

Philosophical

Quarterly

Jan 1952



JL
QM_m2, N25
N52.24.4
123901

10

110
1-52
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY


Vol. XXIV, No. 4]

[January 1952

AN ORGAN
OF
THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
AND
THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

Managing Editor :
PROF. G. R. MALKANI


Editorial Board :
PROF. N. A. NIKAM
PROF. S. C. CHATTERJI



Yearly Subscription Rs. 4
For Congress Members Rs. 3
Foreign 8 Shillings or 2 Dollars Single copy Re. 1 or 2 Shillings

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Primary and Secondary Qualities — A Retrospect by Aloka Mukhopadhyaya	.. 195
Is Time Metrizable ? by C. T. K. Chari	.. 203
Identity of the Self by S. C. Chatterjee	.. 217
The Object and Sensibility by S. K. Chattopadhyaya	.. 225
Idealism versus Realism by Probas Jivan Chaudhury	.. 233
Reason and Revelation by J. N. Chubb	.. 239
The Evolution of Religious Consciousness by Indra Sen	.. 247
Examination of the Main Realistic Argument by G. R. Malkani	.. 253
"To Act from Sense of Duty" by Shriniwas Dixit	.. 261



QM 2, N25
N52-34-4

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIV, No. 4]

[January 1952

Primary and Secondary Qualities A Retrospect

by

ALOKA MUKHOPADHYAYA

The distinction of sensible qualities into primary and secondary has raised one of the most vital issues of epistemological and metaphysical thinking, that of the nature and status of the content of knowing. In fact, it has initiated discussions on the most important problems of modern and contemporary metaphysics and epistemology, problems that are associated with the doctrines of Realism and Idealism. The discussion has fairly wearied out most of our contemporary philosophers, some of whom have been thinking in real earnest to eliminate such words as realism and idealism from their philosophy on account of their extremely dubitable significance. Some are contemplating to go beyond realism and idealism and to build up a metaphysics on neutral lines. The division of metaphysics and epistemology on realistic and idealistic lines has involved, it is felt by some, some sort of cross-division, and philosophers who are otherwise idealistic have claimed affiliation to some sort of a realistic epistemology, as many of our epistemological idealists, again, have defended a realistic sort of metaphysics. In course of polemical discussions the terms "realism" and "idealism" have thus lost all clear-cut meaning. Many now think that the realistic and the idealistic trends of thought which were initiated by a logical distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities have on the whole miscarried, and it has been felt that better results can be had if we succeed in eliminating these two concepts from our philosophical literature altogether. It is felt necessary by some to re-examine the basis of the distinction of qualities into primary and secondary. It is time to consider also if the logical and epistemological consequences that

developed from the distinction followed right lines, or whether for all the difficulties that cropped up in the metaphysical and epistemological discussions of our realists and idealists, the distinction of qualities into primary and secondary was not in the least responsible. The purpose of this essay is therefore to reopen discussion on this point and to examine the basis of this distinction. As Locke was the first thinker to make an elaborate statement of this vital epistemological and metaphysical issue, it will be convenient for our purpose to begin with Locke, although the distinction between primary and secondary qualities can be traced in some form to such earlier thinkers as Democritus, Plato, Descartes and some others.

As against Protagoras who would make all properties secondary and relative, Democritus regarded those properties alone as secondary which would depend on perception by special senses, but others as primary and objective. Thus, according to Democritus, while colour, sound, smell, taste are dependent on perception by special senses, form, size, inertia, density and hardness are properties of things themselves. Descartes took up the same distinction and called shape, size, position, motion, etc. primary qualities, while colour, sound, etc. were regarded as secondary. According to Descartes, qualities which belonged to bodies themselves were primary while qualities which belonged to bodies by virtue of their action upon senses were called secondary. Eventually, the primary qualities were the mathematical properties, the secondary qualities were the sensible qualities. Locke took up the clue from Descartes and regarded solidity, extension figure, motion or rest and number as the primary qualities. These were supposed to belong to objects themselves and were conceived as utterly inseparable from them. The secondary qualities were supposed to be nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations such as colour, sound, taste, in us by their primary qualities. In the contemporary period, the old distinction of qualities reappears as between microscopic qualities and macroscopic qualities. The microscopic qualities, as C. D. Broad and others call them, belong to the essential constituents of the things themselves and are therefore similar to the primary qualities. The macroscopic qualities are supposed to belong to complete structures, to wholes, to the *Gestalten* of the Gestalt Psychologists, and are similar to the secondary qualities, but the latter are not regarded as subjective or mind-dependent, though less original than the microscopic qualities.

To quote Locke, "The qualities, that are in bodies, rightly considered, are of three sorts".

"First, the bulk, figure, number, situation and motion or rest of their solid parts. Those are in them, whether we perceive them or not; and when they are of that size, that we can discover them, we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself, as is plain in artificial things. These I call *primary qualities*."

"Secondly, the power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses and thereby produce *in us*, the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. These are usually called *sensible qualities*."

"Thirdly, the power that is in any body by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture and motion of another body as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make the wax white and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called *powers*."¹

It is evident from the above quotations, that all qualities whether primary or secondary are real, according to Locke, and none of them, not even the tertiary qualities, called *powers*, can be regarded as subjective in any sense. They are in the things themselves either as properties, or as powers to cause sensations in our sense-organs such as colour sound, etc. or powers to cause changes in some other body. Either as properties or as powers they all thus belong to the objects. But their ideas, namely, the ideas which they generate in the perceiver's mind are mental and, in that sense, subjective.

Locke maintains that all simple ideas, whether of sensation or of reflection, are object-based; none of them is a mental construction, or *in that sense*, subjective. They have got an occasion or a cause, outside of them in the external world. They are generated in us and are not caused by ourselves. We do not make any of them. They are received into the mind from an external and alien source through the passivity of the mind. This holds true both in respect of our ideas of primary and of secondary qualities. All qualities and powers are real and extramental. The primary

1. *An Essay concerning Human understanding*, Book II, Chap. VIII, Sec. 23.

qualities are represented by exact copies of themselves in our mind in what may be described as ideas of primary qualities. These are extension, figure, impenetrability or solidity, motion or rest and number. Corresponding to these our ideas, there are properties such as extension, figure, solidity, etc. that belong to matter and constitute its essence. Our *ideas* of secondary qualities are colour, sound, taste, temperature, etc. These are the effects of certain powers (inherent in primary qualities) on the sense organs of the percipient. Our ideas of secondary qualities also have an occasion outside of themselves, and such occasioning causes of the ideas of secondary qualities are called the secondary qualities of matter. The secondary qualities are not as essential to matter as are the primary qualities. Moreover, the secondary qualities do not get the exact representations of themselves in our ideas of secondary qualities. Colour or sound is no doubt caused by certain powers of matter on the sense organs but such powers are not similar to colour or sound. Thus the ideas of secondary qualities do not correspond to the qualities which cause them and which may be supposed to exist in the matter not as essential properties, but as powers of a peculiar sort. This Lockian division of qualities into primary and secondary has been systematically misrepresented by later writers.

Locke distinguishes between the qualities of material objects and our ideas of them. While the former are the properties or powers in the material objects, the latter are the mental representations of these in the mind of the percipient. Thus primary and secondary qualities are both different from our ideas of primary and secondary qualities. Unfortunately, this clear differentiation which Locke himself has made, in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, has been lost sight of by careless readers and ambitious critics and interpreters. Our ideas of primary and secondary qualities both exist in the mind, but the occasioning causes of such ideas (which are the primary and secondary qualities) have an extramental existence. Locke never said that the secondary qualities are only our ideas and so nothing extramental. Locke himself never said that colour, sound, taste, etc., are secondary qualities. He called them *ideas of secondary qualities*. What such secondary qualities are in themselves besides being the powers causing our ideas of secondary qualities, Locke did not suggest. All that he said is that while solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number are properties of matter since matter cannot be conceived as existing without them, the secondary quali-

ties are the powers, not essential to matter. They are the powers in matter to affect our sense organs by means of the primary qualities and to cause sensations in us. The tertiary qualities are also not essential properties of matter but powers to cause changes or transformations in other material bodies. As qualities or powers all are objective, but while the primary qualities inhere in matter existing by itself, the secondary qualities become operative when matter comes to affect, our sense-organs, and the tertiary qualities or powers become manifest when one material body causes changes in some other material body. The secondary and tertiary qualities are in a sense modifications of the primary and become operative when matter enters into relation with some one's sense-organs in one case, and when matter enters into some sort of a causal relation with some other material body in the other case.

Berkeley does not distinguish between a quality and our idea of it. We take the sensible quality as identical with our idea. He abolishes, in the first instance, the Lockian distinction between primary and secondary qualities and our ideas of primary and secondary qualities, resolving all such qualities into our ideas. Berkeley argues in the next place that if our ideas of colour, sound, taste, smell, etc., be mind-dependent and subjective, the so-called primary qualities or ideas like extension, solidity, figure, motion or rest and number should also be regarded as subjective and mind-dependent. Berkeley's "vision" about the third dimension breaks down the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley argues that nature cannot be divided into two parts, one of which is mental and the other non-mental. If colour is mental, then the space occupied by that colour must be mental also. If shape be mental and the space be mental, all qualities primary or secondary are also mental. Thus he revolted against what Prof. Whitehead calls, the "bifurcation of nature". Nature is all of a piece — the colour of the sunset belongs with the sunset and the sunset belongs with its colour. Thus it is either all external to the observer or it is all within the observer's perception. Berkeley accepted the latter view. He gave three arguments to prove that all the qualities, primary or secondary, are mind-dependent and subjective. In the first place, he argues that it is not possible for us to imagine that our ideas of extension, solidity, etc., have any originals existing in the physical order. These ideas can only be *like* our ideas and it is absurd to suggest that our ideas of primary qualities are copies of physical essences or properties which are non-mental and so unlike our ideas of them. What

we know is the real extension or figure, etc., of our experience, and so far as we know them they are our ideas. As sensible qualities their *esse* is their *percipi*, and so the supposition that they exist outside of us as they are experienced, involves contradiction. How can they remain the same as they are experienced and when not experienced? In other words, how can the primary qualities as we know them exist otherwise than as we know them, that is, as our ideas? How can the sensible qualities remain sensible, that is, remain just as we sense them when we no longer sense them or when they cease to be sensible? In the second place, Berkeley argues that it is not possible to imagine the so-called primary qualities like extension and motion without any reference to the secondary qualities. Whatever extension we experience has got certain colour. If the secondary qualities are taken away from our ideas of primary qualities, then nothing seems to stay out. So if the secondary qualities are mind-dependent, the primary qualities which cannot be conceived to exist apart from the secondary qualities must be more subjective. Yet believing in the theory of abstract ideas, so Berkeley complains, we claim to know absolute extension, figure, etc., without reference to the secondary qualities. But if we pause to think, we shall find it impossible to conceive the primary qualities without the secondary qualities. In the third place, the primary qualities are as much relative to the position and the sense-organs of the percipient as are the secondary qualities. Big or small, swift or slow, this is how we describe extension or motion. But such descriptions are correct relative to the position of the percipient, as also in relation to his sense-organs. There is no extension which is neither great, nor small, no motion which is neither swift, nor slow, no figure which is neither like this nor like that. All the so-called primary qualities are related to a percipient and so like the secondary qualities are mind-dependent and subjective. In this way, Berkeley abolishes the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities and seeks to prove all of them to be equally subjective.

Some of his arguments have been utilized by contemporary idealists like Bradley to prove that the primary and secondary qualities, space, time, etc., are all *appearances* as different from Reality. In the contemporary period, Prof. Whitehead also supports Berkeley in so far as Berkeley had revolted against "bifurcation of nature". Many of our contemporary writers think that if the primary qualities are objective, the secondary qualities should also be regarded as objective. If, again, the secondary qualities are

supposed to be subjective, the primary qualities also should be taken in the same way. In other words, many contemporary thinkers side with Berkeley so far as he abolished the distinction between the two kinds of qualities. But contrary to Berkeley's opinion, many would hold that both the primary and the secondary qualities are objective. Our idea of a quality or content, and the content or quality of which we have the idea, are not identical. Awareness and the content of awareness are distinct entities, as Prof. Moore has argued. It is through a confused identification between the two, that Berkeley proves all qualities to be subjective. But if this distinction is not lost sight of, there is good reason for regarding both the kinds of qualities as objective. Locke had maintained the distinction between the quality and our idea of it, and it was Berkeley who by abolishing the distinction between them developed his subjective idealism. Berkeley's subjective idealism can thus be regarded not exactly as a logical consequence of Locke's empirical realism but a confused development in which the distinction between the mental acts and the content, our idea and the quality of which it is the idea, has been overlooked and ignored.

We are of the opinion that the issue regarding subjectivity or objectivity of our sensible qualities has not been finally decided. As subsequent developments moved on wrong lines of interpretation, the enquirer of the new age will do well to begin with Locke and should display better and more sympathetic understanding of the principles underlying the Lockian division of qualities. Difficult though it is to prove that our ideas depend on certain objective properties or powers as their occasioning causes, that they are not presentative but are all representative in some sense, it is nevertheless inconceivable that our ideas are self-contained and do not require any such extraneous reference in an epistemological account of them. Whether our ideas are phenomenal representations of the things-in-themselves (Kant), or essences and character complexes figuring in objects themselves (critical realism), or mere functional representations or relational characteristics of objects which are neutral in essence (new realism), has yet to be decided and settled. Along with that problem the logical basis of a division of nature into primary, secondary and tertiary qualities will have to be re-examined, as it is found difficult to admit that all qualities or our ideas of them are exactly on a par, and the classical distinctions among them are merely fanciful.

Is Time Metrizable ?

BY

C. T. K. CHARI

Madras Christian College, Tambaram

In this paper I wish to propound the problem whether, from our experience of the 'passage of events', we can unambiguously elicit a notion analogous to that of 'distance' in metrical geometry. Topology, the study of the basic connectivity structure of spaces, has enabled us to form precise notions of 'distance' in geometry. A set R of elements is called a 'metrical space' if a real-valued function $d(x, y)$, termed the 'distance between x, y ', is defined for all pairs of elements x, y of R so as to satisfy the postulates : (i) $d(x, y) = d(y, x)$; (ii) $d(x, y) > 0$ if $x \neq y$, and $d(x, x) = 0$; (iii) $d(x, z) \leq d(x, y) + d(y, z)$ where x, y, z are all members of R , i.e., $x, y, z \in R$. Can the postulates be extended by some kind of analogy to the time of awareness ?

(1)

I venture to think that experienced time has no metric inherent in it. We have undeniably a crude perception of duration and the occurrence of periodic phenomena like hunger and thirst, sunrise and sunset, make comparisons, and eventually clocks, inevitable. But subjective estimates of duration alone do not yield an unambiguous metrical theory of time. Bergson's use of the term *durée* in the sense of 'enduring' or 'living through' lies much nearer to our experience of time than the corresponding English word suggesting a length or measure of time.¹ The psychology of time is still desperately in need of clarification and Lotze's famous indictment of it² has not been antiquated. The accounts of the 'specious present' have been so varied that at least one writer³ has been led to suspect that 'different philosophers are introspecting quite different specious presents' and

1. Cf. B. Mayo, 'Is there a Sense of Duration?' in *Mind*, N. S., LIX, No. 233 (January 1950).

2. *Metaphysic* (Eng. tr., Oxford, 1887), Vol. I, Bk. II, Ch. III, p. 315.

3. L. E. Akeley, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXII, No. 21, p. 562. P. 2

another,⁴ more recently, has counselled us to abandon the whole quest for 'units of temporal experience' in the older structural sense. The work of Wertheimer and others, however, tending to show that motion and rhythm are 'Gestalt qualities' makes it impossible for us to reject the doctrine of the 'specious present' if it is intended as a crude description of temporal experience. Our very use of the present participle in sentences like 'I am seeing a flash of light'⁵ suggests that perceived events have a durational stretch. But in all attempts to formulate precisely the 'saddle-back' and the 'wedge' theories of the 'specious present' we encounter formidable obstacles.⁶ Halting at the boundaries of 'Gestalt phenomena', on the other hand, without any further endeavour to analyse temporal experience, leaves untouched almost all the problems the 'specious present' was intended to solve. Substituting, as E. G. Boring⁷ has attempted to do, 'physiological continuity' for 'immediacy' and a 'construct which is just as public as any other convincing inference from data' for 'private experience' does not help us. The doctrine of the 'specious present', notwithstanding its 'structural' flavour reminiscent of Wundtian psychology, is the demand for temporal connectivity of some sort at the introspective level. It is in effect the postulation of a principle which 'can preserve mental events from instantaneous obliteration in the past and pick out of the continuous stream of time unities that, meaning short durations, are consciously present'.⁸ I do not see that the 'operationist' reformulation of the question makes it more intelligible or answerable. If all that is meant by 'immediate awareness of time' is the 'integration' of an 'event' with the 'response' that is the 'report' of it, 'there is no apparent reason', as Boring admits,⁹ 'why there should not be longer integrations of an hour or a year, but they do not seem to happen'. As 'duration' lengthens beyond the con-

4. J. D. Mabbott, 'Our Direct Experience of Time', *Mind*, N. S., LX, No. 238 (April 1951).

5. Cf. Prof. Hans Reichenbach's analysis of the tenses of verbs as 'token-reflexive' symbols, *Elements of Symbolic Logic* (Macmillan, New York, 1947), VII, § 51.

6. See my paper, *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress for 1950*, Part I, pp. 43-52.

7. 'Temporal Perception and Operationism', *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (July 1936), p. 521. Mabbott in his recent article contributed to *Mind* (*op. cit.*) seems to rely chiefly on Boring.

8. Boring's phraseology in his book *The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness* (The Century Co., London, 1933), Ch. 5, p. 134. Italics not mine.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

scious present', the 'integration' of the 'event' with the 'report' becomes 'loose' and the 'observation' is replaced by a 'complex judgment'.¹⁰ What is this, I ask, but the 'specious present' with all its perplexities translated into modern idiom? The more discerning advocates of the doctrine of the 'specious present' like Royce were concerned to maintain that the 'length' of the 'specious present' is arbitrary and that 'longer unities' are metaphysically possible, though not obvious to ordinary introspection. Attempts to draw general conclusions from the relatively short 'specious presents' measured in the laboratory are unphilosophical. Equally so, I am afraid, are the attempts made by Boring and others to retain 'continuity' without undertaking to explain just *what* it means or just *how* it is compatible with the 'integration' of an 'event' with the 'response' that 'reports' the occurrence of the event. To declare at the outset that temporal continuity is *sui generis* and that we cannot, therefore, speculate on it seems little better than a naive acceptance of the doctrine of the 'specious present'.

The trouble seems to be that our researches into temporal perception are not taking us farther afield. Kurt Lewin has said of such activities as writing a letter that they are '*temporally* extended wholes of a structural type as yet very little studied'.¹¹ A recent survey of the findings of experimental psychologists in the field says that 'there is no generally accepted view as to how we perceive or estimate time'.¹² We hear that, whereas the principal cues for space perception and their interrelationships have been carefully investigated, notably by H. A. Carr in his *Introduction to Space Perception*, no reliable list of the cues used in the perception of time has been published; in fact, we are hardly sure of any of the cues.¹³ Whether it is the determination of the 'Weber-Fechner constant' in the perception of time-intervals, or the appre-

10. *Ibid.*, p. 137. Mabbott, unlike Boring, speculates on the possibility of 'prolonged events' (e.g. Mozart's well-known musical themes) getting 'integrated' with the 'observation' without stopping to notice the epistemological and ontological questions about 'pastness', 'presentness' and 'futurity' that this raises: questions implicit in the older doctrine of the 'specious present'. Vide my paper, *Proc. Indian Phil. Congress*, 1950, Part I.

11. Lewin cited in *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology* (prepared by W. D. Ellis with an Introduction by Koffka, Kegan Paul, London, 1938), p. 284. Italics not mine.

12. A. R. Gilliland, J. Hofeld and G. Eckstrand, 'Studies in Time Perception', *The Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (March 1946), p. 163.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

ciation of 'filled' and 'unfilled' time, or the estimation of the 'indifference point', the experimental results are 'either too conflicting or inconclusive to prove or disprove any theory of time perception'.¹⁴ The researches may be summarized by saying that 'different investigators have obtained very different results'.¹⁵

About the only statement we can hazard is that, unlike the awareness of space, awareness of time is not obviously and directly dependent on sense perception.¹⁶ And even apart from 'parapsychology' or psychical research, there are quasi-empirical states of the mind that present difficulties for any logical theory of time-order. The difficulties are not always explicitly dealt with, but they are real enough. Morton Prince found that 'Sally', the 'co-conscious secondary personality' in the Beauchamp case, was entirely ignorant of time-divisions. 'A day, a week and a month were all the same to her.' Yet it is implied by Prince that 'Sally' perceived 'passage' as well as the 'normal' Miss Beauchamp. The 'time of our dreams' shows peculiarities very hard to reconcile with the serial arrangement of events that we habitually adopt in our waking life.¹⁷ A wish and its fulfilment in a dream may not be separated by a 'time-interval'; the two may be experienced as parts of one event. There may even be a 'simultaneity' of incompatible activities. D. E. Klein, in an experimental study of the production of dreams during hypnosis¹⁸ found that the average duration of a dream, judged by external standards, was only ½ a

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-68, p. 172. Very few philosophers seem to have noticed this important paper.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 172. Cf. J. Lindworsky, *Experimental Psychology* (Eng. tr., George Allen & Unwin, London), p. 174. The arguments for a special 'time-sense' or 'time-organ' advanced by biologists like Cyon, Weber, Uexküll, Rawitz, Francois, and Hoagland are dubious. EEG studies have shown that the 'alpha rhythm' of the brain is not significantly related to conscious estimation of time. The case for a 'biological time', distinct from the time of physics and bound up with the continuity of organisms, has been argued by Alexis Carrel (*Man, the Unknown*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1935, Ch. V, 'Inward Time'), Lecomte du Noüy (*Biological Time*, Methuen, London, 1936, Parts III, Chs. VIII and IX), and Ivy MacKenzie (*Arist. Soc. Suppl. Vol. V*). If they are right, our preference of 'clock-time' to 'lived time' seems not a little arbitrary.

17. Mary Sturt, *The Psychology of Time* (Kegan Paul, London, 1925), Chs. VII and VIII. Cf. Dr. Jolan Jacobi, *The Psychology of C. G. Jung* (Kegan Paul, 1942), pp. 70-1; Isabel Stearns, *The Review of Metaphysics*, IV, No. 2 (December 1950), p. 199.

18. *University of Texas Bulletin*, No. 3009.

minute. Another investigation carried out on similar lines¹⁹ revealed that the duration of the dreams evoked depended on the 'depth' of the 'trance'²⁰ and that no quantitative comparisons of the 'time of normal experience' with the 'time of dreams' were possible. Some celebrated dreams arguing for an incredible speed of thought-processes (e.g. Maury's dream of the French revolution²¹) have been ingeniously explained away but not explained. There are again dreams in which 'past' events widely separated in our conventional time and in our ordinary memory are 're-experienced' as a 'now'. These dreams are not unlike the 'dissociated' or 'abreacted' states in which the subject 'relives' his 'past' referring to it in the present tense and experiencing unusually vivid images which are almost like percepts.²² The 'hypermnnesia' of these states has never been, so far as I am aware, discussed by philosophers with the care it deserves. The expedient of dismissing it as a 'hallucination' is none too wise. The hypothesis that 'waking consciousness' has always a fringe of 'dream-consciousness' has been proposed by psychologists²³ and psychical researchers²⁴ whose eminence can hardly be a matter for dispute. One gets the impression from much psycho-analytic literature²⁵

19. *Journal of Psychology*, 1936.

20. This possibly accounts for the results of M. W. Richardson and J. M. Stalnaker cited by A. O. Weber in his critical survey (*The Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. XXX, No. 3, March 1933). They found no significant differences between time-estimation in the waking state and in the hypnotic state. It is notoriously difficult to judge the 'depth' of hypnotic 'trance'.

21. A. Maury, *Le Sommeil et les rêves, études psychologiques sur ces phénomènes* (Paris, Didier et Cie, éditeurs, 1861), pp. 133-4. Le Lorrain and Egger discussed the dream in the *Revue philosophique*. For comments by Havelock Ellis, Delage and others, see R. L. Mégroz, *The Dream World*, (E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1939), Part III, Ch. 9. Cf. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (3rd edition, George Allen & Unwin, London), pp. 20-1. For P. D. Ouspensky's interesting observations, see his *New Model of the Universe* (Kegan Paul, 1934), Ch. VII, pp. 288-90.

22. B. Sidis and S. P. Goodhart, *Multiple Personality*, (Appleton, New York, 1905), Part II, Ch. X, pp. 156-9.

23. Jung cited by Jolan Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

24. René Warcollier, *Experiments in Telepathy* (edited and abridged by Prof. Gardner Murphy, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1939), p. 54.

25. Israel Levine, *The Unconscious* (Leonard Parsons, London, 1923), § 40; Ives Henderick, *Facts and Theories of Psycho-analysis* (1st edition, Kegan Paul), Part II, Ch. 6, section on the 'Id'; O. Fenichel, *The Psycho-analytic Theory of Neurosis* (Kegan Paul, 1946), pp. 282 ff.; J. Ehrenwald, *Telepathy and Medical Psychology* (George Allen & Unwin, 1947), pp. 68-72; C. P. Oberndorf, *Psychoanalytical Review*, Vol. XXVIII (1941), pp. 139-155; L. Dooley, *Psychiatry*, IV (1941), pp. 13-23; Marie Bonaparte, 'L'inconscient et le temps', *Rev. franc. Psychoanal.*, 1939, II, 61-103.

that the 'unconscious' lacks a temporal organization, at least in the familiar sense.

I think I may fairly claim that a temporal magnitude with its ordering relation of 'greater' and 'less' is not unambiguously implied by all mental states. A clock is a device that enables us to introduce a definite metric into time with the aid of various definitions and conventions. A 'unit of duration' is a transient element and cannot be preserved. We cannot, therefore, compare successive time-intervals directly. Definitions of 'equal time-intervals' are necessarily circular. All that we can attempt to do is to convert 'durations' into intervals of *some other* physical magnitude for purposes of comparison. The technique of measuring time in experimental physics involves the use of clocks which beat out their 'cycles' in space. The puzzles about 'time turning into space' arise from this fact.²⁶ The definitions of the measures of space and time are partly contained in the laws of motion which prescribe uniformity of motion under certain conditions. A straight line in Newton's dynamics is simply the path of a particle which is not acted upon by any external forces. The descriptive geometry of the line and the plane is implicit in the equations of motion of such a particle. In classical rigid dynamics, a rigid body has a definite size and two chosen points on it may be conceived as defining the same interval of distance whether the body is at rest or in motion. A rigid body rotating with a uniform speed about an axis of symmetry provides us with a method of graduating both time and space.

It is clear that physical theory isolates the extensive aspect of psychological time and eliminates its incoherencies by formalizing it. We employ the partly symmetrical, partly asymmetrical, relation of 'betweenness' in framing a concept of time-order. 'Betweenness' is partly symmetrical, because if B is between A and C, it is between C and A, i.e. (ABC) implies (CBA). It is partly asymmetrical, because if B is between A and C, then C is not between A and B, i.e. (ABC) implies that (ACB) and (BAC) are false. The class of points on a line and the class of natural numbers are ordered by the relation of 'betweenness'. We can have an independent set of postulates for triads ordered by

26. See H. Dingle's valuable article 'The Measurement of Time' in *Nature*, Vol. 139, No. 3513, February 27, 1937. He points out that, if we had all agreed to measure time in terms of mass or temperature, time would have 'turned into' mass or temperature. *Ibid.*, p. 355.

'betweenness'²⁷ and elicit from it a conventionally defined dyadic serial relation of 'preceding' and 'following' in terms of which temporal 'before' and 'after' can be stated. A class is said to be in a simpler or linear order for the relation C (read 'precedes') if its members satisfy the following postulates: (1) If x, y be any two distinct members of the class, either $x C y$ or $y C x$ (postulate of connexity); (2) if x, y be members of the class and $x C y$, then $x \neq y$, i.e., no member of the class can have the relation C to itself (postulate of irreflexiveness); (3) if x, y, z be members of the class and $x C y$ and $y C z$, then $x C z$ (postulate of transitivity). The natural numbers are in a linear order for the relation 'less than' $<$ or 'greater than' $>$. A class is 'dense' if it is in a linear order for C and if when x and y are in it and $x C y$, there is an element z such that $x C z C y$. Between any two elements there is at least one and therefore an infinity of elements. A class is 'enumerable' or 'denumerable' if its elements can be arranged in a sequence $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, \dots$ such that every x_n is an element of the class and every element of the class appears at a definite place in the sequence. The elements of an 'enumerable' set can be put in a one-one correspondence with the series of positive integers i.e., the elements of a 'progression'. A class K in a linear order for C may be said to have 'Dedekindian continuity' if it is 'dense' and if every bounded sub-class of K has an upper bound in K.²⁸ The class of all rational numbers is in a linear order with 'Dedekindian continuity'. A class in a linear order for C has 'Cantorian continuity' if it has 'Dedekindian continuity' and also contains an 'enumerable' relatively 'dense' sub-class. The class of real (i.e. rational and irrational) numbers has 'Cantorian continuity' and the rationals are an 'enumerable' relatively 'dense' sub-class. 'Cantorian continuity' implies 'Dedekindian continuity' but not *vice versa*. A class in a linear order for C with 'Cantorian continuity' and no first or last element is a 'one-dimensional continuum'. The class of signed real numbers is a 'continuum'. The 'continuum' is an example of a non-enumerable or 'non-denumerable' set; if we choose from it any sequence of elements $x_1, x_2, \dots$, there will always be elements

27. E. V. Huntington and J. R. Kilne, *Trans. Amer. Math. Soc.*, Vol. 18, 1917; Huntington, *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, 1924.

28. Cf. however *Principia Mathematica* (Cambridge, 1912), Vol. II, § 214; E. V. Huntington, *The Continuum* (Harvard University, 1917), I and II. I have followed H. G. Forder, *The Foundations of Euclidean Geometry* (Cambridge, 1927), p. 17. Cf. Weyl, *Das Continuum*.

left in the set which do not appear in the sequence; it is a higher order of infinity than an 'enumerable' infinite set. It can be shown that all 'one-dimensional continua' ordered by C are ordinally similar. By correlating the temporal relation of 'before' or 'after' with the relation of 'less than' or 'greater than' between real numbers, mathematical physics is able to treat time as a 'one dimensional continuum'. The relational structure so constructed is not an empirical order; nevertheless, it is assumed to have empirical applications within given ranges.

Although 'betweenness' is thus common to metrized space and time and in using our everyday clocks we notice a space-displacement and call it a 'time-interval',²⁹ we continue to suppose, on the basis of our awareness of 'passage', that the kind of interval measured by a clock is not the kind measured by a metre-scale; we assume that we cannot swing a measuring-rod into the 'direction' where it would measure 'seconds'. The postulated asymmetry and irreversibility of time are closely connected with our belief in causal relations holding between events. In the $(3+1)$ -dimensional metrical space-time of Special Relativity, the distinction between 'time-like' and 'space-like' intervals is grounded in the assumption that a causal, and by implication a temporal, relation cannot hold between two events when a light impulse travelling from one cannot reach the other. Instead of puzzling over this feature associated with metrical space-time, we should remember that we put it there by defining the velocity of light as the upper bound of all material velocities.³⁰ If we ignore the specific causal (and temporal) connectedness of events and operate with 'betweenness' in its purely spatial aspect, we obtain Minkowski's four-dimensional Euclidean continuum in which time is 'imaginary' ($=\sqrt{-1}$ ct) and 'all directions are alike'. Even the metrical space-time of General Relativity, it has been pointed out recently,³¹ is only a kind of 'space' and its basic vector a 'geometrical displacement'. Instead of being shocked³² at this

29. A. A. Merrill, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIX, No. 9, pp. 238-40; Vol. XXXI, No. 15, pp. 408-10.

30. See my recent note 'Special Relativity and the Lorentz Transformation in the British Mathematical Gazette', Vol. XXXV (1951), No. 313.

31. G. J. Whitrow, *The Structure of the Universe* (Hutchinson's University Library, London, 1949), pp. 93 f.

32. Like E. B. McGilvary, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 13, pp. 346-9; *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (Evanston & Chicago, 1941), pp. 224-6.

'assimilation of time and space', we should remember that we chose to make the particular abstraction and are fully entitled to the privileges it may confer upon us. The temptation to treat the four-dimensional metrical continuum as an 'objective reality' which our 'human spectacles' divide into 'space' and 'time'³³ must be strenuously resisted. A. A. Robb in his *Geometry of Time and Space*³⁴ constructed a 'Conical Order' of instants using as his fundamental relation not the triadic spatial relation of 'between', usually preferred by geometers, but the dyadic, asymmetrical temporal relation of before-and-after. Is it any surprise that he should have found strong grounds for repudiating the popular view that 'the universe is a cinematograph that is being displayed to us' and that 'events do not happen, we come across them'? Space for Robb is the manifestation of a temporal order and 'passage' is intrinsic to reality.

E. A. Milne's cosmological speculations have recently attracted the attention of philosophers.³⁵ The novelty of his procedure consists in his dispensing with the rigid measuring-rod of classical Relativity and defining distance by reflected light-signals. Like Robb, he assumes that temporal before-and-after is logically more primitive than spatial 'between'. Time, in his *Kinematic Relativity*, has an arrow attached to it right from the start. It might have been predicted, on purely epistemological grounds, that Milne and his co-workers would discover time not only as 'duration' but as 'trend' in the universe.³⁶

(3)

I am concerned to make the point that every abstract theory of time is derivable from elements, relations and postulates that are more or less arbitrary. More often than we suspect, we get out of time what we have already put into it. Whether or no time is a 'one-way time', whether or no any 'time-scale' can be regarded as a 'world-wide time', whether or no time has a 'natural origin', whether or no 'laws of nature' change with time, will be

33. J. Jeans, *The New Background of Science* (Cambridge, 1933), p. 101.

34. Cambridge University Press, 1936.

35. See Milne's paper in *Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, No. 92 (January 1950) and the critical study of his theory in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. III, No. 3, (March 1950), pp. 385-405.

36. See G. J. Whitrow, *op. cit.*, Ch. VI. P. 3

determined largely not by the *nature of time* but by the particular *system of abstraction* we choose to adopt in dealing with it.

Much confusion can be avoided if we do not forget that time-measurement and time-order are two distinct, even if related, problems. It may be seriously doubted whether our awareness of temporal connectedness has been made intelligible by the construction of a 'continuum' in which there are no 'minimal' stretches. Sir Edmund Whittaker has opined in his *Turner Lectures*³⁷ that the elementary constituents of perceived 'durations' resemble more the infinitesimal segments of non-Archimedean geometry than the 'points' of ordinary geometry. I should like to make the suggestion a little more explicit in view of the naive assumptions about 'temporal continuity' often made by philosophers. Suppose we build up a 'geochronometry' in which an 'actual moment' on the 't-axis' is determined only when we assign, say,

$$t = a + b\lambda + c\mu + \dots,$$

where $a, b, c, \dots$ are ordinary real numbers and $\lambda, \mu, \dots$ are 'actually' infinitely small quantities of decreasing orders. Hilbert in his *Grundlagen der Geometrie*³⁸ has indicated how these new quantities can be subjected to an axiomatic treatment that renders possible their consistent manipulation. We can say, for instance, that $t_1 (= a_1 + b_1\lambda + c_1\mu + \dots)$ $\leq$ $t_2 (= a_2 + b_2\lambda + c_2\mu + \dots)$ when $a_1 \geq a_2$; if $a_1 = a_2$, the inequalities rest on the second coefficient $b_1 \geq b_2$; if $a_1 = a_2$ and $b_1 = b_2$, the inequalities rest on $c_1 \geq c_2$, etc. By making certain other suitable assumptions, the totality of 'actual moments' can be exhibited as a definite simply ordered set. But the postulate of Archimedes—Given two 'distances' or 'stretches' of a kind, a finite multiple of one can be found which exceeds the other—is not valid in this kind of time, since there is no longer an analogy of the requisite kind with the 'logoi' or the ordinary real numbers. An arbitrary finite multiple of λ (say, $n \times \lambda$) is smaller than any positive finite number a and it is just this property that makes λ an 'actually' infinitely small quantity in the new and distinctive sense.³⁹ In the same way, an arbitrary finite multiple

37. *From Euclid to Eddington* (Cambridge University Press, 1949), p. 41.

38. 5th edition, Leipzig, 1922; Cf. Felix Klein, *Elementary Mathematics from an Advanced Standpoint: Geometry* (Eng. tr., Macmillan, London, 1939) pp. 203 et seq.

39. I need hardly point out that the term 'infinitely small quantity' in textbooks signifies not that the quantity is infinitely small but that it tends to zero and differs from zero by as little as we please. The 'actually' infi-

of μ (say, $n \times \mu$) is always less than λ ; that is, μ is an 'actually' infinitely small quantity of higher order than λ . I do not see why a non-Archimedean time-order should be regarded as falling beyond the bounds of metaphysical possibility. Objections to a theory of the 'specious present' based on 'instantaneous prehensive acts' and 'instantaneous becoming' would become irrelevant if the 'instants' themselves are reformulated in the language of a non-Archimedean geometry. It is a different question whether, starting with a non-Archimedean time-order or a 'Veronesean continuum', we can develop all the familiar results of mathematical analysis. To go no further, the theorem that every simply ordered 'denumerable' set of elements, say, $a, C a_2 C a_3 \dots$ (Cantor's 'fundamental series') has a 'limit element' must be surrendered. But is there any unique 'objectivity' about the familiar representation of time as a 'Cantorian continuum'? Is it not but a convenient tool for some purposes?

Quantum physics makes it impossible for us to rest content with the *a priori* assumption that physical quantities are mathematically continuous. The difficulties encountered by the hypothesis of a 'compact time' (an 'eta' series in the terminology of *Principia Mathematica* or the series which Cantor calls 'überall dicht') in the region of sub-atomic phenomena may be due to the fact that in this domain the hypothesis is no longer a useful extrapolation. A question like 'What happened exactly at $\sqrt{2}$ o'clock yesterday afternoon'? may well become meaningless if one rejects the 'continuum' as a non-enumerable collection of real numbers.⁴⁰ An 'epochal' or 'pulsational' theory of becoming of the kind

nitely small quantities contemplated by Hilbert and Veronese are on an altogether different footing and require a principle less restricted than Dedekind's axiom of continuity. Klein (*op. cit.*) illustrates non-Archimedean quantities by considering the 'horn-shaped angles' which were known to Euclid. In working out a non-Archimedean theory of time-order, it is not necessary, in the first instance, to associate with the symbols any concrete representation.

40. F. B. Fitch in a paper on 'Physical Continuity' contributed to *Philosophy of Science* (III, 4, October 1936) has speculated on the possibility of stating the laws of physics in terms of the rational numbers alone without recourse to the infinitesimal calculus and the theory of limits. I am inclined to think that Hermann Weyl in the revised edition of his *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science* (Geoffrey Cumberlege, London, 1950) has not stressed sufficiently the disquieting contribution made by the Quantum theory to current speculation, e.g. the attempts to construct a 'quantized space-time'.

proposed by William James, Whitehead and Paul Weiss cannot be refuted if one sets out from the time of awareness.⁴¹ Inability to refute it does not, of course, mean acceptance.

It cannot be too strongly insisted upon today that there are perplexities about time not covered by either Relativity or Quantum Mechanics. The metaphysical, the logical and the linguistic muddles about time arise from what may be called 'transitoriness'. In the succession of 'overlapping specious presents', we have a 'now' contrasted with a 'no longer' and a 'not yet'. Extrapolating on the basis of our ordinary memories and anticipations, we form our notions of 'past' and 'future' each of which admits of various 'degrees of remoteness or nearness' as distinguished from the ideal 'present' which does not. It may be said that 'past', 'present' and 'future' are not properties nor even relational properties;⁴² but that would not dispose of the problem created by them. Waving them aside as 'psychological characteristics' will not do. A neutral series characterized by a before-after but not by 'past-present-future' cannot be intelligibly described as a *temporal* series.⁴³ To assume that a metrized time can be the only satisfactory representation of the 'past-present-future series' is arrant dogmatism. The anomalies and peculiari-

It is a matter of satisfaction to me to find Prof. C. R. Sankaran of the Deccan Post-graduate and Research Institute, Poona, citing (*Deccan College Monograph Series*, No. 7, Poona, 1951, p. 38, footnote 102a) my tentatively expressed doubts about the familiar assumption of a metrizable time. Approaching the problem from the standpoint of phonemics, he has said: 'We are thus deviously led once again to the threshold of the philosophical enquiry concerning the ultimate 'discontinuity' or 'continuity' in Nature.' (*Ibid.*, p. 39.) There are valuable references to the 'specious present' and the 'continuum' in Prof. Sankaran's monograph. (*Ibid.*, pp. 28-31, pp. 35-39.)

41. A. Grunbaum in his polemic against 'Atomicity of Becoming' (*The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. IV, No. 2, December 1950) virtually admits this. He is content with showing that a 'Cantorian continuum' can be postulated on the basis of a before-after involving 'betweenness' but not 'nextness'. But can we generate from such a series 'pastness' and 'presentness'? See my remarks, *infra*.

42. See J. J. C. Smart, 'The River of Time', *Mind*, N. S., Vol. LVIII, No. 232 (October 1949).

43. Cf. C. D. Broad, *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1938), II, I, Ch. XXXV, pp. 289-319 and H. F. Hallett, *Aeternitas* (Oxford, 1930), Ch. II. For a technical criticism of the popular view that Relativity has made the 'past-present-future series' adventitious, and even superfluous, see my article "Time as Minkowski's 'Fourth Dimension'" in the 1952 Annual (January) Number of *The Astrological Magazine*, edited and published by Dr. B. V. Raman, Bangalore 3, South India.

ties of the 'twilight states' of the mind, to which I have referred earlier in this paper, plausibly suggest a non-metrizable time. The analogy of a connected but not metrizable topological space is sufficient to tell us that the hypothesis is in principle admissible. To deal with the instrumental data of modern physics, we had to surrender our naive beliefs about 'simultaneity'; clocks had to be 're-graduated'. To accommodate the results of modern 'depth psychology', we may have to renounce the ordering relations we have been associating so long with time and seek other concepts more bizarre and perplexing. And there remains the question whether, on any conceivable interpretation, temporality can ontologically be an 'assertable' characteristic.⁴⁴

44. See my paper in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (July 1951).

ERRATA

The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, July 1951.

"On the Denial of the Law of Excluded Middle," by Mr. C. T. K. Chari.

Page 63. Footnote 17.

For *Intuitionism* etc. Read *Intuitionismus* etc.

Page 71. Footnote 41. Line 2.

For *Unterscheid?* Read *Unterschied?*

Line 3.

For *Yeopardi* Read *Leopardi*

Identity of the Self

by

S. C. CHATTERJEE

Calcutta University

Two years ago I contributed an article on "The Identity of an Object" to the 24th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, which was published in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1955. In this article I made an attempt to show that an ordinary object of the world, or a material thing like a table, a tree, etc., possesses only a functional identity, there being no other identity discoverable or admissible in it. In the present article I propose to discuss the nature of the identity of the self. In what sense are we to understand the self's identity? Is it only functional like that of a material object, or is it of a different type altogether?

That the self possesses identity in some sense cannot be gainsaid unless we refuse to face facts of experience. And that this identity cannot be merely functional follows logically from the nature of functional identity itself. A function is a way of uniformly attaining some object or end, aimed at by some object or self. It is a way of doing something uniformly for the sake of some self or selves. Thus seeing is a function of the visual sense in so far as it acts uniformly to produce the visual perception of objects in all percipient subjects like us. The visual sense has no other identity than that of the function of seeing, since all the parts and constituents of it are changing from day to day. That the function of seeing is the same does not, however, mean that the act of seeing is exactly the same in all cases, but only that the same purpose of seeing is served in all these cases. Now the sameness of purpose logically implies the same self or selves which have that purpose. That a certain purpose is the same in different actions means ultimately that there is the same self which has that purpose and wants to fulfil it in different situations. But the self being an end in itself, its sameness or identity cannot be reduced to the identity of function, since that would imply some other being or self for which the first self performs the same function. Hence while the identity of an object can be explained in terms of

the identity of its function, that of the self cannot be similarly explained.

It should also be observed here that while the identity of an external object is a matter of indirect knowledge for us, that of the self in us is immediately felt or experienced. We speak of the identity of a table or a tree, not because we directly apprehend an identical content in it, but because we see it to occupy the same part of space and do the same thing for some length of time. With regard to the self, however, we have a direct experience of its identity. A person is not only regarded by others as remaining the same throughout his or her life. Every normal human adult has an indubitable sense of his or her personal identity which, as we have already pointed out, cannot be reduced to functional identity. We must, therefore, seek some other way of explaining the identity of the self.

But before we try to explain the identity of the self, we should make clear what is meant or should be meant by the self. By the self we mean that which feels, thinks and wills, and is conscious of doing all these things. The self is a self-conscious subject which feels pleasure and pain, thinks about things and strives for the attainment of certain ends. It is not merely an aggregate of feelings, nor a stream of thought, nor again a series of volitions. On the other hand, we should not suppose that the self is a pure substance without qualities or a mere substratum of conscious states and processes, which is not involved in and affected by them. The self, as we experience it, is neither a series of changing conscious states and processes, nor a permanent substance without any change of state and process in it. The self is a permanent subject of consciousness which feels, thinks and wills, strives for ends, and enjoys and suffers the consequences of its own actions. It is conscious of itself as passing through very varied experiences and yet consciously maintains its unity and identity through them. How are we to explain the identity of the self as thus conceived?

1. Some philosophers who are generally empiricists maintain that the self is an unbroken series of conscious states and processes and that its identity is only a wrong name for the continuity of the stream of successive states and processes which compose it. The continuity among the successive states is maintained by the law of causation. Each of these states arises out of the preceding and gives rise to the one just succeeding it, and all that is contained in the preceding ones is carried forward into the succeeding states. It is in this way that an unbroken continuity

is maintained among all the states and processes which constitute one self. And because they succeed one another very quickly and closely, the illusion of one identical self as persisting throughout them is produced in our mind, just as the illusion of one light burning throughout the night is produced by the quick and continuous succession of a number of different flames.

It will be observed here that the self is conceived as a chain of differentials without anything identical in them. It is the category of mere difference or continuity-in-difference that is applied to the self and is supposed to bring out its real nature. But this does not explain identity of the self properly. Rather, it makes a futile attempt to explain away our sense of personal identity as illusory. For, how are we to account for the illusion of identity, if we have no experience of real identity anywhere in our life or in the world? It is possible for us to mistake difference for identity only if we have somehow and somewhere directly experienced it. But for a direct experience of identity we are not even in a position to have an indirect and illusory experience of it. Further, the explanation of identity through a chain of differentials is hardly acceptable. A thing may be continuous and felt to be continuous. But to say that it is *continuous* is one thing, and it is quite a different thing to say that it is *identical*. So neither the fact nor the sense of continuity can take the place of identity or its experience. Again, that there is an unbroken continuity among our conscious states and processes is rather doubtful. Our waking consciousness has certain gaps or breaks as is evident from its suspension during sleep, swoon, etc. If in spite of these, there is some sort of continuity in our conscious life, that is due, not to consciousness itself, but to the self that continues to be the same through its different states and processes, and connects them together as parts of its own life and existence. Hence identity of the self cannot be explained by the continuity of conscious states and processes; rather their continuity requires to be explained by the self's identity.

2. But there seem to be certain obvious difficulties in conceiving the self as something which passes through different conscious states and processes, and yet remains identical with itself. For this will make the self liable to change with every changing state and process it may pass through. Hence some philosophers abstract the self from all differences of states and processes of consciousness and conceive it as a pure identity without difference, or an identity-above-difference. This view of identity of the self

has been held by various thinkers who belong to different schools of philosophy. Thus among the realists there are some who accept the substantivist theory of the self and hold that the self is an unchanging substance to which conscious states belong as accidents or qualities. So also among the idealists there are some non-dualists who would say that the self is unchanging and undifferentiated pure consciousness; it is not a unity of many different conscious states and processes, but an identity which has no difference or distinction of states and qualities in it. The identity of the self is thus free from all difference and distinction whatsoever.

It will appear from what we have stated above that while on the first view, the self's identity is a wrong name for the continuity of different conscious states, on the second, the idea of difference in the self involves the ascription of wrong characters to it. On the first view, it is difference that is real and really constitutes the self, while its identity is but illusory. On the second, it is identity that is real and really constitutive of the self, while all difference is illusory and, therefore, negated in it. Thus we have two apparently opposed views about identity of the self before us, and neither of them seems to be acceptable. If the self cannot be reduced to the mere continuity of different conscious states, it can neither be a mere identity having no difference of states and activities in it. If our sense of personal identity is indubitable, our sense of personal history is no less so. The self is a person whose life has a history of its own. This means that the life of the self is a historical process of development through different states and stages. At the same time, it is the same self that passes through this history and maintains its identity throughout that history. To explain identity of the self we cannot afford to neglect either fact of our personal experience without the risk of taking a one-sided view of the matter and offering an inadequate solution of the problem.

3. Some idealistic philosophers like Hegel and his followers were dissatisfied with both the preceding views of identity of the self and interpreted it as an identity-in-difference. For them neither difference nor identity is real by itself alone. Either of them taken apart from the other is an unreal abstraction which is nowhere to be found in our experience. Our actual experience testifies to the reality of difference as based on some identity, and the reality of identity as realized in differences. Colours like red, blue and green differ from one another only in so far as they

belong to the same class *colour*. We cannot sensibly speak of the difference between red and loud because there is no community of nature between them. Difference has, therefore, no meaning apart from identity. So also identity has no sense apart from difference. A thing is identical in so far as it unifies differences into one whole. A tree is an identical object in so far as it is a unified whole of many different parts like roots, trunk, branches, leaves, etc. If all this be true, then by identity of the self we are to mean neither that it is only a series of different conscious states and processes, nor that it is an abstract unity which has no differences of states and processes within it. Rather, we should say that the self is identical in so far as it includes and unifies all the different conscious states and processes which make up the personal life of a man. The identity of the self is realized in and through the differences of states and processes, and it has no being apart from them. Hence the logical category that applies to the self is neither mere difference nor mere identity but identity-in-difference.

Although the Hegelian idea of the self as an identity-in-difference seems to be an improvement upon the two preceding concepts of it as mere difference and mere identity, yet it does not appear to us to be quite satisfactory. Here the self's identity is regarded as realized in the differences of its conscious states and processes; it has no reality apart from the latter. But if identity can have being only in the being of different states and processes, it seems to be lost in the differences of states and processes. It is the different states and processes that possess real being, and their identity is but the sum of their separate and fragmentary being. And with this we seem to be carried back to the first and the unacceptable idea of the self's identity as the continuity of successive states of consciousness. Again, if the self's identity is realized only in its different states, we do not see how we can intelligibly speak of these states as *its* states. If the self were any state of consciousness or a sum of conscious states, then it would be wrong to speak of one conscious state as *its* state, for it means that one conscious state is owned by another or a group of other conscious states, which is obviously absurd. But this is just the position to which one seems to be committed when, like the Hegelians, one speaks of the identity of the self as realized only in and through the different states and processes of consciousness. Hence we are to reject the Hegelian idea of the self as an identity-in-difference and search for a more satisfying concept of it.

4. The first step in the search for a more adequate concept of the self is to make a distinction between the essential and the functional character of the self, or between its metaphysical and empirical nature. Metaphysically speaking, the self is what it is in itself apart from its relation to other things or its activities in relation to those things. Empirically speaking, however, the self is what it *does* and how it affects or is affected by other things. The former gives us the essential or metaphysical nature of the self, the latter gives us its functional or empirical character. If we treat the self functionally, then we are to say that the self is just all that it *does*, namely, the different ways of perceiving, imagining, conceiving, feeling and willing. Some empiricists who are also functionalists, therefore, reduce the self to a series of conscious states and processes, and are forced to explain its identity as the mere continuity of the series. It is this functional view of the self that seems to underlie the Hegelian category of identity-in-difference as applied to the self. Of course, the Hegelians are opposed to both empiricism and functionalism in their idealistic philosophy. But when they say that identity is always realized in differences and has being only in the differences, we suspect that they make a confusion between the self's *being* and the self's *doing*, or between its existence and function, and treat the self as having being only in its different states and processes. As we have already pointed out, the identity of the self is in that case lost in the differences of its states, and we can hardly speak of the states as *its* states.

If from the functional standpoint the self appears as a series of conscious states and processes, from the metaphysical it is apprehended as a reality which underlies them and is unaffected by them. The Advaita Vedānta view of the self seems to be based on the metaphysical standpoint and to give us only its essential or trans-empirical character. It would regard the ascription of all empirical characters like bodily and mental states to the self as *adhyāsa* or false superimposition. As such, the self is regarded, not as an identity-in-difference, but as pure identity-above-difference.

Now we are to combine the empirical and the metaphysical standpoints to come to a more adequate concept of the self as an identity-in-and-above-difference. This will help us to explain both the empirical and the metaphysical characters of the self and its identity in and through different conscious states and processes. The self is a reality in the sense that it possesses permanent being

or existence and also performs certain functions or activities. It *is*, and it also *does* something so far as our ordinary waking experience of it is concerned. There are moments in its life when it simply *is* and does nothing. On the other hand, there is no moment, actual or possible, when it simply acts or does something, but is *not*, or ceases to be. That is to say, there is no moment when it is pure activity or function without being an abiding existence as well. If we are to speak of any activity or function as the self's then we must admit that the self first *is* and then acts or functions, or that the self has being even when it acts and functions in different ways. The different conscious states and processes which make up the empirical life of the self are the modes of the self's function in some body, gross or subtle. It is the self that functions in and through them. As such, the self is partially present in them and also transcends them at the same time. The function of a thing expresses the thing in one of its specific characters, while it may have many other characters which are not expressed therein. Further, a thing is not any or all of its characters and functions. The common-sense distinction between a thing and its characters or qualities has also the support of philosophical analysis. A character or quality is the uniform function of a thing in relation to other things. But a thing has a being of its own or an existence in itself apart from its function. The being of a thing is usually expressed in its functions, but it need not always be so expressed. Water, for example, has an existence which need not always express itself in the function of quenching our thirst. This is especially true in the case of the self. The self may in our ordinary waking life function through conscious states and processes and be also present in them. But that does not mean that the self is only the sum of conscious states, or even that the self realizes its identity only in the differences of those states. The self has a permanent being of its own which is quite distinct from its changing functions and the consequent changing states and processes of consciousness. Hence we are to admit that the self is both immanent in and transcendent to conscious states and processes, and that it is an identity-in-and-above-difference.

There are some phases of our conscious life which may be considered here as illustrative of our view of the self. Introspective consciousness is a phase of consciousness in which one is engaged in self-observation. Here the self is at once the introspected content of consciousness and the introspecting subject of consciousness. This means that the self is immanent in the intros-

pected content and also transcends it as the subject which is aware of that content. There is a sort of self-transcendence in every case of introspection or self-observation. It is the same self that observes itself in so far as it is *in* the observed consciousness and also *above* it at one and the same time. So also in contemplative consciousness of the self, the self seems to transcend that in which it is present in a way. When I meditate on my self, it is the self that both meditates and is meditated upon. As meditated upon or contemplated, the self is present in the contemplated consciousness of itself. But as meditating or contemplating, it goes beyond the contemplated content which is here the self itself. As such, contemplative consciousness of the self is a case in which the self transcends a conscious state in which it is also present at the same time.

Introspection and self-contemplation seem to illustrate evenly both the immanence and the transcendence of the self in relation to a conscious state. There are some other phases of our life in which the one or the other of these aspects of the self seems to be more pronounced and more in evidence. Dreamless sleep is a state of our psychical life in which the self rises above the fluctuations of our consciousness and seems to abide in its essence as pure being or pure consciousness. The self is here more clearly seen in its metaphysical aspect as what it is in itself apart from its functions and the different conscious states and processes arising out of them. On the other hand, in a state of mental distraction or utter confusion, we seem to see nothing of the self's transcendent character and it appears to be lost in a confused mass of facts and functions. Here the functional or empirical nature of the self seems to overshadow its real and essential character. But that the real character of the self is not lost even in the state of distraction and confusion appears clearly from the subsequent memory one may have of it as a state passed through by the same self. Hence in spite of such appearances to the contrary we should admit that the self is an abiding reality which is present in all its functions, i.e. conscious states and processes, and at the same time transcends them. It is only in this way that the self can maintain a sense of personal identity amidst the changing states and stages of its conscious life. If this be true, then we require a new category to explain the identity of the self, and it is the category of identity-in-and-above-difference.

The Object and Sensibility

by

S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA

That the 'object' is an epistemological concept cannot be denied even by those who are anxious to sail clear of all epistemology and to build up a theory of objects which is to be metaphysical but non-epistemological. An object is, so far as we know it, the referent of an act of cognition. Apart from that context, it ceases to be an object. If conceivable, it may then pass for a 'thing', a 'neutral particular', or an unclaimed 'universal', but without violence to logical thinking it cannot be considered as an object. We usually take it as a relative term meaningful only through reference to a subject that knows it, or the act of knowing of the subject. When not so related, it (if it is determinable even then) may be anything but it should not be called an 'object' any more than an act of knowing can be called a knowing act even though it does not cognize anything. *The object is that which we know or that which is known.* In this specific sense, it is the content of cognition and the cognitive act is cognitive only so far as it contains it, figures it. We are not concerned here with the question of the exact nature, status and locus of such a content which we call 'object'. We are anxious for some sort of an agreed definition of the object. Such a definition we propose when we say that the object is what is *known*. What is not known but is simply knowable, that is, some sort of a 'possible' object of cognition may also be described as an object, provided it is *substantially* the same as the *actual* content of a cognitive act, only *referentially* called a 'possible' object. In other words, a 'possible' object may also be included in the denotation of the term 'object' if its 'possible objecthood' is a mere mode of speech and not anything substantially different from the *actual* content of a cognitive act. This will be explained later. For the present, we shall call that an object which forms the content of cognition or that which is *known*. As content of cognition or what is known, it is something, and is not a mere nothing since it is never apprehended as a mere nothing. Even in the cognition of nothingness (if such a cognition is at all possible) the 'nothing' which would become the content would be known as

something, though this something would be only nothingness. This its being something or being felt as something may be regarded as its generic character. The object as object is as much a something as the 'tree' or 'rainbow' is something when these latter become objects of cognition. The specific character of this something which we call object, that is its differentia, is its relatedness to some act of cognition or some subject that cognizes.

Can we conceive an object which is not related to a knowing act, or a knowing act which is not cognitive of a content? Can there be a neutral object and an objectless knowing? As the first of these questions has direct bearing upon our proposed definition of the object we may consider it at the beginning. Our new realists who contemplate a theory of objects which is to be independent of epistemology find no difficulty in admitting the first possibility. But what can be this neutral object? Is it not an object which is no object? Does this not involve self-contradiction? Or do we mean by it any possible object of experience, an object which is not *actual* but a possible content of cognition? Evidently, such a possible object cannot be anything 'given' or directly cognized. If it were so, it would be an actual object and not a possible one. It is therefore that which is not actually an object of experience, but *may be* one when it is cognized as an object. But what is this "may-be" object before it is ever known and before it at least once becomes actually an object of cognition and is known as something? Can there be an *a priori* idea of a possible object—an idea of it as a possibility before it is ever given in knowledge? Is an *a priori* idea of any possibility possible? In reply, it may be said that the possible object is the neutral being of the object, a neutral object, or object-in-itself, before it is known and is made into an actual object of cognition. Our cognition presupposes it. But before our knowing of it, it *was* something; had it not been anything it could be nothing when it is actually known. The possible object is thus the prior being of the object before it is appropriated by a cognitive act as its actual object or content. This may be allowed and none but a subjective idealist or an absolute sceptic will dispute this. But though logically admissible as a possibility, the 'possible' or 'neutral' object is not conceivable as an object. It is true that the so-called 'possible' object is not immediately known as such, since that very act of knowing would render it into an actual object and not a possible object. And could we know a possible object before it is ever experienced, we could claim some sort of omniscience

and could know all possible objects before we come to know any of them.

It is no more impossible to know all possible objects before they are actually known than to know a single possible object under the same circumstances. If such an *a priori* knowledge of possible objects before they are actually known were possible, there would have resulted an altogether new dimension, and may be a wider dimension of our experience,—that is, experience of all possible objects before any of them is actually known. We could then know things before knowing them. It is very doubtful if any of the realists lay claim to this sort of omniscience. Or can it be that here we ought to distinguish our modes of knowing? All knowing, it may be said, is not of the same type. There may be thus one mode by which we know an actual objective content, and quite another by which we can know a possible or neutral object. Now, so far as the cognition of an actual object is concerned, our direct and first cognition of it involves some sort of sensuous representation. We know it, at least at the first stage, in a sensuous way when it becomes 'given' to us. Do we know the possible or neutral object, then, in some form of nonsensuous cognition, since a sensuous knowing of it would result in its being "given", that is, being actual, and not as a possible object? Is a non-sensuous cognition of a 'possible' object admissible? This may be possible for our new realist demigods, but this seems impossible for ordinary mortals such as we. The 'possible' or 'neutral' object, so far as we are concerned, seems to be a post-experience construction,—a thought-construction not prior to our actual cognition of an object, but subsequent to that. It is the difficulty to admit the Berkeleian principle that the *esse* of a thing or object is its *percipi* that forces us to *think* of the object as capable of remaining outside our cognition when it is no longer known, as also capable of being somewhere *before* we come to know it. In knowing we *have it*, and do not construct it out of nothing. Its prior existence and posterior being in relation to our actual cognition of it are thus thought-constructions which have as their irrevocable axis of reference the actual knowing of it. Apart from the reference, the 'possible' or the 'would-be' object, as also the 'past' object are no more conceivable than is the past or the future without reference to the 'living' present.

It thus appears that a 'possible' or 'neutral' object is not cognized as such, but is only *referred to*, or *thought of* as being a possible object on the basis of our actual knowing of it, which

precedes such act of reference or thinking. We distinguish the object known from our knowing of it, and since knowing is not making the object or manipulating it out of nothing, we are led to think that it *was* something *before* we knew it, as also that it will remain something *after* we have ceased to know it. But the pertinent question is: what to think of such an object which is not a content of cognition but is outside cognitive relation? If this be called the 'possible' object or the 'past' object, the next question will be; what is such a possible or past object, is it similar to, or different from, the object as we know it? The point seems to be unanswerable. Our new realists no doubt opine that since cognition does not make any difference to the nature of the content, the possible object or the past object is the *same* object as we know it in the present, only it is outside of cognitive relation and belongs to a different temporal context. But that cognition makes no difference to the content cognized is no self-evident truth. At least, it makes the content a cognized content, and we have no cognition or knowledge of it when it is no more a cognized content. When outside of the cognitive act, it is not known to be either *this* or *that*; and so it is not possible to prove whether it remains the same as cognized or becomes altered. If this consideration is ignored some sort of an antinomy will have to be faced. The thesis that the object remains the same when no longer known and the anti-thesis that it becomes different from what it is known to be when no longer known, since it is no longer in knowing relation — seem to be equally plausible alternatives. Neither of these can be logically proved or disproved. This logical insolubility of the problem seems to be due to the difficulty of characterizing the object in "any" way when it is no longer an object of cognition. We no doubt speak of it as a possible object or a past object but this mode of speaking, though habitual with us, does not admit of a strict logical defence.

On close inspection it will be found that the so-called possible or past object is merely the object we know of in direct cognition but spoken of, or referred to, as a possible object or past object in vindication of our realistic belief. The only object we know of is the one of our immediate knowledge. Its neutral being or possible objecthood is essentially an arbitrary extension of its objective being outside cognition in vindication of our belief in its relative independence of the mental act that cognizes it. The object as we know it is relative to our knowing act, it is in and through our cognitive act inasmuch as it is as we know it and cannot be con-

ceived otherwise. The neutral or possible object is nothing but our taking the objective content of our cognition in extra-cognitive references. It is nothing in itself, and least of all object by itself or a neutral object.

It may now be asked: is such arbitrary taking of the object of cognition in extra-cognitive reference, which admits of no logical defence, unavoidable? This does not seem to be true. A realistic epistemology is not necessarily committed to such an absurd belief in the extra-cognitive being of a possible or neutral object. Since object is the content of knowledge and is intra-cognitive, its extra-cognitive being militates against its 'objecthood'. It can no longer be an object. What it will be then is unknowable and indeterminable. The relative independence of the object can be explained otherwise than by admitting its own trans-cognitive being. It is here that the concept of "sensitivity" comes in. The object is apprehended as something other than the knowing act because it is "given" to the knowing act. Its 'otherness' and 'independence' can be explained as due to its being a "given" content. Evidently, cognition does not conjure it up, it presupposes it as a 'given' something. The faculty through which it is 'given' is the sensitivity of the subject. Cognition reveals it as it is sensed, intuited or given. It is not itself the faculty of sensitivity, it presupposes that. The reason is that our faculty of cognition *awaits* the 'given' and does not enjoy the freedom to conceive it in any way it likes. A similar thought might have led Kant to admit two "stems" of experience — understanding and sensitivity. Through sensitivity, so Kant thought, the object is 'given' to us, and by means of the *a priori* thought-functions or categories it is cognized. Many of our post-Kantian epistemologists failed to appreciate the imperative logical reason which led Kant to distinguish the faculty of knowing from the faculty of sensing and to suggest logical, if not temporal, priority of the latter.

No arbitrary extension of the cognized content into the neutral content or possible content becomes necessary in defence of realistic epistemology, once we admit the idea of the "given-ness" of the content. In fact, the object is felt to be 'given' and our act of cognition necessarily takes it as 'given'. Its felt 'otherness' from the act is a direct proof of its 'given-ness'. This its 'given-ness' is so sure a mark of its objecthood that this 'givenness' may seem to constitute the objectivity of an object. To be an object is equivalent to be 'given'. To be an object to a knowing act is the same as being 'given' to the knowing act. This does not run

counter to our definition of the object as something that is known. What is 'known' is what is 'given', and knowing makes it its content. It is as it is *given*, and it is *given* as it is *known*. We know it as it is 'given' to us; and as 'given' to us it is something different both from ourselves and our knowing acts. We depend on its being given, and know it only as it is given and when it is given. It becomes a 'given' content in being intuited by our sensibility, and when not given or sensed it is no more an object than it is a given content. What is it when not given? When not given, it is no longer its own self, and so the question, what can it be when it is not given?, is meaningless. It is the 'given', and as 'given' it is *other* than the act of knowing and *other* than the knower; and when not given, it ceases to be itself.

Its 'givenness', no doubt, implies a transcendental background. As to what this background is,—whether it is a thing-in-itself, or some sort of an 'Avyakta', or the non-intelligible principle of 'Avidyā' or Māyā of the Vedānta, or the Reality itself,—nothing can be said on that score. The 'givenness' of the known content presupposes it, but tells us nothing about it. It is thus bound to remain for ever unknown and unknowable. Whenever we know, or *have* an object 'given' to our act of knowing (which latter seems to reflect it and is cognitive in so far as it reflects it), we feel it as issuing forth from this ungiven and transcendental background of all 'given-ness'. This 'ungeniven', the presupposition of the 'given', is thinkable as a 'many' if we posit it with reference to the plurality of the objects we cognize. Thus, as every single 'given' presupposes an 'ungeniven', the given pluralities postulate corresponding ungiven pluralities — some kind of "things-in-themselves", or "objects-in-themselves" of Kant. But this 'ungeniven' or the transcendental background can only be *thought*, but never cognized, according to Kant. Its probable or hypothetical "many-ness" is also a thinkable 'many-ness'. The distinction between 'the thinkable' and 'the knowable' is vital in such an account. Again, as the logical presupposition of all 'given-ness', of objects-in-general, this transcendental background of all objectivity may be thought as 'one', like the 'avyakta' of Sāṃkhya. Even then it would have some sort of thinkability but no knowability, and these its apparently contradictory aspects, thinkability and unknowability, force our logical understanding to recognize it as an indeterminable or 'anirvacanīya.'

This concept of a thinkable but unknowable background of all objectivity, the Kantian thing-in-itself or the Sāṃkhya 'Avyakta' will seem repugnant to many. They will at once demand logical

justification for our belief in an unknowable thing-in-itself, which is to them a spurious idea. But such critics in their hastiness overlook the fact that the real strength of the plea for the acceptance of the idea of an unknowable background of all that is knowable lies in the superfluity of an elaborate logical defence of the concept. For instance, we cannot be called upon to suggest what this unknowable background of objectivity may be, whether it is similar to or different from the object-as-we-know-it. As the logical presupposition of the knowable it is unknowable, since it can never become a content of our cognition, can never be 'given' in experience. The object or content of knowledge, more particularly its essential 'given-ness' or 'objectivity', postulates the prior, contemporaneous and posterior being of this transcendental extracognitive background out of which the content is *received*. As for the extracognitive background itself, the one thing that can be said is that it is *necessarily thought* (Kant), but is unknown and unknowable. If it is urged that this necessary thought, this knowledge as unknowable is also a kind of knowing, the ready retort will be that this is knowledge of absence of knowledge, and knowing something only as unknowable, and so, no useful purpose can be served by its means. The cognitive faculty becomes conversant with its own utter bankruptcy when it is called upon to force an entry into the 'ungeniven' by way of the 'given'. In fact, no knowledge, direct or inferential, is possible of the ungiven, as knowledge is essentially an interpretation of the given. No inference as to its nature being possible, it is not possible to say whether the 'ungeniven' is similar to the given or dissimilar with it. Between the 'given' and the 'ungeniven' there seems to exist no link at all.

This unintelligible background of all given-ness, this idea of a transcendental thing-in-itself is the necessary presupposition of the object as a 'given' content. To combat this idea one must give up the idea of the essential 'given-ness' of the objective content. But this amounts to denial of the objectivity of the object, as also of our own sensibility in its regard. If this can be possible, that is, if we can regard the object of knowledge otherwise than as 'given', the idea of this unintelligible background of all objectivity may be got over. But, the object is object in so far as it is given, and in so far as it is cognized as something given, that is, something 'other' than the cognitive act itself. The cognitive act becomes cognitive by transcending itself and coalescing with it, and this its very tendency to move out of itself and coalesce with its object by reflecting it or figuring it is suggestive of the 'otherness', the 'given-ness', and what is the same thing, the 'objectivity' of the object. It

is through the sensibility that we have the immediate awareness or intuition of the given *as given*; the cognitive act or understanding mediately knows this given as the object in its very tendency to move out of itself to reflect or figure it. Thus there can be no object other than the object given. There cannot be any ungiven and unknown object, possible or neutral. Whatever is 'given' is necessarily 'known', and the opposite is also true. The object is no more conceivable apart from its relation to our sensibility and standing than it is possible to conceive sensing or knowing an object that is sensed or known.

Idealism versus Realism

by

PROBAS JIVAN CHAUDHURY
Visva-Bharati University

Let us examine the judgment, "Everything is mind." What sort of judgment is this? These are the possibilities: (1) It may be merely verbal or tautological. The proposition means then that everything means the same thing as mind or mental stuff; whatever is called a thing may also be called mental; everything means all things known and mind means knowing. (If everything means all things known and unknown and mind means knowing then the proposition is an obvious contradiction in terms.) The idealist does not intend any of these meanings which are just linguistic recommendations having no factual import. (2) The proposition may be a statement of a psychological fact. Then it means that to experience anything we have also to hold it in the mind. It is obvious and does not state anything beyond the tautology that to experience anything we have to experience it, mind meaning the universe of experience. Again, the idealist does not intend this meaning. (3) He means anything that exists must also be experienced. Is it then an empirical statement? It cannot be so for these reasons. (a) 'Everything' is not an empirical concept for 'everything' is never given in experience. So we cannot state anything with certainty about everything. Everything means all things known and unknown and anything unknown is empirically meaningless. A thing and its knowledge are given together at the same instant; empirically judged, we cannot hold any of these to be prior to the other. So empirically one cannot say whether the existence of a thing is dependent on mind or not. (b) If the proposition were an empirical one then it would be hypothetical and contingent like any scientific generalization and it would not have any *a priori* force or validity. The idealist would not accept this weak status of his principle which he asserts categorically. Empirically we cannot judge whether solipsism is right or not. Empiricism, as we all know, implies solipsism but it cannot assert it. (4) Now if the proposition under discussion is neither empirical nor tautological, it may be synthetic *a priori*. Let us examine if

this is the case. For the proposition to be synthetic, experience (mind) must be distinguishable from thing-hood and for the proposition to be *a priori* the relation of thing-hood to experience must be essential and not accidental or empirical, being derived from experience. That is to say thing-hood must somehow imply experience though the two are not the same thing. But how is this possible? The status of the synthetic *a priori* is very ambiguous and shaky. It has been clearly shown by the logical positivists (and also by Russell and Einstein) that what is *a priori* is analytical and not synthetic, whereas what is synthetic is *a posteriori*. This is quite true so far as empirical knowledge or science is concerned where we have two sorts of thinking, empirical and verbal. We form concepts of experienceable objects (including their external relations which are held as objects co-ordinate with the perceptible objects), name them and describe their behaviour by linguistic conventions. We frame a logical picture of the world. And we have further linguistic rules for translating one manner of description into another. So what is synthetic in scientific thought is dependent on sense-experience and so *a posteriori*, while what is *a priori* certain is a matter of language and definitions. Thus logic and mathematics as applied in science are but a linguistic apparatus and in themselves say nothing about the world but yield only tautologies. Thus the synthetic *a priori* is untenable in scientific thought.

It emerges, therefore, that the proposition under discussion cannot be properly judged as to its correctness if it is taken in a scientific spirit. Let us now see if we can go beyond a scientific attitude of mind without palpable nonsense and find some sense in the proposition and then judge how far it is true. In fact it is a metaphysical statement and we have to judge it metaphysically; and in so judging we have also to show to the positivists that metaphysics is not necessarily nonsense.

The concept of everything which is meaningless in strict and consistent empiricism may now be examined. It includes things unknown (in the sense 'not experience'). Now, are things unknown quite meaningless? I assert I know that there are things unknown.¹ It may be suspected that I may be asserting my knowledge of bare existence of things unknown and so it may be pointed out that bare existence is nothing and the existence of a thing

1. See *Laghucandrikā*, N. S. Ed., p. 469.

cannot be known apart from its content or character. But I clarify my position: What I know is that there exist *things*, that there are existences with *contents*, only I do not know what the contents are. Is it not a contradiction in terms? No. For a knowledge *that* there are things is not the same thing as a knowledge *of things*. But how do I know that there are things without having any knowledge of them? Thus: when I have knowledge of a thing I have also a knowledge that the thing is not created by my knowledge but existed independently before my knowledge of it. Every knowledge is accompanied by an implicit awareness that the object of knowledge exists apart from knowledge on its own right.² This awareness is not knowledge of an object but of a character of knowledge. That objects exist apart from a knowledge of them is a character of knowledge and not of objects. So that the possibility of knowledge of objects implies the existence of objects independent of knowledge, and we are not necessarily required to know objects to assert their existence (apart from knowledge). This knowledge about knowledge may be called awareness. This awareness cannot be denied. An appeal to our total experience will confirm it. To deny it means disbelief in all knowledge. Knowledge implies an awareness that things known are not created by knowledge, are not subjective projections, but are objective. This awareness may be called metapsychological (in character) if knowledge of objects be called psychological. And as corresponding to the psychological process of knowing there are physical objects as its objective correlate, so corresponding to the metapsychological process of knowing there are metaphysical objects. Thus the existence of unknown objects is a metaphysical assertion; that is to say, unknown objects as realities (and not as mere fancies) are metaphysical entities.

The suspicion that to know that unknown objects exist is self-contradictory is got over. The two knowledges are different in character; they are not co-ordinate with each other but belong to two different planes one above the other. The metapsychological awareness about knowledge (and so of unknown objects) is the ground or presupposition of knowledge of objects. But another suspicion may arise. How can knowledge of objects be the reason for believing in unknown objects? The answer is that the objects known are not the same as the unknown objects; objects known

2. See Madhusūdana's commentary on *Gitā*, 2. 7. P. 6

give us a faith in knowledge in general, that is, in the possibility of knowledge, and this implies a faith in the existence of objects in general which are not yet known. This faith is a kind of awareness different from determinate knowledge by sense-experience.

So far we have seen that 'everything' is not an absolutely meaningless concept. Everything means things known (empirically) and things unknown (empirically) but of which one is aware metapsychologically as metaphysical realities. Therefore the proposition, "Everything is mind" is true if mind means any kind of experience, not necessarily empirical knowledge only; that is, if it includes awareness of unknown objects. The proposition then means that of all things, somethings are known empirically, while the rest remain as objects of awareness without being known empirically. But the proposition is false if mind means empirical knowledge or sense experience. For unknown objects included under everything are obviously not empirically known. When this is grasped much of the traditional controversy between the idealists and the realists will appear to be verbal in origin and significance. Certainly we cannot go beyond experience if experience means any form of consciousness; so that the idealists are right. Again there are many things beyond our experience if experience means sense-experience; so that the realists are right. The realists are wrong if they mean to assert that there are things of which we have no awareness of any sort at all, for they cannot form any idea whatever of the subject about which they are making the assertion; they do not know what they are saying. It is an idle and self-stultifying statement. The idealists, again, are wrong if they maintain that there is nothing beyond one's present sense-knowledge, because, as we have seen, one is aware of things not given in immediate sense-knowledge; and this awareness is an implication of the possibility of sense knowledge,—which possibility is not doubted as it is constantly actualized. Thus we may arrive at a solution of the problem respecting idealism and realism.

Let us study further this awareness of unknown objects. *Firstly*, we have to see that it is a fact and not a hypothesis. An awareness can never be proposed as a hypothesis. It accompanies any piece of knowledge as distinguished from a subjective phenomenon. When I know a man I am implicitly aware of his existing apart from my knowing whereas when I imagine a man I am not so aware.

In an illusion, dream or hallucination I temporarily take an object to be known and believe it to be independent of my erro-

neous knowledge; but as the error is corrected the belief (or awareness) also vanishes. Error only proves the validity of knowledge, for error could not be known (or corrected) if there were no knowledge. So awareness of unknown objects cannot be regarded as generally illusory unless and until all empirical knowledge proves false like dreams and hallucinations. *Secondly*, we should note that a knowledge of a particular object makes me aware of the object being independent of my knowing, and knowledge of many objects makes me aware of all these to be so independent, and knowledge in general makes me aware of objects existing without my knowing them. These objects are therefore certainly not transcendental or purely intelligible, but are sense-experienceable. Yet since they are defined as not given in sense-experience but only in a kind of metapsychological awareness, they are said to have a metaphysical status. *Thirdly*, we may note that the awareness that gives us these metaphysical objects also gives as their subjective counterpart the self that is aware of the objects. This self is never given as an object by this awareness, for to be aware of this self as an object we would require another self. *Fourthly*, this awareness of objects as unknown is a conjugate of awareness of objects as known and both are implied by unself-conscious knowledge of objects in which there is no awareness of the self. *Lastly*, we may observe that this awareness of the objects known and unknown and its subjective counterpart, the self, may not be absolute or ultimate, but may be a mode of manifestation of some undifferentiated pure awareness spoken of by mystics. But we cannot assert it unless we have realized that pure awareness.

Reason and Revelation

by

J. N. CHUBB

Bombay

It is a commonly accepted truth among those who follow the religious or mystical as distinguished from the Platonic or rationalistic tradition in philosophy that Reason unaided by Faith, based on Revelation (Śruti), cannot give us a fully adequate knowledge of Reality. This view which insists on the importance of resorting to Śruti as an essential part of the philosophical attempt to arrive at true knowledge has I think been obscured by error and misunderstood not only by those who reject Śruti as an extra and therefore un-philosophical criterion, but also by some of its own protagonists. I shall first lay down three propositions which would perhaps meet with the approval of those who accept the standpoint of Vedānta and Christian thought, but which I think seem plausible to them only because a sufficiently serious attempt has not been made to understand the logic of the view that reason is not autonomous and that when dealing with Reality it must consciously follow the lead of something higher and more certain than itself. The propositions are :

1. Reason can give us a partial but not a complete knowledge of Reality or God. That there is Natural Theology, which means the determination of God's nature and existence by "the natural light of reason" alone, is not denied ; only Natural Theology cannot tell us all that we can come to know of the being and attributes of God. It can, without resort to any authority other than the compulsion of its own natural principles, prove the existence of God (cf. the Ontological argument) and reveal some of the qualities that a Divine being must possess ; but there are certain truths or 'mysteries' about the being of God which we cannot come to believe by the exercise of reason alone, but which we must accept on the authority of revelation and adhere to by faith. For instance reason cannot discover the mystery of the Holy Trinity or the truth of the Divine Incarnation. Thus the theology or the knowledge of God that we possess falls into two parts. One and perhaps the substantial part is 'natural theology'; but this is supplemented by additional knowledge which is derived through revelation.

2. That philosophy must resort to revelation to complete, as far as is humanly possible, its account of Reality is itself a reasonable proposition and therefore rationally justified. There must therefore be rational grounds for accepting a philosophy that rests partly on reason and partly on faith. That is to say, reason by its 'natural light' discovers its own limitations and goes on to affirm the importance and necessity of submitting through faith to an authority higher than itself. Reason itself points the way beyond itself and thus provides out of its own substance as it were, a basis, a rational sub-structure on which, through the aid of supra-rational sources of information, we erect the superstructure of the edifice of philosophy.

3. Thus reason by itself is not enough, but reason aided and supplemented by faith enables us to arrive at a fairly adequate *knowledge* of Reality. The emphasis here is on the word 'knowledge.' It is not denied that reason gives us knowledge. The question is only about the *extent* of knowledge. Through Śruti we come to know something about Reality which we could not have known through reason; but what Śruti gives us is just as much knowledge of Reality as what reason gives us.

All these three propositions contain serious errors. They may be summarized thus: (1) Natural Theology is a fact, only the knowledge obtained by the natural light of reason is incomplete. (2) It is by the natural light of reason itself that we arrive at the above conclusion, and so the recognition of Śruti as a supplementary source of information is grounded in reason. (3) Natural theology combined with revelation gives us knowledge¹ of Reality or God. There are two erroneous assumptions underlying these propositions. The first is that there is such a thing as the "natural light" of reason, with its corollary that unaided reason can go a part of the way at least if not the whole way towards understanding Reality. The second is that our beliefs, persuasions and dogmas about Reality rationally or scripturally acquired amount to knowledge, with its corollary that if this knowledge is felt to be inadequate, the remedy lies in a further exercise of reason and in a fresh consultation of the scriptures for any revelatory matter that we may have missed.

1. In regarding this as error I take true knowledge as equivalent to 'jñāna.' No doubt to think about Reality is in a sense to know Reality but this lower knowledge, *aparā vidyā*, must be distinguished from a direct experience in which God is known in essence and essentially.

It is certainly appropriate to talk of the 'light' of reason, since reason manifests or reveals the order of things; but the question is, is the light of reason a 'natural' light, i.e. a light native to its being and constituting its essence? Obviously not, for if its light were native to it, then it would not only illumine objects but also be self-luminous, which it is not. Its light is not natural but borrowed from a larger Light which is reflected in the workings of reason. The presence of this reflected light in reason accounts for the uncritical assumption made by Plato, and following Plato's lead by most Western philosophers, that Reason is the divine element in man, and our highest authority in determining the nature of Reality. Let us give the name of Spirit to that Reality whose light, native to its being, is cast on the instrument of reason making it luminous, but not self-luminous. The spirit "shining everything else shines, by its light all things else are illumined."

There are two considerations that show that Reason shines by a borrowed light, even as a ball of iron placed in the fire glows with the light of the fire. (1) Reason expresses itself in a system of judgments. Now a judgment is always about an object. In the words of Bradley, its content being referred to Reality always falls outside its own existence; its 'what' and its 'that' fall apart. Hence the validity of a judgment is never self-contained; its truth does not shine within it, but depends on a necessary relation to an object. Thought therefore is not in itself a spiritual activity in the sense in which we have defined 'Spirit' but is a lower instrumentation, of the spirit and wholly dependent on it. A spiritual state is that which reveals its own worth (in the case of Truth its own validity) without reference to an object. It is in this sense pure subject. Reason which depends on the object is not pure subject, but the spirit objectified and therefore in a state of ignorance of its own being. In the language of Śāṅkara, reason is the activity of the *adhyasta* Ātman—the self with the not-self superimposed on it, which superimposition is the result of *Avidyā*. There is, however, an activity of the reason which does not imply a prior superimposition. This is when with the destruction of ignorance the self knows itself as pure subject; it then uses reason not as an instrument for discovering truth but for formulating in mental terms the content of a direct experience or of a truth revealed in the self-luminous light of the spirit.

2. The second consideration is that reason is always in need of a criterion for establishing the truth of its conclusions. Judgments need to be *tested* before they can be declared acceptable.

This is natural and proper at the level of reason to safeguard ourselves from deception and obscurantism, nevertheless it is clear that a process which involves the use of a criterion is not self-luminous. Just as we do not need any light to make the sun perceptible so also a direct knowledge of the spirit does not need to be tested to establish its validity. To know the spirit is to be the spirit, for the spirit can only be known by an identity of essence between the knower and the known. It seems to me that in the end this is what distinguishes philosophy from science, viz. that in philosophy alone we become, or better, realize our oneness with what we seek to know, provided of course we pursue the philosophical quest beyond the sphere of reason to a direct knowledge of Reality.

Now that we have established that reason shines by a borrowed light and not by a light 'natural' to it, certain important consequences follow.

1. At no stage and in no sphere can reason be autonomous. There is therefore no such thing as natural theology. All theology depends on revelation and hence is revealed theology. We can know nothing of God, not even that He exists, except what is revealed to us through the direct experience of the *ṛṣis* or seers of Truth. The distinction which some Christian theologians make between certain truths about God (including His existence) which are known by the natural exercise of reason and certain truths which are "holy mysteries" which can only be known through revelation, cannot in my opinion be sustained, since all truths about God require to be revealed. The proper distinction to my mind is between certain revealed truths which are intelligible to the intellect and certain truths which cannot be made intelligible to the intellect and so must remain 'mysteries'. Whether there are any 'mysteries' in this sense is a separate question and need not be discussed here.

2. Our authority for asserting that reason is not autonomous and that all knowledge of God must therefore be revealed is again not reason but revelation. It is *Śruti* that must first tell us that it is only through *Śruti* and not by unaided reason that Reality can enter our mind by way of concepts. In other words the two considerations I have urged above to show that reason is not self-luminous could not have been urged by the unaided use of reason alone.

3. We must hence give up the double standard of truth used by some theologians, e.g. truths known by reason and truths depending on faith. All that we know of God is a matter of faith made possible through revelation, until faith gets converted into realization.

4. Plato and Aristotle are called 'pagan' philosophers by Christian theologians, because their philosophy does not follow from the Christian revelation, the assumption being that the Christian revelation is the only revelation. But Plato and Aristotle spoke of God and eternal values, and if my thesis is correct, God and eternal values must have been previously revealed and become part of the cultural heritage of the race. The age of mysticism must have preceded the age of rationalism, otherwise the latter would have nothing to be rational about. Had it not been for the mystery religions of ancient Greece, Platonism would not have seen the light of day. This also disposes of the Christian claim (if it is made) and which in the world of today is fast becoming an anachronism, that Christianity is the only revealed religion. The claim cannot be sustained if we understand clearly that man cannot speak of God unless God first speaks of Himself to man. Even if the claim is that though other revelations are possible, Christianity alone is the complete revelation of God's Truth, it remains no more than a dogmatic claim, since if God has revealed Himself before and after Christ there is no particular reason to believe that He has revealed Himself fully only on one occasion. As a matter of fact there is no understanding of the ultimate verities derivable from Christian scriptures which cannot be found, and perhaps in greater abundance, in the Hindu scriptures. Besides, this claim really misses the inner significance of revelation and its relation to theology. Even supposing it is true, the grossly exaggerated importance given to it by Christians would be justified if the testimony of scripture amounted to a *knowledge* of God. The confusion, which as we have seen is one result of slipshod thinking about these things, is between revelation and knowledge or realization between *Śravaṇa* and *Sākṣātkāra*. To read and understand the scriptures even with complete faith is not the same thing as to know God. Then it follows that the main importance of a revelation is not the extent to which it dilates on God's nature—too much of it may even defeat its own purpose if it draws us away from the cultivation of the inner life towards theological speculation for its own sake—but its efficacy in arousing in the faithful a genuine aspiration for the eternal life in which the contents of revelation become facts

of an inward realization. There is a far greater and a more widespread hunger for the 'things unseen' among the 'pagans' particularly in this country, than among Christians; nor if we consider the number of God-realized souls in the world's history can Christianity bear any comparison with the non-Christian faiths. In the face of these facts it has always seemed to me that there is a sad lack of the spirit of humility in those who assert the superiority of the Christian revelation.

Let us now consider an important consequence of the thesis that there is no such thing as natural theology. What on this view is the place and value of reasoning in theology, and what shall we say of the claim of the ontological argument as also other arguments, which claim to prove God's existence without the help of revelation?

I have said that the highest truths of Platonism were derived from the mystery religions which were the outcome of what appears to be a common fund of mystical knowledge possessed by the ancient world, but subsequently lost or submerged in all countries save India, where it has been kept alive to this day. So my answer to the second question would be that however convincing and sound the ontological or any other argument for God's existence may appear to the logical intellect, the argument itself could not have occurred to the mind without a prior revelation of God's existence. The idea of God is, as Descartes said, too great for the human mind to entertain unless God Himself plants it there. For Descartes this consideration merely served as a proof of God's existence, but he does not explain the process by which the human mind receives this idea which it is too small to be able to form out of the substance of its own experience. The idea of God is from the beginning implicit in all thought, since God is the *ratio essendi* of all things including thought; but since our sense bound experience is incapable of suggesting it or even 'reminding' us of it, to use a Socratic image, it is only through revelation that it can be made explicit in our minds and be 'seen' to be a necessary presupposition or postulate of all thought. Unfortunately philosophers do not realize what it is that awakens our thought to a perception of its ultimate presuppositions and hence mistakenly ascribe autonomy to thought and imagine that the highest truths are discovered by the mere exercise of reason. What then is the place of reason and logical proof in theology? The answer is that reasoning is essential without being autonomous. Its main task is to clarify and give a coherent and rational

form to the contents of revelation. This is all that reason can do and all the proof it can give when it deals with the supersensible or metaphysical reality. Bosanquet, quoting a passage from Green in which the latter says that his fundamental philosophical doctrine cannot be proved, but yet is the only way in which we can put the whole thing together and understand it, remarks that this, if it can be shown, is in itself "the highest degree of proof". And this is precisely what we do in theology. With the aid of revealed concepts and other clues tossed into our minds from a level of experience above it, we "put the whole thing together and understand it." There is then only one standard or criterion of philosophical truth, neither *Śruti* by itself, nor coherent thinking by itself, but coherence of thought based on and issuing out of *Śruti*. Nor can we say that *Śruti* is an external premise from which the metaphysical system is deduced by thought, because there can be no metaphysical thought which is not grounded in *Śruti*, though such a dependence may be unacknowledged or even openly denied. It is even ambiguous to say that *Śruti* is an aid in reasoning, since reason in its metaphysical aspect is never exercised unaided by *Śruti*. We may use a famous Kantian dictum, but with what might seem a paradoxical inversion to explain this point. Taking *Śruti* as 'percept', since it is 'given' to thought, though not in the same way as the manifold of sense is given, and reason as 'concept,' we may say that percept without concept is empty, while concept without percept is blind. *Śruti* without reason is empty in the sense that unless by thinking we give a rationally coherent form to *Śruti*, its contents appear meagre and vague and therefore unsatisfactory, at least to the logical intellect, however satisfying they may be, without their development by thought, to the other perceptive faculties of our being. To use a simile, *Śruti* provides the recipe, but reason must cook the dish.

It is then the assumption of the possibility of a double standard of truth in theology that has led, on the one hand, to a misunderstanding of the claims of *Śruti*, and on the other to an encouragement of the belief in the existence of natural theology. I quote an example of this confusion from Das Gupta's 'Indian Philosophy'. In the chapter on 'The Śāṅkara School of Vedānta' the author says "Śāṅkara gives no positive proof of the thesis (that the self becomes a phenomenal knower only through *adhyāsa*). He made use of the dialectic only for the refutation of other systems". The implication here is that since Śāṅkara starts with the view whose origin is *Śruti* alone, that the self is the ultimate seer, he does not prove this conclusion through logical evidence.

But are there two ways of reaching conclusions about trans-empirical reality, the way of Śruti and the way of reason? It seems to be that there is no real antithesis such as Das Gupta seems to assume between accepting Śruti and giving a logical proof. Śaṅkara does prove the existence of the pure self in the only way in which anything of such a nature can be proved, by showing that the notion of a pure self can be coherently grasped at the level of reason and by the "use of the dialectic for the refutation" of rival conceptions, though without the preliminary hint from Śruti no proof of any sort would have been possible.

This paper is intended to be a critique not only of natural theology, but of all natural philosophy that deals with the super-sensible. The true philosopher is one who realizing that the light of reason is a mere reflection, is impelled to seek the source of all light beyond philosophy. One who philosophizes, as philosophers in the West do, with an implicit faith in "the natural light of reason", falls into a natural illusion and, in the end, debases philosophy — the noblest pursuit of the natural man — by turning it into an intellectual game. Having cut itself loose from the light and life of its own being rationalistic philosophy enters on the downward path and in the long run, by an inevitable inner dialectic, passes into its opposite, releasing forces of irrationalism in all spheres of life. Logical Positivism which is a total denial of all metaphysics and values appears to be the final phase of this downward curve as it is difficult to imagine a lower depth of degradation to which philosophy can sink.

The Evolution of Religious Consciousness

- by

INDRA SEN

Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry

The human consciousness, which we know better than any other, is in fact a unitary phenomenon though in intellectual analysis it appears to consist of a number of primary attitudes. These attitudes have acquired a special distinctness in the present intellectual phase of our cultural life. The pragmatic approach of utility, serviceability or workableness is, of course, the most general relation of man to his environment, his situation in life, his material and social world. This is virtually an empirical relation of man in all the three, cognitive, affective and conative aspects of his psychological make-up, though it is predominantly conative in character. Besides this, we have the scientific approach, which is essentially the intellectual relation of man to the facts and phenomena of nature. The philosophical is the same as the scientific applied to the totality of facts and reality. There is then the artistic approach, that of beauty, which is primarily one of feeling. The religious approach is the whole man's relation, cognitive, conative and affective, to the great 'Other', the 'Beyond', the 'Whole', the 'True' and the 'Real'. This approach and relation seems to be innate to the finite self of man and, therefore, in a fundamental and essential sense the question of the origin of religion cannot arise. Man, as a finite self, always finds himself set in juxtaposition to a wider Not-self, a larger and a more powerful 'Other'. This he seeks to know and to this he reacts with different emotions and attempts to adjust himself suitably. This relation and approach is innate to him and therefore 'to be religious' is a necessity of his nature.

Relatively speaking, however, it is possible to say that man becomes irreligious when his outlook is governed almost entirely by his immediate physical and social needs and the means of their satisfaction and he loses all sense and feeling for a larger and a greater reality as the base and the background of the empirical facts of his environment. But in social life such periods are always short and come in reaction to or as a sign of fatigue after periods of active religious seeking. Sri Aurobindo maintains that the search after God, Truth, Bliss, Perfection asserts itself again and again and returns with a redoubled force after every period of scepticism. Says he, "The earliest formula of Wisdom promises

to be its last, — God, Light, Freedom, Immortality.”¹ If this seeking and aspiration asserts itself again and again and that seems to be innately bound up with the nature of man, then it may be more correct to say that the periods of relative disappearance of the religious seeking must be related to those of active seeking as means, which further and reinforce it rather than deny and negate it.

In the West the theory of evolution has tended to undermine religion a great deal. It has shown that man is no direct and divine creation, but the result of a slow growth from the mammals and the lower animals under the working of certain laws of nature. This would naturally imply that the religious consciousness too is a growth from natural causes and, therefore, it could have no supranatural and ultimate validity whatsoever. But this is virtually saying too much. The theory of evolution certainly disproves the opinion held by most religions regarding the origin of man and the other species. But it has not succeeded in explaining the origin of life itself. It merely describes an intermediate process, how given life grows and takes on many forms? Now a theory, which does not explain the origin of ‘life’ and gives merely the conditions and circumstances of its growth, cannot legitimately claim to reduce the essential nature of the form of life and consciousness of any stage to the terms of the process of growth it has passed through. The religious consciousness, which is a distinct phenomenon in man, must, therefore, be judged independently and so judged it has a direct and an unmistakable reference to an ‘Other’, a Power which governs and controls everything and is the object of our wonder, awe, fear, love and a number of other relations. This primary and essential attitude of the human consciousness is the true origin or source out of which the more specialized consciousnesses of the various positive religions have grown and taken shape. The theory of evolution, therefore, cannot affect the essential validity of the religious consciousness. In recent decades the theory itself has tended to become purposive in character, which would philosophically imply the presence of a universal consciousness. This is evidently in accord with the most fundamental truth of religious life. In fact, all science today tends to lend support to religion. Whereas in the 19th century, Europe had witnessed a sharp opposition and mutual contradiction between science and religion, today a surprising accord

1. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 2.

between them seems to grow up there. However, so far as the outer forms and ceremonials of religions are concerned the modern man is on the whole opposed and indifferent. It is the essential religious consciousness, which is acquiring a fresh meaning for him.

Lately psycho-analysis has launched a fresh attack on the origin of religion. To it God is the “father-substitute” of the adult, from whom he seeks the same psychological satisfaction that a child does from his father. He finds in him shelter and protection. God is therefore, it is inferred, a purely psychological creation and no more. Here again an illegitimate inference is drawn from the process and the empirical conditions of the growth of the idea of God. Because the idea of God grows up in man under certain empirical conditions, therefore it can have no meaning beyond those conditions. But they may merely be the circumstances of its manifestation. And so far as the question of the objective validity of God and other fundamental religious values is concerned, our best proof is given to us in the nature of the religious seeking itself. If our inveterate seeking for truth is any guarantee of the existence of Truth, our seeking for beauty, of the ultimate object of Beauty, then the religious seeking involved innately in our finite human nature is a sure guarantee of the existence of “the Great and the Supreme”, the home of all our values. But our conceptions of it will, of course, differ and show change and growth.

If we trace the history of religion from the earliest times to the present day we naturally find a large variety of religious beliefs, forms of worship and other ceremonials. And it would not be difficult to discover some order and sequence in the occurrence of these different facts of the religious phenomenon. But that would be a different approach to the study of religion. All religions have a set of beliefs, forms of worship and other ceremonials. They constitute the religious behaviour and tend to achieve a uniformity and solidarity in social life. Our approach here is that of religious consciousness and experience, which is the essential inner fact of religious life and obviously by far the more important part of all religions. However religion easily tends to become a conservative social trend and then its beliefs and ceremonials assume an unreal importance. Hinduism is perhaps the only exception, which gives a general recognition to all forms of worship and ceremonials and even beliefs and thereby seeks to maintain into clear eminence the primary significance of the religious experience as such.

Now pursuing the approach of religious experience, we would like to know the course of development religion has followed. But it is easier to observe and collect the large variety of religious beliefs and worship existing today in savage tribes and civilized societies and try to assess and arrange them in a scale showing progressive development of the religious consciousness, than to prove philosophically what the most primitive religious attitude must have been and how it must have developed from stage to stage. The savage tribes even today show a form of religion, which has been called Fetichism. They worship inanimate objects and believe that they are endowed with magical powers or spirits. Western scholars regard this as the earliest form of religion, which man in the beginning must have had. Nature-worship, Polytheism, Henotheism, and Pantheism are the further stages through which man very likely passed in order to reach Monotheism and Theism.

Max Müller, one of the distinguished early Indologists, has attempted to trace the growth of religious consciousness in India. He says that the earliest religion of the Indo-Aryans was a kind of Nature-worship. Indra, Agni, Varuna and others were mostly presiding deities of the different forces of nature, for which the Vedic Aryans felt gratitude or fear and which they wanted to propitiate. That led to Polytheism, when the emphasis shifted from the natural forces to the deities presiding over them. Then among a plurality of gods, one of them began to emerge as the most important. And this marked the transitional stage of Henotheism, which paved the way to Monotheism, belief in one supreme God.

But the traditional Indian belief in this connection is very different. The Vedic age is the earliest in our history, but not the most primitive in cultural development. In fact, it is looked upon as the best, when the people possessed the clearest spiritual insight into the nature of truth and existence. This popular and traditional belief has received at the hands of Sri Aurobindo a most illuminating exposition and confirmation. According to him, it is the intellectual and the practical turn of our present cultural outlook which makes us misread the whole process of growth. The savages of today cannot represent the primitive human society because they are already in a conventional stage of life and must, therefore, have previously passed through a creative period. But they have evidently moved down on "a curve of degeneration instead of a curve of growth".² The primitive human society

2. Sri Aurobindo, *The Human Cycle*, p. 7.


could not have been rigid as the savage life is. It must have possessed freedom and imaginativeness. This stage is always religious and intuitive with a strong symbolic mentality. "Intuition brings to man", says Sri Aurobindo, "those brilliant messages from the Unknown which are the beginning of his higher knowledge. Reason only comes in afterwards to see what profit it can have of the shining harvest."³

Sri Aurobindo shows that Indian history bears out these fundamental conditions of the growth of human society. The Vedic life was through and through symbolic. Marriage, *Yajña*, *Caturvarṇa* were all symbolic. Marriage was a sacrament, as it is even today and the four castes represent the head, the arms, the thighs and the feet of the Cosmic Puruṣa (Puruṣa-Sūkta, Ṛg-Veda). And the Ṛṣi, the ideal person of the age was essentially a man of intuition. The Upaniṣads further developed the spiritual traditions of the Vedas, but then came the age of rational philosophy, the period of the six Darśanas. But this trend from intuition to reason is ultimately meant to lead to the recovery of a richer intuition, an intuition made more articulate and sure of itself.

Thus the stages in the growth of religious consciousness marked out by the Western scholars are not quite convincing. And they avowedly regard reason as the best part of man and therefore judge the rest by that standard. Of intuition and a spiritual faculty of knowledge they have poor appreciation. The recent excavations at Mohenja-daro and Harappa and the evidence gathered from the finds discovered there have brought into light the facts of a rich civilization. These facts combined with those of the later history of Dravidian culture offer some further data, which can be of great value to the philosophy of religion generally and can give, in particular, some fresh ideas regarding the growth and development of the religious consciousness.

But while the question of the exact successive order in the stages of the development of religion presents difficulties, the problem of the types of religious consciousness is relatively easy. We have said above that each positive religion embodies a unique form of religious aspiration and attitude. The form of religious experience, which it sprang from and which it holds up as its ideal, is definitely a unique attitude and form of thought, emotion, will and behaviour, individual and social. In an individual religion like Hinduism itself such differences are easily noticeable between Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, Tantrism and others. It is possible to classify

3. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 102.
P. 8



religions according to the kind of the conception of God they subscribe to. And on this basis we label them as polytheistic, pantheistic, deistic, theistic, etc. But if our aim be to classify not religions, but the religious consciousness, then we will have to consider the forms of experience involved in and cultivated by them. And here the entire variety can probably best be subsumed under the three heads of our principal psychological functions, knowing, feeling and willing. Vaiṣṇavism, e.g., is a religion of bhakti, primarily relying upon the cultivation and growth of the feeling element. The religion of Advaita Vedānta relies pre-eminently on knowledge and the Śakti cult on will. But while Śaktaism enjoins the worship of Śakti and the development of the same in the aspirant, works and service are more directly recognized and emphasized in Sikhism as a means of realizing God. Obviously between two religions of Bhakti or knowledge or Śakti and works, there can be interesting differences, inasmuch as the other two elements may enter into their total experience in different ways. Thus each religious consciousness will be a unique fact, and the classification of Bhakti and Jñāna and Karma could be certainly the best guide for the ordering and the evaluation of the different religious consciousnesses.

Religious consciousness, we said in the beginning, is an essential attitude of the finite human individual towards the greater reality beyond. This attitude, in the degree that it continues to exist, is the true spiritual element in each positive religion, which is, so far as the average believer is concerned, primarily a body of beliefs and a certain form of worship and a number of other observances, individual and social. Obviously these external forms and observances depend upon the general cultural life of a society and are no more than the means for the cultivation of the essential, the spiritual element of religion. As means they deserve all the sanctity we ascribe to them, but if they become ends in themselves, then nothing but tragic consequences follow to human life. The real religious experience and its supreme satisfaction is lost and religion easily becomes a dividing force in human society. It will, indeed, be a great advance in the evolution of the religious life of man when the race generally comes to regard the religious consciousness as the true religion, as it in fact is, and all forms of observances as valid and good so long as they help the growth of the true consciousness. Then all religions will come to be conceived as variant forms of the one universal religion of spiritual life.

Examination of the Main Realistic Argument

by

G. R. MALKANI

Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner

1. Realism, as a theory of knowledge, is widely accepted. It is based upon the argument that knowledge is of the real; and the real is that which exists prior to, and independently of, the knowledge of it. We cannot question this conception of knowledge itself. In fact, it is the only legitimate conception. Knowledge is true when it is determined by reality itself, and is therefore *revelatory* of the real. It adds nothing to the real, nor does it take away from it. It merely reveals it for what it is. But if this conception of knowledge is not to be dogmatic and unwarranted, we must be able to justify it by an analysis of our own experience. What we question is the justification given by all schools of traditional realism. If realism is true, is it true of our ordinary sensible experience, or is it true only of a higher supersensible experience?

2. The question which we want to ask here is, what is the *evidence* on which we rely for the independence of the object supposed to be revealed by knowledge? It is evident that the only evidence, let us say, for the *prior existence* of an object, will be some kind of knowledge. But all that any knowledge can prove is the *simultaneous existence* of the object that is known. That which is known is *now*. How can any knowledge prove that the object existed before it was known or as unknown? If we take some other knowledge to prove this, that merely repeats the question.

We do not improve the situation, if we substitute the conception of "independence" of the object for the conception of its "prior existence". For all that any knowledge can ever prove to us is that not only is the object of it *here and now* in an important sense, but also that it is something *as known* or something in the knowledge-relation. The known-ness of the thing is an essential part of the existence of the thing, so far as the evidence of knowledge is concerned. How can any knowledge provide the evidence for the un-knownness of a thing,—which is what is meant by its independence? How can any knowledge prove that a thing

existed when it was *not known*? Shall we therefore give up the question of evidence altogether, regarding it as unobtainable in any case? We could even do that, if there were no sceptics who demanded theoretical proof for all beliefs that claimed to be rational.

3. It will now be said that we have put the question wrongly. We seem to require independent evidence for the prior existence of a thing known. That only means the evidence of another piece of knowledge. We have to rely upon knowledge in any case. If that is so, why seek the evidence of any other piece of knowledge than the evidence of the knowledge originally given to us. *Knowledge itself is the evidence, because it is knowledge.* Knowledge reveals the self-existent or the independently real. But this is just begging the question. We are seeking to justify this very conception of knowledge. Does knowledge reveal the self-existent? What knowledge does it?

4. An attempt may be made to justify this concept of knowledge in our ordinary sensible experience. An object can be related to the subject in various ways. Knowledge-relation is one such specific kind of relation different from all other relations, and it has implications which no other relation has. Imagination for instance is different from knowledge. Similarly, conceiving an object, willing it or feeling it, etc. All these spiritual functions have their own immediate significance known to the subject that exercises them. Knowledge is one such function. When we know, we *accept* an object. We do not make it or imagine it. It follows that the object must *be there* before we can accept it. This is the deliverance of the specific kind of activity we call knowing. After all we can only interpret our own experience as it is. We cannot transcend this experience and philosophize. When we know, we merely establish contact with a thing that is, and reveal it in our consciousness. In other words, we need not go outside the four corners of knowledge itself. It directly reveals its own spiritual structure to reflective thought. On the basis of this structure we can say that there is more in the object known than that it is *now* or that it is *to us* only. It is *in-itself*, the self-existent real. Thus the independence or the unknown prior existence of an object can be proved through an analysis of sense-awareness itself, which is the only kind of knowledge given to us.

If that is so, realism requires no argument. It is proved by a mere reference to our sensible experience, which is a species of

knowledge, and which speaks for itself. And yet does it speak one language which all can understand? What if a *probe* can show that it speaks several different languages? It is possible that the knowledge-relation, how-so-ever genuine it might be, has got mixed up with other forms of relationship, so that we do not know truth from error. There is a misunderstanding about the real contents and the real scope of knowledge. We know one thing, and believe something else. There may be an illusion of knowledge.

5. Let us take perception. It is arguable that the very beginning of sensible apprehension finds us constructing images and conceiving. Our *imagination* and our *conceptualization* are in full operation. Whatever the thing may be *in-itself*, that is the only way *our mind* reacts to the thing. It is a mediated kind of awareness that we have of the thing; and mediation means interference by the mind. The mind interferes with imagination and understanding. We know only what we imagine to be there or conceive to be there. Beyond this we cannot go to a more primitive awareness which can provide the basis for the reproductive imagination. All immediate kind of awareness is formless. There is no distinction of the subject and the object in it. It is not knowledge in the generally understood sense. It may be the case that we first perceive dimly or vaguely, and then we perceive explicitly. But that is only the history of perception, not the logic of it. Logically, the vaguest perception is still mediated. There is no *direct contact* with the thing as it is. It is literally *not given* in knowledge. That alone is given that is put there by the mind,—imagined or conceived. Immediate awareness, if that were possible, could perhaps deliver the goods. But where is such a thing as immediate awareness? And what exactly is it aware of? Can we describe this something? So far as sensible awareness is concerned, *I give to myself the things that I am supposed to perceive.* Reality eludes my knowledge of it.

If this analysis is correct, it is not quite evident what we exactly know. We seem to know something. But that something is mixed up with the products of those other activities of the mind that construct their objects, with the result that we do not know the truth from error. Knowledge is here complicated or confused with other forms of mental activity, which are constructive, not revelatory. This is, in fact, the paradoxical conclusion of Kant's attempt to justify sensible knowledge. He has shown how knowledge, instead of revealing the thing-in-itself, constructs through mental forms the things it knows. After all we only apprehend the

form, not the real thing. The various syntheses are simply various forms of subjective creativity. The uncreated thing-in-itself is left outside and beyond knowledge.

6. It will now be said that there is only one kind of knowledge which we all possess. If that is not knowledge, the term should have no meaning in our experience. But since it has meaning, what other fact of experience can we point to, as an exemplification of that meaning, except the fact of sensible awareness? This then is knowledge; and as knowledge, it ought to deliver the goods; it must reveal the real. In other words, if I sensibly perceive anything, then, for that reason alone, the thing in question is or exists.

Let it be so. We now contend that we have given up one form of the creativity of sensible knowledge, namely that of imagination and conceptualization, for a more insidious form. *It creates the illusion of otherness, independence and reality.* How this is possible, we shall now proceed to show.

It cannot be denied that knowledge has achieved something. It has made a difference. But what exactly has it achieved? It has certainly achieved something in respect of the subject. It has, as we say, made the object *known to the subject*, revealed it to the subject. The subject is thus *enlightened*. But this is not its only achievement, nor the most important part of its achievement, as some might think. In fact, that achievement would be incomplete, if it stopped at that. There would be no *knowing* on the part of the subject, if nothing new and unwarranted were achieved in respect of the object. What makes a so-called knowing "a knowing" is not the simple revelation of the object as *now* or as *to me*. If that is all that is revealed (and what else can any piece of knowledge *legitimately* do?), the *reality* of the object does not emerge; and without the emergence of the *reality*, knowing does not get its specific character and it cannot be said to have arisen. It gets this character only when it does something to the object itself, howsoever unwarranted. It imports into it a new meaning which goes beyond the simple given-ness of the object *to me* in knowledge. Briefly, it produces in the object the character of "prior existence," or "independent existence" or "existence as unknown" (*ajñāta-sattā*). Here then is a new form of creativity. Sensible knowledge gives to the object a quality which no amount of analysis of the object can ever yield. It is no part of the object as such. It belongs exclusively to our knowing activity or perceiving. The quality of "unknown existence" does not belong to *what is perceived* (which can only be *as perceived*); it can more properly be traced to the

perception of it. What is perceived has in it what we can find in it by inspection and analysis. Unknown-ness, independence and priority of existence is not what we can thus find. It is imported by our knowing. That is the chief and the only result of our knowing,—that which divides knowing from other mental activities. To know is to create in the object the appearance of prior unknown-ness, and with it the appearance of otherness and of reality. Do we then really know? Is not such knowledge self-condemned?

7. Here then is our parting of ways. We all agree that we have to go from perception, to the independence of the thing that is perceived. But it is one thing to say that the thing is independent, and therefore we perceive it,—an assertion which is clearly uncritical, since it can never be justified; and it is quite a different thing to say that we *perceive* it, and *therefore* it is independent. The realist is forced to hold the former position, which is quite unprovable; for no evidence can really transcend itself. The latter position is inevitable. But what are its implications? They are evidently non-realistic. It is our sensible knowledge itself that has created the appearance of independence, etc. But then has it not created an illusion for us? The world is an illusion in this sense. What is not independent *appears* as independent through our very perception of it. This is called in Vedāntic terminology *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*. I perceive, and therefore the world exists. It is opposed to *sṛṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi-vāda*, which is the realistic hypothesis,—the world exists, and therefore I perceive it.

We can solve the mystery of the world this way, and in no other way. We have no ground in our knowledge for saying that the world *exists*. We have ground only for saying that it *appears* to exist. Existence is never created, appearance is necessarily created. That the world is created is accepted by many theologians as well as philosophers. But the mode of this creation is not generally understood.

8. It is supposed that the world is created by God by a fiat of His will. Nothing real, however, is ever created that way. What is consciously willed is known to be dependent upon the willing of it. *Reality* belongs to the willing, not to what is willed. Not only that. What is willed does not even have the *appearance of reality*. It cannot appear to confront us by its otherness. It is part of the willing, and when the willing is withdrawn, as is bound to be the case, the thing is withdrawn. From beginning to end there is complete dependence upon the willing, and at no time there is even the appearance of independence or of reality. Can such a thing be said to be *created*? In order that something may be said to be

created, it should at least achieve an *appearance of reality* (and perhaps only the appearance) through the creative act. As a matter of fact, if anything is created, it is this appearance of reality. The real is never created, nor that which is wholly unreal. In what sense then, can God be said to have created a world by a fiat of His will? There is only one way in which anything can be said to have been created,—and that is by perception. Perception is creation. If God has created the world, He has created it in perceiving it. But if that is so, why need we go to God at all? We too perceive a world. Do we not thereby create the world?

9. This may appear a very undesirable conclusion, from a practical point of view; and it may be argued that we have made a problem where there is no problem. In the absence of any other kind of knowledge, we should accept the *prima facie* evidence of perceptual experience. That evidence is final for us. What is perceived is for that reason alone real or independent of the perception of it. That is the very meaning of perceptual experience. This may be termed "the ego-centric predicament." We cannot talk intelligently about anything, including the reality or the independence of a thing, except in so far as it falls within, or forms part of our egocentric activity of knowledge. Independence or reality of a thing may therefore be taken to be proved by perceptual knowledge in all those cases where there is no countering knowledge.

The proviso, however, gives away the case. It leaves room for an illusory kind of independence. If no piece of perceptual knowledge were ever sublated, there would be conclusive evidence of the independence and the reality of that which is perceived. The very doubt would be illogical. All knowledge would be true, because it is knowledge. There would be nothing to expose any piece of knowledge or to render it open to criticism. That however is not the case. We can doubt the internal evidence of any piece of knowledge. It *could* be cancelled. Only knowledge, that could not be cancelled, and that was absolutely true, would provide the sort of evidence that we want. No perceptual knowledge can ever make this claim, which means that the independence which it proves has no logical value, and may be quite illusory. If a doubt can logically arise, it must be given its full value. We can, never therefore logically proceed from the fact of perceptual knowledge to the reality of what is perceived. Logically, it is just the other way about. If A is said to be perceived, and it turns out to be illusory, anything else called B, which is also said to be perceived, is equally illusory. Vedānta sums up the argument in the general

rule: "anything that is perceived is, for that reason alone, illusory (*dṛśyatvāt mithyā*)."

10. We have so far conceded that we are necessarily confined within our knowledge; and we have raised the question, how do we know that the object of our knowledge is real or that our knowledge is true to reality? If we cannot know that, there is no genuine knowledge. There must therefore be a way of transcending the limitations of knowledge and the so-called ego-centric predicament. This is only possible, if there is a species of knowledge, which is true, and necessarily true, on the basis of its own internal evidence; in other words, when knowledge is self-evidently true. We can feel then that we are no longer confined within the limits of knowledge, and that our knowledge has broken its bonds and contacted the real, the veritable real. Is such knowledge possible? We contend that it is not only possible, but that it is the only kind of knowledge that deserves the name. And we need not go far to find it. The very criticism of sensible knowledge ought to reveal levels of experience, which progressively shed the limitation. Every form of criticism pre-supposes a stand-point, which is accepted uncritically, and as more or less self-evident. We must turn our criticism to every such standpoint, till we have reached a level where criticism can be carried no farther, and we are, so to say, face to face with truth. This is the only way to reach an adequate form of knowledge, which reveals the truth and nothing but the truth. That we are able to criticize our knowledge opens to us a whole vista of progressive attainment of truth. The limit is reached when we can doubt no longer, reject no longer; for reality is self-revealing to the knowledge of it. Such reality imposes its own form upon knowledge and determines knowledge, not vice-versa. Our knowledge is then said to be *vastu-tantra* or determined by reality, as opposed to knowledge which is merely conceptual or ideal or *kalpita*. Reason demands such re-orientation, if we are not to contradict ourselves when we accept sensible knowledge as genuine knowledge or as the only possible form of knowledge; for the evidence of this knowledge is limited, but the belief to which it leads is unlimited. The evidence is limited to the thing as it is *now* and as it is *to me*. The belief is unlimited, because it relates to the thing as it is *in-itself* and *independent* of me. Such a belief is quite unfounded.

To sum up, perceptual knowledge is limited in its evidence. It does not prove that what is perceived is *real* or that it exists independently of the perception of it. But in so far as perception appears to mean that, it is the most effective form of illusion or *māyā*.

“To Act from Sense of Duty”

by

SHRINIWAS DIXIT

Karnatak College, Dharwar

On page 117 of his “Foundations of Ethics” Sir W. D. Ross argues as follows : “It can be shown that it is never our duty to act from sense of duty :” To say “you ought to act from sense of duty” does not at first sight appear nonsensical. But it is seen to be so, as soon as we translate the vague phrase “from sense of duty” into a more definite form. If the sense of duty is to be my motive for doing a certain act, it must be the sense that it is my duty to do the act. If, therefore, I say “it is my duty to do act A from the sense of duty”, this means “it is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A.” And this involves a self-contradiction. The whole sentence says that “it is my duty to-do-act-A-from-the-sense-that-it-is-my-duty-to-do-act-A”; that all this and nothing less than this is my duty. But the last part of the expression involves that what I really think or ought to think, is that it is my duty to do-act-A simply. And if we try to amend the latter part of the expression to bring it into accordance with the theory, we get the result : “It is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A”, where again the final part of the expression is in conflict with the theory. It is clear that a further similar amendment, and a further, and in the end an infinite series of amendments would be necessary in the attempt to bring the last part of the expression into accordance with the theory, and that even then we should not have succeeded in doing so. Any such expression would finish with the words “from the sense that it is my duty to do act A”, where it is implied that what I really think is that to do a certain act, and not to do it from the sense of duty, is what is my duty.”

I want, in this paper, to examine this argument. For, if it is valid, the whole of Kant’s ethics will be invalid. Kant says “you ought to act from sense of duty.” This argument aims at proving that this statement is “nonsensical.”

The statement appears nonsensical to Ross because, I think, he misses the proper sense of "sense of duty." By sense of duty he understands "the knowledge that that particular act is my duty." If this were the sense of duty, then, of course, it is absurd to say that a particular act of duty has as part of its meaning a relation to "sense of duty". For no concept can have as part of its meaning its own knowledge. We cannot say, for example, that a table is an idea (i.e. knowledge) of a table. The idea of a table must be other than a table and no part of the meaning of a table. Similarly the knowledge that this particular act is my duty cannot be a part of the meaning of "this particular act is my duty". If sense of duty means the knowledge that a particular act is my duty *then* it is nonsensical to say "it is my duty to do an act from the sense of duty."

But "sense of duty" does *not* mean "the knowledge that a particular act is my duty." Sense of duty stands for the awareness of the *sui generis* notion of obligation *as such*. It is a fact of our moral life that the awareness of the notion of obligation can evoke in us a reverence for it, what Kant calls *Achtung*. Further, it is a fact that this feeling of reverence can work as a motive for our acts and what is more (unlike all the other motives which are called inclinations) we can always summon this motive. All that is meant by saying "you ought to act from sense of duty" is that we will not have done our duty in doing a particular act if the act did not proceed from this motive, from the sense of duty. If this is not talking sense, sensible talk is impossible.

Ross is able to show an appearance of nonsensicalness because he starts from the assumption that "if the sense of duty is to be my motive for doing a certain act, it must be the sense that it is my duty to do the act." This assumption is incorrect. He thinks this is merely a "translation" of the vague phrase "from sense of duty" into a more definite form. But that is a mistranslation. The sense of duty is the awareness of obligation *as such*. And the notion of obligation is neither mine nor yours. If this particular translation of "sense of duty" is disallowed, as it ought to be, Ross cannot show any contradiction, any infinite regress, in saying "it is my duty to do act A from the sense of duty." Indeed his programme was to show that the sentence "you ought to act from sense of duty" is nonsensical. But he quietly leaves *this* sentence and takes another, namely, "it is my duty to do act A from the sense of duty", presumably, because he thinks the latter to be roughly equivalent to the former. I submit, both of them express the same ethical con-

tention. But, then, if one of them yields a self-contradiction, it should be possible, by some round about way, to show the same contradiction, in the other expression. But try as you may, you cannot show that sort of contradiction in "you ought to act from sense of duty".


The sentence "it is my duty to do act A from the sense of duty" however gives a scope for creating an illusion of contradiction because it employs the word "duty" in two different senses. The first use of the word duty stands for some particular act of duty in all its concreteness, required of some agent at a particular time and place. While the word "duty" in "sense of duty" stands for the general notion of duty *as such*. The full meaning of the sentence is "no particular act of duty can really be what it professes to be unless it springs from the motive of fulfilling duty in general".

If one accepts that sense of duty can work as a motive there should not be any difficulty in the above interpretation. Ross himself accepts that it can work as a motive and acts can be done from a sense of duty. He says on the same page "It is better, for instance, to confer a benefit upon A from the reflective thought that that is the action which duty requires, (i.e. from sense of duty) than to do so from a mere instinctive love of A". He accepts that one can do an act from a sense of duty. His only contention is that it will not be called an act of duty. It will be a morally good act. He is never tired of making a distinction between a right act (i.e. to say, an act of duty) and a morally good act. But if this is so, may not one hold that one's duty is always to do morally good acts of this sort (i.e. done from a sense of duty)? That may be false ethics, but the point is, it is not bad logic. One cannot show that in this view there lurks the same self-contradiction which Ross is at pains to show in "it is my duty to do an act from sense of duty". But if there really was a contradiction in holding "it is my duty to do an act A from sense of duty" it ought to have made itself felt in the view that one's duty always is to do acts which are morally good, as done from a sense of duty. But there is no trace of formal contradiction in this. This should suffice to show that the contradiction which Ross is trying to find out is unreal.

I would like to bring another argument to show how weak is the case that Dr Ross is trying to make out. The whole force of his arguments is that the last part of the expression of a statement is not in accordance with the entire statement. I would like to ask "does it make a statement nonsensical?" I think, not. Consider the statements:—(1) You should reach that town with the inten-

tion that you should reach that town. (2) It is false to say 'A is B.' In both these statements the final part of the expression is in conflict with the sense of the entire statement. But I do not think these statements are nonsensical.

Finally I should add that I too feel a certain awkwardness in statements like "I ought because I ought", "Duty for duty's sake". One feels that there is no point in adding "because I ought" after one says "I ought". I think, the awkwardness of such statements is the fault of our language and it is not the awkwardness of the ethical thought behind. But I am sure Ross has not this awkwardness in his mind when he gives the argument quoted at the beginning of this paper. The scope of the difficulty I am trying to refer to is much larger. It is the difficulty one finds, for example, in saying "Gold is not gold if it is not yellow". One is saying Gold is not gold and yet talking sense. The discussion of this difficulty, however, will require another paper.



JL.

Q. 21. 600 008

NSP-21.4