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CONTENTS

	PAGE
Critical Humanism by P. T. Raju	.. 1
Intuition and Immediacy in Hegel by R. N. Kaul	.. 13
The Principle of the Unity and Conflict of Opposites in Dialectical Materialism by Kalyan Chandra Gupta	.. 19
The Method Pursued in Russell's Philosophy by K. N. Kar	.. 27
Dynamism of Personality by S. N. Roy	.. 35
The Place of the Philosopher in Society by G. R. Malkani	.. 41
Whitehead in the Adventure of Philosophy by Bernhard Mollenhauer	.. 51
Discussion — Probas Jivan Chaudhury	.. 57



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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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Critical Humanism

BY

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I

Dr. Radhakrishnan says, in the Preface to his *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, that "a new humanism is on the horizon. But this time it embraces the whole of mankind". He is obviously not referring to the humanism of Schiller, which attracted the attention of the academic circles a few decades ago and which was already old by the time the reference was made. He is of course not referring to the humanism of the American Democracy or of the Russian Communism, both of which criticise each other for not being truly humanistic. He is referring to a humanism that would be fair and just to everything that is true in man, that respects the dignity of man; to that humanistic spirit that is rising in revolt against every form of religion, society and politics that has tended to disvalue the human individual and treated him as unimportant and at most as a means to an end. In the history of humanity, this revolt has taken several forms, each of which was confined to some particular place and time; but the present revolt is going to envelop the whole of mankind, because the world is much more close-knit now than at any other time before. And in the new humanism nothing of value that was discovered in the past would be and could be lost. Humanity could ill afford to spurn the wisdom of the past and jettison the past discoveries of the human mind. For humanism to be perfect, it should not discard anything of value in man. And everything that is of value and belongs to the being

of man can be discovered only through criticism. If the dignity of the human individual is to be defended and if he is to be made the centre of our philosophy, then his nature is to be critically understood; if our humanism is to be true to man, then his nature has to be rightly grasped. Hence critical humanism. We should not make a false or imperfect conception of man the centre and stand-point of philosophy.

Critical humanism is opposed to naive humanism in that the former does not accept a naive and uncritical conception of man as the stand-point. There is a tendency in some forms of modern humanism to understand man according to some prescription of a political ideology. Whether man naturally fits into that conception or not, he is forced into it like plaster into a mould. If he does not fit into the mould, either he or the mould will break. In such forms of humanism there is potential human disaster. Schiller wanted to have a philosophy from the stand-point of "man as such". But "man as such", "man as he stands" "man as he sees himself", etc., are very vague ideas and can be understood in quite conflicting ways. Nor is it enough to understand man as a product of evolution and have as our philosophy "evolutionary humanism". If our philosophy of humanism does not recognise the truth of evolution, it would be imperfect; but just by such recognition it would not be perfect, as there may be other factors involved in the being of man which evolution may not be able either to explain or to evaluate. It is criticism of man's conscious experience that brought to the forefront the truth of evolution; but his experience discloses several other truths. So man's conscious experience is prior to evolution in a philosophical enquiry and for philosophical evaluation. It would be wrong to start with the concept of evolution in order to explain man and his ideals. It has become the common vogue of science to attach little or no value to man's consciousness and so to conscious experience. Philosophy has been imitating this practice. But what interest can we have in things, whether they be of heaven or of earth, if they are not significant for our conscious experience?

Dissatisfaction with the extremes and excesses of traditional philosophies may lead one to recoil to opposite extremes and commit opposite excesses and thereby reject everything true along with the false. It is not merely impossible but also unwise and harmful to reject everything past, just for the reason that it was discovered by a philosophy which has assumed false forms now, and then start anew. If our philosophy is to be true to man, it should accept every truth discovered about man. It would be presumptuous to

say that all philosophies that existed before a particular philosopher were absolutely wrong. Human knowledge never progresses by rejecting everything that is past as absolutely false. Likewise, our philosophy should leave its doors open to every truth that might be discovered about man in the future. True humanism cannot start with principles that restrict man *a priori* to a particular nature.

For instance, humanism may start with the conception of man as a material being, or a biological entity, or mind, or spirit. But if it starts with the assumption that he is any one of these only, it is *a priori* restricting the nature of man. On the contrary, what we should say is: If our criticism of man reveals to us that he is all these, we should accept them; and if the same criticism reveals to us any more factors, we should accept them also.

The defect of materialism is that it took the concept of matter, which is an interpretation of part of our experience, as primary for the interpretation of the whole of our experience. Similar is the defect of many other philosophies. On the other hand, criticism and interpretation of human experience reveal to us that it contains matter, life, mind and spirit, all of which meet in man and his experience. The primary fact therefore for philosophy is man and the world he experiences, not merely man or the world or any of the factors which either contains. "Man-and-world" therefore is the starting point of philosophy. Man cannot and does not think about the world from which he is excluded and to which he does not belong. The world is the world for man, and man is part of the world about which he thinks and in which he acts. There is much truth in the Sankhyan idea that mind and its corresponding objects issue out of an original Ego (*Ahamkara*), in which the split between the subject and the object occurs. The world is the world of the mind that thinks; and that mind can say: "The world is my world; for experience reveals to me that I and my world are part of my consciousness". This view is not necessarily subjective; unfortunately in the English philosophical terminology, there is no word with a meaning that corresponds to the idea of the Sankhyan Ego. The monad of Leibnitz, with some modifications, may be made to correspond to the Sankhyan Ego.

When we start with man plus the world as the primary datum for philosophy, we should not identify this world with matter. Whether the objective world consists of material bodies or persons can be known only from other considerations. The primary datum is the I and the objectivity that I face. It is this objectivity that throws back my mind from the free play of imagination to existence

and affirmative concreteness. I am constrained to feel my existence in face of existent objectivity. In mere imagination and pure subjectivity, one may not touch one's existence.

One advantage of starting with the "I and my world" as the primary datum is that it leaves the epistemological problem and its solution open. "I and my world" is the philosophical datum not only for my waking consciousness but also for my dream consciousness. Objectivity belongs as much to our waking consciousness as to the dream, though the dream objects may be of a different status from that of the objects of waking life. In neither can we create objects at our will, as we can do in our imagination. The vogue of treating the dream objects as objects of imagination or mental images has no epistemological justification. The imaginary world is a shadowy play of existence; it is not existence. In imagination I can imagine myself as a millionaire or beggar without being affected; but I am not so unaffected in dream.

Similarly, existence is involved in the perception of illusory and hallucinatory objects; for I feel my existence threatened by them. It is therefore wrong to say that illusion and hallucination are mere imagination, while perception is not. The latter too contains as much imagination as the other two. And all the three contain objective reference, in that the factor of objective reference is an element in their structure while it is absent from imagination. Dream, like illusion and hallucination, only goes to prove the privacy and autonomy of the human individual and his existence, not airiness like the objects of imagination.

Just as the starting point, "I and my world", does not unnecessarily delimit the solution of the epistemological problem of dream, illusion and hallucination, it does not also delimit the epistemological determination of the nature of the object. The dualism of mind and matter expounded by Descartes turned every object *a priori* into a material one and gave rise to a number of problems, one of which is the problem of our knowledge of other minds. But the object of mind need not be matter alone; it may be another mind or life. It is no objection to say that, if mind can be an object of another mind, then we should be able to know all that is passing in other minds. For, which mind knows all that is passing even within itself? Besides, in the very notion of objectivity is involved the idea that the being of the object is not completely transparent to me. What is not thus transparent is called an object by us. The object is an *object* for me; therefore the possibility of its being something *in itself* and also *for itself* is

left open. To be something in itself belongs not only to an object that is material but also to that which is mental.

II

Thus the philosophical starting point is the human individual thinking about his world to which he himself belongs; it is not the child with its booming buzzing experience and confusion; not insentient matter, which never cares for a philosophy but is only a limit or postulate of human thinking; not society, which can be said to think only in a figurative sense; and not the Absolute or God, about whose philosophy, if it or he cares to philosophise, we can say little or nothing. It is impossible to avoid this starting point, the truth of which was first announced by Protagoras as interpreted by Goethe and some other thinkers. The statement that man is the measure of all things may as well mean that the world is what human thought can understand it to be. There is therefore an element of truth in anthropomorphism as well: we can think only as men can think; to ask us not to think as men do, but as the Absolute or some other impersonal entity does, is to ask us to do the impossible. Indeed, the defect of anthropomorphism lies in its personification of impersonal objects. From this it is a fallacy to jump to the opposite extreme and depersonify personal objects. This tendency is fashionable in materialism and in some epistemological theories that usurped the function of metaphysics and treated the perception of other persons as on a different footing from that of material objects.

Humanism is necessary in order to re-establish man, who is to think and act in his world, at the centre of philosophy. The truth of humanism can be appreciated if we see an implication of materialism and absolutism. Let us admit for argument's sake that matter or the Absolute is true and that it is implied in our being. Then the truth of matter would be a truth of human thought; that is, matter has meaning for human thought and not human thought for matter. Now, by starting with matter as the primary concept of philosophy, materialism treats human thinking as if it has meaning for matter. By interpreting thought as a form of matter we are in effect finding out what thought would mean in terms of matter and therefore for matter. If this criticism is true against materialism, a similar criticism would be true against absolutism. The main criticism of this attempt would be that it attempts to make our life meaningful to the Absolute, while the Absolute is meaningful only to our consciousness. Yet for this

reason, humanism need not and should not discard the concept of the Absolute, if it is a necessary implicate of our thought and life.

Some of the well-known forms of humanism would have nothing to do with the concept of the Absolute. But critical humanism will not refuse to recognise the truth of any concept, provided it is shown to be implied in our being and thought; otherwise, our philosophy would be imperfect and incomplete even as humanism by not including a necessary truth of man's being. That is why critical humanism insists on a criticism of man's being, which is to be the centre of our philosophy, and on a critical understanding of his nature. The more we understand the environment the deeper would be our understanding of man, and the more profound would be our philosophy. Ordinary humanism separates man from the environment and makes a naive and vague concept of man the centre of philosophy. That is why such a philosophy cannot make our knowledge of man deeper. But when we take man as a necessary correlate of his environment, which is the primary datum, the deeper our knowledge of one correlate the deeper would be our knowledge of the other also. The nature of no correlate can adequately be studied without studying the nature of the other.

If we take man and his environment as correlates and are prepared to accept the implications of that correlation and of our knowledge of that correlation, then we may have to accept the Absolute as the unconditioned implied in our thought. This acceptance would in no way be detrimental to humanism but, on the contrary, would make it complete. The complaint against absolutism should be that it has attempted to make the Absolute, which is an ultimate implication, the starting point of philosophy and so the proximate concept to guide our thought and action. And by accepting the essential identity of the individual and the Absolute, it asks the individual to think and act as if he were the Absolute now and here, just as materialism asks man to think and act as if he were nothing but matter.

III

It might be asked: If critical humanism accepts the truths of absolutism, materialism etc., it would be everything or nothing in particular and so what would be new in it? Critical humanism is a reconciliation, a re-synthesis and so a transvaluation of the philosophical truths of all great philosophies: it is not their rejection. By this process, philosophy gains depth and comprehensiveness. The novelty of critical humanism lies in this depth and

comprehensiveness and in a subsequent revaluation of man and the world around him including the spiritual. If it is shown that spirituality is essentially implied in the nature of man, it would be wrong not to recognise it and accept its implications. Critical humanism revives interest in the study of all values and truths relevant to man, whether they are old or modern. For the neglect of the realisation of any would make the life of man so far incomplete. And this new synthesis and deepening of philosophy may result in the discovery of new truths, to which again critical humanism would not be opposed. It will, in the process, recast epistemology, logic, ethics and metaphysics and give a new and sounder perspective. A sounder perspective would mean greater solubility of philosophical problems. The insolubility of a philosophical problem means often a wrong approach or perspective, an artificial and therefore wrong formulation of the problem itself.

Critical humanism, so far as the author's evaluation of the situation goes, adequately represents the humanistic reaction of India to its own past and the modern West. It has been usual to criticise Indian thought as not humanistic, as harmful to the dignity of the human individual, as negativistic, as life-and-world-negating and so on. There are some Indian philosophers who say that this criticism is false and maintain that Indian philosophy contains only so much negativism and other-worldliness as any other true religion would. There are some who admit the criticism and want reform. The Brahmosamaj, the Arya Samaj, and the Gandhian application of spiritual principles to practical politics, in all of which man and society come to occupy more and more the focus of philosophical attention, are examples of surging humanism. Tagore spoke of "Man" and the "Religion of Man" as more important than the Absolute and the Religion of the Absolute. Radhakrishnan stresses that we cannot but think as men do and so thought must necessarily be human thought and whatever we think of would be moulded by human thought. Aurobindo gives a much more positive place to man and his world than the traditional Advaita, as interpreted by some extremists, would. And only very recently the Indian Philosophical Congress has recommended to the universities that the philosophy courses should be given a more social bent than previously. All these movements of thought are sufficiently indicative of the transformation of traditional philosophy towards a form of humanism. But our philosophers are not prepared to accept a humanism like that of Comte or Schiller. They are so convinced of the truth of the spiritual in man that they are

un-willing to part with that truth as with an invaluable heirloom. For all of them, a critical analysis of the being of man discloses its essential spirituality, the non-recognition of which renders our understanding of man the poorer.

A few Indian thinkers who could not gainsay the truth of humanism wanted to designate Indian Philosophy spiritual humanism or transcendental humanism. The tendency itself is indicative of the appreciation of the humanistic view-point. But the term "critical humanism" would be far more appropriate and useful; for it is far more indicative of the method we are to follow in building up our thought, namely, the criticism of man's being in order to make it the proper and true centre of our philosophy. Further, we are not merely interpreting ancient Indian Philosophy, but building up a new philosophy which would include in its scope the solution of many more problems relevant to the life of man than our ancient philosophers cared to tackle. Our epithet "critical" would therefore be more helpful to clear thinking than the other two, which, some critics may even say, are self-contradictories.

If, in India, critical humanism is the result of the contact of the East with the West, it should be of equal interest to the West, where a new Renaissance is taking place due to the recent influx of Eastern ideals and values. As the Greek ideas flooded Europe in the 16th Century, Eastern ideas are attracting the attention of Western thinkers in the 20th. And a movement is afoot seriously to incorporate them. It is generally said that Western Philosophy is more humanistic and the Eastern more spiritual. Now, how can there be a synthesis of the two, and why should there be a synthesis, if they are not equally true? A new philosophical approach is therefore needed to show that both kinds of values are involved in human existence and are necessary for it. So human existence, the being of man, cannot but be the starting point; and we have to show by a criticism of the being of man that it involves the spiritual. Our philosophy would then be critical humanism.

IV

After the above preliminary discussion, we may lay down certain truths and facts with which critical humanism would start provisionally.

1. The primary datum for the philosopher is the philosopher himself plus the world about which he thinks. Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am". But there is no thought that does not think about something, that is, there is no thought without an object of

thought. The existence of something thought about or perceived should equally have been posited with that of the I. The existence of the I that perceives or thinks is bound up with the existence of something perceived or thought of. The primary existential datum of our philosophy must be "I-and-the-Other". It may be that the object I see is false; but that there is an objective side to my perception, that there is an object that binds me down to existence, is not false.

2. Further, Descartes' formula may be interpreted to mean that thinking is the self-certainty of existence. But thinking is not the same as existence; for though thinking may be of existent objects, it works with essences or forms.

3. Nor can the I be equated to existence. When we attempt to fix the I in our consciousness, it becomes very evasive and vague. In the history of Indian Philosophy, the I is ultimately identical with the Atman or the Brahman according to the Advaita; for the Mīmāṃsā, it is just the same as the ego, which says, "I do this", "I know that", and so on; for the Charvakas, it is just the physical body. In Western Philosophy, it is generally the same as mind; but in Indian Philosophy, on the whole, the I and the mind are different. But by all, the evasiveness of the experience of the I is recognised. Hence we have to say that the vague I as we experience it and the world are both forms or essences and not existence itself.

4. In the fourth place, by taking the I and the existence together, we admit the necessary correlativity between the two. We cannot, after so many years of philosophical and psychological study, refuse to accept that the senses and the sense-data are correlated. The Upanishads give a mythological explanation saying that the correlation is the bipolar division of an original deity (devatā). If the sense and the sense-data are correlates, then the I and the world also are correlates. This correlativity may cease, when the I ceases to experience the world; but then the experience of the I as 'I' may also cease, as in the experience of the mystic. His experience may be true; but it cannot be the starting point for the philosopher, who should not assume its truth.

5. The I touches existence only when it faces the Other. Without the Other that forces our mind from subjective imagination and ideas to existence, we should be in the region of subjectivity, and so cannot be certain of touching existence.

6. In this opposition between the self and the Other, the idea of necessity and law takes its root. Necessity is the fact that

something cannot be otherwise and it is the limit on formal existence. This opposition is the limit on the existence of the self in face of the Other, and produces in us the feeling that we are not otherwise. It is first the ground of our existence, and secondly the source of the existential reference of essences.

7. The Other that faces the I need not necessarily be matter. Descartes' dualism gave rise to the vogue of treating the Other, which mind sees, as matter. But whether the Other is a material body or a living creature can be known only from other considerations.

8. Man is most certain of the existence of his own personality only in face of the personality of another person. Our consciousness has a better grip of our own personality when it is thrown back on itself by the personality of another than when it faces a material object, which is to be treated only as an instrument and not as something that treats itself as an end in itself. We have this experience in the presence of the person we love most. Sometimes we have almost the same experience in the presence of the person we dread most. Love, dread, anger, grief, compassion, which often involve reference to another person, throw our consciousness back on our own personality and its existence. That is, we feel our existence the most when we feel the existence of another person and not a material object. When we are handling a material object, our attention is fixed most on our material body with which we handle other material objects; and so both the material object and our body, which handles it, become objects of the I, which is left in the background and so is not gripped by consciousness.

9. As the I knows itself along with the Other and as correlated with the Other, it would be wrong to say that our consciousness knows only itself and is completely ignorant of the Other, and so man finds himself in completely alien surroundings. It would be truer to say that man finds himself in surroundings that appear to him from the beginning to have their own nature. This is the element of necessity in the primary datum. The very fact of the correlation between senses and sense-data and between the self and the Other disproves the idea that the sense-data and the Other can be completely alien to the senses and the I.

10. In the vagueness and the evasiveness of the experience of the "I-and-the-Other" lies the possibility of our self-transcendence. Were the I completely identical with its being, it would not have felt the need for self-transcendence, that is, the need to become something better or more; for then my consciousness of myself

would not have gone beyond my existence. This is the reason for treating the I and the "I-and-the-Other" as forms, and for not equating them to existence. They may be the nearest to existence or touching it the most closely, so far as our experience goes; but they cannot be equated to existence, which, our experience shows transcends both. So the existence of the I is existence as it seems to the I and needs to be subjected to critical analysis.

11. In the consciousness of the "I-and-Other", our ideas, emotions and physical body are as much objects as the objects outside our physical body. The I can make its physical body its own object and so the physical body is not the subject of cognition. When I say "I am standing", the I is identifying itself with the physical body. Yet the consciousness of the I can make the physical body its own object. I may identify myself with my family, property, and country. There are thus degrees of identification. The closest relation is with my body. Epistemologically, all these are objects of my consciousness and the subject of my consciousness is different from them.

12. My experience of my "self-and-Other" is not atomic either temporally or spatially. In fact, the origin of both time and space is to be traced to our basic datum. The experience of time involves a reference to the past moment from the present. Without the reference, our experience cannot be the experience of time. It is possible to perform calculations of time, keeping this reference in the background. But this possibility does not prove that, without this reference, we can have time or experience of time. An explanation of time merely with reference to the object or the Other alone will have little experiential meaning for man. When I recognise a friend as having been seen some twenty years ago, there is reference to time. But this would not have been possible for me, without my gathering my own experience of that past moment into my present. Without the experience of my self-identity, I cannot have the experience of the self-identity of my friend. Duration involves such self-identity. Yet it is equally wrong to refer time merely to the I and not to the Other. Even when I remember that I am twenty years old, memory objectifies my experience; my consciousness objectifies a series of events, however imperfect, incomplete and vague that series may be. Memory as a conscious function is a memory of something, whether that something is the life of the I or that of the Other. Even in the experience of the I isolated from the Other, the past becomes the objectified experience of the I. This of course does not mean that the consciousness of the present is atomic. Yet, along with

the objectified series, the I must have been able to project itself to the past and collect it into its present; and this underlying projection and collection only can be the root of the experience of time, though it is not possible without the objectified series. Thus, whatever meaning the concept of time, without this reference to conscious experience, may have in mathematics and physics, it cannot be significant to human experience. On the contrary, we shall not be wrong in saying that it has meaning, even as an abstraction, only for human experience. And philosophy, as a human endeavour, should not be deprived of its significance for man.

13. Similarly should be traced the origin of space. It is difficult to deny the involvement of the I in the experience of space. It is possible to evolve a concept of space without reference to the I. Such a concept would be abstract and could be meant for abstract thinking. But space cannot be humanly experienced without the I referring to itself its experiences of the Other, treated as experiences of the parts of the same Other coordinated in a particular way. Here it should be pointed out that neither space nor time can be logically derived or reduced from the basic datum; they are only to be traced to it. To try to derive everything from an ultimate datum is the same as to attempt to explain why the world is as it is: which is really an impossible task for our intellect; for the intellect itself is part of the world of its own experience. If the concept of space is to be explained by an analysis like that given by Whitehead, it may do for mathematical purposes; but if the explanation is to be humanly significant, it must involve reference to both the I and the Other. Kant's peculiar approach may lead one to think that space is purely a subjective form, that it belongs only to the mere I; but we have to recognise that the Other is equally necessary for the experience. Neither in the experience of time nor in that of space, can the reference to the Other or to the I be avoided.

Intuition and Immediacy in Hegel

BY

R. N. KAUL, M.A., B.LITT. (OXON.)

1. *Human intelligence discursive in Kant's Theory of Knowledge.* One of the fundamental points in Kant's Theory of Knowledge is the doctrine of the discursive character of the human intelligence. "Concepts without intuition are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (Kant). The human intelligence, according to Kant, is not intuitive: It is a discursive intelligence, whose "whole capacity" consists in conceptualizing a manifold given to it rather than produced by itself. Such a thinking plays an essential part in knowledge. Without concepts, there would be no judgments, no "experience" and no science. But such thinking is not in itself a source of knowledge; in human knowing there is a separation between the faculty of intuition and the faculty of concepts. By means of concepts, we cannot increase our store of intuitive knowledge; we can merely gain an indirect or "mediate" knowledge of the particulars which fall under the concepts,—particulars, which are initially grasped in sensation.

2. *Intuitions vs. Concepts in Kant.* There are two consequences of this theory in Kant which are striking:

(1) the conception of an 'object', as constituted by a synthesis of sense-data, and of such objects as alone available for our knowledge;

(2) the idea that the human understanding can never overstep the bounds of possible sense-experience; and the complete separation of understanding (Verstand) from Reason (Vernunft.)

In these views Kant is influenced by Hume and tries to counter the view of Leibniz that sensation is confused thinking, thus establishing his "critical" philosophy.

3. *Hegel attacks Kantian dualism of Thought and Sense.* Hegel accused Kant of basing his philosophy on an unintelligible dualism. By taking Sense and Thought as initially separate, Kant fell into two main difficulties:

(1) The source of sense-impressions, the independent thing-in-itself, lay altogether outside the range of knowledge.

(2) He made empirical knowledge itself "a standing miracle". There is no guarantee that Thought and Sense could cooperate in knowledge in the way Kant said they must. According to Hegel, knowledge could be made intelligible only if Sense and Thought were not taken as initially alien to each other. Hegel argued (i) that sensation must be regarded as a moment within thought, though a moment which constituted what he called thought's "other"; (ii) Thought itself had more than *one form*, the various forms could not be rated on the same level. He carefully distinguished three such kinds or forms of thinking.

- | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------|
| (a) the thinking of common-sense | } | Understanding. |
| (b) Scientific thinking | | |
| (c) Philosophical thinking — | | Reason. |

4. *Three forms of thinking*: (a) *Common-sense* (b) *Scientific* (c) *Philosophical*. These forms are members of a *single developing series* or "scale of forms" and thus can be arranged in an order of superiority or inferiority. The higher in the scale is *both a development and the truth of the lower*. It contains all that is valuable in the lower, which is sublated (*Aufgehoben*) or transcended in it: it is a more perfect embodiment of a notion which the lower, too, strove to realise. Thus there is no competition between the lower and the higher forms of thinking—the higher must claim to dispense with any necessity for the continued use of the lower. Scientific Thought supplies us with the truth of common-sense, including its virtues and excluding its vices, while itself being sublated (*Aufgehoben*)—destroyed yet preserved—in the thinking of philosophy. Hegel believes philosophical thinking to represent thought at its best; Understanding attempts to do the same work imperfectly or "abstractly" as Reason does so much better and with greater "concreteness". As Mr. Mure says "Common-sense is a rudimentary thinking—but it moves most easily in the medium of sense-perception and Imagination, and its venture beyond these limits is never whole-hearted. It feels its thought to be a thin abstraction which only borrows substance from the solid reality given in sense." (Introd. to Hegel).

(a) *Common-sense* thinking is scarcely thinking at all, but an experience intermediate between thinking and sensing,—thought which keeps singularly close to sense, moving constantly by means of concrete examples and images.

(b) *Scientific* thought, which is the next member of the series, takes the abstract concepts formed by reflection on the data

of sense,—the analytic universal of Kant's Critique of Judgment. It is the discursive thinking with which Kant equated human intellection generally. It is *quite distinct from sensing* but not competent in itself to attain to knowledge without cooperation from sense-intuition. Hegel condemns it on the ground of the sharpness of the divisions it necessarily makes, its constant search for clear-cut distinctions and precise affirmations and denials. Scientific thought knows nothing of that *blending of opposites* which, as the Greeks already saw, constitutes the essence of reality. It is, hence, unable to do more than distort the individuality of the real, and so must be transcended in philosophical thinking.

(c) *Philosophical thinking* is the "truth" of scientific thinking; it is concrete by comparison with the latter's abstraction. It recognises, for example, that Unity is never found apart from Multiplicity, sameness apart from difference; and so is able to represent reality in a way impossible to the thinking of Understanding.

5. *Intellectual Intuition in Hegel*: The crucial question about philosophical thinking is, whether Hegel thought it was also a knowing. Is it, in fact, a form of intellectual intuiting?

There is a sharp division of opinion on this point among the commentators. McTaggart (*Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*) maintained that the answer to the above question must be negative. According to McTaggart, Hegel did not believe that even philosophical thinking could in itself provide us with knowledge. All human thinking was, in Hegel's opinion, *mediatory* in character and needed an element of *immediacy* to set it in motion and give it body. This element of immediacy was provided by the data of the senses, internal and external, which are hence *an indispensable component of knowledge*; and this is true of *all* human knowledge.

6. *McTaggart's interpretation of Hegel*: According to this view, Hegel could not have hoped to deduce the actual details of *reality* from the categories of the Logic, and that he never believed in the possibility of a transition from *essence* to *existence*. Logic is concerned with pure thought, which is an abstraction from the concrete real; and even the Absolute Idea, the culmination of the Dialectic, is an empty thought which needs to be brought to bear on *immediate data*, if we are to have knowledge through it. Philosophy begins from experience; awakened by which "thought is vitally characterised by raising itself above the natural state of mind, above the senses and inferen-

ces from the senses into its own unadulterated element." (Encyclop. S. 12, Wallace—Tr.) This has been interpreted by McTaggart to suggest that experience is to the philosopher nothing more than a ladder which can be dispensed with once it has been climbed. But is this the impression which Hegel wishes to give? For he goes on to point out that "the sciences, based upon experience, exert upon the mind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents are presented, and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary truth. In consequence of this stimulus, thought is dragged out of its unrealised universality and its fancied or merely possible satisfaction, and impelled onwards to a development from itself. On the one hand, this development only means that thought incorporates the contents of Science, in all their speciality of detail as submitted. On the other, it makes these contents imitate the action of the original creative thought, and present the aspect of a free evolution determined by the Logic of the fact alone." Philosophy thus "owes its development to the empirical sciences." And in his own philosophies of nature and spirit Hegel proceeded consistently with this account. He did not try to deduce particular facts from the nature of the Logical Idea, but simply to show that the facts could be so interpreted that the Idea was seen to be embodied in them. McTaggart argues strongly that this is just what we should expect; for if Hegel is true to his principles, nature and spirit can no more be analytically deduced from the logic than can the whole series of logical categories from the idea of being. In both cases the progress is synthetic and analytic at once, and depends on the view that the end of any dialectical progress is implicit in the beginning. The Idea proceeds to phenomenalise itself, therefore, because at its own level it fails to be the reality it claims to express.

7. *McTaggart's interpretation criticized*: Thus on McTaggart's view Hegel held, like Kant, that the human intellect is through and through discursive and incompetent to attain to knowledge on its own account. But if that is so, how does Hegel avoid the consequences of the Kantian theory, that human knowledge is limited by the bounds of possible sense-experience and that human understanding can never hope to penetrate the mysteries of nature? That Hegel rejected the first of these consequences is almost too obvious to need proof. In Encyclop. (S. 19 Zusatz) he says that "the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world;" in Encyclop. S. 8, that "Freedom, Spirit and God" are objects of knowledge for the philosopher. Kant clearly showed that they could not be on the premises

of his philosophy. On McTaggart's interpretation, *the immediacy of sense stands entirely outside the mediation of thought*, and the two are regarded very much as they were by Kant. But that Hegel was no Kantian here is shown by his simple declaration that "sense is not wholly alien to thought but its other," as well as by his general principle that the real is the rational, and by his attempts to find rationality in the Worlds of nature and spirit. If we examine the odd statement of Hegel that "Sensation is Thought's 'Other'," we shall find grounds for thinking that the Hegelian attitude to intellectual intuition was not what McTaggart thought it to be.

443

8. *Sensation is Thought's other*: To understand this we must return to the developing series made up by the three forms of thought, common-sense, science and philosophy. So far we have proceeded as if that series were complete as it stands, or at least, as if common-sense were its lowest member. The suggestion that sensation is a necessary moment within thought implies that it is not. On this view, the first member of the scale of forms which culminates in philosophical thinking is bare sensation, and the series runs: Sensation, Common-sense, Scientific thought, philosophical thinking. There is no absolute gulf between sensing and thinking, but a gradual transition from the one to the other. This is, of course, the Leibnizian account which Kant so persistently attacked. It would, nevertheless, be an error to suggest that Hegel is doing no more than resurrecting the classical rationalist theory of knowledge. His characteristic contribution to that theory is his doctrine of the dialectical relation of the forms of experience; and in fact by accepting this doctrine, Hegel committed himself to the reality of intellectual intuition. Leibniz said, sensation is confused thinking; Hegel said, it is immature thinking, and added that sensation is dialectically related to the higher forms of thought. The members of a developing series are so related that the higher terms "sublate" the lower; preserve their virtues while dispensing with their vices. What is sublated disappears as such; yet its positive character is preserved in that which transcends it. Applying this to the case of sensation and thought, and accepting the view that they do belong to the same developing series, we get the results (1) that sensing is a rudimentary form of thinking, though not necessarily of discursive thinking, and that it is sublated in imagination, science and philosophy, and (2) that its most striking feature, what Hegel calls its immediacy, must be preserved in that which sublates it. In other words, if thought and sensation are dialectically related, *thought*

must have an immediate or intuitive aspect. But then intellectual intuition is in principle possible: "the highest form of thinking cannot be sheer discursive but must bear comparison with the intuitive awareness analysed by Kant in the third Critique" (cf. Hegel and Intellectual Intuition by W. H. Walsh: Mind—Jan. 1946).

9. *Concluding Remarks:* We must conclude, then, that Hegel's conception of the relation of Sense and Thought aims at avoiding the anti-rationalist conclusions which Kant drew. Our interpretation implies that Hegel thought intellectual intuition a possibility for human beings, a doctrine from which Kant had expressly dissented. Hegel's version of this theory is certainly difficult and nowhere stated exactly, but its general nature can scarcely be in doubt. Reason in Hegel, like *Nous* in Plato, at least culminates in an *intuitive awareness of reality*, and the main contentions of the Hegelian philosophy cannot be substantiated unless it does. This is the very opposite of what Kant believed. It is, incidentally, a point of view which Kant thought he had refuted when he analysed the *conception of an intuitive understanding* in the Critique of Judgment. Such an intelligence, it is there pointed out, would make no distinction between possible and actual, or again between universal and particular. Its universals would be concrete, and whatever it thought would be actual.

The truth is that Hegel and Hegelians generally are in the awkward position of being faced with alternatives none of which is acceptable to them. They can hold, *first*, that the thinking of Reason does not differ in principle from that of Understanding, but is merely a better sort of discursive thought,—better in so far as its concepts enable us to give a more comprehensive and coherent account of the world we know in experience. But if they do that, they have no means of avoiding the main conclusions of the Kantian philosophy. Or *secondly*, they can agree that Kant has given a substantially correct analysis of the nature of human thinking, but add that this only shows *how inadequate thought is*. This is the line taken by Bradley, who identified the highest form of experience with a feeling which was above the level of relations. It is hardly a point of view which can commend itself to one who hopes to show that the real is the rational. Or, *finally* they can boldly assert that the intellectual intuition of which Kant spoke must be real for human beings. If they do that, they offer an explanation of *how knowledge of things super-sensible is possible*, and they justify the rationality of the real.

The Principle of the Unity and Conflict of Opposites in Dialectical Materialism

BY

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According to Marx and Engels the evolution of human society is merely an episode in the evolution of the physical world, and the fundamental laws in accordance with which all social changes take place are the same as the laws of evolution underlying the physical world. The interpretation of human history offered by them is thus a materialistic interpretation. The fundamental presupposition underlying this interpretation is that the world is by its very nature material, that the multifold phenomena of the world are nothing but different forms of matter in motion and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of the movement of matter and stands in no need of a supreme guiding spirit. The driving force that moves history is not the unfolding of an Absolute Idea or a spiritual energy or the ambition of kings and generals, but is akin to the forces that move physical phenomena. The conditions which in the final analysis determine the character of the social system of man and the transition from one system to another are to be found in the different methods of procuring the means of life necessary for human existence and also in the relations of men to one another in the process of production. Changes in the mode of production are accompanied by changes in the relations among men and inevitably lead to changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions. The contradictions which are inherent in every form of social structure provide the motive force which guides the development of society. The evolution of human society in all its phases is to be interpreted solely by reference to the material conditions of life and is merely a continuation of the process of evolution that is going on in the physical world.

The interpretation of history, according to this view, has thus an exclusively materialistic basis. The theory of materialism which is involved in this view is, however, to be distinguished from mechanistic materialism. As against mechanistic materialism which looks upon things and their mental images or ideas as isolated facts

to be considered apart from one another, as rigid, fixed objects of investigation once for all, Marxian or dialectical materialism regards nature as a connected and integral whole in which things or phenomena are organically connected with one another. It holds that "phenomena should be considered not only from the stand-point of their inter-connection and inter-dependence but also from the stand-point of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and getting out of being. (Stalin-Dialectical and Historical Materialism). It conceives of the causes of change, very much as Hegel does, as due to certain contradictions inherent in things and social institutions and looks upon every process of development essentially as self-development.

According to dialectical materialism there are three fundamental laws which govern change or movement in every field and by reference to which the entire cosmic process can be interpreted. These are the laws which are in operation amidst the welter of changes taking place in nature, which govern the apparently fortuitous events of human history and also the development of human thought. These are (i) the law of unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites (ii) the law of the negation of negation, and (iii) the law of the transformation of quantity into quality. Of these three laws the first is regarded as the most important, and hence it deserves special consideration.

"Everything develops by means of a struggle of opposites, by a division, a dichotomy, of every unity into mutually exclusive opposites" (Text book of Marxist Philosophy—Edited by J. Lewis, p. 135). This, we are told, is the most fundamental feature of the world. There is nothing which is completely simple. The unity of a thing is constituted by the conflict of the opposite qualities or aspects which belong to its very nature and the thing is, precisely on this account, an identity of opposites. The movement or development of a thing can be understood only by reference to the fact that it is a unity or identity of opposites.

Very high claims have been put forward on behalf of this principle. According to the advocates of dialectical materialism this principle is universal in its scope, and it is only by reference to it that we can hope to have a real insight into the nature of a phenomenon or process. Before we proceed to consider how far the principle can help us in understanding and interpreting the world, we have to determine the precise sense which can be attached to it. When a thing is described as a unity of opposites, it seems to imply that what we call a simple thing must have two

contradictory qualities or aspects which, because they are contradictory, are identical with each other. For Hegel this is an a-priori principle, a necessity of thought. Whenever we try to understand the nature of anything we have to use certain categories of thought, and when we examine these categories we find that each of them leads by a logical necessity to its opposite with which it tends to be identical. Thus if we apply the category of 'being' to anything whatsoever, we are compelled by an inner logical necessity to make a transition to the category of 'non-being'. The thought or category of 'being' is the same as that of 'non-being', the thought or category of 'unity' is the same as that of plurality. There is something in the very nature of thought which initiates the dialectic movement, and this characteristic of thought can be detected independently of the experience of particular objects. The dialectic movement, which implies the passage of the thesis into the antithesis with which it comes into conflict, and the reconciliation of the two under a higher synthesis, is present in nature simply because nature is ultimately the embodiment of thought. The most important fact which we should bear in mind while we try to understand the exact meaning of the principle of the identity of opposites as expounded by dialectical materialists is that for them this is not an a-priori principle of thought but a generalisation from experience. When they refer to the concrete facts of our experience in support of this principle, it becomes clear that its empirical nature is recognised by them. They point out, for instance, that motion itself is a contradiction, that even simple mechanical change of place can come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. (Engels-Anti-Dühring, p. 179). Similarly the atom is a unity of centres of positive and negative electricity which by their mutual penetration determine the physical and chemical properties of the atom (Text Book of Marxist Philosophy—Editor by J. Lewis, p. 147). Life consists precisely in this,—that a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something else. (Engels. Anti-Dühring, p. 180). An organism is at each moment assimilating matter drawn from without and excreting other matter, hence at each moment it is the same and not the same as itself. When we closely scrutinise those examples we find, however, that they do not really lend any support to the proposition that a thing or a process is essentially a unity of opposites or contradictories. If the fact that the same thing is at one and the same moment of time both in one place and another were the whole truth about its motion, then it would be quite unintelligible why a period of

time must elapse before the thing can arrive at one place from another. If the same thing can be at two consecutive places at the same instant it can very well be present at two places separated by a distance of fifty miles at the same instant. Since this does not happen we have to accept the common-sense view that a thing is in one place at one moment and in the next place at the next moment. It is only a muddle-headed rationalism that finds difficulty in conceiving movement and finds in it nothing but a bundle of contradictions. It is wrong to assert that motion as such involves a contradiction or that it is a unity of opposites. Then again it may be true that modern science has analysed the atom into centres of positive and negative electricity and that these positive and negative centres penetrate each other; but this does not prove that the positive centres are the same as the negative centres or that the atom involves any contradiction. In a living organism the processes of secretion and assimilation go on side by side, but since the process of secretion is not the same as the process of assimilation there is no ground for maintaining that an organism essentially involves a contradiction.

That a thing or a process cannot be regarded as a unity of opposites or contradictories in the sense that the opposite or contradictory aspects of which it is composed are identical with each other also becomes clear when we find that we do not detect any necessity as to why just these opposites must be present in the same place or follow each other in close succession. Supposing that a thing in motion involves its being in two different places at the same moment, there is no necessity as to why a thing must occupy two different places at the same moment, that is, must be in motion. According to Hegel, a category of thought necessarily passes over into its contradictory and hence is identical with it. The dialectical materialist cannot assert that the very notion of a thing involves the notion of movement, that is, the occupation by a thing of a particular position in space necessarily involves the occupation of the next position by it. In the absence of certain forces acting and re-acting on each other, things might not be in motion, and organisms might have been the seats of other processes different from those with which we are now familiar. If we depend on empirical data alone, we cannot assert that a particular quality or process must be associated with its contradictory quality or counter-process. In the case of a growing new colony for instance, we may not find that the immigration of people from outside is accompanied by the emigration of people from inside the country. Hence even though two opposite aspects or processes

may as a matter of fact be found in the same thing or in the same place, these aspects or processes cannot be regarded as identical with each other, and a thing cannot be regarded as the unity or identity of opposites or contradictories.

The advocates of dialectical materialism insist that in order to understand the nature of a thing or process we have to find out the essential contradictions inherent in it. Such a view evidently rests upon the assumption that the existence of every thing or process involves certain essential contradictions. If, however, we rely merely on empirical data, we cannot make any such assumption. According to the advocates of dialectical materialism themselves, there is at least one thing which is free from all essential, inner contradictions. This is the stage of human society which is reached after the communistic revolution has run its full course and all class-conflicts have been resolved once and for all. It is a state of society in which the basic contradiction between the productive forces and the economic relations between men has been finally removed, and which is marked by a continuous progress of humanity towards the goal of universal prosperity and happiness. The further development of such a society does not depend upon any basic contradiction involved in the social structure itself. It is true that communistic writers try to make a show of consistency and assert that even a communistic society will undergo development in accordance with the law of the identity and conflict of opposites; but the fact that they are not prepared to point out the nature of the basic contradiction involved in the structure of the communistic society in which the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" has been fully realised, and all that they have to say is that in our present stage of history we are unable to predict precisely concerning future stages, goes to show that they do not really believe that a thoroughly communistic society involves any basic contradiction. If then there is at least one thing which is free from basic or essential contradiction, there may be other things also of a similar nature, and the claim that the law of the unity of opposites is universal in its scope seems to be without any foundation. The only empirical evidence to which the advocates of dialectical materialism can appeal in support of the principle is the fact that there seem to be everywhere in nature forces acting and re-acting on one another, and if the principle is based on this evidence then all that it can possibly mean is that all things are operated upon by forces many of which are pitted against each other. We have now to see whether the principle, when understood in this sense,

can really serve the purpose for which it is intended, whether it can explain every evolutionary movement or show how or why a given process develops.

We are told that contradiction is the driving force of evolution, that the objective contradiction which is present in a thing or process is an actual force, and that it is this force which accounts for the growth or development of a thing. If this contention is true, we are to believe that a stone moves not because a force is applied to it from outside, but because motion involves the contradiction that the same thing must occupy two places at the same moment, or that an organism grows simply because "life consists just precisely in this — that a living is at each moment itself and yet something else" (Engels — *Anti-Dühring*, p. 160). The absurdity of such a contention becomes patent when we bear in mind that the difference between a slow motion and a swift motion cannot be accounted for by reference to the fact that motion involves a contradiction. The contradiction which motion is supposed to involve does not admit of degrees, and hence if we look upon this contradiction as a force we cannot understand why one thing moves more swiftly than another. As a matter of fact, forces which act or re-act on one another give rise to motion as well as the contradiction which motion is supposed to involve; it is not the supposed contradiction which is the source of these movements. A capitalistic society may involve certain basic contradictions, but the presence of these contradictions is due to the active pursuit of certain ends by individuals who are moved by certain desires. We are thus driven to the conclusion that when the dialectic materialist describes contradiction as an actual force he presents us with a figure of speech rather than an exact conception which is verifiable in terms of experience.

We are further told that we must seek for the internal cause of a given process in order to understand how or why it follows a particular course and no other. The attempt to explain a process by reference to external agencies operating on a thing cannot succeed, since such a procedure depends upon certain contingent circumstances and cannot show why the different stages of that process are inevitable. A process is supposed to be understood in the proper sense only when the different stages through which it passes can be shown to be inevitable, and this is possible only when we take into account the essential nature of the process which is a unity of its internal contradictions.

Now, what are we to understand by the internal contradictions of a thing or process? If we understand by internal contradiction

the conflict between opposing forces which are to be found in a thing or process when it is looked upon as an isolated unit, the view that change is the outcome of such internal contradictions alone seems to be contradicted by our actual experience. When a piece of chalk is shattered into pieces by the blow of a hammer, we cannot by any stretch of imagination suggest that the abrupt termination of its integrity is due to certain internal changes or opposing forces, inherent in it. The view can be made to look plausible only if we understand by 'thing' the physical world as a whole, and assert that processes taking place in the physical world can be explained solely by reference to material forces without invoking non-physical agencies such as ideas, thoughts, human volitions or divine intervention. But when the theory is ultimately reduced to this form it becomes obvious that it does not represent any advancement on the ordinary view that the nature of a process and the course of its development can be properly understood only by a thorough study of all the elements which are involved in the process and the diverse forces which operate upon these elements in different ways. We cannot predict with accuracy the changes which a thing is to undergo solely by reference to the opposing forces inherent in it, simply because the thing is not an isolated unit and the changes that take place in it are subject to the operations of unknown factors lying outside it. When we confine our attention to a comparatively small part of the world such as human society and assume that the forces of nature will remain constant for a pretty long period of time we may find it possible by exercising a little ingenuity to predict the different stages through which it will inevitably pass in the course of its development, but the forces which operate upon it from outside and which in their totality must remain incalculable upto the end cannot be ignored and they may upset our calculations at any moment. In reality the distinction between the forces inherent in the nature of a thing and those which operate on it from outside cannot be held to be an ultimate one, and it is impossible to understand the nature of the change which a thing undergoes without taking into account the entire network of forces in which it is enmeshed.

Thus the principle of the unity and conflict of opposites as formulated by Marx and Engels fails as an explanatory principle, and an impartial examination of the principle will reveal that the claims made on its behalf cannot in fact be sustained.

The Method Pursued in Russell's Philosophy

BY

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Mr. Russell has been stigmatized by some philosophers as changing his position constantly. Some have maintained that the time of his writing 'Principia Mathematica' and connected works marks his highest period of development. Since then he has been on the decline. Some have even said that he has been living since that period on the capital accumulated during his early years. Some have felt that his later works do not necessarily follow from his logical contributions.

This paper aims at showing that he has taken certain principles from his logical theory as the fundamental basis on which to develop his philosophical theory. His changing positions only indicate the degree to which he has at particular times been able to extend this principle. Hence these changes do not indicate any fundamental change in his method. The method which he adopted in the course of his logical investigations in connection with the analysis of descriptive phrases has not changed at all upto the present time. The method has come out of his logical enquiry. Hence his philosophy is the outcome of his logical investigations.

What is this method? He has talked of it repeatedly as William Occam's razor. What is Occam's razor? This principle says: "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity." At first Russell held to some kind of Platonic realism. He thought that cardinal integers, for instance, had a timeless being. Hence classes too. He came across Meinong who applied the same argument to descriptive phrases. When we say "the golden mountain does not exist" is a true proposition, it appears that the subject "golden mountain" must designate some object, otherwise the proposition will be meaningless. Hence he concluded that there is a golden mountain, which is golden and mountain but does not exist. Where can then this "golden mountain" be? It cannot exist. But it has a reality. Russell says, "Meinong even thought

that existent golden mountain is existent, but does not exist". This is not a satisfactory situation.

So Russell started investigating the significance of descriptive phrases. He discovered that, in analyzing a significant sentence, one must not assume that each separate word or phrase has significance on its own account. This "golden mountain" can be part of a significant sentence, but it is not significant in isolation. There are two kinds of symbols,—demonstrative and incomplete. A proper name is a demonstrative symbol. It is a name. Corresponding to it there is a referend in this universe. A proper name demonstratively refers to the referend in the world of existents in its signification. It is a name of that thing, which is a constituent of the world. The name signifies that constituent. Hence it is a demonstrative symbol. If the constituent was not there, the name could not have been given. A proper name has significance in isolation. One must be acquainted with the constituent to get the significance of the name. We can never question its existence. "Does it exist or does it not exist?" are senseless questions. A proposition containing proper names, if it is true, asserts something about a fact which has constituents corresponding to the proper names. But "golden mountain" in the true proposition "golden mountain does not exist", has nothing to correspond to it in the real world. So it has no meaning in isolation like the proper name. Unlike the proper name, it can have significance without there being anything corresponding to it in the real world. But it can be defined only in certain contexts. It has definition only in use.

In propositions whose constituent subjects are proper names, these grammatical subject terms are also logical subjects. These terms directly represent, or in other words demonstratively indicate, certain constituents of the world. But in the proposition "Round square does not exist", the grammatical subject is not the logical subject. There need not be anything corresponding to the "round square" for the proposition to be true or the expression "round square" to be significant. It does not directly represent or demonstratively indicate anything in the world. It has significance only in use. But such propositions must be capable of such analysis that what was a grammatical subject but not a logical subject shall have disappeared, leaving behind only the logical subject in the expression. Russell has analysed the proposition on "the Author of Waverley exists" in this way. A proposition about "the author of Waverley" is a proposition apparently about the term which satisfies the propositional function,

'x wrote Waverley'. Hence it can be symbolized as " $E!(ix)(\phi x)$ " to be read "the term satisfying ϕx exists". Now $(ix)(\phi x)$ is a descriptive phrase, and hence a grammatical subject and not a logical subject. When properly analysed it will become $(\exists c): \phi x. \equiv_x. x = c$, which reads "There is an object c , such that ϕx is always equivalent to ' x is c ' or an alternative expression $(\exists c): \phi c: x \neq c. \supset_x. \sim \phi x$ to be read "There is an object c such that c wrote Waverley and no other than c wrote Waverley. Here the grammatical subject $(ix)(\phi x)$ has completely disappeared. Hence the descriptive phrase is an incomplete symbol. Thus *all descriptive phrases are incomplete symbols: they have meaning in use but not in isolation.* "The author of Waverley" cannot mean the same as "Scott". They mean differently.

Classes are also not symbols which directly stand for "the ultimate furniture of the world". He therefore required a definition of classes which would assign a meaning to propositions in whose verbal or symbolic expressions words or symbols representing classes occur, but which would assign a meaning that altogether eliminates all mention of classes from a right analysis of such propositions. We shall then be able to say that the symbols for classes are mere conveniences, not representing objects called "Classes", and that classes in fact are "logical fictions" or "logical constructions".

Miss Stebbing makes clear the relation between logical constructions and incomplete symbols in her 'A Modern Introduction to Logic'. "Now, in assertions concerning logical constructions we are saying something about the way in which an expression is used to refer to what it expresses; we are not primarily saying something about the symbols, but only about that which the symbols refer to. Thus, if X is what is referred to, and " S " is the symbolic expression used to refer to X , then we may say that X is a logical construction if " S " is an incomplete symbol. X will be a logical construction if the whole expression containing " S " can be transformed into another expression equivalent to the original, yet not containing the symbol " S ". Further, X is not a constituent of the world.

"Classes are logical constructions". Russell achieved his objective by devising as translations for statements explicitly about classes other statements which mention only certain properties possessed by the individuals that would ordinarily be members of those classes. The class symbols disappear from every proposition supposedly about a class by resolving into a proposition

about the values that satisfy some propositional function. Take such a statement as, 'The class of people interested in mathematical logic is not very numerous'. Obviously this reduces itself to, "Not very many people are interested in mathematical logic". For the sake of definiteness, let us substitute some particular number, say 3, for "very many". Then our statement becomes, "Not 3 people are interested in math-logic. This may be expressed in the form: "If x is interested in math-logic, and also y is interested, and also z is interested, then x is identical with y , or x is identical with z or y is identical with z ". Here there is no longer any reference to a class.

Russell says in *P. Math.*, "The symbols for classes, like those of descriptions, are in our system, incomplete symbols; their uses are defined, but they themselves are not assumed to mean anything at all. That is to say, the uses of such symbols are so defined that, when the definiens is substituted for the definiendum, there no longer remains any symbol which could be supposed to represent a class. Thus classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects as their members are if they are individuals."

When class symbol is shown to be an incomplete symbol, it is easy to show that numbers are also such incomplete symbols. He defines the number of a class as the class whose members are classes similar to the given class. It can be proved that there is only one such class. It satisfies all the formal characteristics expected of a cardinal number. This is an illustration of the application of the principle of abstraction. Russell replaces the rule: "Consider the property which such and such objects have in common" by the rule: "Consider the class constituted by all objects having a certain relation to each other"; i.e. he defines the common property in extension rather than in intension. Russell prefers the extensional to the intensional interpretation. The meaning of the word "green" therefore is definable by the statement: something is green if it is a member of the class of things which have the same colour as this thing. This principle also represents an application of Occam's razor.

Russell's writings on the philosophy of science exhibit one persistent feature: his explicitly avowed use of the maxim "Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities".

Let us finally state what appears to be the general pattern of the procedure of substituting "constructions" for "inferences".

Let "S" be a statement, employed in some definite context T_1 , which contains explicitly the expression "C1", where this expression symbolizes some entity C ; that is to say "S1" would normally be supposed to be about C . Under what circumstances is C (the entity, not the expression "C") to be regarded as a "logical construction" or "logical fiction"? Suppose there exist a set of entities $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots$, and a set of relations $R_1, R_2, \dots$; suppose, further, that a statement "S2" can be formed which contains mention of these entities and relations but does not contain the expression "C", and suppose finally in the context T_1 , the statement "S2" is logically equivalent to 'S'. Then C is a logical construction out of the specified entities and relations.

Morris Weitz says: "Upon the completion of *P.M.* both Russell and Whitehead re-assembled the techniques which they had employed in mathematics and applied them to the natural sciences. The enormous success they had achieved in their treatment of descriptions, classes, numbers, relations (in extension), etc., as incomplete symbols inspired in them the hope that they might be able to deal similarly with the symbols of other scientific disciplines."

Whitehead was the first to turn the full force of these ideas of *P.M.* upon natural sciences. He persuaded Russell to follow him. The traditional concepts of time, space, mind, matter are no longer the denotata of proper names, nor the denotata of descriptions. It is not necessary to postulate their existence as ultimate furniture of the world. They are logical constructions and the symbols for them are incomplete symbols.

"Everything in the world is composed of 'events'. An event is something which occupies a small finite region of space-time. It is also something penetrable and destructible. Our usual experience with events is in terms of sensations and images. Seeing a flash of lightning is an event. The ultimate kinds of events-in-relation are sensations, images and unperceived events. Everything which we recognize as "Mind" and "Matter" can be built out of these. "Mind" is constructed out of sensations and images. "Matter" is constructed out of sensations and unperceived events. The world is composed of neutral events, which are sensations in some contexts, images in other contexts and unperceived events in still other contexts. In a completed science the concepts of "Matter" and "Mind" would disappear and be replaced by causal laws concerning events. The dualism is not of entities but of causal laws. The difference between mental and physical events is that the mental event is one with which some one is acquainted other-

wise than by inference, while a physical event is one which is either totally unknown, or if known at all, is not known to be known to anyone except by inference. Physical events can be known only as regards their space-time structure. The qualities that compose such events are unknown — so completely unknown that we cannot say either that they are, or that they are not, different from the qualities that we know as belonging to mental events.

Morris Weitz in his contribution 'Analysis and the Unity of Russell's Philosophy' in "The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell" in *Living Philosophers* series rightly asserts that "The fundamental element in Russell's philosophy is the method of analysis." I have shown that the method of analysis as the resolution of incomplete symbols is the most fundamental. It is the basis of his theory of logical construction or "Constructionism". This becomes the basis for his ontological analysis. This also I have already shown. This helps him to analyse "Matter", "Mind", "Time", "Space", "Number", etc., and show them to be mere logical constructions. This is the method by which he constructs everything out of events and arrives at the doctrine of neutral monism. In his work in mathematical logic also he uses analysis as a method. No one will dispute that this is one of his most remarkable contributions on which alone he will be remembered by his posterity as a great philosopher. Philosophy has not contributed anything through the ages which is on such sure foundation and accepted with so little dispute. The former types of analysis have their roots in this form of analysis. It is in logic that logical paradoxes arose in connection with classes and certain difficulties with questions of existence in connection with descriptive phrases. Hence logic itself needed the theory of incomplete symbols and logical construction. This analysis was later extended to solve ontological and scientific problems. Russell with Frege carried out the arithmetization of mathematics and then logicizing of arithmetic; i.e. they reduced the theory of natural numbers to certain logical ideas and propositions. Logic, to Russell, is fundamentally the view that mathematics and logic are continuous and identical. The determination of basic ideas and propositions of mathematics and the reduction of them to logic constitute analysis as logic.

At present Russell is engaged in analysis of: What does a proper name stand for, what is a basic proposition, what is involved in the problem of minimum vocabulary, what is meant by the significance of a sentence, are the principles of extensionality and atomicity acceptable, what is the correct analysis of "A believes p"

and other propositional attitudes which so far have stood in the way of acceptance of the principle of extensionality, etc. These are problems which logical positivists have been tackling under the heads of syntactical and semantical problems. This is the philosophical aspect of logic bordering epistemology. This is concerned with linguistic analysis and the analysis of the relation of the linguistic to the non-linguistic. It involves analysis of language and experience, and the relation between the two. This Weitz calls formal analysis. "Russell's inquiry into Meaning and Truth" and "Human Knowledge" have tackled this form of analysis.

The method of analysis is closely connected with Russell's view about definition. The method of logical construction or of replacing expressions containing incomplete symbols by expressions containing demonstrative symbols (proper names, object words) involves nominal definitions. Incomplete symbols have only contextual definition or definitions of symbols in use. "It is this attribution of meaning which constitutes analysis — in the form of contextual definition — of the sentences in which these symbols appear". Russell inclines in his statements about definition to take definition as nominal. Morris Weitz says: "To sum up: It is our contention that Russell means by analysis two kinds of definition, real and contextual. The chief characteristics of these are: (1) real definition is concerned primarily with complexes which are non-linguistic, i.e., independent of the way in which we use language, whereas contextual definition is concerned wholly with linguistic complexes. Another way to express this difference is that the contextual definition is concerned with symbols, real definition with what is symbolized. (2) Real definition is the enumeration of the properties of a given complex; contextual definition is substitution of one set of symbols for another set. (3) Real definitions are true or false ; contextual definitions are volitional stipulations. (4) Neither are arbitrary, since both are to cope with certain problems" Both have value in reducing the vagueness of certain complexes by calling attention to their components. Mr. Russell agrees with what Weitz has to say.

We thus find that his principal aim in philosophy is to do away with inference of existence of entities when we can substitute constructions and manage with them without needing to assert the existence of such entities. This is done through analysis and logical construction. The theory of construction which in its linguistic aspect is the theory of incomplete symbol was expounded in connection with his logical problems in 'Principia Mathematica'. This has since been his central philosophic instrument which he

has been consistently applying to problem after problem. This method was shared and employed in common by Whitehead, the joint author of 'Principia Mathematica'. The logical apparatus of the 'Principia' modified by the principles of extensionality and atomicity forms the basis of the philosophy of logical positivists. Russell cannot fully accept these two principles. But he is less averse to their acceptance now. There is much in common between his philosophy and that of the logical positivists. He has much sympathy for them and has accepted many of their conclusions. He only accuses them of being extreme.

It seems quite clear then that there is a clear method which he follows consistently in his philosophy. He constructs his philosophy on scientific lines on the basis of existing scientific knowledge. There is no opposition between science and philosophy, and the latter cannot claim any superior knowledge which the scientist does not have access to. Science only deals with facts. But life is not constituted only of facts. To make life significant, we must find place for our aspirations, ideals and possibilities. The use of science and education involve some valuation of certain possibilities of ourselves and the universe in which we live. Valuation does not involve any belief in any Platonic realm of values as ideas. If it is not necessary for logic and mathematics it is not necessary for ethics. But they must be held as possibilities (or potentialities) within existence. Applied science helps us to make certain of these possibilities actual. Education of men is also one such process. The possibilities are many. We have to choose some among them. That involves valuing. It is these things which give significance to our lives and make our lives worth living. It seems philosophy should give greater emphasis to this aspect of life. But it is the opposite in Russell's philosophy. Facts preponderate over values; natural science over ethics; intellect over emotion and will. Philosophy should be a harmonious blending of truth, beauty and goodness. It should find legitimate satisfaction for cognition, feeling and volition. It is in these respects that his philosophy fails. His failure is not in his inconsistency. His is not a false account. It is not complete. It is lopsided.

Dynamism of Personality

BY

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The problem of personality has been dealt with in recent psychology in its various aspects. The foremost attempt to look into the dynamism of personality was made by Dr. Freud and his followers. Other attempts to probe into the dynamism of personality were made by those who looked upon personality as a system of drives — instincts, habits, ideas and sentiments. But a systematic study of the dynamic basis of traits and attitudes is still lacking. The term trait has been used to mean some permanent features of reaction patterns, and the word attitude has been defined as a learned and generalised predisposition to respond in a characteristic way with reference to some situation, idea, value, material object, or person. An attitude is said to be "an acquired, more or less emotionalised, incipient reaction tendency for or against stimulus, e.g., our attitude towards democracy or communism is an acquired reaction tendency of acceptance or rejection."

An attitude has some important features — first, it has reference to some object or idea; secondly, attitudes are our likes and dislikes leading to approach or withdrawal, and thirdly, they are associated with emotions of love, hate, anger, etc.*

According to G. W. Allport traits have no well defined object of reference and no clear cut direction, as of approach or withdrawal, acceptance or rejection. They are features of conduct in respect of which different personalities can be measured. Thus, they are more or less static features of personality and are not expressive of the dynamism of personality.

Dr. Freud's dynamic psychology explains to a large extent the mechanism of abnormalities of personality. His chief concern is with the primary instincts of love and aggressiveness and their vicissitudes in the life of the individual. But the general traits of personality cannot be adequately explained on the Freudian hypothesis. He has no doubt thrown much light on the growth of attitudes such as ambivalence, negativism, exhibitionism, etc., but his psychology affords no clue to the growth of personality traits such as honesty, courage, leadership, etc.

Dr. Allport has made a study of the traits on a comprehensive scale. He refers to two ways of dealing with traits dynamically. According to one view wishes, drives, ideas, etc., are taken as the underlying motive factors of the traits of personality. The second view holds that traits are not based on motives but are due to tensions in the psychological system.


Such theories are more or less vague and do not explain the characteristic modes of adjustment of personality. Allport has rightly suggested that the personality is the dynamic organisation within the individual of those psycho-neural systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment. This psycho-neural system is an organisation of mental and bodily factors which lead to the growth of a group of traits. This system determines personality adjustments and gives it a unique character.

The foundation of personality is laid in physique, temperament and character. These are largely hereditary factors of personality. It may be said that traits develop out of habits. One who has to deal with a hostile environment very frequently develops the trait of Timority. A trait is not a chain of habits but an integrated group of specific habits having a common adaptive significance.

If a trait is taken as a specific habit then its origin is to be traced to some instinct or motive out of which a system of habits has grown up. For example, the sex instinct may be the basis of philanthropic habits, or the aggressive instinct may form the foundation of cruelty or revengefulness. But the most important question arises in connection with the determination of traits by reference to the socio-cultural environment to which a personality adjusts itself. The very fact that a child is born helpless in a strange environment does not necessarily lend support to the view that the development of his personality has to be explained in terms of the fulfilment or frustration of his primary needs. The socio-cultural influences under which he is placed from the very start of life tend to mould him into a pattern more or less flexible but fixed according to a particular social standard. Hence we will have to examine the modes of adjustments of the individual to the social milieu and discover the forces at work within the individual. The needs of the individual have to be fulfilled but the ways of satisfying the needs depends very much on the individual's capacity to utilise his powers to make him not only acceptable to the society in which he lives but to mark out a position for him in his relationship to others.

The Freudian psychology has explained the various devices of satisfying the primary needs of the individual and has made use

of the concept of repression to point out the effect of cultural forces on the instinctive hankering for satisfaction of needs. The various devices adopted by the individual for the satisfaction of needs or seeking relief from instinctual tensions put a stamp on the individual's personality and character. But the fundamental problem of explaining the "style of life" and the variation of traits has not been touched. The theory advocated here suggests that an individual is born with a fund of energy which motivates him and tends to flow out in specific directions. To know how a trait develops and how variation takes place in it we must not only consider the socio-cultural forces and the primary motives, but also the direction in which the psychic energy tends to flow out. We have discovered three main directions of the operation of psychic energy. It may be released in the form of assertiveness or in the form of submissiveness or in an equilibrated control over a given situation. Assertiveness is associated with restlessness and defiance; submissiveness is associated with mental stupor, aversion and delusion; mental equilibrium is associated with self-control, confidence and happiness. When the child first comes into contact with a certain situation he either dominates it or is dominated by it. If he can control his life situations and derive happiness from a balanced distribution of his energy, he becomes emotionally stable. On the other hand, if the environment dominates him he suffers from frustration and becomes passive and inert. But in his attempt to dominate the universe he may fail to maintain equilibrium by being driven by impulses from moment to moment. In such a case he loses balance over himself and engages himself in ceaseless activities only to promote his own welfare.



These three directions in which psychic energy tends to flow are represented here by the three axes R, S and T. The 'R' axis then measures all those traits which develop when the individual loses all balance over himself and engages in endless activities for seeking satisfactions. The 'S' axis measures all those traits that develop when the individual is able to strike a balance between dominating and yielding attitudes, and the 'T' axis measures all those traits which come into being when the individual is dominated by the environment and becomes passive.

Each axis measures a definite group of traits, for instance the 'S' axis measures a person's emotional stability, sociality and intelligence. The 'R' axis measures aggressiveness, impulsiveness and unsociality. The 'T' axis measures temerity, dullness and submissiveness. As the traits in one group are highly correlated, we may assume that there is a general factor underlying that group of traits. Hence, there will be three factors s, r and t.

On each axis verticals may be drawn to indicate the different measures of each trait, e.g., aggressiveness may be very low, low, moderate, high or very high. These five measures will enable us to compare different individuals in the trait of aggressiveness.

It is also a fact that the ethical traits such as kindness, honesty, truthfulness, etc., are generated where the 'S' factor predominates, and habits are formed out of motives called into play by the 'S' factor. Similarly, selfishness, narrow-mindedness and cruelty develop when the 'r' factor predominates and habits are formed out of motives excited by the 'r' factor. But from this it does not follow that a man once honest cannot be dishonest, or a truthful man can never lie. The variation in the traits occurs due mainly to the dominance of one of the factors at a given moment. Observation also shows that a very docile man can on a subsequent occasion turn out to be a violent reactionary, or a cruel man may develop into a philanthropist.

The paired opposites of selfish and other-loving, of truthful and lying, of hostile and friendly attitudes are found to be present in the same individual in his relationship to different persons and things. Different situations evoke different responses from him at a given time, e.g., a man extremely kind to his followers may be extremely cruel to other persons. From such observed facts the only legitimate conclusion that we can draw is that the total amount of psychic energy available to an individual at a given moment tends to flow in opposite directions, and the dominant factor of one phase of life may be replaced by another factor producing opposite effects.

Hence, dominance or recession of one factor or the other at a given moment determines the mode of individual's adjustment in a particular way. It is not at all true that the dominant factor accounts for the formation of habit. The fact is that one dominant factor may lose its dominance, and another factor may come into the limelight. The three factors S, r, and t are so related that there may be shifting from one to the other in course of time. If

a person acts intelligently or bluntly in a certain situation, there is no reason to suppose that his behaviour will have the same stamp always. An intelligent man may act very bluntly. Even when the habits grow up, we observe remarkable changes in behaviour due to the dominance of one factor or the other in a given situation. For example a man who has developed the habit of submissiveness may at times be so much assertive that it is difficult to make him yield under pressure. To account for such variations in personality adjustments, the assumption of the interaction of the three factors is necessary.

The dominance of one factor over the other two may be so persistent that certain traits of personality will develop due to the dominant factor, e.g., a person appears to be bright in intelligence, sociable and emotionally stable when the 'S' factor persistently dominates. The persistence of the 'R' factor makes a man selfish, impulsive and pragmatic, and the persistence of 'T' factor makes him dull, indecisive and submissive. From this it appears that the more desirable qualities go together. Experimental results so far available lend support to this fact. But this is only partially true. A man of superior intelligence may be social or anti-social, calm or restless, self-controlled or impulsive, assertive or submissive. The more desirable qualities are found to have a high correlation only when the particular factor with which they are associated persistently dominates.

If we study any personality we find evidences of the operation of these three factors in his relationship to things and persons. Environmental or socio-cultural forces modify and alter the personal adjustments of the individual, but the inner determining factors exert their influence in the formation of personal traits. It is a well-known fact that constitutional traits are determined by a person's physical endowment. The temperamental traits are largely the products of socio-cultural influences. But the distinctive character which an individual acquires in his relationship to others is fundamentally determined by the interplay of factors which we have stressed above. Hence, the study of the traits of a personality must be based on a comprehensive study of the factors which lie at the basis of personality adjustments.

The Place of the Philosopher in Society

BY

G. R. MALKANI

1. *Introduction.* The subject, with a slight modification, was discussed in a symposium at the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Calcutta. It appears to suggest that philosophers suffer from an inferiority complex, and that they are somehow uncertain of their place in society. Instead of philosophers being kings, philosophers these days seem to be supplicating society for some recognition which they think is their due, but which society is somehow withholding. Nobody ever questions the place of the scientist, the poet, the artist, the preacher, etc. They have a known function in society. But everybody, including the philosopher himself, cannot help thinking that the philosopher is somehow superfluous. He is a kind of parasite. He appears to make no return to society for what he receives from it. Is not society entitled to withdraw what little patronage it grudgingly gives? This paper seeks to remove the wrong impression that philosophy is something useless. At the same time, it tells the philosopher what is his true business and what he should avoid doing in order to save philosophy from the contempt in which it is sometimes held.

2. *Where the philosopher is king!*—Philosophy is supposed to be a pursuit after wisdom. If there is any wisdom that the philosopher garners, society cannot fail to recognise its value. If the philosopher feels neglected, he is himself to blame for it. He must turn his philosophy first upon his own profession. He must be self-critical. Is he true to his own profession? Is he among the wise? Or is he among the herd that are guided by passion and prejudice? A real philosopher is respected wherever he is found. He may not be a king or the administrative head of a state. But he is certainly a king in the cultural field of new ideas and new insights. The common man cannot fail to recognise true wisdom; and he follows a wise man as he would not follow a king. For here is a king of ideas, and so of his mind. He follows the head of the state in fear. He follows the wise man freely and out of inner respect for him. If the philosopher has fallen on evil days, as he well might think, it is no fault of society. There is something

wrong in the philosopher's own pursuits. Often he is a learned drudge, or a purveyor of high-sounding but meaningless words.

3. *Real Wisdom.* All real wisdom is practical. It has a necessary relation to life. It cannot but make itself felt in our daily life and the ideals that we set before ourselves. This is not to say that philosophy is something practical, or that it tells you what to do and what not to do. It is essentially a theoretical activity. But the truth which it seeks is not something abstract and formal having no relation to our actual life. It has a direct bearing upon this life, its direction, and its significance to us. It makes for the *summum-bonum* of life itself. It is rightly called *adhyātmic-vidya*. He is a true philosopher who pursues this knowledge, not he who goes about his business in a purely eclectic spirit, trying to reconcile divergent views, finding good in everything and truth nowhere.

4. *Truth as a value.* There are many cultural activities that have a value for society, but none that comes up to the disinterested love of truth of the philosopher. Religion is elevating, but it is dogmatic on its theoretic side. Even science is dogmatic. It has a clumsy and unreflective metaphysics, the result of a wrong interpretation of experience. Philosophy questions every such interpretation. The philosopher is essentially an iconoclast. He doubts everything that can be doubted. His scepticism has almost universal scope. It stops at nothing except truth in its completeness and self-evidence. All other values are bound to be subordinate to truth. Philosophy is thus at the apex of all cultural values, and the crown of all the sciences.

5. *The values of a primitive society.* A primitive society has no use of philosophy. It is merely interested in those forms of activity which are conducive to its self-preservation. Where it finds its powers limited, it invokes the super-natural. The super-natural is always called to aid even in advanced societies where human effort proves useless and ineffective. Man, by his very constitution, cannot get away from the super-natural. He may refuse to believe in it. But his unconscious mind is bound to recognise the mystery of his life and existence, and pay secret homage to the unknown, the invisible and the transcendent. Religion in some form is as natural to man as the knowledge of nature. While the latter is the result of the biological urge and the need for the adaptation to the environment, the former is the unconscious adaptation to forces and powers beyond the control of man, and therefore properly regarded as super-natural and super-sensible. It is conceivable that science may progressively reduce the limits of the super-

natural and the sense of our helplessness. But it will always be obliged to draw the line somewhere, and make man conscious of his limitations and his smallness in an ever-widening universe with its mystery unresolved. Religion is the means of our escape from this sense of our helplessness and of putting ourselves right with the Whole. We may not believe in a personal God. But we cannot help believing in a power above us and beyond us that can make our future or mar it. God is simply the name of the entity that controls this power. There are refinements in religion as there are refinements in science, which both satisfy a certain need and seek a certain kind of well-being of the individual.

6. *What value has philosophy?* Unfortunately, philosophy answers no such need. It does not, like science, seek any kind of knowledge which we can use for our welfare in this world. In all scientific studies, theory and practice are two different things. Pure science is one thing and applied science another. There is no such distinction in philosophical knowledge. It cannot be further applied. Its value lies in itself. It is its own justification. It is in this sense a pure value. It gives a way of looking at things which permeates and colours all the activities of life that, in the ordinary man, flow from ignorance, misunderstanding and false ideas. We no longer act in blindness. That is all. *Truth does not wait to be applied in order to become useful.* Application is part of the truth itself. The theoretical culmination is also the practical culmination. This is true wisdom. To know the truth is to live the truth. In other words, knowledge itself is value, not a means to the attainment of some other non-cognitive value. Knowledge is power here in the literal sense. There is no gap between knowledge and its usefulness to us. How can a primitive society, tied to its immediate needs, value such knowledge? It is only a highly evolved and cultured society that has partially disengaged itself from its immediate biological wants that can have the time and the aptitude for this kind of higher knowledge. Philosophy bakes no bread; and philosophy opens no cheap heaven that we can enter through prayer or supplication. It seeks a heaven that knows no limits of time and space, here and hereafter, life and death. For Truth itself has no such limits.

It may now be said: "But is any such knowledge possible? Does philosophy give any knowledge at all? Most of the philosophers we know philosophize; but they never get at the end of it. They never get at anything which they can declare as *the Truth*, unless they are less than philosophers and dogmatic in spirit." This view is quite possible, and in most cases justifiable. But if philo-

sophy is a legitimate sort of theoretic activity, it cannot be endless. It must have a problem and a solution of that problem. No genuine theoretic activity is in a vacuum or simply idle. There are questions which science cannot answer, nor can religion. A legitimate question that remains unanswered is bound to create internal unrest. Life may be smooth on the surface, but not below the surface. The philosopher addresses himself to these questions deep within the spirit of man. He may solve no social problem, but he has a real problem for the spiritual well-being of man; and unless he solves it, at least to his own satisfaction, his labours have been in vain. No cultured society can be indifferent to its philosophers who are thus occupied. They answer to a certain need that cannot be ignored, and that is no less insistent in the restlessness of the spirit of man than his physical needs. It is no exaggeration to say that the place of the philosopher in society is the measure of the culture of that society.

7. *How Philosophy may be misunderstood*: It is sometimes argued that the philosopher ought not to occupy himself exclusively with the problems of the individual and of his internal conflicts. Philosophy ought to justify itself to society in a more concrete way. It should make us better men and women. It should solve the problems that face human beings in society. It should not therefore be confined to pure metaphysics, or the search after the ultimate truth if there is any such thing. Whatever else it may do, rightly or wrongly, to satisfy the craving of certain individuals for abstract and intricate theories embracing the whole of reality, it should also solve ethical and sociological problems. If science is the discovery of nature, philosophy ought to be the discovery of man in society.

We cannot quite agree with this view. It appears to us that it is no business of philosophy to make us better men and women. We can be better if we abide by the moral code which every religion commends. If something in that code has lost its relevance or is found not to conform to the ideas of a particular age, it does not require a philosopher to say so or to suggest a remedy. There are practical men called reformers in every society, and they answer to the need. A philosopher is not a reformer. If he studies sociological problems, his solutions will have no more value than all empirical generalisations. He will thus be assuming the role of a scientist rather than that of a philosopher. The study of ethics is part of philosophy. But what the philosopher is interested in are the first principles of moral behaviour, and the knowledge of these has no tendency to make men more moral. The common

man can do without this kind of knowledge, and yet he can lead a perfectly moral life free from any mental reservations and intellectual doubts which are the lot of the philosopher.

The philosopher is as good as useless to society as an adviser on any concrete matters of social organisation. In fact, he must be careful that his philosophy does not degenerate into sociology or psychology, which are empirical studies. He must keep it true to the study of the first principles only or the ultimate presuppositions of every science. This study has a purely theoretical value. It makes us conscious of the limitations of our knowledge, and poses the problem of truth in its literal and absolute sense which has no element of supposition in it. The Philosopher seeks absolute truth, not truth in the context of time.

More generally, the philosopher is the spiritual care-taker of society. He seeks to harmonise the inner man, by harmonising his beliefs, resolving certain problems of reflective thought, and in general interpreting the ordinary man's experience to him in its totality. His usefulness to society is in a sense negative, though important. He brings harmony to the intellectual life, and through it to the whole man. 'This is job enough.' We must cease to cheat society that we can give it any guidance. Society itself does not go to the philosopher for this particular purpose. Why should we unnecessarily thrust ourselves upon it?

8. *How the philosopher can serve society*: (a) If the philosopher wants to be useful to society he must neither teach nor preach. He must set an example of critical, dispassionate, and discriminating consideration of things. Nothing goes so much against his grain as dogmatism, or an ideological fixation, or an 'ism' of one kind or another. For him, truth is not a dogma to be communicated from outside. It is to be achieved from within through a kind of spiritual labour. It is a personal discovery, not a ready-made article. In this way, the philosopher frees the social mind from the dead weight of tradition, fixed ideas and cheap half-truths. *Philosophy is a spirit*. The philosopher who can infuse this spirit in the mass-mind, and make a philosopher of the common man will have done an inestimable service to society. More philosophers there are, more is the judgment of a social group balanced and sane. Philosophy may lead to no ultimate truth; but *philosophising* has a value all its own. It makes truth a personal achievement, not a slogan to be accepted or rejected according to party affiliations. There is a very real sense in which we must

look within for the truth and examine every question on its merits and without prejudice.

(b) Another way in which the philosopher is useful to society is the way he regards things in their *value-aspect*. He always tends to take the longer view. He distinguishes the passing from the abiding, the temporal from the eternal, the mundane from the non-mundane, the false from the true. There are certain eternal verities, and these ought to set the goal of life. The lower should be sublimated, or made the vehicle of the higher.

(c) A third way in which the philosopher is useful to society is by shifting the emphasis from the practical to the theoretical. The common man lacks the *purely theoretical interest*. He confuses useful knowledge with true knowledge. All science has this character. It never questions its own presuppositions and its own methods. It is left to the philosopher to pursue the purely theoretical interest, and seek truth irrespective of its social utility, and as a value in itself.

9. *Doubts about the higher knowledge*: This brings us to the highest function that a philosopher can discharge in society. Has he a new wisdom that can achieve for man the *summum bonum* of his life? That is the aim of Indian philosophy, particularly Vedanta.

It has been argued that philosophy is held in contempt by the younger generation, because of a certain unhealthy tendency of deprecating the known and the visible world, and setting up as the very ideal of truth an unknown, invisible and wholly transcendent entity called Brahman. The world is quite real to us. Whatever its defects, we are firmly rooted in it. We must try to spiritualise this world as the westerners are trying to do in their own way with some success. Philosophy in India must be freed from its religious trappings. It must cease to be a kind of theology based upon sacred texts. It must become rational. It must solve the problems of this life, and improve the conditions of life here and now. It is no use seeking spiritual edification in a world to be, or in the life hereafter, or in the Silence of Brahman. All these are unreal and illusory objectives for a rational being, whatever reality they might have for the mystic. We must save philosophy from this kind of mysticism, if it is to inspire any respect in a modern society.

It is perhaps true that Advait Vedanta which is the crowning phase of Indian thought is not in harmony with present-day tendencies and intellectual trends. But it is one thing to say that times

are out of joint or that the age has run away from the truth, and quite another to say that the truth must conform to the age otherwise it is no truth. If it is the latter, there can be no such thing as eternal verities. Philosophy reduces itself to a social science that solves the problems that are peculiar to each age or generation of men. We may keep philosophy at that, and perhaps attract a few wayward young men to philosophical studies. But will it answer the deeper needs of the spirit? There will always remain another kind of philosophy, and some other men, young and old, who will look after those needs, and philosophize differently. Shall the philosophers of the new age disown them? If they do, the worse for them. There is place enough for all; and there are places and places.

Indian philosophy starts in the acute consciousness of those ills of life which are inherent in empirical existence as such, and which cannot be remedied by make-shift methods. The Europeans have created, with the aid of science, a sort of heaven on earth. (Sometimes it is hell too). But certainly they are not on that account more philosophical. They are more practical only. Certain of the ills of life can be thus treated. But there are ills and ills. Certain ills like poverty, disease, etc., can be progressively reduced through a study of scientific and social aspects of those problems. We can improve the conditions of human existence in general. But not all ills are capable of such treatment. There are ills like 'sorrowing' (*shok*); ills that result from 'attachment' (*moha*); ills that are inherent in the body however well kept, like death and disease, etc. These can never be removed through any social action or empirical methods. Their treatment requires other methods. Wise men think that empirical existence itself must be transcended. This freedom from empirical existence is called *moksha*. It is the enjoyment of true immortality. That ordinary worldly people are not very sensitive to these ills is no argument that there are no such ills or that they cannot be remedied.

Indian philosophy and Indian religion have their origin in the consciousness of the pain of existence. We may call this 'pessimism'. But is it irrational? It requires a certain spiritual sensitiveness to perceive the real problem of evil and to seek its solution. This is the sphere of religion in general. But there is a form of religion that traces all ills that flesh is heir to, to man's ignorance of his own true nature, which is divine. If we could only know the Truth, the Truth shall make us free. This is philosophy in its highest form. Ordinary religion is based upon a certain discipline of the will and upon a certain re-orientation and sublimation of the affec-

tive nature of man. Philosophy replaces this religion by a new enlightenment, that renders both the will and the emotions of man subservient to his knowledge. Religion is no longer blind faith. It is the attitude of the whole man to Truth itself. For, verily, the knower of the Truth becomes the Truth!

This is the highest function of philosophy in society. It seeks to impart the saving knowledge to those who seek it and deserve it. Do we then improve our philosophy by keeping it free from religion, and making it subservient to the social needs, of a particular age? Only those who are sceptical about the higher claims of philosophy will answer the question in the affirmative. They are mostly persons who are influenced by the European tradition in philosophy and have only a superficial acquaintance with Hindu thought.

10. *Is it all irrational?* It may be argued that the Vedantic system of thought here referred to is patently unconvincing and false. If the world is illusory, then human effort too is illusory. Human reasoning is illusory, and what not! Such a philosophy commits suicide. It is wrong therefore to exploit the resources of logic to prove the illusoriness of the world, including all ethical endeavour and human well-being in this world.

Here the first question is whether logic is being misused. If it is, then we must point out its misuse, or any fallacy involved in the reasoning. We cannot extol reason, and at the same time ignore it. We may ignore a person who relies upon a private and uncommon intuition. That is outside the scope of philosophy. We cannot ignore a person who begins to reason and to justify his belief in the illusoriness of the world. The resources of logic are open to all the parties to the dispute alike. This is the only rational way to dispose of a school of thought, and a supposedly wrong tendency in most of Indian thinking. What would not be rational is to reject a most respectable school of thought out of hand because it reaches a certain conclusion that we dislike. A philosopher does not resile from unpleasant conclusions if they are seen to be necessitated by reason itself. Advait Vedanta is a rational system in the truest sense of the term. Let us meet it on its own ground.

It is true that life here and now is the only life with which we are really concerned. But this life can be lived at different levels. Intellectual and aesthetic joys, or the joy of a harmonious and well-utilised life for the good of others, etc., are known to all. But is there nothing better? What is the limit? The limit is

reached when we conquer death itself and achieve the joy of immortality even in this life. Conquest over death is not a physical conquest made possible by science. It is the conquest of spirit over matter. It is the life of the *jivan-mukta*, who is free in life and free in death. Such a man is a living example of "true divinity in human form". What service can compare to this in social utility? The morality of the common man is laboured. The morality of the free man is part of his nature. He can do no ill, nor think ill. His life spreads its fragrance all around. This is what Vedanta offers to those who would follow the way of knowledge or true wisdom.

Society is always sensitive to such achievement. That philosophers of this type are rare is no argument against them. In their absence, we play at philosophy. We apply reason piece-meal to one branch of knowledge or another. In a more aesthetic temper, we seek to co-ordinate different sciences, cultivate the habit of looking at things as a whole, formulate a world-view, and set up speculative systems. So far our reason itself is in bondage to our imagination. We need to be free from our imagination, if we want to know the truth and nothing but the truth. Speculative reason is just imagination. There is no royal road to Truth. We require a moral and spiritual stamina, no less than fine rational discrimination. Those who are satisfied with less, some kind of intellectual scheme or provisional truth to supply a direction to their lives, will get what they want with little effort. But they cannot set the limit, nor decide what philosophy is or what it can do for man. It can be the crown of all physical and social sciences, the royal science of Truth and Freedom. For Truth alone can make us free (*jñānāteva tū kaivalyam*).

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Whitehead and the Adventure of Philosophy

BY


BERNHARD MOLLENHAUER

There are fashions in philosophy as in music. Today's vogue of specialization has deflected many young philosophers from the classical tradition of philosophical Idealism represented by Alfred North Whitehead and reaching back through Berkeley, Locke and Descartes to Plato. New journals appear devoted to linguistic analysis, "semantics" and students specialize in methodology and mathematical logic. Such studies have a curiously alien and barren look to the average cultivated mind seeking some wider spiritual horizon. They are as necessary as the tuning of instruments before a concert; but they are not substitutes for the universality of philosophy. Descartes and Berkeley's ideal of the pursuit of truth in the spirit of high adventure has long since evaporated in lecture halls. Gone is the spirit of Renaissance thinkers and the daring effort to construct new cosmologies. It is claimed that the rapid growth of the sciences requires a fragmentation of knowledge and division of labour. Far from being evidence of progress this narrowness of interest is but another form of intellectual defeatism, the desertion of philosophy as the Socratic pursuit of wisdom.

Whitehead was one who felt the need of a saving wisdom in a sick world, of a better understanding of the relation of the individual to the whole. He sought an understanding of the universe in all its aspects, in all its finitude and mystery. He was one of our few contemporaries who saw the entire problem of philosophy with its cultural affinities. In one of his later works he wrote:

"Philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of them seek to express that ultimate good sense which we term civilization. In each case there is reference to form beyond the direct meanings of words. Poetry allies itself to metre, philosophy to mathematical pattern."

His long unique career like Beethoven has three chief periods, the first is devoted to mathematical research, the second is occupied with the problem of our knowledge of nature and a philosophy of science, in the third he emerges as one of the greatest philosophers since Kant.



It was Whitehead's early mathematical work that won him membership in the Edinburgh Royal Society. It was many years later when the British Academy honored him with membership in recognition of his purely philosophical achievements. In his second period, which coincides mostly with the first world war, we find him in London engaged in working out a philosophy of science. He made a brilliant comparative study of the classical and non-Euclidean geometry of space and of Relativity. These studies are partly discussed in his recent book *Essays in Science and Philosophy* published by the Philosophical Library. This philosophy of science found complete expression in his famous "1920 books." It is one of the most important developments in twentieth century thought. Occasional misinterpretations of this phase of Whitehead's work led to the belief that he was a realist of the Russell-Hume school and that his later philosophy was a repudiation of his theory of knowledge. In spite of his early insistence on the importance of science as an independent study of nature, he thought of his philosophy as a pursuit rather than a retreat from science. He made important contributions to mathematical theory, but did not lose sight of the greater universality of philosophy and its goal of a comprehensive cosmology. The reader will realize this when reading *Essays in Science and Philosophy*.

Whitehead did not write entirely from a scientific point of view, for early in his life a primary source of his thought was sociological reflection. His studies in the nature of knowledge led him gradually to his broader metaphysical speculations. Even in his mathematical period there was a marked philosophical trait. It is illustrated, for example, in his careful distinction between the mathematical use of symbols and the actual process of real reasoning.

"It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them."

For him the use of mathematical symbols was a shorthand process, a simplification, by which we make transitions in reasoning almost mechanically. We see in *Science and Philosophy* that mathematics continued to be a most important part of philosophical discipline. Part Four is devoted to mathematical considerations, concluding with a section on Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Like Plato he maintained throughout his life devotion to mathematical thought in relation to the search for the ideal. There is a close

affinity between Whitehead and Plato who pioneered the method of abstraction.

"When Plato in his lecture connected mathematics with the notion of the Good, he was defending — consciously or unconsciously, the traditional ways of thought spread through all races of mankind. The novelty was the method of abstraction which the Greek genius was gradually emphasizing. Mathematics, as studied in his own Academy, was an abstraction of geometrical and numerical characterizations from the concrete facts of Athenian life. . . . The new epoch of scientific abstractions was arising."—*Essays in Science and Philosophy* Page 112.

In Part Two, the section on philosophy, he points out that abstraction involves selection and emphasis. In a sense all the attributes of finite minds are modes of emphasis through which "Creativity" brings about the emergence of values. All qualities peculiar to finite organisms are "modes of emphasis" whereby the universal is expressed in the particular. In Whitehead's words "finitude vivifies the infinite." Unlike some Oriental mystics, Whitehead believes that the "infinite needs the finite as much as the finite needs infinity. In scientific thought, the qualities of an actual thing are abstracted from that thing in the process of analysis. In the analytical abstractions of physics, for example, there must be a certain limitation of attention that involves a divorce from the living fullness of reality. This analytical procedure is necessary for the purposes of science though it weakens the sense of spiritual reality. "The task of philosophy," says Whitehead, "is to reverse this process and thus exhibit the fusion of analysis with actuality. It follows that Philosophy is not a science."—Page 113.

Like science, philosophy must start from some limited section of experience. For Whitehead the point of departure was mathematical theory. But in the above quoted work he says that the most fruitful starting point in philosophy is that study of values we term aesthetics, a neglected study which nevertheless can lead us to the very meaning of things. Aesthetic experience demands an individualized universe in contrast to the colorless de-personalized, rather poor, world of abstract physics. It involves a heightened though subjective sense of individuality. On the objective side there is the aesthetic object which is correlated with the subject in the unity of mutual relevance. It is the spiritual unity symbolized by the exquisite inner and outer harmony of an aesthetic pattern of art or the artistic unity of a perfect picture. Plato's Ideas are suggestions of this idea of a pattern of aesthetic order of cosmic relationships.

Whitehead believes that the spiritual values in an aesthetic order of the universe have an essential independence of any moment of time. Yet this inherent value would lose meaning apart from its necessary reference to the facts of a changing world. Here he differs from Plato, and insists:

"Value refers to Fact, and Fact refers to Value." Value is the general name for the infinity of Values, partly concordant and partly discordant. The essence of these values is their capacity for realization in the world of Action."—Page 80.

So the World of Value cannot be considered apart from the World as Fact or Activity. On the other hand the World of Activity is modified by the World of Value, and receives its purpose for the future as well as its perspective of unfoldment. Like Plato, Whitehead conceives Value to be timeless but avoids the Platonic doctrine of "imitation." He believed that the notion of purely abstract Values totally apart from any reference or relation to events in the temporal World of Activity was the great error in Greek philosophy. For centuries this notion of "independent existence" has haunted mystical literature. "The two worlds of Value and of Action are bound together in the life of the Universe, so that the immoral factor of Value enters into the active creation of temporal fact." Thus what we would call the phenomenal universe is grounded in a multiplicity of events in space-time, while the noumenal world of Values is grounded upon a timeless unity of a spiritual co-ordination of Values at which Creation aims.

The cosmos as Totality embraces both worlds, the one of finite multiple Activities, the other of coordinated Value. One is the realm of change, the other of immortality. The latter emphasizes the essential unity of the many, the former emphasizes the essential multiplicity involved in the realization of this spiritual unity. It is in the World of Change that we find the development of persistent personality as a vehicle for the realization of enduring Values. So the doctrine of immortality is an issue in the wider topic of the immortality of manifested Value; and personality is an example of the realization of a type of Value. The essence of religious thought for Whitehead is this emphasis upon the divine factor in human nature.

In reading this great volume of varied essays one is impressed with the continuity in metaphysical temper between Whitehead's new Idealism and the American idealist tradition popular at the turn of the century. It is significant that he came to Harvard at the close of a great epoch of European culture, and did his great

philosophical work in the New World. He does not use the term Idealism; for like many contemporary thinkers he is unwilling to be labelled. Like John Eloy Boodin he has points in common with the Realists in their theory of knowledge and is sympathetic to Pragmatism of Dewey's type. In the *Essays* there is a short section on the influence of John Dewey. Generally speaking his philosophical position is closer to that of Boodin, for whom Whitehead is part of the philosophical tradition of Cusanus and Erigena. However he does not go along with Whitehead's theology without important qualifications. The *Essays* do not touch on these profounder problems, being a collection of more or less brief studies written at different times.

No doubt every historically minded student wishes that the great thinkers of the past had been more mindful of posterity and its interest in their early development. We would give so much for the personal recollections of Cusanus, or Erigena, or an account of the early home life and education of men like Bruno and Descartes. Fortunately in his last volume of essays Whitehead has given us a charming and invaluable account of his early education first in 1875 at school in Sherborne, Dorsetshire and later in Trinity College, Cambridge. He was born in the Isle of Thanet, Kent, in 1861. "Geography is half of Character," he writes in telling us of his native village not far from where the Saxons and Augustine landed. It is all storied ground rich with interest and beauty. He attended the local school which tradition links with King Alfred. The great bells of Abbey Church were brought by Henry the Eighth when he returned from the Field of The Cloth of Gold. Their sound was among the many things which Whitehead believed provided that aesthetic background, an "essential element" in his education. His teachers were highly cultivated men of kindly sense and tolerance, the type of liberal scholar whose influence was predominant in the later years of the Victorian Era. We get from this book a vivid picture of the lovely quiet charm and intellectual urbanity of that vanished era.

Discussion

(PROBAS JIVAN CHAUDHURY, M.A., M.Sc., P.R.S.)

Mr. S. K. Nandi in his "A comparative study in the Aesthetic Theories of Benedetto Croce and Rabindranath Tagore" in the last issue of the *Philosophical Quarterly* has stated certain things which have struck me as misinterpretation of Rabindranath. On page 209, he says, "Tagore, in our view, in limiting the content of art to some super-personal reality, to 'what man aspires to be', has made the problem of communication all the more difficult". We request him to explain to us how can man's aspirations be a super-personal reality. Then where does he find Tagore speaking of super-personal reality? He always speaks of art as the expression of human personality and human hopes and aspirations. Again, even if a super-personal reality be the content of art, how does it obstruct communication? Mr. Nandi says, "The Universal either as self or as Reality can be an object of abstract contemplation and thought, but not of creative activity". This is strange for we all believe that the universal is expressed through the particular, the abstract is concretised in and suggested by the sensuous particular. Moreover, as Croce holds, abstract concepts may be intuited. Philosophical poems are poetry if the total effect and the chief intention of the poems be expression of a feeling, in this case the feeling being kindled by some thought. Again, it is the universal element in art that helps communication.

Mr. Nandi says, Tagore does not permit the villain to appear in poetry or drama. Thus Shylocks and Iagos are to be banished from good art. This is strange to any student of Tagore. Tagore wanted art to represent what is noble in man but he could well see that to bring out the noble it may be contrasted against the ignoble. And this is what he writes, "Love, affection, pity, hatred, anger and jealousy are all our instincts; if they, under certain circumstances, get the Sovereign power over human nature, we do neither ignore nor hate them. Yet if gluttony is given a throne in any literature who is to accept it?" (*Sahityer pathe* p. 172). Thus Tagore had objection only against the basest passions of man which do not truly represent man. Mr. Nandi's interpretation of Tagore is overhasty and repugnant to any sincere student of Tagore.

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