War and contributed to a change of outlook on the question of the death penalty?

THE NEW PATTERN OF SOCIAL CONTROL

After World War I there developed in several countries, starting with Russia, an extremely acute internal political struggle. Both communist and fascist movements adopted a new type of political action characterized by a rational approach to the problem of obtaining and maintaining dominance, and by utilization of modern social science for manipulation of people. This pattern of social control is marked by extreme ruthlessness in suppressing one's enemies, in annihilating those who represent an immediate threat, and in gradually but systematically exterminating all the carriers of adverse ideologies.

The upshot of all this was a sudden rash of executions and the mass extermination of political enemies on an unprecedented scale. It is significant how quickly the relatively new term "genocide" was accepted in everyday speech: it denotes something that is a well-established phenomenon of our modern life.

At this point another development which is very important for our times took place. The outright execution of political criminals and active political opponents was rather easily rationalized; but the gradual extermination of the carriers of opposing ideologies ran counter to humanitarian concepts that were deeply rooted and had, in addition, a halo of progressiveness and liberalism. The result was the "social invention" of the concentration camp of the twentieth century. It often appears under very innocent names, but the tremendously high death rate among the internees over a relatively short period of time leaves no doubt that, at least in some countries and in some of the concentration camps, we are dealing with a veiled form of slow execution. It is carried out through confinement under conditions which are impossible for human survival, with poor food, exceedingly high work loads, and occasional direct executions.

[1] *Bulletin of the National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty*, No. 27, London, 1948.

The argument of the abolitionists of the old school that all this involves political offenses only, and that the death penalty for ordinary criminals can be handled as a separate issue, simply does not hold.

In the first place, it cannot be denied that the entire cause of abolitionism loses tremendously in popular appeal and in real significance if the abolitionists are worrying about a few dozen or a few hundred criminals while at the same time virtually millions of people are deliberately put to death the world over.

POLITICAL AND NONPOLITICAL OFFENSES BLENDED

Second—and this is very important for this discussion—the labeling of all these executions as a political matter is simply incorrect. There has taken place what at the risk of sounding trite one might term a totalization of governmental control, which tends to wipe out the sharp distinction between political and ordinary criminal offenses and has made considerable headway in this respect. In other words, the new political parties in control in certain countries have rendered some of the activities important to their political adversaries criminal offenses, and have attached to them as sanctions either outright capital punishment or the veiled death in a concentration camp.

Here are a few instances exemplifying this type of procedure: A decree to surrender all valuables in excess of a certain amount makes the illegal holding of such articles a criminal offense. The law refers to the entire population, but only certain wealthy groups are in possession of such valuables. In addition, the law will administratively be directed primarily against these groups. Thus the offenders will be handled as criminals; but in reality, all this can be a purely political action.

Or currency regulations are introduced, making it a serious offense to export currency abroad. Any violator of this law is prosecuted as a common criminal offender; but all of us will recall instances from the recent past where the main purpose of such a law was politically motivated economic pressure on a group, with genocidal plans in the background. Not many of those who violated currency regulations survived the concentration camp.

A somewhat different development, but one also tending to fuse political and nonpolitical offenses together, is the assigning of political meaning to some of the most conventional crimes against property and crimes of violence. What would appear to be a plain theft becomes a counterrevolutionary attack on communal property; an ordinary brawl, interference with the smooth functioning of the people's republic, and aid to foreign enemies and schemers. The operator of a wine bottling plant, who derived a substantial side income by filling the bottles somewhat below the required level, is sentenced not as a common crook, but as an enemy of the people, who endangers the very foundation of the state economy; and his penalty may very well be not even a slow death in a concentration camp, but an immediate execution.

When the death penalty appears as a sanction for offenses endangering the "security of the state" or, as the Rumanian law effective January 14, 1949 puts it, for sabotaging the economic progress of the republic and negligence in fulfilling service obligations in industry, the assignment of great importance to the distinction between political and nonpolitical offenses becomes questionable.

UNRELIABLE DATA

Here are some additional trends which belong in the same complex of events

and have recently exercised considerable influence on the use of the death penalty. The growing awareness of the potentialities of propaganda for the mass manipulation of people is gradually leading to ever increasing divergency between official reports and actual conditions. The popular acceptance and wide use of the term "Iron Curtain" testifies to the general awareness of this situation.

For this reason the text of the laws and official statistical reports regarding capital punishment are often worthless for judging actual policies in the use of the death penalty. The conventional survey of the "status of the death penalty" the world over, which reports what the laws and the officials say, would be completely worthless today with reference to a number of countries.

An outright misrepresentation of statistical data, ambiguous terminology, the previously discussed veiled execution through concentration camps, a frequent resort to martial law, the turning over of cases involving common criminal offenders to military tribunals which have the death penalty in their repertory—these are some of the most common means by which the extent or the very existence of the death penalty is concealed, and with the help of which a country which proudly points to its criminal code as containing no capital punishment can in reality manage to execute many of its citizens every year.

DEATH PENALTY GLORIFIED

Another trend, of less importance but nevertheless of some significance, was what one might term the glorification of the death penalty, which was evidenced particularly in Nazi Germany.[2] It represented the strongest single large-scale attack on the very foundations of abolitionist theory. With the collapse of the Nazi state, it disappeared as a major phenomenon.

QUALIFIED DEATH PENALTY

One might also raise the question as to the revival of the qualified death penalty, that is, death penalty accompanied by torture. The gradual disappearance of the qualified death penalty in the Western world during the last two centuries is a well-known fact, usually heralded as one of the signs of progress. The date of the last time a victim was broken on the wheel in Germany or of the repeal of the provision in the French penal code for chopping off the arm of a parricide just before his execution is always remembered as a landmark in the progress of civilization.

We do not know of any recent reintroduction of qualifying attributes of the death penalty with regard to the ordinary criminal, but the fusion of political and ordinary offenses, discussed above, and the extreme cruelty used in the contemporary extermination of political opponents, might well prompt an inquiry as to the extent to which the twentieth century has de facto revived the horrors of the pre-execution torture chamber.

A TREND REVERSED

Still another well-established trend, which can be traced for several centuries and which has been affected by recent developments, is the gradual decrease in the number of offenses for which the law provides capital punishment as a mandatory or possible sanction. Although in this respect considerable fluctuation has been observed

[2] As a good example of the characteristic "tone" in which the death penalty was frequently presented in Nazi Germany, see Ministerialrat Rietzsch, "Die Strafen und Massregeln der Sicherung, Besserung und Heilung," in Dr. Franz Gürtner, *Das Kommende Deutsche Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil* (Berlin, 1935), especially pp. 121–23.

throughout human history, the last two or three centuries have displayed a steady decrease in the number of capital offenses in the criminal codes of the western countries. From well over one hundred capital offenses which were rather typical for the eighteenth century, the number has decreased to three, two, or in some countries even one in the twentieth century. The number of death sentences when the legal provision exists, and the number of executions when the death sentence is pronounced, have also decreased accordingly.

The recent fierce political struggles have, however, resulted in a widening of the circle of political acts for which the offender may be executed, and also in an increase, sometimes to remarkable proportions, of the number of conventional crimes which may result in capital punishment by imputing to them political significance, as, for instance, is the case in the Soviet Union.

PRESENT STATUS OF DEATH PENALTY

Now let us see how the death penalty has fared under these influences. It seems that for western Europe the defeat of the western totalitarian countries meant a return to the pre-World War I tenor of thinking in the area of capital punishment.[3] The ideology and practices introduced by the fascist governments in their fight on crime and political enemies were wiped out together with the rest of the totalitarian regimes. Whether this is just an immediate symbolic consequence of the defeat of a political system, and the abolitionist ideology has in reality been permanently undermined, only the future can tell. One cannot help noting that many western European countries which for a long time had not used the death penalty at all recently reintroduced it for political offenders ("collaborationists" or "quislings"); for example, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway.

As to eastern Europe, that is, the countries behind the Iron Curtain, the lack of information really should preclude any definitive judgment. From what little is gleaned of the situation there, it seems that the intensive political struggle of the Communist party to maintain its power and to expand the orbit of its influence makes it very probable that the attitudes and policies described above are prevalent there. The propagandistic repeal of the death penalty for criminal offenses, the denial of executions, the wide use of the veiled death penalty through concentration camp procedures, the harassing of political opponents by regulations to which criminal law sanctions are attached, the interpretation of common criminal offenses as politically dangerous acts—all this seems to be present in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics itself, and one suspects some of it also in the so-called satellites.

Certain Asiatic areas recently seem to have drifted into the same orbit and are exposed to the influence of similar practices.

What really has happened throughout the world with respect to the death penalty cannot be explained away as an expected and temporary intensification of sanctions in the wake of the violence prevalent in time of war. Let us not forget that in some countries the more intensive use of the death penalty actually had its start between the wars. In view of the foregoing analysis, the optimistic assertion made by some abolitionists to the effect that nothing has really happened and that we can peacefully return to hammering at the remaining strongholds of the death penalty is an oversimplification and cannot be substantiated. Something has hap-

[3] L. E. Deets, "Changes in Capital Punishment Policy since 1939," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 6, 1948.

pened in the last thirty years. The trends have become very complex, and the future of the death penalty can hardly be predicted at the present time.

THE TYPE SITUATIONS

Let us now turn to an examination of the use of the death penalty in those countries which are not discussed separately elsewhere in this volume. The conventional survey of capital punishment in the world usually resorts to a listing of countries according to whether they have no death penalty at all, have it for political and military offenders only, or make use of it in their control of crime in general.

Even a quick analysis of such tabulations, however, will show that they are usually not very exact or reliable. The conventional distinction of the three type situations is too superficial to make possible a meaningful analysis; for example, to piece together trends from slight variations in policy, or to understand the real meaning of reforms. Too often only the text of the basic criminal laws is used as the source of information, and especially today this is not a very reliable source. Quite often these basic laws are supplemented by less widely circulated provisions, such as rules of criminal procedure, and special acts dealing with martial law and military tribunals, which substantially change the whole picture.

If we remember the executions through concentration camp procedures, the denial of these for propaganda purposes, and other integral factors, it will become clear that only a careful analysis of the entire governmental control pattern of a country can serve as the basis for its evaluation from the standpoint of the death penalty. In the limited space of this article one cannot do much more than indicate these shortcomings and suggest some research possibilities. Let us, first of all, formulate the type situations with reference to the death penalty which seem to exist in the different countries:

1. At one end of the continuum there are countries which have no legal provision for capital punishment and actually do not have any executions.

2. At the other extreme there are the countries which have legal provisions stipulating death penalty for political, military, and ordinary criminal offenders and which actually make use of these provisions.

3. Somewhere between these two there are those countries which do not seem to have any legal provisions for the death penalty, but which in reality do execute some of the offenders in some way.

4. Finally, there are some countries which, although the death penalty is provided for in the law, have not made use thereof for such a long time that they may be considered as having de facto abolished capital punishment.

ANALYTICAL POSSIBILITIES

These four basic types will be further complicated if we make a distinction between conventional criminal offenders on the one hand and political and military offenders on the other. Then the four possibilities just listed must be considered separately for each of these two categories. The possible combinations would give us all together sixteen possible type situations, which are represented on the accompanying chart and which could be used as the basis for classifying the countries of the world with reference to their policies on capital punishment. This would make possible a quick reference and manipulation of data.

It is impossible to attempt this here, since sufficient information, as already pointed out, is not available on some of the key countries, and since a considerable amount of research would have to be done to establish the true situation in many others. Space would not permit a detailed description of examples to illustrate all these sixteen type situations. However, here is one, just to show how this kind of analysis might be used.

CHART OF TYPE SITUATIONS WITH REFERENCE TO DEATH PENALTY

Types	All Offenders Treated Alike	Ordinary Offenders	Political and Military Offenders
A. No death penalty either legally or de facto	A	A_i	A_{ii}
B. No death penalty legally but de facto	B	B_i	B_{ii}
C. Death penalty exists legally but not de facto	C	C_i	C_{ii}
D. Death penalty exists both legally and de facto	D	D_i	D_{ii}

NOTE: A country falls either under one of the straight letter situations or under a combination of two different sub$_i$-sub$_{ii}$ letters; for instance, A_i-D_{ii} for the Netherlands today.

Imperial Russia, after having abolished the death penalty in 1754 as the first country to do so among modern western states, presumably retained capital punishment for political offenders. Their exact legal status is not quite clear, but it seems to be agreed that the decrees of 1753–54 did not affect them, and some executions unquestionably took place. As to the conventional offenders, there seems to be a consensus that many of them also actually died as a result of corporal punishment; as a rule persons subjected to 400 strokes of the "knut" or to 10,000 strokes by running the gantlet did not survive the ordeal. Thus Imperial Russia would at that time probably fall into a composite type, which according to our chart could be described as B_i-D_{ii}.

As stated, this seems to be the least amount of analysis necessary to yield some meaningful results. It would not mean very much, and often would be directly misleading, to state that Russia at that time simply did or did not have capital punishment.

Further elaboration might, of course, be necessary; for instance, a distinction might be made between military and political offenses. It can be readily seen that a country which openly executes political offenders but does not use capital punishment within its armed forces, and another which does not execute its political enemies but does use the death penalty within its army, let us say in time of war, represent two potentially very different types of political and governmental philosophy.

This distinction between military and political capital punishment can easily be worked into the chart. Likewise, the distinction between outright executions and the veiled death penalty (for instance through concentration camps or "knut") might be quite significant for certain purposes. The chart can easily be extended to take care of these additional details also.

IN EUROPE

As to the present situation with regard to the death penalty in the countries of western Europe, England, which does have capital punishment for both political and ordinary criminal offenders, is discussed elsewhere in this volume.

On the whole, all continental European countries legally have the death penalty at least in some connection, at the very least for treason, especially treason in time of war. The only exception seems to be Western Germany,

where Article 102 of the Bonn constitution states categorically that the death penalty shall be abolished. The situation in Germany, however, must be considered as still fluid, especially with reference to some basic functions and guaranties of the government and in view of the presence of occupational authorities. The latter, as is well known, do resort to capital punishment.[4]

Some of the countries, after having had no executions for a long time, either by tradition (Belgium) or by law (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway), returned to the death penalty especially for collaborators with the enemy during the military occupations of World War II.

It is possible that in some cases the legal acts providing for the death penalty could be interpreted as applying exclusively to World War II situations, so one might conclude that these countries are back in the abolitionist camp after completing this specific action. Whatever the exact interpretation of the legal texts, such seems to be the very definite opinion of the people in at least some of these countries. For example, in several interviews which this writer recently had with people expert in penological matters in the Netherlands,[5] the answer to the question whether the death penalty existed in that country was significantly one and the same: "No, only for persons who collaborated during the German occupation."

[4] Deets, *op. cit.*, p. 586; a check of developments since the time of that study showed that there was no change in that particular respect, except in Germany, as stated. The Austrian law of June 21, 1950, in abolishing the death penalty, expressly refers only to the regular criminal procedure (*Im ordentlichen Verfahren*).

[5] Interviews in May 1952 with Dr. H. Van Rooy of the University of Utrecht and Dr. Ernest A. M. Lamers, director-general of the Penal Administration in the Netherlands.

On the other hand, on March 27, 1952, seven years after the end of the German occupation, the Danish Parliament voted to make "gross crimes" punishable by death during wartime and any period of occupation.[6] Denmark thus did not stop with the execution of several war criminals, but made permanent provisions for capital punishment.

Classification of some of these countries as having or not having the death penalty would often depend on a definition of the terms and principles underlying this taxonomy. The law of May 26, 1947, which abolished the death penalty in the U.S.S.R.,[7] was later supplemented; the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on January 12, 1950 reintroduced capital punishment for traitors, spies, and saboteurs.

As to the countries of Europe which do not have any death penalty for ordinary criminal offenders, a tabulation was prepared by the Howard League for Penal Reform as of September 1950,[8] to be submitted as evidence to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. This tabulation lists fifteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.S.R., and Western Germany. The inclusion of several of these can, however, be seriously questioned. Rumania with its law of January 13, 1949 and the U.S.S.R. with its law of January 12, 1950, which has just been referred to, have too broad formulas for capital offenses that endanger the security and well-being of the state to be able to claim that they do not have any death penalty for what other countries refer

[6] *New York Times*, March 28, 1952, p. 4.

[7] K. P. Gorshenin, *Istoricheskii Akt: Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Sovieta S.S.S.R. ob Otmene Smertnoi Kazni*, Moscow, 1947.

[8] Margery Fry, *Arms of the Law* (London, 1951), Appendix G, pp. 237–38.

to as ordinary criminal offenders. Finland seems to have given up the death penalty only for the time of peace,[9] and even the inclusion of Denmark, with its law of March 27, 1952, is questionable.

IN THE AMERICAS

As to the Americas, Canada and the United States are discussed elsewhere in this volume. Greenland, as a Danish colony, does not have any death penalty. There is a question whether the new Danish law of March 27, 1952 would apply.

Two observations are in order with reference to the Latin American countries. One is that these have been for quite some time strongly abolitionist, and a considerable number of them do not have any death penalty in the repertory of the respective law enforcement agencies. The other is the fact that information regarding the death penalty in the Latin American countries, at least what is available in English, is based almost exclusively on the legal documents, primarily the criminal codes. Some research into the actual circumstances and reports concerning them seems to be badly needed; either this would change the picture regarding some of the countries, or it would reassure the foreign students that what the law says is actually so.

The political changes in some of the countries make correct reporting even of the legal status of this question a very difficult task. Professor Deets[10] lists Ecuador and Uruguay as completely free of the death penalty even in the case of treason and military offenses. The above-mentioned tabulation of the Howard League gives twelve of the countries as having given up the death penalty for ordinary criminal offenders: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

On the basis of the evidence submitted by Professor Deets,[11] the inclusion of Honduras in this list should be questioned. Also, Mexico does not seem to be in its entirety without the death penalty. Moreover, there should be further clarification as to whether the statement of the Howard League that the death penalty was reintroduced in Peru in 1949 for political crimes only, is correct, since this writer has seen references to the effect that murder is a capital offense in Peru. In Cuba the present situation is not clear as of this writing.

Of the nonsovereign countries of Latin America, Puerto Rico and Surinam, not mentioned in the Howard League list, are without the death penalty for criminal offenses.

AUSTRALIA, ASIA, AFRICA

As to the rest of the world, Queensland, Australia, abolished the death penalty in 1922. It is interesting to note that New Zealand, which abolished the death penalty in 1941 by an amendment to the Crimes Act of 1908, restored it for certain cases of murder by the Capital Punishment Act of 1950.

For Asia there are currently three references. Of these, Israel is listed by the Howard League, apparently somewhat prematurely, since as late as February 1952 the bill providing for the abolition of capital punishment for murderers had only had its first reading in the Parliament. The measure was sent to a legislative committee, and at the time of this writing there still was no information as to its further fate.[12] The other two countries are Nepal, which suspended capital punishment by decree for five years in 1931 and never reintroduced it, and Travancore, one of

[9] *New York Times*, December 3, 1949.

[10] Deets, *op. cit.*, p. 589.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 590.

[12] *New York Times*, February 27, 1952, p. 4.

the states of India, which abolished the death penalty in 1944.

In the rest of Asia the death penalty presumably prevails, but the number of countries for which the information concerning its exact status is conclusive, as for instance in the case of Japan, is not great. The same applies to Africa.

LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE STUDIES

The literature on the death penalty is tremendous, but most of it is devoted to a discussion of the pros and cons and the promotion of the cause of abolition, primarily in terms of moralistic and philosophic principles. The bulk of the remaining literature is divided between legal writings on capital punishment throughout the history of western civilization and anecdotal descriptions of the execution methods. Modern scientific studies are mostly limited in scope to the area of western civilization, and at that to a few specific countries, which appear again and again in these writings.

We definitely lack a dependable and truly world-wide study of the death penalty, which would go beyond the legal provisions of the codes and the official answers of government representatives. Such a study, which would have to be a tremendous research enterprise, would be very worth while and revealing.

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The Death Penalty in Canada

By C. W. TOPPING

WHEN Pierre Boucher, an early resident of Quebec City, was asked by one of the French kings whether his town was a law-abiding place or not, he is reputed to have retorted, "We know how to hang in Canada."[1] Later Canadians also have taken pride in the fact that the legal sanctions of the country have been severe beyond those of other nations. They have also assumed with Pierre Boucher that severity of punishment and certainty of punishment are correlated and that the two together are the chief ingredients in the law-abidingness of a people.

The hangmen of Canada—Radclive, Ellis, and the rest—have put close to six hundred persons to death during the eighty-five years that have elapsed since the Confederation of the Provinces. Have the effects of the judicial acts of these men and their collaborators been what Canadians and others have assumed? A factual study of the death penalty in Canada ought to provide an opportunity to document an answer to this question.

CAPITAL CRIMES IN CANADA

The four capital offenses in Canada, according to the Revised Statutes of 1927 with Amendments,[2] are murder, treason, making war against Her Majesty, and rape. Murder is culpable homicide, and homicide is "the killing of a human being by another, directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever."[3] Homicide that is not culpable is no offense, and culpable homicide, which would otherwise be murder, may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who causes death does so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.[4] In addition, where the evidence does not indicate that a charge of murder can be sustained, a jury may bring in a verdict of manslaughter. Death must take place within a year and a day if a charge is to be laid.[5]

But many killings are murder under the Canadian statutes that the uninitiated might regard as no offense or as manslaughter. Where death ensues because of an action in the process of committing another crime, the charge of murder is frequently pressed. A common case is where a female has been choked to death during an act of rape or attempted rape. Almost as frequent are cases in which a clerk or attendant was killed while a store or gas station was being robbed. Charges of murder also arise in cases where a representative of the police power has been done to death. The person guilty of piracy is in a particularly vulnerable position, since he may be charged with murder if he merely "wounds any person, or does any act by which the life of any person is likely to be endangered."[6] A would-be murderer who kills some person other than the intended victim is also liable.

Treason is likewise a complicated offense, and ranges from a personal attack

[1] Louis Blake Duff, *The County Kerchief* (Toronto, 1949), p. 120.

[2] Canada, *Criminal Code and Selected Statutes, 1927*, including Amendments to 1947, Ottawa, 1948.

[3] R.S.C., c. 146, s. 250.

[4] *Ibid.*, s. 261.

[5] S. 254.

[6] S. 137.

on the monarch with a view to killing him or doing him bodily harm to violating a Queen Consort with or without her consent. It also includes any overt act of intention to do physical hurt to the monarch or her eldest son, or the consort; of instigating a foreign force to invade the country; and, the common case, "of assisting any public enemy at war with Her Majesty in such war by any means whatsoever."[7]

Making war against Her Majesty covers two groups of persons: (1) citizens of a foreign power at peace with Her Majesty, who continue in arms or who enter Canada with the intent of levying war or of committing any offense for which a Canadian would suffer death; and (2) citizens of Canada who join any such persons for one or all of these purposes.[8]

"Rape is the act of a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is not his wife without her consent, or with consent which has been extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm, or obtained by personating the woman's husband, or by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act."[9] No one under the age of fourteen years can commit rape.[10] In the case of rape the death sentence is permissive rather than mandatory, with an alternative punishment of imprisonment for life and to be whipped.[11]

It is expected that changes will be made in this list of capital offenses if and when the Report of the Royal Commission on the Revision of the Criminal Code is adopted by Parliament.[12] The Report of this Commission, with an annexed draft bill, was presented to the Minister of Justice on February 22, 1952. In the draft bill, rape ceases to be a capital offense but remains subject to "imprisonment for life and to be whipped."[13] The section on piracy has been clarified but still carries the original penalties.[14] A new offense—infanticide—has been added to the homicide section, with a greatly reduced penalty: "Every female person who commits infanticide is guilty of an indictable offense and liable to imprisonment for five years."[15] An alternative penalty of imprisonment for life has been added to the section on treason with which the section on making war against Her Majesty is now integrated.[16]

[7] S. 74 (i).
[8] S. 77.
[9] S. 298.
[10] S. 298 (2).
[11] S. 299; 1921, c. 25, s. 4.
[12] Report of the Royal Commission on Revision of the Criminal Code in manuscript with annexed *Draft Bill*, Ottawa, 1952.

EXTENT AND TREND OF CAPITAL CRIMES

Details on capital crimes are available in the annual reports of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and of the provincial and municipal police forces. Accurate statistical reports on murder go back to 1876. The summations of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics are based on the 1,729 reports sent in by officials of the 159 judicial districts (1946).[17] Since 1949 the raw data have been manipulated and tabulated mechanically, permitting more detailed comparisons for a given year but making more difficult comparisons with earlier years. The matter was further complicated in the same year by a change in the basis of the statistics from convictions to persons.

The range of capital offenses in Canada was much wider in the nineteenth than in the twentieth century. The first person hanged, according to Louis B. Duff, was a young woman who had been convicted of theft.[18] The first man to suffer the death penalty in Upper Canada—Josiah Cutten in 1792—had been sentenced for stealing rum and furs from a Detroit merchant. The first capital offender in the London district had robbed a store. And so the record continues. But killers were more common on the gallows of the period than were thieves.

Theft does not now rank as a capital offense in Canada, and the number of crimes subject to the death penalty may shortly be reduced to three—murder, treason, and piracy. Few if any rapists have ever been hanged in Canada, and hangings for piracy have been equally infrequent. Nor have charges of treason resulted in many public executions. Of the ninety-nine persons sentenced to death as a result of the Rebellion of 1837–38, only twelve were hanged.[19] Thus murder has always been and still is the chief capital offense in Canada.

[13] *Draft Bill*, s. 136.
[14] *Ibid.*, s. 75 (2).
[15] S. 208.
[16] S. 47; s. 77.
[17] Canada, *Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences*, Ottawa, annual since 1876. Miss Ruth Harvey, chief Judicial Section, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, gave considerable help in the preparation of this article.

[18] Duff, *op. cit.* note 1, pp. 5, 120.
[19] George W. Wrong, quoted in Duff, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 104.

TABLE 1—MURDER CHARGES AND SENTENCES, 1880–1949, BY TEN-YEAR TOTALS

Years	Charges				Sentences				
	Numbers	Mean	Range		Numbers	Mean	Range		Per Cent of Charges
			High Year	Low Year			High Year	Low Year	
1880–1889	254	25.4	40	13	99	9.9	16	4	38.9
1890–1899	223	22.3	28	16	76	7.6	13	4	34.0
1900–1909	310	31.0	42	22	103	10.3	18	2	33.2
1910–1919	596	59.6	86	48	233	23.3	34	17	39.0
1920–1929	540	54.0	77	42	188	18.8	26	11	34.0
1930–1939	450	45.0	54	35	194	19.4	25	13	43.1
1940–1949	450	45.0	66	23	177	17.7	32	9	39.3
Totals	2,823	40.3	86	13	1,070	15.3	34	2	37.9
Mode		26				11			
Median		40				15			

Capital offenses have never constituted as much as 1 per cent of indictable offenses; nor have persons hanged in any year since Confederation constituted as much as 1 in 100,000 of the population. The mean percentage which death sentences constituted of all sentences for indictable offenses between 1880 and 1949 for the ten-year period (1930–39) in which a charge of murder was most likely to result in a public execution was .057. Of the 103,753 investigations made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1951, only 28 (.027 per cent) concerned an alleged murder.

The charges for murder and the resulting sentences are given in Table 1 for all Canada except Newfoundland for the period 1880–1949. The mean and the range are given for subcategories, and the mean, the range, the mode, and the median for the series. The percentage of charges that resulted in sentences is also indicated.[20]

[20] The tables in this article were compiled from tables given in *Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences* for various years but chiefly for 1946, pp. 174–75, and 1949, pp. 48, 49 (I), 55 (VII).

EXECUTIONS

Table 2 gives executions carried out in all Canada except Newfoundland for the years 1880–1949 by ten-year totals.[21] The mean and the range are, again, supplied for subcategories; the mean, the range, the mode, and the median for the series. The percentage of charges and sentences that resulted in executions has also been worked out for the subcategories and for the series.

It is to be noted that there is a relatively greater spread between the median and the mean for executions than for charges and for sentences. The disturbing factors are the ten-year period 1900–1909 and the ten-year period 1930–1939, particularly the latter. During this period both a charge of and a sentence for murder had the greatest probability of culminating in an execution; the mean for any ten-year period was highest; and the greatest number of executions, gauged by total numbers, by high year, or by low year, took place.

TABLE 2—EXECUTIONS OF CAPITAL OFFENDERS, 1880–1949, BY TEN-YEAR TOTALS

Years	Number	Per Cent of Charges	Per Cent of Sentences	Mean	Range	
					High Year	Low Year
1880–1889	49	19.2	49.4	4.9	12	1
1890–1899	44	19.7	57.8	4.4	10	0
1900–1909	64	20.6	62.1	6.4	13	2
1910–1919	104	17.4	44.6	10.4	19	6
1920–1929	92	17.0	48.9	9.2	13	6
1930–1939	127	28.2	65.4	12.7	22	7
1940–1949	91	20.2	51.4	9.1	14	6
Totals	571	20.3	54.2	8.2	22	0
Mode				7		
Median				7		

[21] Executions, 1876–1879, totaled thirteen: mean 3.3, range 6 and 1, mode 3, median 3. Canada, *Statistical Abstract and Record, 1886* (Ottawa, 1886), p. 203. Official records go back only to 1876.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY

An accused capital offender may be detained for lunacy, and a sentenced capital offender may be given imprisonment for life. Before these final actions are taken, appeals both to higher courts and to the representative of Her Majesty are likely to have been entered. A Canadian defense counsel seldom spares himself, his client, or the enforcement officials in his attempts to circumvent a sentence of death. And he is likely, in his efforts, to win support from the press, public bodies, and the general public. He has also, with the passing of the years, won greater support from the psychiatrists.

Table 3 gives the number of persons charged with murder who were detained for lunacy, 1880–1949, by ten-year totals, with mean, range, and percentage of charges so dealt with for subcategories; and mean, range, mode, median, and percentage of charges shown for the series.

Despite the fact that some life sentences are for crimes other than capital offenses Table 4 gives total life sentences for all Canada except Newfoundland, 1880–1949, by ten-year totals,

TABLE 3—CAPITAL OFFENDERS DETAINED FOR LUNACY, 1880–1949

Years	Number	Per Cent of Charges	Mean	Range	
				High Year	Low Year
1880–1889	11	4.3	1.1	4	0
1890–1899	10	4.4	1.0	3	0
1900–1909	13	4.2	1.3	3	0
1910–1919	41	6.9	4.1	7	2
1920–1929	53	9.8	5.3	11	3
1930–1939	64	14.2	6.4	10	3
1940–1949	60	13.3	6.0	13	2
Totals	252	8.9	3.0	13	0
Mode			1		
Median			3		

with the same measures of dispersion as have been worked out for the preceding tables. Since the ratio of death sentences to sentences to life imprisonment may have significance, it is also included in Table 4. Table 5 will give some indication of the number of these sentences that are for the capital offense of murder.

The Commissioners appointed to investigate the penal system of Canada devoted a chapter of their *Report*[22] to "The Treatment of Insane Prisoners." They stated that the problem of the transfer to provincial mental hospitals of prisoners acquitted on the grounds of insanity is relatively easy, but that the treatment of such persons in these institutions creates serious difficulties for administrators. But in the case of the sentenced prisoner who is certified insane by the penitentiary doctor, either at the time of admission or later, serious difficulty has been experienced in arranging a transfer back to the provincial authorities, who in some cases contend that their responsibility is lim-

[22] Canada, *Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Penal System of Canada* (Ottawa, 1938), pp. 149–58.

TABLE 4—PERSONS SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT, 1880–1949

Years	Number	Mean	Range		Ratio of Death Sentences to Life Sentences
			High Year	Low Year	
1880–1889	37	3.7	13	0	2.6
1890–1899	28	2.8	9	0	2.7
1900–1909	27	2.7	6	0	3.8
1910–1919	51	5.1	9	1	4.5
1920–1929	73	7.3	14	2	2.5
1930–1939	64	6.4	15	2	3.0
1940–1949	46	4.6	8	1	3.8
Totals	326	4.8	15	0	3.2
Mode		2			
Median		4			

TABLE 5—COMMUTATIONS OF DEATH SENTENCES FOR MURDER, 1880–1949

Years	Numbers	Mean	Range		Per Cent of Sentences
			High Year	Low Year	
1880–1889	36	3.6	6	2	36.4
1890–1899	32	3.2	6	1	42.1
1900–1909	43	4.3	8	2	41.7
1910–1919	103	10.3	16	2	44.2
1920–1929	75	7.5	14	1	39.8
1930–1939	42	4.2	7	1	21.6
1940–1949	44	4.4	8	0	24.8
Totals	375	5.3	16	0	35 0
Mode		4			
Median		5			

ited to the treatment of "law-abiding citizens." [23]

The situation which the Royal Commissioners criticized in 1938 has been improved somewhat since that date, but is not yet entirely satisfactory. It should be clear that when mentally deranged persons remain in the penitentiaries they not only disorganize the discipline of these institutions but they fail to receive the treatment to which their condition entitles them.

The change of a death sentence to some other penalty or arrangement is most likely to take place by action of the representative of Her Majesty, the Governor General of Canada. It may, however, result from an action in an appellate court. An analysis of the appeals against the death sentence for the years 1946 and 1949 will illustrate the possibilities.[24] Fifty-eight persons were sentenced to death in these years and 44 appeals were taken to higher courts. Of these, the appeal was dismissed in 27 cases, a new trial was granted in 10 cases, the sentence was varied in 4 cases, and the conviction was quashed in 3 cases.

[23] *Report, op. cit.* note 22, p. 157.

[24] *Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences, 1946,* pp. 127–33; 1949, V, pp. 9–14.

PARDON AND PAROLE FOR CAPITAL OFFENDERS

Table 5 gives commutations of death sentences for murder by ten-year totals, 1880–1949, with the common measures of dispersion and the percentage of sentences which these commutations constitute for subcategories and for the series.

It is to be noted that the high period of activity by the representative of Her Majesty was the ten-year interval 1910–19, when an average of 10.3 commutations per year were granted. Sixteen commutations were granted in 1914, and twenty-six in the two-year period 1912–13. In the percentage column, commutation of 44.2 per cent of sentences stands out as high for the series and contrasts strikingly with the 21.6 per cent for the period 1930–39.

The chief disturbing factors in determining the trend appear to have been the movement for the abolition of the death penalty during the former period and the movement of the business cycle during the latter. The greater credence given by court officials, in their attempts to determine responsibility for conduct, to the testimony of psychiatrists may also have influenced the trend for the twenty-year period 1930–49. The percentage of accused murderers detained for lunacy rose sharply during this period (Table 3), and the percentage of sentenced murderers granted clemency declined (Table 5).

A number of convicted murderers who have had their sentence reduced to life imprisonment will receive further clemency. In 1946 and again in 1949, to select two representative years, five such persons were released from the various penitentiaries of Canada.[25] Not one of these persons had served what was considered to be half his sentence. One had served twenty years and three months; one, two years and three months. The time served by the other eight ranged between these extremes, with two serving less than eleven years, and six serving eleven years or more.

The conditions of release also varied. Six went out on ticket-of-leave—one of these to employment and five to the care of a guardian—all under the supervision of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Remission Branch. Three were released temporarily and one was deported.

QUESTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Th British tradition in the administration of justice has been that it is better for a thousand guilty persons to escape than for one innocent person to be convicted. Have any innocent persons been hanged in Canada? This is a difficult question to answer. Murderers in Canada, as in other parts of the earth, are in the habit of protesting their innocence right up to the dropping of the trap door. Where a signed confession of guilt is available, psychiatric opinion suggests that it should be highly suspect in any subsequent court action. Murder is a low-visibility crime, and evidence is commonly circumstantial.

[25] *Statistics, op. cit.* note 24, 1946, pp. 146–47; 1949, V, pp. 26–27.

The Canadian cases that have caused public disputation have not been those in which the question of guilt or innocence was the issue. They have been the situations in which two or three persons were hanged for a single killing where only one weapon was used or only one shot fired.[26] Bungled hangings have also roused public indignation against the crudities associated with a public execution.[27] But public outcry may well have been responsible for any injustices that have been hinted at in the record. Where a series of atrocious murders have taken place or where a killing has been particularly gruesome, a great hue and cry has commonly arisen. In such an atmosphere the police and the court officials may react emotionally, with fatal results to an accused person.[28]

A close study of Canadian procedure in capital cases strengthens the belief that the British principle noted above is still operative. A thorough examination by a psychiatrist in such cases has become routine, with an increasing number of murderers being held for lunacy. Defense counsel has become highly specialized and exceedingly competent. Appeals to higher courts are permitted and expected. Stays of execution are also routine, as are the final appeal for clemency and the substitution of a sentence of life imprisonment for the sentence of death.

Doubt as to the guilt of the accused at any point in these elaborate procedures is likely to react in his favor and to elicit a response which will work to the advantage of an innocent victim of circumstantial evidence. Once a commutation to life imprisonment has

[26] Robert Bickerdike, Scrapbook, II, pp. 121–25. Two Bickerdike Scrapbooks were made available through the generosity of Mr. J. Alexander Edmison.

[27] Duff, *op. cit.* note 1, pp. 131–40; Bickerdike, Scrapbook, II, pp. 103–14.

[28] Bickerdike Scrapbook, I, p. 15.

been secured, a reduction of sentence for the killer who is unlikely to repeat any offense becomes possible.

But the administration of justice is more than the assurance of protection for the innocent party in a suit. Do we really know how to hang in Canada, as Pierre Boucher held, or do we let the thousand guilty murderers escape in the course of our efforts to save the life of the one who is falsely accused, in harmony with the British principle? In other words, can severity and certainty of punishment be reconciled, or have we here an either-or principle?

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police reported in detail the disposal of the 28 investigations of 1951 which involved murder.[29] Eleven of the charges were reduced to manslaughter; 8 cases were awaiting trial at the end of the year; 4 had been acquitted; 3 had committed suicide; 1 had been declared mentally incompetent to stand trial; and in 1 case only was there sufficient evidence to proceed with a trial for murder. Not a single 1951 investigation had resulted in a conviction for murder, and not one person had been hanged as a result of these investigations.

The significance of this report is that a police force which out of 22,818 investigations had succeeded in obtaining 12,386 convictions, or 54.3 per cent,[30] were unable to locate and assemble evidence to satisfy the prosecutor in cases of murder. And Canadian juries have been equally hard to satisfy. The total charges for indictable offenses in 1949 were 31,134, and the total convictions 30,922, or 99.3 per cent.[31] The convictions for Class I offenses, the group with which murder is classified, were slightly less, with 5,894 convictions to 7,662 charges, or 76.9 per cent.[32] But the highest percentage of convictions for murder to charges of murder for the whole seventy-year period 1880–1949 was 43.1 (1930–39) and the lowest 33.2 (1900–1909), and for the series the percentage was 37.9.[33] When one considers the percentage of charges that result in executions, the differential is even greater: 28.2 per cent for the high period (1930–39), 17.0 per cent for the low period, 1920–29, and 20.3 per cent for the series.[34]

It seems clear that there is an inverse relationship between severity of punishment and certainty of punishment, and that Canadians are suffering under a delusion when they assert that they know how to hang. The net result of the administration of justice in Canada as it relates to capital offenses is that murder has become the least risky of any or all the offenses which a citizen might choose to commit.

Movements to Abolish Capital Punishment

The movements for the abolition of capital punishment have never been Canadian movements, but rather Montreal movements, with Mr. Robert Bickerdike, M.P., and the clergymen of that city as leaders.[35] The group were both active and effective from 1910 to 1920, particularly in stirring up discussion in the public press and in persuading the Governor General to commute death sentences to life imprisonment. However, the private bills which Mr. Bickerdike introduced from time to time for the abolition of capital punishment did not win the support of Parliament.[36]

[29] Canada, *Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1951* (Ottawa, 1951), p. 20.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[31] *Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences, 1949*, I, pp. 48–49.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] Table 1.
[34] Table 2.
[35] Bickerdike Scrapbook, II, pp. 104, 121.
[36] E.g., February 18, 1915. See House of Commons Debates, Vol. XLIX, 1915.

Members of the group lost heart and transferred their energies to other reform endeavors.

What arguments did Mr. Bickerdike press in Parliament for the abolition of capital punishment in Canada? The following is a summary of a statement made on March 30, 1915.

1. It is murder and a blot on Christianity.
2. It brutalizes the public as well as the officials.
3. It is not a deterrent and is less feared by some criminals than imprisonment for life.
4. Innocent victims are occasionally executed.
5. All punishment should be reformatory, not vindictive.
6. There are fewer murders per capita in states and countries which have abolished the death sentence than in those which have retained it.
7. It is a relic of barbarism.[37]

The Canadian Penal Association and the provincial John Howard societies, successors to the organizations with which Mr. Bickerdike associated himself, have stressed social work rather than social reform, and members of Parliament have discussed alternatives to hanging rather than capital punishment as such. The Royal Commission on the Revision of the Criminal Code chose as counsel [38] a man who permitted himself to be quoted as follows in the *Financial Post Survey* on capital punishment reported in the issue of October 12, 1946:

I would not favor for Canada the abolition of capital punishment for any period. It would open wide the floodgates of the crime of murder and a vast number of innocent Canadians, including women and children, would, as a result, be murdered because the fear of hanging for such offenses would be removed.[39]

And the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, in a nation-wide poll, found that almost half the persons interviewed considered hanging as the best method of execution, with only a quarter favoring life imprisonment as a substitute for the death penalty. And the citizens of the province of Quebec still stood with Pierre Boucher, since the strongest support for both capital punishment and for the continued use of the noose was found in that province.[40]

The logical time to abolish capital punishment in Canada, if it is ever to be abolished, is when the bill annexed to the Report of the Royal Commission on the Revision of the Criminal Code is debated in the House of Commons. The serious discussion of the issue at that time does not, at the moment, appear likely, but the representatives of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and of the Social Credit Party in the House may take up the fight where the late Robert Bickerdike dropped it.[41] Even under such conditions, prolonged debate, rather than a favorable vote, is likely to result.

Science and Murder

The relationship between science and murder has become closer with the years. The work of the psychiatrist has been noted. The most dangerous of all murderers, the insane repeater, can escape the gallows on recommendation of this scientist. Police laboratories have made little progress except where they have drawn upon the sci-

[37] House of Commons Debates, Vol. XLIX, No. 38 (March 30, 1915), p. 1837.
[38] Report, p. 1.
[39] Mr. Arthur G. Slaght, Q.C., former M.P., Toronto; quoted in Duff, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 221.
[40] Quoted in Duff, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 220.
[41] The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation is a socialist movement; the Social Credit Party, a movement greatly influenced by Christianity.

ences of chemistry, physics, and biology. Can the social sciences, likewise, make a contribution? Can the criminologist hope to document the offense of murder, to predict its incidence in a given area, to hedge it about with effective controls. That capital punishment is an ineffective control should be obvious from the above analysis.

What factors in the total situation stood out in a study of seventy years of murder in Canada? [42] The most significant factor was the presence of a suitable weapon—a revolver, a shotgun, a rifle, a hunting knife, a butcher knife, a heavy bottle, or a club. The robbery with violence that results in a killing belongs here by statute in Canada, indicating that lawmakers are aware of the high correlation between available weapon and fatal action. Another important and commonly present factor was alcohol. Canadian husbands, when intoxicated, struck down men whom they suspected of molesting their wives; husbands who wished to kill their wives screwed up their courage with the help of alcohol; men and women were murdered in drunken brawls.

These two factors together outweighed, perhaps, all others. As Thomas Rossler, the bank bandit and murderer, put it, "Whiskey and guns don't mix." [43] Other significant factors have been in-group conflicts—violent family quarrels, quarrels between friends, spite actions within accommodation groups; out-group conflicts—interracial strife, the avenging of damage or insult; actions due to avarice or to great emotional disturbance verging on insanity; and finally insanity itself.

[42] Based on an analysis of the murders described in the Bickerdike Scrapbooks; in the Reports of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the British Columbia Provincial Police, and the Vancouver daily papers; and in Duff's *The County Kerchief*, *op. cit.* note 1.

[43] *Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1951*, p. 30.

An analysis such as this reveals the difficulty faced by the scientist in this area. Not a single situation described here would constitute a murder in the eyes of large numbers of persons, including court officials and scientists. To them, murder is an action carried out with malice aforethought, the hallmarks of which are planning and an overpowering grudge. But in Canada not only individuals but groups of persons have been hanged for permitting themselves to become involved in the situations documented above. Until recently the now conceded proof of insanity was no sure protection against public execution.

Can the scientist hope to predict the incidence of murder in a Canadian community? The incidence and the location of automobile fatalities have been predicted with dependable accuracy for the city of Vancouver.[44] And murders and automobile accidents show a constant relationship as far as location is concerned. The location of murders for all Canada as a basis for prediction is a much more difficult, if not impossible, project. The provincial police of the province of British Columbia checked up on 326 deaths in 1937.[45] Twelve persons were hanged in Canada in that year—3.6 per cent of the investigated deaths in one of the smaller provinces. The *Vancouver Daily Province* published a file of unsolved local murders and invited testimony with a view to the conviction of the killers. No hangings resulted.

It seems clear that the present incidence of murder is not known in Vancouver, in British Columbia, or in Canada. It seems equally well established that no criminologist can predict the future incidence of murder in an

[44] In a study by Miss Margaret Smith for the Vancouver Town Planning Commission.

[45] *Report of the Provincial Police, 1937* (Victoria, 1938), p. 13.

area until he has determined its present incidence. Thus the contribution of the scientist to description and to prediction is negligible at the moment in Canada.

Does this mean that the scientist can make no contribution to the control of murder in Canada? Absolute knowledge, fortunately, is not essential to a measure of control. It is not known whether convicted Canadian murderers are a representative sample or not; but it is known that they are largely first offenders; [46] and that, in view of the severity of the punishment which they will receive if convicted, witnesses hesitate to testify against them and juries hesitate to find them guilty. Conviction in the case of low-visibility crimes, such as murder, is difficult under the best of conditions. The scientist might well make a contribution which would improve the chances that a murderer who was guilty of this offense would be not only arrested but convicted.

If a more objective approach could be adopted towards the murderer by the public, the press, the police, court officials, prison officials, and parole officers, a clearer picture of this criminal would emerge and it would be possible to determine in general whether he was a good or a bad treatment risk, and specifically what kinds of murderers are good, and what kinds bad, treatment risks. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and social scientists should be of great assistance in such a new operation. There may be sound arguments for the permanent removal from the community of the habitual killer; but the first offender, even in cases where his offense has been murder, merits a more objective handling than he has been receiving.

[46] Thirty out of 32 were first offenders in 1946; 11 out of 18 in 1947; 15 out of 15 in 1942. See Table VII, *Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences* for these and other years.

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Murder and the Death Penalty in England

By MAX GRÜNHUT

THE juxtaposition of murder and the death penalty in England, as in any other country, does not necessarily indicate a logical connection between the two phenomena. A penalty prescribed by the law is not always the outcome of a rational assessment of the crime situation and the empirical evidence in respect of the most effective means of prevention and repression. Medical science bases the evaluation of its remedies on clinical experience, but penal policy is a rationalization after the act.

Our traditional penalties, no less than the concept of punishment itself, have deep irrational roots. Throughout history they have played their part in maintaining law and order, though not without considerable losses to the society they were supposed to protect. With a growing social conscience, penalties with the most obnoxious effects were abandoned, and scientific efforts were made in search of new preventive and remedial measures.

However, the extent of this rationalization of penal law varies with the type of offense and the mode of punishment. While retribution has survived only in a symbolic form in any other province of criminal law, capital punishment is a powerful relic of retaliation in kind. There seems to be a resemblance, at least, between the execution of the murderer and the death of the victim.

This fact explains the strong appeal of the inveterate doctrine which regards the death of the murderer as the natural and just consequence of his crime. Its followers would consider the abolition of capital punishment only if they could be convinced that capital punishment is unnecessary for the protection of human life. Those, however, who deprecate the death penalty as a strange anomaly in a rational system of preventive and constructive penal policy would reconcile themselves to its retention only if it could be proved that it is indispensable to stem the otherwise unchecked murderous attacks. This is ultimately a difference in the onus of proof. With a view to this controversy, the present state of opinion on the retention or abolition of capital punishment in England must be discussed in the light of criminological experience.

THE EXTENT OF MURDER

In 1950 the police reported 122 persons, aged one year and over, murdered in England and Wales. While in three of these cases nobody could be detected as the possible perpetrator, the police suspected 109 persons concerned in 119 murder cases. Of these, 38 committed suicide and 71 were prosecuted. Of the latter, 13 were discharged or acquitted, 29 were found insane, and 29 were convicted for murder. Three of the murderers were under 17 years of age and two were expectant mothers, and thus were exempted from capital punishment. Twenty-four were sentenced to death. Of these, 2 were certified insane and removed to a state mental institution, 8 were reprieved and their sentence commuted to life imprisonment, and the remaining 14 were hanged.[1]

[1] *Criminal Statistics for England and Wales, 1950* (London, 1951), p. xxvi. Unless otherwise stated, all the figures in this article are either taken from the official Criminal Statistics for England and Wales, or computed from figures taken from this source.

TABLE 1—HOMICIDE MORTALITY RATES FOR ENGLAND AND WALES

Year	Per Million Population
1921–30[a]	5.5
1939[b]	5
1940	4
1941	5
1942	6
1943	5
1944	5
1945	7
1946	5
1947	5
1948	5

[a] Rates computed from Decennial Supplement to the Census Report for 1931, Part IV (London, 1947), p. 7, Table 1.

[b] Rates for years 1939–48 taken direct from Registrar General's Statistical Review for 1949, Part I (Medical), p. 38, Table 7.

Criminological data become significant by comparison. A prewar study in the ecology of murder suggests that there are in Europe several zones differing in the intensity of murder criminality. Homicide mortality decreases as one proceeds from the east and southeast to the west and northwest of the Continent.[2]

Homicide mortality rates indicate the number of victims of crime, and for this reason are usually regarded as a most reliable crime index. Under English law, however, this is true only with the reservation that they include as cases of manslaughter the growing number of fatal motorcar accidents due to criminal negligence.

If one turns to criminal statistics and combines the murder rates into groups, it appears that in the first quinquennium of the present century the average annual number of murders known to the police per million of the population was 4.7. This rate remained almost constant at 4.2 between 1905 and 1919, and fell gradually to 3.2 in the decade 1930–39 preceding the Second World War. In the war quinquennium 1940–44 the rate rose again to 3.9, and in the postwar quinquennium 1945–49 to 4.4. The actual rate for 1950 was down to 3.6. The annual averages cover considerable variations. The highest and lowest figures on record during the war were only two years apart. The number of persons murdered known to the police reached its peak of 159 in 1942 and attained its low record of 95 in 1944.

This irregular murder curve must be seen in conjunction with the general trend of crime. Since the end of the last century, when in 1899 the number of crimes known to the police had fallen to the unrivaled low figure of 239 per 100,000 of the population, crime in England has steadily increased to the record figure of 1,209.72 in 1950. Table 2 shows how murder and certain other selected crimes contributed to the significant rise in crime.

Within these fifty years changes may have occurred in the inclination of the public to report cases to the police and in the methods of registration by the police. Taking the figures at their face value, they suggest that crime in England today is five times more frequent than it was half a century ago. This notable rise has even been surpassed by the increase in housebreaking and burglary, which has reached a figure nearly eight times the level of the beginning of the century.

Among the crimes of violence, only rape has increased beyond the mean rate, while wounding today is four times and robbery and extortion are three and a half times more frequent than fifty years ago. Murder, however, is less frequent than it was thirty to fifty years ago. Compared with other crimes, the murder curve seems to be more irregular, with a postwar peak in 1945. However, these irregularities

[2] E. Roesner, "Kriminalstatistische Umschau," 28 *Mo. Schr. Krim.* (1937), pp. 41–51, at pp. 45 ff.

TABLE 2—SELECTED CRIMES KNOWN TO THE POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES
(per million of population)

Annual Average	Murder	Wounding	Rape	Robbery and Extortion	Housebreaking and Burglary
1900–09	4.5	36.5	38.0	8.3	310.8
1910–19	4.2	25.1	44.6	5.3	314.2
1920–29	3.8	22.5	57.2	5.3	482.1
1930–39	3.2	41.0	68.6	8.0	965.7
1940–44	3.9	51.0	95.9	16.2	1,385.9
Actual Figure					
1945	5.1	77.2	127.3	26.4	2,547.2
1946	3.7	70.2	137.0	23.5	2,676.6
1947	4.1	80.4	145.3	25.5	2,583.5
1948	3.9	96.4	160.4	28.1	2,589.9
1949	3.1	98.9	173.0	25.9	2,088.5
1950	3.6	135.7	216.1	29.9	2,433.9

may be due to the small figures concerned, compared with the steady upward tendency in the huge figures for housebreaking and burglary.

Among offenses of violence, rape shows a steady and almost even rise, with a surprisingly steep increase in the last year under observation. While in 1950 the figure for robbery and extortion was the highest on record, the abolition of corporal punishment in 1948 did not hinder a reduction in 1949. For wounding, the steep rise began in the thirties. The general impression, therefore, prevails that the recent increase in murder is a temporary fluctuation within a stable, if not in the long run downward, trend.

A comparison between the curves for murder and suicide seems to confirm the classical doctrine that murder and suicide are mutual substitutes; the year 1942, with an exceptionally high number of 159 murder cases, had the lowest figure for suicides among males for the last fifty years—2,477.[3] However, this time-honored theory has been refuted as a misleading oversimplification. While the fluctuations of the curve of the small figures for murder are indeed difficult to explain, the changing trend of suicides is more dependent on outward conditions. Wartime with its distracting excitements leaves "no time to spare for suicide."[4]

[3] Registrar General's Statistical Review, 1940–1945 (1949), No. 163, 164, p. 243.

TYPES OF MURDERERS

For a complete assessment of the crime situation, the amount of crime must be supplemented by an analysis of its structure. Experience suggests a positive correlation between the frequency of murder and the proportion of murderers acting from acquisitive motives. Countries with a high murder rate have among their many murder cases a large proportion of armed holdups and burglaries.[5] The present evidence from England throws some light on this question.

As a working hypothesis one might classify murder cases into three groups: murder as the expression of a personal conflict, as the outcome of a sudden criminal impulse, and as the result of an acquisitive motive. The first group comprises cases where the offender kills

[4] H. Gruhle, "Jugendselbstmord," 45 *Z. f. Kinderforschung* (1936), pp. 157–202, at p. 163.

[5] H. C. Brearley, *Homicide in the U.S.A.* (Chapel Hill, 1932), p. 81.

his wife, his mistress, or his wife's lover; the second refers to murder from sexual impulse or as the result of a fight; and the last consists of acts committed in the course of a robbery or burglary.

The long-time downward trend in the murder criminality in England manifests itself in the first group. Among the 284 murderers sentenced to death in the decade 1900–1909, 169 or 59.5 per cent had committed the offense in a conflict situation; but of the corresponding (partly estimated) figure of 255 for 1940–49, only 108 or 42.35 per cent belonged to this group.

At the same time, murder from criminal impulse and from acquisitive motive increased both absolutely and proportionately. The total number of murderers sentenced to death increased from 1930–39 to 1940–49 by 29.4 per cent; but while the increase of conflict cases by only 10.2 per cent lagged behind the general rise in murder, acts from criminal impulse rose by 57.4 per cent, and murder for gain rose even by 73.3 per cent.[6] The recent war and postwar peak is therefore due primarily to increased acquisitive crime.

This impression is confirmed by the changing age distribution among men sentenced to death. A comparison of the prewar decade 1930–39 with the war and postwar years 1940–48 shows stable proportions for the intermediate age groups, 24–29 and 30–49, a fall in the number and proportions of men of 50 and over, but an increase from 6.42 per cent to 10.2 per cent of minors between 18 and 21, an age group most probably concerned in robberies and armed burglaries.[7]

[6] Figures computed from Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1–2 (1949), pp. 26–27, Appendix F, Table 2, with kind permission of the Director of Publications, H. M. Stationery Office.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35, Table 6A.

Insane murderers

In every country, murderers, among all offenders, show the highest proportion of persons found insane. The natural inhibitions against an onslaught on the life of a fellow man are so strong that their breakdown is often a pathological reaction beyond the individual's control. At the same time, since a murder trial is a question of life or death, the issue of insanity is more often raised and more vigorously pursued.

Under English law, the question of insanity can be considered at three different stages of a murder procedure:[8] (1) Before the trial, a prisoner may be found "unfit to plead" and thus declared "insane on arraignment."[9] (2) If at the trial the defense succeeds with the plea of insanity, the prisoner may be found, in the terms of the Victorian statute, "guilty but insane."[10] (3) When under sentence of death, he may be certified insane as the result of an examination ordered by the Home Secretary.[11] In any of the three cases he is detained in a state mental institution for an indeterminate period.

The proportion of murderers found insane has remained remarkably constant. Their number per 100 persons prosecuted for murder was 44 in the prewar years 1936–38, again 44 in the war years 1939–42, and 45 in the postwar years 1946–50. Most of these insane murderers are duly diagnosed before or during the trial. In the three-year period 1948–50, 51 were found insane on arraignment, 41 guilty but insane, and 6 were certified insane while under sentence of death. This means that 6.4

[8] R. M. Jackson, "A Note on Broadmoor Patients," 11 *Cambridge L. J.* (1951), 57.

[9] Criminal Lunatic Act, 1800; 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 94.

[10] Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883; 46 & 47 Vict., c. 38.

[11] Criminal Lunatics Act, 1884; 47 & 48 Vict., c. 64.

per cent of murderers were found insane after their conviction.

These conditions are reflected in the composition of the inmates of the State Mental Institution, Broadmoor. In 1949 there were in that institution 419 found insane on arraignment and therefore never convicted after a full trial, 342 found guilty but insane, and 114 other patients certified while under sentence of death or while serving a prison sentence.[12] The majority of insane murderers are diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. Of the male population received into this institution during a twenty-year period, 27 per cent were discharged. As a rule, no man has any chance of being released within the first ten years.[13]

Reprieved murderers

In English law, death is the only penalty applicable to the convicted murderer except in the case of minors under 18 years of age or expectant mothers. For all others, the ultimate decision as to life or death lies with the prerogative of mercy. The practice of granting a reprieve shows only slight variations. The percentage of murderers liable to execution who were reprieved was 54 in the prewar period 1936–38, went down to 41 in the war years 1939–42, and rose again to 49 in the postwar period 1946–50.

No reasons are given for the refusal or the granting of a reprieve.[14] It is, however, fair to assume that the reprieved murderers are a positive selection with regard to character and personal motive, and this must be taken into account if one follows up their later careers. In the forty-nine years between 1900 and 1948, of 1,178 murderers under sentence of death, 537 were reprieved. During the same period 418 reprieved murderers, 316 men and 102 women, were released from prison.

The sex rate of 3:1 among released reprieved murderers indicates a lenient practice in respect of women, since the sex rate for murder is 8:1. Seven men and 8 women spent less than a year in prison; 33 men and 49 women served for terms between one and five years.[15] These figures show an even higher rate of women among those released after comparatively short terms of imprisonment.

In 1949, 12 reprieved murderers served their sentence at the Closed Prison Parkhurst, 32 at the Training Prison Wakefield, and 21 at the Open Prison Leyhill.[16] The experience of the Central After-care Association with reprieved murderers after their release from life sentences seems favorable. Of 129 murderers released from prison between 1934 and 1948, 112 had done well when last heard of; the association lost sight of 3, and 14 were reconvicted. Of these 129 murderers discharged to the care of the association, 102 had had no previous convictions.[17]

Compared with a more remote report from Germany, the present English experience indicates a wholesome progress. Of 50 "lifers" received from 1882 to 1912 at the convict prison of Bruchsal in Baden, 15 were discharged. Of these, 7 became maladjusted or dependent. Of 67 "lifers" received between 1899 and 1927 at Waldheim, Saxony, only five were discharged, mostly after long years alternating between prison and mental institution, and out of this small privileged group, three were well adjusted, and one, who had become blind in prison, earned his living as a hawker.[18]

[12] Minutes of Evidence, *op. cit.* note 6, 15, p. 352.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 360.

[14] On the difficulties arising when, in 1889, the Home Secretary of the day, Henry Matthews, made public his reasons for the reprieve of a Mrs. Maybrick, see Viscount Simon, *Retrospect* (London, 1952), pp. 54 ff.

[15] Minutes of Evidence, *op. cit.* note 6, 1–2, p. 5 and Appendix F, Table 5 at pp. 32–33.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[17] *Ibid.*, 10, p. 237.

[18] Lumpp, "Das Schicksal von 50 zu lebenslänglichem Zuchthaus Verurteilten," 47 *Bl. f. Gefängniskd.* (1913), pp. 107–35; R. Plischke, "Die Lebenslänglichen," 50 *Z. f. ges. Strafrechtswissenschaft* (1930), pp. 146–66.

THE DISPUTE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

It is difficult to predict how these facts will affect the outcome of the controversy about the death penalty. The advocates of abolition are able to maintain that, seen in the right proportion, the present murder criminality in England is less menacing than is generally assumed, that the small fraction of actual executions belies the assertion that only death can expiate the guilt of the murderer, and that the experience with reprieved murderers shows that they are far from being a constant danger to society.

To this the adversaries of abolition will reply that if in a time of a spectacular rise in crime the murder curve shows only moderate fluctuations, it would be unwise to abandon a weapon which so far has kept murder at bay, that the small number of executions suggests that only the worst criminals are put to death, and that favorable experience with the positive selection of released reprieved murderers does not imply the same attitude and conduct in all types of murderers.

However, the issue will not be decided by rational arguments alone. Certain intangible factors of a psychological nature may prove more important. The crime situation today, with the rapid increase in the common crimes of housebreaking and burglary, seems to reflect in the domestic field the feeling of insecurity which has become the political fate of the postwar world. It is this unfavorable climate, rather than any empirical evidence in respect of murder, that makes it difficult for public opinion to accept a solution which can be interpreted as an infringement of the armor of the law.

It required the strenuous effort of penal reformers throughout the nineteenth century to reduce the inflated number of capital offenses in the statute book.[19] In 1837, Lord John Russell, a member of Melbourne's government, defined the object of the reform as "taking away capital punishment from all offenses against property, and its continuation in all cases where an atrocious offense was committed against life and person."[20] The Consolidation Acts of 1861 laid down the state of the law as it exists today; that is, capital punishment for murder, treason, setting fire to a King's ship or dockyard,[21] or piracy by an act endangering human life.[22]

Compared with other countries which retain capital punishment for the most serious forms of homicide, or did so up to recent times, in England the range of conduct covered by the threat of the death penalty is very wide. In English law, the concept of murder exceeds the limits of intentional killing, and comprises fatal actions committed with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm, and violent felonious acts causing a person's death. At the same time, the M'Naghten Rules recognize a lack of criminal responsibility for a much more restricted sphere than any other European legal system.

Death penalty suspended and restored

The classic exposition of the case against the death penalty in England is

[19] L. Radzinowicz, *History of Criminal Law*, I, London, 1948.

[20] *Hansard*, III Series, Vol. 38 (1837), p. 912; 19.5.1837.

[21] Dockyards Protection Act, 1772; 12 Geo. III, c. 24.

[22] Piracy Act, 1837; 7 Will. IV and 1 Vict., c. 88.

Roy Calvert's book which first appeared in 1927.[23] Two years later, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to consider the question of capital punishment in cases tried before civil courts in time of peace. In 1930 the Report of this committee, for which however only 8 out of 14 members accepted responsibility, suggested the abolition of the death penalty for an experimental period of five years. The Criminal Justice Bill of 1938 and the redrafted Criminal Justice Bill of 1947, which brought to an end corporal punishment and penal servitude, left the death penalty untouched apart from a clause which extended the exemption from capital punishment of prisoners under 18 years of age to all offenders who were under the age of 18 years when they committed the offense.[24]

However, the death penalty became the main issue in the parliamentary debate on the bill and in the public discussion of the impending penal reform. In the House of Commons the Home Secretary expressed the view that a time when crimes of violence increased rapidly and more criminals carried arms was not an opportune moment to abolish the death penalty. At the same time he recognized that this was a matter of personal conscience, and therefore the Government left the issue to a free vote of the House; that is, a decision not determined by prescribed party lines.[25]

It was a notable event in the history of capital punishment when on April 14, 1948 the House of Commons voted by 245 to 222 for the suspension of capital punishment for a five-year period.[26] In fairness to the offenders who should not suffer under the inevitable delay till the impending change of the law reached the Statute Book, the Government at once decided to commute thenceforth indiscriminately all death sentences to penal servitude for life. As a matter of administrative practice, there was no capital punishment in England and Wales from April 14 to November 18, 1948.

During the last seven weeks preceding the period of automatic reprieve there were 19 murders; in the first seven weeks after April 14 the number was 25; but in the last seven weeks of the period without death penalty the number was only 17. During the first six weeks after the resumption of hanging, there were 5 executions and 28 murders.[27] Suspension and reintroduction of the death penalty left no visible mark on the murder criminality in England.

In the meantime, a heated exchange of arguments had begun. The *Daily Telegraph* briefed Mass Observation for a survey of public opinion, in the course of which 6,114 persons were interviewed. Of those who had heard of the vote for a five-year suspension, 69 per cent expressed unqualified disapproval and 13 per cent unqualified approval of that proposal. Increasing education seemed to go hand in hand with sympathy for the cause of abolition; 11 per cent of those with elementary, 14 per cent of those with secondary, and 21 per cent of those with higher secondary education were in favor of the proposed suspension. Among the numerous adversaries, the largest group, 40 per cent, gave as their reason the danger for the individual and the community.[28]

On June 2 the House of Lords deleted the clause intended to suspend the death

[23] Roy Calvert, *Capital Punishment*, London and New York, 1927.

[24] Criminal Justice Act, 1948; 11 and 12 Geo. VI, c. 58, s. 16.

[25] *Hansard*, V Series, Vol. 444, p. 2150; 27.11.47.

[26] *Ibid.*, Vol. 449, p. 1094.

[27] Written answer of the Home Secretary, *Hansard*, V Series, Vol. 460, Written Answers, p. 169; 27.1.1949. Also editorial note 7 *Howard Journal* (1948–49), 198.

[28] *Daily Telegraph*, May 28, 1948.

penalty, by 181 to 21 votes.[29] The Government then tabled a compromise in the House of Commons intended to restrict the use of the death penalty to a specified category of murder. These remaining capital cases were to be limited to murder with express malice, committed under any one of five defined circumstances, namely: in connection with the commission of certain other prescribed crimes including housebreaking and burglary, in the course of resisting arrest, by administration of poison, the murder of a prison officer, and repeated murder.[30] Although even this clause threw the net rather widely, it was assumed that it would reduce the number of executions by at least 55 per cent.[31] On July 15, 1948 the House of Commons accepted this clause, but on July 20 the House of Lords defeated the compromise.[32] On July 30 the Criminal Justice Act received the Royal Assent without any further modification of the law of murder.

Royal Commission on Capital Punishment

After this outcome, it came almost as a surprise when on January 20, 1949 the Prime Minister announced the appointment of a Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. However, the terms of reference were carefully worded, and limited the inquiries to the question "whether liability under criminal law in Great Britain to suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited or modified." Mr. Attlee made it clear that the Commission was deliberately precluded from considering the fundamental issue of abolition, "on which Parliament will, in due course, have to take its decision."[33] The primary object of the Commission seemed to be to investigate, on a broad basis, ways and means of resuming the compromise line of the abortive clause of 1948 with a better prospect of success.

The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, under the chairmanship of Sir Ernest Gowers, held thirty sessions from August 4, 1949 to February 1, 1951. These sessions were held in public. Verbatim minutes of evidence were published, together with the written memoranda and appendixes submitted to the Commission. This printed material covers 789 foolscap pages. The Report of the Commission is expected to appear before the end of this year.

The Minutes of Evidence bear witness to the thoroughness and scientific interest with which the Commission went to work. In this it exceeds by far the achievement of its predecessor, the Select Committee of 1929, and is a worthy counterpart to the comprehensive studies of the recent Royal Commission on Population.[34] In addition to evidence on personal experience and subjective opinions of many persons concerned with various judicial, administrative, and medical functions in consecutive stages of the procedure in murder cases, the Minutes contain valuable statistical material which otherwise would be almost inaccessible and from which the present paper has drawn repeatedly. The Commission extended its investigations into conditions in other countries, both abolitionist and nonabolitionist. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and

[29] *Hansard*, V Series, Vol. 156, House of Lords, p. 176; 2.6.1948. For a condensed extract from the debates in both Houses of Parliament see Cicely M. Craven, "The House of Commons and the Death Penalty," "The House of Lords and the Death Penalty," 7 *Howard Journal* (1948–49), 204 and 211.

[30] Minutes of Evidence, *op. cit.* note 6, 1–2, Appendix E, p. 21.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[32] *Hansard*, V Series, Vol. 453, pp. 1411–1530; 15.1.1948; *ibid.*, Vol. 157 House of Lords, p. 1072; 20.7.1948.

[33] *Hansard*, V Series, Vol. 460, p. 330; 20.1.49.

[34] Report of the Royal Commission on Population, London, 1949, Cmd. 7695.

Professor Thorsten Sellin gave evidence in person before the Commission.

Discussion expected

The question whether capital punishment should be abolished or retained is not *sub judice*. Even so, the immense evidence heard and published affects so many aspects of crime and punishment in general, as well as of murder and the death penalty, that a revival of the principal dispute is to be expected once the official report has been published. It is hoped that the renewed public discussion will benefit from the work of the Commission and that the accumulated evidence will help to substitute facts for prejudice, and rational arguments for sentiment. The empirical basis of the controversy needs a good deal of extension and consolidation, but on such a foundation there will still remain the ultimate choice as a matter of high principle.

Lord Templewood, who by his personal work for the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, has done so much to replace obsolete and inexpedient legal sanctions by adequate modes of remedial and preventive treatment, found an admirable expression for the present English case for abolition. He said:

> The savage executions that have disgraced Europe [since 1938] have convinced me that the time has come for us to give a conspicuous example of our detestation of brutal punishment, and to abolish a sentence that cannot reform and does not seem, on the available evidence, to deter.[85]

[85] *Observer*, November 9, 1947. See also Viscount Templewood, *The Shadow of the Gallows*, London, 1951, in which the author presents the case for abolition on a broad empirical basis.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

CHEEVER, DANIEL S., and H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR. *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers.* Pp. xii, 244. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $3.75.

This book tackles the question whether the United States, with its constitutional structure resting on the principle of the separation of powers, can be relied upon to follow disciplined and stable foreign policies. This question is one that troubles all serious students of American diplomacy. They are aware, as these authors are, of the deeply rooted jealousies between the executive and legislative branches of the American government and of the virtual futility to which this unfortunate relationship has from time to time reduced foreign policy during the past. No thoughtful reader will be inclined to take issue with the thesis of this book, which is that sheer survival requires the two branches to cooperate. Nor is the problem a superficial one, to be remedied by a few changes in the administrative machinery. Basic political attitudes, formed back in the Revolutionary period and strengthened by generations of teaching glorifying the system of checks and balances, must be altered.

These authors have done a useful job in analyzing the vast governmental wilderness, the ponderous bureaus and legislative committees and their hordes of "advisers," "assistants," "consultants," and "co-ordinators," from which in some way vital policy decisions emanate. The State Department makes a good whipping-boy for irresponsible politicians, but it only takes the blame for the sins of omission and commission perpetrated by a multitude of governmental agencies. The book at least explodes the simple theory that foreign policy is made by the President or the Secretary of State. It relies heavily upon "bipartisanship," as practiced by the late Senator Vandenberg, for opening a road to permanent collaboration. But it skips lightly over the activities of Senator Taft, does not even attempt to calculate the damage wrought by such episodes as the General MacArthur affair, and is generally oblivious to the influence of minority groups and special interests. It also plays lightly on the follies of personal diplomacy, as practiced by Franklin D. Roosevelt, which led to bitter interdepartmental controversies within the administration. There is nothing to prevent a future president from behaving in the same manner.

The weakest part of the book is to be found in its earlier chapters dealing with American diplomatic history. The authors are not experts in this subject and rely upon the books of a few text writers. Japanese-American rivalry is poorly under-

stood, excessive reliance having been placed on the authority of one book, the scholarship of which is subject to doubt. Thus the legend of Secretary Stimson "leading" the League against Japan in 1931–32, but being "left out on a limb" by the British government, is repeated, although the diplomatic documents, published several years ago, show quite a different account and although several historians have exploded the legend.

These faults to the contrary notwithstanding, the book contains much valuable information and will no doubt make its contribution, insofar as it is read, toward altering basic political attitudes.

RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE
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JACKSON, ELMORE. *Meeting of Minds: A Way to Peace Through Mediation.* Pp. xxii, 200. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952. $3.50.

This book reviews the history of mediation in industrial disputes in the United States, Great Britain, and Sweden; examines the record of mediation in international disputes under the auspices of the United Nations; and deduces from the experience of industrial mediation principles by which international conflicts can be resolved peaceably. The book's premise is a simple one: international relations are a species of human relations, hence the protagonists of social conflict and international conflict, however different may be their respective stakes and strategies, are linked by "the common core of humanity." Though Mr. Jackson acknowledges the "obvious and striking" dissimilarities in the conduct of labor-management relations and foreign policy, he insists that the growing awareness of the "public interest" on the part of the international as well as in the national community traces significant psychological and institutional parallels.

The first part of the book consists of three chapters: the first prepared by Mr. Jackson with the assistance of Donald Strauss, the second by Carl Christian Schmidt of the Swedish Royal Social Board, and the third by Sir Frederick W. Leggett, former Chief Industrial Commissioner of Great Britain. The second part summarizes Mr. Jackson's understanding of the nature of international disputes and reviews the general practices developed by United Nations bodies for the purpose of achieving a cease-fire and a settlement. The concluding chapters set forth the similarities and dissimilarities of the two settings—the arenas, respectively, of labor disputes and international strife—and propose for handling international disputes procedures which, the author holds, have given good results in both kinds of conflict. An Appendix, compiled by Lois Jane Stone, supplies a summary of provisions for handling of industrial disputes in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

Since the book embodies, aside from the signed contributions noted above, the mature thought, as Mr. Jackson gratefully acknowledges, of a galaxy of prominent U.N. officials, social scientists, and practicing mediators who joined in the inquiry of the Friends Service Committee, it must itself be taken as a true product of a meeting of minds. Notwithstanding the massed authoritative opinion backing this inquiry and the exemplary scholarship displayed by Mr. Jackson and his contributors, the work sheds but a dim light on the nature of international conflict here and now and possible avenues leading toward a settlement.

Mr. Jackson's introductory remark reads as follows: "The United Nations has had a fair measure of success over the past four years in the peaceful settlement of international disputes." The evidence is, to say the least, far from conclusive. The four cases which complete Mr. Jackson's selection of exhibits, namely, the Indonesian, Greek, Palestinian, and Pakistani-Indian disputes, can hardly be classed as success stories of mediation. The Indonesian case was "settled" partly by the geographical distance separating the contenders, partly by the enfeeblement and weariness of the motherland, partly by the direct diplomatic (and mostly secret) pressures of the Great Powers; the Greek case was "settled" by the fortuitous defection of Tito from the Soviet bloc which insulated Greece geographically against Soviet intervention; the Palestinian case was settled by Israeli military superiority over the Arab armies and the overt support given Israel by the leading Great Power; and the "settlement" of the Kashmir dispute was as precarious as it was inconclusive. Mr. Jackson and his distinguished confreres to the contrary, a good case can be made for the contention that U.N. mediation has *never* produced significant results except in disputes over minor issues or between minor powers or as a face-saving device applied to major issues which *had* been settled by shifts in the balance of power. Incidentally, these limiting qualifications on the efficacy of mediation can be shown to apply with equal force to the field of domestic disputes.

One cannot lay this book aside without asking a question which the author does not pose explicitly: Can voluntary resort to mediation resolve the one dispute which endangers universal peace, namely, the contest between the West and the Soviet Union over the balance of power? Mr. Jackson and his two European contributors espouse unqualifiedly the case for *voluntary* mediation of labor disputes and cite in its support the experience of the Western democracies. The appendix on the Soviet Union reveals that Soviet legislation—presumably inspired by the dogmatic assumption of the "classlessness" of Soviet society—neither recognizes the kind of industrial disputes which are the most important topics of mediation in Western countries nor provides for voluntary mediation except in disputes over frills and trifles. Even without this appendix we may surmise that voluntary mediation and totalitarian dictatorship are contradictions in terms. Mediation, relying on the meeting of minds rather than on compulsion, *does* presuppose a common core of humanity. If one party is concerned not with meeting another party half way but with the latter's annihilation, then that "common core" shrinks to the vanishing point.

Though the analogies drawn in *Meeting of Minds* between mediation in labor disputes and mediation in international disputes will be of interest to the practicing statesman, he will not find them as startling as does perhaps the specialist in labor relations. Diplomatic history supplies a long compendium on mediation. Competent diplomats, familiar with, for example, the conferences at Vienna in 1815 and at Berlin in 1878 and with routine diplomacy in most any capital any day, will learn from Mr. Jackson's volume that they have been speaking the prose of voluntary mediation for a long time. Incidentally, there might possibly be a market for a book on how to apply the techniques of traditional diplomacy to the settlement of industrial disputes.

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FERRELL, ROBERT H. *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.* Pp. x, 293. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952. $4.00.

This book is the thirty-second volume in a series published under the direction of the Department of History of Yale University on the Kingsley Trust Association Publication Fund. It is an expansion and extension of a doctoral dissertation on the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. As such it affords the reader a comprehensive view of the background and nature of that famous treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. Conspicuous among the authors of this compact are Nicholas Murray Butler, James T. Shotwell, and several advocates of outlawry of war of whom Salmon O. Levinson, John Dewey, the Reverend John Haynes Holmes, Charles Clayton Morrison, and Colonel Raymond Robins were prominent. On page 66 Dr. Butler is credited with planting the idea of renunciation of war in Briand's mind, and on page 68 Dr. Shotwell is quoted as stating that he (Shotwell) "suggested" that M. Briand should "propose renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy" in a treaty "along that line."

Throughout the book one finds a well-documented and well-written account of the reaction of our State Department and the ultimate emergence of the Pact.

W. LEON GODSHALL
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DAVIS, JEROME. *Peace, War and You.* With an introduction by Clarence E. Pickett. Pp. 282. New York: Henry Schuman, 1952. $3.00.

"If man is rational, then the elimination of war is possible."

This is the key sentence in this timely and useful work by a well-known American sociologist, penologist, and journalist. It is simple, the author says. We got rid of dueling. Now is the time to get rid of war. We need only apply the findings of the social sciences to the field of international politics.

The behavior of the Soviet leaders and our own negative reactions "merely raise the scientific question: how can we arouse their friendship and change their behavior patterns?"

Not by opposition alone, the author answers. He cites thirty years of "dismal and ghastly failure in our Russian policy." He omits the period of the Grand Alliance. He was in Russia as a relief worker during the Allied military intervention after World War I. Earlier he had been in charge of all YMCA war work there. Our "negative policy of force and violence . . . actually helped Communism everywhere," he concludes.

"Naturally the social psychologist would also criticize Soviet behavior," he comments, "but two wrongs do not make a right."

In addition to hammering on reform through rationality, along with a firm endorsement of the Golden Rule, the author lines up many of the classic arguments against war including its cost and horror. Moreover, he brings them up to date with examples from Hiroshima and Korea.

While the facts and figures make the book useful for general reference purposes (unfortunately there is no index), it is in the field of current events that *Peace, War and You* might awaken some of the liveliest reader reactions.

For example, the author quotes a letter by no less a person than Sir John Pratt, a British expert on the Far East, which, after recounting some evidence, asserts that no one "can doubt that the Korean war began with an attack upon North Korea launched by Syngman Rhee with the support of his friends in the American Military Advisory Group."

The author offers this British quotation under Hint Number Ten: "Try to keep informed about the point of view now opposite to whatever is dominant in America." This is in a chapter "Hints on Waging Peace." Whether we accept this version of Korea or not, he says, "a balanced opinion takes cognizance of all angles."

The "Hints," which are tailored for individual use by private citizens, come as the last chapter of the book and are advanced as logical how-to-do-it correctives for the ills of national apathy, prejudice, and conceit which are diagnosed in earlier chapters.

The role of the profit motive in causing wars is gingerly dealt with. The "insiders . . . can manufacture a war scare without too much difficulty," the author says. But limiting his charges to what the evidence will support, he neither makes, nor tries to make, a specific case.

Nonetheless, as a solution to the presumedly dangerous drive for profits he suggests the further development of the Rochdale co-operative movement in each country and internationally. He thinks, for example, it would ameliorate the world struggle for oil.

Other institutional developments he favors are: a United States "general staff for peace," limited world government, an enlarged United Nations international economic development program, and universal disarmament.

As the author says, "It is always easier to chart utopia than to build it." Nonetheless there is an earnest Sunday-morning optimism pervading the book which seems entirely warranted by the author's workaday facts and use of them.

JAMES FINUCANE
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Washington, D. C.

TEW, BRIAN. *International Monetary Co-operation 1945–52*. Pp. 180. London: Hutchinson's University Library (distributed in the U. S. by Longmans, Green and Co.), 1952. Text $1.80; trade $2.25.

This small volume, a lucid exposition of intergovernmental collaboration (including supranational action) in the monetary field, should be a useful manual to those who seek information on recent activities in that field. The reader does not need to be versed in the technical aspects of international finance, although some knowledge of economic theory and policy will assist in the full understanding of the study.

The first part of the volume deals with general principles of international monetary co-operation (intercountry payments, exchange rates, international liquidity, international disequilibria, and the international transmission of depressions). The second part contains a discussion of the machinery of intergovernmental monetary co-operation, and pays particular attention to the operation of the International Monetary Fund and of the European Payments Union. This part also considers the history and structure of the Sterling Area. The third part deals with developments in the monetary field after the Second World War, and analyzes important aspects of the problem generally referred to as "the dollar gap."

The book gives evidence that, in the design of a rationally organized community of nations, the segment of financial co-operation is as important as it is complex. In this connection, the author shows that the establishment of the International Monetary Fund was a forward step of considerable extent in international relations.

The presentation of such intricate matter in such short space is very successful. However, a technical point, which seems to this reviewer somewhat obscure, may be indicated here. In discussing the obligation of members of the International Monetary Fund to refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers, the author refers (p. 81) to a "legal" interpretation of the term "transfers" which implies that a member need not "make its currency . . . transferable as between one foreigner and another." It would have been useful if the author had cited the source of such a legal interpretation and had analyzed it more in detail, especially since the author proceeds to conclude (pp. 81–82) "that no member need repatriate his currency unless he is eligible to exercise purchase rights against the Fund." This conclusion is based on the provision of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund which requires its members to convert balances held by other members (Article VIII, Section 4). Before drawing that conclusion, Professor Tew might have considered the obligation of Fund members to convert at par value rates in their markets currency acquired in current transactions. That obligation is not dependent upon the eligibility of drawing on the Fund resources (Article IV, Sections 3 and 4(b) of the Fund Agreement). This point (though important for the specialist) is of little weight if viewed in the perspective of the many lucid explanations of involved problems.

The volume is recommended as a useful survey both to specialists and laymen.

ERVIN HEXNER
Washington, D. C.

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939*. Pp. ix, 146. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. $3.00.

"During the past two centuries," Mr. Carr reminds us, "German-Russian relations have been a key-point in the international politics of the European continent." A year and a half after these Albert Shaw Lectures were given, relations between these countries are still a key point not only in European politics, but in the narrow dividing line between cold war and total war.

Mr. Carr also reminds us at the beginning of this brief, clear, and altogether excellent account of German-Russian relations during the long armistice, that ever since Frederick the Great many Germans have believed that things go well with Germany so long as Russia is kept friendly or neutral and that things go badly, as in 1914–18 and 1941–45, when rulers of the Reich have ignored Frederick's advice to "cultivate the friendship of these barbarians." Even after Russia had been transformed by revolution, Germans both of the Right and the Left acknowledged the importance of "the Russian-German bridge." Some Germans wanted a Left bridge between a revolutionary Germany and a revolutionary Russia; some wanted a Right bridge between a nationalist Germany and

a "restored" Russia. The Russian Communists also wanted a bridge and, in fact, worked on two bridges at the same time, encouraging German revolutionists to wage war against nationalist elements while negotiating with those same elements political, economic, and secret rearmaments.

A dozen years later the Communists worked as relentlessly as the Nazis to destroy the Weimar Republic. Mr. Carr believes that even if the Communists, instead of attacking the middle-of-the-road parties, had made a common front against the Nazis, the outcome would have been the same, except that Hitler probably would have resorted to illegal measures sooner than he did. We do not know yet, Mr. Carr says, just why Hitler ended the Rapallo policy in 1934 contrary to the wishes of his generals and in spite of Soviet conciliatory assurances that the Communists would not let their anti-Nazi feelings dictate their policy.

Stalin made his famous pact with Hitler in 1939, Mr. Carr believes, to prevent at all costs a combination of capitalist states against Russia; Hitler wanted to avoid a war on two fronts. Three years later Hitler repeated Kaiser Wilhelm's blunder and the Russian-German bridge was broken. Will postwar German leaders rebuild the bridge? Or have the technological and political revolutions of our time affected the significance of political bridges as well as other kinds? What the Germans decide is of greater concern to Europe and the world now than when Stalin and Hitler made their fateful compact a decade and a half ago.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICAL THEORY

APPLEBY, PAUL H. *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government.* Pp. xv, 261. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952. $4.00.

This volume is a defense of administration as an agency of social control against the attacks that have been directed against it by law and politics. The morality of administration is equated with the purposes which administration endeavors to advance in a democratic society. In essence, its morality is the public interest, and the author accepts Dewey's definition of the public as expounded in *The Public and Its Problems* (1927). The author, who has a distinguished record of public service, is critical of the relation of law to the morality of administration, but he seeks a rapprochement between administration and a reformed party politics. He recognizes the interaction of administration and politics, and the fundamental subordination of administration to politics. The moral delinquencies of administration are in its tendency to respond too much to the claims of highly organized private interests, or special publics, and not enough to the public interest, or the inchoate majority public. The difficulty is that special interests control political parties and because of the virtual absence of party responsibility the special interests are in a position to control administration, which is not in a position to protect itself from the perversions of politics. The technical key to the ability of administration to function effectively in the public interest is its organization on the principle of hierarchy. The author places Congress at the top of the pyramid, but he criticizes the inability of Congress to function within an ordered concept of its responsibilities as a branch of government.

The material on the utility and functioning of the hierarchy is a solid achievement. Beyond this, there is much that is debatable. The pluralism of an earlier decade is inadequate today as a foundation for a science of social action. To say that "public morality" is ethically superior to "private morality" is to say only that the public interest is supreme, but this does not help identify that interest, and the author does not point to any special craft of administrators in this matter. The author is critical of law (really of the tenets of analytical jurisprudence), but law is in a position to protect its ideals and its craft from the perversions of politics. The ideals that are listed as constituting the morality of administration are also to be found in juristic theory as the end of law.

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FLECHTHEIM, OSSIP K. (Ed.). *Fundamentals of Political Science.* Pp. vii, 587. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. $5.50.

In American colleges, there is a sharp division of practice in shaping the introductory course in government. In some institutions, perhaps the majority, the basic course in American government serves as the introduction. In others, a general treatment of the nature and scope of political science is prevalent. (In some curricula, either avenue is open to the student or to his advisers.) This volume, edited by a professor in the department of history and government at Colby College, is designed to fit the text requirements of the generalized introduction.

Eight authors, including the editor, contribute under their own names to various sections of the symposium. This arrangement brings to the volume differences of style and emphasis. Authors co-operating under the general editorship are Robert J. Koblitz, Bard College; Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania; Lawrence L. Pelletier, Bowdoin College; Ithiel de Sola Pool, Stanford University; S. Grover Rich, Jr., University of Utah; George Schueller, Radio Free Europe; and Margaret Spahr, Hunter College.

With competence and with some literary skill the writers deal with the characteristics of political science, with the history of political theory, with the elements and the constitution of the state, with public opinion and political parties, with the structure and powers of government, and with international law and relations. Valuable comparative data are assembled from governmental forms and political behavior throughout the world, with particular attention to the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union. This treatment is not a new approach to political science, but it is modern and educationally important.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

BAILEY, STEPHEN K., and HOWARD D. SAMUEL. *Congress at Work.* Pp. x, 502. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952. $3.50.

It is gratifying to find more and more attention paid to our legislative bodies by competent scholars who do not live in ivory towers. *Congress at Work,* as the title indicates, is truly the story of a functioning legislature. By means of a score of cases, rather than a connected treatise, congressional procedure is so explained that Congress comes to life as a dynamic human institution.

The story of the enactment of specific bills is not a description of formal procedural steps that follow one another in accordance with the letter of established rules. It illustrates rather, through the careful selection of bills, all kinds of Parliamentary situations and decisive factors, not always based on the merits of the substantive legislation by which one course of action is followed rather than another. For example, a vivid description is given of how the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 became law in less than eight hours from the introduction of the bill to the affixing of President Roosevelt's signature. More often, however, the case illustrates the varied factors, situations, and procedures that operate in the legislative process stretched out over many years.

In one case the driving force of a Norris, the "Father of TVA," in another the unprecedented power of a committee chairman is the center of the story. This is one study of Congress in which the committee system receives the attention that is requisite to an adequate understanding of how Congress operates, although in most of the cases the specific role of the chairman of the relevant committee could well have received more intensive examination. At this writing, there is much speculation as to how much aid and comfort Southern political leaders will offer Republican candidate Eisenhower—for these leaders do realize that a Republican presidential victory in 1952 is, more likely than not, to carry with it a Republican Congress. Many powerful Southern members from "one-party" states who have rolled up long tenure records, would then topple from

their thrones as chairmen of Congressional committees.

A distinct contribution of the Congressional Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was its recognition of the need for additional professional staff. Central figures in the story of *Congress at Work* are the professional staff attached to committees and rank and file members. At the very least, the professional personnel make significant contributions to the orderly transaction of business—and not infrequently are influential in affecting decisions of policy.

Throughout the volume ample evidence is given of the attention members of Congress pay to the political and other constituent problems of the folks back home. In a chapter devoted to the election campaigns of Senator Lehman of urban New York, of Representative Ayres from a politically balanced constituency of Ohio, and of Representative Frank E. Smith from a rural district of Mississippi the reader sees different patterns of grass-root influences at work in which crucial decisions and novel techniques spell the difference between success or failure in close elections. The offices of these three members of Congress come to life as the authors take the reader through a day of their work. The pressures are there in all three cases though the patterns are sure to vary—the character of the legislator's constituency the all-important factor.

Although the activities of pressure groups and lobbies are everywhere in evidence, legislative-executive relationships are recognized, too, as important in a comprehensive discussion of the legislative process. The Truman Committee emerges as one of the best investigatory committees. To round out the picture of *Congress at Work*, an early chapter is devoted to the first week of a Congress and another to the closing week of that famous Eightieth Congress.

In 1950, Professor Bailey gave us a real feel of Congress at work in his excellent *Congress Makes a Law*, the story of the Employment Act of 1946. In this broader study, he and his colleague have made a splendid contribution to the presentation of free government by enhancing the public's understanding of their Congress, and in providing an exciting volume for students of the legislative process.

BELLE ZELLER

Brooklyn College

MCGOVNEY, DUDLEY O. *The American Suffrage Medley*. Pp. vii, 201. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. $4.50.

This little book by a former Professor of Law, now deceased, carries the subtitle: The Need for a National Uniform Suffrage. The subtitle indicates the central theme of the book. Except for the limitations imposed in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments against race and sex discrimination, the states are free to determine suffrage qualifications as they see fit. Consequently, wide variations in voting requirements have existed in the past. Many potential voters are still disfranchised in this way.

The wide variations in the percentages of nonvoters from state to state cannot be explained, however, wholly on the ground of legal disqualifications. The small turnout in many southern states, for example, is undoubtedly partly a result of the one-party situation which prevails in that section of the country.

The most serious legal disqualifications still in existence are the literary and educational tests and the poll tax prerequisite. The extent, nature, and purpose of these disqualifications are examined by Professor McGovney with great care. He then turns to the constitution to see to what extent Congress might have power to restrain the states from imposing such disqualifications. It is his judgment that Congress does not have such power. Thus the anti-poll tax bill, if it ever gets over the hurdle of a filibuster, would be declared unconstitutional.

A better approach, he believes, would be the submission of a constitutional amendment which would state in simple positive terms the qualifications for voting in primaries and elections throughout the country. He would include merely an age and a residence requirement with disfranchisement of those who are serving terms for crime or who have been adjudicated unsound of mind. Inasmuch as many states have literary and educational qualifications, he suggests that it might be expedient to include a section either stating an educational qualification or giving Congress power to enact such legislation.

Obviously, Congress is not likely to submit an amendment of this kind in the near future. Should Congress decide to do so a more flexible amendment than the one proposed by Professor McGovney would be preferable—one that would merely give Congress power to fix uniform suffrage requirements. There is no clear-cut crystalization of public opinion as yet on age, residence, and educational qualifications. Congress should be left free to respond to changes in public attitude on matters of this kind.

E. ALLEN HELMS

Ohio State University

BLOUGH, ROY. *The Federal Taxing Process*. Pp. x, 506. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. $5.00.

This is one of the half dozen most valuable books in the field of public finance that have appeared in the past quarter century, or even longer. Only Dr. Blough could have written it, since it is the fruit not only of thorough fiscal scholarship but also of his eight years as director of the Treasury Division of Tax Research and his current position as a member of the Council of Economic Advisors to the President.

The Federal Taxing Process covers two subjects—(1) a description of the agencies and procedures involved in the passage of federal tax legislation and the administration of federal tax laws, and (2) an analysis of the principal issues (that is, fields of controversy) that have developed in connection with federal taxation during the past two decades.

To most readers the descriptive portions of Dr. Blough's book will be the most interesting, because here, for the first time, is presented a comprehensive "inside" picture of the infinitely complex procedure whereby an interlocking group of Treasury and Congressional agencies initiate and develop a tax "program." This is a "primary" presentation, for the greater part of it is derived from Dr. Blough's long and intimate participation in the federal tax-making process. Evaluation is closely intermingled with description through these sections of the book. Under the circumstances, evaluation involves much personal judgment. But personal judgment, in Dr. Blough's case, is detached and rational, consistently free of personal bias. The wisdom, witlessness, and self-seeking that characterize federal tax formulation, like any other field of legislative procedure, are clinically portrayed and objectively analyzed. No individual, no group, no agency is dogmatically praised or condemned.

In his analysis of major federal tax issues, Dr. Blough does not cultivate new ground, as he does when describing tax formulation and administration procedures. All of these issues have been argued pro, or con, or pro and con by many other writers. Dr. Blough's contribution here is three-fold: (1) He classifies and tabulates several score points of issue associated with over-all federal budgetary policy or with specific federal taxes. (2) He analyzes pro and con arguments of each point at issue in the light of their economic, social and political assumptions. (3) He traces the part each of these issues has played in federal tax history during the past twenty years. Dr. Blough refrains from taking sides on most of these issues; when he does, as he does in favor of "making the best possible use of compensatory budget policy," he scrupulously announces his personal position.

Special commendation must be accorded to the writing style. It is beautifully lucid. Sentences are short. Chapters are organized into sections and subsections, with introductory chapter and section paragraphs which effectively summarize or introduce the topics to come. Here is a wealth of material that will be welcomed by students of public finance and government, written without complexity or confusion.

WILLIAM J. SHULTZ

College of the City of New York

JANEWAY, ELIOT. *The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II*. Vol. 53 in "The Chronicles of America" series. Pp. v, 382. New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1951. Trade $5.00; subscription $6.00; text $2.50.

There have been so many memoirs about how World War II was fought and won and a sufficiently large number of official histories to supply the data, that Mr. Eliot Janeway makes no effort to include this in his own striking work. Even so, one might complain that the bare bones of an accomplishment like that of economic mobilization in World War II, in terms of the sheer power and volume of the effort, are needed as a framework of the political analysis that is the essence of this book. The struggle for survival seems to be limited to a struggle for power among leading figures on our home front. It does not chronicle the nation's accomplishment, which seems to have occurred almost in spite of Roosevelt and his warring puppets.

Students of politics in particular can be grateful for Mr. Janeway's "inside" story of the nature of the struggle for power in this world of political maneuver. It is essentially a Machiavellian analysis, and his hero, Roosevelt, emerges as an intensely Machiavellian character. To write of leadership only in these terms is interesting to the professional of politics, but it may well miss the essential characteristic of leadership that cannot be boiled down to mere maneuvers for power. There has to be some lift in any "Prince" in the Machiavellian tradition, or a Cesare Borgia becomes merely a figure of scorn—as Machavelli's hero did in fact.

Eliot Janeway, starting from Machiavelli, naturally awards the palm to the hard-boiled. His heroes are Baruch and Eberstadt; though he has a great admiration for Frankfurter, who represents the opposite side in the field. However the picture is much more complicated in personal relations than even Mr. Janeway's excellent sources have indicated to him. The inner combinations and permutations betwen Henry Wallace and the allies of the Left cannot be reduced to the simple picture that emerges here. One would also get very little impression of the machinations of the Communist-controlled groups like those that are emerging in the investigations of the postwar years. Their crucial influence, *after* the attack on Russia, was on the side of more production at all costs. But the play of *where* the goods went is of some importance, and what theaters were played up.

If there is a hero, it is the very hero that Mr. Janeway finds it unnecessary to sing. By his own analysis, whatever war mobilization occurred in terms of really successful volume production occurred in spite of Roosevelt's organizational juggling, rather than because of it. The patience of Donald Nelson and his real economic insight and breadth are condemned or forgotten because, forsooth, Nelson was a "weak" man in terms of Janeway's analysis. The fact is, however, that Nelson rode out substantially the whole war and remained in control in a bitterly contested struggle with Baruch and Eberstadt and finally came crashing only when his job had been substantially done. The unsung heroes of production were actually, of course, the great business organizations which turned out the products, in spite of every type of fumbling of controls. The patient labors of staff men and others to make sense of the organizational nightmare which Roosevelt had imposed upon the scheme in the interests of checks and balances and his own political controls, too, might get some mention. But this is not the stuff of highlighted drama and conflict.

It is not a struggle for national survival, in short, that Mr. Janeway chronicles. It is a personal struggle for dynastic power, and one on which he takes sides in what may seem to more cautious historians a somewhat reckless way. My own sympathies happen to be in the main like those of Mr. Janeway, so far as admiration for Baruch and Eberstadt go. But that does not preclude me as an intimate participant of much of what he chronicles from recognizing the virtues of others in the dramatis personae. Everyone is entitled to his preferences. But a historian interested in the most whole truth that he can achieve ought to attempt at least to balance accounts and not to seem omniscient when no one can really know the facts. Mr. Janeway's book may be livelier for the sacrifice of balance in favor of dash.

W. Y. ELLIOTT
Harvard University

MCCANN, FRANKLIN T. *The English Discovery of America to 1585.* Pp. xiv, 246. New York: King's Crown Press, 1952. $3.50.

This book is much more than a discussion of early English voyages to America. By "discovery" the author means the intellectual as well as the physical discovery of America—the realization by Englishmen of the existence and significance of a vast new land across the Atlantic. That the discovery, in an intellectual sense, was a consummation of a long period of years is made abundantly clear by the author. As to this, it may appear to some readers that the author devotes too much space to medieval and early modern notions of the earth and universe that have only remote relevance to his main theme. Taking the book in its entirety, however, this extensive background material appears logical and essential; it serves to provide setting for and to give meaning to much that was done and left undone in the New World by sixteenth century Englishmen.

As the story unfolds, there is, among other matters, a consideration of how the concept of a three-part world was expanded into one of a four-part world; of the role of the astrolabe, compass, and portolano; of the belief that gold was a product of the hottest rays of the sun and therefore was to be found in quantity only in equatorial areas; and of the conviction long held that the torrid and frigid zones were uninhabitable. These last two concepts seem to have served as a deterrent to English interest in North America; and when Frobisher's "gold," carried from Baffin Island, proved to be only so much rock, the equatorial theory of gold was strengthened.

In rounding out his narrative, the author has included helpful accounts of the search for northeast and northwest passages and of how America was for long regarded mainly as an obstacle on the road to the riches of the East.

Real and imaginative literature relating to the New World is treated at length, especially Brant's *Narrenschiff*, Barclay's *The Ship of Fools*, More's *Utopia*, and writings and compilations by Peter Martyr, Richard Eden, and the Hakluyts. Marlowe's *Tamburlaine* is presented as a climax to nearly a century of English hesitation regarding the New World and as an indication that henceforth a positive course is to be set.

Of significance to geography, history, and literature, *The English Discovery of America to 1585* is an admirable example of how different disciplines can be drawn upon and synthesized in the interest of a richer scholarship.

JENNINGS B. SANDERS
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BRYAN, WILLIAM ALFRED. *George Washington in American Literature, 1775–1865.* Pp. xiii, 280. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $4.00.

The problem of the actual versus the mythical Washington is not a new one for historians. Only in recent years has the "true" Washington begun to emerge from the work of historians from Henry Cabot Lodge to Douglas Southall Freeman. The godlike remoteness and formality of the Stuart portraits and the Marshall life vied with the informal prudery of Parson Weems for a century to prevent Americans from knowing their first President, the leader of the Continental Army, or the Virginia planter.

The present study is a contribution to the other side of the problem: to an understanding of the mythical rather than of the real Washington. Myth is as vital an element in a culture as is fact, and often it has greater influence. Dixon Wecter some years ago defined the problem in *The Hero in America* as a deliberate effort on the part of a people to create its own national mythology. Dr. Bryan has accepted the terms of this definition and has filled in the story with generous documentation. He concentrates on the word portraits of Washington that together created a national symbol.

The task was not as exciting as it sounds. The nature of the evidence made it forbidding by sheer bulk and monotony. Thousands of poems, plays, novels, orations, biographies, and miscellaneous works have dealt in some way with Washington,

but a reading of the first hundred established certain conclusions which subsequent source hunting is not likely to challenge. Dr. Bryan wisely limited his field to the period prior to Lincoln's death (when the rival Lincoln myth began) and stopped his work in each section of the study when the law of diminishing returns set in. No one need do the job any more thoroughly than it has here been done.

The "literature" under consideration was disappointing also. The creation of the Washington myth was not the act of a vigorous and romantic national imagination. With a few exceptions, the major American writers did not turn to the father of their country for inspiration because the hard shell of reverence closed in almost immediately when the man died, and a free imaginative treatment of the symbol became impossible. Freneau, Cooper, and Dunlap tried various mixtures of fact and myth with partial success but the results were not too happy. Minor writers swarmed in like flies in summer and by sheer repetition fixed the image forever. In this conscientious and intelligent arrangement and examination of these writings by the literary types into which they fall, Dr. Bryan has left a satisfactory and documented record of the case.

ROBERT E. SPILLER
University of Pennsylvania

CAEMMERER, H. PAUL. *The Life of Pierre Charles L'Enfant, Planner of the City Beautiful, the City of Washington.* Pp. xxvi, 480. Washington: National Republic Publishing Co., 1950. $10.00.

Dr. Caemmerer, Secretary of the National Commission of Fine Arts, author of several books on the history of Washington, prepared this biography of the "architect-engineer" for the recent sesquicentennial of the city. Original research in France enables Dr. Caemmerer to assert that L'Enfant was neither architect nor engineer when, at the age of twenty-two, he joined the band of thirty French officers who offered their swords to Washington's revolutionary army. L'Enfant had studied at the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture under his father, a "court painter" who drew chiefly cartoons of battle scenes for the Gobelin tapestry works.

L'Enfant was at Valley Forge and Savannah. He was "the artist of the Revolution." He sketched Washington for Lafayette; Washington commissioned him to design the medallion for the Society of the Cincinnati (he chose "the bald eagle, which is peculiar to this continent"); he staged patriotic parades and pageants; Hamilton turned to him to design the first national coins. He was therefore in a position to receive favor for his petition to Washington to plan the capital city "on such a scale as to leave room for that aggrandisement and embellishment which the increase in the wealth of the Nation will permit it to pursue at any period however remote."

Washington as chief executive had his troubles with "Mons. Lenfang," whose talents he clearly respected, but whom he could not break to harness. Washington tried in vain to get L'Enfant to deal with the Commissioners in charge: he sent Jefferson, as Secretary of State, a draft of a stiff letter to L'Enfant, to get Jefferson's judgment whether he dared to push L'Enfant so hard without alienating him. L'Enfant tore down a wall of a dwelling built by Daniel Carroll, largest and most resistant of the local property owners, as though it were an obtruding rock or tree, because it encroached upon the line of a proposed avenue; Washington tried to make L'Enfant understand that the new United States proposed to resort to processes of law in such cases.

Alas, L'Enfant suffered the fate of many planners. Washington felt forced to dismiss him as an impractical idealist. L'Enfant pleaded in vain with Washington and the Commissioners not to auction off lots from a map and stakes in the ground in order to raise cash for civic improvements, but to hold the land and borrow against it, so as to curb speculation and capture the increment for the nation. The endless "memorials" that L'Enfant poured upon the President in broken English must have been trying; they are reproduced in full in this volume.

L'Enfant died penniless, protected by a branch of the Carroll family, having spent

years memorializing Congress for just recognition for his part in the plan. Men associated with him carried his planning principles to Buffalo, Detroit, Indianapolis.

I had hoped for more evidence of Jefferson's contribution to the plan of the capital and more than one reference to Benjamin Banneker in this loosely-written book. In sum, the author can only characterize L'Enfant's plan as a "stroke of genius." From what we know of his background and personality, perhaps that is what it was.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
Brooklyn College

ROOSEVELT, THEODORE. *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt.* Vols. V and VI: *The Big Stick, 1905–1909.* Edited by Elting E. Morison. Pp. xxiv, 864; viii, 865–1715. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $20.00 for 2 vols.

This is the third two-volume set of Theodore Roosevelt's letters to appear under the editorship of Morison and his associates. The fourth and final set will bring us *The Days of Armageddon, 1910–1919.* The exceptionally high standard that characterized the editing in the earlier sets has been maintained in these, *The Big Stick*, volumes. Although the letters in this set include less than 8 per cent of those available for the four-year period, the care and skill with which they were selected result in a letter picture of Roosevelt hardly less complete than would have been obtained by publication of all the letters. Professor Morison's interpretative essay is richly rewarding, and the notes are invaluable to the scholar and most helpful guides to the general reader.

The volumes contain letters on all the significant issues of the day—the Panama Canal, labor relations, pure food legislation, railroad problems, the tariff, conservation, the Navy, Japanese exclusion, and so on. And there are letters, many of them, in which he characterized men. William Randolph Hearst is often "of real use in attacking abuses," but "he preaches the gospel of envy, hatred and unrest" (pp. 468–469). William Jennings Bryan is "shallow, but he is kindly and well-meaning, and singularly free from rancor" (p. 339). He rather liked the Kaiser, William II, but he feared the possible effect of one of his brain storms. The Churchills he did not like, neither Lord Randolph nor his son and biographer Winston, although he longed to duplicate Winston's African hunt. Liberal writers like Lincoln Steffens and Norman Hapgood he viewed with mixed feelings. "I think Steffens ought to put more sky in his landscape," he wrote. "It is an unfortunate thing to encourage people to believe that all crimes are connected with business, and that the crime of graft is the only crime" (p. 45).

There are letters on or about judges, ambassadors, books and authors (many of these), race suicide, simplified spelling, sports, and why he did not "settle the Mormon question." Nearly all of them are interesting and most of them contain good common sense. His prejudices of the earlier years remained—against Jefferson, for example—and he still had complete assurance that he know what was right and what was wrong, and acted accordingly.

As he came to rely more and more upon William Howard Taft as a member of his executive team he developed for him a genuine affection. He picked the "big, generous, high-minded fellow" (p. 1231) as his successor, and on March 3, 1909, he gave him this "closing legacy": "Under no circumstances divide the battleship fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans prior to the finishing of the Panama Canal."

CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON
State College of Washington

CAHILL, FRED V., JR. *Judicial Legislation: A Study in American Legal Theory.* Pp. ix, 164. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. $4.00.

One of the liveliest and most important intellectual controversies of our times has been between the traditionalists and the realists in the realm of legal theory. And one of the major issues at stake in this controversy has revolved around the question of what judges do or should do. More specifically, the question has been: do judges legislate, and, if so, should they? The principal arguments of the main protagonists in this debate are summarized in this learned and lucid book by Professor Fred

V. Cahill, Jr., of the Political Science Department at Yale University. Those who are already thoroughly immersed in the literature of contemporary legal theory may find little new knowledge in this book, and much that is quite familiar. For the uninitiated, for the beginning law or political science student, or for the general reader, this urbane little book will serve as an informative introduction to a large body of significant writing. The various points of view are presented in an orderly fashion showing lines of growth and illustrated with references to the leading books and articles which have dominated legal theory during roughly the past half-century.

The orthodox, traditional view of the nature of the judicial function has been that judges do not make law, but merely discover and apply it. It is essentially negative in character, since it assumes that judges do nothing positively but are merely the impersonal instruments through which the law, as to which they have no value judgments, is applied in the settlement of controversies. This was Blackstone's conception of the judicial power, and Mr. Cahill points out that in the formative days of our constitutional history it was this theory which made judicial review palatable. Thereafter, judicial review and the orthodox theory of the judicial function were linked together, the latter supporting the former. The general social philosophy upon which the traditional theory rested underwent profound erosion with the growth of the concepts of evolution and pragmatism.

A separate chapter is devoted to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who "occupies in great measure the position of official judicial philosopher for the modern age." With his distrust of systems and system-builders, and the natural and universal principles of the eighteenth century, Holmes was the bridge from orthodoxy to modern realism. Holmes thought that law was the will of society's most powerful group, and that therefore law must reflect actual social conditions. Accordingly, he held that law was a growing thing, and that in this growth the judge necessarily has an active role. Thus he frankly recognized, as Cahill points out, that judges make law, and are motivated by the same considerations that move the legislator.

In a broader sense, Professor Cahill demonstrates that the discussions of the problem of judicial review directed attention to the larger subject of the legislative aspects of the judicial function. The enlarged concern with judicial review resulted from the more vigorous wielding of the judicial axe in the age of increasing social and economic legislation, with the invalidation of more and more federal and state laws and the judicial control of administrative boards and commissions. Especially as protectors of established property interests, it became obvious to many observers that the judges held in their hands a legislative weapon of great magnitude. To illustrate this position the author examines briefly the writings of F. G. Goodnow, James B. Thayer, and Felix Frankfurter.

Attention is then directed to the earliest school of the new realism, that of sociological jurisprudence. Here Mr. Cahill summarizes the ideas of three representative figures, Roscoe Pound, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and Harlan Fiske Stone. These and other writers formulated "a general legal theory for the modern state." Believing that the law is a social institution and that its method is pragmatic, they not only stressed the fact that judges legislate, but also thought that they ought to do so.

Now Professor Cahill reaches modern legal realism, which, he emphasizes throughout, is not a coherent and consistent school of thought, but rather is largely a point of view and a slogan. First he reviews some of the earlier realists, with special emphasis upon John Chipman Gray, Joseph W. Bingham, Jr., Arthur F. Bentley, and John Dewey. As for the later realists, the author singles out for extended treatment Karl N. Llewellyn, and among the radicals he concentrates upon Edward S. Robinson, Thurman W. Arnold, Jerome Frank, and Fred Rodell. The author then directs attention to the latter-day criticism of the realists by such men as John Dickinson, Morris R. Cohen, and Roscoe Pound, and shows how the realists attempted to restate their position in the light of the criticism. Mr. Cahill believes that in their restatement the realists gave ground, and he cites Edwin Garlan's book, *Legal Realism and Justice* (1941), as an illustration.

Mr. Cahill does not believe that the realists have as yet supplanted the traditional concept of the judicial function with a new one that has achieved general acceptance. In fact, while the realists seem to agree that law is a social technique, that the legal system is a process concerned with social policy, and that judges do and should legislate, they do not agree as to the scope and quality of their law-making power. Finally, Mr. Cahill believes that one of the basic failures of the new realists lies in the fact that they have not fully explored the relationship between judicial legislation and popular, responsible government. But it is clear that the realists have done much to illuminate the nature of law and of the judicial process, and that Professor Cahill has done much to explain the realists.

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Wisconsin

BERGER, MORROE. *Equality by Statute: Legal Controls over Group Discrimination.* Pp. xiii, 238. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $3.25.

Endless are the discussions of problems which can or cannot be solved by the enactment and enforcement of law. The concern of Dr. Berger is with laws enacted to protect minorities against majority discrimination. In this field, the author admits, law can work both ways. "It can sustain discrimination, as it does throughout the South and in some states in the North, or it can sustain equal rights, as it has been doing more and more in the last decade or so" (p. 4).

Antidiscrimination legislation is opposed both on the ground that it interferes with the expression of the majority will, which is a necessary ingredient of democracy, and because, as is alleged, law can be enforced only when it has majority support behind it. Without entering upon an abstract discussion of the rights which are so sacred as to be superior to the right of majority rule, the author attempts to show that antidiscriminatory legislation can and does have some effect in protecting minorities against the cruel impact of prejudice in majority groups.

He traces the history of the struggle over civil rights from the Reconstruction era until the present day. He summarizes Supreme Court decisions on the subject over that period. He shows in particular the changed attitude of the Supreme Court in recent years which has resulted in extended protection to the rights of minority groups. In one chapter he presents in detail the history of the enactment and the enforcement of the New York State law against discrimination. The theoretical aspects of the subject are worked out in a final chapter entitled "Law and the Control of Prejudice and Discrimination."

The conclusions reached are drawn together in part as follows (pp. 192–193): "Law in our society is a formidable means for the elimination of group discrimination and for the establishment of conditions which discourage prejudicial attitudes." Law "can codify our society's loftiest ideals rather than its basest practices—that is, the legal machinery can be withdrawn from the support of discriminatory patterns." Law "can put the state's influence and power on the side of those who are discriminated against and give them effective means for defending themselves. Law can also help establish those fundamental conditions of social life which encourage free association of all groups on a level of equality and which discourage prejudicial attitudes." Favorable laws "can be the wedge for advances in the status and welfare of groups which are made the objects of unfair discrimination. In summary, law can affect our *acts* and, through them, our *beliefs*."

So it is, as the author sees it, that proper legal controls fortify the unprejudiced and the believers in fair play, while weakening the position of those who discriminate for whatever reason. The book constitutes a significant analysis but does not offer, and does not pretend to offer, the final word on the subject.

CARL B. SWISHER

Johns Hopkins University

BROWNELL, EMERY A. *Legal Aid in the United States: A Study of the Avail-*

ability of Lawyers' Services for Persons Unable to Pay Fees. Pp. xxiv, 333. Rochester, N. Y.: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 1951. $4.50.

Legal aid is the practical response of the legal profession to the deep-seated desire of the American public for fair play for persons unable to pay fees. In *Legal Aid in the United States,* Emery A. Brownell, Esq. makes a contribution of the first magnitude by charting the way towards fulfillment of the Declaration of Independence that every citizen stands equal before the law.

Since 1947, preparations have been under way for this authoritative, encyclopedic publication. When the Honorable Arthur T. Vanderbilt, as director of the Survey of the Legal Profession, was designated in the latter part of 1947 as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, it was most fortunate that Reginald Heber Smith, Esq. was available to succeed him. It was Mr. Smith who startled and challenged civic-minded people throughout the United States when, in 1919, he published his thought-provoking book, *Justice and the Poor.* With his sympathetic and broad vision of legal aid, Mr. Smith became the recognized pioneer in publicizing this great movement. Under Mr. Smith, as director of the Survey, and two well-chosen committees of experienced people such as John S. Bradway, Esq., on the civil and the criminal aspects of legal aid, plans were well laid for the report.

Providentially, Mr. Brownell was selected to succeed Mr. Smith as consultant. Mr. Brownell has had years of experience as attorney in charge of the Rochester, New York, legal aid office and as secretary of the National Legal Aid Association. Following the decision of the committees of experts, Mr. Brownell had the energy and capacity to travel well over 40,000 miles to visit 123 legal aid organizations in 103 localities. The draft of his report was revised with the help of the committees of experts and a State consultant in each State.

The report as published under the title, *Legal Aid in the United States,* is worthy of such tremendous and devoted preparations; worthy of the truly great men who dedicated themselves to its establishment. As attorney in charge of the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office for ten years—from 1924 to 1934—I gained personal knowledge of their heroic stature through the privilege of close association with one of them —M. W. Acheson, Jr., Esq.

It is gratifying that their efforts and those of numberless other men and women have continued to attract the active support of leaders of the Bar, as personified by Harrison Tweed, Esq. Much as has been done to extend and expand legal aid service to those in need of it, the coverage throughout the United States is still far from adequate.

Legal Aid in the United States is recommended to everyone who wants the facts, however detailed; who is interested in the brief but substantial history of the legal aid movement; who wants to help in its advance; who is interested in his country and its high principles.

GUSTAV L. SCHRAMM, Judge
Juvenile Court, Pittsburgh

BRINTON, CRANE. *The Anatomy of Revolution.* Pp. xi, 324. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. $5.00.

Professor Crane Brinton has revised and reprinted his *The Anatomy of Revolution,* which first appeared in 1938. Like all his books, this, too, shows him as an accomplished writer whose urbane grace and whose wise understanding will be appreciated not only by students of history but by the general reader as well. He analyzes in the present book the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth century, and the Russian revolution of the twentieth century, and he tries to point out the parallel developments in those four events. He discusses and compares the old regimes, the first stages of the revolution, the types of revolution, the rule of the moderates, the accession of the extremists, the reigns of terror and virtue, and ends with the Thermidorean reaction, the end of the revolutions.

In all these four revolutions Professor Brinton discovers uniformities and analyzes them. He does not claim to make any great discoveries. Most of the similarities are obvious, but it is good to be reminded of them and thus to gain historical perspective. No event in history is absolutely unique, or as Professor Brinton puts it in his unimitable way: "History is essentially an account of the behavior of men, and if the behavior of men is not subject to any kind of systematizing, this world is even more cockeyed than the seers would have it. You have only to look at a page of Theophrastus or of Chaucer to see that Greeks of more than two thousand years ago and Englishmen of six centuries ago seem in many ways extraordinarily like Americans today."

In one point, however, the Russian revolution seems different from the preceding ones. There seems to have been no Thermidorean end of the revolution yet. After a careful analysis of the trends in Russia for the last fifteen years, Professor Brinton comes to the conclusion that there might be some element in the Russian revolution which will single it out from all previous historical experience, but he doubts it. "At any rate, the issue is clear: If the Russian revolution in its later years follows the pattern of other great revolutions as clearly as it did in its beginnings and in its earlier years, then most Russians will eventually be no madder than the rest of us, and we can communicate with them in our mutual misunderstandings—and flashes of insight; if there really is a new thing in Russia, a totalitarian element that really transforms human beings, we can look forward to more Yezhov periods, more Lysenko's and more Stalin's—permanent revolution indeed."

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

LEE, ALFRED MCCLUNG. *How to Understand Propaganda.* Pp. xii, 281. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1952. $3.00.

This is a probing, well-documented study of the build-up and impact of propaganda as it is used to achieve both good and bad political, economic, and social ends and enhanced sales of products. The author, who is professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, has previously published *The Fine Art of Propaganda* and *The Daily Newspaper.*

Approaching his subject with a free, enquiring mind, Dr. Lee shows no political bias unless a predilection for social action which will improve the lot of the common man can be called a bias. While the methodology he prescribes for detecting propaganda and appraising the motives of its purveyors could be more simply and less repetitiously explained in several of his chapters, he presents as useful and thought-provoking a guide as I have seen.

Dr. Lee was executive director of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, a unique institution which survived from 1937 to 1941. He defines propaganda analysis as "an effort to substitute a sensible objectivity for emotional acceptance or rejection" of what one reads and hears. Most well-educated persons make this effort in respect to certain subjects or fields, but how many of us are capable of the intellectual self-discipline which rules out all wishful thinking and feeling?

The need for such a book at the moment need hardly be stressed. Witness the psychological warfare that is being waged by both sides in the cold war and the myths and symbols—omnibus words, the author calls them—which we are asked to accept in an election year.

Of special value to the general as well as the academic reader is the chapter entitled "The Pall of Orthodoxy," which covers the creeping monopolistic control of the press and the often allied centralized control of radio and television.

The final chapter, "What Can Individuals Do About Propaganda?" strikes a note of hope. Dr. Lee points out that persons of more than average courage, lone voices, have effectively made themselves heard in modern America. He instances Thorstein Veblen, Charles Beard, Mrs. Vashti McCollum, who carried her case against religious instruction on released time in the public schools to the Supreme Court and won it, and Larry Gara, a Quaker and a conscientious objector.

"We can all," Dr. Lee concludes, "refuse to be stampeded by anyone for any cause. . . . We can stand on our own feet in our thinking and help others to do the same."

DOROTHY DUNBAR BROMLEY
New York City

CHENERY, WILLIAM L. *So It Seemed.* Pp. xi, 300. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952. $4.00.

When a famous editor sums up 40 years of experience in American journalism what formula does he follow? Mr. Chenery offers a rather typical answer: first you tell how you happened to get into journalism in the first place, and then you record in chronological fashion what you saw pretty largely in terms of personalities rather than through forces, issues, and movements.

Mr. Chenery applies this autobiographical formula to his own career in American newspaper and magazine editing between 1910 and 1950 in a very pleasant and easy-going fashion. He has no axes to grind; he has no enemies to be exorcised, no friends to be exalted. He recalls the past, as he repeatedly emphasizes, simply as something he witnessed and on occasion reported from the editorial podium.

The history of journalism is replete with the names of editors who entered the profession with a burning desire to achieve some goal. They had a message which they felt the public must read. Not so with Mr. Chenery. His embraced journalism, as a reporter for the Chicago City Press Association, as a temporary means of getting established at something after having considered at some length a career devoted to religious activity.

Once Mr. Chenery became familiar with the smell of printer's ink he never considered changing professions. He enjoyed a succession of editorships, starting with the *Rocky Mountain News* in 1914 and culminating with the editorship of *Collier's* from 1925 through to the end of World War II.

Mr. Chenery's editorial philosophy when he took charge of the *Rocky Mountain News* was: "to make whatever comment seemed fair and interesting on the views of the day." Years later, after achieving success as the editor of *Collier's,* he elaborated slightly: "What the editor can do," he writes, "is to seek consciously a particular audience to adopt definite principles and policies and to present what he has to offer with all the professional skill he possesses or can enlist."

The personalities whose names crowd the pages of Mr. Chenery's recollections are described with candor, clarity, and, in most instances, praise. For example, four entire chapters are devoted to *Collier's* staff writers (Winston Churchill heads the list) who worked under Mr. Chenery's direction. There are also detailed descriptions of William Hayward, Jane Addams, Samuel Insull, George Creel, Frank A. Munsey, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

In fairness to Mr. Chenery, one must emphasize that these individuals are related to the news developments which made them subject to editorial treatment. Certain of these events—the fight against Prohibition and the Roosevelt administrations to name two—are treated with great deftness and interest.

Mr. Chenery's preoccupation with what people did and said attests anew the well-known fact that the recording of contemporary affairs by the journalist can be done in no other fashion if he wishes to reach a wide audience.

FREDERIC E. MERWIN
Rutgers University

ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY

BURNS, ARTHUR F. (Ed.). *Wesley Clair Mitchell, The Economic Scientist.* Pp. ix, 387. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952. $4.00.

The aim of the book is to emphasize Mitchell as a scientist. The chapters are mostly by friends and admirers, though the editor states that "some effort" was made to include different schools of thought. Much of the material has appeared before. The new parts consist of a eulogy by A. F. Burns and a revealing biographical sketch by Mrs. Mitchell.

Milton Friedman's discussion of "the economic theorist" seems best. It emphasizes Mitchell's cycle theory as being his strongest claim to scientific achievement; but concludes merely that it is possible to construct from, or read into, Mitchell's work an integrated cycle theory (p. 258). One gets the impression that Mitchell himself merely presented thorough, well organized, and thoughtful evidence on cycles.

Schumpeter's eulogy refers to Mitchell as a kindly, moral man who left a survey of work done and a program of work to be done.

A. B. Wolfe's criticism of Mitchell's thought as lacking the guide of "purposive" equilibrium economics seems to hit the mark.

T. W. Hutchison praises Volume I of Mitchell's early work on "Types of Economic Theory" but states that he "noticeably does not succeed in carrying out his institutionalist program in Volume II . . . to anything like the extent he does in Volume I."

Throughout, one finds references to the great influence of two men on Mitchell: *Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey.* He always saw economic phenomena through Veblen's "pecuniary veil." This fact is sufficient to cast doubt on claims to true science. One finds (1) that Mitchell sought an "empirical science"; (2) that he emphasized relativity, holding that each period has a different science as a by-product; (3) that he was a pragmatist; (4) that he favored the experimental approach, saying that "we cannot do anything unless we try to do something"; (5) that accordingly science was regarded by him as a mere method; and (6) that his main underlying interest was in reform.

A follower of Veblen and Dewey, Mitchell visited Hobson, Beveridge, the Webbs, and the Graham Wallases in England, and joined Charles Beard, J. H. Robinson, and A. S. Johnson in founding the New School for Social Research in New York. Certainly he was not scientific by association.

This book clinches the fact that Mitchell was an institutionalist, falling between Veblen and the more planful younger group. His two basic weaknesses as a thinker were: (1) emphasis of behavior as opposed to motives, and (2) overemphasis of differences among different time periods. How could one who so thinks hope to find true cause-and-effect relationships?

LEWIS H. HANEY
New York University

HIGGINS, BENJAMIN. *What Do Economists Know?* Pp. ix, 166. Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1951; and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. $2.75.

This book states a case for economics as a science and as a profession. Its author argues that economists, regardless of political affiliations, agree substantially on objectives and methods. They are scientists and should preach to convert others to their conclusions. If their field were professionalized, like accountancy and medicine, the public would be protected against charlatans. In a democracy broad decisions should be made by legislatures, but detailed procedures should be left to professional economists. "As long as no other stated objective is involved, the right of the electorate to choose between higher taxes in the upper brackets or appreciation of the currency as a means of checking inflation is no more vital to democracy than their right to decide whether penicillin or sulpha shall be prescribed for septic sore throat," Higgins declares, although this is not a particularly good example for his purpose because the alternatives he mentions would affect differently the distribution of wealth, and individuals who are concerned by this would want to be heard. In general, the argument will give economists assurance in their craft and courage in developing policies by applying it. It should also convince some laymen who are willing to study a closely reasoned book.

The author, while criticizing the maximum satisfaction concept, advocates great equality in distribution. He relies as much on moral revival as on government action to curb exploitation by influential groups. A Keynesian, he believes that continuance of full employment is requisite and that economists know how to ensure it; but his Keynesian emphasis does not prevent his conceding important contributions to economics as a science by other schools, including the Marxists.

As a Canadian professor lecturing in Australia, Higgins takes a more detached view of the current dispute between Western democracy and Russian communism than is usual in the United States. The clash is essentially ideological: neither side

has territorial ambitions, he thinks, although each is willing to fight in defense of its system. Neither allows freedom of expression to those within its borders who oppose its ideology. Even a war victorious to the West is likely to destroy Western democracy. Communism as such cannot be killed by military defeat of Russia, but "if the western world can find a way to maintain a smooth-working economy within a democratic framework," it need have little fear of aggresion from within. There is much truth in this.

EDMUND WHITTAKER
Colorado Agricultural and
Mechanical College

SOULE, GEORGE. *Economic Forces in American History*. Pp. viii, 568. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1952. $4.75.

This is a new textbook in American economic history. There are about ten texts in print, and as many more have come and gone since Katherine Coman wrote the first one in 1905. Every new one brings some improvements. Since more historians than economists write these texts, it is reasonable to expect that a good economist will contribute more new ideas than an equally good historian. George Soule is an economist. He is also a member of the board of the National Bureau of Economic Research, a former editor of the New Republic, the author of a number of books dealing with economic history, and professor at Bennington College.

Whereas most American economic history texts have sought to tell the story from Columbus or Jamestown to the present with some relationship between years and pages, Professor Soule just sketches the colonial period and handles the nineteenth century with considerable dispatch. It is recent economic history that concerns him. Out of 531 pages 310 are devoted to the period since 1900. A good case may be made for this approach. There is more abundant and more reliable statistical data for the twentieth century than for earlier periods. Thus an economist can be at his best in this period. The book may also be an answer to a definite demand in part of the market. Some professors have been looking for: (a) a shorter text, (b) a text emphasizing the modern period, and (c) one containing more national income economics. This text goes far towards satisfying those requirements.

The first two chapters deal with our economic growth before about 1800 and give summaries of the economic topics that will be treated more fully in the next seven chapters. These seven cover the nineteenth century. A second seven chapters stress the same topics in the twentieth century. These are "vertical slices" through history of such subjects as agriculture, manufacturing, finance, and transportation. The last four chapters are the chronological treatment of the same period. This is Professor Soule's way of striking that essential happy medium between the purely topical and the purely chronological approach.

The earlier and more historical sections of the book are the least satisfactory. There are strange omissions. Why include the panic of 1815 and leave out that of 1819 in a list of panics (p. 208)? Why leave out Queen Anne's War in a list of colonial wars (p. 7)? The earlier parts also have most of the errors—for example, most cotton did go directly from southern ports to England; an important minority went via New York (p. 89). The organization is not so good in this portion, and there is a tendency at times to chronicle many facts rather than to dwell on the significance of a select few. The book contains no pictures.

The book has a great many points in its favor. Throughout Professor Soule writes in a judicious tone that is admirable. The economic explanations are generally excellent. Chapter 13 on National Income and its significance in economic history is superb. Professor Soule makes effective use of the National Bureau's findings. The selection of charts and tables, many from the National Bureau, is very good. When he dwells on the significance of the contributions of Eli Whitney (interchangeable parts rather than cotton gin), Oliver Evans, Adam Smith, Herbert Croly, and others he weaves biography and economic history together brilliantly. The basic section since 1900 is of high quality throughout; thus he was eminently successful in his main aim. There is a good up-to-date bibliography and a list of topics for further research by students. Altogether this is an impressive addition to the list of American economic history texts.

DONALD L. KEMMERER
University of Illinois

FLEXNER, ABRAHAM, with the collaboration of ESTHER S. BAILEY. *Funds and Foundations: Their Policies Past and Present*. Pp. xiii, 146. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $2.75.

In 1910 Abraham Flexner's report on *Medical Education in the United States and Canada* was published. Dr. Flexner had visited all the 155 medical schools, and he reported objectively on their curriculums and laboratories and clinical training, their facilities and faculties and student bodies. Within two years one hundred of them had closed their doors and the rest were undergoing basic reorganization. Probably no man in history ever accomplished so much in so short a time, armed with no authority, no power, nothing but facts and the courage and freedom to publish them.

Dr. Flexner's medical education study was made for the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. In 1913 Dr. Flexner became Assistant Secretary and a member of the General Education Board, and in the years thereafter Rockefeller Foundation agencies contributed upwards of $100 million to set the modern American pattern of medical teaching. Dr. Flexner's imagination and initiative as the first director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in the 1930's is well known throughout the world.

Out of all this experience come the essays that form the chapters of *Funds and Foundations*, which amply attests that he is not "retired" at eighty-five. *Funds and Foundations* is vigorous and controversial. Dr. Flexner reviews the technique of assistance and philanthropy in a series of selected cases, the Freedman's Bureau, the Peabody Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Julius Rosenwald Fund. He explores methods, policies, organization, personnel, and objects of expenditures. Persons of influence in the development of philanthropy are discussed and sometimes sharp disagreement is expressed.

Dr. Flexner deplores the trend toward relatively small, individual grants for specific research and other projects. A foundation staff, he feels, is "far too small to study properly the wisdom of the grants" and, moreover, the foundation thereby invades the administrative responsibility of the universities. The proper foundation aim, as Dr. Flexner sees it, is the building of strong, independent, standard-setting institutions, and, if that means in specific cases endowment and building, so be it. His final chapter deals with the neglect of the humanities. "America has been oversold on science," he quotes and urges that modern philanthropy explore more constructively the arts and humanistic fields.

PHILIP S. BROUGHTON
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

SLICHTER, SUMNER H. *What's Ahead for American Business*. Pp. 216. Boston: Little, Brown and Company (an Atlantic Monthly Press Book), 1951. $2.75.

Dr. Sumner Slichter's vision of the "foreseeable future" of our economy is interesting chiefly as a stimulant of discussion by one who became a convert to the theory of the dynamic economy rendered dynamic by government intervention through spending, debt, and controls. The author thinks our society is under the influence of a "defense economy" and that what he calls normal underlying economic conditions will return when there is no longer a substantial shortage of all kinds of goods and that this will occur when the outlay on armaments shifts from the present frantic effort to arm to a replacement basis. Then defense expenditures will drop to ten or twenty billions a year in two or three years.

At this point the budget will show a surplus followed by pressures for reduced taxation. Controls of materials will disappear and price controls will languish to a form looser than during World War II. But the country will be committed to the policy of maintaining a high level of employment. As a result, the expenditures

of local, state, and federal governments will be a high fraction of the national product. But the economy will be more stable because government intervention will continue in the form of public works, measures to limit fluctuations in business and to increase the proportion of income distribution on the basis of need, the regulation of industrial relations, controls to raise or lower prices and to regulate the structure of business. There will be continuing intervention in world economy to replace what he calls our *present stop-gap* measures. There will be more welfare. But we are in danger of neither socialism nor the planned economy. Apparently, according to this dispensation, we are destined to slide more or less comfortably from our present frantic war effort into a continuing, government-supervised, -financed, and -regulated economy which somehow escapes the label of "planning."

Thus the book offers a series of headings for lively dispute, but skirts completely the possible dislocations which might ensue from our abnormally swollen debt. After all, Dr. Slichter took his stand, somewhat belatedly, with the Spenders and the Borrowers. One of the consequences of this policy is now with us—a debt of $263 billion which promises to be much larger before it stops growing. A fundamental blemish in this prophetic vision is the failure to appraise the impact of the debt when the borrowing stops. There is no room here to enumerate the possible consequences, but one obvious problem is the economic effect of an interest charge which may be as much as seven or eight billion dollars a year. This will represent the extraction of that much money from expendable income for transfer to capital funds, which will have a precisely opposite effect from that created by the original borrowing that involved a transfer from capital funds to expendable income or the pumping into expendable income of funds created by bank loans.

JOHN T. FLYNN

Bayside, New York

GORDON, ROBERT AARON. *Business Fluctuations.* Pp. xvi, 624. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $5.00.

Because of the preoccupation of economists in the last fifteen years with both the great structural changes in the American economy and the revolution in theory wrought by Keynes, there has not been much general literature on the subject of business cycles in recent years. Professor Gordon's book is to be welcomed for that reason, and especially so because his work deserves the highest praise. Although it is written as a text, his book should be of value to those economists whose interests lie in other fields and who would like to be abreast of the investigations and theories of business fluctuations.

Professor Gordon devotes four chapters to national income analysis, which he handles with unusual clarity. There then follow five chapters on the description of secular changes, the business cycle itself, its phases, and its generation. Here too Professor Gordon must be complimented on his masterful treatment and well-balanced manipulation of the diverse materials. Theories of the business cycle are treated in only two comparatively short chapters, which is perhaps just as well in an undergraduate text. His own approach to the causes of cyclical fluctuations is eclectic; he avoids the attempt, so characteristic of many theorists of the past, to find one cause or group of causes. He does, however, emphasize the role played by the saving-investment processes and the accompanying cycle-generating factors of the economy. Professor Gordon does not agree with those who have argued that the business cycle is obsolete. Instead, his opinion is that despite the greater efficacy of present-day controls and the recent structural changes the business cycle will continue to be a normal feature of the functioning of the economy. Two chapters are devoted to a description of the cyclical behavior of the economy since 1919. Six chapters cover the subjects of forecasting, the international aspects of the cycle, and the problems of the goals and methods of stability.

The book is written in clear and straightforward fashion. The material is not, as is true of so many textbooks, written down. The undergraduate, however, will have to bring to Professor Gordon's book a good grasp of many economic concepts. If fault is to be found, it would be in points of emphasis. Thus, there is insufficient emphasis on monetary policy, although the brief treatment of it is good. The extensive discussion of counter-cyclical fiscal policy does not perhaps take sufficient account of the unavoidable political realities. The national income analysis is disproportionately long. For the student of business administration there is not quite enough material on the impact of the cycle on segments of the economy, on particular industries, and on forecasting for industries and segments.

But if these are faults, they must be counted as very small when weighed against the excellence of Professor Gordon's book. He is to be congratulated.

D. S. WATSON

George Washington University

MAXWELL, JAMES A. *Federal Grants and the Business Cycle.* Pp. xiii, 122. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952. $2.00.

This volume is the fourth in the series of "Fiscal Studies" issued by the National Bureau of Economic Research. It deals with grants by the federal government to state and local governments, principally from the point of view of their possible and actual use in counteracting business cycles. Mainly because of their fiscal limitations state and local governments in their economic activities behave almost like private businesses, in that their expenditures are expanded in prosperity and contracted in depression. If this tendency is to be corrected part of the activities of state and local governments must be financed by federal grants, which can be expanded in depression and contracted in prosperity. The author reviews succinctly the history of these grants, and gives some appraisal of the possibility of varying them countercyclically. Although the history of these grants stretches back almost to the foundation of the Republic, they did not become large until 1934. From 1919 to 1933 they ranged from $86 to $228 million, and from 1933 to 1949 from $901 to $2,909. About half the grants are now for social welfare; about a quarter for transportation and communication. The main possibility for countercyclical grants lies in public assistance and in public works, and the author gives a careful appraisal of the possibilities in each case, being somewhat optimistic about the first and pessimistic about the second. In the course of the inquiry a number of other interesting problems are touched on, notably a suggestion for the apportionment of federal grants among the states in order to make some compensation for their differences in per capita income. The work is admirably equipped with tables and diagrams. It is a worthy addition to the impressive National Bureau list, both in content and in style.

K. E. BOULDING

University of Michigan

TAX INSTITUTE. *Taxation and Business Concentration.* A Symposium conducted by the Tax Institute, June 15–16, 1950, New York. Pp. viii, 264. Princeton, 1952. $5.00.

In *Taxation and Business Concentration* the Tax Institute upholds its tradition of interesting and useful symposium volumes on controversial subjects in the field of taxation. A large measure of the success of the symposia and the resulting volumes has undoubtedly been due to careful program planning. In the case of *Taxation and Business Concentration,* the important role that planning played is attested to both by the titles of the papers presented, each of them dealing with a significant aspect of the main topic, and by the over-all excellence of the papers.

The introductory paper, "Recent Trends in Industrial Concentration and Taxation" by Professor J. Keith Butters, provides in succinct form essential background material and a conceptual framework for the papers that follow. The next two papers, "Taxation and Large Scale Retailing" by Dean Harold M. Somers and "Concentration in the Tobacco Industry as Affected by Tax Policies" by H. M. Robertson, are particularly well done.

Also worthy of special attention are the papers dealing with the effects on concentration of certain tax-exempt forms of business enterprise—farm co-operatives and government-owned and -financed enter-

prises. Cogent arguments on both sides of each issue are discussed in a stimulating and intelligent fashion. Few will read these papers without gaining fresh insights into these matters.

Despite the general excellence of the papers included, a few shortcomings of the volume may also be noted. At least one important factor contributing to business concentration since the end of World War II—namely, the effect of taxation on mergers of competitive businesses—has been almost entirely neglected. Although a few contributors touch on this matter briefly, for the most part the analysis is confined to the relative burden of taxation on small business as compared with large business.

The last paper in the volume, "The Theory of Business Taxation" by Professor Alfred G. Buehler, President of the Tax Institute, while interesting in itself, fails in some respects to sound the proper concluding note for the papers preceding it. In addition it may be well to forewarn the prospective reader that this symposium, despite its many merits, does not make any major theoretical contribution to the field. The volume does, nevertheless, serve a useful purpose, and it deserves to be widely read.

LEO FISHMAN
West Virginia University

FLOYD, JOE SUMMERS, JR. *Effects of Taxation on Industrial Location.* Pp. xiv, 155. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1952. $3.00.

This little volume deals with a highly controversial question, and a problem on which countless hours and many thousands of dollars have been spent by legislative bodies, tax officials, corporation executives, chambers of commerce, and other groups.

The question relates to the effect of tax differentials among the various states upon industrial location. The problem, which frequently must be dealt with apart from the controversy, is how to determine the tax differentials. Findings and conclusions of this study are not particularly new or startling, but the book should serve a useful purpose.

Following a critical examination of previous investigations of the relationship between tax conditions and the selection of plant locations, the author concludes that sweeping generalizations concerning the influence of tax differentials on the choice of plant sites should be treated with suspicion. Based on a theoretical analysis set forth in the study, tax considerations have little or no weight in determining the location of certain industries, such as resource-oriented concerns, but tax factors may, under given circumstances, become quite important to other types of concerns. Among the latter, for example, are corporations manufacturing seamless hosiery, furniture, and cigarettes, which industries were selected by Dr. Floyd to illustrate a suggested method for measuring tax differentials.

After discussing some of the basic causes of interlocal tax differentials and setting forth the various methods which might be used to measure such differentials, the author explains, in considerable detail, the manner in which the "hypothetical tax bill" technique was employed in this study.

Tax bills for the three industries were computed at 96 urban and rural sites—selected to show high-, median-, and low-tax locations—in nineteen different states. Apparently all state and local taxes except unemployment contributions were included in the survey. With the inclusion of local property taxes, the author encounters the same obstacles to valid conclusions met by others who previously have attempted similar studies.

The computations, based largely on 1946 data, reveal substantial differentials in the tax loads of identical concerns, both between median-tax sites of different states and between localities within individual states. However, the analysis indicates there are few states in which tax bills are uniformly high or uniformly low for all types of corporations and for both urban and rural sites. Moreover, relatively few generalizations can be made because tax differentials are produced not only by variations in state and local tax systems but also by changes in the balance sheet structure of a corporation, as well as in the rate of return upon property investment. Currently, the magnitude of interlocal tax differentials is considerably reduced with the inclusion of federal taxes in the computations.

Various methods are set forth to reduce tax differentials in order to promote maximum industrial development of the nation, but most of them will not seem very practical except, perhaps, to the extreme optimist.

ARNOLD L. EDMONDS
Pennsylvania State Chamber
of Commerce
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

HULL, I. HARVEY. *Built of Men: The Story of Indiana Cooperatives.* Pp. xii, 212. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $3.00.

This little book is both a history and a eulogy of agricultural co-operation as it has developed in Indiana. It is written by a man who has had many years' contact with the co-operative movement in that state. Perhaps its main contribution is to illustrate and document the old adage that "the Lord helps them that help themselves." The history of co-operation in Indiana is almost entirely confined to the thirty-year period since 1920. During that period the author claims great progress for farmers and farming conditions in general in Indiana. He credits much of that progress to the work of the co-operative organizations most of which are federated in the Farm Bureau Cooperative Association.

While the story told about co-operation in Indiana is interesting, and doubtless on the whole historically correct, there are some explicit points and other obvious inferences that suggest a strongly favorable bias on the part of the author. The emphasis in the first chapter might even leave the impression that farmers first found themselves in difficulty at the close of World War I. Also, the impression is given that farmers turned to co-operation for the first time in that period. Certainly neither of these two impressions is correct even for Indiana. Having read some of the journal kept by my grandfather who started farming in Indiana in the 1830's I am convinced that there were other periods just as adverse to farming in that state as were the 1920's. Moreover, having watched the growth of the California Fruit Growers Exchange from 1900 I realize that farmers turned to co-operation as a method of self help, at least, a couple of decades earlier than the beginning of Mr. Hull's history.

One very important point that comes out clearly in the book is the emphasis on the inadequacy of small business enterprises to meet present-day business conditions. The co-operative organizations in Indiana in several instances started as small decentralized units handling such farm products as grain or livestock. According to the author it has come to be clearly recognized that a federation of such organizations is much more effective than the individual units. One might almost conclude that in any lines of business that have products to sell outside their immediate locality small concerns are doomed. Actually, however, studies of concentration in American manufacturing business, starting with that made by Willard L. Thorpe in 1924, show that there was very little increase in business concentration between 1890 and 1950. What the co-operative organizations in Indiana and elsewhere have accomplished is to provide the owner of agricultural resources with the same type of centralized sales department, or in some cases purchasing department, as has long been available to many manufacturing industries.

One claim made by the author certainly must be challenged. The statement is made that "while cooperatives are integrating and growing they cannot build a monopoly as that term is ordinarily used since a co-op is owned by the people who use it." Someone said many years ago "cooperation is prima facie wicked. It is an obvious attempt to take advantage either of those from whom you would buy or of those to whom you sell." While this is prima facie possible, it need not be true in specific cases. On the other hand, it may be true. Certainly some co-operatives have taken advantage of those to whom they would sell by restricting output. Even in cases where restriction has not actually occurred the opportunity exists for co-operatives to restrict output, and when purchasing co-operatives become strong enough they can use precisely the same power tools as any other large buying organization. The social evils of oli-

gopoly and oligopsony or even those of monopoly may quite as possibly accrue from agricultural co-operatives as from any other large business enterprise; and I note that Hull argues that only large co-operatives are likely to be successful.

One other point of criticism may be made of this book. Nowhere does it make quite clear to the unversed reader just what the Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association does. Obviously, it is a federation of co-operatives. It seems apparent that many of the federated units carry out their own sales programs, but the degree of autonomy is not made entirely clear. The division of responsibility as between the different local units in diversified areas and the central organization might have been spelled out in a much more informative way.

In the appendix there is a brief statement concerning the major national organizations concerned with the co-operative movement. Thus a thumbnail sketch is given of a much wider field than Indiana.

In conclusion, the author states that "co-operatives in Indiana as throughout the world have grown from economic distress." The assumption seems to be implicit although it is not spelled out that having been born as one "product of human misery, sacrifice, and effort" they will continue to serve a useful purpose even in a happy clime. Probably this is an acceptable assumption, and perhaps they will serve for a considerable period to make family size farming possible. Co-operative enthusiasts and perhaps all farmers should be on their guard, however, lest the concentrated sales and purchasing organizations take over so much of the control of agriculture as to weaken the position of the family farm which they were designed to aid.

ROLAND S. VAILE
University of Minnesota

WALKER, CHARLES R., and ROBERT H. GUEST. *The Man on the Assembly Line.* Pp. x, 180. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $3.25.

In this slim volume the authors present the first results of their inquiry into the human relations problems of *The Man on the Assembly Line.* This is not, as they modestly point out, a complete and rounded study of *all* of the problems of this man; for this, more investigatory work is necessary—work under somewhat different conditions and climes, and work with groups of different backgrounds than these here studied.

What the authors have done is to take a new automobile assembly plant, and within this plant they selected 180 workers engaged in final assembly work. With the average mass production job defined as having the characteristics of mechanical pacing, repetitiveness, minimum skill, predetermination of tools and techniques, minute subdivision of product, and surface mental attention, work on the assembly line is the epitome of mass production. Against this technical background, they examine the elements which made for satisfaction or dissatisfaction in terms of the immediate job, relations to fellow workers, pay and security, relation to supervision, general working conditions, promotion and transfer, and the relationship of the worker to the union.

The choice of a new plant is significant. It enabled the authors to study not only the workers in their present environment, but because practically none of them had previously been in an industry with the mass production characteristics of automobile assembly, it allowed them to study the problems in terms of transition from one type of work to another. In a sense, this broadened the meaning of the study, but in another sense the effect was to narrow its meaning. To take just one factor which illustrates this point: The most important items in dissatisfaction with the immediate job were mechanical pacing and repetitiveness. For here is where these workers found the greatest difference from their previous jobs. For industries which are less advanced in the characteristics of mass production, the moral is pointed that less mechanical pacing and less repetitiveness will ease the transition. But do the same items of dissatisfaction reign in the older plants—with workers long since accustomed to these things? Here is where the meaning of the work is narrowed. It would be most interesting to compare notes, and to follow the sample workers of this study through more years of their working lives and discover whether they stay "on the line" or move to other jobs or other industries. One suspects that the mechanical pacing problem remains, but the same may not be true of the problem of repetitiveness.

Perhaps the most interesting finding of the volume is that there are distinctions in assembly line work which loom large to these workers, but which have not yet had much attention from previous researchers. These distinctions have a definite bearing on immediate job satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and they revolve around the number of "operations" in each particular job. To put it simply, "the man who puts a nut on a bolt" is different from the man who does five or ten operations. The difference shows in his attitude toward the job and in other ways. Yet all are frequently lumped together indiscriminately as workers "on the line" though they show wide variations in pace, variety, and skill.

This finding is just one among other interesting aspects of the work, for it is one of the handicaps of a short review that more attention is given to the defects than to the virtues. In truth, this is an excellent volume overall. In just two places do the authors seem to slip. The first is in not discounting some of the workers' accounts of their previous jobs. Since work "on the line" has a low "status" connotation, it is entirely possible that previous job experience was "built up" to more variety and skill, for example, than it actually possessed. The second is in the conclusions where remedies for repetitiveness, for example, may be applicable or necessary only for transition problems rather than for permanent ones.

HERBERT J. LAHNE
Washington, D. C.

SCHNEIDER, ERICH. *Pricing and Equilibrium: An Introduction to Static and Dynamic Analysis.* Translated from the German by T. W. Hutchison. Pp. xii, 327. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $4.00.

Professor Schneider has provided a competent and satisfactory synthesis of the economic theory of the firm and the household in his book *Pricing and Equilibrium.* The book purports to be an introductory text to partial and general equilibrium analysis. While it contains a good deal of analysis of the type which is now commonplace in the elementary text, in its attempt to be complete it also contains considerable advanced analysis which is not likely to be grasped by the elementary student. For the "spoon-fed" American student, untutored in even the simplest of mathematics, Professor Schneider's book will have little appeal. The analysis is extremely concise, more or less devoid of illustrative material, and most of the proofs of his propositions are couched in mathematical terms. However, for the advanced undergraduate student in economic theory or for the graduate student, the book provides a useful review. The book is not as encyclopedic as Professor Boulding's *Economic Analysis,* nor does it have the light style of Professor Stigler's *Theory of Price.*

Professor Schneider's approach to partial equilibrium analysis is conventional. He treats first the economic plan of the household, drawing heavily on J. R. Hicks's indifference-curve approach. Although he treats consumption of the household as a function of income, prices, and assets, the demand for individual commodities is related only to income and prices with no consideration of the size or form of assets. In building the consumption function of the household there is no consideration of the work of Duesenberry or of other contemporary consumer behavior theory.

In his treatment of the economic plan of the firm the analysis is more or less similar to Mrs. Robinson's and Hicks's work, with some attention paid to the theory of oligopoly. Very little attention, however, has been paid to developments in the fields of *oligopolitic* price behavior which occurred in the last three years, and little or no attention has been devoted to the wealth of material provided by industry studies on price behavior. One chapter is devoted to the "Long-term economic plan of the firm," but this turns out to be an analysis of the determinants of investment for the firm rather than a discussion of intertemporal relations of costs, prices, demand, and profits.

His treatment of partial equilibrium includes both static and dynamic analysis, indicating clearly the inadequacy of static analysis for many problems. When the reader completes the sections on the indeterminacy of equilibrium under conditions of oligopoly and bilateral monopoly he is convinced that these subjects cannot be easily handled in an introductory text.

PHILIP W. CARTWRIGHT
University of Washington

MAIER, NORMAN R. F. *Principles of Human Relations.* Pp. viii, 474. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1952. $6.00.

This book is an exposition of techniques for use in influencing employees constructively (principally by changing their attitudes toward their jobs, their supervisors, and themselves) without arousing resentments in them. The author stresses the importance of the maintenance of good morale in the work group if maximum production is to be achieved. He points out that much contemporary employee training fails because it does not effect any real change in workers' attitudes—it is too rational and takes too little account of emotional factors in both trainer and trainee. Value judgments, he feels, also play too important a role. He states that "a training program that does not alter people may be interesting, but it is *exposure* and not training. A good training program must not only change people, but must change them in the way that is intended."

The method in which the author places his greatest reliance and which he describes in most detail is that of Group Decisions (the procedure in which the employees, under the guidance of their supervisor, participate as a group in the analysis of problems and reach a unanimous decision relative to the action to take). Other techniques which he discusses and illustrates are role playing, various types of contacts and interviews in dealing with individuals (for example, the free or casual contact, the training contact, the making of job assignments, the induction of new employees, the employment interview, the transfer interview, the promotion interview, the evaluation interview, and the exit interview), and nondirective counseling. Ample case material is provided for explanatory and practice purposes.

Dr. Maier's treatment of these topics is down-to-earth and remarkably objective. He feels that the Group Decision method has a major contribution to make at all levels of employee, supervisory, and management training. On the other hand, he is equally aware of the difficulties and resistances which such a radically different approach to training will encounter in industry. He stresses particularly the extent to which the thinking and attitudes of the supervisor himself must be changed if he is to use this method effectively. He is also aware of the problem of and dangers of a lack of top-management support in realizing the full potentialities of such a program.

Only to a lesser extent does he appear to accept the limitations of the *scope* of this method, that is, the restriction of the types of problems to which it is applicable (principally "how to do it" questions) and its doubtful utility when truly elegant solutions are demanded or responsibility for action must be accepted by the group. Even his evidence of the value of the method as a medium of influencing attitudes is not wholly convincing. When it was subjected to an empirical test the findings, as he himself reports them, are inconclusive.

The book contains little that is strikingly new or original with respect either to concept or methodology. Its chief contribution is its reiteration of the point that training demands far more than an orderly, logical presentation of the subject matter if it is to influence attitudes and through them behavior. The author not only makes this point tellingly but he provides a clear exposition of the methods he advocates and ample material for use in training students, supervisors, and trainers in their principles and application. As a handbook covering the rationale and use of the Group Decision method of training and, to a lesser extent, role playing, interviewing, and nondirective counseling, *Principles of Human Relations* makes a very worth-while contribution to the literature.

ROBERT N. MCMURRY
New York City

BARBASH, JACK, with the assistance of KATE BARBASH. *Unions and Telephones: The Story of the Communications Workers of America.* Pp. viii, 246. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $2.50.

This is an account of the development, organization, leadership, and bargaining experiences of the Communication Workers of America (CIO). Because it deals only briefly with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, does not dwell at length on the National Federation of Telephone Workers, and ignores independent unions and telephone companies while focusing on the CWA and the Bell System, it is necessarily an incomplete survey of telephone unionism.

This book was prepared at the invitation of CWA president Joseph A. Beirne. It is designed, according to the Preface, for union members first and general readers second. Yet those particularly interested in the 10-billion-dollar plant, 35 million telephones, 985,583 stockholders, and, especially, the 602,466 employees (1950) of the Bell System will find this well outlined but somewhat hastily written book stimulating.

When some of the 300,000 or more CWA members gaze at this mirror of themselves they will note that in union there is strength; affiliation with other national unions is worthwhile; strikes, strike threats, and organization bring wage boosts; and in industry today it is union versus management. The "frame of reference" here outlined is clearly that of the author; it is, of course, the *sine qua non* of the official, commissioned union biographer. One is not surprised when Mr. Barbash urges upon a centralized telephone monopoly the plowing of new fields by living with the union (CWA). He points out correctly that all the devices of scientific human relations—morale surveys, systematic employee selection and counseling, and the training of supervisors—did not prevent union growth in the Bell System.

Two sources basic to the study of telephone unionism are FCC commissioner Paul A. Walker's *Proposed Report, Telephone Investigation* (1938) and the Senate Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations hearings (1950) on Bell System collective bargaining. Mr. Barbash uses both, ably summarizing CWA testimony and exhibits in the latter. He does not do justice to the basic company dilemma in this reviewer's opinion, that is, how to grant CWA demands for national American Telephone and Telegraph Company bargaining and avoid government antitrust action. The devotion of the Alliance of Independent Telephone Unions to divisional bargaining and autonomy is ignored. The book is silent on the significance of extensive stock ownership among Bell employees and the vital connection between wage patterns and rate structure. Bell pioneering in employee welfare needs more attention.

Barbash quotes the *CWA News* editor as confiding, "It is not an objective paper in the sense that the daily press is supposed to be—and rarely is. It tries to tell labor's story, in particular the story of CWA-CIO. . . . We stress grievances. . . ." He uses all of his union journals, nevertheless, as sources of facts without sufficient questioning.

Some research scholar will one day try to prepare the full story of telephone unionism in historical perspective from CIO and AFL central archives (and CWA private files), AT&T and Bell divisional personnel records, and the personal correspondence of union and management leaders—sources not now open to Mr. Barbash and his capable wife. He will find in *Unions and Telephones* contemporary insights of great value. CWA, in the meantime, should find it a potent weapon for the union cause.

VAUGHN D. BORNET
Stanford University

SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

PARK, ROBERT EZRA. *Human Communities: The City and Human Ecology.* Volume II of *The Collected Papers of Robert Ezra Park,* edited by Everett Cherrington Hughes, Charles S. Johnson, Jitsuichi Masuoka, Robert Redfield, and Louis Wirth. Pp. 278. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952. $4.50.

Under the editorship of five of his former students and associates, the collected papers of one of the luminaries of the past generation of American sociologists are being published in a three-volume series. This second volume is comprised of nineteen articles, prefaces to other monographs, and book reviews which have been arranged appropriately under the two topics indicated in the subtitle.

Developed during his earlier career as a newspaper reporter, Park's interest in the conditions of the city found both a practical and scientific focus in the problem of social change. This is attested by the bulk of the selections contained in the first section of *Human Communities,* particularly those papers prompted apparently by Park's original suggestions for investigating human behavior in the urban environment and dealing with juvenile delinquency, community organization, a summary of research on the urban community and its personality problems and institutions, the "gold coast" and the slums, the hobo, the gang, the ghetto, and the role of the city in civilization. Each of these essays relates to some aspect of social change in the urban milieu. The theorization which Park attempted draws prominently on the diverse contributions of Ogburn, Thomas and Znaniecki, Simmel, Freud, Adler, Spencer, Comte, and Teggart.

But only when these theoretical fragments are viewed in the context of the second section of the book dealing with the ecological frame of reference does their unity become apparent. An adaptation of evolutionism as expanded by the students of plant and animal communities, human ecology proposed that the basic process of competition produced a structural equilibrium among any human aggregate in a given habitat. The consequent territorial and occupational distribution of persons comprised the symbiotic substructure of human association called the "community." In the urban community, competition and its derivative processes of selection, segregation, dominance, and succession formed natural areas characterized by typical social groupings. But the symbiotic substructure will give rise—in a way never satisfactorily explained—to the process of communication and a cultural superstructure. Termed "society," this form of association is characterized by consensus, convention, and moral order, with three hierarchical levels: the economic, political, and cultural.

When the problem of social change is directly confronted, the ambiguity of the relationship between the biotic and cultural phases leads to a contradiction of the assertions that the two phases are reciprocally interrelated and that human social relations are primarily a matter of communication. Social change seems basically unilateral and nonsocial from the ecological viewpoint which "assumes that the origin of social change, if one could trace it to its source, would be found in the struggle for existence . . . [and its consequences]" (pp. 230–1).

Because his attention centered upon competition which compelled each individual to seek the task he could *best* perform if he wished to survive, Park could not explore certain facets of contemporary urban sociology—social class, social power, bureaucracy, factory organization, and mass communication. Nevertheless, his work will remain a monument in American sociology, testifying to his contagious enthusiasm for concrete, empirical research which has inspired his students and succeeding generations. His engaging style, colorful illustrations, succinct phraseology, incisive terminology, coupled with a cosmopolitan, scholarly vision, have won for Park a preeminence in the study of urban life.

ROSCOE C. HINKLE, JR.
University of Maine

STALEY, EUGENE (Ed.). *Creating an Industrial Civilization: A Report on the Corning Conference Held under the Auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies and Corning Glass Works, May 17–19, 1951, Corning, New York.* Pp. xvi, 368. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $4.00.

This little book is an interpretative report of a conference of industrialists, social scientists, and humanists held in Corning, New York, in May 1951.

The occasion was the centennial celebration of the founding of the Corning Glass Works. The 96 conferees were chosen jointly by the officials of the latter company and the section of the American Council of Learned Societies devoted to humanistic studies. It thus included some of America's most outstanding "men of thought" and "men of action."

Discussions dealt with various human problems occasioned by our living in a progressively industrializing society and with what might be done to ease or solve those problems. The tentative program called for a discussion of the "changes in the nature, conditions, rhythms and personal relations of daily work; to changes in the amount of leisure and the opportunities presented for its use; changes in the relation of the individual to his family, to his local community and to broader contacts; and to changes in the attitudes and expectations, hopes and fears with which men face life's problems and mysteries. How do men and women feel about these changes and about the life they lead today? Can we discover new ways to increase the meaningfulness of life for modern man? To enhance human satisfactions? To decrease the tensions and conflicts that threaten our civilization?"

The three-day conference seems significant mainly in the fact that it was held and thus afforded an arena for the frank exchange of opinion by the highly articulate social science specialists and the industrialists. It did something to vindicate the wide diversity of thinking about the awareness to and the complexity of the problems presented for discussion. It showed also the unanimity of the feeling that something constructive should be done about this overlooked or underemphasized human factor in our changing society.

As might be expected in an "off the cuff" discussion of problems in the field of social change, the discussions which are reported in detail reveal little that is new. The value of the conference lies rather in the breaking of new ground, always a necessary preliminary to the long process of purposeful planning and planting, cultivating out of weeds, and nurturing of plants most promising for the maintenance of the society of tomorrow.

The book shows every evidence of careful editing by an experienced reportorial staff. It is more readable than most conference reports and is probably the first promising step toward the elaboration of a plan of action for solving the human problems of industrial society.

CHARLES W. COULTER
University of New Hampshire

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE. *Civil Rights in the United States in 1951: A Balance Sheet of Group Relations.* Edited by Joseph B. Robison. Pp. 128. New York, 1952. 40 cents.

This booklet is the fourth in an annual series which state the facts and assess the progress in the United States of efforts to break down the barriers which result from prejudice, discrimination, and segregation. The report appraises the events in 1951 in the fields of citizenship, elections and public office, mob violence and law enforcement, employment, education, housing, public accommodations, armed forces, the nation's capital, voluntary associations, athletics, group defamation, media of mass communications, and community action.

The passing of the nefarious McCarran-Walter immigration bill is foreshadowed; the failures of Congress to act on fair employment, the poll tax, lynching, and statehood for Alaska and Hawaii are recorded. The Executive Department continued to press for integration in the armed forces, with the Army trailing the Air Force and the Navy. Segregation in housing operated by the federal government itself was prohibited, but in the far more extensive program of public housing operated by the states with federal aid, segregation was permitted. Moreover, segregation was directly encouraged by private building interests in the defense housing program aided by federal monies. President Truman appointed a Committee on Government Contract Compliance, a weak gesture far short of the FEPC (Committee on Fair Employment Practice) of World War II.

This incomplete summary of the facts concerning the federal government is typical of the entire spotty group relations

record for 1951. While two states (South Carolina and Tennessee) repealed the poll tax laws, and while voting by Negroes in the South increased markedly in absolute numbers, many cases are reported where officials tried to prevent registration and voting. Alabama passed a constitutional amendment to preserve white supremacy. On the other hand, Florida enacted a law eliminating segregation at the polls. Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina passed anti-mask legislation. Of fair employment bills introduced in eighteen states, only one (Colorado) was passed. But eight cities adopted such ordinances during the year. The most significant development of the year was the attack on the equal and separate doctrine as applied to public schools in the South: the aim was to get the Supreme Court to rule on the proposal that segregation per se is unconstitutional. South Carolina and Georgia took strong counter-measures.

All in all, 1951 was not an outstanding year for improvement of group relations. Mob violence, highlighted by the riot in Cicero, Illinois, and a series of outrages in Florida against Negroes, Jews, and Catholics, was duplicated in a lesser degree in too many parts of the nation. At the same time progress was made in higher education, employment, athletics, and in the election to public office and appointment of Negroes to positions heretofore not open to them. The most distressing note, however, is the evidence of popular apathy to the problem of undemocratic group relations and the failure to appreciate not only its evil at home but its disastrous effects on our position as a leader of the democratic forces of the free world.

MARTIN P. CHWOROWSKY
University of Pennsylvania

SCUDDER, KENYON J. *Prisoners Are People.* Pp. 286. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1952. $3.00.

In the past ten years, California has developed one of the most progressive state correctional systems in the country. What was only a few years ago a group of politically dominated and inefficient institutions is now a highly integrated Department of Corrections, staffed with competent and professionally trained personnel. But even more significant than the rapid development of new types of institutions and the revitalization of the programs in the older institutions is the fact that California was the first and to date the only state to put into actual practice the principles of both the Adult and the Youth Authority. Thus, the combination of a unified system of state penal and correctional institutions with the adult and youth authority gives California a unique place in the correctional systems of this country.

This plowing of new ground has not been limited to a revamping of the overall administration of the California correctional system. They have the experimental approach on custody and treatment methods as well. The truth is that we are just beginning to learn how many men can be held safely in open institutions, how important is the atmosphere and setting of an institution, and the extent to which we can bring about true rehabilitation through appealing to a man's self-respect and self-reliance. *Prisoners Are People* dramatizes all of these problems in telling the story of the California Institution for Men at Chino by the man who watched it grow and achieve an international renown. For one familiar with the development of this institution from its earliest blueprints there are some important omissions and here and there an over-emphasis on the role played by some of those prominently mentioned, but this does not detract from the interest in the book or its value in demonstrating what can be done by those who are able and willing to put to the test the shiboleths and slogans which have for so many years frozen penal progress.

Prisoners Are People is full of the quiet drama of those human values which Mr. Scudder consistently refused to compromise. A genuine respect for the individual; a freedom of communication between administration, staff, and the prisoner; a reliance upon an intelligent, trained, and sympathetic staff rather than upon force and physical restraints; and a program offering constructive work and opportunities for individual growth; these values form the philosophy upon which Chino was established. Incontrovertible as these objectives are, Mr. Scudder had to struggle against vested interests, political influence, and sheer public indifference and ignorance.

Told simply and without flourish, the story of Chino is nevertheless an engrossing one. Many of the ideas in contemporary correctional treatment often considered as unrealistic or even visionary have been translated by Mr. Scudder into sound administrative practice. This is the book's real contribution, and, while it undoubtedly has a general reader appeal, it should be read by every student of penology and prison administrator.

JAMES V. BENNETT
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

MORRIS, NORVAL. *The Habitual Criminal.* Pp. viii, 395. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. $5.00.

Morris' work is an analysis and evaluation of recidivist laws in some 25 countries, with primary emphasis given to England and Commonwealth countries. The book has an introductory chapter in which "the habitual criminal" is defined. The rest of the material is divided into two parts. In Part I, Morris presents an analysis and evaluation of the laws adopted by many countries in their attempts to deal with the habitual criminal. In Part II, he analyzes the records of about 300 confirmed recidivists and habitual criminals. The purpose of the entire work is to ". . . protect society from the habitual criminal, and this will not be achieved until we comprehend the characteristics of habitual criminals, and the various means the criminal law (of this and other countries) can contrive to this end. Progress in criminology must be founded on an understanding of the criminal and his relation to society. It is hoped that this work will provide for an understanding of habitual criminals" (p. 29). The habitual criminal laws of the United States are not considered by Morris. He believes, erroneously in this reviewer's opinion, that "in conception and execution they are of a different character from the European preventive detention legislation" (p. 83).

Morris includes three elements in his careful attempt to define "habitual criminal." First are "criminal qualities inherent or latent in the mental constitution." This phrase refers to a condition, and Morris explicitly avoids any decision as to the etiology of that condition. He does, however, exclude those certifiable under English law as insane or mentally deficient. Secondly, there must be "settled practice in crime." In discussing this element, Morris excludes the "extreme position" adopted in certain medical and psychoanalytic approaches to criminology. This is the approach that would base "treatment-punishment exclusively on the social dangerousness of an offender or potential offender. It completely excludes the conception of *nulla poena sine lege* and would appear to exaggerate the adequacy of our existing knowledge." Thirdly, the offenses must constitute a "public danger." This enables Morris to exclude from his study, quite arbitrarily, prostitutes, vagrants, habitual drunkards, and other habitual petty delinquents.

Morris shows, beyond reasonable doubt, that at least two practices are common in all the countries for which he supplies figures. First, the courts avoid imposing the severe habitual criminal sanctions in the vast majority of cases in which they could legally be applied. Secondly, these statutes are most frequently invoked (when they are used) for criminals who are *neither* violent nor dangerous. This is shown conclusively to be the case for England. In short, these laws are predominantly used against a type of offender for whom they were not intended!

England and Wales had a prison population in excess of 20,000 in 1948. There were 32 preventive detainees among this number; they were *all* those male prisoners sentenced as habitual criminals and in custody at the time Morris conducted his study. These 32 committed a grand total of 3,069 offenses of which they were convicted. They concentrated on burglary, housebreaking, and minor larcencies—offenses similar to those causing them to be imprisoned as habitual criminals. Morris says of their last offenses that these men did not threaten society with any crime of

a public nature nor with any offenses to the person. "Their crimes all related to property, and, except in [three cases], did not involve property of any great value. In short, they were nuisances rather than serious dangers to society" (p. 296).

Morris' work deserves serious study by those in this country who are interested in the problem of repeated crime.

FRANK E. HARTUNG
Wayne University

KORNITZER, MARGARET. *Child Adoption in the Modern World.* Pp. xiii, 403. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. $4.50.

Touching at points from Alaska to Zanzibar with main stopovers in the western British Commonwealth and the United States, this is a guided tour on adoption by an English leader. Her experience covers nearly a decade of research as well as staff membership in a child care agency and service as a press representative for adoption societies. Slightly more than one-half of some eighty bibliographical references are from British sources, the remainder mostly from America. Philosophy and procedures, social and legal aspects are compactly presented as in no other single volume.

It is an informative work. In most Latin American countries the adopter must not have legitimate children, exceptions being Uruguay and Argentina with their more advanced laws. North American adoptions present a "somewhat blurred vista full of experiment, energy and endeavour, though still marred by a good deal of old-fashioned inferior legislation." Yet, quite apart from this legalistic defect, adoption work in the United States and Canada—with some exceptions for Quebec—is marked by a highly developed sense of responsibility and a mature social philosophy. "Where agencies take part in an adoption, which unfortunately does not always happen, the applicants are chosen 'for their warmth and ability to give a good home to the child.' "

Warm concern there is in the author's writing, a realistic interest in all "deprived children" for whom adoption can be a normally happy life journey. She reflects a British trend for which there is an American parallel in placing younger infants, older children, and those with slight handicaps or less than perfect health, not only to offer the pleasures and benefits of complete family life to more children and adopters but also as a stabilizing factor to meet national unrest.

Adoption is still in an experimental stage in most countries. However, it seems that there is a modernity of purpose and practice almost everywhere, workers meeting similar problems and tending to tackle them similarly. Laws themselves have more similarities than differences. Legislation is moving, notably in Britain and America, toward the stability of the adoptive family by safeguarding the inheritance of property. Yet, more planning needs to be done here and abroad about the citizenship of adopted foreign children, also about soldier-sired children born to unmarried mothers on foreign soil. More research is needed on the results of adoption, particularly with the long view several years after the adoption has taken place, something more easily done where questionnaires and interviews are accepted chores than in countries where The Family lives behind a high wall of legal and social inaccessibility.

Here is a needed contribution in the field of child welfare. It will be highly valuable for the professionals and students; of less interest to the general reader.

LEE M. BROOKS
University of North Carolina

CUSSLER, MARGARET, and MARY L. DE GIVE. *'Twixt the Cup and the Lip: Psychological and Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting Food Habits.* Pp. 262. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1952. $3.95.

This is a scientific little book in popular language on food habits and their relationships to culture and society. It is a report of the findings from a detailed field study of three localities in the southeastern part of the United States. The communities selected were: (1) a one-crop economy in the tobacco-growing coastal plain in North Carolina; (2) a live-at-home economy of diversified farming in South Carolina; and (3) a prosperous cotton economy with long-term tenants in Georgia. The plan of research is based positively on food preferences rather than negatively on food aversions.

It might be expected at first thought that regional studies of food consumption and diet would be chiefly concerned with the nutritional needs of the biological organism and the available resources within the physical environment. Such a simple formulation would be inadequate, however, and extremely misleading, because it ignores the persistence of food habits and culturally induced attitudes towards food among any group of people. It cannot be assumed that accessible foods which best meet nutritional needs will be in greatest demand or, indeed, that they will be used to any important extent. Neither can it be assumed that added knowledge of food needs and the resources in any area will be effective in correcting diet deficiencies. Food selection is not a matter that is easily settled between the knowledgeable head and a needful stomach; rather the area of food choices seems to be "an area of great unreason." Society and culture enter in with a powerful slanting of sentiments and tastes, through points of prestige and other factors, to tip the scales in favor of sociological preferences, even at the expense of biological deficiencies and prevalent diseases. Just to know what to eat and to be able to get it cheaply is not sufficient to solve the problems of the foodways, as this book points out. Some excellent precautions and suggestions as to how to change the climate of opinion and food preferences towards a more scientific diet are included.

The book appears to be well documented with empirical data and shows good workmanship, although in spots it b comes rather dull reading. There are excellent pictures, and the field techniques and methods of analysis are easy to follow. It may perhaps be regarded as a suggestive model for similar studies in other areas.

LEO W. SIMMONS
Yale University.

FARIS, ROBERT E. L. *Social Psychology.* Pp. vii, 420. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. $5.00.

This text purposes to demonstrate the essential unity of social psychology, "those aspects of human personal behavior which are developed and controlled by the interaction which takes place between the individual and his . . . primary groups" (p. iii). While the omission of collective behavior phenomena is in harmony with this purpose, the failure to discuss the role of language in behavior cannot be likewise excused, particularly if Faris actually is—as he professes to be (p. 352)—a follower in the Chicago tradition. At the same time that other standard social psychological topics are examined by a technique of illustrating general definitions with perspicaciously selected recent American experimental data, polemics are pursued against such things as excessive biological determinism, psychoanalytic concepts and theories, frustration-aggression. Consequently mental mechanisms describing how behavior is produced are a rarity in all but the three chapters analyzing personality problems. In the fifteenth and final chapter a general discussion of current trends and problems is conjoined to an historical resumé of social psychological theories. Overgeneralization in the historical section, however, inaccurately represents the relationship between the rise of the Chicago school and the debacle of the biological, particularly the instinct, theories.

Theoretically Faris appears basically committed to evolutionism, individualism, and free will. The first is manifest in the sequence of chapters which proceeds from considerations of the biological nature of man, to the social nature of human nature and consciousness, to homogeneous social roles (social organization), and to conflicting social roles (social disorganization, the basic cause of many forms of personality maladjustment). Secondly, individuals are unique because they possess (innately?) personal dispositions (p. 269), normal, natural tendencies (p. 50), natural inclinations (p. 56), innate drives (p. 56), innate capacities (p. 4), attitudinal equipment (p. 200), and so forth, and they select social roles in keeping with their unique experiences. The free will assumption is evidenced when Faris repeatedly indicates not only that men desire or will those kinds of behavior in which they engage, but "why" they do so—at least if they

are "normal" men. The most common reasons given include personal satisfaction, interest in novelty, progress, and complexity, efficiency of time and resources, enhancement of communication, and the conservation of personal energy. These reasons are subsequently utilized as scientific facts for the derivation of universal human values, suggesting to the reader that values are not derived from the sociocultural tradition. Thus, for instance, persons adhere to conventional forms of behavior, enforced by informal social controls, because such behavior is most "natural" to them and "easiest" (p. 269). Faris erroneously assumes that the reduction of behavior to these basic forms of motivation is an explanation of "how," by what mechanisms, behavior comes to be as it is—a not uncommon confusion of metaphysics and science!

GISELA J. HINKLE

Orono, Maine

GREBLER, LEO. *Housing Market Behavior in a Declining Area: Long-Term Changes in Inventory and Utilization of Housing on New York's Lower East Side.* Pp. xix, 265. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $4.50.

This case study of an area in New York City's colorful Lower East Side was undertaken as "a prototype for a series of analyses of market behavior in declining areas."

Among the findings are that the number of dwelling units declined sharply between 1909 and 1940; that the area population dropped faster than the housing inventory; that there was an extraordinary amount of demolition; that new land uses have been small-scale except for public housing, and that the "filtering-down" of housing did not operate here appreciably.

Another conclusion is that vacancy ratios declined not during periods of low incomes but only under "the impact of acute housing shortage coupled with high incomes at the end of and after the Second World War." This does not seem to square with the survey of the New York City Housing Authority (January 25, 1937) which shows a marked decline in vacancies before prosperity had set in. Home relief in a depression rather than prosperity may have caused the sharp decline. The Housing Authority report shows that in 25 typical blocks, in which there was an average of 45 vacant apartments in March 1937, vacancies had dropped to 27 per block by October, and three months later to 15.

One of the most interesting conclusions in the book is that despite large vacancy ratios the Negro population from overcrowded Harlem did not pour in. With the problem of "Negro invasion" of white areas now one of the big issues, the finding stands out as a challenging contradiction of what is now dogma in respectable real estate circles.

One of the difficulties with sampling the area is that it was subject to several abnormal and volatile developments which remove it from the framework of "sample areas." These include a sudden awakening of public conscience to the existence of dangers in old-law tenements and an enormous imposition of forced expenditures upon owners. Thus it may be incorrect to conclude that turnover of ownership from individuals to corporations represented "no more than an institutional change in business organization." Responsible owners as well as banks which had inherited buildings during the depression sold them at catastrophic losses, the corporate veil may have appeared as part of the devices designed to avoid personal identification with the new "obnoxious ownership," and sales of bank mortgages at discounts might have replaced the usual quota of foreclosures.

The book poses many interesting questions and gives many interesting answers, some established, some debatable, but the whole area of housing is in issue today, and it is only by constructive studies of this sort that the problem can be spotlighted and clarified.

CHARLES ABRAMS

New York City

COOPER, GORDON. *Dead Cities and Forgotten Tribes.* Pp. xiii, 160. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1952. $4.75.

To anyone like myself who knows very little about the obscure and little written about areas of the world, Mr. Cooper's book is extremely enlightening. The book is divided into four parts according to the sections in the world in which the peoples live. Part One is divided into Europe and North America, Part Two is divided into Central and South America. Africa and the South Seas make up the Third Part, and he ends with the Middle East and Asia.

In every one of these sections are fascinating materials for the professional anthropologist and layman alike. The following are a few examples. In the African section there is a chapter entitled "People of the Veil." These are the Tuareg who live in the mountains of the desert and are perhaps traceable to the vandals. They occupy a million and one-half square miles of the Sahara Desert. The men wear veils called Tagilmus which are dark blue or white strips of thin cloth six feet long and eight inches wide. The men never unveil for it would be indecent. In the section on Europe he describes the Sarakatchans, an aboriginal people inhabiting the high mountains on the borders of Greece and Albania. They are organized into small communities which have an autocratic type of government with one head shepherd known as a Tcherlingas. The arrangement, however, is voluntary in that the people have a choice of whom they select to rule them, and if they wish to continue the partnership at its termination. It can certainly be said that they are a nomadic people. It is interesting to note that all the hard work is done by the women.

The book suffers from a few shortcomings. Some of these are academic, some rhetoric, and some matters of composition. As an example of the first, "Though there are only a few hundred yet they are divided into two races, the Saratchans proper who speak Greek; and the Albano Vlachs who speak Vlach" (p. 27). Here the use of the word "race" will be unacceptable to the anthropologist since the author is speaking merely of differences in language. Rhetorically the author's tendency to high praise of the beauty and splendor is often unnecessarily exaggerated. One becomes tired of phrases such as, "none is more interesting and fascinating than that strange and mystifying. . . ." An example of the fault of composition is that, though the illustrations are beneficial, they are not always in the right place. One looks at the facing picture to find it is referring to a chapter ahead or behind the one being read.

All in all this is a book worth reading. It may even lead many explorers and anthropologists to many of the obscure places and peoples in search of fuller knowledge about them.

FRANCIS L.-K. HSU

Northwestern University

BROWNELL, BAKER. *The College and the Community.* Pp. vii, 248. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. $3.50.

This is the second volume resulting from a project in American culture and the community. The project is financed by a foundation and is set up in co-operation with Northwestern University. The first volume by the same author was published in 1950 under the title *The Human Community.*

The subtitle, "A Critical Study of Higher Education," is an apt description of the book and, as the author indicates, many individuals will disagree with the criticisms. They will disagree also, not with the projected remedies, but with the implication that those proposed are the only ones that have promise.

Briefly stated, the criticisms of higher education are twofold: its bigness and its failure to apply the Dewey philosophy to higher education: "liberal education cannot be imposed on students from above. It must grow from the normal pastures of their experience and behavior. It must be an unfolding of inherent tendencies, values, insights and traditions of their native culture."

The author repeats his sociological premise many times, namely, that "human significance and value are created in the small community. . . . In this pattern and only in this pattern does the human being behave as a whole human being in relation to other human beings. He participates here in the values that are called moral, intellectual, spiritual. Only in the true community is human integration possible." Dr. Brownell finds no compensating values in city life.

From this biased point of view he accuses most colleges and universities of contributing to the drain of young people from

the small community to the city. "It has built the city and all that it symbolized in concentrated power and control, and thus has created the instruments of its own destruction."

There are curious inconsistencies in the book. After castigating interdepartmental courses, the author devotes a full and enthusiastic chapter to a description of the course he has directed at Northwestern. After criticizing large classes he states "attendance at these lectures averaged from one to two thousand persons each week."

Few would take exception to his generalizations as to the desirable direction of remedial measures: more integration of subjects, closer relationship of the humanities to life, more social understanding in engineering, more folk art, and greater service of the institution to its own community. But, unhappily, many of these suggestions conclude by admitting he is only citing the remedies and does not propose to indicate the necessary changes.

As a remedy for size, the author is more specific: establishment of community colleges either as branches of the university or as independent institutions; the application of the apprentice system to higher education; greater use of the tutorial system, study groups, round tables, workshops, and the library.

The present writer is as concerned as Dr. Brownell with preserving primary group relationships of the family and the community, but he does not concur in the author's frequently repeated statements that these cannot be preserved in the large city and the large university. Size is one, but by no means the only, criterion of a primary group.

In fact, the great majority of institutions of higher education have for years been developing integrated programs, primary group situations and values, and relationships with their communities, both urban or rural, far beyond the author's proposed remedies.

FRANCIS J. BROWN
American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

REED, THOMAS H., and DORIS D. REED. *Preparing College Men and Women for Politics.* Pp. x, 180. New York: Citizenship Clearing House, Law Center of New York University, 1952. No price.

Preparing College Men and Women for Politics represents the most comprehensive and thorough attempt made to date to deal with the problem of the "transfer" or the lack of "transfer" of academic instruction in political science to the life and behavior of students after they leave college. The current study, financed by the Falk Foundation, should be read in connection with an earlier report by Mr. and Mrs. Reed to the Citizenship Clearing House published in 1950, *Evaluation of Citizenship Training and Incentive in American Colleges and Universities.* These reports together with *Goals of Political Science,* published by a committee of the American Political Science Association, demonstrate that the profession is becoming aware of its deficiencies in the field of teaching and has started to do something to make up for the lack of communications within its own membership concerning the methods and objectives of instruction.

In order to familiarize themselves with the work of American colleges and universities in the field of practical politics the Reeds conducted an extensive correspondence, visited many campuses, interviewed instructors and students, visited classes, and conducted a series of conferences with groups of political scientists in the various parts of the country. The report represents, therefore, a great deal of the common wisdom of many of the best teachers of political science in the country. To simplify and give point to the report the Reeds have concentrated largely on the single problem of the preparation of students for participation in party politics.

What Mr. and Mrs. Reed have to say about current instruction in political science is not always complimentary and, because their conclusions are based on actual interviews with students and observation of classes, is sometimes devastating. Classroom discussion in the introductory courses is described as often little more than the "pooling of its mutual ignorance" by a minor fraction of the class in the passive presence of the others. Concerning the use of graduate students as teachers they comment drily that "no other class of apprentices is allowed to go on perfecting its own mistakes without guidance from superiors."

Altogether the Reeds have assembled a great deal of information about what is now being done to bridge the gap between classroom instruction and active participation in politics, and they make numerous excellent suggestions for the improvement of transferable instruction. What they do not say is that one of the principal reasons for the paucity of the practical results of political science instruction is that there is so little about political science itself, as a discipline, that is related to the making of the kind of world we want to live in. Political science is a recent offshoot of history, and political scientists are never so happy as they are when they describe the past.

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
Wesleyan University

BRAMMELL, P. ROY. *Your Schools and Mine.* Pp. viii, 438. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. $4.50.

For the citizen who has been trying to keep up with changes in his local public schools, but who has had only an occasional look at fractional parts of the schools instead of the whole, I would recommend reading Dean Brammell's book, *Your Schools and Mine.* I would recommend it also, for the college student, whether he plans to be in the profession of education or not, if he intends to take his place in his community in shaping the future of American democracy.

There should be adult study groups in every American community making careful, systematic studies of the relation of free public education to American ideals and values. The fact that such adult education about education is not more extensive has been due, in part, to the scarcity of sound, factual materials easily accessible to the public. Dean Brammell's book brings the findings of many of these scattered materials together and presents them in common sense English, stripped of most of the educational jargon, tables, and footnotes except where these serve the purpose of adding to clarity.

The author relates these findings and experiences of American free public schools of the past and present to the fundamental question of whether the schools can open the doors of maximum development of the individual and at the same time educate the individual to assume his social responsibility. In brief, he presents the facts about education as it is, its strengths and weaknesses, its problems and potentialities, and he gives practical suggestions as to what part the citizen, the school staff, and the student can take in improving their public schools.

The whole range of public school practice, organization, curriculum, guidance, and evaluation is written in meaningful relationship to such problems of the parent and citizen, as well as the professional educator, as the following: What lies behind modern methods of teaching and learning? Who should be educated? What is the reason for objective tests and modern report cards? Why all this stir among educators about counseling? Why do we need buildings that provide facilities for adults as well as children? How much state aid should we seek in school support, and how much should we assume locally? What part can each citizen play in improving public education?

These and many other questions which disturb the adult citizen about his schools are placed in the perspective of cause and effect and their relation to the ideals of American democracy. Stimulating challenges for discussion groups are presented at the end of each chapter and in the final chapter of the book. A good bibliography for each chapter assures possibilities for flexibility and differences of opinion.

No book is complete to any reviewer, and probably not to any author. Much more could have been done in giving the reader some idea of current research in accelerating improvement of public education, based upon the diffusion and dissemination of frontier invention in better schools. The book also falls somewhat short of its excellent standards established in discussing research in teaching-learning relationships and counseling when it comes to dealing with the school and the community. Here the author could have for-

warded these relationships much more than he did by including what is known about measurement of public understanding about education, community factors affecting the quality of education, the relation of education to the economic welfare of the community, and other important developments which the reader should understand.

These, however, are omissions which can be filled in as supplementary study. On the whole, the book is a significant and useful tool for orienting the citizen in making his schools instruments of the maximum development of personality and of shaping a culture of free people.

PAUL L. ESSERT
Columbia University

NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL. *Student Deferment and National Manpower Policy: A Statement of Policy by the Council with Facts and Issues Prepared by the Research Staff.* Pp. x, 102. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. $2.00.

This volume presents a vital and continuing American problem in its today and tomorrow setting. Since we have only 6 per cent of the world's population, how can we best achieve both national security and future welfare? In Part One the National Manpower Council, under a grant from the Ford Foundation, presents a sound and coherent series of recommendations which are of concern both to the specialist in social or political science and to the general public since they involve student deferment, deferment of apprentices, and military manpower policies.

The basic concept is that the broadest possible student deferment policy is important to the nation's future welfare since "security is based on political, moral, and economic strength as well as armed might." The main change in present policy recommended by the Council is the removal of dependency as a ground for deferment lest postponement of service turn into exemption and the democratic principle of universal obligation to serve be flouted.

Part Two of the book, "Facts and Issues of Student Deferment," presents material to supply background for the recommendations. It is really an appendix with material on the student deferment program, the military manpower pool, the selection of students for deferment, financial aspects of student deferment, skilled and specialized personnel, and student deferment and democratic values. Some of this material is interesting and valuable, but the disclaimer of intent to render judgment on the present policy of student deferment is so seriously undercut by the fact that the volume opens with the recommendation of the Council that the reader wonders whether some of the fine rhetorical questions might not have been omitted. The numerous statistical tables present many aspects of the problems facing us in clear and understandable form. In several instances the chapter conclusion in Part Two seems to be a loose expansion of material already presented in Part One.

The study suffers from two defects: Though short, it is repetitious because of its organization; the account of the stages leading to present deferment policy is necessary for the specialist but may confuse the voting citizen for whom it is also intended. Finally, one who has been in communication with individual draft boards about individual students may note that, handsome as the plan is, things do not always proceed according to plan.

FRANCIS R. B. GODOLPHIN
Princeton University

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

HEXTER, J. H. *More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea.* Pp. xii, 171. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952. $3.00.

The author of this interesting little book, the fifth in the Princeton Press's "History of Ideas" series, sets himself the task of showing that those critics are mistaken who have concluded that More's intention in writing the *Utopia* "must remain mysterious" (p. 11). This task Professor Hexter seems to have accomplished. He is able to show, fairly conclusively in this reader's opinion, that much of the seeming obscurity of the *Utopia* vanishes when it is realized that the work falls into two distinct parts. The two parts are: (1) a "Discourse of Utopia" (now Book II), written in the Netherlands, and (2) a "Dialogue of Counsel" (the principal part of Book I), composed in London some months later and in quite different circumstances, after the author's return from the Netherlands. From this it follows that attempts to treat the work as a "unified literary design" have naturally miscarried, and their miscarriage explains the confusion about More's intention. There are in fact "two different and separate sets of intention" (p. 28).

According to Professor Hexter, the "Discourse of Utopia" is intended as an attack on what More took to be the basic evil in human nature—pride. More advocated the abolition of money and of private property because he believed that only by such radical measures could this "disastrous infection of man's soul" be inhibited (p. 76). It follows that "the ideologically motivated scholars" of both "the Left and the Right" are mistaken in their conflicting interpretations of More. He cannot be interpreted as a modern socialist, for he did not find "the ultimate explanation of the evils of his day in the mode of production" (p. 66). Nor can he be fairly understood simply as the "staunch defender of . . . medieval order and liberty . . . against . . . nascent capitalism" (p. 77). He was rather a Christian humanist, who made an acute diagnosis of the economic and social ills of his own day.

The "Dialogue of Counsel," in Professor Hexter's view, grew out of conversations with Erasmus concerning the civic responsibilities of the Christian humanist, and it reflects, without resolving, More's inner debate as he saw the growing imminence of the moment when he himself would have to decide whether or not to enter the King's service.

This is admittedly a book for the specialist, and even here the author modestly disclaims any "brand new insight" (p. 15) and insists that he is merely reviving the view of the *Utopia* held by More's own contemporaries. All of this is true, but the book should have a wider appeal as a useful and ingenious piece of historical analysis and reconstruction.

W. T. JONES
Pomona College

JONES, W. T. *A History of Western Philosophy.* Pp. xviii, 1036, VIII. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952. Text $6.50 in one volume, $8.00 in two volumes; trade $8.75.

The book contains almost one million words. Three main principles guide the writer: (1) concentration upon major figures; (2) extensive quotation from sources (author steers a course between a book of selection and a textbook); and (3) full presentation of cultural background. Philosophy is an integral part of a general culture.

About one third of the book consists of direct quotations. These key passages are bound together by a connective text of comment, criticism, explication, and interpretation. The connective text is well done. The quotations are fitted into it smoothly, and the critical comment is incisive.

Ninety pages are devoted to "Pre-Socratic philosophy." The treatment of the subject matter conforms to the traditional pattern. There is little indication of the fragmentary basis on which the exposition rests. One hundred and fifty pages are given to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. All citations on Socrates are from the *Dialogues of Plato.* The central theme in the discussion of Plato is the theory of forms, and the frequent references to Plato in later discussion are almost exclusively on this central theme. It seems not to have occurred to the author to consider whether a view of Plato as "a man of letters" would have any value. Nor does he seem to have considered whether the dramatic style of the *Dialogues* makes it hazardous to assert that Plato is firmly committed to any given set of "doctrines." The discussion of Aristotle is more general. He gives attention to Aristotle's ethics, politics, art, science, and especially logic. The logic is even presented in five pages of Euler diagrams.

Two hundred and forty pages cover the rise and development of the Christian

Church and its theological doctrines. The first theme of this discussion develops a difference between a "Jesus religion" and a "Pauline religion." The main interest, however, is an extensive discussion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. This is a valuable section in a history of philosophy, especially if there is any significance in Whitehead's statement that "Aristotle was the last great unprejudiced Metaphysician." The end of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Reformation are given a well-considered discussion in nearly 100 pages. Science and scientific method from Leonardo to Galileo are given fifty pages. Attention is centered on Leonardo, Gilbert, Francis Bacon, Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo. It is puzzling that Newton, whose name appears twelve times in the index, is not mentioned in the text except incidentally in connection with a discussion of other men's ideas. The remaining 300-odd pages are given to much the same list of names found in most standard texts with those nearer in time casting proportionally longer shadows.

Mr. Jones has told his story in an interesting style. He avoids jargon. He tells his story in his own words but gives his authors about a third of the space to speak for themselves. Students of special fields—political philosophy, as an example—will find much of interest in his selections and comments.

Mr. Jones has written of philosophy as an element in general culture, but he becomes a "philosopher" in the end. He finds that the "philosophers" have not found *the answers* and feels some necessity for defending them. But how could one expect to find *the answers* if a culture is living and creative? Such a hope indicates a departure from history and a retreat into an academic department. It is out of place at the close of this book.

M. R. GABBERT

University of Pittsburgh

HAYEK, F. A. *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason.* Pp. 255. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952. $4.00.

The melodramatic title of this excellent study is likely to deflect from it many an interested reader. There is very little in it about "counter-revolution," and the word does not even appear in the index. Actually the book contains a series of articles, previously published in learned journals, but expanded and connected for the present purpose. Many will, like the reviewer, welcome their being brought together in this book.

Its central thesis is concerned with what Hayek calls "scientism"—a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed, more especially its application to the social studies. To it is related the "engineering type of mind" when operative in fields to which engineering, properly speaking, cannot be applied. Hayek is much impressed, as has been this reviewer, with the fact that during the hundred or more years that this sort of misapplication has been practiced—and it is still the *haute mode* in contemporary American social studies—it "has contributed scarcely anything to our understanding of social phenomena."

Hayek presents his reflections in three parts—the first dealing with scientism and the study of society, the second with the alleged "counter-revolution," and the third with Comte and Hegel. The second is actually a very penetrating critical assessment of Saint Simon and his school, and including Auguste Comte. His special study on Comte and Hegel undertakes to show that these two thinkers, usually seen in the diamentrically opposed camps of Idealism and Positivism, actually have exercised a joint influence because of their broad agreement on many points. All in all, Hayek would assign to Comte an even more decisive influence in shaping the patterns of thought that are prevalent in contemporary social science, especially in America, *and* in totalitarianism.

The first part traces the central issue of the book from "the influence of the natural sciences on the social sciences" to "engineers and planners." Here one must note Hayek's advanced view of science: "the world in which science is interested is not that of our given concepts or even sensations. Its aim is to produce a new organization of all our experience of the external world. . . ." He has much of value on historicism and "conscious direction," but the hard core of his focus is reached in his critique of planning which he identifies with central economic planning and defines as "nothing but an application of engineering principles to the whole of society based on the assumption that such a complete concentration of all relevant knowledge is possible." He reinforces his case against central economic planning by a brilliant analysis of the engineering mind, its preoccupation with things and their properties, as contrasted with the merchant's awareness of human needs and relations. The argument Hayek presents is sound enough as far as it goes. It seems regrettable however that he appears to have learned nothing from the controversy which his *Road to Serfdom* precipitated with regard to the problems of planning. He pays no attention whatever to the theory and practice of emergent planning within a democratic context of a working constitutional order, as contrasted with the blueprint planning of an authoritarian society against which he rightly protests. Incidentally, it might be remarked that Hayek wrongly assumes that the idea of a fully implemented and stable man-made order is a modern "scientistic" invention. Writers like Machiavelli and Harrington cherished it; medieval thought is full of it, too; in fact, it is one of the most persistent strands of political thought.

The Counter-revolution of Science is a challenging and highly significant book reinforced by over 600 very instructive and illuminating notes. By its very exaggerations it helps to establish its central point: the dangers resulting from the application of natural science methods to the problems of society.

C. J. FRIEDRICH

Harvard University

LEYS, WAYNE A. R. *Ethics for Policy Decisions: The Art of Asking Deliberative Questions.* Pp. xiii, 428. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. $4.75.

The explicit aim of this book by the Dean of Faculties, Roosevelt College, is to exhibit how ethical standards as formulated in philosophical systems of ethics are applicable to issues in public and private life. Its central thesis is that the chief value of these systems resides in the questions they articulate or suggest in forming responsible decisions, rather than in the detailed content of their ethical doctrines.

Part One of the book is therefore a review of ten historically influential philosophical approaches to ethical theory. It contains readable and often entertaining expositions and critiques of utilitarianism, casuistic ethics, Platonic idealism, Kantian rigorism, Stoicism, Aristotelian moderation, the psychological ethical doctrines of Hobbes and Butler, Hegelian and Marxian historical and institutional analysis, instrumentalism, and the liguistic or semantic standpoint on ethical philosophy; and it concludes with a list of questions that are supposedly the distillation of whatever is pertinent to policy decision in these various approaches.

Part Two is a survey of nine fairly recent but controversial cases of policy making, and includes discussions of the Chicago and Pasadena school issues, the Ward and Sears decisions on their conduct of business enterprise, the Kings River and Tennessee Valley developments, and the problem of the partition of postwar Germany. Dr. Leys tries to show that while not every one of the above ethical systems is relevant to each of the cases examined, good judgment in policy matters can profit from the "organizing ideas of philosophers," since these ideas complement in essential ways "the fact-hugging insights of the practioners." He believes that wisdom in making choices consists in being aware of the kind of consideration that should influence judgment; and he argues that if there is a logic of practical judgment, it is the logic of raising the right sort of questions.

The conception underlying this book is eminently sane and stimulating; and despite some limitations in execution, it supplies much genuine illumination on the role of theoretical ethical analyses in the settlement of complex practical issues. However, Mr. Leys's expositions of philosophic systems are sometimes, and perhaps inevitably, superficial; and though he attempts to deal fairly with all positions, he

seems to this reader to go out of his way occasionally—as in the case of pragmatism—in directing criticisms against what are surely less responsible statements and applications of doctrine. There is also not infrequently a moralistic overtone in his comments, possibly a consequence of his desire to show the immediate practical worth of ethical theorizing. And finally, the discussions of the nine concrete instances of policy making are handicapped by the fact that they serve merely as *illustrations* for the author's general thesis, rather than as genuinely *problematic material* for the institution of ethical analysis.

ERNEST NAGEL

Columbia University

MEAD, HUNTER. *An Introduction to Aesthetics.* Pp. vii, 307. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. $4.00.

For reasons that are made clear in Professor Mead's book, aesthetics has a special place of its own in the philosophical disciplines of today. Although aesthetic speculation dates back to the period of classic antiquity, and the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed much writing and thinking in the general field, aesthetics as it is now understood is a peculiarly modern manifestation. If one reason for this is perhaps suggested by Professor Mead's opening sentence—"He who tries to reason about love only loses his reason"—it is that even such a subjective experience as that of aesthetic value must be brought to the test of objective analysis and speculation in our time.

The three general divisions of *An Introduction to Aesthetics*—Aesthetic Experience, Aesthetic Value, and Philosophies of Art—are a clear and logically developed presentation of the author's reasoning in arriving at his basic definition of the aesthetic experience—that it is "a pleasurable absorption in the perceptual aspects of phenomena." Intended for use primarily as a textbook, the volume is written simply and directly, with adequate definition of the inevitably subjective terms and expressions and a constructively critical presentation of the most generally encountered theories and/or misconceptions of the nature of the aesthetic experience. A selected bibliography lists outstanding writings in the field with particular emphasis on recent works.

Although the author presents the result of his thinking as a general discussion of the aesthetic problem, his examples are largely chosen from the field of painting. His qualified but nonetheless ever-present thesis that appreciation of "formal values" must be the foundation of aesthetic experience is, of course, demonstrable with peculiar aptness in the pictorial expression of modern times, and the discussion of this aspect of contemporary aesthetic principles is among the most enlightening features of the book. However, to this reviewer at least it seems that the thesis developed by Professor Mead on pages 44–45 in distinguishing between what he terms conceptual and perceptual reactions to art objects is somewhat too exclusive. Surely there is more than one road to Parnassus.

DAVID M. ROBB

University of Pennsylvania

JURJI, EDWARD J. *The Christian Interpretation of Religion.* Pp. 318. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $4.50.

This book consists of, essentially, two things: an affirmation of the principles of Christianity professedly based on faith; and a description of some of the world's great religions. This description is, as would appear to be proper in a scholarly treatment, a description which would be little changed, presumably, if given by a scholar who professed any religion outside the Christian pale. The description, moreover, gives the setting of the respective religions in historical perspective and in relation to personalities, culture, and contacts. It is from this approach that we read about the religions of Egypt, Babylonia, the Old Testament Jews, their precursors in Palestine and Syria, as well as Confucianism, Taoism, Shinto, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Mohammedanism. In one brief paragraph the author mentions the indebtedness of the New Testament to Judaism (p. 237); and on the following page he states that "the New Testament is not only free from traceable Gentile religious influence but also independent from the Jewish tradition, though fulfilling the promises of Israel."

The tone and tenor of the book is a far remove from what is sometimes called the "Chicago" theological approach. The chapter entitled "The Making and Dynamism of Christianity," for example, abandons the historical point of view from which other religions are described and is, to use theological terminology, dogmatic; that is, it asserts the superiority of Christianity because it was founded by Jesus. As for "The Responsibility of Christianity," as the concluding chapter is called, "it is . . . on the issue of ontology—that is, of man's total being, destiny, and place in the universe—that Christianity is moved to fix its gaze." The book is scholarly; but it can scarcely be said to make a scholarly appeal. It would be interesting to see as a supplement to *The Christian Interpretation of Religion* a book on *The Christian Interpretations of Religion.*

WILSON D. WALLIS

University of Minnesota

SMITH, HOMER W. *Man and His Gods.* Pp. x, 501. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952. $5.00.

"Man stands among the ruins left from some five millenniums of civilization, surrounded by shattered hopes and burned-out creeds where once were impregnable faith and assured belief, asking himself again, What is his place in Nature?" The constant reshaping of the answers and their influence in reshaping life in historical sequence and in cumulative impact form the meat of this challenging book. Its reason and manner are best explained by a little book within the book—the last chapter entitled "The Story of This Book": "I went back to the Beginning. I wrestled, in my own terms, with the Meaning of Things. I took a sharp scalpel and took the wrappings off life and took a close look at its insides." And this the author proceeds to do with candor, for he writes like a poet, he perceives like a historian, and he dissects like the physiologist he is. Add to this a distinctive talent for perspective, utmost sincerity, and courage, and you have a mixture of subject and presentation that makes for an important contribution, regardless of the reader's personal dogmas and prejudices in the field.

The book is provocative to thought, to the very deepest conscience of man, for—in the words of Albert Einstein's pithy Foreword—". . . man's fear-induced animistic and mythic ideas with all their far-flung transformations and interrelations . . . the impact of these phantasmagorias on human destiny and the casual relationships by which they have become crystallized into organized religion" have frequently limited man's physical and intellectual freedom and caused "boundless suffering."

Once again we come to grips with many cultures and their contributions in the form of talismanic righteousness (Egyptian), the one and only eternal Yahweh (Hebrew), the absoluteness of good and evil (Persian), the immortality of the soul (Socratean), the perfectiveness of the spirit (Platonic), Satan (Babylonian), and the later threading together of all of these (Augustinian). We sense the finality of the crumbled splendor of dynasties built on the more or less voluntary acceptance of frauds and blunders and tales and fearborn superstitions.

One might object here to a recurrent oversimplification (as it is attacked in the historicity of Jesus) or a partisanship for ideas, but Smith knows what he is talking about historically, and he enjoys talking about it, so that his ideas become quite infectious. And being sarcastic and caustic in spots is even acceptable when he takes the bottom out of many pet ideas; he does it so effectively surgically. His question persists: Why do many of the errors of a prehistoric age and the terrors of a prescientific age continue to plague us?

That such re-evaluation is not new is proved by the bulk of the book, a treasure chest of literary look-see into the functions and ideas of men at all times, at all levels. As in political arrangements of our own day, Strabo many centuries ago asked for the use of fairy-tales and hocus-pocus to lead "promiscuous vulgarians to piety and holiness and faith." As to love, law, and morality—there is a story so twisted and changeable that even in this enlight-

ened age there are those who would believe with Chrysostom that woman is "a necessary evil, a natural temptation, a desirable calamity, a domestic peril, a deadly fascination, and a painted ill." Montaigne suggested long ago that the "supreme purpose of human learning (is) . . . to teach us how to live happily rather than how to die safely." Opines Professor Smith, this may be a "brilliant period for the human intellect but with promises unfulfilled, aborted because that intellect was too immature for its promises to complete gestation. . . . He [man] alone can choose, out of his vision of the present and the past, his future course."

BORIS ERICH NELSON
Hampton Institute

MCKENZIE, JOHN G. *Nervous Disorders and Religion: A Study of Souls in the Making.* Pp. 183. London: George Allen and Unwin (distributed in the U. S. by The Macmillan Company), 1952. $2.25.

This small book contains the Tate Lectures essentially as given at Manchester College, Oxford in 1947 and repeated on two other occasions. The style is easy flowing, as would be expected from a spoken statement. Footnotes are present to give support to significant statements, but the book carries none of the pedantic textbook style.

The author starts with the statement that man's personality grows out of his response to his basic needs. These needs are both biological, such as the needs for sustenance, for shelter, and to reproduce his kind; and social needs, such as the needs for affection, for status, and for a moral and rational unity. The way in which the individual responds to these needs must be woven into a harmonious whole both in its inner and its outer relations. He states that wherever there is inner conflict between the tendencies, there we have the basis for a personality difficulty.

Mr. McKenzie is not a cultural relativist, assuming that personality is the product merely of an interplay between these needs and the social environment, but rather that "the individual is always the chief agent of his own destiny" (p. 64). He compares his own position with that of Rivers in, "the assumption of Rivers is that the environment is the vital thing; whereas I should say that the reaction of the individual is the deciding factor" (p. 67). This lays the foundation for his contention that "the ultimate cause of the kind of personality failure which leads to nervous disorders and maladjustments lies in the inability of the self to canalize its energy, thought, and emotions along the line of self-chosen ends, or its inability to integrate its childhood experience with more mature experience" (pp. 68–69). This is not to say that the author deprecates all emphasis on the importance of environment, but rather that the environment does not determine. It is the individual living in that environment who determines. This individual may have a weak will or a strong will, he may choose an efficient way to answer his need, or if he has been unduly thwarted, choose some perverted way. His point is that it is the individual who does the choosing.

All this leads up to his lecture on "Spiritual Healing." The problem here is the same as in any other method of psychotherapy, namely to get the person's wants and needs to coincide. After comparing and contrasting his position with that of Freud, Adler, Jung, Flugel, Rivers, Horney, Fromm, and others, he states that spiritual healing deals with the same kind of difficulties that other modes of psychotherapy do. The difference is that in "practically all spiritual healing there is the assumption that power can come to the individual from sources outside himself, and that he can by prayer, the sacraments and spiritual devotions increase his capacity to receive that power" (p. 122). He does not tell us how to get at this power other than to indicate that it is available only to those who have faith in it. However, he does warn the psychotherapist that he must not rely on this "power" alone, but rather he must accompany this by and base it on some knowledge of why and how the self has failed to unify its own dynamic elements. Nor does he contend that spiritual healing can cure a person of all kinds and sorts of disease, including the replacing of degenerated tissue. Rather he would limit its use to psychosomatic and functionally neurotic disorders. He speaks rather harshly against the indiscriminate resort to faith, prayer, and the laying-on of hands. "Religious helps can be used only along with all the knowledge we can have of the disease both physical and mental. They are a means of aiding, not a substitute for the means open to our hands" (p. 137).

This is the kind of a book that a person who is interested in reading a well balanced, cautious, yet clear statement as to what is encompassed in spiritual healing would do well to read carefully. It will neither convince nor offend those who basically disagree with the author, but it will clear the atmosphere. For those who tend to agree with the value of spiritual forces, it will clarify the relationship between spiritual healing and other forms, or emphases, in psychotherapy.

CARL A. NISSEN
Ohio State University

BLANSHARD, PAUL. *My Catholic Critics.* Pp. 53. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. 50 cents.

Three and a half years ago, Paul Blanshard struck hard at what he conceived to be a serious threat to democracy by publishing his book, *American Freedom and Catholic Power.* On March 21 of this year a blow intended to be a haymaker was sent his way by James M. O'Neill, who on that day published his *Catholicism and American Freedom* (New York: Harper & Brothers). Now Mr. Blanshard, in a small but solid work of rebuttal, gives evidence that he is by no means ready to be counted out, and alleges that most of the counterblows he has received—from Mr. O'Neill and others—have been low ones.

At the heart of the argument between Mr. O'Neill and Mr. Blanshard is a dispute over authorities. Mr. Blanshard denies that his charges can be refuted, as Mr. O'Neill attempts to do, by citing "professional Catholic sources, published under Imprimatur, written by American Catholics anxious to reconcile their love of independence with papal power." He points out that Mr. O'Neill frequently cites "liberal" statements from Catholic theologians of lesser rank (or even laymen) to distract attention from "reactionary" statements by popes and other top leaders of the hierarchy as cited in *American Freedom and Catholic Power.* For example, Mr. Blanshard notes that "On page 89 Mr. O'Neill quotes at length from Father John Courtney Murray on *Governmental Repression of Heresy,*" but ignores the fact that Father Murray's "liberal" position has been repudiated by Father Francis J. Connell, who outranks him, and by high Jesuit leaders in Rome. (As if to give added force to Mr. Blanshard's point, the editor of Catholic University's *American Ecclesiastical Review* in its June issue criticizes Mr. O'Neill's book for having "seriously misrepresented the Church's power of jurisdiction" in his effort to refute Mr. Blanshard.)

Mr. Blanshard's booklet, in addition to 40 pages concerning Mr. O'Neill, contains the text of "Father Connell and the Scholarship of Paul Blanshard," an article by Mr. Blanshard reprinted from the *Cornell Law Quarterly* of the Winter of 1951, and the text of a letter submitted by Mr. Blanshard for publication in the *New York Times Book Review,* but rejected by the review editor. This rejected letter and also Mr. Blanshard's revelation at the beginning of his booklet of the reasons for Harper's six-month delay in publishing Mr. O'Neill's book furnish real food for thought for those who are concerned with newspaper and publishing ethics. Ethical questions are also raised by Mr. Blanshard's remarks (pages 26 and 27) concerning Everett R. Clinchy of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, whom he accuses of misrepresentations as "bald" as those of Mr. O'Neill.

This is more than a conflict between Catholic and non-Catholic leaders—it involves issues which cut across denominational and political lines. Thoughtful Americans will continue to follow the running controversy between Blanshard and his critics in spite of the tedium of seemingly endless charges and countercharges.

STANLEY LICHTENSTEIN
Washington, D. C.

SCHILPP, PAUL ARTHUR (Ed.). *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.* Pp. xviii, 883. New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1952. $7.50.

This monumental volume, a veritable encyclopedia of philosophy, released on June 15, 1952, is the eighth of a series which, since 1939, has dealt with living philosophers. It deserves and will receive immediate attention for its timeliness and its thorough contents. Its huge proportions include: 77 pages of Fragments of a Confession by Radhakrishnan himself, sketching his own philosophic career, 700 pages of comment and criticism of his work by twenty-three distinguished writers (nine Eastern and fourteen Western), 20 pages of bibliography of Radhakrishnan's writings since 1908 (amounting to over 7,000 pages!), and 53 pages of his Reply to Critics.

His Reply assembles his own criticisms and restates his philosophy under the four heads of Metaphysics, Religion, History of Philosophy, and Ethical, Social and Political Philosophy—and is a thorough job, for he had at hand the writings of his critics, not only what they said of him, but also what they had written otherwise in the philosophic field. Any reader of the volume here and now reviewed quite inadequately for want of space, for one thing, may assume at once that rich returns will reward his thorough reading. He will encounter every element rightly falling within the scope of a comprehensive view of human thought as it has dealt with men's affairs of late in our troubled world. The sources are mostly English, of which Radhakrishnan is a master—although, of course, he has command of other tongues, including Sanskrit and Indian vernaculars. He is virtually a product of long and thorough English education, although he is at heart a "proud Hindu," as he says.

Indeed, the key to thorough comprehension by us of his system of philosophy is that he is Hindu and as such he meets his critics, the westerners, especially, who often fail to catch the Hindu point of view bred of five thousand years of religious and philosophic history (*cf.* p. 669). Hinduism has had no formal or official creed, and it has the dynamic character of utter freedom to incorporate within itself, let us say in terms of monistic idealism, or, perhaps, the Absolute, the divergent manifestations and expositions of the One (*cf.* p. 497). Radhakrishnan is consistent in his resolution of the "world" (*cf.* p. 104) into metaphysical, historical, moral, political and religious Unity. It need surprize no one that he makes Buddhism accept the Upanishads (*cf.* p. 572), that all dualisms and contradictions are resolved into "undifferentiated immediacy," the same in all objects and subjects (*cf.* p. 647). His philosophy is a "sustained attempt to understand the universe as a whole" (p. 789), and for him everything "converges and culminates in Spirit." To this reviewer, however, it all amounts at last to a certain measure of inertia, tolerance, and accommodation—in short, pure Idealism. But there are in the volume penetrating comments on matters of pressing interest and concern, including culture, society, politics and the state (see, for example, pp. 829–837, in the light of his ambassadorship to the U.S.S.R.).

JOHN CLARK ARCHER
Yale University

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

BAILEY, SYDNEY D. (Ed.). *Political Parties and the Party System in Britain: A Symposium.* "The Hansard Society Series in Parliamentary Government," Vol. V. Pp. xii, 211. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. $3.50.

At a time when some people in the United States express the fear that Great Britain is turning toward socialism and away from our kind of a free society this little volume comes as a strong corrective.

The editor of the book has drawn together well-known writers to present a symposium on British party life. He has been very skilful in getting articles that fit a plan, so that there is an evident unity to the volume. He opens with a section on the evolution of parties, continues with an exposition of the three major parties of modern years and of minor parties and independents. His third section is a series of essays upon problems of party life such as party organization, finance, formulation of policy, mandate from the people and party personnel. He closes with a chapter of reflections on party life by Sir Ernest Barker and with a very well chosen bibliography. All of this is done in the scope of two hundred pages.

As a nonpartisan review of partisan politics the symposium leaves one with a feeling of satisfaction about Great Britain. There is certainly portrayed here the free political society that is worth understanding. Each of the major parties—the Conservative, the Labour, and the Liberal—has its history succinctly but well told and its principles and philosophy briefly expounded. Because each is done by a sympathetic writer, and well done, it is very convincing. Almost one is persuaded to value the long established bases of British society and to join in his thought the Conservative Party when Kenneth Pickthorn is being read. There are moral values in maintaining the fundamental freedoms.

But after reading G. D. H. Cole and Francis Williams on the Labour Party and finding one's self faced with moral man and not economic man only, with an idea of rewards based upon social values and a sense of community, and with human rights similar to those expressed in the Declaration of Independence being emphasized, one wonders whether he might not go along with Labour. Francis Williams does well to distinguish between post-war policies based upon necessity and policies that are true to Labour theory.

And then one reads Dingle Foot's exposition of the Liberal Party with its emphasis upon freedom of enterprise and its interest in the status of the worker as encouraged by co-operative ownership programs and of consumer welfare as promoted in government development of natural resources, and he wishes that the Liberal Party had more strength. The function of criticism as illustrated by both major and minor parties—and also by independents—is given proper emphasis.

In Ernest Barker's closing chapter of observations one gets the idea that perhaps the parties are losing their appeals in terms of principles and are more and more reflecting the economic and social segments of British society. "We seem to be drifting," he says, "into a state of division between the town and the country mouse; and there is peril in that division" (p. 200). To the reader this is another evidence that parties are still in flux, that society in Britain is still free to express itself politically in manifold ways, and that the British are working, just as we are in the United States, to establish a sound basis for political democracy as a protection for a free society. This symposium gives one full opportunity to form his own judgment.

W. HENRY COOKE
The Claremont Graduate School

SLAVIC COUNTRIES

STOWE, LELAND. *Conquest by Terror: The Story of Satellite Europe.* Pp. xv, 300. New York: Random House, 1952. $3.50.

Academically, Stowe's book suffers from a meager documentation and from its efforts to give the impression that the material it covers is unavailable in English publications. (As a matter of fact, the September 1950 issue of THE ANNALS covering the same area has a table of contents which closely resembles Stowe's.) But, on the "popular side," Stowe has done a magnificent job. His book has the distinction, in fact, of being the most able journalistic presentation of the transformation of Satellite Europe into a Soviet colony.

Stowe summarizes ably the revealing statistics of Soviet progress among Moscow's six puppet states and Eastern Germany: 1 million slave camp prisoners, some 15 million trained soldiers, more than 2 million men in security and other internal armed forces, 18 million farmers and their families (who are now being sucked into Soviet machinery), and more than 15 million industrial workers who are helping to transform the region into a military base for future Soviet aggression. The over-all

picture contains interesting details on secret police, how satellite civilians are trained for war, the use of food as a weapon, the utilization of education and religion, and the "Russianization" of foreign cultures.

The constant exhortations of Stowe about the Soviet menace might antagonize those inclined to view the burning problems of the day more "academically" than he does. But the fact remains that no liberal can continue apologizing for the Soviet system in satellite Europe after reading this popularized account of what is happening to the "shatter zone" of Europe.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

VOGELER, ROBERT A., with LEIGH WHITE. *I Was Stalin's Prisoner*. Pp. 314. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952. $3.75.

Even if this book were only—as it is advertised—"the complete Vogeler story," it would belong with the most valuable contributions to understanding conditions of life and human fate in the satellite countries. But Mr. Vogeler's book tells us much more than a personal story.

After Mr. Vogeler had "confessed" everything invented about him and his activities by his persecutors, and a few days before his trial, he got the following warning from one of the investigators:

"Your entire future will be determined by your behavior at the trial. If you fail to answer the president's questions in the proper spirit, you will be removed from the courtroom and taken to a special hospital. There you will be given treatment that will make you happy to come back and answer the president's questions. But it will also make you a cripple for life." There was no escape.

In Mr. Vogeler's book the so much discussed question, Why they confess, gets a definitive answer. What the author tells about his experiences—and he does it with remarkable precision—makes it perfectly clear that for "Stalin's prisoners" there simply does not exist any possibility of not confessing. The modern inquisition has elaborated an infinite variety of methods to extort "confessions": from a refined psychological pressure to physical tortures of sheer unimaginable cruelty. Mr. Vogeler describes how the prisoners are given occasion to learn, sometimes even to see, which new methods they may expect if they do not give up their resistance. Sooner or later they give up.

After completing the story of his own ordeal, Vogeler adds some chapters about the cases of Oatis and of four American flyers. No less than with his personal tragedy he is concerned with the tragic situation of his country as revealed by his own and other cases. In the concluding chapter he writes: "I was not the first American to be imprisoned by Stalin, and, unless we change our tactics, Oatis, I fear, will not be the last." Mr. Vogeler is convinced that this country has efficient means to defend its citizens. He mentions, for instance, an ultimatum reinforced by a demonstration of American air power. The most common objection against such strong methods is that they involve the risk of open war. This objection can hardly be considered a realistic one. More pertinent and convincing appears to be Mr. Vogeler's observation that "just as we won't go to war with Russia to prevent the unlawful imprisonment of a lone American, neither will Russia go to war to keep him in prison."

GEORGE DENICKE
Washington, D. C.

HALECKI, OSCAR. *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe*. Pp. xvi, 503. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. $6.00.

This is a distinctly second-rate book written by a first-rate historian. One of the principal drawbacks of Professor Halecki's new work is its overambitious geographic and political scope. To this reviewer it seems an almost impossible enterprise to cover adequately the entire sweep of historic development of a vast European "middle zone" in a volume of about 500 pages.

Thus *Borderlands of Western Civilization* is in reality a strange and uneven compound mixture. Its first 356 pages offer a detailed and authoritative history of the Slavic nuclei of Eastern Europe—Bohemia and Poland—and of the adjoining Danubian countries—Austria and Hungary. The last 120 pages, on the other hand, contain little more than a superficial and hesitant review of the major political developments since World War I. The last chapter of the book, "Stalin's Peace," is particularly disappointing in its strangely simplified once-over coverage of all of Eastern Europe's history "from Nazi Occupation to Soviet 'Liberation.'" With the mushrooming new literature on Iron-Curtain Europe, spurred on particularly by such recent British contributions as Hugh Seton Watson's *The East European Revolution* (London, 1950), it seems unwise to retrace well-covered ground in a brief, and necessarily superficial, chapter.

Dr. Halecki, Professor of Eastern European History at Fordham University, is at his professional best in the comprehensive review of the history of Poland, particularly throughout the phases covering the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The scholarly and succinct survey of these crucial decades dramatically stresses the almost innumerable "quasi-permanent opportunities for interfering with Poland's internal problems" (p. 237), which were so eagerly seized upon by Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia. The author's analysis of the successive waves of imperialist conquest of Poland by foreign powers effectively sets the stage for an understanding of the Soviet Union's present, iron-fisted control over this prominent "Borderland of Western Civilization."

The reviewer is impressed by Professor Halecki's ability to grasp and present complex historic phenomena in an alert and frequently lively style. To re-emphasize an earlier point, the major liability of this work appears to be its overly ambitious scope combining two separate books under one cover. The faults of the second practically overshadow the merits of the first. However, advanced students of Eastern European politics and government should acknowledge the author's accomplishment in presenting a comprehensive coverage of East Central European historic developments. The bibliography of the book, although limited to works in English, French, and German, is thorough and will prove to be a useful instrument in encouraging further study in this complicated field.

ANDREW GYORGY
Yale University

OSTOVIĆ, P. D. *The Truth About Yugoslavia*. Pp. xxiii, 300. New York: Roy Publishers, 1952. $3.50.

The sensational title of the book will disappoint the reader, for there is nothing "sensational" in *The Truth About Yugoslavia*. The author has tried to strengthen his presentation by having a very good introduction prepared by Ivan Meštrović, one of the greatest living sculptors of our times.

In a nut shell, Ostović presents the Croat viewpoint on Yugoslavia's royal regime and puts his finger on the "small ruling clique of Serbians" who ruled the Kingdom of Yugoslavia under King Alexander. In Part II, "The Birth of the Second Yugoslavia," Ostović tends to favor Tito rather than Mikhailovich. In no respect, however, is the chapter an expression of a thorough and exhaustive research of the material which has become available recently. (Incidentally, the author uses an esoteric method of documentation which will irritate even those not scholarly minded —for example, see page 207, footnote 15.) The concluding section of the work suggests that Tito's regime presents "no visible alternative" (p. 295), especially since the emigré leaders of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Albanians, and Hungarians cannot "agree on a constructive plan" which would also keep Yugoslavia together. Ten documents pertaining to the problems of Yugoslavia's history between 1915 and 1934 are appended together with four well-drawn maps.

If anything, the publication is an emotional presentation of "how much real and sincere idealism the Croats contributed to the foundation of Yugoslavia and how broadmindedly they conceived the union and worked for its realization over a period of a hundred years"—as expressed in Meštrović's Introduction (p. xiv).

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

GALANTIÈRE, LEWIS (Ed.). *America and the Mind of Europe*. Pp. 125. New York: Library Publishers, 1952. $2.75.

The theme of this little book is one of the most important that can be conceived at this moment. For there is raging a war for the mind of Europe, as well as for its material resources. And in that war, as M. Galantière and M. Raymond Aron rightly insist, there is no guarantee that the United States is winning. The Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and all the apparatus of political and economic co-operation may come to nothing if the European mind is poisoned against America or even left in what is now a too common state of indifference between the two great power centers, Moscow and Washington.

That millions of Europeans should profess and, in many cases, genuinely profess a "plague on both your houses" attitude, naturally surprises and distresses the well-meaning and inexperienced American, voter, congressman, soldier. The reasons for this attitude are acutely analyzed by M. Aron who combines understanding for the attitude with intellectual contempt for its pretensions. There is a determined refusal to face the facts about America and an equally determined resolution to pretend that the Russian and American "menaces" to the old culture of Europe are much the same thing; indeed, the "trahison des clercs" is more manifest in this than in any other of the European attitudes of refusal.

The plan of the book calls for comments on the general alienation of the European intellectual leaders both by countries and by subjects. Germany, France, music, literature—are all dealt with with varying degrees of thoroughness, and there is a very able, informative, and depressing general survey by Mr. Melvin J. Lasky, editor of *Der Monat*. Some of the contributions, like Mr. Stephen Spender's, have, for all their interest, little to do with the subject, and it is a pity that there is no chapter dealing with the problem in its specifically English setting. It is also a pity that the interesting article on "tourism" ignores the fact that the representative American in Europe for the past ten years has been not the tourist but the soldier, so that the opinion of Sweden matters much less than that of the countries which had and have the G.I. among them. But despite the possibly inevitable limitations of a symposium, the *Saturday Review of Literature* deserves thanks for arranging the series, and the articles are even more welcome in book form.

D. W. BROGAN
Cambridge University

EINAUDI, MARIO, and FRANÇOIS GOGUEL. *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*. Pp. x, 229. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952. $4.00.

When two specialists so well qualified as Professors Einaudi and Goguel combine their talents, the result is likely to be a volume well worth reading. This book lives up to its promise; it is the best brief survey in English of a vital political movement whose most interesting manifestations are found in France and Italy. An earlier volume in the same series examined the French and Italian Communist parties. It is to be hoped that others will follow.

Dr. Einaudi's brief but cogent essay on Italian Christian Democracy reveals a deep sympathy for the movement, yet at the same time a willingness to criticize its faults and its limitations. He regrets the fact that the postwar party has lost some of the autonomy and some of the vigorous, far-sighted realism of Luigi Sturzo's prewar Popular Party. This is not because De Gasperi fails to realize that "in the long run, a firm show of autonomy vis-à-vis the Church is essential" for any Italian party. Rather, it is because the Mussolini era left postwar Christian Democracy "mortgaged" to the hierarchy and especially to Catholic Action. Dr. Einaudi is concerned at the possibility that Catholic Action leaders like Luigi Gedda may force their program of "authoritative democracy" upon the party, or may create a rival Catholic party to do the job. Either prospect strikes him as disastrous. His sympathies do not lie with the voluble left-wing faction in the party; but he does hold that Christian Democracy must be socially progressive and must "understand the requirements of a modern state" if democratic government is to survive in Italy.

French Christian Democracy is analyzed by François Goguel who, although a Protestant, also has close ties of sympathy with his subject. His lucid essay examines the background of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), its doctrines, its leadership, its tactics, and its achievements since 1944. In general, M. Goguel justifies the major decisions which the MRP has made at critical moments, and implies that if such a party had not existed in postwar France, democracy might not have survived. His case, I think, is sound. It is a bit surprising, however, to find no mention at all of the MRP's relationship (or lack of it) with the Church hierarchy or with such groups as Catholic Action. Nor is there any reference to such Catholic youth movements as the JOC and the JAC, which have fed so many members into the MRP. I should have wished also that M. Goguel, whose knowledge of French political sociology is unsurpassed, might have given us a clearer picture of the MRP's social base now that the party's conservative hitchhikers have gone over to De Gaulle. M. Goguel seems to suggest that the MRP has held its strength best in the industrialized departments—in what is sometimes called "dynamic France" (pp. 185–187). Some prominent MRP officials believe, on the other hand, that the party is becoming "ruralized," and that its hold seems to be greater in "static France." The MRP's future course may depend in part upon the character of its electoral support.

I for one regret that this volume does not contain a brief introductory essay comparing and contrasting Christian Democracy in its French and Italian forms. It is also regrettable that the translation of M. Goguel's section is overliteral and somewhat wooden. But these are minor reservations. On the whole, the book is a first-rate contribution to our knowledge of Western European politics.

GORDON WRIGHT
University of Oregon

ORWELL, GEORGE. *Homage to Catalonia*. With an introduction by Lionel Trilling. Pp. xxiii, 232. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952. $3.50.

The English edition of Orwell's moving and vivid account of his experiences as a volunteer for Republican Spain attracted little attention in 1938. The book was not published in America (and considering the mass of shoddy material on the Spanish Civil War printed here, that is saying a great deal). As in so many of the things he wrote, Orwell was swimming against the vulgarly obvious current of history.

Perhaps for that reason, fourteen years later, the first American edition of *Homage to Catalonia* is still of importance.

When Orwell went to Spain, he was favorably impressed by the Communists. Mere chance enlisted him in the militia of the P.O.U.M., an anti-Stalinist Marxist group, rather than in a Communist-controlled unit. But Orwell was both intelligent and honorable: he did not have to engage personally in mental prostitution, treachery to his friends, and treason to his country before he recognized dirty-dealing. He was, as Lionel Trilling points out in his fine introduction, a man of virtue. Thus the book has none of the frantic self-accusation, paranoid egotism, flight from reason, and inside-out authoritarianism of the typical "convert" literature, which makes so much of that genre so repellent. It is a straightforward, manly account with none of the trappings of the reformed drunkard. And like anything Orwell has put his hand to, it is superbly written.

In Spain, Orwell found Communist influence approaching dominance. Thanks to the arms embargo policy of the democracies, Russia was the important source of military materiel. Russia was quite willing to choke off the hope of Republican victory, rather than allow arms to go to "unreliable" commands.

The Communist slogans were conservative: stop revolution, join with middle class groups, win the war—on paper, they were appealing. But they also meant violent suppression of the radical Anarchists and Left Socialists, and a world campaign of lying and slander. (As the Republican

Minister of the Interior said in a notable understatement, "We have received aid from Russia and have had to permit certain actions which we did not like.")

In a few months, Orwell left Spain, a fugitive suspected of "Trotskyite-Fascism," with many of his friends dead or imprisoned. He had seen the leading Idealists of our era putting the techniques of Ends-before-Means into action, and he was reaffirmed in his hope in the decent materialism of ordinary men. Most of his later, more important writings are variations upon this theme.

The political aspects of the book should not overshadow the aesthetic. At least half of the chapters are brilliantly readable accounts of the rather primitive warfare of 1937 Spain, of the people of Catalonia, to whom the book pays homage.

HUGH J. PARRY

Heidelberg, Germany

OTHERS

SWEARINGEN, RODGER, and PAUL LANGER. *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919–1951.* Pp. xii, 276. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. $5.00.

Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, in his introduction to this study of the Communist movement in Japan, well points out the significance of the subject. Asia is the great area for maneuver in the world struggle between Communism and democracy. In this area, Japan holds a key position, not only because of its obvious power, but because its large urban proletariat population makes it the Asiatic country which above all others, according to doctrinaire Communists, should logically be Communist. Japanese Communism closely parallels Western Communism while affording special insight into the situation in Asia. Japan therefore comes close to being a "median land" in the study of a typical Communist movement.

The authors, Messrs. Swearingen and Langer, have done justice to their significant subject. They have made full use of their unusual linguistic skill, academic training, experience in military intelligence, and wide contacts in Japan to analyze competently the flood of party literature, reminiscences of Japanese Communist leaders both active and apostate, formerly secret police records, and other materials which have recently become available.

The first third of the book which deals with the prewar and wartime periods, while full of fascinating revelations to the student of Japanese history, reads somewhat like a concentrated chronicle. Space limitations, no doubt, prevented the integration of the story of the Communist movement more fully with the general history of Japan.

There can be little complaint, however, about the remainder of the book which deals with the spectacular resurgence of the Communist movement under the peculiar conditions prevailing in postwar Japan. The organization, program, strategy and tactics, leadership, factionalism, international connections, and domestic repercussions are all exposed so systematically and skillfully as to be thoroughly elucidating.

There are a very few factual slips, such as the identification of Hatoyama as a leader of the Progressive instead of the Liberal party. One might wish for more adequate explanations of such intriguing matters as the apostasy of men like Sano, the personality incompatibility between Tokuda and Nozaka despite their agreement on policy, and the recurrence of systematic violence even during the period of the "lovable party." But this would be asking for definitiveness and perfection in a pioneer work.

The authors have succeeded admirably in showing how the kaleidoscopic Communist maneuvers amid the confusion of postwar Japan fit into a definite pattern of international Communist intrigue. Despite the moderate and objective tone of the book, it conveys disquieting implications of the impact of the conflicting ideologies of the West upon an Orient in ferment.

KAZUO KAWAI

Ohio State University

Defense of Freedom. By the former Editors of *La Prensa.* Pp. 315. New York: The John Day Company, 1952. $4.00.

If there were an award for loyalty and endurance—and incidentally one for understatement!—the editors of the now eclipsed Argentine newspaper *La Prensa,* who also authored this book, would receive both without competition, for this is the story of the rape and murder of this venerable and great Spanish newspaper of Buenos Aires. It is much more sanguinary than the scattered accounts in our own newspapers permitted one to surmise. I am assured that officially we activated ourselves strongly, and editor-publisher Dr. Gainza Paz is reported agreeing that the virtually unanimous rally by the world press was unequalled and together surely delayed if not prevented the final demise. To read about the ways and methods employed by a vain despotic government to force a critical and free newspaper into *Gleichgeschaltung,* even when reported in a coldly objective, reservedly dignified manner, makes one's blood boil. This was a cat and mouse game, with the mouse enjoying the respect of honorable service, the courage of its staff, the dignity of its purpose—the defense of freedom. While the cat wins temporarily at least, the spirit for free access to truthful information quite obviously persists in this (until recently) archaic matriarchate, which even banned Grimm and Twain.

The end came on January 26, 1951, via newsprint restrictions and seizures, character defamation, huge fines on trumped-up charges (such as *descato*—disrespect to the Peróns), shutdowns, mob assaults by direction, arrests, a government inspired labor dispute, Propaganda Bureau's (Sublabor dispute, Propaganda Bureau's (Sub-secretariat of Information and Press) chicanery, and finally overt gangsterism with wrecking and deaths. The editor driven into exile, the 1300-strong staff forced out and hounded down, plant and property stolen, the name usurped, and the hoax of a newspaper perpetuated with the help of stooges—this is the state of affairs now. But no one is fooled, not even the dictator. For he must be haunted by some of *La Prensa's* old editorials, reprinted here. They are testimony that Peróns come and go, but that the freedom of the press shall persist, as it must if we are to enjoy any other freedom. For indeed, as Kierkegaard is quoted in one of the editorials: "The content of freedom is truth, and truth makes man free."

BORIS ERICH NELSON

Hampton Institute

ADLER, JOHN H., EUGENE R. SCHLESINGER, and ERNEST C. OLSON (in collaboration with the Research Department of the Central Bank of Guatemala). *Public Finance and Economic Development in Guatemala.* Pp. xix, 282. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952. $5.00.

The purpose of this study was to analyze the interaction between the Guatemalan government's fiscal operations within the last decade and the country's economic development. Techniques of analysis and experience in research gained by Adler and Henry C. Wallich in the preparation of a similar study of El Salvador (published last year) were utilized and indeed it was the acceptability of the latter work which brought from the Banco de Guatemala an invitation to undertake the study under review. The co-operation of that institution was one of the factors in the high degree of success achieved by the authors.

In the last five years, the Guatemalan government has devoted an increasing proportion of its financial resources to the country's long-run economic and social development. While much of this policy did not begin to take shape until 1949 (which year is only partly covered in this study) numerous problems involved in the process of fostered development had become clearly evident by that time and are made the focal point of the study.

The difficulties encountered by the authors in obtaining certain basic data and the necessity forced upon them of using incomplete samples or crude estimates are familiar to those who attempt research in the Hispanic-American area and place some parts of the study upon quantitatively uncertain grounds. This the authors frankly concede. The disadvantage of limited quantitative information was to some extent offset by the relative simplicity in the Guatemalan economy, but there will be readers who will feel it cannot be said, as the authors maintain, that the period cov-

ered and data available proved sufficient to determine the more general and basic quantitative features of the developing economy of Guatemala. There will be readers, also, who will regret that the study could not be projected beyond 1949. Notwithstanding these limitations, the authors have produced an illuminating study, soundly conceived and as well executed as circumstances permitted. The kind of cooperation in economic research in this hemisphere which their work has evoked is much to be welcomed, and the high quality of their discriminating research attests to the value and necessity of this cooperation.

R. SMITH SIMPSON
American Embassy
Mexico, D.F.

RICHARDSON, H. G., and G. O. SAYLES. *The Irish Parliament in the Middle Ages.* Pp. x, 395. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952. $8.50.

In their introduction the authors describe this book as a monograph on the history of an institution. It is far more than that. It is that rare and delightful phenomenon, a contribution to the history of medieval Ireland which not only makes sense but assumes that there is sense to be made. While its central theme is the changing nature and function of the Irish parliament from its earliest inceptions to the passage of Poyning's Law, the book illuminates by many cross-lights both the society which that parliament served and the early history of the institution in England as well. Few students of medieval Ireland or England can have fields so specialized as to permit them to neglect this work.

So rich a book cannot be summarized here. Perhaps the simplest way to indicate its value is to remark that the final chapter, on Poyning's Law, gives no usual picture of a sudden, dramatic reversal in the relations between the colony and Westminster. Though they are fully conscious of the decisive and cumulative effect which that law was to have in the centuries that followed, the authors have already demonstrated its inevitability and that the principles contained in it were no unfamiliar novelties. In particular it represented no change in what had always been the intent of the Crown toward its Irish Lordship: ". . . for the most part, the statutes of Poyning's parliament . . . , all tended to the same end, an end that all English kings had had before them when their attention was turned to Ireland. No great spirit of independence on the part of the Anglo-Irish, but the long interruption of the Hundred Years War and the War of the Roses, had accounted for the apparent factious freedom of the colony. In 1494 the neglected reins were picked up again and tightened.

Now for an objection. There is one fault with the book which is not excused by its special subject. The authors do not treat, or seem to regard, Ireland as a country whose history for any period must be taken as a whole, with the result that they perpetuate the stale historical division between the doings of the native Irish and the Anglo-Irish, a division that at most was a broad shading, never a clear line. Not one Irish annal is cited, even for the dating of an event. No Irish name appears in a normal spelling, English or Irish; few are even casually identified; and thus it is no surprise that the most definite identification is clearly wrong. Why, for instance, should two words, "McMurgh" and "McMorghowe," be used in the index to indicate one most important family, the MacMurrough (MacMurchadha) kings of Leinster—and also fail to show that these cover references to four different persons, Art Óg, Donnchadh Mór, Murchadh Ballach, and Domhnall Riabhach (the Downaulde Reagh also mentioned)? The Anglo-Irish themselves were acutely aware of the difference. Certainly it is necessary to give the phonetic spellings of Irish names that occur in the documents cited, but, since these are so often misleadingly vague, the Irish form should be given as well: otherwise cross-referencing with native sources is terribly difficult for the student who knows no Irish, and the old fiction of two utterly divergent histories separated by a hairline continues by inertia. In this book the defect does not bulk large. However, its implications for Irish historiography are unhappy.

JOHN V. KELLEHER
Harvard University

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

Few people are as sincere in their advocacy of good government as Mr. George H. Hallett, Jr., the executive secretary of the Proportional Representation League, who reviewed my book, *Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy,* in the January issue of THE ANNALS. But, I submit that also few people are as incapable of understanding the arguments of those who disagree with them.

One of the reasons springs from professional duty. Mr. Hallett has, on account of his position as the recognized leader of the American P.R. movement, the obligation to foster the cause of that system of voting. It is equally important that Mr. Hallett's academic background—as that of so many proponents of P.R. throughout history—lies in the field of mathematics rather than that of political science.

It is natural for the mathematician to be struck by the discrepancy between the share of the votes and the share of the seats obtained by parties under the majority system. He feels that the discrepancy is unjust, and sets out to devise a system which removes it. The political scientist, on the other hand, will ask himself whether the mathematician does not take for granted what he is supposed to prove. He first considers the question whether representation in the sense of a mere reflection of existing political divisions is the true purpose of parliamentary bodies, or whether, since it overlooks the requirements of integration and decision, it does not mean fragmentation. Furthermore, he will, as soon as he thinks in terms of political philosophy, be inclined to agree with what Jacques Maritain has expressed in these words: "In order to eliminate, in addition, every attempt to introduce the 'Trojan horse' of proportional representation into the democratic structure, let us note that just as the common good is not a simple sum of individual goods, so the common will is not a simple sum of individual wills."

The political scientist will finally remember that the "will of the people" is in a democracy, among other factors, a function of the system of voting. We get one kind of public opinion, tending toward integration and decision, under the majority system, and another kind, tending toward disintegration and indecision, under P.R. In the words of Maurice Duverger, the proposal of the proponents of P.R. to "photograph" the different sections of opinion, as if they had an existence independent of systems of voting, amounts to an attempt to "photograph the fog."

Mr. Hallett errs in regard to points of fact as well as in regard to points of principle. Considerations of space limit me to just one example. Mr. Hallett starts out with the statement: "In the recent British elections the Labour party polled . . . more votes than any other party." Evidently, he fails to consider the uncontested constituencies. A correspondent of *The Times* (issue of October 29, 1951) who assigned, as is customary, seven-eighths of the vote in these constituencies to the party which carried them, arrives at the conclusion that the Conservatives had the support of 6,000 votes more than Labour. What is more important, British elections are considered primarily a decision as to which cabinet the electorate intends to be formed, rather than a mere designation of deputies. There remained in 1951 more than 700,000 Liberal votes. As Mr. Attlee said, "when it came to a point" the great majority of the Liberals preferred Conservative to Labour candidates. If we take this factor into account, the Conservative lead in popular support, as of that time, becomes incontrovertible.

Mr. Hallett errs, once again, when he says that the Conservatives "were given power to undo as much of its [Labour's] work as they pleased." Anyone acquainted with British politics could advise him that this is not the case. In fact, the Conservatives have to limit their revisions of Labour's policies very carefully. Besides, Mr. R. A. Butler, the present Chancellor of the

Exchequer, is no laissez-faire economist; his far-reaching acceptance of Labour-sponsored policies demonstrates rather clearly what I termed "inter-party integration," that is, the adjustment of one major party to the other in response to the common dependence on the marginal voter.

In conclusion, I should like to refer to Mr. Hallett's claim that "Professor Hermens . . . suggests that the British Labour party would have been justified in some deliberate gerrymandering to compensate for the wastage of its votes in the districts where it has top-heavy majorities." This is an insinuation. I referred to the redistribution of seats made in favor of the mostly Conservative suburban areas where population has increased heavily, and added: "While this redistribution was an overdue measure of fairness, the previous situation had served to compensate for a factor which operated to the disadvantage of Labour." I merely stated a fact; in this case as in others Mr. Hallett feels qualified to impute motives to me for which there is no basis, except the assumption that there must be something morally amiss with anyone for whom the virtues of P.R. are not as self-evident as for him.

FERDINAND A. HERMENS
South Bend, Indiana

Dear Sir:

Professor Hermens' letter really amazes me. My opinion of him agrees completely with the opinion he expressed of me—that "few people are as sincere in their advocacy of good government," but "also few people are as incapable of understanding the arguments of those who disagree with them."

Take the paragraph with which he ended his letter. He thinks I attacked his moral character (!) because I stated that he suggested a gerrymander. What I said had nothing to do with morals. Unlike most gerrymanderers Professor Hermens suggested manipulating districts with the commendable motive of correcting some of the vagaries which characterize the single-member district system with plurality voting. After the sentence about reapportionment that he quoted as presumably the one on which I based my "insinuation," he went on to say: "The latter (Labour) had been 'carrying coals to Newcastle'; it enjoyed top-heavy majorities in a number of constituencies from which it benefited no more than in the United States the Democrats benefit from their top-heavy majorities in the solid South. The Conservative vote was more evenly, and much more advantageously, distributed. . . . Where such a condition prevails, and the division of the popular vote is fairly even, with the handicapped party enjoying a small lead, near-deadlocks may repeat themselves. Awareness of this fact could suggest the adoption of measures designed to mitigate the effects of this condition until such time as a sufficient shift in the popular vote is expected to give a clear parliamentary majority to one side or the other." This is something more than a mere statement of fact, and I do not think I have misstated its purport.

Professor Hermens says I erred in points of fact and then gives as his only example a statement in which I was patently correct: "In the recent British elections the Labour party polled . . . more votes than any other party." He seeks to disprove this by allowing for votes which were not cast, about which I said nothing. What he meant, doubtless, was that my statement was misleading. But was it? To bring the Conservative total barely above that of Labour he assigns the party which returned its member in each uncontested district seven-eighths of the district's votes, which is clearly preposterous. Does he really think that Labour and Liberals together would have polled only one-eighth of the votes in the uncontested Conservative districts if they had chosen to contest them?

And as for his adding in the Liberal votes as supporters of the Conservatives, that is pretty unfair to the Liberals. The Liberals would prefer to elect their own members, as they could under proportional representation. If they had been fairly represented, they would have been in a position to put some restraints on the Conservative minority whenever they disagreed with it. As it is, the Conservative minority with its unrepresentative majority in Parliament is restrained only by its conscience and sense of propriety and by its judgment as to what is good politics for the future.

Professor Hermens attempts to discredit my observations, first by suggesting that my advocacy of P.R. arises from "professional duty" as a leader in the P.R. movement and executive secretary of the Proportional Representation League, and second by saying that my "academic background . . . lies in the field of mathematics rather than that of political science." The case I made ought to be judged on its own merits regardless of how I came to make it, but actually both of these statements are misleading and are fairly typical of the half-truths which pervade his writings. For nearly twenty years I have received my salary not from the Proportional Representation League which I serve on the side as a labor of love, but from the Citizens Union of the City of New York. And as for my academic background in mathematics, it was confined to the years preceding receipt of a doctor's degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1918. My whole professional life since then has been in the field of political science, mostly in close contact with the actual operations of government and frequently participating in it, rather than in academic circles, though I have also taught political science courses at Brooklyn College, Hunter College, City College (New York), and New York University. Anyway, a little training in the logical processes of mathematics never hurt anyone.

With these few comments I invite the readers of THE ANNALS to reread my review of Professor Hermens' book and see if they do not consider it both logical and fair. Professor Hermens did not prove his theories about P.R. which he elaborated in his book and repeated as if they were facts in his letter. GEORGE H. HALLETT, JR.
New York City

Dear Sir:

My attention has just been called to what purports to be a serious review of the Reinhardt, Meadows, and Gillette *Social Problems and Social Policy* by one Joseph Mayer (THE ANNALS, July 1952, pp. 152–53). The reviewer condemns the book on two counts: (1) The book is based on earlier editions by Gillette and Reinhardt and is not a "thorough-going" revision, and (2) "Most of the book . . . is in the form of a brittle superficiality."

Except for two legitimate criticisms of the authors, one for failure to catch an outdated brief discussion on government expenditures and improvement, and another for allowing a typographical error on national income to pass, the reviewer's first count rests on a contention that: (1) Reading lists at the ends of three chapters (2, 9, 15) are not up to date; (2) Chapter 11 dealing with Child Welfare is ". . . highly utopian and based largely on a so-called 'Children's Charter' formulated at a conference . . . in 1930"; and (3) Chapter 14 which deals with crime gives too much attention to ". . . Reports of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement."

In support of the second count, the reviewer quotes out of context sixteen sentences culled from the entire book.

Even a cursory reading of the chapters themselves would have shown the reviewer that Chapter 2 deals with basic principles and concepts, and Chapter 9 mainly with the historical development of migration policies in this country. Other aspects of these subjects are developed elsewhere in the book. That fact might be reason enough for criticism, but one would hardly know that merely from counting publication dates at the chapters' ends. The reading lists for these chapters might have been improved by the addition of some more recent titles. The absence of such titles, however, does not reflect the content of the book as the reviewer assumes. Moreover, in my thirty years of University teaching, I have never known an instructor who relied upon the textbook reading lists for up to date materials. For such about all the author can do in the way of "suggested readings" is to provide some substantial titles least likely to be on the instructor's reserve shelves.

Even so, the reviewer reckoned without the facts. There are 294 reading references in the remaining seventeen chapters of the book; of these 123 appeared after 1941 and half of them after 1946. It should be noted also by any serious re-

viewer that the book, whatever its shortcomings, was never intended to deal with social problems as if generated and marooned in the "here and now."

If Mr. Mayer really wanted to write about this book without taking time to read it, footnotes would have been more useful than chapter reading lists. Footnotes are generally a part of the author's real working capital. There are approximately 666 footnote references in the book; of these 270 appeared later than 1942 and more than half of these after 1946.

As to the criticism of Chapter 11: This chapter quotes the "Children's Charter" formulated at the 1930 White House Conference. This formulation was a landmark in the history of Child Welfare in this country. It covers about 2 out of 23 pages in the chapter. Then follow 19 pages of discussion on stages in the Child Welfare movement and on a variety of Child Welfare services, needs, and legal and administrative problems. These discussions carry 29 footnote references later than 1941, 15 of which appeared more recently than 1945. Chapter 14 makes 10 footnote references to materials published since 1945, 2 of which are 1950. There are earlier dates in the fotnotes. They include references to such durable materials as Sutherland's *White Collar Criminal*, Murchison's early study of criminal intelligence, Harper's brief classic on *The Pragmatist Process in Law* and, of all things, to the "Report of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement."

If the reviewer had looked at the footnotes in Chapter 15 instead of stopping with a publication date count of the suggested readings, he would have found that 13 out of 32 footnote references are to materials published later than 1946. Moreover, if he had actually compared the chapter content with that of its most recent Gillette-Reinhardt forerunner, he would have noted not only a revision of the statistical data but also that 15 of the chapter's 33 pages have been almost completely rewritten. With practically no effort at all, the reviewer could have found, too; that the present work is 234 pages smaller than the earlier one.

There seems little need to make a critical comment on the reviewer's collection of sentences ripped from their contexts and offered as evidences of the book's "brittle superficialities." The average reader of the review, whether or not in agreement with the author's position on the subjects discussed, will be able to sense their legitimate use as a part of a wider discussion. The sentence noted from page 7, for instance, is followed by ". . . social problems have been the result particularly of the development of certain social and cultural conditions." One of these conditions enumerated and discussed is the acquisition, ". . . insight and the power to make scientific analysis . . ." and to recognize social need. Again without the context: "Planning is essentially the foresighted and cooperative adaptation of means to ends" (p. 190), isn't it? The author is, of course, talking about *social* planning. One can only wonder about the reasons why this kind of book reviewing was ever done. At any rate, the reviewer has given us a new use for an old adjective: "brittle" (See Webster's Unabridged).

JAMES M. REINHARDT
University of Nebraska

Dear Sir:

In the foregoing letter by one James Reinhardt, in what purports to be a serious comment on my review, I should like to call attention to the following:

"Even a cursory reading . . . would have shown. . . . It should be noticed also by any serious reviewer. . . . If Mr. Mayer really wanted to write about this book without taking time to read it. . . . If the reviewer had looked at the footnotes. . . . With practically no effort at all, the reviewer could have found. . . . The reviewer quotes out of context. . . ."

That Mr. Reinhardt does not like my review is understandable. But with respect to such innuendos, to quote him further, "one can only wonder about the reasons." Could it be that the man himself, like his ratiocinations, is also frangible? (As for "brittle," I would, of course, not dare use the term again.)

To the readers of this column, I would suggest a comparison of my review in the July 1952 ANNALS with the pages of the book to which reference is made in Mr. Reinhardt's letter; also, with other pages of the book at random. Naturally, in a review, one can adopt nothing more than a sampling procedure. To one trained, as was the reviewer, under such men as Peabody, Carver, and Palmer at Harvard and Devine, Lindsay, and Giddings at Columbia, the book in question is replete with thin generalities, doubtful platitudes, and, what is worse, with the type of glib utopianism (to use a colorless word when a much stronger one might well be in order) to which most Americans rightly take exception.

This may be further illustrated from Chapter 2, which Mr. Reinhardt says "deals with basic principles and concepts" but which in the main strings together dogmatic assertion about democracy and government, much of which is highly questionable, especially the statements about "planning." Quoting:

"To carry into operation anything like the total national planning will, of course, involve much regimentation. . . . Business will have to take directions and sometimes be put in a strait jacket. . . . Much resentment, struggle, and resistance is to be anticipated. To many thoughtful people this seems to be the only way to save our collective lives and individual entities. To them the alternative appears to be the collapse of modern society through self-destruction. On the other hand, such overall and drastic planning would not leave much of the former democracy" (p. 45).

As for the author's definition of social planning as "foresighted and co-operative adaptation of means to ends," he also approves of its being defined as "an effort at simultaneity" involving a "succession of actions," which he then outlines in such broad generality (p. 191) that a "foresighted and co-operative" gang of criminals planning a bank robbery and "adapting means to ends" with split-second "simultaneity" would fit the description admirably.

In connection with the author's contention that the book has been considerably revised, methinks he protests too loudly. All that my review pointed out on this score was that the revision has apparently "not been thoroughgoing"—this Mr. Reinhardt admits.

Yours truly,

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