


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VOL. 78, No. 10

THE THEOSOPHIST

Edited by N. SRI RAM

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THE THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY was formed at New York, November 17, 1875, and incorporated at Madras, April 3, 1905. Its three declared Objects are:

FIRST.—To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or color.

SECOND.—To encourage the study of Comparative Religion, Philosophy and Science.

THIRD.—To investigate unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.

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Since Universal Brotherhood and the Wisdom are undefined and unlimited, and since there is complete freedom for each and every member of the Society in thought and action, the Society seeks never to maintain its own distinctive and unique character by remaining free of affiliation or identification with any other organization.



THE THEOSOPHIST ON THE WATCH-TOWER

The Theosophical Society is responsible only for its Official Notices appearing in "The Supplement".

THE laying of the foundation-stone for the buildings to be erected at Tiruvanmiyur for the use of the three institutions, the Besant Theosophical School, Kalakshetra and the Arundale Teachers' Training Centre, on June 4 by Srimati Rukmini Devi marks an important step for these institutions which have hitherto been carrying on their work on the Society's estate. When the buildings are ready, these institutions will be housed properly on their own land, measuring some eighty acres, and adjoining the beach not far to the south of Olcott Gardens in the Society's estate. They will together constitute an educational centre, which has been named the Besant Cultural Centre. I quote Srimati Rukmini Devi's words of dedication preceding the laying of the stone (actually nine bricks laid together so as to form the head of a corner):

Although the Centre is new, its work, as you all know, was begun in 1934, as a result of the wish of Dr. Besant, by starting the Besant Theosophical School, which we began in a very small way. From that has grown other activities and work, and many great people have been associated in this work. The founder is the one who gave the inspiration—Dr. Besant—and the one who carried out that inspiration was Dr. Arundale; all of us have been the handmaidens to carry on this work.

Now we will be transferring the work here, I hope, within a short time, perhaps a year or perhaps three years, but we are beginning here today with the laying of a foundation-stone for a new building for the School, because we want to begin with the child, who is the heart of the whole work. . . . However far we may be from the final achievement, in spirit we carry on with the same ideals, and are equally dedicated to the service of our country, to the service of the world, and in the name of the great Teachers of humanity.

I pray that Their Blessing may fully be upon this activity, so that every child, every animal, the poor person, the teacher and the taught, everyone, will be happy and will learn to be of service to the whole world. This is my prayer, and because of that I dedicate this Centre, and with these words: In homage and adoration to the Teacher of Teachers and for the service of our Motherland, I humbly offer and dedicate this Centre.

The ceremony was mainly religious but I was asked to say a few words. What I had to say on the occasion might be of interest to many of our members and was as follows:

I have very great pleasure in being associated with this function. It is the commencement of a big enterprise which I hope will prosper and develop. Although the building to be erected on this foundation is for the Besant Theosophical School, it is intended to be part of a big educational scheme, education including the arts. The arts cannot be separated from real education, nor science; and neither from life; for all life, when rightly lived, becomes an art at every turn, an unconscious art, and at the same time it displays laws, the study of which is Science.

Education is but the fostering of growth, at a time when growth at all levels is fast and decisive but needs guidance. Education is not separate from life, because it is co-operation with life's processes by an external intelligence, that of the parents and teacher, which supplies the lessons of experience, while yet these processes are delicate and tentative, and have not developed the means for wise self-direction.

Dr. Annie Besant was the pioneer of National education in India. She started the work at Banaras, holy Kashi, and was assisted in it by Dr. George S. Arundale. Her work has spread all over India—her ideas even more than the concrete organization. It is these ideas which it has been the endeavor of the Besant Theosophical School, during its existence of twenty-three years on the Theosophical estate, to express in some measure. It is not easy, whether for an individual or for an institution, to realize its ideals. It is more difficult for an institution than for an individual, because the institution is not as plastic as the individual mind and heart can be. It takes time, patience and the harmonization of individual wills.

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
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THE

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[July 1951

On the Denial of the Law of Excluded Middle *

BY

C. T. K. CHARI

The Law of Excluded Middle or *tertium non datur* is one of those venerable principles of thought that have come down to us from Aristotle. The text-book treatment of the law admits of two interpretations. The law can be applied to the meaning of terms and also to the consistency of propositions. Aristotle included it in the domain of 'First Philosophy'. Along with the Principles of Identity and Contradiction, he regarded it as a basal ontological law, a definition of 'what is', a minimum condition of its 'being'.¹ What I propose to ask here is whether the unrestricted validity of the law can be denied on ontological as well as epistemological grounds.

I

Some denials of the *tertium non datur* are based on mere confusion and do not call for discussion here. It is usual to point out that the law does not apply to contraries (white or black) and meaningless objects (virtuous or non-virtuous triangles).² The

* This paper is based on an Address delivered at the Inter-Collegiate Philosophical Conference conducted under the chairmanship of Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan at Tambaram during November 1950.

1. *Metaphysica* (Tr. by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1908), 1006a, 1007a, b, 1011a, 1012a. Cf. H. H. Joachim, *Logical Studies* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 21 ff.

2. M. R. Cohen and E. Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (Routledge, London, 1934), pp. 184-5.

significance of the law is plain in proportion as terms are exactly defined. When speaking of *degrees* of a quality, we must specify some *definite* degree before the law can be legitimately applied. Imperfect understanding of divisions in nature (plant or animal) may render the application of the law extraordinarily difficult, but mere ignorance furnishes no grounds for denying its fundamental validity. Inability to draw a line simply means that we do not have proper logical contradictories between which we must choose.³

The Idealistic criticism and rehabilitation of the *tertium non datur* are based on a subtle dialectic. "The Maxim of Excluded Middle", Hegel wrote, "is the maxim of the definite understanding, which would fain avoid contradiction, but in doing so falls into it. A must be either + A or - A it says."⁴ "Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'Either-OR' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself."⁵ The Law of Excluded Middle, taken abstractly, is a tautologous statement to the effect that two different predicates cannot claim the same predicative position. Hegel and his followers insist that a subject can expand and remain identical with itself only if it is an identity in difference. Even at the empirical level, the subject extends in space or time to accept otherwise incompatible predicates which are more or less on the same level. In the dialectical triad, there is no real violation of the Law of Excluded Middle, because "the opposites are not on the same level. The antithesis is not the negation of the thesis; it is the negated thesis."⁶ "Nothing less than explicit synthesis of opposites differentiated out of immediacy can express the activity of dialectical reason."⁷ The disjunctive judgment by its very form reveals that judgment is implicit inference. Bosanquet,⁸ with a profounder insight into

Hegelian dialectic than Bradley, interprets the *tertium non datur* at three levels. As a tautology, it prescribes the formal *schema* of negation; as a Law of Thought, it gives us the principle of significant negation; as a Law of Reality, it affirms a Self-determining Whole of reciprocally determinate parts, i.e., differentials mutually determining one another in a system. It is amusing to find that writers like Edmond Holmes,⁹ who repudiate all "Logical Metaphysics", accept the Hegelian principle that "opposites are bound to co-operate even while they appear to oppose each other". It is certainly no refutation of Hegel to say that "the growing plant is ever transcending itself, ever losing its identity, ever finding it."¹⁰ The principle of growth is characteristically Hegelian. The Idealistic Doctrine of "Degrees of Truth" does not run counter to the *tertium non datur* when the law is profoundly interpreted; it is the bare identification of differentials that is forbidden by the law.¹¹ In the judgment "The horse is either a mammal or not", the work of thought is to invest the "not" with a positive significance in an ever-widening coherent system of implications.

II

Hegel regarded the supreme office of mathematics as the reduction of differences to the identity with which the understanding busies itself.¹² The modern denials of the unrestricted validity of the Law of Excluded Middle are based, curiously enough, on technical considerations suggested by mathematics and physics. On a "formalistic" interpretation, mathematics operates with symbols which have no content, i.e., which do not refer to anything in particular. Axioms are certain combinations of symbols with which we start. All propositions which can be derived from axioms according to prescribed rules are demonstrable propositions. The entire structure raised is analogous to a language or system of signs. The significant combinations of symbols are determined with reference to the meaning of symbols on a particular interpretation. The rules prescribing these significant com-

3. L. S. Stebbing, *Modern Elementary Logic* (Methuen, 1943), Ch. VIII, pp. 148 *et. seq.*

4. *The Logic of Hegel* (Eng. Tr. by W. Wallace, Oxford, 1892), § 119, p. 220.

5. *Ibid.*, § 119, Note 2, p. 223.

6. G. R. G. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel* (Oxford, 1940), Ch. XII, pp. 140-1.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 130. Cf. Bernard Muscio, "The Hegelian Dialectic" in *Mind*, 1914, pp. 522 ff.; F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford, 1914), VII and VIII; C. A. Campbell, *Scepticism and Construction* (George Allen & Unwin, 1930), Ch. I, § 2; Aristotle's Treatment of the Laws of Thought, according to Joachim (*op. cit.*, p. 151, p. 282) presupposes the reality of Being-such.

8. *Logic*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1911), Vol. II, pp. 213-15.

9. *Philosophy without Metaphysics* (George Allen & Unwin, 1930), Ch. 1, p. 30, footnote.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

11. B. Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (George Allen & Unwin, 1948), Vol. 2, Ch. XXVII, 19, pp. 328-9.

12. Hegel, *op. cit.*, § 117, pp. 217-8; also § 99, Note.

binations play a role analogous to that of rules of syntax in a language. If the term mathematics (or language) is restricted to the formal derivation of propositions from axioms, considerations turning on the meaning of symbols pertain to metamathematics (or metalanguage).

The consistency, the independence and the completeness of the axioms of a deductive system determine uniquely its structural properties. A set of axioms is *consistent* if a proposition and its contradictory cannot be derived from it. Suppose the set is inconsistent, then since p and non- p both imply q , any proposition is demonstrable. Conversely, the existence of a single refutable proposition would be a proof of the consistency of a system. A set of axioms is *independent* if none of the axioms can be deduced from the others; and the set is *complete* if every proposition, in the language supplied by the axioms, is in principle either demonstrable or refutable. Professor A. P. Ushenko¹³ has stated the relation between completeness and consistency thus: "Completeness insures that at least one, consistency that at most one, of two contradictory formulae is a theorem." The calculus of propositions is an example of an axiomatic system and the existence of refutable propositions in it is established by the "method of truth-values."

As early as 1913, L. E. J. Brouwer¹⁴ denied that the classification of all mathematical propositions into "true" and "false" is either cogent or necessary. In opposition to the standpoint of *Principia Mathematica* that mathematics is a branch of logic, he maintained that logic has its foundations in mathematics. Aristotelian logic with its *tertium non datur* originated by abstraction from the mathematics of finite classes and was erroneously generalized. "The laws of logic," Brouwer declared, "developed at a time in man's evolution when he had a good language for dealing with finite groups of phenomena. The so-called logical principles, therefore, arose as expressions of the structural inter-relationships of sentences in the language, and later were found to work when applied to the universe, e.g. the law of the excluded middle was originally an hypothesis and when used in grounding such sciences as paleontology, etc., the practical impossibility of finding examples to disagree with the laws, replaced the 'logical impossibility' of the earlier laws of language. The reliability of logical principles,

13. *The Problems of Logic* (George Allen & Unwin, 1941), p. 89.

14. "Intuitionism and Formalism", *Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.*, 20, 1913,

in practice, rests upon the fact that a large part of the universe of experience exhibits far more order and harmony [Treue und Zufriedenheit] in its finite organization than mankind itself."¹⁵

Brouwer maintained that mathematical objects cannot be said to exist if they are merely consistent with mathematical axioms. The truth of a mathematical proposition in general is not equivalent to the falsity of its contradictory. The proposition "There is a prime number of the form $x^4 + 1$ " is in principle neither true nor false until constructions are known for testing it.¹⁶ The possibility of such construction presupposes an intuition or *Anschaung* in a technical sense. The primal intuition of mathematics is expressed in the inference from n to $n + 1$. Brouwer's criterion of "constructibility" amounts to the statement that all general mathematical propositions to be genuine must prescribe methods for verifying them in a finite number of steps. The denial of the *tertium non datur* in the case of infinite aggregates leads to revolutionary changes in the results of classical mathematical analysis and in the notions of real number, limit and the convergence of infinite sequences.¹⁷

David Hilbert, the leader of the "formalist" school of mathematics, sets out to argue against Brouwer that in principle there are no undecidable formulae in mathematics. Hilbert granted that mathematical conclusions are certain only so long as mathematicians confine themselves to finite assertions which can be verified through a finite number of steps. But whereas Brouwer and his adherents rejected all mathematical propositions which could not be established by this method, Hilbert favoured a procedure whereby "transfinite" propositions could be established in a finite manner. For instance, it can be argued that infinitely distant points, straight lines and planes are devised to guarantee the validity of certain axioms of projective geometry. Hilbert maintained that the procedure is justified if the extended system is free from contradiction and leads to the desired result.¹⁸

15. Cited by Max Black in his *The Nature of Mathematics* (Kegan Paul, 1933) pp. 193-4.

16. Max Black, *Ibid.*, p. 200.

17. Heyting, *Intuitionism und Beweistheorie* (Julius Springer, Berlin).

18. Cf. Hilbert and Ackermann, *Grundzüge der Thoretischen Logik* (Julius Springer, Berlin).

The ambitious "formalist programme" drawn up by Hilbert had to be abandoned in 1931 when Kurt Gödel¹⁹ showed that, in any sufficiently rich mathematical system, there are undecidable formulae. The *Entscheidung* problem or "decision-problem", i.e., the problem of determining in a finite number of steps whether a given proposition is demonstrable or refutable, can be solved only for the simpler types of deductive systems, e.g., the calculus of propositional functions of a single variable. No general method can be formulated by which the problem can be solved for more complicated systems. Gödel's remarkable result showed that the "formalist" methods of proving consistency have limits.²⁰ The *Principia Mathematica* and a large class of similar systems are incomplete. As regards mathematics, Gentzen²¹ succeeded in proving that the classical number theory is free from contradiction, but his proof exceeded the scope of the "formalist programme". More recently, R. L. Goodstein²² has investigated the possibility of an axiom-free equational calculus.

The demonstration of the essential incompleteness of most deductive systems led to a new departure in logic. Just as the unsuccessful attempts to prove Euclid's parallel postulate culminated in the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, the demonstration of the impossibility of proof of freedom from contradiction within the framework of classical mathematics led to the construction of non-Aristotelian systems of logic.²³ Emil Post²⁴ in America

19. *Monatshefte für Math. und. Phys.*, 1931; *On Undecidable Propositions* (Princeton, 1934); Max Black, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-8; A. P. Ushenko, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, § 4.

20. "Gödel's theorem", Carnap has recently pointed out (*Formalization of Logic*, The Harvard University Press, 1947, p. xii), "Combines syntactical and semantical concepts; in a more exact formulation it would state a relation between a syntactical and a corresponding semantical system."

21. *Math. Annalen*, 112, 1936.

22. *Proc. Lond. Math. Soc.*, Ser. 2, 48, 1945.

23. The analogy requires to be interpreted carefully. (Cf. E. J. Nelson, *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XLII, No. 165, January, 1933, pp. 30-42). Euclid's parallel postulate occupies a peculiar position in the system in that it can neither be demonstrated nor refuted from the other axioms. Geometricians for a long time supposed that the alternative to the parallel postulate would lead to "absurd" conclusions. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries demonstrated that what is or is not "absurd" is sometimes a matter of opinion which is notoriously subjective and variable. It was established that the alternative to the parallel postulate could be successfully combined with the other axioms of Euclidean geometry. Suppose an accepted axiom or result is A and the proposed hypothesis is p. The *reductio ad absurdum* proof is an attempt to show that not-p, the contradictory of p, leads to non-A which

and Lukasiewicz and Tarski²⁵ in Poland showed that it was possible to devise multi-valued logics which reject the *tertium non datur*. By the method of constructing "truth-tables", it can be established that the *tertium non datur* "p or non-p" applies to elementary propositions and any finite combination of elementary propositions but not to an infinite set of propositions like "Every even number is a sum of two primes". A trichotomous logic can be fashioned in which there are three values "true", "indeterminate" and "false". In such a system, not-not-p differs from p, but not-not-not-p has the same value as p and the *tertium non datur* is replaced by a *quartum non datur* which may be formulated "p or (not-p) or (not-not-p)".

Professor Hans Reichenbach²⁶ has recently made an attempt to show that a three-valued logic finds an interesting and important application in the field of quantum physics. The considerations on which he depends are so forbiddingly technical that I must content myself here with a brief statement. In classical physics, to predict the future of a material particle, we must have an exact knowledge of its position *q* and its momentum *p*. In theory at least we should be able to lay down methods for ascertaining the precise values of *q* and *p*. In quantum physics, we have in principle two uncertainties Δq and Δp associated with the measurements of *q* and *p* respectively. The uncertainties exist on any conceivable physical method of observing *q* and *p*. The product of the mean of the two errors, in the most favourable circumstances, is of the order of Planck's constant,

$$\Delta p \cdot \Delta q \approx h = 6.55 \cdot 10^{-27} \text{ erg} \times \text{second}.$$

contradicts A. That A and not-A cannot both be true rests on the Law of Non-Contradiction. That either p or not-p must be true follows from the Law of Excluded Middle. Rejection of not-p can establish p only when we assume a logical dichotomy. Brouwer and others maintain that in dealing with certain objects (e.g. the infinite aggregates of mathematics) non-contradiction does not imply dichotomy. We evade the technical issue if we try to prove a dichotomy by the *reductio ad absurdum* method. Kant's philosophy, which assumed the *a priori* validity of Euclidean geometry, is a beacon of warning.

24. *Amer. Jn. Math.*, 43, 1921.

25. *Comptes-Rendus des Séances*, etc., Warsaw, 1930, Vol. XXIII, Class iii, pp. 1-21, 51-77.

26. *The Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics* (University of California, 1946); Cf. Reichenbach's essay on "Russell's logic" contributed to *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, edited by P. A. Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago, 1944), pp. 40-47.

Suppose we postulate some refinement of the instrumental techniques for observing the position q whereby the uncertainty Δq is reduced, the uncertainty Δp associated with the momentum p becomes greater. An ideally precise knowledge of the position of an electron ($\Delta q = 0$) is associated with an utter ignorance of its velocity: The relation can be extended to other "conjugate" magnitudes (e.g. energy and time, $\Delta E \cdot \Delta t \neq h$) and is an illustration of the non-commutative algebra applicable to the matrices q, p , etc., $\left(\text{i.e. } pq - qp = \frac{h}{2\pi\sqrt{-1}} \right)$. The "Psi-function" of the New Wave Mechanics can be interpreted as a "probability" which is continuously variable and, therefore, satisfies differential equations.²⁷

Niels Bohr has given a striking expression to the quantum paradoxes by his well-known "Complementarity Principle". If we wish to secure exact location of material particles in space-time, we must sacrifice causal continuity and if we wish to retain causal continuity, we must give up exact space-time location. We have two "complementary" but *mutually exclusive* aspects of the description of the contents of our experience. Numerous attempts²⁸ to question the validity of Bohr's principle have been made, notably by Einstein, but its adequacy in accounting for the empirical data seems now beyond dispute.²⁹ According to Professor Reichenbach, the causal anomalies of quantum physics can be avoided with a *quantum non datur*. Certain statements ascribing spatio-temporal coordinates to electrons are neither "true" nor "false" but carry a third value "indeterminate"; they are excluded from the field of "assertability".

The issues involved are not simply those of physics; they are epistemological as well. C. I. Lewis, arguing for "alternative logics" in his *Mind and the World Order*, pointed out that the *tertium non datur* is nothing but a conventional decision to make a complete dichotomy of the world of experience. Idealistic Logic

27. Cf. F. O. Rice and E. Teller, *The Structure of Matter* (John Wiley, N. Y., 1949), 1.5, pp. 4-5; E. Whittaker, *From Euclid to Eddington* (Cambridge, 1949), Part IV, § 52, § 56.

28. Vide the early attempt by L. Silberstein in his *Causality* (Macmillan, 1933), esp. pp. 123-127.

29. For a popular account, vide L. Rosenfeld's article "Professor Einstein's Dilemma" in *The Listener* (Published by the B. B. C.), 1950, Vol. XLIV. No. 1139, Dec. 28.

embeds the dichotomy in the postulate of a "coherent" or "intelligible" world-order. Professor Reichenbach claims that a conventional dichotomy can be replaced for some purposes by a conventional trichotomy. It is noteworthy that even Bertrand Russell³⁰ grants the technical possibility of a trichotomous logic. To the objection that the metalanguage coordinated to a three-valued logic is dichotomous—"not true" is split up into "indeterminate" and "false"—Reichenbach has replied that it may not always be necessary to use a two-valued metalanguage. In his *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre* he constructed a multi-valued logic applicable within the framework of an infinite series of metalanguages. He thinks that it should in principle be possible to define some method by which each two-valued language on any level is translatable into a multi-valued language. Does not the new logic identify "truth" with "verifiability" in the narrow pragmatic sense? Reichenbach denies this. "Verifiability" as a semantic construction, in his opinion, can include all "valid possibilities". The *undecidable* is not simply the *undecided*.³¹

Students of Indian philosophy would perhaps like to ask whether the classical Jaina *Syādvāda* or the *Saptabhaṅgī*, which introduced "indescribability" into the scheme of predication, was an anticipation of modern multi-valued logic. Jaina logicians, stressing the extreme complexity of the universe and the relativity of knowledge, were led to recognize situations which could not be described in terms of a plain "yes" or "no". In the usual expositions³² of Jaina logic, the "syād" qualifying statements is interpreted as a "perhaps", "may be" or "probability". If this is a fair interpretation of *Syādvāda*, we have an anticipation not of modern trichotomous logic but of the generalization of a two-valued logic adapted to the case of truth admitting of gradations. What Jaina logicians in effect claim is that, for all ordinary purposes, two-valued logic must be replaced by a probability logic.

30. Vide his "Reply to Criticisms" in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, p. 681.

31. Cf. L. S. Stebbing, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-50; C. A. Baylis, "Are some propositions neither true nor false?", *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April, 1936.

32. E.g., S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (1923), Vol. I, pp. 294-304; A. N. Upadhye, *Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume*, Indian Philosophical Congress, pp. 135-6.

III

I hold that the modern denial of the *tertium non datur* cannot be dismissed as mathematical sleight-of-hand; it has unsuspected metaphysical implications. The fault of current European logic is not its too obvious preciousness, its virtuosity, its exhausting busy-bodyness or its overstrained sense of uniqueness. Rather does it lie in the narrow regions of experience to which it confines itself. It operates with "verifiability" at its lowest levels: mathematical constructibility and sensory validation aided by instrumental checks. And so its technical perfection becomes an exquisite box-lid for the soul. I have recently argued³³ that philosophers have no longer any valid excuse for ignoring the implications of non-sensory and extra-sensory experiences. Such experiences, far from being tame extensions of the sensory world, illustrate the collapse of the categories in terms of which the latter world is ordinarily described.

The question that I would propound here is whether "indeterminable" can be admitted in an ontological as well as an epistemological sense. Can the admission be based not on the relativity and imperfection of human knowledge but on the unique insight into the nature of Reality available at the higher levels of experience? I believe that the question is highly pertinent to the Mystical philosophies both of the East and the West. Mysticism has been interpreted by Hegel³⁴ as an Idealism that has not realized its true stature. The reason-world "may be equally styled mystical, — not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of the understanding". If Reality satisfies the fundamental demands of thought, Mysticism can be little more than the reminder that the reach of thought must exceed its grasp.

There are reasons to be dissatisfied with the Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian assessments of Mysticism. The conviction that Self-Consciousness is intrinsic to Reality may be the driving-force of both Idealism and Mysticism, but in characterizing the nature of Ultimate Reality or Spirit, the two fall asunder and, in the attempts at reconciliation, Idealism seems to have made all the concessions. C. A.

33. *The Aryan Path*, October 1950; *Prabuddha Bharata*, November 1950.

34. *Op. Cit.*, § 82, Note, p. 154; Cf. J. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, First Series (Macmillan, 1899), Lectures IV and V; W. E. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy* (Scribner's, N. Y., 1929), Chs. XXX-XXXIII.

Campbell, starting with a Bradleyan epistemology, suggested that the *modus operandi* of thought may be one thing and its ideal of non-contradiction or harmony another. If the former in principle renders impossible the fulfilment of the latter. Ultimate Reality must be Supra-rational. Campbell's conclusion is, of course, the burden of much mystical teaching. But how, it may be asked, can we repudiate logical assertability in the fundamental sense without creating a chasm between mystical intuition and the intellect? The ontological denial of the unrestricted validity of the *tertium non datur* suggests an approach to the problem. Doubts about the metaphysical self-sufficiency of the 'Laws of Thought' have been already voiced. Russian ontologists like N. O. Lossky and S. L. Frank have remarked that all these laws must be superseded in the sphere of Ultimate Reality. "Containing within itself the entire fullness of Reality, the Absolute is not subject to the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, not in the sense that it cancels them, but in the sense that the laws have here no relevance".³⁵ My doubts about the Law of Excluded Middle are far more radical. I venture to suggest that the denial of the unrestricted validity of the law may be necessary when we deal with the ontological status of certain phenomenal categories. The Principle of Non-Contradiction makes a somewhat different claim on us; any denial of it in the phenomenal world would render all denials groundless and consecutive thinking impossible; we cannot set out to discover empirical facts that can refute it.³⁶ Suppose we accept the Principle of Non-Contradiction or Coherence as a regulative ideal of reason and yet deny the unrestricted metaphysical validity of the Law of Excluded Middle. We are then led to the view that

35. Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge* (Macmillan, 1919), p. 280; vide also *The World as an Organic Whole* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 64-66, and *Mystical Intuition*. Cf. Prof. G. R. Malkani's verdict in the recent debate on Sri Aurobindo's alleged refutation of *Māya-Vāda*. "Logic itself may be superseded; for the very distinctions and conflicts on which logic is based are unavailable in the Infinite". *Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume*, Indian Philosophical Congress, p. 115.

36. Prof. Malkani, *op. cit.*; Blanshard, *op. cit.*, pp. 422-3. I am afraid I cannot agree with Dr. Edward Conze ("The Objective Validity of the Principle of Contradiction", *Philosophy*, Vol. X, No. 38, p. 205-18) that mystical dialectic either renders the Principle of Contradiction meaningless or else violates it. Neither conclusion is forced on us if, as he says (*op. cit.*, p. 212), mystical philosophy interprets ordinary experience against the background of mystical experience. I would suggest that the "coincidence of opposites" of Nicholas of Cusa is an *absolute transcendence of opposites*. Surely nothing less than this is implied by Cusanus when he says "Since the absolutely

The Transcendental Method of Kant

BY

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Kant repeatedly stresses the unique character of his method. But he does not give us any clear account of it anywhere. The second of the two principal divisions of the Critique of Pure Reason is indeed entitled "Transcendental Doctrine of Method"; but this does not consider the specific method of the Critique, but merely draws the plan¹ of a complete system of pure reason, i.e. an estimate of the height and strength of a metaphysics of nature² to which the Critique is to be a propaedeutic. Nevertheless, Kant makes, here, some important remarks about the true method of philosophy. For instance, he says, "All dogmatic methods whether borrowed from mathematicians or specially invented, are as such inappropriate".³ In the Analytic too he repeatedly insists that empirical and psychological methods would be of no use for his purpose,⁴ since philosophy is an *a priori* science and what we know here we know with apodeictic certainty or we do not know at all, so that there is in philosophy no room for more or less probable hypothesis.⁵

That the method of Kant must be very unique can be appreciated in a general way if we realize that the problem with which he is concerned is very unique and does not fall within any pure science such as mathematics or formal logic or within any empirical science such as psychology. What precisely is his problem?

The failure of metaphysics to yield conclusions that are acceptable to all competent philosophers raises in Kant's mind the question: Is metaphysics as a science possible at all? Now the propositions of metaphysics are both *a priori* and synthetic,

1. Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 573.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 592.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 616 and p. 620.

i.e., they cannot be justified by experience nor can they be established by any mere analysis of concepts. The question "Is metaphysics as a science possible?", therefore, reduces itself to the question, "Is its claim to make the synthetic *a priori* judgments which it makes capable of being justified?" In order to answer this question, Kant asks himself a more general question, "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?", i.e., What are the conditions, the fulfilment of which would justify the assertion of a synthetic *a priori* judgment? Now Kant points out that mathematics and pure physics also claim to offer synthetic *a priori* judgments and the success of both in reaching universally accepted conclusions establishes the legitimacy of this claim. By reflecting on the nature of these synthetic *a priori* judgments about the truth of which there is no difference of opinion, Kant tries to determine the preconditions of their being both synthetic and *a priori*. Kant takes for granted the general validity of geometry and pure physics and wants to make this validity intelligible by finding the reason why their judgments, although they are synthetic, can be valid *a priori*. This is a task which does not fall within the scope of mathematics and physics. As the geometer and the physicist do their work, the preconditions of the *a priori* validity of their synthetic propositions are automatically fulfilled, so that they need not as geometer and physicist ascertain the reason why their propositions are synthetic and at the same time valid *a priori*. Nor does this task fall within the scope of psychology. For Kant does not here ask how we happen to make such judgments, but only how such judgments are validly asserted. His question pertains to the validity of a particular type of judgments, and not their process of origination and development in the mind. In fact, his problem must be beyond the purview of every empirical science. For although the validating ground of an ordinary synthetic proposition such as "All crows are black" is experience, still no experience can be the ground of the synthetic propositions of mathematics and pure physics, since they are marked by strict necessity and universality which can never be found in judgments based on experience. Nor could the validity of these judgments be explained by deducing them from certain self-evident judgments or fundamental concepts. For, in that case, they could not be synthetic, although they could be valid *a priori*. It may appear that since Kant seeks the validating ground not of this or that particular judgment but of a whole class of judgments, this validating ground must be identical with the laws of thought of formal logic, i.e., the universal rules which all valid judgments must observe. But this would be wrong. For

the formal preconditions of valid thinking must be wider in scope than the validating grounds of synthetic *a priori* judgments. Formal logic is concerned with all judgments, whether synthetic or analytic, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*; while Kant is concerned with the more specific conditions of a particular type of judgments, namely, synthetic *a priori* judgments.⁶

Kant indicates the novelty of his enquiry by calling it transcendental. But what does transcendental mean?

Kant says that transcendental knowledge is knowledge *that* and how certain ideas are applied *a priori* or are possible *a priori*. The word "ideas", here, would, by reference to the context, seem to stand for both certain synthetic judgments and also the intuitions and concepts that enter as elements into the composition of such judgments.⁷ Thus transcendental knowledge is of a reflective type. First, the knowledge that a certain piece of synthetic knowledge, say *k*, or an element of *k*, is *a priori* is transcendental. Secondly, the knowledge of the reason or ground why *k* or an element of it is valid *a priori* is also transcendental. For instance, the Transcendental Aesthetic is transcendental, because it makes us recognise that our intuitions of space and time are *a priori*, and because it shows that the reason why the synthetic judgments of mathematics are valid *a priori* is that space and time are pure intuitions. Similarly Transcendental Logic is transcendental since it makes out that certain elements of human knowledge, namely the categories, are *a priori* concepts which are due to our faculty of understanding and that this is the ground why the synthetic principles of pure physics are valid *a priori*. On the other hand, mathematics and formal logic are *a priori* sciences, but they are not transcendental: only the knowledge that they are *a priori* sciences can be called transcendental.⁸

So the word transcendental primarily refers to a kind of knowledge about the *a priori*. But Kant employs it also in a secondary and then in a tertiary sense. Thus he employs it to denote every *a priori* factor (whether it be intuition or concept) of human knowledge — all ideas which are *a priori* and yet are applicable to objects of experience are called transcendental; i.e., intuitions and concepts which have their origin in pure reason and yet at

6. Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique, pp. 95-97.

7. "Kant's Metaphysic of Experience" by Paton, Vol. I, p. 227, n. 3.

8. Kemp Smith's Commentary to the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 74.

the same time serve to constitute *a priori* knowledge of objects are transcendental. In a tertiary sense, even the processes and faculties to which such intuitions and concepts are due are transcendental. For instance, Kant speaks of the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, and of the transcendental faculties of imagination and understanding.

That Kant extends the meaning of the word transcendental is noted by Prof. Kemp Smith; but he does not offer any justification for this. Mr. Ledger Wood even criticises Kant for confusing ambiguity on a similar ground.⁹ But these extended meanings can be justified by the following considerations. Of course, the term transcendental primarily applies only to a kind of knowledge or theory about *a priori* knowledge. But, for Kant, his own theory about *a priori* knowledge is the only correct one, so that transcendental knowledge would be, for him, just identical with the critical philosophy. As Kemp Smith remarks, "Transcendental knowledge and transcendental philosophy must be taken as coinciding".¹⁰ Now this critical theory, briefly put, is as follows. The ground for synthetic *a priori* judgments is that we have certain *a priori* intuitions and concepts which have their sources in certain original capacities or powers of the mind, and that these pure ideas and original capacities are the necessary preconditions, not only of all synthetic *a priori* knowledge, but also of all human experience. Hence transcendental knowledge can now be defined as the knowledge of the necessary preconditions of human experience.¹¹ In fact, it is on account of this that Kant must have employed the term transcendental as an epithet of his philosophy. Now just as the word "perceptual" or "empirical" is employed to denote both a type of knowledge and also the object of such knowledge, so the word transcendental is employed by Kant both in connection with the knowledge of the conditions of experience, and also in connection with these conditions themselves which are the objects of such knowledge. This explains why Kant speaks not only of transcendental knowledge but also of transcendental intuitions, concepts, processes and faculties.

Kant's problem and his method of attacking it can be called transcendental in a similarly extended sense. Just as the means of perceptual knowledge is called perceptual, so the method of

getting transcendental knowledge can be called transcendental. But by designating a method in terms of the kind of knowledge which it yields, we give no definite and positive information about the specific nature of the method. Perhaps, an examination of the general nature of Kant's actual arguments in favour of his solution to his transcendental problem (namely, How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?) would give us this information. Kant's solution, briefly put, is that synthetic *a priori* knowledge of things is possible only because, and only in so far as, what we know of them in that way is imposed by the nature of our mind.¹² The argument for this position, in a nutshell, is as follows. We possess synthetic *a priori* knowledge of things; now either our ideas must conform to things, or things (as known) must conform to our ideas;¹³ on the first alternative, synthetic *a priori* knowledge is impossible, and on the second alternative, and on it alone, the possibility of such knowledge can be understood; therefore, the fact that we are in possession of synthetic *a priori* knowledge involves that it must be derived from the nature of the mind, and not from the nature of things. That is, the character of the objects that we know, to the extent we know them *a priori*, must be regarded as being determined by the nature of our powers of knowing; and this implies that our *a priori* knowledge is knowledge, not of things as they are in themselves, but of things as they must appear to us.

Now both from the nature of the above argument and also from some of Kant's express statements, it may be thought that his method "conforms in general type to the hypothetical method of the natural sciences."¹⁴ It may be supposed that the conclusion is reached by starting with certain hypotheses other than Kant's own, then showing that these are unable to explain how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible, and finally by showing that Kant's solution and his alone is able to do so. But this characterisation of Kant's method would not square with such contentions of his as the following: "The concern of our Transcendental Aesthetic is that it should not obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but should have that certainty and freedom from doubt which is required of any theory which is to serve as our organon".¹⁵ Of course, occasionally, Kant himself presents

9. Heritage of Kant, p. 12.

10. Kemp Smith's Commentary to the Critique, p. 74.

11. "Kant's Metaphysic of Experience" by Paton, Vol. I, p. 229.

12. Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique, p. 23.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 125; p. 174; p. 22.

14. Kemp Smith's Commentary to the Critique, p. XXXVIII. See also Ledger Wood's article in the Heritage of Kant, p. 35.

15. Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique, p. 85.

his conclusion avowedly as a hypothesis and tries to show that it is superior to other hypotheses in the field in explaining the relevant data. Yet on such occasions, Kant clearly states that he does so only "in order to draw attention to the character of these first attempts at such a change which are always hypothetical" and he promises that he would afterwards prove his conclusions "apodeictically and not hypothetically from the nature of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding".¹⁶ Secondly, although Kant's method looks very similar to that of hypothesis as employed in the empirical sciences, still there are important differences between them. The similarity lies in the fact that both of them attempt to prove a theory by its capacity to explain certain phenomena satisfactorily. But the points of difference are no less remarkable. In the empirical sciences, there is no claim that the alternative hypotheses that have been considered and rejected are exhaustive; nor is there any surety that there are not unobserved phenomena of the same general type which may happen to be observed some day and show some inadequacy in the accepted hypothesis. The justification of a scientific hypothesis always depends upon the observation of data, which by their very nature, are incapable of being observed in their totality and completeness at any time. It is owing to this that a scientific hypothesis never amounts to knowledge, but always remains a hypothesis. But the data which Kant's theory is designed to explain are totally different in nature. Its data are pieces of synthetic knowledge which are valid *a priori*; and it would appear that the ground of explanation for a single synthetic *a priori* knowledge must necessarily be the ground of explanation for any other synthetic *a priori* knowledge.¹⁷ So the discovery of hitherto unobserved pieces of synthetic *a priori* cognition is not likely to affect the adequacy of Kant's doctrine.

However, the possibility remains that the alternative theories which he considers may not be exhaustive. On behalf of Kant, one may urge that there can be no such possibility. For Kant's actual arguments can be put in the form of a disjunctive syllogism, thus: (1) The ground of synthetic *a priori* knowledge is either that it is due to the nature of the thing that is known or that it is due to the nature of the mind that knows. (2) But the first alter-

16. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

17. Perhaps Paton makes such a remark somewhere in his book 'Kant's Metaphysic of Experience.'

native cannot be true. (3) Therefore, the second alternative must be true. This syllogism is certainly formally valid and the alternatives too are exhaustive and mutually exclusive of each other.

But this way of looking at Kant's argument goes counter to his insistence on the uniqueness of his method and on its distinction from the procedure of logical deduction. Moreover, some consideration would show that the conclusion which the syllogism yields is different from Kant's exact thesis. For to say that synthetic *a priori* knowledge is due to the nature of the mind is merely to assert that some of our ideas are yielded, not by experience, but by reason. Now this conclusion can be held even by rationalists who believe in innate ideas. But Kant is not satisfied with the rationalistic position. For the question has to be answered: How is it that ideas which are yielded by mere reason are at the same time objectively valid? One must offer some explanation as to how ideas in the origination of which things play no part should yet be true of such things. Kant explains this objective validity of our necessary and universal ideas by the theory that these ideas represent the nature of our knowing faculty, that they are its unavoidable form through which alone it can approach things in its attempt to know them, i.e., by the theory that the object to which they apply are only appearances, and not things in themselves. Kant certainly offers an explanation of the difficulty in question. But is this the only possible explanation? Cartesian Occasionalism or Leibnizian Pre-established Harmony is designed to meet the same sort of difficulty. It is also conceivable that other such theories can be devised for explaining the same facts which Kant's theory explains. How then to decide which of these theories is the correct one? It is indeed true that the notions of Occasionalism and Pre-established Harmony appear to be highly improbable and even fantastic when compared with Kant's doctrine. But they are not logically impossible. Kant's argument, therefore, does not conclusively establish his doctrine, to the exclusion of other possible doctrines, as an explanation of synthetic *a priori* judgments, although it makes his doctrine appear more plausible than other theories.

It is perhaps on account of this inconclusiveness of Kant's argument that Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya maintains that the transition from the logical forms to the *a priori* functions in Kant's epistemology is only quasi-logical.¹⁸ What precisely then is the

18. The Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1928, p. 3.

method of Kant, if it be not the method of psychological introspection, nor the method of hypothesis, nor that of mathematical intuition, nor that of logical analysis? Prof. Bhattacharyya suggests that the method of Kant is a kind of introspection which may be called epistemological. It is, he says, "a self-evident transition, a process in self-consciousness, and not in consciousness and as such should be taken as a kind of introspection which is neither logical mediation nor mere internal perception"it gives us an insight into the presupposition of the known content as distinct from the believed content.

It may be objected against Prof. Bhattacharyya that the word introspection necessarily involves some type of direct awareness or intuition and as such could hardly be a correct description of Kant's method, since, according to Kant, philosophical knowledge, unlike mathematical knowledge, is discursive, and not intuitive. "Philosophy", as he says, "is simply what reason knows by means of concepts".¹⁹ Or, again, "the synthetic propositions of pure transcendental reason are infinitely removed from being as evidentas the proposition that twice two make four".²⁰

This objection, however, can be met. According to Kant, human knowledge and the transcendental functions of the mind which are the preconditions of human knowledge involve self-consciousness, at least potentially;²¹ and the act of making this self-consciousness of the transcendental functions explicit would be analogous to introspection, if it is not that inner intuition of which time is the unavoidable form. The method by which Kant is finally convinced of the truth of his doctrine, therefore, can be described as a peculiar type of reflective insight, a process of self-consciousness, which is capable of being made more and more clear and explicit by such considerations and arguments as are adduced by Kant to support his theory, although these arguments and considerations are not, as modes of logical inference, quite demonstrative. To those who do not possess this clear reflective insight, the word "transcendental", as an epithet of Kant's method, may be considered as a clue to the precise attitude which the mind must assume in order to arrive at that level of self-consciousness from where the validating ground or the presupposition of synthetic *a priori* knowledge and finally of all human knowledge, in general, can be discovered.

19. Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique, p. 389.

20. *Ibid.*

21. See "Kant's Metaphysic of Experience" by Paton, Vol. I, pp. 572-577.

Abstract and Concrete Names

BY

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Keynes defines abstract and concrete names as follows; "a concrete name is the name of anything which is regarded as possessing attributes i.e., as a *subject of attributes*, while an abstract name is the name of anything which is regarded as an attribute of something else, i.e., as an *attribute of subjects*".¹ Later on he feels constrained to admit that this distinction leads to a "paradoxical" conclusion, for attributes may themselves be the subject of attributes: for example, in the sentence 'unpunctuality is irritating', unpunctuality "although primarily an abstract name, can also be used in such a way that it is, according to our definition, concrete".² He therefore abandons the distinction and substitutes for it, a distinction between abstract and concrete use of names.

Even before Keynes, Mill while not doing away with the distinction between abstract and concrete, admits that attributes can be subjects of attributes. "Even abstract names," he says, "though the names only of attributes may in some instances be justly considered as connotative; for attributes themselves may have attributes ascribed to them; and a word which denotes attributes may connote an attribute of those attributes. Of this description for example is such a word as *fault*, equivalent to *bad* or *hurtful* quality. This word is a name common to many attributes and connotes hurtfulness, an attribute of those various attributes."³

Johnson in the same strain says, "These examples seem to confirm the view that adjectives can properly be predicated of adjectives as such. If this analysis is correct, we should expect

1. J. N. Keynes, Formal Logic, p. 16.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

3. J. S. Mill, A system of Logic, p. 20.

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"raising a verb or a predicative" into a substantive as a consequence of which "subordinate members are also raised to a higher plane". But this is done by changing the primary members into secondary, or the secondary members become substantives by taking away the substantiality from the primary members; for example, take the sentence "the Doctor arrived extremely quickly and examined the patient uncommonly carefully; she recovered very rapidly", where *Doctor*, *patient* and *she* are primary and *arrived*, *examined* and *recovered* are secondary. If it is reduced to the more elegant form "the Doctor's extremely quick arrival and uncommonly careful examination of the patient brought about her speedy recovery", the primary words are *arrival*, *examination* and *recovery* and the secondary words are *Doctor's of the patient* and *her*.¹³ Thus from the standpoint of grammar, the substantialisation of the attributes is only a useful means of expression but "there is nothing substantial about them". "The riddle of the so-called 'abstracts' like wisdom, kindness" cannot be solved by putting them in a separate category, "for though these words are to all intents and purposes substantives and are treated as such in all languages, yet they evidently denote the same qualities as the adjectives *wise* and *kind*".¹⁴

It is clear from the above that abstract names are really attributes of subjects, but where they appear to be subjects of attributes, their substantialization is fictional. What really is done is a restriction of the generality of the attribute either by affixing a genitive or a possessive pronoun¹⁵ or by predicating the subject of which it is the attribute and therefore on which it depends e.g., *John's honesty*, *movement of A* and so on. That is, from the attribute which is concrete, the attribute-element is separated. This distinction though common in ordinary speech is not always maintained in philosophy. "Ordinary as distinguished from philosophic speech, attests the distinction of attribute and attribute-element in our thought and provides for it without confusion. For the latter it uses the verb 'to have' e.g., a needle has a point, and for the former the verb 'to be' with the adjective corresponding to the name of the attribute e.g., the needle is pointed".¹⁶ A thing *X* has an abstract quality *Y* but is the concrete quality.

13. Jespersen, *Philosophy of Grammar*, pp. 136-7.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

16. *Statement and Inference*, I, p. 170, also Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

Mill does not appear to have drawn any distinction between attribute and attribute-element. Let us turn to his argument. It is not true that the name 'fault' denotes 'laziness', 'unpunctuality' etc. When speaking however of 'Whiteness', 'fatherhood' etc., Mill says that they are non-connotative and that they do not connote anything, whereas of 'fault' he says that it connotes 'hurtfulness'. There is a double mistake here. The latter as attribute-elements imply connotations. "Indeed, *fatherhood* and *whiteness* are intensions, universals taken in abstraction from their instances; and the extensional rather than the intensional aspect of these terms is suppressed when they are used in their abstract form".¹⁷ 'Fault' is not an attribute-element. When we say 'Laziness is a fault', we do not mean it in the same way, as when we say 'The ball is round', or 'Socrates is a man'. It is of the form 'Red is a colour', where Red is a determinate and colour a determinable;¹⁸ the difference being that whereas we can say 'A is red, we cannot use the Subject of the other proposition viz., 'laziness' in the same way, for here the attribute-element is abstracted. As for 'fault' what it really denotes are individual or concrete occurrences.

It is clear therefore that adjectives do not qualify adjectives as such. The substantive-attributive relationship may be expressed in three different forms; i. *X's unpunctuality*, ii. *unpunctuality of X*, in both cases of which, an attribute-element is separated from the complex fact 'X' and therefore it needs some predication and iii. *X is unpunctual* in which case it is a closed unit.

Sometimes it is possible, as we had shown, to use a substantive as a predicate, and in such a case the first two forms recur, say, *John's head* or *head of John*. The predicate here is 'John's' or 'of John'. The predicate is that which 'constitutes new information'.¹⁹ To the question 'who's head?', the answer comes 'John's'. The third of the above forms cannot be applied for there is no attribute. So also in the case of 'abstract names', since the attribute-element has been removed from the complex fact, it cannot be attributed. It can only be predicated. We can say *John's unpunctuality* or *unpunctuality of John* but never *John is unpunctuality*. Where the relation is attributive, it will

17. R. M. Eaton, *General Logic*, p. 248.

18. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

19. Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, II, p. 364.

be of the form John is unpunctual, in which case it is an adjective and cannot be the subject of attributes.

We conclude therefore that Keyne's definition seems to us to be correct and the difficulty anticipated by him does not arise. When we say, 'unpunctuality is annoying', either it means 'unpunctuality in a man is annoying' or it does not mean anything at all. We may in the same way say, 'baldness is amusing', where it means 'baldness in a man is amusing'. It is in this sense that Johnson's assertion that general names including adjectives can take applicatives is to be understood.²⁰ It is really applied not to the adjectives as universal, but always to the particularized universal. The applicative *all* is no exception. It is not applicable in most cases, as in honesty, kindness, greenness etc. Where it can be applied, say, as in "all movement is prohibited" it means "movement of any commodity is prohibited"; or as in "all kindness was wasted on him", it means "the kindness of all persons, etc".

20. *op. cit.* p. 97

Whitehead's Philosophy of 'Process'

BY

JITENDRANATH MOHANTY

I

Whitehead's philosophy of 'process' is developed in sharp contrast with two opposite points of view.¹ According to Bradley, process is unreal; that nothing genuinely real can move is the central principle of the Bradleyan metaphysic. On the other hand, there is the view that intellect only distorts reality, which is process. Whitehead rejects both standpoints.

With many important doctrines in Bradley's philosophy, particularly with his account of the nature of experience and his insistence on the primacy of 'feeling', Whitehead admits a very close affiliation. But in so far as Bradley advocates the unreality of time and process, Whitehead parts company with him.²

With the general spirit of the philosophies of Bergson, James or Dewey, Whitehead is in general agreement; but, as he tells us in his preface to *Process and Reality*, his task is to rescue this type of thought from the usual charge of anti-intellectualism. Quite apart from that question, he has to supplement the Bergsonian and Heracleitean doctrines to a large extent.

Unlike Bergson and Heracleitus, Whitehead admits into his scheme the rival notion of the permanence of things. The history of philosophy has oscillated between these two opposed views. For Whitehead, both are true. Religious and aesthetic experiences, he reminds us,³ always recognize the truth and importance of both these points of view. A sense of the transitoriness of all that is, and yet a feeling of sublime awe and reverence before an unchanging Presence—both constitute the best and the highest of our emotional experiences. An adequate metaphysic must have room for both these notions.

1. *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, p. 116.

2. *Id. cit.*

3. *Process and Reality*, p. 296.

The notion of a static reality is traced by Whitehead to two different sources in ancient thought;⁴ the first is the Platonic doctrine of a world of Ideas. The grand beauty of mathematics deceived Plato. The second source lies in the Aristotelian doctrine of primary substances—a doctrine whose influence on all subsequent speculation is indelible. The doctrine of substance as the static unchanging foundation of changing accidents is what Whitehead calls the doctrine of 'vacuous actuality', against which he launches one of his most vigorous attacks. Locke's conception of mind as a *tabula rasa*, a passive recipient of process, labours under the same Aristotelian fallacy. Such a static notion makes passage from one substance to another unsubstantial; all relations are rendered external, since it becomes equally inconceivable how one substance can be a factor in the real constitution of another substance. This leads to an uneven emphasis on substantives and adjectives to the utter neglect of relations. The philosophy of organism starts by abandoning the Aristotelian predominance of 'quality' over 'relatedness' in favour of the dominance of the latter over the former.⁵

To the question of the source of the static notion, we have given the answer from the historical point of view. Whitehead, however, hits the nail on the head, when he points out the real error in the approach⁶ of all earlier metaphysicians. Once we start with the assumption that the static and the mobile are two different kinds of reality, an irreconcilable dualism haunts us till we are compelled by the logic of consistency to abandon one in favour of the other.

To avoid such consequence, Whitehead suggests that the problem is to be reoriented in a different manner. The problem is not the single one of reconciling permanence with process; it is dual, in-as-much as we are required to show how each requires the other as its completion. The peculiarly Whiteheadian way of stating the problem is this: actuality with permanence requires fluency as its completion, and actuality with fluency requires permanence as its completion.⁷ The philosophy of organism is to demonstrate this statement.

4. *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 316.

5. *Process and Reality*, Preface, p. viii.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 490.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 491.

Since according to the principle of process, enumerated in the ninth category of explanation in *Process and Reality*, the being of an actual entity is constituted by its 'becoming', the statement of the problem by Whitehead may be taken to suggest that, for him, both change and permanence are twin aspects of 'process'.⁸ This is thus a wider conception of process than that of Bergson. We begin to appreciate this when we meet with Whitehead's classification of two species of process. In Bergson's philosophy, 'becoming' alone is; there is nothing that becomes; the continual interpenetration of states makes it impossible to isolate any definite stage of attainment. This is not so in the philosophy of organism. An actual entity, though constituted by becoming, itself never becomes, but 'perishes' only to attain 'objective immortality'. We shall have opportunity to analyse this conception subsequently. For the present, it is important to start with Whitehead's distinction between macroscopic and microscopic process, between process as 'transition' and process as 'concrescence'. To understand how the two species of process work and also interact is to understand a central doctrine of Whitehead's metaphysic.

It is necessary at the outset, however, to enquire why Whitehead has to begin with such a distinction. He himself, of course, traces the distinction historically to the 'unconscious philosophical insight' of the seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers. But it is interesting to note that Whitehead is attempting the task of combining the notion of organism with that of process. Both the notions are central to his metaphysic. His notion of organism had been vividly anticipated by Leibnitz. But in Leibnitz's universe, already gifted with all possible degrees of perfection from the lowest to the highest, no room is left for process. With his affiliation in general to the modern doctrines of process, Whitehead envisages the problem differently. An organism is at once the terminus of process and a reservoir from which quite another kind of process ensues. It is not the windowless monad of Leibnitz. To constitute an organism, one kind of process is involved; of quite another kind is the transition from one organism to another. Since all actual entities are also organisms, at every stage, how-so-ever low we go down, both these end kinds of process can be distinguished.

It is interesting also to note that corresponding to the two species of process, Whitehead introduces two meanings, inter-

8. The permanent, though a stage in 'process', yet remains permanent. This is possible by means of the conception of 'objective immortality' to be discussed later on.

connected but intellectually separable, of the notion of organism: the microscopic and the macroscopic.⁹ The microscopic organism refers to the formal constitution of an actual entity, considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of experience; the macroscopic organism is the actual world as given. We have also two meanings of 'process'. In the one sense, an actual entity itself is an organic process; according to the other, the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is also process.

We have mentioned one important aspect in which Whitehead's conception of process differs from Bergson's. But that is not all. Bergson rejects both mechanism and finalism as inadequate categories. Whitehead, on the other hand, has attempted to find room in his philosophy for both types of causation, efficient and final. While the macroscopic process is efficient, the microscopic process is teleological. In the former, there is a simple transition from one actuality to another; in the latter, the process aims at the 'satisfaction' of a private purpose of an individual organism. This synthesis has been named by its author 'organic mechanism'.

II

The microscopic process is called 'concrecence' and constitutes, according to Whitehead, what Locke calls the 'real internal constitution of a particular existent'. This is the process of reducing the plurality of the universe to the unity of an individual experience of a particular actual entity. But this is a process of 'feelings'. What precisely is understood by calling it a process of 'feeling'? Whitehead's real intention may be gathered by his further account of the various stages of this process of concrecence.

The process of concrecence has three main stages. Since the whole process is one of feeling, it culminates in the 'satisfaction' of that feeling. Since the process is teleological, it ends with the attainment of the final cause which guides it. This final cause is the private ideal.

The process starts however with the simple responsive stage. The actual world is received as pure objective data. At this stage, the subjective form has not yet been imposed. The externality of the data has not yet been absorbed into the internal immediacy of the private recipient.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

The second stage is the stage of supplementation. The objective data are subjected to aesthetic synthesis. A private aesthetic appreciation of the data gradually imposes upon them the private ideal. A sort of organic unity evolves out of the process. Teleology, so long hidden, now makes its appearance as the determining factor.

Under this general stage of supplementation come, however, two sub-phases. Mere emotional appreciation of the data constitutes aesthetic supplementation. Here feeling is blind, though what was alien has been made private. The process may stop here, constituting a blind actual occasion with no intellectual operation, or it may proceed towards a conscious shaping of the ideal. This later alternative requires an intellectual supplementation. For Whitehead, it is to be noted, the intellectual is not qualitatively different from feeling; it is only feeling, made self-conscious, blind feeling endowed with sight, appetite turned into 'vision'. This final stage further involves exclusion of alien ideals and conscious affirmation of the private one.

In one sense, the process of concrecence is the really important part of Whitehead's philosophy of process. The world-process is the becoming of actual entities. And the whole of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead tells us,¹⁰ is an attempt to show the generation and 'perishing' of actual entities. 'Concrecence' is the process whereby actual entities are generated. The other form of process, i.e. 'transition', is the passage from one particular existent to another; this process starts with the concrecent actual entity and makes it a datum for further creative advance. But what is this creative advance for? The ontological principle states that all reasons can be stated only in terms of actual entities, which are the only concrete things. All creative advance is towards generation of novel actual entities. From this point of view, both the forms of process are ultimately resolvable into the first of them.

But, what is the meaning of this process of concrecence, with its three stages and sub-phases? Is it a process in time? Are we

10. *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, p. 117; it is to be noted that herein lies an important point of difference between Bergson's account of the world-process and Whitehead's. Bergson is concerned with the origin and development of species, of some important tendencies of the *élan vital*. Whitehead, however, is concerned with the generation of particular existents. The difference is partly explained by the fact that while Bergson's investigation is biological, Whitehead is a physicist.

stating the stages and the product in an order of temporal succession?

We are reminded of the Kantian doctrine of synthesis. But Whitehead himself reminds us that his own philosophy of organism is just an inversion of Kant's Philosophy.¹¹ Kant's doctrine of synthesis describes how the subjective data constitute the objective world of our experience. Whitehead, on the other hand, claims to show how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction. For Kant, Whitehead says, the world emerges from the subject; for himself, the subject emerges from the world; it is a 'superject' rather than a 'subject'.¹²

This distinction set up by Whitehead himself is to be carefully considered. Is the simple inversion adequate to cover the whole distinction? We know that Kant's doctrine of synthesis describes not a temporal process but only a process in order of logical priority. Kant analyses the logical presuppositions of our objective experience. Is the same true of Whitehead?

Of course, there is the other important point to be borne in mind. Kant's syntheses are syntheses of the understanding. The categories of the understanding constitute the subjective data into objective experience. But the synthesis of the philosophy of organism is not of the understanding, even though Whitehead speaks of the final stage of intellectual supplementation. Whitehead agrees that the subject-object structure is fundamental, but carefully refuses to identify this with the knower-known relation. The fundamental feature of experience is rather a feeling relation for which Whitehead uses the Quaker term 'Concern'. This is the basis of the doctrine of prehension. Thus we can say that while the Kantian synthesis is intellectual and logical, Whitehead describes a process of aesthetic synthesis. Experience, in Whitehead's philosophy, is fundamentally aesthetic in character. Can we then say that, unlike Kant, Whitehead is concerned with the aesthetic mould or structure of experience? The intellectual here, it is to be remembered, is the aesthetic 'concern' turned self-conscious, appetite turned into vision, blind feeling given sight; and the 'private ideal' which is the instrument of this transformation is not imposed from outside but is itself shaped in the course of the process.

11. *Process and Reality*, p. 123

12. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

Even apart from what is set down in the preceding paragraph, it is not quite enough merely to say that, whereas Kant describes the process by which subjective data constitute objective experience, Whitehead describes how the subjective comes out of the objective. Merely to say this is not to say much. What Kant calls 'objective experience' is not the objective in the language of the philosophy of organism; it is already endowed with the private ideal. And what are called the subjective data in the critical philosophy have a different account in the philosophy of organism. The concrete is, for Kant, objective; in the philosophy of organism, it is subjective in form. By 'subjective' Whitehead does not intend to denote the same restricted meaning as in the Kantian philosophy; it has more affiliation with subjectivity in some forms of objective idealism. The objectivity of Kant is made up only of 'apparent'¹³ objective content.

All this is explained by the rather simple fact that, while Kant is ultimately an idealist, Whitehead is a realist. And a main tendency in *Process and Reality*, as its author confesses at the beginning of his work, is to go back to the philosophical tradition of the pre-Kantian philosophy, as against the Kantian sphere of influence. Being an idealist, Kant reduces his enquiry to epistemology; and, being epistemological, his philosophy is tainted with subjectivism. Being a realist, Whitehead makes his analysis ontological. But he is not a realist in the traditional sense. By his rejection of the abstract doctrines of substance and attribute, he overcomes the philosophical abstraction with which traditional realism is charged. He sees the problem of ontology in a fuller light, as did Leibniz.

Thus far we have been examining some of the possible implications of the process of concrescence. We have been asking mainly if it is a temporal process of the formation of actual entities, or an account of the presuppositions (aesthetic?) of the subjective unity

13. *Process and Reality*, p. 212. Whitehead here suggests that Kant's objectivity seems to take the place of the 'satisfaction' in the philosophy of organism. In Kant's appeal to 'practical reason', however, Whitehead finds the 'satisfaction' in a sense more analogous to that in the philosophy of organism.

Whitehead even goes so far in emphasizing the importance of the subjectivist principle that at one place he tells us that the development of an actual entity is nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea. (*Ibid.*, p. 234).

that constitutes an actual entity. But there are other problems besides.

The process of concrescence presupposes two other postulates of first-rate importance in the philosophy of organism. The principle of process states that the being of an actual entity consists in its becoming. But this becoming, again, is the process whereby the whole world of an actual entity gains relevance for the prehending entity. This is the principle of universal relativity, according to which an actual entity is present in every other actual entity. But this phrase 'being present in' must not be understood in the light of traditional abstraction, but must be appreciated in the sense of functional activity. This is how Whitehead restates the principle of universal relativity from the functional point of view: 'By this I mean that every actual entity is something by reason of its activity, whereby its nature consists in its relevance to other things, and its individuality consists in its synthesis of other things so far as they are relevant to it'. (Symbolism, p. 31) This principle of relativity betrays its obvious affiliation with the Leibnizian monadism. Each monad mirrors the whole universe, but from its own unique point of view. While Leibniz speaks of mirroring, Whitehead speaks of relevancy. But in both there is the same doctrine of internal relations. Even though a monad is windowless, its whole being consists in mirroring the universe. The whole being of an actual entity consists in its prehension, positive and negative of all other actual entities. In such a Leibnizian universe, movement becomes inexplicable. Leibnizian monadism ends in the same static universe as Hegelian pan-logism. And Leibniz has to take recourse to the doctrine of pre-established harmony. The philosophy of organism, however, admits no such expedient. How, then, are movement and process to be justified within a scheme of strict internal relatedness?

The explanation is made possible by an extension of the Leibnizian principle of possibility. The Leibnizian application of the principle was narrow, being confined to one act of divine choice of a single compossible world out of an infinite range of possibility. Whitehead accepts rather the Platonic doctrine that the given is made possible through some sort of participation in the possible. Without an admission of unrealized potentialities, the alternative would be a static universe.

Leibniz admitted unrealized possibilities, but this world of possibility remains eternally separated from the created world by

one single divine act of wise and benevolent choice of the best of all possible worlds. The philosophy of organism, however, allows for movement and novelty in process by permitting novel and continual ingressions of the potentials into the actual world. We consequently get a nexus of actual entities which are continually superseded by novel actual things.

The relation of the world of potentiality with the actual world is such that it allows for a process which has always some novelty in store. This relation is twofold:

- (i) The relation of eternal objects to actual entities is indeterminate. There is no determinate relation between any eternal object and any actual entity. Thus there is an infinite range of possible ingressions.
- (ii) On the other hand, there is no indeterminateness as to the relation of the actual entity to the eternal object.

(i) and (ii) may be expressed by saying that the relation of the eternal object to the actual entity is external, while the relation of the actual entity to the eternal object is internal.¹⁴ It is now easy to see how this scheme allows for generation of novelty.

Emergence of novelty, further, requires that there should be a transition from one actual entity to novel actual entities. This is the second term. An actual world is only relatively complete and becomes the datum for a new concrescence.

III

Here is the place to introduce two more conceptions which are of considerable importance in the philosophy of organism. These are the conceptions of 'perishing' and 'objective immortality'. Taken together, they express the reverse side of the procession of novelty which we have considered so far.

14. This account of the relation of 'ingression' offers a tempting comparison with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the relation of 'samavāya' or Inherence. According to Professor Hiriyanna's account of it, the relation of *samavāya* is internal from one side and external from the other. The relation of *samavāya* too holds good, like the relation of ingression, between two distinct orders of being. The eternal objects correspond roughly to the *jñā* of the Indian school of logic.

Contrasting his own philosophy of process with that of Bradley and Bergson, Whitehead tells us that he is rather more Aristotelian in this respect than either of them.¹⁵ He reminds us of the great importance of Aristotle's analysis of becoming and of certain significant suggestions in the dialogues of Plato. Aristotle, however, does not analyse the correlated notion of 'perishing'. Whitehead considers this as one of those unfortunate philosophical neglects which have determined the course of philosophic speculation. Plato, as in all other places, so also here, has relevant suggestions for the philosophy of organism, when he speaks of that which always becomes but never is real, of non-being as a form of being. All those suggest to Whitehead a line of analysis which is of astounding originality and consequences. The whole of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead tells us, may be read as an attempt to analyse perishing on the same level as Aristotle's analysis of becoming.

We have been told that the world-process is an account of the being, becoming and perishing of actual entities. Now, an actual entity, when it is complete, perishes. We have also seen that the process of concrescence by which an actual entity is constituted transforms the alien objective data into private subjective immediacy. But when it perishes, it loses this subjective immediacy. What it thereby attains Whitehead calls objective immortality.

It is important to remember here that the being and 'perishing'¹⁶ of actual entities is not a momentary phenomenon. The life-time of an actual entity is not momentary. It has a historical route. It endures. Duration is an essential feature in the life of an organism. Here is, according to Whitehead, an essential difference between a piece of matter (having 'simple location') and an organism. If 'matter' be fundamental, the property of endurance

15. *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, p. 116.

16. This conception of actual entities, attaining completion and perishing, reminds us of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness where particular existents, *svalakṣaṇas*, instantaneously come into being and perish. In this latter doctrine, *svalakṣaṇas* are the only concrete existents, the universals or *sāmānyalakṣaṇas* being conceptual in nature.

Such comparison and contrast may be further developed. The Buddhist admits only present causal efficacy; hence momentariness. In his conception of objective immortality Whitehead admits causal efficacy in the future. Further, the Buddhist rightly recognizes, what Whitehead himself points out, that, if the entity be material, it cannot persist beyond a moment. But if the entity be an organism, as it is in the philosophy of Whitehead, duration becomes an essential property of the actual entity.

becomes arbitrary; it may persist or may perish instantaneously. But if organism be fundamental, duration becomes an inherent property as a result of evolution.

'Perishing' does not mean elimination from the scheme of things. It rather means exclusion from the focus of full immediacy. The immediacy is lost; but thereby the perished entity acquires a new causal efficacy. It becomes a factor in the building-up of the future. Such loss of immediacy is to be recognized as a necessity in the process of creative advance. Creative advance must necessitate some loss, in accordance with the common-sense dictum 'no loss, no gain'.¹⁷

What does Whitehead mean by the 'objective immortality' attained by an actual entity? In his preface to *Process and Reality*, he describes it as 'the process of appropriation of the dead by the living, whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming'. From another point of view, it is described as 'the function of creatures, whereby they constitute the shifting character of creativity'.¹⁸ This is a new role in the life of the actual entity. The actual entity now belongs to the past and plays its role as a determining factor in building-up the future. Its value lies now in its pragmatic use for the future. The living and growing future is built up on the corpses of the dead. We say, they are corpses, because the taint of subjectivity is gone. The dead actuality has cast off its role of first causation and takes up that of efficient causation.

What is this but the doctrine of the immanence of the past in the future? The past has an objective existence beyond itself in its own future. Thus, while there is a sense in which the future is immanent in the present, there is also a sense in which the past and the present are immanent in the future.

The future is not present in the present in the sense that the present contains any individual occasions belonging to the future.

17. *Process and Reality*, pp. 481-2, 489. Incidentally, Whitehead points out that this failure to combine creative advance with the retention of full subjective immediacy is the root cause of all specific evils of this temporal world. The attribute of 'everlasting' associated with God means just this property of combining creative advance with the retention of full immediacy. Compare Royce's conception of a 'totum simul'.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

The doctrine of the specious present and the delivery of consciousness show that the present does contain the future in a certain sense. Since the future possesses no actual entities, already constituted, the present only contains in it the necessities to which the future must conform.

On the other hand, the future contains in it actualities belonging to the past. The actual entities of the past, after the phase of 'perishing', change over their function of self-formation into the activity of other formation. 'The actual entity as self-creating creature passes into its immortal function of part-creator of the transcendent world'.¹⁹

This is one way of understanding the idea. But objective immortality is to be understood also as the necessity, embodied in the constitution of every actual entity, to play its part beyond its own immediacy. The very constitution of every actual occasion necessitates that it should pass over into this new role. Every actual occasion enjoys the past as alive in itself, but ends in an enjoyment of itself as alive in the future. The creative urge takes it beyond itself through the chrysalis of 'perishing'. 'The occasion arises as an effect facing the past and ends as a cause facing its future'.²⁰

Understood from this point of view, the phase of objective immortality is not an irrelevant accident in the life-history of an occasion. It is a necessary termination of the career of the actual occasion.

Bergson also speaks of time as 'swelling' with the past and 'gnawing' into the future. The past has thus the function of enriching the future. On the other hand, Bergson, in his famous simile of the explosion of the rocket, compares the falling particles or sparks with dead matter, which, in his philosophy, has the sheer negative function of opposing the main creative urge. In the philosophy of organism, however, the 'dead' actual entity forms the basis upon which novelties arise by virtue of the creative urge; thus, instead of retarding the creative advance, the actual entities, after 'perishing', gain a new significance and a fresh creative role.

19. *Adventures of Ideas*.

20. *Ibid.*

IV

The past, present and future are thus intrinsically connected in the philosophy of Whitehead. This leads us to a rather short reference to his view of time, though an adequate discussion of the same lies beyond the scope of the present paper. Like Bergson, Whitehead also rejects that view which takes time as constituted of the vanished past, the instantaneous present and the non-existent future. Both base their philosophy of time upon the experience of duration and specious present. What is immediate for experience is a duration, containing within it past and future. In the philosophy of organism, the specious present of an event is the total temporal duration, during which a definite structural pattern lasts. From this point of view, each actual entity is a duration. This is intelligible if we remember that, for Whitehead, 'duration' does not suggest a mere abstract stretch of time; it is rather 'a concrete slab of nature', limited by simultaneity'.²¹


Here Whitehead is in agreement with Bergson. He agrees with Bergson in rejecting the measurable time of science and of civilized life as abstractions from the more fundamental fact of the passage of nature. But there is this important point of difference, that while this fundamental fact of passage is regarded by Bergson as 'time', real, concrete, and living time, Whitehead thinks that the passage of nature is as much manifested in spatial transition as in temporal duration.²² Both time and space are equally abstractions from the ultimate fact of the passage of nature. 'Only, time is a more primary abstraction, space differentiating itself from time at a more advanced state'.²³

With regard to this point of distinction, it is to be clearly borne in mind, firstly, that both thinkers consider spatial extension and temporal series as abstractions from the fundamental fact of passage. Indeed, for Bergson, temporal series is nothing but an attempt to stretch time upon space. Secondly, it is, in a certain sense, true to say that for both thinkers duration represents this fundamental fact of passage. Divergence appears, however, when we enquire as to where we are to trace this duration. Bergson directs us to plunge deep into ourselves and to live this duration; duration is to be apprehended through concrete living. It does not

21. *The Concept of Nature*, p. 53.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 37.



lie outside; it is the flow of life, inside. Not in dead, inert matter, but where life has put itself inside matter, are we to search for it. Here is a biologist speaking; Whitehead is a physicist, though he extends the categories of biology in order to explain physics. In the philosophy of organism, every actual entity, every event having an enduring structural pattern is an organism, and hence a duration. Passage is as much outside as inside.²⁴ This rids the philosophy of organism of many of the contradictions and inconsistencies which infect Bergson's doctrine of matter.

V

We shall close the present discussion with a rather short reference to another concept, fundamental to Whitehead's philosophy of process.

Every event, in the philosophy of organism, is analysable into three factors: (i) substantial activity; (ii) potentialities for synthesis; (iii) the attained outcome of this synthesis. Now this substantial activity is the general metaphysical principle underlying Whitehead's philosophy of process. In all philosophies, there is an ultimate principle. In the philosophy of organism, this ultimate is 'creativity'. What substance is in Spinoza's philosophy, Creativity is in the philosophy of organism; only here substance is activity. Leibniz, too, conceived substance as activity; but he could not go beyond the atomism of his starting-point. The conception of a Monad of monads gives no unitary principle. Whitehead goes beyond the pluralism of events to the unity of a single all-pervasive principle, which individualizes itself into a multiplicity of modes. This is what ultimately reduces the many to the one. Whitehead describes this 'creativity' in various ways at various places.²⁵ It is 'the Universal of universals, characterizing ultimate matters of fact', 'the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms and

24. *Ibid.*, p. 69. Whitehead, of course, suggests (*ibid.*, p. 69) that it is possible that both these passages might share in some ultimate character of passage which dominates all being. This may be, we suggest, referred to the notion of 'creativity', to be discussed subsequently.

It may also be mentioned here that there is, of course, a sense in which, even in the philosophy of organism, duration needs be lived and enjoyed. Duration, as we have seen, is 'a concrete slab', and feeling is the basis of all concrescence. Accordingly duration is the unity of feeling enjoyed by the enduring entity.

25. *Process and Reality*, pp. 27, 28, 42.

conditioned by its creatures', 'the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality'. Like the Aristotelian 'matter' or the modern 'neutral stuff', it is devoid of any quality. But creativity is devoid of the taint of passivity, associated with the Aristotelian or the modern conception.

Creativity transcends all actual entities, including God; yet, in every actual entity, creativity plays its part. Every organism, in some sense, creates its own environment. Creativity does not act on the lines of an external agency. It individualizes itself into different modes; but each entity thereby is invested with the character of self-creativity.²⁶ Thus, in a sense, every entity is *causa sui*.

Further, creativity is the principle of novelty. Since each actual entity is a *causa sui*, it, in creating itself, transcends other entities, thus achieving novelty. Creative advance is nothing but this continual application of the principle of creativity to each novel situation.

Whitehead's notion of creativity reminds us of Bergson's *élan vital*. Both differ from the static Spinozistic substance. Creativity is an immanent principle. But what is more important to note is that, like the *élan vital*, 'creativity' has no ulterior purpose of its own.²⁷ The *élan vital*, as expounded in the 'creative evolution, is blind irrational activity. Is the same true of Whitehead's principle? Whitehead denies any external teleology. Is there then an immanent purpose in the ultimate creative advance? The idea of immanent purpose cannot be severed from the idea of value; rather, according to Bosanquet, true teleology reduces itself to the idea of value. The substantial activity, taken by itself, possesses no value; since, actuality is value and actuality is only a subsequent modalization of the ultimate principle. The ultimate principle, then, becomes as irrational as the *élan vital*.

Though the ultimate principle has no purpose of its own, each actual entity aims at attaining subjective satisfaction of its own private subjective ideal. The process of concrescence, as we have seen, is the achievement of subjective unity. This is teleology, no doubt; indeed, no other trend is more marked in the philosophy of organism than this insistence on the attainment of subjective unity.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 313-4.

27. *Id.* *cf.*

This is, no doubt, what gives to the philosophy of organism, its predominantly aesthetic tone. But what guarantees harmony between these private values? To avoid the inconsistencies of a pluralism, an ultimate of the Spinozistic type is admitted. But what is there to avoid the inconsistencies of a subjectivistic value-philosophy? Leibniz's pre-established harmony is denied, and rightly so. The doctrine of internal relations, stated in terms of positive and negative prehensions is concerned with the content of an actual entity. Value pertains to the form, by which the plurality of content is reduced to the unity of realization. The world of value, of which Whitehead speaks in his Ingersoll Lectures, is a world of mere possibility. Without a revision of the essentially Whiteheadian principle that restriction is the price of value, and without an admission of a principle embodying actual accomplished value, we are left stranded on the verge of a subjectivistic and pluralistic doctrine of value.

An Examination of Pacifism especially from the Christian point of view

BY

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Travancore

There is a good deal of loose thinking and talking about the supposed duty and virtue of Pacifism. Whether pacifism is morally obligatory according to the highest standards of virtue is a question on which, even after clear analysis of the issues involved, people will differ as on several other concrete questions of applied Ethics. That cannot be helped; but, when one feels that the issues are clouded and confused by want of clear thinking, one cannot but deplore it. Apart from the intellectual pleasure of clearing up confusions in thought and clarifying the issues, there is also the practical importance and need of combating the national weakness that may result from the loose and confused advocacy of Pacifism in the inter-national sphere, especially as such advocacy grows in volume. Pacifists claim that in the present century their movement has been gathering momentum though it is far from being strong enough to be thought of as anything likely to prevent another war in the immediate future.

What is the doctrine of Pacifism? It is that in no case would it be morally right to use violence against a fellow-being, at any rate to the point of killing him. There would seem to be a simple and ludicrous confusion in the minds of many pacifists that the opposite of their creed is militarism and love of violence. They dwell upon the terrible havoc wrought by war, the enormous waste involved in it and the wickedness of it all. They would seem to expect that if only you hate war and its horrors you should join their ranks. If you refuse to join them you are suspected of having at least a lurking love of violence or at any rate of not having a sufficiently intense hatred of evil. It can be easily seen that this pacifists' suspicion of their opponents is unfair and untenable. I hate war and love peace; but my love of peace does not make me a pacifist. Love of peace is not pacifism, disagreement with the pacifist position or even opposition to it is not love of war and

violence. War-mongering and pacifism are not logical contradictions, they are contraries. My position is neither the one nor the other. Though I hate war I am prepared to support my nation if it even engages itself in resisting the wanton assault on it by an unscrupulous neighbouring nation. There are things which I hate even more than war; there are greater evils and calamities. If my country is threatened to be swallowed up and kept in subjection by a neighbouring ambitious power, whose system of government would endanger almost everything that I hold dear and precious, I should certainly wish that my country should resist it by taking up arms when peaceful negotiations fail. If that is what I wish for my country, I should wish it for every country in the world that might be placed in a similar situation. Soviet Russia may not be as black as it is pictured by unsympathetic critics, and the Western democracies may not be as sincere devotees of the great values of social and political life as they claim. But imagine for a moment that it is so in both cases. Then one cannot help ardently desiring that the Western democracies should organise themselves in such a manner as to repel effectively by force a Russian invasion. Untold suffering will no doubt result from such a clash of arms; still one will prefer that to the whole of Europe being subjected to the tyranny of Soviet Russia. This example may perhaps be an inexpedient one since the sympathies of the readers will not be all in one direction over the question of Soviet Russia versus Western democracies. It is easy to take other examples where our sympathies in this country will not be divided, but it is hardly necessary.

I enquire what is wrong with the position briefly sketched above in opposition to the pacifist position? The pacifist cannot rightly and fairly accuse his opponent of holding human life cheap, nor of being insensitive to the finer values of life, though several of them in their arguments would seem to level such a charge. If there are people, and there may be such, who positively welcome wars for their personal ends or for the interests of their group or class, they are certainly open to such an accusation and to deserve the severest condemnation. But my position is that it is the very insistence on the values of life, and freedom and the eagerness to maintain such conditions as would preserve those values, which makes me an advocate of armed resistance being offered to aggressive attacks from those who trample over the rights of others. Human lives are precious to me and that is precisely why I would resist by force those who wantonly trample over them, even to the

point of depriving the aggressors of their right to life. I fail to see therefore how the pacifist can claim to be more humane than his opponent. It is only unthinking sentimentalism which can picture the pacifist's position to be more humane than its opposite. If you value human life and freedom, for the sake of defending them and preserving them for many people should you not be prepared to forfeit them in the case of a few? I am not however to be understood as holding that it is right always to kill a few for the sake of many. Far from that, I can imagine situations in which several may have to be killed for the sake of even one. It is not a question of numbers. To defend an innocent woman it may be necessary and right to shoot several gangsters.

Pacifists may urge in this connexion that one wrong could not justify another wrong. This maxim is acceptable but it is not applicable in the way the pacifist has in mind. One wrong act may necessitate and justify a course of action which would not have been right except for the wrong act which necessitated it, and which in the given situation is perfectly right. The policeman is not, of course, justified in shooting a citizen except for the dangerous anti-social action of this citizen in going about looting and murdering. When the latter persists in such a course it is right for the policeman to shoot him if he cannot arrest him and hand him over to the court of law. To say that the action of the policeman in shooting him is an act of violence and is therefore on the same level as that of the criminal who committed the murders is utterly unwarranted. To take a milder example, if I keep under physical restraint a fellow citizen of mine, it is wrong. But if for this reason I am sent to the gaol, thus being put under restraint myself, it will not be a wrong action on the part of the government. To say that my action and the government's action are both wrong, because in both cases someone is kept under physical restraint, is palpably absurd.

Before proceeding further, let us enquire what is the alternative which the pacifist would suggest to armed resistance when one's nation is threatened and all peaceful efforts to ward off the attack fail. Allow the enemy to do their worst and submit to their oppression? The distinctively religious amongst the pacifists suggest that such a course on our part would probably melt the enemy's heart and they may sooner or later turn away from their wicked designs. I do not understand what solid basis there is for such an expectation or hope. I do not see that history lends support to it. Many pacifists who entertain such a hope base it upon their religious faith. A little later I shall enquire whether there is

ground for such hope in the Christian faith. I shall then argue that there is none. This leads me on to a brief examination of the arguments and considerations which definitely Christian pacifists usually adduce in support of their position. They claim that they have the high authority of the teachings and example of Jesus. To non-Christian thinkers the enquiry whether Jesus taught it is not necessarily of first-rate importance. Still even to such it must have interest and significance. In the philosophical discussion of moral questions the teachings and intuitions of the great prophets and religious and moral teachers of mankind have to be reckoned with. Moreover, as the title of my paper makes clear, I have undertaken to examine the pacifist position especially from the Christian point of view.

One is rather amused to hear certain Christian pacifists quoting the injunction in the decalogue, 'Thou shalt not kill', in support of their position. No one can seriously maintain that the commandment was meant to be an absolute and unconditional one, i.e., universally applicable. It meant that a Hebrew individual should not kill a fellow Hebrew. Certainly it was never understood as a prohibition of war and the slaughter of the heathen nations. There is no evidence of pacifism in the Hebrew scriptures, that is, the Old Testament in the Bible. It is true that some of their later prophets dreamt of a future era of universal peace and yearned for it. Surely this longing for universal peace and even its predictions do not constitute pacifism. Leaving aside the Old Testament let us pass on to the teachings and examples of Jesus and of his disciples. Peter and Paul, the greatest of the apostles, have explicitly upheld the authority of the State and its use of force against rebellious citizens. "Be subject to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as sent by him for *vengeance on evil-doers*" (I. Peter II: V. 13 and 14) "But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he (i.e., the ruler) beareth not the sword in vain: for he is a minister of God, *an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil*" (Romans XIII—V. 4). If the State is in duty bound to use force when necessary to curb lawless individuals, and thus uphold the majesty of law in order to preserve the rights of individuals and maintain the conditions necessary for a good life, how can it be argued that it should not use force against external aggressors coming in to enslave and slaughter its subjects?

Turning to Jesus himself, the pacifist may feel that he is on surer ground. There is a well-known passage in the Sermon on

the Mount about the turning of the other cheek and parting with the garment and going a second mile. One has to admit that a superficial reading of the passage in isolation would seem to support the pacifist contention. But there are other considerations or second thoughts which would substantially alter this conclusion. We will mention a few of them.

(a) Jesus was not laying down directions for the policy and duties of States, but for his disciples as individuals and groups of individuals. I know that this is hotly contested by many Christian pacifists, but they must reasonably admit that it is not obvious that what is applicable to individuals as such can be applied to the State. I do not deny that there are moral principles which should bind individuals and the State. Can this be regarded as one of them? I should think that clearly it is not. If an individual who is assaulted by his neighbour takes the matter to a court of law, the judge representing the authority of the State cannot simply ask the plaintiff to live up to the standard of the Sermon on the Mount and not complain of the assault. The judge has to mete out justice and uphold the majesty of law by punishing the offender. As urged earlier, if the State has thus to put down lawless subjects of its own by adequate punishment and redress legitimate grievances of its innocent subjects, can it be argued that the State should not resort to force to protect all its citizens against external aggressors? Certainly what I as an individual am not morally permitted to do, the State has the obligation to do. As a citizen I have no right to imprison or hang any one; but it is part of the duty of the State to do it in the case of those who deserve it by their criminal actions. (If capital punishment is itself questioned, only imprisonment need be considered for my present purpose, since my point is the obvious one that what is not right for an individual the State may have the obligation to do). In reply to this contention of mine the Christian pacifist may say that the State, especially because it consists of many who are not living the Christian way of life, may go to war but the true Christian subjects should have nothing to do with it. I fail to see how, if it is the duty of a State to protect its subjects, the Christian can justifiably stand aloof from the efforts of the State to discharge its sacred duty. I have argued above that the greatest of the apostles of Jesus did not take his teachings as applicable to the State in this matter.

(b) Jesus was not in the habit of laying down definite and detailed rules for right action. In the Sermon on the Mount he takes examples illustrative of a certain loving and forgiving atti-

tude. It is interesting to note that he takes fairly simple situations such as a man receiving a slap on his face or being deprived of a garment or being compelled to go a mile. But would Jesus have said that if a robber were about to stab you and to loot your house you should yield without protest and lay bare your bosom for his knife? Jesus himself as a babe escaped the slaughter of the Innocents at the hands of Herod by being carried away to Egypt. Years later when once some of his enemies planned to thrust him down a steep precipice he escaped from their midst. Still later he remonstrated with the soldier who unjustly smote him on the face. No doubt I shall be told that in none of these cases Jesus resorted to the use of violence and that is all what the pacifist wants. But my immediate point is only that he did not always "turn the other cheek" and therefore the passage in the Sermon on the Mount is not to be literally taken in a prosaic manner. I shall be asked, In what way then is it to be correctly understood? I have already said that it is illustrative of a certain generous and loving attitude and impulse. But even a noble impulse should not be allowed to freely work itself out in a complex situation where other considerations and impulses of an equally important or still more important nature have to be taken into consideration. I may feel impelled to give all the money that I have with me to a needy man; but if there are more important claims on the amount, of which I am aware, I have no right to carry into effect the charitable impulse of the moment. That is a trifling example, but the underlying principle may be applied to more serious situations. I may wish that it were possible for me not to use force against an enemy army and to slaughter them. But if it has to be done for preventing my fellow citizens and their families from being slaughtered and enslaved for generations, regretfully I may have to check my generous impulse towards the enemy and I may have to resort to arms. This is not explaining away the inward meaning and spirit of the teaching of Jesus.

(c) There is however another consideration of a deeper nature, not based on any particular text or passage. It is the supreme example of Jesus on the Cross. The devout Christian sees in it God's most effective way of coping with the evil and sin of the world. It is not by resisting the evil-doer but by allowing him to wreak his wrath on his (Jesus') head that Jesus combats evil — and that is God's own way. No Christian at any rate can but treat the idea with the utmost reverence. Yet there is one

simple point which many overlook in this connexion and that is the difference between the problem of Jesus and the problem of the State. Jesus' problem was to melt the hardness of the sinful heart and to win over the sinner to the love of God. The State has also to deal with the problem created by bad people whose hearts remain unchanged from their evil ways, and it should not fail to restrain them from evil actions and simply wait for their inner conversion. The State is concerned not necessarily with the change of heart in the right direction but with external actions so that these may not be in violation of the law. Jesus may have freely given himself up to his enemies so that they could do with him as they pleased, but the State cannot permit an innocent citizen to be roughly handled by a criminal. The State must intervene as effectively as necessary and protect the innocent from the assaults of the lawless.

(d) The appeal to the lesson of the Cross is often coupled with the appeal to the triumph of Jesus in such a way as to suggest that the way of the pacifist will be crowned with success and the evil-doer will turn away from his wicked designs. But is this really the case? Has the Cross triumphed in the sense that it appeals to all and melts the obstinacy and hardness of the heart of every sinner? No doubt there are countless individuals in whose case this is true, but unfortunately there are many more who have been untouched by its appeal. Even amongst those who literally participated in the crucifixion of Jesus we have no clear evidence that any repented of their evil and changed their ways. While it may seem to be a kind of deep trust in God and in man to expect that unmerited suffering cheerfully borne will necessarily win over the enemy, it is really to fly in the face of facts and not to reckon with the terrible depths of sin and evil in the human heart. The glorious martyrdom of early Christians touched to the core several hearts, but yet more people failed to be impressed by even that. The expectation that if only we do not offer armed resistance to a powerful enemy nation it will grow ashamed of its evil designs has no warrant in the teachings of Jesus. He does not say that if you 'turn the other cheek' your enemy will immediately feel sorry for his action and apologise to you. He may or may not.

(e) The Christian pacifist may appeal to the fundamental principle of love, which is at the basis of Christian ethics, in defence of his position. Yes, love is the one principle which ought to regulate our conduct. But what love demands of us is not as easy to make out in the complex situation of life as it may appear

when we think of it in the abstract. The pacifist may ask whether you can shoot people or drop bombs on them with love in your hearts. Equally well the question may be put to you whether you can passively watch the enemy dropping bombs on your fellow citizens and blotting out of existence your city and State, for which also you have love in your heart.

Coming back from this somewhat lengthy incursion into the sphere of definitely Christian ethics to the general ethics of pacifism, let us briefly refer to certain criticisms levelled against the resort to armed resistance by a nation. It is said with a good deal of justification that wars really do not permanently solve any problems and that they only lead to further wars. There is some truth in this criticism, but like most true generalisations even this is only partly true. A military victory against an oppressive enemy may leave many problems unsolved. Still it gives time and opportunities to solve these in a constructive and peaceful manner, whereas if the enemy were to triumph he would solve every problem in his own way and there would be none left to be solved in the right way. A man who is rescued from drowning has to continue to face the problems of his life. If he were drowned he would have no problems. The talk of a war which will end all wars is not to be seriously taken. No war by itself can usher in such an era of peace as will eliminate the possibility of all future wars. Nevertheless it is worth while certainly to fight against and crush a menace that threatens to kill the freedom of many nations. This may give us time to attempt the still more arduous task of establishing conditions of peace and stability. No doubt in such constructive efforts we may make costly blunders and pave the way to more wars. This logically does not mean that wars serve no good purpose in any situation. Of course it reminds us of the sad limitations of the method of violence. It cannot too frequently be pointed out that the anti-pacifist is not necessarily one who delights in war and believes in its virtue and its self-sufficiency. It is a sad and dread necessity to be resorted to only when more humane and rational methods fail. The anti-pacifist is no less a lover of peace than the pacifist, only he hopes to bring it about in other ways than the pacifist advocates. Let us briefly indicate how he would strive for peace.

How is it that in an enlightened State we are not obliged to fight against one another for our rights? There is the State which guarantees our rights and promulgates a system of law conducive to their maintenance. There are the courts of law to interpret

the law aright and to give just awards in cases referred to them by the citizens. Further, there is the police to enforce the decrees of the court. If we could imagine ourselves to be living in a disorganised motley of people owing no allegiance to any common authority and submitting to no accepted laws, that would be a partly correct picture of the nations of the world in their relations one with another. The only way in which wars between the nations can be eliminated is to evolve a world organisation which will have sufficient resources at its disposal to enforce its decrees upon rebellious members. Even then force will have to be used, and sometimes perhaps on a big scale, for a long time to come. But if the world organisation will increasingly grow strong, and assert its power whenever necessary, rebellions and revolts on the part of the member nations will gradually diminish. How far the U.N.O. will increasingly serve this purpose need not be enquired into in this context. Something like that, but more comprehensive and effective, seems to be the only practical way of eliminating wars. It raises many practical problems which statesmen have to tackle. It is a hard path that will tax their patience and their good sense. But along that way lies hope and not in the way of pacifism with its appeal to individuals not to support their nations even in defence of any just cause.

I may be accused of naively assuming that, in modern wars, on one side there is a naked and wicked aggression and on the other side righteousness and innocence fighting against evil, and that I have been trying to justify such fight against evil, while in reality we have a totally different situation in which evil and good, wrong and right, are mixed together. I may reply to it in two ways. (a) For purposes of ethical discussion it is permissible to consider hypothetical situations. If a nation were wantonly attacked by an aggressive neighbour, would not the former be justified in seeking to repel it by force? That is the question which I have raised and tried to answer in the affirmative. (b) Even in recent wars, while it may be true that all the parties were guilty in some measure, there were marked differences in the degree and nature of their guilt so that it may be said with sufficient justification that some of them were on the morally right side and some on the wrong side. The point can be illustrated with reference to both the World Wars.

Terāpanthi Sect of Jainism

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It is now an established fact that Jainism, a simple and undogmatic religion, based on the culture of common virtues is neither an off-shoot of Vedic culture, nor has it anything to do with the movement of Buddhism. It is definitely an independent system, with its own history, enjoining its own metaphysics, its own logic and its own unrivalled Ethical Code for laymen as well as for ascetics. The historical and philological evidence from the Vedas and the Purāṇas has amply proved the remoteness of the religion of Ahimsā. The rivalry between the two opposing schools one recommending animal sacrifice and the other holding Ahimsā as the summum bonum, is indicated by the simultaneous occurrence of the expressions "Mā himsyāt Sarvabhūtāni" (do not kill any living creature) and "Sarva-medhe sarvam hanyāt" (kill all kinds of animals in the sarvamedha sacrifice) in the Vedic literature. The story of Rishabha-deva, the first Tirthāṅkara is also cited in Vishṇupurāṇa and Bhāgwatpurāṇa. Consequently Lord Mahāvira, the twenty fourth Tirthāṅkara re-organised the religious order to fight against the prevailing animal sacrifices and to establish non-violence, as the rule of life. Lord Mahāvira left behind him a devoted and well-organised religious order and followers, who strictly adhered to the Jain principles as enunciated in the Jain Āgamas. To this day the Jains have maintained the religious practices and the way of life more or less in the original form. The Terāpanthi Sect of Jainism is one of the Sects, which commands three lakhs of followers today and which aims at leading the spiritual life, whether as a house-holder, or as a monk strictly according to Jain Scriptures, as revealed by the Sarvajña or the omniscient being.

Before giving a historical survey of the said sect, it is necessary to throw some light on the various schools and sects of Jainism. Jains are today divided into two schools viz., (1) Digambara School and (2) Svetāmbara School. The exact

chronology and the cause of this cleavage is yet controversial. According to the Digambara School, India was terribly famine-stricken for twelve years continuously in the time of Chandra Gupta Maurya. Consequently many of the Jain monks migrated to the south, under the leadership of the Śrutakevali Bhadrabāhu. But the others remained in Magadha, under the leadership of Sthulabhadra. When the former returned after the famine was over, they found that the latter had changed their mode of life and had started wearing dress, using utensils and holding a rod. Thus there arose a line of demarcation between the two schools. Those ascetics, who did not wear any clothes were called Digambaras and those who wore white clothes were known as Svetambaras. But according to the Svetāmbara Version the difference between the mode of living of the monks of the two schools existed even in the time of Lord Mahāvira. There were two kinds of monks in his time viz., (I) Jinkalpi and (II) Sthavirakalpi. The Jinkalpi monks were nude and the Sthavirakalpi wore white dress. Consequently the cleavage according to the Svetambaras is much older and the famine episode is not the cause of the division. Had the monks, who stayed in the famine stricken area been so weak-minded, as to change their ascetic mode of life due to the hard conditions, they would have preferred to migrate to the south and would not have dared to expose themselves to hunger and starvation. Whatever be the cause and the circumstances that led to the difference of opinion, the fact remains that the Jains today are divided into these two camps. The Digambara School is further sub-divided into three sects viz., (1) Bispanth, (2) Tehrāpanth and (3) Tāraṇapanth. The differences between the first two sects have been bridged over to a large extent and as a result many of the Digambaras, when asked, to which panth they belong, humorously remark that they belong to 16½ panth, which is the arithmetical average of twenty and thirteen. Both these sects worship idols. But the Tāraṇapanth does not believe in idol worship. The followers of this sect are about ten thousand.

Svetāmbara school is sub-divided into three sects viz: (1) Mandirmārgi or Murtipūjaka sect, (2) Dhundiās or Sthānak-bāsi sect and (3) Terāpanthi sect. All the three sects, as opposed to the Sects of the Digambara school, recognize the wearing of white clothes on the part of the ascetics, women's right to *moksha*, and the possibility of *moksha* for the untouchables and householders. The Mandir Mārgi sect worships the dressed idols and their monks live in the temples. The Sthānaka-bāsis do not believe in idol worship and their monks and nuns live in Sthānakas

or houses especially set apart for them. The *Terāpanthi* monks and nuns wander about from place to place, and temporarily stay at such lonely houses of laymen, as may be offered to them for this purpose. The *Terāpanthis* are the strict followers of the original religious teachings and beliefs, and therefore oppose idol-worship vigorously. From the point of view of the number of the monks and the nuns, which amounts to 750 under the leadership of one Acharya, the *Terāpanthis* may be said to occupy the foremost rank among all the schools and sects of Jainism.

The *Terāpanth* is a reformatory movement, which was started by the Achārya Saṁt Sri Bhikaṇ Ji in Rājasthān about a couple of centuries ago, in the year 1760. He was himself initiated as a monk by Achārya Raghu Nāth Ji of the Sthānak-bāsi sect in the year 1751. He was a profound scholar of the Jain literature, and had taken great pains to study the Sūtras minutely and thoroughly. He discovered that the monks of his time were not strictly observing the ethical code of the Jain monks as laid down in the holy scriptures, and that in them there was more of outward show than of real religious ardour. As a result of this degeneration, even the lay followers of certain localities in Rājasthān had given up paying respects to their spiritual leaders. An incident that led Saṁt Sri Bhikaṇ Ji to launch an open revolt against the degenerate and *unśāstric* conduct of the monks and prompted him to establish a new order of true and devoted souls, is worth-mentioning here. In Rājnagar, a town in Mewār, which was the centre of the followers of Achārya Sri Raghunāth Ji, the Shrāvakas, as the lay followers are called, had given up paying homage to the monks and the Acharya, as a mark of their protest against their deviation from *śāstric* principles. Thinking that Sri Bhikaṇ Ji was the fittest person to pacify the rebel followers and to bring them back to the right path, Achārya Raghu Nāth Ji deputed him to go to Rājnagar and to do the needful. The genuine complaints of the lay followers against the ecclesiastical order gave him an incentive to bring about a spiritual and moral revolution by exhorting the monks to follow the *śāstric* path. Apparently, he did succeed in his mission and the shrāvakas of Rājnagar agreed to pay usual respects to the order of Sri Raghunāth Ji. But when he went to the Achārya, he requested him to give a lead in bringing about the reform in the holy order. But Raghunāth Ji was of the opinion that the changed mode of the monks was simply due to the changing circumstances and it was therefore not necessary to press the point. Sri Bhikaṇ Ji tried his best to induce Sri Raghu Nāth Ji to follow the right path. But having discovered that their

differences were unbridgeable, he broke off his connection with the order of Sri Raghunāth Ji. Sant Bhikan Ji decided to lead a true ascetic's life and to preach the gospel of Mahāvira to the lay followers. He was justified in criticising and opposing the stay of the monks in the sthānaks. According to the Jain tradition a monk should neither cause violence himself, nor should he make others to do so; he should neither tell a lie himself, nor eulogise lying; he should neither himself steal, nor in any way encourage others to steal; he should neither break the vow of Brahmacharya himself, nor should he prompt others to do so; he should neither possess property himself, nor in any way should he advise others to possess property. But by staying in the special houses built for them, the ascetics of his time were not observing the vows in the true sense. They were guilty of the sin called Ardhkarmi in Jainism.

Consequently, Sri Bhikan Ji set an example for others, by observing the five great vows in letter and spirit and soon a band of devotees and earnest followers gathered round him. By the time he came to Jodhpur, he had twelve more monks with him. A strange incident occurred here. It is said that one day the Dewan of Jodhpur Fatehchand Singhji, while passing through the bazar, noticed thirteen lay persons, performing their religious worship in a vacant shop. He enquired of them the reason of their not resorting to the Sthānak for such religious practices as usual. He was informed of the entire episode of the difference of opinion between Sant Sri Bhikan Ji and his Ācharya, and the former's subsequent adventure of establishing a new order, based on the principles enunciated by him. He was also informed that there were only thirteen monks in that order so far. By chance a poet, who was standing nearby and listening to the whole story, composed a short poem eulogising the sect and naming it, the Terāpanth (the Panth of the thirteen). When Sri Bhikan Ji came to know of the poem, he gave a very appropriate interpretation to it. As the word Tehrā in Rājasthān is pronounced as Terā, which also means thine literally, so he said "A person who observes the five great vows of Truth, non-violence, non-stealing, brahmacharya and non-possession, who follows the five samitis or the rules of conduct and resorts to the three gupties i.e., the control of mind, body and speech, is a Terāpanthi or the follower of Tera (Thine, i.e. Lord's) Panth or path". Ever since, this sect is called as such. It may be mentioned here that Sant Sri Bhikan Ji did not agree with the Sthānakbāsi Śvetāmber sect in the belief that a non-Jain cannot attain *moksha*. Thus he gave a wider and

more cosmopolitan outlook to Jainism. According to Jainism the bondage of the soul is due to the inflow of the karmic matter in it. Consequently, who-so-ever destroys this karmic matter by resorting to the path of right knowledge, right faith, right conduct and right austerities can attain *moksha*, irrespective of his caste, creed and sex. Sri Bhikan Ji explained the basic principles of Jain Philosophy in simple Rājasthāni dialect. He wrote on sixty-one different subjects, and in all he composed thirty-eight thousand Gāthās. In one of his works, he has given the analysis of the nine basic principles in the simplest possible manner. It would be desirable to give a brief account of this analysis of his here. According to Jain metaphysics there are nine basic principles or tattvas viz: (1) Jiva, (2) Ajiva, (3) Puṇya, (4) Pāpa, (5) Āsrava, (6) Saṁvara, (7) Bandha, (8) Nirjarā and (9) Moksha. (1) Jiva is the animate substance having consciousness, or knowledge and darshan or perception. Jiva or soul may change its appearance, but its reality is unchangeable. Just as the appearance of the gold is changed by melting, moulding and hammering it out into various kinds of ornaments, but its substantive reality remains unchangeable, similarly the soul may change its form and shape on account of the inflow of karmas, but its reality is always unchanged.

(2) Ajiva is the unconscious substance. It is further divided into five forms, viz., (a) Dharma, (b) Adharma, (c) Ākāsha, (d) Kāla and (e) Pudgala. Dharma is the substance, which helps in the movement of Jivas or Pudgala, i.e., unconscious matter. It is immovable itself, but it helps the movements of the moving objects. It is eternal, formless and pervades the universe. Adharma is just the opposite of Dharma and is necessary to help objects coming to a stand-still. It is an indirect cause of the fixation of objects. It is also eternal formless and universal. Ākāsha is also an eternal formless and all pervading substance, which allows space to objects and is the container of the substances. Kāla is the eternal and formless substance, which is the cause of the change of things and which gives rise to the past, present and future. Pudgala is the eternal perceivable matter, which is capable of being melted and moulded into forms.

(3) Puṇya or meritorious karma is regarded as a subtle form of Pudgala. It is the karmic matter, which comes in conjunction with Jiva and brings it good fruits. Puṇya gives happiness to the Jiva.

(4) Pāpa is also a subtle karmic matter, which wraps the soul and which gives rise to bad fruits. It gives pain to the Jiva. Just as good diet makes the body healthy and bad diet makes it unhealthy, similarly the Puṇya gives happiness (sukha) and pāpa gives pain or (dukha) to the soul. The health and disease of the body increase and diminish in proportion to the good and the bad diet. In like manner, the happiness and the pain of the Jiva diminishes and increases in proportion to its Puṇya and Pāpa. When both kinds of diet, i.e., good and bad are stopped, the body perishes. So when both Puṇya and Pāpa are done away with, the Jiva is liberated from the karmic matter.

(5) Āsrava is the inlet in the soul, through which the karmic matter enters. It is like the inlet of a tank. Just as the inlet and the tank are one, similarly the Jiva and Āsrava are one. Just as the inlet allows the flow of water into the tank, similarly Āsrava allows the flow of karmic matter in the soul. Just as the water and the inlet are different from each other, similarly karmic matter and Āsrava are different from each other. Just as inlet is that, which allows the flow of water, but inlet is not water; similarly Āsrava is that, which allows the flow of karmic matter, but karmic matter is not Āsrava.

(6) Saṁvara is the blockade or stoppage of all karmic matter. That which stops the flow of karmic matter into the soul is Saṁvara.

(7) Nirjarā : It is the partial shaking off of the karmic matter, which makes the soul pure.

(8) Bāṇḍha : The bondage of karmas with the Jiva is Bāṇḍha. Bāṇḍha makes the Jiva and the karma joined together like oil and oilseed, like ghee and milk and like mineral and earth.

(9) Moksha is the complete annihilation of karmas. Just as oil is freed from the seed by means of the oil expeller, similarly the Jiva is freed from the karmic matter by means of the self-control and austerities, etc. Just as ghee is separated from milk by means of the churning instrument, similarly the Jiva is separated from the karmic matter by means of self-control and austerities, etc. Just as mineral is separated from the earth by means of fire, similarly, Jiva is separated from the karmic matter by means of self-control and austerities, etc. This is moksha.

There are numerous Pradeshas or regions of the Jiva and all the regions have their own inlets or Āsravas. Consequently the karmic matter enters through all the regions of the Jiva, like the water of a tank, which flows through all its inlets. Just as all the inlets of the tank are blocked in order to empty it, similarly all the Āsravas are to be blocked in order to put an end to the karmic matter. This is Saṁvara. Just as having blocked all the inlets of the tank, the water is let out by opening the outlets and the tank is partially emptied; in the same manner, having blocked the Āsravas by Saṁvara, it is necessary to undergo austerities to let out the karmic matter. In this way Jiva is partially purified. This is called Nirjarā. Nirjarā frees the soul from karmas partially. Just as the entire tank is emptied by letting the water out gradually, similarly when all the pradeshas of the Jiva are freed from karmic matter by letting it out gradually and when the Jiva is completely purified and becomes self-luminous, it attains moksha. On account of the simplicity of expression, self-devotion and right interpretation of the Jain Śāstras, on the part of the founder of the Terāpanth, this sect attracted the attention of the masses and gradually gained ground.

The first Āchārya Saṁt Sri Bhikaṇ Ji was succeeded by Āchārya Bharimal Ji Swami in the year 1803. Āchārya Sri Bhikaṇ Ji had initiated 39 monks and 56 nuns in his life time. The Second Āchārya passed away at Rājnagar (Mewār) in 1821, having initiated 38 monks and 44 nuns. The third Āchārya was Sri Rai-chand Ji, who initiated 77 monks and 168 nuns.

Sri Kālu Rām Ji Swāmi, the eighth Acharya of the Sect was a profound Sanskrit Scholar. He ascended the gaddi, as Acharya in the year 1909. He was eminent for his great learning and mastery over the Jain literature. For his sound and correct interpretation of Jain Śāstras, he was held high by many contemporary philosophers of India, as well as of Europe. Sri. C. M. Chopra in his book, "The Short History of the Terapanthi Sect" writes about him as follows :—

"His sweet, clear, sonorous and penetrating voice moved and stirred the heart of his audience so much, that even the hardest heart melted away like snow and learned to show real compassion towards living beings. His holiness was one of the world's greatest soldiers in the spiritual field, who fought bravely the spiritual war for the emancipation of the soul". The name of Dr. Hermann Jacobi of Bonn and Dr. Charles W. Gilkey of Chicago may be men-

tioned as two of the notable persons, who paid visit to His Holiness and who were much impressed by his personality and high erudition. He initiated 155 monks and 255 nuns. Three days before his death, he nominated Swāmi Tūlśi Gaṇi Ji as his successor.

His Holiness Swāmi Tūlśi Gaṇi Ji, the present Āchārya is a scholar of Saṅskrit and Prakrit, a master of Jain Śāstras and a Rājasthāni poet of high order. The very fact that he was nominated as the Āchārya at the young age of 22 by such a great Āchārya, as Sri Kaluram Ji, goes a long way to show his proficiency and the greatness of his personality. He has so far initiated over four hundred monks and nuns and commands the respect of 3 lakhs of lay followers, the majority of whom are well-to-do businessmen. The present number of monks and nuns under his order and discipline is about 750.

In the introduction to "The Cultural Heritage of India", Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has remarked: "Spiritual life is the true genius of India. Those, who make the greatest appeal to the Indian mind are not the military conquerors, not the rich merchants or the great diplomats, but the holy sages, the rishis, who embody spirituality at its finest and purest. India's pride is that almost in every generation and in every part of the country, from the time of her recorded history, she has produced these holy men, who embody for her all that the country holds most dear and sacred. By their lives they teach us that pride and power, wealth and glory are nothing in comparison with the power of spirit. It is those who scorn their own lives, that raise life above our scorn". The truth of this statement is amply proved by the selfless and pure life of the hundreds of ascetics of the Terāpanthi Sect, who in spite of originally belonging to the richest community of India, have relinquished wealth and who even in the twentieth century never use any conveyance whatsoever, and wander from village to village and from town to town traversing the distance of hundreds of miles on foot, preaching the culture of common virtues, for the spiritual uplift of mankind. They are all under the guidance and control of their Āchārya, who is called the Pūjyaji Mahāraj and who is the highest Spiritual authority and the object of the greatest reverence of all the followers, whether laymen or ascetics. He is held so high, because of his self-sacrifice, high learning and an exalted moral life, dedicated to the betterment of soul and uplift of humanity. All the monks and nuns follow his personal example and lead a pure and simple life, with the aim of

bringing about a spiritual regeneration in society by exhorting people to lead a perfect life. In the modern world of conflicts and wars, aggression and violence, there are in India, not one or two, but hundreds of pure souls, who never resort to violence, who do not cause any injury to any man, bird or beast by body mind or speech and who have nothing, but love and compassion for all the living creatures. In the present age of economic race and lust for private property, these noble selfless workers have no worldly belongings, neither money nor property, and are content with three wooden utensils, and a few books, which they themselves carry from place to place. They are the living apostles of non-violence, truth, purity and goodness and represent that spiritual force, that lustre and illumination, which is expected to lead the suffering world, that is at the verge of committing suicide, from the darkness of doubt, chaos and conflict to the light of hope, order and peace.

A Note on Freedom

BY

G. R. MALKANI

1. The problem of freedom may be considered at different levels. There is freedom at the naturalistic level, when we will any movement of the body with reference to external nature. We cannot deny this freedom altogether. At the same time, freedom is here limited by the life of desire and impulse. Our will is determined, in no small measure, by the requirements of life.

Some will deny freedom here altogether. They will argue: "Being what we are, we cannot but act as we do. We all have certain habits, and possess a particular nature. Our acts follow from these almost automatically." We cannot refute the argument that whenever we act, our nature, whatever it is at the time, expresses itself in the act. At the same time, we cannot deny that we are not automatons. Even when we act under the force of a desire or impulse, we feel that we can check the impulse, control it. This feeling would not be possible if we were absolutely determined. Whenever we act consciously, we act with a sense of freedom. Our consciousness and our sense of freedom always go together. The one is an indication of the other. It is only when we act unconsciously that we may be said to act without freedom and to be determined by the needs of the body or by our fixed habits. But this limit is rarely reached in our conscious life. We are responsible for most of our acts during this life. Sometimes there may be extenuating circumstances which determine our course of action to a greater or a lesser degree. But our freedom is not annulled altogether. It is limited, but real. We carry the dead weight of the past, but we are free in the present moment. It is by such acts of limited freedom that we have built up our nature and made it what it is. We are thus masters of our destiny.

It is possible to argue that freedom is either absolute or nil. There is no sense in saying that we are free only partly. Part-freedom is no freedom. We are either free or not free. If we are not absolutely free, then we are determined. Let us carry our life back into the past, to the very first act that we ever did. What decided us to a particular course, and not to another? Two equally

free spirits ought to act in an identical manner. There is no question that they will be *induced in a different degree* by a particular course of action prompted by desire. If they are induced in a different degree, it is because there is already a determination in their nature, which makes them so liable. How then do we account for different behaviour? The logic of this leads us to the inevitable conclusion that we are never *really* free, and that we are merely acting a part imposed upon us from the outside or by the reality that has made us and fixed our place in the order of things. There is no freedom at all.

This may even be so, and it may fit in with a certain religious temperament of complete resignation. But we all *want to be free* from all limitations. The question cannot therefore be burked,—what is absolute freedom.

2. The next higher level of freedom is moral freedom. We act with a greater sense of freedom when we shake off the domination of desire and self-interest, and act solely by the authority of the moral law. We *ought* to do certain things, and *ought not* to do certain other things. Here the will is more itself, more autonomous. It legislates for itself. It is no longer under the sway of an external force. It is obeying the law of its own being or the law of practical reason valid for all rational beings. The authority of the moral law is not an external authority, which may be said to determine us from the outside. It is the authority of reason itself in the practical sphere. Action in accordance with the moral law therefore can be said to be autonomous or free.

It is evident however that every formulation of the law must take into account human nature and human environment. For a being who is through and through rational, and who has no animal nature, there is nothing called an 'ought' or the categorical imperative. It is because man is a complex being and *naturally inclined* to act out of desire or self-interest, that the moral law takes the form of an 'ought' or a kind of external authority. Besides, the moral law by itself lacks content. A perfectly moral being like God will have *no motive* for action. There will be no moral behaviour for him, no action called moral. Motives of action arise only at the human level of bodily and social existence, where conflict of interests is possible. *It is part of the law to sublimate the animal and the egoistic nature of man.* Man's moral freedom is still limited to courses of action that are grounded in his finite

human nature. He has a natural invitation to certain courses of action. By recognising the authority of the moral law, he changes their direction by replacing self-seeking motives by other-seeking or altruistic motives. More generally, he impresses upon his motives the universality of the law, and thus holds the animal in him in check. His freedom is not perfect. It is only a step in that direction. Perfect freedom lacks any motive of action. It cannot determine itself one way or the other. Self-determination and freedom ill go together. It is not through self determination, but through the negation of every motive of action, that perfect freedom is realized. Even the authority of the moral law is an impediment and a limitation. It is in some sense coercive. A truly free man knows no law. He is a law unto himself, if that has any meaning. There is no conventional morality for him. Or if we may say so, what he does is moral, because *he* does it.

3. This brings us to the third level of freedom. Naturalistic freedom and moral freedom are still qualitative only. Man may be said to *act* freely, not that he *is* free. This substantial freedom is the only real freedom. It is only when man has realized his own true divine nature, that all his acts can be said to be expressions of real absolute freedom. He has no longer a dual nature. He has entirely subordinated his lower animal nature. He is a pure or a liberated soul. "Action does not bind or limit the liberated man; action does not bind or limit the Eternal; but we can go farther and say that action does not bind or limit our own true being at all. It binds or limits only the surface constructed personality." Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 251-3.

Let us now be clear about this freedom of being or free being. A liberated soul has nothing really to work for, no motive of action. Why should he act at all? If he acts, he acts because of his human nature. There is still *a certain* duality of nature in him. His released soul in some way realizes its divine nature and regards itself as free from all worldly encumbrances, including the body and its relationships. His human nature regards certain ends as good, others as bad. The world is not unreal to him. It is something real. So are other individuals and their sufferings. Naturally, he wants to relieve their sufferings. If he finds that he can add to the good and refuses to do so, he cannot find peace. He must help. This is just Lokamānya Tilak's thesis. A released soul has got to do something and help the world, in order to relieve its pain and to enable it to attain its higher spiritual evolution. If

he does not do it, he will not have attained to the fullness of his spiritual stature. Individual salvation (*eka-jiva-mukti*) is not desirable, even if it is possible. It must be accompanied by universal salvation (*sarva-mukti*). It follows that a certain Vedantic view, according to which "the one is equal to the all" or the salvation of the one is equal to the salvation of the all, must be rejected as false. The one is not equal to the all, nor can the one dispense with the all. The individual man cannot be in a more privileged position than God Himself. If God has to serve humanity from age to age by assuming the form of man, as Hindu orthodoxy believes, why not a mere man?

It is evident that this view is opposed to the views of a certain school of Vedantic thought. If the world is real, and humanity is real, they provide an environment for the individual that is very different from the environment of the released soul according to Advait Vedanta. If there is a real 'other', it is bound to be a limitation. It will react upon the individual, and make of him an exclusive personality. Can an exclusive personality be perfectly free? Has he not to take account of the 'other' that limits him? No mere individual can attain to perfect freedom. He must shed his individuality. Then alone can he be a released soul. But then what duties and what obligations for him? He has become the All. There is an end to all the purposes of life. There is no law of action for him. His freedom cannot be translated into a code of conduct. There is no literal expression of it. If he acts, he acts out of *grace*. There is *no necessity* for him of any kind. His knowledge has broken the connection between "the surface-personality and all the motives of which it is capable," and his real Self. The purest human motives are still human, and infected with human limitation. The real superman is he who acts as though he was not acting. This is the ideal of human freedom, according to Advait Vedanta. Can we stop short of it?

It is evident that if humanity at large is real and requires our help, we cannot retire into our peace; for we shall not find peace. Our destinies are somehow tied up with it. Can the end of our journey be fully realized at any time? If not, then there is work and there are duties still! We cannot be quite free. Where then is the released soul? He might have attained his highest. But there is something higher still. For how can he ignore the call for help of a suffering humanity? There is a real bond between him and others. This bond can only be broken by the knowledge of the

Self as the Self of all, and by the knowledge of the illusory character of all empirical existence. There is then no demand for action of any kind. It is freedom through knowledge, not through acts. There is no other real freedom in the strict sense.

If what we have said about the liberated soul is true, the same must be true about the Absolute and the Eternal. He can have no cosmic purpose or cosmic plan. If he had, he would be a magnified man. A purpose is a limitation. When I have set a purpose for my activity, my freedom is restricted to that extent. There can be no such thing as a growing purpose for the Absolute, as it can be, say, for the artist. And what purpose after all? Can it be anything but finite purpose, deriving its reality and its meaning from a finite personality? How can the Infinite so determine itself, if it is conscious of itself? There can be no such thing as infinite purpose.

Let us suppose that there is no purpose in the Absolute. The activity of the Absolute issues out of supreme Bliss. But if this means anything, it means perfect self-fulfilment, and perfect peace. Such peace cannot contain within itself an inner urge or tension, that makes for activity of some kind. Even sport or *lila* is ruled out; for it implies some inner tension which is relieved through sportive activity. It is always desire, conscious or unconscious, pure or impure, that forms the motive of action; and desire is a bondage, even if it is the purest in character. The Eternal cannot suffer from desire. He cannot therefore act consistently with his own absolute freedom.

4. Real freedom is freedom of being. It does not express itself in action; for action is incompatible with it. It has *no expression* outside being. But does the Absolute then suffer from a certain incapacity for action? This however would be a wrong way of putting it. Incapacity is a limitation, because greater power and greater freedom is achieved through its removal. But where the capacity itself is a limitation, the negation of the capacity can only make for greater freedom. It is in this sense that the Absolute is incapable of action. At the same time, it would be wrong to describe it as inactive or static. We associate with these states the lack of a certain capacity, the capacity to move or to act. The Absolute lacks nothing. It fulfils. The negation is therefore the way to complete freedom and self-fulfilment. The Absolute is neither static nor dynamic. It is the reality beyond them both.

The Absolute neither acts nor creates a world. If it does anything of the kind, it would be *of the world*. Only the Absolute that has lost its stand or forgotten itself to some extent or become united to *māyā* can act or create. But then we are no longer dealing with perfect freedom, that is achieved through knowledge. The Absolute may be said to act in ignorance only. There is no act that is inherent in, or conforms to, Absolute Freedom, which is the freedom of being, pure and simple. We conclude that we have no analogy and no meaning for an action out of perfection and an expression of it.

God in all theological systems is supposed to be perfect. And yet He is understood to have created a world. His knowledge lacks nothing, nor does His power. Is He not perfectly free when He makes a world? He could make or unmake or make differently. Thus we can combine in Him the power to do all things and complete freedom of the Self. Is this not a more concrete ideal for man than a non-human kind of being, that appears to be the negation of everything that we value as human beings? Like a great magician, with unlimited powers, He brings into being what His vision determines in its absolute wisdom. There is a combination of values here that far transcends the impersonal ideal of the Absolute.

The tradition says that God made man after His own image. But it appears to us equally true that man makes God after his own image. After all God, however conceived, is only the Supreme man or *puruṣottam*, endowed with love, power, etc., to an unlimited degree. If a real God has made a real man, it is equally true that a real man has made a real God. If man could realize his limitation as man and shed his individuality and humanity, his God would have to be a very different God. The problem of freedom brings into prominence the limitations of man as a free agent and the logic behind his aspiration after complete freedom. Can God, conceived after man, escape those limitations and that logic? The best interpretation of God would be that He is the human image under which man conceives the Eternal and the Absolute. This image has a meaning and a value for man. But that does not mean that it is the reality itself or that it represents the Absolute Freedom that he seeks.

Why did God create a world? What was His motive behind it? Is it all a cruel joke or a serious venture? Does the being

of God get any glory added to it through the venture? These are inconvenient questions for the theologian. It would be to the greater glory of God if He could do without a world of this sort, and in fact without any world whatsoever. The real God requires no world and creates none. And yet if it is created, it could only be created as all illusions are created. There is no alternative to the Vedantic ideal of the Absolute, that is unrelated to the world except through the creative power of ignorance.

5. It is possible to argue that freedom should not be confused with being, and that there is no such thing as substantial freedom or freedom of being, which we have suggested above as the only ultimate kind of freedom. Being is the correlate of knowledge. It is what is known. It has necessarily a substantial character, or a standing character. If we sought the Absolute of knowledge, we should arrive, by the logical analysis of knowledge, at something that is both immutable and self-evident,—immutable because that is the character of all substance that alone is known, and self-evident because that alone is *truly* known. It is something that literally is, and that determines knowledge itself instead of being determined by knowledge. It is what we should call the thing-in-itself in some sense in which the thing-in-itself is self-revealing to knowledge and not a hypothetical entity that is both unknown and unknowable.

The logic of knowledge however is to be distinguished from the logic of will. Will is the principle of freedom. Whenever we will, we are said to will freely. There is no other kind of willing. But this freedom of the will is encrusted with static elements that prove as a dead weight upon it, and so limit it. As in all knowledge there is an element of truth, so in all willing there is an element of freedom. The problem is to get rid, through analysis and through negation, of the other element which is incompatible with the nature of willing, and creates a discord within it. It is arguable that the static elements in willing belong either to the sphere of desire and passion, or to the authority of the moral law which seeks to curb desire and to replace the blindness of impulse by a super-natural or divine law. Freedom is not complete till these static elements are rejected and negated; and when they are negated, we get the Absolute of will.

We can go a step farther, and construct a whole system of philosophy in terms of our volitional experience. We can argue that *standing being itself* is an illusion created by desire, the static

element in willing. It is a kind of self-love or self-interest that gives rise to the greatest of our illusions, namely the identity and the changelessness of the self. It is desire (*vāsnā*) again which gives the appearance of being or reality to things of sense, which are always in a flux, and which would be so regarded by any dispassionate intelligence that was not blinded by desire. Even the appearance of externality or of non-mental existence may be due to *vāsnā*. This illusion of the permanence of things external is the cause of our enticement, and also the cause of our loss of freedom or bondage. Instead of knowing ourselves as free, we know ourselves as restricted on all sides by a self-existing and immovable world of objects. This illusion of being must be dissipated, if we are to realize our true freedom, which is not the freedom of being, but freedom *beyond* being. The way to this is through the negation of every kind of motivation that makes of us actors on the world-stage. The end can only come when our freedom is complete, and the illusion of being is terminated on all sides. We are then the reality without being. We may call it the *nirvāṇa* of non-being, or just *śūnya*. We are free *from* being, and *above* and *beyond* being, which is just our illusion and our bondage. What therefore is real for knowledge, namely permanence of things or being, is just illusory for will, and vice-versa. The former is the ideal of Advait Vedanta, the later the ideal of Buddhism. There is no contradiction between the two, except when we confuse the logic of knowledge with the logic of will. Each is supreme in its own field, and indicates the kind of the Absolute that is possible in each case. Beyond this Absolute, we cannot go logically. There can be alternate forms of the Absolute, each true in its own way.

This view has the merit that freedom is understood in relation to our volitional experience only; for it is in that experience that it has its proper meaning. But we are not quite convinced that its analysis of the so-called illusion of being is quite satisfactory. It is arguable that everything is momentary (*kṣaṇik*) and that nothing really "stands" in all that we empirically know. But the very knowledge of change is impossible, if there were nothing unchanging. Universal change would lead to universal unreality, including change itself. It is called in Vedanta the fallacy of *jagat-andha*, or non-appearance of a world.

This however may not be a fallacy, but only a logical consummation, as the *mādhyaṃika* Buddhists might argue. We may, in a universal negation of being, have to negate change itself, and thus pass from the momentary (*kṣaṇik*) to absolute non-being

(*śūnya*). If we cannot dip in the same river twice, we cannot dip in the same river even once; and so nothing is what it is even in the moment it appears to be. But even so, how do we account for the appearance of momentary being at all? Non-being or *śūnya* cannot appear as being. It is only being that can so appear, whether the appearance is true to it or not. All illusions of being imply real being. The illusion of being cannot be explained through mere will alone. This illusion only arises when the creations of will are confused with real being in the back-ground.

It may now be argued that the analysis we have given relates to the illusions of knowledge. But there are illusions of will too. There might be a truth of will and an illusion of will. We have an illusion of will when what is in truth and in fact "freedom beyond being" is confused with static being which is the object of thought. It is this kind of illusion that is hinted at by those philosophers who argue that reality is moving and changing, but that it is made to appear as static through the interference of thought with its static habits. Thought, they say, is attuned to apprehend dead matter, not living and moving reality which is essentially spiritual. Here the false appearance is attributed to thought and truth to the will. The functions of knowledge and of will are just reversed. But the difficulty here is that knowledge is never creative. It is the will that is creative. Where something is made to appear which is not there, it is the will in the form of conception that is responsible for the appearance. In other words, all forms of illusion are due to will alone. No creation, no illusion; and creation belongs to the will, not to knowledge. Furthermore, what is created in all illusory appearance is a misrepresentation of the real state of things. We may call this state of things "freedom" or *śūnya*. But in so far as it constitutes the truth of the illusion, it has necessarily to be understood in the cognitive way. All illusion is in the end a matter of misperception. There is no other illusion, called the illusion of will. But if that is so, there is only one analysis of illusion, namely that which is proper to erroneous knowledge.

Secondly, an immutable being cannot be denied by those who admit any form of illusion at all. How, for instance, can an illusion occur, if there is only a succession of mental states? An immutable consciousness, that knows the illusion and knows the truth, and that can therefore see an illusion as cancelled, is essential to the very possibility of an illusion. An uncanceled illusion is no illusion in any sense. This consciousness is beyond the will. It

is of the nature of being. It is self-identical in all willing. The fundamental fact is not that "there is a willing", but that "I will". How can the will explain away the being of that which is its own presupposition?

Thirdly, right knowledge has an essential bearing upon right willing, not vice-versa. The way of knowledge is therefore superior to the way of freedom through the will. It is a fact of human consciousness that the state of knowledge determines our will. Without knowledge we will blindly. If we know the truth, our will will be automatically determined in accordance with the truth, and such willing is the only right willing. Taking Vedanta as the way of knowledge *par excellence*, it can be argued that knowledge of the truth makes us free. The knot of the Self and the not-Self is resolved, and there is freedom from empirical existence as such. The willing that is compatible with such knowledge cannot bind us. This cannot be said about the freedom achieved through the will alone, but which is accompanied by ignorance of being. It is not fundamental freedom. It leaves questions about being unresolved. This then is the difference: Right knowledge resolves the problems of will; for we cannot will in opposition to knowledge which is direct and absolutely certain. But we can know erroneously even when our will is free to all intents and purposes. Our ignorance about the truth cannot be dissipated through any discipline of the will or possible freedom achieved in that sphere. If the illusion of *otherness* in the realm of being persists, it will constitute a limitation upon our freedom. It therefore stands more to reason if we trace desire, the static element in willing which is supposed to account for the illusion of being, to ignorance of being or wrong knowledge, as Advait Vedanta contends. Our fundamental malady is ignorance of the truth, not desire. The latter is a product of the former. Wrong knowledge leads to the distinction of good and bad, and this distinction in its turn leads to desire and aversion.

Fourthly, freedom is a relative concept and can only belong to intelligent being. We can understand that being is free or that freedom belongs to being. It is impossible to attach any meaning to freedom *beyond being*, or freedom *without being*. It is like value without reality. The very concept of freedom raises the question, *whose freedom?* It is not freedom that is free, but being that is free. Freedom implies an immutable being behind it. It is only such being that can enjoy freedom or achieve it. But if the very self-identity of the self is an illusion, then nothing is bound

and nothing can be free. The very content and meaning of freedom evaporates. It becomes a vacuous concept.


Lastly, the consummation of freedom, called *Nirvāna* by the Buddhists, is supposed to take the form of a higher intellectual intuition of what is beyond both being and non-being. How are we to understand such an intuition without reference to being of any kind? It can only be the intuition of true being or transcendent being, that is at the same time free. Mere freedom, however transcendent, but without the implication of being, cannot be the content of any intuition. What appears to be indicated by such an intuition is that there is a transcendent freedom that is coincident with being, so that the two cannot be distinguished or kept apart any more. It is the Vedantic conception of Brahman that is by its very nature freedom itself; it is both being and freedom; for freedom does not attach to it as a quality, but takes on a substantial character. Brahman is one and indivisible, although we may arbitrarily, and for our own convenience of understanding, distinguish many different aspects or qualities within it.

6. It will now be said: The criticism given above is valid if we want to have a unitary experience which reconciles the Absolute of Knowledge, namely Truth, with the Absolute of will, namely Freedom. But logically speaking, such a consummation is unattainable. Logically speaking, we can only get at the form of the Absolute implied in knowledge or in will, but never at the Absolute implied in both those forms of experience. A further question of the unity of the different forms of the Absolute does not arise; for it has no logical basis. The original question starts from a certain aspect of experience; and when it is resolved, no question is left over. The Absolute is the limit of all questions. The unity of the different forms of the Absolute, if there is unity, may be experienced. It cannot be logically asserted; and when it is asserted, we are confusing two different stand-points.

It is true that we have different kinds of questions. We want to know what we *are*; and we want to know what we should *become*. But while the answer to the former question resolves the latter, the converse is not true. If I know what I am in my essential being, I have no need to do anything in order to become. If I am the Truth, the Truth can make me free. To get at the Truth of myself is a philosophic possibility. To achieve freedom is not a philosophic possibility. Philosophy can only indicate the direction my will should take in order to be itself or to be free;

and when this freedom is achieved, if it is at all achieved, it does not resolve the problem of Truth. The philosophical approach to Truth can only take the form of the knowledge of the Truth, and only secondarily the form of the freedom of the Truth. For freedom is through knowledge. In any other sense, it will not be a matter for philosophy alone, and it is bound to be limited by the want of knowledge of the Truth.

The Absolute is not merely a matter of logical form. We may reach the form, although it is doubtful whether we can do so without some clue provided by a higher religious experience that supports it. But even if we reach the form, how are we to transform it into an experience which alone can realize the form? It would be a very narrow view of philosophy to restrict it merely to the resolution of certain logical questions, leaving the actual experience of the Absolute reached in this way to some kind of spiritual culture or non-philosophical discipline. There is a distinctly philosophical approach to the Truth; and it can only take the form of knowledge of the Truth. Logic is only an aid. It is not an independent form of establishing the Truth which we might then proceed to experience. Philosophy is a concrete affair, not an abstract logical affair. Logic is critical thinking within the wider scope of knowledge and the means thereto, which may not be quite logical. The adventure of philosophy with its goal of realising the Truth goes beyond logic. If we once admit that, knowledge of the Truth becomes the main concern of philosophy, and freedom becomes a desideratum only in so far as it is involved in that knowledge. Philosophically, we can only know; we cannot become, except in the sense in which to know is to become.



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