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# THE TWENTIETH Century

JULY 1952

EDITED BY MICHAEL GOODWIN

CONTRIBUTORS INCLUDE

ROBERT BOOTHBY

The turning point in Europe

JOHN BEAVAN

Northcliffe and the serious Press

E. F. SCHUMACHER

In search of socialism

JACK LINDSAY

'Swinburne the novelist

JOHN DAVENPORT

Augustus John

FORMERLY THE NINETEENTH CENTURY & AFTER

1877



1952

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## EDITORIAL

Public opinion remains the most baffling and formless of all monsters. Constantly invoked as the ostensible cause of this or that shift on the social surface, it nonetheless refuses to disclose its true inwardness to the observer. The political war-cries pass overhead and are instantly forgotten. What is the public's real attitude towards the bizarre deadlock in British politics, and the economic stagnation which underlies it? Do people relate their personal frustration to that of the community, or are they unaware of the connection? No one knows, and in the absence of knowledge everyone goes on repeating that 'public opinion' favours this or that - a question-begging exercise in psychological warfare, since the voters are not consulted about their 'opinions', while the opinion-forming minority carries hardly any electoral weight. These are the traditional terms of make-believe in a democratic society. What renders them dangerous at the moment is democracy's failure to respond to the stimulus of leadership. Or is there simply no leadership? That would explain a great deal, but it raises issues too uncomfortable to be faced squarely by the party strategists on either side.

We print in this issue some critical comments upon the recently published volume of *Fabian Essays*. On the whole their reception has been unfavourable even in quarters politically friendly to the authors. Unless one is greatly mistaken this reaction stems from a disappointment at their failure to challenge the prevailing conspiracy of silence about the country's real problems, a conspiracy in which most of the political leaders have joined since 1945. Sir Stafford Cripps was the shining exception, and even he was not immune from temptation. His colleagues, moreover, saw to it that his policies were watered down to what the electorate would think tolerable. In consequence they proved ineffective to cure the root disease, which is the steady decline in Britain's competitive position relative to the newer industrial countries. The opportunity of a revolutionary break in 1945-48 (revolutionary in the sense of reversing the downward trend) was missed, and the Conservatives have if anything shown themselves even more timid. What Socialist idealism might have effected in 1945, Conservative realism was given a chance to do in 1951, after the third

financial crisis in six years had driven Labour from office. To justify itself at the bar of history, Mr Attlee's Government would have had to convince the miners that it was in their interest to dig more coal, and to this end a bold essay in syndicalism or 'co-determination', instead of the carefully planned bureaucratic transfer of management, might not have been amiss. By 1951 every opportunity of this kind was past, and no one was any longer in the mood to listen to exhortation. There remained the heroic course urged by some of the younger Tories: a declaration of bankruptcy, the complete sweeping away of the food subsidies, and the trebling of the bread price, coupled with a warning that things would get even worse unless the nation pulled itself together. Would that have worked or would it merely have provoked a stunned refusal to respond? No one can tell, since the experiment was not tried. But in the absence of leadership it seems somewhat unfair to blame the public for being apathetic and continuing to believe that 'the crisis' is a hoax played by the politicians. There is no doubt that this is what most people do think, and can one really say that their leaders have done everything possible to disabuse them?

These reflections are not materially altered by a consideration of the *Fabian Essays* whose authors, with the characteristic exception of Mr Healey, resolutely strangle themselves with their respective Old School Ties. Fabian Socialism, we used to be told, is not a sectional or class doctrine, but a revolutionary, though peaceful and scientific, method of solving society's problems, its principal characteristics being ruthless clarity of aim and unflinching steadiness of purpose. The emblematic tortoise which adorns the cover of Fabian publications was to reach the winning post ahead of the capitalist hare, primarily through the exercise of superior powers of ratiocination, but it was also to 'strike hard'. On present evidence the animal seems not merely slow, but fearful of novelty and unwilling to use its brain as well. There is no sign of the intellectual ruthlessness which made the Webbs a power in their day. Instead, agreeable half-truths are elaborately wrapped in cotton-wool. We are to make do with what we have – the Welfare State – and avert our gaze from its crumbling economic and social foundations. The emphasis is on equality and the further democratization of society: an estimable programme inherited from the nineteenth century, when economic progress and the presence of an effective governing *élite* could both be taken for granted. The disappearance of these factors is not mentioned, probably not even considered. Here is Socialism without tears, indeed Socialism without

planning, which most people had hitherto thought to have some bearing on the subject. It is true that planning acquired a bad name in 1945–50, when it became synonymous with exhortation and 'targets' which were never reached. But that is no reason for dispensing with it altogether. Yet to read these essays one might think that our only problem is how to divide the economic cake more equitably.

This, it must be said emphatically, will not do. This kind of pseudo-Socialism is useful only as a soporific. Taken in large doses it must be fatal to the organism. The problems of an over-urbanized, over-industrialized society – lethargy, retreat into private life, the withering of communal forms of existence – cannot be cured by an approach which on the pretence of scientific objectivity treats human beings as mere consumers of goods. The deadly pall of apathy which hangs over public (and private) life to-day is both the cause and the effect of a failure of leadership for which both major parties must take the blame. To break the deadlock something more is required than traditional party politics, but the missing element cannot be supplied by a decadent empiricism which evades all the real issues on the plea that they do not lend themselves to quantitative treatment. So far as the opinion-forming minority is concerned, the vicious circle can only be broken at the point where some of its members are willing to challenge the comfortable assumptions prevalent in society as a whole: the assumption, for example, that the economic crisis is not real, and that we can go on coasting gently downhill for an indefinite period without suffering any ill effects. This is as true of the Conservatives as it is of their opponents, for Imperialism and Socialism both become meaningless if society is permanently reduced to the level of merely keeping alive, with or without external assistance. In such circumstances all political programmes become verbiage. We have not yet reached this stage, but we are in danger of nearing it within a foreseeable period – perhaps only a few years – unless the downward trend is reversed. Twelve years ago, a crisis of unmistakable magnitude was successfully dramatized by Mr Churchill. To-day it is less easy to persuade the ordinary man and woman that there is something seriously amiss. Instead of a single dramatic challenge there is a gradual, and not too uncomfortable, downhill slide, with the prospect of an eventual stabilization at a somewhat lower stage. Only – and this is where the heirs of the Webbs might have been expected to employ their trained minds – a permanent balance at this kind of level makes nonsense of all plans for further social advance, just as it makes nonsense of all talk of keeping the Commonwealth in

being. Crash or slide, the process is not really compatible with the surviving aims of both the major parties. Nothing can make it tolerable save complete apathy on the part of the traditional governing class and its rivals, a lethargic acceptance of the downward cycle, an Austro-Hungarian adaptation to defeat. If this is not to be the outcome, the stodgy empiricism which governs Labour's outlook to-day (the obverse of Mr Bevan's muddled emotionalism) must receive a far ruder and more trenchant challenge.

## COMMENT

### IT JUST GROWED

On May 14th the Earl of Cork and Orrery moved in the House of Lords that 'the principles laid down in Chapter 14 of the *Manual of Military Law* should be reconsidered by a competent tribunal before the publication of the revised edition.' It might seem at first sight that this was hardly an issue to arouse strong feeling or to bring the Lord Chancellor and two ex-Chancellors into the fray with their heaviest guns engaged. But the debate was in fact one of the sharpest of the last few months. It did not run on party lines at all; it was mainly a clash between soldiers and sailors on the one side and lawyers on the other, and the present Lord Chancellor in resisting the combined operations of the military and naval champions had the support of the holder of his office under the Labour Government.

The complaint of the Earl of Cork and Orrery, and others who spoke for his motion, is that the revised version of the chapter in question is 'inimicable to military discipline and unjust to officers and men of the Armed Forces when serving under active service conditions.' Until 1944 the *Manual* laid down that responsibility for violations of the laws of war (apart from crimes committed by soldiers simply as individuals) rested on those who gave the orders and not on those who simply obeyed them. The 1944 edition, on the other hand, declares that soldiers 'cannot escape liability if in obedience to a command they commit acts which violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiments of humanity.' It is this phrase which is now a cause of worry in the Fighting Services because it is feared that it will make it easier for an enemy (and concretely the fear is of a particular type of enemy with particular methods) to bring to trial and convict prisoners for alleged war crimes,

and also to undermine discipline by propaganda proclaiming that certain actions or certain weapons are illegal and that soldiers obeying orders in these respects will be punished if captured. As the Earl of Cork and Orrery stated his case, referring back to an earlier debate on a similar motion:

We were told, for example, that the right course was not to alter the law, but to administer it wisely. . . . It is not we who interpret the law in such cases, but our enemies. The great objection to the amendment is that in certain cases it hands over justice, or the administration of justice, to our enemies . . . we can conceive of Communist officers charging our officers with giving improper orders. In fact, they are doing that at this very moment in Korea. . . . The whole object of this motion was to try to keep the trials of our men in our own hands, and not to legalize their trials before the set of scoundrels with whom we are now engaged in war and against whom, it seems, we shall be fighting for many years to come, perhaps on a far greater scale than at present.

Another speaker dwelt on the danger to military discipline latent in a provision which requires a subordinate to decide for himself whether an order given to him is or is not in accordance with 'the unchallenged rules of warfare' and 'the general sentiments of humanity'. Lord Wilson declared:

Should we be so unfortunate as to get involved in any future war, one cannot expect the same pattern in its development as in the last. Psychological warfare is sure to play an important part. The morale of our Forces will be one of the enemy's main objectives, both by means of propaganda and the tactics of infiltration through fifth columnists into all ranks. . . . The creation of the opportunity to dispute certain matters plays straight into the hands of any disloyal or traitorous element, presents an opening for agitators to undermine discipline and provides a stepping stone to mutiny.

The lawyers brushed aside these arguments with the contention that the 1944 edition was a correct statement of international law in the matter – though it was at the same time admitted that the *Manual* had no statutory force, but merely represented the opinion of the jurist who wrote it, who happens in this case to be Professor Lauterpacht. The Lord Chancellor accused the supporters of the motion of trying to alter international law and, after reminding the generals and admirals that they could not know as much international law as Professor Lauterpacht, went on:

the statement which for the first time found its place in 1944 in the *Manual of Military Law* does represent the consensus of international opinion as to what the law is. I myself think that long before 1944 that rule of law had become established. International law has been a matter of growth from

the time of Grotius through the centuries. Sometimes it becomes embodied in a Convention to which the several States have put their signature, and that is the most satisfactory way of its development. At other times it grows through the opinion of international lawyers and gradually becomes accepted by the municipal courts.

It seems, therefore, to be the view of the Lord Chancellor that the British Army was entirely ignorant of international law on this vital point, until in 1944 Professor Lauterpacht revealed it for the first time. He did not make the law, but merely discovered what already existed, like Columbus finding America. The Earl of Cork and Orrery, however, quoted the *History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission* to the effect that opinion on the matter 'developed strongly' during the Second World War. International law was then indeed 'growing' through the 'opinion' of lawyers concerned with the very practical and concrete problem of preparing indictments against the followers of Hitler, and the *History* relates:

English writers, such as Professor Lauterpacht, observed that the British Military Manual had no statutory force and could therefore be amended in the face of new developments.

But if it could be amended in 1944 'in the face of new developments', surely it could be amended again in the face of still newer developments in 1952. How is it that a principle which was evidently regarded as novel in 1944 has attained the dignity of sacrosanct and immutable law in the course of eight years? Perhaps it is because it would be too embarrassing if any of the principles adopted for German War Crimes trials were called in question. But the British Government in its policy on War Crimes trials ignored its own *Manual of Military Law*, even as revised by Professor Lauterpacht, for this declares that unconditional surrender does not abrogate the Geneva Convention in the treatment of prisoners, whereas the official position of the Allied Governments was that it did. It may be, therefore, that the best solution for the controversy which has arisen over the revision of the *Manual* would be for the War Office to re-issue it as it is, with a note for officers explaining to them that it has no authority, that it merely expresses the opinion of Professor Lauterpacht in the face of new developments which are now past, and that in any case no British Government is bound by it.

G. H.

#### DURHAM STALEMATE

The protracted tussle between the Durham County Council and certain of its employees is as anomalous as it is different from the D. C. Thomson dispute. The aged Dundee publisher is still trying to put the clock back by debarring union members from his employ: the Durham councillors, by insisting upon union membership for all, have tried to put the clock forward so fast that they have jammed the works.

The big fight at Durham has been between the Education Committee of the Council and the teachers. Neither side has been shadow-boxing, but so far neither side has won. The first round opened in November, 1950, when the Council made it a condition of employment that every teacher in its service should be a member of some union. This was in effect a threat of dismissal to those not prepared to disclose their affiliations. The Durham teachers stood firm on their freedom of choice, and the National Union of Teachers and the Joint Executive Committee of the Four Secondary Associations unhesitatingly backed them up. They refused to furnish the information required, and the Council did not press the point. Round one thus went to the teachers.

The matter did not long rest there, however. The Council soon sought other means of achieving their ends. Candidates being interviewed for vacancies or promotions found themselves asked to say whether or not they were union members. The N U T advised its members that this, too, was an improper question, and other unions added their support. Meanwhile an abortive meeting was held between representatives of the teachers and the Council, and a deputation from the Council met the then Ministers of Health and Education, Mr Bevan and Mr Tomlinson, to discuss the situation. In March 1951 the House of Commons held an inconclusive debate on the Durham issue, when it was clear that Mr Tomlinson still hoped that an understanding might be reached at a further meeting between the Council and the N U T which he had arranged. These talks, however, broke down, and in April the teachers' associations called upon their members in two divisions of the County to give notice of their resignations. Their response was unanimous, and the second round in the dispute would have been theirs – at the expense of their neglected pupils – had not the Minister on April 3rd used powers under the Education Act, 1944, to intervene. The Council reluctantly agreed to accept the letter and the spirit of the directive that they should refrain from the offending question.

That they had not accepted the spirit, however, became evident in the opening of the third and current round when they issued revised regulations requiring that applications for extended sick leave must be made through professional organizations. This was held to be only another way

of enforcing the so-called 'closed shop' policy, and the employees affected – and these included not only teachers but doctors and dentists, nurses, midwives and engineers – formed a joint emergency committee which issued an ultimatum to the Council that unless an assurance were given by April 20th that all pressure to join unions was to cease on the part of the Council, they would embark upon sanctions against it. This assurance was not forthcoming, and the great majority of members of the unions concerned have accordingly placed their resignations in the hands of the local authority. Membership of the N U T amounts to about 90 per cent. of the Durham teachers, and of these the County Council is faced with the prospect of replacing some 3,790 men and women between now and September 1st when their resignations take effect. The Council's latest move has been to report the dispute to the Minister of Labour, and instruct the Minister of Education of their action. Miss Horsbrugh is no doubt very relieved to pass the buck; but it is probably only a temporary respite. The N U T, with its insistence upon the professional status of teachers, does not like the idea of its disputes being treated merely as labour troubles, and the Minister of Labour may well feel that there is no case for a court of inquiry where the issue is one of trade-union membership.

In spite of the other elements which have been introduced, this is indeed, and has been all along, the crux of the dispute. Even here, however, the difference between the two sides is very small. The term 'closed shop' is misleading; for it is only upon union membership, not upon membership of a single union, that the Council has been insisting. Mr Tomlinson and the N U T were quite explicit from the outset that all teachers should be encouraged to join a professional organization. The closed shop is in a sense the logical conclusion of the trade union, and the Durham miners, who are for the most part solidly behind the Council, with its almost entirely Socialist membership, cannot understand what all the fuss is about. At the same time this is not a political dispute, nor is it the outcome of dissatisfaction on the part of the teachers with the local authority. On the contrary, relations between them are, on the whole, exceptionally good. It is a clash of principle only inasmuch as the Council has shown itself unable to distinguish between 99 per cent. voluntary membership and 100 per cent. compulsory membership. More obscure is the extent to which it is a clash of personalities. Meanwhile time is getting short. There is no question of being able to rush in 4,000 fresh teachers on September 1st, and the Prime Minister has said that Miss Horsbrugh will not hesitate to intervene again should it come to that. It remains to be seen whether there is still enough goodwill and commonsense on both sides to avoid such an unsatisfactory dénouement.

D. B. M.

## DESMOND MACCARTHY

Desmond MacCarthy was a man of the world; an amateur in the best, the eighteenth-century, sense. His easy wit, his good humour, his knowledge of men and books were so deliciously blended that his critical acuteness was taken too much for granted. He combined a zest for life with a rare detachment, so that although he was intimately associated with that essentially Cambridge phenomenon 'Bloomsbury' one does not think of him as an integral part of that fabulous society. 'Bloomsbury' was esoteric: Desmond MacCarthy's field was wider, though he may not have dug so deep. A contemporary of the philosopher George Moore, he saw 'Bloomsbury' develop from the beginnings. Nobody did more than he to popularize the early work of Lytton Strachey, of Virginia Woolf; but the political as well as the literary and social worlds had a strong appeal for him. His essay on Asquith is brilliantly perceptive. Maynard Keynes, who moved also in the great world, was of deepest 'Bloomsbury'; not so, one feels, MacCarthy: both old Etonians, MacCarthy was one of Nature's Oppidans.

He was an admirable editor, with a remarkable combination of taste, sense, and open-mindedness; his literary criticism was often first-rate; his dramatic criticism, for which he had real flair, invariably so. It is regrettable that more of his work has not been reprinted. The two or three volumes that exist stand up well, *Portraits* being especially good. The pleasant flow of his writing could crystallize into epigram. Thus, of Strindberg he wrote: 'He was an ever-resisting struggler; but a man who is all struggle, though he may be gigantic, cannot be great.'

He may have felt at times that he had frittered away his talent. Like other young men, he had had high literary aspirations. Yet one has only to feel what a gap his death leaves to realize that his was anything but a wasted life. His talent was to be Desmond MacCarthy. As one ploughs one's way through some laboured thesis masquerading as criticism, or sighs over the pert opinions of the infallible young, one longs for his humane chuckle and tender worldliness. He once wrote of Clough's 'love of the beauty of things as they are'. This quality he had in a high degree. He might have written a volume – or volumes – of memoirs which would have been an English classic. It was left for his wife to write one such volume, *A Nineteenth Century Childhood*.

An essay on Wilfrid Blunt begins with a quotation from the poet:

'Time is a feathered thing.' Thus, if I wrote my memoirs, I would begin them; but I shall never write them. . . . I prefer to talk them or dream them; and I shall dream them best, some night, when the streets are silent

and empty, when, with a sack over my shoulders, I am staring into a perforated pail of glowing coke, guarding tools till morning. . . .

If Desmond MacCarthy had been a night watchman he would not have been a solitary one. The street would have been crowded with every conceivable sort of person – a duchess or two, a sweep, a Cabinet Minister, some poets and painters, and as many children as had managed to swarm down the fire-escape.

Addressing his twenty-two year old self, he said that he had been when young too indolent to concentrate:

Meanwhile how delightful you found it to imbibe literature at your leisure! And so you read and read. I must say I was grateful to you afterwards, for as a critic I should have run dry long ago if you had not been so lazy.

The fruits of that laziness enriched his fellow-countrymen for nearly half a century.

J. D.

## CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

SIR, – In his letter commenting on my article *Two Wars* Mr Chester Wilmot raises the question of evidence for my statement that Britain and the United States agreed at the Teheran Conference to Soviet territorial claims on Poland. The evidence on this point is the Polish version of what took place at the negotiations in Moscow in October 1944, when the Soviet Union was represented by Stalin and Molotov, Britain by Churchill and Eden, the United States by Harriman, and Poland by Mikolajczyk and Romer. Ciechanowski in his book *Defeat in Victory* says that Stalin then raised the question of Poland's eastern frontier and that Churchill made a compromise proposal on the matter.

At this point Molotov made a surprising statement. He said that he saw it was necessary to remind those present that at Teheran President Roosevelt had expressed his complete agreement with the Curzon Line as the Polish-Soviet frontier and regarded it as a just solution . . . and that the President had merely added that, for the time being, he preferred his agreement on this point should not be made public. . . . Molotov paused dramatically for a while to see whether Churchill, Eden or Harriman would take up his challenge, and when it became evident that they were not prepared to do so, the conversation switched to the subject of the western frontiers of Poland.

It is a fact that, whereas Churchill soon after his return from Teheran declared in a public speech his endorsement of the Soviet claim to the Curzon Line as a frontier, Roosevelt did nothing of the kind, and this led the Polish Government to believe that the American Government disagreed with the British on this question. It appears, however, that Roosevelt's silence was due not to international, but to domestic, political considerations. The Polish-American vote was regarded by the Democratic Party electoral managers as of crucial importance in several States for the Presidential election of 1944, and the influential Polish-American Congress led by Rozmarek was a strong champion of Polish national claims. Roosevelt could not afford to yield to Russian demands publicly until the election was safely in the bag, and he skilfully avoided making any definite commitment one way or the other before November.

Yours faithfully,

G. F. HUDSON.

## THE TURNING POINT IN EUROPE .

### I. THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

Robert Boothby, MP

Twice in the last half-century the Western Powers have won a world war and lost the peace. Why? Mainly because of their failure to comprehend the nature of the twentieth-century revolution. As E. H. Carr has pointed out in his *Conditions of Peace*, they continued to preach, and in part to apply, the once valid but now disruptive ideals of the rights of nations and *laissez-faire* capitalism; while their enemies were striving to build up the world into larger units under centralized planning and control.

Despite the terrible warning of the inter-war years the Western Democracies clung, at San Francisco, to the Wilsonian principles of disarmament, isolation and of secession called 'self-determination', covered up by the smokescreen of a high-sounding but impotent international superstructure. Despite the rise of two highly protected economies of continental scope and limitless potential power, to the east of them and to the west, the little nations of Western Europe made yet another attempt to return, on an independent basis, to the multilateral economic system of the nineteenth century. While they chattered the Russians acted; and

filled, almost overnight, the vacuum created in Central Europe by the collapse of Hitler's Empire.

The Potsdam Agreement set the seal on the Russian *fait accompli*. It left half Europe in the grip of the Red Army, and Berlin and Vienna marooned outposts of the Western world. But it did more than that. It reasserted the conception of ultimate German unity which was basic to the Second and the Third Reich. It is difficult to believe that the political implications of a line of demarcation which gave the Western Powers a foothold in the Prussian capital, but cut off Saxony and Thuringia, with Leipzig and Dresden, from the old cultural Germany of the pre-Bismarckian era, can ever have been seriously considered.

I have some claim to be heard on this matter now, because I was an eye-witness of the San Francisco Conference, and I then summarized and published my conclusions as follows:

It is becoming increasingly clear that neither the Americans nor the British had worked out sufficiently precise plans to deal with the situation arising out of the total collapse of Germany. Here lies the root of the trouble. Molotov had a clear-cut policy and was tough. That policy was to deploy existing Russian power in such a way as to get as much as possible while the going was good. . . . There is only one way out of the present *impasse*, and that is for Great Britain and the United States to formulate clear-cut policies and carry them out with resolution. We have now to decide where we must stand, and there stand. So far as Europe is concerned, the Western Democracies, including Scandinavia, constitute for us an essential minimum; and our continuing failure to form a regional group is greatly to be deplored. To suppose that the Charter of the United Nations now provides any kind of collective security is to be the victim of a dangerous illusion. No World Authority consisting of separate sovereign states will keep the peace unless those sovereign states are prepared to submit unconditionally to its decisions, and to place their armed forces unreservedly at its disposal. At present they are not so prepared. The objective of any realistic democratic foreign policy must therefore be to achieve a combination or combinations of democratic sovereign states, held together by a realization of their common principles and interests, which can be depended upon, if challenged, to act together.

The fact remains that the total military victory of the Allies in 1945 was accompanied by the heavy political defeat of the Western Powers. And the reason is not far to seek. Had we never dissolved the Atlantic Alliance, the Russians would have had to deal with us as they dealt with us between 1941 and 1945, instead of running roughshod through our broken ranks. Similarly, if we had never dissolved the Grand Alliance after the First World War, there can be little doubt that the Second World War would not have taken place. We did not realize that the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in 1918 had destroyed the Europe of

the nineteenth century. Nor did we realize that, when the American and Russian armies met at Torgau in April 1945, the European system of 1919-39 had been obliterated.

When Mr Churchill launched the idea of a United Europe at Zurich he was still thinking in terms of pre-war Europe. He had in mind all the European countries west of Russia, and certainly did not contemplate a United Europe which excluded a part of Germany, and the whole of Poland, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This was also the conception of European unity which dominated the congress at The Hague in May 1948. It is fundamentally and ultimately the right conception but, as events have since proved, it was premature. Despite the presence, of the Red Army on the Elbe we deluded ourselves that war was over, that the Russians would recoil from the heart of Europe, and that the achievement of European unity in freedom and peace was in sight. Alas, the sense of being in a state of continuous war is the essence of the Communist faith; and to the proselytizing drive of Communist ideology Stalin has added the force of Russian nationalism and the historical sanction of the Pan-Slav movement. The blockade of Berlin and the seizure of Czechoslovakia by the tested Communist method of infiltration, treason and violence, brought the Western Democracies to a sudden realization of the magnitude of the danger that confronted them; and the invasion of South Korea convinced them, at last, that the only hope of avoiding a third world war lay in a restoration of the balance of world power.

This was a momentous decision. It involved the re-creation of the Atlantic community, rearmament, the admission of Federal Germany to the fraternity of the West, and the effective defence of Western Europe. It also meant that, for the time being, the conception of European unity had to give way to that of Western European unity; and it is the psychological reluctance of so many people to face the full implications of this fact that has led, in my opinion, to much intellectual confusion; and to a failure, on the part of the European Movement in particular, to think the problem through.

Germany is the crux of this problem, because it is the focal point of the convulsive struggle for world power which is now being waged between the forces of totalitarian Communism and those of liberal democracy. Unless and until the Russians become masters of all Germany they cannot become masters of all Europe. That is what they are now trying to do; and that is what they must be prevented from doing.

Another danger of equal potential magnitude to the Anglo-Saxon countries would be the domination of continental Europe by a reunited, rearmed and centralized Germany. Mr Denis Healey, in his article in the June issue of THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, puts the case for the admis-

sion of such a Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with cogent lucidity, on the ground that it is the only framework wide enough to attract her and strong enough to hold her. There is only one flaw in his argument: it is the one thing the Russians will never permit.

The objective of a Fourth Reich could only be the recovery, by one means or another, of the lost Eastern provinces. It could be achieved either by a third world war, or by an alliance between Germany and Russia; and the price of the latter would be the withdrawal of Germany from the Western fraternity. On this subject it is best to speak plainly. We have fought two world wars to prevent the domination of the Continent of Europe by Germany, and we are certainly not going to fight another to achieve it.

The rise of a united Germany [says Professor Sir Lewis Namier, whose authority as a historian is not in dispute] completely changed the political physiognomy of Europe and, which may seem singular, the mental and moral physiognomy of the German people. From excessive, and often nonsensical, political fragmentation, Germany passed over to a disciplined centralized unity, and from unmeasured subjectivism the German gradually passed over to totalitarian *Gleichschaltung*. But pygmy principalities and the Leviathan State, spiritual anarchy and spiritual regimentation, are opposite expressions of the same political incapacity to build up a sound human community. The political creations of the German are inorganic and grotesque; the work of the typical introvert.\*

Many of us are old enough to remember the days when the cry '*Ein Reich, Ein Volk, Ein Führer*' rang through a terror-stricken Continent. I do not want to hear that cry again, for it is the manifestation of the Will to Power (*der Wille zur Macht*) which is the method by which the German seeks compensation for what as an individual he has renounced, in national dominion over others.

In all the circumstances the approach of the Western Powers to the problem of Germany could hardly have been more unfortunate. It was a mistake to try and rearm what amounted to an enemy-occupied country before making peace. We should have negotiated a political settlement first. You cannot in fact achieve any lasting international co-operation by forcing people to rearm, or to accept the rearmament of others, against their will; and it was an error to suppose that Western Europe could be united for the purpose of creating an army. In fact hardly a day now passes without some fresh explosion of political exasperation which drives the French and German Parliaments further apart. If, on the other hand, the contractual treaty had been offered to Federal Germany a year ago, or better still two years ago, and had never been made conditional on the

\* *Avenues of History* (Hamish Hamilton).

recruitment of German soldiers, it would have been signed and ratified by this time; and a great deal of unnecessary trouble and heart-burning would have been avoided.

The failure of Britain to give a lead when every country in Western Europe was looking to us for leadership is another major tragedy of these post-war years. Our refusal even to enter into discussions for the creation of a European army, or a coal and steel authority, drove the Continental countries back on themselves; and when Mr Eden took over the Foreign Office last year he found negotiations for the one completed, and for the other more than half-way towards completion. In a difficult situation he did the best he could. He promised close British association both with the E D C and the High Authority under the Schuman Plan. He gave additional guarantees to France. Last, but not least, he put forward a plan of his own for the reorganization – and revival – of the Council of Europe. The plan suggests that the work of the Specialized Communities now about to be set up should be conducted within the framework of the Council of Europe. It further suggests that 'organic links' should be established between the Communities and the Council of Europe; in other words, an association in the functioning of the Communities on the part of those European States which are not members of them, in ways still to be defined, in order to provide opportunities for practical co-operation in specific fields.

This is a typically British conception. It envisages the development of the Council of Europe along confederal or commonwealth lines into an international organization, without historical precedent, which would combine effective collective action at governmental level with democratic consultation, and leave ultimate sovereignty with the national Parliaments. In British eyes such a solution has three enormous advantages. First, we have had experience of it, and found that it works. Second, it engenders a sense of membership of one community, based on values and traditions held in common, without any need for a rigid federal constitution. Third, it is flexible, and there is no need for the terms of membership to be identical for every participating country.

About the object of Mr Eden's proposals there should be no doubt. It is to associate Britain more closely with the work of the Council of Europe, and to make that work more important and effective. They were endorsed by an overwhelming majority at the meeting of the Consultative Assembly last May. But an alternative plan was then put forward by M Spaak, contrary to them in spirit and purpose, which, if it were carried into effect, would alter the whole course of European policy and development in what might prove to be a most sinister direction.

Briefly, this is to turn the proposed coal and steel community under the

Schuman Plan into a Constituent Assembly, charged with the task of establishing a 'political community' comprising six countries, namely, France, Federal Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Britain has already declared her inability to enter a European federation, for reasons which are well understood on the Continent. In the circumstances we have no right to put obstacles in the path of those who desire a closer political and economic integration of Continental Europe, nor should we seek to do so. But what may now be called the Spaak Plan is full of dangers which the ingenuity with which it has been devised tends to obscure, and which must be squarely faced before any irrevocable decisions are taken. It would weaken the Council of Europe beyond repair. It would drive a wedge between 'The Six' and Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Finally, it would bring into existence a political, military and economic power unit which must ultimately be dominated by Germany, since she would be effectively stronger both in coal and steel, and in military potential, than her partners. The choice posed at Strasbourg, although M Spaak would not admit it, was between a tight Continental federation under the command of Germany, from which Britain would be excluded; and a wider and looser association of the countries of Western Europe, working through and within the Council of Europe under the leadership of Britain.

For my part I have no doubt as to which is the best course to pursue; and I have little doubt that, if the issues were plainly put to them, the great majority of the French, the Dutch and the Belgian people would also, and unhesitatingly, choose the latter. It is therefore a matter for great satisfaction that at Strasbourg Mr Anthony Nutting, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made the British attitude towards the Spaak Plan perfectly clear.

'This suggestion [he said] not only runs counter to the provisions of the E D C Treaty . . . but would, I am convinced, be a grave dis-service to the cause of European unity, and would mean that the final links which the United Kingdom hopes to establish with the European community would be missing. Thus a blow would be struck at the very basis of our policy on European co-operation and we should no longer be able to play a really effective part in European affairs.'

Let us face facts. The unity of Western Europe is not the same thing as the unity of Europe; and there is at present no purely European solution to the problems of defence or economics. To imagine that any permanent solution is to be found in the creation of a political sub-unit in an already truncated Continent, based on an uneasy balance between France and a divided Germany, is to be the victim of an illusion. When you are engaged in a desperate struggle for world power, all political and military

arrangements must be regarded as *ad hoc* and provisional. This gives reality and force to the empirical British approach, and point to Mr Eden's dictum that few of the existing associations can be said to have reached their final shape or to have found their final position in the general picture. The proposed European Defence Community is no more than a somewhat precipitate attempt to increase the deterrent effect of our retaliatory power in face of the specific threat represented by the presence of the Red Army in the heart of Europe. It is not, and never can be, the answer to the problem of European defence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is where the real power of the Western world resides; and the answer will be found within the context of N A T O, or not at all. N A T O itself is in the process of rapid development, and the question that now arises is whether we are to regard it as a temporary alliance, or whether we go on to create an organic union which is the basis not of a federation, nor of a league, but of a commonwealth of nations. We must surely attempt to realize the larger aim. N A T O is an organization of such potential strength that it is capable of discharging the function performed by British sea power in the nineteenth century. Committed to free institutions, and pursuing a coherent and common foreign policy, it might well preserve a *pax* for the free world as a whole; but S H A P E does not, as yet, provide the necessary machinery to frame and implement such a policy. We are at present conducting a global struggle against the forces of Communism without any central organ of decision to direct political policy or military strategy on a global scale; and the dissipation of our available strength is, in consequence, enormous. So is the ineffectiveness of our propaganda. This struggle is, fundamentally, a struggle for the minds of men. We could defeat the Russians in arms and still lose the world to Communism. The basic strength of the free world lies in freedom, which is the ability to think. Despotism is no new thing. In attempting to combine collective security and planning with personal liberty the social democrats are the real revolutionaries of the twentieth century; and, as such, should be continuously on the offensive in the psychological war which will ultimately decide the issue.

An effective Western Union can be built up only by the method of continuous organic consultation, at every level; and it is not difficult to conceive of the machinery required for this purpose. At the political summit, a Supreme Council of Ministers; in the military sphere, the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff in control of supreme commanders in various areas; and in the economic field a Joint Production and Resources Board, to which a Development Board might later be added. That this would involve some pooling of national sovereignty is not to be denied. But in any looser association between greater and lesser Powers, the strongest is bound to

make the decisions imposed by the dynamic of events; and the lesser Powers can retain a far greater control over their own destinies by advancing their views and claims in a Council which effectively decides policy than by keeping up the fiction of total national sovereignty and independence in the modern world.

A united, but not necessarily a federated, Western Europe is an essential part and prerequisite of any wider Western Union, if only for the reason that it is a vital strategic frontier of the free world. A comprehensive democratic union of such strength that no one will dare to challenge it remains the supreme and imperative goal. Unless and until it is achieved there can be no real security for anyone, no possibility of raising the standard of life in the under-developed countries of the free world, no chance of coming to terms with the Soviet Union in terms of the realities of geography and trade, and therefore no hope of uniting Europe in freedom and in peace. In this affair Britain, as the solitary country belonging to the Commonwealth, to Europe, and to the English-speaking fraternity of the Atlantic, has a key role to play. We are the essential link between Western Europe and the Atlantic community; and, with courage and vision, we can become the linch-pin of the whole. But we must never lose sight of the ultimate goal. The Brussels Pact, the limitation of the conception of European unity to Western Europe, and the E D C, constitute a specific reply to a specific threat. They are not in themselves the true vision of Europe's future.

There has been no fundamental change in British policy since Palmerston declared that

the system of England ought to be to maintain the liberties and independence of all other nations . . . to throw her moral weight into the scale of any people who are spontaneously striving for freedom, by which I mean national government, and to extend as far and as fast as possible civilization all over the world.

There can be no permanent solution of the European problem so long as half Europe is enslaved; and Germany can never be reunited in freedom and in peace unless and until it can become an integral part of a liberated and united Europe. That is the true vision, and that is the hope. A generation may pass before it is realized, but we must not give way either to impatience or despair. It will tax the sanity and staying power of the Western Democracies who have, in recent years, gyrated madly between the extremes of pacifism and bellicosity, demanding alternately the rabid appeasement and unconditional surrender of their enemies, and each at the wrong time. But there is no other way through. As a contemporary writer has truly said, Western civilization will have to live with the Stalinist challenge for a long time, unless it prefers to die with it.

## FRANCE AND VIETNAM

Derrick Sington

In an important sense the struggle in Indo-China provides an object-lesson of what the Western democracies must avoid in the future if they are to secure their major aims. In Indo-China, France is locked in conflict with a tightly knit combination of Communist leadership, fanatical national feeling, and a growing conviction that the Western democracies stand for the repression of Asian aspirations and for the perpetuation of white domination in the non-white world. This formidable pattern can be repeated in most of Africa and in some other parts of Asia, if the lesson of Vietnam is not learned.

The crucial mistakes of French policy date from 1946 when, by a series of manoeuvres, Admiral d'Argenlieu first blocked, and then tried to prevent, the union of Cochinchina with Annam. The belief held by Vietnamese nationalists that the 'independence' promised by France would be a pretence dates from those months. The extremist tendencies of the Viet-Minh leaders and the influence of the Communists in the Viet-Minh grew steadily from that time. The chance that a Communist stranglehold of the nationalist movement might be avoided in Vietnam – as it has been in India, Burma and Indonesia – was lost in 1946 and 1947. Today the vast majority of the ablest and most disinterested Vietnamese are fighting and working with the Viet-Minh – not as Communists, but because they believe that the Viet-Minh is the organization which represents struggle and sacrifice for national independence.

Very late in the day – in 1949 – France recognized that major concessions must be made to Indo-Chinese nationalism if any part of French influence and interest were to be maintained, and the policy was then inaugurated of offering to the Indo-Chinese 'true independence' in contrast to the 'Sovietization' which they would experience under Viet-Minh rule. 'Independence within the French Union' was offered to Bao Dai. But at present most Vietnamese nationalists believe that this formula is a mere phrase used to disguise a continuance of colonial status. How justified is this assumption?

In the first place the whole issue is blurred at present by the military struggle raging in all parts of the country, but principally in the Tonkin Delta. Such a struggle, waged on Vietnamese soil, principally by French

forces, is bound to make independence, in any degree, illusory as long as it lasts. The real masters in the countless villages in Indo-China, used as bases of military operations, are the French commanders, quartermasters, and adjutants. And behind the fronts the widespread network of the French Security Police is the real ultimate authority – backed by the power of the French Army. As long as an armed struggle, conducted by France, determines the situation in Vietnam, ultimate Vietnamese responsibility and freedom are impossible. But the scepticism of Vietnamese nationalists arises not only out of the presence of French military power, but also out of the political framework which has been accepted by Bao Dai for 'Independence within the French Union'. This framework is based on two documents: the Bao Dai-Vincent Auriol agreements of March 1949, and the agreements signed at Pau in November 1950. In neither of these two treaties is independence for Vietnam in reality conceded. The most that can be said to be provided for is Vietnamese 'participation' in the vital sectors of government. Thus in foreign relations, Vietnam must obtain the consent of the French Government before negotiating any agreement with a foreign State; French economic interests in Vietnam may not be nationalized without French consent; and those fields of administration which determine Vietnam's economic policy – tariffs, the currency issue and foreign exchange – are all under the control of mixed committees which include representatives of France, and of the States of Laos and Cambodia (the two latter being at present generally represented by French officials). On these mixed committees, decisions must be unanimous on all major questions, so that France, as well as the Indo-China States, possesses a veto right.

Under normal peace-time conditions this framework of economic administration, set up under the Pau agreements of 1950, might form the basis of evolution towards independence and greater equality between the partners involved. But in the economic field, as in the military sphere, the hard realities of present conditions in Vietnam make words like 'partnership', 'equality' and 'independence', used in connection with the country's relationship to France, sheer pretence. Vietnam is economically prostrate, 80 per cent of her defence budget is financed by France, and her trade deficit with France in 1951 was about 200 million francs, all of which means French financial control and the reverse of independence. Of the one economic move which could lead to the ending of Vietnamese dependence on French purse-strings – the sponsoring of a Vietnamese application for an international loan 'without strings' – there has been no whisper either for the present or the future. Even looking ahead to a time of peace, French officials have conveyed in unmistakable terms to Bao Dai's Ministers that France does not intend to go beyond the Pau institutions in her grant of 'economic independence'.

In one field only has France succeeded in creating the impression that Vietnamese independence may conceivably be attainable through the agreements of 1949 – in that of Defence. The imprint of Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny's imaginative personality is unmistakable in this field. His predecessor as Commander-in-Chief in Indo-China, General Carpentier, was known to view the agreement to set up a Vietnamese National Army with disfavour, and practically nothing was done in his time. But in a short year of command, Marshal de Lattre transformed the scene. The French Military Mission to Vietnam is now working hard and steadily to build up Vietnamese forces. There is as yet no question of these forces being independent of French control (supplies still have to be drawn from French Army depots and 80 per cent of the finance is provided by France), but the Vietnamese Army is already acquiring something of an impetus and *elan* of its own. Thirty-six battalions, now being organized into four divisions, are formed and active. Twenty-one of them are commanded by Vietnamese officers (though attached to each is a French liaison officer who in some cases is *de facto* commander). About half the existing battalions are manning watch-towers and static posts, and half are engaged in aggressive operations. The 1st Vietnamese Parachute Battalion has acquitted itself particularly well in action against the Viet Minh, and the Vietnamese, with their catlike agility and small stature, have an aptitude for parachute work. All young Vietnamese now have to undergo six months' military training, and specially selected students must do eight months in officer training schools. The rank-and-file training centres are run by Vietnamese officers and NCOs, but the officer schools are controlled by French instructors with Vietnamese assistants. The centres are well equipped with the latest American weapons, transport and signals material. A start is being made also – though on a very small scale – with the foundation of a Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. Fifteen pilots and thirty mechanics are now being trained at the new Nhatrang school of aviation and will form an artillery observation group in a year's time. A naval school is being opened with a course to train four hundred Vietnamese to man Vietnamese-commanded river-landing craft. And yet, despite the zeal with which French officers are undertaking the launching and organization of the Vietnamese Army, they are confronted with formidable problems.

The first of these is the financial question. Last year France's contribution was about 75 milliard francs. This year's programme provides for the forming of six new battalions, and as the force builds up progressively the military budget will mount. Can France, beset by her own financial problems, bear this increasing strain? Can a limited economic recovery in Vietnam, coupled with badly needed tax reform, enable the Vietnamese

authorities to shoulder a considerable part of the burden? Or will a request have to be made for American financial aid? These are questions to which answers will have to be found in the next twelve months. But more important and more difficult of solution than the shortage of money is the shortage of officers for the Vietnamese Army. Officers, particularly senior ones, take time to emerge, and there is a shortage of about a thousand for the thirty-six battalions already in existence. The Dalat Officers' School will turn out four hundred officers this year, and the two Schools for Officer Reservists will train about seven hundred. But the reservist trainees are still not obliged to enter the Army, and at present there is understandable hesitation in calling them up for active service because of political complications which developed at the beginning of this year. These developments, symptomatic of the political weakness of Vietnam, consisted in the refusal of two hundred students called up for training at the Nam Dinh Officer Reservist School to return from leave, on the grounds that they objected to serving in an Army 'under French control'. They only rejoined unwillingly after a week of negotiations. This incident illustrates how critically the political weakness of Vietnam affects the building up of the armed forces. How is a national army to be created, when confidence in the reality of nationhood is lacking?

This question of the build-up, fighting spirit, and independence of the Vietnamese Army is crucial, if a Vietnamese nation is to be brought into being which shall have the slightest chance of a military or political victory over the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh have not less than half a million regulars and guerrillas in the field, compared at present with 120,000 Vietnamese troops on the Bao Dai side. (This last figure includes the so-called *Supplétifs*, the relatively lightly-armed formations commanded by local or religious leaders such as Le Roy and the chiefs of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao movements.) Moreover, the Viet Minh are reported to be forming a fresh division north of Hué. France and Vietnam have therefore to start on a great expansion of the Vietnamese Army merely to keep pace with the increasing strength of the Viet Minh. And to achieve this a very rapid recruitment and training of reliable Vietnamese officers is the essential foundation. After the Nam Dinh incident the risks and difficulties in attempting this in the present political atmosphere are plainly to be seen.

The central factor governing political morale in Vietnam at present is that the 'national leaders' under Bao Dai do not inspire the conviction that they are capable of wresting the reality of independence from *de facto* French control. Most of them are drawn from the circle of Cochinchinese officials who identified themselves most closely with the French colonial government in pre-war days, and the one able man in Vietnam who in recent years has stood up firmly, as a nationalist figure, to French

administrators, has been carefully excluded from Cabinet office. He is Nguyen Huu Tri, the former governor of Tonking, who at present remains in enforced inactivity – and apparently under a certain amount of surveillance – in Hanoi. Old, ingrained habits of the French administrators in Saigon have proved too difficult to discard, and prior submission of Cabinet lists to the French has repeatedly been insisted on, even since the grant of 'independence', with the result that only personalities who would have been considered 'safe' in the heyday of colonial rule are included in the government. The new Prime Minister, Nguyen van Tam, who has just replaced Tran van Huu, is, from the point of view of the French 'old hands' in Saigon, even safer than his predecessor. Twenty years ago he was a provincial chief in the French colonial administration and took a leading part in suppressing the uprisings of his compatriots in Cochinchina in 1930 and 1940. Though unquestionably an able administrator, he is first and foremost a French-trained police official of considerable ruthlessness, who has been associated in the recent period with the suppression of trade unionism and the indiscriminate use of 'third degree' methods upon oppositionists – Communists and non-Communists alike. He has the reverse of a nationalist record, and a question which is being widely asked in Indo-China is whether he will do more with his power than complete the process of making a police State out of Vietnam. Whether the election of an Assembly, promised for this autumn, will be followed by the appointment of a more representative and democratic Prime Minister and Cabinet depends upon the preparedness of the French, and of Bao Dai, to make the Government in some way responsible to the new elected body. This does not at present seem very likely.

To many observers it appears that the only hope – and a slender one at that – of breathing a new moral and political climate into Bao Dai's Vietnam and of creating a genuine national State, rests in a gesture which France could make – in a declaration that, after the restoration of peace, Vietnam and the other States of Indo-China will receive complete independence, including the right to determine whether or not they wish to become members of the French Union. Such a declaration might still transform the atmosphere in Vietnam, make possible the rapid creation of a national army, and attract into the service of Vietnam many of the Viet Minh nationalists who are antagonized by the Sovietization of the Viet Minh. It is hard to see what either France or the Western democratic world could lose by such a step. It is true that an increase in Chinese aid to the Viet Minh could offset the effect of any French move, military or political, in Indo-China. But at least such a declaration would remove from France the remaining stigma, which still clings to her in the eyes of most Asians and many Europeans, of fighting a war of colonial repression in Asia.

## NORTHCLIFFE AND THE SERIOUS PRESS

John Beavan

Few serious daily newspapers are published in this country and their circulations are small. By 'serious' newspapers I mean those which have the values of educated people and provide enough news and comment to enable their readers to take a deep and continuous interest in public affairs. In England, there are *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*; in Scotland, the *Glasgow Herald* and *The Scotsman*; and in Ireland, the *Irish Times*. Such good provincial newspapers as the *Yorkshire Post* and the *Liverpool Post* lie outside this definition; so does the *Daily Telegraph*, which is a successful compromise between *The Times* and the *Daily Mail*, but is hardly a substitute for the former.

The four serious dailies in England and Scotland together sell something over half a million copies a day. It is to the readers of these papers that the weekly, monthly and quarterly reviews look chiefly for their audience. So do the two serious Sunday papers, the *Sunday Times* and the *Observer*. The serious dailies, being more costly than the others, are in great demand in reading rooms. Nevertheless, the figure of half a million may be too high an estimate of the demand for this kind of journalism. All these dailies (including *The Times*) have a local as well as an national appeal. Some people buy them primarily for their special commercial news, their accounts of local sport or their classified advertisements, and take small interest in their political news and comment.

In a politically mature country, containing large numbers of well-educated people one would expect the readership of serious dailies to be higher than this. In addition to university graduates there are many schoolteachers, solicitors, accountants, trade union officials, councillors, magistrates, technicians and businessmen who are intellectually capable of appreciating such papers, but do not buy or see them regularly. In fact before the State secondary schools had vastly expanded the educated middle class, there may have been as many readers of serious newspapers as there are to-day. During the second half of the nineteenth century a strong provincial Press developed. The owners of such newspapers regarded them as a source of political prestige rather than of profit. They catered for men of the middle and upper classes and assumed them to have or aspire to have a profound interest in politics. *The Times* was their

model. London itself was well provided at the beginning of the century. It had two fine Liberal dailies, the *Daily News* and the *Daily Chronicle*, and four Conservative ones, the *Standard*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Morning Post* and *The Times*. It was possible to have serious evening papers, too, in London until club life waned in the twenties. The *Westminster Gazette* was edited by Spender, the *Pall Mall Gazette* by Garvin.

The loss of the greater part of the serious Press is chiefly attributable to Northcliffe. He showed that by improving its typography and lightening its contents a London daily could become a national paper with a mass circulation and make large profits. He and imitators such as Pearson and Hulton strangled many newspapers and compelled others to change their character. The evil that Northcliffe did in his life increased after him. Since his death, circulations have increased enormously and newspapers have become frivolous to a degree that would have shocked him. Millions who never bought a daily newspaper at all now do so as a habit. That is a gain; it is better that people should buy a frivolous newspaper than none at all. But the growth of circulations has had two deplorable effects. All mass circulation newspapers must compete in frivolity with the most frivolous; otherwise, they would lose readers and perhaps endanger their very existence. And it has become almost impossible economically to start a new paper either serious or frivolous. A lesser consequence is that Fleet Street to-day has a declining need for serious journalists. The serious newspapers have to train almost all their journalists, and when they are trained there are few opportunities for them outside the half dozen serious papers unless they are able and willing to debase their journalistic standards. The quality of serious journalism must be reduced with the decline in the numbers allowed to practise it. Fortunately the B B C has compensated to some extent for the adulteration of the British Press. But if the monopoly is broken, broadcasting must go the way the newspapers have gone. Unfortunately man needs not love the highest in journalism when he sees it.

Several distinguished journalists who worked for Northcliffe have given us books that reveal his strange personality and genius, and now that the fourth and final volume of the *History of The Times*\* has been published the time has come for a definitive biography to be written. Such a biography must at the same time be a history of British journalism from 1890 onwards. The influence of Northcliffe, for good as well as ill, remains with us to-day through the entire range of the British Press. His direct

\* *The History of The Times*, Part IV; The 150th Anniversary and Beyond. Two vols., 50s.

influence on the serious Press was, of course, made through *The Times*. It was on its last legs financially in 1908 when he became one of the Chief Proprietors and its circulation was a mere 40,000. When he died in 1922 it was a better newspaper and a healthier property with a circulation over four times as great. '... he and he alone had transformed the early Victorian survival into a contemporary newspaper with a prospect of a commercial future not less impressive than its past. If in 1922 [when he acquired absolute power] he could only prejudice its future character, he had given it a present.'

The authors of the *History* have tried to be generous to Northcliffe. He 'was not an illiterate proprietor. He began as a writer, always liked writing and was writing within six weeks of his death. Nobody who could write as well as Northcliffe, at his best, did for the *Daily Mail* would lose his affection for the writer and his craft. He ranked him, and the compositor who served him, high above the capitalist who came from outside *Fleet Street* to amass money by enslaving writers and compositors'. Northcliffe, the authors say, did nothing for money, though his genius attracted millions and gave him power to bestow fortunes on his principal colleagues. He re-created *The Times*, yet 'he neither understood it nor felt at home in it. He came to it too late. He had long admired and coveted its influence and wished to possess it for himself as the crown of his career.' At first his task was to 'get the old barnacle-covered whale off the rocks and safely into deep water'. Then in 1912, 'the Old Gang', Buckle, Bell and Chirrol, went and the young proprietor, John Walter, was subjugated. Northcliffe thought he should be master and rule through Dawson, whom he put in the editorial chair. Dawson, however, was stubborn. He fought to save the tradition of editorial responsibility, knowing that 'the quality of *The Times* could only be guaranteed by men whose ability earned them the responsibility of organizing it'. Northcliffe failed to learn the lesson 'that in the office of *The Times* personal power, whether of Proprietor or Editor, must be limited. The quality that gave the paper its distinction was not conferred by one man; it was the contribution of a society.'

The break with Dawson came in 1919. Northcliffe had not been satisfied with the conduct of the paper before and during the General Election and now he decided that he must bring Lloyd George down. To do this, he had to dictate the policy of *The Times* as he did of all his other newspapers. Northcliffe in fact 'had persuaded himself that he alone in Britain, could ride the coming semi-revolution by speeding up the [Peace] conference, and hence demobilization; by making the Hun pay, and hence safeguarding high wages'? Dawson had to concur or go. Northcliffe chose as Dawson's successor Wickham Steed, the paper's most distinguished foreign correspondent who had recently been made Foreign Editor. Steed's views

were much closer to Northcliffe's than Dawson's had been. Steed did not believe that the problems of the Peace Treaties and demobilization could be solved on old-fashioned Tory or Liberal lines, and he distrusted Lloyd George as an opportunist 'lacking the sense of principle necessary to the proper defence of British ideals of European settlement'. For Steed, a reasoned programme was necessary for editing and he demanded what Northcliffe himself had insisted on in a memorandum to his editors a few weeks before – 'no diversity of opinion' in his newspapers. Steed got his wish and was made responsible for policy in all Northcliffe's newspapers. The subsequent campaign against Lloyd George, Curzon and the Coalition, records the *History*, 'had no parallel in all journalism since Barnes's attacks on the lath-and-plaster Cabinet, and Althorp's and Brougham's answering "War on *The Times*" in 1834. Most men disliked these specimens of belated early-Victorian hard hitting, and many readers of *The Times* protested'. Subscriptions were cancelled, but Northcliffe felt that the 'circulation of *The Times* was secondary to a personal vindication identified with a patriotic purpose' (Northcliffe had been disappointed in his hope of playing a leading part in the making of the peace). Steed opposed Lloyd George for more solid reasons.

One example of the vigorous journalism of Steed's era is the Leader on the composition of the British delegation to the Washington conference of 1921:

The attendance of Mr Lloyd George or of Lord Curzon at Washington seems particularly undesirable. The pompous and pretentious manner of the Foreign Secretary, his business incapacity as exhibited in the present state of his Department, and his obsequious docility to the Prime Minister's behests, even when these do not commend themselves to his judgment, unfit him for the discharge of the responsible duties which the mission would impose upon him. The Prime Minister himself has many admirers at home, even among his opponents. . . . But of all statesmen in Europe he is probably the most distrusted. It is notorious that no Government and no statesman who has had dealings with him puts the smallest confidence in him. . . . The great qualification needed from the representatives of the Empire is a character for conspicuous straightforwardness and honour. We have many such men in our public life, but Mr Lloyd George is not of them.

In spite of its promising beginning, Steed's editorship was a troubled one. Walter neither approved his Irish policy nor his robust way of presenting it. Northcliffe supported Steed, but not with great conviction. A crisis occurred shortly after Northcliffe had received the trading accounts for the second half of 1921. He telegraphed to Steed, to Sir Campbell Stuart, his Managing Director, and to others: 'In view appalling gross figures just received am returning immediately. Figures are worse than I

predicted two years ago. All those explanations and statistics with which it was attempted to dope me make very pathetic reading to-day. I predict position will get steadily worse if last two years fatuous optimism prevails.' Northcliffe returned to England, having decided to bring the price of the paper down. He sent his private secretary to give the decision to the daily editorial conference. But it was more than a simple announcement. Readers, Northcliffe had written, were deserting *The Times* on account of its editorial gaffes. There must be no more of them. He, Northcliffe, was responsible for policy; the Editor and his staff for the blunders. His kindness to them had been blameworthy. 'But I am not going to be gentle in the future as in the past.' And he threatened a root and branch inquiry into the administration of *The Times*, the expenses thereof and the personnel.

With difficulty Steed persuaded his senior colleagues not to resign there and then. This, he pointed out, could only gratify Northcliffe's ambition and purpose. Steed, who had a contract, then consulted Sir Charles Russell, Northcliffe's legal adviser, about the degree of provocation necessary to constitute unlawful dismissal. Russell told him that he had found Northcliffe so abnormal that he considered him incapable of business and unlikely to live long. Russell advised him to remain as Editor and defend the staff.

The suspicion Steed had that Northcliffe intended to increase Stuart's powers and thus diminish those of the Editor was justified. Northcliffe had a plan to make Stuart Managing Editor, appoint an Associate Editor and edit *The Times* himself, with Steed as his political adviser. In the meantime he must get Steed out of the way, attending international conferences, wear him down and discredit the editorial department by constant criticism. Steed and other members of the managerial staff were summoned to Pau where Northcliffe was staying. But the final collapse was approaching. 'His mind was racing at an ever-increasing speed and the pressure he put on his "great armies" (the Napoleonic term was repeated) was correspondingly intense.'

The battle was over the change of price. A stream of telegrams was sent from headquarters at Pau. The *Morning Post* lowered its price and Northcliffe wired to Stuart: 'A fight between the three papers will result in the victory of the best. The *Telegraph*, in many ways superior to us, must be compared minutely. Who gets small advertisements will be one of the deciding factors. Last week's papers excellent but many things done badly. D's return was worth one column daily; Chauffeur case mishandled; should have been on home page. University kissing case badly done; have told Lints Smith (the Manager) to dismiss legal man. Leaders still too long.' One telegram began: 'No. No. No. The articles must begin

on a Monday. Strict Jews do not read newspapers on a Saturday. Lucky dogs.' Northcliffe returned to London still desperately full of energy and then went to the Continent again, where he could plan in peace. He cabled 'Arrange for Steed's resignation.' At this time, John Walter at last came to the end of his tether, decided that for the ultimate credit of the family name it would be better if he ceased to be nominal chairman and sold to Northcliffe his large but not controlling block of shares. With them Walter would be parting with his option to acquire Northcliffe's holding on his death. Then Northcliffe had two sudden changes of mind or heart. He offered the chairmanship back to Walter and 'his little son' after him; and he wired to Steed: 'Have purchased Walter's entire interest thus sacking two of your chief enemies, Lints Smith and Walter.' When Steed got to Paris a few hours later he found Northcliffe obviously out of his mind waving a loaded revolver at the shadow of a dressing gown. Two months later Northcliffe died. In the meantime several schemes had been put up for the disposal of *The Times* - one of them might have brought in Lloyd George as editor! John Walter found in the end the right kind of man with the millions at his disposal, Major J. J. Astor, the present chief proprietor. Steed unfortunately lost his editorial chair and Geoffrey Dawson was brought back.

The part played by Dawson in supporting the policy of appeasement is well known. If this *History of The Times* illustrates the misfortunes that may strike a serious newspaper with a proprietor bent on using his personal power, it also shows what may happen when an Editor with complete powers and modest proprietors becomes too personally involved with politicians. Dawson drew up a memorandum which the proprietors accepted, claiming a free hand for the Editor to conduct his side of the paper as he thought best, so long as he was in charge of it. 'The power of the proprietors is exercised properly by the appointment and dismissal of the Editor, not by interfering with his work or doing it themselves. . . . No Editor can do his work properly if his assistants or correspondents are liable to be appointed except by his own choice or with his full approval.' The custom had been to recruit the foreign staff through the Chief Proprietor and the Manager, and not always with the Editor's approval. Dawson's definition of the positions of Editor and Manager was a reversal of policy. 'The Editor not merely possessed power to a degree unknown to his predecessors but to an extent impossible for himself, even by delegation, to exercise; and so far from recognizing the necessity to surrender power, he was temperamentally inclined to take more of it.' Much is made of the fact that he did not appoint a Foreign Editor when that post fell vacant. Is it considered that there should be two Editors of a serious newspaper, one responsible for foreign news and opinion, and the other for the rest?

This may have been feasible when 'foreign affairs' were less momentous than they are to-day and could be separated from 'domestic affairs'. But Dawson, in the opinion of most newspapermen, took no more powers than are required to edit a paper. Had he had average humility, it would not have been impossible for him to delegate his powers successfully. Nor was it his ignorance of European affairs, or lack of expert guidance on foreign policy, that caused him to give such complete support to Baldwin and Chamberlain. He was led astray by his desire to be in the counsels of the great and his willingness to use his paper almost as an instrument of government and diplomacy.

Dawson was in fact not fitted to exercise wisely the power he had taken. He so far departed from the traditions of good editing as to interfere regularly with the messages sent by his correspondents in Europe. The *History* says 'they felt bothered by the practice of excluding anything that the Germans might regard as "unfair" from both the Leader and the news columns of the paper. . . . In fact, messages were cut or omitted from time to time in accordance with what was accepted by the Editor as the requirements of diplomacy'. Pained by a violent outburst against *The Times* in Berlin, Dawson plaintively wondered what had occasioned it: 'I did my utmost, night after night, to keep out of the paper anything that might hurt their susceptibilities.' By this time Barrington-Ward, who was destined to succeed Dawson, had become virtually Foreign Editor. He stood, no less firmly than Dawson did, for the appeasement of Nazi Germany but his reasons for doing so were more substantial. He was one of those men who, having survived the battles on the western front, regarded the avoidance of war as a sacred duty to the fallen, as well as to the living. Thus the grievances of Europe, especially those felt by Germany after Versailles, should be removed without regard to the kind of government the aggrieved nation might now have. 'Dawson came to the same conclusions by way of talk with people of a certain cast of thought and his close personal friendships with Baldwin, Chamberlain and Halifax.'

This *History* is a stupendous affair. It has many passages of absorbing interest, though some find they are written without grace or narrative skill. It is repetitious and much of the detail is of slight interest even to the specialist reader. One wishes that some passages had been shortened so that more space could be given to the development of *The Times* as a newspaper. Nothing is said of its criticism of the Arts, or its domestic reporting. Even its unique parliamentary service is not mentioned. Nor does it emerge clearly what was Northcliffe's contribution to the craft of serious journalism. One suspects that it was important. We learn that he thought many of the contributions were too long. (He would have agreed

with C. P. Scott that most pieces are improved by shortening.) We also know that he fought the staff to get as a regular feature the light Leader which is highly thought of to-day. Surely it would have been worth while giving more of his penetrating bulletins criticizing the day's issue. It is also surprising that only one example of typographical change is given. How interesting it would have been to see what the Bill page and the Leader page looked like at the beginning and end of the Northcliffe regime.

The *History* officially finishes with the death of Barrington-Ward. Whether the powers of the Editor were curbed after Dawson's departure is not revealed. The information would have been of special interest, since the newly appointed Editor of *The Times*, Sir William Haley, has spent his previous journalistic life in an office where it was laid down that Editor and Business Manager should walk hand in hand, the first, be it well understood, just an inch or two in advance.

## IN SEARCH OF SOCIALISM

E. F. Schumacher

'Where do we go from here?' – this is the question which eight Fabians have set out to answer in a book bearing the proud title *New Fabian Essays*.

They found that they had to devote a good deal of space to the prior question, 'Where do we stand?' There have been great changes since before the war, and it is certainly right to stop and try to become fully aware of them. 'Our economy,' says Mr Strachey, 'is exhibiting behaviour quite different from that which it exhibited during the whole of the inter-war period.' And Mr Crosland finds that 'the new society is quite different in kind from the capitalism which it succeeds'. Is it still useful to call it capitalism? Mr Crossman calls it 'welfare capitalism' and comments that 'the planned Welfare State is really the adaptation of capitalism to the demands of modern trade unionism'. Mr Crosland considers and rejects various new names for it and finally calls it 'Statism', because, he says, 'the most fundamental change from capitalism is the change from *laissez-faire* to state control'. Others talk of Managerialism.

All are agreed that it cannot be called Socialism. About the far-reaching and even fundamental changes that have taken place they are not in doubt. Economic 'stimulation' has worked – the critics may say it has worked too well. Twenty years ago, let it be remembered, the Right generally asserted that 'stimulation' either could not work at all or could

only make matters worse; while the Left, on the whole, believed it to be incompatible with the capitalist system. Chronic unemployment has been replaced – recent events notwithstanding – by chronic labour shortage. While there used to be an inability to find employment for all available (or potentially available) savings and capital, there are now ‘never enough savings to provide for all the new objects of investment which are clamouring for execution’. Welfare arrangements and income redistribution have abolished the worst kind of poverty – and so on and so forth. ‘The new society is infinitely more humane and decent than the old,’ says Mr Crosland; ‘most of the unbearable social tensions which afflicted capitalism . . . have disappeared.’ And the extraordinary thing is that this has been done without a great deal of ‘socialization’, without extending public ownership over more than a small sector of the economy. Mr Albu is quite blunt about it when he says: ‘The truth is that the most urgent of these objects of public ownership have now been achieved by other means’.

And yet, the new ‘system’ cannot be called Socialism. Why not? Where do we go from here? ‘A reforming party,’ says Mr Jenkins, ‘is always in danger of destroying itself by its own success.’ That is fair enough, but is it the whole story? Is the ‘Loss of Momentum’ of which Mr Crossman speaks simply due to having achieved, albeit by unorthodox means, what one had set out to achieve? No, the problem goes deeper, and most, though not all, of the eight authors feel it.

In the first place, there is a certain feeling of uneasiness and depression, it seems, because some of the difficulties that have been encountered have arisen in unexpected quarters and have shown themselves to be quite independent of the ‘system’. In the original *Fabian Essays*, there was, as Mr Attlee records in his Preface to the new volume, ‘an underlying assumption that peace will continue and will allow the development of socialism to take place in country after country’. But where is peace to-day? There may indeed be a mechanism that ‘inevitably’ drives capitalism to war – but it also looks as if the problem of war is older than that of capitalism and that, in any case, socialism in one’s own country does not provide immunity from war outside.

Quite apart from the tragic problem of war and peace, a rather unexpected major difficulty has arisen in the economic field – how to achieve a balance of external payments. Strange to say, the Fabians were, and apparently still are, singularly ill-prepared to come to grips with this problem. The transformation of capitalism into ‘Statism’, or what you call it, has not solved it, nor is a further transformation into socialism likely to do so by itself. It is an exceedingly awkward problem – independent of ‘system’.

Mr Strachey talks about it at some length. Let us see what he has to say.

In fact, the only really grave difficulty has been, and is, the balance of external payments. Even here, however, it is the consequences of world rearmament – rather than our own programme in itself – which are causing the difficulty of the balance of overseas payments to reappear just when it *appeared to have been mastered*. . . . What, after all, is the basic task which we have to perform in order to balance our overseas payments? *We must set aside exports* – both visible and invisible – to a sufficient value to pay for those imports, visible and invisible, which we decide to buy. We must give the provision of these indispensable exports priority over every other call on our productive resources. . . . Who can possibly say that there is anything inherently impossible about doing that? (Italics mine.)

As Bacon said, ‘It had been hard for him that spake it to have put more Truth and untruth together in a few words’.

True enough, the balance of external payments has become a problem of central importance. It is the kind of problem that can really bring you to a dead stop. If a balance of payments crisis is left unsolved, it produces, like bankruptcy, a real collapse and incalculable internal and external consequences. Politically, it can ruin governments and parties for a long time. Again, Mr Strachey is undoubtedly right when he asserts that the difficulty with the balance of external payments is not caused by the programme of the Labour Government. But when he suggests that it is caused by world rearmament and that the problem had ‘just appeared to have been mastered’, I fear that he is very far off the mark. And when he goes on to ask his simple question and to give his simple answer – ‘we must set aside exports’ – it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that a strange lacuna exists in Mr Strachey’s able mind – a lacuna in the place where there ought to be a deep knowledge and understanding of Britain’s ‘only really grave difficulty’.

It is surely a most dangerous illusion to think of the balance of external payments as the type of problem that could ever ‘appear to have been mastered’. The problem of making both ends meet is never mastered once and for all. Ask any housewife, and she will tell you. It was the Korean war and the great movement in world commodity prices which provided quite temporary and largely illusory relief in Britain’s balance of payments crisis – a fluke, and no question of anything having been mastered. This is not a mere quibbling over words. A man who thinks he has mastered the weather because the sun happens to shine, and then proceeds to abandon for good his raincoat and umbrella, is likely to get very wet a little bit later.

Nor is there, I venture to suggest, any merit whatever in Mr Strachey’s

simple answer purporting to define the 'basic task' which we have to perform in order to solve the problem of external payments. It is emphatically not simply a problem of setting aside an adequate quantity of exports. Exports have to be sold; how can anyone say that 'to-day there is no difficulty in finding the markets for our exports'? They have to be sold in the right markets. They have to be sold at a price that gives a tolerable return in external purchasing power. What is more, imports have to be procured – again at a tolerable price. Can we lightheartedly assume that the imports of foodstuffs and raw materials we require will always be procurable?

There is, surely, a writing on the wall. It reads: 'World Sulphur Shortage'; it reads: 'Meatless Days in Buenos Aires'. And what next? Mr Strachey admits that 'if the terms of trade turned sufficiently against us, the burden of providing the necessary exports would become heavy indeed, and this would be a grave factor preventing our standard of life from rising as fast as it otherwise would'. He does not even consider the possibility that the terms of trade might easily *reduce* our standard of living, let alone the possibility that things may happen so that there will be (with regard to some really essential imports) no question of 'terms of trade' at all. The sulphur problem is not a problem of terms of trade, but one of sheer physical availability. Is it wise to shut our eyes to the fact that something similar may arise over wide sectors in the field of food imports? Or over many raw materials without which we cannot get on?

Mr Colin Clark recently pointed out that if the population of the whole world – just think of it for a moment – were concentrated in the United States, the number of people per square mile would still be less than it is in England and Wales. Anyone who cares can look up the figures and check the calculation. Is not this enough to make us all take the problem of Britain's balance of payments very seriously? No important country in the world depends on imports the same way as Britain does. No country suffers from a similar disequilibrium in the degree to which it is dependent on others, compared with the degree to which others are dependent upon it. Economically, the rest of the world could, if absolutely necessary, get on without Britain; but Britain could not get on without the rest of the world – that is the brutal fact.

So when anybody attributes Britain's balance of payments difficulties to the programme of the Labour Government, or to rearmament, or indeed to the war, he makes the mistake of taking the 'releasing factor' for the underlying cause. When he discusses the problem in terms of exports only, in terms of simply setting aside enough exports, he makes the mistake of treating a problem of supply as if it were merely a problem of exchange.

Of course, Mr Strachey can say that he has answered all this in his essay, and he can quote the following:

If the economists mean that the terms of trade are going to go on getting worse and worse, then I do not believe that there is any real reason why they should. No doubt they may do so if the industrial nations do not make a sustained effort to help the primary producers of the under-developed world. . . . But as long as we face up to that necessity of the world-wide development of primary production, I cannot see that there is any need to panic about the terms of trade.

He then refers the hopeful reader to the second (and final) part of his essay devoted to 'the problem of the *external* unbalance between different nations and parts of the world' and to 'a consideration of contemporary imperialism'. But when you read this second part you find in it nothing about developing *primary* production. 'The under-developed countries are going to be industrialized: 'From China to Peru the great majority of the human race is still but slightly touched by the Industrial Revolution'. We must now help them to get properly touched (or burned?). For this purpose, not for the purpose of getting food and raw materials to keep Britain alive – for this purpose there should be a 'publicly controlled and directed export of capital', mainly from the United States who 'will have to join with us in a sustained effort'.

In other words, a large volume of goods is going to be set aside by Britain, not for exports to obtain imports in exchange, but to be loaned to ('invested in') under-developed countries, so that these under-developed countries should create secondary industries (which means raising the demand for raw materials in the world) and should improve their own standards of consumption (which means raising the demand for, or reducing the supply of, foodstuffs in the world market).

Now, let there be no misunderstanding. Of course, it would be wonderful if the rich countries really went out of their way to help the poor. No one denies that. But the question is this: 'Is Britain still a rich country *in this sense?*' This matter of obtaining imports and paying for them by exports is Britain's gravest difficulty. What *has* she to give away? In any case, it is hard to see how the giving away is going to *help* when one cannot make ends meet.

These are unpalatable facts, and Britain is in an unenviable position. Naturally, there is no need to panic – there never is. But there is need to face the facts and to take action undreamt-of in the philosophy of Fabianism. Mr Strachey believes 'that there is a prospect of economic progress before us, such as we have never known', provided only that 'we keep our economy going at full blast'. Agreed. But can we fulfil the proviso? Can we get the *primary* products? If not, there is a prospect of

economic difficulties such as we have never known. This is a problem that faces the country irrespective of 'system' or party in power. And because it by-passes questions of system (at least in the present state of the discussion) most of the Fabians, I fear, have not faced it. Because the facts are unpalatable when you do face them, the Fabians feel unhappy in spite of their gigantic success in matters of 'system'.

It may be thought that I have been churlish in picking on this one point, and a somewhat technical point at that, when there is so much else in these eight essays that is good and constructive. I admit, matters concerning the country's balance of payment are not 'fundamental' in a philosophical sense. Nor is bankruptcy in private life. It merely ruins you.

Let us then turn to more fundamental matters in the philosophical sense. Why is there this atmosphere of depression – disappointment – frustration throughout the book? What lies behind this feeling, so frequently expressed, that while capitalism has been abolished yet something worthy of the name of socialism does not seem to have been brought much nearer. 'The Labour Party was unsure where it was going,' says Mr Crossman. 'The familiar landmarks on the road to socialism had been left behind: it was travelling in strange country, exposed to climatic rigours it had not anticipated and against which its traditional equipment gave little protection. . . . How can the Labour Party regain its sense of direction?' That is the question. And what is Mr Crossman's answer? I, for one, cannot find it. I can only find the sentence: 'We are certainly not in a position as yet to map the new route to socialism'.

Luckily, some of the other authors are a bit more positive. Listen to Mr Crosland:

The purpose of socialism is quite simply to eradicate this sense of class, and to create in its place a sense of common interest and equal status. This will require not only more measures on the economic plane, directed to the greater equalization of living standards and opportunities, *but also measures on the socio-psychological plane*. It is here that the essential difference between statism and socialism lies, and it is in this direction that socialists must look for the main advance. (Italics mine.)

Now, this is striking a new – or, rather, too long forgotten – note. 'The crucial problem,' he says later, 'is the psychology of industrial relations, and the general tone and atmosphere in industry.' (Why only in industry?) It does not matter that Mr Crosland cannot precisely say how this is to be solved. At least he does identify the problem *as one that cannot be discussed primarily in economic terms*. If socialism is merely to mean more efficiency, higher productivity, more output, and a higher standard of living – *all these concepts being defined and measured in much the same way as under capitalism* – then it will never regain its momentum.

Although Mr Crosland has struck this 'new' note (I put 'new' in quotation marks, because it is really the oldest of the old), he has done so only very faintly. He believes that 'the easy and spectacular things have all been done'. (But have they – on this non-economic plane?) And he speaks of 'the difficulty of engendering enthusiasm for further change in a population largely employed and enjoying rising standards every year'. Yes, *further* changes on that aridly economic plane, more appeals for higher productivity and greater effort, more increases (or promises of increases) in the standard of living, *without any change in the Quality of Life*, will not engender much enthusiasm. But this is not due to the great majority of people believing that they already live in the best of all possible worlds. It is due to the fact, often unknown to themselves, that their real longing is for changes on the non-economic plane – on the (let us be quite old-fashioned!) moral plane.

Some of the contributors see this quite clearly, e.g. Mr Albu. He charges the nationalized industries with 'failure to create in their managers, technicians and workers any radical change of attitude towards their work and responsibilities', and declares categorically that 'the creation of a feeling of common purpose in the activities of industry (why only industry?) still remains . . . one of the outstanding unattained objectives of socialist industrial policy'. Incidentally, Mr Albu's few remarks on the problem of the external balance of payments and the need to seek new sources of supply of food and raw materials, although they only lightly touch upon the matter, are more realistic than any other remarks on the 'gravest difficulty' in the book.

There is much more in this volume of *New Fabian Essays* than can possibly be discussed in this review – much that is good and some that is not so good. Denis Healey on 'Power Politics and the Labour Party' brings a welcome whiff of fresh air. Mrs Cole (on Education) and Mr Mikardo (on Trade Unions) have much to say that is of interest. But although a bit of a new start has been made, the lost momentum has by no means been recovered. However, we are promised a further series of essays. Perhaps these will be rather less conventional, a bit more visionary – in the sense of imaginative, rather than imaginary – and rather less concerned with small further extensions in the application of the methods employed hitherto. Let these small extensions look after themselves; they will come, even under non-Labour governments, after a lot of laborious committee work. What is needed is a new idealism – 'faith', if you like – that looks at everything in this society with new eyes and addresses to it a new question: 'Does this – whatever it is – really serve genuine human needs and aspirations?' And what is it that should so be looked at? All the established relations of man to man in production, distribution and exchange; the

products themselves; the work processes (are they of such a kind that they degrade and offend the personality of the worker?); the homes in which people live and by which they are formed; the surroundings of these homes; recreation, education, welfare, and the rest. Perhaps the question of commercial broadcasting is more important, from this point of view, than the question of whether or not the cement industry should be put under public ownership. Perhaps town and country planning is more important than higher death duties.

Socialism, to engender enthusiasm, must create a new set of values: it must give a new *quality* to the concept of 'standard of living'.

There is so much to be done.

## PROMETHEUS UNBOUND

G. L. Arnold

Readers of *New Fabian Essays* must be struck by the eloquent passage in which Mr R. H. S. Crossman contrasts two alternative modes of human behaviour in periods of stress. Commenting on the current retreat from optimism and belief in progress, he suggests that this emergence of a soberer attitude need not weaken our determination to make the world a better place:

The recognition that progress does not necessarily bring freedom has led a considerable number of socialist intellectuals to accept defeat and to withdraw from politics into mysticism and quietism. But this is not the only conclusion which can be drawn. Facing the century of totalitarianism, we can choose between two philosophies, symbolized by the figures of Buddha and Prometheus. Buddha represents the withdrawal from the struggle for freedom. For the Oriental Buddhist, or for the Western defeatist, intellectual humility is the greatest virtue; the good man is not involved but detached; he accepts the world as a vale of woe and seeks realization in a transcendental eternity. The other philosophy, that of the sceptical humanist, is symbolized by Prometheus, chained to his Caucasian peak, with the eagle pecking out his liver. Prometheus stole fire from the gods in order to help his fellow-men. He did not believe that any law of nature or divine purpose would automatically give freedom and happiness to his fellow-men. Neither God nor history was on his side. It was his duty to steal fire, in defiance of law and order, and to prefer eternal agony to the denial of truth.

Several reflections are suggested by this remarkable statement, the first and most obvious being that Mr Crossman has misread the legend of Prometheus. It is misleading to speak of the Titan having tried to benefit

'his fellow-men.' They were not his fellow-creatures, but beings of a lower order, and the revolt he staged was largely for the purpose of demonstrating his contempt for Zeus and the other Olympians. Prometheus, *pace* Mr Crossman, did not steal the fire because he considered it his duty – such Kantian or Stoic notions were foreign to him – but because he saw no reason why the hated Olympians should monopolize it. For one thing he wanted to play with it (Mr Crossman ought to read Freud or Jung on this fascinating topic). For another thing he wanted to make himself independent of Zeus. Although idealized in later poetry, he remains primarily a rebel whose archetypal significance is plain to modern psychology. The *puer robustus et malitiosus*, to adapt Hobbes's description of the unruly plebs which worships such image-breakers, is still discernible behind the tragic mask of the Æschylean hero. Even if one takes the myth at its face value, Prometheus chained to his peak appears as an antinomian figure. His refusal to surrender was motivated (if we can trust Æschylus, who is after all our principal authority) by hatred of Zeus, contempt for the Olympians generally, and faith in his own final victory. There are some famous lines in English poetry which breathe a kindred spirit:

What though the field be lost?  
All is not lost; th' unconquerable will,  
And study of revenge, immortal hate  
And courage never to submit or yield,  
And what is else not to be overcome . . .

Milton's Lucifer is a straight descendant of Prometheus (this is not an original discovery). And what of the Arch-Milton sitting at Chalfont and brooding over the defeat of his party? One has only to glance at *Samson Agonistes*, notably the close ('Fully revenged – hath left them years of mourning . . . Soaked in his enemies' blood', etc.) which breathes the true Classical-Biblical spirit. Again in more modern times, Prometheus (or Æschylus) has inspired a succession of kindred spirits, not the least important being Marx whose doctoral dissertation opens with a hymn of praise to the Titan ('Prometheus is the foremost saint and martyr in the philosophic calendar'). This then is the historical background of Mr Crossman's declaration of faith. One sees at once that he moves in select company, but it is likewise evident that he has introduced a new and discordant element into the traditional story: his Prometheus has, as it were, read the Stoics and acquired a conscience, and a notion of duty, which strike one as modern, not to say existentialist. He sounds a little like M. Sartre.

One's next question is whether the transition from myth to reality in the passage I have quoted is not perhaps a shade too abrupt. We are to 'choose' between Buddha and Prometheus. This seems a loose and confusing way of stating the issue. Buddha, when all is said and done, is a real,

though remote, historical figure, whose disciples, like himself, existed in the flesh, shared his thoughts, and after his death founded a religion. Prometheus, for all his incontestable merits as a symbol, lacks reality. We cannot 'choose' between them, any more than we can 'choose' between, say, Bertrand Russell and Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor. If someone at the back of the class objects that the historical Buddha is a shadowy figure, I merely observe that the distinction between reality and myth is not affected by length of time. If the argument is that Prometheus has full metaphysical status as a timeless embodiment of suffering and struggling humanity (the sufferings and struggles being real enough) I can only say that I prefer a flesh-and-blood hero to one who owes his existence to the poets and myth-makers. Human beings require symbols, and it is undeniable that the humanists have made Prometheus their standard-bearer; but it makes a difference whether people attach themselves to an authentic saint or a mythical one. Prometheus chained to his peak, with the eagle devouring his entrails, is a tremendous and terrifying figure. I vastly prefer him to Buddha. But I cannot get round the fact that in sober truth he did not exist.

The trouble with these poetic images is that they lend themselves to unconscious manipulation. One can never be certain that the symbol will over a stretch of time continue to have the same meaning for different individuals. Having sprung fully clothed from the poet's head, it remains dependent upon our human vagaries in a way in which the authentic saint or hero, however misunderstood and travestied by disciples and clerical corporations, does not. An example of this process is unwittingly provided by Mr Crossman when, having evoked the Titan on his lonely crag, he goes on to draw a brief sketch of the archetypal Fabian:

... if freedom is to survive, it is essential that neither the U S A nor the Soviet Union should win, and that ideological passion should subside. What the Western socialist needs today is not a crusading creed, but a critical attitude to both ideologies; and the role of the British Labour Movement is to furnish an example of this critical humanism in action. Sceptical, but not cynical; detached, but not neutral; rational, but not dogmatically rationalist. The Promethean social conscience, which I have described on an earlier page, is the only force which can prevent the modern state from degenerating into a managerial society, or the East-West conflict into World War III.

I hesitate to guess what this passage may suggest to other readers. To me it suggests, not Prometheus on his rock, but the Editor of the *New Statesman* at his desk weighing the pros and cons. 'Sceptical, but not cynical; detached, but not neutral; rational, but not dogmatically rationalist.' If not exactly a Promethean image, it is certainly a civilized and

pleasing one. It calls to mind a succession of eminent humanists to whom our world owes what little urbanity it possesses: Montaigne, Hume, Goethe, or – going further back – Epicurus. A Chinese might find a surprising resemblance to Confucius and reflect that Mr Crossman has after all merely re-stated the ancient contrast between the practical Confucian and the mystical Taoist attitude. What cannot, I think, be seriously maintained is that we have here an adequate picture of the Titan who refused to bow the neck to Zeus, though tortured beyond endurance. It may be that Mr Crossman is too civilized to see Prometheus in these Æschylean terms. What seems clear is that the archetypal rebel does not fit very well into the Fabian pantheon:

Haughty thy speech and swollen with pride, as becomes a servant of the gods. Ye are but young in tyranny, and think to inhabit a citadel unassaulted of grief; yet have I not seen two tyrants fall therefrom? And third I shall behold this present lord cast down in utter ruin.

Speaks thus the voice of sceptical humanism, of Fabian moderation? No, it won't do. If things are brought down to that level one thinks rather of Trotsky in exile, shortly before the assassin-executioner got him. But the whole pretentious effort to convert metaphysical and poetical imagery into the small change of politics is misconceived. Mr Crossman has fallen victim to the disastrous fashion started by Professor Toynbee. The ravages of this cult are visible on every page of his essay:

Judging by the facts, there is far more to be said for the Christian doctrine of Original Sin than for Rousseau's fantasy of the noble savage, or Marx' vision of the classless society.

This sounds impressive, until one remembers that the doctrine of Original Sin says nothing about institutional arrangements. What it does is to affirm a certain view of human nature which remains true (or the reverse) whatever the historical destiny of mankind. The correct Christian deduction is not that the classless society is impossible, but that its coming would not alter man's fundamental predicament. The misuse of such doctrines for purposes of polemical phrase-making is not intrinsically superior to the banal sentimentalism which depicts the founder of Christianity as a social reformer. It is a pity to find Mr Crossman sinking to what might be termed the Sayers level. It also shakes one's faith in his consistency, for what is the value of his Promethean affirmations if the entire humanist position is thus evacuated without a shot? His Prometheus began by sounding like Jean Paul Sartre, went on to display the benign scepticism of Anatole France, and now reveals himself as a colleague of Mr C. S. Lewis. Again, what are 'the facts' in the light of which Mr Crossman judges the doctrine of Original Sin to be true after all? The facts of yester-

day's political situation? Theology requires a firmer basis. If there is 'something to be said for' the Christian doctrine, we ought not to have to depend upon the latest news about concentration camps. In fact we don't. It is a characteristic error on Mr Crossman's part to suppose that what matters to politicians must also be important to philosophers and theologians. Karl Barth's *Roemerbrief* was published at the height of the post-1918 Wilsonian euphoria, when all good Liberals hailed the flimsy League as the guarantee of perpetual peace. By contrast, as we all know, the liberal-humanist belief in perfectibility and human goodness arose originally as a reaction against the furies unleashed by the Wars of Religion. If you make your appeal to history you must be prepared for such dialectical surprises. 'Judging by the facts', as they appeared to thinking people in Europe after the devastation of the Thirty Years War, those who believed most fervently in Original Sin were also most fervent in holding that heretics should be denied toleration, from which it seemed to follow that to be orthodox was to advocate massacre. Anyone can demonstrate in two minutes that this conclusion is unfair and irrelevant, but the historical evidence then appeared conclusive, and some of us persist in regarding the subsequent reaction as salutary. If Mr Crossman wants to reinstate the orthodox view he must take his stand on firmer ground.

But what chiefly prejudices one against his judgment in matters of history is his evident lack of discrimination in awarding certificates of merit or demerit to writers whose works have come to his notice. It is not merely that he is irritatingly brash, but that he seems unaware of the existence of different levels of significance. For Mr Crossman one writer or thinker is as good as another. It is all one to him whether a remark was made by Rousseau, by Lenin, or, allegedly, by Buddha. The universe in which he moves is peopled by authors of interesting works of fiction, sociology and metaphysics, and all without distinction are in turn called upon to present their credentials. His essay teems with casual allusions to Rousseau, Marx, Wells, Buddha, Professor Toynbee, Arthur Koestler, Prometheus and Aldous Huxley, and while he is more severe on some than on others, there is no suggestion that he recognizes intrinsic distinctions among them. He hails them all as colleagues and subjects them to the same brisk, slapdash treatment:

Most of us would now agree that Toynbee's sense of direction was better than that of the early Wells.

Here is one point where Toynbee's picture is more acceptable than that of Wells or Marx. . . .

By rejecting the automatism of Wells and Marx, and the defeatism of Koestler and Aldous Huxley. . . .

After 1918 Western man lost his faith in the White Man's Burden.

And so on. The comparison between Buddha and Prometheus, the portrait of the 'Promethean' sceptic, and the learned excursion into Original Sin have already been quoted. Frankly, one cannot feel that Mr Crossman is at his best in thus imitating Shaw. The effect is one of pastiche, and in some instances of unconscious parody. To talk of Marx and Wells in one breath is, to anyone but a Fabian, like comparing Bach and Berlioz. To contrast either or both with Koestler and Huxley is grotesque. Mr Crossman has not yet learned to distinguish between thinkers and *littérateurs*. Can this be the reason why his own contribution to *New Fabian Essays* falls so flat?

When he descends from these unaccustomed heights into the political grassland he becomes at once more interesting and less irritating. He has some sensible things to say of the intelligentsia's role in backward countries, and the harm done by modernizing primitive economies without altering the political regime. But in the concluding paragraph he is off again:

We must first accept the Cold War as the central fact of twentieth century politics (just as class war was the central fact of nineteenth century politics) and then disprove the prophets who prove that it must end in World War III.

One sees his meaning, but wishes nonetheless that he had expressed it differently. Professor Toynbee has much to answer for.

## ONE HIT, ONE MISS

Sidney Hook

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COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY AND CATHOLIC POWER. By Paul Blanshard. 340 pp. (Cape. 18s.)

This provocative book, which continues a libertarian tradition begun by Tom Paine, has a double thesis. The first asserts that as systems of *doctrine* the authoritarian ideologies of the Kremlin and the Vatican are both incompatible with the principles of democracy. The second maintains that as systems of *power* both challenge democratic institutions and constitute a domestic and international threat to the structure of freedom in the modern world.

On the basis of his argument Mr Blanshard proposes that American policy dissociate itself from any alliance or united front for any purpose

with either variety of totalitarianism in their struggle against each other. Since in the present junction of world affairs it is extremely unlikely that American democracy will make common cause with the Kremlin, Mr Blanshard is in effect recommending that in international affairs we forego alliances or coalitions with any Catholic parties. In Europe, he quite properly points out, the chief political instrument of opposition to Stalinism should be the Socialist movement, but he fails to observe that West European Socialist parties, in the interest of their own survival, have often felt justified in entering a coalition with Catholic parties to prevent victory for the partisans of the Kremlin. This suggests certain crucial difficulties in Mr Blanshard's position that remain unclarified and weaken what he has to say by making it appear an unrealistic counsel of perfection. There is obviously a difference between supporting Franco and entering a common front for special purposes with the Christian Democratic Parties of France and Italy.

The parallelism which Mr Blanshard draws between the doctrines of Communism and Catholicism in their relation to democratic principles is very impressive, particularly in their claims to privileged access to truth, their internal organization, their methods of deification, education and propaganda. But in respect to doctrine Mr Blanshard overlooks a central point. Whereas from the standpoint of democracy, Stalinism is both a heresy and a conspiracy which justifies seizure of power by a minority to impose the will of the Party on the population by force and violence, Catholicism is only a heresy, since the full programme of the Catholic State, even according to the most orthodox interpretation of its dogmas, is to be introduced only when a majority of the population has been won to the Catholic position. So long as the processes of political democracy remain intact, the Catholic political programme can be contested in the give and take of the processes of representative government, its political animus exposed in the same way as those of other pressure groups, and its authoritarian dogmas criticized in the same fashion as those of other creeds. This is implicitly recognized by Mr Blanshard himself when he states that 'the Kremlin aims to destroy the governments which it cannot conquer by persuasion; the Vatican is, on the whole, law-abiding and non-revolutionary.' But he does not see the far-reaching implications of this admission. For if Catholic political parties are law-abiding, a vigilant public opinion can defeat their attempts to breach 'the wall of separation' between Church and State, and to impose their cruel and parochial notions about birth control and divorce upon the community at large. Nonetheless it remains true that since a democracy rests upon the freely given consent of the governed, any church which denies its communicants the moral right to examine both sides of every social question, including

literature critical of its own position, is to that extent hostile to the doctrinal ethos of democracy. Here Mr Blanshard scores a telling point in his criticism of the Vatican's educational policy.

The second main proposition of Mr Blanshard's book is that considered as patterns of power the Vatican and the Kremlin 'are as alike as the two poles of the earth'. No observant reader can fail to note that Mr Blanshard himself refutes this preposterous equation. He tells us that the Vatican 'is almost everywhere on the defensive whereas the Kremlin is the world's most rapidly expanding imperialist power.' His description of Communist power in action makes the mind reel with horror. Compared to a regime of concentration camps, mass liquidations, and total cultural terror, the Vatican's demand for public support of parochial schools, and its veto of humane marriage and birth control laws, seem mere irritations. Is there no difference between the threat of eternal damnation for a mortal sin like divorce, which can be persuasive only to those who are already convinced, and the threat of torture to oneself and family here and now for any kind of criticism of Stalin?

On occasions, Mr Blanshard characterizes the Soviet exercise of power as 'infinitely more dangerous' than the Vatican's. Precisely – and one would imagine that no comparison between the finite and the infinite is legitimate. Yet Mr Blanshard, admitting that the encroachments of the Vatican and the Kremlin are 'strikingly different in kind and degree', can couple in the same sentence the danger to democracy of an unscientific parochial school system, in which after all attendance is voluntary, and the danger of 'an invading military column'. This lack of proportion, were it to have a serious influence, could weaken the struggle to oppose clericalism on the domestic front, and to combat Communism on the international front. One can understand the causes of Mr Blanshard's myopia in evaluating the dangers of Kremlin and Vatican power. He has observed that despite our support of Stalin against Hitler, Stalin is now an even greater menace to our survival. And like many other liberal and democratic Americans he has become alarmed at the boldness with which some of the partisans of the Vatican in the United States are seeking to undermine the public schools. On this last point, it should be noted that the battle, thanks among other things to Mr Blanshard's previous book, *American Freedom and Catholic Power*, is by no means lost. The issue is joined, and large sections of our population are aware of it. Catholics in the United States, if we are to judge by men like Francis McMahon and Allen Tate, do not constitute a monolithic front. Their influence may grow. And finally, even in a largely Catholic country like France, the political programme of the Vatican is far from being realized.

Was it wrong to support Stalin against Hitler, and was this the cause of

our weakness *vis-à-vis* Soviet power? No, the mistake lay in the criminal foolishness of building Stalin up as a kind of Russian democrat and taking the dissolution of the Comintern at its face value, despite the warnings of those who knew Stalin better than Churchill and Roosevelt did. Similarly, it is not wrong to enter into alliances with Catholic political groups to withstand the massed attack of Stalinism against free democratic institutions which permit both the Catholic Church and Rationalist Societies to compete with each other freely for public support. For all their differences a Catholic trade union and a Socialist trade union have much more in common than either has with a movement which destroys *all* free trade unions. This obvious point is overlooked by some irrational Rationalists who regard Catholicism as a more dangerous enemy to free institutions than Stalinism, despite the historic record which proves that whereas it is possible to preserve free institutions in Catholic countries, this is altogether impossible in any country ruled by the Kremlin. In Communist countries even the right to be silent has been abolished, and among the first victims of Communist terror are Rationalists who cannot swallow the dogmas of dialectical materialism or who fail to grovel before the icons of Stalin.

## THE GOOD NATURE OF BISHOP BUTLER

Lan Freed

It is related that on his deathbed, 200 years ago, Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham and sometime Preacher at the Chapel of the Rolls Court, experienced misgivings as to his fitness for salvation. His chaplain, however, by reminding him of the divine mercy, was able to reassure him, and he died happy. We must all be glad to know this, and we can only wonder that so saintly and well-esteemed a Christian could ever have doubted that he had earned his Heavenly reward, for the little that is told of Butler's private life seems to show that nothing in it belied his own conviction, as recorded in his sermons and other works, of the essential goodness of human nature. We learn that he was modest and retiring, very charitable to the poor, and beloved by all who knew him. They say he had 'a calm and benignant countenance' with a sweetness of expression that matched the sweetness of his disposition.

Butler's amiability in his personal relations was reflected both in the style and in the tenor of his literary works. In an age of fierce polemics he was always notably urbane. Though he set himself to refute Deism

and scepticism, and indeed every school of thought which presumed to doubt the truth of anything to be found in Holy Writ, he never thundered or denounced. His method of controversy was to argue with elaborate dialectical skill from premisses which his opponents themselves accepted, often with the effect of demonstrating that for all their denials they were not nearly so far from being good Christians as they chose to pretend. Though he had left the Presbyterian fold in which he was reared, largely, we may guess, because the emphasis upon original sin was so alien to his cast of mind, Butler's single recorded excursion into sectarian controversy was an early correspondence with a Dr Samuel Clarke on some rather obscure doctrinal question, and in the end he came round to Dr Clarke's opinion after all. For the rest, he devoted himself to the reasoned refutation of Deism, and to the championship of human nature against its denigrators.

Possibly because of its very exceptional forthrightness and simplicity Butler's theory of human nature has been much misunderstood. Commentators, hampered by their own ethical theories and preoccupations, have tried to work out meanings in the Butlerian doctrine that it is man's duty to act in conformity with his nature, above and beyond what Butler himself suggested. They have tried to make him a kind of Perfectionist who in exhorting man to obey the law of his nature was really upholding an ideal – a kind of perfect man, like Plato's perfect bedstead. Professor C.D. Broad, for example, in his sympathetic study of Butler's ethic in *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, suggests that what he was really trying to say was that virtue consists in acting in accordance with the *ideal* nature of man. But I think this is to misunderstand both Butler's thesis, and his ultimate purpose, which was rather to establish the fundamental rightness and goodness of human nature than to lay down standards of perfection. The truth of the matter is that Butler, for all his orthodoxy, had been deeply affected by the doctrines of Shaftesbury, who argued that since Nature in general has so evidently been designed by a wise and benevolent Creator for the happiness of living creatures, and since human nature has the ability to distinguish good from evil, and is spontaneously disposed towards goodness, there is no need for Revelation to instruct us in these matters. All that we need to know of the purposes of the Supreme Being, and how to act in harmony with them, is revealed to us by our own reason and the moral sense with which, to this end, we have been endowed. Butler reacted to this by writing his celebrated *Analogy of Nature*, in which he sought to prove with many ingenious arguments that Nature and the Bible *both* reveal the divine dispensation, and that to doubt the evidences of the Christian faith is as irrational as it would be to doubt the evidence on which we base our expectations regarding the

continuity of natural processes. He further argued that faith in a just dispensation absolutely requires belief in an after-life in which rewards and punishments shall be awarded according to men's deserts. In this way Butler, as the upholder of orthodoxy, dealt with the fallacies of Deism. Nevertheless it is perfectly apparent that the insistence of Shaftesbury and his school upon the natural goodness of man evoked a warm response in Butler's mind, and that the usual emphasis of the Christian preacher upon human depravity was as uncongenial to him as it was to them.

In all his talk about human nature Butler, far from suggesting that it ought to be better than it is, was continually stressing what he regarded as its peculiar, and peculiarly admirable, characteristics. Starting with the proposition that man, above all the rest of Creation, is designed for virtue, Butler sets himself to test this theory by examining human nature itself. He asks in effect, what is *characteristic* of human nature? What makes man different from the beasts? What makes him unique? There is nothing perfectionist about this. 'Everything is what it is and not another thing', says Butler in deprecating the use of pejorative terms to describe what is natural. He looks at man as he is. Carefully and reverently, as befits an investigator of the Creator's handiwork, Butler places Man under the microscope, and records his findings.

To begin with he sees much which resembles the constitution of the brutes. Here are instincts and principles of action, some chiefly conducing to the individual's own welfare, some to the advantage of the herd. These, as in the case of animals, operate according to bodily constitution and external circumstances, as is right and proper. But now Butler observes that in addition to these normal animal constituents, man possesses an extra organ, as it were: a unique organ which serves to control and regulate the rest, and which in fact determines the essential character of the whole organism. Butler went to considerable pains to describe in detail the character and functions of this distinctively human attribute, which he calls Conscience or, just as frequently, the Principle of Reflection. In the first of his sermons *Upon Human Nature* Butler introduces Conscience as follows:

We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects, and in such degrees, and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience.

This faculty, Butler continues, 'tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other and leads them to do good,' and moreover it provides a *universally acknowledged* standard of morality, which is that of 'veracity, justice, and regard to the common good'. And if we ask why we should obey the dictates of conscience, Butler answers that 'it carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide, the guide assigned to us by the Author of our Nature'.

Now although Butler's Conscience, as he describes it, may strike us as being an extremely complex and versatile organ, we begin to realize, as he continues his exposition of the various services it performs for us, that in surveying and judging our personalities, controlling our impulses, and 'showing us in all cases the way we should walk in' it does for us one thing supremely: it promotes our happiness. Butler is perfectly candid – indeed he is emphatic – about this, and herein lies the notable originality of his ethic. He has no use at all for that sidelong approach to self-regard which characterizes most moral teaching. He accepts as a plain fact of our existence that any actions we perform, in so far as they are voluntary actions, which is to say, in so far as they are informed by a motive, must necessarily in a sense be self-regarding: must, that is, be directed to the attainment of ends which we ourselves desire; and because he holds – with Shaftesbury – that our Maker is benevolent, and has formed our nature for happiness and virtue alike, he finds nothing in the least degrading in the fact that, as he puts it, 'nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature, but happiness'. Butler's ethic has sometimes been likened to Kant's, chiefly on the grounds that both of them maintain that the essence of moral action is obedience to a self-controlling faculty which Kant calls Reason and Butler calls Conscience. But here the resemblance ends, for whereas Kant taught that moral action is incompatible with the motive of self-interest, Butler, again following Shaftesbury, insisted that it is our positive duty to be self-regarding, even as it is our true nature to be so, and that if only we consult Conscience before we act we shall be certain of hearing something to our advantage.

Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident, for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every circumstance if we take in the future, and the whole, this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things.

Butler concedes that there are certain cases where virtue is not, or at any rate does not seem to be, directly rewarded in this world, but he maintains that 'for the most part' the path of virtue is the path to happiness, on earth, as in the hereafter. And it is the easiest of all paths to

find, for Conscience, Self-love, Benevolence, and Human Nature itself all point towards it.

Butler's insistence upon the entire compatibility between the motives of self-love and of benevolence makes him, in effect, the defender of human nature against two classes of its denigrators: the religious, of the type who dwelt upon the essential wickedness of the human soul, and the sceptics of the Hobbesian school, who practically identified self-regard with the aim of benefiting oneself at other people's expense, and denied the existence of kindness and good-will. With those who upheld this latter view Butler, though never really acrimonious, comes near to expressing impatience. He permits himself a reference to their scornful faces and their claims to 'know the world'. Against their views he argues, with incomparable charm and persuasiveness, that kindness is natural, that the feeling of benevolence is among the most pleasant of all emotions, even as benevolence is 'the most excellent of all virtuous principles'. In a characteristic passage he says,

Let it not be taken for granted that the temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater delights than meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good will, especially when it is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in themselves mere misery, and the satisfaction arising from the indulgence of them is little more than relief from that misery, whereas the temper of compassion and benevolence is in itself delightful, and the indulgence of it, by doing good, affords new positive delight and enjoyment.

And again,

Is benevolence less the temper of tranquillity and freedom than ambition and covetousness? Does the benevolent man appear less easy with himself from his love to his neighbour? Does he less relish his being? Is there any peculiar gloom seated on his face? Is his mind less open to entertainment, to any particular gratification? Nothing is more manifest than that being in good humour, which is benevolence while it lasts, is itself the temper of satisfaction and enjoyment.

Another argument reinforces these considerations. We are social beings. Very many of our passions are rooted in social feeling and the wish to stand well with our fellows.

Mankind are by nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as much desired as any external goods.

Sometimes through folly and the lack of self-control we pursue this type of satisfaction by wrong methods, but, thanks to Conscience, we all know in reality that we shall best satisfy the social side of our nature not by rapacity and aggressiveness, but by being just, truthful, and benevolent.

How natural, then, to be good! How obviously expedient! 'The privileged congregation seated in the Chapel of the Rolls Court, looking up at that 'calm and benignant countenance' while they listened to the gracefully-turned phrases which proved to them how much better they were than they knew, must surely have felt a glow of righteous fervour, and have resolved to be thenceforward more truly self-regarding and benevolent than ever before. No doubt but on leaving they gave generously to the beggar in the porch outside. Perhaps, though, as they were borne home to their abundant eighteenth century dinners the glow began to fade a little. Perhaps in the mind of one or another the face of the beggar somewhat obscured the memory of the calm and benignant countenance, and evoked, with a sigh, the reflection, 'Alas, Bishop Butler, if human virtue is indeed so very natural as you say, why are we not even now living in an earthly Paradise?'

A Utilitarian of the succeeding century, if he could have gone back through time to answer the good gentleman's perplexity, would have been bracing.

'Believe me, sir, the world is getting better every day. Bishop Butler was perfectly right in emphasizing man's natural disposition to co-operate with his fellows and to desire their happiness: but what he failed to take sufficient account of was the hard fact that our social impulses can only find free expression under conditions which engender in each individual a sense that his own interests are truly coincident with those of his fellows. To this end it is essential that social institutions should develop, and where necessary be radically amended, in accordance with the principle of securing the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number. In the present age of progress [he would have continued], this fact is becoming ever more widely recognized, and its recognition is reflected in the trend of our civilization to-day. The process is slower than we could wish, but the new Education, the developing ideas of social justice and equality, are already beginning to make it impossible for any man in whom social feeling is normally developed to think of the rest of his fellows as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness. I assure you that we are now looking forward with perfect confidence to a new era in which the conditions which obstruct natural human co-operativeness and regard to the good of others will all – or nearly all – have been swept away. And when civilization finally prevails the very notion that man could ever be the enemy of man will seem the most fantastic of imaginings.'

In some such words we may suppose that the voice of John Stuart Mill, out of the Age of Optimism, would have supported and supplemented Butler's message. Both men had faith in human nature. Both were in favour of human happiness, only whilst it was characteristic of Butler's

unworldly and theorizing mind that he should have sought above all to prove that if men were good they would be happy, Mill, politician and social reformer, argued that if they were happy they would be good.

Today we may feel little confidence in the truth of either proposition. In the light of our own century's experience we may be inclined to dismiss Butler with his more than Deistic optimism, and the Utilitarians with their faith in Progress with a capital P, as a pack of starry-eyed sentimentalists. For surely, even without our bitter experience, they should have known better! Mill was quite unwarrantably sanguine even about the condition of his own countrymen, but, what was even more remarkable, he left almost entirely out of account the sufferings and problems of less privileged nations. In his treatise *On Liberty* he calls the members of primitive or static cultures Barbarians, and takes it for granted that the best service which could be rendered them would be to raise them as soon as possible – by coercion if necessary – to the exalted level of European civilization. Such an attitude seems a little quaint nowadays, to say the least. As for Butler's pious cheeriness: could even he have led so sheltered an existence that he was sincerely convinced of the truth of his own dictum that 'virtue is rewarded for the most part in this life'? Did he really imagine that the unfortunate had made their own beds? On the other hand, how many of his own congregation, even, owed their prosperity to 'virtue, benevolence, and regard to the common good'? To such criticisms Butler would no doubt have rejoined that wealth is not of itself a means to happiness, but this would have been no answer to the case that acute poverty is a cause of suffering. In view of the wretchedness which was the lot of the majority in those days, there is almost an effect of callousness in all this sunny talk about the expediency of virtue. How many people in Butler's time could even afford to be virtuous?

And yet . . . Nobody who reads the sermon on *The Love of our Neighbour* could believe that Butler was really callous. Rather he seems like a man carried away by philanthropy: by a fondness for his fellow men so strong that it beguiled him into fantasy, making him see them as both better and happier than they really were; because, simply, that was how he desired to see them. One has sometimes the impression that just as other men enhance in imagination their *own* prospects, so Butler, out of the goodness of his own nature, out of his innate benevolence, day-dreamed for others a quite illusory access to happiness. However, leaving aside the unjustified optimism about happiness, it is not unlikely that the other half of Butler's thesis – that it is typical of human nature to be rational, just and kind – had a degree of deliberate purpose behind it. Butler was by no means lacking in psychological insight, and he may well have perceived that to impress people with a conviction of their innate

sinfulness and worthlessness is not the best way of inducing them to improve. Very probably he considered that the continual pious emphasis on human frailty had gone far enough, and that it was high time for the infusion of a little healthy self-respect into the Christian heart. Give a man a good name and he may try to live up to it. Give him a bad name and he may hang himself – or hang somebody else. If this was Butler's view, many events happened later in the world which appear to have confirmed it. Nor, on the other hand, was Butler altogether unrealistic in his outlook on the human state. He made a few references to the distressing condition of the world – though he did not suggest any material remedies. But one gathers that he had implicit confidence in the final triumph of intelligence and benevolence in human affairs.

This was certainly wishful thinking, and one cannot but feel that if Butler could have foreseen the events of the first half of our century his faith in the power of human goodness would have been severely shaken, and that it was as well for him that he never knew how the creature 'above all designed for virtue' would conduct itself in days to come. Nevertheless, if he could have sustained the shock he might have recognized that even though events had not justified his faith in the natural virtuousness or even in the natural self-regardingness of man, his doctrine that happiness lies in co-operation had found after all a kind of negative justification. And even if he had felt bound to revise his opinion about the *universal recognition* of justice, veracity, and regard to the common good as the supreme moral principles – in the face of more than one ethical system which almost overtly repudiates the first two at least – he would have found nothing to shake, and much to reinforce, his opinion that an intelligent regard to our own interests will make us the supporters of justice rather than of tyranny. And here, on reflection, we find that Butler said over 200 years ago something of truly prophetic import: 'Reasonable self-love and benevolence point the same way.' What was then more like a pious sentiment than a statement of fact, at best a half-truth, in an age when exploitation of the disadvantaged often paid extremely well, and Nemesis slept on from generation to generation, is now crystallizing before our eyes into large patches of hard sense.

In its application to personal relationships, which was indeed Butler's main preoccupation, there is about as much truth in the dictum as there was in his own day. Good-natured people find happiness in making others happy. Ill-natured people get quite a lot of satisfaction out of their bullying and disagreeableness. But in contemplating, as we are now compelled to contemplate with urgent concern, the relationships of large human aggregates, of nations and groups of nations, the proposition that reasonable self-love and benevolence point the same way seems, as a broad

generalization, most obviously and unquestionably true. They point the same way. Whether the way is not an impossibly hard one may still be doubted, for it is beset by two sorts of obstacle: firstly the natural obstacles of conflicting material interests caused by the lack of Enough to Go Round, and secondly the psychological lures and pitfalls which, in Butler's words, cause men to 'rush on their own ruin'.

The thing to be lamented [he said] is, not that men have so great regard to their own good or interest in the present world, for they have not enough; but that they have so little to the good of others. And this seems plainly owing to their being so much engaged in the gratification of particular passions unfriendly to benevolence, and which happen to be most prevalent in them, much more than to self-love.

When he wrote that, Butler was probably thinking of individual vices and follies, but he would no doubt have agreed that the kind of 'particular passions' to which men collectively yield are equally incompatible with reasonable self-love; and this not only because they lead to war, but also because they prevent co-operation in the overcoming of material obstacles to general human advantage. No doubt Butler looked at human nature through the rose-coloured spectacles of his own benevolence; still, our survival pretty evidently depends on our ability to prove that he was right in the main after all.

## BISHOP BUTLER: A REPLY

Mary Scrutton

Mrs Freed's article on Bishop Butler moves me to lively agreement and controversy. It is always a relief to hear him mentioned otherwise than as a competent forerunner of the late Provost of Oriel. His message is a strange one, and people who try to fit him into the regular ethical categories are bound to misrepresent him. They most usually treat him as an appeaser. They put him between the Reason men and the Sentiment men, as one who thinks that both thought and feeling are needed to show what we ought to do, and between the Duty men and Pleasure men as one who thinks that, when we find it, we shall like it. One expects therefore at best an ingenious cynic, and more likely a Bishop contributing to *The Times*. One opens his pages – and falls back, disturbed, under the gimlet eye of a most steady, clear and responsible thinker. Two sentences of Butler's are enough to show how far he is from the cheap general retailer.

Yet, we are told, he blurs distinctions which to the great moralists are crucial. Observe his well-known slight on the Theory of Knowledge:

... a moral faculty, whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or Divine reason, whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as including both.

Such problems, which justly engaged the deep and lifelong consideration of Kant, draw from Butler little notice and no originality.

Yet he is original. It is plain at once that he has the really valuable sort of originality, which does not consist, like Shaw's, in shaking the puzzle till one gets some new combination of notions, but in considering and expressing some unspoken but important aspect of universal experience. In reading Butler we feel with relief that something real is at last being touched on which most moralists ignore. There is a liberation, a sense of breathing plentiful fresh air, and we become conscious how even Plato, even Spinoza, and still more the immoralists like Hobbes and Nietzsche, kept us to the study and the hothouse. What then is his find? Mrs Freed locates it in his attitude to Happiness.

Butler is perfectly candid. . . . He accepts as a plain fact of our existence that any actions we perform, in so far as they are voluntary . . . must necessarily in a sense be self-regarding, must, that is, be directed to the attainment of ends which we ourselves desire . . . he finds nothing in the least degrading in the fact that, as he puts it, 'nothing can be of consequence to mankind, or to any creature, but happiness'.

Now there is no doubt that this has a great deal to do with it. Butler has nothing against the world, and he is uncommonly free of cant in saying so. His interest in morals is not caused by having seen something nasty in the woodshed; he does not command us to share in any inessential, personal bitterness as a necessary step to being right and good. He is not busy lashing the lower parts of his own nature. And these motives have underlain so much of the best and most impressive moral theory that it is a real revelation to see them dispensed with, to have a chance to find whether ethics is possible without them. It is a great point not to be prejudiced *against* happiness. All the same, two things strike me:

- (1) Many other ethics insist on happiness without having Butler's realism and humanity.
- (2) Butler's attitude to happiness is not quite so simple as Mrs Freed would suggest.

The first point is one of the most interesting paradoxes of morals. Epicurus, Aristotle and Spinoza all take happiness as the sole purpose of human life, and all finish by belittling almost all those emotions by which

human beings can attain it. The last two restrict us to the delights of reason: the first considers Thinking quite as dangerous as Feeling ('Set your sail, happy youth, and fly from every form of education'); and will leave us only enough thought to save us from religion, enough food to save us from hunger, and enough friendship to pass our days in peace and keep us from more disturbing occupations. All have been driven to a definition miles away from the original meaning because they wanted to make happiness something stable, yet saw that the objects of our desires are changing, and so pinned their faith to some one part of our nature which seemed less dependent and uncertain than the rest. They saw no real happiness for human nature without as severe a surgical operation as that recommended by Duty. And this is just the pitfall that Butler avoided. It is worth noting his opinion on such surgery:

In general, experience will shew, that as want of natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; so the apathy the Stoics talk of, as much supposes, or is accompanied with, somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind. Those who formerly aimed at this upon the foot of philosophy, appear to have had better success in eradicating the affections of tenderness and compassion, than they had with the passions of envy, pride and resentment. . . . How far this observation may be extended to such as endeavour to suppress the natural impulses of their affections, in order to form themselves for business and the world, I shall not determine (Sermon V, Upon Compassion).

Yet Epicurus was as genuinely concerned for happiness as Butler. *What Butler alone has grasped, is that happiness and every other human purpose worth talking about depend on the wholeness of the personality.*

The second point, the place of happiness in Butler's system, is not an easy one because of the form of his work. Much of his best thought lies in his sermons, and even a philosopher knows that when speaking in public you cannot present both sides of a case at once. Any remark from one of them therefore must be put in the context of other sermons and of the short 'Dissertation on Virtue', usually printed with the *Analogy*. I cannot at present run down Mrs Freed's quotation 'nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature, but happiness' and rely on her to correct me, but I suspect it of a context like that of the equally strong remark in Sermon XI:

When we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this (virtue) or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it.

If Butler were as partisan as most moralists, this would certainly stamp him as some sort of egoistic hedonist. But most of the explanation can be found in the first part of the sentence:

Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such; yet, that when we sit down . . . , etc.

Butler is distinguishing the psychological mechanism by which we bring ourselves to do our duty from the speculative reasons for doing it. When we 'justify a thing to ourselves' we try it in our own petty tribunal, the tribunal of self-love. When we justify it absolutely, we consider the place of our own interests in a larger scheme of things, and the tribunal, though its constituent impulses may stay the same, changes function and becomes the tribunal of conscience. Were this not so, there would be no meaning in the first half of this sentence, in the distinction of Conscience from Self-love which runs through the whole system, or in the insistence of the *Dissertation* that 'benevolence is not the whole of virtue'. Butler does indeed believe that most of the time, in Mrs Freed's admirable phrase, 'if only we consult Conscience before we act we shall be certain of hearing something to our advantage'. He does believe and say that 'duty and interest are perfectly coincident' *in the very long run*. His business in this particular sermon is to show how far *even* enlightened egoism demands that we behave ourselves; accordingly 'there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion' and its place in the psychological mechanism of goodness must be suitably stressed. But, of course, to call Duty and Interest coincident is to say as plainly as possible that they are *not* synonymous. The reason for being good with Butler is *not* that it will make us happy, either in the vague and equivocal sense of the Utilitarians or in the precise artificial one of the older moralists. For Butler has seen clearly that the idea of an organized, deliberate pursuit of Happiness has got something wrong with it; that it is self-defeating not from accidental circumstances or inadequate definition, but from a confusion in the idea itself. What shall we do on Monday? On Monday we work at the farm. And on Tuesday? On Tuesday we will go out bathing and take a picnic. And Wednesday? On Wednesday I think we will just be happy. But do you mean we will talk, or ride, or lie in the orchard and look at the sky? *No*, I said we would Be Happy, and only then shall we have consulted our own interests and done that which was the purpose and justification of our business on the other days.

People may love themselves with the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable. . . . Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions and affections. So that if self-love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any other principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as happiness (Sermon XI, Upon the Love of our Neighbour).

So we have to discover what our particular impulses are before we can aim at that satisfaction of *all* of them which is perhaps the natural meaning of 'happiness'. It is Butler's main psychological point that some of them are direct wishes for other people's happiness, while others (*pace* Mrs Freed) are not wishes for happiness at all, but for something more like order. And it is perhaps his main point as a moralist that we cannot embark on morals without some tincture of this kind of psychology.

As for our interest in other people's happiness, Butler can explain it much better than the Utilitarians. They had to posit in all of us an abstract passion for their Universal Carrot, the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number. This is a most unconvincing piece of stage machinery. Instead, Butler, sticking to the facts, notes that we have *particular* impulses to please other people which are as strong and specific as any of our other feelings. 'Compassion is a call, a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy, as hunger is a natural call for food.' Are these impulses then disinterested? Yes, says Butler, in the same sense as the drunkard's desire for whisky or the angry man's wish to shout – or indeed any other particular impulse. That is to say, they do *not* spring from careful calculation of the main chance, and they may well be foreign to it. On the other hand, of course, they *are* interested in the sense that they are *our* wishes – that their satisfaction will be *our* satisfaction – but that seems a small mouse to spring from so much cerebration and knowledge of the world. The point made by calling benevolent feelings disinterested is the fair one that their satisfaction depends on changing something outside ourselves. You would not be satisfied deliberately to take a drug which would make you *feel as though* you had said a kind word to somebody, any more than at other times you would accept a drug which would make you feel as though you had told them what you thought about them. Yet often, particularly in the second case, the drug would be better for your general happiness. People (above the starvation level) are often just as anxious to grow carrots or give them away as they are to eat them, though few moralists have noticed it. Human impulses can never be understood by treating them all as acquisitive. This makes it easier to place those virtues which, as Butler rightly insists, can *not* be treated as means to anybody's happiness, e.g. justice and veracity. (Veracity has gone down in favour since the days of Butler and Kant, but Justice has correspondingly risen, and the controversy should still be topical.)

Suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow: yet such an action

would surely be vicious. . . . The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others. . . . (Dissertation on Virtue).

From this he draws the shrewd and remarkable conclusion that though God may be a Utilitarian, that ought not to make us so.

Were the Author of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were his moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition indeed, the only reason of his giving us the above-mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce more happiness than forming us with a temper of mere general benevolence. . . . The happiness of the world is the concern of him, who is the Lord and Proprietor of it: *nor do we know what we are about when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways but those that he has directed: that is indeed by all ways not contrary to veracity and justice.*

Butler's reverence is not only for God. It is for the infinitely rich and complex personality of man, for that wealth of powers and impulses, which admits indeed of harmony and direction, but not of the mutilation prescribed by narrower moral systems, and by those professing Happiness as much as any other. Ask Plato what is to be done with our personal passions and our wish for a private life; he answers, suppress or sublimate. That is, we must either make them cease to exist or turn them, without residue, into something else. Ask Bertrand Russell or Epicurus what is to be done with our religious impulses. The answer is the same, and, moreover, so is the disgusted, fanatical, explosive expression with which it is delivered. We are to be happy only in their ways. All are ashamed of the complexity of their nature. Now astute psychologists in any age have seen that the cures so recommended were irrelevant, because they were impossible. A very bitter residue always remains. Spirit is indestructible, whatever may be true of matter; we may put up a notice deploring a part of our nature, but we cannot get rid of it, and there are certainly limits to the changes we can make in it and the methods that will effect them. Here again I agree with Mrs Freed that Butler showed at least sound policy in being optimistic, that he rightly thought 'that to impress people with a conviction of their innate sinfulness and worthlessness is not the best way of inducing them to improve.' She thinks, however, that he is piously lying. I do not. Butler is akin to the mystics. They, the best of them, are people with a perfectly sound notion of wickedness, and yet with so deep, so clear a faith in the human soul that they still insist that within it the spring of salvation is always to be found. Consider Plato, certainly no optimist.

Our description of the soul is true of her present appearance; but we have seen her afflicted by countless evils, like the sea-god Glaucus, whose original form can hardly be discerned, because parts of his body have been broken off or crushed and altogether marred by the waves, and the clinging overgrowth of weed and rock and shell has made him more like a monster than his natural self. But note . . . what she would become if her affections were entirely set on following the impulse that would lift her out of the sea. . . . (Rep. 611d, Cornford's trans.)

And Traherne:

That you are a man should fill you with joys, and make you overflow with praises. . . . The true exemplar of God's infinity is that of your understanding, which is a lively pattern and idea of it. . . . Here is a profitable endlessness of infinite value, because without it infinite joys and blessings would be lost, which by it are enjoyed (*Centuries of Meditation*, II, 24).

Exactly the same assumption is made by the psychologist who treats folly and neurosis as an accretion, and believes that the patient has under them a Real Self which is worth digging for. None of these people deny that things, as they are, are very bad, nor that human souls have made them so. They are peculiar only in believing that the remedy may in part be looked for within. Does anybody care to deny this? Will anyone produce evidence that as soon as people become more comfortably off they immediately and in the same proportion become better? Of course it is true that people must have the minimum, and that while one is considering means to that the relevant moral theory is Utilitarianism. But Utilitarianism is bankrupt once the divisible, external goods have been distributed. Each view has its place and can be made to look silly out of it. For everything is what it is, and not another thing.

#### REVIEW OF REVIEWS

### THE FRENCH REVIEWS

J. G. Weightman

A young French writer once said to me, after spending two or three years in England, that his stay here had taught him at least one thing: that the human mind is not everywhere the same. This young Frenchman, I should add, had previously lived in Germany and had written a very intelligent book about that country; but only after crossing the Channel

did he realize that the principles of thought that the French have taken for granted since the eighteenth century, and perhaps even since the seventeenth, are not universally applicable. The English, a mysterious race, get along somehow without them and may never even have heard of them. There, on the edge of Europe, you have a whole nation – until recently the most powerful in the world – content to live in an indefinable mental fog, full of half-formed thoughts, intimations of poetry, and base pragmatism sicklied over with moral values. My friend went back to Paris feeling, I think, some affection for England, and at the same time all the usual emotions that the English inspire in the French: bewilderment tinged with resentment and admiration mixed with contempt. He was, however, anglicized enough by now to be affected by the King's death. Instead of remaining ironically aloof, as would have befitted his important status as an '*intellectuel*' with a philosophical cast of mind and a left-wing, Marxist training, he behaved like the great mass of French people; he got excited and for two days bought every edition of the Paris newspapers. He confessed this to me shamefacedly, while his wife, to excuse their orgy, said, 'Ah, if only you knew how sad it is for a little girl to be brought up in a Republic.'

These reactions and contradictions throw light on some aspects of the French reviews during the last quarter. Of those I have seen, only one mentions the British Monarchy, although for a fortnight the French dailies and weeklies were crammed with articles on the subject. We have to conclude that the monthlies, being on a higher intellectual plane, are not interested in the popular demonstrations and do not even think them worth attacking. The one exception is *Terre Humaine*, the Leftish, Catholic periodical which, in its March number, devotes an article to Elizabeth II. This begins in a critical tone:

The accession of Elizabeth II was a windfall for the popular weeklies which habitually substitute pictures for ideas. . . . Contemporary history suddenly began to resemble the most gaudy illustrations in the history books and for a fortnight our Republican nation found its daily dose of escapism and unreality (a drug normally supplied by the shoddier press) in the pomp of another nation's Monarchy. We should not jump to the conclusion that, in spite of the memory of Bourbon stupidity and Orleanist double-dealing, the event has psychoanalysed in the French people a longing for an impossible restoration. French thought, when not deflected by sentimentality and picturesqueness, inclines towards Jansenist and Jacobin severity and it has difficulty in understanding that cult of appearances which the English have raised to the dignity of a civic religion.

For is this out-of-date Monarchy anything more than a brilliant and empty symbol, a piece of theatrical luxury indulged in by a nation but poorly gifted in respect of private imagination, in order to brighten up a particularly dull and grey existence – in fact, a poor man's treat? When, on

this occasion, the Grand Opera heralds proclaimed at the cross-roads, 'The King is dead, Long Live the Queen,' the spectacle of a young woman being suddenly lifted up into a fictitious first place made one think that the British Monarch is a precious trinket placed out of reach on the highest shelf. A 20th century Queen, a face, a figure, a statuette, a portrait, perhaps, but a portrait in the mirror of the imagination of the peoples of the British Commonwealth, and which the Sovereign must do her best to resemble.

After this fierce beginning, we pass almost without transition to a much more friendly account of the political function of the Monarchy. The English tried the method of cutting off the King's head, says *Terre Humaine*, but found it did not work. Therefore, they modified the Monarchy.

Was it the result of empirical fumbling, or of a specifically British compromise? Perhaps, but it was at the same time, and much more definitely a solving, by means of close thinking, subtlety and humour, and in a particular, exceptional case, of the problem of the power of man over man; the wiping out of the humiliation of being subjects, without abolishing the Monarchy or humiliating the King. Nothing could be more elegant; in this sense, the English Monarchy sums up an entire civilization.

*Terre Humaine* goes on to make the familiar point about the Monarchy affording protection against Fascism and dictatorship, for however able and popular the Prime Minister may be, he can never usurp the first place. Then the article rises to a rousing conclusion, very different from the opening paragraph:

Great Britain still has an important part to play in a world where her prestige has been diminished and her power reduced, and where the civilized values she represents are seriously threatened, and if she is really entering upon an Elizabethan age, if her young Queen brings her luck (there are living and noble superstitions which carry more weight than pedantic sociology), the whole of mankind will be delighted to see that the world still contains an England.

The same fluctuation between admiration and puzzled irritation ('living and noble superstitions' on the one hand and 'a piece of theatrical luxury' on the other) is noticeable in the March number of *Esprit*, of which the main section is devoted to the 'Labour Party Experiment' in Britain. It is an attempt to sum up the achievement of Mr Attlee's Government. In his introduction, J.-M. Domenach makes a revealing remark:

The Labour Party is a tradition, an organization, something accomplished. It is not a doctrine. The articles collected here take into account its two-fold originality; it is not a theory and yet (or because of that) it exists.

The Frenchman's first instinct, then, is to suppose that the Labour Party, being doctrinally vague, does not exist. J.-M. Domenach reacts against this tendency:

England is the only country where a Socialist Party, supported by the strongest and most coherent workers' movement in Europe, has used its six years in office to bring about an initial transformation of society, without spilling a drop of blood or putting an extra prisoner in the Tower. This peaceful transformation deserves to be appraised for its own sake, instead of being denied, as it so often is, by people who claim that the Labour Party is not Socialist. The truth must be stated: in spite of the long tradition of French Socialism, in spite of Jaurès, Guesde and Léon Blum, the S F I O has nothing similar to show and our Socialist theoreticians, if they cannot bring themselves to respect the Labour achievement, should at least begin by studying it.

*Esprit* offers seven long articles on various aspects of the subject; Socialism and Labour, the economic situation, the Labour voter, the Trades Unions, etc., and the series concludes with a piece by Ian Mikardo defining the attitude of the Bevanites. Just as *Terre Humaine* praised the Monarchy, but was very impatient about the things that go with it, so the contributors to *Esprit* recognize that the Labour Government has set up a kind of Welfare State, but reproach it with having neglected fundamental problems through a lack of creative imagination. François Sellier writes:

The Labour Party's *social experiment* has succeeded if we take the expression to mean the redistribution of the national revenue by means of taxes and social services. It was the Labour Government, to a large extent, which provided British workers with a well-being and security such as they never enjoyed before, and which they alone enjoy in the capitalist world. But the Labour Party's *experiment in government* has failed if, by this expression, we mean the attempt to reconstruct the economic administration of a great industrial country.

The Bevanite revolution, adds Sellier – criticizing implicitly Mikardo's statement in the same number – does not touch upon this problem, although it has benefited from the latent disappointment among the workers. No real workers' democracy has been achieved and the Welfare State, such as it is, could be quickly destroyed again by unemployment and inflation. John Hunder, in his article, also complains that the moral situation of the British proletariat has remained unchanged and he adds that Labour rule actually widened the gulf between the Trade Union leadership and the masses. He is also pessimistic about the financial future of the Commonwealth. Canada has already left the sterling area; Australia will shortly follow her example. The Commonwealth still hangs together and has an economic, strategic and psychological rôle to play in

the Western Hemisphere, but it is much more fragile than before. Australia, for instance, is far more remote from Britain in 1952 than she was in 1939. Hundec continues:

The Frenchman's reaction to all this would no doubt be to shake his head disdainfully and say, 'It's obvious.' But it is not at all obvious to an Englishman. Great Britain, although now a second-rate power, has retained the mentality, the needs and the geographical extent of a first-rate power. England's victory in 1945 resembles France's in 1918. Victory has made it difficult to measure the price of victory. . . . The English did not suffer any humiliation during the war and do not remember ever having been beaten. Nothing has happened, therefore, to urge public opinion to envisage new solutions. As usual, after the war, the English wished to return to 'normal life', that is to the state of things 'before', while removing the bad features. Economic problems were considered as temporary, although difficult. Great Britain had only to increase her exports and all would be well. Seven years of economic crises have not really altered this naïve optimism. While a few individuals and a number of journalists are more worried by the problem now than before, the government, the political parties and the country as a whole, for various reasons, are not inclined to alter their attitude. They have been disturbed by these questions but they have not thought them out thoroughly.

These articles do not make comforting reading for an Englishman, whatever his political opinions. The Bevanites are given credit for trying to ginger things up, but even they are 'far from having thought profoundly about the nature and aims of socialism.' And so we are left, living in the fool's paradise of our Welfare State, a second-rate power with first-class illusions, at the centre of a shaky Commonwealth, with our Monarchy which is at once a triumph of civilization and comically out of date. But, coming from the French, this is warm praise indeed. About their own country they are much more bitter. *Terre Humaine*, in its March number, is very critical of the French Government's policy towards Tunisia ('the spilling of innocent blood brings bad luck') and so contemptuous of developments at home that it claims (April) that with the accession of M. Pinay the country has fallen back into the Third Republic. The March *Esprit* again assails the Government for its weakness over the German problem. Now that the Bonn agreement has been signed, we can expect a new spate of protests in the coming months. The April *Esprit* carries a long special feature on the plight of students in France; their number has enormously increased during recent years, while University teaching staffs have remained practically the same; students are underfed and overworked, hence many cases of tuberculosis; the quality of academic teaching suffers from the 'social degeneration' of France, and so on. The organization of University education in England is contrasted very favourably with this state of affairs.

The French ability to look squarely on the darker side of life is most marked in *Les Temps Modernes*. The May number includes, for instance, an excellent piece of writing about a love affair between a toothless concierge of sixty and a crossings sweeper, the confessions – written in hard-boiled slang – of an ex-juvenile delinquent who became a member of the French contingent of the S A during the war, the memoirs of a man who had tragi-comic experiences cleaning out the latrines in a German concentration camp, and a first-hand account of life in the condemned cells of a Spanish prison; the longest contribution is an extract from a book by Donald Webster-Cory, soon to be published in French, on homosexuals in the United States. His argument is that homosexuals constitute a large minority and deserve to be treated with the solicitude shown to other minorities. Judging by these excerpts, it is not a great book; it is earnest and apparently well-informed, but it does not go deep enough into the psychological complexities of the subject. However, Mr Webster-Cory scores one good point for his side: he draws attention to the fact that, in view of the wide definition of sodomy in the laws of several States, most heterosexual American couples are guilty of it and should be consumed with remorse.

There are many good, if sombre, articles of a general nature and it is difficult to know which to quote. Perhaps the most outstanding is Albert Béguin's account, in the May number of *Esprit*, of a recent journey to India. He describes with remarkable freshness the usual impressions of poverty and over-population. Being a Catholic, he tries, rather ineffectually, to argue against birth control as a solution, but one has the impression at times that such an intense vision of exotic suffering has loosened and weakened his Christian system of beliefs. Béguin notes one feature of India that I do not remember seeing mentioned elsewhere:

The over-population of the towns would be less obsessive if the teeming masses were not so unbelievably taciturn and gentle. Such gentleness on the part of a people so oppressed is, in the end, painful to contemplate. The silence of India is difficult to imagine unless one has been plunged into it as into some palpable element. Europeans, accustomed to the brightly dressed, noisy crowds of the Mediterranean countries – even reflective Spain is rowdy compared to India – spontaneously associate the sensation of a human world rich in colour and movement with the sensation of noise, loud voices and talkative nations. In India this association has to be broken and one has to become accustomed to a world in which a kaleidoscope of colour and teeming multiplicity are to be contemplated at any moment in the midst of a disturbing silence. When the Indian is crouched, motionless, on the threshold of his shop or the edge of the pavement, his gaze is turned inwards and he is in a state of withdrawal which may be contemplation, vague dreaming or a hungry stupor. But even when he is active, and is moving agilely through the swarming crowds in the bazaar, the Indian

remains silent. Innumerable light, thin bodies move about on bare feet, making no appreciable noise on the sandy earth which muffles even the noise of big carts. There is nothing more unbearable after a time than this tremendous silence, broken only on the southern shores by the shrill voices of a more loquacious people, or occasionally, on the banks of the rivers and lakes of the interior, by women gossiping as they pound their washing on the stones. Near water a sense of well-being is created by the transparent light, by the feelings of devotion caused by the sacred character of the river, and tongues are loosened in this happier setting. But this is true only of primitive villages, where life is no doubt easier. Even at Benares on the Ganges, the pilgrims paddle noiselessly in the dirty water, where ritual bathing is accompanied by a thousand profane activities. On one occasion I took refuge for two whole days in a hotel bedroom to escape from the insistent presence of this universal human silence.

There has been no striking literary event during the last three months and the recent numbers of *La Table Ronde* are rather dull, apart from some excellent letters by Paul Claudel and extracts from Paul Léautaud's malicious literary diary. Samuel Beckett, the Irish author of *Malloy* and *Malone Meurt*, two novels written directly in French and as yet untranslated, is highly spoken of. So is Marguerite Yourcenar, a classical scholar teaching in America, who has written a volume of imaginary *Mémoires d'Hadrien*. The April *Temps Modernes* publishes a vigorous denunciation of T. S. Eliot's negativism, 'Eliot contre l'Humain', by a young Anglo-French critic, Oliver Todd. This is passionate, well argued and, if anything, a little too complete. The *Cahiers du Sud* continue to bring out unpublished work by Simone Weil; the latest piece, dating from 1941, is concerned with the moral responsibility of writers. She was attacking the view, prevalent in the non-collaborationist circles in which she moved, that eminent writers could not be held responsible for the defeat of France. What she wrote then is still true of French literature today, since it plays a much greater part in the public life of the nation than English literature does in England:

It is true, as Mauriac has pointed out, that the best contemporary works are not widely read. But the responsibility of writers cannot be measured by the number of copies sold. Literature enjoys immense prestige. This can be seen from the efforts made by certain political groups to use the names of famous writers for demagogic purposes. Even those people who have never heard the names of these writers are nevertheless influenced by a literature they have not read. Never has so much reading been done as today. It is not the books themselves which are read, but mediocre or bad periodicals, which find their way into the suburbs and the villages. As a result of the literary habits of our time, there is a continuous line of connection between the worst of these periodicals and the best of our writers. This fact is known, or rather vaguely sensed, by the public, for whom in consequence the most contemptible publicity stunts are adorned with the prestige of the highest

form of literature. During the last few years, unbelievable turpitudes have been committed; for instance, well-known writers have given advice to the love-lorn. It is true that they have not all stooped so low; far from it. But those who have stooped have not been disowned or rejected by the others; they have not lost face among their colleagues. This slackness in literary morals and tolerance of bad behaviour make our most eminent writers partly responsible for the demoralization of a farm girl who has never left her village nor heard their names.

## THE INVENTION OF KING ARTHUR\*

G. F. Hudson

The vogue of Arthurian romance throughout Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of European culture. So great was the fame of Arthur of Britain and his knights that they were represented in sculpture on the archivolt of the north portal of Modena Cathedral, at a date which is disputed by archaeologists, but in any case belongs to the twelfth century. At first sight it is difficult to account for this universal popularity, for the *matière de Bretagne* was not without strong competitors. The French had the legendary cycle of Charlemagne as well as the material of the Alexander romances;; the Germans had a large body of tradition going back to the heroic age of the Teutonic tribal migrations. If Arthurian legend nevertheless prevailed over these rivals, it must have been because it provided a range of themes not to be found elsewhere, and the secret of its fascination is to be found in its content rather than in the exceptional gifts of the writers and reciters who gave it literary expression.

The scholars of Arthurian literature are divided into two camps. The one regards the legends as in essentials the product of a medieval Christian and chivalric imagination; the other refers the main themes of Arthurian romance to primitive elements of pre-Christian Celtic myth. M. Jean Marx definitely belongs to the latter school and in the introduction to his recently published book he declares:

In all these narratives, even in those which are cast in a courtly and chivalric French mould, there appear elements infinitely more ancient, often misunderstood by those who relate them and interpreted with much difficulty. These elements convey to us the echo and survival of a mass of myths, scenes and traditions, the Celtic origin of which will be made clear in the course of the present study.

\* *La Légende arthurienne et le Graal*. Jean Marx. Presses Universitaires de France.

Arthur is the central figure of Arthurian romance only to the extent that he presides over the court to which the real heroes—Gawain, Percival, Lancelot and the rest—belong. He provides what an American writer has called a 'magnificent background' for the exploits of his knights, but he himself plays very little part in the action of the stories. This is proper to his character if he is imagined as a reigning king; for the possession of a kingdom is hardly compatible with the solitary adventures which may be undertaken by a vassal warrior without any political responsibility. Arthur had not always, however, been a king; in the earliest account we have of him, that of the *Nennius*, he is not a king but a *dux bellorum*, a captain of mercenaries or *condottiere* who fights for the kings of the Britons against the Saxon invaders, and there can be little doubt but that this version represents the real historical Arthur as nearly as we can ever reach him. In Geoffrey of Monmouth, on the other hand, Arthur has not only become a king, but the ruler of all Britain, and he not only fights against the Saxons, but also wages war on the Romans and conquers France, being about to advance into Italy when the treachery of Modred forces him to return to Britain. All this, of course, is entirely unhistorical, but it does not follow that the Galfridian Arthur is simply a product of Geoffrey's imagination. He is a composite personage, a fusion of two different historical prototypes – the Arthur of the *Nennius* who was a champion of the Britons against the Saxons, but was neither a king of Britain nor a conqueror of France, and another person who did not fight against the Saxons, but was for a short time ruler of Britain and did subdue France (or Gaul as it then was) with an army brought over from Britain, namely the Roman emperor Constantine III, who was set up as a claimant to the imperial title by mutinous Roman troops in Britain in the year 407. We do not know anything about Constantine's origin, but as he was only a private soldier before his elevation and as the 'Roman' army in Britain at that time was almost entirely recruited within the island, it is highly probable that he was a Celtic-speaking Briton. His career as an emperor was brief, for, though he obtained control of the parts of Gaul which were not at that time overrun by the Vandals, he failed to force his way into Italy and was finally besieged and captured in Arles by the forces of the previously reigning emperor Honorius. It would be natural for him to be regarded in Celtic oral tradition as a king of Britain who had made war on the Romans. But in ethnic memory later experience tends to obliterate the impression of earlier events, and the long struggle against the invading English which began about 440 gradually became the overwhelming fact of the historical consciousness of the Britons, so that knowledge of the Roman empire could only be recovered from Latin literary sources. Geoffrey of Monmouth had con-

siderable Latin learning, but his treatment of Constantine III is remarkable; he makes him the brother of Aldwr, king of Llydaw (Britanny) and the grandfather of Arthur, but does not mention his campaign in Gaul, whereas such an expedition is the climax of the career attributed to Arthur. It is clear that the historical acts of Constantine III have been transferred to Arthur, but we cannot be sure whether this was done by Geoffrey to give greater dramatic unity to his pseudo-history or whether an amalgamation of Constantine and Arthur had already taken place in popular tradition. In any case the result was to transform Arthur from a leader of mercenaries into a great and powerful king.

This conception of Arthur was essential for the appeal of the Arthurian tales to the feudal aristocracy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, for it established the Arthurian knights in *le grand monde*. Nevertheless he is not a king in the manner of the twelfth century. As M. Marx writes:

King Arthur is a Celtic chief; from his older character of war-commander (*dux bellorum*), there remains his role of chief of a companionship which no one can enter without achieving certain exploits. . . . The warrior companionship finds expression in the Round Table.

Wace, who was the first medieval author to mention the Round Table, explained its shape as due to a desire to avoid quarrels about precedence. But in fact this famous table is certainly derived from the custom of ancient Celtic feasts, in which there were no large tables at all, but the chief held the place of honour in the middle of the hall and his vassals sat round in a circle, each with a small table of his own to eat from. The Celtic tradition comes out even more clearly in the description of the Grail Castle in Chrestien's *Conte del Graal*; Nitze and Loomis have shown that it is quite unlike the interior of a twelfth-century French castle, but conforms to the traditional pattern of an Irish or Welsh royal hall.

The activities of the 'knights' of Arthur's court are in keeping with the origin of their 'table'. They are not primarily concerned with human warfare or politics, but with the deliverance of the *Gaste Pays*, the land which has been deprived of its fertility because of a curse or because of the malady of the Grail King on whose vitality the course of nature depends. The Grail King is the possessor or guardian of magical talismans, fetishes or *objets merveilleux*, including the Grail itself, a lance and a sword; these talismans do not in themselves suffice to heal the *Roi Méhaigné* or to restore the *Gaste Pays*, but if the questing hero can fulfil the necessary conditions (which are unknown to him at the outset) their magic becomes operative. We are here in a world which is totally different from the cultural *milieu* either of Christianity or of fully developed Greco-Roman paganism; it is a world of extremely primitive animist construction in

which there is no separation between man and the powers of nature, and nothing to prevent legendary human heroes being assimilated to figures of cosmic myth. After the conversion of the Celtic peoples to Christianity the gods and goddesses of Celtic paganism could in any case survive only by being represented in story as human beings – as in the Irish tales of the Tuatha De Danann – but this euhemerization was rendered easier by the lack of a clear line of division between the human and divine in the original mythology.

M. Marx reviews the evidence for a derivation of the Grail from the traditional Celtic 'vessels of plenty', talismans of fertility which provided their possessors with inexhaustible supplies of food and also had powers of healing and even of reviving the dead. These 'vessels of plenty' in Celtic myth were of various kinds – horns (either for drinking or holding fruit and grain), baskets, bowls, cups and metal cauldrons. The horn (which, if taken from the ancient wild cattle of northern Europe, could be of great size) and the basket were probably the oldest forms of the 'vessel of plenty' and both are associated with the *matres* or nature-goddesses on Gallo-Roman monuments; in this respect Celtic myth ran parallel with the Greek fancy which attributed the horn of plenty to Amalthea, the nurse of Zeus. In those forms of the Grail legend which are not obviously adapted to purposes of Christian edification the primary function of the Grail is to provide the Grail King and his guests with food, and the Grail is always carried, on its appearances in the hall of the Grail Castle, by a young girl. A *grail* is certainly not a chalice; it signified in medieval French a hollow dish or bowl. There are, however, indications in Arthurian romance that the conception of the Grail was not fixed; it might assume a variety of forms, as was natural enough if it was indeed derived from Celtic tradition. The *Perlesvaus* relates that 'the Grail appeared at the sacring of the mass in five several manners that none ought to tell . . . the last whereof was the change into a chalice'. As an embodiment of the life-giving and fructifying powers of nature, the significance of the Grail was ambivalent; on the one hand, it retained its primitive connection with abundance and exuberance of life in nature, so that, as Loomis has pointed out, the word *grail* in German came to signify a paradise of sensuous pleasures, while on the other hand its association with immortality facilitated its identification with Christian relics and its cult as a goal of ascetic virtue. The Christian adaptation of the Grail is an interesting development of the medieval imagination, but the weight of the evidence is decisively against the original derivation of the Grail legend from a Christian source. The part played by the 'Grail damsel' is alone sufficient to refute a purely medieval origin; as M. Marx argues:

If the legend of the Grail starts from Celtic sources and is gradually Christianized, the presence of the young girls is easily explained. But if the legend arises from traditions of the Precious Blood or from the Byzantine liturgy, it can never be explained.

The Celtic derivation is even clearer with regard to the Lance, which the champions of the medievalist school refer to the Christian legend of the lance of Longinus. The properties of the mysterious lance of the Grail Castle in Arthurian romance are recognizably those of the *gai bolga* of Cuchulainn and the *luin* of Celtchar in Irish legend. According to Professor T. F. O'Rahilly, these magical spears of Irish tradition represent the power of lightning; they are highly dangerous not only to enemies against whom they may be used, but also to their possessors and therefore they have to be 'quenched' when not in use. In the story of Balaaín there is a clear parallel with the older Irish tale of Ængus and Cormac. Balaaín finds the lance suspended point downward in a golden bowl, and although warned by a voice not to use it, he takes it and wounds King Pelleán with it, thereby destroying the fertility of the land. In the Irish tale Cormac has to abdicate after being wounded with his own spear, and this is in accordance with the traditional idea that a maimed king may not reign; he must either be healed or replaced. In the Grail romances the themes of the healing and replacement of the *Roi Méhaigné* by the Grail Hero are combined, not always without contradiction, and this points back to a myth concerned with a god, for in such myths the wounding and healing or death and resurrection of the god are episodes in the life of an immortal being, whereas a human 'corn king' must in the end die and pass on his office to his successor. For the purpose of story-telling it does not matter which theme is adopted, for the adventures which the hero must undergo are the same whether their effect is to deliver the Grail King from his infirmity or to prove the hero worthy to be his successor. In either case the fertility of the *Gaste Pays* is restored. In a Christian age the Grail King could not be represented as immortal (though the names he bears in Arthurian romance point unmistakably to divine prototypes) and so he is made to belong to a dynastic succession. Thus in the *Didot Perceval*, Perceval finally succeeds in the test and the Grail King is healed, but dies three days later and Perceval succeeds him.

If, however, it is admitted that Arthurian legend is not simply a product of twelfth-century French or Anglo-Norman imagination, but incorporates at least a large element of Celtic mythical tradition from pre-Christian times, it still remains to inquire how this traditional lore was introduced from the 'Celtic fringe' of Europe into the world of chivalric Romance culture in which it underwent its great literary development. There has long been controversy between those scholars who attribute

the transmission mainly to the Bretons and those who believe that Wales was the principal source. It might perhaps be expected that a Frenchman would be a champion of the claims of the Bretons, but M. Marx is in fact in favour of a Welsh derivation. His two principal arguments are first that the Bledhri who is stated in certain sources to have been a great reciter of Arthurian tales is described as of Welsh origin, and secondly that medieval Breton literature in extant written versions is almost non-existent as compared with Welsh. If the claim of the Bretons is rejected, the spread of Arthurian legend must be ascribed to cultural fusion due to Norman conquest and French-Welsh bilingualism in South Wales early in the twelfth century. The arguments for exclusion of Breton influence are not, however, decisive, and there is a strong case to be made for the primacy of the Bretons in the propagation of the *matière de Bretagne*, even though the vogue thus created may subsequently have opened the door also to story-tellers from Wales, where the traditional lore was perhaps better preserved. The poverty of medieval Breton literature is to be explained by French cultural absorption of the Breton nobility at a time when Breton oral tradition had not yet been reduced to writing, whereas in Wales the old Celtic culture persisted much longer among the noble families and their bards and was perpetuated in writing before English influence became predominant. But this early transition to French culture among the feudal class in Brittany provided just the conditions which would lead the Breton *conteurs* as heirs of Celtic tradition to adapt their literary stock to the tastes of French patrons. The Bretons were in a position of unique advantage for disseminating Celtic legend in French aristocratic society because they were part of it; the dukes of Brittany were among the great feudatories of the kingdom of France, while in England, as important auxiliaries of the Norman conquest, they formed a bilingual French-Celtic element within the ruling class. The Welsh, on the other hand, in that part of Wales subdued by the Normans, belonged no less than the English to the conquered population, and in the first half of the twelfth century the ranking produced by the Conquest had by no means been obliterated. It would have been extremely difficult, therefore, for Welsh bards to make an impression on French princely courts if the Bretons had not prepared the way for them.

The late Dr J. S. P. Tatlock in his important work, *The Legendary History of Britain*, assembles convincing evidence in support of the view that Geoffrey of Monmouth was of Breton descent, though born and bred in south-eastern Wales. His motive for writing his *Historia*, as he himself explains, was a Britonic racial patriotism, but this was combined with a loyal attachment to the Norman monarchy, such as would have been natural in a Breton of the Conquest. In Dr Tatlock's words:

It is clear that Geoffrey's social station was central rather than peripheral; he had connections which he valued with the ruling race, caste and family. . . . But those who profited most from Geoffrey's work were the Britons; and one of his motives may well have been to heighten respect for them among his Norman superiors. . . . A dozen years later we find him pluming himself on what he has done for the Britons' fame; they should garland him who has made their history celebrated throughout the world.

Geoffrey of Monmouth's work had a wide currency on the Continent and by providing the Britons with so glorious a history he undoubtedly contributed to the diffusion of Arthurian legend. It may even be that stories which originally had no connection with Arthur were associated with his court after Geoffrey had made it universally famous. But it is probable that the themes of Arthurian romance which are not to be found in the *Historia* were already being propagated in France by Breton *conteurs*. Full weight must be given to the contention of Mr R. S. Loomis that most of the Celtic proper names in the French texts are nearer to Breton than to Welsh forms, and there is no impossibility in his attractive theory that the controversial Modena sculpture represents a story told by a minstrel of Alan Fergant, Duke of Brittany, to the international company of princes and barons assembled in Bari on their way to the First Crusade.

## SWINBURNE THE NOVELIST

Jack Lindsay

There can be few people who have maintained the same attitude to Swinburne throughout their life. I think I am fairly typical in that I began in youth with a rapturous admiration, swerved to a contempt of him as a mechanical versifier with thin over-generalized imagery, and have come to rest on what I think is a reasonably balanced appreciation. The same oscillation can be generally seen in his reputation. When he died in 1909, Meredith in his last public letter declared him the greatest of all lyricists; but in the 1920's Swinburne was about the most abusive term one could use in criticism. Now, however, there have recently been many signs of increasing interest and respect. Mr Randolph Hughes's edition of *Lesbia Brandon* will be certainly found a milestone in this development; or rather a turning-point. For while it savagely demolishes a great deal of what has passed as serious study of the poet, it enables us to gain a radically new focus; and though many may demur from some of the more enthusiastic

judgments, the book's importance and its bracing scholarship are undeniable.\*

Previously, what has seemed most lacking in Swinburne is inner struggle, development after his first phases. Mr Hughes is fiercely opposed to the interpretation of Swinburne's post-1880 period as a rather ridiculous collapse under the stern paternal eye of Watts-Dunton; and in much of his position he is unshakeable. But it is hard not to see the later Swinburne as largely repetitive. If one thoroughly knows *Atlanta*, the first *Poems and Ballads*, and *Songs before Sunrise*, is there much of the essential Swinburne the poet that one has not absorbed into one's system? That is not to deny the many fine things in the later plays and *Poems and Ballads* and so on; but the effect is of a magnificent technical apparatus running still on its great original impetus rather than by an inner process of self-renewal. (The term *technical* is not here used opprobriously, for genuine technique must have behind it somewhere a rich spiritual process of organization.)

Swinburne himself was aware of points of arrest. 'As in some points . . . I found myself at thirty very much what I was at thirteen, so I have some reason to fear that if I live so long I shall find myself on the same points (like Lander) very much the same at seventy as I was at seventeen.' And this is a matter of definite fixation, not simply of continuity of growth. Meredith had declared in the early 1860's, as the obverse of the admiration expressed in the 1909 praise, 'He is not subtle; and I don't see any internal centre from which springs anything that he does. He will make a great name, but whether he is to distinguish himself solidly as an Artist, I would not willingly prognosticate.' By Artist here Meredith meant something much more than a fine craftsman with words; he meant the man whose creativeness is revealed in his ceaseless struggle to remould life from new centres of being.

But now, with this edition of *Lesbia Brandon*, we can see that there was this kind of struggle inside Swinburne; and though Mr Hughes would clearly not agree with some of my remarks above, he himself is not so far out of agreement with it when he says of *Lesbia Brandon*:

This is novelistic work in the highest. In view of it, and of other things of a like quality, one cannot help regretting a little that Swinburne did not devote to the finishing of *Lesbia Brandon* and to other work in the novel some of the large amount of energy he expended in writing his dramas in verse.

\* *Lesbia Brandon* by Algernon Charles Swinburne, *An historical and critical commentary being largely a study (and elevation) of Swinburne as a Novelist*, by Randolph Hughes (The Falcon Press, 35s.). *Pasiphae*, *A Poem* by A.C. Swinburne, introduced by Randolph Hughes, with engravings by John Buckland-Wright (Golden Cockerel Press).

The latter are full of noble poetry and subtle psychology, and I have a great love for them; but they are largely in the idiom of another age; had he completed *Lesbia Brandon* and gone on to other work in the same line, not only would he have certainly taken a place in the front rank of novelists, but he would have had much more influence on his age. . . .

He would also have freed himself from his fixations and achieved development artistically in a way which he failed to achieve in the later poems.

In discussing *Lesbia Brandon* and its attendant fragments, one finds it difficult to speak of Swinburne's work here without at the same time speaking of Mr Hughes's. Apart from the dimensions of the latter's commentary and analysis (well over 400 pages in a book of 580 plus xxxv pages), he has so enriched and illuminated Swinburne's fiction writing that novels and analysis seem permanently entwined. His book will not come quite as a surprise to those who have followed his work on Swinburne – in his *Centenary Survey* in the *Nineteenth Century* (June 1937), and in the magnificent Golden Cockerel editions of *Lucretia Borgia* and *Pasiphae*, which he edited\*; and it is to be followed, we are told, by yet more critical volumes. But as it stands it is definitive and constructs around *Lesbia Brandon* a coherent and considered account of the poet-novelist.

Mr Hughes has published much of his best critical work in French, dealing with Balzac, Baudelaire, and Mallarmé; but, with this book he comes explosively into the English arena. He has always smitten hard those who seem to him to belittle his heroes or to treat them without the high standards of scholarship which he exacts from himself; and even when one dissents from his viewpoint, it is exhilarating to watch a critic who is so clear in his values and his scholarship. One knows where one is; and the combat is conducted in prose that can glint with angry and dangerous edge or expand warmly in a golden sun of admiration.

Here, Messrs Gosse, Lafourcade, Wise and Hare come in for many shattering blows; and it may truly be said that Mr Hughes rears his solid edifice on foundations composed of the splintered fragments of less worthy works battered down into the soil. He sets out his commentary in three sections: a history of the manuscript of *Lesbia Brandon* and of Swinburne's efforts to complete the novel; a detailed analysis of the theme and structure of all Swinburne's fiction, including *Love's Cross Currents* (serialized in 1877 and published as a book in 1905), with a general inquiry into the æsthetic of the Novel and Swinburne's influences,

\* Swinburne himself would have been delighted by these two books, nobler than any production he ever saw of his own writings. The *Lucretia*, fine as is its writing, does not prepare one for the realistic grasp of the contemporary scene in the fiction. *Pasiphae* (c. 1866–7) is a dialogue of Pasiphae and Daedalus, with the Nurse at the end: in dignified blank verse with effective stichomythia.

especially Balzac and Latouche; and a discussion of the text and various particular points. From the total picture emerges that new insight into the nature of Swinburne's creativeness already indicated.

The villain of the piece is Watts-Dunton. Mr Hughes denies that he held Swinburne in subjection, but shows conclusively that he unscrupulously purloined parts of *Lesbia Brandon* and used all his depressive powers to turn Swinburne from fiction. It is too simple, however, to argue that because Watts-Dunton achieved his ends by lying and moral pressure, Swinburne was in those latter years perfectly capable of asserting himself. But what Mr Hughes demolishes is the thesis, most recently set out by Mr Hare, that Swinburne was suffering from endless alcoholic poisoning. And he is certainly right in arguing that his troubles had roots far back in childhood. He seems, however, to treat them as merely physical. What Swinburne suffered from appears rather a mixture of physiological and psychological factors. The masochistic impulse that lay at the core of his sexuality and stirred so much of his best work was based in elements which also held him back and determined the limits of his self-expression. It gave him precocious powers, but made further development very difficult. In *Lesbia Brandon* we see him valiantly struggling to break through the obstructions; and what this effort implied can only be grasped after we have carefully considered the work.

In a masterly analysis – the virtues of which can be realized by a comparison with the discussion of the novels by M Lafourcade and Mr Hare – Mr Hughes shows how Swinburne contemplated a linked series of definitions, and works out as thoroughly as the material allows the way in which it all dovetailed. *Love's Cross Currents* and *Lesbia Brandon* were particularly united by Lady Midhurst, a figure of great power, in whom Swinburne focuses all that he feels most repressive in Victorian society. Not that she is simply a stifling puritan (say, like Mrs Clennam of *Little Dorrit* or Mrs Burman of *One of Our Conquerors*); she is more subtly and complicatedly evil than that; she has her own brand of cynicism and toleration of 'immorality' – within the accepted bounds. And she has a certain cold intellectuality. But she stands supremely for the power-lust that without illusions will fight to preserve the thing it despises, because its whole mechanism of domination is based in that despicable thing. She plays a larger part in *Love's Cross Currents* than in *Lesbia Brandon* as it stands; but she is Swinburne's most important character-creation, and of the first novel he said truly that it 'stands or falls by Lady Midhurst'. He calls her 'entirely a creature of my own invention'.\*

\* Mr Hughes is, I think, misled by Swinburne's comment that Lady Midhurst, himself and his novel 'must be all together condemnable' from the Galilean point of view; he takes her to be a sympathetic character. Clearly Swinburne admires

The theme of both novels is sexual frustration. But – and here it is that the novels move beyond the poems – the sexual relations are shown in their social setting, and the personal relations become emblems of social forces, as is the case in all important novels. To attempt here a full analysis of the complex interconnections of the considerable number of characters in the two novels (and two fragments) is impossible; it is enough to point out that the key-theme in *Love's Cross Currents* is the separation of two lovers by Lady Midhurst after the man has adulterously begotten the heir that bars him out; and that that of *Lesbia Brandon* is the hopeless love of Herbert for the homosexual Lesbia who in turn hopelessly adores his sister. These main themes are reinforced by all sorts of sidelines; and Swinburne shows a genuine power of character-definition. The women in particular are convincingly done, and illustrate various aspects of the society of which Lady Midhurst is the central symbol. Clara in *Love's Cross Currents* is delicately and powerfully revealed in all her self-divisions, lost between her fine dreams and her conventional eye for the main chance. And the women of *Lesbia Brandon* fill out the picture yet more fully. Lesbia the misfit is less interesting than Margaret, Lady Wariston, who is shown in her development from what seems a rather nondescript wife into 'a vague and violent thirst after action and passion', and on into her final breakdown. And the vulgar Leonora (based, as Mr Hughes shows, on Rossetti's Fanny) is painted with an ironical realism that awoke the admiration of Meredith.

It is impossible to argue, in the face of this gallery of women, that Swinburne could not create character or achieve genuine dramatic detachment. The men on the whole are not so effective; they tend to be more merged in the poet's unresolved conflicts, and to fall into the ready-made pattern of sadist and masochist; Harewood and Reginald in *Love's Cross Currents*, and Denham and Herbert in *Lesbia Brandon*. But here too there are many indications that Swinburne could have broken through into the fuller grasp of life, of people in their own rights. The slight glimpses of Mathison suggest that he could have shown ordinary folk with warmth; Margaret's husband is well depicted as a conventional country

her superb aplomb, her paganism, etc., but that does not mean she is his mouth-piece or that he identifies himself with her. (She slights Victor Hugo and Swinburne's own most cherished political positions.) He has an ambivalent attitude to her as to the Messalinas, etc., of his poems; but what is creatively important is that in the novel, by the more realistic definition, he is getting such figures into a clearer social focus and breaking the infantile bond of love-hate, joy-pain. They cease to be wild images that he hurls in defiance at a repressed and repressive world, and become socially located, dramatically realized. (Mr Hughes himself, from a different angle, stresses the successful objectification of conflict in the characters.)

gentleman; and in Mr Linley, though still fascinated by the sadist, the novelist achieves satirical objectivity. Mr Linley is the male counterpart of Lady Midhurst; or rather, we feel that he would be if *Lesbia Brandon* were as completed as *Love's Cross Currents*. He lacks some of the charming qualities of Lady Midhurst, and exudes an immediate smell of evil; but the pair of them, in the last resort, are the dominating and destructive figures of their world.

It goes without saying that there are many passages of striking poetic evocation, such as Herbert's dream and Lesbia's deathbed, of which Mr Hughes makes much. But more surprising, perhaps, is the capacity shown for describing action and scene in a clear style, precise in detail and moving with rhythmic breadth as a whole. The increasing realism is indeed what makes Swinburne's fictional work impressive; and if he had fully broken through to the stable union of poetry and realism which he is here seeking, he would indeed have made a great contribution to the English novel, the world novel. In any event, at the lowest evaluation, his achievement is high enough to disprove the legends of an inspired but automatic *scald*, a marvellous-boy poet who uses words as dazzling abstract counters in metres as galvanic as the twitches of a dead electrically tormented frog. He emerges as a human being as well as a prodigy; and for this reason we gain a new and sympathetic insight into his creative processes. The hard brilliant carapace falls away, and we see chaos as well as creation – the next striven-for step as well as the mastered round.

Herbert's wanderings on moorland, hill, and seacoast are rendered with lovely and tender clarity; and, in particular, the passage in Chapter III which tells of the boy struggling in the waves has a sharp immediacy that will astonish those who think Swinburne could write only of a weltering waste of wan waters. Again, the capacity to catch and define, not merely evanescent moods of sense and thought, but crucial and complex moments of inner change, again will astonish those who know only the glittering mad-parrot of some of the biographies or the monotone stridency of some of the poems. Take the following from the account of Margaret:

But for her, in town and country, the life she lived was by no means enough. And unluckily she had no love for London. She was not brilliant in society, and her beauty shone there through a cloud. Her husband did not embitter and did not enliven her life. She would have done him no wrong: but he did her no good. He had for her a little love, and she had much liking for him. He could fill up his life with little satisfactions, but he could fill no single and sufficient expression of her wants and powers. In those years, a maiden at heart, she had a vague and violent thirst after action and passion. She did not rebel against what was, but she desired what might be. Of one thing only she never thought; of love.

Or, for a different sort of effect, take the long sustained picture of Leonora, which concludes:

a woman too stupid for vice or virtue; a victim given over to scurrility and success. She could not spell, and had never tried to think. She did not care more for one man than another; the watchword of her life was indifference. She was cold, slow, heavy; and therefore capable of worse things than a sensual woman abandoned to herself. She could neither love nor reflect; she could not even talk the bright false talk of women naturally dull. But for all this she was still one thing: a tower of ivory, roofed with gold.

The accounts of the Italian patriot and the French exile are also of much interest; and in them Swinburne has effectively posed the passionate nationalist and the abstract internationalist. How he meant to weave them into the finished story is not clear.

Mr Hughes examines the problem of dating *Lesbia Brandon* so thoroughly that one is pleased at being able to add even the least suggestion to his analysis. I think, however, he underestimates the influence of Meredith, especially of *Emilia in England* (later called *Sandra Belloni*) which had appeared in 1864. For instance, Meredith had there discussed, through some of his characters, the position of the Novel, as here Swinburne does in his important Chapter III.\* And Mr Linley calls Carlyle 'a Puritan on a hippogriff'. Swinburne cannot but be thinking of the description of Wilfrid the sentimentalist in *Emilia* as the man seeking to ride a Hippogriff – to hold an impossible position based in egoist self-division. Swinburne seems to use the term to mean merely lost on a chimera, whereas with Meredith it has a precise psychological and philosophic significance; and there can be no doubt that the former is echoing *Emilia* (rather than the opening of Wieland's *Oberon* where probably Meredith found the image originally and where it signifies only romantic flight). And I am surprised that Mr Hughes does not point to the character of Tracy Runningbrook in *Emilia*, who is certainly based directly on Swinburne and whose extremely vivid pictures of Sandra in her collapse and renewal can now be seen as not at all unlike the descriptive passages in *Lesbia* – such as the subtly elaborated eye-picture which opens it. Previously no one has noted that Tracy's prose is close to Swinburne's; only his vituperation to reviewers has been taken as authentically Swinburnean.

So far I have touched only lightly on the question of Swinburne's masochism, which cannot however be ignored. It lies at the heart of

\* Mr Hughes cites some French attacks on Balzac, but not Leslie Stephen's vicious essay in *The Fortnightly*, 1871. I think that if Swinburne had been writing in the 1870's he could hardly have missed a blow back at it in *Lesbia*, Chapter III; for he must have known it.

his creative impulse and in turn rules the constrictions that hedge him in. What we get from *Lesbia Brandon* is the very close associations of school-birchings, sea-buffetings, abasements of adolescent shame, and later, political rebellion and martyrdom. Here Swinburne seems akin in many ways to Shelley, though he shows the same elements in a more intensely canalized way. Mr Hughes strongly urges that he had nothing of the sadist in him, that he always identified himself with the sufferer and not with the inflictor of pain, and that concepts of honour, of an endurance-test, were at every point tied up with his masochist ideas and feelings. We may accept this as essentially true, and yet he profoundly bored and repelled by *The Flogging-Block* and *The Whippingam Papers* in which Swinburne himself revelled and which here appear cited in the notes. No doubt we are helped towards comprehension by the notion of the endurance-test:

As for shame, he had never for a second thought of it. A flogging was an affair of honour to him; if he came off without tears, although with loss of blood, he regarded the master with chivalrous pity, as a brave enemy worsted.

Certainly such an attitude had its ultimate roots in the tests of initiation-ritual at the tribal level, and persisted in the ascetics and martyrs of early Christian days. *Askesis* meant craft-training and then athletic training before it meant religious self-denial.

This is how one is hardened against prison, hunger, thirst, privations and agonies. The martyr's dried-up skin will serve as a cuirass, the iron claws will slide over them as over thick horn. Such a man will be he who by fasting has come often close to death and purged himself of his blood. . . . (Tertullian.)

It is amusing indeed to meditate that Swinburne with his flagellation-tests was carrying on the tradition of the ascetics whom he thought he was despising in the name of pagan stoicism! But in fact what had a deeply-rooted social and historical significance for them, had become a purely idiosyncratic pang and resistance in his case. And that is why we can feel a deep sympathy with Tertullian's Martyrs, yet see only an infantile fixation in Swinburne's sexuality.

A poet with such a fixation can develop so far and no further. He can develop as far as his sexual drama of submission, suffering and triumph can go on providing him with patterns and images that can be at all adequately identified with external reality. And so, because the fixation canalized Swinburne's energies with extreme intensity, it helped him in his earlier phases (roughly covering the ground defined by *Atalanta*, *Love's Cross Currents*, the first series of *Poems and Ballads*, *Blake*, and *Songs*

*before Sunrise*). He was able to use its patterns and pressures to express his revolt against certain aspects of his world, to affirm his sense of union with the suffering sources of life, and to rise into a conviction of Beauty triumphant after all. On the one hand his revolt was sexual and aimed against the puritanic philistinism of his society; on the other hand it was political, expressing partnership for the various forces gathered under the banner of Mazzini – though he did not accept Mazzini's theology. It is no accident that the flogging Austrian general Haynau is mentioned in both *Love's Cross Currents* and *Lesbia Brandon*:

He was put in prison and examined; you know what that means with our Austrians: beaten to pieces till something comes of it; death, or madness or confession. Wh! when they don't stop at women. There's Haynau hardly warm in hell yet.

But this link between what we may call the infantile pattern and the historical process had reached its point of final tension about 1870; and if Swinburne was to continue finding the powerful and dynamic relation to society and history which he had found in the 1860's, he had to break through at least part of the obstructive fixation and come closer to the fullness of reality, to adult relationships.\* In *Lesbia Brandon* we see him strenuously making the effort; but a complex set of factors, which stretch from his own psychic resistances to the malign actions of Watts-Dunton, prevented him from completing the work. Yet, even so, he had gained much; and though his writing after 1870, and even more so after 1880, lacked the early dynamism of impact, it cannot be dismissed. Especially does his critical prose need as thorough a revaluation as his fiction has now won.

Mr Hughes, moved by a laudable enthusiasm for an abused or at least obscured hero, tends at times to spoil his case by over-emphatic claims: Thus he says of *Love's Cross Currents* that it proves 'he could introduce into the novel a beauty of sheer poetry higher than any that had ever been seen there'. Now, if one defines 'sheer poetry' so that it covers only the particular kind of poetry in which Swinburne excelled, one can justify the statement. But one is not unduly widening the definition if one remarks that Bunyan built the bases of our novel on a great sweep of epical poetry, in which the prose often rings with the very clash of the weapons

\* The Mazzinian synthesis breaks down in 1871 – as can be seen by comparing Swinburne's Ode on the Proclamation of the French Republic in September, with his letters during the Commune and his review of Hugo's *L'Année Terrible* in *The Fortnightly*, 1872. Mr Hughes might have used this point in dealing with the dates of *Lesbia*. Sadier (Chapter XI) is a definitely pre-Commune figure; Swinburne would have written this chapter quite differently after 1871.

of life and death: that Sterne has his own subtle poetry in prose, both in image and style; that *Wuthering Heights* is permeated with lyrical energies that we can only call poetic; that Dickens's power of evocation deserves the same term, even when it is humorous, as in the account of Pecksniff's walk where the very universe oozes unctuousness; and that Meredith in *Feverel* had introduced a new lyrical relation of man and nature, in both the love-scenes and the magnificent storm-passage of renewal. . . . And what if one looks outside England, to Cervantes and Balzac and Gogol!

It would be more true to say that Swinburne's fictional work has close affinities with that of Meredith, who contemporaneously was attempting a new fusion of poetry and psychological realism.\* Mr Hughes does not do justice here, and even less does M. Lefourcade. We cannot dispose of the matter by saying that Swinburne lacks the vulgar elements that Meredith has; for those 'vulgar' elements are precisely part of the whole expanding and deepening struggle of the Novel in Meredith's hands. What is important is the fellowship now revealed between the two writers; and the vision we have of what a tremendous rôle Swinburne would have played if he had been able to add to his lyrical poetry an extended definition of conflict in a series of novels. For Swinburne, apart from his power to write in subtle, concise, concentrated prose, owned also, it is clear, the power to build character on a large scale, to blend the generic and the particular so as to beget people who were both highly individual and also social types – that is, expressing certain basic trends and conflicts of the writer's world.

That he did not carry his fiction further than he did cannot be merely laid at the wicked door of Watts-Dunton. We must look for the root-cause in the masochist fantasy which had become ingrained into the poet's spiritual and bodily system. That under no circumstances he could have broken through its hold, it would be rash to say, since he made so strong an effort here to attain the realistic approach which is ultimately based in a grasp of common life. But what we can say is that in the given circumstances he failed to attain the full stature postulated by the achievement of his existing fiction. And we can add that in this edition of *Lesbia Brandon* we have at last the basis for a fully considered judgment of his life and work, thanks to the infinitely patient editorial work and the bit-

\* The 'indirect' method used by Swinburne is to be found in less extreme form in Meredith, who was continually attacked for it, e.g. 'The only author who [besides Meredith] has adopted this method is Mr Flaubert, in *l'Education Sentimentale*, which always reads as if it had been constructed by the process of writing it in feuilletons, and then suppressing every alternate one.' *The Saturday Review*, November 15th, 1879, on *The Egoist*.

terly-polemical but always scholarly critical analyses of Mr Randolph Hughes. It is encouraging. A writer in the long run does get the critical insights he deserves; but sometimes the run is long, and, as Mr Hughes would say, some of the runners should much earlier have been disqualified.

## AUGUSTUS JOHN

John Davenport

Augustus John has been one of the great successes of his generation, yet he seems to regard himself as a failure. Judged by the highest standards he may be right. Are some artists born out of period? Is English life unpropitious to painters? Is there something cynically buffoonish in Celts who despise gifts while they accept them? In *Chiaroscuro*\* Mr John raises many questions and answers some of them; but he remains, for all his robust masculinity, an enigma. He does not try to baffle us; indeed, he invites us to share his confusion, ironically pointing out paradoxes in his nature with a laugh in which self-appreciation mingles with disdain.

*Chiaroscuro*, parts of which Mr Cyril Connolly had the editorial brilliance to publish in *Horizon*, is a somewhat incoherent assemblage of fragments, held together by its author's powerful personality. There is no time-pattern. Dates to Mr John are as unnecessary as callipers. We do indeed begin at the beginning, in Pembrokeshire in the late 'seventies, where the painter's father was a successful solicitor, first at Haverfordwest and later at Tenby. The restrictions of provincial life were uncongenial: 'I wanted to be my own unadulterated self and no one else.' In 1895 the shy student entered the Slade. It was not long before his altogether exceptional gifts as a draughtsman were recognized. He was a genius; a genius moreover with rare physical attributes; with wit, too, and intelligence. The triumphal progress began: Mazeppa in a hansom cab. Does one blame the artist or the country of his choice? 'I am no modernist' – a boast? A confession? Wonderful drawings; some original paintings; portraits in the grand tradition. No great wall paintings; no satire. Something wrong with the period? With the artist, so prodigally gifted, so corrupted by his time, so innocently convinced of the power of his prejudices? At the same time Picasso, a Spaniard with Jewish blood, had

\* *Chiaroscuro—Fragments of Autobiography*. First Series. By Augustus John. (Jonathan Cape. 30s.)

made his home in Paris. Two equally gifted young men with very different backgrounds and foregrounds: each of them has fulfilled himself in his own way. The whole problem of the artist in England is too complex to analyse here. Roughly speaking, it may be explained in terms of the national love of amateurism. In France, the artist, however famous he may become, retains his professional status; in England this is not the case: he is expected to be a social success as well. Something goes wrong, sometimes slowly, sometimes rapidly. There is no Charles V today to pick up Titian's brush.

Meanwhile, here is Augustus John with his ardent romanticism – Welsh and Spanish gypsies, the fisherfolk of Connemara, Provençal landscape, the anarchism of Fourier as a ground; and above a conglomerate mass of the great and un-great of the last fifty years. A great 'character' emerges, a giant covered with the dust of a falling world. In spite of some splendid pictures, it is impossible not to have a feeling of unparalleled waste. Sickert, a painter of infinitely fewer natural gifts, but with a more orderly mind and a less exotic approach to life, succeeded where John has failed. It may be argued that Sickert was not British; at least, by birth.

*Chiaroscuro* gives an impression of increasing fame, increasing loneliness, increasing disgust: all off-set by a deliciously sardonic humour.

[Will Rothenstein's] own speech owed nothing to his native Yorkshire, being modelled closely on the best examples to be met with at Oxford, a town he had visited personally.

There is little of this sense of satire in the painting, although the portraits have often been uncompromising enough to disturb the sitters. There is the strange story of the first Lord Leverhulme, who returned a painting minus the head of the subject.

Much mystified, I wrote to his Lordship requesting an explanation of this remarkable proceeding. . . . I received in return a letter stating that on finding the picture too large to place in his safe, the owner had cut out what he considered to be the most important part, that is the head, and lodged it in that repository: as for the remainder, it had been sent back by an error on the part of his housekeeper: I was urgently requested to keep the matter dark, and invited to dinner at Hampstead.

Just as in his larger compositions one is often aware of a failure in design, *Chiaroscuro* has no plan; as its author says, it is fragmentary. It is none the worse for that – they are good fragments. It seems a pity, however, to have omitted so much that was good of the original contributions to *Horizon*. Designed, or undesigned, as it is, the book could easily have absorbed them, one would have thought, without such ruthless pruning. The prose is in the grand manner. It has become the

custom to praise as prose almost any sentence more than twelve words long. The praise lavished on Sir Osbert Sitwell's amusing autobiography, for instance, was full of the beauties of 'the prose'. In fact the admired passages are the most impotently writhing ones, where the syntax has failed. One is reminded of a snake with a broken back. Augustus John's purple patches similarly fail sometimes to come off. When it is good, as in many of the descriptions of loved regions in Wales or Provence, it is very good; and as one might expect of so gifted a portrait painter, he can evoke a face. Here is J. D. Innes:

He himself cut an arresting figure: a Quaker hat, a coloured silk scarf, and a long black overcoat, set off features of a slightly cadaverous cast, with glittering black eyes, a wide sardonic mouth, a prominent nose and a large bony forehead, invaded by streaks of thin black hair.

He can communicate, too, his enthusiasms, such as those for Rembrandt or for anthropological science. His love for the good things of the past is never merely 'nostalgic', as they say, but informed with passion:

I am partial to fisher-folk. The *matelots* of Boulogne have lost their magnificent coifs, now only seen in old photographs. In the eighteenth century the popular life and character must have been far richer, but Sir Joshua Reynolds who visited this region, makes no comment on the scene in his diary. He and his compères were, it seems, too concerned with rank and fashion to waste their time on common folk. With the rise of a new bourgeoisie, flourishing on the principles of self-help, child-torture and mass enslavement, all manifestations of the folk-spirit were frowned upon as vulgar and un-Christian: the old songs and dances were gradually forgotten, and the hereditary costumes folded and put away, to be replaced by the shoddy products of the factory: and now that the country crafts have gone too, there is not much joy left in the land. The *genius loci* has become a disreputable character, interesting only to the policeman.

There are many such good things in *Chiaroscuro*. One turns from landscape to portrait, from comic anecdote to æsthetic speculation. A Celtic melancholy underlies all: *Chiaroscuro* is an apt title. Respector of tradition, despiser of convention, lover of the primitive, painter of the rich, Augustus John is more full of contradictions than most men. He is surely the first anarchist to have been awarded the Order of Merit, and doubtless gains ironic pleasure from that as from so many other things in life.

## BOOK NOTES

BEATRICE WEBB'S DIARIES 1912-24. Edited by Margaret Cole. (Longmans, Green, pp. 272, 24s.). This is the sequel to *My Apprenticeship and Our Partnership*. It appears at a moment when the third generation of Fabianism – Professor Cole, and his wife who edits this volume, representing the second – has just made its bow with a symposium reviewed elsewhere in this issue. The contrast is interesting and not altogether flattering to the pupils. Mrs Webb's diaries for the 1912-24 period are, of course, primarily a running commentary on the events of the day and the growth of the Labour movement. But they provide material for the sociologist as well as the historian. The inner history of the Asquith-Lloyd George split, the rivalries between Henderson, Clynes and MacDonald for control of the Labour Party, the shoddy manoeuvring around the miners' strike of 1921, the impact of the Russian Revolution – all this has been described before, but never with quite this hard, clear, unflinching candour. There is no tolerance of fools here, and spades are not described as agricultural implements. Mrs Cole has exercised a certain amount of censorship – how much it is difficult to guess. There is at any rate enough left to make some of the political moguls wince. The Webbs had a low opinion of Lloyd George's character and no illusions at all about MacDonald, or Snowden, who in 1924 was already 'talking like a Treasury clerk'. They thought highly of some Labour leaders, did not much like the trade unions, looked upon Bernard Shaw as an amusing sprite, and did not take H. G. Wells at all seriously. There are devastating portraits of Litvinoff and Kameneff, an appreciative sketch of Krassin, a constant strain of pro-German and anti-French sentiment, and a conviction that the traditional governing class is played out. The tone is calm, self-assured, occasionally arrogant and insular. The intellectual focus is narrow, but personal judgments are always shrewd. The 'partnership' itself must remain forever a model of what such relationships should be. By the time this volume closes, Sidney is sixty-five and in the Cabinet, but he is still 'my boy'.

AVENUES OF HISTORY. L. B. Namier. (Hamish Hamilton, pp. 202, 15s.) Professor Namier's inclusion in the recent Honours List will have been judged by many a belated tribute to one of Britain's leading historians. The paradox of Namier the Russian-born Jew, who is also one of the arch-Tories among historians, has often been commented on. He is, of course, the leading authority on eighteenth-century parliamentary government in Britain. In this volume we are in the main presented with the other Namier: the connoisseur of Central European history and the stern critic of German pretensions to political eminence in this area. But there is a third Namier, well represented by the introductory essay on History which carries a significant criticism of Arnold Toynbee: a Namier who can hold his own in the field of generalized thought, even when confronted with the impressive dogmatism of the Toynbeean school. For the most part reprinted from *The Times Literary Supplement* and other periodicals, the present collection of essays is perhaps a shade less satisfying than its predecessors, *In the Margin of History* or *Conflicts*. It is nonetheless a distinguished addition to a list which also includes *Diplomatic Prelude* and

*Europe in Decay*. All these, it must be remembered, are mere chips from the workshop. One longs for something substantial, a sequel perhaps to *1848: the Revolution of the Intellectuals*. He remains the historian's historian.

THE CONDUCT OF LIFE. Lewis Mumford. (Secker and Warburg, pp. 292, 21s.) American sociologists and anthropologists of the strict or academic school are notoriously addicted to jargon, and Mr Mumford, the distinguished author of *Technics and Civilization* and *The Culture of Cities*, wins our hearts immediately by his lucid prose. Presumably the mandarins regard him as a highly talented vulgarizer of their thought, but the public has reason to be grateful for his existence. All the same, this volume sometimes comes perilously close to journalism. Humanism needs its popularizers, and the liberal philosophy is worth expounding afresh at a moment when the fashion is against it. But to a European, Mr Mumford's defence of the creed of William James and John Dewey smacks of complacency. 'Confidence in creation' is all very well, but with the shadow of the atomic bomb hanging over our cities we are in no mood to be told that perhaps the next generation will see happier times. Mr Mumford is widely read, intelligent and civilized. He represents liberalism at its best. It is not his fault that in Europe his message falls a little flat.

MATERIALISM. M. N. Roy. (Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta, pp. 242, Rs. 7/8.) Mr Roy has been one of the stormy petrels of modern Asian nationalism for so long that to many people his appearance in the guise of an amateur philosopher will come as a surprise. The present book, whose first edition appeared in 1940, was actually prepared while he was in prison in 1934, following the Meerut trial. As might be inferred from his stormy political past – he has at various times fought under Pancho Villa in Mexico, helped to organize the Communist rising in Shanghai in 1927, and supported Britain against Gandhi and Nehru in 1942 – it is the work of an unorthodox Marxist. Faced with Hindu mysticism and obscurantism, the author, like many of his countrymen, adopts the classical materialism of the Encyclopædists and the *Aufklärung* as a weapon to pierce the armour of tradition. A libertarian Socialist, he rejects Lenin and Stalin, but holds fast to Marx and Engels. All this makes him agreeable to Western progressives, but from the modern European standpoint he seems a little old-fashioned. A belligerent humanist, he has something in common with Mr Mumford, but his straightforward materialism suggests a different intellectual climate – that of the French Revolution and its successor, the Russian. 'The phenomenal progress of the natural sciences in the 19th century', he writes, 'exposed the utter absurdity of the "spiritualist" doctrine of epistemology, which had condemned man to eternal ignorance and proclaimed the real world an illusion.' Here is positivism with a vengeance.

WHITHER EUROPE. M. J. Bonn. (Cohen and West, pp. 204, 15s.) Professor Bonn is that *rara avis*, a genuine European or, at least, Anglo-German. He writes dispassionately and lucidly on a subject which has lately inflamed imaginations on both sides of the Atlantic: the chances of European union. In the light of his cool intellect and varied experience as a scholar and official adviser, it is easy to accept his considered view that European unification is going to be a lengthy affair and that it will be a union of nations rather than of states. The earlier chapters on European history could have been spared.


**RECALLED TO SERVICE.** General Maxime Weygand. (Heinemann, pp. 437, 30s.) This stout volume, although a Book Society choice, seems likely to leave its mark chiefly among students of contemporary military and political history. As such it has considerable importance. Its author plainly intended it as a counterblast not only to M. Reynaud's memoirs, but to Mr Churchill's first volume. One hazards the guess that its impact will nonetheless be confined to Frenchmen – and elderly conservative Frenchmen at that.

**A HISTORY OF IRELAND UNDER THE UNION 1801 TO 1922.** P. S. O'Hegarty. (Methuen, pp. 787, 50s.) This seems likely to become the standard history of modern Ireland, at least for Irish nationalists who are not bigots. Vast in scope and eloquence, generous in tone, well documented, passionate and yet fair, liberal rather than Catholic in spirit, it is a pleasure to read, though one often finds oneself swamped in lengthy quotations from speeches marked by outmoded eloquence. But who shall blame the author for that? He did not aim to write a textbook. Here is the spirit of Irish nationalism at its best. Mr O'Hegarty himself belongs to the generation of Griffith, the generation which led the final struggle for independence. He writes political history in a romantic strain. Economics are not for him. One is carried along on a Niagara of rhetoric. England is the villain of the piece, the Irish have been a submerged nation since 1169, and anyone who stood for the Union is by definition an enemy. But he is generous towards non-Celts, claims the Anglo-Irish as part of the Nation, and holds aloof from the Catholic hierarchy. Unlike the bitter outpourings of East European and Middle Eastern nationalism, indignation here is not marred by hatred. A notable work.

**THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1901-05** (Harvard University Press. Two Volumes, pp. 1342, 20 dollars). These monumental volumes – Nos. 3 and 4 in a series covering the elder Roosevelt's career – throw light on his first Presidential term and incidentally illuminate a large part of the American political scene. They are easy reading, but will not appeal to many outside the United States, their subject matter for the most part being confined to domestic politics and public personalities now forgotten.

**PEASANT RENAISSANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA 1900-50.** Ruth Trouton. (Kegan Paul, pp. 320, 28s.) A scholarly and well-documented study of peasant life, agrarian co-operatives and rural education in the most important country of South-Eastern Europe. The author's sympathies are with the pre-war Croatian Peasant Party, but she is moderately hopeful of progress under the present régime.

**THE MARCH OF JOURNALISM.** Harold Herd. (Allen & Unwin, pp. 327, 21s.) This is the story of the British Press since 1622, and a very readable and interesting story it is. One learns, for example, that as late as 1663 Sir Roger l'Estrange doubled the functions of Surveyor of the Press and sole licensed editor of 'news-books'. He held that it was unwise to license newspapers, since their reading unsettled the multitude and gave them 'not only an Itch but a Colourable Right to be Meddling with the Government'. As the story continues, it becomes increasingly clear that his fears were justified. The earlier chapters have a certain sprightliness which owes something to the period. Towards the end Mr Herd is content with factual reporting on the working of the modern newspaper, and a shade too



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anxious to rebut suggestions that Britain's Press might be improved. There are those who hold that this country has both the best and the worst newspapers in the world, but Mr Herd is not concerned with judgments.

**THE CHARACTER OF PEOPLES**, by André Siegfried. (Cape. 12s. 6d.)

A rapid but careful survey, by the doyen of French social historians, of the characteristics of the French, German, English, Russian and American nations. He distils his wide reading and intimate knowledge of the whole world into a few lucid chapters in the French manner. His remarks on nations other than America are not strikingly new, but they are excellently arranged and they cannot be made too often, since it is now imperative that each of us should realize that national, not personal, characteristics, make up at least 50 per cent. of our personalities. With regard to America, M. Siegfried makes the interesting observation that the first crystallization of the national character occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century, but that it later broke down under the new wave of immigration from Eastern Europe and Italy, so that the country is again in a state of unpredictable flux. The general conclusion of his book is pessimistic, though cheerfully expressed. M. Siegfried is old enough to have travelled all round the world in 1898-1900. The changes which have taken place since then, in particular the decline of Europe, seem to him comparable to the collapse of the Roman Empire. His only forecast is that we are now beginning, not a new chapter in history, but a whole new book.

**HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S ART**, by Hermann Licht. (Allen and Unwin. 35s.)

A translation, with illustrations, of a German summary of world art history. Naturally it cannot be much more than a catalogue, but as such it is valuable. It ought perhaps to have included a wider choice of illustrations; those given in colour are well below the standards we are now used to.

**THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION**, by Wilhelm Reich, M.D. (Peter Nevill Ltd. 25s.)

This work is in the now traditional line of books on sexual 'emancipation'. Dr Reich's aim is to help the individual to achieve the fullest enjoyment of living through complete sexual self-expression. When he first wrote his book in the 1930's, he was struggling against sexual repression caused by bourgeois society, church morality and National Socialist ideology, and he was enthusiastic about sexual freedom in the Soviet Union. Now he has to admit that America is more progressive sexually than Russia. His doctrine, in brief, seems to be that no strict moral code is possible. There is nothing wrong in occasionally breaking the marriage vows, birth control should be within everyone's reach, young people should have sexual intercourse (but based on love) as soon as they wish, and so on. We owe a good deal to such writers, however naïve and rebarbative their style may now appear.

**VICTORIAN OLYMPUS**, by William Gaunt. (Cape. 15s.)

An enjoyable account of the neo-Classical school of Victorian painters, centred on Lord Leighton, one of the great, beautiful, chaste, mysterious, empty Victorian giants. The only criticism that can be directed against Mr Gaunt is that he pulls his punches. His book makes one wish it had been fatter and less reticent.

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*Surely she was the most beautiful woman that ever water washed,*

but the chapter itself is not so perfectly controlled. If his whole work had been salted with the occasional realism of his African writing, he would have been undoubtedly great.

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ANCIENT EGYPT, by J. E. Manchip White. (Wingate. 21s.)

Probably the best short account of Egyptian civilization that has so far appeared. The text is clear and lively, the illustrations excellent. We are left wondering, of course, what the psychological content of this civilization was, but that is not the author's fault; it is an inevitable feature of the subject. Mr Manchip White provides a first-rate historical framework within which we can exercise our imagination.

CITY OF SHEPHERD KINGS (Ancient Gaza V), by Sir Flinders Petrie. (British School of Egyptian Archeology and Bernard Quaritch. 50s.)

In her introduction Lady Petrie writes: 'This volume serves a double purpose. It is not only *Ancient Gaza V*, to give details of the fifth and last excavation of Tell-el-Ajjul, but is intended, under the title of *City of Shepherd Kings*, to inform a larger public of Flinders Petrie's five-year examination of a site ranging through the period of Canaanite, Middle Kingdom and Hyksos domination.' Although this is essentially a book for Egyptologists and students of archaeology there is much to interest the layman and to entrance the artist.

The coloured plates of the Hyksos gold work are beautifully reproduced and will appeal to everyone. The text is at times almost a catalogue of pottery, some of it very fine, flints, ivory, with many scarabs of great importance. The skull measurements, and the lists of weights, though extremely interesting to the specialist, will

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not appeal to the uninitiated. But there is a fascinating contribution by Dr Margaret Murray on Beliefs and Ritual, and Chapter XVI, describing the traverse of the Wadi Ghazzeh, will delight the geologically minded. Architects will find much to interest them in the magnificent ground plans of Gaza. Finally, for the traveller who is familiar with the Middle East, the photographs of Wadi Ghazzeh will fill him with a longing to return.

This is a book of great importance to the scientific world as well as a tribute to a great man whose unceasing labours for over half a century have contributed so much to archaeological knowledge throughout the world.

There are still several volumes in manuscript, amongst them the *Proto Dynastic Corpus* and the *Seven Memphite Tomb Chapels*, and it is disappointing to know that they can only be published if donations from the public are forthcoming. Let us hope this situation will not continue for long, and that, when the full importance of the excavations has been realized by the general public, sufficient funds will be subscribed to permit the publication of the remaining works.

*The Editor of*

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
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## EDITORIAL

The nomination of General Eisenhower as the Republican candidate for the Presidency marks the end of Isolationism as a political creed in America. European observers must be aware that this is not the first time that the mourners have gathered around the coffin of Isolationism only to see it rise again with 'twenty trenched gashes in its head'. But there are reasons for feeling that Eisenhower's victory over Taft is more significant and more lasting than Willkie's victory over Taft in 1940, or Dewey's conversion to anti-Taft views and his victories in 1944 and 1948. The main reason is that Isolationism is in fact impossible for the United States to practice to-day – and it was not wholly impossible in 1940. In twelve years the facts of political life are being born in, even on the opposition party.

Another reason for thinking Eisenhower's victory significant is that it was not the victory of one man – certainly not the victory of Eisenhower personally. He was a passive spectator at his own triumph, drawn along as Roman Emperors were at their triumphs, by hands equally willing to honour him, and bind the limbs of those he had defeated. Eisenhower, in fact, was carried to victory on a wave of popular sentiment within the Republican Party. That wave of sentiment, much more than the candidate, is what is significant for America's allies. It signifies the discontent of even loyal members of the Conservative Party in American politics with dogmas which smack of a past that is gone beyond recall. The dogma that America is a country which has turned its back on the Atlantic to find its future in the Pacific; the dogma that America must avoid entanglements that result in her giving more than she gets; the dogma that the social services open the back door to Socialism – these are some of the dogmas so thoroughly repudiated by the rank and file of the Republican Party. It would be a mistake to imagine that the old guard of the party was converted; it was not, it was overwhelmed and may live to fight another day. But after stacking all the cards in its own favour it could not and did not win. Almost everything that was said from the platform in the first three days of the Convention was the true dogma according to the old guard. The speeches by MacArthur and Hoover were the last splutters of the Dinosaurs – and very loud splutters at that. But they carried no weight

with the Convention, and both men ended the week more generally discredited than they began. The American people, in the roar of party conclave or in the quiet of the polling booth, are not easily taken in by fustian.


The Convention was far more certain of what it rejected than of what it wished to adopt. The so-called Party Platform is made up of a score of planks which do not fit together, and are indeed intended to restore party unity – which means unity between two elements that are really irreconcilable. It would be kindest and wisest not to attempt to analyse it, because like all party platforms drawn up at conventions it is a nine days' wonder which is forgotten before the election is ended. But if we look elsewhere to see what the new Republican Party is going to favour there is a disturbing lack of evidence. On home affairs the candidate himself has said very little, and that was too much. Eisenhower has not understood the elements of America's domestic problems, and when he tries to answer questions about the subject he reveals ignorance, and a prejudice in favour of returning to the frontier spirit of Abilene, Kansas, at the beginning of this century. But amongst the General's most useful and hard-working backers has been Thomas E. Dewey, and he is likely to have a large hand in the domestic policy Eisenhower advocates, and – if he is elected – the policies he will actually pursue. Dewey's views are no secret, and no novelty. He believes in a more efficient and less generous version of the Fair Deal. It would be a policy of the mixture as before, but with a fee for the prescription to save waste. The nearest equivalent to Dewey in British politics is R. A. Butler; neither are economists, both are efficient reformers who wish their party to move with the times.

It is, of course, in its impact on foreign affairs that the Eisenhower nomination is most significant. For twelve years the American Administration has had to face the awkward fact that the whole basis of their foreign policy, not merely the details but the very existence of an active policy of participation in world affairs, was questioned or denied by a section of the opposition party. What was more serious, that section of the party was often on the point of becoming the official leadership of the opposition. As long as Senator Vandenberg was alive it was possible to pretend that there was a bi-partisan foreign policy; with his death the bi-partisan policy was extinguished, in spite of all that John Foster Dulles could do. The leadership in foreign affairs passed to the Taft wing of the Republican Party.

It is that disastrous situation which has been remedied by the Convention. If Taft had been nominated – though his election would have been most unlikely – American foreign policy would have been hamstrung till November, because there would have been no prospect of continuity. The outcome of the election would have seemed abroad as significant as the outcome of a civil war. Now the election is reduced to the democratic proportions of a change of emphasis. What will that change of emphasis be? It appears that whether Eisenhower is elected or not, there will be a new self-confidence in American policy, because the experimental policies of the cold war will have been approved in principle by both the great parties. With that greater self-confidence, we must realize, is bound to come greater impatience with Allies which do not conform. Relations with America after the election, whoever is elected, are likely to be more clear-cut, but not easier.

To be specific, if Eisenhower is elected he is likely to demand a clarification of the aims of the Grand Alliance. He is agreed that Europe is more important than Asia, that a hot war would be disastrous, and that America needs allies; but just because he agrees on those issues, and would have a mandate from the American people, he is almost certain to demand that the Allies agree with America on lesser details. The attitude towards Communist China, the problems of East-West trade, are subjects on which clarification is overdue. But the main issue, in which Eisenhower is passionately interested, is the future of Europe. As a General he has never attempted to conceal his determination that Europe shall be united by a federal union. He differs from most American people on this only in that he knows what he is talking about. With Eisenhower as President the question of how far, how fast and how extensive the process of federalization in Europe is to be, will become the number one question for America's allies.

But it is of course by no means certain that Eisenhower will be elected President. The Democratic party is the natural majority party in America because it combines the firm labour alliance with the actual support of the farmers. Unless Eisenhower can break that union, or carry all the floating voters, he will not be elected. The Democratic nominee, Adlai Stevenson, was chosen by the Convention just because he could hold together the labour voters and the farm voters, as well as avoid an irreconcilable split between Northern Liberals and Southern Conservatives. His record is one that should appeal to many floating voters. He is something of an intellectual who has carefully thought about the place



of private enterprise in American society and the place of America in the world at large. As a delegate to the United Nation's Assembly in 1946 he made his mark as a man who recognized the full extent of American obligation to trade on equal terms.

Yet it is true that Stevenson did not want to run. He is known to have felt that the Democratic Party could do with a period out of office, to purge itself of the corruption which resulted from twenty years of uninterrupted power. Even more important, he has felt – at least until recently – that unless the Republican Party were given power it would never learn responsibility. However, those scruples have been overcome, and there is little doubt that Stevenson will campaign vigorously.

It should make a good campaign, though we may expect its traditional descent from high principles to low vote catching. Such details need hardly concern non-Americans. For the world at large the significance of the American conventions is greater than any possible significance of the election itself. By nominating Eisenhower and Stevenson the two great parties have made it clear that America will no longer swing between extremes; that the possibilities of isolationism or imperialism have been abandoned. Henceforward, the two parties will compete for the votes at the centre, not for the support of their own extremists. Henceforward the foreign policy debates will be on the line of action, not on whether to act at all.

For Europe this means a greater measure of security, but it will also mean greater demands. If the domestic battle on isolationism is ended, the struggle over what policy to pursue abroad will be intensified. America will now take its full place as an architect of the emerging Atlantic Community. In Europe, desultory planning for a distant future must be replaced by decision.

## COMMENT

### Technology-wise, Science-foolish

It is, curiously, even perversely, comforting to find a sphere of work in which America does not at the moment lead the world; in which she is desperately trying to catch up; in which for once there is a 'gap' not in her favour. Even more curiously, the field of American disadvantage is science, fundamental or basic, as opposed to applied: or, as Dr James Conant prefers to call it, in his foreword to the first report of the National Science Foundation, 'uncommitted research' as opposed to 'programmatic research'. As he defines them, 'applied research is like drilling for oil when you know where the oil is. Fundamental research is like prospecting for oil in a hitherto unexplored country'. To the English reader this report of the National Science Foundation is, at first glance, disturbing: it labours the case for supporting basic scientific research so persistently and protestingly that one begins to wonder how the idea ever arose that America is a science-mad nation; and it seeks to justify this insistence on the need for more fundamental research almost solely on the grounds of its potent contribution to preparedness for war. To scientists here the first part of the argument must seem otiose (surely no one ever doubted the importance of basic research) and the second part distasteful. But the report must be read in the light not only of the brief history of American science, but also of the even briefer story of the National Science Foundation.

Just as in raw materials (according to the recent Paley Report) the United States is now consuming more than she herself produces, so in science she has always been a bigger consumer than manufacturer of research. The measure of her dependence on scientific discoveries made elsewhere is given quantitatively in terms of Nobel prizes: 'Three out of four awards in science have gone to scientists outside the United States. This country is by no means self-sufficient with respect to scientific talent.' All this, of course, is common knowledge in scientific and academic circles. But it is nice to be reminded of it, especially when we are being so tirelessly, almost tiresomely, instructed – by everyone from productivity teams to the Paymaster-General – to look to America to learn how to run a technical civilization. It appears – and not only from this report, but from the way in which President Conant wooed the British universities in his Pilgrim speech last March – that academically and scientifically we

have much of value to teach, even if technologically we have lots to learn. And what we can teach and contribute is not only the intangibles: it is things of immediate as well as ultimate importance, even for cold or hot war. The opening sentence of the report could not have made this, by implication, more clear: 'Penicillin, the proximity fuse, the atom bomb, among a host of other scientific contributions to American victory in the Second World War, brought home to many citizens the value of scientific research.' Leaving aside the begged question of 'value', the choice of examples is illuminating: for it happens that the fundamental work on penicillin, on radar (the basis of the proximity fuse) and on nuclear fission was all done in this country and the results presented to American science to develop.

Since, then, America's scientific dependence on us and on the rest of Western Europe is known and, by implication, acknowledged, why does the report have to fight rather than state its case for fundamental research? The partial and immediate answer is that the body itself, the National Science Foundation – established by an Act of Congress of 1950, thirty to forty years after our own comparable bodies were started – has had to fight for its finance. The original first year's budget proposed by President Truman was 14 million dollars, but it was cut to 300,000 by the House Committee on Appropriations and was later restored to only 3½ millions. Compared with a total estimated expenditure on research and development in the United States (by industry, universities and the Federal Government) of close on 3,000 million dollars, the sums appropriated to the National Science Foundation hardly seem worth cavilling at. Yet the Foundation's first budget was questioned and cut by Congress – and not on the grounds that sufficient was already being done to encourage basic research, but because the Foundation's programme of aid to basic research and to the training of scientific manpower was not an immediate tangible contribution to the present defence of the nation. This, no doubt, is the reason behind the plaintive tone of the Foundation's first report and explains the laborious simplicity of the arguments, which include a basic-English history of scientific progress starting from Thales of Miletus (600 B.C.) with side-glances at the Greek etymology of electricity and magnetism. It explains, presumably, the carefully chosen quotations, not from top-ranking scientists, but from leading businessmen and industrialists like the chairman of the board of General Motors and the vice-president of General Electric, testifying to stockholders or to the readers of *Colliers* and *Fortune* about the importance and shortage of research. And it explains, presumably, the *argumentum ad bellum*.

Curious as all this special pleading seems to us, the need for it appears to be very real. The report estimates that only slightly more than 10 per

cent. of all American research and development is done in universities, and since most of the basic research is done by universities (though much of their work is also applied and developmental) it follows that the proportion of fundamental to applied research in the whole country must be dangerously low, and the pressure for 'defence research' is increasing the imbalance. That it should be necessary to set up a central government-sponsored agency to redress the balance must also seem curious, more especially in America, a land teeming with charitable trusts and foundations for the philanthropic support of learning. Perhaps the dependence of American universities on industry and foundations for much of their endowed research is not, on the whole, healthy for those unspectacular pursuits like 'pure' research which need to be financed from unearmarked resources if they are to have the freedom that good research demands. Somehow, in this country, we seem to have learnt how to preserve intact the virgin freedom of our academic activities while financing them now almost entirely from State funds. The basis of it may be that most people, including those in government, accept that fundamental research is a genuine and disinterested research for knowledge, not for industrial or warlike 'know-how'.

A. S.

### Musical Houseparty

To the non-specialist – and, for all one knows, to the specialist also – the charm of the Aldeburgh festival is its houseparty atmosphere: and it is a party which, unlike Glyndebourne, one can afford to attend. As a festival, it differs from Edinburgh, Cheltenham and the rest in two ways: it is small – the Jubilee Hall sets the size of the audience at less than 300 – and it has a *genius loci*. Aldeburgh, in fact, is a kind of miniature Bayreuth; serious and, in performance, perfectionist; but ending, like a good houseparty, with a couple of good jokes – at least they were not as bad as most musical jokes. The epithet which is bound to appear in describing the festival is 'intimate', which is unfortunate if it be taken to imply either the cosy or the *recherché*: the only implication here is friendliness and informality. It is pleasant to watch patrons, performers and audience stroll out of the houses, along the street or the shore, and into the hall; to see the performers taking turns at turning-over; and to have patrons prepared (and competent) to be compères, or rather to tell us what comes next. The fact that we have paid for our seats hardly seems to arise: the impression, and indeed the reality, is that we are invited guests at a

private performance, of a meticulously professional standard, in an atmosphere of the best amateurism. If it is all done under distinguished and near-royal patronage, there appears to be no snob-value attaching to attendance. Perhaps it is a selected, rather than a select, audience; perhaps it is self-selected by acquaintance, with this particular seaside place or with friends who frequent it, with the particular resident composer or his musical friends and accomplices. Or perhaps the Earl of Harewood summed it up in his closing speech when he said that the audience consists of those who live in Aldeburgh, those who don't, and those brought by one or other of the first two categories. The point is to categorize, not the audience, but the festival. This is not music for the million, not even for the thousands who fill the Albert Hall (and the pockets of successful impresarios) to pay mass homage to Tchaikovsky and the concerto; nor has it the kind of anonymous specialism of Cheltenham's contemporary music, nor the international tourist pull of Edinburgh. All this is simply to say that Aldeburgh is different, and even those who have not been there know that: but it is different in a hopeful way. For here is music made as well as performed – and performed as well as it is made – in a manner which recalls the courts and Kapellmeister of Germany, or our own Elizabethan age. The difference is that it is not solely for the private audience, it is not a Court culture: you can pay for your seat. Perhaps this is how music – and for that matter the other arts, which Aldeburgh does not neglect – should grow in our democratic, tax-burdened age.

W. A. S.

## CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

SIR, – As a trained economist who has just returned from three and a half weeks in the U S S R, after living there almost continuously from 1931 to 1937, may I make some critical comments on your June article on 'The Soviet Economy'?

Your correspondent makes much of the present need to alter the basis of price calculations in current Soviet plans as if this represented some intrinsic weakness in the Soviet system. In fact, of course, even our own 'Cost of Living' Index is far from perfect, and your contributor's criticisms of Soviet price calculations could be made anywhere where the same basic index has been in use for a number of years, especially where the economy was developing as rapidly as in the U S S R.

On page 489 your correspondent seeks to find some contradiction between the ending of 'all subsidies to industry and trade' in the U S S R, and the fact that the percentage of the Budget allocation to industry did not fall. In the Soviet Union a 'subsidy' to industry means, as here, a current contribution to that industry, to enable it to sell *below cost*. But Budget allocations to industry are, in the main, *capital* investments. Thus to abolish 'subsidies' means to abolish special assistance to enable industry to sell below cost. The fact that the Budget contribution to industry continued to rise with the Budget means that *capital investment* each year continued to rise.

On the same page there is an extraordinary statement – completely contrary to present fact – about 'the purchasing power of consumers' incomes' in the West being relatively high and tending 'to rise', while in the U S S R it is 'low by all standards'. Having just visited the U S S R, where prices are steadily falling, I cannot make head or tale of this comment. Moreover, a study of the absolute purchasing power now available in the U S S R is impressive, both compared to 1937, and compared to Western Europe as a whole. Your correspondent says 'wages are low in Soviet Russia'. At the official rate of exchange, the average wage in the U S S R to-day (1,000 roubles per month) is £22 per week! In fact, comparing both wages and purchasing power, we found that the average wage was more like £6 per week, but even this is not a low wage compared to Europe as a whole, not to mention Asia.

Your correspondent's statement that during the last two decades the prices of consumers' goods have risen 'approximately twice as fast as wages' is utterly incorrect. We made careful note of prices when in the U S S R, and since our return I have compared these with the prices quoted by Sir Walter Citrine in his *Search for Truth in Russia*, 1937. On the one hand, the average wage then was about 250 roubles a month, while now it is 1,000 roubles. The money wage has thus been quadrupled between 1937 and 1952. On the other hand, prices rarely have more than doubled, and some have fallen, as is shown by the following figures – where I have only taken commodities which appeared both on Citrine's list for 1937 and my own list for 1952.

|                     | Minimum prices<br>(rouble)<br>1937 (Citrine) | Minimum prices<br>(rouble)<br>1952 (P. Sloan) |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Potatoes (lb.)      | 0.27                                         | 0.36                                          |
| Bread (lb.) (wheat) | 1.27                                         | 0.92                                          |
| Macaroni (lb.)      | 2.27                                         | 1.90                                          |
| Rice                | 2.95                                         | 3.90                                          |

|                       | Minimum prices<br>(rouble)<br>1937 (Citrine) | Minimum prices<br>(rouble)<br>1952 (P. Sloan) |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Meat                  | 3.18                                         | 4.40                                          |
| Sugar                 | 1.73                                         | 4.16                                          |
| Butter                | 6.81                                         | 10.80                                         |
| Cheese                | 5.77                                         | 9.00 { Cream<br>Cheese<br>less)               |
| Milk                  | 1.08                                         | 1.23                                          |
| Eggs (each)           | 55 k.                                        | 63 k.                                         |
| Fruits (lb.)          | 2.00                                         | 2.00                                          |
| Men's winter coats    | 500                                          | 240                                           |
| Men's hats            | 25                                           | 80                                            |
|                       |                                              | 60 (Panama)                                   |
| Men's boots and shoes | 150                                          | 240                                           |
| Men's caps            | 10                                           | 30                                            |
| Women's shoes         | 110                                          | 137                                           |

Your correspondent writes as if the first post-war cut was in 1948, and 'affected mainly alcoholic drinks and caviare' (page 490). In fact the first post-war price cut was in December 1947 and affected bread and other cereal products and beer. Prices of certain other formerly rationed goods were raised above the previous rationed price. In 1948, apart from alcoholic drinks and caviare, a number of industrial goods were reduced in price, including jewellery, cosmetics, radio sets, gramophones, plastic articles, stoves, bicycles, motor cycles, and cigarettes. A lot more than drinks and caviare! Your correspondent's further unsubstantiated statement that wages have since been 'reduced somewhat' seems to be without foundation.

Your correspondent, on page 491, makes the assertion that the Soviet authorities have yet to discover that high wage rates provide a strong inducement! Yet in the U S S R, wherever one goes, wage-incentives are far greater than in Britain. We found the absolute minimum wage for unskilled work to be 500 roubles a month. The average wage, we found, was 1,000 roubles, and incentives for skilled or heavy work were so great that engine drivers, miners and others could take home as much as 3,000, 4,000 or even 5,000 roubles a month. One young miner was recently reported in *Pravda* as earning 8,000 roubles a month. To write that a country with such wage incentives 'has yet to discover' the value of incentives shows a tragic ignorance of Soviet economics.

On page 493 your correspondent makes out that present living standards can be no better than at the outbreak of the war. Yet as the figures show, wages have quadrupled, while prices are in some cases below, some are equal, and some are above the 1937 level. Taken all round, and with rents remaining unchanged, it appears not unfair to estimate prices as a whole as somewhere between the 1937 level and 200 per cent. of the 1937 level; with wages four times more, this gives an increase of real wages between two and three times between 1937 and 1952. As ten years - 1941-1951 - must be taken out of this as dead loss, due to war and repairing the damage of war, the U S S R has achieved the magnificent result of actually doubling or trebling real wages in a period of about five years. This seems, on paper, incredible. But knowing the U S S R as I did from 1931 to 1936, and verifying the wages and prices prevalent there to-day, I know it has actually happened.

I cannot, in reasonable space, deal with all the points raised by your contributor, but trust that you will publish this letter with the figures contained in it, in order that your readers may get a truer picture of the 'formidable development of Soviet industrial potential', to use your correspondent's words, than he gives himself.

Yours faithfully,

PAT SLOAN,  
General Secretary.

June 24th, 1952.

BRITISH SOVIET FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY,  
36 SPENCER STREET, E.C.1.

#### Our Contributor replies:

Economists will agree that there is no such thing as a perfect index of costs of living, industrial production or national income. There are, however, various degrees of imperfection. In the Soviet Union, one does not deal with an inaccuracy, due to changed patterns of production or habits of consumption, of say 10 per cent. The official rate of increase in industrial production and national income suffers from exaggeration, due to price manipulation, amounting to 100 per cent. and more.

As to Soviet policy on subsidies, it seems to be agreed that the system of subsidizing producer goods industries at the expense of the consumer has remained unchanged. As in the past, the investment programme appears to be financed largely from purchase taxes on daily necessities. This view is confirmed by D. A. Allakhverdyan, when on page 71 of his book on

*Questions of the Theory of Soviet Finance*, published by the State Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, he says:

The prices of producer goods in several heavy industries are fixed, as before the war, below their real cost. . . . The prices for the products of heavy industry continue to be relatively low. . . . A significant part of the accumulation of heavy industry is realized through inner-industrial accumulation of the light and food industries.

In the West, subsidies are used mainly in order to cheapen the consumption budget of the worker, and not the investment budget of the State.

Throughout the last twenty years or so, in the West the standard of living has tended to rise. Against this, in the Soviet Union, the *per capita* consumption of the rapidly rising industrial proletariat has remained static, at best, in all major items such as basic foods, housing, clothing and shoes. The average diet has remained rather dull, overloaded with starchy foods and short of protective foods, providing, as before the war, approximately 2,900 calories per day. According to the F A O, the average consumption of cotton, wool and rayon in Russia was 6.8 lb. in 1950 against 9.0 lb. before the war. (During this period it increased from 26.2 to 27.5 lb. in this country, and from 26.2 to 39.7 lb. in the United States.) The position is similar in the case of shoes. The growing over-crowding of urban dwellings in Soviet towns, due to wartime destruction and post-war urbanization, is too well known to need any elaborating. It cannot be denied, however, that the living standards of certain new privileged classes have improved in recent years. Wages of 1,000 roubles per month are no common feature, even in Moscow where wage levels are well above the national average. In the selected factories, shown to the economists visiting Moscow in April, the average wage level was found to be close to 700 roubles, but for the country as a whole it is likely to be nearer 600 roubles. In agriculture, which still employs more than half the working population, it is still less.

No economist would wish to rely on travellers' tales for any price comparison. In his report, which he describes as a simple account of a journey rather than a study, Sir Walter Citrine gives several wage and price ranges, from which Mr. Sloan has made a selection. He seems to have quoted mainly, but in part incorrectly, from pages 293-294 and 345. On page 294, potatoes and wheat bread are said to have cost a minimum of 0.30 and 0.70 roubles per kilo, and not 0.76 and 1.27 roubles per lb. On page 345, minimum prices of men's winter coats, boots and shoes are quoted at 225, 40 and 50 roubles respectively, and not at 500 and 150 roubles. He confronts his arbitrary selection and inaccurate quotation with another set of prices, without stating either the kind or the quality of such varying commodities as coats, shoes, meats and fruit. Compared

with his quotations of 3.30 and 2.00 roubles per lb., respectively, for meat and fruit, other economists visiting Moscow last April recorded prices ranging from 5 to 8 roubles for beef, 10 to 12 roubles for pork, and 4 to 5 roubles for apples. Most countries have eliminated disputes of this kind by regularly publishing official price and wage data for purposes of historical and international comparison. Russia has not done so for the last two decades. While the first price cut after the war affected, as stated, mainly alcoholic drinks and caviare, some non-food items were also listed for price reductions. Like drinks and caviare, these were also of small benefit to the ordinary citizen of the Soviet Union, who needed bread, clothing and dwelling space rather than caviare and jewellery, gramophones and motor cycles.

It would indeed be wrong to say that Soviet Russia has yet to discover the value of incentives. In fact, the article referred to average wage rates and not to differential bonuses. One can hardly dispute that, through a system of incentives, the exploitation of human muscles has been developed to a fine art in the Soviet Union. This is illustrated, for instance, by the ratio of one to sixteen, quoted by your letter writer, between the minimum rate of 500 roubles for unskilled work and 8,000 roubles for a mining Stakhanovite. While in Russia, wage ranges tend to widen, in the Welfare States of the West the range between unskilled and female labour on the one hand, and skilled male labour on the other, has narrowed in recent years.

In this short space it is impossible to deal with all the fallacies and statistical errors put forward by Mr Sloan. How difficult it is to be definite about a comparison of wage and price levels inside and outside Russia, is illustrated by his suggestion that weekly earnings in Moscow amount to £22 at the official rate, but to £6 at a rate chosen by him. On his reckoning, wages in Russia and Britain, in roubles and shillings, are roughly of the same order. Against this, some of the economists who visited Moscow last April believe that, in any comparison of the cost of living in this country and in Russia, the rouble is to be taken at 4d. This means that the Russian worker would have to labour three times as long as his British counterpart, if he wished to reach the standard of living to which the latter is accustomed, while he would have to work almost four times as long in order to consume as much protective food as is eaten in England.

As long as the Soviet authorities do not release even the minimum of statistics which any underdeveloped country provides nowadays, they and their friends must be content if trained economists make their own calculations as well as is possible in the circumstances.

## THE TURNING POINT IN EUROPE

### II. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

Robert Boothby, MP

In the nineteenth century Britain was the arbiter and director of an expanding world economy based on multilateral trade, competition in free markets, free currency convertibility, and the international mobility of capital and labour. This was due not only to the fact that she was the greatest industrial Power but that she was also the biggest purchaser of goods. The City of London was the principal banker and merchant for the rest of the world, from which we imported freely, and in which we invested heavily. Sterling, supported by ninety-day bills of exchange on London, was the international measuring-rod of value; and it could be said that the whole world was the sterling area. Britain financed the economic development of backward or expanding countries everywhere, including the United States. She lost a lot of money in the process – and made far more. The system worked so long as we were able to pursue an expansionist economic policy based upon fortuitous but repeated discoveries of gold, the possession of ample reserves of call money, the exploitation of new markets and inventions, and the filling up of empty spaces by large-scale migration. It was threatened when our industrial supremacy was seriously challenged at the beginning of the present century, and our proportion of world manufactured exports began to fall. It was abruptly terminated by the First World War.

In 1919 the United States had already succeeded us as the dominant world economic Power. This radically changed the situation because instead of being the biggest buyers, they were the biggest potential sellers of goods; and it is manifestly impossible for the currency of the world's greatest seller to do the same job as the currency of the world's greatest purchaser. Moreover the conditions which gave rise to the economic system of the nineteenth century no longer existed. The international mobility of men, of capital and of goods was sharply restricted by the rise of the two continental economies which to-day bestride the globe – the totalitarian economy of the U S S R, and the free but highly protected economy of the U S A. To these Germany soon sought to add a third, under centralized planning and control.

The era of British industrial and commercial supremacy had come to an end. The era of mass production and large economic units had arrived. The material basis of the national economies of Europe was no longer adequate to enable the various nation-states, including Britain, to maintain – in isolation from one another – their standard of living; but only the German industrialists, under the intellectual domination of Walther Rathenau, saw this. They tried in vain to extend the rationalization of their own basic industries, on an international scale, to those of Europe. The forces of *laissez-faire* capitalism were too strong for them. A determined attempt was made, under entirely different conditions, to restore the economic system of the nineteenth century. Britain returned to the gold standard at the pre-war parity of exchange. Other countries followed her lead to the best of their ability. Thereafter international trade became a ruthless pursuit of gold. Each country strove desperately to build up an export surplus, but this struggle for markets did little to increase the real wealth of the world, which is dependent not simply upon moving goods from here to there, but upon the aggregate amount of human energy and skill applied to natural resources everywhere. It only enabled some countries to export their unemployment to others, which got into unpayable debt as a result. Outside the United States a blighting deflation forced down the prices of primary producers everywhere, crippled the heavy industries of Europe, drove millions of workers off the land and out of work, and enormously increased the real burden of all debts. The object of this policy was the re-establishment of the supremacy of the market, and with it the political independence of the mercantile society. The consequence was the worst economic crisis the world had yet experienced.

Between 1934 and 1937 there was a gleam of light. Forced off the gold standard by short-term calls on London which could not be met, the British Government (which had been formed with the avowed intention of doing the precise opposite) let the pound find its own level, protected the home market, expanded the system of imperial preference, established an exchange equalization fund, and regulated credit with the primary object of maintaining the stability of commodity prices. In so doing they brought into existence the modern sterling area; and, anticipating ruin, achieved a measure of prosperity which we had not known since 1918. With a flexible exchange rate the British international accounts automatically came into balance. 'This', commented Mr Frank Graham, of Princeton University, 'provided Great Britain and the world as a whole with the best exchange situation we have had since World War I.' The results were spectacular. Our gold reserve rose by over £200 million – much faster than our short-term foreign debts. Production rose by

nearly 50 per cent., our exports to countries within the Empire by 52 per cent. and our imports from them by 64 per cent. At the same time the volume of our trade with the outside world expanded by over 30 per cent. Confidence in sterling was restored. Once again it became a yardstick, although it was unanchored to gold; and, as such, was generally accepted as a reliable medium for the conduct of international trade. By 1939 we were so liquid that we could stand the strain of the withdrawal of foreign balances amounting to £250 million in less than a year.

The Second World War put paid to all this. By 1945 Britain had £600 million of gold and dollar reserves against some £3,500 million of short-term foreign debts, or sterling balances, incurred entirely on behalf of the war effort. Here was an opportunity for constructive economic statesmanship. We got, instead, the Bretton Woods Agreement. This fixed the monetary price of gold at an artificially low level. It also fixed exchange rates between independent sovereign states, in a world of chaos, without any knowledge of the governing factors, and without any attempt to co-ordinate national monetary policies. It put the onus of restoring a balance of payments not upon the creditor, but upon the debtor nations. Finally, it provided an international monetary fund of \$3 billion to close a dollar gap which between 1946 and 1949 alone amounted to \$20 billion. Since Bretton Woods the American wholesale commodity price index has doubled, and the sterling area has been gutted of its remaining gold reserves. Worse was to come. The terms which accompanied the first American loan to Britain revealed that yet another attempt was to be made to return to the economic system of the nineteenth century. No comprehensive plan for the revival of world trade had been worked out, but regional plans of any kind were ruled out by a renewed insistence on the application of the principle of non-discrimination. Back we had to plunge, under conditions far less favourable than those which existed in the 'twenties, into the icy seas of free convertibility, unregulated multi-lateral trade, and cut-throat international competition.

I have some claim to be heard on this subject now, because I moved the rejection of the Bretton Woods and Loan Agreements in the House of Commons; and, when the regulations to establish the convertibility of sterling were debated on July 31st, 1947, I said:

We are now financing the world dollar deficit. . . . The convertibility of sterling is imposing upon us an unbearable burden, which we are simply not capable of carrying. . . . All these arrangements will be very short-lived. They will have to be abandoned.

In the event convertibility lasted for five frightening weeks, by the end of which the American loan had been washed away. Since then we

have done nothing to reduce our margin of illiquidity. At the end of 1949, despite the writing up of our gold reserve after devaluation, we had less gold and more debts than in 1945. In 1950 there was a half-turn for the better. Our gold reserve rose faster than our foreign balances. The relief proved to be temporary and illusory. It was due to a combination of Marshall aid, the great movement of world commodity prices which followed the outbreak of the Korean war, and the conversion of stocks of essential raw materials into gold. During the first half of 1951 our liquidity position again deteriorated; and in the second half we squarely met the fate of all bankers who accept deposits with inadequate cash reserves. Our gold reserve fell by £550 million. In addition, our credit balance of £100 million with the European Payments Union was converted into a debit balance of £200 million. In short, we ran through our reserves at the rate of £850 million in six months. The cause of this is not far to seek. In the wake of a boom year, the countries of the sterling area, with the exception of India, had been over-importing from the dollar area; and their banker, Britain, had been spending more money than she had got.

The economic history of Great Britain since 1918 deserves the closest study because it is a manifestation of the underlying *malaise* which has held Europe in its grip for the past thirty years. With the exception of the brief period from 1934 to 1937, it is a story of continuous and accelerating decline, with the result that we are now in a permanent crisis arising from our illiquid position – and this despite the fact that, since 1945, we have had £2,000 million of foreign aid in dollar loans and gifts from the United States and Canada, as well as sterling gifts from Australia and New Zealand. Most of the countries of Western Europe are in similar, although less desperate, plight. They, too, are in perpetual deficit to the United States; and it is an illusion to suppose, as some do, that you can get rid of the national deficits of a dozen countries by the simple process of adding them up. But they are not so utterly dependent on imports as Britain. As a last resort, and at great cost, most of them could make themselves sufficiently self-supporting to survive in relative economic isolation. Britain alone could not get on without the rest of the world.

The fundamental economic disequilibrium between the New World and the Old, and its symptom the dollar shortage, is therefore no temporary phenomenon. It is the outcome of an economic process which has been developing since the beginning of the present century, and which has been hastened but not caused by two world wars. It will not be solved by orthodox methods, or palliative measures, or by applying nineteenth-century remedies to twentieth-century ills. In 1949 Sir Stafford Cripps declared that Britain must achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency by 1952. In 1952 Mr R. A. Butler declared that our goal was

still free convertibility with the dollar, and that this could be achieved by a large increase of exports to the dollar area. These are unattainable objectives. How can we seriously contemplate dollar convertibility with a prospective and as yet unattained surplus of only £100 million per annum, and short-term liabilities amounting to well over £4,000 million? Any reserves we happened to possess would be drained away not in five weeks, but in five days. How can we seriously contemplate a great increase of exports to the dollar area when we know that the United States do not want, and will not take, manufactured goods from abroad on any substantial scale? These are the economics of cloud-cuckoo-land.

The productivity of the United States is one of the marvels of contemporary civilization. Their output in 1939 was \$160 billion a year. To-day it is in the region of \$270 billion. To-morrow it will be \$300 billion, and ten years hence \$500 billion. Although their production in 1948 was two-thirds greater than it was in 1937, the total amount of their imports in terms of real value increased by only 5 per cent.; and, so far as they are concerned, the problem for the rest of the world in the future will be how to feed their voracious machines without starving every other country of raw materials, not how to add to the production of manufactured goods within the dollar area. Meanwhile we must face the fact that for many years to come the amount of dollar trade will be limited by the amount of dollars made available in one form or another, for that purpose; and that lack of monetary reserves will compel the countries of Western Europe to retain import and exchange controls. It is so far encouraging that official Washington has, from time to time, shown signs of realizing this. A document entitled 'The United States in the World Economy', published by the Department of Commerce in 1943, pointed out that unless the supply of dollars was more adequate to meet the requirements of other countries, they would assuredly insist on their right to exercise a close selective control over the use of the amounts available, and to promote more intensive relations with third countries under preferential trading arrangements; and the recent report of the Materials Policy Commission, set up by President Truman to examine the problem of raw materials, drew attention to the urgent need for expansion to meet the ever-increasing American demand for primary products, and the importance of long-term contracts and buffer-stocks in this connection.

The United States have, in fact, made dollars available to their impoverished customers abroad on a colossal scale during the period under review. They financed the First World War to the tune of \$17 billion. They made loans to Europe amounting to over \$10 billion in the 1920's, most of which were subsequently repudiated. In the 1930's they raised the dollar price of gold and bought \$17 billion of it (in exchange for exported

goods) which they immediately reburied in the vaults of Fort Knox. They financed the Second World War by means of lend-lease; and since 1945 their exports have exceeded their imports by \$31 billion, of which at least three-fifths, or \$18 billion, have been paid for by the American taxpayer. It is a tremendous story; and, in the aggregate, a tremendous sum. Yet, at the end of it all, despite the burdens of rearmament and of heavy taxation, the American people have achieved an overall productivity, prosperity and standard of living without parallel in history; while the peoples of Western Europe and its dependent territories continue to languish in comparative poverty and apparently inextinguishable debt. Why? There are many reasons, political and economic. But the fundamental reason is the resolute refusal on the part of all countries and all democratic parties in Western Europe to face the realities and consequences of the twentieth-century economic revolution. For thirty years we have kept our heads in the sand, and now we are at the point of suffocation. As Barbara Ward truly says in her book *The West at Bay*\*:

The British, the French, and the Low Countries, all assumed that the inter-war world could be a recognizable version of the nineteenth century with a gold standard, with free trade, with national sovereignty (only slightly limited by the League of Nations), with liberal ideas and capitalist economics. The possibility that the first war had torn a gaping hole in the old fabric was not considered. Even the portent of the Russian revolution was tidied away behind explanations of the backwardness and barbarism of Russian society. Over these days the last light of the Victorian sun still streamed, the light of a safe world of order and progress, the light of great certainties and greater wealth. But the illusion cannot be recreated after this struggle. For this time, it seems, all the pillars have fallen. The last ray of the old sun has been extinguished and if we of the Western world do nothing but look backwards, then 'we are for the dark.'

\* \* \* \* \*

If the future lies with large economic units then the case for expanding rather than contracting the unities of the free world outside the dollar area becomes overwhelming. There is indeed only one radical remedy for our present endemic disease, and that is to build a trading area in which we can all breathe and live, and in which the Americans may find a profitable field of investment. Within this area there must be adequate supplies of raw materials, a high degree of productivity, and assured markets. Western Europe, as such, is not a viable economy. It is a dense industrial area, without visible means of support. Moreover the national economies of the countries which comprise it are competitive rather than complementary, and their economic policies are sharply divergent. It is, there-

\* Allen and Unwin.

fore, an error to suppose that the creation of a single market in Western Europe alone is the answer to the problem. We are all a bit bemused in this matter by the United States. Because they have immense productivity and a single market, we are inclined to assume that the one is necessarily dependent on the other. Not so. Switzerland has a high degree of productivity, and no internal market of great size. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, has a vast internal market and a comparatively low productivity. Productivity depends primarily on adequate capital investment, modernization, skill, hard work, and the existence of assured supplies of raw materials and markets. In my submission, an economic unit of sufficient potential size and strength to meet the requirements of the modern world can be built out of a combination between the countries which are at present members of the European Payments Union and those of the sterling area; but not out of one or the other group, in isolation. It is therefore necessary to forge closer economic links between the Continental countries of Western Europe and their associated overseas territories, and the British Commonwealth and Empire.

In order to restore an economic balance to the free world we have, simultaneously, to maintain internal financial stability, to expand production, and to eliminate external deficits. To some extent these aims are contradictory. Any rapid increase of production must involve public expenditure, capital investment and an expansion of credit which, added together, can only increase the inflationary pressure. The maintenance of internal financial stability, on the other hand, may well necessitate a deflationary policy on the part of certain countries which puts a brake upon production and leaves unused a part of their national resources. If the volume of imports could be freely increased the problem would be easier to solve in a manner that would combine an expansion of production with stability of prices. But here we come right up against the balance of payments. In order to eliminate external deficits several countries, including Britain and France, have recently been obliged to make severe cuts in imports. This in turn, by depriving the internal market of goods, must tend to increase the inflationary pressure. Moreover, in the long run, competitive import cuts can never solve the problem, because their logical conclusion is the elimination of trade altogether.

Having outlined this dilemma, in general and sombre terms, let me say that I believe the problem to be by no means insoluble. But it can be solved only by radical measures of international regulation, discrimination, co-ordination and planning, which are alien to European traditions, and which certainly have no part in the American experience. I propose to consider the matter briefly under the three heads indicated, namely money, production and trade.

The free world outside the dollar area is suffering from an illiquidity, i.e. shortage of monetary reserves, which is the primary cause of the recurrent economic 'crises' which afflict us. Both the E P U and the sterling area are in permanent deficit on dollar account. The convertible assets of the E P U now amount to less than the creditor position; and the banker for the sterling area is barely solvent. This is an impossible situation. The assumption underlying the Bretton Woods Agreement was that flexibility of exchange rates could be sacrificed in return for the creation of ample international resources. As, however, the monetary reserves created were wholly inadequate for their purpose, we have got the worst of both worlds. At present the economy of Western Europe, as a whole, is far too rigid; and this applies also to the national economies of the various countries. We have reached the stage where nothing automatically 'gives', even under the most severe economic pressure. All necessary economic adjustments have to be made, if at all, by means of the clumsy and difficult method of direct physical controls, with import cuts and currency devaluation as a last resort. The reason is that unco-ordinated monetary policies, non-discriminatory multilateral trade, and exchange rates fixed even provisionally, cannot be made to mix; and that any attempt to keep rates fixed over substantial periods of time, during which the relationship between independent national price levels is constantly changing, is bound to cripple trade, evoke disequilibrium in international accounts, and distort the composition of production. There is only one answer, and that is to bring into being a more flexible monetary system through the limited inter-convertibility of sterling and European currencies. This need not involve convertibility with gold or the dollar which, under present conditions, is quite out of reach. It does involve the abandonment of fixed exchange rates within the sterling area and the European Payments Union. There is no point in devaluing or revaluing sterling or any other currency to new fixed levels, because there is not the slightest reason to suppose that to-day's guess would be better than yesterday's. Our objective must be to get some reasonable parity between the nominal and real value of our respective national currencies, and therefore to allow them to find their proper levels; and this can be done by the establishment of exchange markets in certain centres, controlled by the operation of an international exchange equalization fund, and subject to appropriate safeguards against speculative or panic movements of capital. It would go a long way to re-establish contact with reality.

What is ultimately required is a comprehensive strategic control over the economy of the area as a whole. Although the European Payments Union and the sterling area differ, in so far as the former is no more than a clearing system whereas the latter is a banking system, both suffer from

the same fatal defect, namely lack of machinery which could bring about some co-ordination of the monetary and fiscal policies of the participating countries, and enable concerted action to be taken in the event of a sudden emergency, e.g. a sharp and unexpected change in the balance of payments. Such machinery could be developed (1) by merging the governing body of the O E E C with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe; (2) by establishing a central committee to co-ordinate the economic policies of the sterling area countries, in close liaison with the O E E C; and (3) by the practice of continuous co-operation between central banks, recommended by the Genoa Conference of 1922, and never attained. We should then be on the road towards the main objective I have in mind, which is to build out of the sterling area and Western Europe an economic unit capable of standing on its own feet. An essential condition of success would be the creation of a dollar pool, and the pursuit of a dollar-saving strategy, which would reduce the dollar imports of the area as a whole to the level of its total dollar income; and for this purpose it might well be found desirable to establish a Federal Reserve Bank to hold the available supplies of dollars and distribute them in accordance with agreed priorities, so that the investing and purchasing power of each participating country could be concentrated on the economic development of the rest. In any event credit policy should be co-ordinated, and designed with the object of maintaining confidence in sterling, which would be the yardstick of the new economy, and of keeping its value – and therefore the value of all the convertible currencies – stable in terms of commodities; for a stable commodity price level is of infinitely greater importance than any pegged relationship between currencies, or between currencies and gold.

A more flexible monetary system, with a greater co-ordination of national monetary policies, would undoubtedly provide the framework within which an increased production of raw materials and manufactured goods could be achieved; and without this there can be no hope of maintaining, still less of raising, the standard of living in the countries outside the dollar area. The O E E C has suggested an expansion of 25 per cent. in the total production of Western Europe as a target for the next five years. Meanwhile the trend has turned downwards, mainly owing to lack of adequate sources of power. It is fantastic that, in a situation such as this, Germany should be importing coal, and Britain both coal and semi-finished steel from the United States. German production is still limited by factors arising from her defeat and occupation which are gradually but steadily being eliminated. So far as Britain is concerned, the brutal truth is that our production of coal and food since the war has been nothing like sufficient to justify the standard of living we have enjoyed and which, unless we can obtain a substantial increase, must now fall. Increased

production over the whole field demands modernization and, therefore, adequate capital investment. It is at present being cut down. One of the reasons for this is that the rate of capital formation in Western Europe has been relatively low since the war, because it is still allocated on a national basis, as if the economy of each country was a self-contained unit, aiming at a balanced development of industry within national boundaries rather than the harmonious development of the whole. The British attitude, in particular, towards this problem has been insular to the point of lunacy. The answer seems to lie (1) in the strategic planning of the basic industries of Western Europe through the medium of agreed international investment programmes, (2) in the redirection of production and investment both at home and abroad with a view to obtaining sufficient supplies of essential food and raw materials from non-dollar areas which are willing to accept payment in sterling or European goods, and (3) in industrial specialization. For instance, in order to prevent cut-throat competition between Britain and Germany of the kind which ruined the basic industries of both countries in the 'twenties and – if we are not careful – will ruin them again in the 'fifties, it will be necessary for each of them to concentrate, by agreement, on the type of production for which they are best suited. There is no longer sufficient capital available to permit the construction of redundant factories to produce identical products in excess of market demands.

The Schuman Plan is the necessary foundation for industrial rationalization on an international scale; and British participation, in one form or another, is essential. Coal pits that are uneconomic and steel works that are obsolete must sooner or later be closed by competition or agreement; and the Plan is an alternative not to some supposed and illusory British freedom of action, but to the inexorable pressure of unchecked and uncontrolled international competition. If capital investment is conducted on a purely national basis it will be wholly inadequate for the purposes of industrial production and colonial development. But with a greater co-ordination of investment plans on the part of the countries of Western Europe, and an increased specialization of industrial production, the real return on capital investment could be considerably increased, and more capital made available for investment overseas. Germany, in particular, should be encouraged to concentrate on the export of capital goods to the countries of the sterling area and the other associated overseas territories, thus relieving the pressure of intra-European competition. Last, but not least, there can be little hope of obtaining the required expansion of production unless fuller and better use is made of Europe's available manpower, transport facilities are increased, and provision is made for an extension of both long- and short-term credits. The establishment of a

European Investment Bank, and of a central authority to co-ordinate the economic policies of the countries within the sterling area, can no longer be delayed if disaster is to be avoided. Apart from these the necessary machinery to achieve all the above objectives already exists. Only the will is lacking.

I turn now to trade. And I begin by making two dogmatic assertions. Planned national economies cannot co-exist with international economic anarchy; and, in a world suffering from an endemic economic disequilibrium and an acute dollar shortage, the effect of non-discrimination can only be to throttle down the total volume of trade to the lowest common level. If, in the name of non-discrimination, every attempt to regulate imports or to prevent the flight of capital has to be extended to every market and every currency, trade within the free world will gradually dry up altogether. Trade is, or should be, the mutually advantageous exchange of goods; and no amount of talk about economic 'integration' can exorcise the dependence of Western Europe, including Britain, upon supplies of food and raw materials from outside. The political separation of the agrarian countries in Eastern Europe from the industrial countries of the West by the Iron Curtain is an unmitigated economic disaster; and in so far as trade between the two areas can be expanded by means of barter agreements for the exchange of raw commodities against manufactured goods (the only method of dealing with a totalitarian economy) the economic problems of Western Europe will be eased. They can only be solved by the creation of a trading area out of the complementary economies of the European Payments Union and the sterling area, in which the former will supply the capital goods necessary for the economic development of the latter. Without this there can be no hope of getting adequate supplies of primary products.

It involves the abandonment of the doctrine of non-discrimination which, in the modern world, has become a powerful weapon for spreading the virus of depression and restriction; a modification of the most-favoured-nation clause; and a denunciation of the restrictive clauses of G A T T. It further involves the extension of the sterling trading area to Western Europe and its associated overseas territories by means of reciprocal trade and payment agreements, which themselves provide the finance for the conduct of trade, and secondary preferences. Finally, it involves the negotiation of long-term contracts, a subject about which more nonsense has been talked since the war, by people who should know better, than almost any other. A conference should be held between members of the sterling area and the E P U to consider ways and means of expanding production, of securing the economic development of backward areas, and of building a co-operative trading system which will enable the mutually beneficial

exchange of goods and services to take place at the highest possible level. These proposals run counter to many accepted and traditional American beliefs. The fact remains that another attempt to return to the multilateral and uncontrolled international economy of the nineteenth century will bring another, and perhaps fatal, economic crisis to the free world. We should tell our American friends, politely but firmly, that G A T T is now making rules for a game that is no longer being played; and that the alternative to discrimination is our permanent and abject dependence on their charity. Moreover there is no other method of achieving the economic integration of Europe which they so constantly demand. To insist that we should all jump simultaneously into a customs union is to ask us to postpone, indefinitely, the realization of the whole conception underlying the Marshall Plan; and would in itself have no effect whatsoever upon the dollar gap. The Americans themselves can hardly feel happy about the present situation. Marshall aid, for which they made such great and generous sacrifices, saved Europe from economic collapse. But the European dollar deficit has only been reduced from \$5 billion to \$4 billion, the fundamental economic disequilibrium continues, and the problem of the dollar balance of payments remains as acute and intransigent as ever.

Whatever we do the United States, as the great creditor nation, will determine the economic climate of the free world. They have all the gold. And we are all in debt to them. But the economic *tempo* at which they live is no longer our *tempo*; and a ripple on American waters can become a mountainous wave by the time it has crossed the Atlantic. In 1930 events in the United States over which we had no control brought Europe to ruin. In 1949 a fall in American output of only 5 per cent. enforced upon Western Europe a devaluation of 30 per cent. Another American recession could easily bring a volume of unemployment to the free world outside the dollar area which would be regarded by the workers as too high a price to pay for the somewhat nebulous benefits of 'multilateralism' and 'non-discrimination'; and we might then find ourselves in a revolutionary situation. In the circumstances I do not believe that a system which denies all defence against instabilities arising from the fluctuations of a dynamic economy so greatly out of proportion to our own can survive. What can we expect of the United States? We cannot expect them seriously to modify their tariff system, or to accept manufactured goods in sufficient quantities to enable us to achieve a balance of payments by means of increased exports to the dollar area. Nor can we expect them to increase the convertible assets of the European Payments Union, or to back an international monetary fund of the size and character envisaged by Lord Keynes in 1943 with some of the gold now buried in the vaults of Fort

Knox, although it would pay them a thousand times over to do so. On the other hand we may reasonably expect them to raise the dollar price of gold, which would greatly alleviate the prevailing illiquidity of the non-dollar world due to lack of monetary reserves; and to regulate their purchases of raw materials with the object of stabilizing prices. Last, but again not least, we can expect them to embark upon a major programme of capital investment abroad, designed specifically to increase productive capacity, staggered over a period of time, and free from crippling restrictions – provided we build an economic unit in which it will be worth their while to invest. What is most important, if the sum of things is to be saved, is that the rest of the free world should have some assurance of a steady and predictable flow of dollars, which does not have to be fought through Congress every year. The size of the stream, and the channels through which it runs, are of less importance than its continuity.

To sum up. A limited Continental political federation is at least a feasible proposition, although its main planks – the Schuman Plan and the European Defence Community – are at present the products of political expediency, and devoid of any mass emotional appeal. But, in terms of economics, a union restricted to the geographical area of Western Europe is an anachronism, because it constitutes an artificial entity which can never be made self-sufficient. It has become urgently necessary for the countries of Western Europe to participate in an economic union large enough to satisfy the technical requirements of modern production, to secure an adequate supply of raw materials, and to achieve an overall balance of payments. This they can do by co-ordinating their economic policies and pooling their resources with those of the sterling area countries in the manner I have attempted to describe, and in no other way. I am aware that the policy which I advocate is revolutionary in character, but I cannot help it. We live in a revolutionary age; and in a world in which economic isolationism and *laissez-faire* can find no place. The choice, for us, is between a return to the jungle of uncontrolled competition in which we can no longer hope for independent economic survival, and the adoption of conscious international planning to increase the productivity, the trade and the prosperity of the free world as a whole.

*(This is the conclusion of an article the first part of which appeared in the July issue.)*

## REFLECTIONS ON THE PERSIAN OIL DISPUTE

Lord Birdwood

On June 23rd the International Court of Justice dispersed to consider their powers of jurisdiction in the case of the Persian Oil dispute; and there is thus a pause of a month or so in which we can take stock of this most dangerous of controversies. It is against the background of a story covering fifty-one years that we should place the present issue in perspective, and I therefore extract the bare bones of the past as leading us to the scene to-day in the International Court at the Hague.

In 1901 William Knox D'Arcy, an Englishman who had made his fortune in Australia, was attracted by the reports of the French geologist, de Morgan, on the possibilities of oil in South-West Persia. He accordingly negotiated a concession, and in May 1910 an agreement was signed. D'Arcy was committed to form his Company within two years and on the commercial side it was agreed that the Company should pay annually to Persia 16 per cent. of the net profits. Royalties were thus linked to profit rather than production, an arrangement which might be welcome for Persia in good years, but not so profitable in times of trade depression and low prices. For seven years D'Arcy struggled without success. Finally, with his funds near exhaustion, he was forced to call in others into partnership. At last oil was struck in commercial quantities, and on April 14th, 1909, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was registered. It is thus fair to claim that the subsequent vast industrial structure with its world-wide ramifications owed its inception to the imagination and courage of one man.

In May 1914, by mutual agreement, the British Government took up £2,000,000 of shares in the Company. It should be remembered that in those days the oil market was highly competitive and the new Company was struggling for its existence. The British Navy was about to change from coal to oil and the guarantee of a long-term supply of oil was certainly welcome for the Admiralty. Finally, fresh subscriptions of capital in the open market could not now result in the company coming under non-British control.

As a result of the general economic depression, which set in after 1929, world oil prices fell. Mexican oil which fetched £6 15s. 2d. per ton in 1930 dropped to £3 18s. 5d. in 1931. While the actual production of the

A P O C fell only by 3.18 per cent., net profits were very considerably reduced. For Persia the result was that only £307,000 was received in royalties in 1931, as compared with £1,288,000 in the previous year. Not unnaturally the Persian Government protested. It was certainly not possible for a government to plan ahead with a large portion of its revenues subject to such wide fluctuation. It was while notes were being exchanged on these matters that quite suddenly in November 1932 the Persians cancelled the D'Arcy concession. There is therefore a precedent for Persian bilateral cancellation of an international agreement. Britain took her case to the League of Nations and, to reduce the story to its simplest terms, the late President Benes, as rapporteur, was able to persuade the two parties to settle the matter by direct negotiation. We should note the remarks of M. Faroughi on behalf of Persia before the Council. They are significant in view of the Persian contention to-day that the 1933 concession was forced upon them!

'I have the honour to announce my Government's entire approval of the report placed before the Council. I have nothing further to add. I wish merely to express my happiness at having had this opportunity of making before the Council a statement testifying to the better relations between my Government and that of His Britannic Majesty.'

The resulting new concession of 1933, operative for sixty years, was a straightforward business proposition, just and profitable for both Persia and the Company. The old limitation of royalties harnessed only to profits was removed. Henceforth they were assessed on both profit and production. The latter link took the form of a payment of 4s. per ton of oil whether exported from or sold in Persia, the former being a payment of 20 per cent. of profits in excess of a fixed sum, which was in fact largely exceeded in each subsequent year. Payment was made on all profits, whether in the form of dividend distribution or as reserves accumulated after 1932. Article 22 of the new concession provided for international arbitration in the event of a dispute, a provision which eighteen years later was to prove not worth the paper on which it was written. Under the 1933 concession royalties rose steadily and in 1937 stood at £3,500,000. The Second World War placed a strain of anxiety and uncertainty on the Company, and production which in 1938 had exceeded 10,000,000 tons dropped to 6,605,000 tons in 1941. Nevertheless, to meet the difficulties of the Persian Government, the Company guaranteed an annual payment of £4,000,000, a sum which until the end of 1943 exceeded considerably the amount that would have been due under the concession. In this way some £5,500,000 passed to Persia without any obligation on the part of the Company to make the payment. There followed the unprecedented post-war expansion. Where world production was doubled between

1938 and 1950, in Persia figures were trebled. In normal circumstances 35,000,000 tons of Persian oil would have been raised in 1951, the greater proportion of it being refined in the largest refinery in the world at Abadan. During this period there were no particular symptoms of Persian dissatisfaction. Indeed, in contrast to our perennial quarrel with Egypt which has persisted for thirty years, the formulation of a Persian demand to nationalize oil came swiftly and suddenly.

In October 1947 the Majlis took steps to write off the effects of negotiations conducted with the Soviet in 1946, which would have opened the door for a Soviet concession in Northern Persia. On that occasion the final clause sounded a slightly ominous note.

*In all cases where the rights of the Iranian nation in respect of the country's natural resources, whether underground or otherwise, have been impaired, particularly in regard to the Southern oil, the Government is required to enter into such negotiations and take such measures as are necessary to regain the national rights and inform the Majlis of the result.*

That was an unfriendly reference which the Company was prepared to meet; but since the Persian Government took no further action on an opportunity which they themselves had created, the insinuation was left unchallenged. The Persians did, however, indicate in a general way that they wished to open discussions. Talks began, but owing to frequent changes of Government little progress was made. One serious handicap has been the difficulty of finding a Persian Government sufficiently reliable and established with which to negotiate, a difficulty which the Americans are lucky enough to avoid, in their certainty of being able to deal in Saudi Arabia with one man whose authority is at all times not questioned.

In spite of this first hint of Persian dissatisfaction, it was the Company which made the opening move to suggest revision in favour of Persia. In 1948 the British Government had adopted a policy of dividend limitation, and in answer to the appeal to industry, the Company maintained its dividend at 30 per cent. at a time when trading results would have justified a higher distribution. It was therefore suggested to the Persian Government that, if they felt that the dividend royalty was insufficient in relation to the Company's profits, ways and means could be discussed to consider a fairer arrangement. It was from these talks that a new Supplementary Agreement emerged in 1949; an agreement which, while offering Persia immense increases in royalty income on both tonnage and profit, was still within the terms of the 1933 Concession. The details of the proposals need not concern us. Acceptance would have resulted in an income for the years 1948 to 1950 of £76,660,000 instead of £38,600,000. Nevertheless, the agreement which was signed on July 17th, 1949, was

never ratified by the Majlis, nor was any attempt made to explain its very advantageous terms either within the Persian Parliament or in the countryside. Instead, a Parliamentary Committee was appointed in June 1950 to examine the agreement, and Dr Moussadeq appeared on the scene for the first time as leader of the Committee.

Henceforth a Majlis, which was capable of wasting a generation on any urgent matter of internal reform, rushed towards its appointed climax of oil nationalization with a sense of urgency worthy of a nobler motive than that of blind national pride. The first nationalization measure in March 1951 followed immediately after the assassination of General Razmara, the Prime Minister, who could be regarded as falling a martyr to reason. The Resolution took the form of the acceptance of a bare statement of intention made by the Majlis Oil Commission.

In the name of the prosperity of the Persian nation and with a view to helping to secure world peace, we, the undersigned, propose that the oil industry of Persia be declared as nationalized throughout all regions of the country without exception. . . .

The technique is refreshing in its disregard of political morality. You take action guaranteed to produce chaos and defend it simply by stating it will produce utopia. It was on this statement that the British Government subsequently accepted the principle of nationalization for the sake of negotiation. But the subsequent nationalization Act of May 1st, with its blatant confession (Article 2) that 'the Government is bound to *dispossess* at once the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company' stretched the logic of toleration too far and the Company took the dispute to the International Court of Justice under the terms of the 1933 Convention which covered arbitration. With gathering confidence from the comfort of words, the Persians now rushed on with successive measures in the stimulating process of dispossession, and the story of the indignities to which the staff at Abadan were subsequently submitted has yet to be told. There remains, too, for future record a faithful account of the tragedy of friendships destroyed and social progress and welfare liquidated in an outpost of progress on Persian soil. Here we are more concerned with the milestones of fact; and so, as a layman, I pick out only those features of the legal position which stand out in clear relief.

The British application to the International Court asked that the Persian Government be instructed to submit to arbitration. Meanwhile the temporary Board of Directors of the new National Iranian Oil Company were hard at work in the oil fields undermining the authority of the Company, and on June 22nd the British Government asked for a ruling which would restrain both parties. Accordingly, on July 5th, the Court

issued their interim injunction which would permit the A I O C to carry on operations as they had done previous to May 1st. Attempts, therefore, to sell oil to foreign countries before the International Court's next move are a direct contravention of the Court's order and a denial of international arbitration as a method of settling disputes. It was the final order of expulsion by Dr. Moussadeq on September 25th which induced the British Government to take the case to the Security Council. The alternative was to use force to maintain our position, and the decision not to do so invites a wealth of argument. Certainly, for those on the spot, nice distinctions between the protection of life and the protection of property must have seemed academic. At the time, and in those circumstances, retreat was probably inevitable. That is not to say that in other circumstances, and with a different previous direction of policy, to show strength would not have been right. We should clear our minds of one misconception. It has been argued that to defend our interests by force might have resulted in the invocation by Russia of their Treaty with Persia of 1921. That may be true, but it is as well to realize that Russian action would have had no legal sanction whatsoever. The 1921 Treaty was negotiated under a Russian fear that Persian soil might be used by a third power as a base for an attack on Russia, in very different international circumstances to those of to-day. The Persians were unhappy concerning the interpretation of the Treaty and questioned its meaning. On December 12th, 1921, Rothstein, the Soviet representative in Teheran, set their minds at rest.

I have the honour to inform you that Articles 5 and 6 are intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her by the partisans of the Régime (of the Czar) which has been overthrown. . . .

The Soviet Union might have used the entry of British troops into Southern Persia as the excuse to move on Teheran. But it should be clearly understood that had they done so we should not have been risking war with them over Persian oil. We would merely have been a step nearer to accepting the direct challenge on a far greater issue, in contrast to its indirect acceptance which the Korean situation represented in June 1950.

The preliminary stages of proceedings before the International Court continued, and a not unfamiliar game of ball between the Security Council and the Court resulted in the British Government filing its Memorial, the Persian Government countering with an objection challenging the Court's jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case: and the proceedings concluded last month were but a skirmish to decide this issue. The legal labyrinth is frightening. I quote one of the many diversions as an example. Persia accepted the jurisdiction of the old Permanent

Court by signing the 'optional clause' and ratifying it in 1932. But there was a condition; which was that their acceptance covered 'all disputes arising *after* ratification, with regard to situations relating to the application of treaties or conventions accepted by Iran and *subsequent to the ratification*'. Some part of the British case rests upon two treaties, of 1857 and 1903, by which Britain received 'most favoured nation' treatment in Persia. Do the words, 'and subsequent to the ratification' refer to the 'situations' or to the 'treaties and conventions'? If they refer to the situations then clearly Persia must accept jurisdiction since the British case rests entirely on situations subsequent to 1932. But if the matter is confined to conventions subsequent to the ratification, then the treaties of 1857 and 1903 cannot be quoted as supporting the British case. Such is the tortuous course of international justice.

There are now three courses open to the Court. It may decide that it has jurisdiction. It may decide that it has not jurisdiction. Finally it may decide that it cannot give a verdict on its own jurisdiction until it has heard the merits of the case.\* It would certainly seem that the merits are so intricately interwoven with the question of jurisdiction that their separation is impossible. One firm contention of the Persians is that the issue is purely a domestic concern. A nationalization law has been passed. The principle of nationalization has been recognized, and that is the end of the matter. Yet the Persian claim can hardly be substantiated or condemned without first considering the merits of the case.

For the layman there is this to be explained: Article 22 was specifically written into the 1933 Convention to cover international arbitration. The Convention, though the result of mutual discussion, derived directly from an appeal to the League of Nations. If the Persian claim is valid there appears to be nothing to prevent any member of the United Nations from entering into a solemn obligation with another member to resort to arbitration when things go wrong, and overnight writing off the effect of its signature by passing some such legislation as a nationalization Act, thereby placing the issue in the sphere of domestic control beyond international interference. But what is the deeper significance of this latest example of the invocation of international arbitration? In past decades great Powers exercised authority by virtue of their power and prestige. Power, and the balance of power, directed diplomacy and settlement; and

\* Since this article was written it has become necessary to add that the decision of the International Court in no way affects the validity of the British claim. We are merely for the present unable to find a Court to hear our case. That being so, attempts to sell oil to a third party will be fought in whatever National Court is concerned; and consequently decisions will depend upon the particular relations which Britain enjoys with the country in whose Court the case is presented.

lesser nations danced to the tune accordingly. In search of a new morality, the world sought a new machinery. The Permanent Court of International Justice was followed by the present International Court: and what has been the result? If justice and equality had been achieved as between great and small, the old imperialism could have passed on with few to mourn. Yet, if the case of Persian oil is typical of the shape of things to come, we in Britain may be forgiven for believing that the search for justice has but resulted in placing the great, at least in physical terms, at the mercy of the small. The great may not exercise their strength, yet the small can exploit their weakness. Is such a travesty of idealism to be the pattern for international progress? If so, the future is indeed one of muddled conceptions and a new morality must end in stagnation.

Meanwhile what is happening in Persia? Bravely Dr Moussadeq proclaimed that the country would sink into poverty with honour rather than swim with oil royalties dependent on British assistance. There is Persia's real enemy! A national conceit which refuses to face up to her own limitations, an attitude of mind which argues that the people who could compose Persian couplets cannot fail to produce and sell oil.

Sometimes we wonder why a country deprived of its one consistent source of revenue does not offer more tangible evidence of dissatisfaction at the loss. There can be only one answer. The people of Persia never knew their wealth. For generations they have lived at subsistence level and they continue to do so. The wealth through oil was dissipated in a hundred devious ways between the Government's Treasury and the peasant, with the result that the latter has had little to lose. It could thus be argued – and indeed this may be the correct perspective – that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the people of Persia are to-day together aligned against powers which, diverse enough in internal policies, are one under the banner of nationalism. Tudeh fanatics, Fedayan Islam and Moussadeq's nationalists have hitherto stood in loose yet effective alliance. Dr Moussadeq's sudden exit and the manner of his equally swift return only serves to underline the sinister powers which now reinforce the latest manifestations of nationalism and mob control. Nor can we discount the efficacy of such unknown factors as strange angelic messages which come to Dr Moussadeq in dreams. Of the future there would seem no certainty, unless it be that the Company must still look to the day of return. If it were any help in this dilemma it could be safely asserted that they would be prepared to reassume their responsibilities under very different circumstances to those of recent years. The clear recognition of the 50/50 principle in profit stands, and it is now for Persians to rise to the occasion.

## PAKISTAN, ISLAM AND THE WEST

Percival Spear

We are now so accustomed to the word Pakistan and to its representatives with the golden sheepskin hats, that it is easy to forget how recent is the idea of Pakistan and still more recent the word. We owe the word to a strange dreamer, who lived for a large part of his life in Cambridge and died last year. He was Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, and, though he says he invented the term earlier, he gave it to the world in the declaration *Now or Never* of January 28th, 1933. He was as obstinate as Mazzini in refusing to recognize the substance of his dream when it materialized, and he died an exile, disapproving, as I understand, of most of the Pakistan leaders. Nevertheless he was important as the inventor of a striking name, as the first practical planner, albeit in a confused and misty manner, and as the inspirer, if often only by a process of repulsion, of many young Muslims. The idea itself can be traced back somewhat further, to the writings of Iqbal. It was latent in the attitude of Syed Ahmad Khan, but his conscious separatism was more that of traditional Islam than of modern nationalism. It was only in 1940 that the attainment of Pakistan was adopted as the aim of the Muslim League, and only after 1945 that people thought of it as more than a rallying cry or a bargaining counter.

The idea and the name are of recent growth; respect for the programme of Pakistan is even more recent. Before 1937 it was little regarded by Muslims themselves, and up to 1945 it was usual in non-Muslim circles, and not Hindu ones only, to mention the idea only to ridicule it. The elements of Pakistan are as diverse as the idea is recent. There is apparently nothing but the Islamic idea and fear of non-Muslims to hold it together. It is polyglot in language – Pushtu, Sindhi, Urdu, Punjabi and Bengali. It is varied in race. Nearly two-thirds of the whole population of 75 millions inhabit Eastern Pakistan, formerly the eastern portion of Bengal. These people differ in race, in language, in temperament and in tradition from those of West Pakistan. The only links in common are the Muslim religion, with its cultural ethos, some tincture of the Mughal tradition with its Persian background, and the new westernism which was super-imposed on all Indian communities during the British period. This diversity pursues Pakistan into the economic sphere as well. Pakistan

has not one economy but two, and these are not particularly complementary. Eastern Pakistan grows rice and jute and exports the latter. Western Pakistan wants neither and grows wheat, which the east does not want, and cotton. Neither provides products or facilities which the other needs, such as coal and iron, jute or cotton mills. It happens that jute, cotton and wheat are all in world demand, so that the terms of trade at the moment are favourable, but it is clear that there can be no such thing as economic self-sufficiency for Pakistan, and that it must depend for prosperity on world conditions and good management. An unfriendly critic might call it a ramshackle empire; there are many outside and some within who doubt the possibility of its continued existence.

How did it come into being? First may be mentioned the personal element. It is an undoubted fact that many Muslims who joined in the early stages of the national movement, and in many cases were members of the National Congress, saw their chance of influence and power recede as the power of Congress grew. Up to 1919 all may be said to have been agitators together, looking hopefully forward to the day, still thought to be far distant, of responsibility and power. The Muslim League could then co-operate with the Congress, and Muslims feel comfortable within the Congress fold. But thereafter the feelings of comfort and co-operation grew noticeably less. In Hindu majority provinces the non-Congressmen had no future and the Muslim Congressmen only a subordinate future. This tendency reached a peak with the elections of 1936, when the Congress declined to form coalitions with minority parties, and would only give office to Muslim Congressmen. The aspiring Muslim politician then saw himself condemned to the political outer darkness, or else hanging on to the coat tails of an overwhelmingly Hindu party. It was not altogether an accident that the most vehement Pakistani leaders came, not from the Pakistan homeland, as it were, but from the Hindu majority provinces. Mr Jinnah himself came from Bombay, where he could never hope to be the dominant figure. For years he was himself a Congressman, and no friend to the British Government. He moved first to independent co-operation with the Congress, and then to forthright opposition. His lieutenant and heir, Liaquat Ali Khan, came from the United Provinces, where his career was similarly blocked.

But we should not overstress the personal factor for it was of comparatively minor importance. Far more compelling was the second, which we may call the Islamic fear. It waxed and waned in direct proportion to the probability of British withdrawal from India. By 1907, when a Radical Government was in office in Britain and the Morley-Minto

reforms were under discussion, Muslim leaders could see at least as far as the possibility of a Hindu-British partnership. The foundation of the Muslim League expressed this fear and the determination to secure consideration should the proprietor consider the taking of local partners. Separate electorates for Muslims, which were secured in the Morley-Minto reforms, represented both a claim for a share in any future partnership and a fear of free competition with Hindus on account of Muslim backwardness. The first World War, with its Turkish complications, for a time threw the Muslims and Hindus together. But the collapse of the Khilafat movement and the Montford reforms saw a revival and rapid development of the fear complex. Self-government for India was now well over the horizon and each party began to jockey for position in the next instalment of reforms. The 1935 Act with its provincial autonomy put matters to the final test. Here was real devolution of power in a limited sphere. The Muslim nationalists, of whom Jinnah was still one, hoped for co-operation with the Congress in Hindu majority provinces. The Congress high command's decision in 1937 to countenance no such coalitions, and only to admit Muslim Congressmen to office, had fateful results. Muslims in minority provinces felt the sting of minority status as never before, and this was aggravated by the Congress use of patronage and a certain tendency to Hinduise in some provinces. The Muslim demand for partnership was met by Congress insistence on supremacy. The tension thus set up led inevitably to the demand for separation.

The third major motive behind the Pakistan movement was the liberal-nationalist one. In the early nineteenth century the Indian Muslims saw themselves as an outlying portion of the one Islamic *millat* or people. The whole conception of an Islamic brotherhood was in decay, the Caliphate was confined to an invalid Turkey, and the Indian outwork had been overrun by the infidel. From this slough of despond the Muslims were aroused, as they were also from their apathy towards the Hindus and resentment against the British, by Syed Ahmad Khan. By abandoning the traditionalism and formalism which had been dominant in Islam since the Mongol invasions, and returning to the rational traditions of the early Caliphate, Ahmad Khan was able to find common ground between the spirit of Islam and the culture of the West. The connecting link was reason, whose vehicle was the common heritage of Greek thought. The characteristic Western expression of reason was science, and the Syed became an enthusiastic advocate of scientific studies. Nature and Reason were the two words most often on his lips; the first society in his college at Aligarh was a Science Club, and his followers were for many years listed in the census as 'Necharis' or Men of Nature. The

nationalist component grew up as the result of other factors. First we may notice that the idea of necessity infiltrated through the study of the English language and literature. The example of Western nations like Italy and Germany was impressive and infectious. Still more influential were the stirrings of nationalism in the Islamic world: Egyptian nationalism, the Young Turk revolution and the Persian revolution of 1909 (if such it can be called) pointed a way of renewal for Indian Muslims apart from British domination and Hindu associations. The first World War interposed an interlude in the logical development of this process. The misfortunes of Turkey provoked a revival of pan-Islamism or internationalism in the form of the Khilafat movement, and common grievances against the British led to alliance with the Hindus in the Lucknow Pact and the first non-Co-operation movement. Ataturk's abolition of the Caliphate effectively deflated the Khilafat balloon and thereafter Hindu-Muslim unity was soon succeeded by Hindu-Muslim riots. Between that time and 1937, Muslims hesitated between nationalist and democratic Anglophobia, with its logical corollary of co-operation with the Hindus, and Muslim nationalism with its logic of separatism. It was fear which turned the scale, and the moment of turning was the elections and their aftermath in 1937. For many years Jinnah himself was more anxious for independence than separation from Hindus, and for him too the decisive moment was the Congress rejection of coalition in 1937. Liberal nationalism made independence desirable, and fear of Hindu influence made separation seem inevitable. Fear for the Islamic community, national desires for independence and liberal notions of self-government, with a tincture of personal feeling, provided the motive power for the Pakistan engine of state.

What are the forces, cultural, political and intellectual, which hold this country together in an inner unity? Or are we to account for its continued existence by the fear complex and by Western nationalism only? Mention has been made of the Islamic fear, the fear of the absorption of the Muslim community within the Hindu fold. I believe that this fear had this much basis in fact, that there was something unique to be absorbed. Islam in India cannot be thought of simply as a separate religious denomination. The differences are far deeper than those between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. For they not only think but act and feel differently. No compromise is ultimately possible between the Hindu and Muslim way of life; if the two cannot mix happily on a secular basis they must live apart. Yet the Pakistani has at the same time borrowed the feeling of nationality from the West, very much as the Turks did. By this is meant the sense of separateness not only from other religions and cultures, but from other groups within his own culture,

The Pakistani has not indeed sought, like the Turk, to purge from the national life Islamic culture altogether, leaving the Muslim religion as a matter of religious opinion and Friday observance (if at all). He still regards himself as part of the great Muslim brotherhood and so is concerned with events in other parts of the Muslim world. But though he is still a brother to other Muslims, he is a brother in a different sense. His group must be independent of other Muslim groups, as well as of non-Muslim communities. His country, as it were, has dominion status within the Muslim commonwealth. One cannot call this nationalism based on racialism, for Pakistan is a hotch-potch of races. It is rather national feeling based on a sense of identity which has arisen in a mixed but geographically homogeneous group of people. Thus, while the Pakistani is much concerned with developments in the Middle East, and interested in those of Indonesia, he insists on his separateness as a community. He insists on Pathan identity with Pakistan – hence the imprisonment of Abdul Ghaffar Khan – and rebuts with vigour Afghan interference. Islamic traditions of brotherhood and democracy have perhaps made easier the growth of a sense of nationality in particular Muslim areas: there are no caste and outcaste divisions to be overcome. But this nationalist feeling has certainly been helped by Western ideas. The result seems to be a most interesting blending of local cultural traditions with borrowed ideas. Whether this feeling is as strong in East as in West Pakistan may be doubted, but there seems to be no doubt from the deportment of all classes of Pakistanis, and from their readiness to make sacrifices in the cause of their new country, that it is real and it is strong.

The third binding force of the young Pakistan State is its frank acceptance of the West. One would be far from suggesting that this attitude is uncontested, but it is a dominant feeling. Its growth goes back once more to Syed Ahmad Khan. The adoption of Western manners and conveniences was known before his time, but it was he who grasped the spirit of the West and communicated it to the Indian Muslim. Believing, as he did, that Islam shared with the West a common heritage of Judaic ethics and Greek philosophy and science, he could afford to be radical in his views and bold in advocating them. Through his college at Aligarh he influenced the cream of the rising Muslim youth. The Khilafat agitation of the Ali brothers was in the nature of a medievalist reaction. But it was not they, but Iqbal, who caught the ears of the young Muslims of the first World War generation. Iqbal combined a conviction of the uniqueness of Islam and its mission with a frank though not uncritical attitude to the West. Like Ahmad Khan he appealed to reason, though in a different manner, and for him the knowledge and skill of the West

lay open for selection and appropriation. The results of this attitude are to be seen in the men who have risen to leadership, and they in their turn have helped to secure acceptance for it in the body of the Pakistani nation. Jinnah himself was a polished westernized gentleman, equally at ease in the High Court of Bombay or before the Privy Council in London. Liaquat Ali Khan was an Oxford man, as much at home in London as in Delhi or Karachi. Jinnah's successor as Governor General and Liaquat's as Premier, is a Trinity Hall man in Cambridge, and his successor as Governor General, and former Finance Minister, is a Trinity man. These Westernizers would not have risen so high, or wielded such influence, if there had been no acceptance for their openly avowed attitudes. The same process can be observed in the acts of the administration. Education is being rapidly developed along Western lines, and British colleagues are welcomed in the work. Most significant of all has been the bold championing of the women's movement. The *Maulvis* remain in the background and attempts to give them a special place in the Constitution have been rejected. A Pakistan Minister has insisted, in a public lecture, that their proper place is the mosque or the *madrasah*, and that the regulation of the State should be left to the Pakistani people in their democratically elected assemblies. It is true that the Constitution opens with the ascription of all power to God, and to God in the Muslim interpretation. Is there then to be one law for Muslims and another for the infidel? I think that the answer to this question depends upon what we mean by theocracy. Do we apply the term to every State which allows a place for religion in the national life? And should we by that token regard Britain as a theocracy, because the Church of England and the Church of Scotland are both 'by law established'? One must distinguish between theocracy proper and mere official recognition of religion. Let us consider how Pakistan fits into this picture. The sovereignty of Allah is proclaimed in the Constitution, but so far as one can see, it is in the same sense as Eire proclaims the sovereignty of the Holy Trinity. The Constitution also proclaims that, under God, the whole people exercises political power and seeks to secure it by the usual devices of popular assemblies and responsible government. Non-Muslims are full citizens, and may even, I believe, be members of the Muslim League. The *ulema*, or doctors of the Muslim law, have been denied any special place. There are not even two arch-*Maulvis* and twenty-four *ulema* sitting in a Pakistan Second Chamber. It is the people, and not the *ulema*, which will interpret Islam in the modern world, and the State will only be Muslim so long as the people will it. If Islamic consciousness seems stronger than Catholic consciousness in Eire, or Presbyterian consciousness in Scotland, or Anglican consciousness in

England, it is because the Muslim in Pakistan is at present more religious-minded than his Christian counterparts in Europe.

I should not like to give the impression that all is well with Pakistan, that a straight course has been set over calm seas to the haven of the liberal State. The course has been set, but the seas are not calm. The external dangers, such as the attitude of the Afghans and the Kashmir problem, are too well known to need comment. Internally, one great problem is the full integration of East and West Pakistan. Another is the stress between the forward-looking, westernizing Muslim and the dead-weight of traditionalist conservative Islam. The backwoodsmen of the Punjab lack leaders but not numbers, and they are the hope of the backward looking *ulema*. They cling to old customs like *purdah* and Muslim exclusiveness, and their thoughts run easily to *jehads* or holy wars. They have done badly in elections but they contain a reservoir of fanaticism of whose exact strength no one can be quite sure. The cry 'Islam in danger' is a nightmare for Pakistani statesmen, as once 'No Popery' was for English ones. Kashmir is a convenient rallying cry. The military plot of a year ago, for all its Communist connections, was not unrelated with this feeling, nor, I think, was the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan. Pakistan has found her soul but her destiny cannot yet be regarded as fixed or certain. She is still, and for some years more must continue to be, at the cross-roads of national fate.

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## MAO TSE-TUNG

Franz Borkenau

A considerable amount of talk and writing has been devoted during the past year to the subject of differences between Moscow and Peking. For a section of the Left in Britain, the assertion of such differences has virtually become the pivotal point of an entire political world-view, while in the United States, the denial of any distinction between Russian and Chinese Communism forms part of the credo of some circles of the Right. On closer inspection, the debate appears to turn upon a mistaken way of posing the issue: those who believe in the possibility of conflict between Moscow and Peking tend to think in terms of national Russo-Chinese divergencies, of a kind not fundamentally different from national rivalries in the non-Communist world: a view which ignores the fact that even outside the Communist orbit such rivalries are unlikely nowadays to

produce major international conflicts. As against illusions of this sort, there is doubtless truth in the assertion that Stalin and Mao Tse-tung are irrevocably united against the West by a community of political faith, whatever secondary differences may exist between them.

The interesting suggestion has recently been made by an American author, Mr Benjamin Schwartz (in *The Rise of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, 1951) that Chinese Communism differs basically from the Russian brand in that its foundations are not proletarian but agrarian. This comes closer to the real problem, since the possibility of serious tension between Communist régimes is here linked to the presence of structural differences in the make-up of the respective Communist parties. The first essential in trying to understand the Communist orbit is to realize that every social and political order develops its own type of international relations and conflicts. In the Middle Ages, the major conflicts pivoted upon position within feudal society; in modern times, the issue at stake was the power of the competing national states, and secondarily control of movable property; in the Communist world, the Party is at the centre of things, and the issue turns upon its inner cohesion and the size of the orbit within which it is able to impose its strictly defined credo upon men. From which it follows that a 'deviation' of Chinese from Russian Communism, in matters of social base and 'ideology,' must in fact produce a life-and-death struggle.

Schwartz, however, appears to me to overrate the significance of Marxist doctrine in its formal aspect for the structure of present-day Communist parties. According to Marx, the party of Socialism must retain a proletarian class character from the start until the final victory, and that is certainly not true of Chinese Communism. But is it any truer of Russian Communism, this organization of 'professional revolutionaries' of the intelligentsia which has given birth to a novel machinery of political rule? Is it not rather the decisive point about Russian, Chinese and any other form of Communism that in its working the Marxian class theory constitutes only an historical reminiscence, which Stalin himself for good reason nowadays tends to dispense with? The organization of 'professional revolutionaries,' which on the morrow of its victory transforms itself into an instrument of rule, represents in its inmost essence a force altogether outside the conflicts of interest groups, indifferent to and independent of them. Precisely therein lies its 'totalitarian' character. It follows that proof of Mr Schwartz's thesis cannot be found in the mere fact of the alienation of Chinese Communism from the proletariat. Rather it would have to be shown that Chinese Communism is nothing but an executive organ of peasant interests, incapable of rising above the limitations of peasant thinking and striving. But there is no question of any such

limitation. Chinese Communism – like any other Communist movement – has sought a social foundation where one could be found: i.e. at first among the peasantry. But it never lost the consciousness that this represented merely a transitory phase, that a Communist society was impossible without large-scale industry; and to-day a process of shifting the centre of gravity to the large towns is rapidly going under way. Here, again, no fundamental and permanent difference between Chinese and Russian Communism can be said to exist.

None the less Schwartz seems to me to be on the right track in looking for differences in the organizational structure of the two movements. His account of the subject, which unfortunately takes one only to 1932, even suggests one of the most important factors in stressing the complete independence of Mao Tse-tung from Moscow throughout the period of his rise to eminence. This is the point where his career resembles that of Tito (a fact often enough stressed), and actually goes far beyond even the latter's achievement. For Tito's rise began when he became the Comintern's special representative in Spain, and then the leader of the Yugoslav Party by the grace of Moscow; while Mao Tse-tung, although of course a loyal Party member, was never in Moscow's special confidence. Schwartz has furnished exhaustive proof of this fact and thereby spot-lighted a problem which from the Kremlin's viewpoint is close to being insoluble. The Communist world movement rests on strict discipline from above, all the various national leaderships being appointed and controlled by the Centre. Any infringement of this rule has hitherto invariably entailed destruction, yet the rule does not apply to the leader of the greatest and most important non-Russian Communist movement – Moscow's belated and formal investiture merely serves to underline this fact, as we shall see in a moment. Everything suggests that the Communist movement cannot possibly have more than one centre, yet everything equally suggests that Moscow and Peking are to-day determined at all cost to avoid a breach. Here then two momentous historical figures are struggling against the necessity inherent in the structure of the movement they themselves have created: an unmistakable portent of historical drama on the grand scale.

Let us put some flesh on these abstractions. Mao Tse-tung was preceded as chairman of the Chinese Politbureau by four different groups of leaders. It is a weakness of Schwartz's work, which it shares with other studies of Chinese Communism, that the basic character of these leadership cliques, and the process of their successive rise and fall, is not properly brought out. The observer's attention is unduly concentrated on China and not sufficiently fixed on Moscow. These four ruling groups of the early period owed their emergence not to local processes but to Moscow's

fiat, and their rise and fall corresponded to changing tactical conceptions at the centre. The Party's founder, Chen Tu-hsiu, represented the 'united front' period inaugurated by Radek in 1921, which called for co-operation with left-wing Socialists in Europe, and with the Kuomintang in China. He and the group around him fell from power at the end of 1927: not because in obedience to Stalin's orders they had led the Party towards a disastrous defeat – no Communist Party leadership has ever found defeat fatal to its authority as long as its policies harmonized with the aims of whatever faction happened to have the upper hand inside the Russian Party – but because Stalin, from the middle of 1927 onwards, was moving towards rupture with the right wing of the Party under Bukharin and Rykov, and consequently was replacing 'right-wing' by 'left-wing' leadership cliques throughout the Comintern. This turn-about resulted in the establishment of a sort of stop-gap administration in the Chinese Party, and a little later – closely paralleled by similar reshuffles of leading personnel throughout the world Communist movement – in the imposition of the left-wing extremist, Li Li-san, as Party leader. Little attention has been given to the fact that all the extremists pushed to the top in 1929 – Neumann in Germany, Barbé in France, Guttman in Czechoslovakia – were demoted in 1931. Li Li-san suffered the same fate, and students of the subject have given themselves quite needless pains trying to discover special 'Chinese' causes of his displacement. He was followed – again in conformity with the general pattern – by a slightly more moderate and even more strictly Moscow-controlled group, chiefly represented by Wan Min. Up to this point, and notwithstanding the dramatic development of the Chinese Revolution, the inner history of the Chinese Communist Party is a mechanical reflection of the Moscow 'general line.' But at this point the chain of causation is abruptly broken. Under pressure of persecution, the Wan Min Central Committee broke up, and its remnant took refuge in the Communist-controlled mountains of South Kiangsi, where Mao Tse-tung, Chu-teh and their colleagues had meanwhile established their authority. The seat of the Central Committee and the Politbureau was shifted from Shanghai to these distant mountains, and the Comintern was left to sanction *post factum* the displacement of its representative and the election of a new leader removed from its control by virtue of geography alone. It was a genuine historical turning-point: a revolt against Moscow (executed with traditional Chinese decorum) which was not visited by any penalties. What made it possible was a concatenation of numerous factors: principally perhaps the growing indifference of Stalin and his circle towards the Comintern, which was characteristic of this phase, especially during the first Five Year Plan period, to make way for a

radically different attitude after 1934. Also there must have been on Stalin's part an unholy fear to let himself in for a repetition of the experience of 1927-28, when he badly burned his fingers in China. Thirdly, there was the proved incompetence of Wan Min. If as a result of all this the Chinese Communist Party dissolved into thin air – what did it matter? There is documentary proof that it took at least two years for Stalin to be informed of the existence of Chinese Soviets, i.e. Communist-controlled areas. No one, Stalin least of all, expected Mao to emerge from his mountain hollows.

Stalin's indifference found its counterpart in Mao Tse-tung's diplomacy which displayed the characteristic Chinese talent for manoeuvre, in sharp contrast to the unbending dogmatism typical of European Communists. His strength lay in his ability to remain outside the ferocious factional struggles which unseated one group of leaders after another. Now and then he tried to insulate his native province of Hunan from these quarrels, without much success and without thereby making himself more popular among the Party leaders. But when in 1928 he took to the mountains he was fully in accord with the 'Party line' of the moment, which called for armed risings. When he succeeded in surviving, while other leaders more closely connected with the Party directorate went down in senseless offensives, his mountain stronghold naturally acquired greater importance. The Party leaders in Shanghai nonetheless felt no great yearning for the starvation rations and the thin mountain air of the Tinkanshan, and Mao for his part never spared with the required professions of loyalty. Thus he was left in peace; and thus in the end he came to the top as the leader of the only surviving fragment of the Party which had some life in it, whereupon he redoubled his verbal conformism and simultaneously extended his effective control. There is no need to doubt that even then he was determined to become and remain leader of the whole Party. It is highly unlikely that he was thinking in terms of a conflict with Moscow. Contact was almost non-existent; even the decision to undertake the 'Long March' to the North was made on his own initiative, and Moscow's formal sanction was given after the event.

Once the centre had been shifted to Yen-an, however, closer contact with Russia followed naturally. His old opponents tried to exploit this opportunity, and once more he had to manoeuvre Wan Ming and the others by entrusting them with important posts. But now he had a trump card to play: Moscow suddenly needed him most urgently for the united front with Chiang Kai-shek against Japan, a manoeuvre which neither Wan Min nor Li Li-san could possibly have carried through. Stalin was rightly worried about the danger of war on two fronts against Germany and Japan. Mao Tse-tung became the chosen instrument for deflecting

the threatening Japanese attack against China by forcing Chiang Kai-shek to adopt an energetically anti-Japanese policy. Thus he was suddenly transformed into a highly important factor in the Russian game. With that he was firmly in the saddle: not because geography protected him from his opponents, but because he had now found the strongest possible backing. By 1937 he was in full control. And now he struck the decisive blow, not foreseen by anyone at the time and still not properly appreciated abroad. With the outbreak of the Second World War, which reduced Moscow's freedom of action, he promptly expelled Wan Min and all the other 'Muscovites' from the Party directorate, and in June 1941, a few weeks before the German attack on Russia, he launched the *cheng-feng* campaign, usually translated as 'rectification.' What was it that was thus 'rectified'? Nothing less than the internal Party régime, and this in a manner which flatly contradicted every tenet held by Moscow. It is this episode, barely mentioned nowadays, which ought to be treated as the starting-point of every investigation into the Moscow-Peking relationship.

It has to be remembered that in Russia the years 1937-38 were the time of the 'Great Purge,' that cruel and massive bloodletting. While Yen-an remained untouched, the purge raged among the exiled Chinese in Moscow, as it did among all other foreigners. Mao was left in peace because he occupied an irreplaceable position in the game of Soviet foreign policy; but there could not be the shadow of a doubt that he was marked down for the fate of the Baltic, Polish, Hungarian, Yugoslav and other Party leaders, if only because he belonged to the Communist Old Guard which was then being liquidated (exception being made for the French and British sections of the Communist world movement, who likewise happened to be essential from the foreign political viewpoint); and more particularly because he had come to the top independent of the Russian Party and police apparatus. A Westerner faced with this situation would probably have rebelled and gone under. Mao showed his capacity for taking the long view by instituting the *cheng-feng* instead of open rebellion. The core of the matter had to do with the methods of intra-Party discussion, Chinese observers agreeing that the drive was specifically directed against the Moscow-controlled Wan Min and Li Li-san factions and their habits of carrying on internal Party polemics. It introduced the sharpest sanctions against the mingling of personal and political questions, threatened the direst penalties for denunciations based on personal motives, prohibited automatic expulsion and police persecution for purely tactical differences, and laid it down that discussion was to aim at 'deviations', but not at the individuals representing them. One may argue that pious resolutions to this effect are nothing new in the

history of the world Communist movement, but the seriousness of the matter is attested by the fact that – unlike the Politbureau of the Russian Party and of all satellite Parties – the Chinese Politbureau has never been ‘purged’; even more important, the secret police has not attained to a fraction of the significance it acquired in Russia in settling disputes among the top level of the hierarchy. In other words, Mao Tse-tung’s Party, although Communist and therefore terrorist and totalitarian in its attitude towards social and political opponents, is not a Stalinist Party in its internal régime, as regards the relations of the leaders towards each other and towards the membership. This difference can only be eliminated by breaking Mao’s power or by radically changing the Russian Party régime. Nothing need here be said about the chances of co-operation among two organizations of such different type. It is sufficient to say that Mao Tse-tung’s independent rise to power, and his victory over the Muscovite agents within the Party, led of necessity to the tacit repudiation of the Stalinist type of Party organization.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, Chinese Communism had achieved *de facto* independence. Aside from the weight of the Leninist tradition, it was linked to Moscow only by the force of circumstance. This state of affairs was reflected in the field of Party doctrine, in a manner completely ignored abroad. Bewitched by reminiscences of the furious debates among the Russian leaders during the ‘twenties, world public opinion has missed the significance of the new style in Communist discussion since the beginning of the ‘thirties, a style which excludes open polemics while giving to the minutest differences in formulation a significance they would never obtain in free and open discussion. Mao Tse-tung had always been sparing in his eulogies of Stalin. With the *cheng-feng*, Stalin’s name was pushed so far into the background as to constitute a deliberate minimizing of his importance. A slight change in the opposite direction began with the Communist conquest of China, while the Moscow agreement between China and the USSR early in 1950 constituted a turning-point in that Stalin’s name was now included in all Chinese Communist Party documents: clearly a concession to Russian protests during the talks, but one for which Mao exacted a price. While from the ‘thirties onwards, the official doctrine had become increasingly known in Russia as ‘Leninism-Stalinism’, the *cheng-feng* had inaugurated a rival formula: ‘Marxism-Leninism and the doctrine of Chairman Mao’. Not only was Stalin’s name suppressed – a silence louder than words – and the modest title of ‘chairman’ brought into significant contrast with the increasing deification of Stalin: Mao was promoted to the place which in the Russian formula is occupied by Stalin. This implied a claim to equality already at a time when Mao’s control did not extend beyond Yenan. There

is no need to rest the case on speculation. Following the unification of China, and in particular during the great campaign culminating in the thirtieth anniversary of the Party’s founding (1951) the claim becomes explicit and acquires a social and geographical content. The formula now runs: Lenin and Stalin have shown the way to those modern industrial countries for whom the proletarian revolution constitutes the approach to Communism. For the colonial and semi-colonial countries, for whom the path to Communism leads through an alliance of all anti-imperialist forces, the strategy has been laid down by the Chinese Communist Party ‘under the leadership of Chairman Mao’. Thus the Chinese Communist Party claims the leading role within the Communist movement throughout three-quarters of the habitable globe.

We have here a concretization of the statement that every society has its own forms of expansion. The rivalry between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung is not a matter of territorial conquest or economic relations: where questions of this kind arise they are doubtless relegated to the background, just as eighteenth and nineteenth century diplomacy made a point of minimizing those disputes over formal precedence among sovereigns for the sake of which major wars had been waged in the age of feudalism. But just as genuine voluntary compromise was impossible during the Middle Ages in matters touching the *point d’honneur*, or during the nineteenth century over conflicting national interests, so to-day within the Communist world the same applies to the right of control over Party organizations. The great power-political struggles of the totalitarian epoch are fought out over control of the Party. That was shown in a flash by the Yugoslav conflict: a premature explosion due to inexperience on both sides in handling forces as yet only half understood. The problem constituted by Russo-Chinese relations unfolds far more slowly but is bound to have vastly greater historical consequences. At the moment the best barometer is the relative influence of the two centres in directing the Communist Parties throughout the remainder of Asia. This novel division of Asia into spheres of influence was doubtless the main subject of the Russo-Chinese talks in 1950. Recent developments within the Indian Communist movement suggest that one of the decisions reached was to assign India to Mao’s field of action.

Here we have the key to the otherwise inexplicable zig-zags in the recent history of Indian Communism. When the Chinese Communist troops appeared on the Tibetan border, the Indian Communist leadership was still composed of a group of left-wing extremists installed by the already dead and defunct Zhdanov. In pursuance of the example set in China by Li Li-san in 1930, they entertained the lunatic notion of starting armed risings in the major cities of India. It is a puzzle why they were left in control even after the elimination of Zhdanov, and after they had in-

volved the Indian Communist Party in a succession of disasters. Presumably the matter was connected with their hostility towards Mao Tse-tung whom they denounced in the official Party organ as an 'opportunist' – a notable infringement of Party etiquette. At any rate an immediate change supervened after Mao's visit to Moscow. The Indians were compelled to send apologetic messages to Peking, very coldly received by Mao, and a few months later the ultra-left directorate was dismissed. Its place was taken by a rival group which followed Chinese precedent in seeking a base among the agrarian rebels of Hyderabad and which incessantly appealed to Chinese experience in doing so. Matters did not develop smoothly, however. The rebellion in Hyderabad petered out and Moscow took the opportunity in the spring of 1951 – apparently in connection with Russo-Chinese differences over Korea – to get rid of the new Indian leadership and replace it by yet a third clique which looked for support to the Bombay trade unions and had less to say about the Chinese example. That, however, proved a mere interval. In November, 1951, Ajoy Ghosh became General Secretary of the Party, and in his wake the professions of loyalty towards Peking returned. The entire propaganda machine went into high gear behind a campaign which slavishly reproduced the Chinese pattern ('Bloc of Four Classes' including the 'national bourgeoisie') and trumpeted the glory of Maoism. By way of contrast, Moscow induced Ana Pauker (not yet demoted) to attack this policy as 'opportunistic' in an article in the official Cominform journal – in short, the struggle over control of the Indian Communist Party continues unabated. And no wonder: Moscow and Peking are both convinced that India is the most immediate and the most important potential centre of revolution. Whoever controls Indian Communism *ipso facto* controls a Communist India. If Mao wins out in this struggle, he becomes potentially stronger than Moscow. If he loses the prey to Stalin, Chinese Communism remains after all a regional phenomenon.

So far as can be judged at the moment, Mao Tse-tung has done nothing to extend his influence in Pakistan or further to the West. It is equally clear that he is trying to gain further control throughout South-East Asia by means of the Communist Parties in Burma and Malaya which are overwhelmingly Chinese. It does not follow that these two organizations are mere off-shoots of Peking: the guerilla war waged by the Communists in Malaya shows little trace of political direction in general, and assimilation of Chinese experience in particular. The situation is clearer in Indo-China: Ho Chi-minh and his circle are loyal followers of Moscow who share the prevalent Tonkinese and Annamite dislike of Chinese supremacy: a point which might usefully be kept in mind when the subject of possible Chinese intervention in Vietnam is being considered. Obscurity surrounds the

position of the Japanese and – perhaps even more important – the Korean Communist parties. It would appear that Moscow has placed bigger obstacles in Peking's path in these areas than has been the case in India. The numerous and obscure internal Party crises in Japan, and the colourless slogans employed by the Japanese Communists, may well reflect a state of suppressed rivalry between Stalinist and Maoist factions.

These suggestions may help to clarify a subject not yet properly understood, but a qualification is necessary: experience shows that the more basic a political conflict, the longer it takes to appear on the surface – precisely because the implications are so terrifying. A breach between Moscow and Peking is possible only under circumstances of acute and world-wide political crisis, and even then only if specific circumstances work towards it – to say nothing of the fact that the endless talk about 'Chinese Titoism' can only serve to tighten the bonds between Stalin and Mao. The non-Communist world is for the time being reduced to watching and studying these tensions and their progressive unfolding. Still, a policy of watchful waiting has on occasions proved serviceable in the past, and may do so again.

(Professor Borkenau is a sociologist, and writer on political affairs)

## THE SOCIOLOGIST'S STONE

Harold Rosenberg

The Soviet Union is a society that has within it a unique and separated entity, 'the great whole', as Lenin called it, 'which we are creating for the first time – the Party'. This whole, says the official *Agitator's Handbook*, is 'the organizing and directing force in the Soviet Government, the heart, brain and spirit of the people, the leader and teacher of the workers'. It is the Person that rules the U S S R, strictly speaking the only person that exists there – no other group and no individual (not even Stalin himself) is a person in the sense of being recognized as separate and self-directed. To-day there is great interest in knowing this Communist Person. Everyone is concerned with what it thinks, what makes it act, what it intends. Above all, there is the desire to know what it is likely to do (not the same thing as what it intends, since a person may act differently than he intends) especially about starting a war.

How does one grasp the character of such an abstract creature which leaves its tracks everywhere but which, like a god or demon, cannot be seen because it is not a thing but exist *in* other things – human beings,

institutions – as a thinking, feeling and decision-making power? It is a question of drawing the figure of an invisible being, a dramatic portrait, which, in the case of the Communist Party, will suggest its posture as ‘the vanguard of the proletariat’, its intellectual and emotional physiognomy, the magnitude of its strength and the conditions under which it might feel forced to exert it to its maximum. Most of our knowledge of Communism comes from individuals who have beheld the shape of the Party *within themselves* as well as externally: whether it be Lenin, who first formed the image of the Communist in his mind and then brought it into being; Trotsky, who was repelled by Bolshevism, then embraced it; Stalin, who re-formed it according to his interpretation of Lenin’s acts and thoughts and according to the demands of his own struggle to dominate it; the intellectuals who were invaded by it and painfully expelled it as an alien spirit, a ‘God that Failed’, as their book of confessions appropriately entitled it; the possessed one among the foes of Communism to whom it is the Devil himself. . . . All these have tried to tell not only what Communism thinks, feels and does, but *who* that collective being is that has dwelt in them. There exists, in short, a literature concerning the Communist Party which is a product of the imagination, more or less informed by experience, composed in longer or shorter historical perspective, coloured with hopes, fears, reverence, dogma, will to power, hate, disappointment, contempt. The sum of these inwardly reflected images constitutes our knowledge of Communism and the basis for forming estimates in regard to any new adventure with it. Is there some approach more reliable than this, from which sentiment and subjectivity can never be altogether absent? Is there a way of looking steadily at ‘the great whole’ as a figure completely outside the observer and at a distance from him, revealed through its own words and deeds alone, yet with its active principle exposed, so that it is recognizable as that entity able to exert so much force upon the human mass?

In response to the current desire for acquaintance with Communism (exactly proportionate to the desire not to be acquainted with Communists) a new kind of savant of Communism has appeared: the scientist, the professional maker of predictions. He speaks not because he was visited by the spectre but because people are asking questions and it is his job to answer them. If his colleague in astronomy can foretell that a certain planet, hitherto unseen, will appear in the skies on Tuesday morning at 3.46, why should not he, by applying a comparable method, be able to predict what Stalin and the Politbureau are going to do? Perhaps not as precisely as the other foretells the positions of the stars, but surely with more accuracy than one whom the ‘whole’ attracts or repels as if it were an aspect of his own personality?

Last year the Rand Corporation, an organization which carries on

scientific enterprises ‘for the public welfare and security of the United States’, published the first two studies of a series which, through the joint efforts of political and social scientists and other specialists, is intended to provide a functional characterization of the Communist Party and the Soviet State. The opening volumes were: *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, by Dr Nathan Leites of Yale, an anthropologist with O W I and U N E S C O experience, and *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority*, by Dr Margaret Mead, who has told us so much about Samoans, and other males and females. Rand Corporation projects are, one gathers, paid for by the United States Air Force. Each of the books in question is subtitled *A Rand Corporation Research Study*, is referred to as a ‘report’, and in appearance is a cross between a textbook and a printed memorandum intended for circulation among interested parties. All this suggests a very serious, almost confidential, investigation. For months before publication, Dr Leites’s *Code* was, it is said, the most-discussed ‘RESTRICTED’ document in Washington. Just before its official unveiling, *Look* magazine featured it in a special article called ‘How the Politburo Thinks’, headed by a statement from the Editors declaring that ‘there is no more important document in Washington to-day’ and that while it makes things look pretty black for freedom we are lucky in that ‘it is already (?) in the hands of U S policy makers’. The publication of Dr Mead’s book was noticed in a *news* story in the *New York Times*, though most of the story was devoted to a work yet to come on how their traditional swaddling clothes brought the Russians a Dictator. Since there are many good books and articles in English on Communism, the fuss about the Rand studies has to do, obviously, with the aura of respect surrounding ‘science’, especially since the atom bomb.

The dust-jacket of Leites’s *Code* describes it as ‘A systematic analysis of the political strategy of Communism and the rules by which it operates.’ The author’s Introduction, however, says something a little different: he is offering, he says, ‘some of the findings of a *still-continuing* study of the political strategy of Communism’. Obviously, if the book were a ‘systematic analysis’ of Communist strategy, one would get not just ‘findings’, and only some at that, but the whole strategy, laid out and logically taken apart. The fact is that the book contains no analysis, systematic or other, except the analyses quoted from Lenin and Stalin. Leites’s ‘rules of strategy’ consist of generalizations derived from Communist writings, and these generalizations are numbered and grouped under such headings as ‘Means and Ends’, ‘The Control of Feelings’, ‘Deception’, ‘Violence’, ‘Deals’. One discovers, for instance, that the Party plans to keep in permanent fighting trim; that it expects agreements with it to be violated; and so on. I don’t know what use the U S Air Force or the State Depart-

ment expect to make of these summaries, but if they imagine that the *Code* constitutes an analysis of strategy, rather than an abstract of the more prominent Bolshevik formulas, we had better watch out. On the basis of his Introduction, however, Dr Leites can well deny that he personally sold it to them as such.

The jacket goes on to remind us that 'we have been at a loss to understand how their [the members of the Politbureau] minds work, what their goals are, and what they believe must be done to achieve those goals'. Presumably the *Code* is going to enlighten us on Stalin and Company's manner of cogitation, what considerations make an impression on their brains, and how their thoughts result in actions tending to bring into being particular historical objectives. To know what these last are would be especially important, since the concepts 'Socialism' and 'Communism', never too precise to begin with, have become immeasurably beclouded by Soviet statements and practices. Here again, however, Leites is at odds with his blurb writer. He does not, he announces, propose to discuss the major theories of Leninism-Stalinism; he is willing to make the assumption – a very dubious one – that his 'rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective action' can be understood without Bolshevik theory. Thus no Bolshevik goals; just their How-To-Do-It book. It is as though one tried to present the mind of the Pope without saying anything about Catholic theology.

After comparing the *Code* to Machiavelli's *Prince*, the publishers hand it over as 'being made available to the public [instead of being hidden in a vault underneath Mt Everest?] in the belief that it is a major contribution to our ability to understand and to *predict* Politbureau behaviour'. For this to be the case, two things would have to be established about the rule book: (1) that the rules mean what they say – that Trotsky, for example, was wrong when he argued that a statement meant one thing to Lenin, and something quite different when repeated by Stalin; (2) that the Bolsheviks actually behave according to those rules, since when people grab up table legs in a fight, Queensberry rules become meaningless. Even if the rules meant what they said and the Bolsheviks obeyed them, they still would not indicate what the Politbureau is going to do, any more than the 'code' of Hoyle suggests how a man is going to play his hand in a poker game. Actually, Leites does not pretend to understand the Politbureau mind; he does not even insist that the rules are still in force. 'Since the Politbureau has abandoned the unusual frankness in statements of policy that existed up to 1930, any conclusions concerning present rules of strategy must remain, to some extent, conjectural.' If the Russians aren't going to tell us candidly what their rules are, Leites won't take any responsibility for them. And, though at the bottom of each of his packages

of rules he summarizes what the Russians have been up to since 1945, and suggests what can be expected of them in the future, he warns that 'this study does not attempt to analyse recent or current behaviour in terms of the policy rules'; it only contains 'a few suggestions in this direction'. Besides, 'these suggestions are simply *hypotheses* and further research is needed to test them. Moreover, they are merely illustrative . . .' No one could be more modest than Dr Leites nor carry scientific reserve farther. Indeed, if we take him at his word, he is hardly claiming to say anything. Yet his innocence is purely technical. It is one thing to make 'a few suggestions' in a laboratory, with further research to come later; quite another when the partial exposure is made in an atmosphere of passion. Dr Leites is presenting provisional and partial knowledge under circumstances where a strong urge exists to form a picture of Bolshevism and where therefore his public will not be content to restrain its mind within the chosen field of data, as it would were the subject under consideration one with which it is not directly concerned – e.g. the Minoans or the classification of beetles.

Having failed to expose the metaphysical core of the Bolshevik Person (inseparable from its 'major theories' and its history), Leites produces a caricature of it. The effect is both to create delusions and to conceal important aspects of Bolshevism. For instance, concentrating on Bolshevik hypocrisy as illustrated by 'deals' made with people they have denounced, one fails to perceive that while all political parties make deals, the Communists have made a principle, almost an ideal, of being 'practical', precisely because of their fear of being carried away by theory to the point of losing their sense of historical reality. Thus what is meaningful in Stalin's relations with the non-Communist world is not his appearance of being a snake in the grass (which sometimes doesn't fit anyway) but the fact that he has increasingly allowed himself to do *anything* (e.g. the 1939 alliance with the Nazis) in the name of Marxism, until Bolshevik theory neither guarantees that he will support his friends nor prevents him from co-operating with his enemies. Caricature is an inevitable result of Leites's method when it is applied to living human forms. In caricature, a few features which the subject has in common with others – a heavy jaw, a long cigarette holder, a curving smile – are combined to produce a resemblance. General attributes, exaggerated, become the sign of a particular person. Leites knows that his rules are just such generalities. 'It is not assumed', he says, 'that any of the rules apply [sic] exclusively to the Bolsheviks . . . it is only the entire *Code* which is characteristic of Bolshevism.' But what makes the *Code* itself a whole and hence more characteristic of Bolshevism than its separate parts? Doesn't Bolshevik strategy, its frontal lobes so to speak, need to be seen in the still larger context of the historically deve-

loped Bolshevik physiognomy? One would gather as much from Leites's own writing on a former occasion. In a rather thoughtful paper, 'Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts', published some years ago, he said,

When it is asserted that a certain behaviour is "typical" in a certain culture, it is not implied that there is no other culture in which it is, at the same or some other time, equally "typical." What has hitherto turned out to be rather [?] unique is the syndrome of each culture (the ensemble of its regularities), but not each element of the syndrome.

According to this, the Code, covering only one element of the Communist 'syndrome' would, taken altogether, be no more typical of Bolshevism than any one rule in it. Without the whole Bolshevik 'culture' before you, you cannot be sure that the Code's 'findings' do not equally describe the strategy of Tammany Hall. When can Leites's characterization of Bolshevism cease to be a caricature – made up of the deceit, cold-blooded calculation, etc, which Bolshevism has in common with other political movements – and describe the Communist Party in particular? Not before he has arrived at the sum of all relevant data. For that is the specific advantage claimed by the Method, that it composes its ensemble *at the end* of its study out of all the facts gathered, whereas the imaginative writer *begins* with the unique whole which his experience has made present to him. But since Communism keeps adding to that sum of facts, the Methodologist cannot truly finish his study until Communism shall have ceased to exist. He must therefore keep silent until the end of his trail is reached and Communism is dead, lest he betray his Method itself and invade the field of dramatic figuration whose laws he has not analysed.

It is hard to say to what degree the Method is responsible for a substantial error in the Code, the assumption contained in the act of compiling it that Bolshevism is a changeless entity that unambiguously expresses its will, habits and beliefs through its written documents. It is enough for Leites that Lenin and Stalin should *say* the same thing for the statement to become a Bolshevik rule. But the history of orthodoxies shows that words go on being repeated long after they have lost their original meanings. In a state of decay, or when forced to modify its practices, a corporate being like the Communist Party more or less automatically disguises its altered condition under the phraseology of its heroic beginnings. One has only to read the exchange of letters between the Cominform and Tito to realize that Stalinism has become immersed in a species of verbal hallucination, in which the nightmare ambiguity of its language is only partly deliberate (the 'Æsopian' language of Bolshevism is being overplayed in America, perhaps owing to our tendency to believe that every practice follows conscious rules); in part the weird meanings that words like 'inter-

nationalist', 'proletarian policy', or 'traitor', have acquired under Stalinism are both a cause and an extension of its unreal world. If this is so, how can a Code of Bolshevik strategy be compiled by paralleling the words of Lenin and Stalin?

What remains of Marxism in Leninism, and of Leninism in Stalinism, is an extremely subtle historical question. Asserting the identity of the two last by quoting Lenin and Stalin as interchangeable sources, the Code has given a static answer to this question, that is to say, though I am sure Leites did not intend it, a Stalinist answer. The assertion that the 'operational code' of the Communist Party to-day is still that of Lenin's Party, is Stalin's primary weapon against Tito and his chief claim to legitimacy in the minds of millions of workers and intellectuals, wherever a revolutionary situation arises. Excluding the imagination, which, to follow Spinoza, makes things *present* to us, Leites's method has brought him no closer to the Bolshevik whole than some thin shavings of its ideology. Nor do I believe that adding more shavings from different parts – Leites has announced further publications and given lectures psycho-analysing 'the Bolshevik élite' – will ultimately result in a solid representation of Communism. The notion that, in matters like these, science will in the end correct all its errors and come forth with the truth, is just another kind of pie in the sky.

## II

Dr Mead's *Soviet Attitudes Towards Authority* is a severer test for The Method than Leites's Code. She counts on it both to overcome the absence of certain information, which the Soviet system does not make accessible, and to take the place of expertness in Marxism, Communist history, and Russian, which she readily admits she does not possess. The preparatory work on *Soviet Attitudes* was done by a team of specialists; Dr Mead herself was able to do only a minimal amount of '... first hand analysis of materials'; yet she is solely 'responsible for the theoretical phrasing' of the Report. What she has to offer, says Dr Mead, is her 'anthropologist's training in relating isolated items of behaviour to a systematic whole' – a capacity resembling that of the poet or dramatist, except that it is systematic. Thus equipped, she can take the 'insights, research and formulations' of others and reconstitute the shape of the invisible mastodon. Here the Method alone is clearly posed against scholarship, intuition and experience.

Reaching for the body itself of Soviet society, 'the systematic whole', Dr Mead makes claims much less reserved than Leites's, less indeed than the blurb itself. Besides being an 'attempt to examine contemporary Bolshevik character', her book 'directs itself toward' answering dozens of

interesting and profound questions. As, where a revolution has occurred, 'how will individuals who embodied the old culture behave within the new revolutionary forms?' – or, what is 'the meaning of the organizational changes [in the U S S R], the extent to which different parts of the "apparatus" are rivals, the relationship between the actual clique formation and the official ideal picture . . . ?' Before the advent of the Method it used to take the entire literature of a nation to illuminate subjects like these. In addition, *Soviet Attitudes* claims to help us *predict* – and with regard to very delicate matters too; for instance, 'the type of loyalty of border populations or the sorts of pressure exerted upon a chairman of a collective farm, by central authorities on the one hand and the members of the collective on the other'. And all this Dr Mead accomplishes in exactly one hundred pages!

Needless to say, there are many kinds of answers to questions and many kinds of 'predictions'. How will conventional people behave after a revolution? 'Unhappily'. The loyalty of the border populations? 'It will be doubtful'. The chairman of the collective? 'He will find himself often in a tough spot'. Medieval wizards used to give predictions like these to the barons who poured out their treasures to them. What prevented recognition of the hoax was that the revelations came from research which promised some day to uncover the Philosopher's Stone. Without evaluating Dr Mead's Method one cannot decide whether to regard the following as a serious comment on the U S S R or as a speech for a modern version of *The Alchemist*:

A populace disillusioned regarding the hope of tangible rewards, subjected to terroristic pressure, living within a situation in which all are treated as subject – and most of all those who must also be the most incorruptible – may become steadily less responsive to positive motivation, more apathetic, and less able to participate with any enthusiasm in Soviet life.

I can imagine this being recited at the head of a long table at the Pentagon. When Dr Mead gets through, silence. Then a Colonel asks, 'Doctor, you said that the Soviet people, being disillusioned, terrorized and enslaved, *may* become less enthusiastic. Wouldn't it be safe to predict that a people so treated *will* become less enthusiastic?'

Apart from emptiness, there is the more serious question of error. The key to her Method, Dr Mead tells us, is its approach developed in studying 'preliterate societies'. Now, what happens when this approach is made to the U S S R and the Communist Party? In the primitive community, the 'whole' is the entire culture, and ideas (attitudes) and institutions are different aspects or 'items' of behaviour. Consistently with her Method, Dr Mead assumes that the Russia of the U S S R is a community and that the Party and its 'authority' are to be understood in terms of Russia,

including its social and psychological past, so that the way babies were swaddled in Kharkov in 1890 seems to cast more light on Soviet rule than Lenin's interpretation of 'proletarian dictatorship'. In place of the primitive community, we now have the 'nation-state' but the anthropologist's perspective is the same:

Primarily we are concerned with those regularities in the behaviour of citizens of a nation-state which can be attributed to the fact that such citizens were reared or have lived for a long time under the influence of a set of nation-wide institutions.

But to approach the Soviet Union, or any modern State for that matter, as if it were a community in the old sense is to begin with a basic mistake. It is to assume, by analogy and without any historical or empirical justification, that the Soviet Union is a social organism created by the usual processes of social life and defining itself in terms of its inner development. The U S S R, however, did not flower from the past of Russia. In comparison with older societies the U S S R is a quasi-community. It lays claim to the individual in the total manner of pre-liberal cultures; but here the individual was not formed from birth by the whole communal life, as in the Samoan village, but was deliberately modelled by a discipline of directed thoughts and acts imposed by the Party caste which is the custodian of the Bolshevik idea. It is a society split into a separated elite and a dominated mass by its primary act of organization, and its unity can only be maintained through a constant application of force and repression, which is, of course, not true of preliterate societies.

Failing to distinguish between a genuine community and a twentieth-century power area, Dr Mead entirely misconstrues the character of totalitarianism and the situation of the individual in it. To her, totalitarianism means that 'the whole of each individual's personality is conceived as being involved in anything which he does'. If so, what is wrong with it? Old cultures, most religions, many artists, to say nothing of psycho-analysis, also conceive the whole personality as involved in anything the individual does. Anyone possessing an inner coherence joined with an external unity of action, any dedicated person, would fit Dr Mead's definition of totalitarian. According to it, the Soviet Union is the land of modern personifications of Greek heroes, Christian saints, inspired creators. Her only antithesis to 'totalitarian' is the fragmented democrat who gives part of himself to his job, part to his family, part to his country, until his soul looks like a checkerboard. The illusion that totalitarianism offers this choice between total involvement and fragmentation accounts for much of the attraction of totalitarian movements, especially among intellectuals. Actually, however, totalitarianism does not conceive the personality as *involved* in what the individual does; it conceives it as *arising*

from what he does. The individual *is* his role, and his personality is erased as a residue of capitalist egotism. Identifying the totalitarian state with primitive cultural homogeneity, Dr Mead shares the philosophy of 'togetherness' of the Soviet rulers, and her criticism of Stalinism is limited to certain of its practices.

Soviet man, [says a Communist editorial she quotes], feels himself an indivisible part of the industrial or social collective to which he is bound, with which he labours. . . . The personal interests of Soviet man must combine harmoniously with communal interests; the personal must always be subordinated to the social.

Reading this after thirty years of experience of how individuality is valued in the Soviet Union, you might suspect that being 'an indivisible part' there of something to which you are 'bound', and having your personal interests 'combined harmoniously by being always subordinated', would leave very little, if anything, of 'you'. On this ominous passage, however, Dr Mead comments as follows:

It must be recognized that in such an ideal there should be no need for force, for physical coercion. . . . A character structure such as that described here is congruent with a complete respect for all human beings in a society, with a lack of hierarchy, and with a lack of any sense of gulf between a group ruling and a group ruled.

Yes, perhaps on an Oceanic island you can have indivisibility, equality and fraternity (just trading in liberty). But this is the twentieth century, and all of us have something 'inharmonious' in us, so if someone wants to combine us indivisibly he *must* use force.

Unable to apprehend the *made* community of Communism, Dr Mead is further confused by the fact that the Bolshevik Idea on which the U S S R was founded is no longer what it was. In a sense, it is the absence of the Idea in the presence of its form that is the most powerful determinant of Soviet behaviour. People still join the Party and behave as if it held the clue to life, but –

Our best material, [says Dr Mead], on this requirement of absolute acceptance of the Party's right to dispose of the individual comes from the Old Bolsheviks. Recent interviews with Soviet DP's suggest that Party membership to-day does not carry such completeness of dedication.

Evidently something is missing from the Party. The Old Bolsheviks voluntarily *became* the Party personality, while the present comrade holds back a morsel of self, though this morsel is the 'traitor'. The Party's Idea is therefore no longer embodied in its members. But what technique does the anthropologist have for studying an absent Idea? The focus' of the Method is on individuals; its famous approach is to study a culture as a combination of 'interpersonal events'. 'Abstractions like "the Party" or "Soviet agriculture" are convenient ways of describing certain of the

institutional activities of Soviet men and women.' This implies that the relation of the individual to the Party is of the same order as his relation to his trade or family. The Communist Party then is nothing else than the name of a group of persons. But the fact is that the Party is not the reflection of the member's social life; it exists beyond the individual and his behaviour; it is the Society that remakes him in its image. Hence the vacuum left by the Party's loss of its Idea will not reveal itself in the interpersonal relations of the member, nor even in his thoughts – the comrade goes on behaving as he did before. Only one aware of the dynamic centre of the original collective entity can be conscious that what once moved it is now missing and that it is being animated artificially from the outside. The Soviet Union is a mystery because it is neither a community nor a cult, but a vast agglomeration of disparate events and relations presided over by an Idea that is no longer there.

Leites treated the Bolshevik Idea as if it were still present unchanged as a Code, because there it was written down in books. For her part, Dr Mead, if she cannot find Bolshevism among present-day Bolsheviks, will take it from those who have been shot. The Method makes no distinction between the Party of the living and the Party of the dead; its primary interest is its own problem of collecting data. Dr Mead concludes that a conflict exists between 'Bolshevik Party ideal and Soviet State practice' – as if the 'ideal' of October, 1917, were still sitting like an angel on the roof of the Kremlin. But the behaviour she herself describes indicates that the characteristic of Soviet life is not so much conflict between ideal and practice as chaos resulting from the failure and deterioration of the Idea.

Our Rand Corporation anthropologists have given us some surface features of Communism and some petty calculations of probabilities. Dispensing with the imagination, they have left to others the work of the imagination, essential in formulating concrete situations. The prestige of the Method in America is a testimony to the weakness of our literary and theoretical culture. Everyone knows, of course, that prophecy is dead and that human affairs are no longer invaded by those trans-human entities which Marx called 'the illusory community', and Blake 'Mental Deities'. Just the same it is wrong to take it for granted that the scientific Utopia, in which nothing shall exist but human individuals, has already arrived. Unless people behave as 'regularly' as the stars or the pre-civilized, the practitioners of the Method are certain to be taken by surprise. Dead or not, prophecy has this advantage: it sees the future not as an extension of the present surface but as *crisis*, as a breach of continuity. To predict living events is to foresee the direction from which the catastrophe will come. It is to know that what affects the future is not the regularities of current behaviour but the dying of the gods.

(Mr Rosenberg is a contributor to American literary and critical periodicals)

## REVIEW OF REVIEWS

## THE GERMAN REVIEWS

G. L. Arnold

For the past three months, German periodicals like *Aussenpolitik*, *Gegenwart* and *Frankfurter Hefte* have been full of laborious self-questioning on the subject of German unification *versus* entry into the Atlantic system, and from the way things are going this discussion may still be in progress three or six months from now. Indeed, if it is a fact that rearmament has been tacitly put off till after the general election in 1953, the topic seems likely to go on being debated long after the Bonn agreement between the Federal Republic and the Western Governments has been ratified. This slow-motion progress causes the same arguments to be endlessly repeated, since it is no longer possible to play variations on the Adenauer-Schumacher controversy over the question whether German 'integration' in Europe will or will not finally destroy the chance of getting the Russians to liquidate the East German régime, at a price. All that can be said here is that a careful study of the German periodical press discloses no enthusiasm for the official policy, but at best an attitude of resigned acceptance. Two or three years ago, 'Europe' was a word to conjure with. To-day this mood seems to have passed – whether because of the general post-war let-down, or for more material reasons, it is difficult to say. Europeanism is kept alive by a few intellectuals. The average German, if he thinks about such things at all, seems more concerned with the fact that his country looks like becoming effectively split into two parts.

If this really happens, the small band of genuinely Europe-minded Germans will have the melancholy privilege of being able to say, 'We told you so.' It has long been an axiom with some of the ablest, and least popular, German publicists that the traditional policy of playing off Russia against the West would one day yield very bitter fruit. This policy was by no means discontinued under the Weimar Republic, as witness the Rapallo agreement with Russia, signed in 1922 by the Republican Government and hailed as a great diplomatic triumph. Dr Felix Stoessinger, who devotes an interesting article to this subject in the June *Deutsche Rundschau*, speaks with understandable bitterness of an event which thirty years ago confirmed him and his colleagues on the *Sozialistische*

*Monatshefte* in their pessimistic appraisal of the Republic's chances of survival. What so depressed them was that the Rapallo policy had the hesitant support of those very Social-Democrats whose entire existence as a party was bound up with their success or failure in carrying Germany into the Western camp. Dr Stoessinger eloquently denounces the self-exculpatory legends invented by the authors of the crime, chief among them the assertion that the Weimar Republic had honestly sought, but failed to secure, an understanding with France. It is less easy to follow him in holding British policy responsible for the post-1918 recrudescence of German nationalism in its traditional form. He suggests that Britain welcomed it as a means of isolating France, which is stretching the evidence a little. The fact remains that Rapallo started not only the political but the moral rot. It infected the Left with parlour-Bolshevism, and the Right with dreams of a military alliance with Russia and a war of revenge against the West, thereby making things a good deal easier for Hitler, and for his present imitators in East Germany.

The all-pervading issue also crops up in the July *Frankfurter Hefte*, whose distinguished editor, Dr Eugen Kogon, devotes twenty-five pages of chronology and analysis to the 'fifth act of the European drama,' as he calls it. Where Dr Stoessinger is brilliant and trenchant, and occasionally a trifle doctrinaire, Dr Kogon is resigned and philosophical. A visit to the United States last year brought home to him the great gulf between the shell-shocked condition of Europe and the cheerful hedonism of his American hosts, fully occupied with their local affairs and with the great overriding problem of making the world, or at least America, safe for middle-class comfort and leisureliness. He found them charming, well-meaning, sympathetic, and frighteningly remote from the sullen, sulphurous atmosphere of the Old World, now destined, he thinks, to become a kind of Hellenistic annexe to the new Rome. The best that can be hoped for in his view is European unification, followed by a precarious balance of power. The ideal – peaceful co-existence of the Atlantic and Soviet worlds, and gradual mutual interpenetration – is not likely to be realized.

The struggle is going to be tough. Perhaps the practicable optimum can be achieved: confrontation and limited successes, without war! Genuine peace, as the fruit of order, is beyond the reach of our generation. It remains the perennial ideal goal – in our age a necessary illusion, a productive utopia.

Another writer in the same number informs us that the issue of religious education in State-supported schools has now become the real stuff of West German politics, practically crowding out all other topics and causing the political and confessional battle-lines to be re-drawn. Perhaps there is hope for European civilization yet.

But will democracy survive in Western Germany? Dr Friedrich Glum, writing in the liberal *Neue Rundschau* (No. 1, 1952), has his doubts, and warns against a repetition of the Weimar era, when only the outward forms, but not the values, of Western civilization were incorporated in the Republic. The trouble is that warnings of this kind are invariably addressed to those whose business it is to make do with the instruments at hand. It is all very well to blame the politicians for failing to inspire enthusiasm in the younger generation: they may well reply that it is not their task to inspire, but to govern. On Dr Glum's own showing, the real fault after 1918 lay with the *Gebildeten*, the intellectuals (including everyone who had somehow acquired an academic title: a distinction which in Germany sets off the élite from the common herd). They, and not the unemployed, as he quite rightly points out, were responsible for Hitler's emergence. The anti-democratic philosophy had already permeated the majority of this class by the time of the first World War, when Thomas Mann, Werner Sombart and others proclaimed the coming triumph of conservative German *Kultur* over liberal Western *civilization* (Thomas Mann quickly repented; most of the others did not). For the rest, National-Socialism had its most effective forerunner in the romanticizing youth movement. Dr Glum is a little too kind to those Germans who graduated from the movement into the Party: after all, many others did not, and those who took the step were not merely concerned to 'renew society', but had formed very definite notions about the manner of doing it. The youth movement, he says, 'was originally by no means militarist and chauvinist. It was only as a result of the first World War that it acquired a definitely national and anti-Western orientation, which Hitler and his followers then perverted into chauvinism and militarism.' This is to ignore the fact that the movement had already split up before the War, and that the proto-Fascist section, which was later to triumph under the Nazis, was gaining ground at the expense of the rest. What happened during and after the War was that the majority went over to them, while a minority attached itself to the democratic parties. Both the Socialists and the Catholics had considerable youth organizations. But the defection of the main middle-class body from the liberal cause did indeed prove fatal. It was they who formed the core of Nazism. Those pre-1914 *folk* enthusiasts who survived the War – in many cases as officers – later organized the S.S. The economic and political crisis of the 1930's merely provided the opportunity. Their *Weltanschauung* was already formed. The 'War against the West' has had its partisans in Germany since Napoleon's time, and Stalinism in the Eastern zone is now cashing in on this powerful subterranean tradition. All this is sorrowfully noted by the author, who adjures the Bonn Republic to make democracy work this time. He is not too

sanguine about the future. 'We have no illusions, believing as we do that the political and spiritual vacuum is even greater than in 1918.' Germany, as Dr Schumacher recently observed, belongs neither to the East nor to the West. The trouble seems to be that every attempt to reach a synthesis has hitherto produced either a lifeless compromise or a catastrophe.

*Neue Rundschau* articles frequently contain hitherto unpublished material, the latest instance (No. 2, 1952) being the full text of Kafka's *Letter to his Father*, a document of considerable interest to students of Kafka. It is to be included in the forthcoming complete edition of his writings. The two preceding issues of this important quarterly review contained *inter alia* a sixty-page onslaught on Heidegger by his erstwhile pupil, Karl Loewith. Even an outline summary is out of the question, the more so since Heidegger's terminology defies exact rendering into other languages, a circumstance which naturally puts one on one's guard against his teachings. Heidegger, who in his more recent statements comes close to treating poetry as a source of philosophic cognition, is, of course, sublimely indifferent to such considerations. Some of his gnomic utterances are analysed by Dr Loewith, who reaches the conclusion that the author of *Sein und Zeit* has not merely modified his original doctrine, but carried it to a point where it implicitly justifies the substitution of oracular *obiter dicta* for traditional philosophic reasoning. It is indeed the peculiarity of Heidegger's metaphysic in its latest phase that he no longer tries to maintain the continuity of the philosophic tradition, but instead looks for inspiration to mystics like Eckhart and poets like Hölderlin, whose inspired utterances supposedly throw light on the mysteries of Being. 'Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige,' which being interpreted means (so far as Heidegger's utterances can ever be translated): 'The thinker speaks of Being. The poet names the Holy.' Heidegger is now content to stand on that, and to do without the support of either theology or philosophy, though in a sense he occupies the intermediate ground between them. Philosophy, he thinks, began to go wrong as far back as Plato and Aristotle, who introduced a misleading instrumental interpretation of thought, and tried to deduce everything from first principles or causes; while traditional theology is not a genuine theology of faith, but merely a derivative of Greek ontological speculation. 'Truth' is to be found in certain poets and mystics (those approved of by Heidegger – they happen in the main to be Germans) and cannot be reduced to logical form. Which should be welcome news in Oxford.

But although it has become highly personal and esoteric – so much so that the Master's idiom is fully comprehended only by some favoured disciples admitted to the inmost circle – the doctrine still throws light on public matters which happen to be of consequence to Heidegger as a

German living in the present century. Thus the history of the Occident turns out to have a metaphysical significance, although on a strict construction of Heidegger's earlier statements upon topics such as Being and Time there is really no distinction between history and nature, and no particular significance in either. This puzzling contradiction is noted by Dr Loewith who also points out, not without a touch of malice, that in 1933 Heidegger for a moment thought he had discovered a metahistorical turning-point – in the outbreak of the Third Reich! Heidegger's notorious inaugural lecture on his appointment as Rector of Freiburg University in that momentous year is still of interest, he thinks, because it exhibits certain features of his subsequent teachings on the subject of History, with a capital H; and this although by 1946 he was ready with a metaphysical explanation, not merely of his own particular misjudgment, but of the 'necessarily' erroneous nature of *all* judgments upon contemporary history!

The philosopher expected from the National-Socialist movement 'a total revolution of German existence' – i.e. evidently what in his later writings he calls a change in the essence of Man. The language of this address – existence and determination, being and capacity for being (*Seinkönnen*), the interpretation of this capacity as destiny and compulsion, the emphasis upon the specifically German *Seinkönnen* – is throughout derived from the concepts of *Sein und Zeit*, and simultaneously from the vocabulary of the political movement. The whole is a politicized existential philosophy of revolution (*Umbruch*) and advance to new goals (*Aufbruch*). . . . It is necessary to recall Heidegger's address, not as though political activity and philosophical thinking could ever merge completely, but because thinking can at times lead to practical results which in turn lay bare some of its constituents. What reveals itself in Heidegger's manifesto is a decided readiness to believe in historical destiny as such. The 'moment' seemed to have arrived when genuine history, fateful reality (*Seinsgeschick*), was emerging, and when one therefore had to be momentary. Heidegger gives no thought to Plato's quest for the just State. He thinks in a confused and confusing manner 'historically', and at the same time entirely non-politically, because his historical thinking has uncritically exceeded its proper boundaries.

By 1946, all this had become (for Heidegger) a mistake to which Thought is necessarily prone when busying itself with so abject a topic as contemporary history. The nature of the Third Reich, according to a fragment written in 1939 and duly published after the war, merely exemplifies the profound truth that the world as such is plunged in darkness, the darkness being due to metaphysical and metahistorical circumstances over which human beings have no control. Hence various disagreeable features of contemporary history, which cause ignorant people to become naively indignant, whereas the Wise Man knows them to be bound up with the intractable essence of things.

However that may be, the present generation of German students seem to be taking to philosophy with even greater enthusiasm than their elders. Heidegger himself is said to be lecturing to overflowing audiences, and similar scenes are reported from Munich, Heidelberg and other centres, where the principal chairs are occupied by philosophers highly critical of his work, but equally *engagés* and contemptuous of what passes for philosophy at Oxford. Marxism, Thomism and Existentialism are battling for control of what for want of a better term must still be called the German soul, and with the exception of the encyclopædic Professor Bense at Stuttgart no one seems to be taking much notice of logical positivism or other Anglo-Saxon products. The July number of the *Merkur* carries the text of an allocution delivered by Heidegger over the Bavarian radio last May. It is a shade less gnomic than some other recent utterances, but still presupposes considerable erudition on the part of the audience. Its title, *Was Heisst Denken?* (*What Is Thought?*, or, perhaps, *What Does Thinking Mean?*) suggests an essay in epistemology, but we are soon informed that Thinking is a very special aptitude or awareness, of which only a handful of philosophers have hitherto possessed a glimmering, while Science is by definition incapable of Thinking, in Heidegger's sense of the term. What that sense is, I shall not try to explain to my Anglo-Saxon readers, who would probably not believe it anyhow.

The traditional irrationalist bias is also to be found among scientists. Open any issue of *Universitas*, a monthly review edited from Stuttgart and dedicated to the popularization of philosophy, science and the arts; and you are at once enveloped by thick steam-clouds of irrationalist metaphor masquerading as scientific or literary criticism. The phenomenon is all the more remarkable since nearly all the contributors are well-known scholars, and authorities in their particular field. It is when they begin to generalize that they seem to feel the need to validate their findings by an appeal to a particular metaphysic, that of the Romantic epoch. *Universitas* serves the important purpose of *haute vulgarisation*, but the selection of authors – up to a dozen in each issue – displays a distinct bias towards the traditional organismic *Weltbild*. One can hardly open a number without coming upon an attack on Freud, a qualified defence of Jung, and a discreet plug for Carus or some other Romantic. In the June issue, Professor Walter Schubart works over this well-trodden ground and once more comes up with a triumphant demolition of 'mechanist' psychology, from the eighteenth-century English associationists to – Freud! Professor Emil Preetorius, of Munich, shakes his head over modern art and hints, none too obscurely, that it is related to the collapse of civilization. Professor Otto Forst de Battaglia suggests that we are witnessing the end of European history and the opening phase of a

prolonged struggle between giant totalitarian imperialisms. Dr Hermann Rauschning, who once described Hitlerism as the 'revolution of nihilism' now wishes to state that the twentieth century as such is implicated in the said revolution, and that our case is, humanly speaking, hopeless if we are not of his own Christian-Existentialist persuasion. Dr Rauschning is the favourite historical philosopher of *Universitas*, and his favourite philosopher is Kierkegaard. The condition of the world is a subject to which he has devoted much thought since his hopes of a 'conservative revolution' were disappointed by the Third Reich and its Fuehrer, and his most recent diagnosis is to the effect that modern 'nihilism' can only be overcome by a restatement of the Christian faith – not a very original thesis, but there is a kind of desperate urgency about his writing which reminds one that, like the professed atheist Heidegger, he yielded to temptation in 1933. We are to become true Christians, but we are also promised a means of escape from 'the desperate situation into which we have been led by ideological confusion and the relativization of all norms.' Like Heidegger, Dr Rauschning is persuaded that the critical condition of Europe, the destiny of the human race, and the existence or non-existence of God, are all located on the same plane, and that the universe is implicated in his quest for something to take the place of his former certitudes. The Battle of the Marne convinced Spengler that the Decline of the West was at hand. The experience of the Third Reich has made Dr Rauschning feel that nothing less than the salvation of the world is at issue. With the stakes as high as that, politics becomes a solemn affair indeed. By what may or may not be a coincidence, Spengler, Heidegger and Dr. Rauschning were all at one time or another involved in the 'German Revolution'. One hopes their successors will approach the Goddess History with greater circumspection.

Compared with these impassioned or oracular outpourings, there is something curiously restrained, sober and almost humdrum about the theological journals which have lately come to hand. *Evangelische Theologie*, it is true, devotes much space to Kafka and Kierkegaard, but does so without ecstatic convulsions and groans, such as the literary Pythias of Germany are wont to emit when treating of these topics. The June number includes a thoughtful contribution by Dr H. Werner on 'The Secret of Israel and the Work of Franz Kafka', and a defence of Kierkegaard's Christianity by Dr Anna Paulsen. Dr Steck analyses the recent Encyclica *Humani Generis* and its challenge to the modernizing 'New Theology' within French Catholicism, and discreetly welcomes the latter as an approximation to the standpoint occupied by modern Reformed theologians. The Barthian emphasis on the Biblical message (Kerygma), to the exclusion of all other topics of traditional dogmatics, is the subject of another article which deals cautiously but firmly with this explosive

matter. The theological faculties appear to be in the van of the movement, with the churches either following at a distance, or refusing to sanction the more radical conclusions. The writer in *Evangelische Theologie* clearly anticipates further attacks from conservative Lutherans.

It is a peculiarity of all these articles that they are written in lucid, sober, classical prose, quite free from the frenetic contortions of style and grammar which a decadent romanticism has bestowed, among other curses, upon the majority of German writers. The same may be said of the Catholic bi-monthly review *Hochland*. One gets a little tired of hearing about Kafka and the deeper meaning of his novels, but the article by Dr Guerster in the April number, which treats the subject from the Catholic viewpoint, is distinguished by a welcome lucidity and sobriety of thought, as is Dr Achim Besgen's discussion of Albert Schweitzer's ethics. The June number includes an extract from the recent work of an exiled Spanish author, Americo Castro, *Espana en su historia. Cristianos, moros y judios* (Buenos Aires, Losada, 1948). Castro's interpretation of his country's tragic history since the break-up of the medieval synthesis centres upon the conviction that Spain owes far more to Islam than its historians have been willing to admit. His account of the genesis of those military Orders which played so large a part in the Reconquista is of particular interest. He believes that both in France and in Spain the Orders which spearheaded the Crusades were themselves the outcome of an antecedent assimilation of Islamic spirituality – typically a conjunction of mystical asceticism and 'holy war' against the unbelievers – which was quite unknown to medieval Christianity before it came in contact with Islam. The paradox lies in the fact that Islam became steadily more tolerant – at least in Spain – while Spanish Christianity developed a growing fanaticism culminating in the expulsion of the Moslems (and their allies, the Jews) long after they had ceased to be dangerous. By the sixteenth century, Spain had become totalitarian, and since then it has resisted all attempts to lead it back into the main-stream of European history. Franco's rebellion was merely the most recent incident in a drama which began when the 'plural society' of medieval Spain was destroyed by a fanatical Catholicism which had no counterpart in the rest of Europe. It is not without interest that this thesis is served up to the readers of *Hochland* without any apology for its implied criticism of the clerical-totalitarian debacle of Spanish culture, and this at a time when one can scarcely open a 'liberal' journal that does not bestow a solemn benediction upon Metternich, de Maistre and Donoso Cortes. Commonsense in Germany seems to have taken refuge among the theologians.

## U. S. LIT.

John Davenport

*The Confident Years*\* is the fifth and final volume of Mr Van Wyck Brooks's *Makers and Finders: a History of the Writer in America, 1800-1915*. Mr Brooks began by being fascinated by the great failures, the victims of a hostile commercial civilization, and has ended by becoming something of a sentimental chauvinist, conducting a love affair on the grand scale. His early studies of Mark Twain and Henry James revealed him as a critic of the nineteenth-century materialism which transformed the genius of the first into a popular talent and sent the second into voluntary exile in Europe. He conceived literary criticism as social criticism, and attacked the serfdom of American thought to a brashly optimistic commercialism. Like James Huneker and H. L. Mencken, he invoked European standards in art. He produced his first work in 1910, during his last year at Harvard, and in 1915, when he published *America's Coming of Age*, he became something of an oracle; but his obsession with failure, his sentimental-pathetic conception of the artist in America, his misanthropic representation of the Gilded Age, his attack on the parochialism and vulgarity of contemporary taste suddenly ceased. After twenty-five years of quarrelling with the national character Mr Brooks fell in love with it. The first signs of this were seen in his *Emerson* (1932). He began to sentimentalize America before the Civil War, and his books became a series of affectionate pilgrimages to the shrines of the past. Whereas before he had extolled European standards of taste, he now lamented the alienation of American writers from their native roots. He who had lamented the divorce of the artist and society and taken an almost masochistic pleasure in recounting the history of failure now began to discover a national tradition and to point out that the great writer is the voice of the culture to which he belongs. This has led to his becoming a timid and reactionary critic of the contemporary scene, as can be seen in *The Opinions of Oliver Alston*. Henry James and T. S. Eliot are attacked for not being rooted in a native culture. 'If a writer does not belong and find happiness in his belonging, he is nothing. A man cannot be an artist without expressing his race.' He came to believe that the international pilgrim of art was an impossible

concept. This view may or may not be a tenable one; but one thing is certain: it has caused a decay in Mr Brooks's critical faculties. As volume of his history succeeded volume the faults increased – the self-indulgent lyricism, the quotations from the text without acknowledgment, the subjective impressionism. An American critic of the younger generation has aptly described all this as 'second-hand ecstasy'. He has become a critic fundamentally no longer interested in criticism, but the self-appointed historian of the American Dream. His attacks on those modern writers who do not fit into his scheme are both fretful and ineffectual.

The present volume, like the earlier ones, is exhaustively comprehensive. It is difficult to see the wood for the trees. It was, of course, a formidable task: to write a history of pre-Civil War American writing, whether it be the New England of Emerson and Hawthorne or the New York of Washington Irving, is a comparatively simple one. After 1865 the case is different. With incredible speed the whole continent opened up. The history of modern America is a history of less than a hundred years. There are many different Americas, peopled by many different races. It is only by chance that the language they have in common is English. The South-West, the West, the North-West, the Middle-West, New England, New York, the South, the deep South – all are different. Out of this extraordinary conglomeration has come the best writing in English of the twentieth century. Independent American literature began with Whitman. A critic's powers of analysis must be formidable indeed to grapple with such a problem, to point out the main lines of development, and to relate the parts to the whole. It cannot be said that Mr Brooks has succeeded, but he has been assiduous in his reading. It is all here, from Henry Adams to Eliakum Zunser. As a compendium for reference the book, like the other four volumes of *Makers and Finders*, is admirable. As a work of criticism it is less satisfactory. No longer bathed in the golden glow of New England or cheered by the Pickwickian jollity of Washington Irving, Mr Brooks finds himself in frequently uncongenial company, and in such company he is at his most gentlemanly worst. Had he written on the English literature of the same period one feels that he would have been unhappy except in the company of a few female novelists and minor Georgian poets. He would have yearned for the world of Thackeray and Tennyson, and looked for echoes of it in the deciduous prose of Mr Percy Lubbock. For his theme is really the breakaway from gentility to realism. One must be grateful to him for his labour of love, however, for that is what it is. He may not understand his mistress, he might have preferred to write an ode to her eyebrows than to her skyscrapers, but he adores her. His sharpest words are for her betrayers, such as Ezra Pound, less confident than Mr Brooks in the Great Tradition.

\* *The Confident Years* (1885-1915). Van Wyck Brooks, J. M. Dent. 21/-.

*The Confident Years* covers a period at once immensely complicated and enormously rich. For the first time we are dealing with the growing literature of a whole continent and not with mere local sections of it. Mr Brooks begins with James Huneker's arrival in New York in 1886, 'a metropolis at the awkward age . . . [whose] literary life . . . was a sort of Dutch-English family party.' When W. D. Howells moved down from Boston he had found the New Yorkers 'very light' in contrast to the lettered pedants and transcendental cranks of New England. Mr Brooks speaks of desultory dabblers and sterile dilettanti with a culture of European – that is to say Parisian – origin. This chapter and the succeeding ones on Philadelphia and the South are full of minor figures, but as the Middle West and West open out more familiar names appear. Unfortunately, the more familiar the names, the more scissors-and-paste the method.

As a small-town boy, in these middle eighties, hearing the 'Bulldog of Darwinism' attacked 'absurdly', as he put it, by a Catholic priest, Dreiser responded like countless young Protestants to this 'general in the war of ideas for freedom', as Edgar Lee Masters called Ingersoll in one of his poems.

It would be difficult to find a less readable piece of writing. The pages are pimped with inverted commas in an attempt to achieve a layered compactness. The result is indigestible.

Owen Wister's 'Virginian' might have been thought of as a cross between Melville's 'Welkin-eyed' Billy Budd, the 'handsome sailor' of English song and legend, and the lonely figure of Natty Bumps, whom he resembled in his humble birth, his reverent nature, and his shy respect for women.

Such comparisons are as confusing as they are irrelevant. We push West, return to New York, discover San Francisco, follow Lafcadio Hearn to Japan, Frank Harris and Jack London to England. The writing gets thicker as the fun grows more furious. The opinions also grow more platitudinously bewildering. How strange, for instance, seems this description, so conventionally misleading, of 'the circle of the *Yellow Book*'.

[It] expressed the note of the *fin-de-siècle*, so often the note of despair and the twilight of time, with the deep nostalgia for the pagan world of cruelty, marble, pomp, and lust that inspired so many French writers for two generations. The Rome of the late Cæsars haunted their imaginations, along with the erotic aspects of the story of the gospel, aspects that appealed to Oscar Wilde, George Moore and Edgar Saltus, the New Yorker who was often in London as a friend of Wilde. Meanwhile, etc., etc.

One feels that Mr Brooks is as far away from the mark in the next chapter, when we find ourselves back in New York with the distressingly vulgar O. Henry, who was 'occasionally an artist', and with the anything but vulgar Edith Wharton, who gets a chapter to herself. It is misleading to

say that she 'could not yield to her native world as it actually was', for that was what she did; her native world was not O. Henry's, it was the world of old New York in which she had been brought up and which she knew intimately. It is untrue to suggest that she 'felt obliged to see it in terms of England, so that she constantly suffered lapses in which her people and scenes no longer corresponded with the reality they assumed to present'. Mr Brooks's chauvinism deceives him, he cannot bear that Edith Wharton should have known London, Paris and Rome as well as social New York; and, worse, have preferred to live in them. Admittedly, Henry James once said 'She *must* be tethered in native pastures', but then perhaps he did not wish to be crowded in his own new-found European ones. As has been said, she could neither do with contemporary America, nor do without it. She had cut her roots. Yet surely Edith Wharton's function, since she performed it so admirably, was to describe the world of her choice rather than one chosen for her by somebody else. Proust no doubt could have written an admirable novel about working-class conditions in Lille. That he did not happen to do so is no matter for regret. Mr Brooks complains that Lily Bart of *The House of Mirth* and Ralph Marvell of *The Custom of the Country* were expected by the author to be taken for tragic figures, whereas Lily Bart was almost as worldly as the gambling world in which she lost, and Ralph Marvell, a sensitive man, was also a ninny. He complains that they were not

'big enough – great-hearted, free or fine enough – to give "dramatic significance", by their fate, to a social world that possessed no significance without them, a world that novelists in general avoided, as Frank Moore Colby pointed out, more and more seeking "significance", where they found it, in the slums.'

As social criticism of the society of old New York this may be justifiable; as literary criticism it is feeble; especially feeble when we find *The House of Mirth* praised as 'surely good' on the next page. The alternate blame and praise of this chapter on Edith Wharton are typical of Mr Brooks' critical equivocation; the final effect is of a confused mind, the mind of a muddled moralist demanding arbitrary antitheses. This is not to claim Edith Wharton as a great artist – of course she was not; but she was perfect of her kind; limited; snobbish, no doubt; more at home with the past than the present, but marvellously evocative of that past, her homesickness for it sharpened with satire. It is humourless to complain that she was not a great writer. Enough, surely, that she was an unusual one. Distinguished critics have blamed her in much the same terms as Mr Brooks. Her personality was so strong that she has often been as it were 'overmatched'. To compare her with Henry James is to compare a goldfish with a sturgeon.

The chapter on Dreiser is equally confusing, because although Mr

Brooks realizes the gigantic clumsy power of the great realist he confuses his portrait with irrelevant detail, without putting his finger on the essential man. Dreiser's enormous stature, his immense sprawling naturalism, cannot be contained in such a sentence as 'It was the note of actuality that won the day for *Sister Carrie*. . . .' The pages on Dreiser are appreciative enough, but reading them one would never guess that the author was discussing the most dynamic force in American writing since Whitman.

This is carping. Mr Brooks's talent is not for blocking in the big background, for making a massive design. His small vignettes of minor figures reveal him at his best – the eccentric Josiah Flynt, the ninety-ish Edgar Saltus are very well done, and his rehabilitation of Booth Tarkington is both timely and needful. An immensely skilful writer, Tarkington is one of those artists who appeal at once to a wide public and to the professional; the amateur critic misses his quintessence, misled by the wide sales and deceptively simple subjects – one is reminded of Daudet. *The Magnificent Ambersons* is an admirably subtle book, and so is *Alice Adams*. In dealing with such a man Mr Brooks shows flashes of the critic he used to be. Tarkington was not a great genius, but a master craftsman, and Mr Brooks explains his weakness clearly and well when he says that in his failure to conduct his stories to their logical end he always wound up in a fashion that pleased his neighbours: 'He was not sufficiently detached from his world to criticize its values.'

From the settled west of Tarkington's Indiana we move to the South-West, and here again Mr Brooks is at his best. His pages on Mary Austin, author of *The Land of Little Rain*, *Lost Borders* and *The Flock*, are full of understanding. He writes well, too, on Thompson Seton and his *Gospel of the Red Man* and the less appealing, the embarrassing Mabel Dodge. When he comes to the 'Muckrakers' he is less happy. The muckrakers destroyed once for all the fatalistic optimism of the old unthinking self-confident American past. It was in 1906 that Upton Sinclair published *The Jungle*, the novel that Jack London described as the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of wage-slavery. It is a nightmare story of life in the stockyards of Chicago; a nightmare and all quite true. The muckrakers were performing an essential function, some passionately, like Sinclair, others dispassionately, like Gustavus Myers in his bleakly objective *History of the Great American Fortunes*. It cannot be said that they wrote well, but Mr Brooks's excessive fastidiousness leads him into exaggeration when he says,

So while none of the books of the muckraking circle – nor all of them together – could be weighed with one of Willa Cather's novels, they represented nevertheless a mood that focused the minds of writers as the cause of abolition had focused them sixty years before.

It is a far cry from Upton Sinclair to Paul Elmer More, who, on being offered *The Jungle*, replied 'Some time ago I made up my mind I was through with realists.' More, a former instructor in Sanskrit at Bryn Mawr College, retired in 1897 to a hut in the woods at Shelburne, New Hampshire, rather as Thoreau had retreated to Walden Pond half a century before. In 1903, however, he settled in New York as literary editor, and finally editor, of the *Nation*. His extreme puritanism, his hatred of naturalism in any form, caused him to dislike almost every contemporary author. Tolstoy was a 'compound of the decadent and the humanitarian', Ibsen 'as false to life . . . as to art', Galsworthy 'smugly prurient'. It was not to be expected that one who found the mind of Bernard Shaw 'smudged and smeared' should find much that was congenial in many contemporary American authors. Mencken was a 'brawling vulgarian', and he described Dreiser's style as produced by a 'miscegenation of the gutter and the psychological laboratory'. For More, American literature had ceased with Longfellow and Lowell. The word 'romantic' became More's epithet for everything he disliked in literature and life, from his *bête noire* Rousseau down. In his anti-romanticism he turned to classicism. Attacking Wordsworth and Shelley, he rejoiced in Pope and recommended Swift as a counter-irritant in the 'welter of humanitarian optimism'. He wrote in praise of Donne. The pedantic puritan is seen as one of the spiritual fathers of T. S. Eliot, together with his fellow-leader of this counter-reformation, Irving Babbitt. The movement became known as the New Humanism. It is probably true that More's *Shelburne Essays* were the greatest contribution to letters of the New Humanists, but Mr Brooks is less than just to Babbitt, whom he scarcely mentions. Unsympathetic though he was, he was a powerful teacher, and there is something moving, something pathetic in his lack of compromise.

Meantime, the Middle West was assuming a larger and larger role in the literary life of the country. To Mencken, Chicago seemed the literary capital of the United States, with Carl Sandburg, Vachel Lindsay, Edgar Lee Masters, Ring Lardner and Sherwood Anderson all working there, as Dreiser had a decade before. It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of the Chicago school. As Mr Brooks points out, it was continental in outlook. These writers were mentally at home all over the country. For Henry James, when in 1907 he published *The American Scene*, the United States he knew had ceased to exist. His re-visit caused him nothing but disgust, and when he finally returned to Sussex he carried with him 'above all else the sense of an absolute dispossession' in his native land. In his chapter on *The European Scene* Mr Brooks deals with some other self-exiled Americans – Logan Pearsall Smith, Louise Imogen Guiney, Anne Douglas Sedgwick, Gertrude and Leo Stein, Bernard Berenson and others. The list

is a varied and a distinguished one, and Mr Brooks writes of them with an almost wistful appreciation before he returns to Mencken's Baltimore. It is easy to underrate Mencken to-day, with his naive inversion of popular prejudices and his noisy generalizations; but it was largely due to him that the new writers of the Chicago school got a hearing. While Gertrude Stein, Veblen, Ellen Glasgow and Theodore Dreiser were working in obscurity the public was still reading Winston Churchill, Booth Tarkington and Richard Harding Davis. Certain of Mencken's admirers praised him for 'liquidating the American past'. Had this been possible it would have been anything but a service to his country or its writers. Writing with restraint, Mr Brooks points out that the fact that one could impute these feats to him was a proof of the force of Mencken's mind. 'One could leave the balance to be redressed by others.'

Mr Brooks's period ends in 1915, by which time the American Renaissance was fairly under way. With Eugene O'Neill the Provincetown Players were opening a more vital era of the American stage; apart from the younger novelists there were a number of young poets, although the most talented of them – Ezra Pound – had settled in London. It was paradoxically from London, where T. S. Eliot followed, that the most vital poetry issued. Pound's verbal antisepsis cleared platitude from the language; he was all for concentration as opposed to diffuseness. At times an absolutely clownish figure, it is difficult to over-estimate his importance for his contemporaries and for succeeding generations. The cross-fertilization between Europe and the United States was of immense value to American writers and to English ones. A study of the writing from 1915 to the present day would need a volume to itself. Mr Brooks is content to leave the scene as the curtain goes up, but in his final chapter he allows himself *A Forward Glance*.

The years from 1880 to 1915 saw amazing changes in the United States. It is still not easy to get a clear picture of it all, so vast was the expansion, so complex the interplay of forces. What survives of the original American tradition? A tradition cannot be inherited; as Malraux says, it must be re-created. Has this occurred in the United States? Mr Brooks quotes Schweitzer's contrast between 'world-and-life affirmation' and 'world-and-life denial'. The life-affirmers are those who are compelled to serve mankind with lively hopes of a spiritual and physical progress, while the life-deniers are those for whom existence is merely a stage play or a pilgrimage through time to the eternity that is really home. It might be said that for the first type the ideal society lies in the future, while the 'least evil' for the other lies in the past. Mr Brooks places T. S. Eliot in the second category. He makes him, that is to say, a Hamiltonian rather than a Jeffersonian American. Hamilton and Jefferson still symbolize two

diametrically opposed points of view – the traditionalist Hamilton who stood for authority, regarding 'the people' as a 'great beast', and Jefferson who believed in freedom and the brotherhood of man. Jefferson won the day in America because of his trust in human nature, a confidence, says Mr Brooks, that was 'bred by the conditions of American living'. For Mr Brooks this is the main body of American tradition as expressed in American literature, the line running through Emerson and Whitman from Franklin and others a century before. Americans 'know there will be a to-morrow', they 'believe in to-morrow'. He realizes that Americans could never, of course, return to the kind of ingenuous optimism that had governed the mind of a nation of pioneers. Too many illusions had been shattered even before the 1914 war and the crash of '29. The revival of interest in Melville is interesting in relation to this. Mr Brooks says that 'the great myth of Moby Dick rose in the American imagination and Melville's overpowering sense of the omnipotence of evil blacked out the sunniness and whiteness of Emerson and Whitman'.

Except in Hollywood movies and the sentimentality of the *Saturday Evening Post* the Jeffersonian tradition seems to be in decline. These represent popular feeling, the dream, the American Dream of the masses. The artist in America has become an increasingly isolated figure, and an increasingly melancholy one. America has undoubtedly come of age, but with something of a rush. Auden has pointed out that in the many distinguished American novels of the last twenty-five years man is 'the absolute victim of circumstances and incapable of choice'. Traditionally American life and thought had been staked on the will; Americans traditionally believed that there was no evil that the will could not conquer and abolish. But have not history and the modern world betrayed them? 'History had gone back on the promise of American life, the promise of human equality, brotherhood and progress that was virtually its moral principle and basic in it.' This is a long way from Whitman's *Democratic Vistas*. It is not far from *The Waste Land*.

Mr Brooks finds this hard to take.

'One might almost have said that the only tradition, or strand of tradition, that Eliot ignored was the tradition of the country in which he had grown up, to which, in fact, far from ignoring it really, he seemed to be actively hostile, though he published no formal essays on American writers.'

By connecting his religious views with his literary criticism Eliot spread a philosophy of literature through the academic world, especially in America, the basis of which was a virtual denial of whatever gave literature in America its historic importance. To Mr Brooks this seems a betrayal of trust, and in his desire to prove that the American tradition is living he is forced into clearly untenable positions, as when writing of

writers so unlike as Thomas Wolfe, Erskine Caldwell, Hart Crane, E. E. Cummings and Hemingway he says that 'behind whatever masks, all these typical American writers continued to express the traditional American faith'. It is impossible not to be touched by Mr Brooks's faith. He does not stand alone. It is difficult not to believe, however, that after the Pacific was reached, the plains populated, the great forests cut down, North America ceased to be a magical continent mysteriously different from other parts of the world. While the possibilities of expansion seemed infinite, when the resources of the continent seemed inexhaustible, the American tradition of which Mr Brooks speaks was the right tradition. Unfortunately, whatever the universe may be doing, the earth is not perpetually expanding. The constrictions of the twentieth century have affected the United States as much as the rest of the world. Her best writers have realized this. Her business men and politicians have not; nor, one feels, for all his awareness and sensitivity, has Mr Brooks. Yet one has to respect his loyalties: Jefferson was a great man.

## EURIPIDES AND MR ELIOT

David Paul

Readers, to a greater degree than playgoers perhaps, have continued to be puzzled as to what exactly Mr Eliot was aiming at in his *Cocktail Party*. Clearly, a well-tailored West End success was not his primary intention, may not have been among his intentions at all. More probably it was an accidental result, a by-product of a process whose real purpose pointed elsewhere. It is only by chance that the work in a way resembles – superior in degree, though not in kind – one of Mr Terence Rattigan's more efficiently serious plays. In both cases a sound and workmanlike handling of a theme is the primary merit; the merit of the theme itself, its emotional or intellectual content, is another question. Mr Eliot, in a recent short study of his own dramatic practice, has illustrated further the nature of his technical aims as finding a greater degree of fulfilment in *The Cocktail Party* than in his earlier plays. This will not deter some readers from continuing to feel that *The Family Reunion* is a more considerable play, both in its content and in its presentation, even if that presentation is obviously less efficient than, as well as being in quite a different kind from, that of the later play.

Another possible ray of light is the disclosure of indebtedness, for plot,

to the *Alcestis* of Euripides. This does not perhaps open quite so wide a vista as might have been hoped. At first sight the indebtedness is the slightest of pretexts. The borrowing extends only to three of the figures in *The Cocktail Party*, who can at once be paralleled with the three principal figures of the *Alcestis*, namely, Admetus, his wife Alcestis, and Heracles who comes as an accidental guest to Admetus's house at the moment when Alcestis has died for her husband, and who, when he discovers the fact, goes in his role of hero to the shades, wrestles with Death, overcomes him, and restores Alcestis to a bewildered Admetus. From these Mr Eliot has derived his Psychiatric Inquisitor, the central figure of his drama, and the discontented couple, Edward Chamberlayne and his wife who, like Alcestis, 'disappears' and is eventually restored to a contented and corrected husband, as a wife who has received the same treatment.

Mr Eliot would not claim to be a Euripides any more than he would allow the claim, by English proxy, to Professor Gilbert Murray. And so far as his derivation is concerned it is more from the plot which Euripides used than from his use of it. The *Alcestis* is a play of great and curious beauty. So far as it can be compared with any other play it must be with *The Winter's Tale* where the main theme, the reunion of a lost wife, noble and self-sacrificing, with an undeserving but contrite husband, is the same. The reunion scenes in both plays release a curiously similar dramatic emotion; though in Shakespeare's case there may be more contrivance and more naïveté, compared with the ironic clarity, the simplicity and supernatural awe of Euripides.

There is, quite deliberately, little trace of these qualities in Mr Eliot's treatment of the theme. So far as he has chosen to borrow at all from Euripides, as apart from the traditional material which the Greek dramatist could use in common with his contemporaries, his borrowings explain one or two minor mystifications without in any way justifying them dramatically. The Unidentified Guest's potations of gin are one of the puzzling minor items of the play. They have the uneasy emphasis of false significance. They are explained but not justified by the potations of Heracles. As a traditional Satyric figure in Greek drama Heracles is always appearing in a state of Bacchic jollity, and his doing so in the *Alcestis* is appropriate and right. It helps to make him a character, to reduce him from a status which would otherwise be too big for the play. The Psychiatrist is scarcely a Satyric figure, and his potations, along with the severely pawky, abstrusely jolly little song which he is given to sing do not succeed, as their intention may have been, in rounding him out to a dramatic character in his own right. Still less do they help to reduce his uncomfortably looming moral status. The psychiatrist remains not a figure, but a function, and a very curious function at that.

For me, he is the focus for nearly all the dissatisfaction which a reading of this play produces. He has all the disadvantages of that dubious dramatic device, the *deus ex machina*, with the added disadvantage that he is not produced at a crisis, an emergency where he can no longer be done without. He is there from the beginning of things, running the whole machine. The other characters are his creatures, or his adjutants. This, I think, explains the emphatic failure of Celia the saint, whom he makes and, with tender sadism, breaks. The making and breaking are not his choice, but they occur through his agency, and his judgment, his version of them obtrudes over the spectator's, who is left with no choice but to accept the psychiatrist's version or to reject Celia altogether as a moral figment, with no dramatic dimensions. In fact, it seems to me that the nature and function of the psychiatrist in the play shuts out one essential dramatic dimension altogether, the dimension of independent moral sympathy. We, as spectators, are not free as to the distribution of this. It is distributed before our eyes by the Grand Inquisitor. If we disagree with his distribution we invalidate his overwhelming part in the play, and consequently the play itself.

Now it seems to me that this freedom of moral sympathy with any or all of the characters in a play is absolutely indispensable to dramatic value. If we are not left free to give or withhold it in proportion as we will, then we are not interested, we are simply irritated by the dramatic proceedings. As it happens, the *Alcestis* is a specially happy and deeply shrewd example of a free distribution of dramatic sympathy. In the first place we can sympathize with Admetus's plight. A young, happy and prosperous king, he has been allotted death by the fates unless he can find a willing substitute, a ruefully difficult task. We can sympathize with his reproaches of his aged father. Why should the young die, and the old survive? We can sympathize with the father. He has abdicated his kingdom to his son. Why should he abdicate life as well, instead of enjoying the tranquil retirement he feels that he deserves. We can sympathize with Alcestis, who can undertake the renunciation without being specially noble about it; who is fully aware that she is sacrificing herself not so much for her husband as to her love for him and her children; quite a different emotional quantity from the poor creature who sobs in front of her and wonders with unconscious irony how he is going to survive without her. Our sympathy makes Alcestis's sacrifice credible, where a moment's suspension of it would cut off belief. We can sympathize with Heracles, the much-laboured and travel-tired hero, finding such a dismal welcome when he calls unexpectedly on his friend, and rightly indignant when he discovers the concealed cause of his friend's real grief. We can sympathize with his wish, when he brings Alcestis back to the world, to play the same trick on

Admetus which Admetus had played on him and conceal the identity of the woman who now lives, just as Admetus had tried to conceal it when she had died. This retort of dramatic irony is the supreme touch; it brings the supernatural event to natural life, and it reduces Heracles from the too solemn status which his achievement would otherwise give him. For a moment the two remotest of dramatic emotions, the sense of the ridiculous and the sense of awe, meet, balance, and are one. Euripides has met the challenge imposed by his impossibly difficult theme and has achieved the miracle by a carefully considered distribution of sympathy, which remains in even balance at the end, as it was at the beginning.

The sense of the ridiculous and the sense of awe. Are these perhaps the chief elements of dramatic entertainment which the author of *The Cocktail Party* was aiming at? Is it these which seem to be continually defeating each other behind the screen of the psychiatrist's guidance, and mingling into the curiously abstruse bathos of the closing scenes? Complexity is increased and dramatic impact confused by the fact that the original, the whole and wholesome Alcestis of Euripides, is distastefully cut into halves. As the wife lost and found she becomes Lavinia Chamberlayne. As the woman who sacrifices herself with her eyes open she becomes Celia, the saint. The sense of incompleteness in both characters may be due to this division. More particularly, I think it is due, as I have suggested, to the fact that we are not allowed to judge for ourselves. The verdict is pronounced within the play itself. And so the life of the play is shut off by the personality and the moral pronouncements of the psychiatrist who 'runs the show'. There can be little doubt, I think, that this figure is a moral projection, whether willed or otherwise, of the author's own personality. Now the drama will endure any degree of individual stylistic treatment, from Ibsen to Pirandello, from Marivaux to Chehov, but it will not bear the imposition of the writer's moral individuality and survive. The plays of Byron are dead projections of Byron's moral image, while his *Don Juan*, which is stamped with the same image, contrives to live. *The Cocktail Party*, though infinitely more subtle, skilful and practised in its workmanship than any of Byron's plays, shares their central defect. For total dramatic sympathy it requires total identification with the personality and the views of the author. Such an identification is possible, as we have seen, in an immediate, contemporary, *fashionable* sense. Whether it can be indefinitely renewed or repeated remains to be seen.

While I do not think that *The Cocktail Party* adds as much as it seemed to at first to its author's total achievement (of which it is none the less an integral part) I think it is of great importance and interest as illustrating a conflict between immensely painstaking craftsmanship on one hand and an ineluctable – and fatal – moral impulse on the other, a conflict so acute

as to illustrate in a new way a central dramatic problem which has rarely, to my knowledge, been given explicit consideration. It is the problem of the moral scope and independence which is the pre-requisite of dramatic vitality. It is this requirement which has been at the root of centuries of opposition, whether tacit or hostile, between the Church and the theatre. Whenever the Church has taken over the theatre, as in the Middle Ages, the theatre has been without moral independence and consequently without life. No one can pretend that medieval drama is alive to-day – with the very questionable exception of its knockabout comedy – or that it can be revived except as a curiosity. I saw one such curiosity, no doubt average and representative of its kind, at the Paris Festival of 1951 – *Le Vrai Mystère de la Passion*. As a pictorial, speaking narrative, one could see how excellently it must have fulfilled its original moral and instructive purpose. As drama it was without a moment of vitality – with one remarkable exception. With the appearance of Judas, after the betrayal, all the dramatic sympathies sprang to life. In spite of himself, the writer's instinct had made of Judas a genuine tragic figure, if only for a moment. But the sympathy evoked was nothing to the purpose of the play.

The real reason for the opposition between Church and theatre was always simply that the Church was its own, one, central drama, and could admit, in reality, of no other. It is just possible to imagine a Sophocles, given the facts, writing a Tragedy of Christ: but being a Sophoclean tragedy it would unquestionably be blasphemous. The only other possible dramatic figure in the Christian hierarchy is either Satan, or his mortal instrument, Faust. The fact is that drama in its essence will not admit of the resolution, either redemption or damnation, on which religion must insist – and it is this which invalidates Faust, in the final reckoning, as a tragic hero. The essence of *Hamlet*, and of *Lear*, is that there is no resolution. There is simply an ending – 'Oh, let him pass!' – which is not the same thing, and which makes a positive or negative resolution irrelevant. What is *Lear*'s ultimate end? Does he pass into the heaven with Cordelia, which he had already glimpsed; or does he end with 'Thou'lt come no more. Never, never, never, never, never'; or does he think that she's alive ('Look there, look there!')? We cannot know, and to know positively would defeat the tragedy. Again, what resolution is there in *Hamlet*? He simply passes into the uncertainties on which he had brooded – 'the rest is silence', – with the usual last anxiety for justice in this world: 'Report me and my cause aright.' It is possible to imagine another ending, a resolution in which *Hamlet* takes extreme unction after confessing himself and makes what can positively be considered a good end. The result would in one sense be edifying, but all the inscrutable gods of the drama would rise in rage to obliterate the blasphemy.

For the essence of tragedy is the insistence on the conflict for its own sake, on the pursuit of that conflict to its utmost intensity, and the refusal to go beyond it. The conflict is always a moral conflict; and yet any attempt to view and to resolve it in the light of a specific religious code defeats its dramatic meaning. The Greek drama is what it is because the Greeks had no set of tabulated religious or moral commandments. Their moral law, apart from the vestiges of the early taboos, was one of perpetual enquiry. There is no Jewish classical drama – apart from the possibilities of Job, which is not of Jewish provenance – precisely because they had a rigid code of moral commandments. To them, the moral implications of almost any act were a foregone conclusion. By the light of their religion they could not have tolerated drama, which will not tolerate foregone conclusions, but insists that the moral judgment, however violently disturbed – which it is and always must be whenever we truly consider *Hamlet* – must finally remain in suspension.

This dramatic law, if it is a law, can be tested by application to the individual output of any single dramatist, with interesting results. It may help to explain, for example, why some of the works of Ibsen are still dramatically alive and others are not. If *The Doll's House*, once so sensationally alive, now seems largely dead to us, it is because it is concerned with an unwritten social and moral code which no longer has any meaning for us. We can share neither it nor Ibsen's obvious revolt against it. Why, on the other hand, does Ibsen's *Wild Duck* remain so obstinately and queerly alive? I think the main reason is that its moral implications are in no way codified: they remain capricious, mysterious, and valid. They continue to escape us, and we cannot either resolve or dismiss them. It is for the same reason that Pirandello's *Six Characters* can still to a limited degree disturb us, while his other plays are slowly becoming embedded in the factitious interest of their futurist, experimental period. Take the most flippant of dramatists, Wilde, and you will find that he too is heavily involved in a moral code. In proportion to his very flippancy, it would seem, his plays are limed with the sticky, sentimental moral conventions of the moment when he wrote – and in particular with the fashionable creed of the fallen woman with a heart of gold. *Lady Windermere's Fan* and the rest are half submerged in the sentimental mud of their time, and half floated by their wit. It is only with *The Importance of Being Earnest*, where the most serious conventions become the silliest, and where religion is reduced to the importance of being christened, and of *not* being born in a hand-bag, that Wilde the butterfly achieves dramatic liberation. Here the dramatic sympathy, if it can be so called, is light-handedly but evenly distributed, not heavily focussed on the bare shoulders of some heroic, if naughty, kept woman, and Wilde's own personality, flatulent

and flashy as it was, achieves a marvellous suspension in the pure solution of the wit.

But Wilde's masterpiece, as has often been pointed out, belongs in its own way to the same genre as Restoration comedy, a genre in which a kind of negative dramatic justice is achieved by the suppression of all moral judgment, and a consequent even withdrawal of sympathy from all the *dramatis personæ*. The prototype of the whole kind is Macchiavelli's *La Mandragola*. 'Hard', 'modern', 'glittering', 'cynical' are the terms usually applied to this comedy of cuckoldry, particularly by a northern audience. It is nevertheless a perfect example of its kind, its fault being the limitations of that kind. The moral, the human dimensions of its characters are nearly all cut off as if by a sheet of plate glass. We can see them, or rather suppose them, but for emotional purposes they are not really there.

Such a work can only provide the top layer, and the thinnest, of dramatic satisfaction. However uncommitted, morally, the drama must in the end remain, in order to satisfy all the emotions for which it can find satisfaction, it has to engage all the moral understanding. It seems as if its highest function is to intensify and to illuminate the sense of right and wrong, but by doing so only to complicate them. It can illuminate good and evil only by showing up the inextricable obscurity of their inter-relationship. The moment it attempts to define them, to establish their limits, by any law whatever, it fails to do so, and it fails as drama. Nevertheless the drama at its highest has only been possible at periods and in places where the moral sense has been most acutely, even painfully developed. It is for this reason that in modern times the highest tragic achievement (and concomitantly the highest comedy) has been reached within the environment, though *not* within the domination, of a strict religious system – in the plays of the Jansenist, Racine, and in the Elizabethan drama. We usually think of Elizabethan England in terms of licence. But by contrast with Renaissance Italy and France, the Elizabethan was a puritanical regime. It is true that English puritanism did not stifle the theatre until the latter days of Shirley. But it had always been here. It was, in a sense, the reason for the thing which it opposed and which it finally destroyed. But an exploration of the fact that the drama at its greatest had been created within the periphery of a religion with which it remained essentially incompatible, and of all that the fact involves, would require another essay.

## THE BANTU LITERATURE OF SOUTH AFRICA

Henry Swanzy

The air is now full of voices talking of South Africa, her economics, her politics, the demerits of her present leaders, the merits of the opposition. Not only are leading journalists sent out from this country or America, like H. V. Morton and Vernon Bartlett, but even men of letters, like Julian Duguid or, *mirabile dictu*, Charles Morgan, whose aim it is to take soundings in the warring ideologies, all within the space of a month or two. For their part, South Africans, even South African Liberals, do not write much of their country, except anonymously for Messrs Gollancz, and then only to express their feelings of guilt for the social disasters of a country pitchforked into industrialism. Even the notable literary exiles, the Campbells, the Kriges, the Plomers, the Van der Posts, are content, so far, to make general protests cast in social terms. Not one of them, as far as I have seen, has delved into the literature of the Bantu themselves, even though this is closely connected with perhaps the most creative aspect of the Anglo-Saxon impact, the work of the missionaries: for the Sotho-Sechuana group, the Paris Mission, centring on the press at Morija; for the Nguni-Xhosa, the Presbyterians with their press at Lovedale. This article is a fleeting and unauthorized attempt to fill the gap, to indicate roughly what is there.

There are seven or eight Bantu language groups in the Union that have been reduced to writing, but they largely consist of the two principal complexes already mentioned, with the addition of Zulu, an off-shoot of Nguni. I am no Bantu scholar, so I must confine myself to the indications which have been given in English, merely mentioning the statement made by experts that no less than 7,000 European words have been absorbed into the African languages proper. For practical purposes all higher literary activity so far has been conducted in English. The Dutch Reformed Church has recently protested against the *stepmotherly* treatment of Afrikaans in the mission schools, a treatment hardly unexpected in view of Afrikaner views on the uneducability of the native *skepsels* or *creatures*. There is no Bantu writing in Afrikaans which can in any way compare with the product of a century of missionary work: undoubtedly the most developed corpus of African writing to be found anywhere in the Continent to-day, with 227 titles published by 1939 in Sotho, 238

in Xhosa, 153 in Zulu, eighty-three in Tswana, thirty-two in Tonga and seven in Venda.

Much of this work is of course the simple expression of education: grammars, vocabularies and the like, translations of the Gospels, and works like the *Pilgrim's Progress*. The first of them were hammered out in the wild nineteenth century, when the fount at Lovedale was twice destroyed in the Kaffir wars, once (1846) melted and used as bullets. By 1865, a complete edition of the Bible had been made in Xhosa, which was revised seventeen years later after very severe criticism by a pioneer, the Rev. Tiyo Soga. For what is interesting is that the Bantu soon started to have a hand in the development of their own culture. After the little *Ikwezi* (*Morning Star*) produced by the missions in 1841, the next paper was called *Indaba* (News); but it was followed towards the end of the century by a paper edited by an African and called, significantly, *Imvo*, which means *Opinion*. Very early, in fact, we find the characteristic conflict, generalized all over Africa in a thousand ways, between the impatient barbarian and the European expert, who inevitably lacks his direct impetus towards expression. In S. Africa this conflict was particularly acute in the 'thirties, when writers and critics were highly suspicious of the new *Africa* orthography, which adds many letters to the alphabet, in order to follow the characteristic turns of African expression, with a consequent hold-up in the actual production of books. Even so, in the single year 1934 the Sotho press at Morija produced 370,000 books in twenty languages and two journals, all with a staff of two Europeans and forty-two Africans.

On a limited experience, and always in translation, I would say that the mind revealed is what one might very well expect: the product of a rather stately, somewhat humourless, pastoral people, lacking the ingenious fancy of the Bushmen, with aristocratic praise-songs (the so-called *isibongo*) alternating with stories of dynasties and a considerable genre, whether in stories, novels or plays, of the tale of star-crossed lovers. For reasons connected with production, there seems to be little direct comment on the total racial situation; and Europeans intrude to a very small extent, probably because the writers wish to live in a world all their own, revelling in the pride of their own euphonious and expressive periods. It is, however, interesting to observe that a recent Sotho novel, *Lilahloane*, by A. Nqheku, is apparently a Roman Catholic attack on the *Communists of Mapoteng who call themselves Lekotla le Bafo* (the Basuto Commoners' Party, who are organized against the close corporation of the Sons of Moshesh). It has been criticized because it contains too many neologisms: *telefono* and *telegrammo*, which may be inevitable, but also *maart* instead of *mopitlane*, *oktober* instead of *mphalane*. Another novel, this time in Xhosa,

by the poet and critic A. C. Jordan, concerns a child born of the Pondomise royal line, but educated at Lovedale and the University College at Fort Hare. When he returns to claim the throne, he marries an educated girl, who flouts all tribal custom, wearing short skirts, walking bare-headed in public, killing the cobra that houses the spirit of the royal ancestors, whose wrath is thereupon aroused to destroy woman, husband, son and all. Dr Jabavu, who gives an account of this work (in his small pamphlet *The Influence of English on Bantu Writing*), is roused to admiration both for the language, the construction, and the settings, whether tribal assemblies, local farmers' meetings, teachers' conventions, boy scout camps or the *fraternals of ministers of religion*. The most famous of all Bantu productions, available in English, French and German, was published in translation (by H. W. Dutton) as long ago as 1931, with an enthusiastic introduction by Sir Henry Newbolt, who looked forward with a prophetic eye to the efflorescence of writing in the *outer Empire*. This is the novel *Chaka*, by Thomas Mofolo, which may still be obtained from the Oxford University Press, and tells, in an epic form, with much use of symbolism (the warring aspects of the tyrants' mind) the rise and fall of the greatest of Zulu warriors, in a style and poetry which often emerges through the rather stiff English rendering.

Thomas Mofolo was born at Khojane in 1875, the son of a father in the Mounted Police. As a boy he herded cattle, going to school only when the season allowed. But he was fortunate in that his master, Everitt Segoete, was a man of talent, who later became an Anglican minister. From the little village school, Mofolo went to higher school, then to Morija to be trained as a teacher. After a time in the world, he returned to his *alma mater* to write, spurred on by the translations he had read there, both religious works, and novels by Rider Haggard and Marie Corelli. The first production was *Moeti oa Bochabela*, the Traveller to the East, whose 170 pages recount the journey of another herd-boy into Natal during the wars. The next book, *Pitseng*, which was much longer, was even more autobiographical, with an account of Mofolo's courtship. The third was *Chaka*. It is now that we encounter the tragedy of these first South African generations. Mofolo left Morija, since his wife had died and he wished to earn more money as a recruiting agent at Teyateyaneng. Here he married once more and opened a store in the high Drakensbergs, which failed to prosper. He sold it for cattle, and wandered again, first to Port Elisabeth, a Xhosa area, then to East Griqualand, where he bought a farm from a white man. This again he was forced to sell, since its boundaries did not march entirely with Native land. He lost a resulting court action, and returned penniless to Teyateyaneng, where he died in poverty three years ago. The face that looks out of his photograph is that of a very bitter man.

After Mofolo, the best-known Bantu writer is the Xhosa poet, Samuel Edward Mqhayi, who also died very recently. A long and elaborate memorial by A. C. Jordan is, unfortunately, mislaid, but one remembers a curious and plaintive allocution to Britain, which had forgotten, in the period between the wars, its traditional role of African protector. In this Mqhayi departs a little from the norm, for so far we have found the Bantu writers mainly concerned with their own life. The third spokesman of the pioneering generation was even more syncretistic. He was Solomon T. Plaatje, who translated Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* and the *Comedy of Errors* into his own language and wrote a book in English on *Native Life in South Africa*, and even a novel, *Mhudi*. (He started life as a court interpreter, having, like many Bantu, a gift for language.) Among the Zulu, the principal figure, the scholar B. W. Vilakazi, was also syncretistic, using nearly every English model, even the heroic couplet, in his work, *Inkondlo ka Zulu*, published in the 1930's. Vilakazi won a Master's degree for a thesis on the conception and development of poetry in Zulu, later becoming the first Bantu Doctor of Literature, with a second thesis on literature in Nguni. He died in 1947, at the age of forty-one, after co-operating with Dr C. M. Doke, the doyen of all language scholars, in a great Zulu-English dictionary.

Translations are notoriously misleading, but it may be interesting to quote one or two examples of this Bantu writing, starting perhaps with Vilakazi, whose personal tensions have soared far beyond the tribal environment. Here is a poem on *Death*:

On I travelled searching for thee,  
Thou daughter of death, whose eyes  
Gaze in one direction constantly.  
Thou whose face is forbidding.  
I went in search of thee, and brought thee  
Into my father's house. And saw thee  
Stretch out thy wings approaching.  
Thou nearly overtakedst me  
Among the crowds at Durban,  
But I prayed to the spirits, and thou waitedst.  
And I hurried in the darkness,  
Succeeded in bringing home the old man.  
Then I looked and saw thee, Death  
Begin thy work by taking his foot and folding,  
Knotting it to thy waist.  
Then didst thou go aside and touch his hairs  
And curl them. Then his mind thou enteredst  
And didst confuse it, leaving it so.  
After that thou movedst away, observing him,  
Pleased with the great work  
For which thou hadst come on Earth among us.

One quotes this for the personal tension of the new age, a deeper expression of the African malaise than any of the more overt protests of writers absorbed into the European sphere, like the Coloured novelist, Peter Abrahams, well known in England. It may be useful to set beside it a translation made by another poet, the Xhosa J. J. R. Jolobe, whose *Poems of an African*, published a year or two ago, contains translations he has made himself of a sonnet on light, an elegy, an historical poem on the clan wars, and an elegy on the fallen, which follows:

Did you not notice how they left their homes  
With heads aloft, chests out, and marching well  
With left and right, challenging the world?  
Eternally they thus will ever be.  
Did you not see the flow of love the day  
They left, seen from sad looks of aged men?  
The matrons sighed, the young wife's eye a tear  
Did hold. The maidens wept, the children sobbed.  
Their worth was plain, and precious were they then,  
On that proud day of sad departure.  
When mountains are no more, forever thus  
Will they remain, for love outlives all change.  
Did you not hear how they made light, it seemed,  
Of grievous things which pulled at your heart strings?  
They laughed at danger and despised gaunt death,  
They looked beyond, and saw the fruit, vast gains  
To their own race, to mankind and the world.  
All generations sure will pass, and change  
With circumstances of this world, but they  
Shall never change. When these our hairs turn grey  
Forever black will theirs be, and when  
Our backs are bent, with strength will they march on.

One will not claim great things for the thought or diction of these poems, but they are respectable, and they are being read, along with many others, by the gradually emerging *élite* of the Bantu peoples of South Africa. How many more lie hidden, like the 1,700 proverbs, twenty-one heroic lyrics, nineteen essays, and six stories from Shakespeare, said to have been evolved by a young Tswana student at Healdtown! It seems necessary that people who care for these things should be aware of them, and not allow them altogether to sink into the suburban limbo of so many things industrial, with monstrosities like the Xhosa collection published in Cape Town in 1950 by Goodwill Soya Mama and A. Z. T. Mbebe, under the title *Blackberries*. There are in South Africa, apart from the devoted mission teachers and the learned specialists in the Bantu studies departments of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand, a number of Europeans who attempt to preserve and develop, and even to admit into our own culture cycle,

the best products of this other world. Notably there is Hugh Tracey, the enthusiast who was responsible for putting on the air the beautiful Zulu Persephone myth, *Chief Above and Chief Below*. Their work may, perhaps, be noted by people of imagination who are now at last turning their mind's eye to the African continent, at least in its tormented southern sector.

## BOOK NOTES

**BOLIVAR**, by Salvador de Madariaga. (Hollis and Carter, pp. 650, 45s.) This is the final volume of a trilogy planned by the author many years ago. Its predecessors, *Columbus* and *Cortes*, raised the curtain upon the Spanish-American drama which played itself out in three centuries, from about 1500 to 1800. *Bolivar* brings it down with a bang. In between, a two-volume history of *The Rise and Fall of the Spanish American Empire* introduced a slightly more orthodox enquiry into the subject than is possible within the confines of biography. One states a mere preference in placing these historical studies above the biographical. Not that Don Salvador lacks the passionate interest in character and individuality essential to the biographer. On the contrary, he has almost too much of it, and South American history provides him with an admirable subject-matter for his gifts. It is just that as an outsider one tends to be more interested in the whole than in its multi-coloured parts. Madariaga writes history in the grand romantic manner. The nearest equivalent of his latest volume is Mr Churchill's biography of Marlborough. But Marlborough's career was central to much that decided the history of Europe, and though himself a less 'interesting' figure than Bolivar, he is of greater interest to the historian. The break-up of the Spanish Empire during and after the Napoleonic wars gave an opportunity to revolutionaries brought up on the ideas of the French Enlightenment and filled with naive admiration of Napoleon. Bolivar was one of them. He seems to have been distinguished chiefly by his ability to profit from changing circumstances. In fact he was an adventurer, and his career has become the model for dozens of other South American Caudillos. To his countrymen he is The Liberator, and Madariaga has probably risked some obloquy by refusing to conceal the shadowy side of his character. But the long tale of marches and counter-marches, diplomatic intrigues and amorous adventures somehow fails to capture one's interest as did those two earlier volumes.

**MEMOIRS**, by Franz von Papen. (Andre Deutsch, London, pp. 598, 25s.) Von Papen probably lives in the popular imagination as a stiff-necked Prussian Junker who made a deal with Hitler from whose consequences he never escaped. In fact he was a West German Catholic, and his Catholicism is the key to his career. It enabled him to worm his way into the Catholic Centre Party under the Weimar Republic, acquire financial control of the Party organ, and from this strategic position carry on the long campaign of sapping and mining which led to the disintegration first of the Centre and then of the Republic itself. In this task he had, of course, many helpers, from the senile Hindenburg to the Social-Democratic Ministers who refused to fight when the chance was offered

them. His *Memoirs* run true to type. They are the apologia of an unreconstructed German Conservative who never for a moment doubted that the Empire ought to be restored, parliament abolished, and the Corporate State introduced. For this purpose he formed an alliance with Hitler, who speedily undeceived him. It was not Hitler's intention, von Papen now states, to keep his promises or to live in peace with the world. He claims to have made this discovery in 1934, when the Gestapo murdered his secretaries and all but had him murdered as well, as outrage about which he complained in a dignified letter to Goering. After that things went from bad to worse, although he was offered (and accepted) diplomatic posts in Vienna and Ankara. But nothing really horrified him until he was shocked by the uncouth behaviour of his American gaolers at Nuremberg. The death camps, it seems, only got bad towards the end, when they were 'overcrowded', and the Americans are now having to treat Korean partisans as the Germans treated the Russians. The last-mentioned statement is apparently made in good faith by the author, who also urges his Western readers to realize that Germany is the only possible bulwark against 'Asia'. He speaks with contempt of the Nazi leaders, but repeats the legend that in 1933 Hitler was the only apparent alternative to Communism. There is the usual twaddle about 'materialism', from which it was the business of von Papen's high-minded friends to rescue the masses, and about the beauties of the Corporate State. For the rest he has a good conscience. Did he not do all he could in his personal capacity to help Jews and political prisoners? A revealing book.

**THE FORRESTAL DIARIES**, edited by Walter Millis. (Cassell & Co., pp. 516, 25s.) Mr. James Forrestal resigned his post as US Secretary of Defence on March 1st, 1949, and less than three months later fell to his death from a room in the Naval hospital where he was confined after having suffered a nervous breakdown. Reading the excerpts from his official Diaries for the 1944-49 period, which have been put together (and heavily edited) by friends, one catches a glimpse of the mental strain that was doubtless a contributing factor in his untimely death. Forrestal left the chairmanship of an important Wall Street firm in 1940 to join the Roosevelt Administration as Under-Secretary for the Navy; but unlike Acheson and Harriman, who also came from Wall Street, he had not been born in the purple. The son of poor Irish immigrants, he was a self-made man who had risen to the top by sheer ability and hard work. Hard work in the end killed him. He was intensely serious, repressed and given to worrying. He played some part in reversing American foreign policy after 1945 and in laying the ground for the present rearmament drive; but where others did the same and conserved their health, Forrestal cracked under the strain. It was characteristic of him that from 1947 onwards he thought war with Russia might come any day. The political mad-house in Washington, and the inter-Service rivalries he was supposed to iron out, did the rest. The Diary reveals few secrets (it has been heavily censored), but conveys a good deal of the atmosphere in which the Washington planners have to work. It is not an altogether encouraging picture. Forrestal himself was appalled by the improvisations, snap decisions, and bureaucratic entanglements that surrounded him, although he pays high tribute to the courage and good sense of Mr Truman, whose political principles were otherwise not much to his taste. It is a curious commentary on the complexity of American politics that so many of the key posts in an Administration dedicated to the Fair Deal were and are held by Wall Street men, or by military men who seem to enjoy far wider discretion than is the case in Britain. It is equally curious to learn that

in 1948 General Eisenhower deprecated a move to by-pass President Truman in his favour at the Democratic Party convention, on the grounds that the President ought not to be challenged in the midst of an international crisis. The 'crisis' has since then become a permanent state of affairs, and Washington has apparently made up its mind to live with it for a while. It proved too much for Forrestal. The editor of this volume has done his work well, and the explanatory notes are intelligent and restrained in tone.

VOICE OF ASIA, by James A. Michener (Secker & Warburg, pp. 291, 21s.) The author of this book was a sports columnist at the age of fifteen, a University lecturer some years later, an associate editor of Macmillans in New York by 1941, and a U S Navy officer during the war, having waived his Quaker principles to join the fight. Last year he made a rapid tour of the Far East, starting in Japan and proceeding via Korea, Hongkong, Formosa, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia and India to Pakistan. Out of this might have come another bright, slapdash travelogue, or another ponderous essay written in academese. What has in fact come out is a vivid and sincere piece of reportage. Mr Michener is a genuine American Liberal who is not afraid to voice his opinions. At the same time he is quite free from the fashionable mania for idealizing all things Asian and describing all the ills of Asian society to European colonialism. He noticed, and was shocked by, the collapse of 'law and order' in Indonesia, yet felt that the Dutch had to go. He was not taken in by the more grandiose claims made for MacArthur's administration in Japan, but thought that on balance Japan had profited from it. He noted that the British have become popular in India, and that Congress has so far done very little to alter the Indian village. He was appalled by the destruction in Korea, without in the least doubting that the decision to accept the challenge was right. In short, he is reasonable. There are some engaging pen-pictures of local politicians, nationalist intellectuals, and vestigial Empire builders in immaculate tropical suits. The tone is informal without being unduly chatty. A shrewd and readable piece of reporting which should help to correct some popular American misconceptions.

WEST AND EAST OF TITO, by Harry Hodgkinson. (Gollancz, pp. 187, 12s. 6d.) Another book on Tito? Fortunately not. Mr Hodgkinson, who served as an Intelligence Officer in the Adriatic during the war, knows the Yugoslav Partisans at first hand, and could no doubt write an entertaining volume about them. Instead he has written a really brilliant essay on the Cold War. The title is to some extent misleading, since most of the text deals not with the Yugoslav conflict but with the wider implications of Stalinist policy and propaganda. There is even a chapter on the language controversy of 1950, which gave Stalin an opportunity, as the author points out, to revise various awkward Leninist postulates, as well as his own 'theory' of nationalism. Mr Hodgkinson has grasped the interplay of ideology and power politics west of the Iron Curtain, and makes some amusing observations on the turns and twists of the Party line. He is full of valuable advice for the Cold War strategists, and even displays a strain of cautious optimism about the policy of 'containment'. He thinks America can win the arms race and force Russia to deflate her claims without war. This is good news, but it is admittedly based on speculation. Mr Hodgkinson writes well, almost too well. If he were less scintillating he would stand a better chance of being taken seriously in official quarters – those quarters where Mr Carew Hunt's painstaking but naive and jejune book on the *Theory and Practice of Communism* is still treated as a fount of wisdom.

THE DILEMMA OF SOUTH AFRICA, by John Hatch. (Dennis Dobson Ltd., pp. 252, 18s.) The author, who lectures at Glasgow, toured South and East Africa in 1950 and 1951, and was able to meet everyone from Ministers in the Malan Government to African nationalists and trade unionists. Out of these travels he has constructed a sober, well-informed and inevitably pessimistic report on the South African political crisis. As a Liberal he was not likely to be favourably impressed by the claims made for *Apartheid*, but what makes his conclusions so depressing is the clear evidence that *Apartheid* is not a policy but a myth. There is in fact no way of separating the two races, since industry depends on Black labour. What is happening is merely that the workers in industry are, *qua* Africans, deprived of political rights. The only hope left after reading Mr Hatch, and that a thin one, is that the Liberal wing of the United Party will eventually wrest control from the epigoni of General Smuts, and form a genuine opposition instead of a sham one. He is inclined to believe that the Nationalists are firmly rooted in the White electorate and can go on governing for ever – until the crash comes.

THE LAND SYSTEM IN PALESTINE, by A. Granott. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, pp. 326, 21s.) The much-abused term 'authoritative' can without danger be applied to this work which first appeared in a Hebrew edition three years ago. The political upheaval in progress while it was being written has drawn a sharp dividing line between the Mandatory and the post-Mandatory period, and a subsequent edition will have to deal with the present position of Jewish and Arab landownership. But with this proviso, Dr Granott, who has for many years headed the principal instrument of Zionist land settlement, the Jewish National Fund, has written the standard work on the subject. Though now chiefly of historical value, it gives a very good picture of the evolution of landownership in Palestine since Turkish times, and especially of conditions under the British Mandate.

TEN GREAT ECONOMISTS, by Joseph A. Schumpeter. (Allen & Unwin, pp. 305, 21s.) The late Professor Schumpeter (himself no mean candidate for inclusion among the First Ten) before his death at Harvard in 1950 left instructions for a volume to be edited from various critical and semi-biographical essays written during his lifetime in German and English. He was born, as was Keynes, in 1883, the year of Marx's death, and it was always a point with him that the period from Marx to Keynes should be treated as a unit. The Ten are Marx, Walras, Menger, Marshall, Pareto, Boehm-Bawerk, Taussig, Fisher, Mitchell and Keynes, while an Appendix adds some briefer notes on Knapp, Wieser and Bortkiewicz. Schumpeter's command of the history of economics was probably unique. With the majority of those discussed in this notable volume he was personally acquainted, and unlike some other economists he had followed their writings in the original. The result is a collection of essays which both the specialist and the student can read with profit, though much of it is caviare to the uninitiated.

SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF EXTERNAL POLICY 1931-9, by Nicholas Mansergh. Issued under the Auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Geoffrey Cumberledge at the O U P, pp. 449, 42s.) This is one of those monumental Chatam House affairs without which political writing in this country could no longer be carried on. Vast in scope, impeccable in scholarship, Olympian in tone, it sets a standard for the aspiring historian, while providing the mere journalist with everything he needs for his leading article. The evolution of Commonwealth affairs, with special

reference to the foreign policy pursued by the Dominion Governments during the 'Appeasement' period, is traced with steady skill, while much thought is also devoted to the way in which the Statute of Westminster unfolded its potentialities. The general impression is that, with the exception of the New Zealand Labour Government after 1935, the Dominion Governments concurred in the policy pursued by Mr Baldwin and Mr Chamberlain, though in the case of South Africa there was a tug between pro-German and anti-Italian tendencies due to fear that the struggle over Abyssinia would lead to African participation in modern warfare.

PARLIAMENT: A SURVEY (Allen & Unwin, pp. 288, 22s. 6d.) The chapters which have gone into this symposium were based on extra-mural lectures delivered in the University of London between January and March 1950. They strike a balance between general exposition and academic scholarship, and are thus of particular usefulness to the student. Lord Campion, Mr L. S. Amery, Professor Brogan, Mr Craik Henderson, Sir Arthur Salter, Mr H. E. Dale, Mr Ivor Thomas, Mr F. W. Lascelles, Professor F. C. S. Wade, Sir Cecil Carr, Professor A. L. Goodhart and Mr G. M. Young deal with various aspects of parliamentary government, and some useful light is thrown on such intricate subjects as Standing Orders and delegated legislation.

CHILD ADOPTION IN THE MODERN WORLD, by Margaret Kornitzer. (Putnam. 16s.)

Miss Kornitzer, who is Press Officer to the Standing Conference of Societies Registered for Adoption, has written a useful book, both for the social worker and those who have adopted children or hope to do so. It covers all the ground – the laws of adoption at home and abroad; the methods of adoption; and the psychological problems. Miss Kornitzer gives a convincing answer to those who wonder why children should remain in institutions in this country when there seem to be ten potential adopters for every child capable of being adopted. On one point her advice is disputable. Is one justified in telling a child falsely that its mother is dead in order to discourage day dreaming or a wish to seek her out? Surely it is a fundamental human right to know what there is to be known about one's origin. Much of the advice in the book is based on common sense and experience; adoption has not yet been adequately studied by social workers or psychologists, but studies are now being made. Many people who adopt children are not capable of using such a comprehensive guide. One would like to see a short pamphlet embodying the advice Miss Kornitzer gives put into the hands of every adoptive parent.

MODERN ENGLISH PAINTERS: SICKERT TO SMITH, by John Rothenstein. (Eyre and Spottiswoode. 25s.)

To read Sir John Rothenstein's book on modern English painters is like a hurried half-hour visit to the great gallery which he so ably directs: better than nothing, but rather inadequate. Sir John 'does' seventeen painters in the space of 200 pages, and without the interesting reproductions the book would be a bit thin. Among so many painters there must obviously be very contrasting merit. Gwen John and James Pryde, Matthew Smith and Ambrose McEvoy, Wilson Steer and William Nicholson do not share the same pages comfortably, yet they are all dealt with at more or less the same length and in the same language. Sir John impeccably puts the first first, but his praise becomes problematic when he writes, for example,

about Pryde's 'deeply impressive' pictures, and calls them 'an original contribution to painting'; when he describes McEvoy as 'magical' and compares him favourably to Gainsborough. Standards of criticism must be exact if they are to mean anything; Sir John allows them to wobble disconcertingly from one painter to another. He is more Catholic than discriminating, which, if not the best quality in a critic, is, however, an excellent one in the director of an art gallery which is 'most pleasing when open to most men'. But to do Sir John justice, his book is about painters more than painting. He has succeeded in collecting conscientious biographical details sprinkled with delightful anecdotes. He must be thanked for repeating Wilson Steer on his father: 'Will Rothenstein paints pretty much like the rest of us – but from higher motives of course.' Many more examples of painters' wit and excerpts from their writings – how well painters write – leaven Sir John's own *Times* Editorial style.

MUSIC AT BELMONT, by J. T. Sheppard. (Rupert Hart Davis. 15s.)

Musings, mainly on episodes in Homer and the Greek dramatists. Sir John Sheppard, Provost of King's College, Cambridge, is an enthusiastic Hellenist who believes in the marriage of the Christian and Hellenistic traditions. At a time when Greek is becoming more and more remote, it is important that those who know the language should express the essence of their studies for our benefit. Yet this book, like some others on Greece written by dons, is too steeped in easy sublimity. Perhaps the sheltered beauty of Cambridge is to blame. Familiar tags of poetry drift across the pages, the Greek heroes are seen in a good clean English light, with only an occasional, chatty recognition of evil – 'The *Medea* isn't by any means a pleasant play. Certainly it is a play about unpleasant people,' – and all things tend to be reconciled in a comfortable, after-dinner fuzziness. This is a pity, because a book written with knowledge and the best of intentions, instead of convincing the reader, irritates him. 'To Hell with the Greeks,' he says, 'if this is the effect they produce. Hand me the *News of the World*.'

WITCHCRAFT, by Pennthorne Hughes. (Longmans, 21s.) Under this title Mr Pennthorne Hughes has written a short book for the general reader, largely founded on the researches of Professor Margaret Murray. He goes further than has been attempted by most recognized authorities in his theory that the cult was not only a survival of the Paleolithic and Neolithic fertility rites, but appealed to an 'other-consciousness' or 'hyperæsthesia' which, evinced in the ritual dance, had been derived from our sub-human ancestors. Some notable inaccuracies, when he discusses anthropology or paleolithic prehistory, and a good deal of generalization might leave readers who are familiar with this interesting subject unconvinced that Mr Hughes is fully qualified to propound his theory. His approach to pagan survivals in Christian ritual might well have been more reverently handled.

HINDOO HOLIDAY, by J. R. Ackerley. (Chatto and Windus. 10s. 6d.)

A re-issue of a diary of a six months' stay in a small Indian State – first published in 1932. Slight, subtle and imperishable. Mr Ackerley, now the unobtrusive editor of *The Listener*, has, beyond all reasonable doubt, achieved immortality with this one book. It is both a delicate and affectionate description of half a dozen Indian characters and a strange self-revelation. The unique and happy product of a particular personality in a particular situation, it makes other books appear pretentious and clumsy.

55 SHORT STORIES FROM THE NEW YORKER. (Gollancz. 15s.)

A magnificent collection of stories in all moods – tragic, humorous, sophisticated, wry. For the English reader, the most interesting pieces are perhaps the hard-boiled, knowing studies of American life – mating techniques, nervous breakdowns, the American soldier abroad, etc. There are, however, excellent contributions from English writers, too, in particular a hilarious piece by Sylvia Townsend Warner. As the standard of composition and style is uniformly high, we enjoy an exhilarating vista of talent, if not genius. French literature, at least, has nothing comparable to offer at the moment.

DANIEL DEFOE. (Francis Watson. 10s. 6d.)

A useful biographical and critical summary.

ROSE AND CROWN, by Sean O'Casey. (Macmillan & Co. 21s.)

The fifth volume of Mr O'Casey's biography. There are good things to be found in it, once one gets used to the, too-flamboyant Irish style, alternating between genuine writing and newspaper rhetoric.

*The Editor of*

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
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SIR CHARLES WEBSTER reviewing Volume IV in *The Spectator*

CASSELL

### EDITORIAL

To devote an entire issue to a single subject represents something of a departure for this Review. But we have for some time been concerned with the eventual necessity of giving wider coverage than we have previously been able to give to the various aspects of European Union. There have, of course, during the past few years been a number of articles in the TWENTIETH CENTURY dealing separately with particular problems connected with the work of European Unification, and always there has been an underlying regard for the concept, as for its relationship to other ventures in the field of international affairs. But the usefulness of the present collective undertaking will, we hope, be granted by those whose time does not allow them to search widely for references when they can be made available in omnibus form.

This issue was prepared, in part, at this time because it was felt to be clear that we are approaching a critical juncture in the affairs of Western Europe. Also because, were it not for the sinister test of power now being conducted with Germany as its centre, it would be tempting for Americans, not unnaturally concerned with the Far East, and with recent dramatic upheavals in the Middle East, to lose sight of an area which has not yet ceased to be the major battleground of the cold war.

As British writers have recently pointed out, the effort that was to be made to close by 1953 the 'hideous gap' in the defence of Western Europe, which everybody had discovered at the time of the Korean crisis, is relaxing. The United States Congress has heavily and arbitrarily cut both the American defence budget and the fund for 'off-shore' purchases on which so much of European rearmament depends. The spirit implied by such measures has found acceptance and, indeed, has been reflected in Britain and much of the Continent, where public opinion has willingly conceded to such false and lazy optimism as retrenchments of this kind might have been expected to inspire. The danger of a rude awakening is likely to increase in proportion with every act aimed to encourage such an attitude.

This issue observes no particular discipline either as to the length or the pattern of its contents. Certain aspects of the overall problem of

European Union seemed to stand out for attention in a production of this kind, and the exposition and clarification of these aspects has been apportioned to writers especially qualified to deal with them.

All in all, the authors of the articles which follow have been granted an entirely free hand, and have been limited only in so far as the title-matter goes. Consequently, while the reader will recognize that the same note of sincere and urgent concern runs through all the articles, no equal sameness exists in the views expressed or the conclusions drawn by their separate authors.

What, it is hoped, will emerge from this symposium of British opinion on the subject of European Unity is that subject's vast and deep-seated complexity. By the Americans, to whom the concept has become a near-kinsman by adoption, this complexity, not at first fully appreciated, is now clearly, if still not yet sufficiently widely, understood. But none better than the European can realize the urgency of solving the many problems here discussed, living hourly as he does on the very razor's edge.

Among these pages will be found a response to the many current doubts and queries associated with all intelligent discussion of European Unity. The disquiet in the Protestant mind over the dominant Catholic note in the conduct of the Union, the superficial disregard for historical precedent in the vision of a United Europe, the menacing potential of Germany in the newly envisaged association of European Powers – all these are reflected in the articles which make up this special issue. As are, also, the numerous leading questions which spring to the mind in any review of this subject. To what extent has Western Europe already advanced towards unity? What is the true significance of the work already done at Strasbourg? What are the military and economic problems involved? And how is European Unity regarded by its policy makers in relation to the broader concept of the Atlantic Community, a problem which, as readers of the Review well know, has long been an intimate concern of the TWENTIETH CENTURY.

## CAN A DIVIDED EUROPE SURVIVE?

Barbara Ward

Author of *The West at Bay* (1948); *Policy for the West* (1951); and numerous other works

In theory, the contemporary division of Europe could be ended by massive Western rearmament, enormous superiority in atomic weapons, an invasion of Eastern Europe and the thrusting back of Russia, after incredible destruction, to its own frontiers. But the theory is not worth discussing, for no sane man in the West considers such a plan.

In theory, Western acceptance of Russia's good intentions and of Russian plans for a united Germany could lead to a relaxation of the present divisions. But this, too, is not worth discussing, for the Russians have given no evidence of their intention to relax their control of half Europe in return for kind words and promises. On the contrary, that control was established between 1945 and 1947 when the West was at its kindest and also almost completely unarmed. No 'threat from imperialist America' created the Iron Curtain. It followed, as the Communist Tito has since learnt, from the imposition of Russian imperial control. The only issue worth discussing is therefore the question whether, with Soviet power established in the heart of Europe and still pressing outwards through local Communist parties and their fellow travellers, the western fringe can survive and maintain an independent existence.

It can be said at once and with certainty that there is no reason, *a priori*, why Europe should not survive, divided, for the simple reason that it has done so before. One might almost say that division has been Europe's secular fate. Some of its most lasting frontiers have been based not upon mountains and rivers but – as is the case to-day – upon an ideological divide. There have, for instance, been two 'Europes' since the Dark Ages, the Europe of Rome and the Europe of Byzantium: the Europe of Western Christianity, of constitutional rule, divided powers, personal responsibility, curiosity, activity, science and reason; and the Europe of Orthodox Christianity, of monolithic rule, autocratic power, collective organization, dogma and tradition. In their modern guise these two Europes still exist, between liberalism and communism, between humanism and totalitarianism. But the frontier is much older than the contemporary clash of principle. The Europe which the Iron Curtain now divides is in the main that Western Europe whose spirit and descent

can be traced from the Greeks and Romans, and which has always been more a way of life and a system of culture than a geographical fact.

This Europe can survive division because it has already done so again and again. In fact, on two occasions the dividing line followed with curious exactness the line of today. The Roman Empire, established in Britain, Gaul and Italy and holding the marches in Germany, covered most of our contemporary 'free Europe', but after the defeat of Varus lost the hope of spreading outwards and eastwards into what is now Stalin's sphere. Nearly a thousand years later Charlemagne's kingdom covered roughly the area of the Schuman Plan. Half a millenium after that the Turks lopped off all south-eastern Europe and twice the frontiers of Europe were pushed back to Vienna itself. In fact, if all the movements in Europe's fluid frontiers are taken into account, all the invasions of barbarians from outside, all the eruptions of alien faiths and ideologies, it is almost true to say that the present rump of Western Europe is what normally constitutes the settled, assured heart of European civilization, and that what lies beyond the Iron Curtain has been for centuries a debatable frontier and one in which genuinely Western institutions and habits of mind and politics have only taken transitory or partial root.

Apart from the centuries of Scandinavian invasion, Western Europe has been remarkably free of external trouble – it has on the whole created its own instead. Yet it was not the automatic forces of destiny that halted the barbarians from the East on one frontier or the Mohammedan invaders on another. The history of Europe not only shows that division is one of its normal states. It also illustrates the conditions under which frontiers hold – and those under which they do not. Naturally one must accept the arguments from history with caution, all other things never being quite equal. Yet if history is not to be a guide, the only alternative is guesswork and imagination, and here other things are even less equal (like George Orwell's animals).

The chief condition of a lasting frontier – in other words, a line beyond which external pressure cannot go – is obviously a balance of power. But this in turn demands a number of other conditions – political unity, adequate military technique, economic and social staying power, and what might be called spiritual resilience. One of the reasons why Charlemagne's frontier against the East lasted not much longer than his lifetime was the collapse of political unity after his death, whereas the Roman frontier had behind it for hundreds of years the centralized power of the Empire. Later, while the Ottoman Sultans encroached upon divided quarrelling kingdoms and principalities, and as long as the organization of the Turkish army into regular infantry was technically far in advance of the still feudal levies of Europe, the Ottoman Empire continued to

move westwards and to push the eastern frontier of Europe towards its present Danubian line. It was not until Turkish pressure had helped to forge the political unity of the Habsburg Empire, and the West had learnt and improved upon Turkish tactics, that a stable boundary began to appear. The Turks, too, illustrate the further need for social and moral cohesion and staying power. It is not necessary to go back to the crumbling of the *Pax Romana* to see how great a part the weakening of internal social unity plays in the undermining of frontiers. After its last great thrusting out to Central Europe, the highly organized, markedly totalitarian institutions of the Ottoman State succumbed to atrophy and the Empire that had been the terror of Europe in the sixteenth century was its 'sick man' three centuries later, losing control of province after province in a series of fruitless local wars. We need not assume, in looking at Europe's present division, that the pressure will always run from East to West. Other dynamic materialist crusading faiths have broken their mainspring before now. The Soviet Union is not necessarily exempt from the judgments of history.

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But for the time being the pressure does move from East to West, and the stabilization of the Iron Curtain as a frontier does depend upon the cohesion of the West and the creation of a balance of power on the Western side. It must also be admitted that never in the history of Europe has such a balance demanded so great and imaginative an effort or so striking a reversal in traditional attitudes and policies.

In the past the economic problem of stability was not decisive. The self-sufficient peasant economies of the European states were not menaced by the imposition of any particular frontier. Nations could eat, and they could supply their armies, even if the Turks had overrun the Balkans or put an end to trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the past, too, the balance of power could, very largely, be settled in purely European terms. The political and military resources of Europe itself were sufficient, when rallied, to check the external threat. Today, no local political union or economic unity would be sufficient to create a balance of power. The Soviet Union dwarfs any conceivable political combination in Western Europe. It is only if the New World is drawn into the balance that stability can be assured. This, then, is the first possible weakness in European staying power. The Atlantic alliance is not yet a fully accepted and incontrovertible fact to many people on both sides of the Atlantic. The more conservative elements in America accept a policy of committing the United States to an Atlantic partnership only grudgingly and hope that, for instance, the rearming of the Western Germans will permit the

withdrawal of American troops. In Europe, neutralists, fellow-travellers and their Communist comrades argue that Russia would be amenable if only the 'threat' of American troops were withdrawn. But the reality of Europe's precarious balance is that, without American participation, the situation is no better than that of 1939, with Germany free to strike a bargain with East and West, and Britain and France too weak to maintain the balance of power unaided. Only if American weight is thrown into the scales can Soviet power be contained and Germany's potential irresponsibility countered.

But this need for political and military partnership on an Atlantic scale is only one part of Europe's conditions of survival. To a greater or lesser extent, all the economies on its western fringe are based on manufacturing for export and upon the import of food and raw materials. The dependence may be greatest in the case of Great Britain but the pattern is general. Economic stability depends upon world trade and can therefore be achieved only in a world setting. This does not mean, as many critics of the Western policy of 'containment' suggest, that Western Europe cannot survive without trading with the Soviet sphere. The figures for past trade are irrelevant. Germany may have relied upon Eastern Europe for food and raw materials, and Britain upon Russia for grains and timber. The point is that all economic plans for the Soviet sphere are now based upon frantic industrialization, and within a decade the surpluses of food and raw materials will have vanished and will be replaced by deficits. If the Western Powers were to make their long-term plans on the basis of primary products from the Soviet world they would be risking the dislocation of their own economies. The question is whether they are sufficiently aware of the need to provide from within the free world alternative sources of supply. The recent Paley Report on Raw Materials has given the danger signal. Within two decades the shortage of primary products may be such that even the United States, which can buy where it will, may be embarrassed. The possible embarrassment of Britain and Western Europe would be twenty times as great.

This problem of the long-term supplies of raw materials is only one aspect of the wider question whether the Western Powers have any long-term economic strategy for holding the line in Europe. At present the length of a Congressional appropriation appears to be the outer limit of thought, yet a year is not even adequate for planning the career of a single individual. A mighty alliance, a political association formidable enough to hold the Soviet giant in check, is inconceivable upon an economic basis that may crumble away in twelve months' time. Here then is the second great obstacle to the maintenance of the European frontier. Most of the economic forces operating uncontrolled in the free world point away from

stability, cohesion and co-operation in Europe and towards competitive collapse. The *ad hoc* measures of the last four years have made good the damage of the last war and restored Europe's capacity to produce. They have not evolved a balanced pattern of international trade, they have not secured the long-term expansion of primary products, they have not reopened the flow of international investment. The symbol of this failure is the continuing dollar gap, and although the connection between maintaining the line in Europe and creating a viable system of trade in the free world may not appear obvious, it is clear enough that Britain and Western Europe could stand only a certain degree of unemployment without giving up the idea of 'containment' altogether in favour of some combination of neutralism abroad and extremism at home.

For the issue is not simply one of economics. The supporters of Atlantic co-operation – in other words, the supporters of the only combination of Powers capable of containing Russia on the Iron Curtain – are all moderate men. Extremism of either the Right or the Left rejects the idea of Atlantic partnership. In Britain, it is the fellow-travellers on the Left and the extreme 'imperialists' on the Right who oppose the Atlantic connection. In France, the Communists, the Neutralists and the Gaullists make up the combination; in Germany, the followers of the late Dr Schumacher and the ex-Nazis; in Italy, the supporters of Togliatti and Nenni and the neo-Fascists follow the same fatal pattern of the extremes united to destroy the co-operation willed by the centre. But the triumph of moderation in politics depends upon the maintenance of conditions of reasonable prosperity and expansion. Economic well-being is not the whole answer, but its opposite is the enemy of that spirit of reason and goodwill without which alliances founder in nationalist feeling, emotional prejudice and instinctive isolationism.

The question whether Europe can remain divided thus depends today very largely on the question whether the Atlantic community can be made a genuine economic and political partnership. Within such a partnership the staying power to withstand Communist pressure can be maintained, a balance of power sufficient to deter Russian ambition built up, and a new world of opportunity and expansion created to absorb Europe's energies and hopes, and to offer, over the years, the spur and threat of freedom to the slave world beyond the Iron Curtain. The Russian experiment in total imperialist control has been tried before by other tyrannies and history is strewn with the wrecks of their colonial systems. We need not suppose that Moscow will be immune from the law of diminishing returns of dictatorship or from the difficulty of securing effective succession to an autocratic yet non-hereditary leader of the State. Once weakness sets in at the centre of the Soviet system, it will spread

sooner or later to the periphery. Then the pressure in Europe will begin to run decisively from West to East and the frontiers will be capable of modification without general war – or else irrelevant as they became in the eighteenth century between Catholic and Protestant Europe. But before this transformation can come about the West itself must be organized, prosperous and active in faith.

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Yet it is possible to wonder, even if an Atlantic community is created, whether the present frontier is a tenable one. That various frontiers have existed in Europe in the past is a fact, yet few have survived if they run through the very heart of a country. The splitting of Germany into two, with or without an Atlantic community, surely makes the present division a highly hazardous one. The hazard is unhappily inescapable. Yet in a situation where there is no good answer, the division of Germany may be the least of a number of evils. The reunion of Germany at present would entail the adherence of a very powerful nation to one side or other in the Cold War. If Germany opted for the West, the Atlantic alliance would include for the first time a potentially aggressive partner with specific, passionately-held territorial claims against the Soviet bloc. Under such conditions the risk of general war would seem almost greater than in the present division.

Yet a Communist Germany, adding the Ruhr to the East's industrial potential, would spell the end of free Europe. Nor is it possible to believe that peace would follow from the manoeuvres of a supposedly neutral Germany playing off East against West to its own advantage. It may therefore be that, in the present degree of international tension, the division of Germany is least likely to precipitate general war.

To this possibility there remains one cogent objection. The long-term division of Germany is conceivable. Can the same be said for the division of Berlin? This exposed island of the Western world, divided from the main Continent by complete Communist encirclement, is the most disastrous inheritance of the war. The more absolutely the Soviets seal off the East German frontier, the more precarious becomes the condition of Berlin. If a new blockade were imposed the Western Powers could, in theory, decide to maintain an indefinite airlift. They can, in theory and in practice, compensate and settle in other parts of the free world every citizen who might choose to be evacuated from the beleaguered city. But, short of risking general war, they cannot physically attach West Berlin to Western Germany.

This problem does not invalidate the general principle of containment or weaken the case for holding the line in Europe. It does, however, point to the weakest link in the chain of stability and security in the West.

## THE ROOTS OF EUROPE

G.F. Hudson

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and a regular contributor to *The Economist*.

The nations of Europe form a group not simply because they share a part of the land surface of the earth which geographers have defined as a continent, but far more because they share the inheritance of a distinct civilization. That there should be an equivalence between the land area of the continent and the range of the civilization which we call European is not something to be taken for granted as being in the nature of things, for there is no automatic correspondence between a continent and the territorial sphere of a civilization. The historical unity of European civilization is due to the fact that it has spread by processes of diffusion ultimately going back to a single source which was so located as either to exclude or transform influences coming into Europe from Asia and Africa; first the maritime culture of the Greek settlements, scattered along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts of Europe from Spain to the Crimea, grew into the Greco-Latin world of the Roman Empire extending northwards to the Rhine and the Danube; and then after the disintegration of the Roman Empire the Christian 'Romanistic' civilization spread over all northern Europe, reaching west to Ireland, north to Scandinavia and east to Russia. In Asia and Africa, on the other hand, the territories of the Roman Empire were overrun by the Moslem Arabs and Turks and became the domain of a different civilization; Islam also penetrated Europe, gaining a temporary ascendancy in Spain and later in the Balkans, but without making a permanent and complete cultural transformation in either area. Except for the European corner of Turkey between the Bosphorus and the Maritsa, Europe to-day consists of countries which have the Roman world as the main origin of their past culture and Christianity as their traditional religion.

At a time when a closer association of European nations west of the Iron Curtain has been projected, and already to some extent realized, it may nevertheless be held that emphasis on the distinct origins and traditions of European civilization is undesirable, that it is really irrelevant to the changed conditions and circumstances of the present age, and that for the practical needs of the 'cold war' it is more important to unite all the 'free world', without distinction of historical origin, in solidarity against

totalitarian domination. For this way of thinking a special political and economic association of Western European countries may be useful for some purposes, but the main direction of attachment beyond the boundaries of the nation-state should be to the United Nations or to N A T O, not to Europe as such. It is true that as a result of the diffusion of European civilization outside Europe, through emigration and settlement in the Americas and through impact on peoples of non-European cultural tradition in Asia and Africa, a new world-civilization has come into being, and there is a potential danger in any grouping of nations which may tend to re-accentuate the division of the continents. It is also true, as two European wars and the threat of a third have amply demonstrated, that the democracies of Western Europe cannot maintain their independence without support from North America, and insular Britain has ties with an inter-continental Commonwealth which rival those binding her with continental Europe. In spite of these considerations, however, there is good reason for holding that Europe should receive a special loyalty from those who dwell within its borders and share in its heritage. It is a reasonable presumption that a civilization which has already created so much has still its peculiar contribution to make to human progress, and it is a reasonable expectation that its vitality will be the better renewed if its heirs can be made more aware of what they have in common and less emotionally segregated in their respective national enclosures. And if such an increased sense of unity finds expression in a new institutional structure, that would not be so very new after all, for the greater part of Europe outside the Iron Curtain once had political unity under the Roman Empire and all of it was comprised in the ecclesiastical unity of medieval Christendom.

A multinational civilization involves a balance between the common, unifying, supernational element and the various national cultures. This balance is precarious, liable to be tilted one way or the other, so that there are oscillations between tendencies towards an excessive cosmopolitan uniformity on the one hand and a centrifugal particularism on the other. Thus the extreme standardization of thought, art and ways of living under the Roman Empire was followed by the variety of the post-Roman era; the universality of the medieval Church by the separation of national churches at the Reformation; and the cosmopolitan aristocratic French-European culture of the eighteenth century by the romantic cult of folk-legend and local popular tradition. The development of political nationalism in the nineteenth century was closely connected with such an emphasis on national history and culture at the expense of the common European heritage. But up to the second decade of the twentieth century the centrifugal forces were never so strong as to produce a fundamental disruption

of the common European consciousness; neither the resort of sovereign states to war as the *ultima ratio regum*, nor the excesses of national vanity and self-glorification, nor the divisions of religion and ideology, entirely destroyed the sense of underlying unity based on a shared tradition. Even the French Revolution with its assault on the *Ancien Régime* throughout Europe did not involve such a disruption, for it emanated from the country which was the principal heir of the Renaissance, and looked back for precedents to ancient Rome. It is only in our own age that large parts of Europe have been torn away by political and cultural movements totally repudiating all common ground between European nations and severing the last bonds which restrained their diversity. First, the Communist revolution in Russia not only proclaimed an entirely new order of society in irreconcilable conflict with the non-Communist world, but gradually secluded the Russian people from all contact with Western Europe, so that the gulf which has been created has been continually widened with the passage of time. Then the Nazis in Germany, invoking the concept of racial superiority, brought about a 'revolution of destruction' which deluged Europe in blood and isolated the spirit of the German people in a self-adoring dream-world of paranoiac barbarism. The Nazi bid to dominate Europe ended in utter defeat, but as a result of the cataclysm the Soviet power advanced to the Elbe and the Adriatic, cutting Europe and defeated Germany itself into two radically separated segments. To-day the Iron Curtain imposes on all within its cruel metallic envelopment a mental seclusion and disconnection from the European tradition such as has never existed since the first emergence of an all-European civilization.

The fundamental factor in the twentieth-century disruption of Europe has been the development of ultra-nationalist states of mind in Germany and Russia. In each case the nationalist urge, a tendency of a blindly emotional character, has combined with an intellectually elaborated ideology, but in each case the ideology has been a rationalization rather than the real driving force. This has been more apparent with the Nazis than with the Bolsheviks, because the theory of Nordic-Aryan racial superiority was from the beginning clearly devised to justify German *Herrenvolk* pretensions, whereas the Soviet Communist régime sprang from a doctrine which was not only rigorously internationalist, but laid down – a dogma accepted by Lenin himself – that the most highly industrialized countries must lead the way to socialism. But the path taken by Soviet Communism since the death of Lenin – and even before – has been one of ever-increasing assimilation to Russian nationalism, so that the supposed triumph of international socialism has produced a State which liquidates disaffected subject peoples by mass deportation without dis-

tion of class, attributes all modern scientific inventions to Russians without regard to historical evidence and prohibits the intermarriage of Soviet citizens with foreigners, even though they belong to other Communist countries. The idea of a universal mission as the leader of world revolution has done for Russia what the doctrine of racial destiny did for Germany; it has released the national ego and its will to domination from all such inhibitions and restraints as might be imposed by ideas of international law, the rights of nations or a common civilization.

The origins of the states of mind which have so tragically come to possess the German and Russian peoples in our time lie far back in the history of Europe. Both the Germans and the Russians have undergone historical frustrations which the British, French and other Western European peoples have not experienced, and which have had the effect of alienating them from the main European tradition. For the Russians this has been primarily a cultural and spiritual frustration, the problem of what Russian writers used to call 'the borrowed soul', the contradiction between the medieval pride of 'holy Russia' and the extreme cultural subservience of the Russian ruling class to Western Europe after the westernizing reforms of Peter the Great and his successors. The German *malaise* was of a more directly political kind; it arose from the disintegration of the medieval Reich and the long period of national disunion, from the clash of nationalities within the Habsburg empire, and finally after 1918 from the humiliation of defeat and of the Versailles *Diktat*.

Of all the peoples of Europe who were beyond the frontiers of the ancient Roman empire, but were brought into the fold of medieval Christendom, the Russians shared least in the secular heritage of Greece and Rome. This, as N. Zernov has explained in his illuminating book *Moscow the Third Rome*, was due to the use of Church Slavonic instead of Greek or Latin as the language of Russian medieval learning:

the spiritual isolation of Russia was maintained in spite of its conversion to Christianity. It must be remembered that almost up to the eighteenth century a knowledge of either Greek or Latin was absolutely essential as the key to the storehouse of European culture; theology, philosophy and science were confined nearly exclusively to these two languages. Russians with a few exceptions knew neither of them, which meant that they remained outside the main stream of Christian learning, unable to make use of its achievements or contribute to its development. . . . Plato and Aristotle, Cicero and Virgil, the men whose writings inspired the minds of other Christians, remained unknown in Russia.

This deficiency did not, however, produce any sense of inferiority in the Russians; on the contrary, after the Turkish conquest of the Balkans and Constantinople had left the ruler of Moscow as the only independent monarch in the sphere of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Russian monks

propagated the idea of Russia's special divine mission as the unique champion of the true faith. The doctrine thus found expression in the installation charter of the first Patriarch of Moscow:

Because the old Rome has fallen on account of the heresy of Apollinarius, and the second Rome, which is Constantinople, is now in possession of the godless Turks, thy great kingdom, O pious Tsar, is the third Rome. . . . All other Christian kingdoms are now merged in thy kingdom. Thou art the only Christian sovereign in the whole world, the master of all Christians.

Nor were these pretensions mere devices of Muscovite statecraft; they corresponded to a concentration of national life on religion which had no parallel elsewhere in Europe. Again to quote Zernov:

The Russia of the sixteenth century could be described as one vast religious house obeying the ecclesiastical canons, attending church services and observing the rules of fasting. The church precepts were considered to be as binding on each citizen as were the laws of the State. Foreign visitors, including Orthodox Greeks, were astonished at the length of the Russian church services and the austerity of the fasts, which were as strictly observed by the Tsar and the nobility as by the simple peasants.

It is only by appreciating this historical background to modern Russia that it is possible to understand the force of the revolutionary messianism which made its appearance in Russia soon after the middle of the nineteenth century. Peter the Great, resolved to cure Russia of secular backwardness and weakness, had forcibly sent the Third Rome to school with foreigners and heretics; he had thereby made Russia one of the Great Powers of Europe, but at the cost of a wound to Russian pride which could never be healed. Western Europe was constituted the measure of all things, and the French-speaking Russian aristocracy was so denationalized that it even became a fashion to have difficulty in understanding the Russian language. In the end this spiritual expatriation with its contempt for the Russian past brought about the cultural counter-movement of the Slavophiles, who poured scorn on the 'rotten' materialist West, reaffirmed the unique value of Russian Orthodox spirituality and preached a return to the old Muscovite way of life. The Slavophile cult made a strong appeal to the newly formed Russian intelligentsia, but the influence of Western thought and the cultural development of Russia itself had gone too far for such medievalism to be a practical programme. There was, however, another way in which the sense of frustration at Russia's backwardness and the desire to turn the tables on the West could find expression – by looking not to the past, but to the future, for Russian supremacy and representing Russia not as the rearguard of Christian religiosity in a world given over to secular materialism, but as the vanguard of a new social order in the age of capitalist industry. The group of Russian revolutionaries known as Narodniks held that backward

Russia was destined to bypass the capitalist development of the West and by making the first socialist revolution to lead the world to the achievement of social justice. The idea of socialism, like that of parliamentary democracy, had come into Russia from the West, but whereas the principles of political liberalism were already largely realized in Western countries, so that here Russia could only imitate and follow, those of socialism were still only dreams of the future, affording the Russian genius an opportunity to be first in the field. The Narodniks were confident that it could perform this task because they believed that the communal tenure of land by Russian peasants in the *mir* (really a fiscal device of the period of serfdom) was a survival of primitive communism, and that this could be used as a base for the construction of a new socialist order; thus Russia's economic and social backwardness would actually be an advantage, for it meant that Russia had not travelled so far on the wrong road as the nations of Western Europe.

In connection with this theory of Russia's mission of world-leadership towards the society of the future, now claimed in Stalin's Russia to be in process of fulfilment, the extreme Narodniks also formulated a political doctrine which anticipated the essential characteristics of the present Soviet régime. They repudiated political democracy as an invention of the 'rotten' West and conceived of the socialist revolution as primarily the task of an organized conspiratorial group conscious of its purpose; in the words of Tkachev:

Neither now nor in the future can a people left to its own resources accomplish a social revolution. Nor can a leaderless community erect a new world on the ruins of the old. . . . Only a revolutionary minority can maintain such a role and such a mission.

The nucleus of the revolutionary minority must consist of men and women entirely dedicated to the revolution, as if in a religious order. The true revolutionary, according to Nechaiev,

is animated by one single interest, one single idea, one single passion – the Revolution. . . . He hates and despises all the manifestations and motives of present-day social morality. In his eyes what is moral is that which aids the triumph of the Revolution and that alone.

It is from such ideas, such values and such emotions, that the new Holy Russia of Stalin, the 'leader and teacher of all working people', has taken its shape. Marxism prevailed over the Narodnik faith in Russian revolutionary circles around the turn of the century, substituting the industrial proletariat for the peasantry as the pre-destined revolutionary class; superficially this renewed the Western orientation of Russian thought, for it postulated the primacy in social evolution of the Western countries which were far ahead of Russia in industrialization. The emphasis on

industrialization and on the proletariat as a social base has remained a part of Soviet Communism. But the totalitarian monoparty political system which has been created in Russia corresponds to the conceptions of Tkachev and Nechaiev, not those of Marx and Engels. Equally the identification of Communism with a Russian national chauvinism carried to fantastic lengths of glorification of the Russian genius, not only since but also before the Revolution, corresponds to the Narodnik idea of Russian world-leadership through socialism and is as remote as possible from the genuine internationalism of Marx. Communism remains international, but only in the sense that the Communists of the West are bound to serve the Russian State by treason to their own countries; thus it is their duty to believe that the pioneers of modern science were Russians no less than to assist, as opportunity offers, the conquest of their homelands by Russian armies.

The evolution of German Nazism has been more straightforward than that of Russian Bolshevism because it has never been similarly disguised by the form of an internationalist or democratic faith, but it has been fundamentally comparable as a product of national frustration. Germany, unlike Russia, was a part of medieval Latin Christendom and shared in its development with Italy, France and England, holding even a titular primacy in the West through its identification with the Holy Roman Empire. But with the disintegration of the Empire, the religious disruption of Germany and the failure to create a nation-state of modern type, Germans fell back on the idea of racial superiority as compensation for their political decline. By it they could claim to have been the real founders of European civilizations, for the achievement of Greece and Rome could be attributed to the original Aryans and that of medieval and Renaissance Europe to aristocracies sprung from Gothic, Frankish, and Lombard invasions of the Roman Empire. The theory also set a premium on barbarism since it was only by periodic outbursts of Nordic violence that civilization could be renewed.

The condition of a real revival of European civilization is the successful assertion of the European tradition in its wholeness, not as a static, obstructive barrier to change, but as a continuity of progress, against doctrines which serve as mere instruments of national megalomania and self-isolation. Europe must be positively affirmed as something larger, older, greater and more enduring than any nation within Europe, however great may be its population and power, or its contributions to the common inheritance. Europe is no lost cause; it has already with the aid of its North American reinforcement won the victory over German racialism, and it is organizing itself to resist the messianic dictation of Moscow. It is not at an end, but at a new beginning.

## TOWARDS A MORE PERFECT UNION

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America and Russia are the twin sponsors of a United Western Europe. Russia has given only the spur of fear without which conservative nationalism would have smothered the idea of supra-nationalism; but America has given form to the whole movement, and has offered rewards of the most tangible sort to those who follow her example.

For it is essentially the American example which is being consciously followed by the proponents of unity in Western Europe. Because America is the strongest and most prosperous country in the world less lucky people are seeking for the secret of her success. Americans have never been shy of telling the world that the secret of their success is federation and democracy; it was therefore only to be expected that many of the democracies of the West should seek salvation in federating.

But such a step is contrary to an age-old European tradition, the nationalist tradition, which has its roots a thousand years back and has dominated European civilization for the past four hundred years. To understand the causes of the movement in Europe towards a wider community, it is necessary first to understand why this nationalist tradition has begun to fail. It has not yet failed, of course, and the whole history of the free world in the post-war era can be seen as a struggle between the old tradition of nationalism, backed with all the ancient glories of Europe, and the newer tradition of an international community, backed by the precept of America and endowed with some of the glamour of the United States' own example. The example was not perfect, for in the course of 150 years the United States had acquired a great deal of nationalism, even though its population was drawn from an international community that included almost the whole world.

The nationalist tradition had considerable early success in rendering harmless and meaningless the insistent American demand for federal union in Europe. This demand first became vocal in 1947 with the inauguration of the Marshall Plan; it reached its high point a few years later when Mr Paul Hoffmann was administering the European Recovery Plan

with the threat 'Integrate or else'. At this time America was primarily concerned with the economics of Europe, and interest in European union was primarily in economic integration. It seemed to most Americans and very many Europeans that the secret of American prosperity lay in the vast single market, uninterrupted by tariff barriers, that lay between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The main object of Mr Hoffmann's administration of E R P was to reproduce those conditions in Europe.

The efforts to 'liberalize' European trade were extensive, and have been represented – chiefly by those imbued with the nationalist tradition – as great steps towards European Unity. This is a false picture. All that has been done by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, and by the European Payments Union, has not brought Europe anywhere near to the state of 'unity' which existed in 1914 when the Gold Standard still operated. The idea of a Customs Union, which was discussed in 1947–48, would have been a real move towards unity, but the idea was killed stone dead by the forces of economic nationalism. The result of the Marshall Plan, on the surface, was to make European nations less insolvent, and so somewhat less insanely autarchic, but there was no significant move towards anything worthy of the name of European Union. It may be objected that during this period there arose – partly because of American interest and suggestion – a political movement for European unity which resulted in the Council of Europe. But there again behind all the window-dressing there has been no fundamental change in the relationship of the European powers. The Council of Europe at present is far more a tribute to the strength of the idea of 'open diplomacy' and 'democratic foreign policy' than it is to European unity. Members of Parliament from many nations are enabled to sit down together and talk over their common problems, but they have shown no aptitude for devising common policies. Even such an elementary concept as a 'European' passport has not got any distance at Strasbourg, because the Assembly has been given absolutely no powers. Power remains in the Ministerial Committee, and the Foreign Ministers have seen to it that the nationalist, not the federalist, tradition shall prevail.

When Americans see through the façade of European unity, or are distressed by the slowness of progress towards federation, their scapegoat is Great Britain. Britain 'dragging her feet', has become a sort of heraldic device in the American mythology about post-war Europe. This view fails altogether to take account of the fact that Britain has a tradition not strictly nationalist, nor in any way federalist. The British method of building an international community has behind it all the prestige of the British Commonwealth. It is a method based on trade and telegrams. The

trade relationship of Britain and the Commonwealth is one of mutual advantage, with the United Kingdom providing a vast and regular market, while the remainder of the Commonwealth is invaluable as a source of cheap food. But on that simple economic basis has been built a political superstructure which is one of the wonders of the modern world. Essentially what holds the Commonwealth together is the extraordinarily intimate exchange of telegrams, in which common problems of foreign policy and economics are freely discussed. This free but secret debate has succeeded, in spite of great difficulties, in avoiding violent quarrels between Britain and countries as differing in outlook as Australia and India.

It is, of course, perfectly possible to throw grave doubts on the future viability of the Commonwealth. It can be said that in the past its unity, demonstrated in 1914 and 1939, depended on common traditions and race; and that with the introduction of Asian members the unity of the Commonwealth is only a façade, which has been exposed by the Korean war and India's equivocal attitude. But the fact remains that for most people the Commonwealth is a most remarkable effective world-wide organism. It was this model which Britain held up to Europe. British statesmen were always willing to co-operate with Europe on the same lines on which they co-operated with the Commonwealth. O E E C was envisaged by them as a sort of clearing-house for economic information – not unlike the Commonwealth Finance Committee which sits in London – ready to give guidance, incapable of issuing orders. What is more, it was very nearly this model which carried the day. If the Marshall Plan had run its course till 1952 without the earthquake of the Korean war, the economic organization of Europe, and probably the defence organization also, would have been of the consultative type which has been tested in the British Commonwealth. This would have been a triumph for the modified nationalism of the British against both American federalism and the extremes of European nationalism which sought to make O E E C simply a method of dividing up American aid.

The British plan for producing a sort of Commonwealth of Europe failed narrowly because of the increase of tension resulting from the Communist policies which culminated in the outbreak of war in Korea. The worsening of the outlook for peace transformed American interest in Europe from being primarily economic to being primarily military. This inevitably carried with it a demand that Germany should be thrown into the military balance by restoring her army.

The prospect of a revived military Germany was so disturbing, and so vivid a reminder of what nationalism had brought to Europe, that it

effectively killed any chance of a settlement of Western Europe on the basis of even modified nationalism. The strongest element in European federalism is disgust with the record of European nationalism. The two countries which have suffered most severely from excesses of nationalist feeling are Germany and France, who have torn each other to pieces time and again in modern history. It was in those two countries, therefore, that the urge to real federalism was strongest.

In essence the indigenous origin of European federalism has been this realization that the Franco-German nationalist feud was too horrible and too debilitating to be allowed to continue. But at the same time the tradition of hostility was so deep in both countries that it demanded a tremendous effort to break it. That was why a 'Commonwealth' solution was not sufficient for Western Europe. The relation of France and Germany was such that it would inevitably have broken up any mere alliance or understanding; to stop the feud, only Union was enough.

The most striking feature of post-war Europe has been this defeat of nationalism, in both East and West. It may revive elsewhere, as it has revived in Yugoslavia, but at present nationalism, after 400 years of growth, culminating in the self-determination principle of 1919, appears to be losing power rapidly. The backbone of the sovereign States of Europe seems to have been broken by the Second World War. Almost every Continental people saw the State to which they owed allegiance fail in its prime duty of giving protection to them. Almost every State was overthrown at least once, and many were overthrown twice during the course of the war. Such violent events could not fail to loosen loyalties and raise the most persistent doubts as to the value of sovereignty.

At the end of the eighteenth century the American colonists looked across the Atlantic and saw Europe in a constant state of war between the independent kingdoms and empires of the day. It was largely disgust with that scene which led them to form a more perfect Union of States which would not, it was hoped, be able to quarrel and fight. Exactly the same motives were present in the minds of many Europeans after two world wars, when they also sought Union.

This historical background also helps to explain why Britain has remained outside this stream of European thought. The back of *our* sovereignty was not broken; the moment when many European sovereign States were humiliated was our Finest Hour.

Though the ground for a European Union was prepared by the Second World War and the emergence of an overwhelming external threat, and

even though America favoured such a Union, it might never have overcome the obstacles of nationalism but for the men who came to power in the Western countries concerned. De Gasperi in Italy, Schuman in France, and Adenauer in Germany, have in common the language of their birth – German. Adenauer and Schuman are both Rhinelanders, though from opposite banks of the river, and de Gasperi is a Tyrolean from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. All these men are earnest Catholics, and they represent the instinctive Central European feeling that there is a cultural unity behind the superficial divisions of sovereign States. It is mistaken to regard this as a Roman Catholic movement because historically it goes back beyond the Reformation, to the really Catholic Church which embraced so much of Europe and of which the political manifestation was the Holy Roman Empire.

The great question that lies ahead for the emerging European Community is whether it can find and hold for itself some universalist or internationalist philosophy to replace the warring nationalist creeds. There is a great danger that the new federal Europe consisting of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries will become simply a Greater Germany, dominated, however peacefully, by the largest partner. Such a relationship will carry within itself the seeds of its own decay. Unfortunately, the historical pressures which have brought a European Community into existence at this particular moment, rather than in a decade or two from now, are pressures which favour the hegemony of Germany. The very name of the new political organism, 'The European Defence Community', indicates the extent to which it is confined at present to problems of war. Certainly the American pressure, without which the Schuman Plan would never have been ratified, and the European Army scheme never signed, was clearly and openly designed to bring about a better defence structure in Western Europe. But in a Community concerned primarily with heavy industry and armed forces there can be little doubt that Germany will quickly become the dominant partner. Can the European Defence Community become a European Community in which Paris and Rome would play at least as large a role as the upstart Bonn, or even Berlin?

It is in an attempt to ensure that the partnership is universal, and not confined to defence, that the French leaders have insisted so firmly that there shall be a real Federal Assembly, completely different from the meeting of national delegations which is the British version of the Council of Europe. Mr Eden's proposal for holding the Federal Assembly at Strasbourg in close conjunction with the Council of Europe is an attempt to bridge the gap between the federalist and nationalist concepts of European union. It is very doubtful whether the compromise will work

for long, and the likelihood of its failure points up the sad state of European unity. There is no European unity; the Continent is as divided as ever.

The new divisions which are emerging or have emerged are as great or greater than those that existed in 1945. The first division of Europe is, of course, between East and West. As long as the Iron Curtain exists there can be no European Union, only a partial union of Western Europe. But Western Europe itself is also divided. Six countries have followed the American lead towards a virtual United States of Europe; the remaining members of the Council of Europe have followed the British lead on a leisurely progress towards a European Commonwealth. The very friendly relations between the two groups should not blind us to the fact that they are divided and could drift apart.

What is the remedy for the failure of European Union? To answer that question it is necessary to see first why it failed. It did not fail because Britain and America had different ideas about the methods of organizing European unity; it failed because Europe is not a unit. This simple fact was concealed from many intelligent people on both sides of the Atlantic, partly because of the piecemeal approach towards unity in the years after the war. If the only object of European unity was to meet certain economic difficulties, then Europe certainly would be more efficient as a unitary market than subdivided by States; that would be true even of Western Europe alone. If the only object of European unity were to build more efficient defences, then certainly a unified army would be more efficient than a group of national armies.

But if the object of European unity was to create a United States of Europe, or a European Commonwealth which could have a life of its own and enjoy some feeling of self-sufficiency, then European unity by itself was a failure from the start. The essence of a political unit or community is that its individual members should feel that they have more in common with each other than with those outside the community. A United Europe does not fulfil that specification. It is absurd to ask an Englishman to feel closer to the average Portuguese than to the average Canadian; equally it is absurd to ask a Norwegian to feel closer to an Italian than to most of the inhabitants of Minnesota.

The Community basis on which political unity can be founded crosses the Atlantic. That is why the Atlantic Community has replaced European Unity as the political reality of tomorrow. But the problems which have bedevilled the history of European unity apply with even greater force to Atlantic unity. Is it to be organized on a federal or confederal basis in line with American tradition, or on 'Commonwealth' lines in accordance with

British traditions? An even more serious question is who are to be the sponsors and what the motive forces bringing it to birth?

The Russian threat, of course, remains – driving us closer together. But in building some measure of unity in Europe there was also the active friendly insistence of America. There will be no such American pressure for Atlantic unity. We must face the fact that a great deal of American pressure for European unity was the result of vestigial isolationism. Their hope, for instance in the Marshall Plan, was that by American action *from outside*, Europe could be set on her own feet and left to look after herself. The North Atlantic Treaty was an enormous step forward because America recognized that she had to be a member, not just a sponsor, of that organization. But though a full member, America is most unlikely to press for any tightening of the bonds of the Community. At present she is the acknowledged leader, and what she says, after some grumbling, goes. The American interest, in the short run, is to keep the organization loose so that the power of the largest State is always overwhelming.

For this very reason it is in the interest of Britain to see that the bonds of the organization are drawn tighter, or we shall find ourselves always accepting American policies, as a lesser evil compared to quarrelling with America and seeing her act independently. It is in the British – and European – interest to see that the Atlantic Community is strong enough in its internal structure to allow sharp disagreements without dissolution of the alliance. Unfortunately it will be very hard for Britain to adopt this line because it is alien to the whole loose Commonwealth tradition, which was based on our position as the most important power. Secondly, it will be difficult because our role since the war has been to act as brake on the American steam-roller driving Europe towards political integration.

Somehow Britain must reverse her role in accordance with the changed circumstances. If we can make this effort and seize the opportunity which now offers us, Britain has a chance – a last chance – of making the free world operate according to the commonsense principles of which we are so proud. If we fail to take the opportunity we shall find ourselves in the long run either dissatisfied satellites of a wholly independent America, or reluctant members of a European Union imposed from outside.

## WESTERN UNION: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES

Robert Boothby, M P

Conservative M P for East Aberdeen since 1924

We live in a world overshadowed by the menace of Communism, and threatened with catastrophe by the titanic global struggle for power which is now being waged between the forces of Communism led by Russia, and those of liberal democracy led by the United States of America. In order to avoid the final destruction of our civilization we have to consider, coldly and objectively, the causes and nature of the threat; the policy required to meet it; and the character and future development of the various international organizations in the free world to which it has in large measure given rise.

It is one of the tragedies of life that decisions taken under the pressure of events are apt to have far-reaching consequences; and can be reversed, if at all, with difficulty and often at great cost. I should not care to share the responsibility of those who accepted the decisions of the Yalta Conference. But that they were implicit in the situation which then prevailed is not to be denied. We were fighting an enemy with whom a compromise peace was unthinkable, with a totalitarian but indispensable ally whose ultimate objective was the destruction of the capitalist system in any shape or form, and the triumph of Communism.

The fact [wrote Professor Varga, the acknowledged mouthpiece of the Kremlin] that the Soviet Union and highly developed capitalist States were in the same camp against Hitlerite aggression meant that the struggle of the two systems inside the democratic camp was relaxed and temporarily stopped. It did not mean that the struggle was ended.

In these circumstances it is clear that the war could only have ended with the total military defeat of Germany, and the division of Europe by a line with the Red Army on one side and the forces of the Western democracies on the other. It can be argued that this line might have been pushed further east if the rapidly developing political problems had been considered at an earlier stage by a Supreme Allied Council, for which the present writer vainly pleaded in 1943; but not that it should not have been drawn. In the event its geographical position was dictated not by political considerations but by military operations. Nevertheless we continued, for some time, to be sanguine about the results. The Charter of the United Nations was drafted, at San Francisco, in an atmosphere of

quite unwarranted optimism. We had yet to learn that, for democracies, there can be no such thing as total victory in war.

The question has now arisen whether the policy of the West towards Russia should be one of 'containment' or of 'liberation'. We have no moral right to take away from the populations of the satellite countries now groaning under the Russian yoke the hope of ultimate freedom. Equally we have no moral right to promise them freedom in the immediate future, unless we are prepared to embark on a war of liberation. We are not so prepared. Our policy must therefore be, in the words of Mr George Kennan, one of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of expansive Russian tendencies.

The impending collapse of the capitalist world is the basis of the Communist faith. We have, first of all, to demonstrate by action rather than words that this is not going to happen. We have then to convince the Russian people of the existence, outside the Communist orbit, of a civilization which enjoys a far greater measure of individual freedom and a far higher standard of living than they themselves possess, by means of propaganda which is informative rather than subversive. The knowledge that such a civilization exists – stable, decent, and confident – must in time induce in the Kremlin a sense of frustration. And, to quote Mr Kennan again, no messianic movement can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs. Meanwhile we have no alternative but to build up the deterrent effect of our retaliatory power. For Moscow, in its present mood, understands no language but that of force. Unless and until the West is strong, there can be no hope of coming to a reasonable settlement with the Soviet Union, based on a *modus vivendi*, and without a third world war.

The proliferation of international organizations since the conclusion of the Second World War is at once startling and disconcerting. There is the United Nations Organization, with its Economic and Social Council, its Technical Assistance Board, and its European and Asiatic Committees. There is N A T O and the Council of Europe. There is the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Investment, the International Labour Office, the Food and Agriculture Organization, G A T T, the O E E C and its offshoot the European Payments Union, and a separate organization in Washington for the international control of raw materials, not to mention the proposed Authorities for the administration of the Schuman Plan and the European Defence Community. The consequent overlapping, actual and potential, is prodigious; and it is a miracle that it has not led to greater chaos than at present exists. Clearly the streamlining and rationalization of these international organizations has become an urgent necessity.

Let us consider them under three main heads – U N O, the Council of Europe, and N A T O.

The basic assumption underlying the Charter of the United Nations is unity of purpose amongst the Great Powers. Such unity of purpose did not exist at the time it was drafted, and does not exist to-day. The Charter, in its present form, is no more than a multilateral treaty between a large number of separate and independent nation-states. It contains no provision for the writing of a code of international law which shall regulate the relations between these states. On the contrary, it contains the veto clause, with its implication that the Great Powers are above the law; and that force can only preserve peace when it is applied to small nations, and provoke war when it is applied to the strong. U N O must be maintained because of the value of the work done by its functional institutions, because it is a bridge between the Communist world and the free world, and because it is a framework upon which an effective World Authority may one day be erected. But to suppose that it now provides any kind of collective security is to be the victim of a dangerous illusion.

The Council of Europe is the product of the Hague Congress of 1948, held on the initiative of British statesmen under the leadership of Mr Churchill, to whose influence the modern conception of European Union probably owes more than to that of any other single man. It has achieved a number of successes, notably the signature of a Convention of Human Rights and the admission of Federal Germany to the fraternity of the West. But it has been bedevilled from the start by doubts about its real purpose and functions, and by interminable and irreconcilable arguments between 'federalists' and 'functionalists'. The truth of the matter is that the political problems implicit in the creation of such a Council were never thought out before it was established. As a result it has been constantly by-passed by functional organizations such as the O E E C; and, with an amateurishness which has exasperated friend and foe alike, has been driven to the desperate expedient of passing scores of hastily drafted and superficial resolutions, based on inadequate statistical information, to which scant attention has been paid. It is now in what amounts to a death-agony of frustration, which has given rise to the demand for a 'little federation'.

For this situation the British have a grave and accountable responsibility. We were the leading advocates of the functionalist as opposed to the federalist approach, yet we refused even to enter discussions on the Schuman Plan, which we might have decisively influenced. Similarly we have refused to join the European Defence Community, although the immediate creation of a European Army under a unified command 'in

which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part' was vehemently demanded by Mr Churchill on the floor of the Consultative Assembly in 1950. As one who was present on that occasion, I am sure that nobody had any thought that the United Kingdom would not participate fully in the European Army that was then proposed. When the French added a rider to the effect that there should be a European Minister of Defence, Mr Churchill merely said that he was not himself a candidate for the job. What did that imply? It surely implied that we were in. And in the circumstances it is not difficult to understand the stupefaction of the Continental delegates to the Assembly when they heard from the Home Secretary, in December of last year, that after all we were out.

The European coal and steel community, which owes so much to the faith of M. Robert Schuman and the practical genius of M. Jean Monnet, is the logical basis for the rationalization of European industry and the functional development of the economy of Western Europe as a whole. In no way does it conflict with the conception of European solidarity because, granted future British co-operation amounting to a permanent and organic association, it will dispose of an aggregate production of coal and steel which can rival that of the United States and far surpass that of the Soviet Union. The European Defence Community, without British participation, is a more doubtful proposition if only for the reason that, in approving it, Bonn and Paris in fact approved different things – Bonn the first decisive step towards the restoration of total national sovereignty, Paris the imposition of permanent limitations on the free exercise of that sovereignty. For France, as for Federal Germany, there is only one escape from this dilemma, and that is a merger of E D C with N A T O, on terms which will ultimately permit of equal French and German status within the ambit of the larger organization.

The fact remains, and also the hope, that in defence N A T O must ultimately govern all. As Mr Walter Lippmann has pointed out, an alliance is like a chain. It is not made stronger by adding weak links to it. Since N A T O represents the sole effective concentration of military power in the free world, it follows that the creation of a number of scattered additional alliances can only weaken that power. There is really no solution of the problem of European defence or of German rearmament except within the context of N A T O. Meanwhile the stresses to which N A T O is subjected increase rather than diminish, and the 'miracle' of Lisbon has turned out to be something of a *mirage*. There is no longer any hope of reaching the targets that were then envisaged. The rift between France and Germany widens; and the Saar remains a thorn in the flesh of both. It is better to face the fact that the plan for a European Army has failed significantly to contribute to the emergence of a European

consciousness; and that, for Europeans, the slogan 'guns instead of butter' has at present only a limited appeal.

A drastic reorganization of the machinery of N A T O is urgently required for the purpose of drawing up jointly agreed programmes for the defence expenditure of the constituent members, the places where particular lines of production should be developed, and the measures which should be adopted to ensure that the necessary resources are available and allocated to carry the total rearmament effort to a successful conclusion with the minimum of economic disturbance. In considering whether a particular country is pulling its weight, account must be taken of its total contribution to the defence of the free world; for unless and until each country is felt to be doing its fair share, the present dangerous dissatisfaction is bound to continue.

So far as the wider aspect of Western Union is concerned, I remain convinced that confederation rather than federation offers by far the best hope. I use the word confederation advisedly because it is defined in the dictionary as 'a permanent union of sovereign states for common external action', and that is precisely what I mean. We have suffered a good deal in recent years from what Mr Kennan calls the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems on the part of the United States. Because they solved their own political problem by the acceptance of a common institutional and juridical framework, they have sought to impose it on Europe. But Europe does not consist of thirteen agrarian colonies sharing the same background of common law, speaking the same language, and until recently united under the political authority of a single Crown; and the twentieth century is not the eighteenth. Moreover, the United States finally achieved federal union by means of an appalling war, made no less bloody by being called civil, in which the contending forces were part of a federal army. In actual fact the conception of a number of States with equal rights, regardless of their size and power, tends to exalt the principle of national sovereignty, and to ignore the law of change. Life is complex, diverse and dynamic; and any international organization which is going to work must be capable of rectifying the wrongs and injustices, which will continue to arise in an imperfect world, without undue delay. For this purpose the method of diplomacy is better suited than a constitutional strait-jacket. If the structure is too rigid it will collapse under the first serious strain.

Britain certainly has no moral right to oppose a limited Continental federation of the kind now advocated by M. Schuman and M. Spaak; but, if it takes place outside the Council of Europe, it will be completely at variance with the basic concept of European solidarity. For my part I remain sceptical alike of its desirability and of its value. It has no roots

in history, no traditions, and no viability in terms of politics, economics, or military power. It is totally devoid of mass emotional appeal. And, as I have said before, it would be based upon a temporary and uneasy balance between France and a divided Germany. In short it is an artificial product of professional politicians rather than the outcome of any spontaneous natural growth, or popular demand. How can you form a political federation, which leaves national governments any considerable degree of freedom in designing their own domestic economic policies, out of countries whose economies are essentially competitive, and vary between the extremes of *dirigisme* and *laissez-faire*? Is it conceivable that the Governments of France, Italy, Federal Germany and the Benelux countries would willingly abandon that freedom, or be allowed by their electorates to do so? These questions have only to be asked to be answered. The attempts to form a customs union between the Benelux countries, and between France and Italy, have already failed. The truth is that the propagandists for the 'little federation' ignore the very real sacrifices which are implicit in total economic integration, and paradoxically play up to national interests and sentiment. The Italians are told that it would mean foreign capital investment and the export of surplus manpower, the French that it would mean security, and the Germans that it would mean the recovery of their economic power. No-one is told about the snags.

History teaches us that organic evolution is the best and most enduring form of human progress. Let us therefore seek to build a comprehensive democratic union by the method of organic consultation. The framework for such a union already exists in the shape of the Atlantic Community, the British Commonwealth, and the Council of Europe. As a member of all three, Britain has an important part to play. Inevitably she must put the Commonwealth first. Apart from ties of sentiment, it has met the acid test of any human association – in times of stress, of crisis and of danger it has held together and held firm. Moreover it forms a vital link between the Western world, Asia and the Pacific.

The Council of Europe can be made the laboratory in which a great experiment in confederation, without historical precedent, could be carried out. This depends on the acceptance in principle, and the development in practice, of what has become known as the Eden Plan. The Committee of Ministers should be the executive authority for the definition, alignment and execution of collective policies in matters of common interest. The functional European authorities should be streamlined and brought under its direct authority; and it should be guided, although not bound, by the advice of the Consultative Assembly, which would then become an effective forum of European opinion, with powers

of suggestion, criticism and stimulation over the whole field. If the conception underlying the Eden Plan is rejected outright, and an attempt is then made to form a separate and limited Continental federation, the Council of Europe will perish, and with it the hopes of a new generation.

Upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization depends the security of us all, and therefore our continued existence. The political machinery of N A T O requires to be drastically overhauled; and a joint economic policy pursued which will apportion the burdens of defence fairly as between the member countries, make the necessary resources available to them on reasonable terms, and secure adequate supplies of raw materials through extensive investment in the under-developed territories of the free world. In this latter project, which is of supreme importance, the United States, as the great creditor nation, must necessarily take the lead and play the dominant part.

Here, then, is the task – to weld the three great cantilevers of the Atlantic Community, the British Commonwealth and the Council of Europe into a structure that will successfully withstand the Communist challenge, by forging new political links between the Old World and the New, and closer economic links between Western Europe and the sterling area. It is a formidable task. But, with courage, vision and good will, it can be accomplished in time to save the sum of things.

## A SOCIALIST VIEW OF WESTERN POLICY

Denis Healey, M P

Labour M P for South Leeds since 1951

The handling of German rearmament by the Western Powers will stand for many years as a model of bad diplomacy. It is difficult to believe that the active agents in this case were the same Governments who negotiated the Atlantic Pact with an impeccable mastery of timing and presentation.

Two years have passed since Mr Acheson first issued his ultimatum to the Council of N A T O in New York. At that time America's demand for German troops was supported by no European Government except the Dutch. German opinion was known to be overwhelmingly against a defence contribution. But none could resist the argument that America might withhold support from the attempt to defend Western Europe on the ground. The principle of German rearmament was publicly adopted

by N A T O, and the search for a means of implementing that decision has distorted the whole of Western political and military planning in Europe ever since.

The evil consequences are all too easy to enumerate. The Bonn Government has effortlessly achieved a decisive bargaining position in the Western World, before its uneasy partners were able to construct a framework capable of controlling a resurgent Germany. Because West German opinion was opposed to remilitarization, the Contractual Agreement has been tied to the European Defence Community as a bribe for a German defence contribution. Thus the Occupying Powers have lost any credit they might have won in Germany for relaxing their control – and have been compelled to surrender more than perhaps was wise at the time. The psychological damage to European public opinion, particularly in France, has been considerable. Until September 1950, America had used her immense diplomatic influence in Europe with discretion. This unexpected ultimatum on an issue so supercharged with emotion robbed her of much of the credit she had won by her tactful administration of Marshall Aid.

Of the effect on Soviet thinking it is more difficult to judge. Russian propaganda was given a valuable means of rallying Eastern Europe and dividing the West. Whether the decision immediately influenced Russian policy, and in what direction, there is no means of knowing. Certainly it confined a maximum of provocation with a minimum of additional security. Though the prospect of German rearmament has convulsed European politics for two years, the defence of Western Europe has not been reinforced by one German recruit. Indeed a real accession of military strength from Germany is not expected until a further two years after the necessary agreements are ratified – whenever that may be. This has always been the crucial weakness of the original military argument for a German defence contribution – the West would be unable to raise German troops at the period of greatest danger when they were most needed. Germany could not in any case have made much of a contribution towards reversing the military balance in Europe. Her main function would be to increase the margin of safety once it was established. Worse still, if the Western decision provoked Russia into arming Soviet Germany the balance would swing still more in Russia's favour in the short run. For Russia has gained an eighteen months' start on the West by training and arming the cadres of her German army in the *Bereitschaften*.

Moreover, the West has throughout paid too little attention to the opinions of the Germans it proposes to recruit. Even to-day the great majority of Germans of military age are unwilling to put on uniform. Catastrophic defeat has discredited the military tradition far more

effectively than Allied propaganda. In any case, no German can see the point of serving in an army which is unable to protect his own home; it will be several years before N A T O is strong enough to defend Western Germany even with German military help. For, as Schumacher has said, the absence of a geographical barrier across Central Germany would make a war of movement inevitable; and Western Germany could only be spared the fate of Korea if the Atlantic forces were strong enough to hit back against aggression so hard and fast as to win the first major battle on the Vistula. It is conceivable that the Germans might have overcome their misgivings if they had been offered genuine equality by the Powers which demanded their assistance. But the demand was made at a time when none of Germany's neighbours were prepared to concede this. The European Defence Community is thus compounded of mistrust. We have the extraordinary position that Germany's contribution to her own defence is to be restricted by treaty in proportion to the French contribution. In fact there is a double arms race – the West as a whole against the Soviet bloc, and Germany's Western neighbours against Germany. But the strength of the West as a whole against Russia can be artificially restricted by the failure of E D C's other members to keep pace with Germany. While this sort of suspicion and mistrust colours the Western attitude to Germany, the West Germans will inevitably feel a solidarity with their brothers in the Soviet Zone which far outweighs their solidarity with E D C. No German will give an affirmative answer to the question 'Would you fight for the Western world even against German soldiers from the Russian Zone?' Nothing but national unity, or the certain prospect of it, will make Germany a reliable ally for any group of Powers.

Confronted by these objections, the supporters of current policy tend to fall back on selfish economic arguments. Why should we, the Western Powers, cripple our economies for the defence of Germany, they ask, while the Germans, free of this burden, simply expand their trade at our expense? There is less in this argument than meets the eye. Under the Occupation Statute, Western Germany has been contributing over £600 million a year to the upkeep of Allied forces on her territory. This contribution will cease as soon as E D C begins to operate. Then Germany will make only such a contribution as she finds convenient as a member of E D C. In fact, after June 1953 the British Treasury will have to find anything up to £200 million more – in dollars – if the British forces are to remain at their present strength in Germany. Nor is it clear that the defence burden then falling directly on Germany will much reduce her ability to compete abroad with British exports. Since Germany is not to produce heavy armaments, German machinery will continue to stream abroad, while British engineering is still crippled by rearmament. All this

is to say that the case against German rearmament now is quite as formidable as the case which is usually brought forward to support it. But both the case for and against are fatally defective. They treat German rearmament solely in relation to current Western military needs. They ignore it as an essential element in the political problem of Germany itself.

If German rearmament is rightly seen as the inevitable climax of Germany's recovery from defeat, the problems and opportunities it presents fall into the right perspective. As I argued in the June issue of the *TWENTIETH CENTURY*, the re-emergence of Germany as the strongest Power in Western Europe, and as a world Power in her own right, will be the most important new factor in international affairs in the next ten years. Permanent military occupation of a great nation against its will is impossible for democratic Powers. Nothing less would prevent the Germans from rebuilding their army when they want it. In the long run German rearmament is inevitable. When it comes Germany will once again be master of its destiny. If the Western Powers have not by then prepared a framework in which a rearmed Germany can remain a peaceful member of the international community, the chance will have gone for ever.

And here arises the heaviest complaint against the timing of the Western decision to rearm Germany. By demanding German troops at a time when France was still convalescent from the Second World War and entangled in Indo-China, and when the development of N A T O as a permanent political and military structure was still embryonic, the Western Powers were compelled to accept as a framework for German rearmament an organization convened in panic, built up only under temporary external pressures, and fatally inadequate right from the start – the Continental Community. It is doubtful whether the concept of a Continental Community would have won even French support but for the prospect of immediate German rearmament. And it is certain that Britain and America would not have agreed in the Washington Declaration to support this concept as a framework for German rearmament if the French Government had not refused point-blank to consider any other. It is a melancholy story. French rationalism put forward federal institutional ties as an adequate safeguard against a revival of German expansionism. But federation can only express and exploit a genuine community of interest – it cannot create one where none exists. Indeed, deep-seated trends towards conflict are exacerbated by too tight a legal obligation to co-operate. The American example argues exactly the opposite of what its admirers believe: America lost proportionately more men in the Civil War than in either of the World Wars which followed.

Yet the opposing forces in the American Civil War began as components of a mighty federal army. The long-term sources of disagreement between France and Germany are quite as fundamental as those which divided the Northern and Southern States of America a century ago. It is possible that these conflicts might be rendered harmless within a broader framework, where other Powers could mediate. But in a purely Continental Community, of which France and Germany are the only important members, such mediation is impossible. And France's insistence on the federal principle excludes in advance participation by America, Britain, Scandinavia and perhaps even the Benelux countries.

But the survival of the Continental Community might be even more dangerous than its collapse. For if it survives it is bound to be dominated by Germany. As a combination of population, industrial resources and national will, the Federal Republic alone is already the strongest single Continental Power and will soon be stronger than all its partners put together. Moreover, no framework for binding Germany to the West will survive unless it allows for German unity, and a united Germany would have an overwhelming predominance of power within a Continental Community. In the long run this would create immense dangers not only for Germany's Continental partners, but for Britain and America too. For Germany has as yet few long-term interests to tie her to the Atlantic Community, and the Continental Community in itself would do nothing to increase them. A Continental Community dominated by Germany might be dragged entirely outside the Western camp, to become at best a dangerous Third Force in world affairs, at worst an ally of Soviet Russia. It is foolish to imagine that a Continental Community will create a new international loyalty, so that the question of domination by one member or another will not arise. For if nationalism is on the wane in France and Italy – which it is permissible to doubt – no one can deny that it is growing fast, week by week, in Germany. And German nationalism is bound to grow until the problem of German unity – including the Saar as well as the Soviet Zone and the Eastern provinces – is solved in a way satisfactory to Germany.

French opinion is awakening to these dangers. But the French reaction is blunted and confused by a mixture of pressures and motives. The whole weight of America's diplomatic influence is deployed to compel the French to carry through M. Schuman's policy to the bitter end. This pressure may well be the decisive factor in forcing the Continental Community into uneasy life. Behind this there is an extraordinary mixture of motives. The Quai d'Orsay never shared M. Schuman's vision, but hoped that the pursuit of the impossible would at least postpone the unpleasant. But, as one obstacle after another crumbles under external

pressure, the vested interests created by the popularity of M. Schuman's policy in the U.S.A. prevent an open revolt against it. Each time the process comes to a halt it is jerked a little further along by a new spasm of self-deception. The latest attempt to cover E D C and the Schuman Plan with a fully-fledged political federation is a good example of this policy of doubling and redoubling on an empty hand.

Technocracy, so long a dominant element in French affairs, has given full support to M. Schuman. M. Monnet's pursuit of technical efficiency by opening the French economy to foreign competitors and planning the basic industries of Western Europe as a whole, makes little allowance for the political or human factors. It recalls the least pleasing features of early Fabianism. And, underlying everything, is the most sinister element of all, the inheritance of Vichy. Many Frenchmen, particularly of the middle class, are totally defeatist about France. They regard German domination of Western Europe as inevitable, and they prefer it to domination by Russia or America. So they want to obtain the best terms for France within the *Neue Ordnung* while they are still in a position to bargain for them.

While increasing numbers of Frenchmen look upon German predominance as something it is useless to struggle against, the international consequences of this are seen to be good as well as bad. The recent crudeness of American diplomacy towards Europe, as well as in the Far East, has revived aspirations to create a European Third Force. There is as yet little real support for the Atlantic Community as a developing entity. The prospect of American withdrawal from Europe is welcomed as well as feared – and by all but a small section it is considered certain. In the face of these opinions few Frenchmen dare outright oppose their Government's policy. Those who oppose German predominance fly to the other extreme of wishful thinking. The argument is now becoming fashionable that the Continental Community is a cunning device to keep Germany permanently divided. Yet nothing would be more fatal than to base Western policy on the permanent partition of Germany. This would be certain to drive Germany into Russia's arms, rupturing any framework which had been built to hold her.

So far America has shown little awareness of these dangers. Indeed, it is only American pressure which has kept M. Schuman's policy afloat. It is easier to explain than to condone America's enthusiasm for the Continental Community. Apart from her doctrinal attachment to federation and the single Continental market, America has not so far been prepared to accept a long-term commitment in Western Europe. The original demand for German troops was intended to offer the prospect of a situation in which the U.S.A. might be able to withdraw her troops

from Europe. European Unity is still seen as a Maginot Line behind which Americans can slumber in peace. The possibility that Europe under German control might make a deal with Soviet Russia is not considered, though it is urged by all the history of the last two hundred years. But if America withdrew her troops from Europe it is probable that Britain would have to follow suit. The way would then be clear for a repetition of August 1939. Too few people realize that Britain's unprecedented military commitments on the Continent are strictly conditional on America's sharing them. As it is, the financial consequences of German rearmament in E D C may compel Britain to reduce her forces on the Continent unless America carries the new dollar burden.

It is tragic to reflect that most of these dangers could have been averted if in 1950 and 1951 America had been less impetuous and Britain less yielding. The right way of responding to the problem would have been to continue basing N A T O strategy on the defence of the Rhine – itself an ideal requiring at least two years to achieve. The ultimate German contribution should meantime have been prepared, as was done by the Russians, through the training of cadres in *Bereitschaften* or similar formations, with as little publicity as possible. Then, when the time came for setting the defence of the so-called Elbe line as a target, the Germans could have been told frankly that unless they made the required sacrifices N A T O would be content to fall back on the Rhine. It is likely that by 1953 the Germans would have been ready in any case to carry arms again. On the basis of the existing cadres, the build-up of German divisions could then have proceeded as required. Meanwhile the political, economic, and military integration of N A T O should have been the overriding aim of Western policy, since N A T O is the only framework large enough for the Germans to enter without dominating.

Yet though the Washington declaration has set certain limits to Western policy, it is not too late to remedy the worst consequences of earlier mistakes. E D C may yet fail to obtain ratification. And if it is ratified, determined efforts by the Atlantic Powers could still tie it closely enough into S H A P E to remove the greatest dangers. Britain is well placed to lead such an effort. But there are still some British politicians who believe that by keeping N A T O a loose organization and intervening judiciously within the Continental Community, Britain could recover her old position as the first World Power, by diplomacy if not by material strength. So many Europeans wish for this that the illusion might still inhibit the necessary strengthening of N A T O as a whole. The Eden proposals for the Council of Europe are, for example, wisely interpreted in France as offering a permanent counterweight against Germany in the Continental Community. But there is in fact no evidence

that Mr Eden intends this by his proposals. Nor could the Continental Community possibly survive a situation in which the weaker member, France, was permanently supported against Germany by a Britain who played the role of arbiter without accepting any responsibility. In any case M. Schuman is already doing his best to kill the Eden proposals at birth, and the proposals certainly go as far as Britain could ever go in associating with the Continental Community.

If America reduced her European commitments, Britain would be compelled to follow suit. There is in fact no alternative to the Atlantic Community as an adequate framework for attracting and holding a resurgent Germany to the Western side in the Cold War. I believe that a vigorous assertion of this fact by Britain would offer hope to many Frenchmen who have been plunged into despair by their Government's present policy. But such an assertion must be accompanied by concrete proposals for strengthening the political, economic, and military integration of N A T O. The next six months offer us a great opportunity – perhaps the last real opportunity for this.

There are many people who concede the force of much of the foregoing argument, but feel that Europe is by now too solidly committed to the concept of a Continental Community to turn its eyes West again. I believe that the uneasiness I have expressed is shared by enough Europeans to make the transition to an Atlantic Community much easier than appears. A survey of Socialist opinion in Europe may illustrate this point. For the European Socialists are superficially less sympathetic to the Atlantic idea than members of other parties. To Socialists, Europe is the only part of the world where their faith might become a potent international force, while America is still regarded with doctrinaire mistrust as 'the citadel of world capitalism'.

It is widely believed, particularly in the United States, that European opposition to German rearmament under present conditions is largely centred in the Socialist parties – that, indeed, the Socialist parties are organizing an international campaign against the ratification of E D C. This is far from the truth. In most cases the Socialist parties have simply reflected the attitude – or attitudes – prevalent in their own countries. But when and where they have been out of office they have been able to express the national feeling about German rearmament more freely than parties carrying the international responsibilities of government. And in some countries, particularly Germany, they have not resisted the temptation to exploit the electoral advantages offered by this freedom.

The Socialist parties which offered least resistance to American pressure for a German defence contribution were those with governmental responsibility for national defence. The Socialists of Norway, Denmark

and Holland have always had the strongest national interest against basing N A T O strategy on the defence of the Rhine. Despite their recent sufferings under German occupation they could not regret America's determination to defend the Elbe 'line', even at the price of German rearmament. But in varying degrees they distrust the Continental Community as the framework of German rearmament. The only European Foreign Secretary to have urged publicly the admission of Germany to N A T O is the Norwegian Socialist, Halvard Lange.

Among the prospective members of E D C, the issue of German rearmament has always been entangled with the broader issue of a Continental federation. Though, as Frenchmen, nearly all French Socialists would have preferred to see Germany permanently disarmed, the federalist group led by André Philip used the N A T O decision to rearm Germany as an argument for Continental Federation. For a time they seemed to win the support of the extreme anti-German wing led by Jules Moch, who was Defence Minister when the crucial decisions were made. But since Moch has been out of office he has led the struggle against ratification of E D C, on the grounds that, as it has emerged from the negotiations, it does not offer France sufficient security against a rearmed Germany. It still seems probable, however, that the majority will follow the advice of the Secretary-General, Guy Mollet. Both in office and outside, Mollet has followed a consistent and responsible line. He strongly opposed the original 1950 decision to rearm Germany, but saw no point in continuing this opposition once the British Labour Government had yielded. The original French scheme for a European Army owed much to his imagination, but he has always seen British participation – or at least the most intimate British association – as vital to its success. He has consistently opposed the idea of a Continental Federation, believing it would be dominated nationally by Germany and politically by Catholic reaction. Thus he would always be prepared to accept any constitutional loosening of the framework for German rearmament, for the sake of British participation. In my opinion, most French Socialists, like most of their compatriots, once they have recognized the inevitability of German rearmament in some form or other, would prefer N A T O to E D C as the framework, providing N A T O is strengthened and doubts as to its permanence are reduced.

The attitude of the German Socialists needs careful interpretation. They bitterly oppose ratification of E D C, on the grounds that this would condemn Germany to an eternity of armed partition, and also on the grounds that Germany is not, either in E D C or in the Contractual Agreement, offered genuine equality with her prospective allies. But they have stressed their readiness in principle to contribute to collective

security against Soviet aggression. And the conditions they have themselves set for negotiations with Russia on German unity are obviously unacceptable to Russia at the present time. Not unnaturally, they hope to win the next General Election on the rearmament issue, and perhaps to force a General Election on it before the statutory date of August 1953. But despite a little oscillation on this issue, it seems certain that if they come to power after E D C and the Contractual Agreement have been ratified, they will not seek to abrogate them root and branch, but only to revise them. And it is fairly clear what revisions they will demand: they will seek – and get – still more concessions than the Germans are given in the Contractual Agreement, and they will demand more equality in E D C. In practice the latter means membership of N A T O. So far as I know, their only official demand for membership of N A T O was made by Dr Carlo Schmid in the recent Bundestag debate on E D C. But they have always made the point that Germany does not have equality in E D C so long as the strategy of E D C is decided in N A T O, where Germany is not a member. And even more strongly than the French Socialists they distrust the Continental Community as a citadel of Catholic reaction. They want a framework of which Britain and the Scandinavian Social-Democracies are also members.

So the key to the situation rests – as in fact it always rested – with the British Labour Party. Many of the present difficulties might have been avoided if the British Labour Government had resisted the American ultimatum over German rearmament in 1950, or the French ultimatum over E D C in 1951. The Labour Government was sufficiently ashamed of these lapses to be less than candid with its supporters about their consequences. That is, of course, the prime cause of the Labour Party's present vacillations over Germany, now that it is in opposition. The great danger at the present time is that the Conservative Government will fall between two stools. Unwilling to take the plunge towards a real Atlantic Community it will mislead the Continent about the extent of its readiness to enter a European Community, thus compounding Mr Churchill's crimes as leader of the European Movement. By, in effect, tricking its Continental allies into ratifying E D C, it will betray its own interests as well as theirs. The recent foreign affairs debates in Parliament have underlined this danger. The Labour Party is thus offered a real opportunity for constructive opposition on a major issue of foreign policy. It is a challenge as congenial as it is momentous.

## GERMAN REARMAMENT: THE HOUR OF DECISION

Julian Amery, M P

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The Western Powers and the Soviet Union were united in the war by one common purpose and one only. This was to destroy the armed might of Germany which threatened them alike. That destruction was accomplished in April of 1945. Thereafter the Grand Alliance could only have been perpetuated if the Western Powers and Russia had both agreed to give the same priority to preventing Germany's revival as they had given to ensuring her defeat. The Western Powers, at least in their post-war mood, were prepared to do this. Hence their acceptance of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. The Russians, however, had more far-reaching and less static designs. The war had made them masters of Eastern Europe. The aftermath saw a prodigious rise in the number of their Communist supporters, both in Western Europe and in China. The whole Eurasian land mass seemed to be within their grasp.

The existence of a Russian threat to the peace was first generally recognized in the West as a result of Mr Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri, less than a year after the armistice. Within a few months, the Fulton doctrine had become official policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Western Europe was reinforced against Communism by Marshall Aid. Greece and Turkey were sustained against the threat from the North. The Cold War had begun in earnest.

Germany, which as an enemy had been the unifying force of the Grand Alliance, now became the chief bone of contention in the new struggle for the world. The Germans number skilled technicians and stubborn fighting men. Their country is the heart of the great West European industrial complex – the Ruhr, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Saar, Lorraine. If Western Germany were to revive within the Western camp, the human and economic potential of the Western Powers would remain greatly superior to that of the Soviet bloc. But if Germany should go over to the East, the balance of economic and military power would then be much more equal. With German help, the Soviets would find the task of holding together their new Empire of 100,000,000 Europeans and 400,000,000 Chinese greatly eased. They might even feel strong enough to accept the

risk of another war. The Grand Alliance to keep Germany down has thus become a struggle for the soul of the German people; a struggle in which the former allies are doing their best to outbid each other.

Both sides in this struggle have much to offer. The Western Powers enjoy immediate advantages. Psychologically, the great mass of the German people have always regarded Russia as the main enemy. Almost every family lost a man in Russia in the war. The behaviour, moreover, of the Russian soldiers who invaded the Reich has left a permanent scar on the memory of the German people. Still more important, ten million refugees from the lost provinces and the Eastern Zone keep up a daily hymn of hate against the Russians. Ideological considerations also work for the West. After twelve years of dictatorship, the German people see little attraction in another and even more complete totalitarian system. They are enjoying their present freedom and seek to emphasize their cultural affinities with the West. No less convincing is the economic argument. The Russians have stripped Germany of her moveable capital equipment, while the United States is using surplus wealth to rebuild the shattered German economy.

The attractions of a pro-Russian policy are less obvious to the Germans, though they may still prove more fundamental. They are of two kinds, economic and political. In the economic sphere, a Germany tied to the West and cut off from the East would have to face continuous competition not only from United States, but from British, Belgian and French industry. In partnership with the Soviets, however, Germany would have the free run of her traditional markets in Central and Eastern Europe and in Russia itself, and might even extend them to include Communist China.

Similar considerations apply in the political sphere. Western Germany, even a united Germany, could hardly hope to wrest the leadership of the Free World from the hands of the United States or the British Commonwealth. Working with the Russians, however, a united Germany would soon become an equal partner and, by superior skill, might even secure the dominant influence.

It was against this general background of the struggle for Germany, dramatically illuminated by the Berlin blockade and airlift, that Mr Winston Churchill called, in the spring of 1950, for German participation in the defence of the West. In August of the same year, he renewed this suggestion at Strasbourg, when he proposed the formation of a European Army in which Germans should take their place alongside the soldiers of other Western countries. A few weeks later, at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Powers, German rearmament became agreed Western policy.

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The case for a German contribution to Western defence rests upon strong logistical and political grounds. Let us first consider the logistics of the matter. The Russians have 175 divisions and 20,000 first-line aircraft. But their industrial base is insufficient to sustain a long war. The Western Powers have a superior economic potential and the American stock-pile of atomic bombs. They are, however, very weak in conventional weapons. In a war, the atom bomb might accomplish the eventual defeat of the Soviet Union. It could not, however, by itself prevent the Red Army from occupying Western Europe, and inflicting untold damage on the United Kingdom. Liberation, if it came at all, might then come too late. To secure a favourable balance of power, therefore, the Western Powers must raise and maintain sufficient forces to enable them to hold up a Russian attack in Europe for long enough, at least, to allow their superiority in atomic weapons to take its full effect. The forces required for this purpose have been variously estimated by competent military authorities at between fifty and seventy divisions. By a supreme effort, the Western Powers might be able to reach such a target. But how long could they maintain it? They already have heavy commitments in the Middle East, South East Asia, and Korea. To maintain fifty to seventy divisions in Europe as well would involve an almost intolerable strain on their economies and might give rise to grave social problems. In the long run, therefore – and the Cold War may last a lifetime – the burden of Western defence can only be sustained, without social and economic dislocation, if the Ruhr industry and the forty-eight million Germans of the Federal Republic play their part in helping to bear it.

Weighty political arguments point to the same conclusion. To defend Germany from Communism is in the interests of all the Western Powers. It is in Germany's interest, too. But how can you explain to the mothers of Texas or of Lancashire that their sons must mount guard on the Elbe, if German boys of the same age live at home and go about their peaceful occupations as if there was no danger of war? How can you explain to British and French industry that they must devote themselves to rearmament and bear the immense taxation overheads which the defence programme calls for, while their German competitors concentrate on storming the few remaining neutral markets of the world? So long, of course, as Germany was an occupied country and the object of discriminatory treatment, such objections could not apply. But if Germany is to be brought back into the family of nations, if a European system is to be evolved, then equality of rights for Germany will be a mockery unless it also means equality of sacrifices.

What of German public opinion? Large numbers of Germans are still opposed to rearmament. The democratic leaders fear that it may put

power back into the hands of the same men who supported Hitler. The Nationalists believe that by postponing a decision on rearmament today, they may get better terms from the West tomorrow. For the broad mass of the German people, however, opposition to rearmament reflects not a calculation of interest but a mood of indifference and neutralism in the struggle between East and West. The slogan 'ohne mich' – 'include me out' – still finds a loud echo. To change this mood of neutralism is of the first importance to the Western Powers and to those Germans who wish to throw in their lot with the West. There is no easy way of bringing this about. You can create an army, but you cannot ensure that it will fight. There is truth, nevertheless, in the saying 'He that is not with us, is against us.' It may well be that the surest means of committing the German people to the Western cause lies in bringing their sons into the line of Western defence.

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Germany must be rearmed, if the long-term defences of the West are to be assured. But great risks attach to that rearmament. Germany has provoked four major wars since 1866. Nor are the indications for the future altogether reassuring. The post-war revival of German morale and German industry testifies to the continuing vitality of the German people. But what use will they make of this vitality? Their present mood grows increasingly nationalist and revisionist. Where will it lead? A rearmed Germany might use her new strength to draw the Western world into an adventure to liberate Eastern Germany and reconquer the lost provinces beyond the Oder-Neisse Line. Alternatively, she might use the combination of her military and industrial power to make herself the dominant force in Western Europe – a prospect fearful to the French and scarcely less so to Britain. The dangers of rearming the Germans do not make that rearmament any less necessary. It is only common sense, however, to take them into account in considering the framework within which the German military contribution should be made. We cannot altogether avoid them; but we should seek at least to reduce them to the minimum.

What should be the framework of German rearmament? At first sight, the simplest course would seem to be for the Federal Republic to join N A T O and raise a new German Army which would be placed under S H A P E. N A T O, however, is, by definition, a defensive organization. It is, accordingly, difficult to include in it, as a full member, a Power which, like the Federal Republic, has territorial claims upon its eastern neighbours, including the Soviet Union. This is not the only objection. N A T O is not a political but a strategic conception designed

to meet a particular danger in a particular area. Nor is it likely to endure beyond the crisis it was designed to meet. American troops are in Europe because of the danger of Russian aggression. But, if the Red Army were withdrawn into Russia, the G.I.s would almost certainly return across the Atlantic. A German national army would then remain the dominant military power upon the Continent.

It has sometimes been argued that N A T O is the right framework for German rearmament precisely because American membership of N A T O makes it strong enough to prevent Germany dominating the West. This is true in the short run. The weakness, however, of N A T O lies in its inevitably temporary character. It offers no solution to the long-term problem of Germany's relations with her European neighbours.

The alternative to direct German participation in N A T O is German participation in N A T O through a European Army. This has three major advantages. First, the conception of a United Europe is one which embraces the whole of Europe, east as well as west. German participation in a European Army, therefore, involves no abandonment of Germany's territorial claims. On the other hand, it does not directly involve the United States in support of those claims, as would be the case if Germany adhered direct to N A T O. In the second place, a European Army, considered as the military instrument of a United Europe, is intended to be permanent. The European Army would continue even if the Russian danger receded. It would thus constitute a guarantee against any single European state, including Germany, becoming militarily dominant upon the Continent. The third major advantage is of a psychological order. German nationalism has proved a dangerous force in the past. It may well prove so again in the future. Could it be absorbed within a wider European patriotism? No one can say for certain. Most observers, however, agree that the European ideal is the only ideological force apart from nationalism which has made serious headway among the German people since the war.

The Western Powers have been right to choose the European rather than the N A T O framework. But the European Defence Community is a poor substitute for a true European Army. When Mr Churchill called, at Strasbourg in August of 1950, for a European Army, it was plainly his intention that Britain should take part in it. The Conservative Party, however, was in opposition at the time, and Mr Churchill's views on Europe were not shared by the Labour Government. When, therefore, the French Government proposed the formation of a European Defence Community, the Labour Government declined to be a party to the negotiations. As a result, the European Army, like the Coal and Steel Pool, has developed upon a Six Power basis. Now Continental Western

Europe is too weak a vessel to hold the strong wine of German rearmament. There is, indeed, as Mr Boothby has pointed out in recent articles in these pages, a serious danger that the Continental Community will be dominated by Germany. The best hope of preventing this and of maintaining a balance in Europe, is for Britain, if not to participate fully in the Six Power Community, at least to be very closely associated with it. This is what the Conservative Government have sought to do. They have initiated conversations, at the technical level, to discuss the possibilities of an 'interchange' of personnel and units and a 'blending' of air forces as between the E D C and Britain. But, plainly, discussions at the technical level are not enough. If Britain is to be closely associated with the Continental Community, she must be associated with its political institutions. This is what the so-called Eden Plan seeks to bring about. Under the Eden Plan, the Ministerial and Parliamentary organs of the different European communities would be developed within the Council of Europe of which Britain is a full member. The British Government and Parliament would thus be associated, by means of observers, with both the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly of the E D C. These observers would acquire moral influence with the community and incur moral obligations towards it. With the passage of time and the experience of co-operation, the distinction between association and full participation would become increasingly blurred.

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The prospect of close British association has emboldened the French and Benelux Governments to sign the E D C Treaty. Whether it will be ratified by their Parliaments remains to be seen. Many developments relevant and irrelevant will affect the final decision. One in particular deserves our attention. This concerns the relations of the West with the Soviet Union.

The greatest fear in the minds of Western statesmen is that Germany might line up with Russia. So, in Moscow, the greatest fear is that Germany may be integrated fully into the West and make the N A T O Powers strong enough to resist Russia and perhaps even to put pressure upon her. The Russians have, therefore, gone to great lengths in their efforts to prevent the formation of the E D C. Their aim, as their recent Notes have indicated, is to secure a united but neutralized Germany from which all occupation forces have been withdrawn. They calculate, no doubt, that the comparative weakness of the German democratic parties and the eastward pull of economic forces would in the end incline a neutral Germany towards the Soviet camp. Some observers believe that the Russians attach so much importance to securing such a neutral

Germany that they would even agree to free elections in order to attain their end. Others have suggested that rather than accept the integration of Germany in the West, they would go to war. Both views may be exaggerated, but they have led many political leaders in the West, and in Germany itself, to advocate a postponement of the E D C, at least until Four Power talks have taken place and Russian intentions have been probed to the bottom.

Russia's intentions must, of course, be probed. There is no reason to avoid a Four Power meeting, provided it is to be something more than a vehicle for Soviet propaganda. Very grave dangers, however, must attend any postponement of the E D C. If the Western Powers once give the impression that they are prepared even to discuss the neutralization of Germany, a fatal blow will have been struck at the whole conception of European unity. You cannot bargain with a great ideal. That is why the theory of the 'creative pause' is an illusion. For better or for worse, the ideal of a United Europe has become identified in the minds of public opinion on the Continent with the conception of a European Army. If the E D C were postponed now, it would be postponed for ever; and the European Army would not be the only casualty. The Coal and Steel Pool would be still-born. The Council of Europe would be forgotten. All this might have immeasurable consequences. Deprived of hope in the West, Germany might well relapse into neutralism; and neutralism, as the Russians hope, might all too easily slide into dependence on the Soviet powers.

The argument today is no longer whether to rearm the Germans, but when and in what framework. The Western Powers have agreed, and in my view rightly, to rearm them within a European Defence Community. The process of bringing that Community into being has already begun. It cannot be halted now without risking fatal injury to the whole European conception. We have no real choice, therefore, but to go forward. *Le vin est tiré; il faut le boire.*

## GERMANY AND EUROPEAN UNITY

Sebastian Haffner

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In some sense – though not necessarily the same sense in which the term is now used by British and Frenchmen – ‘European unity’ has been a constant theme of German history and a constant aim of German policy; and European unity is, for Germans, perhaps more easily grasped as an idea than German unity. This may sound paradoxical to Western readers; but the whole course of German history bears it out.

In the whole eleven or twelve hundred years of German history there is not one period – unless it be the six months between Munich and Prague, October 1938 to March 1939 – when Germany formed a national State in the sense in which Britain and France have long been national States: that is, a State comprising all Germans and nothing but Germans, and fusing citizenship with nationality. At all other times the States which Germans have produced have either comprised many non-Germans or excluded many Germans; very often they have done both.

Nor can the millennial German failure to form a national State on the West European model, and settle down in it, be simply put down as a ‘failure’ *sans phrase*. The fact is that, except for relatively short periods in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Germans have not been greatly interested in national unity and a national State. Their political ideal, throughout their history, has been not the national State but the ‘Reich’ – a term I hesitate to translate by ‘Empire’, for the word ‘Empire’, in present-day English parlance, also carries connotations of nationalism, denoting the domination of one nation and its State over others. The German idea of the ‘Reich’, by contrast, denotes a political order which ignores nations and nationalities. It derives from the political conceptions prevalent in late Roman times, when the ‘Roman Empire’ had long ceased to mean the domination and exploitation of the Mediterranean and Atlantic littorals by Rome, and had simply come to stand for unified authority, law, order, peace and civilization established over a very large area inhabited by people of many races, habits, and creeds. There is nothing in the conception of a ‘Reich’ or non-national Empire of this kind which prevents it from becoming universal. And the ‘Reich’, as conceived by Germans in the beginning of their history, aims in principle at uni-

versality no less than that other heir of Rome, the Catholic or a Napoleonic universal secular order, based upon a non-national, meta-national authority, assuring peace and law to all mankind – that is the vision and the inspiration behind the Reich idea, to which the Germans devoted, in one way or another, the six greatest centuries of their history, from the tenth century to the Thirty Years’ War. (It is, incidentally, a curiously modern vision: a universal political order for all mankind – what else is the ultimate inspiration behind the League of Nations and the United Nations? Or, for that matter, behind World Revolution, ‘workers of the world, unite’ and the Marxian ‘withering-away of the State’?)

Meanwhile, of course, in practice the Reich, the ‘Empire’, ‘Holy Empire’, or ‘Holy Roman Empire’ of the Germans, never came anywhere near to uniting all mankind. It did succeed, in the later Middle Ages, in uniting very considerable parts of Europe; for one short and rather dazzling moment in the early sixteenth century, just before its break-up under the pressure of France, the Reformation, and the Turks, it seemed to have the unity of all Europe within its grasp. It is, therefore, not a difficult mental operation for Germans to fuse the Reich idea with the idea of European unity; and to feel that they are the oldest ‘Europeans’ and that it is the others, rather, who are the latecomers.

It may be objected that all this is harking back rather far. Whatever may have been the political ideas of the Germans in mediæval times, have not the modern Germans turned their backs on them? Have they not become nationalists *par excellence*? Has not the achievement of national unity been the overmastering urge of Germans in the nineteenth century, and have the twentieth century Germans not proved rabid imperialists of the nationalist kind – that is, aggressors trying to conquer and subject other nations and to set themselves up as a *Herrenvolk* above them? Can one trust the present-day Germans to be good Europeans, let alone good world citizens? Obviously, there is a great deal to justify these questions. But I cannot help feeling that the reading of modern German history which underlies them is somewhat less than complete. It is not only that the passions of two wars have made objectivity difficult; the friendly critics of modern Germany in the Western world often seem to me to fall into the same error as the hostile ones: namely, that of interpreting recent German history in terms of Western parallels and Western preconceptions, rather than in terms of German antecedents and, in consequence, overrating and overstressing those aspects of it which, as it were, translate easily into Western terms, disregarding or altogether missing those which do not. There is a curious lopsidedness and naivety in the current British reading of modern German history, which takes the democratic nationalism of 1848 at its face value, regards Bismarck’s paradoxical creation as the

less normal political and geographical form of Germany (only 'ruined' by 'Prussianism' and 'militarism'), and considers Hitler a nationalist aggressor. It all seems to rest on a tacit assumption that the Germans cannot but be guided by the same basic political conceptions which dominate modern Britain or France – that their chief aim must needs be to enjoy the status of a homogeneous nation-State, their chief concern national unity and their chief temptation national aggrandisement.

This assumption is, of course, not altogether nonsensical; it is only dangerously incomplete and out of focus. Nationalism has played (and is still playing) its part in the Germany of the last 150 years; but it is a counter-point rather than the principal theme, which remains the Reich idea; and sometimes the two themes get inextricably mingled. Nationalism may have partly accounted for the movement of 1848, but what accounted for its feebleness and failure? It may have accounted for the momentary dazzling success of Bismarck's incredible *tour de force*, but what accounted for its instability and transitoriness? It may have accounted for part of Hitler's original appeal, but what accounted for the violent destructiveness of his internal regime even before his foreign defeat? My suggestion is – and I make it neither to whitewash nor to blacken Germany – that the real key to modern German history is the survival of the old universalist, non-nationalist Reich idea, and that the confusions and contradictions of the last century in Germany stem largely from its clash with newly-received and ill-digested nationalist ideas, a clash in which the original universalism, for good or ill, always seems to come out stronger.

It seems to me significant that the twilight of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648 did not open the way to any spontaneous and indigenous nationalist movement in Germany; that, with the grand vision of supra-national universal order fading, the Germans quite contentedly resigned themselves to the residual sub-national fragments of order provided by their little principalities and duchies; and that the two major political units which emerged from the ruins of the Holy Roman Empire, Austria and Prussia, were again smaller Reichs, characteristically different in spirit and temper, and yet alike in that neither was, or pretended to be, a national German State, but found their *raison d'être* in the order and unity they gave to several nationalities or fragments of nationalities (Prussia had at the end of its great century, the eighteenth, almost as many Polish as German subjects), and that both fought a long, not unsuccessful, rear-guard action against the stirring spirit of nationalism in Germany throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.

Nationalism in Germany indeed is only 150 years old; even when it made its belated appearance around 1800, it was a French importation, carried into Germany by the French revolutionary armies; the first major

modern national German State, the *Confédération du Rhin*, was a Napoleonic creation; and how little nationalism was really understood in Germany, how easily it merged with reminiscences of the old Holy Roman Empire, was shown both in 1848 and 1871: In 1848, when the Paulskirche Assembly, quite naively and meaning no ill, included all Czechs, as well as many Poles and Danes, in its projected national German State; in 1871, when the Germans quite willingly accepted Bismarck's 'Reich', which excluded all the Austrian Germans, as the fulfilment of their 'national' aspirations.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the terms 'nation', 'national', 'nationalism,' never acquired a precise, accurate meaning in Germany, although they did doubtless have a strong emotional power; that nationalism was never taken seriously and literally, and never meant what it had come to mean in the West. A true German 'nationalism' would have aimed at collecting all Germans – and only Germans – into one compact, saturated State, which would then have taken its place by the side of other nation-States to bicker and quarrel with them, in the accepted European manner, over exact ethnological frontiers and minority rights. But the aims of German nationalism were never defined or, indeed, conceived in this way – never, that is, before Hitler, who did for a while so define them but only in order to deceive. It must be admitted, incidentally, that this kind of integral nationalism would indeed, for a country in the position of Germany, have been impractical to the point of craziness. It is not possible to conduct one's affairs in a deliberately non-nationalist, even anti-nationalist, way for a thousand years and then suddenly turn round and try to become a comprehensive and exclusive national State. Germans were in the nineteenth century distributed in their hundreds of thousands all over Eastern and Central Europe: were they to be forcibly expatriated? Or, if not, how were they to be included in a national Germany without including millions of non-Germans? And what about Germans who, though contiguous, no longer wanted to be Germans, like the Swiss and the Alsatians? Even if the all-German nation-State was to be restricted to more or less contiguous and more or less willing Germans, its outline would have taken the crazy shape of post-Munich Germany, and neighbouring natural units like Bohemia would have been arbitrarily broken up. No, the Germans were perhaps not to be blamed too severely for not really meaning nationalism when they declared themselves 'national-minded' or 'nationalist' in the days between Metternich and Hitler. But what did they positively mean by their 'nationalism'? What did German nationalism aim at?

Probably the fairest definition would have been: a sufficient concentration of national power to resume a policy of Empire-building, or Reich-

building; the two terms may at this stage be used interchangeably, for the old idea of the Holy Roman Empire – non-national and essentially European – did increasingly compete in German minds with the new national imperialism of nineteenth century Europe, implying the domination of nation by nation, and practiced mainly overseas. During the First World War, both concepts made their public appearance in Germany, the first in the Liberal idea of 'Mitteleuropa', the second in the expansionist war aims of the Right. Under the Weimar Republic there were again two different versions of a new 'Reich' or Super-State current – a more liberal one envisaging a United States of Europe (up to the Russian border), based on Franco-German reconciliation, and a more tough-minded one aiming at unification of the geopolitically defined Eurasian heartland from the Rhine to the Urals; and this latter, again, had two versions: one based on a German-Russian merger, the other on the conquest of Russia by Germany. The positive aims of a 'national' German policy remained all the time immensely, and dangerously, variable; but they all had this in common that they considered the nation-State as something which must be transcended, so that the 'Reich', the Super-State, might come into being; and this can as little be called 'nationalism' in the Western sense as Nietzsche's belief that man must be transcended to let the super-man arise can be called a variant of Western humanism. Let me repeat here that I am trying neither to excuse nor to condemn, but only to analyse and understand. I believe that political ideas are in themselves morally neutral and that the habit of using some of them as terms of abuse is silly. I do not, in particular, believe nationalism to be inherently good and imperialism inherently evil. So I do not see any reason for condemning or despising the Germans because they are imperialists and not nationalists; but I do believe it dangerous and wrong to mistake their deep-rooted imperialism for nationalism because it is often clothed in nationalist phraseology; or because nationalism is to Westerners more sympathetic or more plausible. Misunderstanding can almost never do good; and this particular misunderstanding has had its share in the genesis of both World Wars. Nor is its power for mischief exhausted. It may, for instance, wreck the plans for a United Europe which are now in progress of realization. In these plans Germany has inevitably a key role to play. Nor is she unwilling to play that role, or insincere in her professed 'Europeanism'. Nothing is easier for Germans than to identify United Europe with the Holy Roman Empire and to consider themselves the earliest and most genuine 'Europeans'. But do the other Europeans – or the Americans – share this conception of United Europe and of the German role in it? Or do they regard Germany as a static nation like France, Belgium and Holland, contributing nothing but a measurable sum of manpower, coal,

and steel to a static international insurance pool? If they do, there may be surprises in store for them.

## II

Having established this historical and psychological background, let us now consider what bearing it has on the present practical politics of European unity.

Neither the term 'Europe' nor the term 'unity' have a very clear definition. Europe used to be defined by geographers as the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals. In this sense the term is at present politically meaningless. There is another usage which defines as 'Europe' the Continental countries between the Atlantic and the Russian border. Even this Europe is at present politically non-existent; more than a third of it lies behind the Iron Curtain. For immediate practical purposes the Europe whose unity is in question today is even at its biggest what many people – and certainly the Germans – would consider only a rump-Europe: the arc of countries swinging from Scandinavia and Britain, via France and Western Germany, through Italy to Greece and Turkey – an area very roughly suggesting the outline of the Roman Empire. But in fact even this *Kleineuropa* of fifteen nations has for purposes of full Union been narrowed down to a *Kleinsteuropa* of six nations: France, Benelux, Western Germany, and Italy – again an area with some historical precedents as a political union, since it more or less retraces the boundaries of the Empires of Charlemagne and Napoleon. Surely there is a profound ambiguity in the designation 'United Europe' for the six-nation set-up. It may mean a deliberate restriction of the term 'Europe' to this relatively small Western European area – a resigned recognition and acceptance of the fact that the eastern frontiers of Europe are now on the Elbe. Or it may carry, on the contrary, a challenging announcement that this six-nation Union considers itself incomplete until it has become what its name proclaims: a Union of all Europe; until it includes in itself all the European nations now held captive behind the Iron Curtain. To call the French-West German-Benelux-Italian combination 'Europe' may be understood to mean: 'Europe is now reduced to what we represent' or 'We are determined to become a complete Europe.' It is probable that the French think of this new 'United Europe' in the former, static sense; the Germans in the latter, dynamic one.

So much for the term 'Europe'. The term 'unity' or 'union' is equally capable of different interpretations. Indeed, it is the different meanings attached to 'unity' which has led to the emergence of the inner group of six within the wider group of fifteen among the nations which today form the politically independent and active part of 'Europe'.

The originators of European Unity after the Second World War were the British. Mr Ernest Bevin's speeches and actions in 1947-48 coined the phrase 'Western European Union' and created the institutions which today embody the 'unity' of the fifteen: O E E C and the Council of Europe. But it soon became clear that what the British meant by 'unity' or 'union' was simply inter-governmental co-operation, while the French, Germans, Italians, and Benelux nations thought of federation. As a result, the British practically dropped out of the European movement; the British-sponsored inter-governmental organizations form today only a vague penumbra around the real nucleus of United Europe, which is formed by the six, with France and Western Germany at the inmost centre. So far, so good. But might it not turn out that the French and German conceptions of 'union' and 'federation' are as different as were the British and French conceptions of 'unity'? France and Germany are agreed on wanting more than the loose and non-committal inter-governmental co-operation offered by Britain. Are they also agreed on exactly how *much* more they want? If the historical background is taken into account, it may be doubted.

The French are, among Europeans, the nationalists *par excellence*. What the vague, wide, limitless Reich is to the Germans, *la République Une et Indivisible* is to the French. When they enter into a European Federation, they presumably do so in order the better to protect and reinsure the identity, integrity and continuity of France. They are prepared, it is true, to surrender well-defined parts of their sovereignty to the new European body, on condition that others do the same, but they do so in order the better to safeguard those parts of their sovereignty which they intend to keep to themselves. Their conception of the 'United Europe' which they are about to enter is static – not only geographically but constitutionally. What they seek in it is, in the last resort, security for France – and security, in particular, against the vagaries of Germany. West European Federation is to them the means by which unilateral international action is to be made impossible for Germany – at the price, it is true, of making it also impossible for France; but they feel they can afford honestly to pay this price because they are not eager for action, being content with what they have and only wanting to live in peace and comfort within their own frontiers. They are, as it were, prepared to handcuff themselves to Germany so that Germany cannot once again run away; as for themselves, they have no desire to run anywhere. Hence their care to make sure of a certain balance of power within the new six-nation European Union; their insistence on keeping their special economic links with the Saar, on having an equal or slightly superior number of divisions in the common European Army, on basing European Union on very clear,

firmly-written treaties and constitutions with very exact limitations of what is common and what is separate. All this legalistic primness, which the Germans are always complaining of as lacking in 'European spirit', is on the part of the French desperately innocent, sincere, and indeed inevitable. Granting their almost subconscious premise that the purpose and *raison d'être* of European Union – any European Union – is and must be to safeguard the national integrity and security of the nations which enter it, they cannot possibly behave otherwise, and they can claim with perfect justice that the Germans need only accept this premise in order to feel perfectly satisfied with France's conditions of union.

But the Germans are equally innocent and sincere when they feel that the French are horribly unfair, petty, and 'non-European'. For the Germans also have their almost subconscious, unquestioned preconception of what a United Europe is and inevitably must be: to them United Europe is not a mutual reinsurance company of integral nations, but, inevitably, a new Reich. To the French, Europe is a means by which they can safely remain French. To the Germans it is the means by which they can be released from being merely Germans. Where the French are drawing up a cautious contract for a *marriage de convenance*, the Germans are seeking an enormous Wagnerian love affair with metaphysical overtones. The French are out for security; the Germans for grand adventure. Where the French have before them a vision of a Europe as a city where at last each national family can sleep safely in its own house because the neighbours are no longer armed and there is a joint police force, the Germans see all the national families mixing up and celebrating a huge generous feast of fraternization. This German vision of Europe is certainly more muddled than the French one; but it is not less sincerely held, and it is not even necessarily more impractical and unrealistic. What is rather tragic, and not a little disturbing, is the failure on both sides to see really what the other side is after; the attitude of hopeful self-deception, coupled with an instant readiness for furious indignation about the other party's bad faith.

This may sound as if I do not believe that European Unity will come about. But I do not for a moment doubt that it will come about. In fact it is coming about now, before our very eyes. What I do not see is that it will happily stabilize itself in its present form. The United Europe that is now being formed will be a rather absurdly small 'Europe', and it will needs have to be based on an intimate understanding between France and Western Germany; but all one sees at present is an intimate misunderstanding between them. As soon as the Europe which is now being constructed with so much devoted skill by M. Schuman and Dr Adenauer around the *Montan-Union* and the Defence Community has taken shape, its

French and German elements will begin to pull furiously in different directions, both in its external policy – where Germany will want it to be expansionist and France static – and in its internal development, where Germany will be the champion of vigorous centralism and France of decentralization and States' Rights. How the new structure will stand this strain is hard to prophesy.

But to assemble at least the elements on which to base a tentative prognosis we have now to widen our horizon. We have so far considered only France and Germany in isolation; but, of course, they do not exist in isolation. We have analysed the internal strains and pressures which will work on the provisional Union of Western Europe; but the external pulls and pressures may well be stronger. Behind France and Germany loom America and Russia: Powers less intimately affected than France and Germany are by the destinies of Europe, but affected by them all the same, and capable of outweighing the wishes and preferences of France and Germany with the heavy weight of their superior mass. Even now, the drama of European unity has three active protagonists: France, Germany and America; and Russia may at any moment join in to make a fourth. European Union would not now be as near to realization as it is if America did not wish it to come about. America wants it to come about because she considers that it will provide what Mr Acheson has termed 'a position of strength'. Such a position of strength will have, from the American point of view, three successive purposes: first, to make Western Europe safe against Russian invasion; second, to exert attraction on captive Eastern Europe and pressure on Russia for the release of its captives; third, to make it possible for America to withdraw her troops from Europe after a settlement with Russia and a Russian retreat from Eastern Europe has been achieved.

How do the French and German conceptions of Europe fit in with these American purposes, and which has the better chance of receiving America's backing? As long as we remain in the purely defensive first phase, there is no conflict and no major problem; obviously, French and Germans alike want to be invasion-proof. It is when we come to the second phase that their interests diverge; and here it seems that Germany may have her greatest chance – that she may find the powerful American wind filling the sails of her dynamic conception of a greater Europe (is there not even now something like a Washington-Berlin axis by-passing and overshadowing the Paris-Bonn axis?). If she plays her cards well; if she does not alienate France too much in her reliance on understanding with America; if she does not forget the abiding European interests of Britain; if she finds the wisdom, statesmanship and farsightedness to reconcile, even at great apparent sacrifice, Poland and Czechoslovakia:

then, incredible as it may seem, the millennial dream of a German-centred European Reich may yet come true some time in the late 1950's.

But it is at this point that Russia will have to play her part in the game. A peaceful retreat of Russia to her frontiers in exchange for an American retreat from Europe, leaving Germany at the centre of a united Europe, is only one of three courses which Russia may take in reaction to present developments. Of the other two, one is a forestalling diplomatic offensive, offering an early settlement on the basis of the *status quo*, with minor concessions to America and Britain and some bribes for Germany at the price of renouncing her union with France; an offensive of which there are already clear signs, and the potential strength of which should not be underrated. The other possible Russian course is war – a war which Russia would presumably lose, but in which Europe would lose its present relative importance, and which would in all probability end with the world turning around a Washington-Moscow axis. For it is the American habit to make converts and close allies of defeated enemies, and she might find this even easier to achieve in the case of Russia than in the case of Germany or Japan.

A war with Russia – even if it were not mainly fought on German soil – can therefore be as little in Germany's interest as a too early settlement with Russia, which would leave Russia in possession of Eastern Europe and Germany either isolated and exposed or divided and tamed. The aim of German policy will probably rather be something in between – a delayed settlement, involving a Russian as well as an American withdrawal and leaving a united Europe grouped around Germany as a third force in world affairs. But Germany would have to gain far more confidence than she now enjoys to make this prospect acceptable to the rest of Europe (and to Britain); and she would have to play her cards exceedingly well to avoid the many pitfalls that lie in her path towards this aim. Looking at German history as a whole, it seems unlikely that she has the resources of statesmanship which would be needed for success. But Germany is the land of surprises and apparent miracles. Who would have thought seven years ago that she would be back in the great game of power politics to-day and that she would even have another sporting chance of shaping Europe according to her dreams? But this is undoubtedly today a sober fact. After a half-century of disastrous, clumsy, and brutal blundering, Germany in the last four years has not put a foot wrong. Her further progress in her resumed European career will be a matter of some fascination to watch.

## EUROPE CAN BE DEFENDED-AT A PRICE

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For European defence the year of Eisenhower was a year of astonishing progress. The first year of Ridgway, now at its halfway mark, looks like being a year of frustration and partial failure. That is not the new Supreme Commander's fault. The causes have been beyond his control, since he, like his predecessor, can only make the best of the men, money, and materials which each nation contributes to his command. The success of Eisenhower's year was made possible because the contributions were doubled and trebled, and for the first time a coherent defensive force was knit together. The frustration of Ridgway's year is that the momentum has been lost. The further contributions promised at Lisbon in February are not coming forward as they should, and there is a risk that this military failing may react on political progress – on the growing co-operation through the North Atlantic Council and on the prospects of the European Defence Community.

The purpose of this article is to consider five questions. First, what has been achieved already? Secondly, what is likely to be achieved this year and next? Thirdly, what part will the European Army play in building Europe's defences? Fourth, can Western Europe be defended at all with the forces likely to be available? And, finally, what of the related political progress?

Europe's defences are being developed in accordance with what General Eisenhower, in an unmetaphysical moment, called his 'basic philosophy'. This was that the Western nations could not afford large standing armies. They must, therefore, rely on small active forces backed by large reserves. The reservists would remain civilians, working for industry, farming, commerce and so on, but they could be called out in an emergency. The aim was to make the active force strong enough to withstand the first shock of a Soviet attack (if one were ever to come). It could hold a front long enough to allow mobilization of the reserves. Where it could hold, and for how long, would depend on its size, but in any event the plan was to make it fit for a stand somewhere on the Russian side of the Rhine. Both the active force and the reserves must, of course, be backed by an adequate tactical air force. Air power was the third

element in Eisenhower's 'philosophy'. As one of his senior staff officers said not long ago: 'A strong covering force with strong air power above it, and mobilizable reserves that can be brought into action at very short notice – and we shall have this problem licked.'

In Eisenhower's year a beginning was made with the licking. The covering force was created, and by the spring it amounted to seventeen or eighteen divisions between the Alps and the Baltic. Italy had a further four divisions between the Alps and the Adriatic. (There were, and are, also small forces in Austria and Berlin, but strictly speaking they do not come under S H A P E). Opposite the seventeen or eighteen divisions on the central front, the Red Army was believed to have about twenty-four divisions in Eastern Germany and Western Poland. The Soviet divisions were, however, supposed to be rather weaker, not only in luxuries like mobile laundries but also in the essential – firepower. So that by the spring General Eisenhower had a screen which was numerically almost a match for its immediate opposites. Thus the Soviet Government, if it were ever to think of mounting an offensive, would have to move more troops from Russia. If it did there would be a chance that we should hear of it, giving time to mobilize reserves and take political action.

At the end of Eisenhower's year the reserves were simply not there to mobilize. In this and in air power the problem was very far from being licked. Three or four French divisions were the only support which S H A P E could expect to arrive quickly in an emergency. No other force could be expected in less than two months – and then the best available would be two or three British Territorial divisions. Figures for air power have been kept secret. Air force officers are clamlike for once. But supreme headquarters has never hidden the fact that in the air it was weak. Pilots, planes, and airfields on the Continent have all been scarce. Possibly the number of jet fighters and modern medium bombers in service had risen above a thousand by the spring, but it was certainly no match for its potential opponents. In deadly contrast to 1944 and 1945, the skies would not be ours.

What of the present and future? The programme for this year was agreed at the Lisbon conference in February. It aimed at strengthening the covering screen, trebling the reserves at least, and expanding the air squadrons. The famous 'fifty divisions and four thousand tactical aircraft' announcement was made – and was received, quite rightly, with scepticism. Each nation's share in the total has never been specified by S H A P E. It is possible, however, to guess the Army figures from statements by national Ministries and speeches by discreet or indiscreet generals. The figures given here are only a guess and should be treated as such.

|                       | 1951 Active | 1952 Active | 1952 Reserve |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| United States . . . . | 6           | 6           | 2            |
| Great Britain . . . . | 4           | 4           | 2 or 3       |
| France . . . . .      | 5           | 7           | 5            |
| Belgium . . . . .     | } 2 or 3    | 3           | 2 or 3       |
| Netherlands . . . .   |             | 2           | 2            |
| Others . . . . .      |             | 1           | 1            |
|                       | —           | —           | —            |
|                       | 17 or 18    | 23          | 14 or 16     |
| Italy . . . . .       | 4           | 7           | 3            |
|                       | —           | —           | —            |
| TOTAL . . . . .       | 21 or 22    | 30          | 17 or 19     |

Numbers, of course, can be misleading. We must also ask of each division – Is it fully equipped? Are its men fully trained? Is it backed by proper supporting arms and services?

With the British and American active forces the answers are fairly satisfactory. The men and weapons are ready in Germany. The British contribution, including three armoured divisions with Centurion tanks, is most notable. The Americans have a high proportion of regulars, whom they can keep together in units for three or four years at a time. Since 1950 they have trained hard, living in the open for weeks. Of the 'trained on beer and women' tradition not much is left. The British Rhine Army has also had a stiff routine, but it does suffer from the constant changing of its men as their National Service period ends. No sooner is a tank crew or infantry platoon knit together into a team than one or two of its members are due for demobilization. Every unit in Rhine Army has to be both a training school and a fighting force. They do succeed in combining these duties, as they have shown in the summer manoeuvres last year and this.

(The consequence of cutting Britain's National Service period, as Mr Shinwell wishes, would be to make Rhine Army a training force of small fighting value. Nobody likes to take young men away from their careers for two whole years, but most are effective soldiers only in the last six or nine months. It is true, of course, that the two-years' rule is 'temporary' – as temporary as the stationing of American troops in Europe. When the American Army can safely go home we might safely cut our National Service period.)

As to British and American reserves, both are doubtful starters. There are trained forces in the United States, but could they be shipped across within thirty days? Thirty days is the period within which the first reinforcements are supposed to be ready for battle. In Britain we have Territorial Divisions some of which, with their Z men, are reserves of the

highest quality. But could they be ready within thirty days? There is not the slightest chance of it. Of course, when Britain first undertook reserve commitments, long before Lisbon, she hoped to keep some of her active Army at home. A war in Korea, terrorism in Malaya, and skirmishing at Suez have prevented that. Our promise of reserves might still have been kept by a reorganization of the Territorial Army, but that has not been done and obviously is not going to be done. As it is, the Territorial divisions would need at least eight to twelve weeks to become fit, and then they would not have the latest equipment. Here the cuts in Britain's rearmament programme come in. The effect of those cuts is in general obscure, but one consequence is clear. Centurion tanks which would have come to the Territorial divisions are now to be sold overseas for dollars. On other equipment, too, the Territorials are short. So Britain fails on the reserve part of her Lisbon promise. She is not alone in failing. The Continental countries have made a great effort to expand their forces, as planned at Lisbon, but none looks like succeeding. Arms, money, and men are all suffering from what the Americans now call 'slippage'. The new divisions of the French Army depend largely on the delivery of American arms. So far the deliveries have been running behind time. American tanks of the Patton type – the same tank generation as the British Centurion – have been expected ever since last year, but they did not begin to arrive in numbers until this summer. How many are now coming, and how steadily other arms are flowing, one could not tell without visiting each new division.

Some of the arms were being produced in Europe, and with these also there has been trouble. The most notable case is with the French factories which the French Government hoped would be financed through American 'off-shore' purchase. The United States Government, however, has been unable to finance them, with the result that the French Government has had to cut other parts of its programme to keep these plants going. The cuts may not directly affect the French forces this year, but they may do damage indirectly. In particular, the disappointment and uncertainty over American aid may make the French Government reluctant to extend the period of conscript service in the French forces. It may be unwilling to take more men away from productive industry and agriculture. The extension of service – from eighteen months to two years – has been discussed for a long time. Without it the French Army cannot be kept at its present strength, because the low birth rate of the 1930's is diminishing each annual intake. And unless the Army is kept up to its present strength it cannot increase the number of active and reserve divisions, as planned at Lisbon. Still less can it make the further growth provisionally planned for 1953.

The Belgian Government has gone ahead with its plans for longer service. The two-year period came into effect at the end of July. But at the time of writing the Belgian Government, faced with a troublesome threat of mutiny and the refusal of its neighbours to raise their service period at present, has suspended the new system. Unless her neighbours change their minds, she is unlikely to keep to two years. So she, too, is in danger of failing her Lisbon promises, both for active divisions and for reserves.

In air power four thousand tactical aircraft were the target this year. More than a thousand each were said to be coming from Britain and the United States, and eight hundred from France. In practice these numbers, great as they are, may well be reached. But will the aircraft be new? This year almost all the British fighters are bound to be Vampires and Meteors, which are obsolescent. The new Hunter, Swift, and Javelin are not expected to reach squadrons before next summer at the soonest – and the cuts in Britain's rearmament programme may delay them. That will happen if steel and labour are diverted from the aircraft industry (especially from making gas turbine engines) to engineering works on exports. Similarly the new French Mystère is not likely to reach French squadrons until next summer or autumn. Until then they must rely largely on American Thunderjets (good but obsolescent) and British Vampires. The American air force is gradually getting new Sabres, but for these the European theatre necessarily comes second to Korea. Next year, of course, the improvement in aircraft types and numbers should be immense. All the new machines – Sabre, Hunter, Swift, Javelin and Mystère – fly close to the speed of sound. All ought to be a match for anything the Russians are known to have ready. The Red Air Force may, however, produce its own surprises.

To sum up for this year and next. This autumn a roll call on the ground, based on the Lisbon list, should find an almost full muster of active forces, although they may be short of equipment and imperfectly trained. A roll call of reserves is likely to reveal many absentees. In air squadrons the answer should be 'all present', but at least until next year many pilots will be flying old planes. The improvement in the air next summer should be very important. But on the ground there is little hope for any improvement. The British, Belgian, French, Italian, and Netherlands armies seem to have stretched themselves to the limit at present. Without some uncovenanted gain – an end to the Indo-Chinese war, or peace in Malaya, or a sudden willingness on the Continent to accept two-year conscription, or a great change of heart in Congress about foreign aid – the growth of Western defences will go slower and slower. The momentum lost this year will mean that progress stops towards the end of next year.

Our effort then will go into keeping arms and armed forces at the level they have reached. But many changes – good and bad – can happen before next autumn.

One would be creation of the European Defence Community. That would bring with it hope of added strength for the active forces and for the reserves. The mere fact of creating a European Army will not, of course, strengthen our defences. The contingents contributed to it by France, Italy and the Benelux countries will simply be the contingents they now contribute to S H A P E. Those contingents can grow only if their countries are prepared to put more men into them, pay more for them, and give them better weapons. The European Army will not magically lift anyone's burden. The only wonder it may work is – because it is evidence that Europe is uniting – that it may spur some people in Europe to greater effort than they would make for national aims and that it will warm the feelings of Congress. Materially the important gain from the European Defence Community is that it will bring in a new nation – Western Germany. That is its whole purpose. But for the need to gather a contribution from Germany, without raising German national forces, there would have been no European Army and no European Air Force. If the European Defence Treaty does come into effect by the end of this year the first German active divisions should be ready by the summer of 1954. In practice they are not likely to number more than six or seven at first, in spite of all that has been said in Washington, Paris, and Bonn. The prudent planners at S H A P E certainly do not count on more. The total might perhaps reach twelve by 1956, and in 1957 the first few reserve divisions should be formed. (The German divisions will be German in nationality and will be full fighting divisions, although plenty of camouflage is being poured over them for fear of frightening the neighbours; but that does not mean that they will follow the old disciplinary or political ways of the *Wehrmacht*.)

There have been many doubts about whether, militarily, the European Army could work. In its final form there seems no reason why it should not. The treaty leaves the European Defence Commissioners plenty of latitude, and there need be nothing rigid in the new organization. There is, for example, no need to form every Army Corps exactly of one German, one French, and one other division: the system can be varied at will. The Italians will probably keep most of their forces for defending Italy, and the French may keep one or two complete French corps to cover the sector north of the Alps, where the French frontier is farthest east. The greatest obstacle to European operations will be language. There have also been doubts whether, politically, the European Army can be kept under civilian control. That depends on the Council of Ministers and the

Parliamentary Assembly above the Commissioners: they will have to assert themselves. At present it looks as if every national contingent would, when in doubt, take orders from its national Government in preference to anybody else. Its natural inclination will surely be that way. And in this the German contingent can be no different from any other. Obviously an existing French division will not suddenly become more loyal to the European command than to its home country, so why should a new German division? The European tradition will need years to take root.

Can the available forces defend Western Europe? The short answer is 'At present, no; given all that has been promised and something more, perhaps yes.' With twenty divisions or so, backed by only a handful of reserves, the best that could be expected would be one short stand. If attacked by the full weight of the Red Army – and, after all, no attack is conceivable from any other quarter – the active force would have to fall back, and fall back a long way. It could put up a stiff fight: that is the great difference from eighteen months ago, when the Red Army could have marched to the Channel almost unopposed (except by strategic bombing). Now there would be a fight, although it might not last long. Within a month the T.34s would be rolling through Paris.

But if the screen could hold for the best part of a month, and if the reserves ready within that period were not merely five or fifteen divisions but twenty or thirty, what then? Then there would be a fair chance for Western Europe. In the early stages deep penetration by the attacking army could not be prevented. That has to be accepted, grim as it is for people living in Western Germany: there is no alternative. Defensive theory to-day is based on 'strongpoints' which are self-contained, and between those strongpoints penetration is accepted; even welcomed for the opportunity of trapping the enemy which it offers. The penetration might reach as far as the Rhine – perhaps across it at one or two points. Militarily that does not matter so long as counter-attacks are launched. Given the certainty that reserves are getting ready behind them, the active forces can concentrate on fighting such an action. But they cannot fight it with only twenty divisions on the whole front between the Alps and the Baltic. With thirty, perhaps. In General Eisenhower's time that was mentioned as the minimum figure for the covering force.

With that strength the active force can also exploit two other great advantages which the West has (or should have). One is skill in generalship. Often in war an inferior force, well led, has won – as in the German offensive of 1940, or in the first British defence of Alamein. The tactical problems on the central front in Germany would be fearful: or, seen another way, they would be a challenge to Allied generals who showed high promise in 1943-45. The quality of Allied generalship ought to be

well above the Russian standard. The second great advantage is in new weapons. Atomic artillery and high-speed minelayers on land may be mentioned. Neither, so far as is known, is available yet to S H A P E, but both should be supplied soon. Neither will be the slightest use unless employed from a firm base: but if the Allied forces are built up until strong enough to provide that base, then they can benefit enormously from the new weapons.

For effective defence, then, the aim would have to be thirty active divisions (thirty-five with Italy), twenty or thirty reserve divisions (thirty to thirty-eight with Italy), and a tactical air force of 5,000 or 6,000 modern planes. The whole of this calculation is, of course, very rough and ready. As Mr Churchill has said, no one can settle battles before they are fought. The figures given err, if anything, on the short side. Yet these figures are above the Lisbon totals, and the Lisbon programme is not going to be fulfilled this year. With the loss of momentum in Western rearmament there seems, at present, very little likelihood of its being fulfilled next year or the year after. Creation of the European Army should bring some improvement. Here, however, comes the first political result of the slowing down, as mentioned at the beginning: the partial failure of the Lisbon plan may kill the European Army. It may do so because the French National Assembly, seeing that France is not going to be so strong as she expected, will fear that Germany would dominate the European Defence Community. (Of course, this is not the only threat to E D C.) If the European programme is dropped, the shock may spread: Congress, seeing that the Europeans are not uniting, may be less disposed to give them dollars. And so the damage to Western defence may mount.

Another political consequence of the Lisbon failure may be to undermine co-operation through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Before the February conference, for four months, the 'Three Wise Men' had worked at a dual task. They had balanced military requirements against economic possibilities, and they had divided the economic and military burdens among the North Atlantic nations as equitably as they could. Their inquest into national affairs was searching, and it was something that sovereign nations have never submitted to before. At Lisbon their recommendations, although disputed on some points, were accepted. Each nation substantially undertook the share they had allotted to it. Had they all gone on to fulfil their promises, the whole experiment would have been an astonishing success in international co-operation – almost a revolution. In the event individual nations, one by one, have fallen away from their pledges. Britain has not prepared her reserve army and has cut her production programme; France also has cut her programme and does not look like lengthening her conscription period;

Belgium is in trouble over the two-years service, and so on. Everyone, at root, is worried about money. Perhaps we should not be too disappointed at these failings, and possibly the knowledge that they have failed will spur the nations to be as co-operative as they can in the North Atlantic Council. But can the experiment be repeated? The sharing of burdens, the work of the 'Three Wise Men', was to have become an annual fixture. After the failure of the first experiment it will not be so easy to try again.

This article has given necessarily a rather gloomy picture. The success of Eisenhower's year came because the nations were waiting for his lead: the contributions to his command were being prepared before he arrived, and he reaped the fruit of the first effort in rearmament. General Ridgway has suffered because, after the first effort, the various countries are finding the cost of arms still higher than they expected. As a result rearmament may be stopped at or near its present level: that implies a gamble on the possibility that a small force would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Government in all circumstances. With so many unknown factors in Soviet policy, and with Russia piling up her own atomic bombs, it is a risky gamble. An alternative is to pay the extra cost – to make Western Europe defensible. The effort needed to pay that cost is great. Yet, after the astonishingly good start made last year, it is an effort which should not be beyond us.

## THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN CO-ORDINATION

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In the economic far more than in the political sphere the case for greater co-ordination or even unification in Europe is so self-evident as to brook no challenge. It cannot be doubted that greater strength and prosperity would result from a breaking down of the tariff, quota and currency barriers that now hamper the free movement of trade and capital within Europe. Without these artificial frontiers industry could move where it found its most efficient setting. Specialization and the division of labour, which are the foundation of economic progress, could then develop to a degree so far unattained in Europe. Industry and trade would reap the advantages of a vast domestic market.

Americans who make these points and argue the consequential lessons

with such enthusiasm and power of conviction often go on to draw the parallel with their own country. The power and prosperity of the United States, they say, are the product of this mass market economy within which industry, trade, men, money can move without having to overcome artificial barriers, and within which the salubrious effect of real competition (though not, it should be noted, competition from imported manufactures) makes itself felt. It is a parallel of which one should entertain some suspicion and reservation. The power and prosperity of the United States are also due to the immensity of its natural resources and the vigour of the new human stock it imported in such numbers from Europe. China and India possess much vaster markets and far greater populations than those of the United States, and yet they remain poor countries. It does not by any means follow that if this great market were created in Europe the result would be a rise in the volume of trade and the standard of welfare to levels comparable to those now enjoyed in the United States. There are many factors other than mere size which determine economic power and prosperity. Nevertheless, after taking these reservations into account, the fact remains that the advantages of greatness are considerable and that if Europe, even Western Europe, could harness those advantages the way would be opened for a startling improvement in industrial techniques, for a considerable expansion in the volume of trade and prosperity. What then is Europe waiting for?

The first answer to this question is provided by the sheer inertia of the *status quo*. For every argument in favour of doing something new, mankind will usually find ten for staying where it is. This inertia is not a purely negative force. Immense vested interests have developed and grown up with the splintering of Europe into its national constituent parts. They are not necessarily the greedy interests of industrialists whose concerns and fortunes might be endangered by the removal of frontiers and tariffs. The existence of whole communities may depend on the element of protection which has grown up with the national frontiers. French agriculture, the Belgian coal mines, the Italian textile industry, certain parts of the British chemical industry, might be endangered by the complete removal of obstacles to the free flow of trade within Europe. With the collapse of these industries it is not merely a few capitalists who would suffer, but whole communities and regions would have their economic basis roughly withdrawn from under them and would be called upon to find a new economic way of life. Here is another contrast with North America. Its beautifully integrated economy was forged out of a wilderness. It was not called upon to plough up and level and obliterate the relics of a thousand years of history and nationalism. These localized interests that might be injured in the unification of the European economy cannot be disregarded

in the interest of the greater good. They could be so disregarded if there were complete mobility and flexibility in our economic affairs. These qualities, however, have been weakened rather than strengthened of late. Social services, the greater organization of labour, these and all the other adjuncts of modern economic civilization, have made for certain rigidities which would make any bold and rapid advance towards unification extremely painful and liable to cause explosive situations in which the economic advantages of unification might be more than offset by social and political strife.

This, however, is more than an argument for going slow, for not attaining our ideal straightway. It is also an argument for thinking ahead, for not ignoring the implications of the main problem, for taking care of its ancillary and subsidiary problems, those involved by the inevitable impact on the existing economic structure of Europe of any real bold move towards unification.

This slow advance towards unification is, in fact, taking place. It is taking place through what might be called the 'functional' as opposed to the 'political' approach to the goal of unity. At many points the European community is building itself into a more integrated, united whole, without the framework of political federation, but nonetheless solidly and persistently. This functional approach is that of tackling every problem as it arises, in such a way as to create greater unity: to increase the transferability of European currencies, to reduce import tariffs and quotas, to liberalize trade from import licensing, to move towards a customs union. Let us not assume that in this advance something new is being attempted. We are merely trying to make good the immense damage caused by two world wars and forty years of growing economic nationalism to what used to be a reasonably integrated European economy. Europe before 1914 was a much closer approximation to our economic ideal than anything which is likely to be achieved over the next decade. There were national divisions, but by and large it could be said that Europe had one currency – gold and sterling, which were synonymous. There were no exchange controls to plague traders and travellers. There were no import and export quotas. There were few countries that required passports from foreign visitors. There were very few restrictions on movements of population. There were tariffs and, unfortunately, they showed a tendency to rise. But in 1914 tariffs on the whole were low. Britain, which dominated the commerce of Europe, was a completely free trade country. Moreover, where tariffs applied they were operated without discrimination. The most favoured nation clause was dutifully obeyed by all great commercial nations. To enumerate these features of pre-1914 Europe is to describe a world which to-day would seem to belong to an unrealizable Utopia.

The progress which has been made recently towards recapturing the essential qualities of this former system should not be minimized. It has taken place at many points and, therefore, may lack any sensational or dramatic evidence. But it has, nonetheless, been solid. Most of that progress has been made within the framework of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, the European counterpart to the Marshall Plan administration. It therefore owes some of its stimulus to the constant prodding in the direction of integration which has come from American quarters. Undoubtedly, the most important single achievement under this head has been the formation of the European Payments Union which has given to Western Europe all the advantages of genuine transferability of currencies and of a considerable liberalization of trade. When the United States began to give Marshall assistance to Europe they discovered an almost fantastic situation: they found that European countries were prevented by payments difficulties from trading among themselves as well as with the dollar world. They discovered, for example, that France was pleading for American steel under the Marshall Plan, when there were plentiful supplies of Belgian steel next door available for immediate delivery, but yet not available because they could not be paid for. The Americans wisely decided that one of the highest priorities in the European reconstruction programme should be given to devising payments machinery which would overcome this economic insanity, cut through the bilateralism on which most European payments agreements were then based, and convert Western Europe into an area within which multilateral freedom of payments would be possible. That was done through setting up successive versions of the Intra-European Payments Agreement and then the European Payments Union. One of the main advantages of that union is that it has made it possible for each country in Western Europe to regard all the others as one single group from the point of view of commercial policy. There is no need for Britain, for example, to discriminate against Belgium but not against the Netherlands, because trade with these two and all the other E P U countries is ultimately settled in one single clearing. This has also opened the door to a real liberalization of trade, removing from the shackles of import licensing a large proportion of trade within Europe which is transacted between individuals and firms in the E P U countries.

This development in the monetary sphere is not the only line of progress which has been made towards union and integration. A great deal of hard work has been done in preparing for a customs union of European countries. Some of the countries concerned have formed a 'low tariff club' and are striving to entice their higher tariff colleagues into its fold. Excellent work has been done towards the elaboration of a European

electric grid. Plans have been made from which can be visualized the possibility of British industry tapping the hydro-electric power of the Alps. The Schuman Plan vies with the European Payments Union in its claim to be the most solid and worthwhile symbol of European unity and economic integration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is surrounded by economic committees considering the joint problems of supply that devolve from the decision to form a common front for defence. Beyond all these special illustrations of the advance towards economic integration there is perhaps the most important of them all – the habit of co-operation and consultation which is being fostered by the countries working within the framework of O E E C. Never before have the countries of Europe been prepared to submit their budgets, investment programmes, monetary and credit policies, balance-of-payments situations, to the cross-examination and criticism of their European colleagues. This is now common form in Paris. A real European Secretariat is being evolved in O E E C and the neighbouring N A T O. Representatives of all the countries concerned stand ready to give their evidence, to disclose their plans to these committees, to have these plans shot at and to report back to their governments with suggestions of amendments. This intellectual movement towards co-operation, this willingness to merge, pool and discuss common problems is in itself a great achievement.

So far, so good; but if the countries of Europe have found it possible to travel the road of unity to this quite significant milestone, why should they have not gone beyond it? The main reason for the relative slowness of this progress is no doubt to be found in the lack of uniformity in the economic policy of the countries concerned. This is really a political argument since economic policy, the choice between planning and free enterprise, between physical and monetary controls, is one which devolves from political attitudes rather than from economic techniques. The best example of this clash is provided by the difficulties which have been encountered in forming the economic union between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Remarkable progress has, in fact, been made in forming Benelux, but the ultimate goal always eludes the pursuer because the two principal countries concerned, Belgium and the Netherlands, are at heart wedded to different economic philosophies. One tends to choose freedom where the other prefers planning. Their currencies have been hard and soft, respectively. The one has applied dear money while the other has been inclined to cheapen it. It is in this attempt to mix oil and water that the real difficulties in forming the Benelux Union have been encountered. The lesson which is to be learned from this experiment in miniature of forming greater unity in the European economy is that some integration of domestic economic policies is an essential preliminary to

real progress along this road. In this respect the recent report published by the professorial working party of O E E C is full of significance. It shows the link that exists between domestic monetary policy and external solvency, and in the course of its exposition it reveals what immense gaps now separate the domestic policies pursued in the Western European community.

Another obstacle to quicker progress towards unity and integration is the lack of uniformity in the fiscal habits and traditions of European countries. Taxation systems have grown up on quite different lines. In some countries import duties are an essential part of the revenue-raising machinery – hence the special difficulty of reducing those tariffs. In others the whole burden of fiscal work has to be put on indirect and not on direct taxation. In certain countries the evasion of direct taxation is regarded as a valid and justifiable initiative on the part of the taxpayer. In others, on the contrary, there has grown up an almost excessive measure of discipline in this sphere. It is difficult in the circumstances to ask countries in which there is reasonably good fiscal discipline to mix their budgetary affairs with those countries where a looser morality prevails. This, to the outsider, may seem a flippant argument, but on closer consideration it will be seen to hold very profound weight and significance.

In enumerating the obstacles to European Economic Union, some mention must also be made of the special difficulties inherent in Britain's participation in such a union. The exceptional position of Britain, with its threefold responsibilities: to the Commonwealth, to the English-speaking North Atlantic community, and to Europe, has often been expounded and need not be elaborated here. What should, however, be stressed is that whereas British representatives have always been inclined to sound the note of caution and gradualness in the discussions of any particular aspect of this problem of integration, when it has come to deeds and not words, Britain has shown itself prepared to play its full part and bear its full share of the burden in any such advance. That was very apparent in all negotiations that led up to the European Payments Union. It may yet prove to be true of Britain's participation in the Schuman Plan.

All these factors have proved serious handicaps to more rapid advance towards economic union in Western Europe. When the difficulties are enumerated the wonder is not that so little but that so much progress should have been made over the past five years. There are good reasons to believe that under the propulsion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization this progress will continue. Let us not ignore, or attempt to dissimulate, the fact that fear of Russia has been one of the most potent allies of the cause and that in so far as N A T O pulls towards the goal of union, it is common defence against this threat which will provide a good deal

of the cement for this union. If the union is ever consummated Uncle Joe will vie with Uncle Sam in the list of sponsors. There need be no regret or shame that so negative an influence as fear should have played this dominant part in propelling Europe towards the goal of union. Fear can be an effective aid and ally, provided it is used as a spur to constructive action and not merely to digging shelters.

The road ahead provided by the development of N A T O and O E E C is the road of gradualness; it is the functional approach: the tackling of every problem of economic policy in Western Europe as a means and an excuse for taking Europe a little nearer the goal of unity. It is by patient and persistent progress along this road that we shall best serve the cause of unity. To leap into an attempted political federation now, before the basic economic problems of union are even considered, would be to prejudice the whole cause. It would do so by burdening the ideal of union with all the blame for the violent and explosive frictions which 'union now' would inevitably create. There is much to be done in furthering the functional approach. All kinds of projects, aimed at closer unity of the countries of Western Europe, are in process of study or application. In the monetary and commercial spheres there are ways of achieving a greater collaboration between the countries of Europe and their extensive overseas territories. The machinery of the European Payments Union might be welded even more closely than it is now to that of the sterling area. The preferences which European countries extend to their overseas territories might be extended to Europe itself, as a step towards the ultimate creation of a real European customs union. There are projects for creating a European Investment Bank and a European Federal Reserve System. Some of these may well be visionary, ill-conceived or redundant. But the fact that they are being studied and discussed, some within the framework of O E E C, others by the Council of Europe, are tokens of the slow but steady march which is taking place towards the goal of union.

A great danger, however, overhangs the whole course of this development. It lies in the possibility of the goal being conceived not merely as a united Europe, but an exclusive, autarchic Europe discriminating in its financial and commercial policies against others and, particularly, against the dollar world. There are many voices in Europe that preach this doctrine. To this school of thought the main driving force in making Europe one, solvent and prosperous is to find economic independence from the United States. These ideas are the economic counterpart of the political philosophy of the 'third force' which would interpose a powerful neutralist bloc between the United States and the Soviet Union, thus keeping the balance and the peace between them. In its economic views

this school assumes as axiomatic the indefinite persistence of a dollar shortage throughout the non-dollar world. The basic premise is that the United States, by the very nature of its economy and of its technical advantages, will always export more than it will import, that the rest of the world, therefore, can only find independence from regular, demoralizing charitable 'hand-outs' in a policy of permanent discrimination against the dollar world. Thus it would be all too easy for the instruments of economic co-operation in Europe – E P U, the movement towards a customs union, the plans for cartellization of basic industries and the like – to become barriers and not bridges between Europe and the rest of the North Atlantic community. It would be a major tragedy as well as a strange paradox if this were to befall – a tragedy because it would cut right across the great alignment of free nations which is our safeguard, a paradox because it is American dollars and initiative which would have helped to bring to life these very instruments of discrimination used against the United States.

There is no need for this vicious twist to be given to the whole movement of European integration. But the avoidance of this danger must depend on the United States as well as on the countries of Western Europe. It is up to the United States to prove that the basic premise of the 'insulationists' in Europe is false – that the dollar shortage is not a permanent, chronic feature of the economic scene. This will call for a wise and constructive investment policy, discreet but consistent export of capital from North America to the other parts of the world; above all it will call for a more lenient attitude towards free entry of other countries' products into the United States. It would be difficult to exaggerate the aid and comfort which the cause of discrimination in Europe receives from every reminder that the forces of protection are still so strongly entrenched in the United States. On this score, however, there is no need to despair. All indications are that over the years to come the gargantuan economy of the United States will become more and more dependent on materials imported. This will help to bridge the dollar gap – partly by the imports in question, but also by the American investments that will be needed to develop new sources of these urgently required raw materials. But there are less precise reasons for the belief that the right response will be forthcoming from the United States. If the history of the past forty years has one lesson to teach it is that in the end the United States tends to do the right thing, though often with aggravating deliberation. At the really decisive moments, the decision is usually the correct one. There is no need yet to abandon hope that the United States will, in fact, follow an economic policy in keeping with its position and responsibilities as the world's greatest exporter of capital and of manufactured goods (a position

Great Britain was fortunate enough to hold in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries and to which the response was 'free trade').

On this assumption, optimistic perhaps but not unreasonably so, it should be possible to envisage Western Europe moving gradually towards economic unity, doing so without flamboyant political gestures, remembering always that the basis of unity is homogeneity of fundamental economic policies and conditions, above all, securing this advance towards union without the cement of discriminatory, exclusive, autarchic devices aimed at the rest of the world and especially at the dollar countries. But let the concluding sentence of this appreciation of the prospect stress that if this highly desirable goal is to be reached it will call for continuous and often courageous initiative and effort on the part both of Western Europe and of the Atlantic world in general.

## EUROPE FROM LORRAINE

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The movement for the federation of Western Europe is often misunderstood, particularly in Great Britain and the United States. We tend, and Americans still more so, to think of it in pragmatic terms, to argue as to its value as a measure of military security or as a means of reproducing in the Old World some of the economic advantages of a large single market. There is a tendency to assume that the motive power behind the movement is similarly rational and the product of relatively recent developments. The over-simplification of political issues prevalent in America makes a large-scale change of this kind particularly appealing. At last, they feel, those Europeans are showing some kind of sense; at last they are willing to forget the past feuds and wars; at last they are beginning to behave like sensible Americans: the Council of Europe is something like the great Constitutional Convention; Strasbourg is a modern Philadelphia; and Dr Adenauer and M. Schuman are the Hamilton and Madison of the twentieth century.

How plausible it all sounds – and how misleading it all is! So far from being a simple acceptance of the logic of contemporary economics and strategy, the movement for European Union is made up of diverse and

complex strands; its supporters are moved by hates as much as by loves. So far from being a stream-lined twentieth century 'solution' to Europe's problems, it has historical roots that go back at least to Charlemagne and to the tripartite division of Charlemagne's Empire. There is not one single broad highway to Strasbourg but a multitude of separate roads – some of them very unlikely ones. Until this is appreciated, those who play with the idea of European Union, especially in the English-speaking world, are in the same position as children playing with an unexploded bomb, under the impression that they have found some new and interesting mechanical toy created specially for their enjoyment.

Let us look at one such road to Strasbourg, that of the Count Jean de Pange.<sup>1</sup> Monsieur de Pange comes from a long-established noble family of Lorraine. His wife is a member of one of the most remarkable of French families, that of de Broglie, and so a descendant of Madame de Staël and of Necker. He himself was trained at the turn of the present century as a medieval historian at the Ecole des Chartes. He is an ardent Catholic and well acquainted with the great figures in the Catholic hierarchy in more than one country. He is not, in this account of his own intellectual and political journey towards the idea of a European federation, writing of experiences felt from the outside, but with something of the authority that comes, if not from the exercise of power, at least from easy familiarity with those who do exercise it. It is a book which deserves to be treated seriously. Of M. de Pange's absolute sincerity, there can be no doubt at all. The middle of the book is taken up with passages of description of his experiences on the Western front in the first world war – experiences which no man of any sensibility could undergo and not feel a genuine horror of war, and a genuine desire to find some means of ending the national feuds which have hitherto been at the root of so much of Europe's suffering. Since his family home lay within the part of Lorraine annexed by Germany in 1871, the meaning of being subjugated to another nation is for him also a vivid one, and not a mere paper concept. And although the mainspring of his ideas can be traced far back in his career, he has the final honesty of admitting when he was wrong. Thus although his teachers at the Ecole des Chartes were revisionists in the Dreyfus case, de Pange, like most men of his kind, was anti-Dreyfus, on the ground that injustice to an individual was better than calling into question the honour of the French Army, thus deflecting it from its task of preparing for the reconquest of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. He now admits that, having seen where such ideas lead, he

<sup>1</sup> *Les Meules de Dieu: France – Allemagne, Europe*, by Jean de Pange. Paris. Editions Alsatia, 1951.

was wrong; that individual rights must be central in any civilized State.

On the other hand, although he repudiates the 'integral nationalism' of the Action Française, he remains essentially a monarchist, believing that State power based upon popular will rather than some immanent right can only lead to totalitarianism of one kind or another. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire remain for him the great disasters, the diplomacy of the *Ancien Régime* the example of wisdom. Despite the passion he felt for the undoing of the wrong of 1871, he hates Clemenceau, the father of victory, more than any other political figure who crosses these pages. His hero is the great royalist, Marshal Lyautey, whose empire-building on a basis of the peaceful diffusion of French culture he admired in his youth, in Morocco, and whom he would have liked to see exercising not dissimilar functions in regained Alsace. And Lyautey, too, hated the Republic. One chapter consists entirely of a description of the coronation of George VI, which M. de Pange attended – and its irrelevance is only apparent, since M. de Pange sees in the British Monarchy, and in the link with the Commonwealth which it provides, that spiritual sanction which is for him at the root of all healthy political organization.

Sincerity, the avowal of opinions, some of which will be unpopular, is a great merit; what of M. de Pange's range of knowledge? It would be an impertinence to insist upon his deep and loving knowledge of his own Lorraine, of neighbouring Alsace and of the Saar (whose surrender to Hitler in 1935 he regards as the real blunder of pre-war diplomacy), of the German Rhineland, and of Austria where he lived as a boy and where in the Habsburgs, the disappearance of whose Empire still fills him with immeasurable regret, he saw primarily the Dukes of Lorraine. The United States scarcely exists except as a contributor to victory in two world wars. Of its role in world politics – indeed of world politics as distinct from European politics – there is no mention. With Great Britain the position is different. M. de Pange is friendly to this country and in the early months of the war was deeply involved in informal discussions which may have played their part in the abortive Anglo-French Union project of June 1940. It is difficult to see quite how M. de Pange reconciles his apparent enthusiasm for this scheme with his present advocacy of a European Federation on quite a different basis, and on one which would be more likely to separate the destinies of Britain and France than to unite them. One suspects that his real knowledge of British politics and recent British history has its lacunæ. (No profound student of British history would repeat the legend that the Entente with France at the beginning of the century was the personal work of Edward VII. Nor was it Cecil Rhodes' intention that the number of German Rhodes

Scholars should be equal to those from the English-speaking world. Rhodes' last will added in a codicil fifteen scholarships for Germans to the sixty provided for the Commonwealth and the two for *each* American State.) It is more than the passing factor of a Socialist Government – as events indeed have shown – that has prevented Britain from marching in step with the advocates of a real federal system for Western Europe. As for Russia, if the Americans are tolerated but ignored, the Russians are feared and detested. M. de Pange quotes with approval Tocqueville's prophecy of the coming might of Russia and his advice to France to unite with Germany to resist it. He condemns the French Government for having brought Russia into the League of Nations in 1934, which he regards as the death-blow to that institution. For him the European Union movement means that 'Europe has already regained consciousness of herself before the menace of the Slav world, in which she has recognized her unconquered enemy of the past fifteen centuries, since the period when its pressure against the Germans provoked the great invasions.' For it is not only Communist Russia but all the Slavs who are thus put under the ban. The Czechs in particular. No words are too harsh for Benes, and every accusation brought by the Nazis against Czechoslovakia as an oppressor of minorities seems readily acceptable to M. de Pange, despite his proclaimed aversion for the principle of nationality which he regards as one of the unhappy progeny of the French Revolution. A United Europe committed to a crusade against both Communism and Slavdom, cut off from the resources of the eastern half of the Continent, seems a poor guarantee of either peace or prosperity. Yet this would appear to be what M. de Pange is advocating.

Let us look more closely at this creature of his imagination. The war of 1914–18 was a war, he shows, to remedy the wrong done to Alsace-Lorraine. But the French in their turn were wrong to insist on treating Alsace as an integral part of France and forcing her to accept the entire system and outlook of the Third Republic. That such an attempt was made was the fault of the anti-clericals. The separate culture of Alsace, centred round its deeply Catholic religious feeling, should have been encouraged and given institutional expression. Regionalism in Alsace might have helped to revive regionalism elsewhere in France. In his regional and anti-centralist tendencies, M. de Pange shows curious affinities with the Vichy outlook, despite his severity at the expense of Vichy's collaborationism. Alsatian autonomy is thought of, then, as a model for France. But it is to be more than that. Alsace is to be a bridge for the entry of French ideas into Germany. So, too, could have been the Saar, and finally the Rhineland itself. If, instead of pursuing reparations into the *impasse* of the Ruhr, France after the first world war

had given proper political and economic encouragement to the Rhineland autonomist movement, then flourishing under the Mayor of Cologne, a certain Dr Adenauer, it could have been a bridge between France and Germany. If the Popular Democrats, the precursors of the M R P, and founded on the model of the Catholic party of Alsace, had had power in France in the inter-war years, they could have linked up with the Centre Party in the Rhineland and with Catholic Bavaria, with the Catholic parties of Italy and Austria 'to discuss projects of European Union which took shape only a quarter of a century later.' Instead came Hitler, backed by the new Protestant industrialists.

Yet this notion of a federal Europe is presented alongside another which stands in some contradiction to it, that of a resumption of French influence in Germany. For the German Empire created by Bismarck and its Emperor – *quel parvenu!* – M. de Pange has nothing good to say. For him Prussian militarism is rightly odious, and the Reich itself, whose only common possession was Alsace-Lorraine, a merely transient phenomenon. Not only did M. de Pange regard as possible after its fall the revival of the separate kingdoms and principalities – the old French illusion of 'The Germanies' – but also the possibility of France playing an active role in German affairs. How right in his view were the French negotiators at Westphalia in 1648 to insist that the links between Alsace and the Empire should remain, that thereby France might have a place in the deliberations of the Imperial Diet! But can the methods of 1648 mean anything in an age when the balance of forces has shifted so profoundly and when the sentiment of nationality has come to exercise so profound an influence? What can be built upon dynasticism in the twentieth century?

It would be unfair to M. de Pange to press the point too far, for clearly this argument is a secondary one and is partly brought in to criticize those Frenchmen who in his view were led by an exaggerated nationalism, and a wish to maintain an exclusive and narrow French outlook, to lose a chance of reconciliation with Germany on the morrow of 1918. The heart of the matter remains his particular view of European federation. Its military, economic and political institutions are hardly touched upon. From some asides on the proposed Anglo-French Union and its similarities with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, from his comparison of the Commonwealth with the League of Nations, and other references to federalism, one must assume that M. de Pange is no clearer than are most Continental students of what is implied by the acceptance of federalism under modern conditions. What is important to him, however, is not the institutions but the idea: the binding force is essentially a cultural one; and the cultural unity is that conferred by the common Catholicism of the lands in question. Republicanism of the French

radical and anti-clerical variety, and continental socialism, which is close to it in spirit, are thus the principal internal enemies. It is a point of view which anyone is perfectly entitled to hold. But a few comments upon it will suggest themselves. It would mean not merely the direction of political development in France itself along certain lines, but also the maintenance of the division of Germany. For the Catholic majority which is Dr Adenauer's support is, of course, largely the accident of Germany's division along lines which leave the core of Protestant Germany on the Soviet side of the line. Much of the current support for the Bonn Government, and much of the opposition to it, are only understandable if this is kept in mind. It explains, too, the not surprising lukewarmness of the Dutch towards the federation scheme – they are nowhere mentioned in M. de Pange's book, but they can scarcely be excluded from the organization of Western Europe; and the Dutch Protestants can hardly feel at home in a union inspired along these lines. Something of the kind may also affect the attitude of Switzerland, a country which is mentioned, though somewhat obliquely. Finally, of course, the lack of a political movement in Britain corresponding to the Continental parties in which M. de Pange puts his trust adds another difficulty to those of fitting Britain into the scheme.

M. de Pange's views – and a summary must do them some injustice – are not of course shared by all those who support the movement for European Federation. But the preponderant roles of the Catholic Lorrainer, M. Schuman, and of the Catholic Rhinelander, Dr Adenauer, are a pointer to where some at least of its strength lies. It is a point of view which must be considered; and it will be obvious that to consider it and assess its potentialities it is necessary to take a much longer view of European history than is often customary. Centuries have gone to making up the complex of issues of which the problem of Alsace is typical. The difficulty is to keep this long history in perspective with the newer developments, the rise of Russia and the United States, the development of the British Commonwealth, the claims of new secular ideologies. There is a genuine unrest in Western Europe, a genuine dissatisfaction with existing political institutions, a genuine readiness for radical experiment. But it is not clear that this demand can be met by going behind the French Revolution. For better or for worse, the Reformation, the French Revolution, and for that matter the Russian Revolution, are facts of history. Statesmanship must reckon with them if the remedies it proposes are not to be worse than the disease.

## SWITZERLAND AND THE DECLINE OF THE WEST

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In the inter-war years when one travelled in the Balkan peninsula the extraordinary ignorance which reigned in Yugoslavia about its neighbour Rumania or in Rumania about its neighbour Bulgaria was striking. This was primarily due to what in those days we regarded as Balkan conditions, the poverty which prevents individuals from reading or travelling and which indeed absorbs their attention to such a degree that they are unable to interest themselves receptively in their neighbours' affairs. And so one constantly heard the same laments about the same problems, which were presented to one, in each country in turn, as the most unexpected phenomena.

To-day when one travels in Western Europe it is very much the same. The problems are monotonously similar; among them are the ignorance, the indignation, but, above all, the apathy one discovers where sympathy and understanding would seem more in place. The British are surprised when they find that (hitch-hiking students apart) very few continentals can travel abroad unless they are financed by their Government or a flourishing industrial concern: the Germans are amazed to hear that the humanistic intellectual in other countries than Germany is being squeezed out of existence while the technician flourishes at the cost of specializing to an inhuman extent: the Italians are astonished to learn that skilled workmen elsewhere can often afford more than University professors. The only humanistic group – if humanistic it be – which can still hold its own almost anywhere is that of the lawyers in spite of the over-production of *avvocati* in Italy.

It would appear plausible to explain the seeming Balkanization of the West in terms of the progressive poverty which has followed two world wars. This poverty has been mitigated socially by the bigger obligations assumed by each state, but the bigger obligations have in the last instance been financed at the expense of those classes whose former leisure allowed some of their members to live a civilized life. What at first seems to be an almost fascinating mystery is the discovery that Switzerland, the one really prosperous country in Europe whose currency for instance is as 'hard' as that of the United States, suffers nevertheless from many of the

self-same troubles as her neighbours and is equally perplexed in searching to escape from the 'malaise' of the times.

It is evident that all the Western European countries are oppressed by the weight of taxation necessitated by the course and results of two world wars in the past and the fear of a third one in the future: the remnants of the educated classes and the less skilled working-people are also hard-hit by the constant rise in prices, most of all perhaps since the Korean War and the latest wave of rearmament. Switzerland, whose political existence is based upon the international recognition of her armed neutrality, was no more than a spectator in the two great wars against Germany. In 1945 her industrial plant was in condition to supply the ex-belligerents with many of their needs; in 1950, just as the consequent boom in Switzerland had waned, a fresh one began with the rearmament dictated by the war in Korea; Swiss chemicals and machines were again in eager demand, and the Swiss watch industry was once again set on its feet. To observe life in the Swiss towns is to observe the tremendous well-being which these developments have not only preserved but heightened. The Swiss, nevertheless, are unable to adjust their fiscal system to their financial needs, and there is at least as much conflict in Switzerland as in any other West European country with regard to the incidence and levying of taxation, indeed the question of which authority may levy which tax is almost more serious than that of who is to pay.

Sheltered as they have been from the direct impact of war, the Swiss think in terms of the prosperity of life in Western Europe between 1870 and 1914 when continuous expansion was taken for granted. At the same time they cling tenaciously to the conception of their society incorporated in the Swiss constitution of 1874, the conception of a confederation of free cantons whose decisions are based upon direct plebiscitary, not parliamentary, democracy. This constitution, naturally, is a written one, the inflexibility of which is occasionally regretted nowadays; constitutional, including basic fiscal, changes require the approval of the two voices of Swiss sovereignty, the approval, that is to say, of the majority of the cantons and of the majority of the male population. No sooner had the 1874 constitution been voted than industrialization attacked Switzerland in earnest; the constitution which had been designed for a loose chain of mainly peasant communities was overtaken by events; it had to be constantly amended to supply the needs of a small but highly industrialized society.

The most critical fiscal issue arose out of the first World War, the cost of mobilization and the rest. Using constitutionally sanctioned emergency powers the Swiss Federal Government began to levy a direct tax on incomes, although the constitution assigned the levying only of indirect

taxes to the central authority; direct taxation was assumed to be a function of the all-important cantons. In the 'thirties, in order to fight unemployment, the Federal Government again felt obliged to levy a direct tax, and since the second world war it has never ceased to do so, always on the basis of emergency powers. Although the technical obligations of the Federal authorities had expanded to an extent which necessitated a great increase of the funds at their disposal, much conservative protest was raised, especially from the French-speaking cantons which professed to fear oppression from the large German-speaking majority in the country. At last, at the end of 1950, the Swiss public was induced with some difficulty to agree to a financial programme which sanctioned the raising of a direct income tax by the central Government in Berne for the following four years. In spite of Swiss prosperity this measure was essential in order to avoid the expansion of the Federal debt and the distressing results which this might bring. During the period from 1951 to 1954 a permanent financial plan – the long heralded *Finanzreform* – is apparently worked out. By then, most supporters of the expansion of the provincial rights of the central authority believe, direct federal taxation must have become enough of a habit for the public to accept it as permanent; there are others who deny prognostications of the kind.

Then the meantime Switzerland has embarked upon a big rearmament programme of her own, the cost of which is not included in the bills which the Federal Government has to pay with the proceeds of the Four-Year Plan. Indeed since the beginning of 1951 the extraordinary budget required for rearmament – originally estimated at a cost of 1,464 million Swiss francs over five years – has been under discussion. It has caused considerable friction. On the one hand many people say why bother about it at all? With the continuing boom, the *Wehrsteuer* or income tax, the customs, postal services and federal railways are bringing in more than they ever have before, and the Confederation could well fill whatever gap may be left with a loan. On the other hand most people in authority have urged that the expense should be positively faced in order that the inflationary tendency already in existence should not be further stimulated; they have also pointed out that delay intensifies the problem since the cost of rearmament has steadily increased. Since the Army is a federal responsibility the financial burden of military costs falls upon the Federal Government alone.

Two expedients have been repeatedly put forward to meet the new army bill. The Social-Democratic Party has returned to its favourite proposal of a capital levy. A carefully drawn-up plan for a levy which should affect only about 80,000 persons was put to the country in a referendum held on May 18th, 1952, but was rejected by 421,459 to

328,032 individual votes, and by all the cantons as such except Zürich, Basle, Schaffhausen and the Ticino. The other main fiscal device which has been under discussion for some time is a tax upon all drinks other than tea, coffee and cocoa, the so-called *Getränkesteuer*. The wine-growing peasants, especially in the cantons of Vaud, Neuchâtel and Valais, together with the powerful pressure group of the hôteliers, succeeded in blocking this tax when it was brought forward in the Swiss Parliament in 1951. But the *Bundesrat* or Federal Government returned to the charge, and early this year the two Chambers in Berne accepted a new Government plan for covering rearmament costs, a plan which included the tax on drinks and a heavy tax on luxury foods. A referendum on this proposal was arranged for July 6th of this year.

As the time for this critical vote drew near, while the party leaders, as they often have on similar occasions before, advised acceptance of the *Bundesrat's* proposal, it became evident that strong feelings and powerful grounds were ranged against it. On general grounds people prefer to vote no, all the more when any kind of tax is involved. The urban public in Switzerland – a large majority in the country, though the towns remain relatively small – is already irritated by the high cost of living which is partly due to the lavish subsidization of the peasantry now reduced to 18 per cent. of the population. A referendum on a law to continue this protection of the farmers (which goes further than in Britain since it may ban inexpensive foreign foodstuffs and subsidize Swiss food exporters) was accepted by a bare majority at the end of March. In Geneva and in Basle (in the latter town the big chemical industry pays poor wages) annoyance over high food prices helps to keep the insignificant and now divided Swiss Communist Party alive; its weakness was, however, nicely demonstrated on April 20th, 1952, when a Communist Initiative against the unpopular purchase-tax was nevertheless defeated by 550,712 to 128,237 votes and – this was unprecedented – in every canton. In Zürich, the largest Swiss town (Berne is now a close rival for that distinction), indignation against expensive food is nurtured but at the same time soothed by the notorious Herr Duttweiler whose chain stores – the 'Migros' – undercut all other retailers. Another element of difficulty in the situation is that the Minister of Finance is the one *Bundesrat* or Federal Minister who represents the Socialist Opposition. Last December Dr. Max Weber was elected to this onerous position. He is a man who is greatly esteemed by those who know him, but there is some suspicion in hostile circles that a Socialist like Dr Weber, who stood far to the left in his youth, will try to play some Socialist trick upon the public, while the French-Swiss resent the Socialist view that new circumstances require some restriction of cantonal liberty.

When the referendum was held on the Government's plan to pay for Swiss rearmament the deficiency in the functioning of the Federal Constitution was well illustrated. A necessary, important and overdue measure was defeated by 352,205 votes to 256,035, all the cantons rejecting it but three. Out of several disquieting features of the situation, the two most obvious were the fact that only 43 per cent of the electorate took the trouble to vote and that French Switzerland provided a *compact vote* of no. Thus in Switzerland as elsewhere the question arises as to whether existing institutions are worn out and if so what can possibly take their place? Thoughtful people ask themselves whether a federal constitution with a relatively weak central authority has not been rendered obsolete by technical developments, and whether a plebiscitary democracy is workable when the issues to be judged by the simple citizen become increasingly technical. Pessimists point to the Initiative launched by the French-Swiss of Lausanne some years ago and accepted in September 1949. In accordance with this decision, if the Federal Government uses its emergency powers to promulgate decrees, the latter must be approved by popular referendum within the following twelve months, or they must be withdrawn. The consequence has been the opposite to that desired by the initiators who hoped to put an end to emergency decrees; on the contrary the Government is able to issue any decree, however arbitrary, without reference to the public, provided that the operation of the decree in question is restricted to a period one day less than twelve months. Another ground for doubt is provided by the small proportion of the electorate which goes to the polls when referenda are held. This low participation is no doubt due partly to apathy, partly to bewilderment. It may well be argued that it is not a bad thing, since it is better that only the opinion of those who take an active interest in the question at stake should be weighed. The small percentage of voters is used as an argument against the enfranchisement of women – how should they, poor creatures, judge the issues which confound Swiss men. Yet, here, too, modern circumstances are proving corrosive. The old response, 'They will never get the vote in Switzerland' is changing. A few women have been elected on to a few local bodies, especially church councils (*Kirchenräte*), and one hears it admitted uneasily that gradually 'it may come here too'.

Not only the political, but also the military, assumptions which the Swiss believed to be fundamental are now shaken by technical advance. It is only too obvious that wars stimulate scientific invention, above all in the matter of armaments. When in 1950 the Swiss decided upon a new and tremendous effort to achieve greater strength for the defence of their neutrality against a possible attack from the East, it became clear that a

revision of their military organization was essential. All the elaborate devices evolved during the second great war, radar and the rest, had to be considered and adopted in so far as the future defence of Switzerland might necessitate. Will it be possible to train Air Force pilots and armoured divisions on the old militia basis, with only a few hundred professional officers and the rest of the forces dependent upon a few weeks' training in the year? Just when many Germans are hoping to adopt the Swiss model if they must be rearmed, people in Switzerland are beginning to ask themselves this question in anxious tones scarcely above a whisper. The death of two young men on a forced march organized by professional officers last year for candidates (*Aspiranten*) for commissioned rank has done nothing to diminish Swiss antipathy towards the conception of a professional army as opposed to a militia. For this militia is regarded as an integral part of Swiss democracy. Indeed the Swiss speak of their military service as a major part of their civic education; they believe it to supply an essential *esprit de corps*, a national cohesion, which their cantonal schools and universities cannot provide in the same way. Again, to vote in the many referenda put forward by commune, canton or confederation is, it has been seen, an optional affair; it cannot educate the indifferent who simply abstain. Military service on the other hand is compulsory for all able-bodied men; it is perhaps partly because it is regarded as inseparable from citizenship that the feeling against the recognition of women as citizens dies so hard. It should at the same time be noted that incipient doubts about the possible efficacy of a modern militia have not prevented the training of over half a million men up to date, together with pilots who put in regular hours of practice, and engineers who combine their professional and army work. The Swiss, like Marshal Tito, believe that theirs is potentially the strongest army in Europe to-day. It will be a very long time before any international force will inspire them with the same confidence.

For in spite of their wealth and ability to travel, in spite of their linguistic and literary connections with their European neighbours and in spite of the Red Cross tradition in Geneva, it cannot be said that more than a handful of the Swiss are enthusiastic Europeans. Far from regarding themselves as a microcosm of a federated Europe, as their admirers fondly do, they are sceptical about the institutions of Strasbourg and the possibilities of a European Army, and they applaud the tenacity of Britain's insistence upon national sovereignty. A catastrophe such as the Po Valley floods last autumn will arouse the splendid generosity of the Swiss, but on the whole they are not much less apathetic than their poverty-stricken neighbours about their neighbours' affairs; a foreign affairs debate will empty the Swiss Chamber of Deputies

Apathy is partly to be attributed to the feeling that international organization has so far proved futile and that the problems of today are on so large a scale that they have necessarily become remote; it is clear that nothing of political importance can be achieved without the support either of the United States or of the Soviet Union. In addition their neutrality gives the Swiss a peculiar psychological approach; they regard it as the condition of survival for their multi-lingual state; thus, far from uniting them with their neighbours, on the contrary it divides them from Europe.

The Swiss have of course often been reproached with exploiting their neutrality in the interests of their trade, but it was with a conviction which sometimes seemed nothing short of mystical that they insisted upon the compatibility of good diplomatic and commercial relations and their individual hostility to Nazi Germany during the last war. In the case of the U S S R the anti-Communism of the Swiss has worn their fidelity to the paradox a little thin, but so long as the war against Russia remains a cold one we are all to some extent involved in these schizophrenic contortions. Certainly the Swiss resented the idea of an American veto upon their trade with the countries beyond the Iron Curtain as an infringement of their sovereignty or neutrality – in effect the same thing –, and this caused some friction between Berne and Washington in 1951. Since then Swiss trade with the East has conveniently dwindled to almost nothing, and there is a feeling of relief that sharp words with the United States have thus become unnecessary. Occasionally the Americans may block some Swiss account as in the recent case of a Zürich banker, whom they accused of dealings with China. And Swiss pharmaceutical goods in particular have a way of arriving in Hong Kong or Macao after which they disappear out of Western sight. But apart from trifles of this kind the most remorseless Swiss industrialists at present have so many orders on hand that they have little time to think of their former markets in the East. It is not so much the American veto but the Schuman Plan which arouses the enmity of Swiss heavy industry. Switzerland has neither coal nor iron of her own, but a flourishing machine industry headed by the firms of Sulzer and Brown, Boveri. The idea of depending upon the price decisions of the six Schuman powers is highly unattractive and helps to reduce even further the fragments of Swiss sympathy for that European union which is emerging so painfully and uncertainly into reality.

Thus with the devices which seem to have eliminated distance, Switzerland has drawn no nearer to her fellow Europeans – only, possibly to the United States. Within Europe only technical achievement, fashion and second-rate literature seem unaffected by national frontiers; in the bookshops of Western Europe one seems everywhere to find an oddly

high proportion of translations of neither the best nor the worst books from abroad, but of something between the two. The Swiss, without very much conviction, have so far resisted invasion by television. Otherwise their intellectual life suffers from the same troubles as that of the rest of us. The general level at the universities has fallen, and this can no longer be attributed to the effects of the war, least of all in Switzerland. Less and less students interest themselves in the humanities since only technical studies offer a comfortable future in the service either of the State or of industry; less and less have the technicians time for anything but technical training.

The problem of patronage is as great in Switzerland as anywhere, in spite of the country's resources. For the well-to-do classes as a whole are either uninterested or afraid: in other European countries people fear the future because they are poor while in Switzerland they fear it because they are rich. In other words, with an insecure world around them they fear the sudden loss of the markets upon which their prosperity depends. Apart from a few famous collectors such as Reinhard of Winterthur the wealthy Swiss do not patronize literature or the arts. In so rich a town as Zürich the *Kunsthaus* is facing a financial crisis. Here in Zürich, however, there is one exception. The king of the Migros chain-stores, Gottlieb Duttweiler, whose ingenuity runs to the sudden importation of cheap flowers from the Riviera, who will bring down taxi charges by starting a cheap service of his own and who runs clubs with cooking classes for bachelors, has recently diverted his energy into the channels of culture. It remains to be seen whether this interest will persist and whether it will be guided by taste and knowledge.

In another direction it is significant that there is no first-rate weekly in Switzerland in spite of excellent journalists and other potential contributors. To some extent the Sunday editions of the more important newspapers, particularly that of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, serve the same purpose, but the existing weeklies cannot be taken very seriously. As for monthly reviews, the circulation of a good publication like the *Neue Schweizer Rundschau* is scarcely more than private. The same may be said of highly praised new books if they soar above a certain level.

The intellectual and æsthetic life of Switzerland is hampered by the small scale upon which it must be lived. Apart from the economies to which it is at present sworn the Federal Government cannot afford to buy a work of art so easily as the Government of a larger state for whom a smaller fraction of its budget is involved. Still less can the cantons take action of this kind, though it is they who are regarded as bearing the main responsibility for education and cultural life. On the other hand every book which is published in Switzerland is written in a language

which makes it accessible to the French, the Italian or the German public, at least. With all these considerations weighed up, the problem of a decaying intellectual life, like all our other problems, is found in Switzerland too; public interest in intellectual things is declining, and with it the possibility of a *modus existendi* either for the non-scientific intellectual or for the creative artist; only the musician perhaps is not overwhelmed by the mechanical triumphs of our day. For the rest the abuse of the cinema and the wireless, with the complementary lack of leisure, silence, solitude and the loss of contemplation, conversation and letter-writing in the sense in which they survived until somewhere about 1914, are reducing us all to robotism. The ravages of the machine age are heightened by the mechanical snobbery which it seems to have brought. Everywhere people are pushed into living beyond their incomes by the obligation or ambition which they feel to possess the latest technical gadget. In wealthy Switzerland, too, a book or a painting thus comes to be regarded as an out-of-date luxury.

The case of Switzerland in the present decline is instructive because it seems to make clear that the root of the evil is not to be found in poverty, nor in the direct results of war, nor yet in over-centralization, nor in any kind of political totalitarianism. While the manifestations of contemporary decadence are so frequently the same as the effects of the lack of machines in what we used to deplore as Balkan conditions, the machines – not the lack of them – would seem to be the cause of our present discontents. The technicians have induced an automatic totalitarianism, an involuntary *Gleichschaltung* of Western civilization, and we are faced with the peril of having nothing to defend from the Communist world revolution. The danger approaches slowly perhaps in terms of a single life, but with a deadly certitude.

#### A LETTER TO AN AMERICAN FRIEND

John Davenport  
Author and critic

DEAR P.,

Before the war, sitting beneath the blue towers of Mazatlan, drinking tequila while the boy from the hotel fished fresh oysters for luncheon from the grey Pacific, I wrote to my tutor at Cambridge saying that I would like to proceed to a Master's degree. This odd proposal was not due to sunstroke or even to the tequila, it was the result simply of homesickness.

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Not that I had been away from England for more than two years, but I was filled with a longing for Europe. *Heimweh* would be a better word perhaps than homesickness, for my nostalgic yearnings were not simply for London fog or Gloucestershire wold but as much for the chestnuts of Paris and the pines of Rome, for Europe as a whole. It had been pleasant to walk across Harvard Yard with Conrad Aiken, to hear Aaron Copland play the piano score of the Second Hurricane, to drink Bourbon in eighteenth-century silence with William Faulkner, to see California through the crystal eyes of Edward Weston and drive through the magic of New Mexico to visit Frieda Lawrence. Good, too, had been the blue points eaten in Boston, the T-bone steaks on Third Avenue, the quail shot on the Mexican border, the lobsters of San Francisco. But the feeling grew; a Swedish freighter was boarded at San Diego, we had called at Mazatlan, we were having oysters for luncheon and I was drinking tequila and writing sentimentally to suggest proceeding to a redundant degree. The college authorities and I had parted less in sorrow than in anger. My suggestion was a futile gesture of atonement. I knew that I was hopelessly committed to being European and the absurd symbol of M.A. seemed appropriate to my mood. Perhaps after all I was a little tipsy.

That was before the war, before so many of the places I was remembering had been destroyed. Now Dresden is smashed to bits, Caen in ruins; of the Florentine bridges only the Ponte Vecchio remains. Yet still the dusty ruins hold us. In spite of cynicism and despair, in spite of Communists wrangling with Catholics, Existentialists arguing with Existentialists, in spite of a split Germany, an impotent France, an isolated Spain, an overpopulated Italy, in spite of the fact that Great Britain has become a third-rate Power, Europe still seems to many ordinary Europeans like myself the only tolerable Continent to live in. We are left this time filled not so much with hatred as with self-disgust. An ignoble but not an altogether unwholesome emotion. The blame is divided equally; none of us can feel self-righteous, man or nation. Unless human affairs are hopelessly and evilly mismanaged, Europe may become more of a unity than it has been for a thousand years. We shall muddle through. Bernard Berenson, finishing at Vallombrosa seven years ago his *Sketch for a Self Portrait*, wrote a splendid paragraph:

Put our situation at its worst. Paint it as black as you can, make it as hopeless. Yet mankind has been through as bad. 'As bad!' Surely we are much better off than Nycenæ after the Doric invasion, or the Latin world after the crumbling away of the Western Empire. Both recovered: Greece to become the model for all modes of thought and feeling, expression and action: and our Western world to form, after centuries, the Mediæval civilization, with its previously unimaginable achievements in social organization, in philosophy, in the visual arts and in architecture particularly.

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Should we sink, as we may, even lower than we have already, yet we have not lost nor are we likely to lose our science, our mechanical knowledge and inventiveness, or our accumulated information on all subjects, or the masterpieces of our literature and our arts. Happily nothing has been wholly lost essential to continuation of either our material or immaterial civilization. Only our artisanship has suffered in a way from which it may take generations to recover.

Of course, our 'mechanical knowledge and inventiveness' may be applied to destroying us finally. There are no doubt possibilities of complete disaster. These possibilities must be faced; but they can be faced; nothing in history is inevitable, however imaginary free will may be proved to be. But I am incompetent to deal with the future or even with the present. I can only try to say what 'being a European' means to me, an unintellectual being without a system.

Tradition cannot be inherited. Malraux has pointed out that it must be recreated; T. S. Eliot concluded a famous essay when he said that '(the poet) is not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in what is not merely the present, but the present moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is dead, but of what is already living.' This applies to others besides the poet. It applies to us all, who live in Europe. It is not easy, for Western European tradition is immensely complicated. We are in social and intellectual confusion. Yet no more than the rest of the world. *Angst* is not a European monopoly.

Confusion is nothing to boast about, but it may be admitted with profit, and even be made into an asset. At least we are all in more or less the same beautiful leaky boat. The decay of privilege has its advantages. For generation after generation my own family stayed comfortably rooted, changing its religion in the sixteenth century, lethargically royalist in the seventeenth, but not to the point of romantic self-sacrifice. They married their cousins and drifted fatly through the eighteenth century into the late nineteenth before slithering almost imperceptibly into the great puddle of the middle class. Eight hundred years of the island life, as Gertrude Stein has called it, had made them healthy but smug. They made their tours in Italy and brought back the spoils, but they only became Europeans when my great-grandfather came under the spell of Newman and was received into the Catholic Church. His family followed him. My grandfather was at Oxford at the time – this was during the 'sixties. They took to it like wildfire, several of my great-aunts deserting the hunting-field and becoming nuns. Then my grandfather married the only daughter of a musician famous in his time as a composer. He was a very bad composer, but a good musician—an early editor of Purcell; the friend of Mendelssohn, Chopin, Schumann, Liszt and Brahms, he was

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PARRISH

Stanford's predecessor in the Chair of Music at Cambridge and Principal of the Royal Academy of Music. This was stodgy enough, but Lady M., his wife, was anything but stodgy. Her father was an adventurous Béarnais who married one of the three beautiful daughters of a Danish aristocrat, a character straight out of Karen Blixen. (Another of the daughters married the redoubtable Mommsen.) This sudden admixture of new blood and Catholicism resulted in my father and his seven brothers and sisters being brought up almost as foreigners. An Austrian priest taught them Latin and Greek, the girls all proceeded to convents in France, Austria or Italy, my father and his brothers went to Feldkirch and Heidelberg instead of to English schools and universities. In a continuously Catholic family this might have been reasonable enough, but as it was they came to belong to no particular English world, but to a European one. A steady decay in the family fortunes—due to a sort of unworldly listlessness—completed the confusion. When I went to the school so admirably described by Sir Compton Mackenzie in *Sinister Street*—a polyglot sort of place—I was as much a stray as any of the refugees from Russia and Central Europe who formed over 10 per cent of its numbers, but at the same time filled with the innumerable social and intellectual prejudices of the landless Englishman. I was in fact a snob in the familiar British fashion. It was not until much later that I realized how fortunate I was in my freedom from many inconvenient responsibilities and in my eventual readiness to think, or to try to think, as a European. To think of Europe not as a number of foreign countries but as a Continent to which I inseparably belonged. This sounds intolerably banal. What could be more natural? Unfortunately, it is not 'natural'. Nationalism is the curse of the age.

Paradoxically, however, it is true that without a love of one's own country one cannot understand another. To love one's own country is to appreciate its special virtues; it does not mean that one has to approve its special vices. Without such a knowledge there is a danger of becoming unbalanced. We all know those determined Franco-philes who praise Chartres without having seen Durham, and read Voltaire while they neglect Hume; and there are those famous art lovers who make up, or used to make up, the foreign society of Florence. It is a question of lighting, of perspective. To be a European does not mean that one has to bundle about like a bagman from Albi to Venice, from Copenhagen to Seville, without having seen anything of England except the view from the Golden Arrow. In its way that is as stupid as the most blinkered chauvinism. One can be a good European and still have an abiding-place, preferably in one's own country. Maurice Baring, for instance, was at once the most English and the most European of men. It is in fact as

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necessary as a knowledge of Latin and Greek is necessary for the understanding of Western literature. Viewed from outside, Europe seems incoherent; but we are all involved.

No man is an *Island*, entire in himself; every man is a piece of the *Continent*, a part of the *Main*; if a clod be washed away by the *Sea*, *Europe* is the less, as well as if a *Promontory* were, as well as if a *Manor* of thy friends or of *thine own* were; any man's death diminishes *me*, because I am involved in Mankind. . . .

To many Americans, Europe seems a sort of bloodstained dust heap, and to others, a pleasant but unreal playground. Edmund Wilson saw Rome in terms of dirt, whereas to me it is still a dazzle of domes, golden and saffron. The moral atmosphere is another matter. Europe is old and cannot be rushed. Even Paris retains an essential inviolability and so does Venice. Knowledge grows slowly and gently in ever-widening circles. First those schoolboy tours in Normandy and Brittany, in Holland and Flanders; then Touraine and Burgundy; the Rhine; Provence and Languedoc; North Italy, Tuscany, Umbria; Rome; Naples; Sicily; the bleak grandeur of Castile, too, and the softer joys of Andalusia. The list would be never-ending, each place adding something to the senses, as each masterpiece adds something to the mind. But in my next letter I will try to deal with persons, places and masterpieces in more detail. The splendours and miseries of Europe, the interplay particularly between Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, countries which at times seem a mere conglomeration of displaced persons, filled with mutual hatred and mistrust. Meantime, my love to you and to the New Yorker.

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## EDITORIAL

The Labour Party Conference at Morecambe will be watched with unusual anxiety. It is a sick Party. Nobody knows where Labour is going, or indeed whether it is moving at all. What will it do, if, as seems probable, it gains power once more at the next general election? No definite answer to this question can be expected to emerge at Morecambe. The new programme of the Party is not expected to be clarified until next year. All we are likely to get are indications of the mood of the leadership in the answers given to the wild and ingenuous resolutions submitted by the constituency organizations. It is futile to blame the Party for its present unhappy state. The truth is that Social Democracy, here and elsewhere, has reached the end of an epoch. After half a century of effort it has achieved the Welfare State and the nationalization of the basic industries. What does it do now? The sensible answer is that it should consolidate. There are generations of work required to make the Welfare State as excellent in reality as it is on paper; the great industrial cities, and many square miles of London, are burdened with out of date, squalid and decrepit housing; thousands of new schools and new factories are needed. At present only a minority of the workers have been equipped for a new way of living. Labour will not have done its primary task until it brings the bulk up to this level.

But can a dynamic political party be content with mere consolidation? Labour in Britain still contains a large Socialist element, as the constituency party resolutions show. Its clamour for ‘more Socialism’ is naïvely expressed, but is none the less genuine. The old Socialist dream was of a new relationship between men, and this the Welfare State, with its mixture of large-scale nationalization and repressed capitalism, has not achieved. The danger, shown most clearly, perhaps, by the Swedish example, is of attaining a state of political boredom, with the major parties agreed upon co-operation and elections reduced to a competition between rival sets of administrators. British Labour has still to face its basic problem: what does ‘Socialism’ mean in a commercial country dependent on world trade? Is there a ‘Socialist’ solution of Britain’s permanent problem of earning a living in an ungrateful world?

It is apparent from the resolutions submitted for discussion at More-

but it is also an invincible obstacle to them, until such time as the Poles, worn out by the accumulated betrayals of Europe, become a whip in the hand of the Muscovite.

Well, except for the dispositions of the Polish people, has anything intervened to thwart the Russian plan or paralyze its action? I do not need to tell you that the progress of its conquests in Asia has been continuous. I do not need to tell you that the so-called war conducted by England and France against Russia delivered to the latter the mountain fortresses of the Caucasus, control of the Black Sea, and maritime rights which Catherine II, Paul and Alexander I had tried in vain to wrest from England. Railroads are uniting and concentrating its forces, scattered over a vast expanse. Its material resources in Congress Poland, where it has entrenched itself in Europe, have increased enormously. The fortifications of Warsaw, Modlin, Ivangorod – points chosen by the first Napoleon – command the entire course of the Vistula, and constitute a formidable base for attacks to the north, west and south. Panslav propaganda has had the satisfactory result of weakening Austria and Turkey. And as to the meaning of this Panslav propaganda, you had a foretaste of it in 1848–49, when Hungary was invaded, Vienna was devastated and Italy crushed by the Slavs fighting under the flags of Jellachich, Windischgraetz and Radetzky. And, in addition to all that, the crimes of England against the Irish have raised a new and powerful ally to Russia on the other side of the Atlantic.

The plan of Russian policy remains changeless; its means of action have considerably increased since 1848, but up to now one thing remains beyond her reach, and Peter the Great touched on this weak point when he wrote that in order to conquer the world, the Muscovites needed only souls. Well, the vivifying spirit which Russia needs will be infused into its carcass at the moment when the Poles become Russian subjects. What will you then have to throw into the other scale of the balance?

A continental European will perhaps reply that by the emancipation of the serfs, Russia has entered the family of civilized nations, that German power, recently concentrated in Prussian hands, can resist all Asiatic shocks, and finally, that the social revolution in Western Europe will end the danger of international conflicts. An Englishman who reads only *The Times* will be able to say that, supposing the worst, i.e. if Russia seizes Constantinople, England will then take possession of Egypt and will thus secure the path to its great market in India.

As concerns the first point, the emancipation of the serfs freed the central government from obstacles which the nobles were in a position to place in the way of its centralized action. It created a vast reservoir for the recruitment of its army, dissolved the communal property of the

Russian peasants, isolated them, and above all, strengthened their faith in their Autocrat. It has not disaffected them of their Asiatic barbarity, the creeping heritage of centuries. Any attempt to raise their moral level is punished as a crime. I need remind you only of the official provocations against the temperance societies which tried to wean the Muscovite from what Feuerbach calls the material substance of his religion, namely, vodka. Whatever the future effects may be, for the present the emancipation of the serfs has increased the forces at the Czar's disposal.

Let us pass on to Prussia. Formerly a vassal of Poland, it grew to be a first-rate Power only under the auspices of Russia and through the partition of Poland. If Prussia should lose its Polish prey tomorrow, it would sink back into Germany instead of absorbing it. In order to maintain itself as a Power distinct from Germany it must lean for support on the Muscovite. Its recent increase of power, far from relaxing the bonds, has made them indissoluble. Besides, this increase of power has increased Prussia's antagonism towards France and Austria. At the same time Russia is the pillar on which the arbitrary rule of the Hohenzollern dynasty and its feudal tenants rests. It is its safeguard against popular disaffection. Consequently Prussia is not a bulwark against Russia, but its predestined instrument for the invasion of France and the digestion of Germany.

As for the social revolution, what does this word mean if not class struggle? It is possible that the struggle between workers and capitalists will be less fierce and bloody than were the struggles between the feudal lords and the capitalists in England and France. Let us hope so. But in any case, while a social crisis of this sort may increase the energies of the Western peoples, it will also, like every internal conflict, invite aggression from without. Once more this conflict will clothe Russia with the rôle it had during the anti-Jacobin war and since the Holy Alliance, that of the pre-destined saviour of order. It will enlist in Russia's ranks all the privileged classes of Europe. Already during the February Revolution, the Comte de Montalembert was not the only one who put his ear to the ground to listen for the distant sound of the hoofs of Cossack cavalry. The Prussian country bumpkins were not the only ones in the German representative assemblies who proclaimed the Czar their 'father protector'. All the stock exchanges of Europe rose with each Russian victory over the Magyars and fell with each Russian defeat.

There is but one alternative for Europe: either Asiatic barbarism, under Muscovite direction, will burst around its head like an avalanche, or else it must re-establish Poland, thus putting twenty million heroes between itself and Asia, and gaining a breathing spell for the accomplishment of its social regeneration.

## COMMENT

## Malan's Progress

Among possible situations of unexpected peril which may be set as problems to a casuist is that of the passenger in a car who discovers that the driver is a suicidal maniac. The passenger in such a case may indeed be slow to realize his predicament; when the driver declares his intention of driving the car over the edge of a high cliff into the sea, he may at first regard it as merely a rather poor joke. But if he has once convinced himself that the man at the wheel is really out of his mind, he must quickly make a choice between three possible courses of action. He can try to take over by force from the driver, with the risk of failing to do so (especially if the driver is a strong man) and causing the car to crash in any case. He can open the door and jump out, with the risk of a nasty fall on the side of the road. Or he can remain in the car, mildly expostulating, and allow himself without resistance to share the suicide's fate.

The present relation of the British people to the Union of South Africa, as a fellow-member of the Commonwealth and the power responsible for the administration of the three native Protectorates within South African territory, has a certain analogy with the hypothetical situation above described. All intelligent and well-informed observers of the South African political scene are agreed that the policy of the Nationalist régime headed by Dr Malan is heading the country towards a terrible disaster. This disaster may be postponed for a shorter or longer period but, if there is a persistence on the present course, the catastrophe is ultimately certain and the longer it is postponed the more frightful it is likely to be. No sympathy for the many white South Africans who disapprove of the current trend but are powerless to stop it, nor even for the Nationalists themselves, cursed with a heritage of untenable faith amid the desperately difficult problems of a multi-racial society, can affect the opinion of detached observers that *apartheid* is hurrying South Africa to its doom. The question for the British people is how far they, too, may be involved by Malanism in its mad rush towards self-destruction. They would not, of course, be direct victims of the upheavals which *apartheid* must bring, but if their Government, in its desire to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth and to avoid an acute conflict over the Protectorates, continues to repudiate, as it has already done, the principles on which British colonial

administration in Africa has hitherto been based, they will share in the odium which the racialist policy must increasingly incur among all the peoples of Asia and Africa and the vast majority of civilized mankind.

Britain cannot take over the wheel from the driver in South Africa; by the Statute of Westminster, South Africa is an independent country and in any case the means of coercion would not be available. But Britain can get out of the car. The British Government can do this by making it clear, both to South Africa and to all the world, that it will make no concessions whatever to *apartheid* legislation, whether in the Protectorates or in any African dependent territory for which it bears responsibility. Undoubtedly such a policy has its risks. A resentful Malanite South Africa can break away from the Commonwealth and by its control over a major part of the world's gold production can seriously increase Britain's economic difficulties; it can also, by various means of pressure – including in the last resort the use of force – paralyse the administration of the Protectorates. The Malanites have made it clear that they are going to make both the declaration of a Republic and the demand for cession of the Protectorates issues at the next general election. But nothing that they can do, even with a stronger electoral backing than they already have, to harm or humiliate Britain would, on a long view, be half so damaging to Britain's vital interests as a short-sighted British attempt to buy off Malanite wrath by a policy of appeasement at the expense of the African population of the Protectorates. That would be the policy of sitting in the car while Malan or another drives it towards the precipice.

It is, unfortunately, the policy which is actually being followed. The banishment of Seretse Khama, enacted first for a period by a Labour Government and now made permanent by a Conservative Government, has never been anything but an act of appeasement of the South African Union. All the miserable hocus-pocus by which Whitehall has tried to sustain the hypocritical pretence that it is in deference to the wishes of the Bamangwato tribe has not concealed from the world at large the real reasons for the decision. If under increasing pressure and menaces British Cabinets think it expedient to let the South African Union interfere more and more in the affairs of the Protectorates, they may be able to defy criticism in Parliament (since both the main parties in the State are so badly implicated in the surrender over Seretse), but they should not suppose that the rest of the world will be unaware of what is happening – least of all the Asian countries of the Commonwealth and the peoples of British Africa.

If the British Government feels that it cannot hold on to the Protectorates or fulfil its responsibilities towards their inhabitants in the face of South African hostility, its best course would be to apply for them to

be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations. If that were done, any South African encroachment or pressure on them would be a direct challenge to the world organization, and Britain would neither be left alone in a conflict with South Africa nor driven to make morally ruinous compromises in the hope of staving off a crisis. Alternatively, if it is thought unworthy to abdicate a British responsibility by calling in the United Nations, there should be a firm resolution not to make any further concessions of principle. Public opinion needs to be roused without delay to the importance of the issue, or the march of events will soon take it by surprise.

G. H.

### Reparation to Israel

The signing of the agreement, under which the German Federal Republic will pay Israel and various international Jewish bodies something like £287 million over a period of fourteen years, is part of the process of re-integrating Germany within Western society. Its value is largely symbolic – no one would pretend that the burden assumed by Germany bears any relation to the destruction and pillage of European Jewry, but it is the sort of goodwill gesture that may gradually help to remove some of the poison accumulated during the Hitler years. Israel will be assisted through a very difficult economic period, and this fact, though in a sense irrelevant to the moral issue underlying the agreement, is not without importance to the question whether Jews and Germans will ever be on normal terms again. It is certainly going to be a very long process, but a step has been taken.

'Reparations' to Israel are not the only issue, however. There is also the lengthy business of restitution affecting individual Jewish property sequestered under the Hitler regime. The sums involved are considerable – probably as much as the total agreed upon between the Federal Government and Israel – and the legal procedure has been extremely slow, though a little more rapid in the former American zone of occupation than in the British. Compared with Krupp, the former owners of Jewish property have been doing badly. The Germans have also blotted their copybook in recent months by their elephantine handling of the Auerbach trial in Munich, and by their treatment of the Jewish D P remnant at the Foehrenwald camp, near the Bavarian capital. A continuation of such incidents, coupled with the steady evidence of deep-rooted popular anti-semitism, could do much to hold up the process of reconciliation.

The Auerbach case was chiefly remarkable for the unsavoury mess of Bavarian petty politics which it revealed. In the end, the former Refugee Commissioner was convicted (and committed suicide) after most of the original charges against him had been dropped, and after the Bavarian Minister of Justice had been compelled to resign. All the three judges were former members of the Nazi Party. They made an effort to be fair, but the spectacle of a concentration camp veteran being sentenced to jail by former Nazi judges for some minor misdemeanours, and committing suicide in hospital after the trial, has left a bitter taste behind. Decent and sensitive Germans have been shocked and humiliated, the more so since the trial was 'properly' conducted; it was not a judicial crime, merely a display of moral obtuseness. While it was still in progress, the Munich police distinguished itself by raiding the Foehrenwald camp – mainly inhabited by sick and elderly D P's – and coming to blows with the inmates, who very naturally refused to be searched. This disgusting scene took place on May 28th, and has only recently been fully reported in the *Manchester Guardian*. In addition to using their truncheons, the police enlivened the occasion by shouting 'the crematoria are still there' and 'the gas chambers are waiting for you'. Altogether it was a very Bavarian scene, though lacking in the *Gemuelllichkeit* which romantic writers traditionally associate with that country.

Foehrenwald is now inhabited by 1,900 Jewish survivors of the Hitler years, of whom seventy per cent. are seriously ill, many with tuberculosis. That may be the reason why they have so far found it impossible to leave Germany, for even Israel now requires that immigrants shall pass a medical examination. Norway, Sweden and Switzerland have agreed to accept small batches of elderly people and tuberculosis sufferers. The others seem condemned to stay in Germany, where everything reminds them of the recent past – including the behaviour of the Bavarian police. About ninety per cent. of the adults are concentration camp survivors, and many have lost all their relatives in the gas chambers. They have no intention of staying in Germany, where the smell of the slaughterhouse has by no means evaporated, but they have no way of getting out. It is of course only one facet of the great refugee drama, but a particularly poignant one. For their part, the Germans would be well advised, if they cannot help these people to resettle, at least to leave them alone.

G. L. A.

### Accidents to Jets

The air tragedy at Farnborough has added to the publicity which has been given to recent accidents to jet aircraft. Are jets more difficult to fly, and are they more prone to accident? The peculiar thing is that in the first five years of the jet age, accidents to aircraft of this type did not often make the headlines. When R A F Meteor jets were helping to shoot down V 1 flying bombs, and Goering's Messerschmitt jets were flying against our troops in Holland in 1945, we had no indication that an extra crop of flying accidents were occurring. Nor have there been any signs in Korea that either Chinese Air Force or United Nations jets are crashing or breaking up at more than normal accident rates.

It would, of course, be reasonable to expect that jet aircraft would provoke a higher crop of accidents. If you have to fly aircraft at higher speeds, and land them at higher speeds, you need a higher standard of flying to do so safely. Better judgment and quicker reactions are called for. The German Heinkel 400 m.p.h. fighter of 1939 was too fast and dangerous for normal German flyers. It could be handled by crack test pilots like Udet, but not by the ordinary run of Luftwaffe pilots. And so it never became part of Germany's regular air equipment. We need a better race of pilots to handle 600 m.p.h. jets safely than we did for the 350-400 m.p.h. Spitfires and Tempests of 1945. Two things could help to reduce current risk factors. First, the more general introduction of power-operated controls inside the aircraft as opposed to manually operated switches and knobs, which can invoke greater human error at high speed. Secondly, a more gradual transit in training from flying aircraft at about 200-300 m.p.h. to piloting jets at 600 m.p.h., and this means the production of more types of jet trainer aircraft. The human mind is like a muscle which flexes best when it has been trained to perform a series of conditioned reflex actions rhythmically and automatically. This, translated, means gradualness in flight training. Fortunately, jet aircraft for training are coming into more general and frequent use, and will help to make jet flying safer for the uncertain pilot.

There is nothing in the jet engine *per se* which provokes accidents, nor is there anything in the design of the wings, fuselage and tail-planes of nearly all current jet planes which makes flying more dangerous. It needs to be said, however, that jet engines are much more powerful than their predecessors and can therefore put a greater strain on air frames. We have still to do a lot of research on fatigue factors in airframes, and one cannot help wondering, pending the official finding, whether the Farnborough accident to John Derry's DH 110 was due primarily to aircraft surfaces that had strained too often through the sonic barrier. When flying faster

than sound is a general practice, and not a subject for display by our ace pilots, aircraft safety standards will be subjected to even severer tests. But the points already mentioned will then become increasingly important – to have pilots with quicker reflexes, to have more powered controls in aircraft, to know more about airframe fatigue, and to break through the sonic barrier by a gradual routine process and not in one glorious boom. But by then pilotless and radio guided aircraft may be becoming the rule.

Few people outside the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply know whether the current accident rate is alarmingly high or not. The Air Minister's last official statement on the subject in the House of Commons should calm the worst fears, though for security reasons he quoted no overall figures. Not even the most wishful thinkers tell us that Russia and her satellites are crashing large numbers of jets. And if we are, then surely experience and disciplined care can help to reduce the accident rate to normal proportions.

A. L.

### Hobson's Choice for Scientists

Someone who had better remain anonymous – he was a don in uniform who has since become better known by a couple of best-sellers – once remarked to me as we waited for a plane in Karachi, after a week's experience of India as seen from G H Q Delhi, that there were only two solutions for India: five years under the Russians or five minutes under the sea. As I happened to have known India rather longer, and to love it rather more than he did, I resented this reaction to the miserable inefficiency and poverty of the people. But I saw what he meant: ruthless modernization, including collective farming, or euthanasia, were the only alternatives he foresaw for those all too teeming millions.

Professor A.V. Hill, in his presidential address to the British Association meeting last month, brought back to my mind the *obiter dicta* delivered by the staff officer-don as we sat and talked in an ancient landau drawn by a camel in 1944. Since then a lot has happened, including *The First Five-Year Plan* of India's Planning Commission, which Professor Hill quoted to effect in his address as an illustration of the pressure of a population, increasing by five million a year, on the available natural resources. Ought the West, Professor Hill asked, to withhold those lifesaving advances which have made possible and may accelerate India's phenomenal population increase, for a justified fear of the consequences? The applica-

tion of insecticides and anti-malarial drugs, for example, would save a million lives a year in India – and add a million a year to her over-population.

It is the duty, or at least the tradition, of British Association presidents to be provocative; and Professor Hill's address has already been compared with Tyndall's of 1874 (also delivered in Belfast), claiming for science the succession to theology as the arbiter of cosmological theory. A better comparison, and a more illuminating one, would be Sir William Crookes's address in 1898 – the anniversary of Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population*. Crookes also stated a neo-Malthusian 'colossal dilemma' and predicted world-starvation by the 1930's. But he did at least predict a possible way out: artificial fertilizers, to be obtained (he suggested, almost prophetically) by the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen. So this year's 'dilemma' is in some ways a dusty question.

The facts, of course, are not in dispute. The large non-European populations – in Asia, Africa, and South America – are entering a stage comparable with that of Europe at the beginning of her period of rapid growth. Europe's population\* increased five-fold in the 300 years since 1650; since 1800 it has almost tripled itself, and in the last 100 years it has doubled; the proportion of European populations (including North America and Australasia) to world population nearly doubled from the middle of the eighteenth century to the beginning of this one. This phenomenal, and hitherto unmatched, growth was due – as the similar increase in non-European populations now is due – to the falling death-rate which followed the advances in public health and sanitation. It accompanied the spread of the industrial revolution, but it was accompanied by a revolution in farming: we, or Professor Hill, tend to forget that up to the eighteenth century Great Britain was subsistence-farmed by peasants – as India is now – but that the change to farms of efficient size and to a blend of arable and livestock husbandry raised output per man and per acre to the stage where surpluses could be marketed and hands could be set free for other, industrial, occupations. The higher standard of living which this agrarian-cum-industrial revolution made possible took effect, in time, in a falling birth-rate. The time-lag, in Britain, was about seventy years: but then deliberate family planning was hardly heard of till the Bradlaugh-Besant trial and acquittal made birth-control a permissible head-line topic for Victorian newspapers. It is true that in seventy years India's 360 millions could double at the present rate of increase. But news and science both travel faster to-day, and the need

\* More precisely, Western Europe, for demographically (as in other ways) Eastern Europe and Russia have followed a different pattern.

therefore would seem to be for speeding up – instead of hushing up – the advances of science.

With the hind-sight that Europe's experience can give us, it is safe to say that Professor Hill's dilemma is unreal and exists neither in ethics nor in practical politics. The withholding of life-saving or life-prolonging knowledge is impracticable as well as unthinkable, at least so long as scientists remain human and human beings retain any control over science; and the consequences of applying life-saving techniques can only be to hasten the metabolic process of turning short-lived, unhealthy and (economically) unproductive populations into sounder and more viable communities. The spiritual and physical apathy of under-fed, malaria-ridden peoples can but be changed for the better by the opportunity to live not only a longer but a more productive life: and when families, especially mothers, see a future for their children they will begin sooner or later to plan and care for them more intelligently, because more hopefully. It means a social and an economic revolution; but the condition of that revolution is the same as for Europe's earlier and similar revolution – more of one kind of productivity, followed by less of the other.

With the prospect of enabling Asia to repeat Europe's demographic and economic feats, Professor Hill's dilemma surely becomes Hobson's choice. And so far no one has mentioned Russia, except my acquaintance of 1944 in the camel-carriage: yet Russia, in so many things midway between Europe and Asia, is having her demographic revolution now. Since the beginning of the century Russia's population has increased by half – despite wars, famines and revolution – and it will have doubled itself by the end of the century. So if we cannot or will not help Asia to do it, Russia can and will.

A. S.

## IN PLACE OF DOLLARS

T. E. M. McKitterick

The author is an economist and a member of the Fabian Society Executive

Mr Harold Wilson is a former President of the Board of Trade, and has a reputation as an economist. His Bevanite orthodoxy cannot be questioned. Consequently, when he appears as author of *In Place of Dollars*, the latest *Tribune* pamphlet; when the notice on the front refers back to *One Way Only* and adds that 'this pamphlet brings the argument up to date and shows the way ahead'; and when Mr Wilson himself proclaims that it 'attempts briefly to analyse the nature of the economic crisis that faces us and to indicate the measures which, the writer believes, can alone lead us through to solvency and independence before it is too late', the reader expects something both authoritative and distinctive in the way of recipes for our economic salvation.

One need not hold it against Mr Wilson that his preliminary analysis is largely a restatement of familiar arguments. There are hard facts, incontrovertible by Bevanites or anti-Bevanites, which can do with restatement until they are grasped by everyone in the country. The decline in our economic position began long before 1939; we had lost our industrial supremacy; we could no longer sell our goods abroad where we liked, at any price we liked; the countries which we had ourselves developed were beginning to drive us out, and economically as well as politically the world centre of gravity was moving to the other side of the Atlantic. In spite of the materials slump of the later 1930's, world production of primary products was already showing signs of being inadequate to keep the industrial potential of the manufacturing countries fully employed, and the terms of trade were moving sharply against the industrial producers. The war added to these troubles, but it did not create most of them. Recovery, and the development of our full economic strength, are not only matters of rebuilding what was destroyed in the war; they also involve a complete reassessment of our competitive position in the world, of our resources, our capacity and our costs of production, perhaps even a radical alteration in the shape and direction of our industry. Certainly they demand flexibility, since we may at any time have to adapt ourselves to changes in the economic weather outside – and no one will disagree with Mr Wilson when he points out that a slight uneasiness in America

may be disastrous for us unless we are able to improve our insulation against that sort of shock.

It is the second stage of the Bevanite analysis that introduces controversy, though less on economic than on political grounds: because the rearmament programme is the greatest hindrance to flexibility, the rearmament programme is wrong. Far too much is made of this argument – which in any case one would have preferred to see conducted in the terms of 1952, and not in the language of the Bourbons of April 1951. Mr Wilson may be right, but the impression his long argument leaves with the reader is that his real reason for wanting to reduce the arms programme is a political one: he wants a gesture of defiance to the Americans, and the economic part of the discussion is brought in as an *a posteriori* rationalization of an emotional desire. This is a serious charge to bring against an economist, but one is forced to do so, because throughout the pamphlet there is next to nothing to indicate what effects Mr Wilson expects a reduction of the programme to have, next to nothing in the way of concrete proposals to show what should be done with the capacity released. The four-point Plan for Britain with which he ends his long denunciation of Gaitskellism is empty of precision. For twelve large pages, three columns to a page, we are led through a tremendous build-up to the Plan – with, at the end of it all, an intellectual mouse.

The mere fact of not being new is no condemnation of the four points. The trouble is not that they are wrong, but that they are inadequate. It was not these placid generalities that we had been led to expect, but something positive, something practical, offering an intelligent and intelligible guide, even if we disagreed with it.

First of all, 'we shall need an all-out drive to develop non-dollar sources of food and raw materials' – which means vast expenditure by both private enterprise and public authorities in areas of the world capable of development. I hope not to be unfair to Mr Wilson here, because he has recently published another pamphlet\* in which he deals with this part of the problem at much greater length. Expenditure on the development of backward areas, no matter on how great a scale, cannot produce immediate results (a point which Mr Wilson emphasizes in both pamphlets), and is therefore a contribution to long-term and not to short-term solutions of our problems. In the long run, the benefits may be very great. But to stop there is to beg the most important part of the question. Even if there were no rearmament, could we afford anything like the scale of expenditure that will be needed? In *War on Want* there are some instructive figures; in this pamphlet there are none, but this is the one that

\* *War on Want*, by a committee of the Association for World Peace, under the chairmanship of Mr Harold Wilson. July 1952, price 1s.

will be widely read. The omission is serious. One does not expect Mr Wilson to give precise estimates. But in a pamphlet for popular consumption, appealing as it does to the liveliest elements in the Labour Party, it is essential to give some idea of the order of magnitude involved. For the plain fact of the matter is that, in relation to so vast a problem as world poverty and the urgency of carrying through schemes for the development of resources, we cannot make any commensurate contribution except at the cost of a *lowering* of our standard of living for a period of perhaps several decades. Can we convince the trade unionists and the housewife, let alone the professional man and the industrialist, that this has got to be done? 'The people will bear the sacrifices and make the efforts when they realize and accept the objectives of our policy,' says Mr Wilson, referring not specifically to this but to the whole of his programme. Perhaps they will, even though the hope of pie in the sky palls after a time. But it will take more than Mr Wilson, more than the whole host of Bevanites, to prepare the minds of the public for the consequences of an effective programme of development, and mere talk of sacrifices and efforts does not help much. Unfortunately, these Adullamites of the Labour Party have been followed into their cave by a body of supporters whose *raison d'être* is that they object to any cut of anything for any reason. But then, of course, there is always America to supply the dollars, while we in Britain reap the harvest.

Point two is that 'we shall need to insist on far greater freedom to develop trade with the non-dollar areas' – the Commonwealth, Eastern Europe and Asia. 'We must be free to develop intra-Commonwealth trade by the full use of long-term contracts, discrimination against dollar imports and greater freedom to use Imperial Preference.' I agree emphatically, and so does Lord Beaverbrook. But what of Mr Wilson's suggestion that the Americans should lower their tariff – which we all agree would be a good thing? It might be difficult to persuade even a Democratic Congress to do so while we were in the process of raising ours against them. We must also persuade the Americans to drop the Battle Act, or circumvent it ourselves, since 'there is clear evidence that East-West trade could be further developed, if we for our part were to reduce the list of strategic controls to the absolute minimum, and the *East showed more willingness to take our consumer goods, as well as industrial equipment and raw materials.*' The italics, I need hardly say, are mine. Mr Wilson knows, from past experience in office, how much trouble we have had with Eastern countries over delivery dates for capital equipment, even when the arms programme was a lot smaller than it is to-day, and no doubt he has ideas on how that sort of difficulty could be eliminated. But can he offer one single reason why the Eastern countries should 'show more willingness

to take our consumer goods'? Why are we not sending them now – for consumer goods do not, on the whole, come under the Battle Act? If the East showed more willingness to take what they do not want, if the Americans agreed to lower their tariff, while we discriminate against them – but conditions like these are not the politics of the real world.

Point three has the merit of plainness and brevity: 'either as part of a redistribution of the Atlantic arms burden, or if necessary, by immediate unilateral action, Britain's own rearmament programme should be reduced to a level which her economy can bear.' It is not fair to taunt the Bevanites, as some of the critics do, with failing to say what figure of expenditure they think will do. Such things cannot be expressed in terms of a single figure, and it was wrong and misleading of the Government to encourage the practice. Mr Wilson quotes, from a United Nations source, an estimate that in 1951 the British arms programme took up to 82 man-years per thousand worked, against 74 in America, and he is right to point out that the indirect effects are greater than this figure would indicate: the burden falls on the engineering industries especially, which could otherwise supply exports we can sell readily, and equipment for the modernization and expansion of our other industries. But even if the loss to the rest of the economy is put much higher – as high, say, as 20 per cent. – it would be necessary to secure a big reduction in the armaments programme in order to have more than a marginal effect on the rest. That is why it is essential that Mr Wilson should give us some sort of idea of what scale of reduction he has in mind. For if the programme is really to be 'reduced to a level which Britain's economy can bear', the reduction may have political implications which the Bevanites have not, so far, admitted. If it is not reduced sufficiently to carry these political implications, the economic benefits may be almost negligible. That is also why I suggested earlier that Mr Wilson gave the impression that he wants the programme reduced for political rather than economic reasons. But I wish he would say so.

Point four is summarized as the need for 'a far more purposive direction of our national economic life' and to 'economize to the utmost in dollar expenditure'. Then there are three statements of method – 'the maximum development of our agriculture, on a war basis'; 'recasting our industrial system so as to provide the goods the world needs – and this means capital equipment rather than consumer goods – and so as to economize in imports, especially dollar imports'; and 'much more rigorous control of capital investment to ensure that the right priorities are observed'. These are the main internal 'measures which . . . can alone lead us through to solvency and independence before it is too late'. One has waited expectantly (through twelve large pages) to see if something specific is to follow.

But that is all. There is nothing here that is not in a dozen constituency Labour Party resolutions for Morecambe. Nothing that it takes an ex-President of the Board of Trade to say.

The time for such generalities is long gone by. We want specific ideas. Recasting our industrial system – yes, very necessary to fit our changed circumstances. But into what shape? And how? Every attempt at the redistribution of our resources provokes resistance, from trade unionists as well as others. If Mr Wilson wants to reduce the size of the Lancashire cotton industry to make room for more engineering exports (and the case for doing so is very strong) has not the time come to warn the electors of Blackburn East about it? The right priorities – yes again; they must certainly be observed. But what are they? To change a country's industrial structure by control over investment is a lengthy business which requires determination and clarity of purpose; we cannot wait for the ideas till Labour is in power again.

The maximum development of our agriculture – no one disagrees with that principle. But once again, how? By price incentives and subsidies, so that Mr Stanley Evans can go on complaining that farmers are feather-bedded? By inspection and direction? On whose technical advice? To produce more grain, more root crops, more stock, more timber? And where? There *are* answers to all these questions, and many of us have our ideas. But Mr Wilson does not even hint that he knows them. A few months ago I heard a leading Bevanite (not Mr Wilson) address a gathering of French Socialists in Paris. Someone in the audience asked him to state the Bevanite policy for agriculture, and he had to admit that they had not thought one up. But a country with a precarious balance of payments, and so heavily dependent on imported food as Britain, cannot afford not to have an agricultural policy. Nor can people who claim to lead it.

There are two other points. Earlier in the pamphlet, tucking it away in a context where it has no earthly relevance to anything except Mr Bevan's resignation speech, Mr Wilson treats us to a childish attack on the Treasury and its control over the activities of other departments. 'Little men doing their silly sums,' he quotes from Mr Bevan. Now Mr Wilson's proposals involve even wider planning and even closer control than we have had, and no doubt these things are necessary. When Labour was in office, the sums were done by the Treasury, the Central Planning Staff and the Economic Section of the Cabinet Offices. They are done there still. They will be done there under the next Labour Government unless some other organ is set up to do them. It may be that the Treasury sometimes got its sums wrong, sometimes did the wrong sums. But if Mr Wilson wants someone else to do them, let him say so; there are important political implications. But when he calls for more control over investment,

loser determination or priorities, the controlled reshaping of our industrial system, let him not sneer at the sums or say they should not be done. After all, he was once an Oxford economist himself.

Finally, there is Mr Wilson on America. The United States, he says, should recognize her position as the world's greatest creditor nation', which means tariff reduction and the scrapping of the Buy American Act; 'a wealthier nation should be prepared to offer more than it gets from debtor countries.' The United States 'should be willing to join in with other nations in international action to plan and allocate raw materials and scarce foodstuffs'. The United States 'should realize the need for fair shares in the distribution of the arms burden'. The United States 'should organize herself to play a far greater part in world development'. In every case the word 'should' is Mr Wilson's own.

No doubt the United States 'should' do all these things, in her own interest as well as ours. Mr Wilson suggests that she will do some of them, but not adequately.

And as long as this is the case, Britain's solvency and independence are in danger. Moreover, there may come a point where some great international policy issue, or some great disagreement on economic policy – such as East-West trade or Imperial Preference – may cause the U S to threaten to withdraw some vital measure of economic co-operation.

In the next column he advocates both greater East-West trade and extended Imperial Preference. How one is to reconcile such undisciplined behaviour on our part with the self-sacrificing sweetness he demands of the Americans, he does not trouble to explain.

In place of dollars, we have a few generalized statements of what we should do, and an enormous extension of American responsibilities. There is no real escape offered, because there can be none in a world so overwhelmingly dominated by the American economy. We can only hope to ease the strain on ourselves by remedial measures, by economy in the use of resources, and by higher productivity within the resources we have. Mr Wilson has nothing to say about productivity. (One would like to hear his remarks on the recent visit of Mr Rickenbacker, and his surprise that we were working only a single shift on our best potential dollar export, the Comet.) For the rest, we must hope (and Mr Wilson does not really suggest anything else) that instead of sending dollars to us the Americans will send them somewhere else, to develop the backward areas, to finance fresh sources of materials, food and goods of all sorts – not 'in place of dollars', but dollars to a different place. But when the time comes for the Labour Party once more to assume the responsibility, it will need ideas far more positive, far more constructive, than Mr. Wilson is prepared to offer us at this moment.

## DICTATORSHIP IN EGYPT

Mark Alexander

The author, a frequent contributor to *The Twentieth Century*, is stationed in a Middle Eastern capital.

General Neguib's experiment in *Peronismo* is now moving into its second phase. Power has passed into the hands of the Army, i.e. the group of officers forming the secret military Junta which rules behind the scenes. The tempo of 'purges' and social reforms is being stepped up. What are the chances that the experiment will bear lasting fruit?

It will be recalled that the original Army movement of July 23rd-26th had as its object the removal of the King and his obnoxious entourage. In the subsequent lull it became a question whether the movement would go further, and in particular whether the political 'purge' would be pushed against the resistance of the Wafd's powerful right wing. The Wafdist leaders themselves clearly hesitated for some days after July 26th, before deciding that safety lay in climbing on the military band-wagon. Yet having taken this step they found that, so far from shielding them against attack, it had precipitated an internal crisis which had been in the offing for some years: the revolt of the younger and more progressive elements against the executive of the Party. This self-elected body had gradually, by a process of co-optation, become associated with the principal land-owning and big business groups affected by the Army's reform programme. Its principal members were also deeply involved in corrupt transactions, and consequently sensitive to demands for a 'purge'. Thus the drive for social reform became linked with the demand for a clean-up in public life, and the Wafd's sins boomeranged upon its hitherto unshaken position in the country.

At the centre of this nexus stood a group of politicians led by the Party's Secretary-General, Fuad Seragh el-Din; his four brothers – like himself board members of various enterprises owned by Ahmed Aboud, the uncrowned king of Egyptian industry – and two former Ministers, Osman Muharram and Mahmud Suliman Ghannam, whose names invariably cropped up in connection with shady financial transactions under the old regime. The flood of scandalous stories published about them during the past few weeks will undoubtedly provide the country's lawyers with a livelihood for years to come – if the Army does not choose to employ its

own methods of investigation and trial. The point is that this clique dominated the Wafd executive through the aged Nahas, while the majority of the parliamentary party belonged to the left wing. When the Wafd was in power the clique also ran the Government. Ministers who stood out against it were driven from office, the most prominent case being that of Dr Ahmed Hussein (not to be confused with the Fascist leader of the same name), Minister for Social Welfare in the last Wafd Government, who was grotesquely accused of Communist leanings for having proposed the introduction of minimum wages: he had to resign and was sent on a U N mission to Mexico, though his services were more urgently required at home. With the coming to power of General Neguib and his friends, it became clear that this state of affairs would be challenged. The younger and more progressive Wafdist leaders, having established contact with the military Junta, pressed for a purge of the Party executive; they were willing, however, to spare the aged Nahas, the Party's symbol and its chief internal conciliator, though he had in recent years fallen under the malign influence of Fuad Seragh. Nahas, in turn, obstinately shielded Fuad Seragh. The purge begun early in August thus threatened to peter out. As conducted by Fuad Seragh and his friends, who still controlled the Party machine, it amounted to no more than the expulsion of a dozen nonentities. The 'purge' in fact was presided over by those who should have been the first to go. When General Neguib, urged on by his Junta and the younger Wafdist, pressed Nahas to rid himself of the Seragh el-Din clique, the old man refused, and by the beginning of September the Wafdist leadership felt strong enough to come into the open with a programme of resistance both to the purge and to the projected land reform. It was then that the Junta struck, and the opponents of reform were packed off to jail, alongside some elderly Liberals and independent politicians, against whom no personal charges could be formulated, but who were vaguely identified with resistance to the Army's programme.

One reason why the Army had once more to intervene openly was the weakness displayed by the Wafd's reformist wing which, though strong in numbers, lacked leadership and resources. Fuad Seragh el-Din controlled the Party machine and most of the Wafdist press (he owned the two principal papers, *Al Balagh* and *Al Nida*), while the opposition was disorganized. But it also suffered from uncertainty over the policy to be pursued. United in its demand for social reform, it could not make up its mind on the attitude to be adopted towards other countries. Some of its spokesmen were (and are) 'anti-imperialist neutralists' and vaguely in favour of a united front with the Communist Party for purposes of internal reform. To this group belong Dr Mohammed Mandur, lecturer on the history of art and ideologist of the left wing, and Dr Mohammed Belal,

leader of the Wafdist youth organization and an outright fellow-traveller. The West's long-standing identification with the forces trying to preserve the *status quo* has driven these men into an attitude of desperate flirtation with the Communist Party. This should be a cause for alarm, for they include the more capable and idealist leaders of the younger generation. It is a matter for regret that Western representatives have for so long given the impression of not being interested in those outside the small circle of discredited political veterans who for the past twenty years have monopolized power.

A competing group of Wafdist radicals at loggerheads with the old Party leadership is headed by Salah el-Din, Foreign Minister in the last Wafd Government and Editor of the influential daily, *Al Misri*. With the support of influential back-benchers like Ali Karim, Mahmud Fathi Gundi, and others little known outside Egypt, he has persistently, and in the end successfully, sought the military Junta's backing for a move to overthrow the Nahas-Seragh leadership. While hardly pro-American and certainly not pro-British, the members of this group, unlike the fellow-travellers, realize that the real danger comes from Soviet imperialism. They are willing to support social reform, but it remains to be seen whether they are capable of stimulating any drive in that direction. Of the smaller political parties loosely linked with, or in opposition to, the Wafd in recent years, the Saadists might have qualified for office under the new regime (their industrialist clientele has always taken a more liberal attitude on land reform than the Wafd leadership) had it not been for the aftermath of Nokrashy Pasha's murder by a Moslem Brotherhood fanatic late in 1948. The assassination of the Saadist Premier was followed at that time not merely by the temporary suppression of the Brotherhood, but by the murder in unexplained circumstances of its then 'Supreme Guide', Hassan el-Banna. For this the Saadists have never been forgiven, and though they kept extremely quiet after the Army coup of July 23rd-26th, they were 'remembered' on September 6th, when their leaders were carted off to prison. An investigation into the murder affair has long been demanded by the Brotherhood. The moment seems now to have become ripe. But can the Brotherhood pass beyond the stage of repaying old political scores? Is it a movement capable of propping up the Army dictatorship?

Spokesmen for the Brotherhood have in recent weeks tried to convince foreign correspondents that the movement has always stood for social reform. There is little evidence to back this claim. When the Army leaders first published their draft plans for land reform, the proposed limitation of land holdings to 200 acres per owner – in a country where two million peasants own less than one acre, while 2,215 landowners own a total

of 863,000, and close on a million farm workers own nothing at all – struck the Brotherhood leaders as dangerously radical! They thought 400 acres should be the upper limit, and the Prime Minister, Aly Maher, was grateful for their support in opposing a measure which, he complained, would damage the national economy. Aly Maher has gone, but Hassan el-Hodeibi, Supreme Guide of the Moslem Brotherhood, is still there, although his prestige among his followers has suffered from the publication in a Cairo weekly of pictures showing him in bathing dress – an affront to the fundamentalists. Outside the bathing box, though, the Supreme Guide is no modernist. In one of his first public statements after the July upheaval, an interview with the Cairo weekly *Al Muwassar*, he observed that there was no need for social security legislation, since the obligation of 'sakat' (mutual aid) took care of all such problems in an Islamic country. There is a radical wing in the movement, about which more will have to be said, but it is not yet dominant, though it appears to have links with the Army Junta.

As it is organized at present, the Brotherhood is a retrograde influence. Its origins go back to the dispute between modernists and fundamentalists which lies at the base of Egyptian development since the British occupation of 1882. Broadly speaking the Wafd stems from the secularist nationalism of Mustafa Kamel, whose disciple, Saad Zaghlul, founded the Wafd Party proper. The Brotherhood's tradition goes back to Mohammed Abdu, a follower of the important religious thinker Jemal el Din el Afghani. Abdu laid it down that the Koran contained all that was needful for Egypt's social salvation, and that the spiritual influence, as well as the political dominance, of the West must be opposed. Hassan el-Banna, the true founder of the Brotherhood, proclaimed his allegiance to this tradition when in an open letter to King Farouk, in 1944, he declared that Egyptian political life should be remodelled on the pattern of the ancient Caliphate. The present Supreme Guide in turn is a disciple of Hassan el-Banna, and under his influence the Brotherhood has consistently championed Pan-Islamism, as against the secularist Egyptian nationalism of the Wafd. 'Kaumiye' (nationalism) is in fact abhorrent to it, for the simple reason that it not only appeals to non-Moslems – Copts, Jews and Greeks – but even tends to revive pre-Islamic institutions, as was done in Turkey by the Kemalists. But the movement's present leadership is also conservative in social matters. Its 1946 manifesto ('What we tell the public') expressly disclaims interest in such mundane matters as the building of hospital and schools, and the progress of co-operatives. Independence cannot be restored by such means. 'There is only one way, the way of the Prophet; propagating his doctrine, rallying the believers around his banner, gathering them for the struggle for the realization of

his doctrine – there is no other way.’ The movement’s social doctrine is anti-capitalist, but it is a romantic, backward-looking, anti-capitalism; though in practice the Brotherhood has successfully adapted itself to Mammon: its property in factories, trading companies, etc., is estimated to run into millions. It is barren of constructive ideas. After the Army had seized power, it was the officers who worked out plans for land reform, while the Supreme Guide of the Moslem Brotherhood contented himself with demanding the closing of night clubs.

There is, however, a radical opposition group within the movement, centred around Salah Ashmawi, Sayed Koth, and the weekly *Al Dawa*, and supported by the membership of the Suez and Ismailia branches. This group called for the continuation of the ‘holy war’ against the British during the early summer, but took a new line after the Army coup, stressing the primacy of domestic reform. ‘The expulsion of the British,’ wrote Ashmawi in his weekly, ‘would be of little use if we cannot at the same time improve the living conditions of the people and carry out social reforms.’ Ashmawi may in part be influenced by personal motives in opposing the leadership’s policy – he was one of the leaders in the inter-regnum following Hassan el-Banna’s death, and in 1951 was defeated in the competition for the post of Supreme Guide – but the group he leads has considerable backing from the younger organizers and the rank-and-file. In so far as Army officers and intellectuals sympathize with the Brotherhood their support goes to this radical wing, not to the conservative leadership whose principal backing comes from the clerical dignitaries of El Azhar university. But even the radicals are nebulous in their political aims. They clamour for improved living standards for workers and peasants, without committing themselves to anything in particular, and their agrarian programme is not even as explicit as that of the Rumanian ‘Iron Guard’ in the ‘thirties, with its slogan ‘An acre for everyone.’ It must also be borne in mind that while the Brotherhood is much more influential in the villages than is the Wafd – it is in fact the only political movement which has ever managed to gain a real foothold there – it carries less weight in the towns, and in Middle Eastern politics the towns are decisive. The return to Koranic puritanism is not an effective slogan among the urban population. ‘Misr Effendi’ (the ‘little man’) may dislike night clubs and foreign films, but he resents clerical interference with his private life even more, and the vague radicalism of the middle class – to say nothing of the smouldering discontent of the proletariat – cannot be deflected from social aims, now that the Army coup has opened the flood-gates.

How far the dictatorship can or will go to meet this demand for social change does not, of course, depend entirely on its own volition. General

Neguib’s political acumen and his knowledge of economics – a subject in which he holds a university degree – are at least as good as that of some leading Western statesmen, but the Junta around him naturally has no clear political programme. Yet even within the narrow framework of religious conservatism and military amateurism a good deal can, and no doubt will, be done. The vicious circle of stagnation, corruption and hopelessness has been ended; the traditional alliance of Palace, big business, and old-line political bosses has broken down, and the way has been cleared for fresh political alignments. For the moment this is more important than the purely economic and social significance of land reform and other proposed legislation. Economic change will in any case be slow in coming. What matters is that reform has at least been made possible. It is no longer necessary for intellectuals to turn to Stalinism or Fascism, and therein lies the biggest hope of the moment. The lower middle class and the intelligentsia are the decisive political factors all over the Middle East. It is they who lead all political movements, from the Communists to the Fascists, and it is only in co-operation with them that any start can be made in reforming these countries. The importance of the Egyptian military revolution is that it has given them fresh hope. It has also made it possible for Egypt’s new rulers to adopt a realistic attitude towards the Communists. After July 26th, the new Government, as was to be expected, at first took a tolerant view of the Party. Subsequently the official attitude hardened, especially after the Kafr el Dawar riots, in which the Communists were an important factor. Both at Kafr el Dawar and elsewhere they not merely took the opportunity to organize demonstrations: they deliberately tried to provoke clashes with the military and police, in the hope of bringing about bloodshed and thus lessening the new regime’s prestige among the workers. Their success was limited, but the Government was put on its guard, and the situation is now well understood on both sides: as long as Neguib does not remove Egypt from the ‘Western camp’, the Party is going to make trouble. If he does, he can count on limited toleration – as does Peron.

Communist activities since the July coup have not been limited to staging bloody incidents. The Trojan Horse is in full operation. Fathi Radwan, once a fellow traveller, now combines a portfolio in the new Government and the presidency of the small but virulently anti-Western Nationalist Party, with the role of chief Soviet propagandist outside the Communist ranks. Formerly deputy chairman of a Fascist group, and in 1951 Egyptian representative at the Communist ‘peace conference’ in Vienna, he is the ideal go-between. Communist enthusiasm for collaboration with their erstwhile ally, the Fascist movement of Ahmed Hussein, has cooled, following ‘Black Saturday’ (January 26th) and the

allegation made in the trial of Ahmed Hussein – which still continues – that his organization was financed, *inter alia*, by the Political Police. Instead, the Communists have taken a step towards legalizing themselves by setting up a brand new ‘Popular Democratic Party’ under Fathi er Ramli, a well-known writer who has spent a lifetime investigating village conditions and whose personal integrity is unquestioned. It is somewhat disturbing to find him ready to act as a ‘front’ for the Communists – presumably because he considers that they alone are in earnest about social change. The new party’s programme contains nothing very striking, but is clearly in line with the current Stalinist blue-print for backward countries. All told the Communist Party, though a good deal stronger than it was before the final phase of Farouk’s disastrous rule, is not yet a danger to the Government, but it has a nuisance value which it is going to exploit as long as the dictatorship does not take an anti-Western stand.

Abroad, the military revolution has naturally been hailed with pleasure by like-minded movements in other Middle Eastern countries. In some instances, the family resemblance may be deceptive. Thus Colonel Sheshekly in Damascus is now putting himself forward as a precursor of General Neguib, although the régime he heads has a different basis, or rather none at all: in Syria a corrupt and inefficient parliamentary régime has been replaced by an inefficient military dictatorship which lacks public support. Its reforms, apart from those that are of no importance, have remained a dead letter. There is also a slightly ridiculous clamour for military dictatorship in Lebanon – a country without an army. Matters are different in Iraq; there a general election is pending which, if honestly conducted, should bring the opposition under Salah Jabr to power. The Iraqi Army, which in the ‘thirties intervened actively in politics and even set up a reasonably effective dictatorship under Bekr Sidky, has in recent years been quiescent. Whether it can afford to remain so if conditions in neighbouring Iran get out of hand, remains to be seen.

Military dictatorship may thus well become the fashion throughout the Middle East, and as in Egypt it may turn out the vehicle of long overdue social change. This combination need not frighten Western observers who have grasped the fact that the alternative may well be Stalinist rule. Dictatorship by itself can effect nothing. To imagine that it can is the besetting temptation of Western diplomacy. Its present importance in Egypt lies in the fact that it has coincided with a reform movement. If it disheartens its popular allies its own roots will wither. Its worst enemies may well be those domestic and foreign sympathizers who caution it against any dramatic move: Western diplomats are not by temperament or training ideally suited for the task of guiding a revolution.

## ORDEAL BY MENDACITY

Irving Kristol

The author is a former editor of the New York review “Commentary”

By an appropriate irony, the British edition of Owen Lattimore’s *Ordeal By Slander* has been published almost simultaneously with the two volumes of the McCarran Committee’s hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations which contain Mr. Lattimore’s testimony. The cordial and sympathetic reviews of Mr. Lattimore’s book in the *Economist*, *Spectator*, *Listener*, *New Statesman and Nation* and other reputable periodicals provide a strange counterpoint to the hostile and acerbic probings of the American Senators. It is no more strange, however, than the counterpoint provided by Mr Lattimore as an indignant author and Mr Lattimore as a witness under oath. *Ordeal By Slander* is a passionate and eloquent denial of the accusation that Mr Lattimore and the I P R had been guided over the years by Stalinist sympathies. In contrast, his evasive, disingenuous and ultimately self-incriminating testimony before the McCarran Committee offers ample warrant for believing that such was exactly the case.

In the chapter of *Ordeal* written by Mrs Lattimore, she describes how, with the assistance of several friends, she looked through her husband’s writings for quotations that would show him to be an anti-Communist. As she found out, ‘this was a difficult job,’ and her explanation of the difficulty was two-fold: (1) her husband was a loyal American who simply expected his readers to take it for granted that he was against Communism, and (2) he was a scholar who didn’t intrude his own bias into his work. It is safe to say that no other non-Stalinist alive who had written eleven books, over eighty magazine articles, dozens of book reviews, and hundreds of newspaper articles on current Far Eastern affairs (what was scholarly about *them*?) would have found himself in such straits. In the end, Mrs Lattimore was reduced to quoting irrelevant platitudes (‘No Chinese government can be genuinely independent if it is subject to manipulation by Russia’) or wrenching sentences more or less forcibly out of context (e.g. ‘Those of us who have never been Marxists have many straightforward disagreements with the Marxists’ – what Mrs Lattimore forgets to mention is that this statement turns up in an *unfavourable* review of an anti-Communist book written by an ex-Communist.)

Nor was Owen Lattimore himself able to improve upon his wife’s

'evidence' when he appeared before the Tydings Committee; he was constrained to use such arguments as: 'In these years (1935-36) the Communists, of course, hoped that the Japanese assault upon China would strengthen the Chinese Communists. I, *on the other hand*, kept demanding a tougher American policy toward Japan and kept warning people that Japanese aggression was building up Communism' (my italics). That italicized phrase is precious indeed, in view of the fact that the Communists, along with just about everyone else, were insisting that the United States intervene to prevent Japan from gobbling up China.

It is too bad that the Lattimores did not have the task of finding pro-Stalinist quotations; they would have had a much easier time of it, as the McCarran Committee showed. Immediately at hand there were his solemn and approving reviews of a host of obscure Stalinist brochures, the tenor of which is summed up in his comment on Anna Louise Strong's *This Soviet World*: 'Her book as a whole is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of "regimentation".' With some little extra effort, they could have dug up his verdict on the Moscow trials:

The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered or rectified. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in the future he finds himself being victimized by 'someone in the Party' or 'someone in the Government.' That sounds like democracy to me.

And with some real diligence, they might have traced Mr Lattimore's line of thought prior to the Stalin-Hitler Pact, when he was all for collective security; during the Pact, when he saw the war as 'one between the established master races and the claimant master races'; and after the Pact, when Allied troops couldn't set up a second front too quickly to suit him.

But, one inevitably feels, why bother? What if Mr Lattimore has been rather less than frank about the history of his opinions? Is that not his private affair? It would be easy to reply to this by pointing out that Mr Lattimore did, after all, write a book which many trusting people took at face value. But that is a minor matter which could have been left to the informed reviewer to deal with, and which certainly did not merit a Congressional investigation. The really important thing about Mr

Lattimore's private opinions is that they played a part in the affairs of the nation which make them very much a subject for legitimate public concern.

They are, for instance, a subject for concern on the part of the foundations that generously subsidized, and the individuals who read, *Pacific Affairs* – the very influential quarterly which Mr Lattimore edited for the International Council of the I P R during the years 1934-41, and which passed in universities and Government bureaus for an authoritative, objective, and scholarly journal. In *Ordeal By Slander*, Mr. Lattimore insists that it was in fact what it passed for, and he presents statistics which purport to show that at least as many non-Communists and anti-Communists contributed to it as did pro-Communists. The McCarran Committee, for its part, has collected its own statistics which are more accurate, more detailed and more convincing than Mr Lattimore's, and which reveal that the overwhelming bulk of the pages which had any relation to politics whatever were written by Stalinists or pro-Stalinists; it also came up with documentary proof that anti-Stalinist articles were unwanted, that they were printed only under duress, and that the editor took pains to see to it that an 'answer' was found in the same issue. However, the statistical quarrel is superfluous. Any person with his political wits about him who leafs through *Pacific Affairs* will see immediately that Mr Lattimore was editing a Stalinoid magazine. Naturally there were many articles which did not have a political bearing; these were the husks that served to protect the tendentious core. But as to Mr Lattimore's intentions, there can be no doubt. To settle this question once and for all, it is worth while – as well as intrinsically interesting – to relate the tempestuous career of an article by the British economist, Mr L. E. Hubbard.

Mr Hubbard is one of the writers for *Pacific Affairs* to whom Mr Lattimore points as proof of his lack of bias. This contrasts oddly with his reactions upon first seeing Mr Hubbard's article. Here is what he wrote to Edward G. Carter, Secretary General of the I P R, on December 13th, 1937:

Of the material awaiting me here the most interesting was the Hubbard article on the Soviet Five Year Plans, which Holland and I have read with, probably, curious expressions on our faces. While waiting for whatever reaction it may detonate in Motylev (head of the Soviet Council of the I P R), I may as well review several considerations that are likely to turn out to be pertinent.

In the first place, it is a calamity that in spite of our combined and persistent urging, the Soviet Council has never contributed adequately to *Pacific Affairs*. As a result, this very skillful attack threatens to make an impression on readers who have not had the prior advantage of reading

constructive presentations of problems of major Soviet interest, by Soviet authors.

In the second place, . . . Hubbard cannot lightly be refused a hearing. He has an important influence and standing among 'people who count' in England; otherwise he would not be retained as an expert by the Bank of England.

In the third place, this article comes to us, though we did not ourselves request it, through Chatham House, one of the major organs of the I P R. As editor, I necessarily recall that I forced through an article by Asiaticus (the pen-name of Heinz Moeller, a Comintern agent in China) on British capitalist financial policy in China, against the protests of Chatham House. This would make it difficult for me to refuse the Hubbard article on the ground that it is impolitic.

Motylev, having seen the manuscript, detonated much as he had been expected to, and on February 8th, 1938 we find Mr Lattimore writing him as follows (the italics are his own):

In regard to L. N. [sic] Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms. I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question of anti-Soviet articles in *Pacific Affairs*. The real difficulty is this: the membership of the I P R is predominantly of the 'democratic nations.' These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual members of the I P R appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticising the U S S R. If I, as editor of *Pacific Affairs*, prevent them from doing so, they will criticize *Pacific Affairs* as 'an organ of Soviet propaganda' and largely destroy its usefulness.

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic in the public life of the 'democratic nations,' and resisting the forces that favour imperialist aggression and facism, is only gradually spreading. In the circumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favour publication of positive and constructive articles, while not preventing entirely the expression of negative and defeatist views. This means that whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article as this one by Hubbard we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them constructively. . .

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action:

(1) I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs. A copy of this article, thus revised, is attached to this letter.

(2) I am writing to G. E. Hubbard (brother to L. E. Hubbard), of Chatham House, asking him to withdraw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. If, however, he officially insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it, in our June number.

(3) Finally, I urge you to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House insists on publication of the original article.

In concluding this letter I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, *Pacific Affairs* ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the

best of my ability, within the limits imposed on me by the different national bodies which have a voice in the conduct of *Pacific Affairs*, I shall publish only material which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the U S S R Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with indispensable assistance.

The Hubbard article appeared in the June issue. The title given it by Mr Lattimore was: 'A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union,' and he took the liberty of inserting some footnotes 'correcting' Mr Hubbard's statistics on the basis of pro-Soviet sources. In the same issue of *Pacific Affairs* there appeared an article by one A. W. Caniff which presented a very favourable picture of Soviet economic development. The McCarran Committee discovered that this name covered the two persons of Harriet Moore and Andrew Gradjanov, both on the staff of the American-Russian Institute which was affiliated with the Soviet cultural organization, V O K S.\*

Mr Lattimore's private opinions are significant, too, because they happened to be the opinions that directed and dominated the Institute of Pacific Relations. It would be hard to overemphasize the role that this organization played over the last two decades in setting the tone for discussing Far Eastern problems. It was not one organization among many; it was *the* organization – as near a perfect illustration of monopoly as any anti-trust act could envisage. To it the various foundations and philanthropic businessmen gave their grants; from it young scholars in the field received their fellowships, printing the findings of their researches in its periodicals; from it, too, the Government recruited its Far Eastern experts, while the schools, the armed forces, and the civilian agencies of the Government distributed its pamphlets by the hundreds of thousands. Is not a Congressional investigation justified if it comes back with the information that 46 people intimately connected with the I P R have been cited under oath as members of the Communist Party? That 11 of these, plus 8 others active in I P R affairs, were shown to be collaborators with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus? That, according to a former Soviet Foreign Office official, the requests for 'scholarly' data which came from the Soviet Council – and which were fulfilled with

\* In another letter to Motylev in 1937, Mr. Lattimore wrote: 'If I am to convert *Pacific Affairs* from a loose and unorganized collection of articles into a journal which has a recognizable position and general point of view, I must rely very considerably on you. The Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations is more interested in this question of coherence than any of the others, all of which by their composition and form of organization are more or less incoherent. If I could have from you an article in each number, and if these articles were planned to succeed each other in such a manner as to create a recognizable line of thought, it would be much easier to get other contributors to converge on this line.'

alacrity by the American Council – originated in fact with Soviet naval intelligence? And that there is every reason to believe that the leading staff members of the American Council knew this? That the I P R staff member who became John Carter Vincent's assistant when the latter was chief of the China Division – and then of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs – of the State Department was identified by several witnesses as a member of the Communist Party? That another I P R staff member, similarly identified, was deputy to Presidential assistant Lauchlin Currie? That the highest official of the American I P R for many years wrote a pseudonymous column for the *Daily Worker* and reported regularly to the Communist Party's Politbureau? That the war-time director of the Washington office of the I P R now edits a paper in Communist China? That the leaders of the Japanese section of the I P R were members of the Sorge espionage ring, and that at least two prominent I P R authors acted as couriers for it? That Vice-President Henry Wallace's pamphlet, *Our Job in the Pacific*, was written by Eleanor Lattimore, while his book, *Soviet Asia Mission*, was written by a contributor to the *Daily Worker*? That at a three-day meeting of Far Eastern experts in October, 1949, called by the State Department for advice with regard to the crisis in China, 17 of the 25 people invited were active in the I P R? And that the point of view which was there most popular, among the experts and State Department officials alike, was expressed by a secret member of the Communist Party?

These were some of the things that the McCarran Committee discovered from the I P R files it confiscated, and from the witnesses it so tenaciously cross-examined. It is not, by far, the whole story – no member of the Communist caucus in the I P R has yet told us the inner history of its operations, though in requesting legislation that would empower a Congressional committee to give immunity to a friendly witness the McCarran Committee hints that we shall not have long to wait. But that there is a story, with a sordid plot – of that there can be no question.

In this story, Owen Lattimore is an essential character. The country's number one Far Eastern expert, Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University, and, at one time or another, editor of *Pacific Affairs*, Roosevelt's personal envoy to Chiang Kai-shek, Deputy Director of Pacific Operations for the Office of War Information, member of the Pauley Reparations Commission to Japan and author of its report, outstanding 'theoretician' and publicist of the I P R – he was the merchant of Stalinist ideology and the salesman of Stalinist policy to the non-Stalinist world. It was his task to explain to the American people and the State Department, in a language which could affect them, that Soviet Russia's intentions were really pacific, that

the Chinese Communists were the representatives in Asia of the inexorable 'revolution of our time' which it would be futile and wicked to oppose, and that a 'progressive' programme for the Far East meant the abjuration of any such 'reactionary' policy as fighting Communism with arms – for Communism is an 'idea' which, presumably unlike certain other ideas such as Fascism, ought only to be combatted (so to speak) 'in the hearts of men,' etc., etc. He was successful to an extent that even he must have thought phenomenal. By 1945, 'vulgar' anti-Communists such as Grew, Hornbeck and Ballantine were pushed out of the State Department and their places taken by sophisticated 'progressives' led by Mr Lattimore's old and valued friend, John Carter Vincent. These new men did not, as has been charged, 'sell China down the river.' They merely borrowed from Mr Lattimore a policy – of denying aid to Chiang until he had formed a coalition with the Communists – which had this as an inevitable consequence, and which they smugly and foolishly thought to be the only 'constructive' programme suitable for their advanced political sensibilities.

Just how deeply enmeshed Mr Lattimore was in the Stalinist apparatus that worked through the I P R, it is at this moment hard to say. There has been testimony by former Soviet officials that his work was followed with a friendly interest, and his name uttered with a knowing air, by the ruling circles in Moscow. More specifically, Louis Budenz, a former editor of the New York *Daily Worker*, has asserted that at a meeting of the American Communist Party's Politburo in 1943, Frederick Vanderbilt Field reported that he had received word from Lattimore of a change in line from supporting Chiang Kai-shek to openly opposing him; moreover, according to Budenz, Mr Lattimore was frequently referred to in an intimate way in secret Party documents. And there are several intriguing episodes, touching upon Mr Lattimore's relations with Soviet officials in America, whose meaning is as yet obscure. However, it seems clear that Owen Lattimore was no spy in the sense that Alger Hiss was one, and that Senator McCarthy's description of him as 'the top Soviet espionage agent' in the U S was irresponsible and wide of the mark. A spy would not have walked into the American Embassy in Moscow in 1936 and demanded that Ambassador Bullitt cable Washington to recognize Outer Mongolia as an independent Republic – at a time when it was formally a part of China and actually, as Mr Lattimore well knew, a Soviet protectorate. And a spy would not have recommended Frederick Vanderbilt Field, widely known to be a Communist, for a commission in Army Intelligence during the last war. Such brazenness is the mark of a man transported by the conviction of his own infinite innocence and righteousness. It was an innocence and righteousness bestowed upon him

by History, as a reward for his having recognized her as the living Goddess. This recognition he summed up in a single formula: '*Ta be progressive in politics is to be on the side of that which is going up and against that which is going down.*' What was going up, of course, was the Kingdom of Freedom, represented somewhat crudely in our day by Communism and the Soviet Union; what was going down was the Kingdom of Necessity, represented by capitalism and the status quo.

Lattimore's relations with the Marxist myth were essentially flirtatious, if intense; he was incapable of the final self-surrender that would have made him a true Bolshevik. What stood in his way was, apparently, pride; eager to ride the wave of the future, he was unwilling to merge himself with it. One aspect of this pride was displayed in his delicate avoidance of Marxist jargon. His own style, he felt, had a distinctive contribution to make – he could translate the new dogmas into something resembling the ancient rhetoric of the academy. According to Professor Karl Wittfogel, Lattimore once boasted to him that he had never read Marx for fear of losing his own accent; and Lattimore's private correspondence to other members of the I P R 'family' (i.e. the inner circle that controlled the organization) is full of references to his own special rhetorical abilities and of criticism of the more stereotyped diction of others. Even conspiracies, it would seem, have their snobs; and even snobs have their uses. As Budenz put it: 'It was particularly stressed in the Political Bureau that his great value lay in the fact that he could bring the emphasis in support of Soviet policy in language which was non-Soviet.'

In view of the stress placed by Lattimore and others on his capabilities in this field, it is depressing to note that his artfulness was of the crudest sort. He avoided the cliché 'agrarian reformers' when speaking of the Chinese Communists, substituting in its stead the more pompous 'dynamic popular government in North China.' He would demonstrate his open-mindedness about Communism with such utterances as: 'No propaganda can hide the fact that there is good and bad in Russia.' His favourite technique has been described as 'ventriloquism'; this involved putting his opinions into other people's mouths under the guise of scholarly objectivity. Thus, criticizing an article by Harold Isaacs he would say: 'Mr Isaacs, referring to China, writes of the "cold embrace of Communist totalitarianism"; but it appears from other accounts that it is in these areas that there is really a beacon of hope . . .' Sometimes, he would take it upon himself to express the sentiments of Uzbeks and Mongols, secure in the knowledge that they were not likely to write a protesting letter to the *Times*.

To all these peoples (neighbours of Russia in Inner Asia) the Russians and the Soviet Union have a great power of attraction.

In their eyes – rather doubtfully in the eyes of the older generation, more and more clearly in the eyes of the younger generation – the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination.

The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things.

It is incredible that these shoddy and transparent dodges should have been successful. But they were, in such a measure that Mr Lattimore was able to make himself the spokesman for practically the entire body of respectable opinion – Conservative as well as Liberal – on the Far East. His non-sequiturs became the logic of Senatorial speeches and Government memoranda. His insinuations became the 'facts' of college textbooks. His ingratiating pseudo-Marxist platitudes became the stock-in-trade of all the 'experts,' and laid the groundwork for a moral and intellectual *trahison des clercs* that, for the sheer simplicity and magnitude of it, is perhaps without parallel in history.

The magic of his ineffable presence dies slowly. There are still many who rally to his defence as one insulted and injured; and in certain academic circles it is considered good form to speak of the 'inquisition' he has suffered, just as it is considered bad form to be caught browsing through the 5,000 pages of the hearings before the McCarran Committee. Nevertheless, there are signs of an awakening to sanity. The *New Republic*, which had proudly published long excerpts from Mr Lattimore's defiant statement before the McCarran Committee, found itself admitting on July 14th:

The (McCarran) report will, we believe, substantiate these charges: that a Communist Party caucus infiltrated the staff and council of the American I P R before the last war; that I P R officials knew of this infiltration and tolerated it; and that the I P R gave up its objective research function and adopted the role of advocate in China policy. The record will further indicate that Owen Lattimore knowingly accepted these trends and that he erred in professing naiveté or ignorance before the Committee.

A very modest statement; but at least a beginning.

## EMULATING CHARLEMAGNE

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'Faire l'Europe' – a slogan often adopted without considering its implications by some governments hankering after a greatness they wrongly believe departed – shares the common fate of political slogans: that of covering up a great deal of confusion.

Confusion as to intentions first of all: the movement towards European unity appears, according to the men who encourage it, as a crusade of good intentions, as a very deliberate effort to seek new solutions to problems which do not lend themselves to the usual approach, or even, unfortunately only too often, as a voluntary escape, a means of disguising the inability or the refusal to tackle urgent internal problems courageously.

Also, and here the danger is more evident, confusion as to aims. For if there are different motives for 'building' Europe, it is not always the same Europe that is envisaged, and to neglect making the necessary distinctions early on, under the pretext of seeking unanimity, can only lead to disappointment. We do not wish to analyse here the different conceptions of Europe which are proposed to us, nor to remove this dangerous confusion; a few short notes would not suffice. We propose only to indicate, from the viewpoint of a French Catholic, the considerable dangers of a certain form of European union which, however, does not seem to have any serious chance of success.

It has often been pointed out, and several authors pertinently recalled the fact in the September issue of this review, that Messrs Schuman, Adenauer and de Gasperi were brought up in a common culture which immediately brings to mind, even to those with only the most rudimentary knowledge of history, the Europe of Charlemagne and that of the Habsburgs. At the same time Christian Democracy is in power in Italy, Western Germany, Belgium and Austria, and it remains, and will doubtless remain for a considerable time, a necessary element in any governmental combination in France. It is therefore easy, only too easy in fact, to imagine a union under Catholic inspiration between the continental democracies of Western Europe – a union which would rebuild, in the world of to-day, the Europe of Charlemagne. We shall enquire later whether this is a mere figment or a formula whose realization is possible

or even likely. This is hardly important, however, for even in its mythical state a 'Vatican Europe' affects in no small measure, although in very different ways, the external policies of most European States. Those who would like a Socialist Europe regard it as a reactionary plot; others, rather summarily, pretend to see in it a Papist plot, and explain thereby the British and Scandinavian reticence. Finally, even the most favourable comments\* neglect or ignore the marked distinctions which one must make between the Christian Democratic movements of Western Europe, if one does not wish to caricature a situation which is far more complex than is generally realized, not only in Great Britain but also in the countries which might be called upon to participate in this continental union. All this may be said without wishing to recall the childish Machiavellism of those who, without more ado, propose the 'alliance' of 'policies' between the Vatican and the White House as an anti-Communist crusade.

In order to examine the possibilities and dangers of the formula we have evoked, a few observations must be made on the position of Christian Democracy in France. Behind the compromises which the exercise of power always involves, and which it has involved for the M R P in a greater measure than may be thought suitable or desirable, it is important to realize the ambiguity of the term 'Christian Democracy', as applied to the French context. The foreigner sees it as a party which, like the Italian, Belgian and Germanic movements, draws its inspiration from the pre-1914 German Centre Party. This comparison, which is not entirely false, but has only a limited significance, would have greatly surprised both the founders and the more lucid supporters of the M R P. The Mouvement Républicain Populaire drew its immediate inspiration from the experience of the Résistance, whilst its more profound inspiration derived from a serious intellectual effort, a considerable modification of the social approach and a reconsideration of the significance of their own faith, undertaken by a large number of French Catholics now of age to hold Cabinet office. This change of perspective and feeling, centred mainly around specialized youth movements, has given to present-day French Catholicism a twist, a style which the foreigner understands with difficulty, and which, if he is a Catholic, he quite often mistrusts. The fact that Christian Democracy in 1945 was chosen by most of its electors as a lesser evil, and that the Party had thus to modify its programme and compromise itself, is relatively unimportant. The salient feature is that it is around the M R P of 1945, or the not unimportant fraction of the M R P of 1952 which remains faithful to its vocation, rather than around a terribly insipid Socialist party, that some attempt could be made (with but few chances of success, however) to build up a French Labour movement.

\* Such as the one in *The Economist*, August 16th, 1952.

At the same time the experience of the collusion, although condemned by Rome, between the Conservative Catholics and the positivist and atheistic nationalists of the 'Action Française' provided a lesson which the French Catholics of to-day are not ready to forget. That the 'nationalisme intégral' revealed itself to be the surest road to treason was perhaps not a necessity, but it is now well known in France what distinctions must be made between the realm of the faith and the realm of politics. Henceforth the Christian's political *engagement* is made more easy, and the new liberty he finds has already proved most fruitful.

These few notes are perhaps too rapid and too full of implications for those who have not lived through the transformations they recall. They are, however, sufficient to explain why a number of French Catholics are fully aware of two dangers implicit in a European union of openly Catholic inspiration:\* a danger for France and a danger for the Church. A danger for France, since it would soon be realized that the union had been based on a misunderstanding, and that the partners were not speaking the same language. The strength of numbers alone would be enough to ensure that the 'Vatican Europe', like the Holy Roman Empire, was a Germanic one. There is too much talk of the risk of German predominance on an economic or military plane. It is curious to note that certain measures designed to avoid this risk contain the seed of a spiritual and ideological predominance of the countries of German civilization. Here the risk is infinitely more serious, not only for France but also for Europe. For if Europe is to be built, it will only be viable if the several participants do not mark it too heavily with the stamp of their own culture.

The danger to the Church is even more certain. The perils that were revealed to French Catholics by the Maurras crisis would again be present, but they would be incomparably more fearsome, for they would be jeopardizing the very unity of the Church. The conclusion has been reached in France that the separation of Church and State, and political freedom of action for Catholics outside the bounds of a confessional party, guarantee better than any other formula the spiritual interests of the Church and the purity of her mission. This is even more true within the context of a European union where Rome herself, and not merely the hierarchy of a given country, would necessarily become involved in political action, at least by arbitrating the conflicts which are latent in any union, if the vital separation of spheres is not assured. Rome's viewpoint has, during the last few decades, fortunately shown itself to be so Catholic

\* These dangers were noted early on by such enlightened authors as Mr J. Hours (*L'Europe à ne pas faire*, 'La Vie Intellectuelle,' October 1950). The ideas expressed here are directly inspired by such work.

(which, it may be recalled, means universal) that there is no doubt the Papacy would certainly not easily accept a role which would both tarnish the purity of its mission and limit its horizon to the rump of a continent, however steeped in history that part of the continent may be.

One of the reasons why a Catholic Europe appeals to certain people is that they fully realize that even as the splitting up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1918 by arbitrary frontiers was not enough to form nations, so treaties, constitutions, juridical and diplomatic edifices will not, by themselves, make European union a viable reality. The federation of peoples with a history behind them is not a task for a Cabinet; it can only be the result of a revolution, and revolutions are born from popular enthusiasm. It is easy, therefore, to claim that Europe can only be founded on a religious or quasi-religious basis. Hence the notions of a Socialist Europe or a Catholic Europe. To those who have some acquaintance with the political parties of the Continent, it would sound ridiculous to say that Socialism could be the object of any popular enthusiasm whatever. There remains a Catholic Europe. It is certainly conceivable, but is it anything more than a mere figment?

In order to talk only of things we know, we shall again limit ourselves to reasoning on the French example. Similar remarks based on other examples could doubtless be made. The answer we seek is to be found in two factors, each closely related to the other and above all to the whole history of the French nation.

The first is due to a special characteristic of French culture. It is often stated, and it is very true, that French culture is, by vocation, a universal humanism, and is therefore national without being nationalistic. But one must not forget how much the growth of this culture owes to the early existence of the French nation. The Germanic and Italian cultures flourished long before Germany and Italy existed as nations. French culture has constantly grown in the shelter of a State which protected it without enslaving it, and the significant stages in the development of French unity were also the significant stages in the blossoming of French culture: St Louis and the Cathedrals, François I and the Collège de France, Richelieu and the Académie, Louis XIV, who did so much in his forty years' reign that it became known as 'le grand siècle', and lastly Napoleon and the University. This link is so strong that it is difficult to visualize the perpetuation of French culture unless national independence is maintained. And the stakes are such that conscious French participation in a type of union which would not only give short shrift to the national independence of the participants, but which would also involve an almost certain predominance of Germanic culture, would not be dangerous, or undesirable or even risky: it would be simply unthinkable, and it would be dangerously

misleading to imagine that such a union could be realized without awakening a violent popular reaction.

This link between culture and – if not the State, which is a legal entity peculiar to the Latin mind – at least national independence, is an apparent paradox which will not surprise the reader. Taking the term 'culture' in its broadest sense – not limiting it to the more formal manifestations of intellectual activity, but interpreting it as that which, for want of a better phrase, we call the way of life of a people – is enough to show that the same thing is true of British culture. British democracy, resting as it does on the 'rule of law', is a way of life, a culture rather than a simple formula for government; and it is perhaps above all because it is based on a common culture, in the sense we have ascribed to the word, that the Commonwealth is a lasting institution. For the British, as for the French, a hasty and imprudent surrender of national sovereignty would be such a betrayal of the most fundamental national values that it would be surprising if it did not immediately arouse against it a popular reaction.

'Popular': this is the key to the second factor we wish to mention. We have admitted, and it is obvious, that European union is a task of such magnitude that it cannot be built unless supported by a revolutionary current of popular enthusiasm. Now, if there is one thing which is neglected by the formulas under consideration, and especially the one we are studying, it is popular reaction, and working class reaction in particular.

To appoint, because it is fashionable to do so, trade union representatives into organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community, does not mean that these reactions are being taken into account. Now, at any rate in France, they would most certainly oppose any rash surrender of the country's independence. Not that the people are nationalist. Nationalism is a learned or semi-learned deviation from true national feeling. The people have, however, a strong sense of national independence of very ancient origin, which they proved but recently: the Résistance during the German occupation gained its character and strength from the fact that it was a fundamentally popular movement, whilst professional nationalism easily led to treason. In 1944, after a century and a half of the industrial revolution, popular national sentiment was as strong and as genuine as at Valmy. The Communist Party is fully aware of this, and exploits and alienates popular sentiment by constantly making national independence the major point of its programme.

This unfavourable popular reaction would be all the more marked if the policies concerned gave, rightly or wrongly, the impression of disguising a clerical experiment or clerical revenge. And this is another reason which causes many French Catholics to regard these policies with extreme caution. The freedom of action they have discovered in the sphere of

politics has enabled them sufficiently to dissociate the terms 'Catholicism' and 'reaction', for them not to countenance a formula which must needs re-introduce ambiguity. The efforts of the Church in France are, furthermore, too much concerned with the revival of faith among those classes of the population who, through poverty, have lost sight of God, to justify trust in policies which, for the sake of an uncertain benefit in the purely material sphere, would destroy the very meaning and hope of those efforts. These Catholics are quite genuinely in line with a very fundamental tradition of French Catholicism: its ceaseless resistance to ultra-montanism. And the new kind of ultra-montanism to which we are alluding would evince an even more profound and dangerous failure to recognize the Church's mission in the world of to-day, than the *intégrisme* of the Catholics of the 'Action Française' who, although condemned by Rome, also persisted in being more papist than the Pope.

So it seems that the Europe we have studied is but a myth. If its dangers are obvious its chances of success are slight. Was it then worth discussing? We think so, for two reasons. For one thing, myths themselves are potent, especially in the political sphere. On the other hand, some recent political moves seem to imply that certain European statesmen are being tempted to emulate Charlemagne. And the dangers are as real in isolated cases as they would be in the case of a general scheme, with the important difference that the ultimate sterility of the former is certain.

This does not mean that, because we are dismissing a particular intellectually attractive type of European union, we should reject the principle in question and any other form of union. It should, however, be noted that contrary to the belief of the inhabitants of the United States, accustomed to an efficient way of life in a federal union, a federation or union between countries whose cultures and national characteristics are so widely different as those of Western Europe does not, in itself, present any special interest. Its only interest is as a method of solving certain well-defined concrete problems. These problems are, basically speaking, those of economic solvency, defence, and finally the narrower problem of Franco-German relations. There is no doubt that these problems can only be solved at the cost of a certain degree of union, but we do not think this union should cheapen national independence. The penalty of neglecting it might well lead not only to failure in solving these problems but also to a formidable re-awakening of nationalism. In this sense, Britain's refusal to abandon her sovereignty is sound. It is to be regretted, however, that her refusal was not accompanied by a more constructive criticism of federalist proposals.

## THE SAINT-SIMONIAN PORTENT

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The movement known as Saint-Simonism, which disturbed French life in the years following 1825, deserves more attention than it commonly gets. A generation ago it could still be dismissed – as Engels had dismissed it – as a laudable but hopelessly unrealistic essay in Socialist thought. To study it to-day is to discover a disconcerting portent of present-day totalitarianism.

The literary career of Claude-Henri de Rouvray, Comte de Saint-Simon, began at the age of forty-two. Having lost one fortune in the Revolution and squandered another in entertaining scientists, writers and artists to an immense series of banquets, in the vain hope that their conversation would complete his education, he was penniless. When he wrote he was starving, ill, living in a garret, supported sometimes by a former valet, sometimes by working nine hours a day as a copyist in a pawnshop. In these grim circumstances he produced, between 1802 and 1825, a large number of pamphlets, outlines, 'catechisms' and 'projects'. These writings do not offer a coherent doctrine. What they do offer is a handful of ideas, varying from grotesque, almost lunatic fantasies to diagnoses which show real insight, and prophecies which have proved astonishingly accurate. Here it is possible to consider only a few of the more significant fragments.

Common to all stages of Saint-Simon's thought is the conviction that society was passing through a double crisis, of belief and of organization. Traditional Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, had lost its hold over men; the Churches, unable to assimilate the discoveries of science, could no longer command faith. At the same time what he called the 'feudal' structure of society was in dissolution; the nobility and the military had neither the right nor the capacity to govern a society based on industry. In short, both the spiritual and the temporal power were in decay. Saint-Simon was concerned to find a new governing class which should be fitted to direct – spiritually and temporally – the society of his day. His ideal was a new religion combined, indeed fused, with a new organization of society.

His search led him in various directions. In the main his favourite candidates for the new leadership were the scientists and the 'industrials'

– meaning, approximately, the agriculturists, manufacturers and merchants. The dogma of the new religion was to be the sum of scientific knowledge; its morality was to centre in the injunction: 'Man must work.' The details of the proposed solutions varied but the angle of approach was constant. What Saint-Simon sought was the basis of a new order; and the stress was equally distributed between the idea of order and the idea of novelty. He was an extreme authoritarian and in this he was not alone in his day. The individualist doctrines inherited from the Revolution, the political liberalism sanctioned by the Charter of 1814, were widely attacked throughout the Restoration period. In general, however, they were criticized – as by de Maistre and Bonald – in the name of Royalism and Catholicism; and the alternative offered was a re-creation of the Middle Ages. The originality of Saint-Simon lay in his demand for an organization of society which should be both uncompromisingly authoritarian and uncompromisingly modern. •

Saint-Simon was one of the first to attribute to the philosophy of history the character of a positive science, such as might permit accurate forecasts of the future developments of humanity. He devised his own philosophy of history. For him, history consisted in an oscillation between 'organic' and 'critical' periods. 'Organic' periods are those in which the spiritual power is recruited from the most enlightened sections of society and is therefore able to supply society with an adequate philosophy of life. The last such period he believed to have been the Middle Ages. This had been followed by a 'critical' period, in which the spiritual power had abdicated from its position of intellectual leadership and in which accordingly all had been called in question. This period had culminated in the eighteenth century, which had been purely critical and destructive. The destiny of the nineteenth century in general, and of Saint-Simon in particular, was to inaugurate a new 'organic' period, based this time not on a theological system but on a 'système terrestre et positif.' Once society had been reorganized according to this system there would be no more room for liberty of conscience in politics than in astronomy, physics or chemistry. The new clergy of scientists, being in possession of demonstrable truth, would be entitled to impose it on all. A Catechism must be devised containing 'the principles which are to serve as basis to the social organization, and also a summary instruction in the laws which govern the material world'.\* The teaching in all schools and churches would be controlled to ensure conformity, and civil rights would be conditional on passing an examination in the Catechism.

\* XXII, 237. Unless otherwise stated references are to volume and page of the *Oeuvres complètes de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, Paris, 1865–78. 47 vols.

Save for one brief period Saint-Simon was consistently hostile to the liberal values. In his eyes uniformity of outlook was not merely the sign but the precondition of a healthy polity. The arguments with which he supports this view are both vastly more honest and vastly more intelligent than those adduced – in public at least – by the totalitarians of to-day.

Let us note . . . that according as civilisation progresses, the division of labour . . . increases in the same proportion. This has the result, as an absolute necessity, that men depend less on one another individually, but that each of them depends more on the mass, in exactly the same ratio. Now, the vague and metaphysical idea of Liberty as it is current to-day, if it were to continue to be taken as a basis for political doctrines, would pre-eminently tend to hamper the action of the mass on individuals. From this point of view it would be opposed to the development of civilisation and the organisation of a well-ordered system, which requires that the parts be firmly bound to the whole and dependent upon it.\*

Even more abominable than this general liberty of the individual is his liberty to meddle in politics. Such meddling is possible only because politics have not yet advanced from the 'metaphysical' to the 'positive' stage; soon 'the practice of politics will be entrusted exclusively to a special class of scientists who will impose silence on the talkers'.† As for the sovereignty of the people, 'the people knows very well, except in moments of delirium of short duration, that it has not the leisure to be sovereign'.‡

This is one side of the picture, but there is another. Saint-Simon was not only an authoritarian, he was also – in a sense – a democrat. He vigorously proclaimed the principle of equality of opportunity. In the new order privileges of birth were to be abolished and social eminence was to become the reward of work alone. The *élite* was to consist not of men of birth but of men of ability. Moreover, in the last years of his life Saint-Simon underwent something which at least resembled a religious conversion. In his last – and unfinished – work, *Le Nouveau Christianisme*, he expounded a religion shorn of all dogma and reduced to the single principle of brotherly love.

Religion must direct society towards the great end of improving as rapidly as possible the lot of the poorest class.§ All social institutions must have as their object the moral, physical and intellectual betterment of the most numerous and poorest class.||

\* XXI, 16.

† XXI, 17.

‡ XXI, 210.

§ XXIII, 117.

|| Motto of Saint-Simonian journal *l'Organisateur* and with a minor variation of *le Globe*.

The theme recurs again and again throughout the book. Saint-Simon had in fact for the first time turned his attention to the poor, and particularly to the new proletariat which was multiplying around him as the Industrial Revolution sped on its ruthless way. It was this sudden awakening of sympathy which enabled Saint-Simon to move the hearts as well as to interest the minds of men.

On his deathbed Saint-Simon refused to waste time in seeing his relatives; his sole concern was to hand on his message.

'People believed that every religious system must disappear because they had succeeded in proving the decrepitude of the Catholic system. They were mistaken; religion cannot disappear from the world; it only changes its form. . . . Do not forget that, and remember that in order to achieve great things, one must be passionate. . . . Forty-eight hours after our second publication the party of the workers will be formed: the future is ours.' He lifted his hand to his head and died.\*

Such was Saint-Simon: the authoritarian who created the *mystique* of the proletariat, the religious teacher whose kingdom was of this world, the rationalist who recognized the supremacy of sentiment, the positivist who proclaimed the ineradicability of the religious impulse. He had his illusions and he had his follies, but there have been falser prophets.

When Saint-Simon died he had only one convinced follower, Olinde Rodrigues, the son of a wealthy Jewish banker; it was he who assembled the first body of disciples. Pre-eminent among these were Bazard, a former *Carbonaro* and founder of the *Charbonnerie française*, and Barthélemy-Prosper Enfantin. Enfantin, born in 1796 as the son of a banker, had had a varied career as *polytechnicien* and as officer-cadet, as wine-dealer and as bank-cashier in St Petersburg and Paris. He had a good intelligence and wide knowledge, strikingly good looks and, undoubtedly, extraordinary personal magnetism. Together with Bazard he very soon replaced Rodrigues as leader of the Saint-Simonians; and in due course he ousted Bazard. It is Enfantin who dominates the history of the Saint-Simonian movement. He soon attracted followers, who were drawn wholly from the intelligentsia: engineers and mathematicians from the *École Polytechnique*, with a sprinkling of doctors and philosophers. Many of these men were of quite outstanding ability; they included, for instance, Henri Fournel, a mining engineer who gladly resigned a most lucrative appointment as director of Le Creusot, and Michel Chevalier, who later in life was to become economic adviser to Napoleon III and one of the powers behind the 'economic revolution' of the 1860's. All were wholly devoted to the

\* *Globe*, December 30th, 1831.

cause and showed it by their acts. The major Saint-Simonian undertaking, the publication of the newspaper *Le Globe*, was made possible only by their generosity. Some gave their entire fortune, others worked as editors for months on end, from nine o'clock in the morning until two o'clock the following morning.

There can be no doubt that from the start it was the religious content of the doctrine which attracted these men to Saint-Simonism. Writing fifty years later, one of the most intelligent of them, Hippolyte Carnot, remarked that Saint-Simonism 'was born of the need felt by the hearts and minds of men to attach themselves once more to a religious thought.'\* Even at the time this was clearly realized by the Saint-Simonians. 'Who are you then?' cried the disciple Barrault to an audience of potential converts. 'People who no longer believe firmly in anything that is believed to-day, and who come to us here with your scepticism, your disgust, your boredom, your indifference, your uncertainty . . . † It was a problem which already then was recognized by many as one of the gravest in modern civilization. It was Joubert, not himself a Saint-Simonian, who wrote:

The emptiness left by this immense destruction (of Christianity), this vacuum is everywhere; it is in all hearts, it is felt obscurely by the masses, as it is felt, more clearly, by exceptional minds. This emptiness must be filled; so long as it is not filled I claim that society will not be calmed. . . . Such is the profound, the true cause of the social unrest.‡

The problem was not indeed confined to the intelligentsia. 'Two old men, on the day of their initiation into the Saint-Simonian faith, cried out: "We have more need than the young to believe in something; we want to die in peace." § Saint-Simonism acquired its *élite* by appealing to the frustrated religious impulse. To complete the picture the testimony of yet another of the leaders should be added: 'In Saint-Simonianism there was not perhaps one person who had not been driven to it by family troubles.' || The movement drew its recruits from the scientists and technicians, but it drew them through their hunger for faith and their hunger for love.

Between 1825 and 1831 the Saint-Simonians clarified, systematized and popularized the teachings of the Master. In their periodicals, *Le*

\* Carnot, *Sur le Saint-Simonisme*. Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Vol. 128. Paris, 1887, p. 122.

† III, 230.

‡ Joubert, Discours, quoted by H. Louvancourt, *De Henri de Saint-Simon à Charles Fourier*, Paris, 1913, p. 401.

§ *Globe*, December 17th, 1831.

|| D'Eichthal, *Archives saint-simoniennes*, 1866, quoted by Louvancourt, op. cit., p. 179.

*Producteur*, *L'Organisateur* and, after the July Revolution, *Le Globe*, and above all in the *Doctrine de Saint-Simon: Exposition, Première Année* (1829) – which remains to this day the best summary of Saint-Simonian theory – they accomplished a formidable piece of re-editing, carried through with considerable propagandist skill. The work of these years made the obscure Saint-Simon an important influence in modern European thought; and it gave him the reputation – which he himself had scarcely merited – of a 'father of Socialism'. This aspect of the doctrine cannot be considered in any detail here. It can only be noted, in passing, that the Master's attack on privilege was developed by the disciples into an attack on inheritance. On the death of the owner property is to revert to the State, which will thereby come into sole possession of the means of production. The relationship between employer and wage-earner will disappear, the 'exploitation of man by man' will cease. In future there will be on the one hand the workers – 'les travailleurs' – and on the other hand the State, 'devenu Association des travailleurs.' Wealth will be distributed solely as a reward for services rendered to the community.

Property will no longer be merely individual, it will be social. . . . The earth is considered as an instrument of work of which the State is sole proprietor, and which is distributed by the State to each according to his works.\*

The social order envisaged by the Saint-Simonians was anything but egalitarian. It was intended to be just; and justice precludes equality. If each is to be allotted a task appropriate to his capacity, and reward proportionate to his works, there will clearly be great inequality. On this point the Saint-Simonians could scarcely have been more emphatic. The globe is to be exploited by 'association' (in italics) but also hierarchically (in capital letters).† The new order will in fact be 'the most unitary, the firmest hierarchy'.‡ The existing Army would be an excellent model for society as a whole.§

'Partisans of equality! Saint-Simon tells you that men are *unequal* . . . Defenders of *Liberty*! Saint-Simon tells you that you will have *leaders*!' || For who, indeed, would desire 'to compress hearts, bend intelligences, break strengths beneath the heavy yoke, beneath the absurd level of EQUALITY?' ¶

\* *Globe*, June 2nd, 1831.

† *Adresse au Président de la Chambre de Députés*, IV, 122.

‡ *Exposition de la Doctrine de Saint-Simon, Première et Deuxième Années*, ed. of 1854, Paris, p. 218.

§ *Globe*, March 3rd, 8th and 21st, 1832.

|| *Exposition*, p. 29.

¶ *Ibid.* p. 30.

Mankind, said the Saint-Simonians, had reached the crucial moment in its history. Behind lay the evil age in which men had exploited men; ahead lay the age in which men would combine to exploit Nature. 'The Golden Age, which a blind tradition has hitherto placed in the past, lies before us'; such was the motto of *Le Producteur*. The slogan was Saint-Simon's,\* but the meaning which his disciples attached to it was new. They looked forward to a 'universal association of the peoples', united in industrial production. The doctrine was never better summarized than by the *Globe* at a time when that newspaper was still Liberal and hostile to the Saint-Simonian cause: '(This philosophy . . . based on a new conception of human nature . . . recognises that the destiny of the species on the globe is to exploit, and to modify to its best advantage, external nature.'† For this purpose the State would be required to plan; and as the sole depository of the means of production it would be well equipped to do so. Far more specifically than Saint-Simon himself, the Saint-Simonians stand at the head of the long line of Socialist planners or – as they would have put it – of 'organizers'. It is nevertheless doubtful whether these ideas, for all their originality, would have given the movement any great influence. The Saint-Simonians took over from Saint-Simon not merely his concern for a more rational organization of society but also his championship of the poor; and it was this that gave the movement its emotional dynamism. The Saint-Simonian 'prédications', given at Paris before large audiences, mark a transformation of social sentiment in Europe. In them the *mystique* of the proletariat first found full expression. The attitude, if not the style, was still to be met with a century later, among the Left intelligentsia of the 1930's:

What! while your reason weighs with a lofty deliberateness, examines with a scrupulous complacency the smallest details of the social order which we propose, do you not hear the cries of suffering and rage, the groans, the stifled sighs and the death-rattle of so many unfortunates who suffer, grieve, languish, expire? Listen, listen at last! . . . At the sight of this whole people whom you see . . . moving about pale with hunger and privation, exhausted by rough work, barely covered by its rags . . . I conjure you, children of the privileged classes, stand up and, with your hand on those putrid and bleeding sores, children of the privileged classes who grow fat on the sweat of this miserable class which is exploited for your profit, swear that you have no share in its sufferings, in its grief, in its agony! Swear! – You dare not swear!‡

Thus Barrault, a former schoolmaster who became the principal orator of

\* It appears as motto to the *Opinions littéraires et philosophiques*, and in *De la ré-organisation de la Société Européenne*.

† *Globe*, II, pp. 159–60.

‡ III, 230.

the movement. His appeal was greeted by 'sobs, tears, embracings'.

¶ The success of these preachings was in fact far greater than could have been foreseen. The new movement was widely and seriously discussed among the educated. It was perhaps an understandable, if exaggerated, confidence, that announced: 'At the heart of universal existence, we know the destiny of humanity. It is the *whole of humanity* that we are come to teach and to convert. . . .'\* The only remaining problem seemed to be the method by which this mass conversion was to be carried out. In practice the Saint-Simonians relied on propaganda. They published their newspapers and they sent out their missionaries, and very soon their doctrine was being debated in England and Belgium and Germany, as well as in France. Since they held no political power at all there was no other method they could have employed. There were nevertheless times when, abandoning themselves to fantasy, they advocated French expansion because France, as the bearer of the Saint-Simonian gospel, was the only country capable of realizing 'the great pacific unity which is to embrace all the surface of the globe'.† Though on the whole they believed – like most of their contemporaries – that the age of wars had ended at Waterloo, they had moments when they were prepared to sanction one last general war as a means of achieving an organization embracing 'the totality of the European populations'.

However achieved, the conversion was to be total, admitting of no exceptions and no deviations. A new twist was given to Saint-Simon's theory of 'organic' and 'critical' periods. Already in the *Producteur* of 1826 it was maintained that the present anarchy of opinion could only be transient, that mankind must shortly return to 'dogmatism, the normal state of human intelligence, the state to which it tends by its nature, continually and in all matters'.‡ The article was by Auguste Comte, himself a renegade pupil of Saint-Simon, but the view was that of the whole movement. Freedom of opinion is abnormal in human history; indeed it is a morbid symptom:

In these epochs of dissolution . . . there is no more religion, that is to say no powerful hand which combines, in an indissoluble bundle, the wills, the ideas, the acts of all; there is only public opinion, fugitive and almost unseizable.§

'Critical' periods are characterized by disorder, atheism, individualism and egoism; 'organic' periods are the periods of order, religion, devotion

\* *Globe*, February 12th, 1831.

† *Globe*, February 17th, 1831.

‡ *Producteur*, II, p. 314.

§ *Globe*, January 26th, 1831.

and association. A 'critical' period was now ending. As for the future, there could be no doubt:

If one understands by *theocracy* a state in which the political law and the religious law are identical, where the heads of society are those who speak in the name of God, assuredly, and we have no hesitation at all in saying it, it is towards a new theocracy that mankind is moving.\*

Religion for the Saint-Simonians is essentially communal; as the etymology of the word suggests, it is that which binds together. In a striking phrase they defined religion as 'the explosion of the collective thought of humanity'.† From this it was a small step to decide that society was itself religion. The two terms became interchangeable: 'Religion or Society'‡ is that which exists in the 'organic' periods of history and which is disrupted in the 'critical' periods. The practical conclusion is obvious: 'Let Church and State become identical.'§

It could be assumed that the Saint-Simonians would end by establishing a new church, with themselves as the priests. The development went even faster and further than might have been expected; and here the driving force was certainly Enfantin. As early as 1828 he wrote:

People will know that we speak in the name of God, precisely because we will speak in the name of God; and because His Word in our mouth will be as miraculous, a thousand times more miraculous than any of His Words which have been revealed before us, by the mouths of the Prophets and the Apostles.||

It was doubtless under Enfantin's influence that the relatively sober *Exposition: Première Année* awarded the deceased Saint-Simon 'a rank more elevated than the SON of GOD',¶ and proclaimed that 'Moses promised men universal fraternity; Jesus Christ prepared it; Saint-Simon carries it into effect'.\*\* But all this was a mere foretaste of things to come. By 1830 the Saint-Simonians had been organized into a rigidly hierarchical Church; those who refused to accept this were expelled. The Church was divided into a supervisory College, followed by Members of the Second Grade, followed by Members of the Third Grade and followed by a proletarian Grade of Workers. The whole was dominated by Enfantin, who was now known as the Supreme Father. In this Church the sovereignty

\* *Exposition*, p. 440.

† *Ibid.*, p. 250.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 477.

§ Letter from d'Eichtal to John Stuart Mill, quoted by Louvancourt, op. cit., p. 404.

¶ XXV, 95. Letter of November 15th, 1828.

¶¶ *Exposition*, p. 31.

\*\* *Ibid.*, p. 40.

of the people was supposed to have become for the first time in history a reality. The manner in which this was conceived to happen has since become only too familiar:

That sovereignty of the people, which is an impracticable dream for those who see in the people only a multitude without a leader, is truth for the Saint-Simonian Pope; for the people is in him, loving, wise and powerful, marching as one man towards the future which God has ordained.\*

The hold which Enfantin now obtained over the faithful, and the adulation which he received from them, would appear incredible if psychoanalytical findings on the imago of the omnipotent father were not there to explain it and if the Stalin-cult (partly artificial though that is) were not there to remind us that such things do in fact happen. The day was to come when Chevalier, in the *Globe*, would prophesy that Enfantin

with his finger, filling the valleys and laying low the mountains, will trace swift paths between them in order that they may be united and that there may soon be only one life, one faith, one leader for all the earth,†

and when another disciple would declare in court that

our FATHER bears the whole human race in his bosom. . . The man whom you see . . . can alone ennoble, make good, laborious and joyful the peoples and tribes who make the islands and continents of Asia and Africa boil like ant-heaps. What Christ could not do this man undertakes.‡

There were to be followers who would greet Enfantin with the cry: 'Hail, FATHER, Hail! You advance like a divine giant and draw us in your footsteps!'§ It is true that there were to be other followers who would break away, saying sadly as they went – and this too has a familiar ring –;

'I believe that this theory abolishes all human liberty.' – 'I doubt; I have become a philosopher again . . . I am alone in the world once more.' – 'To see my beautiful future, my beautiful heaven torn and soiled like this!' – 'I will disappear. I will go where I see a religion.'||

Among these dissidents there were many broken hearts, and more than one suicide.

Saint-Simonianism always remained a middle-class movement. It never won much support among the industrial proletariat; and even if it had done so the French proletariat of that time, relatively small in

\* II, 216–17. Letter from Bazard and Enfantin on the July Revolution.

† *Globe*, March 28th, 1832.

‡ *Religion Saint-Simonienne. Procès en la Cour d'Assises*. Paris, à la Librairie Saint-Simonienne, 1832.

§ Quoted by S. Charléty, *Histoire du Saint-Simonisme*, revised edition, Paris, 1931, p. 127.

|| The reactions of the dissidents are fully recorded in *Morale*, Paris, à la Librairie Saint-Simonienne, April 1832, first part: *Réunion générale de la Famille, séances des 19 et 21 nov. 1831*.

numbers, badly organized and without the vote, could never have brought the movement to political power. Moreover, from 1831 onwards Enfantin was to lead the movement away from social preoccupations into a morass of erotic mysticism from which it was never to re-emerge. It is nevertheless true that the movement as it grew out of the thought of Saint-Simon and as it developed up to 1831 remains a most instructive study. At the very beginning of the secular, liberal and industrial age in which we are still – precariously – living, Saint-Simon, Enfantin, Bazard and some of their followers perceived what the characteristic weaknesses of that civilization were going to be. They foresaw with some accuracy the social tensions which were to accompany the development of modern industry, with its vast productive capacities, under an economic system in which the means of production remained in private hands. They were much concerned with the problem presented by the growth of a vast industrial proletariat. They thought seriously about economic planning, its aims and methods. On all these matters they produced ideas, some of which have entered into the common stock of Socialist thought. But even more remarkable than the intelligence and rational foresight of the Saint-Simonians was their intuitive understanding – drawn of course from their personal experience – of those irrational, purely emotional forces in human beings which in our day have erupted with such prodigious force into the world of politics. The Saint-Simonians sensed the emotional disturbance which would result from the collapse of traditional religious faith. They sensed the uncertainties and anxieties which would result from the dissolution of all absolute authority. They sensed what deep longings in men respond to the fantasy of a world-wide community living in total unanimity, security and obedience under an all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful Father. And they sensed that these were problems which Liberalism would find it extremely hard to solve. The Saint-Simonians offered their own solution. In doing so they confronted Liberalism with a challenge which at the time appeared a ludicrous one but which has since become a deadly serious one – and one with which Liberalism has yet to cope. It has often been said before, but is none the less true for that: the strength of Communism does not lie only in a combination of the political and military might of the Soviet Union with the existence of hunger over wide areas of the globe and the ineptitude of various reactionary governments – important though all these factors are. It is the achievement of the Saint-Simonians to have indicated – far more accurately than Marx ever did – the psychic forces which, a century after their day, were to be canalized into Communist fanaticism and were thereby to create the political power in which Western democracy is discovering its most formidable enemy.

#### REVIEW OF REVIEWS

### THE LATIN AMERICAN REVIEWS

George Pendle

While millions of Latin Americans are fascinated by the glamour of North American civilization and eager to imitate the U S way of life, many others deplore the extent to which Latin American traditions are being undermined to-day. The Catholic Church, in particular, is alarmed, and Catholic writers are doing their utmost to warn parents that family life is disintegrating. The editors of *ECA* (Estudios Centro Americanos), a review published in El Salvador, complain in issue No. 59 that 'ninety-two per cent. of the Latin American pupils now studying in the U S A are at non-Catholic colleges or universities, with the most lamentable effect on their habits and their Faith'. The infiltration of 'lax and vulgar' habits, says *ECA*, occurs especially through the cinema. A fifteen-year-old boy is referred to as an example. He is said to have written, when answering a questionnaire: 'At the cinema I have learned an important truth which no one had ever taught me: I have learned that God created woman for man's pleasure, and therefore I believe that I am doing no wrong in loving her.' *ECA* No. 60 contains a sensational article on the advance of Protestantism in Central America:

Thousands of peasants and entire parishes are falling victims to an ever more aggressive proselytism. . . . Male and female missionaries who considered it no longer prudent to remain in China, are pouring upon our land and, what is even worse, they are flooding us with the gold that was destined for that vast region. Furthermore, quantities of fair-haired young women – mostly European refugees – visit our homes and our public offices preaching the 'Truth' and causing uneasiness among wives. Luxuriously-produced pamphlets, which speak to us of a very attractive Christ and of a highly-coloured sanctity, are broadcast from the Panama Canal Zone or from the presses of Mexico.

A second reason for this vigorous assault on Central America is that Protestantism has lost its appeal in the U S A and Protestant proselytes are therefore trying to recoup abroad the losses that they have sustained at home: 'We have become the scene for the salvation of the defeated Protestantism that is fleeing from the North.' Catholics in Latin America are called upon, then, to fortify their faith and that of their children and

servants. Moreover, they must oppose with their own contributions the gold that comes from the North.

It has been proved that the Protestants make many conversions among simple folk by means of the gifts that they distribute. We cannot do better, therefore, than to assist the dispensaries, the nurseries, the canteens, the workmen's co-operatives, and all the thousand other works with which our Church brings alleviation to bodies and souls.

Surprisingly, the edition of *ECA* containing the foregoing article carries large advertisements for Ford tractors, the Grace Line, and the United Fruit Company.

The editors of *ECA* would be shocked to find in the Buenos Aires review *Sur* (double number 209-210) an essay by Alvaro Fernández Suárez entitled 'Sex and Technics'. The author suggests that all great cities of the West to-day are 'festivals of erotic luxury', as is indicated by 'the posters that adorn the walls, the shops of feminine stuffs and clothes, the perfumers' show-windows, and the murmuring of the multitudinous human river that circulates through the streets'. Fernández Suárez' explanation of this state of affairs is that

Technics having brought into being instruments of magical efficacy for the production of wealth in proportions previously undreamed of, leave our modern communities with a huge surplus of energy after the most urgent needs of nourishing the body and protecting it from the inclemency of the weather have been provided for.

Thus many millions of persons in the West now have physical reserves and opportunities for leisure which, in former times, were only available to the most privileged classes, and 'as sex is, next to hunger and the desire for security, the strongest of all human appetites, it inevitably absorbs a very great part of the surplus energy'. This is why so much attention is accorded to-day to feminine embellishment, and Technics furthermore have provided new means for beautifying the modern woman and 'for prolonging her sexual activity by ten years, by comparison with even quite recent times.' The sexual preoccupation of our society has been exploited for the conquest of money and of power. Sex has been called in to assist the sale of all kinds of merchandize, to propagate religion, and to help political parties to victory. Countless films and magazines have been produced with the purpose of exciting the erotic imagination of the young, thereby using up some of the excess of energy existing among them.

The writer then argues that in societies such as the North American this 'sexual tension' has naturally produced a *Feminocracia*. Thus 'there is a close connection between the growth of the social power of women and the development of Technics'. (Incidentally, Señora Perón once remarked that 'Our century will not be known as the century of the world wars, nor

even as the century of atomic energy, but as the century of triumphant feminism'.) Fernández Suárez points out that women in their present ascendancy demand and obtain more comforts for the home than ever before and thus exert a tremendous influence on contemporary domestic architecture. The feminine outlook has recently affected our social values in many ways: for example, women are responsible for the reverence which surrounds children in modern society and for the fact that children to-day, for the first time in history, have an autonomous status of their own. Women, too, are responsible for the lack of discipline now apparent in literature. They have brought disorder into politics, substituting passion for reason in regard to persons, problems and events.

Women tend to look upon the world as a conspiracy of individuals and groups wherein the dominant motives are the affections, love, hate, envy, sympathy, antipathy. They envisage things as irrational and capricious, whereas the typical male treats his social surroundings as a game of abstract forces, sometimes intelligent, sometimes blind. In other words, for the woman, history is a melodrama of persons or a tragedy of passions manifested in concrete individuals; for the man, it is a melodrama of ideas or a tragedy of dark and unknown powers.

The Catholic writers of El Salvador would state that the eroticism of Western society, and the ascendancy of Woman in the West, were the result of the people's failure to conform to canon law. *Sur's* author maintains that both phenomena derive from the fact that modern science leaves us with too much spare energy and time at our disposal. The British Prep. or Public School master would agree with the latter interpretation, and would recommend strenuous exercise, such as rugger, soccer, hockey and cross-country running, and the healthily exhausting boredom of a day spent fielding at cricket.

Every two months a new issue of *Cuadernos Americanos* arrives from Mexico. This admirable review never fails to live up to its sub-title: *la Revista del Nuevo Mundo*. No. 6 (Vol LX) contains an essay on 'The Americas in the World of Yesterday and To-day' by Juan Natalicio González, a stimulating writer who was, unsatisfactorily, President of Paraguay for a short while in 1948-49 and is the author of one of the most valuable of modern books on his native land: *Proceso y Formación de la Cultura Paraguaya* (Asunción & Buenos Aires, 1938). Natalicio González' latest essay deserves attention because it is a brief and clear presentation of a Latin American nationalist's attitude to world affairs. It should be read by every British and U S diplomat taking up a post in Latin America and by all government officials appointed to negotiate with the representatives of a Latin American republic. The argument develops in the following manner:

The Americas are no longer living a special existence of their own: they are beginning to think and to live in universal terms. (The author omits to mention that the Latin American Republics themselves command no fewer than one third of all the votes in the Assembly of the United Nations.) It is ridiculous, therefore, that so many Latin Americans should still imagine that 'Europe guides the world': this idea is out of date, 'like the light of an extinct star'. It is of course true that the Americas once were an autonomous region. The indigenous American peoples, whatever their remote and unknown origins may have been, created their own type of civilization with their own unaided genius. Unlike the peoples of Europe, they did not receive contributions from the ancient civilizations of other continents. This long isolation of the American world was subsequently one of the main causes of the downfall of the Spanish-American Empire. When Spain conquered, plundered and colonized the New World, the Spanish settlers were quickly absorbed by the Indo-American surroundings. They soon felt themselves to be more American than Spanish, and so they resented – and finally overthrew – the power of metropolitan Spain. They adopted the industrial techniques that came to them from Europe, 'but at the same time they carried in their entrails the indigenous spirituality'. After the collapse of the Spanish Empire, however, another colonial system was imposed upon these people. Their industrial development was arrested in the interests of European speculators and even their means of transport and communication were now owned by foreigners living in Europe. This period of foreign investment should therefore be known as 'the Second Colony'. The young Republics were at the mercy of Europe, and they even imported European political methods, which proved to be an utter failure. When the second world war began, Latin America had reached a state of economic and political stagnation. The North Americans appealed to the Americans of the South to collaborate in the war; but they all, except the Brazilians, refused to do so. (Brazilian troops fought in the campaign in Italy.) Why did the Latin Americans refuse to fight? It was not because of dislike of the Allies or sympathy for the Axis. The decisive reason was that the Spanish-speaking Americans were not free to devote their attention to the fate of the whole human race. They had a more urgent task: they had to attend to their own masses who for so long had been economically enslaved by European finance and industry.

To-day, says Natalicio González, the Americas – North, Central and South – are beginning to think 'universally'. The North Americans and the Latin Americans have two vitally important characteristics in common: they believe in perfectibility and they believe in incessant progress. Europe is in decay, and America is the continent of the future. The only

danger is that the U S A, technically so advanced, may wreck the continental unity by trying to reduce the other and more backward half of America to a renewed condition of economic slavery.

That is a fair summary of a Latin American nationalist's statement on the past, present and future of the world, in so far as it concerns him. But there are other points of view. The Uruguayan review *Marcha* (No. 614) has published a new poem by Latin America's greatest living poet, the Chilean, Pablo Neruda, who, because of his Communist sympathies, is now in exile. (I am not sure whether he is still in the U S S R, but he was there not so long ago.) It is a nostalgic poem, partly lyrical and partly political, in the traditional manner of the Chilean *cuando*, beginning:

Oh Chile, large petal  
of sea and wine and snow,  
ah when  
ah when and when  
ah when  
shall I be with you again . . .

The poet says that he belongs to his native earth. When it rains in Chile he, far away in Siberia, feels that rain; when the snow slides from the trees in Chile, it falls on him, no matter where he may be; and the dark Chilean wheat grows within him;

and the wind which overthrew  
the last wave at Valparaiso  
hits me in the chest  
with a shattering noise  
as though it has found  
my heart a broken window.

It is the month of October: Winter in Siberia, but Spring in Chile.

Oh my people, is it true that in Spring  
my name sounds in your ears

and you remember me  
as though I were a river  
that passes your door?

I am a river . . .  
place your ear to the ground,  
a subterranean river, singing.

October, oh Spring,  
return me to my people.

Neruda longs to be home again taking part in the revolutionary struggle. His poem ends with the haunting Chilean melody:

*Ay Patria sin harapos,  
ay Primavera mía,  
ay cuando  
ay cuando y cuando  
despertaré en tus brazos,  
empapados de mar y de rocto,  
ay cuando yo estoy cerca  
de tí, tomaré la cintura,  
nadie podrá tocarte,  
yo podré defenderte  
cantando,  
cuando  
vaya contigo, cuando,  
vayas conmigo, cuando,  
ay cuando.*

An interesting pamphlet published by another Uruguayan review, *Número*, has recently and rather belatedly reached us. This is *Aspectos de la Literatura Gauchesca*, by Argentina's most celebrated modern poet, Jorge Luis Borges. The writer traces the development of gaucho literature from the earliest times until its culmination in the epic masterpiece *Martín Fierro* by José Hernández (1834-1886). The gaucho – the rough, carefree untutored horseman of the Argentine and Uruguayan plains – is extinct to-day, but a great nostalgia for the gaucho and his violent times exists in the River Plate region. Borges's explanation is as follows:

Nowhere on earth is there a man who does not secretly aspire to a full life: that is to say, to the sum of all the experiences of which man is capable. There is not a man who does not fear that he may be defrauded of some part of this infinite patrimony. Certain philosophers have honestly thought that man's only aspiration is pleasure; but man also longs for defeat, danger, pain, desperation and martyrdom. Thus, weary of useless glory, Oscar Wilde provokes a lawsuit which will gain for him the entrance into prison, so that he may enrich himself with darkness . . .

When the Argentine and Uruguayan people recognized that the hard and dangerous days of the nomad horsemen were past and that life had grown peaceful and tame, gaucho literature became fashionable. Reading *Martín Fierro* and *Don Segundo Sombra*, the civilized inhabitants of the modern cities of the River Plate now compensate themselves for what they have missed: the physical dangers, the barbarous duels with flashing knives, the nights spent in the open air with the saddle as pillow, the drunkenness, rape and violent death. Borges suggests that the people of the River Plate still subconsciously share the gaucho's conviction that 'blood which is spilt is not so very memorable, and that it is natural that men should kill'. He continues:

I remember hearing one afternoon an old man regretting, but without

bitterness, 'In my time everyone had a death on his hands.' And I shall not forget another who said to me gravely: 'Senor Borges, I have been in prison many times; but always for homicide.'

*Martín Fierro* is not merely a poem of pastoral life on the unfenced plains of southern South America: other similar regions of the American continent have inspired the production of (for example) cowboy films; but none of them has given birth to a poem of the quality of the Argentine epic. *Martín Fierro* is a straightforward account (Hernández did not use 'local colour' in his verses) of the vicissitudes experienced by a gaucho in the second half of the nineteenth century and of the gradual annihilation of the lawless, nomad horsemen by the ever-advancing power of urban governments, eager to subdue the countryside and impose order upon it; and to-day the orderly townspeople in their security subconsciously wish that they could bring back the life that their ancestors so recently destroyed.

As the Latin American reviews reveal, literature in the Hispanic republics is generally less cerebral than the European. The writers, some of whom have great talent, work hastily, carelessly and rhetorically. (Jorge Luis Borges is one of the notable exceptions to this rule.) The natural exuberance of the Latin American continent constantly breaks into the literature, which is swamped with verbiage. Local folklore and traditions, old and new European and North American ideas and affectations, jostle for ascendancy. The final characteristics and forms of the civilization which is evolving in the southern New World, are not yet apparent. Guillermo Morón, in the Venezuelan review *Cultura Universitaria* No. 29, has suggested that 'just as the skin of a man wrinkles upon his body, until it kills him, so does culture feel the tightening embrace of its own skin, and is eventually asphyxiated by it'; but the skin upon the body of Latin American culture is still very young and elastic.

## THE ÆSTHETICS OF KIERKEGAARD

Derek Stanford

The significance of Kierkegaard as æsthetician is that he combined a rare and instinctive appreciation of such phenomena with a sense of its necessary limitation. After all, to assert that a work of art should be spoken of and judged in terms appropriate to its medium is a far different thing from attempting to maintain that an æsthetic attitude to life is sufficient. Yet this confusion and deliberate confounding of what Kierkegaard called 'existence-spheres' has prevailed for more than half a century. From Wilde to Joyce, in the field of letters, the adherence to the æsthetic approach has produced a series of incestuous masterpieces, a line of inbred compositions in which the humane resonance and content existed in inverse proportions to a progressive æsthetic significance. That this artistic era of strangely barren glory may now be drawing to its close is indicated by many symptoms. It is probable, however, that the recession from this attitude is of a largely unconscious nature, and that its whilom partisans, whilst feeling some degree of dissatisfaction with the tenets of their former cult, would be unable to locate the factors which have occasioned their loss of faith, or – further still – to propose and formulate alternative principles of some fresh system. The phase of transition we must endure with as much hope and patience as we can muster. In the meantime, we shall find in Kierkegaard's thought a subtle critique of just this old monopolizing æsthetic credo.

In order fully to understand the graphic cogency of Kierkegaard's æsthetics a glance at their author's personal background is needed. By taking a swift preliminary perspective we better comprehend the strongly accented turn which circumstance gave to his thought. To observe the forces that led Kierkegaard to state his opinions in so emphatic a form is not, of course, to view them as constituting some private idiosyncrasy, but rather to account for the decided and personal terminology employed. His notions of art, and the life of art, are as little theoretical as one could imagine; and it is precisely this total absence of the academic about his pronouncements that make them so vital a current today. Unlike Hegel, whom he criticized for creating a structure that was no habitation, Kierkegaard insisted on the existential or living application of his reasoning. For him, then, practice was the direct projection of

theory on to the plane of matter – of tangible existence or artistic material. It was not a case of saying, as with Hegel, that immediate experience and the idea were not commensurate levels of being. An idea was something existence verified, something validated or discredited by living. This verification, it need hardly be remarked, was not an external material process but one concerning the inner life, or rather that part of the inner life stirred into action by the business of living. Kierkegaard may, accordingly, be described as a spiritual pragmatist.

The biographical key to Kierkegaard's æsthetics is found in his powerful predilection for a life of pure appreciation consistently frustrated by guilt and despair. Sent to the University by his puritan father to read for orders, he yielded to a fascination with the arts, with connoisseurship and elegant fine living. The result of this first conflict was a great access of mental stimulation but – right at the roots of his young manhood – guilt. From the arts he passed on to discover the erotic. Mozart's *Don Juan* released in him a world of amorous imaginings. From music he progressed to his symbol of it – to Regina Olsen, his unhappy single love. She, in turn, made him a poet, because she could never make him a wife; and a poet – remember – to apply his definition, is one with an 'unhappy love-affair with God.'

There is no call, here, for a recapitulation of the detailed facts of Kierkegaard's life up to the time of his break with Regina, for these have been given again and again. All that needs be insisted on is that every desire that Kierkegaard conceived became, as it were, psychologically vetoed. Love, the pleasures of the senses, the appreciation of women and the arts, all of them grew to be associated, to stand as images and symbols of each other. And of them all, without exception, none promised a future of secure enjoyment. For Kierkegaard to exercise his mind with any of these great solaces of living was sufficient to prompt in him guilt or despair; guilt that his occupation was not the one to which he was called; or despair that the object could not last, that sooner or later it must be snatched away. Recognizing this, we need not wonder that for Kierkegaard the æsthetic sphere was morally the region of 'pleasure/perdition.'

The term æsthetic has no consistent history, and the zones of its activity have been differently defined. Baumgarten, it would seem, first used the word in 1750 to indicate 'the science of sensuous knowledge'; since when it has referred to the study of beauty, natural and artistic, or solely to the latter. Kierkegaard's application of the term appears at first both vague and unusual, and boldly invades the domain of conduct generally reserved for the science of morals. The area, briefly, which he stakes out for his subject comprises all life lived in the spirit of pleasure, diversion and entertainment, and taken to be outside of moral jurisdiction and free

from all religious consideration. Perhaps the most important characteristic and manifestation of the æsthetic, as Kierkegaard sees it, is 'the interesting', a term continually occurring in his work. This quality or attribute may be described as that which attracts and intrigues rather than converts or convinces; that which need not be taken in earnest or interpreted in any literal fashion; that which lacks positiveness of position, though often appearing as sensational or novel. Thus we can describe a principle held for the sake of intellectual virtuosity or a principle which makes free-play with scepticism as examples of 'the interesting.'

Kierkegaard's own pseudonymous works are full of Pyrrhonic feats of dialectic, such as the remarkable *tour de force* entitled *An Ecstatic Lecture* which occurs at the beginning of his book *Either/Or*:

If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry, you will also regret it; if you marry or do not marry, you will regret both. . . . My philosophy is at least easy to understand, for I have only one principle, and I do not even proceed from that; for if I did, I would regret it, and if I did not, I would also regret that. If it seems, therefore, to one or another of my respected hearers that there is anything in what I say, it only proves that he has no talent for philosophy; if it seems to have forward movement, this also proves the same. But for those who can follow me, although I do not make any progress, I shall now unfold the eternal truth, by virtue of which this philosophy remains within itself; and admits of no higher philosophy. For if I proceeded from my principle, I should find it impossible to stop; for if I stopped, I should regret it, and if I did not stop I should also regret that, and so forth. But since I never start, so can I never stop; my eternal departure is identical with my eternal cessation.

Other common instances of 'the interesting' are found in the entertaining of religious beliefs and practices, not because of some truth attached to them but out of a preference for their charm or quaintness. The term may also be applied to a person, and in his *Journals* Kierkegaard mentions the case of a young man who lives in a state of what he calls 'reduplication.' This young man has two lives which he is careful to separate: in the one, he plays the part of secret leader to a criminal gang; in the other, he appears as a refined and much-sought-after man-about-town. This condition of 'reduplication' constitutes what Kierkegaard regards as a type of 'demonia' and what we might describe today as a form of self-induced split personality. The second chief aspect of the æsthetic with which Kierkegaard concerns himself is what he terms 'the immediate', a quality harder to define. In one context he speaks of it as 'the vital fluidum . . . which cannot with justice be designated by words'; but this is in a non-æsthetic work where he is attempting to place it in relation to 'Religion' and 'Faith'. For the main part, though, he examines it as operating under the ægis of 'the interesting', that is, as

outside the jurisdiction of moral or religious consideration. Here, it becomes identified with the sensual and the momentary ('the sensual is always the momentary'); and in a brilliant interpretation of Mozart's *Don Juan*, it is shown as achieving its freest expression in the genius of 'the musical erotic'.

But the best illustration which Kierkegaard offers of the cult of 'the immediate' occurs in his book *Stages on Life's Way*, and which is sub-titled *In Vino Veritas: A Recollection*. Now 'the immediate' is that which precludes both anticipation and reflection; it is that which believes itself out of time but which, seldom participating in the eternal, enjoys its own condition as an illusion. Such a state of illusory experience is what a number of young men in Kierkegaard's story try to procure for the adventure they indulge in. *In Vino Veritas* might be described as a Symposium held in honour of the Heraclitean 'perpetual flux'. The story begins with a proposal by one of the five that they shall hold a banquet. As this necessitates anticipation, the principal proponent of 'the immediate' objects to it on the following ground:

To be good, a thing must be all at once, for 'at once' is the most divine of all categories and deserves to be honored as is the word '*ex templo*', because it is the starting-point of the divine in life, so that what does not occur at once is of the evil.

The speaker, however, who also subscribes to the cult of 'the interesting' and (as Kierkegaard elsewhere points out) is not therefore interested in 'decisive action', does not wish to insist on his opinion; words, he might say, need not be implemented. After some discussion the plan is dropped, but some time after, when it has been forgotten, all receive a card of invitation from Constantine Constantius, one of their number. The party, to which they find themselves invited, and at which they are to be permitted to make speeches only and strictly *in vino*, will be held that very night. A wooden pavilion in wooded country outside the town has been chosen as the *milieu*, freshly decorated and furnished for the occasion. Everything is novel, everything prepared for, and yet at the same time unanticipated. Thither they drive in the evening in coaches, to find an orchestra welcoming them with music. They drink and dine, and at the stroke of twelve Constantine bids them rise from the table. First Constantine, and then his guests, hurl their glasses against the door, 'a symbolic act', as Kierkegaard tells us,

for at the last blow the door was thrown open and one saw, like him who has presumptuously knocked at the portal of death and sees when it is opened the puissance of annihilation – so one saw that crew of destruction prepared to lay everything waste [a reference to the band of artisans hired

by Constantine to dismantle the apartment] – a memento which in a second changed the participants into fugitives from that place, and in the same second transformed, as it were, the whole environment into a ruin.

Taken on the surface, a harmless enough idyll, but one which in the fulness of detail contains within itself the feverish seeds of what I would term psychological impressionism.

When we add 'the immediate' to 'the interesting', we obtain an image of 'aesthetic man' as criticized by the character Judge William in Kierkegaard's book *Either/Or*. The aesthetic man – to use Herbert Read's distinction – is all personality, no character. His is the danger of 'multiplicity', of becoming the vehicle of uncontrolled forces, of becoming 'a demoniac', and losing the 'unifying power of personality' (the word is used here in its old sense, as nearly synonymous with individuality). The aesthetic admits of no choice, because it admits of more than one alternative, and because – to the powerful imagination – every alternative is equal; or because, as Judge William has it – 'it is either entirely immediate, or it loses itself in the multifarious'. There is, he maintains, no evaluative or formative property in the aesthetic. According to its viewpoint, man is what he is and never what he may become. Into this condition he enters 'immediately' without an act of will or the freedom of choice. It is true, he admits, that choice is not precluded, if by choice we mean something much weaker than decision. One may, for example, choose to be, or let one's temperament nourish within one, 'a Don Juan, a Faust, or a robber chieftain'. But even this 'choice' or transformation possesses nothing final or binding about it. It is only one of a number of illusive and successive phases of being. Its duration is temporary, its direction capricious, a brief affirmation which the next 'choice' cancels out. From this failure to attain to a steady or lasting image of oneself, Judge William asserts that 'every aesthetic life view is despair'. Yet another objection the Judge raises is the tendency of aesthetic existence to rate talent and its cultivation above the following of one's calling and the performance of one's duty. Now the issue of talent, the Judge argues, raises the question of whether or no one is in possession of it. If one is not, then one is excluded from 'accomplishing anything': if, on the other hand, one *does* possess talent, then, equally, one is excluded from 'the universal human' (that is, from a sense of having a place in the human totality), since one's qualitative difference separates one from the ordinary run of mankind, and because the talented and the untalented have 'no higher expression in common'. From this, the Judge concludes that the aesthetic depends and is based on 'the accidental' and 'the occasional'.

These strictures of Kierkegaard upon 'the immediate' and 'the

interesting' are substantiated by a penetrating essay, on the falsities of Socialism, in the work of the political philosopher Donoso Cortés.

If I do not live in the past, [he writes in a passage which we may read as a comment upon 'the immediate'] because it is past, and because there is no unity between the present and the past; if I do not live in the future, because the future does not exist and because when it will exist it will not be future; if I only live in the present and the present does not exist, because when I am about to affirm that it exists, it has already passed, my existence is manifestly more theoretical than practical; for in reality, if I do not exist at all times, I do not exist at any time.

Both 'the interesting' (with its insistence on the novel and sensational, its disruptive exhibitionist break with the past) and 'the immediate' (with its rejection of inheritance and history) imply the denial of tradition, a condition which Donoso Cortés foresaw.

If there is no bond of union, [he wrote], between the past and the present and between the present and the future, it follows that man exists only in the present moment. But in this hypothesis, it is clear that his existence is more phenomenal than real . . . what is denied in this case, if his unity and solidarity with mankind is denied, is that he is always the same person at different moments of his life.

Existentialist and Catholic join hands in criticizing what I would term the 'ego-in-flux' tendency, a motive which runs through modern thought, from behaviourist psychology to the fluctuating inner monologues of James Joyce and Virginia Woolf. We get it, for example, in the anti-individual 'automatic writing' of the Surrealists, in the almost total dissolving of subject in the light-drenched canvases of the school of Monet, in the totalitarian politics of blood-and-soil sodality, in the 'racial memory' of Jung, and in the cinema's visual exploitation of humanity's dramatic liquefaction of moods. Certain of these manifestations come near to perfecting what is, after all, a very incomplete imperfect image of man; but all of them share in the modern attempt to break down the integrity and wholeness of things, to concentrate on one aspect of being and let the part in focus dominate the whole. Artistically speaking, they represent a denial or defeat of the will-to-form; since that *which* repudiates the idea of wholeness can possess neither clarity nor harmony, as these – in their fulness – depend upon the first. This statement, it will be recognized, does not set out to criticize such works of art from an academic standpoint: it does not posit some preconceived notion of conventional surface shapeliness, but rather insists, with St Thomas Aquinas, on that unifying wholeness of apprehension without which the subject is seen only in parts, and comes to lack thereby its true individual nature.

It must not be concluded from Kierkegaard's remarks that he took as his task the destruction of the æsthetic. His own instinct for it was far too strong; and in his *Journals* he confesses that while Mohammed protested with all his might against being called a poet, he himself protested as strenuously against being looked upon as a prophet. The suggestion, then, that Kierkegaard's treatment of the æsthetic resulted from envy, bitterness, or ignorance (factors conditioning the attitude of certain philosophers to artists) does not bear examination. Kierkegaard did no more than relegate the æsthetic to its proper plane of being. There was in him none of that fear which the abstract mind may experience in the face of concrete creativity.

In all that I have noted down, [he wrote], in the *Journals* of 1848 and 1849 something of the literary side often slipped in. It is not so easy to keep all that kind of thing apart when one is poetically productive to the degree that I am. For strangely enough, deep within me I am quite otherwise clear about myself. But as soon as I note it down I immediately become productive.

And in his many works there occur again and again whole sequences of characterization, dramatic incidents, and narrative anecdotes, such as are seldom come across in the course of philosophical writing. No, it was not for want of the æsthetic in his own make-up that Kierkegaard wished to limit its activity and sway. What he undertook was not to annul it but to 'dethrone' it, as he tells us; to implicate it in the workings of our cultural-spiritual body, and not to leave it to function by itself as the sole agent in our life of judgment. For Kierkegaard, as for St Thomas, 'beauty is not essentially desirable, except so far as it partakes of the essence of the good'. Through the mouth of his character, Judge William, he saw 'the æsthetical, the ethical, and the religious' as 'three great allies' whose unity, 'beneath the diverse appearances which everything assumes in these diverse spheres', it is our business to conserve. But just as St Thomas admitted that beauty 'affords to our faculty of knowledge something ordered, over and above the good', so for Kierkegaard the Christian religion was a sphere unto itself 'where the æsthetic relation appears again, though paradoxically, as higher than the ethical' (although, he adds, 'normally it is the other way about'). The superior nature of the æsthetic in this context depends upon our entertaining towards God an attitude of admiration, and not an attitude of imitation, which is what we entertain for the ethically virtuous man. Another way of asserting this, no doubt, is to maintain with Aristotle that the life of contemplation is higher than that of action – provided that the object of our thought be the highest.

## IT COULD HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE

David Paul

'Cela aurait pu être autrement.' Valéry's concise and universal condemnation of the novel remains a challenge to be faced and inquired into, not an irrelevant allegation to be ignored or dismissed, even if he used it to dismiss the novel. There is after all something salutary about the absolutism of the statement. And it is not quite so absolute as it looks. The novel, like the poem, is, more or less, a work of art. Any condemnation which applies to the one must apply in some degree to the other. It is all a question of degree. The discipline of poetic form necessarily has the greater appeal to the perfectionist, because it excludes to a greater degree the possibilities of being otherwise. But it can never exclude them altogether. If it did, the result would cease to be art, because it would no longer be human. Some of Mallarmé's most nearly perfect poems are on the way to this condition. They very nearly touch a perfection which excludes human significance. One can legitimately reverse Valéry's attitude and insist that the essential significance of human art is that it *could* have been otherwise. If it could not have been otherwise, it would have no meaning for us.

To go beyond that, one may well question the value of formal perfection as an ideal or a necessity in itself. Art cannot be measured by the standards of a Racine, who was one of the most individual writers who ever lived. For Shakespeare, in the end, perfection was simply irrelevant; the play became a form which had to be made to hold as much as possible. If the form snapped under the strain, there were always the contents, to be valued for themselves. The novel, as a form, is scarcely a form at all. It requires, or tolerates, even less discipline than the Elizabethan play. For the novelist on the grand scale, perfection must ultimately remain irrelevant. If it is not, it can only lead – and it can only lead once – to *Finnegan's Wake*. For a Dostoyevsky, a Melville, or a Proust, a formal perfection, a symmetry of content and meaning beyond a certain point would simply have been cramping. One may regret Dostoyevsky's periodic plunges into the deep end of a bath of vicarious self-pity, one may regret the increasingly obvious, enormous and boring ramification of personal lies which Proust felt compelled to construct around himself in his autobiographical novel; but without these personal releases – or escapes – it may be that neither novelist would have been able to go on writing at all.

The criterion of perfection can only be applied to the novel on a small scale. There is nothing in *Adolphe*, apart from a few pages of conventional and indispensable framework, which could reasonably be wished otherwise. There is nothing in Jane Austen – but a part of the fascination of her flawless surfaces is the search for tiny flecks on them. There are more than a few in *Pride and Prejudice*, almost none in the others. In the present century, are there any novels at all to which Valéry's dictum could be applied in the negative? Perhaps *A Passage to India* is the most perfect novel of the past fifty years, though it is certainly not the greatest. There is nothing in it that could reasonably be imagined as being better written otherwise. A mental glance at *Howard's End* will best illustrate the crowning virtues of the later novel's inevitability.

But there is another sense in which Valéry's stricture can be almost universally applied, and that is to the novels which are the products of what is usually called a 'born story-teller'. The born story-teller, whose end and whose means are governed by the same criterion of realistic plausibility – he has no possible purpose beyond that – always reminds me of the lunch-table raconteur whose art and purpose are much on the same level. You sit opposite him at table and listen to the first story beginning. You can watch its course as it coasts cautiously past the truth. Then there is a just perceptible pause, an intake of breath, a plunge, maybe, of the tongue into the cheek, to prepare for the launching into an open lagoon of plausibilities which cannot have any relation with the truth apart from their all too obvious plausibility. You can watch the narrator making his quick, not quite random choice among his wide range of fictitious possibilities, his only care being that they will have some symmetrical relationship with each other, and that the end will have an obvious correspondence with the beginning. Such would be the *métier*, and the fate, of every novelist, if some were not gifted with what had best be called a sense of authenticity, a sense, among a wide choice of developments, of the one and only development which carries a ring of truth, beyond the plausibilities and the facts.

*Hemlock and After*\* is a wholesale essay – not to say an orgy – in a variety of plausibilities. On almost every page it recalled to me one or other of a certain range of novels of the past twenty years. Nearly every one of its characters carries that sense of *déjà vu* which has no correspondence with one's experience of life, but an immediate correspondence with novels one has half read and almost forgotten. Here, for example, is a character who can only be described as basic Aldous Huxley:

Of Bill Pendlebury's 'going to pieces' there could be no doubt. His red,

\* *Hemlock and After*. By Angus Wilson. Secker & Warburg, 12s. 6d.

beery moon face, beneath the bald, grey-tufted head, oozed good nature or would have done but for his small, pouting, disappointed mouth. His old grey flannel trousers stretched barrel-tight across his pot belly and broad buttocks, but even the old-school scarf tied round his waist could not bring them to a point where the top fly-buttons could be secured. His short legs were like swollen baroque columns beneath his huge, broad trunk. For all his beer-sodden, over-indulged body, his broad shoulders and huge hands still had a gorilla strength. His eyes were small, very sensual, very intelligent and somewhat sly.

It is necessary and inevitable that Bill, who is meditating a life of Cecil Rhodes, should also talk like a Huxley character, with a wider range of 'bad' language:

'Here are the old bastard's letters I was talking of last night,' he said, and his voice was surprisingly soft, blarneying, and caressing. 'This one to Barney Barnato is absolutely characteristic – the note of patronage of the respectable rogue to the unpresentable pal, the doubtful facts and figures of the claim-jumper turned administrator – a more bloody cooked-up set of figures I've never seen even in a bucket-shop circular – and on top of it all, the wonderful Imperial moralizing note, the "God gave us our burden and we must shoulder it" tone, that was obviously the bit of cant or idealism in Rhodes, call it which you will, that we all need to make us tick. Now you can see why I must do Rhodes; he's such a full-size, all-round saintly bastard. Not one of those damned literary neurotics like Henley or Kipling who went in for Empire to make up for their lack of balls.'

Mr Wilson has affiliated himself to that school of novelists – it extends from Huxley to Graham Greene – who can never let their characters alone. It is rarely a question of letting *well* alone; and that perhaps explains why these writers can never resist the itch or the urge to nudge, prod or manoeuvre their characters. Like most disciples, Mr Wilson feels compelled to go further than the masters. Here he is, not nudging or prodding, but literally flinging his principal character into the grass:

Elizabeth was in as malicious a mood towards her father that morning as her brightly disguised boredom with life made possible. She had decided, after considerable argument with herself, to sit in judgment upon him. Bernard saw her approach with apprehension. There was a square ugliness about her jaw and her over-broad shoulders that the slightly too smart appearance, which the world of women's glossies had imposed upon her, accentuated without improving. He would have wished anyone a thousand miles away at such a rare moment of blissful relaxation, but he was too happy to regard even Elizabeth with more than vexation.

His divergence from sexual orthodoxy, though comparatively recent, was by now sufficiently fused with his personality to condition his general behaviour. With younger people, in particular, his natural boyishness was accentuated by a pæderastic desire to bridge the years, which sometimes disastrously overstepped the boundaries of absurdity, particularly when it was not set in its necessary emotional framework, and, more often than he guessed, even when it was. He sprang from his deck chair as his daughter

approached and sprawled on the grass, legs wide apart. Then turning lazily, as he supposed, on his side, he looked up at her with an amused, twinkling smile, and sucked at a piece of grass.

It was not altogether a fortunate performance, but it was all that Elizabeth could have wished to justify her long-debated disapproval.

'Limbering up, Daddy?' she said. 'Doesn't the uric acid make it difficult? Or don't the deadly crystals give you their familiar message for the ageing?'

Bernard threw his head back and roared with laughter too hearty to suggest that he cared for the joke. The strained brightness of his daughter's speech confirmed him in his decision to try to probe and relieve the causes of her distaste for life.

Nothing could be more contrived, on the part of the writer, than this priapic playfulness on the part of his central character. But then Bernard Sands is patently manipulated throughout his all too deliberately inglorious career. There is nothing vital inside the conception of him which could possibly dictate any convincing development. As an instrument of stylized, satiric fantasy he might dubiously serve, but within a conventional realistic framework he simply will not do. Instead, he has to be done to death. Superficially he is used as a stalking-horse for a satirical attack on 'humanism'. It might be interesting to debate why the ancient humanist scarecrow must still be trotted out for derision. I suppose the principal reason is that, old as it is, it still has more life in it, is in fact much less of a scarecrow than its more recent but much more tattered substitutes, Communism, Catholic diabolism (the novels of Greene and Mauriac are a kind of unconscious devil-worship) existentialism, or logical positivism. But there is little point in pursuing the theme since, in *Hemlock and After*, it figures only as the most obvious of pretexts. Something evidently had to be attacked, and something called 'humanism' was chosen. Since it is identified, without possibility of distinction, with the homosexuality and the hedonistic frivolity of one Bernard Sands, an eminently imaginary Man of Letters whose presumably humanistic works have clearly never existed, any serious question of humanism, so far as it can still be seriously in question, cannot arise.

If Bernard Sands is a dummy, to be twisted about at his author's will, his rival and opposite, Mrs Curry, an intended apotheosis of scheming, fatal femininity, is a portent of a different kind. One is perfectly justified, I think, in assuming that some form or other of male adolescent hysteria underlies that familiar world of fiction in which all the women characters are hags and bags, or hard as nails. When these qualities are as universal as they are in the present case, the explanation must be, not misogyny, but sheer terror. Mrs Curry, a sort of miscellaneous female pander and obscene mother-goddess in one person, could only command credulity in the over-heated imagination of a terrified schoolboy. With every reappearance

and there are many, she becomes more obviously an imaginary female succubus, putting a fatally increased shade of unreality on every scene in which she takes part.

But perhaps the most unconvincing element in the novel as a whole resides not so much in the conception of the characters as in the author's mechanical mania for unpleasantness. One cannot dignify the quality with the name of evil – or at least it is only the pettiest manifestation of it – and Mr Wilson's insistence on it suggests not so much a passion or an obsession as an unconscious and tyrannical habit. It becomes as monotonous as a facial tic. The climax of the story, the opening of Vardon Hall, according to the wishes and schemes of Bernard Sands, as a 'home' for young writers, proves to be a concentrated and extraordinarily flat orgy of spite. What is so remarkable about it is not the spite of the characters for each other, but the author's disinterested spite for all of them. Literally no one can be spared: 'Poor Mrs Rankine moaned with pain, as the district nurse, for whom the accident made the afternoon one of the most enjoyable of her life, directed the two young stock-brokers who assisted the injured lady to one of the many cars drawn up in the drive.' When even the district nurse, on her solitary appearance, has to receive a small jab, it can only confirm an already fixed impression of an indiscriminate stabbing of so many waxworks with a small pen-knife. It is another sad instance of how easy it is to go too far with borrowed precepts. 'Il faut créer le poncif,' said Baudelaire, forlornly defining the recipe for the success which he never had in his lifetime. One must create a commonplace. But Mr Wilson has not yet created a commonplace. He has simply mixed, and thickly applied, a number which were already in existence. The mixture is not disguised by a liberal application, after cooking as it were, of a thin and sour sauce of homosexuality.

The newest form of the *roman fleuve* promises to resemble not so much a river in spate as a canal with a series of carefully constructed lock-gates. The desire for continuity on a large scale has to take account of the public's, or the publisher's, insistence on a degree of completeness and unity within each volume. It is a difficult problem for the novelist to cope with, more especially as his allegiance today is likely to lie towards Proust rather than Romans or Galsworthy. Mr Powell's and Miss Antonia White's novels\* are each a second volume in a projected series. They have both, though in quite different degrees, been touched by the fate which threatens all second volumes. One has only to think of *A l'Ombre des Jeunes Filles en Fleur* to understand something of its nature and effects. To continue after the first rounded impact almost necessitates the flatness of

\* *A Buyer's Market*. By Anthony Powell. Heinemann, 12s. 6d.

*The Sugar House*. By Antonia White. Eyre & Spottiswoode, 12s. 6d.

anti-climax. Moreover, Miss White seems to have fallen too much into the temptation to make each volume a thing in itself. *The Sugar House* has all the tidy compactness – apart from some returns to earlier events which strike one as startlingly out of key – and, alas, all the fatal competence of a conventional love story. What is episodic in the treatment might still be there even if the book were a quite separate conception. It is entirely concerned with the affairs of the heart of Clara Batchelor whose own gentle reality does nothing whatever to help the unreality of her three cardboard lovers.

If Mr Powell's second volume is less decided in its impact than the first, *A Question of Upbringing*, it is not for reasons of discontinuity, but for reasons which, at the end, remain on the whole legitimate, and may well be justified by later events. It is inevitable that a continuation must involve a thickening and multiplication of strands of narrative, with a possible diminution of single impacts. There is nothing in the present volume quite to compare, for happiness and clarity of treatment, with the don's tea-party in the first. But for anyone who entered that world it should be a pleasure to re-enter here – and a mixed pleasure once again to encounter the peculiarities of Mr Powell's style. It is a style Latinate to the point of jocularity. At more comic moments it seems as if shades of Wodehouse were perpetually threatening to close. But, as with any perpetual threat, one ceases after a time to take particular notice of it, and in the end it is never quite fulfilled. But there are moments when this writer's habit of deliberative circumlocution almost affect one like a thickness of speech, moments, indeed, when I for one cannot understand him, as when for example a certain Barnby states

in the most formidable terms at hand his own ineradicable unwillingness, for that matter suspected actual physical incapacity in face of financial indemnities of the most extravagant order, to be inveigled into any situation that might even threaten approach to intimacy with her.

Mercifully, Mr Powell has the gift of coming clear with his dialogue, which is always a pellucid integument of the speakers. With talk of any kind he strikes a golden mean between clarity and characterization. And the variety of impact, between narrative and talk, gives the writer the saving gift of tonality. Certain events and experiences are blotched or fogged with distance, as in life, while others strike one with the abrupt and banal vividness of a debutante's conversation at a party. Mr Powell's often clumsy style casts a cunning and necessary veil over discontinuities of narrative. He is still on cautiously perfect terms with the autobiographical convention. The effects of personal memory and of objective consideration are still indistinguishably blended, as much in personal narrative as in accidental minutiae:

Across the road the coffee-stall came into sight, a spot of light round which the scarlet tunics and white equipment of one or two Guardsmen still flickered like the bright wings of moths attracted from nocturnal shadows by a flame. From the park rose the heavy scent of London on a summer night. Here, too, bands could be heard distantly throbbing. We crossed the road at the island and joined a knot of people round the stall, at the side of which, as if killing time while he waited for a friend late in arrival, an elderly person in a dinner-jacket was very slowly practising the Charleston, swaying his weight from one side of his patent leather shoes to the other, while he kept the tips of his fingers delicately in his coat pockets. Mr Deacon glanced at him with disapproval, but acknowledged, though without warmth, the smirk proffered by a young man in a bright green suit, the uncomfortable colour of which was emphasised by auburn hair, erratically dyed.

Mr Deacon is the outstanding new advent to this second volume, and that last sentence indicates, as neatly as possible, that he is Mr Powell's Charlus. As if rightly fearful of invoking comparisons, his creator mercifully and appropriately kills him off before they can develop far – though it is quite possible that Deacon's shade will reappear. Decidedly he is one of the minor pleasures, not to be compared for instance with the pleasures of watching Mr Powell coping, on tiptoes of precaution, with the embarrassments of being 'in love' for the first time. Kid gloves are not in it compared with the stealth with which he approaches – and lets slip – this inexhaustibly exhausted theme. If his treatment of it is, in the end, unconvincing, it has been for that very reason all the more enjoyable. Mr Powell is one of the rare writers – perhaps he is the only one alive? – whose often dexterous and invariably polite struggle with his more obvious limitations can be a continual pleasure.

The last word must be with Widmerpool. He grows, he insists, he assumes surprising and convincing dimensions. There is still nothing about him that one could wish otherwise – except, maybe, that he is subjected to one too many farcical accidents? In the first volume he was the rank outsider, the person whose existence on the confines of one's own imagined possibilities remains a besetting puzzle. He is still that, but he threatens to become something more, to become, in fact, a personal success in his fashion, by dint of ludicrous failures; and to become, at the same time, that menacing thing, the *alter ego* who is also one's ridiculous and unthinkable opposite, the unflattering image thrown back by the merciless, distorting mirror of facts, as opposed to the smooth mirror of personal fancy. Perhaps all of us, or nearly, have our Widmerpools. There is still just a possibility that the name may pass, as a term, into the English language.

## LES MAINS SALES

M. Jean-Paul Sartre is a difficult writer to appraise. Some of his work seems crude to the point of being almost stupid, and stupid in the most tedious way; not stolidly and crassly dull, but ingeniously, longwindedly, untiringly asinine, as French intellectuals sometimes are. He will take an obviously incomplete set of ideas and juggle with them in chapter after chapter, with the air of one who is giving a thorough explanation of reality. Thus we have the immense new book on Jean Genêt, the homosexual thief, *Saint Genêt, Comédie et Martyr*. There is an occasional plum in this pudding, yet in spite of its size the pudding is unsubstantial; it is, in fact, a vast soufflé, blown up by facility and originating partly in the worthy desire to take the outcast seriously and partly, one suspects, in the less worthy ambition to 'épater le bourgeois'. Sartre has, I think, produced several of these ingenious but crude works; *Les Chemins de la Liberté*, his *Baudelaire*, his *Réflexions sur les Juifs*, *Morts sans Sépulture*, *La Putain Respectueuse* and *Le Diable et le Bon Dieu*. Nevertheless, he is a great writer, with one first-rate novel to his credit: *La Nausée*, two plays, *Huis Clos* and *Les Mains Sales*, as well as two or three books of brilliant criticism, *Situations I and II* and *Qu'est-ce que la Littérature?* He is certainly a greater man at times than his literary enemies, now snapping around his heels.

His two excursions into the film world show the same contrast of bad and good. *Les Jeux sont faits* was pretentious and full of inconsistencies; *Les Mains Sales*, a slightly modified version of the play of the same name, recently shown in London for the first time, is a near-masterpiece, one of those rare works which give full expression to a political problem. Here it is the problem of political action within the Communist Party. The scene is Illyria, a German-occupied country, officially collaborating with the German war-effort, but about to change its policy in view of the Russian advance and other signs of an eventual Allied victory. The Regent is casting around for guarantees for the future. The bourgeois industrialists, although comfortable, suspect they will be ruined by continued collaboration with Germany. The Communist Party is carrying on an underground fight, and the people are starving. At this moment of crisis, Hugo, the idealist son of a factory-owner, joins the Communist Party. He is prompted to do so mainly by the guilt-complex, so often described in French literature. For good measure, he is given personal problems as well.

Never having done anything positive, he does not feel 'a man'; he is also married to, and in love with, a young woman of his own class, who is frigid because he has never been virile enough in character to arouse her emotions. His entry into the Party is therefore an experiment on several levels; will he slough off his guilt-complex, achieve something definite, and thaw his wife into soft submission?

The test soon comes. Hoederer, the Communist leader, has decided to form a united front with the Regent and the middle-class Nationalists, so that the country can be kept stable during the immediate post-war period, until the Communists are strong enough to take over. This will involve a temporary change in the Party line. A strong minority faction of the Party, to which Hugo belongs, disapproves, and Hugo is asked to become secretary to Hoederer in order to assassinate him and ruin the plan. Once installed in Hoederer's suburban villa, Hugo is faced with the Hamlet-like problem: to kill or not to kill? Hoederer turns out to be the finest man he has ever known, cynical but warm-hearted, subtle and brave, lucid and resolute. Although Hugo still disagrees with Hoederer's policy, which he considers unclean because it involves dishonest propaganda, he cannot bring himself to murder, for rigid partisan reasons, a man who is so abundantly alive. He is bullied this way and that by the minority faction who send extra emissaries, and by his wife who has accompanied him to the villa. Finally, in the most perfect and thrilling scene of the film, he is unmasked and paternally forgiven by Hoederer himself. He goes out broken and dismayed. Then his wife emerges from the hiding-place where she has been listening to the conversation and tells the middle-aged Hoederer that she has fallen in love with him, the first 'real man' she has met. He, mildly attracted, kisses her. Hugo returns, sees them, snatches up the revolver and kills Hoederer in a fit of jealousy.

The lesson of the film might seem to be simply that it is easier to commit a crime for sexual, than for political, reasons. The English title of the play, *Crime Passionnel*, implied this. The real point is quite different. The film uses the flashback technique and the story is told by Hugo when he is released from prison two years later. Communist murderers are waiting to bump him off as an 'anarchistic intellectual'. He escapes from them and takes refuge with a woman-comrade, who has always been in love with him in a stern and motherly way. With her, he recapitulates events and decides that he can still work as a Communist. But then, to prepare him for his re-entry into the Party, she explains that during his stay in prison, circumstances have altered. Under Russian pressure, the former minority faction is now carrying out a united front policy, identical with Hoederer's plan. Hugo must forget the past, because Hoederer is now spoken of as a Communist martyr and hero. Overwhelmed by the irony of

the situation, Hugo refuses to do so, and is liquidated by the Communists.

*Les Mains Sales* is, therefore, a tragedy of human failure. Hugo undergoes great mental anguish in order to 'act' and 'be a man'. This means killing the most complete person he knows. He manages to do so in the end, not for great and impersonal reasons, but from the sordid motive of sexual jealousy. Two years later he discovers that even if he had committed the act as a heroic, political assassination, it would still have been nonsense, because the Party line has changed. He, therefore, has no place in life, and life has no meaning. The conscious lesson of the film is, then, as bleak as Hardy's *Life's Little Ironies*. It is the grotesque and undignified tragedy of all those people who do not succeed in killing and being killed for satisfactory reasons. Such people have always been numerous, and they are now more numerous than ever. The film is a vigorous and exhilarating expression of despair, such as only the French, perhaps, with their cheerful bitterness, can succeed in giving us.

But the despair is complete only on the surface. The real hero is not Hugo, but Hoederer, and the real lyrical implication of the film is that it is a fine thing to be a man like Hoederer, even if one ends up with a bullet in one's stomach and uttering the none-too-poetic last words, 'C'est c. . .' This is the proper language of tragedy nowadays. Hoederer's 'C'est c. . .' and Hugo's 'Non récupérable' ('not-salvageable' for the Communist Party), like the 'b——'s and 'f——'s of modern American novels, are very different from the warbling conclusions of Shakespeare's and Racine's tragedies. But fundamentally the values are still the same. Hoederer, wonderfully played by Pierre Brasseur, is a big, lovable character, who believes in human life and in man's struggle against fate, and who represents the evangelical element beneath the sophistication and pessimism of Sartre's writing. He is, in fact, a Democrat without illusions, the hypothetical, political 'hero of our times', the sort of man Stalin ought to have been, and, alas, is not – nor Maurice Thorez, nor Jacques Duclos – a compound of Lenin, Jaurès and Keir Hardie, as we fondly imagine them to have been. Our only complaint against this excellent film is that such Communist leaders no longer exist. Hoederer is the ideal, non-existent type of Social-Democrat. Although, in the film, Sartre has him shot, he is still, apparently, looking for him in real life, and in the wrong places, since – according to the latest news – he is again flirting with the Communist Party.

J. G. W.

## HINDEMITH'S 'MATHIS DER MALER'

Hindemith's 'Mathis der Maler', which was staged for the first time in this country at the Edinburgh Festival this year, by the Hamburg State Opera, is a noble and impressive operatic failure. It deals with an episode in the life of the early sixteenth-century painter Mathias Grünewald, famous for his altar-piece at Isenheim – who played a part in the German peasants' revolt, but later decided that he could serve humanity better by using his natural gifts as a painter. It is a moral tale, and it wholly bears out Wilde's dictum about the irrelevance of morality to art, or at any rate the error of moralizing through art. Moreover, while its social message makes it aesthetically unacceptable to the artistically fastidious, it still fails to make it politically acceptable to those who insist on preaching in art, such as the Communists. For although the opera tackles the noble theme of the social duty of the artist in the struggle of the people against their oppressors, it comes to all the wrong conclusions: i.e. that the artist not only should not actively intervene, but even in his art need not concern himself with such problems. He is allowed to shut himself up in his ivory tower, excusing his weak indulgence of his personal tastes in art as obeying the dictates of his artistic conscience, cutting himself off from the people and becoming once more the pampered lackey of a corrupt Church and Court. Hindemith commits the further sin of presenting the Archbishop, Mathis's employer, in a favourable light, as a wise, tolerant man, not as a corrupt tyrant – a clear case of hypocritical bourgeois pseudo-objectivity.

The libretto, which Hindemith wrote himself (no professional librettist in his senses would have attempted it), is very badly made, ill-proportioned, and deficient in dramatic interest, with a painfully artificial double love-interest, which is introduced to give the opera its one slight thread of dramatic continuity, and perhaps to make it operatically more effective; it is in fact only a source of distress, both to the audience and to Hindemith, whose lack of belief in these 'love episodes' is betrayed by his almost complete inability to write convincing music for them. The sole exception is the end of the duet between Mathis and Ursula in Scene III, one of the best, but disappointingly brief, moments in the whole of Act I. In spite of these weaknesses, Hindemith has managed to create something which leaves the listener, at the end of the performance, deeply moved. That a work so irredeemably bad should be able to do this is the

best proof of the emotional power and inspiration of Hindemith's music. Probably the strength of the impression owes much to the saving of the best music for the last two scenes, which although dramatically a mere epilogue to an action that never developed, are the loveliest and most poignant in the opera. In the first act, in spite of moments of beauty and power in the second and third scenes, there is undeniably much of the Hindemith who prides himself on being as good a routinier as any composer was, and who has rationalized his musical language to the last hemidemisemi-quaver.

What the ordinary listener would probably consider the chief weakness of the opera, from the musical point of view, is the lack of sensuous appeal in the sound itself, particularly in the vocal writing, which is ungraceful and unlovely, but also in the score, where Hindemith was clearly more at home. It is spare, healthy, and athletic, but it offers little gratification to the physical ear, even a puritanical one, let alone the depraved creature that most of us possess, never content unless it is being ravished. Sir Thomas Beecham touched on this subject at his press conference one morning during the Festival, when in answer to a question as to why concert-goers have no interest in novelties while cinema-goers have no interest in anything else, he put forward the explanation that the ordinary music-lover still thinks of music first of all in terms of a succession of nice sounds, while modern composers have lost interest in sound as such, and are much more concerned with form. Sir Thomas does a monstrous injustice both to audiences, which, especially in this country, have an insatiable desire for spiritual elevation from music, and for that reason still prefer Beethoven's orchestral works, for all the modesty of their colours, to the brilliant scores of Berlioz; and to modern composers, whose medium is still sound, and for all of whom, even for Schoenberg, sound is still the first thing. But there is a grain of truth in what he said, and Hindemith is the one composer whose works might bear out his argument, the composer to whom sound, outside the sphere of mere harmony, seems to matter least. Few listeners do in fact value sound, in this sense, above other, more solid qualities in music, but Hindemith's music is too much a matter of solid qualities and not enough of those sudden irrational indulgencies that have always illuminated the greatest music. He is respectable, in the most literal and flattering sense of that word – but apt to be dull.

In justice to the opera it must be said that it was not well served by the performance, which was very far below the standard of the other five Edinburgh performances by the Hamburg company. Mathieu Ahlersmeyer (Mathis), Helmuth Melchert (the Archbishop) and Elfriede Wasserthal (Ursula) were all indifferent when not poor, and even Theo

Herrmann as Riedinger was much less good than he had been earlier as Rocco and Baron Ochs. None of them, it must be said in *their* mitigation, has anything very rewarding to sing. The acting was equally poor, stiff when it was not ham, as it was with Anneliese Rothenberger (Regina) and Kurt Marschner (Sylvester), who were both like something from a silent film. The production was fussy, in sharp contrast to Günther Rennert's others, but the sets and costumes, by Helmuth Jürgens and Alfred Sierke, were good, and the orchestral playing under Leopold Ludwig was unostentatiously excellent. Since the orchestral score is the most satisfying part of the opera, the excellence was in the right place, and contributed much to any favourable effect that the opera made. But after hearing it once, one felt that three times would be enough.

C. M.

## BOOK NOTES

THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by the Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill. Vol. V: 'Closing the Ring.' (Cassell, pp. 640, 30s.) THE WAR SPEECHES OF THE RT HON. W. S. CHURCHILL. Compiled by Charles Eade. Three volumes. (Cassell, 63s. the set.) Like the Mississippi, Mr Churchill's history of the Second World War 'just keeps rolling along.' And like the Mississippi, too, it has unsuspected depths alongside not a few shallows. This latest volume lacks some of the drama of its predecessors. The period it covers – June 1943 to the eve of D-day a year later – was in the main one of preparation for the grand climax. But the interval was devoted to political as well as military planning, and the post-war world began to take shape at Teheran in November 1943. Here the narrator merges into the statesman, and we gain a glimpse of the stresses underlying war-time arrangements. It is the raw material of written history, not the finished product. The historian now has before him the authentic account of what occurred when the frontiers of Eastern Europe were redrawn by the Big Three. He will know in what terms they agreed to compensate Poland at the expense of Germany, and why the political regime was not mentioned. And he will be able to ponder Stalin's sardonic remark, 'I am becoming a Conservative,' when his allies reminded him of the original Bolshevik slogan, 'No annexations or indemnities.' There is much else of high value, alongside a seemingly inexhaustible flood of cables, memoranda, letters, and official Minutes – some of them highly entertaining. There is a piquant reminder to Mr Eden, apropos of King Peter of Yugoslavia's intended marriage, that the Registry Office is not to be despised; and there is a great accumulation of military detail. But the permanent significance of the volume will rest upon its disclosure of how the Grand Alliance met the stresses of the year preceding the invasion of Europe. Suffice it to say that the author's Gargantuan capacity for work, travel and enjoyment emerges more overwhelmingly than ever. By contrast Roosevelt appears pallid, and Stalin crude rather than mysterious. To emphasize the contrast we have three volumes of Mr Churchill's war speeches, an abridgement of the seven volumes originally published between 1941 and 1946. They cover the entire period from May 1938 to the discharge of the atom bomb, and the entire gamut of human emotion as well.

VON RUNDSTEDT, by his Chief of Staff, Guenther Blumentritt. (Odhams, pp. 280, 16s.) No greater contrast than between Mr Churchill's exuberant vitality, which overflows into his prose, and the dry, desiccated personality of Hitler's last Commander-in-Chief in the West, as portrayed by a fellow-officer and fellow-Prussian. Yet Rundstedt was not merely the ablest German Commander of the Second World War, but the epitome of the Prussian military tradition. He represented that unthinking 'devotion to duty' which is the German substitute for civic consciousness, and as such he served Hitler to the end, knowing that the war was lost, that the Fuehrer was half-insane, and that the prolongation of fighting was a disaster for Germany. Had the conspirators won on July 20th, 1944, Rundstedt would without hesitation have served the new Government and capitulated to the Allies. As it was, he stayed on until Hitler sacked him on March 10th, 1945, for having made a pessimistic estimate of the situation. For Rundstedt shared none of the Fuehrer's illusions, and frequently said so – in private. Although grey and uninspired like its subject, this biography written by his faithful Chief of Staff has its value for the historian of Germany's downfall. The military critic will be particularly interested in the evidence here assembled that no serious plans for invading Britain existed in 1940, and that Hitler never showed much enthusiasm for the project, leaving it to Goering and allowing it to drop at the first opportunity: He did not trust his Navy, and seems to have thought that the air raids would be enough to neutralize Britain while his Army polished off the Russians.

DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE, by David Thomson. (Oxford University Press, pp. 284, 16s.) The first edition of this valuable work appeared in 1946 and quickly took its place among the standard works devoted to the history of the Third Republic. Mr Thomson has now revised it and carried the discussion down to 1951. Thus the Fourth Republic's beginnings are brought under scrutiny and the reader is made aware of the continuing tradition of government linking it to its predecessor. Constitutional history is Mr Thomson's forte; he is at his best in explaining the working of parliamentarianism in France, and in particular the mingled success and failure of French liberalism in adapting Anglo-Saxon models to French soil. On the whole his verdict on the Third Republic is favourable, but he recognizes that its violent death in 1940 was due to structural inadequacies and not just to misfortune. Given the strength of the revolutionary tradition stemming from 1789, the latent hostility of the Church to the Republic, which has abated only recently, and the secession of part of the working class from society, the Republic, he thinks, did remarkably well, though after 1918 it never really mastered any of the urgent problems. Liberal democracy has struck genuine roots in France, but the legacy of authoritarianism has not yet been fully overcome. Future editions might with advantage include a statistical analysis of general election results in recent decades. The treatment of economic subjects is a little sketchy, and there is only the most cursory reference to the modernization undertaken since the war. An important and often neglected subject, also mentioned with tantalizing brevity, is the composition and functioning of the Conseil d'Etat. One would like to know how far the higher civil service is still recruited from the descendants of the old Noblesse de Robe.

U.S.A. – THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION, by the Editors of *Fortune* and Mr R.W. Davenport. (Heinemann, pp. 234, 18s.) This curious work first saw the light as a special edition of *Fortune* magazine, the quarterly companion to *Life* and *Time*. When it appeared in February 1951, the 'great debate' on American foreign

policy was already in full swing, and the editors joined the fray with a statement of what they hoped might be regarded as acceptable principles by the readers of *Fortune*, i.e. the business community, or anyhow its upper crust. Since then the debate has merged into a Presidential election campaign in which *Fortune's* banner is borne aloft by General Eisenhower, whom Mr Henry Luce and his earnest young men clearly regard as America's last hope. The authors of this volume came in at an earlier stage, but their minds were already made up. 'For something more than twenty years the editors of *Fortune* have observed the intellectual and spiritual confusion that has led to the present bankruptcy of U S policy that so enervates the world.' This is a fair sample of their attitude, and of their style. The rest is in keeping with the premise, the solitary note of originality being a repeated insistence that American capitalism is not merely efficient, but lovable for its own sake. But the authors are not, in the American sense, Conservatives. They look down upon the provincialism of Mid-Western Republicans, extol labour-management co-operation, and hope for a Pax Americana which will be progressive as well as stable. In short, they represent the Dewey wing of Republicanism which is now hoping to achieve power. The adventurous foreign policy they advocate has already been publicly sponsored by Mr Dulles and General Eisenhower. There is consistency here, if little else.

THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN ENGLISH CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, by Lionel Robbins. (Macmillan, pp. 207, 15s.) Professor Robbins has long been concerned to rescue the classical economists from what he regards as the unjust aspersions cast upon their memory by modern Socialists, who have failed in his opinion to differentiate between the crude *laissez-faire* philosophy of the French school and the true classical doctrine. His views on this subject were first formulated in 1939 and have since then been revised and expanded. He gives a very clear account of the main stream of classical thought on State intervention from Smith and Bentham to John Stuart Mill via Malthus and Ricardo, pausing now and then to rebut the suggestion that they were indifferent to what is nowadays called welfare economics. The picture which emerges is one of a constant effort to synthesize economic and social considerations, with a steady bias in favour of economic policies tending to serve the long-term interest of the community as against narrow and short-range group interests, including those of the capitalist. The elements of a liberal form of socialism are conceded in the case of Mill, but stress is laid on his ambivalent attitude towards State action. Professor Robbins has made out a strong argument for reconsidering the import of classical doctrines, but it may be felt that he needlessly weakens his case by coming to the rescue of the grotesque Senior.

THE REALM OF SPIRIT AND THE REALM OF CAESAR, by Nicolas Berdyaev. (Gollancz, pp. 182, 15s.) This is Berdyaev's posthumous message to our generation – 'the last book written by the great philosopher,' to quote the publisher's note. Those who do not regard him as a great philosopher will nonetheless see some relevance in his impassioned diatribe against Communist collectivism, especially coming from a Russian *émigré* scholar who at times – especially since the last war – seemed favourably inclined towards the Soviet Union. Berdyaev passed through Marxism on his way to the Orthodox Church, and in a sense he never ceased arguing this issue, in the terms current during the first decade of the present century. While this gives a somewhat old-fashioned flavour to his writings, it rescues them from superficiality. He is always intensely aware that Communism

is an *Ersatz* religion which must be fought on the spiritual plane. On the other hand, he seems never to have realized that West European Socialists are capable of being totally indifferent both to his own viewpoint and to that of Lenin. This posthumous essay takes one over ground familiar from earlier controversies, until we reach once more that sharp antithesis between Spirit and ordinary reality which Berdyaev shares with all mystics, and which he sees partly enshrined in the modern philosophy of personalism. A certain intellectual pharisaism characteristic of the school is appropriately reflected in the publisher's wrapper which informs the public that 'from the theocracy of Byzance down through Rousseau, Hegel and Marx to Hitler' a good many people might have benefited from Berdyaev's special insight – the kind of asinine remark that fails to impress the unbeliever.

**THE STERLING AREA: AN AMERICAN ANALYSIS.** Published by ECA and available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 21s. A most useful guide to the basic economic patterns of the countries and areas lying within the Sterling Area. Prepared with little regard for cost, and amply illustrated with diagrams, this publication is nonetheless most reasonably priced and should be within the reach of all serious students of international affairs.

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
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
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**EDITORIAL**

The thirty-fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution would be a suitable time for reflection upon the course of events since 1917 even if the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party had not been called together on the eve of the traditional November celebrations. A revolution does not become historical until it is over, and the movement unleashed by the Bolsheviks in November 1917 has yet to run its full course. But the familiar cyclical pattern, from the break-up of the old order to the formation of the new (which is in fact the old one "on a higher plane," in the Hegelian phrase), has become increasingly obvious in recent years; so much so that the new Party statute even dispenses with the hoary make-believe about the "vanguard of the proletariat," and blandly defines the Communist Party as a "voluntary militant union of Communists" drawn from the peasantry, the working-class and the intelligentsia—the latter being the term employed to designate the new ruling class of State officials and Party bureaucrats. The process begun at the 18th Congress in March 1939, when Stalin supplied the "cadres" of the State Party with an ideological justification by declaring the State to be the prime instrument of Communist construction, reached completion in October 1952, when Stalin, Malenkov and Beria were able to take the identity of State and Party for granted. What fissures lie behind this appearance of monolithic strength we do not know, and shall not know for years. Enough that we can inspect the completed facade.

What confronts the observer, then, is both the heritage of the original break-up—the frozen lava of the Revolution that was to make all things new—and the actual outcome of the past generation's bloody travail: the new society which in some respects seems not very different from the old, though in others—notably in the abandonment of free labour, personal liberty and the rule of law—it does represent a momentous departure from what was formerly regarded as the norm. This two-fold character of Soviet reality forms the subject of the various papers collected in the present issue of *THE TWENTIETH CENTURY*—with the exception of Marx's vigorous and alarmingly topical pen-portrait of an earlier Russian impact on Europe. In a selection of this kind coherence

must take precedence over completeness, and we do not apologize for having omitted some aspects of the subject, such as the state of literature and the arts, and the development (or stagnation) of the curious mixture of positivism and Byzantinism which passes for Marxian philosophy in the Soviet Union. Not that these are mere frills. The new society is racked by internal contradictions to which the present cultural deadlock bears mute testimony, and Malenkov's crude strictures on the fall in literary output, and the frequent shoddiness of the articles manufactured by this branch of Soviet industry, are as significant in their philistine way as was Napoleon's half-humorous observation 'If we have no poetry that is the fault of the Minister for the Interior.' The all-embracing nature of modern totalitarianism finds its most marked and most destructive expression in the attempt to synthesize all the domains of spiritual life. Such an undertaking would be dangerous even if fools and fanatics had not rushed in where Engels feared to tread, for culture cannot be manufactured at will in the best of circumstances. But in fact the Party's efforts to introduce an integrative principle into the sciences and arts, i.e. to interpret them to each other in the light of the ruling ideology, are typically conducted at such a low level of intellectual honesty and discernment as to blight the work of the specialized agencies of culture—save, it appears, in the domain of industrial and military science. There the experts have successfully asserted themselves against charlatans and fanatics. But in the realm of opinion-formation-cum-interpretation concerning the world in general, and especially the world outside Russia, the Party's monopoly remains unshaken; and it is unfortunately this monopoly of misinformation and misinterpretation that stands between the healthy elements of Soviet society and the Western world. The Iron Curtain is largely an affair of the mind, and it is thickest where the regime senses the danger of contact between the new Soviet elite and its counterparts in the West.

Here is the point where the 'cold war' impinges directly upon the internal stability of the new society which has gradually evolved over the past generation, ever since the 'proletarian dictatorship' sent the proletariat packing and imposed its totalitarian rule upon all classes of the population. Behind the Party, closely amalgamated with it and yet not entirely identical with it, there stands the new hierarchy of military, bureaucratic, managerial and professional experts whose loyalty the regime must retain at all cost. Should they come to distrust the kind of factual information and theoretical interpretation which the Party still

monopolizes they may be tempted to dispense with its services—even though it is their shield against the masses, and even though the Leninist-Stalinist myth is more or less genuinely accepted by most members of this privileged caste. There are some reasons for thinking that the Party is to-day already on the defensive, morally and organizationally. The growing rigidity of its thinking may well reflect an increasing loss of control over fields it once monopolized. It may be in danger of being degraded to the status of a glorified propaganda agency, while policy is directed by men who pay no more than lip service to its professed principles. Yet the ruling group still retains its hold to the degree that it succeeds in welding together the Party and the Army: twin pillars of the totalitarian State who must stand or fall together. The directorate which will succeed Stalin on the day he retires can justify its absolute rule in the eyes of the Soviet hierarchy only by asserting its guardianship of the Leninist-Stalinist 'science of revolution,' and it is the prestige of this 'science' which Stalin himself was at pains to reinforce by his lengthy article in *Bolshevik* on the eve of the 19th Congress, his address to the assembled gathering, and the set speeches of his chief lieutenants. Dull and monotonous though they are, these documents deserve attention. Through them the Communist Party asserts its pre-eminence in a society which in some respects may be outgrowing its tutelage.

It is against this background that one has to consider Stalin's curious forecast of armed conflicts within the 'Western imperialist camp'; his straightfaced remark that 'all traces of patriotism, liberalism and personal freedom' are disappearing from bourgeois society; and his reiterated assertion that the 'general crisis of capitalism' is becoming more profound. On the face of it these judgments seem to express merely the familiar Soviet mixture of obtuseness, misinformation, and inability to understand the West. The present friction between the United States and Western Europe after all arises primarily from the unprecedented closeness of their mutual association and the immensity of their common undertakings. Europe is constantly pressing America for more assistance, not for less, and within Europe itself every movement towards political or economic integration and modernization—whether of a single branch of production or of entire national entities—is dependent on American support. To understand this should not, it seems, be very difficult for a Government with ample sources of information at its disposal. Yet this obstinate attachment to outdated doctrines is more than a matter of theoretical conservatism. It is the Kremlin's way of asserting its authority

in a situation which in reality calls for the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and much else besides. Everything that has happened since 1917, and especially since 1945, goes to show that the regime needs 'Western war-mongering' and the 'cold war' as a condition of its own self-perpetuation. The Stalinist amalgam of Bolshevism and traditional Russian nationalism represents a force which in its inmost essence is incapable of living in peace with anyone, though it need not always and everywhere choose the path of open aggression. For the time being at any rate the 'cold war' suits it to perfection, and only the naivest of fellow-travellers can imagine that it is seriously concerned to end it. That is no reason for people in the West to despair, or to call for a 'crusade' which would flatten what is left of civilization. We are primarily in need of patience, intelligence, and the will to make democracy work. A despotism built on slavery of the body and the mind cannot in the long run successfully compete with the free nations of Europe and America, though in some Western countries a part of the working class has seceded from the body politic and in the East the radical wing of the nationalist movement is toying with Stalinism. The task of recovering the allegiance of these secessionists is not an easy one, but neither is it hopeless, and once it is seriously taken in hand some of our present fears will diminish. Meantime we have no option but to settle down to a prolonged test of endurance.

## MOSCOW HAS A PLAN

By a Special Correspondent

The public has listened with curiosity to recent Soviet interpretations of world trends and events, and it has heard with some emotion the official forecasts of conflicts that lie ahead. If the formal utterances made during the Nineteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party last month can be taken as an indication, the Soviet Government will go on confronting the Western world in the twilight zone between cold war and cold peace, between strictly limited co-existence and carefully directed violence. Throughout the sittings of the Congress, the question was asked all over the world whether in the end Russia will choose war or peace. No answer has been given, the atmosphere remains tense, and world opinion is left in doubt.

Sandwiched between the reports made by Malenkov and Moskatov on the work of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, which occupied the first two days of the Congress, and the announcement of changes in the Party statutes and the election of Party officials, which brought the Congress to an end, the third item on the agenda was almost lost from view. Yet no subject deserves fuller attention than the report, presented by M.Z. Saburov, on the fifth Five Year Plan. Its success or failure may well determine whether in 1955 we shall be on the eve of another world catastrophe.

When the draft directives of the Plan were published on August 19th, six weeks before the opening of the Congress, some commentators were in a hurry to pronounce that this was clearly not a plan for war, and that it held out bright prospects for the Soviet citizen. These were soothing but hasty words. Where the fate of the world may be at stake, more than a superficial analysis is required. The dull language of the Plan, and its dreary presentation during the Party Congress, must not be allowed to obliterate its importance. Here is the fullest documentation since 1946 on Soviet economic intentions at home and abroad. Stalin next decided to steal the thunder from Malenkov by publishing his essay on 'The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U S S R', and Malenkov in turn anticipated Saburov's report in his own address on the internal situation in the Soviet Union. Thus the Plan has to be studied in close relation to Stalin's and Malenkov's statements.

Like its predecessor, the new Plan conceals as much as it discloses. Worse, it deliberately sets out to mislead the public about past achievements and future intentions. Saburov, the present chairman of the State Planning Commission, is no novice at the planning desk. In presenting his report he was even more discreet than Voznesensky, his former chief, in submitting the first post-war Plan in March 1946. In spite of this, the student can discern much that is presented in disguise. Experience of the past twenty-five years of the Plan era is a guide to at least some of the pitfalls set by Saburov and his colleagues. More particularly, the fourth Plan serves as an introduction to the fifth. The preamble to the directives of the new Plan states that 'the successful fulfilment of the fourth Five Year Plan has made it possible to adopt another, the fifth Five Year Plan, ensuring a further advance of all branches of the national economy and a rise in the material well-being, health and cultural standards of the people'. In April 1951, the State Planning Commission and the Central Statistical Office had published a joint report on the achievements under the Plan that came to an end in 1950. What had been planned and what had been achieved?

When the German army had been driven out of Russia in 1945, the country's administration was in a chaotic state and its economy near collapse. Although the fact is now conveniently ignored, it was to a considerable extent due to Western arms and relief supplies that the Russian people were able to sustain the horrors of war and to endure the privations of post-war adjustment. When in August, 1945, the preparation of a fourth Five Year Plan was ordered, the war-time chaos had hardly subsided. More than one-third of the country's industrial potential and farm stock had suffered from the effects of war, and the supply of consumer goods was reduced to half its low pre-war level. When post-war planning began, the extent of military and civilian losses was not yet known, and no manpower budget could be drawn up. No inventory could be taken either of industrial capacities, resources of raw materials or stocks of finished goods. In these circumstances, the first post-war Plan, approved by the Supreme Soviet in March 1946, could hardly be more than a list of loosely connected 'targets' in some of the more vital branches of the Soviet economy. As these targets were in many cases expressed in prices which had no meaning under the conditions of post-war inflation, and as no provision had been made, in the forecasts of wages and living standards, for skimming the surplus purchasing power accumulated by peasants and workers during the war, the Plan was bound to suffer its first serious shock when, six months after its inauguration, a drastic currency reform became necessary. No attempt seems to have been made to recast the estimates of industrial production and national income in terms of real

prices, and in fact after the termination of the Plan, the results were published in terms of the meaningless so-called 1926-27 constant prices, although the authorities had already recognized them as being worthless for planning purposes.

According to official Soviet statements, total industrial production, which in 1950 was to surpass the pre-war level by half, had in fact by the end of the fourth Plan risen to almost 75 per cent. above 1940. The output of producer goods was said to have doubled, while the supply of consumer goods had allegedly increased by one-quarter. These claims, again made by Malenkov in his speech at the Party Congress, are based on the inflated price weights of 1926-27, and are thus exaggerated. A sober analysis of Plan achievements suggests that the output of fuel and steel had increased by 60 and 50 per cent. respectively, while the total output of producer goods had risen by approximately 40 per cent. only. These achievements are so impressive that Western statesmen would hardly have felt the urge to inflate them any further; not so Malenkov. By 1948-49, the output of the main industrial raw materials and capital goods had been restored to pre-war level, and the industrial potential was extended sufficiently to undertake new commitments. Measured by the targets of the third Five Year Plan, the output of coal and electricity surpassed the 1942 target in 1950; that of iron, steel and cement rose above the target figure in 1951, but output of oil failed to reach the 1942 goal. The same is true of important industrial consumer goods, such as cotton textiles and leather shoes, and of the main agricultural products, such as grain, sugar and animal produce. In fact, the domestic supply of consumer goods of agricultural and industrial origin lagged behind all schedules. The fourth Plan (1946-50) demanded that the pre-war volume of national income and consumption be surpassed, that the food industry be expanded to the fullest possible extent and that consumer goods be manufactured on a big scale. Yet even the misleading official index of consumer goods presented by Malenkov at the Party Congress does not claim more than an increase by one-quarter. In reality, by 1950 the domestic supply of consumer goods is unlikely to have surpassed the pre-war level, and may even have been less than in 1940 when related to the increased population.

Productivity per worker, which was supposed to rise by more than one-third, is in fact likely to have remained stationary. As the working week had been increased during the war from forty-two to forty-eight hours, productivity per hour is likely even to have declined to some extent. The failure to increase industrial productivity was compensated by the influx, beyond the Plan target, of at least five million peasants and soldiers who preferred even life in over-crowded urban quarters to existence in the agricultural collectives. No provision had been made in the Plan

to meet their requirements of food, clothing and shelter. The emphasis from the outset was on the reconstruction of the industrial potential, and no adjustments were made when the problems of labour and consumption proved to be greater than had been assumed at the end of hostilities. In so far as changes were made, they were merely upward revisions in the programme for the output of capital goods and means of production. All this was bound to affect the standard of living of the Soviet citizen. While the Plan visualized an increase of more than 60 per cent. in the output of producer goods, it envisaged an increase of less than 30 per cent. in the production of goods for the consumer. Achievements fell far short of this modest goal. While the ambitious targets for fuel and steel, industrial products, capital investments and producer goods, were reached or surpassed, the planned output of industrial and agricultural consumer goods in many instances fell short of the proclaimed aim.

The fourth Plan, whose established goal it had been to rehabilitate the war-damaged economy and to raise the national income beyond the old level, thus succeeded in restoring the Soviet Union's economic power, but this recovery was achieved at the expense of an improvement in living standards in town and country. How unsatisfactory the first attempt at post-war planning was, can be gauged from the failure to improve real income and living standards beyond the level of 1940. While the Plan implied a rise in living standards by approximately half, in reality by 1950 it was no better than in 1940. It is true that nominal wages surpassed the Plan target, but the fact that this has not been included in the list of achievements is proof, if proof were needed, that the Soviet worker knows how lamentably his income, in terms of real wages, has lagged behind.

When after the completion of the fourth Plan in 1950 no new programme was announced, some observers assumed that no further Plan was to be put into operation, or that in the changed economic conditions of the post-war years the Soviet Union did not require an integrated production programme. In fact, the provincial and professional press frequently referred to the existence of a Plan, and the national press continued to give quarterly Plan results, until some eighteen months after the fifth Plan was due to start its existence its main features were made known officially. Thus the Soviet authorities confirmed the belief that so highly centralized an economy as that of the Soviet Union is unlikely to operate without a Plan. The delay in announcing the fifth Plan was in fact not without precedent. The first Plan was approved in April 1929, although it had been due to start in October 1928. The approval of the second and third Plans was delayed by as much as twenty-two and fourteen months, respectively. But one genuine change did take place:

while it had taken the better part of four years to prepare, and four volumes to print, the first Five Year Plan of 1928-32, the fourth Plan was drafted in little over six months and issued in a booklet of little over a hundred pages containing less than 40,000 words. The fifth Plan distinguishes itself by even greater brevity than its predecessors.

The draft directives gave the general outline of the Plan in little more than 10,000 words, which is half the space taken up by the general outline of the previous Plan. No space is given this time to stating the principal aims of the programme. The section on industrial development is less than half as long as in 1946, and the standard observations on the material well-being of the Soviet citizen, the standard of living, and the social services, are also shortened to little over half their previous volume. It is hardly accidental that so few details have been given of Soviet intentions regarding the development of industry and social welfare. This brevity is likely to have been dictated by external as well as internal considerations.

A comparison of the new Plan with its predecessor reveals some other interesting features. While, in spite of changed conditions, the similarities between the two Plans show an element of continuity and even conservatism in Soviet economic thinking, certain alterations and omissions are equally telling. The withholding of information has been carried even further than on previous occasions. While the new directives follow closely the lay-out and presentation of the fourth Plan, in one respect Saburov has departed from the practice of his former chief. While Voznesensky liked to give his targets in absolute quantities, his successor has indicated the goals set for 1955 exclusively in the form of indices. Thus both targets and achievements are unlikely henceforth to become known in real quantities, and indices will have to be converted from starting points that are not always known with certainty. This applies in particular to new production of a military character.

Apart from a few casual remarks, little is said about regional planning. While on the last occasion half the text was concerned with the rehabilitation and development of the various Republics of the Soviet Union, little room has been given to this subject in the draft directives of the fifth Plan. The gap is filled in part by the information that has emanated from the regional Party conferences, but certain details of regional planning, like other important items of the Plan, such as the distribution of public investment, have probably been transferred to unpublished appendices. At the end of the last war, the secret supplements of the 1941 Plan fell into Allied hands. Since then it has become known that a substantial amount of detailed planning is withheld even from those most closely associated with the execution of the Plan. Still, some facts do emerge. In addition to references to the development of electric power and ship-

building, machine tools, fishing in the Baltic, and hydro-electric and metallurgical projects on the Volga, in the Urals and in Transcaucasia there is a good deal of emphasis on the regional planning of building materials. In this respect, preferential treatment is to be given to the Urals, the Volga region, the Far East and Central Asia. This suggests that the eastward migration of Soviet industry is still proceeding. The list of priority targets for the building industries is a clear indication of the preference given to the continued movement of workers and plants to the interior. In the congested industrial areas of the Western territories, by contrast, the workers cannot hope to have their dwelling space enlarged.

In so far as the draft directives allow an estimate of the industrial trend during the current Plan period, the new programme can be regarded as a true successor of the first post-war Plan, and as a forerunner of the next Plan which is to bring the fulfilment of the production targets which Stalin set as early as 1946. In fact it is not improbable that, at least in the sphere of basic industries, the general outlines of the production programme were drafted a decade ahead, before Hitler began his attack on the Soviet Union. The war has caused a delay of at least five years, and the first post-war Plan was concerned with rehabilitation rather than development; but since 1949 Soviet industry has made remarkable progress in most branches producing basic materials and capital goods.

Since much of the industrial effort during the fourth Plan went to rehabilitate industrial capacities, it is not surprising that most of the goals of the fifth Plan appear modest by comparison with its predecessor. But though the rate of increase in production is to be smaller than during the period of post-war reconstruction, it is assumed to be greater than for the whole decade from 1940 to 1950. This is true not only of such basic materials as iron and steel, cement and fertilizers, but also of all the main consumer goods, such as foodstuffs and clothing. In the basic industries which have advanced progressively during the last twenty-five years, the new targets are impressive even where they are smaller than in the immediate past. Annual increases of 22.5 million tons of coal, 6.5 million tons of oil, and 3.5 million tons of steel, would be formidable achievements even in more industrialized countries than the Soviet Union. The targets for the output of certain non-ferrous metals, synthetic materials, machinery and equipment are even more ambitious. The estimates given for the current year by Malenkov in his speech at the Party Congress provide a fairly good picture of the progress made in some of the basic industries. All major industrial raw materials seem to be coming forward according to schedule, and Plan targets are likely to be reached in time if the output of pig iron and fuel is stepped up. This applies in particular to the supply

of electric power and refined oil. Against this, the annual rate of increase will probably be slowed down somewhat in the steel industry.

From past experience it may be said that on the whole the greatest efforts will be made to reach the goals for basic materials and capital goods, while the same need not apply to other important sections of the economy. The new Plan visualizes an increase of capital construction by 90 per cent., of producer goods by 80 per cent., of consumer goods by 65 per cent., but of real wages by 35 per cent. only. Stress is laid throughout on raising the efficiency of work and the quality of the finished product; waste is to be eliminated wherever possible. Blast furnaces, which in the past do not seem to have worked efficiently and to full capacity, are to be utilized to the full. Against this, the capacity of generating plant is to be increased considerably, so as to relieve existing plant that seems to have been overloaded in recent years. The output of the oil industry is to be raised sharply through the full utilization of all refinery capacity and the installation of new oil processing and cracking plants and equipment. Much has been said of the high rate of output scheduled for the oil industry. While Stalin, in his speech of February 1946, had set a target of 60 million tons of oil for 1960 or after, this has now been raised to as much as 70 million tons to be produced by 1955. It should not be forgotten, however, that fuel and lubricant requirements have risen out of all proportion, and that other sources of fuel and power, particularly the all-important supply of coal and lignite, have lagged behind the increasing needs of the rapidly growing Soviet industry.

It is probably due in part to the unsatisfactory fuel position that very modest targets have been set for the increase in the production of industrial and agricultural motor power. While the output of steel and oil is to rise during the Plan period by 60 and 85 per cent., respectively, the production of motor cars and agricultural tractors is expected to increase by about 20 per cent. only. The heavy demand for capital goods of military and civilian nature is likely also to have played a part in fixing low production targets for motor vehicles. During the previous Plan period, the capacity of car and tractor plants was increased considerably, and some of this capacity is likely now to be kept in reserve for an emergency, or switched to the production of military vehicles and equipment to which no reference is made anywhere in the Plan.

When evaluating the overall targets of the Plan, it seems justifiable to accept as reasonably accurate the official data on physical quantities of individual industrial products, and to distrust all composite volume data. During the previous Plan, the total volume of industrial output was said to have increased by almost 75 per cent., i.e. at an annual rate of 13 per cent., the output of producer goods having increased by more than 100

per cent., or 16 per cent. annually. The analysis of individual production data has, however, shown that at the end of the fourth Plan period the output of producer goods stood some 40, and that of all industrial goods some 20 per cent., above pre-war. There was little or no improvement over 1940 in the supply of foodstuffs, clothing and dwelling space. The annual rates of increase in producer goods and total industrial output amounted in reality to 7 and 4 per cent., respectively. During the period of the fifth Plan, an annual rate of increase of 12 per cent. has been forecast, output of producer goods growing by 13, and of consumer goods by 11 per cent. annually. While industrial output is no longer calculated in terms of the so-called 1926-27 prices, but supposed to be based on the real 1951 prices, there is reason to believe that inflationary price weights will be allowed to enter into the calculation of composite volume data when individual targets are not achieved. The output of capital goods does not promise a higher rate of increase than in the past, i.e. 7 per cent. per annum. In the consumer goods industry, where the rate is claimed to amount to 11 per cent., it is unlikely to rise beyond 4 per cent., even in the most favourable circumstances.

A realistic estimate thus suggests that by 1955 the output of capital goods will be twice as large as before the war, while the total industrial output may be between one-half and two-thirds above 1940. These are achievements of which countries more developed than the Soviet Union might be proud. It seems odd that, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, Saburov should insist that by 1955 the output of producer goods will have increased to more than three-and-a-half times, and that of consumer goods to twice the pre-war level. The only possible explanation is that after so much exaggeration during previous Plan periods the Soviet leaders feel unable to admit rates of growth which by comparison would look like a descent from what was claimed to have been achieved in the past.

The new Plan stands out for an emphasis on consumer goods unheard of in Soviet planning. But whether bright prospects for the consumer are genuinely likely must depend on an analysis of past performance and probable future achievement. The Soviet authorities often claim that three-quarters of the total national income enter human consumption, while the remainder suffices to meet all government requirements (including defence expenditure). This ratio is one of the most misleading data produced by Soviet economists. When the consumption rate was first quoted in the early 'thirties, it included various items of government expenditure which in no other country are defined as civilian consumption. In spite of many changes in the structure of the Soviet economy and in the distribution of industry, the ratio has remained almost unchanged throughout the Plan era. It has thus proved to be a mere statistical

fabrication. Of late, a Soviet writer, D.A. Allakhverdyan, has fully confirmed this view. In his recent works on Soviet finances, Allakhverdyan has stated that the consumption fund includes almost the entire public expenditure on the needs of national defence and State security. Malenkov, in his speech at the Party Congress, gave data which fully support this contention. When announcing Soviet production indices he informed his audience of an impressive shift from consumer to producer goods that had occurred in recent years. While official Soviet sources have given the share of capital goods in the total volume of industrial production in 1940 at three-fifths, according to Malenkov this proportion had risen by 1948 to two-thirds, and since then it has increased further to almost three-quarters. In 1955 it will be at the same rate. No conjuring trick will succeed in transforming a one-quarter share of consumption goods in the volume of industrial production into a three-quarter share of the consumption fund in the total national income. •

In view of Malenkov's data showing the priority given to heavy industry, the targets of the fifth Plan for the increase in foodstuffs, clothing and other consumer goods, must be considered utterly unrealistic. Until last year grain, the basic food and animal feeding stuff, did not even reach the modest target set for 1950. After three mediocre harvests, Malenkov claimed in his speech that this year's crop had surpassed the target of the fourth Plan. But so as to reach the exceptionally high goal of the fifth Plan, some additional 60 million tons, in terms of biological yield, equal to a barn crop of some 40 million tons, would have to be harvested. Improvements of this order in the agricultural field are exceptional, even in countries whose farming industries are more mechanized and intensified than those of the Soviet Union. It will take ten years rather than three to raise the barn yield of grain from 0.32 to 0.48 tons per acre.

The forecasts of improvements in the supply of animal products, such as meat and dairy produce, are equally unrealistic. By 1950, the livestock population had not yet reached the low level of the years before the last war. Through a transfer of livestock from individual to collective farms and a stricter control of deliveries, the marketed supply of meat and dairy produce had been increased, but the total national output remained unaffected by this shift. The disturbance of the countryside caused by the concentration of collectives did little to improve the supplies of national produce. Even if irrigation and reclamation make good progress during the Plan period, not more than one-tenth of the arable land will benefit from these improvements. In the first instance, industrial crops will be grown under irrigation, and sugar beet may be the only food crop to give higher yields as a result of better treatment. Grain and grass yields will remain unaffected and thus will fail to reach the target. As a result, the

output of meat and dairy produce will also lag behind the planned schedule. The failure of the agricultural programme, of course, will have its effect on the overall Plan of consumption.

Other items of the workers' budget appear hardly more promising. During the remaining three years of the present Plan, the annual rate of increase in the domestic production of cotton fabrics and leather shoes will be lower than in the past three years. As to dwelling space, the failure of the building industry to reach its target is too notorious to require a detailed account. The planned increase in other consumer goods, even if achieved, may not be fully available to the civilian population. According to Voznesensky, the former head of Gosplan, in 1940 civilian consumers received less than half of the market supply of cotton goods, and less than four-fifths of the leather footwear produced. Even if favourable conditions prevail, the domestic supply of consumer goods is unlikely to increase by more than 4 per cent. annually, or by approximately 20 per cent. throughout the Plan period. The consumer will thus remain the least favoured participant of the Plan. While it is proposed to double the supply of furniture and to treble the output of building material, much of this will be used to meet the requirements of army and administration. The financial rewards of workers and peasants will not be sufficient to absorb more than a small part of this produce.

It is significant that, contrary to the previous Plan, no target has been set for nominal wage rates. An improvement of real wages is promised in vague and ambiguous terms. The worker is kept in the dark as to whether his individual real income is to increase by 35 per cent., or whether he has to share the planned improvement in workers' incomes with the 5 million newcomers to industry. Even if the planned reductions in retail prices are passed on to the consumer in full, the 45 million workers and employees of the national economy in 1955 will hardly be able to consume more than a fraction of the trade turnover which is to increase by as much as 70 per cent. The remainder will find its way into non-civilian consumption or into stocks.

The provision for social services shows even more clearly than the absence of a target for wage rates the intentions behind the Plan. While the output of basic materials is to increase by at least one-half, and the supply of capital construction and heavy equipment is to be doubled and trebled, the number of doctors and hospital beds, libraries and cinemas is to be raised by 15 to 30 per cent. only. Even if the quality of the social services is improved, it remains true that, as in the past, the Plan caters for the consumer only in the last resort. His share in the national product is the residual element of the nation's resources.

The rural population which, since the financial reforms of 1947, has

participated least in the post-war economic recovery of the Soviet Union is now singled out for an improvement in its economic position. According to the Plan, the incomes of collective farmers are to rise by not less than 40 per cent., compared with a planned increase of real wages by not less than 35 per cent. But since the agricultural production programme is the least likely to materialize, the rural population is equally unlikely to benefit substantially from any economic improvement during the Plan period. As the concentration of collectives has been halted, the uncertainty of the last few years may come to an end, but controls of output and delivery will be tightened and the role of the machine tractor stations will be further enhanced.

The traditional distribution of the national product is not accepted throughout the Soviet Union without a certain amount of protest. This is borne out by statements made by Stalin and Malenkov during the Party Congress. It would be a mistake to consider public accusations and 'self-criticism' as evidence of open opposition or resistance. There is neither. Yet it is not without significance that it required the authority of Stalin to explain to the political hierarchy, and to the country as a whole, the continued existence of social differences; while Malenkov was mobilized to brand bureaucratic inefficiency and political nepotism. Some officials, for instance, are accused of using their position to occupy communal land and to force the farm administration to supply them with grain, meat, milk and other produce, free of charge or at low prices. The growth of class differences, of nepotism and corruption, will remain a social, if not an economic problem, throughout the Plan era.

Some of the worst features of the planned economy are caused by the absence of a price mechanism. So long as planning is done primarily in physical terms, and prices and price ratios do not form an instrument of planning, the Plan is bound to go wrong in many instances. Foreign observers have pointed frequently to the utter confusion that has reigned whenever prices were fixed arbitrarily without regard to economic realities. The critics have it now, on the authority of Stalin himself, that Soviet economists and planners, with few exceptions, are badly informed about prices and price relations. In one instance, quoted by Stalin, they intended to fix the prices of grain, bread and cotton at the same level, and when challenged by the Central Committee they had nothing sensible to say. More than any previous example, this case throws light upon the questionable validity of production indices that are based on arbitrary prices and price ratios.

In his article in *Bolshevik*, which may become his political testament, Stalin described the object of socialist production as being not profit, but man and his needs, the satisfaction of his material and cultural require-

ments. The analysis of the fifth Plan shows that by 1955 the Russian workers and peasants will be little nearer this aim of socialist policy than they have been at any time since the inauguration of the first Plan, some twenty-five years ago. The changes in the economic structure contemplated under the new Plan do not alter the salient facts: Soviet industry remains directed predominantly towards the production of heavy equipment, and the improvements in the utilization of plant capacity and labour are likely to further this trend.

To-day the Soviet Union is the second largest industrial power in the world. The combined industrial resources of Western Europe are still somewhat greater, but the margin is shrinking steadily, and by 1955 Western Europe will have been outranked by the Soviet Union in some vital sectors of her economy. It is true that America's industrial potential is still almost three times as large as that of Russia, but here too the gap is narrowing. In the last three years Soviet industrial production has increased by some 40 per cent., compared with only half as much in the United States. Moreover, the diversion of raw materials into domestic consumption, and obligations towards foreign customers, are small in the Soviet Union by comparison with the United States and Western Europe.

In all Soviet planning there has always been a strong bias in favour of autarky. Little is said in the fifth Plan of the role that foreign trade can play in contributing to the variety of goods available and in thus raising the standard of living of the people in and outside the Soviet Union. A solitary sentence in the directives for the Plan is devoted to the expansion of foreign trade. In spite of much recent talk about the extension of world trade, the fifth Plan, like its predecessors, is the work of men who think in terms of domestic production and national economy. In their view, the Soviet Union remains a self-contained economic entity. Soviet economic expansionism is still divorced from domestic economic planning.

In the last resort, it is the security aspect more than any other consideration that directs the Plan. So as to assure the country against any eventuality, stocks of raw materials and foodstuffs are to be doubled. The list of items which suggest the predominance of considerations of defence, if not aggression, is lengthy and conspicuous. Basic materials, such as iron and steel, fuel and power, may be used for civilian as well as for military purposes. But the heavy forging presses and heavy steel plates, hydro-electric plants and hydro-turbines, excavators and bulldozers, aluminium and other non-ferrous metals, synthetic rubber and artificial fibres, which are singled out in the Plan for a considerable increase in production, make a formidable list of commodities that are found on the production programme of countries prepared for an armed clash rather than extended trade.

Malenkov's prediction at the Party Congress that the danger of war is growing, cannot be ignored. Even more important are the statements made by leading military figures who put their opinion on record after the civilian planners and administrators had completed their task at the Congress. Marshals Bulganin and Vassilievsky fully confirmed what the analysis of Malenkov's and Saburov's statements has shown, i.e. the predominance of heavy equipment in the Soviet production programme. Much of what Stalin had said in his article in *Bolshevik* was meant to assure the Soviet citizen that though others might be involved in war, he was not to suffer. As against this, the utterances of the military leaders were addressed to the outside world.

The Soviet economy can be put on a war footing in a few months' time, and the new Plan is meant to create conditions for the supply of the most modern arms, in quantities that would exceed considerably those produced during the last war. A formidable report on the military production programme during the concluding stages of the last war was contained in the preamble of the fourth Five Year Plan. It included an annual output of 40,000 aircraft and 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured cars; 3 million rifles, 2 million tommy-guns, 450,000 machine-guns, and 120,000 heavy guns. When those vast quantities of armament were produced, Soviet steel production was one-third of what it is now.

In conclusion it can be said that the Soviet Union disposes of an industrial potential that in the sphere of producer goods is one-and-a-half times as great as before the war, and will be twice as great in 1955: a formidable achievement in peace-time and a frightening prospect in case of war. Throughout the period of the current Plan, priority will be given to all aspects of national security, and contrary to official claims, consumer goods will have only a low order of preference. While some of the statements made during the Party Congress suggest that no immediate clash with the Western world is contemplated, others show that the Soviet Union can be put on a war footing at very short notice. Though it contains no open programme for war, the fifth Plan is no programme for peace either. It presents itself as the economic counterpart to a political concept that so far oscillates between cold war and cold peace.

## SOVIET STATISTICAL THEORY

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A number of the conceptual premises upon which statistical science and practice have long been based have recently been attacked and discarded as harmful to statistical development in the Soviet Union. It seems incumbent upon statisticians in other countries to study the Soviet theses, to determine the extent to which differences are real and not merely semantic, and to take issue with those that appear to undermine the structure of thought upon which their own work is founded. The Soviet attack, in the writer's opinion, can best be interpreted as a new phase of the ancient conflict between dogma and science. The dogmas upon which it leans have the essential characteristics of those in a revealed religion. Pretending to be scientific, these dogmas are actually anti-scientific in spirit and in the consequences which would follow their general acceptance.

The relevant post-war promulgation of Soviet statistical doctrine occurred during a two-day 'Conference on Methodology' at the Central Statistical Administration of the U S S R in Moscow on February 20th-21st, 1950. A summary record has been published and has appeared in translation in the official journals of some other countries.\* The conference was opened by the Chief of the Central Statistical Administration, Mr V.N. Starovskiy. He explained 'that harmful bourgeois influences and anti-Marxist distortion in Soviet statistical science and literature hamper its development'. He 'identified the main obstacle to the development of statistical science as the formal mathematics school of thought' which 'considers statistics (to be) a universal science for the study of nature and society based ultimately on the mathematical law of large numbers and not on Marxist-Leninist theory'. A report on the correct theoretical basis of statistics was then given by Mr V.A. Sobol of Mr Starovskiy's staff. Statistics, said Mr Sobol, is a social science, whose tasks and theoretical foundation are formulated in the works of Lenin and Stalin. Its tasks are to

\* See, e.g. *Vestnik Statistiki*, c. 1, 1950 (publication of the Central Statistical Office of the Ukrainian S S R); and *Statisticky Zpravodaj*, Rocnik XIII, 15 rijna 1950, Cislo 809, pp. 253-69 (Statistical Bulletin published by the State Statistical Office of Czechoslovakia).

aid in the building of a Communist society. Its theoretical foundation rests upon historical materialism and (Communist) political economy. 'Incorrect views', which insidiously lean upon the theory of probability, had been expressed by such writers as Academician V.S. Nemchinov, who supported the chromosome theory of heredity at the August 6th, 1948, session of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Among others tainted with heresy were Mr I. Yu. Pisarev (also of Mr Starovskiy's staff) who was the author of the article on 'Statistics' in the Great Soviet Encyclopædia.

Following Sobol's report, according to the record, there was 'lively discussion'. Most of this seems to have reflected a certain liveliness of haste to endorse Mr Sobol's pronouncements; but there was some slight dissent. Mr G.A. Podvarkov of the Moscow Economics and Statistics Institute 'averred that it is dangerous to exclude nature and its laws as a subject to be studied by statistics'. This view was countered by the charge, by Mr S.P. Partigul of the Central Statistical Administration, 'that Podvarkov was guilty of objectivism in his defence of the bourgeois position on statistics'. The hapless Pisarev then came upon the stage in the role of repentant heretic, confessing his sins. The record observes that 'his printed works and oral statements [had been] severely criticized' at the conference. He

acknowledged that this criticism was basically sound. He also acknowledged the correctness of the theses of Sobol's report. The criticism of the so-called universal theory of statistics, which he himself supported and developed, showed him that this had been a gross error on his part. . . . He promised to correct his errors and to give an exhaustive criticism of the universal theory of statistics on the basis of Marxist-Leninist classics on statistics.

One cannot refrain from speculation on the motives involved in Pisarev's confession. His views were long held and well known; and he was in the employ of the Central Statistical Administration. Why was his retraction withheld until this particular occasion? Was he groomed for the part? Was his retraction *pro forma*, like that of Galileo? Did Pisarev say to himself, 'But it still seems to me that statistics is applicable to nature'? We cannot know. The one explanation that seems wholly implausible is that which the record purports to establish, namely that he underwent a sudden, genuine, and complete conversion in consequence of the arguments advanced in the discussion.

Pisarev's retraction was followed by a statement from my amiable one-time associate in the United Nations Statistical Commission, Mr I.S. Malyshev, who is understood to be Deputy Chief of the Central Statistical Administration and hence Mr Pisarev's superior officer. Malyshev gave his subordinate a final admonition.

The fact [he said] that all bourgeois statisticians uphold the universal theory is all the more reason why Pisarev should give a serious Party criticism

of universal statistics, the theories of which contradict the statements of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on the subject and method of statistics as a social, Party, science.

Malyshev concluded the conference by announcing a new textbook on the theory of statistics for use in the Special Statistical Schools of the Central Statistical Administration. This was prepared by the Administration, consistent with the decree of August 10th, 1948, which 'determined the tasks of all State statistics, tasks which are the basic theoretical and practical work of all statisticians of our country'. A summary of the new textbook, prepared by Mr U. Čermenskiy, is appended to the report of the proceedings. He explains that

in contrast to former syllabuses, it is above all stated that statistics is a social science, class conscious and Party conscious. This disposes of the bourgeois statement . . . that the subject of statistics is mass phenomena of nature and society. In this connection it is necessary to recognize as entirely erroneous the statement that the central thesis of statistical science and the basis of its methods is the mathematical law of large numbers. . . . The scientific basis of statistics is historical materialism and Marxist-Leninist political economy. . . . By means of properly gathered and processed statistical data, statistics illustrates socio-economic phenomena and processes only after the forms have been established and the substance and distinguishing properties of the phenomena and processes have been clarified.

To summarize:

(1) The character of statistics as a science is determined by its single generalized task of helping to build the Communist state.

(2) It follows that statistical analysis cannot *discover* socio-economic relationships but only *illustrate* them. Čermenskiy says 'socio-economic analysis . . . precedes statistical research'. Statistical method is employed 'only after' the character of the phenomena or processes has previously been formulated.

To comment: It is true that hypotheses must be formulated before they can be tested by statistical, experimental, or any other method of science. By 'socio-economic analysis', however, Čermenskiy and his colleagues do not refer to the formulation of hypotheses but to Marxist-Leninist dogma. This dogma, unchallenged and untested by repeated submission to empirical evidence, is the major premise of all Soviet research. The Soviet theses mean that statistics must prove whatever the supreme expositors of political, economic, and social doctrine in the U S S R demand that it prove. This is a negation not only of statistics as an objective science but of all scientific thought and method. It is anti-scientific and essentially theological. It is not surprising that Karl Pearson, author of *The Grammar of Science*, is stigmatized as 'one of the most reactionary of bourgeois theoreticians'.

(3) Statistics is a *social* science. According to Sobol it 'employs the theses of Marxism-Leninism in determining the indexes of social development'. That is, it measures the progress of Communist organization and production, thus becoming a form of State accounting. Lenin is quoted as saying that statistics must be popularized 'so that working people may gradually teach themselves to understand how much they must work and how much they can rest'. 'Statistics serves as a tool for the building of a Communist society.' To this we must agree in part. Statistics is indeed a tool, but one which, like any science, is within itself indifferent to the purposes for which it may be used. The sciences of physics and chemistry have produced instruments that may be used alternatively for destruction or for the enrichment and improvement of human life. I have no doubt that statistics is a useful tool in the construction of a Communist society, but it may equally be a tool for advancing the self-interest of the most monopolistic private enterprise. In the world at large, business organizations are, next to governments, the greatest users of statistical methods and data.

(4) Since statistics is a social science it is not concerned with the study of nature. Thus Nemchinov holds 'incorrect views' because he 'believes that mass phenomena with varying characteristics in any field of nature or social life are a subject for statistics. This thesis is fundamentally in conflict with Marxism'. Čermenskiy states tersely: 'Because statistics is a social science it is incorrect to say that the subject of its study should be mass phenomena of nature and society, as the bourgeois statisticians assert.'

It may be that the differences here are at least in part matters of definition. The existence of mass phenomena with varying characteristics in nature seems to be recognized, but their study is excluded from statistics. Presumably their study under some other name is not ruled out. If this be the case we would appear to require two different but parallel types of science: statistical statistics and statistical non-statistics. I gladly withdraw these terms in favour of any better ones.

(5) It follows from the preceding thesis that 'a universal science (of statistics) studying both natural and social phenomena' cannot exist. Belief in its existence reflects 'reactionary bourgeois views having nothing in common with Marxism'. 'There are no grounds for turning statistics into a universal science.'

The dilemma indicated in the preceding paragraph again confronts us. Suppose that in an Indian state I should correlate fluctuations in rainfall with the prevalence of certain insects. Since neither phenomena are social in a human sense, my research would apparently be one of non-statistics. Suppose I next should correlate the insect series with agricultural production. The latter involves human effort and is a factor in the economy.

I suppose it may therefore be termed 'social'. If so, my single calculation becomes simultaneously one of statistics and non-statistics. If I then take a further step, correlating agricultural production with some index of the standard of living, I am engaged wholly in statistics.

It is possible to maintain and work with such distinctions, just as it is possible to construct a model of astronomical movements placing the earth at the centre, in accordance with the Ptolemaic conception. Both things are possible but as science they are neither practicable nor useful. Among the goals of science are generality and simplicity – the effort to embrace the widest possible range of phenomena within the terms of the simplest possible laws or formulas. The denial of a place for natural phenomena within statistical generalizations to which, along with social phenomena, these generalizations are applicable, is anti-scientific in its implications and at variance with much human experience. An actuarial table for telephone poles is constructed in the same way as an actuarial table for human beings.

(6) The theory of probability is the hidden source of much evil in statistics. It hampers development. It is used by bourgeois statisticians to give the 'universal theory' the appearance of being scientific. Malyshev asserts that it is 'absolutely necessary' to do away with the universal theory 'if an end is to be put to formalism in the theory of statistics'. This 'formalism', or the 'formal-mathematical trend' has one of its principal origins in the 'law of large numbers'.

I leave as an unanswered question the reasons for this strong antagonism to the theory of probability. It was probably more than anyone else Tchebychev, the great Russian mathematician, and his colleagues, who should be credited with this basic statistical principle that is so vigorously denounced. I do not understand, however, that it is rejected as false when regarded as a theorem of mathematics. This attitude toward it is implied in references during the Moscow Conference to methods of quality control in industry. Mr A.M. Bryanskiy of the Central Statistical Administration asserted: 'The selective method of checking the quality of production in industry cannot be considered a statistical method. It is a mathematical method based on the use of the theory of probability.'

A further unanswered question is raised by the last statement as to Soviet attitudes toward methods of sampling. Ever since 1946, when Professor Mahalanobis proposed the creation of a United Nations Sub-Commission on Statistical Sampling and was made Chairman of that highly useful body, a place on the Sub-Commission has been held open for a Soviet nominee. A Soviet member has never been named because one has never been nominated, although the present writer was assured by Soviet representatives in the year mentioned that qualified experts in

sampling were to be found in their country. Are we to infer from this fact and from the words I have quoted that the work of this Sub-Commission and its members – P.C. Mahalanobis, G. Darmois, F. Yates, and W.E. Deming – together with that of its adviser, R.A. Fisher, is not to be regarded as statistics?

I do not wish to imply that there is nothing in this record with which those who are reared in the tradition of science can agree. For example, 'Soviet statisticians should be first-class economists and active builders of Communist society rather than non-participating recorders of phenomena.' I find in this a kernel of truth which is acceptable. Re-phrase the statement to read: 'Statisticians who handle economic data should be first-class economists', and I think that most statisticians, Soviet and non-Soviet alike, would concur. Again, Mikhaylov 'criticized those statisticians who deny the necessity of studying individual phenomena and assert that orderly behaviour is manifested only by mass quantities'. I am inclined to doubt the existence of many such people. Perhaps the propagandistic necessities of Lysenko's biological theories have conjured them into a hallucinatory existence. To the extent that they really do exist I would join Mikhaylov in his criticism.

When all of the possible explanations of seeming disagreement with Soviet statistical conceptions are recognized and conjoined with the partial agreements, there remains a deep gulf between generally accepted scientific postulates and Soviet conceptions. The obstacle to bridging, as I see it, is the dogmatic or theological character of the premises upon which Soviet thought is built. The writer, like others of his generation, was reared on the assumption that major conflicts in the world's arena between theological dogma and scientific reason had come to an end. It seemed axiomatic that scientists were both free and obligated to draw independent judgments from tested evidence, to be discarded or modified only in their clash with further evidence or the reasoned judgments of others. Such judgments were to be drawn by anyone entitled to be called a scientist without regard to the effects upon his own or others' preconceptions. Nor was this obligation challenged in the name of orthodoxy. Similarly, the right of an individual to find his God and seek his soul's salvation in his own way went unchallenged by science.

This youthful optimism now seems immature if not naive. Intellectual honesty, freedom of the mind, and the human dignity that accompanies uninhibited expression of honest opinion must once more be defended. Their defenders can take comfort in the assurance that the weapons of those who attack are obsolete and clumsy. Their morale is apparently not very good. It is doubtful if men in a free society who are armed with reason, tested evidence and independent judgment have cause for fear.

## THE SOVIET ARMY

J.M. Mackintosh

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There can be no doubt that of all the instruments of policy at the disposal of the Soviet Government at the present time, the Army is the most imposing and formidable. Its impressive size, and its halo of victories over the German Army during the Second World War, encourage the Soviet Government in its present uncompromising attitude and enable it to maintain its hold over the countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet leaders believe in force, and as the speeches at the Nineteenth Party Congress have shown, they intend to give their armed forces exceptional priority in the coming years.

But the Soviet Army is more than just an exceptionally large and powerful national defence force. It has a dual character which is the key to its own strength and weakness. Defence of the Soviet Union is only one of its roles in the eyes of the Government. Its victories are also intended to further the political aims of the ruling Party. It has been the constant fear of the Soviet leaders that the Army might come to question the identification of Party and State. On the one great occasion when the Party leaders persuaded themselves that the military chiefs had indeed begun to do so – in the years 1937-38 – they reacted with such violence that the purge resulted in the destruction of the entire Army high command and some 15,000 officers. It is only when we remember that the Soviet leadership insists on Army loyalty to the Party first and to the homeland second that we can understand the Soviet Army and the non-military factors which influence it.

Perhaps it is best to approach this subject from the viewpoint of the Soviet leaders. Having decided upon a peace-time standing Army of three million men, their problem is how to ensure maximum military efficiency together with a first-class security system and unquestioning political reliability and loyalty to the Party. Of these tasks the maintenance of military efficiency is the most straightforward, and there is no doubt that the authorities have succeeded in building up a formidable military machine. The Russian soldier is first-class military material, being physically tough, used to a hard life and ignorant of many of the comforts

to which Western nations are accustomed. Military discipline is Prussian in type. Saluting even of non-commissioned officers is strictly enforced, and a single case of omission may mean five days' close arrest. Absence without leave may be counted automatically as desertion, punishable by many years' forced labour. Military terminology for a soldier in the presence of an officer is rigidly laid down and adhered to: 'Permission to report' must be asked before a soldier can speak to a superior, and instead of 'Yes' and 'No' the soldier must say: 'Exactly so', and 'In no way, no' – a return to the practice of the Imperial Russian Army. Under the military code laid down in 1940, a soldier has no redress against an officer and no channels for an appeal against an order or a sentence. On occupation duty in Germany and Austria, Soviet troops are confined to barracks permanently after duty hours, and contact with the local population is absolutely forbidden. Army discipline in fact can be summed up in this way: an officer has unlimited power over those under his command and in extreme cases, even in peace-time, insubordination is punishable by execution on the spot.

As a fighting force the contemporary Soviet Army has the advantages of battle experience, self-confidence drawn from a long succession of victories, and experienced war leaders. The High Command is under the direction of the War Minister, Marshal Vassilievsky, who served during the war as Chief of the General Staff and Commander of the Front, or Army Group, which captured Koenigsberg in East Prussia. He has a number of Deputies – including it is believed, the most famous of Soviet officers, Marshal Zhukov – and he directs the Army through four main organs: the General Staff under General Shtemenko; the Command of the Land Forces under Marshal Koniev; the Rear and Supply Services under General Khruliov; and the Political Administration under General Shikin. The principal chain of command passes through the Headquarters of the Land Forces (comprising the commanders of the active arms of service) to the Military Districts into which the Soviet Union is divided – twenty-three in all. Each Military District is commanded by a Marshal or senior General, and according to its geographical position contains a large or small component of the Army's active and reserve formations. These may be organized in armies (as in the frontier districts), corps or divisions (in the more central districts). But the strength of a military district is to be reckoned in the number and type of divisions it contains. The bulk of the Army's strength lies in the rifle (infantry) divisions and motorized rifle divisions (the latter containing a greater proportion of motor transport). These divisions, which number about 11,000 men each, usually contain three rifle regiments, a regiment of artillery and an armoured regiment of fifty tanks. Secondly, there are the tank divisions,

of 10,500 men, containing three or four tank regiments and a motorized regiment. There are also larger mechanized divisions of 13,000 men, with three mechanized regiments and two tank regiments. The artillery, too, is organized in divisions: the field artillery division and the anti-aircraft division, both about 6,000 men in strength. Finally, there are some cavalry divisions of about 5,000 men. In an active force these are grouped in corps and armies. A corps would consist of two to three rifle divisions and a tank or mechanized division, and two or three such corps would make up a rifle army. The armoured formations are, however, also grouped in powerful mechanized armies with no corps organization, but with a strength of two tank and two mechanized divisions each. A rifle army would probably also have one or two artillery divisions at its disposal.

The basis of Soviet war doctrine and practice is the use of the Army's strength in mass formation. During the last war a superiority of eight to one over the enemy was regarded as the minimum for an offensive, and the Russians scored their greatest victories when a Front Commander was able to employ on one sector two tank armies of 1,500 tanks each. Over 20,000 guns were concentrated for the storming of Berlin in 1945. The rifle armies are used to effect breaches in the enemy lines, to attack fortified positions and to hold them against counter-attack, while the mechanized forces pour through the gaps to exploit the break-through. Everything is sacrificed to the aim of mobility in the mass, including the reduction of the Rear and Supply Services to the absolute minimum. Living off the country is the rule rather than the exception. The medical, engineering and signals services have to be content with the barest necessities and only in the branch of recovery and repair of damaged vehicles is there anything approaching what in the West would be regarded as a satisfactory complement of technicians and equipment. In action, considerable use is made of penal battalions for effecting suicide break-through operations. In fact, the whole structure and outlook of the Soviet Army on the military side is that of a rough but effective machine of great brute strength.

But military efficiency is not enough for the Government: it must have unquestioning political loyalty as well. This presents a serious problem, loyalty to one's homeland being a natural emotion, while readiness to die for a political regime is not. This is especially true in the Soviet Army, since the majority of recruits come from the collective farms where conditions of life lead to a constant struggle with the regime. The task of identifying the Russian soldier's natural love for his country with loyalty to the Party, is the main duty of that unique feature of the Soviet Army, the Political Administration. Attached to every headquarters, from the General Staff to battalion or company level, are representatives of the

Political Administration with the title of 'Deputy Commander for Political Affairs', or in Soviet terminology 'Zampolit'. In most units the Zampolit organizes two daily political sessions, an early morning reading of the newspapers, and lectures and discussions on political affairs after military training in the evening. He encourages men to join the Party and the Komsomol, runs the unit club and edits its newspaper. In general the Zampolit is supposed to have a hand in everything from discipline to sport, but his main functions are educational and propagandist. He works hand in glove with the officials of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of the Interior. The Soviet Government frankly acts on the principle that every citizen is a potential enemy of the State, especially during Army service when he has access to arms. Hence the troops of the Ministry of the Interior, and what are called the 'Special Sections' within the Army itself. The former are organized in regiments and divisions, trained and equipped to carry out the decisions of the Party even against the Army. They are in charge of deportations, they combat partisan activities, they maintain the security of State officials, and assist the frontier guards to patrol especially dangerous border areas. Allied with them is the 'Special Section', i.e. the network of agents within the regular Army. Representatives of the Special Section are attached to most formations and may summon any officer or man to prolonged interrogation; they recruit agents among the soldiers and generally create an impression that the eyes and ears of the Secret Police are everywhere.

The Army thus organized, trained, indoctrinated and supervised, has at its disposal vast resources of man-power and industry. National Service men serve normally for three years, and on completion of their active service are placed in the reserves, where they do a short period of training each year. In a statement made to the Nineteenth Party Congress on October 7th, the War Minister, Marshal Vassilievsky, stated that 60 per cent. of the present reserve officers and 90 per cent. of serving officers, from company commander upwards, have battle experience. In the sphere of military expenditure, the Budget accounts for a declared total of 23 per cent. for defence purposes, but since much of Soviet military expenditure is concealed in the budgets for the Ministries of the Interior, of Construction and of State Security, the true total is probably well over 26 per cent. In 1951 Mr Shinwell gave the figure of 5,000 armoured fighting vehicles as the annual output, and it is believed that the output of guns is over 20,000 a year.

How is this tremendous military machine deployed? The latest official information given by the British and American authorities is dated 1951, but there is no reason to suppose that any significant change has occurred in the last eighteen months. At that time the Soviet Army consisted of

175 rifle, mechanized, tank and cavalry divisions, with 40 artillery and anti-aircraft divisions in support. Of this total, 110 were rifle and cavalry and 65 armoured. In Germany there are 32 divisions, comprising 4 rifle 10 mechanized and 8 tank divisions, together with 2 artillery and 8 anti-aircraft divisions, grouped in 2 rifle armies and 4 mechanized armies. In immediate support are 2 tank and 2 mechanized divisions in Poland. There are 2 divisions (1 rifle and 1 mechanized) in Austria, and 2 mechanized divisions each in Hungary and Roumania. There are no Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria or Albania. In the whole of Eastern Europe there are, therefore, 42 divisions, 27 of them armoured. The strength of the Soviet armies in the Far East is believed to be not less than 40 divisions with 6 army headquarters. This leaves just over 100 divisions for the rest of the U S S R, 50 to 60 of which are probably west of a line drawn from Leningrad to Rostov-on-Don, and the remainder concentrated in the Caucasus and the Central Asiatic Republics. These concentrations are commanded by the outstanding field Commanders who emerged with high reputations from the recent war – men like General Chuikov in Germany, Marshal Malinovsky in the Far East, General Antonov and Fediuninsky in the Caucasus, Generals Pukhov and Grechko in the Ukraine, General Galitsky in the Carpathians, Generals Bagramian and Gorbатов in the Baltic, and General Luchinsky and Marshal Meretskov in Leningrad and the Far North. All commanded fronts or armies during the war, and are also considered to be thoroughly reliable politically.

In trying to list the credit and debit factors of the Soviet Army as a fighting force, there comes first on the credit side the high quality of the individual fighting man, his physical toughness, his contempt for hardships, and his readiness to accept a high rate of casualties. Second in importance are the vast human and industrial resources at the disposal of the High Command. Thirdly, there is the very considerable measure of success achieved by the Political Administration and the Secret Police in keeping the soldier ignorant of Western conditions – with one important exception to be mentioned below. Also on the credit side must go the skill and experience of Soviet Commanders at all levels, and particularly the excellence of Soviet artillery science. As against these positive factors there is the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion which stifles initiative and makes Commanders unwilling to accept responsibility in crises, outside a strictly limited range. Another serious weakness is the lack of educated men on the level of senior non-commissioned officers, skilled drivers and mechanical engineers capable of intricate maintenance, and this defect is becoming increasingly noticeable as the Soviet Army becomes more motorized and mechanized. Although the units for the recovery of

vehicles are more numerous than the medical units, the tendency is to drive a vehicle or a tank until it breaks down, with no attempt on the part of the individual driver to maintain it. While the rear services and communications have been simplified, increasing mechanization places strains on them which they are unlikely to withstand without more elaborate equipment.

Most important of all is the question of morale. It is true that the Political Administration works hard, and on the whole successfully, to keep the Army's morale high. But the Soviet soldier who served abroad, during or after the war, was undoubtedly impressed by the fact that defeated Germany enjoys a higher standard of living than victorious Russia, and when he goes home on leave the contrast becomes even more glaring. While the soldier expects severe discipline, he frequently receives sentences for minor misdemeanours whose savageness offends his sense of justice. He resents, too, the width of the gulf between soldiers and officers, whose conditions and pay are so much better than his. He cannot understand the need for the harsh restrictions forbidding all contact with the German population, and the severe penalties inflicted on any offender tend to make him feel that he is not the proud member of a victorious army, but a piece of cannon fodder. These grievances remain as yet beneath the surface, but they would undoubtedly play an important part in any future war in which the Soviet Union suffered a severe defeat. The Soviet Army is an impressive military machine, but if it has an Achilles heel, this is most likely where it is to be found.

## SOVIET AIR POWER

Asher Lee

The Author served in R A F Intelligence during the war and has published a book on the Soviet Air Force

Whatever the Soviet Government may state or imply to the contrary, the Soviet Air Force has been expanding steadily for the last five years. In 1947 both official and unofficial estimates of strength ranged about the figure of 15,000 operational aircraft. To-day the equivalent is more likely to be about 20,000. Like other statistics, these figures can be misleading. What kind of an air force does the U S S R possess? What are its strategy, its main technical developments, its operational strengths and weaknesses? In what way is it ahead of Western air forces, and where does the West hold the advantage?

The Soviet Air Force is not an independent organization, as is the Royal Air Force or the United States Air Force. The bulk of its squadrons are organized into air regiments, divisions and corps, and subordinate to the local Army command. There is also a separate naval air arm of over 3,000 planes, consisting of fighter, reconnaissance and torpedo-bomber squadrons, which are controlled operationally by the Soviet Navy. The Strategic Long-Range Command is, however, directly subordinate to the Supreme Defence Council. This Air Command, which includes some air transport squadrons, houses the expanding strategic bomber force of the U S S R. Finally, there is the Air Defence Command, which includes the equivalent of both the British Fighter and Anti-Aircraft Commands.

Of these various components, the tactical air forces subordinated to the Army are the most powerful, experienced and best trained. The West has nothing to compare with them at the moment. They comprise some 10,000 operational aircraft: fighters, light bombers and reconnaissance machines. Well over half of these are modern jets, such as the well-known MIG-15 fighter and the Tupolev twin jet. These two planes are the equivalent of the American Sabre and the British Canberra. Thus at the moment the Soviet tactical air arm is equipped with jet planes that can compete technically with anything the West can put against them. There are those who point to the three British supersonic fighter planes which were on show at Farnborough: the Javelin, Swift and Hunter. These are,

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of course, superior to the MIG-15. But early in October, during major air manoeuvres, the R A F Fighter Command Chief, Air Marshal Sir Basil Embry, was quoted as saying that none of these supersonic fighters were yet part of R A F standard equipment and that he had to rely at the moment on the Meteor and Vampire fighters which are becoming obsolescent by present standards. We can be fairly certain that the U S S R will keep abreast of the West in the development of fighter and light and medium bomber planes. The Army support air regiments are mobile, equipped with modern wireless and radio-telephone equipment, and they have learned much from the Luftwaffe, both during and after World War II. Western tactical air forces are much weaker and only America's tactical atomic weapons can equalize the situation in the next year or so.

The Soviet Union's general air strategy has been modified in three main ways since the end of the war against Germany. Much greater emphasis is now laid on strategic bombing, strategic fighter defence, and co-operation with the Navy. During the war, the Soviet Air Force was relatively weak in all three departments, but in those campaigns that did not matter much: the strategic bomber threat to the U S S R from the Luftwaffe was never very great. The main task of the Air Force was to support the Army in its land battles. Even the naval air squadrons were largely engaged in this work, operating from coastal bases. There were limited anti-shiping operations in the Black Sea and over the Baltic, but there was little German air opposition. The Soviet mine-laying, torpedo-bombing and anti-shiping bombing air effort rarely had any major effect on the naval situation in either the Black Sea or the Baltic. But now the whole emphasis of Soviet air strategy has shifted. Soviet submarines must be ready for sorties into the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, and since their potential hunting grounds are global, they will need a full measure of long-range air support. Now, too, for the first time in its history, the U S S R faces the possibility of heavy long-range air bombardment which can reach out to any of its cities and production centres. The previous threats from Germany and Japan were minor in comparison, for neither of these two Powers ever developed a serious strategic bomber force.

The Soviet Air Force has reacted vigorously to the new situation, but Russia's air defence problems are enormous. A major initial move after the war was the increasing production of radar equipment. German technicians, machine tools and equipment were carried off wholesale from the Siemens, Telefunken and Askania factories, and put to full use in Riga, Kiev, Moscow and other production centres. Early warning equipment, patterned on German models, was produced at high speed. Produc-

tion of television equipment, which competes to some extent with radar requirements, was given a lower priority. By the end of 1946 the Air Force was forming its first corps of radar signal units. Since then the early warning system, a key element in strategic air defence, has been constantly expanded and improved. Yet Russia is now learning, in the stern arbitrament of war, something of the complications of air defence, despite her radar and her modern jet planes: in Korea it is Soviet radar and signals experts, as well as Soviet guns and planes, that are helping the Chinese to defend the power plants near the Yalu river. In some ways this should not provide a very difficult defence problem, since American bombers must repeatedly return to the same target areas and tactical surprise is difficult. The area itself is small and the defenders can assemble a good concentration of MIG fighters and anti-aircraft guns, as well as a fairly thick radar screen for early warning. And yet the defence of these targets has been largely ineffective. The Soviet Air Force must expect similar failure if and when it attempts to defend fringe targets such as Port Arthur, Vladivostok and Leningrad. In attacks on these areas, raiding bombers would frequently have the advantage. In the defence of targets deep inland, such as the atomic development centre at Irkutsk, and of Moscow itself, Russia will be better placed.

What of the strategic bomber force? Until 1942 it was the Cinderella of the Air Force. It had to yield to the transport aircraft requirements of Russia's parachute and airborne cadres, or to the needs of the tactical air forces which supported the Army in the field. In the early 1930s Russia was the only country in the world that had a substantial force of four-engined heavy bombers, but by the outbreak of war her heavy bomber force was virtually non-existent. Since 1942, however, there has been a steady development which has accelerated over the past five years. Until 1946 there were less than 200 four-engined Tupolev and Petlyakov bombers with trained crews in the Long-Range Bomber Command, inferior in carrying capacity and in navigational skills to Lancaster and Flying Fortress squadrons. Russia had no equivalent to the American B-29 Superfortress which carried out the devastating air attacks on Japan. However, since 1946, the U S S R has built a force of several hundred Tu-4 heavy bombers which have a performance equal to the R A F Washington and Lincoln bombers. She still has no force of strategic bomber aircraft equal to the American B-36 in range and striking power. In fact, the U S S R is well behind the U S A in nearly all aspects of strategic bombing. But the Kremlin is conscious of these inadequacies, and designers such as Klimov and Ilyushin have been set to remedy them. It is certain that Russia will produce squadrons of long-range jet bombers in the late 1950s, and Soviet air designers will be equal to the task of

providing planes that can carry Russia's modest stock of atom bombs (currently and tentatively estimated at less than fifty) to any target area required.

The need to provide for a heavy bomber force has impeded plans to build up air transport squadrons for carrying parachute divisions and for increasing the mobility of the air squadrons. Moreover, in war-time the rail communications system will be particularly vulnerable to bombing. Long-range sea-mining can also slow up Soviet sea communications, and the ports are especially exposed to air attack. All this means that the demand for transport aircraft will be very great in time of war. There are substantial numbers of four-engined transport aircraft, but Russia needs a force of at least 5,000 of these to meet her practical requirements, and she has less than half that strength at the moment. Nor is there any sign yet that Russia is building jet transport planes such as the Comet, Britannia and Princess, which can carry bigger loads, faster and for greater distances.

In many ways the Soviet Navy is the least important of the fighting services. The Soviet empire is largely land-locked, and lack of aircraft carriers and battleships will not seriously affect the Soviet fighting machine. This is an age in which naval surface vessels require more and more air cover and the striking power of the air arm is becoming heavier. Battleships and cruisers are becoming obsolescent as fighting units. A surface fleet is not a vital element in Soviet naval power. If the U S S R can convert its force of 300 submarines into an effective ocean-going striking force, and protect its merchant ships in the Black Sea, the Baltic and coastal waters from bombing and mines, its forces will have fulfilled the main naval tasks called for.

In a global conflict the Soviet Air Force would have more than enough to do. If the struggle could be confined to Europe, it could be an efficient fighting machine. There is the rub: American strategic air power dilutes the efficiency of the Soviet Air Force and challenges it in a sphere in which it is inexperienced and uncertain. There is another general factor which must be acting as a deterrent in both the East and the West: new weapons, including guided missiles, atomic artillery, guided aircraft and supersonic fighters and bombers are developing so rapidly that air planners cannot nowadays plan with any confidence. It is harder to-day to look five years ahead aeronautically than in any previous period of the flying machine's half century. The Russians must know this, and it may be assumed that their air planners will proceed with caution.

## FORCED LABOUR IN SOVIET SOCIETY

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When the Bolsheviks set out to create a new social order after their seizure of power, both their friends and their enemies were agreed that there were only two alternative prospects for the future. Either (as socialists hoped and anti-socialists feared) they would succeed in building up a classless society free from the profit motive and the 'extraction of surplus value' from the workers, or else (as anti-socialists hoped and socialists feared) they would revert in essentials after a brief period of experiment to the type of bourgeois society which they had repudiated. What neither the sympathetic nor the hostile observers of Bolshevism anticipated was that the new society would exhibit phenomena characteristic neither of the future socialist order anticipated by Marxism, nor of the contemporary bourgeois-democratic order evolved by Western civilization, but of ancient and primitive societies as known to the historian and anthropologist. Yet this is what has happened in Russia in many respects since the beginning of the Stalinist era, and in none more remarkably than in the large-scale revival of the institution of slavery. The use of forced labour, as now practised in the Soviet Union, certainly has no place in the picture of the future as formerly imagined by socialists (including the original Bolsheviks themselves), but neither is it a continuation of the usages of a modern capitalist economy. The sociologist who seeks standards of reference and comparison for the study of this phenomenon must go back at least to the days of plantation slavery in the West Indies or the American South, and better still to the empires of the ancient world, where slavery formed the basis of the economic system.

During the nineteenth century, under conditions of bourgeois democracy, the doctrine that the use of slave labour is not only immoral but also inherently unprofitable became an axiom of capitalist economics, and the assumption that this principle holds good absolutely, for all possible social conditions, has commonly been made by writers commenting on the concentration camp systems of modern totalitarian states. Thus Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their book *Soviet Communism: a New Civilization?* which became the bible of fellow-travellers in the 'thirties, sharply criticized the account of Soviet forced-labour camps given by Professor

Chernavin, a Russian scientist who was sentenced to a term in one of the White Sea camps and escaped into Finland in 1932:

His naive belief that this and other penal settlements are now maintained and continuously supplied with thousands of deported manual workers and technicians, deliberately for the purpose of making out of this forced labour a net pecuniary profit to add to the state revenue, will be incredible to anyone acquainted with the economic results of the chain-gang, or of prison labour, in any country in the world.

Having thus dismissed the idea that there could be any motive of economic exploitation in the Soviet penal camp system, and being convinced that large-scale repressive measures were unavoidable in the making of the socialist revolution, the Webbs were disposed to take a favourable view of what they called 'the constructive work of the Ogpu'. The pages in which they dealt with this delicate subject (Vol. II, pp. 584-594) betray indeed certain moral qualms, but these appear to have been set at rest by a letter in the *Moscow Daily News*, allegedly written by a prisoner in one of the camps and quoted with great satisfaction by the Webbs to show how the prisoners themselves appreciated the good intentions of the Ogpu (as it then was) in using their labour for such projects as the construction of the canal joining the White Sea and the Baltic:

In the Karelian woods, in the barracks of the technical workers, I first learned the meaning of real work, and what it means to be an engineer who has behind him the persistent energy of a mass of workers who know what they are working for. At my age I cannot philosophize much, but the idea of rehabilitating wayward people by means of constructive labour is a wonderfully healthy and beautiful one.

It did not occur to the Webbs in their sweet simplicity of mind (which fell short only of the perfect gullibility of Henry Wallace on his conducted tour of Siberia in 1944) that this letter could have been written under dictation or even composed in the offices of the *Moscow Daily News*. For the Webbs it was evidence that the Ogpu was really engaged in works, not only of engineering construction, but also of 'human regeneration'. The belief that the forced labour system of the Soviet Union is without economic motive is also shared, however, by writers who are at the opposite pole to the Webbs in their judgement of the Soviet regime. Thus Hannah Arendt, who in her book *The Burden of Our Time* regards the Stalinist state as a system of totalitarian domination no longer pursuing any purpose of social welfare, nevertheless considers the mass arrests and deportations to be entirely political and not at all economic in aim:

It is undeniable, to be sure, that the NKVD periodically rounds up a percentage of the Soviet population and sends them into camps which are known under the flattering misnomer of forced-labour camps; yet although

it is quite possible that this is the Soviet Union's way of solving its unemployment problem, it is also generally known that the output in those camps is infinitely lower than that of ordinary Soviet labour and hardly suffices to pay the expenses of the police apparatus.

It is not possible, however, to infer that slave labour is unprofitable simply because the output of the slave is lower than that of the free labourer. The basic question is one of cost. In a given situation the cost of obtaining free labour may be so much higher than that of employing a slave that it more than cancels the advantage of the higher productivity of the free worker. The prevalence of slavery in certain phases of social evolution is not due merely to an erroneous belief in its profitability, but to particular economic conditions. As Viljoen, following Nieboer, explains the matter in *The Economics of Primitive Peoples*:

The necessity for the employment of forced rather than free labour depends on whether the resources of a country are open or closed. In a community with open resources, and especially with free land, the means of subsistence are available to all. Labour, in such a society, is the most important factor of production, for anyone with nothing but his own ability is able to make a living independently of the capitalist or landlord. Free labourers, therefore, are not likely to offer themselves for employment; certainly not for the rude and uninteresting kinds of work . . . men must be induced to work in such a society, and such compulsion usually takes the form of slavery. Where all the free resources have been appropriated, conditions are different. People who are destitute of land or capital are obliged to work for the possessors of property. Slaves are therefore not necessary.

Slaves are provided in early societies partly by conviction for criminal offences (including unpaid debts and violation of religious taboos) and partly by capture in war (including civil war and the suppression of revolts against the ruling authority). Slavery was specially prevalent in periods of the formation of empires, when wars of conquest and punishment for rebellion supplied great numbers of slaves, while rapid economic development created opportunities for using them. Slavery tended to decline when political consolidation produced more stable and orderly conditions, while the growth of population to the extreme limits of available resources at the given technological level of the economy produced a proletariat which an employer could hire for wages near subsistence level without the initial capital outlay of purchasing the worker. Such a development can be traced in various societies, though often modified by those fixations which preserve social institutions long after the conditions which gave rise to them have disappeared. Moral objections to slavery also played a part in its decline; the higher religions have usually disapproved of the treatment of human beings as mere chattels. Moral

objections, nevertheless, were not powerful enough to prevent a revival of slavery when in the course of history situations economically favourable to slavery recurred. In the seventeenth century slavery was extinct in Western Europe (except for a limited use of convicts in mines and galleys), but the shortage of labour for the lucrative tropical agriculture of the West Indies led to the import of slaves captured in African tribal wars. The existence of plantation slavery became a major political issue for both Britain and the United States in the early nineteenth century; in both cases the ultimate outcome was abolition, but only after an obdurate resistance by the slave-owning interest.

In an industrial capitalist economy slave labour ceases to be profitable. The costs for the private *entrepreneur* of carrying on business with slaves are threefold – purchase, guarding and upkeep; the first two charges are not incurred in hiring free labour, and as long as wages in the free market are kept low, as they are in the 'classic' period of capitalism, the difference from the cost of slave upkeep is not sufficient to offset the special costs of slave-owning. The capitalist may indeed have inherited ownership of slave families, so that he does not have to purchase new slaves, but he still has to maintain the slave children until they are old enough to work. In any case, the possession of a labour force of fixed size is quite unsuitable for the highly competitive and mobile economy of pure private capitalism. The *entrepreneur* needs to be able to take on more workers when business is good and lay them off when business is bad, but if he purchases slaves in a time of commercial boom, he makes a capital investment in workers who in time of slump must either be maintained in idleness or sold off at cut prices.

Under conditions of bourgeois democracy, which allow the workers to combine in trade unions and exert political influence in the state, the bargaining position of the worker in relation to the capitalist becomes stronger, and the direct and indirect costs of labour in the economic system tend to rise. Theoretically they may rise to the point at which it would again be economically profitable for an employer to make use of slaves. But the same process of democratic development which increases the cost of free labour also gives it the power to prevent a revival of slavery, for it is necessarily the class interest of organized free labour to exclude the possibility for employers to undercut wage rates by bringing in unpaid workers.

The economic exploitation of forced labour by the state is likewise normally excluded in a capitalist democracy, though for rather different reasons. The state possesses a number of prisoners who have been sentenced for criminal offences, and it could use their labour without incurring the special charges of purchase and guarding which fall on the private

slave-owner, for the state does not have to buy its convicts and it maintains a prison administration for guarding them in any case. But there is strong objection from both the capitalist class and organized free labour to the exploitation of this labour by the state in business enterprises. The private capitalists are opposed to competitive extensions of state trading, especially if carried on with an unfair advantage of cheap labour, and the free workers insist that the state, no less than the private employer, should hire labour at trade union rates. Apart from this opposition from the main class interests in society, the prison population is in any case too small in a liberal democracy to be a serious economic factor. A liberal jurisprudence aims at keeping the number of offences punishable with imprisonment to a minimum and ensuring that only persons who have actually committed such offences shall be imprisoned. But this means that the number of convicts is never adequate for really large-scale economic enterprises. It can only become so if the intake of ordinary criminals is supplemented either by captives taken in war or by mass arrests of large categories of the population on racial or political grounds.

No less decisive is the restraint on severity in the treatment of prisoners imposed by law and public opinion in a liberal democracy. The effective exploitation of slave labour always involves great cruelty, with death as the ultimate sanction for refusal or failure to do adequate work. But in the evolution of the Western democracies penal reform has always gone hand in hand with general political development; even the criminal is regarded as possessing human rights and being under the protection of the law. Abuses occur in prison administration even in the most enlightened democratic society – for the prisoner is always at a disadvantage in complaining against his gaoler – but nothing approaching the systematic cruelty required for real exploitation of prison labour can be practised without publicity and protest. Not many years ago the chain-gang system, which persisted in parts of the United States, was abolished after exposure by the press of cases of atrocity had coincided with the production of a harrowing film under the title *I am a Fugitive from a Chain-gang*.

If, however, we turn from the conditions prevailing in modern Western democratic societies to those which exist under a totalitarian Communist regime, we are confronted with a state of affairs in which the considerations listed above no longer hold good. In the first place, the state is restrained from using slave labour neither by private capitalists, for there are none, nor by organized free labour, for the trade unions have become mere organs of the despotic state. Secondly, the state does not restrict its convict class to ordinary criminals, but arrests and deprives of freedom vast numbers of people who by Western liberal standards have committed no offence. Thirdly, all these prisoners in the hands of the M V D

(the successor to the former OGPU and N K V D) are unprotected by law or public opinion, for the M V D, as the mainstay of the regime, is above the law (except for its own internal regulations) and has the power to prevent any public exposure or criticism of its actions. In these circumstances there can be no doubt, on the evidence available, that the Soviet state does make convict labour pay, in the sense that it carries out projects at a lower cost than would be required if free labour were used. This applies especially to development schemes in Arctic Russia, Siberia and Central Asia, where on account of the harsh climate or primitive conditions of life special inducements would be necessary in order to bring about a migration of free labour. Theoretically, no doubt, the powers of the Soviet state with its planned economy are such that it can direct its citizens to work anywhere, at any wage rates and under any conditions it chooses to fix. But it would be politically dangerous, even in a totalitarian society, to apply such pressure indiscriminately to the people at large. Instead, a special labour force is sorted out from the population without provoking general resistance, for all convictions are at least nominally for offences against the law (even if only for the crime of being a 'socially dangerous element') and the ordinary citizen continues to believe that by never blotting his copybook he can avoid the fate of being 'sent away.'

Convict labour is made productive in the Soviet Union by a system in which food rations are carefully graded according to the prisoner's work. He (or she) is assigned a daily quota of work (roughly the maximum which can be expected of an able-bodied person) and if he fulfils it, he receives the full food ration plus a small money wage with which he can buy extra food or tobacco at the camp commissary. But if, for whatever reason, he falls short of the quota he receives a smaller ration and no wage; if he keeps on failing to reach the quota he soon suffers so seriously from malnutrition that he can do even less work and then receives a still smaller ration. The vicious circle ends with consignment to the 'death file', which means that the idle or unfit worker is left to die of starvation. Refusal to work, insubordination, or attempts at escape are more directly punished by shooting.

The working of the system is thus described by Elinor Lipper, the Belgian-born Communist who was arrested in Moscow in 1937 during the Great Purge and spent eleven years in Soviet prisons and camps:

If a prisoner does not meet his labour quota 100 per cent., he cannot keep body and soul together very long. Therefore it is to his own interest to use every ounce of his available strength to earn his daily twenty-one (for women) or twenty-eight and a half (for men) ounces of bread. The managers of Dalstroy, the trust in charge of exploiting Kolyma [the gold-mining area of north-eastern Siberia], are interested in fulfilling the plan by more

than 100 per cent. In the first place, they all thereby serve the state; in the second place, they earn decorations; and in the third place, the state then showers the top rulers of Kolyma with annual bonuses amounting to fifty and a hundred thousand roubles apiece.

In order to gain these rewards the managers aim at cutting costs in every possible way at the expense of the prisoners. An example given by Elinor Lipper is the saving on prisoners' clothing effected by Dalstroy. Berzin, the first general manager of the Kolyma goldfields, provided fur tunics and felt boots for men working in a region which boasts the world's record for winter cold. But after Berzin, as an associate of Yagoda, had been recalled to Moscow and shot in 1937, his successor substituted wadded jackets and canvas shoes. The result was a great increase in mortality and disablement from frostbite. The influx of prisoners, however, was sufficient to fill all gaps and the authorities were quite indifferent to the human aspect of the reduction in cost. Similarly, the abundance of convict labour enables the managers to dispense with the most elementary replacements of human muscle, as used in the time of the Pharaohs. Thus timber cut in the forests has to be carried on the backs of men and women, because neither mechanical nor animal transport is provided.

It must be said, in fairness to the Soviet institution of slavery, that it is, generally speaking, free from the kind of sadistic cruelty which was characteristic of Nazi concentration camps. This is due to a fundamental difference of purpose in the two systems. The Nazi concentration camp was a place of extermination and torment; the Soviet prison camp is a place for the exploitation of labour. The inmates of Nazi camps were not used for productive enterprises except during the war, and then the labour was managed, not by the S S but by the Speer organization. The S S were torturers and executioners; they left industry to the capitalists. Their economic activities were confined to robbing those whom they arrested, collecting their clothing and gold teeth fillings when they were murdered in gas chambers, and using their ashes as fertilizer after they had been cremated. The M V D, on the other hand, have made a most successful combination of police organization and big business. They conduct their economic enterprises with efficiency as a sector of the Soviet planned economy, and they do not wish to kill off their labour force over and above the high mortality consequent on the ruthless cutting of costs. The Soviet state puts to death those whom it regards as really dangerous (such as disaffected Red Army officers or Polish officer prisoners of war), but the millions who are sentenced to forced labour camps are not meant to be killed wantonly. Except in certain special disciplinary camps which have a terrible reputation, Soviet camp guards are not permitted to indulge in the pleasures of Dachau or Buchenwald.

The profits of the slave system are divided between the trust managers and the state. It is clear that the trust managers, who receive bonuses proportionate to their success in achieving the maximum production for the minimum cost, have as strong a motive for exploiting the labour under their control as any capitalist employer has ever had. It may be held, however, that the state's profit is impersonal and detached from any private interest. It might even be argued that, though some individuals may suffer excessively from the forced labour system, there is an overall benefit to the community through the results achieved and that it is indeed 'socialist construction', not to be compared with the economic operations of classical, feudal or bourgeois society. But even the state's share in the proceeds of Dalstroy and similar enterprises is not untainted by motives of private profit. The enrichment of the state goes to the general purposes of the Soviet budget, but one of these purposes is feathering the nests of the ruling group which controls, though it does not formally own, all the means of production in the society. The share of the national income absorbed by the upper strata of the Soviet bureaucracy, in salaries, bonuses, perquisites and allowances, remains one of the most carefully guarded secrets of the regime, but there is enough evidence to indicate that this parvenu class is not less greedy than any governing officialdom known to history – even though, within four decades of a proletarian revolution, it is still shy of displaying its wealth. Alex Weissberg, the Austrian scientist whose book *Conspiracy of Silence* is one of the most illuminating documents for the study of Soviet society, records a discussion with a friend in prison on this subject:

Bogutzki had often told me of the life Kossior had led before his arrest.

'But', I objected, 'a leading statesman must be freed from material worries. I see nothing wrong in the fact that a man like Kossior should earn 6,000 roubles a month while I, say, earn only 1,000'.

'Say 60,000 roubles a month perhaps, and even then you've mentioned only a part of the sum a man like that costs the State', Bogutzki replied.

The rewards for loyal service to the chief henchmen of the dictatorship have been increasing ever since 1932, when Stalin reversed Lenin's policy of restricting the personal incomes of Communist Party members. The lavish generosity of the Leader to his favourites (not to speak of such trifles as Stalin Peace Prizes for the Dean of Canterbury and his kind) is financed from a state revenue to which slave labour makes an important contribution. Slavery is a vested interest, not only for the managers of Dalstroy, but also for the 'boyars of the bureaucracy' who do not directly participate in such enterprises.

From the foregoing considerations it is possible to give a provisional answer to the question whether maintenance of the supply of slave labour

is a motive in the scale of arrests carried out by the M V D. Slavery is certainly profitable in the Soviet economy, and Professor Chernavin was not as 'naive' as the Webbs supposed in believing that there was an element of slave-raiding in the activity of the secret police. On the other hand, large-scale political terror is in any case an essential part of the system of totalitarian dictatorship, both for the elimination of elements of the people regarded as undesirable and for the intimidation of those who remain. Mass arrests would no doubt take place even if no profitable use could be made of the prisoners' labour. But the fact that the state and its rulers gain rather than lose economically by the transformation of large numbers of free citizens into slaves lends additional vigour and comprehensiveness to the purging process – so that, for example, when during the last war there was disaffection among certain minor nationalities of the Soviet Union – the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Balkars and Kalmuks – the authorities made no attempt to sort out the subversive elements, but deported these peoples to forced-labour camps *en masse*. In the Soviet penal system the motives of political power and economic profit go hand in hand, each reinforcing the other in a wonderful harmony of purpose. The one end which most certainly is *not* promoted by it is the ideal of socialism.

## THE RUSSIAN COLONIAL EMPIRE

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It is a commonplace that the Habsburg Empire fell because its rulers could not satisfy the conflicting claims of its nationalities. It is less widely known that the Soviet Union is a multi-national State. Of its 200 million inhabitants nearly half are not Russians. According to Communist propaganda their mutual relations are a happy friendship and brotherhood, such as cannot even be imagined where Western landowners, capitalists and imperialists hold sway. The miracle can be achieved only in 'the land of socialism', where all alike bask in the sunshine diffused by the scientific healer of nationalist passions, the teacher of genius of all progressive humanity.

So profound is Western ignorance of the Soviet nationalities, so great the desire of Western people to find some good in the Soviet system, that this propaganda picture has long passed for reality in the West. Only recently have independent Western writers begun to study this subject. The first volume of Professor Carr's *Bolshevik Revolution* contains a valuable summary of Soviet doctrine on national problems. Several studies have appeared by American and British scholars on particular national problems at particular periods. Periodicals and pamphlets published by exiles from the Soviet Union contain material on recent history.\* The most serious attempt at a general survey is the recent book by Mr Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*.† For those who wish to understand Soviet nationality policy, and its bearing on both Soviet foreign policy and the action of Communist parties in Asia, Mr Kolarz is a learned, level-headed and reliable guide. His book deserves to be widely read, for this

\* For example, *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920*, by J. Reshetar, Princeton University Press, 1952; articles on the Bashkir national movement 1918-20 by R.E. Pipes (*Russian Review*, October 1950) and by Mary Holdsworth on Soviet policy in Central Asia (*Soviet Studies*, January 1952); *Narodoubiistvo v SSSR* (Genocide in the U S S R), by A. Avtorhanov, Munich, 1952, dealing with the fate of the Chechens of the North Caucasus. Of the various periodicals issued by exiles of the Soviet nationalities, I have found the most useful factual material in *Türkeli* (Munich).

† George Philip & Son Ltd., 25s.

is a subject of great practical importance for both statesmen and public opinion in the West. Here only a few of the main features of the problem can be noted.

Moscow's treatment of the non-Russian nationalities varied, during the successive phases of the Soviet regime, in much the same way as its treatment of its subjects as a whole. In the first months of the Bolshevik dictatorship the nationalities, like the workers and the peasants, were offered a paradise of freedom and happiness. During the civil war, non-Russian political groups were alternately supported as popular movements, or persecuted as bourgeois reactionaries, according to the needs of the military situation. In the years of N E P a measure of self-government was allowed to the nationalities, within the framework of the overall Bolshevik dictatorship. At this time official doctrine abhorred equally the two 'deviations' of 'Great Russian chauvinism' and 'local bourgeois nationalism', but in practice the central Government denounced the first more severely than the second. This official emphasis was, however, differently obeyed or disregarded in different areas. In the Ukraine it was carried out: the Bolshevik rulers of the Ukrainian S S R were to some extent Ukrainian home-rulers as well as Bolsheviks. In Central Asia it was ignored: the exponents of Communism in Turkestan were almost all Russians, and 'Soviet power' meant power of Russian bureaucrats over Turkish or Iranian peasants. The First Five-Year Plan brought a fierce onslaught on self-government in all non-Russian areas. The chief sufferer was the Ukraine. The first purge of Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalists' occurred in 1930. Three years later, when the death from starvation of several million Ukrainian peasants, caused by Moscow's policy of forcible collectivization and requisitions, inflamed Ukrainian nationalist feeling against Moscow, a bigger purge swept away many leading Ukrainian Communists. The most eminent, the Commissar for Education, Skrypnyk, anticipated arrest by suicide. In Central Asia, collectivization caused mass famine among the nomad herdsmen: a comparison of the census figures of 1926 and 1939 shows that about 1,500,000 Kazakhs, some 40 per cent. of the whole Kazakh nation, 'disappeared' during this period. Of the comparatively small number of Central Asians who occupied leading positions in the Communist parties many were removed by the drive against 'bourgeois nationalism' in the early 1930's. At the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party in 1934, Stalin himself laid down that local nationalism was in many areas a more dangerous 'deviation' than Great Russian chauvinism. This change of emphasis has remained valid to the present time.

The monster purge of 1937-38 - the *Yezhovshchina* - involved a massacre of the leading Communists of the nationalities. In the Ukraine, Postyshev,

the organizer of the 1933 purge, himself succumbed, together with all nine members of the Ukrainian Politburo, all 12 members of the Ukrainian Council of Commissars, and 45 out of 57 members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In the Transcaucasian S S R's and the North Caucasian A S S R's about 4 per cent. of the population were arrested, and all leading Communists disappeared except Stalin's two faithful henchmen, the Georgian Beriia and the Azerbaidjani Bagirov, who have survived to the present day. In Central Asia, too, a clean sweep was made. The Uzbek Communist leaders, Hodzhaev and Ikramov, figured in the show trial of Bukharin in 1938: the Communist leaders of the other Central Asian S S R's disappeared without publicity. A further stage was reached during the Second World War. The Volga Germans, some 400,000 strong, were deported from their homes already in 1941. Later on the principle was established that if the authorities considered that a large number of members of any national group had helped the German invaders, or even had showed insufficient enthusiasm for the Soviet war effort, then the whole nation should be deported from its homeland to an unknown destination in the interior of the Soviet Union. This fate overtook the Tatars of the Crimea, the Kalmyks of the Caspian steppes, and the Karachay, Chechen and Ingush peoples of the North Caucasus.

The manner of the deportation of the Chechen nation recalls the infamous Massacre of Glencoe of 1691, usually regarded as one of the blackest episodes in British history. Like the Campbell troops in Glencoe, the Russian M V D troops came to the Chechen mountain villages as friends, and were received as friends in Chechen houses. After they had been there some weeks came Red Army Day, February 23rd, 1944. The troops celebrated the occasion by songs and dances in the village squares. The villagers assembled to watch them. In the middle of the festivities orders were suddenly given to arrest all male civilians. On the following days, large numbers of the men were shot, and the rest, together with their women and children, were herded into lorries and transported to the railway. There they were packed into trucks and slowly removed, in the Russian winter, to their distant destinations. Accounts of refugees, who had seen Chechen deportees in Central Asia at a later date, suggest that about half died of hunger, exposure and disease during the journey. The scattered survivors have no schools or press in their own language. More than half a million Chechens have been destroyed as a nation.

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The triple centralization of the political bureaucracy, the economic planning hierarchy, and the Communist Party, reinforced by the purges

of the 1930's and the post-war repression, have destroyed any vestige of national self-government that existed in the 1920's. This is true of the whole of the Soviet Union. The worst effects are felt, however, in the more backward areas, such as Central Asia. As even less is known in the West about these areas than about the Ukraine or the Baltic Republics, it may be well here to devote a little space to them.

Since 1929, industrialization has made gigantic strides in Asiatic Russia. But its benefits to the local nationalities are doubtful. The growth of such industrial centres as Ufa, Karaganda and Tashkent has provided Bashkirs, Kazakhs and Uzbeks with jobs as unskilled labourers: the skilled workers and the engineers are Russians, and to a lesser extent Ukrainians, Armenians or Georgians, imported from outside. During the First Five-Year Plan thousands of uprooted Kazakh and Bashkir nomads were forced to work in the new industrial plants in the Urals. Appalling living conditions, unfamiliar climate, and moral bewilderment caused by the sudden destruction of their traditional way of life all contributed to their very high death-rate.

Since 1929 the agricultural production of Central Asia has been re-organized in the interest of Moscow. The Moscow planners have needed cotton, and Central Asia is the most suitable part of the Soviet Union to produce it. Therefore the Central Asian peasants, forced into collective farms at great cost in human lives, and still greater cost in livestock, were ordered by Moscow to grow cotton. Food grains were to be imported from European Russia or Siberia. Thereby the weapon of hunger was placed in Moscow's hands to bend the people of Turkestan to its will. The British have often been criticized for encouraging cotton production at the expense of grain in Egypt. But at least the Egyptian cotton-grower has had a better price than he would have had for grain, and no British Government ever considered withholding grain from Egypt in order to starve Egypt into submission. Egyptian politicians were able to denounce British imperialism in general, and cotton policy in particular. But Uzbek politicians who resisted Moscow's agricultural plans for Uzbekistan were 'unmasked as bourgeois nationalists' and paid the supreme penalty.

Both industrial development and agricultural changes have brought an influx of Russians into Central Asia, as industrial experts and as farmers. Between 1926 and 1939, the proportion of Kirgiz in the Kirgiz Republic fell from about 67 per cent to 50 per cent. In 1938, less than a quarter of the students at the university of Kazakhstan, in Alma Ata, were Kazakhs. Undoubtedly many new schools, high schools and universities have been created in Central Asia since the Revolution, but they are designed principally for the Russian colonists. The great majority of industrial specialists and political administrators in Central Asia are Russians. The members

of the Councils of Ministers of the S S R's are usually Asians, with the significant exceptions of the Ministers of State Security. But the heads of departments within the Ministries are usually Russians. The First Secretaries of the Communist Party at Republican and provincial level are usually Asians, but the Second Secretaries, and in most cases also the Party secretaries in charge of propaganda, are Russians. The real business of Government and Party is done by these Russians, who communicate directly with their superiors in Moscow, by-passing their nominal Asian chiefs.

Soviet policy has been based from an early stage on the old principle of 'divide and rule'. In this it shows itself the heir to Imperial Russian policy. Already at the turn of this century, the Volga Tatars, socially and culturally the most advanced of the Russian Moslems, were gaining influence among their co-religionists. Tatars provided a large part of the intelligentsia of Moslem Russia, and used their influence to strengthen the notion of the unity of all Russian Moslems, and especially of those who spoke Turco-Tatar languages. The Imperial authorities resisted them, not only by repressive measures, but also by doing all they could to stress differences of dialect or of social customs between individual Moslem groups. The Soviet regime has developed this practice more 'scientifically'. Dialects are magnified into languages, tribes into nations. Tatars and Bashkirs are treated as two nations. In the 1920's the Khanates of Bokhara and Khiva were abolished, and together with the previous Russian administrative units of Turkestan were reshaped into five Republics – Turkmen, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz and Tadjik – which in due course became fully fledged S S R's. Since then these 'nations' have been kept as separate from each other as possible. All are encouraged to have close contact with Moscow, but little if any with each other. The Soviet Government's motive was not solicitude for the ethnical purity of the Central Asian 'nations', but simply the desire to divide in order the better to dominate.

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It is doubtful how successful the Soviet rulers have been in their attempt to denationalize the peoples of the Union, to reduce them to a common denominator of *homo sovieticus*. One effect of industrialization has been to create a more numerous Asian intelligentsia. Though education in Asiatic Russia serves principally the local Russians, Asians too make use of it. Though the proportion of educated persons among the Asians is much lower than among the Russians, it is much higher than it was among the Asians before 1929. Moscow hopes that these educated Asians will be won over by the regime which has given them their opportunity, that they

will become the exponents of Moscow's policy among their own people. It is probable that those Asians who enter the upper caste of Soviet society are treated as equals by their Russian fellow-members of the caste. There is no colour bar in Soviet Russia, and there was none even in Imperial Russia.

But the problem is not so simple as that. In pre-1914 Hungary, Slovaks or Serbs or Roumanians who rose through the Hungarian education system were able to pursue careers without suffering discrimination, provided that they regarded themselves, not as Slovaks or Serbs or Roumanians, but as Hungarians. Yet as education became more widespread, the number of educated Slovaks and Serbs and Roumanians who insisted on retaining their original nationality, and devoting their talents and skill to the service of their own nation in its struggle against political domination by the Hungarians, steadily grew. In France there is no colour bar against colonials who have attained higher education. Yet the French-educated intellectuals of Vietnam, Tunis, Madagascar or the Ivory Coast have tended increasingly to act not as exponents of French policy among their own people, but as champions of their own people's national movements against the French.

It is difficult to believe that the same is not the case with the Asian intellectuals in the Soviet Union. They cannot be unaware of the appalling sufferings of their own peoples. That they should be indifferent to these sufferings would be a contradiction of the experience of all colonial empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Such facts as are available from Soviet Asia give the opposite impression. There is evidence that, despite persecution and propaganda, Islam still has a strong hold not only over the peasants but also over the intelligentsia. The constant purges of the leading Communists of the S S R's are evidence of persistent nationalism among the Soviet-created ruling class of the nationalities. The purges have continued even in the period of relative post-war stability. The Kazakh S S R received a new Prime Minister at the end of 1951, the Uzbek Communist Party a new First Secretary in 1950. Both the Government and the Party leadership of the Georgian S S R were drastically purged in 1952. Even more revealing is the purge of literature and history in all the Moslem S S R's in the last years. The official history of Kazakhstan, published in 1943, was rejected by the authorities as suffering from bourgeois nationalist errors. The revised version appeared in two volumes in 1949 and 1950. Early in 1951 the Kazakh Party authorities decided that this, too, was unacceptable. The purge of history and literature has been extended during 1951 and 1952 to the North Caucasus and to the Azerbaidjan, Turkmen, Uzbek and Kirgiz S S R's. The past anti-Russian rebellions and wars of these nations, previously praised by Communist

writers as anti-imperialist, are now interpreted as reactionary revolts, instigated by Turkish or British agents, against the progressive influence of Russian civilization. Moscow's determination to deprive the Moslem peoples even of their dead heroes shows its fear of the national consciousness of the new Moslem intelligentsia. Moscow, in fact, faces an unpleasant dilemma. In order to develop the economic resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia it needs educated people from these nations. But every Asian intellectual it produces is a potential leader of nationalist resistance to Moscow.

The peoples of Soviet Asia suffer from a threefold tyranny. Their workers are exploited in the same way as the European proletariat in the worst days of early capitalism, their peasants have exchanged serfdom to the nobility for serfdom to the State. All classes alike are subject to totalitarian terror. All nations alike are subject to an alien central government in Moscow. This combination of economic, political and national oppression has no parallel in the history of European colonialism. Yet the spokesmen of this regime present themselves at meetings of U N O as champions of 'national liberation' against 'Western imperialism', and are accepted as such by large sections of Moslem, Far Eastern and African opinion. It is time that the truth about Soviet colonialism were more widely known.

It is, however, important that Western opinion should not make the mistake of attributing these or other misdeeds of the Moscow rulers to 'Russian imperialism'. The Russian people never chose the Bolshevik regime. Russian workers and peasants are exploited by the same State capitalist bosses as Uzbek or Azerbaidjani workers and peasants. Russian intellectuals are at the mercy of the same Party inquisitors as Kazakh or Georgian intellectuals. Even the Russian colonists living on the land seized from Kazakh nomads who perished in the famine created from Moscow, have no security. The non-Russian peoples may or may not one day have the chance to decide their own fate, and they then may or may not decide to separate from Russia and set up their own independent States. But it is not for the West to incite them against the Russians or to blame the wickedness of the Russian people for their fate. Mr Kolarz, in his restrained and fair-minded conclusion, rightly stresses that only when Stalinist totalitarianism is a thing of the past, will the Russian people be able to enjoy the cultural intercourse and friendship both with their Asian neighbours and with the Western world, for which its genius, warped and frustrated by Bolshevik tyranny, truly fits it.

## POLAND'S EUROPEAN MISSION

Karl Marx

*The following extracts are taken from a volume of writings by Marx and Engels on East European subjects, to be published shortly by Allen and Unwin under the title 'The Russian Menace to Europe'. Part I of the above represents a slightly condensed version of a series of articles published by Marx in the London 'Commonwealth', on March 24th, March 31st, and April 5th, 1866. They were first reprinted in Vol. VI (1916), pp. 212-19 of the 'Archiv fuer die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung'. Part II is the prepared text of an address delivered by Marx on January 22nd, 1867, at a joint session of the Council of the International and the Polish Workingmen's Society in London, to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the Polish rising in 1863. It was among the papers inherited by his daughter Laura and was first published by her husband, Paul Lafargue, in a French translation, in the review 'Le Socialisme', No. 18, of March 15th, 1908.*

### I

Wherever the working classes have taken a part of their own in political movements, there, from the very beginning, their foreign policy was expressed in the few words – Restoration of Poland. This was the case with the Chartist movement so long as it existed; it was the case with the French working men long before 1848, as well as during that memorable year, when on May 15th they marched on to the National Assembly to the cry of 'Vive la Pologne!' – Poland for ever! It was the case in Germany, when, in 1848 and 1849, the organs of the working class demanded war with Russia for the restoration of Poland. It is the case even now; with one exception – of which more anon – the working men of Europe unanimously proclaim the restoration of Poland as part and parcel of their political programme, as the most comprehensive expression of their foreign policy. The middle class, too, have had, and have still, 'sympathies' with the Poles; which sympathies have not prevented them from leaving the Poles in the lurch in 1831, in 1846, in 1863; nay, have not even prevented them from leaving the worst enemies of Poland, such as Lord Palmerston, to manage matters so as actually to assist Russia while they talked in favour of Poland. But with the working classes it is different. They mean intervention, not non-intervention; they mean war with Russia while Russia meddles with Poland; and they have proved it every time the Poles rose

against their oppressors. And recently, the International Workingmen's Association has given a fuller expression to this universal feeling of the body it claims to represent, by inscribing on its banner, 'Resistance to Russian encroachments upon Europe – Restoration of Poland'.

This foreign policy of the working men of Western and Central Europe has found unanimous consent among the class to whom it was addressed, with one exception, as we said before. There are among the working men of France a small minority who belong to the school of the late P.J. Proudhon. This school differs *in toto* from the generality of the advanced and thinking working men: it declares them to be ignorant fools, and maintains, on most points, opinions quite contrary to theirs. This holds good in their foreign policy also. The Proudhonists, sitting in judgment on oppressed Poland, find the verdict of the Staleybridge Jury, namely, that it 'serves her right'. They admire Russia as the great land of the future, as the most progressive nation upon the face of the earth, by the side of which such a paltry country as the United States is not worthy of being named. They have accused the Council of the International Association of setting up the Bonapartist principle of nationalities and declaring the magnanimous Russian people to be outside the pale of civilized Europe, such being a grievous sin against the principles of universal democracy and the fraternity of all nations. These are the charges. Barring the democratic phraseology at the wind-up, they coincide, it will be seen at once, verbally and literally with what the extreme Tories of all countries have to say about Poland and Russia. Such charges are not worth refuting; but as they come from a fraction of the working class, be it ever so small, they may render it desirable to state again the case of Poland and Russia, and to vindicate what we may henceforth call the foreign policy of the united working men of Europe.

But why do we always name Russia alone in connection with Poland? Have not two German Powers, Austria and Prussia, shared in the plunder? Do not they, too, hold parts of Poland in bondage, and, in conjunction with Russia, do they not work to keep down every national Polish movement?

It is well known how hard Austria has struggled to keep out of the Polish business; how long she resisted the plans of Russia and Prussia for partition. Poland was a natural ally of Austria against Russia. When Russia once became formidable, nothing could be more in the interest of Austria than to keep Poland alive between herself and the newly rising Empire. It was only when Austria saw that Poland's fate was settled, that with or without her the other two Powers were determined to annihilate her, it was only then that in self-protection she went in for a share of the territory. But as early as 1815 she held out for the restoration of an inde-

pendent Poland; in 1831 and in 1863 she was ready to go to war for that object, and give up her own share of Poland provided England and France were prepared to join her. The same was true during the Crimean war. This is not said in justification of the general policy of the Austrian Government. Austria has shown often enough that to oppress a weaker nation is congenial work to her rulers. But in the case of Poland the instinct of self-preservation was stronger than the desire for new territory or the habits of government. And this puts Austria out of court for the present.

As to Prussia, her share of Poland is too trifling to weigh much in the scale. Her friend and ally, Russia, has managed to ease her out of nine-tenths of what she got during the three partitions. But what little is left to her weighs like an incubus upon her. It has chained her to the triumphal chariot of Russia, it has been the means of enabling her Government, even in 1863 and 64, to practise unchallenged, in Prussian Poland, those breaches of the law, those infractions of individual liberty, of the right of meeting, of the liberty of the press, which were soon afterwards to be applied to the rest of the country; it has falsified the whole middle-class Liberal movement which, from fear of risking the loss of a few square miles of land on the eastern frontier, allowed the Government to set all law aside with regard to the Poles. The working men, not only of Prussia, but of all Germany, have a greater interest than those of any other country in the restoration of Poland, and they have shown in every revolutionary movement that they know it. Restoration of Poland, to them, is emancipation of their own country from Russian vassalage. And this, we think, puts Prussia out of court, too. Whenever the working classes of Russia (if there is such a thing in that country, in the sense it is understood in Western Europe) form a political programme, and that programme contains the liberation of Poland – then, but not till then, Russia as a nation will be out of court too, and the Government of the Czar will remain alone under indictment.

It is said that to claim independence for Poland is to acknowledge the 'principle of nationalities', and that the principle of nationalities is a Bonapartist invention concocted to prop up the Napoleonic despotism in France. Now what is this 'principle of nationalities'?

By the treaties of 1815 the boundaries of the various states of Europe were drawn merely to suit diplomatic convenience, and especially to suit the convenience of the then strongest continental Power – Russia. No account was taken either of the wishes, the interests, or the national diversities of the populations. Thus, Poland was divided, Germany was divided, Italy was divided, not to speak of the many smaller nationalities inhabiting south-eastern Europe, and of which few people at that time knew any-

thing. The consequence was that for Poland, Germany and Italy, the very first step in every political movement was to attempt the restoration of that national unity without which national life was but a shadow. And when, after the suppression of the revolutionary attempts in Italy and Spain, 1821–23, and again after the revolution of July, 1830, in France, the radical leaders of the greater part of civilized Europe came into contact with each other, and attempted to mark out a kind of common programme, the liberation and unification of the oppressed and subdivided nations became a watchword common to all of them. So it was again in 1848, when the number of oppressed nations was increased by a fresh one, Hungary. There could, indeed, be no two opinions as to the right of every one of the great national subdivisions of Europe to dispose of itself, independently of its neighbours, in all internal matters, so long as it did not encroach upon the liberty of others. This right was, in fact, one of the fundamental conditions of the internal liberty of all. How could, for instance, Germany aspire to liberty and unity, if at the same time she assisted Austria to keep Italy in bondage, either directly or by her vassals? Why, the total breaking-up of the Austrian monarchy is the very first condition of the unification of Germany!

This right of the great national subdivisions of Europe to political independence, acknowledged as it was by the European democracy, could not but find the same acknowledgement with the working classes especially. It meant, in fact, nothing more than to recognize in other large national bodies of undoubted vitality the same right of individual national existence which the working men of each separate country claimed for themselves. But this recognition, and the sympathy with these national aspirations, were restricted to the large and well-defined historical nations of Europe; there were Italy, Poland, Germany, Hungary. France, Spain, England, Scandinavia were neither subdivided nor under foreign control, and therefore but indirectly interested in the matter; and as to Russia, she could only be mentioned as the detainer of an immense amount of stolen property, which would have to be disgorged on the day of reckoning.

After the *coup d'état* of 1851, Louis Napoleon, the Emperor 'by the grace of God and the national will', had to find a democratized and popular-sounding name for his foreign policy. What could be better than to inscribe upon his banners the 'principle of nationalities'? Every nationality to be the arbiter of its own fate – every detached fraction of any nationality to be allowed to annex itself to its great mother-country – what could be more liberal? Only, mark, there was not now any more question of nations, but of nationalities.

There is no country in Europe where there are not different nation-

alities under the same government. The Highland Gaels and the Welsh are undoubtedly of different nationality from the English, although nobody will give to these remnants of peoples long gone by the title of nations, any more than to the Celtic inhabitants of Brittany in France. Moreover, no state boundary coincides with the natural bond of nationality, that of language. There are plenty of people outside France whose mother tongue is French, as there are plenty of people of German language outside Germany; and in all probability it will ever remain so. It is a natural consequence of the confused and slow-working historical development through which Europe has passed during the last thousand years, that almost every great nation has parted with some outlying portions of its own body, which have become separated from the national life, and in most cases participate in the national life of some other people; so much so that they do not wish to rejoin their own main stock. The Germans in Switzerland and Alsace do not desire to be reunited to Germany, any more than the French in Belgium and Switzerland wish to become attached politically to France. And after all, it is no slight advantage that various nations, as politically constituted, have most of them some foreign elements within themselves, which form connecting links with their neighbours, and vary the otherwise too monotonous uniformity of the national character. Here, then, we perceive the difference between the 'principle of nationalities' and the old democratic and working-class tenet as to the right of the great European nations to separate and independent existence.

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When the old Polish State was being formed by the union with Lithuania, where was then Russia? Under the heel of the Mongolian conqueror, whom the Poles and Germans combined, 150 years before, had driven back east of the Dnieper. It took a long struggle until the Grand Dukes of Moscow finally shook off the Mongol yoke and set about combining the many different principalities of Great Russia into one State. But this success seems only to have increased their ambition. No sooner had Constantinople fallen to the Turk than the Moscovite Grand Duke placed in his coat-of-arms the double-headed eagle of the Byzantine Emperors, thereby setting up his claim as successor and future avenger; and ever since, it is well known, the Russians have worked to conquer Czargrad, as they call Constantinople in their language. Then the rich plains of Little Russia excited their lust of annexation; but the Poles were then a strong, and always a brave people, and not only knew how to fight for their own, but also how to retaliate; in the beginning of the seventeenth century they even held Moscow for a few years.

The gradual demoralization of the ruling aristocracy, the want of

power to develop a middle class, and the constant wars devastating the country, at last broke the strength of Poland. A country which persisted in maintaining unimpaired the feudal system of society, while all its neighbours progressed, formed a middle class, developed commerce and industry, and created large towns – such a country was doomed to ruin. No doubt the aristocracy did ruin Poland, and ruin her thoroughly; and after ruining her, its leaders upbraided each other for having done so, and sold themselves and their country to the foreigner. Polish history from 1700 to 1772 is nothing but a record of Russian usurpation of dominion in Poland, rendered possible by the corruptibility of the nobles. Russian soldiers were almost constantly occupying the country, and the kings of Poland, if not willing traitors themselves, were placed more and more under the thumb of the Russian Ambassador. So well had this game succeeded, and so long had it been played, that when Poland at last was annihilated there was no outcry at all in Europe, and indeed people were astonished at this only, that Russia should have the generosity of giving such a large slice of the territory to Austria and Prussia.

The way in which this partition was brought about is particularly interesting. There was at that time already an enlightened 'public opinion' in Europe. Although *The Times* newspaper had not yet begun to manufacture this particular article, there was that kind of public opinion which had been created by the immense influence of Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, and the other French writers of the eighteenth century. Russia always knew that it is important to have public opinion on one's side, if possible, and Russia took care to have it, too. The Court of Catherine II became the headquarters of the enlightened of the day, especially Frenchmen; the most enlightened principles were professed by the Empress and her Court, and so well did she succeed in deceiving them that Voltaire and many others sang the praise of the 'Semiramis of the North', and proclaimed Russia the most progressive country in the world, the home of liberal principles, the champion of religious toleration.

Religious toleration – that was the word wanted to put down Poland. Poland had always been extremely liberal in religious matters; witness the asylum the Jews found there while they were persecuted in all other parts of Europe. The greater portion of the people in the Eastern provinces belonged to the Greek faith, while the Poles proper were Roman Catholics. A considerable portion of these Greek Catholics had been induced, during the sixteenth century, to acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope, but a great many continued true to their old religion in all respects. They were principally the serfs, their noble masters being almost all Roman Catholics, and they were Little Russians by nationality. Now this Russian Government which did not tolerate at home any other religion but the Greek,

and punished apostasy as a crime; which was conquering foreign nations and annexing foreign provinces right and left; and which was at that time engaged in riveting still firmer the fetters of the Russian serf – this same Russian Government descended upon Poland in the name of religious toleration, because Poland was said to oppress the Greek Catholics; in the name of the principle of nationalities, because the inhabitants of these Eastern provinces were Little Russians, and ought, therefore, to be annexed to *Great Russia*; and in the name of the right of revolution, arming the serfs against their masters. Russia is not at all scrupulous in the selection of her means. Talk about a war of class against class as something extremely revolutionary – why, Russia set such a war on foot in Poland nearly 100 years ago, and a fine specimen of a class-war it was, when Russian soldiers and Little Russian serfs went in company to burn down the castles of Polish lords, merely to prepare Russian annexation, which being once accomplished the same Russian soldiers put the serfs back again under the yoke of their lords. All this was done in the cause of religious toleration, because the principle of nationalities was not then fashionable in Western Europe. But it was held up before the eyes of the Little Russian peasants at the time, and has played an important part since in Polish affairs.

## II

When the last Ukases on the abolition of Poland became known in this country, the leading organ of the stock exchange exhorted the Poles to become Muscovites. Why not, if it was a means of adding to the security of the six million pounds sterling recently lent to the Czar by the English capitalists?

In 1830 a revolution broke out in France. It was an event unforeseen by the providence of St Petersburg, which had just concluded a secret treaty with Charles X to improve the administration and geographic arrangement of Europe. As soon as the sad news arrived, the Czar Nicholas called together the officers of his Guard and delivered to them a short warlike harangue, ending with the words, 'To your horses, Gentlemen!' It was not a vain threat. Paskievitch was sent to Berlin, from which point he was to direct the invasion of France. A few months later everything was ready. The Prussians were supposed to deploy their concentration on the Rhine, the Polish army to enter Prussia, and the Muscovites to follow in the rear. But then, as Lafayette said in the Chamber of Deputies, 'the advance guard turned on the mass of the army' – the Warsaw uprising saved Europe from a second anti-Jacobin war.

Eighteen years later there was another eruption of the revolutionary volcano, or rather an earthquake which shook the entire continent. Even

Germany began to stir, in spite of the maternal apron-strings on which Russia had held her since the so-called war of independence. And what was even more astonishing, of all the German cities Vienna was the first to try its hand at the raising of street-barricades, and with success! This time, perhaps for the first time in history, the Russian lost his nerve. Nicholas lost no time in haranguing his Guards. He published a Manifesto to his people, declaring that the French plague had infested even Germany, that it was approaching the frontiers of the Empire and that the Revolution in its delirium was casting crazed glances at Holy Russia. Nothing astonishing in this, he cried. For years this same Germany had been a ferment of infidelity. The cancer of a sacrilegious philosophy had eaten into the vital organs of this people, so healthy in its outward aspect. And he concluded with this message to the Germans: 'God is with us! Now hear this, infidels, and yield to us, for God is with us!' Shortly afterwards, by the instrument of his faithful servant, Nesselrode, he sent the Germans another message, but this one was overflowing with tenderness for this pagan people. Whence came this change?

The reason is that the people of Berlin had not only made a revolution: they had proclaimed the restoration of Poland, and the Poles in Prussia, deceived by the popular enthusiasm, were in the process of setting up military camps in Posen. Hence the amiability of the Czar. Once again it was Poland, the immortal knight of Europe, who kept the Mongol in awe! It was only after the betrayal of the Poles by the Germans, particularly by the German National Assembly in Frankfurt, that Russia recovered its force and became strong enough to stab the Revolution of 1848 in its last refuge, Hungary. And even there, the last man to lead a campaign against Russia was a Pole, General Bem.

Now there are many people who are naïve enough to believe that all this has changed, that Poland has ceased to be 'a necessary nation', as a French writer called it, and is now only a sentimental memory. And you know that sentiments and memories are not listed on the stock exchange.

But I ask you, what is there that has changed? Has the danger diminished? No, only the intellectual blindness of the ruling classes of Europe has reached its zenith.

In the first place, the policy of Russia is changeless, according to the admission of its official historian, the Muscovite Karamsin. Its methods, its tactics, its manoeuvres may change, but the polar star of its policy – its world domination – is a fixed star. In our times only a civilized government ruling over barbarian masses can hatch out such a plan and execute it. As the greatest Russian diplomat of modern times, Pozzo di Borgo, wrote to Alexander I at the time of the Congress of Vienna, Poland is the great instrument for the execution of Russian designs on the world,

but it is also an invincible obstacle to them, until such time as the Poles, worn out by the accumulated betrayals of Europe, become a whip in the hand of the Muscovite.

Well, except for the dispositions of the Polish people, has anything intervened to thwart the Russian plan or paralyze its action? I do not need to tell you that the progress of its conquests in Asia has been continuous. I do not need to tell you that the so-called war conducted by England and France against Russia delivered to the latter the mountain fortresses of the Caucasus, control of the Black Sea, and maritime rights which Catherine II, Paul and Alexander I had tried in vain to wrest from England. Railroads are uniting and concentrating its forces, scattered over a vast expanse. Its material resources in Congress Poland, where it has entrenched itself in Europe, have increased enormously. The fortifications of Warsaw, Modlin, Ivangorod – points chosen by the first Napoleon – command the entire course of the Vistula, and constitute a formidable base for attacks to the north, west and south. Panslav propaganda has had the satisfactory result of weakening Austria and Turkey. And as to the meaning of this Panslav propaganda, you had a foretaste of it in 1848-49, when Hungary was invaded, Vienna was devastated and Italy crushed by the Slavs fighting under the flags of Jellachich, Windischgraetz and Radetzky. And, in addition to all that, the crimes of England against the Irish have raised a new and powerful ally to Russia on the other side of the Atlantic.

The plan of Russian policy remains changeless; its means of action have considerably increased since 1848, but up to now one thing remains beyond her reach, and Peter the Great touched on this weak point when he wrote that in order to conquer the world, the Muscovites needed only souls. Well, the vivifying spirit which Russia needs will be infused into its carcass at the moment when the Poles become Russian subjects. What will you then have to throw into the other scale of the balance?

A continental European will perhaps reply that by the emancipation of the serfs, Russia has entered the family of civilized nations, that German power, recently concentrated in Prussian hands, can resist all Asiatic shocks, and finally, that the social revolution in Western Europe will end the danger of international conflicts. An Englishman who reads only *The Times* will be able to say that, supposing the worst, i.e. if Russia seizes Constantinople, England will then take possession of Egypt and will thus secure the path to its great market in India.

As concerns the first point, the emancipation of the serfs freed the central government from obstacles which the nobles were in a position to place in the way of its centralized action. It created a vast reservoir for the recruitment of its army, dissolved the communal property of the

Russian peasants, isolated them, and above all, strengthened their faith in their Autocrat. It has not disaffected them of their Asiatic barbarity, the creeping heritage of centuries. Any attempt to raise their moral level is punished as a crime. I need remind you only of the official provocations against the temperance societies which tried to wean the Muscovite from what Feuerbach calls the material substance of his religion, namely, vodka. Whatever the future effects may be, for the present the emancipation of the serfs has increased the forces at the Czar's disposal.

Let us pass on to Prussia. Formerly a vassal of Poland, it grew to be a first-rate Power only under the auspices of Russia and through the partition of Poland. If Prussia should lose its Polish prey tomorrow, it would sink back into Germany instead of absorbing it. In order to maintain itself as a Power distinct from Germany it must lean for support on the Muscovite. Its recent increase of power, far from relaxing the bonds, has made them indissoluble. Besides, this increase of power has increased Prussia's antagonism towards France and Austria. At the same time Russia is the pillar on which the arbitrary rule of the Hohenzollern dynasty and its feudal tenants rests. It is its safeguard against popular disaffection. Consequently Prussia is not a bulwark against Russia, but its predestined instrument for the invasion of France and the digestion of Germany.

As for the social revolution, what does this word mean if not class struggle? It is possible that the struggle between workers and capitalists will be less fierce and bloody than were the struggles between the feudal lords and the capitalists in England and France. Let us hope so. But in any case, while a social crisis of this sort may increase the energies of the Western peoples, it will also, like every internal conflict, invite aggression from without. Once more this conflict will clothe Russia with the rôle it had during the anti-Jacobin war and since the Holy Alliance, that of the pre-destined saviour of order. It will enlist in Russia's ranks all the privileged classes of Europe. Already during the February Revolution, the Comte de Montalembert was not the only one who put his ear to the ground to listen for the distant sound of the hoofs of Cossack cavalry. The Prussian country bumpkins were not the only ones in the German representative assemblies who proclaimed the Czar their 'father protector'. All the stock exchanges of Europe rose with each Russian victory over the Magyars and fell with each Russian defeat.

There is but one alternative for Europe: either Asiatic barbarism, under Muscovite direction, will burst around its head like an avalanche, or else it must re-establish Poland, thus putting twenty million heroes between itself and Asia, and gaining a breathing spell for the accomplishment of its social regeneration.

## SOCIALISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM

Felix Stoessinger

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### I

Discussions on Marxist theory are not everyone's affair, but they tend nowadays to involve everyone's fate. If Napoleon was right in holding that politics is destiny, it has become doubly true to say that Marxist politics are peculiarly relevant to the destiny of the present age. Ignorance is no protection against the delayed impact of certain theoretical constructs upon the public mind. Yet ignorance is an important factor in the current misinterpretation of the Soviet-American antagonism which tends to portray the East-West conflict in terms derived from the pseudo-Marxist categories of the Leninist apocalypse: bourgeoisie versus proletariat, private enterprise versus state planning, capitalism versus socialism, or even Fascist versus Communist dictatorship. The baleful polarization of the world into extremes compelled to mobilize for a final showdown is nothing but the projection of early Marxist catastrophism into the sphere of world politics. Those who view the Cold War under this aspect have unwittingly surrendered to the Stalinist formula. The 'final catastrophe', which need not take place at all, may thus well be brought about if we believe in its inevitability – or permit ourselves to be deluded into such a belief by those interested in promoting it.

Ever since the Cold War became noticeable in 1946 it has become increasingly relevant to enquire whether the present world tension would be significantly lessened if Russian military barracks along the Elbe and the Adria were decorated with pictures of the Tsar, instead of photographs of Stalin. Commonsense suggests a negative answer, and the text-books are there to remind us that all the major wars since 1793, in which a coalition organized by Britain emerged victorious, have left in their wake an unstable equilibrium, one aspirant to European hegemony being replaced by another. What is new in this perennial struggle to establish and preserve a balance of power regulated externally by Britain, is the unorthodox attitude of the latest Continental newcomer: instead of being treated as a traditional problem of foreign policy, to be handled with due care, the time-honoured conflict is refracted in Moscow through the

idiosyncratic prism of an outdated theory, and what emerges is a fatalistic doctrine of an allegedly inevitable world economic process. And since the Kremlin, armed and panoplied with its rusty doctrinal equipment, is busy proclaiming *urbi et orbi* the inevitable triumph of its own species of socialism over the massed forces of world capitalism, the monumental ineptitude of its foreign policy has in fact succeeded in polarising the world into a Soviet and an Anglo-American 'camp'.

This assurance of victory is derived in the last resort from Lenin's pamphlet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). Yet in his fifty-page article in *Bolshevik*, published in early October on the eve of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress, Stalin went out of his way to define the antagonism between the two worlds in terms suggesting that Lenin's construction, though valid in the abstract, has no great practical significance. One is tempted to recall Kant's observations on the philistine maxim 'That may be true in theory but does not hold good in practice.' What is practically useless must in fact be theoretically unsound. But let it pass. What lurks behind this methodological confusion is apprehensive awareness of the gap between a misleading theory and the reality its purports to portray – a gap which could be bridged only at the cost of limitless sacrifice. And since the entire Leninist-Stalinist edifice rests on a foundation of long exploded theories, its practical results constitute both a sanguinary warning to mankind, and an indirect confirmation of Marx's sagacious dictum that humanity can only set itself tasks which it is actually capable of solving.

### II

The cleavage between the Socialist and the Leninist heirs of Marxism is older than the Bolshevik Revolution. It goes back to the opening years of the century, when the 'internal contradictions' of Marxist theory, and the various points at which it contradicted experience, were first examined by the neo-Marxist school then known in Germany and elsewhere as the 'Revisionists'. 'Revision' in theory found its counterpart in what was called, not very felicitously, 'reformism' in political practice. The achievements of the school have been overshadowed by the wretched balance-sheet of the European labour movement since 1914, much to the subsequent obfuscation of Socialist theory and practice. They are still worth considering at the present day, for they impinge on some extremely urgent practical problems, including that of European economic integration. Revisionism had its doctrine, its internal history, even its secrets. Much of it was linked to the personality of one man who was extremely careful to avoid the limelight: the late Joseph Bloch, who from 1895 to 1933 published the principal organ of the school, the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, but

did not himself appear before the public save in very occasional essays. Admiration for the creative genius of Marx did not deter Bloch and his pupils from undertaking the laborious task of revising his doctrine and fashioning a new theoretical instrument adapted to the requirements of the twentieth century. A good deal of traditional lumber had to be discarded in the effort to transform Marxism into a method of enquiry capable of giving meaning and consistency to the contemporary Socialist movement, and indeed to modern intellectual life in general. Bloch's 'revisionism' went far beyond the estimable but tentative stirrings associated with the name of Bernstein. It was the real antithesis to the wooden dogmatism of the orthodox school which combined passivity in the face of events with a spurious radicalism in matters of doctrine. But though 'reformism' gained the upper hand in practice it unfortunately failed to absorb the spiritual content of the movement to which it owed its triumph in the practical domain. Hence the subsequent disorientation of European Socialism. Hence in particular the inability of German Social-Democracy to strike a balance between radicalism and revisionism, between primitive and up-to-date doctrinal conceptions, and last not least between Pan-German and European policies. It is through this gap between old-fashioned radical utopianism and an incompletely absorbed modernist stream of ideas that the ancient idealism of the European labour movement has largely leaked away.

The controversy started by the Russian Revolution superimposed itself upon this initial cleavage, and in no country more disastrously than in Germany, ending with the current geographical partition. The pre-1914 radicals in the German labour movement were for the most part spiritual descendants of Snug the joiner, 'No lion fell, nor else no lion's dam. For, if I should as lion come in strife, into this place, 'twere pity on my life.' Whenever they appeared on the scene they took good care to warn the public that their menacing roars were strictly part of the show. Provisional lions, they did not seriously alarm the spectators with their provisional snarls. Matters changed when Lenin, from 1903 onwards, entered upon the heritage of the dying radical orthodoxy. It was once more Joseph Bloch who in those days said prophetically: 'If Lenin ever comes to power it will be a monumental disaster for the Socialist cause.' Lenin was in some respects a narrow-minded pedant, apt to be morally indignant when someone ventured to question this or that Marxian theorem; but he was no Snug: his fangs were perfectly genuine. Needless to say, he was blind to the significance of the revised and modernized Socialist conception elaborated by the new school, though he would on occasion engage in somewhat superficial polemics with its representatives. I note in passing that when Bloch died as an emigrant in Prague in 1936

an unknown young Communist was among the few who followed his coffin to the grave: he had come, he said, to pay his respects to Lenin's only genuine opponent in the Marxist movement.\*

What the new school had to offer could be gauged from the impressive special number of the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* published in May 1918, to mark the centenary of Marx's birth. A full generation later, its main doctrines still stand up. They can be summarized as follows: (1) The belief that capitalism must 'necessarily' be destroyed by its internal contradictions is no longer tenable. That also goes for Engels's 'export pessimism' which is the real foundation of Lenin's pamphlet in 1916, though Lenin's observations on monopoly capitalism do relate to a genuine problem. For the rest, he operates with the doctrine of inevitable catastrophe due to progressive pauperization, which both 'orthodox' and 'critical' Marxists had abandoned ten to fifteen years earlier. (2) Contemporary social policies in the Western world (the 'welfare state') have made an end of the assertion that the workers' share of the national product cannot guard them against pauperization. (3) Small-scale production and trade are *not* doomed to disappear, unless the Bolshevik practice is adopted of destroying them by force without putting anything equivalent in their place. In all countries, including those under Stalinist regimes, a new middle class is emerging. The medium-sized plant is probably best adapted to modern industrial conditions. Industrial giants will remain confined to a few branches of production only. (4) There is no absolute tendency towards concentration of capital. (5) Surplus value is *not* the only source of capitalist wealth. (6) The industrial proletariat is not going to form a majority of the population in any period of time that can now be envisaged. In the most advanced industrial countries it has already passed its numerical high-water mark. (7) While the class struggle is a reality in all societies (including the pseudo-socialist society of modern Russia), it is far from being the only motor of historical development. There is everywhere class solidarity in the common interest of society, i.e. the interest to maximize production. (8) The economic interpretation of history retains its limited significance, in the manner stated by Engels in 1890, in reply to the pertinent questions addressed to him by Bloch, then a nineteen-year-old student – a correspondence with which even Communists are familiar, since Stalin has quoted from it in his recent pronouncement on linguistics.

### III

It is worth noting here that the development of society's productive forces is the central concept of Marxism. Yet for many decades the whole

\* Cf. also my *Revolution der Weltpolitik*, 1939. There is no space here to pursue this subject further.

Social-Democratic movement (by no means only in Central Europe, but in the Anglo-Saxon world as well) viewed society from the consumer's standpoint and busied itself with the task of maximizing satisfactions in the current utilitarian ('greatest happiness of the greatest number') fashion, without troubling to consider where the means were to come from. This *soi-disant* socialism was really a species of liberalism, and the task of scraping the liberal barnacles off the socialist ship was among the major pre-occupations of the Blochian school in Germany: Producers' Socialism versus Consumers' Socialism. It is to be feared that the British Labour Party is as yet far from having completed its analogous process of self-education. The development of the productive forces within the existing society is the starting-point of any genuine socialist policy, and the only means whereby labour can achieve permanent political influence, irrespective of election results. Only thus can it raise itself to the dignity of a 'subject' of history. The older school held that the working class need only defend its sectional interests and wait for the triumph of 'the dialectic' which would painlessly promote it to the seats of power. This quietist pseudo-radicalism hands the political initiative to labour's opponents, who can capitalize on their social usefulness since the expansion of production is manifestly in their interest and it therefore becomes possible for them to argue with some plausibility that no one else can be entrusted with political power. Beyond this familiar scene there loom the twin menaces of Fascism and Stalinism, under which labour is driven to work by the whips and scorpions of the police state – the historic penalty of its own failure to rise to the level of its responsibility. It thus pays for its narrow sectional consumers' egoism by losing its freedom and human dignity, and the wearisome struggle to recover its rights has to start all over again.

But there is a reverse side to the medal: if labour is of necessity condemned to work for the expansion of society's riches, long before its own share of the newly created wealth is sufficiently enlarged to permit it to enjoy higher standards of living, it is also true that from a certain point onwards capitalist society becomes dependent on the consuming power of the wage earners and the inhabitants of what were once colonies. There is a genuine 'dialectic' which imposes collectivist forms of organization upon a market economy transformed by the operation of its own laws. Yet we are far from having given adequate consideration to the great problems of economic democracy, and this despite the terrible warning contained in the Stalinist planning system. Every extension of state control is an *ad hoc* measure which may in some circumstances raise the productivity of key industries, but cannot transform the economy as a whole. Such contrivances do not acquire the dignity of a system by being

generalized and extended to ever wider fields. There is need to remember Marx's warning that capitalism can only be superseded at the point where its institutional arrangements interfere with the maximizing of production. Long before Trotsky imported the planning techniques of the Prusso-German war economy into Russia, this problem of state socialism had engaged the earnest attention of those interested in what I have ventured to call Producers' Socialism. For the productive forces must not be thought of as purely material; they include a moral element. Changes in the material structure are always in danger of congealing into something fixed and rigid, into a new mechanical determination, unless they are accompanied by a parallel increase in human productivity. One can only describe as a travesty of socialism any measure of expropriation which takes place for egalitarian or political reasons only, without paying due regard to the productive relations and the probable effect on human volition. Expropriation does not transform property into an element of socialism: what has to be socialized is production, i.e. the producers themselves. The socialization of the living and working human being is the precondition for the socialization of production. The probable effects of state ownership are always uncertain and never entirely satisfactory. From the viewpoint of genuine Producers' Socialism, what is required is the amalgamation of the state and the economy, rather than the domination of the economy by the state. To enable this to take place, economic institutions must acquire a political character, instead of conspiring behind the political scenes, as is now normally the case in liberal-democratic countries.

It is worth recalling here that during the first Russian Revolution, in 1905, Soviets arose spontaneously, in a very primitive fashion, as representatives of economic units – namely, factories. Their significance was totally misconceived by Lenin, although he promptly discerned in them a potential threat to the power of what was later to become the Politbureau. He was emphatic in denying their capacity for developing into parliaments or self-governing institutions. Again, in 1917, his slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' swiftly gave way to a policy of emasculating them by the Party machine. The 'Soviet system' as a form of government has not existed in Russia for a single day, though a blatant propaganda has persuaded the world of the opposite. 'Producers' Socialism' by contrast postulates economic self-government, and the representation of economic interests in a 'parliament' of its own, as a transitional step from liberal to socialist democracy, which yet does not derogate from the historic achievements of the former. The democratic assembly representing the individual citizen in his capacity as a voter needs to be paralleled by a functional representation of corporate economic interests, in which the

collectivity of the modern labour process can find adequate expression. This holds true at all levels, from the purely local to the national. Every major branch of economic life is capable of being organized on a self-governing basis, with parity of representation for management and labour, and these councils, or whatever they may be called, can become the basis of institutions which could gradually absorb a good deal of the administrative work now left to the state.

#### IV

The concept I have tried to sketch out briefly in these few remarks is far from being a matter of domestic policies only. It impinges directly upon international affairs, and in particular upon the Leninist scheme of 'world revolution' which has become the axis of the Cold War. It was Lenin's inability to transcend the formulas of Marxist pseudo-orthodoxy that caused him to regard capitalist property as the fatal straightjacket imposed upon society, which must be ruptured immediately; whereas the moderns saw as early as 1900 that it was the European nation-state which was strangling the productive forces of society, and that it did not matter greatly whether the state was run on liberal or on *soi-disant* socialist lines: compared to the accumulation of productive power in North America, and what appeared to be a similar process in the British Commonwealth, the society it protected was anyhow out of date. In consequence they took the lead in suggesting a common European market and its corollary: a system of preferential tariffs. In itself this demand is neither capitalist nor socialist. It is merely commonsense. But it took some acuteness to perceive, as Bloch did half a century ago, that the then existing rivalry between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon Powers was not an instance of the familiar competition between conflicting national states, because the U S A and the British Empire were no longer national units in the old sense. They belonged to a new order of magnitude. Economic processes were about to give rise to the emergence of five such *Imperia*: (1) The British Commonwealth; (2) America; (3) East Asia (at first dominated by Japan, later by China); (4) Russia; (5) Europe, provided it could be united and linked to its African hinterland. If it could not, it must necessarily become a satellite of the super-empires, culturally as well as economically. That this fragmented Europe might quite suddenly be Balkanized, and turned into a battlefield for extra-European super-powers, was a warning uttered a generation ago by the 'moderns', and duly ignored by German Social-Democracy and by the Socialist movement in general. Those who put it forward were also the first to demand a Franco-German coal-and-steel union. Indeed, they did so in 1918 – before Germany had capitulated. They were condemned to watch in subsequent years while

Part-German fanatics and balance-of-power artists between them led Europe towards the Second World War.

Here is the point where modern Socialism, as sketched above, impinges most immediately upon what is vaguely known as foreign policy. European union is primarily a means of safeguarding the independence of Europe – now merely one planet out of five, no longer the sun around which the other stars revolve – but it is also the corollary of a new organization of society. It implies, at the very least, that advanced and undeveloped regions must have the right to form economic and political unions, and that within these unions or empires all traces of old-fashioned colonialism must disappear. And conversely it excludes not merely the Bolshevik myth of world revolution, but the naïve Wilsonian slogan 'One World'. For in its literal application this slogan, in the guise of 'liberating' backward Asiatic and African countries from European tutelage, prejudices their right to decide for themselves to which of the five major economic and political entities they want to belong. The frivolous game of exploiting the pseudo-independence of backward countries, in the interest of what is really a modern form of genuine 'imperialism', must not be allowed to interfere with the serious business of reorganizing the world economy. From the socialist viewpoint the relevance of this principle is underlined by the fact that 'socialism in one country' is impossible, while it remains a necessity in any one of the five economic empires, or unions, referred to – whether it is the British Empire or the European Union. Thus the Commonwealth patriotism of the British Labour Party finds its economic and political justification, as does the European – or rather, Eurafrikan – conception of modern Continental socialism. That the British Isles do not by themselves constitute an area large enough for socialist economic policies to take effect, hardly requires further proof. The same holds good of the various European nation-states, and indeed of a truncated Western Europe. Thus in its concrete application, socialism to-day must aim at an 'imperial' development capable of sustaining the independence of the larger whole, and conversely the economic affairs of such a whole, both domestic and external, are bound to involve a degree of organization incompatible with the traditional market mechanism. Socialism and imperialism imply one another; they are historically dependent upon each other. This is true not only of Europe but of the British Commonwealth, and indeed of the new world of super-empires generally. If this emerging world society is disrupted by the Soviet-American antagonism, it will not be owing to blind fate or economic necessity, but primarily owing to an intellectual and moral failure to respond to the challenge of the twentieth century.

## THE HERO IN HISTORY

Harold Rosenberg

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*We suffer not only from the living but from the dead. Le mort saisit le vif!*

Marx, Preface to *Capital*.

In the past history had been at the mercy of poetry, thought Marx. The great revolutions had taken place as costume dramas. In the act of creating new social forms, men had ceased to behave 'realistically'. They lost touch with the time and place they occupied as living men – they became, more or less automatically, actors playing a part. 'Thus Luther donned the mask of the Apostle Paul; the Revolution of 1789 to 1814 draped itself alternately as the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire.'\*

Social reality gave way to dramatic mimesis because history did not allow human beings to pursue their own ends. They were thrown into rôles prepared for them in advance. Beginning in a situation which they had not created, they were transformed by a 'plot' that operated according to certain rules. 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.' It was the pressure of the past that took revolutions out of the 'naturalistic' prose of ordinary life and gave them the form of a special kind of dramatic poetry.

The 'circumstances' in which historical acts take place constitute an external continuity: the plot of history. There is also an inner continuity between the men who are to act historically in the present and other actors who once trod the stage. Not only a plot but stars of other days. Not only a situation but heroes living in the memory – men who in a situation sufficiently resembling the present one played their part with greatness. Compelled to add a new act to the drama which is 'given', the revolutionists were easily deceived both as to what they were doing and as to who they were. They imagined they were performing the part set down for them by the events of their own lives – their action became a spontaneous repetition of an old rôle. They imagined they were playing themselves – they were but mimicking the engraving of a hero on one of

\* *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, by Karl Marx. All quotations are, unless otherwise indicated, from this work.

history's old playbills. Every great historical figure is a possible case of mistaken identity, Marx saw. The supply of fictions is inexhaustible. 'The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.'

The question of myth in history is the question of the hero. And the question of the hero is the question of resurrection. The hero is he who is able to come to life again after he has perished. If the dead stayed dead, and could not cause what once was to be again, there would be no heroes and no myth capable of overpowering man's sense of his time.

The dead hero waits under the ground, in the darkness, 'like a nightmare'. At a certain moment he will be called up to replace the living. When? 'Just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes.'

It is the revolutionary crisis, the compelled striving for 'something entirely new,' that causes history to become veiled in myth. Crisis means that the plot of history can no longer be played along visible lines without leading to foreseen catastrophe. The actors stand at a terminal point of the action, with inevitable destruction before them on one side and an empty space of possibility on the other. Every familiar ruse will but result in ending the performance for them. Hence anything may be allowed to happen, except the expected. In crisis men are dazed by the elimination of choice and the need to choose the unknown.

In this paralysing yet open moment the hero is released from the depths of dead events. The resurrected one is blind to the ambiguities and vacuums of the revolutionary situation. To him the present crisis is but the duplication of an event finished long ago – in Greece, in Rome, in medieval France. For the hero the plot of history has been written once for all, and is outside of time. To act historically is to enact a timeless incident *which he has played before*. The hero is aware only of eternal forms; duration is not accessible to him; when he says 'a thousand years' it is but a figure of speech for an endless series of recurrences.

That the hero is 'dead' means that he moves entirely in the completed, that the contingencies of his existence were ended before he mounted the stage. Hence he is totally defined, and at one with his deed – unlike the living with their vacillations of desire and their dilemmas. Men recognize in him not themselves but the embodiment of a part which they shall have to play as if they were wholly given to it. It is from his being dead that the hero derives his strength and the singleness of his passion, which is beyond mania or fanaticism. When Marx speaks of 'the awakening of the dead in these revolutions', it is a kind of demoniacal possession

of society that he has in mind, a spontaneous transformation or displacement of identity, followed by the surging up of new powers of vision and of action. By becoming 'resurrected Romans' the French Republicans were able 'to keep their passion at the height of the great historical tragedy'. An inspiration lifted them out of the limits of everyday life. That this inspiration consists of an invasion by the 'dead generations' is what makes a 'nightmare' of history.

As the revolution brings forth the dead upon the stage, as the prose of connected occurrences gives way to the poetry of action, elements of classical tragedy appear in the drama of history. As in Aristotle's formulation of tragic plot structure, the historical protagonist, mistaken as to his identity, is unaware of the meaning of his acts: 'the heroes, as well as the parties and masses of the old French Revolution, performed the task of their time in Roman costume and with Roman phrases, the task of releasing and setting up modern bourgeois society'. Also, as in *The Poetics*, the mistaken identity of the protagonist is resolved in a Recognition, Aristotle's 'change from ignorance to knowledge': 'the new social formation once established, the antediluvian Colossi disappeared and with them the resurrected Romans . . . Bourgeois society in its sober reality had begotten its true interpreters and mouthpieces'.

History is a drama, rather than a structure of objective events, in that the Recognition can occur only through the action itself – not through contemplation. At a certain stage, the revolution caused the revolutionists to cease to be Romans and 'to beget' themselves. The affirmation of their true identity, its revelation through its own 'mouthpieces and interpreters', had to take place by a 'begetting' of the action; it could not occur through an intellectual discovery that these heroes were not actually Romans but disguised businessmen.

Since it changes men into themselves by making them seem something else, history is ironical. But it is ironical only subjectively, only with regard to human consciousness. The objective irony of Greek tragedy, Reversal of the Situation, 'a change by which the action veers around to its opposite' (Aristotle), does not rule over historical change. Reversal defeats the action of individual heroes. Their acts often produce results exactly opposite to those intended. Were history the drama of these heroes, the ironic principle of tragic Reversal would apply to it. History however, is not the tragedy of individuals, but of beings whose mortality extends beyond the individual life that can be crushed by the Reversal. In history, the plots of the lives of the heroes, subject to final catastrophe, are enacted within the movement of a larger plot whose actors are not individuals but social classes. As to these classes, with their indefinitely prolonged lives, no historical situation is reversible.

Thus though it operates according to the tragic mechanics of mistake and recognition, the historical drama of the resurrected Romans does not break down into a Reversal but results in the creation of 'something entirely new'. Into the static dialectics of Greek tragedy has entered the principle of evolution with its 'leap' of the emergent event. In the classic theatre change of fortune could only be a 'veering around to its opposite'. Here, in the historical drama, change of fortune means entering a new world. There the action unveiled the past to the consciousness, exposing the elements of the present situation as a completed whole, and confronting the actor with a trap. Here the repetition of the past event forces a development of the situation and confronts the actor with genuine novelty. Out of 'the great historical tragedy' comes *the step forward*. It is prepared not only by acts but by what might be called internal events, mostly microscopic, invisible, themselves not worthy of the stage – the 'organic' aspect of the 'circumstances and relationships created by the class struggle'. While the heroes keep repeating the past as if they were acting out an eternal plot, time has entered into their drama in the form of a continual modification of the situation. And this subterranean change in the historical situation will determine what the outcome of the action and its meaning shall be. Thus the actions of the awakened dead are deprived of the magical absoluteness of myth and become relative to 'the task of their time'. The stature of the hero is decided not by the awesomeness of his deed and by the pathos of the Reversal, but by the historical step forward which he helps to bring about.

In thus making the hero relative to the historical situation, constantly altered by off-stage actions, Marx, having admitted the myth into history, will not permit it to affect its direction. The historical relativism of the heroic is emphasized in his contrast between the repetition of tragedy and the repetition of farce, which he defines as the repetition of a repetition.

The first repetition of the Roman dead in the French Revolution became an instant in the historical life movement – its timeless poetry resulted in an original creation. Therefore this re-enactment of Rome was a serious action, not merely a mask ritual mocking real life. It was not an escape from the present and its 'tasks', but a means of plunging into the midst of the actual situation and of converting it. The automatism of a spirit that transformed businessmen and lawyers into Romans was a phase of a genuine historical confrontation, whose tensions were to survive in other forms until they changed not only men's relations to one another but the earth as well. 'The awakening of the dead served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles.' Their being lost to themselves was their way of embracing the present with a maximum of inspiration, 'of keeping

their passion at the height of the great historical tragedy'. But if they did what they had to do, without knowing what they were doing, it was because the plot of history, its objective movement, so to speak, gave *its* meaning to their symbolic gestures. What happened was not a necessary consequence of their actions – these were locked in the fantasy of Rome; history pulled them into the material future. And only in *this time* could these acts have been creative, only at this turn of the subterranean clock-work of change. Precisely, however, because his action is not absolute but relative to its moment, the hero's performance cannot be put on as a revival and retain its quality: 'all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice . . . the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.' The same act and the same hero, appearing again at a different time, are converted by the relativism of history from the grand to the petty, from the serious to the absurd. Thus in Louis Bonaparte the French 'have not only a caricature of the old Napoleon, they have the old Napoleon himself caricatured as he would inevitably appear in the middle of the nineteenth century'. The myth cannot change history; on the contrary, history elevates or degrades the myth, makes use of it or casts it aside.

With Aristotle the distinction between tragedy and farce turns on whether the imitation is of characters of 'a higher or lower type'. In the historical epic neither moral nor social elevation decides the issue, only the time criterion, the relation of the heroes to the *given* 'task of their time'. The 'old Napoleon' has been transformed inevitably from a hero into a clown because the organic change of situation has made it impossible for the French bourgeoisie, and hence for him as its 'representative', to produce an authentic historical novelty.

Thus in Marx's drama of history the hero and his act are contingent on the larger plot, the change from one social form to another. And this larger plot itself is relative to some future creation that will replace what is now being created. Historical action is action that begins in an aim which will become untenable through being realized, and which the actor will have to abandon for another aim, or find himself disengaged from the plot. In the drama of history, man comes to require a new capacity: the ability to give himself to the absoluteness of action, while being conscious that his act will be justified only if it is correctly timed in the invisible whole of the historical situation – and to give himself while being conscious also that even if his act is correct and is justified, it belongs to a moment only and will be surpassed. The historical act will not end in the achievement of the desire, or in the establishment of the ideal that made him ready to act – a new desire and a new readiness will be demanded of him. Situated in history I know that my act can at best

bring forth only another beginning. Yet though it can contain but an atom of time, I must consent to stake my whole life on it, for this is the act that belongs to the plot and there is no other kind of act that belongs to it. Does man possess this capacity for the absoluteness of action in a situation known to be relative to historical novelty? Apparently it had not been acquired by the revolutionists of the eighteenth century. 'In the classically austere traditions of the Roman Republic, its gladiators found the ideals and art forms, the self-deceptions they needed in order to conceal from themselves the bourgeois limitations of the content of their struggle and to keep their passion at the height of the great historical tragedy.'

When he describes the human incapacity for the historical, Marx seems to be referring not merely to the behaviour of the French Republicans but to a permanent inadequacy of man to his situation. Poetry is inescapable to a permanent inadequacy of man to his situation. Poetry is in crisis. Does it not follow that in the historical drama the world of prose moves precariously toward its extinction in the poetic? At the bottom of every situation lies the poetry of its ultimate wreck. To be genuinely historical man would have to be a tragic poet. But man shuns the poetry of his future, which is the inevitable failure of his action. He uses himself of his future, which is the inevitable failure of his action. He uses himself up in the effort to preserve as long as he can the delicate, weak, and humanly desirable world of prose. So that the ferocious leap of poetry finds him unprepared, and he is forced to call upon powers other than his own. 'Just when they (men) seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things . . . they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past.' The historical is unendurable, its content needs to be concealed, therefore myth appears inseparable from revolutionary crisis. Given the compulsion to create 'something entirely new' the nightmare of the dead generation will overpower the consciousness, the ghosts will walk, and whatever novelty comes into existence will be the unwilling and unpredicted effect of time's ironical victory.

Yet to mark the recoil of human consciousness in the face of the new was also something that would be surpassed. In *their* revolution, the workers would escape the mythical mechanism of resurrection and self-disguise which is the poetry of history. When this new social class took the stage as an historical actor, man for the first time was to gain the capacity for conscious historical action within the contingent situations of the historical plot. Through this newly developed gift of the living for the changing and the novel, the completed dead would be kept off the stage. Instead of yielding their parts to resurrected heroes repeating an old incident, the workers would step forth in their own guise and in *their own time* – and the historical drama would be played without costumes, without mistaken identities or mistaken rôles, without absolutes, but with 'the limitations of the content' of the conflict in full view. 'The social revolu-

tion . . . cannot draw its poetry from the past but only from the future.' Not from the finished but from the change that will overtake the present. 'It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required world-historical recollections in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. . . . There the phrase went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the phrase.'

But the function of the mythical veiling of the historical was to arouse the 'needed' passion. Deprived of the myth, the proletarian revolution would have to take place without passion, or with a kind of passion altogether different from the ecstasy of doubled time which 'drugged' earlier revolutions. The mythless proletariat would have to experience directly the new dramatic pathos which its predecessors evaded through dreaming themselves Romans. Committed to 'the sober reality' they would have to undergo without relief the pathos of the historical. Marx's prediction of Socialism depends entirely on the capacity of the proletariat to endure this pathos. If, in the open moment of crisis, the latest historical protagonist were to prove, like his predecessors, incapable of acting in direct response to the historical content; if once again the pressure of the tragedy makes its way and plunges the action into the abyss of the past, the 'social revolution' in Marx's sense would never take place. Having failed to 'strip off its superstition' it could not begin with itself. Without the power to live in his own time and its needs, man could never free his history from the grip of the myth. Each act of the historical plot would be fated to end with a fall into recurrence. Thus it would have been a mistake for Marx (as for Hegel) to have conceived the drama of history as a continuous whole, and his attempt to outline in advance the act that was to follow the one being played in his day would fail through the impotence of his hero to perform the deed demanded by his time.

A century after the revolutions of 1848 and the publication of *The Communist Manifesto*, the requisite simplification of history has not been brought about. The drama continues to be one of resurrections, disguises, costumes, productive mistakes. Man, as he is, has not acquired the capacity for the historical; in crisis his response is still – the mask. Across Europe and North Africa have marched businessmen, clerks, factory workers, farmers, led by the ghosts of Romans, Teutonic knights, Slav chieftains. England at its last defence barrier in 1940 rejected the military, political and economic evidence, and rallied to the heroic echo of the Shakespearian iamb.

For a time it seemed that the new actor, the proletariat, might have come to dominate the action of the plot in a section of the world and thus to have begun the alteration of the entire historical drama. For twenty-

five years the question was debated whether or not the U S S R was a 'workers' state'. The presence of 'heroes', Lenin and the Bolsheviks was admitted. Yet it was contended that the October Revolution was an original act of the proletariat. The mind has no means for determining the origin of a mass act. The Revolution might have been a conspiratorial coup of the Bolshevik professional revolutionists, using as their instrument workers and soldiers confused by the war. Or it might have been the sudden upsurge, under extreme conditions and the stimulation of an extraordinary leadership, of the class which had evolved with the development of Russian industry and engaged in preliminary struggles with autocracy. Even if we take the latter view, which in many important respects is the more intelligible, we must recognize that the Russian Revolution had two sources, the Party and the working class, and conceive these two sources as separate entities in origin, structure and consciousness, which came together only during the revolutionary overthrow itself. Neither Lenin, Trotsky, nor Stalin ever contended that the Party was an organic part of the working class, organized by the class itself as its leadership. So that without answering the question as to who made the Revolution, we can decide quite definitely that historical action in Russia has been for many years the privilege of 'heroic' history makers. And it is also clear that in the U S S R the plot of history has been swamped in myth.

Thus the old mechanism of the historical plot still operates. Once again, as the line of the action turns visibly towards catastrophe, an empty space of possibility appears. Dazed by the elimination of choice, men choose the unknown. Figures step forward to the footlights and identify themselves to the audience as partisans of the open. In France's post-war crisis, M. Sartre declares that no plot of history exists but that it is for us to make events by our free choice, to write the drama as we like it. Behind his back, of course, the play goes on with the old actors – there possibility seems to have all but vanished. Sartre has a free choice so long as he does not choose within the action itself. His calling for 'something entirely new' must remain entirely negative, a policy of resistance, for he has not committed himself to a historical *who* that is to introduce this something new into the drama. He demands action but does not name the actor – it is as if he were trying to arouse the audience to change the play. But can the 'us' who are to intervene with our free choice be the spectators of history as such, that is, men as individual human beings? That cannot be – it would be the 'end of history'. Except as hero the individual has never been able to supplant nations, classes, cults, as historical dramatic persons. We cannot intervene in the performance without identifying ourselves beyond ourselves as individuals, and M. Sartre does not tell us with whom to

identify ourselves. In choosing choice itself and ignoring the question of the identity of his historical protagonist, he merely bears witness that a crisis exists and that historical crisis means empty room for the undefined. That emptiness will be filled by Someone. Willing the new, where no one is present with a capacity for the historical, means in practice *waiting for the hero*.

M. Malraux also rejects the old actors and speaks on behalf of the possibilities to be drawn from the situation through action. 'We have no faith in programmes but only in objectives. Let us define our objectives one after another, reach them as fast as possible, and then go on to what follows.' Since no actual choice is available he, too, is compelled to choose the unknown. But the image of Malraux is more revealing historically than the image of Sartre. Sartre, and this is vastly to his credit, is genuinely out in the open; he speaks for the living individual, who has not yet won a place in the historical drama. While his position implies the hero, as a human being he will resist him. In contrast, Malraux, supporting de Gaulle, has placed himself in the shadow of the hero, the repetition of Joan of Arc who 'saved' France. 'What Gaullism stands for, first of all, is the restoration of a structure and vigour to France.' If Sartre and Malraux resemble each other in their faith in possibility, Malraux, eager to have history made at all costs, has abandoned the action of the intelligence – the criticism of the drama – and has given himself up to the myth and its catastrophe.

What shall we think of this act of once more anticipating the hero with desire? It is undeniable that there is something deeply pathetic in it. But as a positive commitment is there not something banal and profoundly boring in this appeal to be taken by surprise? It has all happened before, each time in the name of the new. We are familiar with the heroes of the twentieth century; we should be experts in the process of their emergence from the depths. They seem to stand for adventure and possibility, yet their careers are altogether routine. Each comes forth 'naked', an anonymous man – Hitler, Germany's Unknown Soldier; Mussolini, a Socialist editor; Stalin, a Party secretary; de Gaulle, an undistinguished brigadier. They have no features; they are supported by future victims and foes precisely because no one knows whom they represent nor what they intend to do ('we have no faith in programmes'). It is in action itself that they seek to acquire a physiognomy, yet they never overcome their vagueness. The heroic duplications of the present century lack the daemonism of earlier resurrections. They do not spring from the overpowering presence of a single predecessor, they rather combine in themselves a series of imitations. And in each series it is the figure of Napoleon and that of some folk leader. The heroes of our time belong to contrived

rather than spontaneous myths – though evoking perhaps even more fanaticism as a guard against partial disbelief.

In Marx's terminology the revivals of the heroic by the contemporary masters of quick change belong to the category of farce. The comic nature of the modern hero is instinctively recognized at the moment of his entrance upon the stage: in the popular phrase, 'At first nobody took him seriously.' The clown-hero retaliates to the ridicule of the world by exposing the lack of seriousness of the rest of the cast, of all the existing historical actors. The leader without a programme challenges all opposing parties, governments, individuals, to live up to *their* programmes. And since all are playing a comedy of pretence, 'the adventurer who took the comedy as plain comedy was bound to win'. The victory of the genuine hero was the victory of a new historical actor in a state of transformation. This was revealed in the novelty of the 'sober reality' that slowly emerged from the mist of his poetry. The substitute hero, on the other hand, represents only the failure of the plot to bring forth its protagonist. When, having assumed power, he can no longer, as Marx said of Louis Bonaparte, 'take his world history for a comedy' the 'serious buffoon' is compelled to 'take his comedy for world history'. Thus each of Hitler's speeches after 1932 opened with an autobiographical incantation bearing testimony to the powers that lifted the outcast ex-soldier above the mighty of his time, while Stalin meets every situation, domestic and international, by recounting his defence of genuine Leninism through purging the Party of enemies of the right and the left, and by instituting a new purge. With the false hero the myth must be permanently sustained against the historical. Malraux's 'no faith in programmes' finally comes to mean that at each turn of events the leader's solution is to repeat the process of his own apotheosis.

The myths of the twentieth century do not 'beget' new forms, nor are its heroes the 'mouthpieces and interpreters' of a new historical identity in the process of revealing itself. If our epoch is an epoch of crisis, it is of a crisis that cannot be overleaped by a magical duplication of the past. In vain are the dead of every period disinterred. The effect is not of a heroic transcendence of 'the limitations of the historical content' but of mixing the 'nightmare' into the 'sober reality'. The visible plot of history has to all appearances broken down. No one can define the reality that succeeds our farcical interludes, no one can predict the next act, no one point with assurance to the privileged actor. To the Hegelian Marx it was inconceivable that a historical situation should not ultimately produce its true protagonist. With us, the surrender of identity seems the first condition of historical action.

## BOOK NOTES

**FACES IN THE CROWD**, by David Riesman, in collaboration with Nathan Glazer. (Yale University Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege at the OUP, pp. 740, 32s. 6d.) Mr Riesman is the Kinsey of American politics. Having worked out his tools of investigation in *The Lonely Crowd*, he now applies them to the exhausting and exhaustive task of analysing the attitudes of a representative (one hopes) selection of people towards public life and social problems in the U S A. For this task he and his collaborator have employed a team of research assistants, armed with questionnaires half a mile long and demanding information on the subject's attitude towards questions ranging from the election of the next President to 'dating' girl or boy friends. Everything about this work is on a gigantic scale: the size of the book, the care taken to prepare it, and the conceptual apparatus employed to illuminate the basic distinctions between 'tradition-directed', 'inner-directed' and 'other-directed' types of persons. To review it briefly is out of the question; to criticize it would require an almost equivalent mountain of labour. Let it be said briefly, then, that Mr Riesman and his team of investigators have assembled twenty-one full-length 'profiles' out of a random selection of 180 interviews, ranging from Hollywood writers to semi-literate Harlem charwomen. Their aim has been to discover what typical culture-patterns exist in the U S A and how they reflect themselves in daily life. In the process they have thrown a good deal of light on their own mental make-up, some of its disconcerting to mere Europeans. But *Faces in the Crowd* is in some sense an important book. Its vast bulk and technical language should not deter earnest students of American folklore from reading it.

**THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON: A STUDY IN BOLSHEVIK STRATEGY AND TACTICS**, by Philip Selznick. (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., pp. 333, 42s. 6d.) The superfluity of newsprint in the U S A makes for the production of books which cannot conceivably be of the slightest use to anyone. Mr Selznick's magnificently produced tome is another of those Rand Corporation Studies (financed by the U S Air Force) whose failure to make any significant contribution to their subject was analysed in an article printed in the August TWENTIETH CENTURY. It is, like Mr Nathan Leites's *Code*, a study in what the author would probably describe as the descriptive sociology of institutional models under totalitarian control; in other words, a book on Communism. Its ostensible purpose is to reduce to some semblance of order the mass of information or misinformation about Communist Party tactics and organization which American research institutes have been able to compile. Its failure is total, complete and unmitigated. Everything that is known about Leninist and Stalinist methods of conducting political warfare is here sieved through the conceptual apparatus of American academic sociology, and the resulting flavourless and shapeless product is served up to the reader in strict conformity with the most exacting requirements demanded of investigators in this field – in other words, as an unhistorical, static and

meaningless accumulation of so-called facts. It is not Mr Selznick's fault. It is the fault of his teachers, and of the research institutes given over to this pseudo-learning. They should be razed to the ground and their inhabitants told to earn their living by honest labour.

**THE NEW MAN IN SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY**, by Raymond A. Bauer. (Harvard University Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege at the OUP, pp. 196, 25s.) The Russian Research Centre at Harvard is becoming the chief source of factual and descriptive scholarly writings on Soviet topics, and Mr Bauer, who headed the Harvard Refugee Interview Project in Europe, in 1950–51, has special qualifications for the task of assessing the changes in official Soviet doctrine on psychology since the beginning of the Stalinist era in 1928. He gives a very clear and well documented account of the manner in which Russian scholarship since that date has inter-acted with Party orthodoxy in establishing the present official pattern of doctrine and research in all matters pertaining to theoretical and applied psychology. A criticism to be made of this excellent volume is that it treats the Bolshevik conglomerate of ideas and attitudes as a whole which has remained substantially identical since 1917, merely adapting itself to changing circumstances; whereas it would have been pertinent to enquire how far the evaporation of earlier concepts and attitudes is responsible for present rigidities. The subject is approached from the outside. This, however, is probably an inevitable limitation in a study which in other respects approaches academic perfection.

**ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE**, by Karl Mannheim. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 320, 25s.) When Mannheim died in 1947, his major methodological writings were for the most part still unavailable in English, a defect now rendered good in part by the translation of six early essays composed between 1923 and 1929 and published in German periodicals. Mannheim was always more than the sociologist of institutions as which he became known in the English-speaking world after 1933. His early work, which included *Ideology and Utopia*, was in the methodological field, where he was joined by other followers of Max Weber, Rickert, Dilthey and Troeltsch in the search for a theory of social investigation that should stand up to the charge of relativism. The intellectual crucible in which this generation was formed is well described by Dr Kecskemeti, who has edited these manuscripts on behalf of the New School of Social Research in New York, assisted by a Rockefeller grant. Out of it came George Lukacs, the only significant theorist Stalinism has produced in Central Europe, but it also gave rise to the counter-movement in part associated with Mannheim. The essays collected in the present volume do not make easy reading, and their inconclusiveness seems to have been felt by the editor, whose introduction terminates on a slightly apologetic note. Mannheim in fact failed to turn 'historicism' into a genuine philosophy, but his failure was significant and holds important lessons for present-day scholars. Those interested in the 'sociology of knowledge' cannot afford to pass this volume by.

**THE DILEMMA OF OUR TIME**, by Harold Laski. (Allen & Unwin, pp. 268, 18s.) The late Professor Laski was in his life-time regarded by some Labour Party sympathizers as a notable political thinker with a capacity for stating important

truths in easy language. The grounds alleged for this belief have never been satisfactorily explained to non-believers, and they are not likely to be made plainer by the posthumous publication of a lengthy essay originally intended as a postscript to an earlier volume composed in 1944, when it was still assumed, in and around the editorial office of the *New Statesman*, that the Soviet Union and the United States would live happily ever after. *The Dilemma of Our Time* is the dilemma of the surviving Popular Fronters and Stalino-Liberals of the mid-thirties. Since Laski was and is one of their favourite writers, it must be assumed that they will scan the present volume. It is probable that no one else will. At his best Laski had a journalistic facility for popularizing the thoughts of other men. In *The Dilemma of Our Time* he is not at his best, since he gives us his own hurried, superficial and cliché-ridden observations on the causes and consequences of the Cold War. Their general drift may be gauged from his concluding observation that 'the great difference between witch-hunting in the United States and witch-hunting in Russia is the undoubted fact that in Russia, as in the countries of the Cominform generally, there is far less regard for the sanctity of human life. . . .' This might become a classic of asininity, if it did not have to compete with so many other specimens. Garrulous, silly and infinitely cocksure, this volume displays the familiar equivocations of the Stalino-Liberal mind, anxiously attuned to every breach of law in Alabama, and always ready to excuse mass extermination in the Soviet Union, on the plea that things are not perfect in the USA either.

*STALIN VERSUS MARX*, by Klaus Mehnert. (Allen & Unwin, pp. 128, 8s. 6d.) Dr Mehnert's pamphlet appeared in the original German last year, and the publishers are to be congratulated for making it available in English. Written in popular style, it gives an excellent account of the evolution of Stalinist doctrine in the fields of history and linguistics. The celebrated controversy on language staged in 1950, which resulted in the carefully planned reinstatement of Russian as the premier linguistic vehicle in the U S S R, is placed in its proper perspective and light falls on the Stalinist doctrine of 'revolution from above'.

*IN THE NAZI ERA*, by Sir Lewis Namier, F B A. (Macmillan & Co., pp. 186, 12s. 6d.) Professor Namier is now at work, in company with other historians, on the great History of Parliament which the Government last year decided to finance. This latest collection of essays and reviews from *The Times Literary Supplement*, the *Manchester Guardian*, *The Listener* and other newspapers and periodicals, is therefore likely, for some time, to be the last. But even if the author had more leisure at his disposal he would find it difficult to continue the slaughter of German post-Hitler memoirists, for this particular species of literature has now come to an end. The victims in the present volume include Halder, Weizsaecker, von Dirksen, Erich and Theo Kordt, and Paul Schmidt. A particularly interesting chapter is devoted to the *Anschluss*, and Munich is once more examined in detail. There is an appreciative reference to Benes – 'a Victorian in twentieth-century Central Europe' – but his weaknesses are not obscured. On the whole this selection is both thinner and grittier than earlier volumes, but there is the same masterly control of the subject, and the same deadly accuracy in nailing German inventions, especially those of Weizsaecker.

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
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PARRISH

**MONARCHY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM**, by Sir Lewis Namier, F B A. (Geoffrey Cumberlege at the OUP, pp. 30, 2s. 6d.) The text of the Romanes Lecture, delivered by Professor Namier in the Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford, on May 15th this year. It is clearly a fragment struck off in the work-shop currently occupied by the author, in preparation for his forthcoming account of eighteenth and nineteenth century parliamentary history, within the symposium above referred to. The most significant conclusion arising from it is that parliamentary government, as currently understood, is no more than a century old: as late as 1846 it was still assumed that the choice of Ministers rested pre-eminently with the Crown, although the doctrine began to be questioned. The complete sovereignty of Parliament is a very recent thing.

**UTILITY AND ALL THAT. AND OTHER ESSAYS**, by Professor D. H. Robertson. (Allen & Unwin, pp. 205, 18s.) The papers collected in this volume were written between 1945 and 1951, and therefore cover the period of the Labour Government, which was also the period of Britain's adaptation to the post-war economic world. But the selection also includes some more technical contributions to economic theory which will be of interest to the advanced student. Notwithstanding a certain amount of whimsical self-depreciation on the grounds of theoretical and mathematical 'idiocy', the two essays on the theory of interest are by no means easy reading. The remainder offer fewer difficulties to the layman. No. 2, 'The Economic Outlook', a Presidential Address read to Section F of the British Association in Dundee in August 1947, is perhaps of special interest, since it contains some polite but pointed criticism of the concept of planning expounded by Sir Oliver Franks, who is shortly to return to this country from his term as Ambassador to Washington. There are also some highly topical observations on Britain's share in Western European recovery, delivered with the author's customary felicity of style.

**ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. A Report** by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Pp. 172, 6s.) This is a concise, factual and, on the whole, uncritical survey of the working of N A T O since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. Written on behalf of a Chatham House study group by Mr Donald McLachlan, it offers the reader a useful guide through the maze of N A T O committee work, and some commonsensical suggestions for improving the organizational structure set up in Paris. Attempts at constructive criticism are dimmed by reticences on the part of the study group, partly overcome in the section explaining Britain's reservations on the subject of European or Atlantic federalism. The military line-up in Europe is described with tantalizing brevity, and only the briefest reference is made to conflicting American and British views on the strategic significance of the Mediterranean. By contrast, a very full account is given of the international bureaucracy now grouped around the Permanent Organization in Paris. Aside from some irritating lapses into facetiousness, such as the employment of the phrase 'Three Wise Men' to denote the executive of the Temporary Council Committee, this part of the Report has the ring of authority. The broad political conclusions scattered throughout the text will command less support, notably the suggestion that a fifty years' armed truce can be established on the basis of Western 'hegemony' in the industrial and military sphere.



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
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The publishers of the British edition of ORDEAL BY SLANDER, by Owen Lattimore, mentioned in our October issue, are McGibbon and Kee Ltd.

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