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
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
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
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[October 1951]

Limitations of Logic

By

G. R. MALKANI



1. European philosophy is supposed to be based upon reason, and Indian philosophy on some kind of super-sensible intuition. Can there be two different kinds of philosophy? If that is not possible, are we not obliged to regard one of those types as genuine philosophy, and the other as no philosophy at all? It is often suggested that philosophy is nothing if it is not a matter of reason. It is a thinking consideration of things. It is a rationalization of experience, etc. On this view, it would appear that European philosophy is the only genuine type of philosophy. Indian philosophy is not philosophy, but dogmatic religion embellished with some kind of spurious reasoning that takes its cue from the scriptures, that are supposed to contain the revealed word whatever its source.

2. It cannot now be denied that reason is only an instrument. It is an instrument of truth. It is not the truth itself. It is a legitimate question whether European philosophy, which swears by reason, has used it properly in order to reach metaphysical truth. One essential character of truth is that it is common to all the individuals that are qualified to know it. Truth is one, whoever may know it. It is not the private property of any individual philosopher. Has European philosophy reached, through reason, any kind of truth that is recognised as such by all or most of the philosophers of the west? What strikes a person who has only a casual acquaintance with European philosophy is the great diversity of opinion about every philosophical subject among the

great and renowned exponents of European philosophy. Where is the truth? Nobody knows. It is a chaos of opinions. There is no reasoned system of truth acceptable to all the philosophers. Reason appears yoked to *imagination*, not to the perception of truth as such.

This is in marked contrast to the use of reason in science. In science, there is a common level of *sensible experience* that prescribes its problems, and checks the vagaries of imagination. All scientific problems relate to perceptible facts; and these facts control every explanation that is offered. No hypothesis can go untested and unverified. The problems and the procedure are fixed for all aspiring scientists. Reason has a use. Has reason demonstrated the same sort of utility in philosophy? Evidently not.

3. Kant recognised this. He wanted to put philosophy on a scientific basis. Did he succeed? He did not succeed in enunciating any super-sensible or metaphysical truth. For him, such truth was not possible. Scientific truth was all that was available to reason in the sphere of real knowledge. Beyond this, we can only get at certain *a priori* synthetic principles, which are valid in sensible experience and make that experience possible. The knowledge of these principles is the only metaphysical knowledge there is. In particular, we cannot know the truth of transcendent entities such as God, Freedom and Immortality. Kant may be right. But how did he reach this conclusion? Did he reach it in a *rational way*? If he did, what sort of reason did he employ? Is the criticism of reason itself a piece of reasoning? It is reasoning that gets its direction from a stand-point outside reason,—a truly metaphysical stand-point reached without reasoning, and therefore intuitively. The limitations of reason cannot be known, unless those limitations are transcended. And they can only be transcended in some form of intuitive experience. In other words, the critical method of Kant transgressed the strictly rational method that is sought to be imposed upon all philosophical thinking. No European philosopher of note has ever reached his conclusions in a strictly rational way. He has *seen* those conclusions first, and reasoned about them afterwards. He has an evaluating higher experience, that sees the truth of lower unreflective common-sense experience in its own way. The resources of logic are only employed for the exposition and the confirmation of this truth reached without logic.

4. It may be that Kant was wrong, and that reason can perhaps indicate the general character of a higher metaphysical truth. But are we sure that we are here strictly on logical grounds, and that reason can demonstrate the necessity of a truth that goes beyond reason and that is a *standing challenge* to the rules and the procedure of reason itself? If, for instance, relations involve self-contradiction, how are we to avoid self-contradiction in any Whole which cannot avoid relations of some sort between the manifold elements constituting it? If again the category of "substance and qualities" involves self-contradiction, how are we to avoid self-contradiction in an ultimate unity of all the known differences,—a conception evidently patterned on the notion of substance and its qualities? A mystical solution of the problems of reason has nothing rational about it, and cannot be acceptable to reason. It is metaphysical conclusions like these, where reason goes beyond its legitimate sphere and contradicts itself, that have brought about a reaction in the West against all metaphysics. It is argued that metaphysical knowledge is not possible, and that it is in any case only an illusion of knowledge due to the misuse of words or the improper extension of the use of certain concepts that have meaning only in sensible experience. All metaphysical statements are non-sensical. Such is the result of the European tradition, that exalts reason, to the exclusion of any other method of knowledge, in philosophy.

5. Indian philosophy has a different tradition. *It replaces imagination by some kind of spiritual experience as the starting point.* Indian philosophy is thus subordinate to religion and has a religious inspiration behind it. This does not mean that it is a kind of theology. It has the form of theology, but the substance of philosophy. Philosophy is supposed to be concerned with a knowledge of the super-sensible ground of empirical reality. It is supposed to be concerned with metaphysical truth, which in European philosophy is identified with the truth of God, Freedom and Immortality. How is the knowledge of this truth possible? Not through reason alone which is not an original or an intuitive source of knowledge. The senses are intuitive, but they cannot grasp the super-sensible. There is only one way in which the reality of the super-sensible can be indicated to us. This indication comes to us from the scripture as a revelation from above. Metaphysical truth can *never* be reached from below or on the basis of our sensible experience, which is the starting point for science. All that we can legitimately demand is that the truth indicated

by the scripture should be capable of being *justified to reason*, and also capable of being *transformed into direct intuitive knowledge* which alone can indicate reality in a conclusive and final way. It is this justification to reason that constitutes it a "philosophical truth". Reason must be satisfied. And yet how can it be satisfied? If we depend entirely on formal logic, it can never be satisfied. Formal logic is the logic of things. It is based upon a certain experience, where thought determines reality, and where thought is all in all. When we want to know metaphysical truth, we cannot demand the application of the standards of sensible truth. Our reasoning must cease to be *formal*. It must rise to a new dimension of experience opened up by scriptural revelation. Reason can be, and will be, satisfied. But it must recognise new forms of truth that enter our experience through the revealed word. Says Heidegger, "Logic is only *one* exposition of the nature of thinking, and one which, as its name shows, is based on the experience of Being as attained in Greek thought. The animus against 'logic'—the logical degeneration of which can be seen in "logistics"—derives from the knowledge of that thinking which has its source not in the observation of the objectivity of what-is, but in the experience of the truth of Being". (Being and Existence, p. 387, Eng: translation).

6. Here then is our first criticism of logic as employed in philosophy. There is no universal logic as such, **except** for the level of experience at which we are considering things. *Every new form of experience has its own logic*. It is not logic that dictates to experience, it is just the opposite. Our common error is that we take sensible experience to be the only type of experience that is possible, and the logic that is true of it as the only possible logic. But the view that sensible experience is the only possible kind of experience is itself a metaphysical view, that is open to challenge.

We contend that logic is *not independent* of metaphysics and does not determine what sort of metaphysical view ought to be acceptable to us. *Every metaphysics has its own logic*. When we speak of realistic logic and idealistic logic, the distinction has a meaning. Our metaphysical position determines the form of our logic. It is because of this dependence of logic upon metaphysics that one metaphysician is not able to refute another. Each thinks that he is in the right, and that he is only being misunderstood and misrepresented. The truth is that realistic logic does not apply to idealistic metaphysics, and cannot therefore refute the latter; and when we think that the latter is refuted, it is really

not. No metaphysician was ever truly refuted by another metaphysician. They are simply talking a different kind of language, and employing different forms of thought to explicate what they believe to be the truth. This truth comes to them from above. Most often it takes the form of a religious experience. Thus, our religious experience determines our metaphysics, and our metaphysics determines our logic. Logic is only a product of our spiritual experience, which can take various different forms. It is strange then that some of us erect logic into our only God. 445

7. No-one ever reached his metaphysical position *through logic*. He reached it, let us say, intuitively or through some kind of original insight, without argument and without reason. When he argues, he is really arguing *from* it, not *towards* it. He is merely seeking to justify to himself what he has accepted, to begin with, without argument. Is not all real metaphysics, in this sense, grounded in intuition rather than in reason? Intuition comes first, and determines our reasoning. It is mainly therefore a question of what you see or intuit,—and there can be levels of intuition. It is not a question of correct reasoning or otherwise, except within very narrow limits. There can be a thinking and a thinking. The man of perceptual fineness thinks better than one without it.

8. To substantiate our view, we shall now try to show how even formal logic is not necessitated, and that its laws can be questioned. We can sit in judgment on anything, including reason itself in all its aspects. Kant took certain categories of thought as *inviolable*. Bradley, taking his clue from Hegel, tried to show that every such category was found on analysis to involve self-contradiction, and that therefore it could not be true of reality but only of appearance. He thus went a step farther than Kant, and denied the character of truth to the knowledge of phenomena. But he unreservedly accepted the law of non-contradiction as being true of reality as such. His two criteria of truth were comprehensiveness or wholeness and self-consistency. Both these criteria were dependent upon the acceptance of the law of non-contradiction. The part contradicted itself. The whole alone was free from self-contradiction, and therefore truly self-consistent. We can however question the law of non-contradiction itself, and in fact all the laws of formal logic. State anything as unquestioned, and we can show that it can be questioned. We accept nothing except the truth that *cannot be stated*, but that is nevertheless self-evidently true. If no such truth is available, truth as such is not available at all.

9. The so-called universal logic, the pre-supposition of all valid thinking, is by no means a necessary logic. Let us take the law of identity, A is A . Is this a significant proposition? The relation of identity is no relation at all. If two terms are available, there will be a relation; but identity cannot be proved. If identity is a fact, the relation cannot be proved. When we say that something is identical with itself, we first make a distinction, and then cancel the distinction. If the distinction has meaning, identity is impossible, and vice-versa. We require both distinction and identity, in order to have a relation of identity; and this is impossible. We state practically nothing when we say that A is A ; or alternatively, we state an untruth. The best interpretation of the law would be that if we give a thing a name, let us continue calling it by that name. This does not state any objective truth, but only a convention for social intercourse.

10. Let us next take the law of excluded middle, — A is either A or not- A . The two alternatives A and not- A seem to exhaust all possibilities. But do they? Is it not possible that something may be neither what it claims to be (A), nor even the mere negation of what it claims to be (not- A)? What shall we say about the illusory?

Let us take the instance of a snake that is illusory. Here 'illusory' is not just an adjective of snake. It is more properly indicative of the ontological status of a snake-appearance. How shall we describe this appearance? We cannot say that it is a snake, nor that it is a mere not-snake. The former would not be illusory, the latter would not appear. The illusory snake is different both from what is called a snake and from the negation of a snake. More generally, it is different from the real and different from the unreal, and indescribable in either of those terms. Our experience thus imposes upon us the necessity of recognising forms of being to which the law cannot apply. The category of the *anirvāchaniya* describes such forms.

Again, what shall we say about the possibility of something being real that is without any character, and therefore literally indescribable. We cannot say of it that it is such and such; nor even that it is the mere negation of every such-character. It is a positive reality beyond both affirmation and negation. The highest truth of spiritual experience might easily lend itself to this form of indescribable being. The law of excluded middle cannot apply to what is essentially non-conceptual. But if that is so, the

law ceases to be universal. There are levels of experience where the law becomes inapplicable and even meaningless.

The fact is that there is no necessity about the law. It is not the law of all being. There are more things in earth and heaven than we can conceive of, or that we can catch in our dichotomous logic, appropriate only to things at the level of sensible experience. Ultimate reality, if there is any such thing, will confound our logic. It will be a region beyond logic, and therefore truly a-logical.

11. The law of non-contradiction is supposed to be the very essence of formal logic, — A cannot be both A and not- A at the same time. But why can they not both co-exist in the same place and at the same time? We have seen that the illusory is neither real nor unreal. We can now argue that it is both.

An illusion is constituted just by the co-existence of a thing and its negation in the same place and at the same time. An illusory appearance is defined as the appearance of a thing in a ground where the negation of the thing exists. In other words, in order that a thing should be illusory, the negation of the thing should exist in the very place where the thing appears to exist. If the thing exists in one place and its negation in another, as we find to be the case in our ordinary experience, the thing is taken to be quite real in the place where it exists, and not illusory. It is co-existence in the sense indicated above that defines an illusion, which may therefore be said to involve an internal self-contradiction. If it is argued that a thing and its negation do not *really* co-exist, we have still to explain what we mean by "really" here. What is quite certain is that an illusion only emerges as the result of the co-existence.

It will be said here that a thing and its negation may co-exist, but they cannot be both *equally real*. What are we to make of a thing existing in exactly the same sense and to the same extent as its negation? In calling it "illusory", we imply that its non-existence is the truth of its existence. The illusory snake is *not*. It is sublated, cancelled. Thus the negation is more real than the affirmation. It is truer to say that the negation of the thing exists rather than that the thing exists. The thing and its negation are not of the *same order of being*. What the law of non-contradiction demands is that the thing and its negation cannot exist in the *same sense*; i.e., they cannot co-exist if they are equally real.

That may be so. But the logical question remains unresolved. For logic, everything is a thinkable; and one thinkable is quite

as real as another. If now the negation of a thing is real just where the thing appears to be, we have the required co-existence. It is the co-existence of contradictories for all logical purposes. Logic knows of no *scales of values*. It deals only with thinkables. And here we must recognise that the locus of the negation is the locus of the thing. *Without such co-reality, the illusory cannot emerge.* The negation is in the very place where the thing is. For logic, both have the same value; and therefore logically, a contradiction can be real. A can co-exist with not-A in the same place and at the same time.

12. Another question that arises here is: In what sense can negation be said to exist? In what sense does not-A exist? Is the negation of a thing some other positive thing or things, or a specific kind of entity that is opposed to every positive entity and that is called *abhāva*.

Let us suppose that a negation exists in the simple sense of that term. We say that the "negation of the snake" exists in the place where the snake appears to exist. But then how can the negation exist without that of which it is the negation? The thing negated forms part of the negation. If therefore the negation exists, the thing negated exists with it and as part of it. The negation must include its *pratiyogi*. This is a self-contradiction. How can a thing exist as part of its own negation? And yet how can we avoid this implication? Pure and mere negation is not a fact to us. It is always the negation of something or the other.

13. An attempt may be made to explain away the negation. There is no such thing as negation at all. Every thing that is, is positive. Or what is the same thing, the negation of a thing is another thing. The negation of A is another positive entity B, in which A is absent. Negation consists just in the difference of one thing from another. It is not a specific kind of entity called *abhāva*, which is different from all positive entities called *bhāva*.

Let that be so. But then how do we understand "difference" itself. What prevents A and B from being identical? The only thing that prevents this is a third entity called negation or *abhāva*. The negation of A alone keeps A from coalescing with B. We have thus to admit, in addition to positive entities, such a thing as negation, which alone keeps them apart and makes them different. It is not the characters of A that make A different from B, and *vice-versa*. Characters themselves are different, because the negation of those characters intervenes. The negation of one

positive entity therefore is not another positive entity. Negation has to be understood as a distinct form of reality without which the world of things cannot be realised. It is, in a sense, the very stuff of things. For without it, things would have no definiteness, no particularity, no difference. They would lose their limits. They would collapse into an indefinite mass, that would be as good as no-thing.

14. There is no contradiction between one thing and another thing. There is contradiction only between a thing and its negation. It is A and not-A that are contradictory, not A and B. Contradiction can only be defined as the co-existence of a thing and its negation, and in no other way. There is contradiction if A implies not-A, or if it can be equated with not-A, or if to say that A exists is to say that not-A exists.

We can however ask, as we did about the entities A and B, why cannot a thing and its negation co-exist? For if they could, a contradiction would not ensue, as it does not ensue when A and B co-exist in a group or a collection. One thing does not contradict another. One and the same thing does not contradict itself. Only a thing and its negation contradict. But why? The only answer to this question is that a thing and its negation cannot co-exist, because there is a negation between them. In other words, we are unable to prove why a thing and its negation cannot co-exist, except by resorting to another negation. That keeps the question alive. There is no inherent impossibility in a thing and its negation co-existing. There is no inherent contradiction between them. There is contradiction, because we have interposed another negation, which solves no problem. The sum and the substance of the argument is that the law of non-contradiction itself has no formulation which is logically intelligible or satisfactory. There is contradiction because there is negation between two entities; and this negation itself is contradictory, because there is another negation, and so on. To explain contradiction, we go to negation; and negation itself becomes contradictory, because there is another negation. At the root of the law, there is illogicality. Can we claim that it is a necessary law, valid of all reality? We proceed with the law, as though it were an undoubted and absolute truth. We do not ask for its credentials or question its own logicity. And yet if we go to its root, it is exposed to be quite unwarranted.

15. The laws of thought are not to be taken as inviolate. They are open to criticism. It might be said that in order to criticise

the laws, we have to accept the laws. Our contention is that the acceptance of the laws cannot be a justification of their truth. This justification is only possible when they pass the test which they seek to impose on other matters of criticism. They do not pass this test themselves. Their claim to truth is disallowed by themselves. We interpose no outside criterion in order to condemn them. "They are discredited out of their own mouth" as one might say. It is easy to be brave in all matters of discussion by taking the law of non-contradiction as our weapon. But instead of turning the axe to the super-structure based on the law, what if we turn the axe to the law itself?

We can silence every law and every positive thesis by all accepted methods of silencing. There is no truth in the dictum that the real is the rational. We can subject reason itself to criticism and to ultimate rejection. It is the Great Negation, that stops at nothing except the Truth that is eternal, self-revealing and self-evident. It is beyond thought and all its categories. It is super-rational and intuitive in an important sense.

Husserl's Phenomenology and Indian Idealism

BY

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It is an unfortunate philosophical neglect amongst Indian scholars that despite the large growth of literature on comparative philosophy in this country, little attention has been paid to the massive structure of thought laboriously raised by Edmund Husserl under the formidable title of "Phenomenology". I say this is regrettable, since Edmund Husserl's philosophical thoughts would have added a fresh momentum to that process of self-discovery and self-expansion on the part of Indian philosophy, which, initiated by such scholars as Radhakrishnan, Ranade, Sri Aurobindo and K. C. Bhattacharyya has resulted in the accumulation of a vast literature on comparative philosophical and religious thought.

Two reasons, we may suppose, have been responsible for this neglect of Husserl's thought. The first, perhaps, is the formidable title "Phenomenology", whose empirical and positivistic associations are alien to the general trend of Indian thought. The second, and no less important factor has been the great obscurity of Husserl's writings and the scanty translations of them, available in the English language. The present essay is meant to prefigure a possible study of the very intimate affinities of spirit and movement between the phenomenology of Husserl and Indian philosophic thought in general.

I

"Phenomenology"¹ is not phenomenism. Phenomenism may be either psychologism or positivism. Phenomenology is opposed to both. To positivism, phenomenology is opposed, being itself a study of "essences" and "meaning". Husserl himself had

1. The following exposition of phenomenology has obvious limitations. It is meant to expound those suggestions which are relevant to the present comparative study.

his psychologistic phase, but he soon got over it. The attack of Frege on his psychological study of arithmetic led him to recast his psychologism. In recoil from psychologism, Husserl had yet the courage to avoid the contemporary snare of logicism. He rejected symbolic logic as well as the conception of logic as a purely normative science.

A task of great magnitude, however, lay before him. Rejection of prevalent alternatives needed courage and critical acumen. But positive reconstruction was an uphill task, when all common tracks had been abandoned. Husserl had to tread new and unknown paths.²

Rejection of psychologism is only a preparation for rejecting any sort of psychological Idealism. Psychological subjectivity affords but a poor foundation for Idealism. It is but one natural event amongst others. Idealism, if grafted to this subjectivity, is on no better ground than the realism it opposes. Kant had shown the way out of this false controversy between realism and psychological idealism. The solution must be traced back to a point where the controversy ceases to have relevance. Kant's great contribution, in this respect, was his doctrine of the transcendental subjectivity, the transcendental Unity of Apperception. Husserl builds up his idealism on the basis of such Transcendental subjectivity,—an idealism which he calls the *Transcendental Phenomenological Idealism*.

Hegel also had taken the cue from Kant. But Hegelianism is a piece of great speculative adventure. Husserl abhors theorising. Phenomenology is descriptive, not speculative; its basis is self-evidence, not deduction. Phenomenology, for Husserl, is not one theory amongst others. Transcendental Idealism has not developed merely as a reply to the historic problem of Idealism. Experience is to speak for itself. To suspend our judgment and to wait upon experience for delivering its own credentials is the safest way. So far, the phenomenologist has sympathy for the positivists' method of relying on positive intuition. But the positivist admits only one kind of intuition. For the phenomenologist, the distinction between various types and grades of intuition is of cardinal importance. Each is valid within its own sphere.

2. The paths, though newly turned into highways by Husserl, had been previously trodden unknowingly, Husserl admits, by the great critical philosophers of Germany. That similar excursions had been undertaken in India too is the contention of this essay.

What I have said above justifies the title "Phenomenology". But, why "Transcendental"? Like phenomenology, the word "transcendental" also denotes a particular level of reflexion. The transcendental point of view is contrasted with the empirical and psychological points of view. From the latter points of view, the natural world, external and internal, presents itself as a real 'other' to consciousness, as a real transcendent. This is what Husserl calls the *transcendent thesis*. Transcendental way of looking at things, on the other hand, refers every thing back to consciousness. The reality of the natural world is not denied; but the *transcendent thesis* is found to be inadequate. That the natural world exists is undeniable. The task of phenomenological enquiry, however, is "to clarify the meaning of this world, the precise sense in which every one accepts it, and with undeniable right, as really existing." The result of this enquiry is found to be this that "only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically the meaning of Absolute Being," whereas, the real world has its reality "only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity."³

The above-mentioned distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental follows closely the line laid down by Kant. The 'transcendent', in the Critical philosophy, is what claims to go beyond all possible experience; the 'transcendental', on the other hand, is what constitutes the very possibility of experience. In Husserl's phenomenology, the 'transcendent' thesis is the thesis of the natural standpoint, which asserts a real 'other', outside and independent of transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental reflection "brackets" this transcendent thesis; it is left impotent; its efficacy on belief and thought is lost. For reflexion of this level, the ultimate point of reference is the transcendental subjectivity, which is what makes even our experience of the natural and psychological worlds possible. The transcendental realm bestows meaning and significance on the transcendent world.

From Husserl one hears of 'levels of reflexion', of raising ourselves to higher levels, of changing 'standpoints', of re-directing our mental 'glance', and ultimately of what he calls a new *Einstellung*. Philosophy, thus, in Husserl's writings, assumes the grace of a living act. Already, earlier in his writings, (in *Logos*. Vol. I), he had rejected the 'Weltanschauungsphilosophie'. Philosophy is a spiritual act and not a static world-view. Like

3. Husserl: *Ideas, Pure Phenomenology*, Translated by Boyce Gibson. p. 21, Author's Preface to the English edition.

Descartes, Husserl attempted to live for himself this life of meditation. "Phenomenology" starts from an initial 'motivation'. The phenomenologist needs be motivated with the new 'Einstellung'. He is to feel within himself the irresistible need of undertaking the meditations.⁴ One feels here something stimulating, invigorating, even amounting to inspiration as contrasted with the barren logic of our times.

Transcendental reflexion leads Husserl ultimately to a clear separation between two worlds—the world of consciousness on the one hand, and the real world, on the other. The contrast between the two worlds is deeply felt and unambiguously stated. Let us quote from Husserl himself. On the one hand, "Consciousness, considered in its 'purity', must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape, which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-temporal system, which cannot experience causality from anything nor exert causality upon anything.... On the other side, the whole spatio-temporal world, to which man and the human Ego claim to belong as singular subordinate realities, is according to its own meaning mere intentional Being, a Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for a Consciousness. It is a Being, which consciousness in its own experience posits, and is, in principle, intuitable and determinable only as the element common to the motivated appearance-manifolds, but over and beyond this, is just nothing at all."⁵

The relation between the two worlds is one of one-sided dependence. Consciousness, as such and in its purity, does not require any real thing of the real world. The Being of Consciousness will not be essentially affected by the complete nullifying of the thing-world.⁶ Pure Consciousness alone has absolute being. On the other hand, the real world, by its very nature, can have relative being, and, therefore, necessarily presupposes the Absolute Being, as the source of its meaning and significance. It has, as Husserl has said, Being for consciousness.

4. Religious implications of such a conception of philosophy have been pointed out, though very inadequately, in an article entitled "German Phenomenology and its implications for Religion" by J. S. Bixler, in the Journal of Religion. Vol. 9, p. 589-606.

5. Ideas, p. 153.

6. Ibid. p. 151.

Phenomenology is the study of the immanent structures of this pure consciousness. Nothing that can be an "object" of consciousness is "immanent". If all "transcendent" is "bracketed", we are left with consciousness as such, in absolute purity of its intrinsic nature, consciousness free from all awareness of objects. Our constant preoccupation with objects makes us blind to the fact that consciousness has such an intrinsic nature of its own. Phenomenological reflexion requires us to divert our attention from the known object to the 'knowing' itself, from the perceived to the 'perceiving', from the judged to the 'judging', and so on,—till the nature of pure consciousness presents itself to our "insightful intuition".


II

If this be the 'motivation' and this the culmination of Husserl's thought, it is interesting to see how the ancient Indian thinkers had been treading similar highways, though with varying degrees of progress. Many had even scaled altitudes, of which Husserl's excursions carry bare hints and suggestions.

1. To begin with the Nyāya-Vaisesika school, we find even within its realistic epistemology anticipations of "phenomenological" thought. The Nyaya-Vaisesika has a realistic metaphysic, and the sole task of the system is to classify the various objective categories. Nine such categories are classified, the list including substance, attribute, action, Universality, Particularity, Inherence, Negation, etc. One point, however, is of "phenomenological" importance in the present context. The Nyaya-Vaisesika recognises that these objective categories are all meaning-products. The categories are called "padārthas",—a Sanskrit term, whose etymological meaning is "meaning of words". The intimate connexion between expression and meaning has been recognised by Husserl to the extent of identifying expression with logical meaning.⁷ For the Indian logician, the common feature of all these objectivities is that they are all 'knowables';⁸ to be 'knowable' is to be an object of consciousness. And the object-world is, both according to Nyaya-Vaisesika and the modern phenomenology of Husserl, an 'intentional' 'meaning-product'. This may be a small step; but it may be said to possess such importance as Husserl ascribes to Brentano's findings regarding the concept of intentionality. Such ideas are forerunners of phenomenology.

7. Ideas, p. 347.

8. Bhāṣāparichheda, by Viswanātha, Karika, 13.



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2. A decidedly much higher step is taken by the Sāṃkhya School. It has been common both in India and abroad to interpret the Sāṃkhya as a realistic dualism. But, there are two characteristics, which carry weight in favour of a clear idealistic formulation. Firstly, the Prakṛiti, or the ultimate principle of the natural world, has its course of evolution for the Puruṣa, the principle of subjectivity. The two are no doubt recognised as independent principles, but the course of development of the one has no rationale, except with reference to the other. This is distinctly an idealistic trend and clearly one that approximates to Husserl's position regarding the relation of the real world with the realm of Pure Consciousness. The second, and a more important consideration, is the recognition of a principle of transcendental subjectivity. Like Husserl, the Sāṃkhya includes psychological subjectivity along with Ego (ahamkāra), Intelligence (Buddhi), and Mind (manas) within the natural world. The ultimate point of reference, that which makes all experience and knowledge possible is Pure Consciousness as such, unsoiled by contact with the object-world.

3. But, nowhere is the emphasis on the supremacy of Pure Consciousness as such greater than in the Vedānta of Shankara. The ultimate reality in the Vedānta philosophy, is Pure Consciousness. Consciousness alone has absolute Being, the object-world possessing a derivative appearance-status. That which can be the object of consciousness, that which, to use Husserl's language, is transcendent to consciousness, is different from consciousness as such. Our empirical and psychological self is no less objective than the physical thing-world. The Vedantic discipline consists in the turning of the 'mental glance' from the object known to the knowing as such.

How then does Consciousness descend from its pristine purity to the objective level, so as to constitute what passes for psychological subjectivity? For Husserl, the question may be re-stated thus: how is it that what is absolute in itself can abandon its immanence and can put on the character of transcendence?

Husserl and Vedānta have very similar answers. Vedānta traces psychological subjectivity to the prior and false identification of the body with the self (dehātmaḍhyāsa). Let us now listen to Husserl: "Only through the empirical relation to the body does consciousness become real in a human and animal sense, and only thereby does it win a place in Nature's space and time—the time which is physically measured."⁹ Consciousness and body con-

9. Ideas. p. 164.

stitute, Husserl tells us, a "natural unity." Shankara admits that this "linking-on" has no rational intelligibility; yet it is a natural unity characterising our empirical consciousness (naisargikoyam Lokovyavahārah).¹⁰ Only, Husserl will not call this unity 'false' or "illusory". But this is also what Husserl tells us: ". Consciousness itself, in these apperceptive interweavings, in this psychological relation to the corporeal, forfeits nothing of its essential nature, and can assimilate nothing that is foreign to its own essence, which would indeed be absurd."¹¹ Shankara also recognises this absurdity — "mithyā iti bhavitum yuktam."¹² Vedānta does not mean anything radically different by calling this unity "false" except that this is a unity which yet leaves Consciousness pure and unaffected intrinsically.

In this regard, Husserl seems to have stopped short of the Vedāntic Idealism and stopped exactly at a point, which may be taken to be mid-way between the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta. The Sāṃkhya recognises the principle of objectivity as a real "Other" to consciousness; it is only the development of objectivity, which the Sāṃkhya posits to be for consciousness. Husserl, though he recognises two distinct realms of Being, yet does go far enough to show that the 'transcendent' thing-world is, so to say, 'constituted' within the 'immanent' nature of consciousness. The real world has a derivative being, in that its meaning it owes to consciousness. Yet both Husserl and the Sāṃkhya agree in not going far enough with the Vedānta, which takes the real world as annulled and negated from the transcendental standpoint. With the Sāṃkhya, true knowledge consists in the discrimination (vivekajñāna) of the two ultimate principles; their distinct essences should be correctly apprehended in their purity. By such apprehension, empirical consciousness will, no doubt, disintegrate, yet the principle of objectivity is not dissolved. So with Husserl: the phenomenological "bracketing" does not mean a negation of the transcendent thesis; it demands only a suspension of belief in it, so that we do not make 'use' of it. Compared to both, the Vedānta takes a bold step ahead towards making this type of idealism more self-consistent.

III

We have observed how striking is the affinity between the ancient Indian thinkers and the German phenomenologist. But the

10. Shankara: Adhyāsa bhāṣya.

11. Ideas. p. 165.

12. Shankara: Adhyāsabhāṣya.
P. 3

present account will not be complete if we do not make a reference at least to one contemporary Indian thinker, the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya, who for some time held the George V chair in Mental and Moral philosophy at the University of Calcutta. By many of his pupils, Professor Bhattacharyya is adored as the ablest contemporary metaphysician in India.^{12a}

Professor Bhattacharyya starts with a fundamental distinction between subject and object. "Object is what is meant, Object, as the meant, is distinguished from the subject or the subjective of which there is some awareness other than the meaning awareness."¹³ Object, thus, is seen to be what Husserl calls an intentional meaning-product. Metaphysics is concerned only with what is 'meanable'; as such, there can be metaphysics only of the object. "The metaphysical controversy about the reality of the subject is only about the subject viewed in some sense as object." (The Subject as Freedom, p. 17). There can be no metaphysic of the subject, taken in its purity.

Psychology, however, claims to give knowledge of the subject. This claim is as spurious as that of metaphysics. The attitude of both is equally objective. The task of neither is to know knowledge as such, purely in its knowing function. Metaphysics seeks to apprehend reality as distinct from our knowledge of it. Neither does psychology know 'knowing', as distinct from the known. According to Professor Bhattacharyya, "Psychological introspection is at least awareness of the known-ness of the object, the known-ness being meant as an accident of the object, as an abstraction from the known object, as the difference between the object as known and the object that is only believed, or as the object *coming* to be known."¹⁴

Where both metaphysics and psychology fail, Professor Bhattacharyya suggests a new spiritual discipline, — "a new philosophical study which may be called spiritual or transcendental psychology."¹⁵ The aim of this new study would be the self-evident truth.

12a. The most important among Professor Bhattacharyya's published works are: *Studied in Vedantism* (Calcutta), the *Subject as Freedom* (Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner), *Concept of Philosophy* (an article in the volume 'Contemporary Indian Philosophy', edited by Radhakrishnan and Muirhead).

13. K. C. Bhattacharyya: *The Subject as Freedom*, p. 1.

14. *The Subject as Freedom*, p. 19.

15. *Ibid.* p. 28.

The self-evident is a quite different category than the meaning-categories. The Subjective is outside the region of the objective. What is needed is a "Spiritual Cultivation of a subjective attitude," by which escape may be made from "the objective knowing attitude."¹⁶

This entails a distinction between psychological introspection and spiritual introspection. Professor Bhattacharyya's account of spiritual introspection closely follows Husserl's idea of phenomenological reflexion. "The distinguishing of the subjective function of knowing etc., as other than this abstraction of objectivity," writes¹⁷ Professor Bhattacharyya, "may also be called introspection, and it may be, with greater right." And phenomenological reflexion, as we have seen, requires us to divert our 'mental glance' from the known object to the knowing itself—from the perceived to the perceiving, from the judged to the judging and so on. Writing on "The starting point of Husserl's philosophy," Salmon emphasizes this distinction. "Phenomenological reflexion is not introspection in the psychological sense but an actual reflexion, consciousness ceasing to be awareness of any object and becoming conscious of itself. It is to rest not on any "philosophical justification," but upon its actual ability to be practised."¹⁸

Both Husserl and Professor Bhattacharyya attach great importance to the concept of 'function.' "The view point of Function is the Central viewpoint of phenomenology."¹⁹ The functions, in Professor Bhattacharyya's thought, "represent the modes of freedom from the corresponding psychological abstractions."²⁰ Husserl's loyalty to the concept of intentionality emphasized by his realist predecessors Meinong and Brentano shuts off from his vision the full depth of this concept of function. Functional study means for him "how objective unities of every region and category 'are consciously constituted'". On the other hand, the doctrine of intentionality requires him to hold that all consciousness *must* be consciousness of some object. But if that be so, if that is, the objective reference belongs to the essence of consciousness as such, how then is the study of pure consciousness, of consciousness freed from the shackles of objective awareness, possible? Yet, that is

16. *Ibid.* p. 28.

17. *Ibid.* p. 30.

18. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1929-30.

19. *Ideas*, p. 252.

20. *The Subject as Freedom*, p. 30.

what Husserl claims on behalf of phenomenological reflexion. To stick to this formulation of the doctrine of intentionality and yet to assert an absolute being of Pure Consciousness, involves a plain contradiction.

Professor Bhattacharyya, free from this vestige of objective-attitude, visualises the full depth of the concept of function. He does not mention Husserl; there is nothing to bear testimony to his acquaintance with the works of Husserl. (The English translation of Husserl's "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie" was first published in 1931, this being the only one of Husserl's works to be rendered into English. Professor Bhattacharyya's lectures, published under the title "The Subject as Freedom" were delivered in 1929). But, Professor Bhattacharyya was a Kantian Scholar; and he attempts to transcend the last remnant of objectivism which lingers so disturbingly in Kantianism. The interest of Kant is still in the object, "in the Known-ness or objectivity of the object. . . ."²¹ He considers the critical philosophy as 'a disguised form of spiritual psychology', as conceived by himself; Kantianism "misleads so far as it presents the function as an objective meaning. . . ."²² This last remark could, with no less aptness, have been made against Husserl.

Function thus becomes for Professor Bhattacharyya the indicator of the modes of freedom of consciousness. It is true that consciousness is of an object. But this 'of' signifies a unique relation. The relation is one of one-sided dependence. Objectivity, no doubt, it 'constituted' within consciousness. But, the reference of consciousness is a free reference, a free 'positing'. We have seen that Husserl does recognise this possibility. What is, however, in Husserl an occasional suggestion is, in Professor Bhattacharyya's philosophy, recognised as the essence of 'transcendental' idealism.

21. Ibid. p. 38.

22. Ibid. p. 38.

The Problem of Artistic Truth

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1. In what sense can a piece of art be said to be true and how far the qualification is aesthetically relevant is the question we seek to answer here. The answer will depend naturally on the view of art one adopts, and our view is that art is an imaginative experience (accompanied by a delight of an extra-ordinary kind) of some sentiment or feeling, which is not passively and blindly suffered but actively enjoyed with enlightenment. It is in a sense knowledge by acquaintance of some emotional quality where the emotion is at once felt and known. This experience of a sentiment is the meaning of the piece of art and this meaning is uniquely determined by the elements of art so that it cannot be expressed by any other manner. We may have only rough analogues of it if we try to reproduce it by other means. Thus such suggestive phrases as 'gorgeous gloom', 'exquisite melancholy', 'explosive passion', and others used to describe certain moods expressed in poetry or drama, do but indicate the moods which have their unique being in the body of their respective artistic pieces. The imaginative experience of art is an organic whole of parts. The parts,—for instance in poetry, words, their meanings and sounds and the thoughts and accessory feelings and sensations produced by the meanings,—all mean, point to and exist for, some dominant or overwhelming or transcendent sentiment. This ordered action of the parts brings out the final product which transcends the parts and is yet immanent in them. It is 'in and above' the parts. Expression or objectification of feelings, recognised to be the function of art, involves this dynamic process. This is essentially the view held by classical Indian aesthetics.

2. Now if art builds up an unique experience, which is "a world by itself, independent, complete and autonomous",¹ it cannot have any reference outside, any 'other' which it has to represent or copy. The artistic experience is significant; no doubt, it has a certain meaning by virtue of its relation of parts to the whole, and of end to the means, and by virtue of some intrinsic

1. A. C. Bradley: *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, (1923) p. 5.

moving power of this end which is a mood, but there is no significance or meaning beyond the experience. So the question of truth cannot arise. Works of art do not mean other things to which they might be true. But there is causal connection between art-experience and other things which is mistaken for meaning, and so the question of truth is raised. Art-experience often recalls from memory similar experience undergone before, or it leads to a prediction and subsequent verification of similar experiences in future. But this complex relation of resemblance between art-experience and some other experience causally linked up with it is not the relation of meaning. The artistic experience does not mean the other experience resembling it, and so, it can neither be true nor false to this experience outside art. And such resemblance has no artistic relevancy, though it does act on life. Art, particularly of the realistic type, sharpens and enriches our perception of nature (including human nature); we know more of our surroundings in a very real sense. But this conditioning of our mode of apprehension is a life-value, not an artistic one. It has nothing to do with the appreciation of the unique and immediate experience that art provides us.²

3. Thus the matter of artistic truth may be very simply settled. Once we have a firm grasp of what art really means we shall have no difficulty with the question of its truth or falsity. Art being a matter of unique autonomous experience cannot mean anything beyond it and so cannot be true to anything. Only a judgment in the form of a proposition means something beyond it and is true or false with regard to the object meant. A very realistic painting may not give persons to whom it is presented any insight into the natural objects depicted therein unless the proposition (that it resembles or is true to the object) is stated.³ The vehicle of insight is the proposition which alone is true or false; the painting affords only a selfcomplete experience. For Croce the question of artistic truth is meaningless "because the distinction of truth and falsehood must concern a judgment or statement about reality and cannot apply to the mere presence of an image, to a mere subject without a predicate, of which nothing is asserted and which, therefore, does not enter into judgment".⁴

2. See B. C. Heyle "Artistic Truth Reconsidered", *Jn. of Aesthetics*, Vol. VIII, p. 257.

3. K. B. Price: "Is there Artistic Truth"? *Jn. of Philosophy*, XLVI, p. 288.

4. Croce: *Breviary of Aesthetics* Tr. by E. F. Carr in his *Philosophies of Beauty* (1931).

Sir Philip Sidney observed long ago, "Now, for the poet, he nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth".⁵ "The notion of truth applies only to propositions and not to states of affairs" remarks a modern thinker⁶ following a text-book of logic.⁷ But as we shall see presently, this thinker does not apply this principle to the question of artistic truth thoroughly. Had he done so he would have seen that art-experience being a state of affairs and not a proposition cannot be in any sense true or false. The sense in which he (John Hospers) recommends the application of the qualification 'truth' to art is that it is truth to experience and not truth about anything. A proposition states a truth about something beyond it, but art is true to things we encounter in experience. Thus Becky Sharp (a character in Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*) is true to life, she is an instance of a type we have experienced, and by presenting her Thackeray has given us an insight into the universal type or essence which is exhibited in other instances. The resemblance between Becky Sharp and other instances of the same type is her truth to experience.⁸ But this relation of resemblance which is the basis of this truth to experience is not meaning. As has been pointed out before, art does not mean that which it resembles; it could do that by explicitly stating that it does so mean. But art does not contain such propositions. Thackeray cannot put down in the narrative itself that Becky Sharp resembles many women in actual life. Thus works of art may be true to things without giving us any insight into them, or they may be false to things without misguiding us in anyway. Art-world is an autonomous world complete in itself. The reason why we have an illusion that art may be true to actual world is that after contemplating the art-world we think of the actual one, and are led by certain resemblances to propose a proposition like this, "it is true to life", and then proceed to verify this proposition for truth. Art has no proposition and so is neither true nor false. Our proposition-making falls outside the aesthetic activity. The idea of truth or falsity does not appear so long as we are within the art-world. Hospers's 'truth-to' is but a modified version of 'truth about' and the latter is obviously not a character of art. Art is an experience or intuitive

5. *An Apology for Poetry*.

6. John Hospers: *Meaning and Truth in Arts* (1948) p. 158.

7. Cohen and Nagel: *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific method* (1934) p. 27.

8. See Hospers, *op. cit.* 162-66.

knowledge or awareness, and as such cannot consist of statements of facts which may be true or false.

4. This seems to be undoubted, at least in the case of non-literary arts where propositions are unthinkable. For propositions are made of words with certain conventional rules of reference (semantic rules) and certain rules of ordering (syntactical rules). But doubt is sometimes cast on the belief that propositions can be made of words only.⁹ Music and painting can express propositions. There are natural relations between artistic representations and things represented, which relations may serve for semantic rules, and there are conventional rules of order in arts according to which these representations (like words) may be arranged. But that proposition is idle. As a critic has ably shown,¹⁰ the natural relations between an artistic representation and its reference outside art is not reliable, for the same element may stand for what it resembles, for what it causes and is caused by, and for what it is associated with. A certain posture may stand for so many different things. Conventional definitions are required for clarity and not natural ones, and the former have been so far devised with regard to words only. Natural symbols do not work unambiguously. Besides, the rules of order in art do not help to bring meanings out of these natural symbols. So that meaningful propositions cannot be made in non-literary arts, which therefore, have no character like truth or falsity.

5. But meaningful propositions may be present in literary arts and they are present in much of the finest poetry of the world such as that of Lucretius, Dante, Milton, Donne and Browning. These poets are thinkers and the imaginative experience they want to communicate is closely dependent on certain theoretical beliefs they entertained. Thus Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra" cannot create for us any imaginative experience unless we believe like him in certain characters of reality such as the existence and immortality of the soul, God's hand in our making and essential reasonableness and goodness in the scheme of things. We can hardly have the aesthetic relish from Donne's *Divine Poems* unless we believe in resurrection. These poems contain propositions about the world which cannot escape being either true or false. So, should we conclude that literary works of this type are either true or false? Our answer is No. For this simple

9. e.g. see T. M. Greene: *The Arts and Art-criticism* (1948) p. 425.
10. K. B. Price: *op. cit.* pp. 289-90.

reason that the propositions (involving judgments about the world) contained in such pieces are but parts in an organic whole which has a meaning and significance transcending the parts and determining their meanings and quality. The thought contained in a poem is there as an accessory to some dominant mood for which the poem exists, the thought may be intellectually either true or false but the poem as a whole is neither. The poem as a final product of many elements in it, chiefly accessory thought and feelings, is a unified whole of emotive experience which may be gained by a provisional belief in the thoughts, and which is not at all dependent on our permanent belief got through intellectual verification of the thought. Thus the thought in a literary work is no thought proper as met in science or philosophy, it is a kind of intuition,¹¹ and is not judged by the standards of logic for truth or falsity but is simply believed in under the influence of the dominant mood expressed by the work as a whole. Rhyme and rhythm helps in detaching the mind from its ordinary realistic and intellectual tendencies. Now the thought in a poem is so readily accepted that it is obvious that the reality to which it refers is not something rigid beyond the art-world, something strictly rational, but it is the flexible art-world itself, an imaginative analogue of the actual world. The world where resurrection is true is not really the world we actually inhabit with our intellects in the order of logic, but it is a provisionally accepted world-picture. The mind follows the utterance of the artist, as if under some hypnotic influence it is ready to feel and believe. The poem acts as a charm on the mind. Coleridge speaks of "willing suspension of disbelief" on the part of the reader of poetry, but as Richards points out,¹² it is not willing or conscious; the question of intellectual belief or disbelief does not arise at all while we are reading well. If it does arise, through some fault, either ours or the poet's, we have ceased to be reading poetry and have become engaged in quite a different type of activity. Conscious verification of the statements in poetry is done only at the cost of the poem; such intellectual interest in art breaks up its unified experience and murders beauty. Richards has distinguished emotive beliefs required in art from intellectual ones¹³ to explain the assent we readily give to meaningful propositions in poetry. The question of truth or falsity with regard to such propositions, we have

11. See Croce: *Aesthetics* Chap. 1, 2.

12. I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism* (1929) p. 277.

13. See *Ibid* pp. 273-76.

seen, does not arise. So that the artistic work, which is a new whole made out of such accepted propositions and other elements, cannot be said to be true. We may reject the propositions (in our intellectual attitude) and yet appreciate the art. The doctrines and factual matters employed in some literary works (which are said to be philosophical or realistic) are there only like plot or myth in other types of writing; they serve to bring out the dominant mood. This view has been advocated by many a Western thinker, eg. I. A. Richards, John Middleton-Murry, D. G. James and Lascelles Abercrombie.¹⁴ We see that it can be very simply deduced from the theory of art we have adopted, the one which is essentially Indian. A thought in art serves as an accessory to the main emotive experience of art and as such has no independent status and, so, is accepted for the sake of the dominant experience.

6. Now it may so happen, as it often does, that in some literary piece a thought, instead of being subservient to some dominant emotive experience, itself dominates. The artist has a thesis to submit, some message to communicate. In that case the intellectual interest in the thought must be aroused and it will be verified and judged true or false. So that the work will be either true or false. But in that case it ceases to be a piece of art, it is but science or philosophy in a literary garb. Whether a piece of writing is a work of art or non-art is determined by the total effect and the intent of the work. If some emotive experience is the end, the writing is art, if, on the other hand, some intellectual thesis is intended, it is non-art. So we conclude that art, where some emotive experience dominates the parts containing thoughts and feelings, cannot be either true or false.

7. A cognate question is raised like this: It is admitted that the intellectual truth of a thought, contained in a piece of art, has no relevance for art as such; for the vigorous intellectual interest is suspended in an aesthetic attitude; but is all intellectual activity totally suspended? Is not the mind active and interpretative in aesthetic contemplation, where meanings of words and complex sentences have to be followed, allusions and suggestions to be quickly seized, and the subtle relation of means and ends and of parts and the whole to be appreciated? And in that intellectually alert condition, is not some kind of incipient verification of propositional statements in a literary piece at work? This verifi-

14. See Hospers, *op. cit.* p. 216.

catory work, it is admitted, cannot be carried out explicitly with full intellectual interest without breaking up the aesthetic attitude and destroying the artistic experience, but it may be carried out silently within the aesthetic experience.¹⁵ Our answer to such a suggestion is this. We admit that the intellect is not totally at rest in an aesthetic attitude, particularly in poetic contemplation, where words have their subtle shades of meaning and which interact in a variety of ways leading to new meanings and suggestions. The intellect may in such a state of non-logical activity mark the agreement or disagreement of certain assertions (made in a poem) with our intellectual beliefs. And in the case of agreement there will naturally be some satisfaction, while in the opposite case some dissatisfaction. But this satisfaction or otherwise can in no sense be aesthetic. The intellectual joy and the aesthetic one are not of the same kind. Aesthetic joy is a kind of beatitude arising from our enjoyment, with enlightenment and poise of, some dominant mood or sentiment; its taste is of an extra-ordinary kind. Incipient verification and consciousness of agreement or disagreement are thus admitted as possible within artistic contemplation, but their aesthetic relevance is denied.

8. The broad conclusion emerges from our discussion that art is not to be qualified by truth or falsity. Some parts of it may, while intellectually (and, so, non-aesthetically) regarded, yield truth or falsehood, but such cognitive elements have no aesthetic relevancy. They may have bearing on our life and personality and thus have practical efficacy. But art has no meaning apart from the experience which it offers us and, so, it corresponds to nothing and is true or false to nothing. Yet when Keats and Rabindranath equate beauty with truth they cannot be wholly at fault. They mean by truth anything known immediately and intuitively and accepted as valuable in itself. "What imagination seizes as beauty is truth" (Keats) means what is a unified whole of intimate experience is a true experience. It is a piece of knowledge or presentation which is not true by its being known again as true to some other presentation, but it is known only once as intrinsically satisfying and self-sufficient. Truth here means but truth of realization, and if art can afford this it is true. It is true if it is successfully expressed and so recreated in the mind of the beholder or the reader. Truth of art is thus, unlike cognitive truth, not thoroughly objective in character. For the conditions of

15. J. L. Jarret "Verification in the Reading of Poetry", *Jn. of Phil.* XLVI, pp. 435-44.

realization of an experience include the realizing mind (its range of experience and temperament) as much as the mind of the artist and the universality of the experience communicated and the means of communication.

Aristotle makes the end of art reside in a pleasurable emotion felt by the subject. Art attains its complete being only within the mind of the person for whom it is created. But the subjective emotion felt by a person is deeply grounded in human nature and so it has a sort of objective validity. Aristotle distinguishes the right sort of audience from the weaker sort; a tragedy may end with happiness for the latter.¹⁶ Thus though the truth of art is subjective, because art is an immediate experience of an experiencing mind (as the Indian aestheticians have held),¹⁷ it has its roots in the universal nature of man, his basic drives and sentiments. Hence it has some objectivity. In Indian aesthetics the basic sentiments depicted in art (called *sthayibhāvas*) are held to be rooted in the fundamental instincts and emotions of man (*vāsanās* or *vṛttis*), and the judgment of taste, though essentially subjective, derives some objectivity from the consensus of opinion of the sympathetic observers (*sahṛdayas*).¹⁸ Thus though truth as a character of art in the sense of truth of experience is but a redundant term it yet suggests and claims that the experience so realized is not a stray or arbitrary one but something intrinsically significant and fundamentally human. The mind in aesthetic contemplation, while tasting the beauty of experience, is conscious of the intrinsic value and significance of this experience, and this consciousness certainly deepens the aesthetic flavour. The source of this consciousness is the psychical substratum (*vāsanāloka*) common in man, the generic instincts of humanity. The sense of objectivity, necessity or universality which is pre-cognitive, is associated with (and is a factor in) value-consciousness in aesthetic contemplation. Truth, in any sense whatsoever, is nothing if it is absolutely subjective and has no pretensions to objectivity. So that while some great thinkers (e.g. Keats and Rabindranath) speak of artistic truth, they wish thereby to suggest the objective validity of art-experience which is otherwise, by its very nature, subjective.

16. See S. H. Butcher: *Aristotle's Theory of poetry and Fine Arts* (1907) pp. 210-15.

17. e.g. Abhinavagupta: *Locana* 1. 4. Also *Bharata Natyashāstra* 6. 34; 6. 35.

18. see Abhinavagupta: *Locana* 1. 1 and 1. 4.

9. The intuition of universality in a particular experience, of some generic traits in a specific presentation, is dimly present in aesthetic contemplation, and it is in this sense only and not in any logical one that art has universality and truth. Thus there is some intelligible element (not strictly cognitive) in art-experience which is not pure emotion. (Richards¹⁹ and Abhinavagupta²⁰ have recognised this). Kant has spoken of subjective necessity involved in aesthetic judgment²¹ and also of 'commonsense' (in the sense of a common principle of feeling), and sociability. His love of formalism held him from seeing that these characters are not associated merely with an 'empirical interest' in the beautiful, but that they are somehow elements in the aesthetic experience. Art expresses sociability and implies a common human nature. Works of art are specific variants of generic values, they possess 'depth-meanings' or 'root-values' of universal scope below their sensuous surface and immediacy of specific values.²² Whitehead says, "The habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid values".²³ The survival of great poems "is the evidence that they express deep intuitions of mankind penetrating into concrete fact."²⁴ These deep intuitions of mankind are intuitions of human values, but they are present in the aesthetic consciousness not in a clear and cognitive form by way of concepts. Though themselves indistinct, they yet distinctly flavour the aesthetic experience which gets through them the character of greatness, truth and universality. Art always directs us through suggestions to something felt to be somehow enormously important for us but inexpressible and only vaguely discerned.²⁵ It is because of this something and only as indicative of it, that we speak of a work of art as true. Otherwise Richards is right in saying that to remark "How true" while reading some work is to misuse it and to waste time.²⁶

19. See his *Principles of Literary criticism* (1926) p. 98.

20. See *abhinavabhāratī* 6.34 'Rasanā cha bodha-rupā eva'.

(Aesthetic experience is certainly intelligible also).

21. Kant: *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (Meredith's *Tvana*), § 20, 40 and 41.

22. M. Rader, "Isolationist and contextualist aesthetics," *Jn. of Phil.* XLIV No. 15.

23. *Science and Modern World*, (1926) p. 287.

24. *Adventures of Ideas*, part I, chap. 2.

25. See Helen Wodehouse: "Poetry and Truth", *Philosophy*, VIII p. 452.

26. see *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 272.

Note: — Besides the transcending "something" that is the end of an artistic piece and that lends the latter its character of truth, there is another factor in art which contributes to the same character. This is the relation of parts to the whole, the fine adaptation of means and ends, what Kant might be describing as "purposiveness without a purpose". This is a formal factor, but the mind while realising its significance is aware of its deeper roots in the universal mental continuum of men. The significance is derived from the mind's innate love of teleological activity or purposive hunt, of actualisation of an ideal end. Truth of art, from this aspect, will mean effective or true functioning of parts towards the emergence of the whole.

Is Kantianism a Bar to Modern Mathematics ?

BY

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Mathematics does not stand where it used to do. It has been generally accepted that mathematics requires a synthetic development of a priori concepts in the light of pure intuition, and that the mathematical axioms upon which ordinary geometry is based are undoubtedly true. Now, modern mathematics opposes these two fundamental ideas, and offers a new description or analysis of mathematical reasoning. According to the modern school of mathematics, Kantianism seeks to interpret the spirit of mathematics in a way that is objectionable, and fails to offer, therefore, a proper outlook of modern mathematics. The principal contention of Kant that mathematics is essentially a construction has been objected to, and held invalid. In the present article I have sought to establish that Kantianism is not necessarily a denial of the spirit of modern mathematics.

Kant has expressed his mature views on mathematics towards the end of the first critique thus: "Mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the conception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite, which, as an intuition, is an individual object; while, as the construction of a conception (a general representation), it must be seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under that conception". (p. 741). The modern school of mathematics seems to opine that resorting to intuition makes a mathematical proof less rigorous, and leads to an unsuccessful demonstration. After the premises have been laid down, no appeal to anything but a strictly deductive logic ought to be needed in mathematics. Russell concludes, therefore, that the whole trend of modern mathematics, with its increased pursuit of rigour, has been against the Kantian theory. (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 145).

Modern mathematics is further a challenge to the supposed sufficiency and axiomatic character of Euclid's presuppositions.

The first proposition of Euclid, viz., 'to describe an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight line', assumes that the two circles will intersect. "But his system does not contain an explicit axiom to that effect, so that the demonstration fails". (p. 178, *Modern Instruction to Logic*, Stebbing). But even if you supply a fresh axiom, the proof will not amount to a demonstration. For what is an axiom but a primitive and provisional proposition obtained by an appeal to the immediate apprehension of perceivable entities and their relations? The logical priority of the so-called axioms involves the concept of logical simplicity which is a relative notion, and is therefore never absolute.

Now in the opinion of the modern school, mathematics is a purely logical and rationally thought out interpretation, without the least help of intuition, of the consistency of primitive propositions. But may we not ask, how does this interpretation take place? If primitive propositions are provisionally undefined concepts, we cannot strictly be said to interpret them unless we find objects for them. "If we can find objects that can be fitted into the system because they are related by similar relations, we are said to 'interpret' the system". (Stebbing, *Ibid*, p. 207). We shall have to see if such interpretations can take place without the help of intuition. The very conception of a system is a step beyond mere analysis.

In this connection, it should be recorded to the credit of Kant that he was not unaware of the fundamental distinction between the classical algebra and geometry. He notes, "Mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of quantities (*quanta*), as in the case of geometry; it occupies itself with pure quantity also (*quantitas*), as in the case of algebra, where complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object indicated by the conception of quantity" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B. 745). Kant, however, would not accept the so-called fruitless philosophical contemplation of mathematical concepts as the proper method for pure mathematics, and holds that the method of algebra in equations, from which the correct answer is deduced by reduction, is none-the-less a kind of construction although by means of symbols. If analysis means a procedure of reason without the help of intuition, Kant would very much abhor it. As he says elsewhere, "It would be vain to philosophise upon the triangle, that is, to reflect on it discursively; I should get no further than the definition with which I had been obliged to set out".

But this does not mean that Kant aims at establishing a system of empirical geometry. It is to be regretted, therefore, that some of our astute logicians have misinterpreted the nature of Euclidean geometry by holding, for example, that what ordinarily passes for geometry is a science entirely empirical as dynamics, and is thus a branch of natural science. (Vide Stebbing, *Ibid*, p. 459). Paton rightly asks, "How could the empirical intuition of one triangle give us, or even seem to give us, that apodeictic certainty which Euclid undoubtedly claims?"

We contend that the universal or the apriori is manifested in individual instances, and that the science, viz. mathematics, which deals with it, is to be sharply distinguished from a mere analysis of concepts. Secondly, if the interpretation of a primitive proposition, as is essential for modern mathematics which is identical with logic or deductive development, means the finding of objects fitting into a system, and therefore constituting a system, Kant will perhaps argue that the intuitional element will be necessary both to the truth and to the consistency of mathematics. (cf. Paton — *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* — Vol. I, p. 157).

The development of non-Euclidean geometries has brought about a fresh challenge to Kantianism. It is held that there are different kinds of geometry corresponding to the different kinds of space. This is no doubt a recent development, and it cannot reasonably be traced in Kant. But it does not invalidate Kantianism on that account. For Kant himself is not opposed to the discovery of any new apriori knowledge which 'may be acquired gradually and may at any stage be confused or indistinct.' Secondly, it is difficult to believe that there would be intuitions of different kinds of space without having the least connection among themselves. The least amount of connection implies some apriori aspect or other of spatial intuition.

It is to be admitted, however, that these schools of geometry deny any particular kind of space the right to be called more fundamental than others, and hold in particular that Euclidean space is in no way a more fundamental one. But this does not amount to denying the possibility that there may be a basic feature of pure intuition. For we have to face the disjunctive proposition: "Either one or more of the geometries should be intelligible, or all the so-called geometries are based on confusing fictions." The second alternative being hopelessly impossible, there must be pure intuition of space and time which renders one or more systems of geometry intelligible. Suppose there are p systems of geometry,

and one of them applies to the actual space of the physical world; but that one rather than another must apply to the actual physical world is too subtle a question to be decided by mere experience. Kant's problem still persists, and demands our close attention. Our views about space change as days pass by; but the very possibility of a mathematician's presupposing the relation of one part of space to another gives a direct lie to the attribution of merely empirical characters to the intuition of space.

As we turn back, the plausibility of Kantianism does not seem to have been damaged due to the advent of modern mathematics. When Kant and modern mathematicians refer to analysis, I do not think they refer to the same thing. Modern analysis is a synthesis of the finest order, and it is evident, therefore, that modern mathematics does not necessarily preclude one's acceptance of Kantianism. It is undoubtedly very difficult to anticipate how the interpretation of Kant will be affected in future in the light of the modern theories of mathematics. But "we do not see why it should be impossible to restate Kant's assumptions so as to fit in with modern physical doctrine." No solution of the problem has been offered; but the attitude we should adopt has been sufficiently indicated. If the foundation of Kantianism has not been demolished, the superstructure has got to be understood in an adaptive way.

The Gita—How it Resolves a Psychological Conflict

BY

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The Gita claims to represent all the aspects of Hindu Philosophy in its limited significance while in its wider aspect it seems to give expression to all possible views of Religion and Philosophy. It has been interpreted by different writers and commentators from the standpoints of Jnana, Bhakti and Karma. Essentially all the writers agree to emphasise one particular point, that the Gita is both a Philosophy and an Ethics as well. In another way the Gita lays down certain regulations and injunctions in order to reach a particular status of life. But upto now nobody has tried to explain it from a psychological standpoint or the psychotherapeutic aspect of the Gita. With all my humble regards for Dr. G. S. Bose whose interpretation of the Gita I could not manage to see before I put down a few lines on the subject, my attention to this side of the Gita was drawn by Prof. R. C. Haldar, Head of the Department of Psychology, B. N. College, Patna; and I propose here just to follow the Gita and point out briefly the psychological conflict in Arjuna's mind with which it starts and how that conflict is solved in a clever method of Rationalisation by Lord Krishna.

Some writers and critics are of opinion that the Gita is an interpolation in the story of the Mahābhārata. About its history and authenticity also contradictory opinions are held. Still we would like to accept the story as it is related in the Mahabharata. It is a story built up on the psycho-sociological background of a civil war; a war which took place between two groups of the Kuru clan, Arjuna leading the junior branch against the other party led by the elders of his own clan. The other party consists of the elders like Bhīṣma, the chief of both the sections and Drona, the common preceptor. Both of them side with King Duryodhana, their patron, against whom Arjuna has got to fight.

The first chapter in the Gita is known as Arjunavisadayoga which opens with a challenging war cry of conchshells. As soon as the war cry stops, Arjuna's ambivalence is shown against the

other party. He is sad and depressed. He leaves his bows and arrows; sits on the chariot hopelessly disappointed. He came to fight his own people for safeguarding his own interest. But by this time he forgets that and suffers from acute moral and emotional conflict which makes him bewildered and inactive. That is suggested by Arjuna's request to Krishna at the outset for placing the chariot exactly at the middle of the two contending parties—the chariot almost symbolising the position of Arjuna's mind (See Ch. I, S. 21-22).

Arjuna then perceives all the persons assembled there—the fathers and grandfathers, cousins and friends of all grades (Ch. I, 26-28, 31).

The bewilderment and inactivity caused is about to overwhelm him. But he seeks to further justify it with cautious and argumentative rationalisation in the way of explaining the whole position to Krishna. This position of ambivalence is very strong for the moment when he feels that he cannot be active any more. Actually he tries to defend this inactivity by saying that it is not proper to fight with his own clan. The advent of this ambivalence is sudden and before it came Arjuna did not perhaps know it. Then he becomes extremely nervous and leaves the bow and arrows on the chariot. He becomes extremely benevolent and kindhearted to those people against whom he came prepared to fight. He tries to overcome this fit of nervousness by a series of moral and rational arguments. In the first spurt he talks about his own generosity and magnanimity, by saying that he does not want to possess the kingdom at all. A second line is struck then; he talks about the possibility of pollution of blood and of the mixed castes arising after the death of these people leaving so many widows behind—a real terror for the people of ancient tribal order. From this social argument he turns to moral and religious reasoning to strengthen his position. He declares that he will be involved in a greater sin and suffering by becoming a cause of destruction of his own people. The conclusion may be drawn from these three series of arguments that, Arjuna does not want to be cause of his self-destruction. This idea of self-destruction he has obtained, firstly, by his inner resistance, and secondly, by his self-identification with the whole clan. His idea about self and destruction may be both false and wrong, but upto now he adduces them in self-justification and in supporting his pleas that he is not going to fight because he wants to save the higher values and moral ideals.

We leave Arjuna in this condition and try to find out the role played in the drama by Lord Krishna. He poses to be a by-stander

or an onlooker; but this is not sufficient to express Krishna's proper role. He is the friend, philosopher and guide to Arjuna. He first tries to set Arjuna's mind free at a level where Arjuna may think that he has got no true responsibility for the catastrophe. The soul is eternal and universal; it is neither born nor does it die; who is then the killer and who the killed? Thus argues Krishna in the well-known verses of Ch. II, 19-ff.

This is the first suggestion given to Arjuna by Krishna in order to make his mind absolutely free of the personal responsibility. Actually speaking, the same end is sought in psycho-analytic treatment to some extent. The mind is dull and depressed when an individual first approaches the analyst. The first task of the analyst is to handle the case very patiently in order to create a full confidence which technically is known as an artificial emotional relationship of transference. Next task of the analyst is to make the mind free of all the bondages and responsibilities or to bring the mind in a state of perfect equilibrium, free of the Super-Ego dominating over the personality. Krishna reminds Arjuna of the social-ethical odium that he will suffer as a fighter, and then vigorously advises (Ch. II—S. 37) :

*Hato vā prāpsyasi svargam jtvā vā bhokṣyasē mahīm
tasmāt uttiṣṭa kauntēya yuddhāya kṛta niścayah.*

This is a good source of inspiration for a fighter as Arjuna is. Krishna knows it, and then strengthens it further. So he wants Arjuna to overcome his emotional conflicts with the help of Buddhi or Intellect — which should strengthen his Ego (Ch. III, S. 43) :

*Evaṁ buddhēḥ param buddhva saṁ stabhīyat mā namāt
manā jahi śatrum, mahābāho, kāmārūpaṁdurāsadam*

Just before this, he emphasizes the dark side of nature, and Ahamkāra or vanity which give rise to a false sense of the Ego and of the values (Ch. III, S. 27).

*Prakṛteḥ kṛyāmānāni guṇaiḥ karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ ahamkāra-
vimūdhātmā kartāhamiti manyatē.*

Then in the fourth chapter Krishna directs Arjuna to discard his confusion and arise for action with superior knowledge (Ch. IV, S. 43) :

*Tasmātajñāna sambhūtaṁ hṛitsthaṁ jñānāsīnātmanaḥ
chhītvainam samāyāṁ yogamatistottīṣṭha, Bharata*

But action is as yet difficult for Arjuna. Krishna wants to bring him round to that point by rationalisation, that is by explaining *Samnyasa* or a sort of ethical regulation which Arjuna is asked to follow. This state is referred to as: "Not to hanker for results, but to do the duties." That is the core of the ethics, that Krishna upholds.

Some ethical rules are then prescribed throughout the later *Adhyayas* (Ch. IV to VI). All this serves a two-fold purpose,—to overcome Arjuna's doubts in his mind, and to create in Arjuna's mind an unbounded confidence in Krishna as the Wise Man who knows the social, spiritual and occult lores of all the times. In course of this he explains several stages of human consciousness. The stage of Intellect comes first, and next is the stage of Meditation. The third is a stage of developing Concentration upon a particular object. This last stage according to Krishna is the best stage (Ch. IV—S. 18 ff; and Ch. VI):

*yasya sarvè samārambhāh kāma samkalpavarjitāh jñānā-
gnidagdhakarmānam tāmāhuh panditam budhāh, etc.,*
leading to an intellectual identification of the self and the universe (Ch. VI, S. 29, etc.). But the intellect does not suffice.

From chapter VII onwards upto chapter XI the whole tone is therefore changed. At first Krishna dealing with Arjuna indicated his neutrality; in the second stage Arjuna was asked to follow a course of action,—a sort of ethical social occupational therapy (Ch. II to Ch. VI).

But this is not enough for the moment. So Krishna at the third stage shows his vast theoretical knowledge and this is capped by his elaboration of his own subjective power and grandeur (Ch. XI—He as the Master of the Universe). It is the last trick to win over the mind of the individual just paralysed in the state of indecision. By this show of splendour he finally draws Arjuna's mind to his own self. Now Arjuna understands that his guide is not merely an onlooker or a common man or even a theoretician, but he possesses supernatural power and spirit. Arjuna's mental paralysis now is lessened as he feels attracted towards Krishna's awe-inspiring personality. This further arouses a spirit of self-surrender in Arjuna towards Krishna which prepares him finally to submit to Krishna in the 12th Chapter. It is the eternal mystery of the Indian idea of *Guruvāda*, and at the same time is comparable to the parallel process of transference relationship of modern psycho-analysis. Both run on the same principle of self-surrender to an awe-inspiring and domineering personality in the time of a con-

flicting situation. I will not try to point out the differences between the two or the draw-back of the method here, but simply will be stating the principle as it has been accepted.

From the 13th Chapter onwards, the field being already prepared, Arjuna patiently hears what he is told to do. He learns and he feels inspired only because of his surrendering himself to Krishna. His personality is now in a passive state of acceptance, and it acts up to whatever he is advised to do by Krishna. His early resistance is gone and he waits now for being re-educated by Krishna. The dominating role is played by Krishna after establishing his position finally secured in Arjuna's mind. As a friend he aroused emotion in Arjuna's mind; but changed the very nature of emotion later on; from friendly love it gradually becomes transformed into a respectful and detached reverence towards a distant and higher personality. Lastly, he makes Arjuna's mind ready to take up the same responsibility once again voluntarily from which he once wanted to escape. After keeping Arjuna's mind tight under his superior grip, Krishna brings all sorts of rationalisations to bear, which Arjuna is not in a position to meet. He simply accepts them in uncritical faith. In the Gita finally, Krishna's influence rests on this ultimate spirit of faith and self-surrender which is another way of establishing emotional relationship with an individual. It fits in quite with Krishna's demand as a Guru (Ch. XVIII, S. 65):

Manmanā bhava madbhakto madyajī mām namaskuru
As a result, Arjuna too admits (Ch. XVIII, S. 73):

*Naṣtomohah smritirlabdhā tvat prasādānmayācyuta sthitoṣmī
gatasamdēhah kariṣyē vacanam tava.*

Now after this brief analysis of the whole content, I would draw conclusions. Human nature is much the same as it was in the time of the Gita, so that fifteen hundred years or thirty thousand years ago emotional conflicts and self-justifications were not unknown to men in any society. Losing self-confidence and surrendering ultimately to the Guru in order to gain back self-confidence through faith remains a usual practice even now in the Hindu Society as well as in the Fuehrer's Reich. Let us not be surprised if we are told either that psycho-analysis is based on the very same basis of *Guruvāda*, or that the *Guruvāda* in the Gita is running on a parallel course of psychological therapy through suggestion, with the same end, though the name psycho-analysis was not given to it. We had to wait for a scientific age and for a

pre-eminently scientific genius like Freud who could give it a scientific basis. The method of treatment begins with suggestion and transference, and finally ends in re-education of the Individual. The victim is promised self-confidence only through the Guru now called the analyst. No mention is made however in the Gita of the Individual when after his self-surrender he is left alone. Evidently he is never completely free, but only strong in-so-far as his faith is strong in the Master. The author of the Gita stops there, when Arjuna says only *Kariṣye vacanam tava* or Krishna says *sarva dharmān parityajya māmēkaṁ śaraṇam vraja*. It stops therefore at a point where the individual is destined to be in the grip of his so-called maker of fate for ever, without knowing real sublimation of freedom through any creative reshaping of his own raw materials as supplied by nature. Without this no real solution can be found for human suffering through external and artificial measures. In order to alleviate the intensity of suffering, many temporary methods are suggested which are worth being experimented upon. The Gita too suggests one of such methods aiming at curing human suffering. We do not claim that it reached the stage of science, but that stage is reached as a result of the progress of all such enquiries, crude and careful. No science can claim to have reached perfection, much less the science of mind. I have here only tried to show that the Gita could be seen in this light as aiming at psycho-therapeutic measures for human mind.

An Examination of Prof. Northrop's "Meeting of East and West" from the Indian Point of View

BY

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Professor F. S. C. Northrop of the University of Yale has recently published a momentous book *The Meeting of East and West* in which he has ably brought out the points of agreement and difference between the cultures of the East and the West and has also suggested how unification can take place between the two. It deserves careful attention of all interested in this great problem of modern times.

The main thesis of the book is that the approach of the West is traditionally theoretical or inferential, whereas that of the East is aesthetic or empirical. Thus, the West has discovered what he calls the theoretic component of things and the East the aesthetic component of things. Accordingly, they have different philosophical conceptions regarding man and nature and all their ideological differences and conflicts are due to this basic philosophical difference. To quote his own words, "The Oriental portion of the world has concentrated its attention upon the nature of all things in their emotional and aesthetic, purely empirical and positivistic immediacy. It has tended to take as the sum-total of the nature of things that totality of immediately apprehended fact which in this text has been termed the differentiated aesthetic continuum. Whereas the traditional West began with this continuum and still returns to local portions of it to confirm its syntactically formulated, postulationaly prescribed theories of structures and objects, of which the items of the complex aesthetic continuum are mere correlates or signs, the East tends to concentrate its attention upon the differentiated aesthetic continuum in and for itself for its own sake."¹ He says again, "The Orient, for the most part, has investigated things in their aesthetic component; the Occident has investigated these things in their aesthetic component."²

1. *The Meeting of East and West*, p. 375.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 376.

From these remarks of the Professor it appears that the East is mostly tied down to the empirical world and as such is purely positivistic, whereas the West leaves the empirical world, formulates idealistic theories from a distance as it were, and returns to experience only for verifying those hypothetically formulated, apriori theories. If we may be permitted to use psychological terminology the East accordingly is extroverted and the West introverted. But such an evaluation of the East and the West does not appear to be consistent with what is ordinarily believed by a large majority of thinkers. Ordinary belief is that it is the Easterners who are veritable dreamers, idealists and non-positivists, and it is the Westerners who are realists because they are mostly in touch with facts and unconcerned with the framing of idle hypotheses.

Any way, the Professor has chosen to speak in an opposite vein and my object in this paper is to examine the justifiability of his new contention. But before I actually begin my enquiry I would like to draw your attention to the following points. My purpose in this enquiry is not to support the general belief that the Easterners are really dreamers, but, instead, my purpose is only to examine the tenability of the Professor's view that the Easterners are mere positivists and are not much interested in any thing non-empirical. The second point is that Prof. Northrop has spoken of the entire Orient, and as such he has examined the philosophy not only of India but also of China and Japan. I, on my part, shall speak only of India because it is beyond my competence to speak of China and Japan. The third point is that as Prof. Northrop has mostly cited Dr. Das Gupta's views in support of his theory, I shall also refer to Dr. Das Gupta's statements in support of my conclusions wherever necessary.

Prof. Northrop in his account of Indian philosophy has pointed out the following. That India in its attempt to understand the basic nature of man and universe has mostly used the aesthetic or empirical method and not the theoretical or logical method. Says the Professor, "The first thing which the Hindu continuously emphasises and impresses upon any one who would understand the basic philosophical and religious insight of India is that it refers to some thing which must be immediately experienced to be known, and which cannot be attained by the logical methods of Western science, philosophy, and theology or described in any determinate way."³ Although he admits that "the Orientals, both

3. Ibid., p. 363.

Hindus and Buddhists,.....have developed so many logically formulated systems",⁴ these systems, for the most part, tend, according to him, to refer to immediately apprehended factors. Says he, "Consequently, for the Easterner, even when he develops logically formulated systems containing most subtle distinctions and technical concepts, his aim tends to be to direct the reader..... towards the indeterminable, indiscribable, ineffable and immediately apprehendable aesthetic factor, which neither logical methods nor philosophical or scientific theory can convey."⁵

These remarks also imply that the Indians do not generally believe in any theoretically known ultimate reality. On the contrary, they believe in the ultimacy of an aesthetic continuum which is apprehended in immediate experience. To quote Professor's own words, "In the Western sense of the term (metaphysic), these Easterners are not metaphysical at all; instead they are the most extreme positivists, since they insist that no reality exists except that which is immediately apprehended."⁶

This, in brief, is his general description of Indian philosophy. But with respect to Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, he has gone into some detail. What he has said specifically with regard to these systems is that Nirvana of Buddhism and Brahman of Advaita Vedanta are the same as undifferentiated aesthetic continuum and as such they are known aesthetically in immediate apprehension. He says, "In short, Brahman in Hinduism is the same immediately apprehended, undifferentiated aesthetic continuum which was found to be Tao in Taoism, jen (human-heartedness) in Confucianism and Nirvana in Buddhism."⁷ Two points need clarification here, namely, what is the meaning of this Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum and what is the nature of immediate apprehension in which that continuum is known? Let us examine them.

Our ordinary experience of ourselves and of the outside world is an experience of determinate specific cognitions on the mind side and determinate, specific sensations on the nature side. The objects of these determinate cognitions and sensations form what the Professor calls the differentiated continuum and this differentiated continuum is aesthetic because it is apprehended directly

4. Ibid., pp. 363-364.

5. Ibid., p. 364.

6. Ibid., p. 366.

7. Ibid., p. 367.

in internal introspections and external sensations. But this differentiated aesthetic continuum is not basic or primary. Back of this there is a field factor which the Professor calls the Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum because in it all differentiations on either side are wiped out. These differentiations can be removed by an experiment like the Yoga. Says the Professor ".....it may be possible, by some experimental technique, to eliminate the Maya-Shakta differentiations from the complex aesthetic continuum, so that only the emotionally moving, aesthetically ineffable, indeterminate field factor remained..... It is precisely this which the Oriental method known as Yoga attempts to achieve."⁸ He says further, "We can by certain specific methods attempt actually to remove the sensed or imagined differentiations from the otherwise completely indeterminate undifferentiated aesthetic manifold.....It is precisely this experimentation which the retreats of the Buddhists and the method of Yoga attempt to put in actual practice."⁹

Let us now try to understand the meaning of immediate apprehension in which the Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is known. The immediate apprehension even at the final stage is partly introspective and partly sensuous, introspective with reference to the field factor of mind and sensuous with reference to the field factor of nature. Says the Professor, "....the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is in the immediately apprehended natural object in its empirically given aesthetic character as much as it is, in the mind."¹⁰ This partly introspective and partly sensuous character of the immediate apprehension becomes all the more clear from the following words of the Professor which explain the true significance of the figure of the Buddha sitting in quiet contemplation with his eyes half open and half closed. His words are, "The Buddha sits in quiet contemplation, his eyes half open, half closed; half open to give the cosmic naturalistic component of the all-embracing aesthetic continuum; half closed to keep the differentiations in it from being clearly and determinately sensed and also to give the so called subjective or introspected portion of this continuum; but with eyes nonetheless half open so that the images even in the introspected portion of the continuum will also be indeterminate, indefinite and unclear. Thus immersed in the all-embracing aesthetic continuum, with all

8. Ibid., pp. 368-369.

9. Ibid., p. 342.

10. Ibid., p. 368.

its emotionally moving, ineffable content, one gets its ineffable immediate unity in the very midst of its transitory, determinate differentiations. Thereby the common denominator running through the distinction between the subjective and the objective is found; and the one-ness of the aesthetic field portion of the real self with the field portion of all other things is achieved."¹¹

Thus three points become clear from the Professor's account of Indian philosophy. (1) The Indians have not generally used the logical method in understanding the ultimate nature of man and universe. (2) They all ultimately believe in the primacy of the Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum and do not believe in any theoretically posited reality or realities. (3) Nirvana of Buddhism and Brahman of Advaita Vedanta can be identified with the Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum and as such they are immediately apprehended partly introspectively and partly sensuously. Let us take up these three points one by one for examination.

With the exception of Carvaka philosophy alone, all the systems of Indian philosophy have recognized inference as a valid method of knowing ultimate truth. Students of Indian philosophy very well know how according to Jainism there is beside the empirical and testimonial, an inferential way of knowing things which is called *anumana* or *parokṣa*. It is through this method alone that Jaina philosophy posits the existence of space (*akasa*), time (*kala*), the principle of motion (*dharma*) and the principle of rest (*adharma*). One fails to understand how the ever unobservable transcendent space (*alokakāṣa*), the unseen principle of motion (*dharma*) and the unseen principle of rest (*adharma*) can be arrived at otherwise than theoretically or inferentially. If the unseen electrons, or electromagnetic propagations can be regarded by Northrop as hypotheses, it is difficult to understand why *dharma*, *adharma* etc. cannot be similarly regarded?

Coming to Nyaya philosophy we find that it has made its greatest contribution in the field of inference itself. Says Dr. Das Gupta, "Inference is the second means of proof and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made on this subject."¹² The science and art of Logic were so much developed in Nyaya that it gave rise to such finer distinctions of argumentative device as *jalpa*, *vada*, *vitanda*, *tarka*, *jati*, *chala*, etc. In support of the

11. Ibid., p. 351.

12. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 343.

fact that Nyaya is not always confined to bare empirical evidences, we may refer to the inference of Samanyato drsta type in which conclusion is not drawn from any empirical data. To specify the theoretical approach of Nyaya we may point out that it establishes the existence of God and many other entities on logical grounds. Says Dr. Das Gupta, "Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Isvara on the basis of inference.....of the Samanyatodrsta type".¹³ Further, how can the adrsta which, as the very name suggests, is unseen be regarded as empirically known? Even the soul itself according to some old Naiyayikas¹⁴ is a hypothesis.

In Vaisesika we find that the existence of atoms has been established by a long chain of inferential arguments. Similarly akasa, dik, kala, mana and Isvara are all imperceptible entities whose existence is inferentially established. Again, particularity or viśeṣa which inheres in imperceptible eternal entities is posited theoretically.

In Samkhya again we find that prakṛti or the primordial matter cannot be experienced in its Samyavastha or unevolved state and it is for this reason that it has been called avyakta. Says Dr. Das Gupta, ".....it is hypothetically the mother of all things."¹⁵ Also the constituents of prakṛti, namely sattva, rajas and tamas can never be known in experience, but no body can deny their existence on that account; for the entire universe is an outcome of the interplay between them alone. Amongst the evolutes of prakṛti, except the four gross elements, everything else, namely buddhi, ahankara, manas, the five sense organs, the five motor organs, the five subtle essences of tanmatras, is suprasensible (sukṣma). Purusas which are drastas or pure subjects are not only not known by sense experience but cannot even be grasped as objects of thought. So if there is any way to posit their existence that is the inferential way. Says Dr. Das Gupta, "This principle of chit cannot separately be perceived per se, but the presence of this principle in all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference."¹⁶

What is true of Samkhya is to a great extent true of Yoga also because they are mostly in agreement with respect to both epistemology and metaphysics. The most important difference

13. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 363.

14. Nyaya-Bhasya, 1. 1. 9-10.

15. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 245.

16. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 240.

between the two is with relation to God. Whereas Samkhya is atheistic, Yoga is theistic. To get the knowledge of God Yoga first takes the help of the logical method, and only later it verifies it in intuitive experience. Thus the Yoga procedure is identical with the Western procedure of first postulating and then verifying in experience. They would, however, differ only in this that whereas the West verifies mostly in sense-experience, the Yoga does it in intuitive experience. To confirm that the Yoga argues theoretically for positing the idea of God, the following words of Dr. Das Gupta may be quoted, "Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent prakṛti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe, how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best service to the purusas, how can it remove its own barriers and lend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prakṛti equilibrium? How can this blind tendency so regulate the evolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones? There must be some intelligent being who should help the course of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony may be attained. This Being is Isvara."¹⁷ Does it not show that the Yoga posits God as an explanatory hypothesis on theoretical grounds?

Coming to Mimamsa we find that it so much utilized the method of postulation that it sanctified it as a separate and full-fledged pramana or source of knowledge. With the help of this method Mimamsa not only believes in sources of knowledge other than perception, but it also believes that knowledge received through such sources and particularly from the Vedas is valid in itself. Such knowledge, being valid in itself, does not need any verification in experience. This is indeed going a step farther than the West. For whereas the West has to verify its inference or postulations in experience and change them if need be, Mimamsa would not come down to experience even for verifying its knowledge. Says Dr. Das Gupta, "Truth according to them (Kumarila and Prabhakara—the mimamsakas) is determined a priori, while error is determined by experience."¹⁸

With respect to Buddhism the Professor himself admits that the Buddhist philosophers were being guided by a genuine intellectual curiosity and by a definite, logical method. Says he, "Neverthe-

17. Ibid., p. 259.

18. Ibid., p. 209 (foot-note).

less, they are exceedingly technical, involving the theoretical distinctions and complications typical to Western philosophy. . . . This has led many Western and Oriental scholars to conclude that Buddhist philosophy is like Western philosophy in its use of syntactically designated, logically formulated concepts by postulation."¹⁹

With regard to Advaita Vedanta also we cannot say that it has in any way ignored the logical method. Not only the logical method has been utilized in full by Sankar in order to support his conclusions, but the same has to be used by every one who aspires to realize Brahman.

For, to realize Brahman every one has to undergo a strenuous process of critical reasoning which is called in Vedanta 'manana'. Says Dr. Das Gupta, "A man should try to understand correctly the true purport of the Upanisads (called Sravana), and by arguments in favour of the purport of the Upanisads to strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upanisads (called manana), and then by nididhyasan (meditation) which includes all the Yoga processes of concentration try to realize the truth as one."²⁰

Let us now come to the second point of the enquiry that all the systems of Indian philosophy ultimately deny the existence of any reality other than the aesthetic continuum. I shall show here that most of the systems believe in a number of ultimate realities which being known theoretically or inferentially do not, and in fact cannot, form any aesthetic continuum whether differentiated or undifferentiated. What the Professor ascribes to Indian philosophy is true to a certain extent of only the Carvaka philosophy because this philosophy alone is purely positivistic. But even this philosophy does not believe in any undifferentiated continuum but rather in a plurality of ultimate perceptible reals. Any way, the importance of this school in Indian philosophy can be judged from the words of the Professor himself. He says with respect to this philosophy, "It has had very little effect upon either traditional or present Indian institutions."²¹

All other systems we have seen use the inferential method and I shall state below the names of the ultimate realities which they have discovered with the help of this method. The Jaina philosophy believes in souls, time, space, dharma, adharma and material atoms. Each of them is an ultimate real underivable from any

19. The Meeting of East and West, p. 347.

20. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 490.

21. The Meeting of East and West, p. 362.

other. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy believes in God, souls, mind, time, space, substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, inherence and negation. These are all ultimate and eternal. God, here, should not be taken as an ultimate ground of all existence but it is merely an efficient cause. The Samkhya-Yoga also believes in a plurality of souls and primordial matter. It is true that Yoga believes in God also, but the God of Yoga is only one of the many spiritual substances which initiates and regulates the evolution of prakrti. It does not create the purusas or prakrti. They are eternal themselves. In Mimamsa again we find that it believes in souls, atoms and adrsta sakti as ultimate existences. How in face of these facts can it be said that all systems of Indian philosophy ultimately point towards an Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum?

Prof. Northrop would, however, be right in thinking that most of the aforesaid pluralistic systems of India generally admit the possibility of the direct realization through Yoga what is theoretically established by reasoning. But the most important fact to bear in mind is that these pluralists firmly hold that by such realization the many realities are known clearly and distinctly. For example, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika what appears as one continuous mass of matter will be revealed as nothing but a cluster of numberless distinct atoms, if it is grasped directly by Yogic intuition. So none of these pluralists can admit the possibility of the intuition of an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

But what about Buddhism and Vedanta? Would these systems support the Professor's conclusions? And this brings us to the last point of our enquiry. Let us take up Buddhism first. We have seen already how the Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum with which Nirvana of Buddhism has been identified by the Professor is a positive remainder which results after all differentiations from both mind and nature have been eliminated. We have also seen how according to him the immediate apprehension of this remainder is introspective and sensuous side by side. Now, can Nirvana be regarded as a positive remainder? Be it noted here that the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, according to the Professor himself, "appears in its purity in the final product of the dialectic of negation, the nihilistic Mahayanistic Buddhism of Nagarjuna."²² But what does the nihilistic school of Nagarjuna mean by Nirvana? Does it really mean that Nirvana is a positive remainder? Can the

22. Ibid., p. 350.

Sunya, being completely indescribable, be regarded either as positive, or as negative? Says Dr. Das Gupta explaining the Sunyavada of the nihilists, "The appearances of the phenomena are communicated as being in a state of change and process coming one after another, but beyond that no essence, no existence, or truth can be affirmed of them. . . . Nirvana is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow. It cannot therefore, be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena."²³ It may be argued here that even though it is nothing positive, it is not negative either. But this cannot be a ground for regarding it as a positive remainder. It has been clearly and emphatically stated by this school that Sunya is only another name for that which is indescribable either as existent, or as non-existent or as both or as neither (*Chatuskoti vinirmuktam sunyam*).

Chandrakirti therefore says that "with Sunyavadins the truth is absolute silence."²⁴ Thus it is difficult to identify the indescribable Sunya with the Undifferentiated aesthetic continuum as Prof. Northrop has done. And for this reason such a Buddhist can neither be called a positivist nor an existentialist.

With regard to the question of its knowledge, it is difficult to accept the Professor's view that it is known in aesthetic experience. This aesthetic experience has already been seen to be introspective and sensuous even at the ultimate stage. Can such sensuous aesthetic experience be possible of Sunya? To quote Dr. Das Gupta's words, "In this state there is nothing which is known and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found."²⁵

Let us finally come to Vedanta where we need not examine all its different schools but only the Advaita school of Sankara. For, according to the Professor himself, it is this school of Vedanta which truly represents the spirit of Hindu culture. Says he, "the Vedanta. . . . especially as commented upon by Sankara. . . . largely defines and determines the culture of most of the Hindu portions of traditional India."²⁶ What we have to decide in connection with Advaita Vedanta is this. Is Brahman immediately apprehended in aesthetic experience? Our answer to this question will be in the negative. The Professor, however, answers it in the

affirmative, because he has identified the Brahman with the Undifferentiated aesthetic manifold which is there in the mind and nature as an objective fact. This means that the immediate apprehension as understood by the Professor is an apprehension of an object, although that object is completely undifferentiated. But according to Advaita Vedanta when Brahman is realized there is no immediate apprehension of any object, but instead there is an objectless self-enjoyment. It will not be out of place here to mention that immediate apprehension can be of three types—(1) immediate apprehension of external objects by sense-experience, (2) immediate apprehension of mental states by introspection, and (3) an immediate apprehension which is objectless self-enjoyment. It becomes possible for the Professor to regard the immediate apprehension of Brahman as a kind of aesthetic experience, because he takes immediate apprehension in the first two senses in which it is not objectless, but is of an object. But can Advaita Vedanta accept that Brahman is apprehended immediately in sense experience when the entire world of sense-experience is negated by it? Can it also accept that Brahman is immediately apprehended in introspection, when by introspection the Professor means an introspection of a field-factor in the mind? By an acceptance like this there will be no escape from the duality between the knower and the known so emphatically denied by Advaitins. What in fact the Advaita Vedanta accepts and emphasises is that Brahma-knowledge or Brahma-jnana is objectless, because Brahman is pure consciousness or pure self-shining intelligence. Says Dr. Das Gupta, "Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when this knowledge dawns, even the state of knowledge which at first reflects it is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its own true light The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as illusory nothing."²⁷

23. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 142.

24. Ibid., p. 140.

25. Ibid., p. 142.

26. The Meeting of East and West, p. 362.

27. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 491.

A Study of some Defence Mechanisms in Indian Thought

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The present day psychologists of the West seem to be inclined to think that there has been no psychological study worth the name in India, because they find that our study of the human mind has not been experimental in the sense in which the experimentalists of the West take it. But if one cares to go through some of the portions of the vast literature of India he will be convinced of the absurdity of such a notion. Being unable to appreciate the valuable contribution of Indian psychology and its genuine approach to the problems of human behaviour, some of the experimental psychologists dismiss the whole system as a philosophical treatise and mystical literature. There have existed several profound psychological doctrines in India as early as 1000 B.C., and we find applied psychology in the Upanishads, Bhagwat Gita and other systems of philosophy. It is not possible for me in a short paper like this to deal with the psychological theories propounded from time to time by the Indian scholars and to show their application in the fields of Art, Literature and Science; but my chief endeavour in this paper is to show how the concept of the Unconscious has been developed in Indian thought, and to indicate some instances in the literature of different ages where the ideas of the Unconscious have manifested themselves in the forms of various defence mechanisms.

The study of the Unconscious mind started by Charcot and Janet, and developed to its completion by Sigmund Freud and his followers, has shown fully well that the conscious stage of mind and human behaviour depend greatly upon something which is unknown to him. The behaviour of a man cannot be determined without a thorough understanding of his unconscious state of mind which is known in Indian philosophy as the repository of Saṁskāras. The Indian Psychologists recognise four states of Consciousness —1. Walking (Jāgrata), 2. Dreaming (Swapna), 3. Sleeping (Sūṣupti), and 4. the Super-conscious (Turīa). They study the

Unconscious or the Sub-conscious, the abode of past experiences (Samskāras), not separately and individually, but in the process of development of the super-conscious, because they believe that the end of our study is to strengthen the mind as a whole and to attain a well-integrated personality.

On the vast exhibition ground of the Conscious mind there frequently arise certain emotions and impulses which our conscious mind thinks unpleasant and un-worthy of social recognition, and hence endeavours to drive them out of its domain. But these undesirable ideas are not destroyed; they take refuge in the unconscious realm, and are always in search of an opportunity to find some outlet to express themselves. Sometimes when there are conflicting emotions in the Unconscious, or a certain emotion is very strong and the repression is equally strong, there arise nerve disorders and functional diseases. There are certain methods called mechanisms of defence by which the Id Impulses or the unfulfilled repressed desires find their manifestation. One of the most important of these is Sublimation which is a conscious effort to substitute one emotion for another. It enjoys the best form of social and moral applause over other mechanisms like identification, projection etc., because in this way an undesirable emotion is diverted from its natural course, and the libido is directed in some socially useful channel. The psychologists of ancient India had already anticipated the Psycho-analytic theory of repression, and held that all sorts of complexes and neurotic conditions had the repressed impulses as their root-cause; and they very confidently prescribed sublimation of this energy as the most effective and advantageous form of outlet. The only difference between the method of psycho-analysis and the Indian method seems to be that the psycho-analysts hold that the mere Catharsis or the purging out of the conflicting idea is enough to secure normality, but the Indian Psychologists put great emphasis on religious discipline and developing the whole personality not only to normal but to even better state.

From the very dawn of Indian civilization, i.e., from the time of Vedic hymns, which has been called the pre-sexual stage of humanity by C. C. Jung, we find the expression and the transference of the libido in a very clear form. As Jung already tried to show, quoting from the Vedas and the Upanishads, the Sun God and fire represent the libido or the reproductive energy of man. There are to be found frequent passages in the Brihadaranyaka and Aitraya Upanishads where the fire is said to be created by rubbing the

hands (by the *Adi-pursh*) before his mouth. Passages like this lead Mr. Jung safely to conclude that "the sexual act was pushed out of its proper zone and was transferred to its analogous mouth zone,—the mouth receiving the significance of the female genitals and fingers of the hand receiving phallic meaning."

"Truly I am myself the creation for I have created the whole world; therefore he rubbed his hands held before his mouth so that he brought forth fire from his mouth, as from the mother womb and from his hand." Br. Up. 1. 4. 1. It seems that as there was resistance against real sexuality, the accumulated libido was adapted and transferred to such expressions and acts in order to compensate itself in the nearest possible way.

Again, in the epic (Paurāṇic) literature, almost all the mythological stories may be found representing some sort of inhibited emotions of the unconscious mind, which have been repressed due to their undesirability and have manifested in some sublimated form. The Oedipus complex is obvious in all the myths of creation in the Purāṇās. For instance there is a myth in *Devi-Bhagwat Puran*. Mahashakti, having created Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, expresses her desire to marry them, and thus the creation starts with the union of the son and the mother. In the well-known mystic literature of Kabir also there is an allusion to Nirāṅjan born of the deity Māyā entering into wedlock with his originator deity herself. Frequent manifestations of Electra complex and Castration complex may also be easily traced in such myths of epic literature. The instance of Brahma creating Saraswati and falling in love with her due to her unparalleled beauty and ultimately marrying her is a clear case of electra complex. *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad* describes creation in the following lines: "In truth Atman was as large as a woman and a man when they embrace each other. His own self he divided into two parts out of which husband and wife were formed. With her he copulated and from this humanity sprang. She however pondered: how may he unite with me when he himself has created me! Now I shall hide. Then she became a cow, he however became a bull and mated with her, and so on. From this sprang that horned cattle, and in this way he created all that mates." As evidence for the castration complex, we find frequent stories in the *Mahabharat*. For example the episode of Shikhandini and Bhishm-pitamah is a clear manifestation of the penis envy and castration complex. Again, the instance of Arjuna and Brihannalla shows an obvious expression of this complex.

