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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIII, Nos. 3 & 4]

[Oct. 1950 & Jan. 1951

AN ORGAN
OF
THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY MADRAS
AND
THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

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Yearly Subscription Rs. 4


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Foreign 8 Shillings or 2 Dollars.

Single copy Re. 1 or 2 Shillings

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Māyā-Vāda : Sri Sankara and Sri Aurobindo

BY

G. R. MALKANI

I

Introduction

1. There is a distinction between a theory and a symbolic representation of truth. A theory can only be falsified by another theory, and it is always open to correction. It can never represent absolute truth. A symbolic representation, being only symbolic, does not require to be refuted, but merely transcended. If *māyā-vāda* were a theory, it could be refuted. It is not a theory. It is a symbolic representation which requires to be transcended; and when it is transcended, it leaves no residue of a problem. For Truth alone is; and Truth can never be questioned. *Māyā-vāda* is no truth. It is affirmed only to be later negated. But it does its proper function of answering certain inevitable questions, dissipating false ideas, pointing to the truth and releasing the theoretic consciousness from error and ignorance.

2. Sri Aurobindo treats *māyā-vāda* as a theory and picks holes in it. It is natural. How can we get rid of *māyā* once we have asserted it? And if we cannot get rid of it, we have in the end an ultimate dualism, which contradicts the non-dualistic stand of Advait Vedānta. *Māyā* itself may be, and has been, declared an illusion. But this does not satisfy Sri Aurobindo. He says: '*Māyā* is itself an illusion, the parent of numberless illusions. But still this illusion and its works have some kind of existence and so must in some way be real..... There is then

a reality in *māyā*; it is at the same time real and unreal, existent and non-existent; or, let us say, it is neither real nor unreal: it is a paradox, a supra-rational enigma. But what then is this mystery, or is it insoluble? How comes this illusion to intervene in Brahman-existence? What is the nature of this unreal reality of *māyā*? (The Divine Life, Vol. II, p. 224.)

This sort of objection is natural once we treat *māyā-vāda* as a *vāda* or a theory to be defended. There is a Brahman, and there is the power of illusion completely opposed to the nature of Brahman, whether we put that power within Brahman or without It. An ultimate dualism seems unavoidable. Sri Aurobindo appears in comparison a better monist. For he avoids the dualism of a real Brahman and an illusory universe. There is nothing illusory anywhere. Everything is real, and everything follows from the nature of Ultimate Reality. The universe is a creation of the Consciousness-Force of Brahman. What the real brings forth must be itself real. It is a potentiality actualized, that is all. We can truly and literally say: 'All this (i.e., the world) is Brahman (*sarvam-idaṁ-Brahma-eva*).' This indeed is monism. Everything is to be traced to Brahman and His power. Nought can exist outside Him and beside Him.

3. There is only one difficulty in this account. Is all that we see and all that we know just as we see and know it? Is there no error anywhere? Is everything a veritable part of Brahman, so that to know it is to know Brahman? Does the mentally constructed universe measure up to our notion of Brahman or 'the Ultimate Unity aware of Itself'? Sri Aurobindo recognizes this difficulty, but does not regard it as insuperable. The creations of the mind represent the lower *māyā*. For Advait Vedanta, this is the only *māyā*. Small wonder it is that all that we know ordinarily, with our minds only, is regarded by it as illusory. But there is the higher *māyā* of the Super-mind that alone has the integral vision of the Ultimate Unity that is Brahman. Advait Vedanta, according to him, misses the link of the lower *māyā* and the higher *māyā*. He sums up the position by placing before us a dual possibility: 'There is, we may suppose, an original consciousness and power creative of illusions and unrealities with mind as its instrument or medium in the human and animal consciousness, so that the differentiated universe we see is unreal, a fiction of *māyā*, and only some indeterminable and undifferentiated Absolute is real. Or there is, we may equally suppose, an original, a supreme or cosmic Truth-Consciousness creative of a true universe, but with mind acting in that universe as an imperfect consciousness, ignorant,

partly knowing, partly not knowing,..... But this ignorance in fact proceeds, however stumblingly, upon knowledge and towards knowledge; it is inherently capable of shedding the limitation, the mixture, and can turn by that liberation into the Truth-Consciousness, into a power of the original knowledge. Our inquiry has so far led rather in the second direction..... There is no need of bringing in an original power of Illusion always mysteriously existent in the eternal Reality or else intervening and imposing a world of non-existent forms on a Consciousness or Superconscience that is for ever, eternal and absolute.' (Ibid., pp. 217-8.)

II

The logic of māyā-vāda is irrefutable

4. Sri Sankaracharya is noted for the extreme rigour of his logic. The conception of *māyā* follows from the notion of reality. It is wrong therefore to argue, as Sri Aurobindo and others seem to do, that it is inconsistent with that notion. Indeed, we may disagree about the notion of reality itself. That is possible and even in a sense legitimate. But once we accept Sri Sankara's notion of reality, the conception of *māyā* cannot but form part of it. There is no other alternative.

There is an important difference between Sri Sankara's notion of reality and that of Sri Aurobindo. All other differences follow from this fundamental difference. For Sri Sankara, the Absolute or Brahman is of the nature of the Self or *ātman*. To know the Absolute, we must know the unity of the Absolute with the Self. There is no other way. 'Thou art that (*tattvamasi*)' is the very quintessence of wisdom. There is only one intuition of the Self as opposed to the intuition of the not-Self. This intuition of the Self merely requires to be purified and perfected, when the Self itself will be known as the very Absolute. We must negate all the different forms of the not-Self, e.g., the physical body, thought, the ego, etc., that we ordinarily confuse with the Self. This mutual confusion of the Self and the not-Self (*adhyās*) is all our ignorance, and the source of all the ills of life. Thus negation is the only way to Truth — '*néti, néti*'.

There is no evidence in Sri Aurobindo's writings of this supreme truth of the Upaniṣads. The self has got to be transcended, not realized. There is a higher truth beyond the Self. The Absolute is conceived more or less in objective terms. It is a differentiated unity, not a pure unity. Those who can appreciate Sri Sankara's stand will understand that it is impossible to accommodate real

differences in the intuition of the Self or *ātman*. Sri Aurobindo ignores the *mahāvākya*s altogether or explains them away. To that extent, his philosophy falls outside the Upaniṣads or is based upon a very unorthodox interpretation of them. Whatever the value of that philosophy, let us here recognize that it is not Sri Sankara's, for whom the *ātman* alone is the limit of conceptual reality. Since all differences are conceptual, they cannot be accommodated in the nature of ultimate reality. We can negate everything, we cannot negate the *ātman*; for it is no object of any kind, and it is only an object that can be negated. It is pure, without any differences. It is non-empirical existence or divine existence *par excellence*. Only the *ātman* can be free from the stain and the sin of empiricity — *ātmā-apahata-pāpmā*.

5. Sri Sankara may hold any view about reality based upon the Upaniṣads. He may even be right. But what has he got to say about the known and the visible world? Is it not in some sense real? If not, how do we explain its existence? In other words, why this world?

Advait Vedanta contends that the known and the visible is not the real. In fact, if it were the real, there would be no problem of reflection, and no philosophical problem of truth to solve. It decides that the real is beyond the known and the visible, and quite opposed to it in nature. It is literally a metaphysical reality. It is the underlying substratum of the world. It is Brahman or the Great. Since the term 'Great' is used without qualification, it does not indicate any degree of greatness. It is the Great, than which nothing can be greater. It is one without a second (*ekam-eva-adūtiyam*). It is pure intelligence (*cin-mātra*). It is without internal or external differences (*bheda-rahitam*). It is indivisible (*nir-avayavam*), undifferentiated (*nir-viśeṣam*), unqualified (*nir-dharmakam*), self-revealing (*sva-prakāśa*), and of the nature of the Self (*ātma-rupam*). It is infinite (*anantam*), immutable (*śāśvatam*) and blissful (*ānandam*). If that is the nature of reality, what is the ontological status of the world? It is clearly different from the real. It is different also from the unreal or *tūchha*, which includes both the fanciful (e.g., a hare's horn) and the self-contradictory (e.g., the son of a barren woman). The unreal or *asat* can never appear and can never be taken for the real. The world is accordingly different both from the real as well as from the unreal, and indescribable in either of those terms — *sat-astābhy-ām-anir-vacaniya*. This is the character of all illusory appearances. The world too could have no other character.

6. Is not this logical? If reality is what we have said it is, the world too can only be what we have said it is; for the illusory does not exist, and does not in any way affect or limit the real. Only the real can limit the real. The illusory no doubt sits upon the real, but it has no kind of entrance into it. It comes from nowhere, and goes to nowhere. If it stays, it does not stay in its own right, but only in the right of the ground, without which it could not appear. In this sense, it is the ground itself, and nothing apart from the ground. Figuratively speaking, it comes from the ground, stays in it, and goes back to it. It is not *contained* literally in the ground, but the ground is all the reality it has. It is in this sense that we must understand the Upaniṣadic statement: 'The world has come out of Brahman, stays in It and goes back to It (*yato-va-emāni-bhūtāni-jāyanté...*)' Again, when the Upaniṣads declare, 'All this is Brahman (*sarvam-idam-khalū-Brahma*)', what is meant is not that the world is contained in Brahman — for that is impossible by the very nature of the two — but that Brahman alone is, not this that we see. The world is to be negated in Brahman, not affirmed. The proper analogy is: 'This man (seen from a distance) is a trunk of a tree', i.e., the man does not exist, it is only the trunk.

7. We can now answer the question, *why* the world? The reason for its existence can be no other than the reason for the existence of all illusory appearances. It is erroneous perception or false knowledge. An illusion is only dissipated when false knowledge is sublated by true knowledge. The appearance of a world, which includes both the objective as well as the subjective, is due to an error of perception. We call this error '*māyā*'. It alone explains, if anything does, the illusion of a cosmos.

8. Is the logic convincing? It appears not. We have only succeeded in setting up a dualism in another place. Instead of Brahman and the world, spirit and matter, we have Brahman and *māyā*. The error of perception is not nothing. It is there in addition to the truth of Brahman. We have not got rid of dualism altogether.

The logic of *māyā-vāda* has an answer to this. Does an erroneous perception exist? Is it real? Here we must be clear about one thing. We are not enquiring about the occurrence of an empirical entity, called the perception of the illusory. If no such thing had occurred, we should have no problem about it. We could not formulate a significant theoretical question regarding it. We can only formulate such a question regarding what is in some sense given. The perception of the illusory is

therefore given. Our question relates merely to the *ontological status* of this given something. We now contend that its ontological status is the ontological status of the object of that perception. If the object is real, it is perception proper. But if the object is non-existent and illusory, the perception of it too is equally illusory. There is no possibility of any sensible contact with such an object. The truth is that the subjective does not stand by itself. It has a necessary reference to the object, and stands or falls with it. Where the snake-appearance, for instance, is illusory, the perception of *that* snake is equally illusory; what is only a *fancy* is taken for *perception*. There is evidently here a *subjective illusion*. In other words, *māyā*, which we have identified with the perception of the illusory, is itself illusory. How can an illusory *māyā*, non-existent in its own right, contradict the non-dual character of Brahman? The illusory never does anything to its own ground.

9. But have we not over-stated our case? There is Brahman, and there is the cosmic illusion, call it by whatever name. The illusion itself cannot be denied altogether. We may describe it as *anirvachaniya* or inexplicable. But the inexplicable is. It appears to us that this reasoning shows a misunderstanding of the nature of an illusion. We are inclined to give some reality to an illusion. But let us then at least be consistent. If anything has some reality, it has absolute reality. There can be no degrees of reality. There can be degrees only in an evaluational scale. Something is more valuable, something is less. But reality is not value. There can be no degrees of being or existence. There is an absolute gulf between existence and non-existence. There is no third term between them which can partake of both. If the illusory has *any* reality, it is equivalent in reality to its underlying substratum. But if that is so, what is the sense in calling it illusory and *not real*? Strictly speaking, there is no intermediate logical status, except as a way of speaking, which must in the end be corrected, for it points beyond itself.

The truth is that, once we realize something to be illusory, it is impossible to give it any reality. It is only the psychical inability of thought to get away from a certain stereotyped habit of regarding everything thinkable as real, that makes us give reality to the illusory, and thereby set up endless, but meaningless, problems for ourselves. It is just an *illogical psychical habit*, and nothing more. As a matter of fact, the illusory is not literally thinkable or knowable. It contradicts itself. It is *this*, that is at the same time *not this*. Our thought does not visualize this contradiction in the being of the illusory, and so it takes it to be literally think-

able. In truth, an illusion realized is simply an illusion transcended. It has no theoretical value. What is the theoretical value of something which we do not, and cannot, believe? It is belief that indicates some theoretical status. Where belief is rendered impossible, theoretical consciousness has no problem to pursue. Any question about the illusory is therefore meaningless to rational thinking. What does not exist is really nothing; it is as good as *tūchha*. We do not ask any question about the *tūchha*. Why should we continue asking insoluble, because meaningless, questions about the illusory?

10. In conformity with this inner logic of *māyā-vāda*, Advait Vedanta goes beyond *māyā-vāda*. To those who see the world and want to know the truth about it, the answer is that the world is illusory or *māyāyic*. But to those who have seen through the illusion and realized the truth, there is really no world and no illusion either. The last word, by this logic, is not *māyā-vāda*, but *ajāt-vāda*. The world was never born. It never was. Brahman alone was, is, and ever shall be. *Māyā-vāda* is only a stepping-stone to this final consummation of knowledge. It is not a theory to be defended. It is only a descriptive word for the ontological status of the world in relation to the nature of ultimate reality. It gives all the philosophical explanation that the world is capable of. If we discount the explanation, we must change our notion of reality. We cannot accept the Vedantic notion, and still ask for some other explanation, or argue that the explanation in question contradicts the notion. Ultimately, it is the level of our experience that determines our philosophical formulae. *Māyā-vāda* represents an important formula of our reflective consciousness. *Ajāt-vāda* represents a still higher formula; but then philosophy has already ended in the saving knowledge of *ātman*, and nothing is left to thought to solve or to resolve.

III

Does Sri Aurobindo provide a more plausible theory in place of māyā-vāda?

11. Sri Aurobindo stoutly opposes the view that the world is illusory. He compares his own view with *māyā-vāda* thus: 'Both proceed from the conception of the One Reality, but one line leads to a universal Illusionism, the other to a universal Realism — an unreal or real-unreal universe reposing on a transcendent Reality or a real universe reposing on a Reality at once universal and transcendent or absolute.' (Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 185.)

It is argued that the world is real, because it is a manifestation of absolute reality or Brahman. All creation or becoming is a self-manifestation on the part of this Reality. This manifestation presupposes perception of a certain truth and the power to direct the force of creation along the line of the truth. The infinite Reality contains infinite truth. This infinite truth cannot all be realized in the forms of actual existence. Only something of it can be so realized. 'Infinite consciousness in its infinite action can produce only infinite results; to settle upon a fixed Truth or order of truths and build a world in conformity with that which is fixed, demands a selective faculty of knowledge commissioned to shape finite appearance out of the infinite Reality..... This power was known to the Vedic seers by the name of *māyā*. *Māyā* meant for them the power of infinite consciousness to comprehend, contain in itself and measure out, that is to say, to form — for form is delimitation — Name and Shape out of the vast illimitable Truth of infinite existence.' (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 147.)

12. Sri Aurobindo distinguishes two kinds of *māyā*, the lower and the higher. 'The lower, present and deluding mental *māyā* has first to be embraced, then to be overcome; for it is God's play with division and darkness and limitation, desire and strife and suffering in which He subjects Himself to the Force that has come out of Himself and by her obscure suffers Himself to be obscured. That other *māyā* concealed by this mental has to be overpassed, then embraced; for it is God's play of the infinities of existence, the splendours of knowledge, the glories of force mastered and the ecstasies of love illimitable where He emerges out of the hold of Force, holds her instead and fulfils in her illumined that for which she went out from Him at the first.' (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 175.) In other words, the Absolute forgets Himself in the world in order to find Himself again at the supra-mental level. *Sachchidananda* plays with Himself. It is a triple movement of involution, evolution, and Self-realization. It is 'the whole key of the world enigma'. (Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 171-2.)

13. God is not like an irresponsible magician that creates by his word whatever comes into his mind. He creates in accordance with the law or the truth of His being. The regularity in nature merely expresses the operation of this law. There is nothing arbitrary, nothing merely fanciful in the world. There is a plan behind it, which fulfils the purposes of God.

14. If we ask for the motive of creation, we are told, it can be no other than the delight of being. The Absolute requires nothing to fulfil Itself. It has no defect or deficiency to make good. It is

ever and eternally self-fulfilled (*pari-pūrṇa*). The only reason for creation is the sport-motive (*līlā*), which is also the delight-motive (*ānanda*). Sport is the purest of delights; for there is no end beyond the Sport itself. 'Out of Delight is the world born, in It it stays, and into It it disappears.'

15. The important thing to note in this account of creation is the function of the mind. For Sri Aurobindo, it has only a subordinate function. It is not the secret creatrix. In this, he differs from both the Buddhists and the Advaitists. For Buddhists, the idea is the only reality. There is nothing outside the idea. This is called *viññāna-vāda*. When therefore the flow of ideas ceases, nothing is left. It leads straight to *sūnya vāda* or nihilism. For Advaitists, conception or *kalpnā* is the only creative force behind the world. No conception, no world. The world in this sense is idea only. Idea is the function of the mind. What is beyond the mind is the pure and immutable Intelligence or *ātman*. There is no third term called super-mind or over-mind, except in the sense of a higher function of the mind that seeks to know the truth about reality. *Brahma-jñāna* is *vṛtti-jñāna*. So far as the world-appearance is concerned, it can only be explained as the function of the lower mind or conceptual thought. There is nothing to mediate between this mind and Absolute Reality. There is no reason in Reality itself for the existence of the world. The only reason for it must be found in conceptual thought, that superimposes a non-existent and a wholly illusory world upon a Reality that does not in any way contain it and is quite opposed to it in nature. This leads straight to illusionism or *māyā-vāda*. As against both these views, Sri Aurobindo sets up the Supermind as the real creator. Nihilism and illusionism, according to him, would be 'the only wisdom if we suppose that our human mentality or anything at all like it represents the highest cosmic force and the original conception at work in the universe'. (Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 180-1.) But 'the world expresses a foreseen Truth, obeys a predetermining Will, realizes an original formative self-vision — it is the growing image of a divine creation.' (Ibid., p. 181.)

16. Sri Aurobindo talks of self-manifestation on the part of Reality. This is a poetic idea that cannot bear analysis. We can talk of the artist manifesting himself in his works. They embody a certain idea or an ideal that he has in his mind. For him, the self-expression is a necessity. He has an urge to express himself. And when he has expressed himself, he has grown thereby. The expression is not superfluous. It is the reality itself. It adds to

his personality. His creativeness is not an accident of his being. It is the expression of an inner tension. The idea would not give him any rest. It demands expression. It is through this expression, wherein all the supernormal powers of the artist are involved, that the idea is really fulfilled; and when the idea is fulfilled, the tension is resolved and turned into joy. It is this self-expression therefore that distinguishes the artist from a mere dreamer bereft of joy.

How shall we now understand the self-manifestation of the Absolute in the form of the world? Does it add to the sum-total of reality or the value of reality? If it does, where is the sense in calling anything *absolute*? The Absolute will be like the Life-Force of Bergson that grows through evolution. Duration will not be an accident of its being, but the very essence of it. Similarly, in the philosophy of Whitehead, God is enriched through the time-process. In the case of these European thinkers, creativeness adds to the value of being and is not meaningless. Certain possibilities are realized or potentialities actualized. We cannot say the same thing about Sri Aurobindo's Absolute, that is complete from the very beginning. It does not diminish, nor does it grow, although it may create worlds on end. It is like the Christian God or the First Cause. Self-manifestation on its part can really achieve nothing by way of positive value. It achieves only a negative value — a descent which has the character of self-oblivion, and an ascent which has the character of self-discovery. If the self-oblivion is real, the Absolute is the worse for it. It has lost its own Self-awareness, which is the awareness of Truth. It has become the awareness of an *other*, the not-Self, which is the fundamental Ignorance or *ajñāna* according to Vedānta. But while this *ajñāna* is understood to be quite illusory, Sri Aurobindo's Self-oblivion is evidently something quite real and a moment in the life of the Absolute.

17. Another question arises here: Is there anything in the Absolute that requires manifestation? Is there anything in It that is merely possible or potential? If there is, then to that extent there is a certain deficiency in the Absolute. This deficiency is incompatible with that complete self-fulfilment which the notion of 'bliss' implies. Bliss cannot be the source of creation, but a will prompted by an inner urge for self-completion. Moreover, Reality ought to be self-manifest and self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*). The self-revealing does not require to be manifested objectively. For that will not be self-manifestation, but self-degradation, or better still the confusion of Self with not-Self or truth with untruth; we

take the Absolute for what is not the Absolute. The real Absolute does not require to be manifested, and can never be truly manifested; and when it is manifested, the Absolute is involved in an ignorance of Itself or Self-oblivion. Sri Aurobindo recognizes as much when he says: '*Sachchidananda*, involved by one of His lower movements in the self-oblivious absorption of Force that is lost in the form of her own workings, returns towards Himself out of the self-oblivion.' (*Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 176.) Advaitism rightly therefore regards the world not as the manifestation of the Absolute, but as a creation of Ignorance or *avidyā* that leads us away from the Absolute.

18. Sri Aurobindo says that the Infinite has infinite possibilities that can be actualized. There must therefore be a selective faculty of knowledge in the Absolute that sees a certain truth and directs the force of creation along the lines of the truth. But what is the connection between this truth and the Infinite? The Infinite cannot be a series, or a magnitude or a number. It can only be one and indivisible. Else it is bound to be incomplete and finite. If there is any truth about the Infinite, it can only be this indivisible whole. If the whole is not manifested, nothing is manifested. To conceive infinite possibilities in the Absolute is to introduce them arbitrarily through the action of the mind or the lower *māyā*. They cannot represent any truth about the Absolute, unless we degrade the Absolute and break it up into a number of possibilities. The truth is that the Infinite, if it is real, can only be a simple, undifferentiated and indivisible Whole. Such a Whole cannot be manifested. It is always and eternally self-manifest or it is nothing. The so-called measuring faculty of *māyā* does not measure out the truth, but only untruth. It makes the Infinite appear finite, the undetermined 'determined', the non-material 'material', etc. It superimposes a false appearance, it does not bring out the truth. It is the faculty for perversion or *adhyāsa* only, not the faculty for revealing the truth. There is no other possible meaning for *māyā* even on Sri Aurobindo's own premises.

19. The concept of *lila* or sport too is not appropriate to the Absolute. It renders the Absolute a complex individual with certain tensions in it. It is a wholly anthropomorphic idea. We first personify the Absolute, and then conceive Him as sportive. He becomes a magnified man. Indeed, according to Sri Aurobindo, the Absolute is both personal and impersonal. He is the unity of both. But how is this unity possible in any literal or non-figurative sense? In a figurative sense, or on the basis of a certain interpretation involving negations, even the finite individual is one with the Abso-

lute, according to Advaitism. But a unity of the two, in which each brings its own contribution to the whole, is impossible. The Impersonal has no *exclusive formation* implied in the notion of personality. There is no person, without some qualifying or limiting adjunct. There are various kinds of physical and non-physical bodies with which a self can identify himself, and thereafter function as a separate individual or a person. If there is an 'I', there must be a 'you'. If there is a person, there must be a world outside the person. Even *Saguna Brahman* has the body of *māyā*. He must be in some sense an egoist, an individual. He cannot be the Whole or the Absolute. The personal and the impersonal can be the same entity only with a difference. This difference relates to the false adjunct, which must be rejected in order to realize the identity or unity in the literal sense. Hence '*néti, néti*' (not this, not this)', is the way to Truth. Personality is a limitation that requires to be shed. It has no place in the highest quarter.

20. The idea of evolution in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo has a certain attraction for the average educated man steeped in the culture of the West. It appears to give man something to aspire after. Instead of endlessly aiming at an indefinite and infinite goal, we have in Sri Aurobindo a very definite line of evolution, from man to super-man, and from super-man to divinity. We can progress towards a supreme end, and not merely turn round and round in a cage like a squirrel trying to catch its tail. But the whole account of evolution impress us with the meaninglessness and the valuelessness of the whole process. The Absolute after all cannot ascend to any higher heights. Self-oblivion and self-discovery do not achieve a new value; and if they are taken as real moments in the life of the Absolute, there is any amount of dis-value, in the form of unnecessary suffering and evil of all kinds in the bargain. If a *real* God can freely will it all, there can be no remedy for it. And then, is the re-discovery on the part of the Divine much to enthuse over, when in the inscrutable ways of God it can again be followed by self-oblivion or a fresh descent into some kind of a world? For nothing can prevent the repetition of a similar process in the free sportiveness of the Divine.

The self-forgetfulness of man is at least intelligible and justifiable. Can that be said about the self-forgetfulness of the Absolute, that is complete Master of Himself, not subject to time or circumstance or any internal imperfection? Man is unable to get out of his finitude, and so he carries his finitude even into the Absolute. The concept of 'evolution' of Sri Aurobindo's philo-

sophy sounds plausible only by this *logic of the finite*. If there is any *logic of the infinite*, all this talk of creation of the real by the real must give place to the recognition of the eternal perfection of the Absolute, and the complete absence of any motive in Him for creating an imperfect world that can add no positive value to His own being, but that can surely add a negative value in the form of self-estrangement. The logic of *māyā-vāda* is in this sense the only logic of the infinite. It keeps the Absolute untouched by the imperfections of the world.

IV

Sri Aurobindo's objections against māyā-vāda

21. According to Advait Vedanta, we are in a sleep of Ignorance, the Ignorance of our true divine nature or *ātman*. This sleep does not occur *in time*. There is no time outside of it. Time, and the whole process in time, is a dream within this primal Ignorance or *mūl-avidya*. The sleep of Ignorance is, in this sense, beginningless or *anādi*. Not that it always was there. But since the whole of time is a product of *avidya*, a dream *within it*, it would be wrong to assert that *avidya* itself begins to be at a particular moment of time.

The sleep of Ignorance, however, is broken. It is broken when the knowledge of our divine nature arises. Like all ignorance, it has therefore an end or *anta*. That the dawning of the knowledge is an occurrence in time and is in that sense a part of the dream in question goes without saying. The *end* of Ignorance and the *knowledge* that dissipates it are thus part of the great sleep of Ignorance itself, outside of which there is no time. We can then say that the primal Ignorance is beginningless, but that it has an *end*, the end being quite as illusory as all the occurrences in time.

The whole of our empirical existence may be said to be comprised within the three states of deep sleep, dream and wakefulness. They constitute a dream within the great sleep of Ignorance. We wake up from this dream when we see the sun of Truth, or the unity of the self (*jiva*) with the Absolute (*Brahman*). We then dream no more. We are released from empirical existence as such. We have attained *mokṣa* or the Final Freedom. We are the very Eternal, and we stay as such.

22. (a) Sri Aurobindo now says: 'In the philosophies of Mayavadins..... the analogy of dream is given..... But it may be as well to give the dream analogy its full value and see whether

our sense of world-experience has in any way a similar basis. The fact that world-existence seems unreal to us when we pass into the spiritual silence or into some *Nirvana*, does not of itself prove that the cosmos was all the time an illusion. The world is real to the consciousness dwelling in it, an unconditioned existence is real to the consciousness absorbed in *Nirvana*; that is all that is established.' (*Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 190-1.)

This argument, it appears to us, is the result of a misunderstanding of the point of the analogy. The point is not that the dream-objects are real to the dreaming consciousness, and the objects of waking life are real to the waking consciousness, and that therefore neither of these states can deny the reality of the other. If that were the case, there would be no such experience as that of correction or *bādhā*. The *bādhā*-consciousness implies that the dream-objects are delusory and do not exist apart from the dreaming. In the same way, when we wake up from the sleep of *avidyā*, which involves the whole of our empirical existence, we regard the objects of all our experiences in that state as purely delusory.

It might here be asked: But did we not *really dream* the dream of those three states of sleep, dream and wakefulness? If we did, then there *was* that dream at least. Our answer is that the wakefulness of the saving knowledge or the knowledge of the Unity leaves no such residue. If any such residue is left, what is cancelled? There is the real dream and real objects that are part of it. Nothing is cancelled. But the saving knowledge cancels even itself as part of the dream. For, in the end, the very fact of waking up or what is called *Brahma-jñāna* belongs to the realm of ignorance. A product of ignorance has, so to say, cancelled ignorance. It is the Great Negation, in which the child eats up the mother and all that is born of the mother, including itself. A truly released soul can therefore only express himself thus: 'There was no ignorance and no waking up from ignorance either, no bondage and no release from bondage. There is only the Eternal Divine. It was always so, and it will always remain so.'

Sri Aurobindo asks, how can we compare our experience of a world which is continuous from one break to another, methodical and coherent with a dream-experience which is discontinuous and incoherent? The analogy fails here. (*Ibid.*, 192.) But coherence is a relative term. If there were no coherence in a dream, we would not be impressed by the reality of its objects, and they would not constitute for us a dream-world. It is certainly not a pure chaos, which can never constitute any kind of a world. The dream-objects

however evoke all the passions to which we are subject in waking life. Everything is so real. And then there can be a dream within a dream. Thus the dream can wholly imitate waking life. There is no difference. The analogy is complete. There can therefore be such a thing as the dream of empirical existence. When we wake up from this dream, we shall marvel at our stupidity. We shall then realize that we had been under a fascination, and that the most realistic of our experiences were made of the stuff of which all dreams are made. This is the Great Awakening that Advait Vedanta aims at.

Sri Aurobindo says: 'We see too that the dream-consciousness seems to be wholly devoid of that control which the waking consciousness exercises to a certain extent over life-circumstances.' (*Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 193.) But do we not seem to exercise control over the circumstances with which we are faced in our dreams, just as we seem to do in waking life? And contrariwise, it has been argued even by great philosophers that our apparent freedom and conscious control in waking life is only a deception, and that a stone falling from a great height could think, if it were endowed with consciousness, that it was freely falling of its own sweet will. It is quite possible to argue that we are being driven by forces we know not, and yet we seem to be masters of our destiny. Our self-control is only an illusion. The dream-analogy, it appears to us, can be carried to its logical limits with disarming simplicity.

23. (b) *Māyā-vāda* argues from the facts of sensible experience and comes to the conclusion that no valid test can be applied in this sphere to distinguish the true from the false. If misperception is a fact, and if every fact of seeming valid perception has the same logical structure, the latter is equal to the former in truth-value. The generalization is quite justified that whatever is perceived is for that reason alone illusory — *drśyatvāt-mithyā*.

Sri Aurobindo puts forth just the opposite thesis. According to him, there is no difficulty in knowing the truth about the sensible world. We can directly intuit objects, and relate the sense-image with the object imaged. 'We experience a real universe through our imaged sense-transcript by the aid of the intuition and the reason — an intuition which gives us the touch of things and a reason which investigates their truth by its conceptive knowledge.' (*Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 203-4.) In any case, 'there is something there that justifies the image, something with which it has more or less correspondence. But in the theory of illusion the only reality is an indeterminable featureless pure Existence, Brahman, and there is

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no possibility of its being translated or mistranslated into a system of symbol-figures.' (*Ibid.*, 204.)

We question the view that there is any intuition of reality that transcends the sense-images and that can relate these to the things-in-themselves. Our only intuition of reality, as Kant showed, is a sensible intuition. If it can deceive, as it undoubtedly does in certain admitted cases, there is no way of getting out of the deception, except by a change in the method of our knowledge as Vedanta contends. The only sense in which we can be said to intuit reality directly is the sense in which we intuit the underlying ground, that is undetermined, undifferentiated and non-sensible. But then no kind of real relation can be established between this ground and the super-imposed sensible reality.

As to the contention of Sri Aurobindo that a pure spiritual existence without any determinations cannot be mistranslated into sense-figures, that appears to us a gratuitous and illogical assumption. It amounts to saying that only a sensible object can be mistaken for another sensible object, and that there can be no illusion of sense as such. But once we are conscious of the error of sensible experience, where shall we set the limit? Can reflective thinking, which is the essence of philosophy, accept the evidence of the senses at all? As a matter of fact, once we accept an element of error, uncertainty and doubt in our sensible experience, we can set no limit to it, and logically the whole must go. It proves the subjectivity of our knowledge; and knowledge that is subjective can never be true. The amount of error, in this connection, is not a quantitative matter, but a qualitative matter. Certain examples may be cited to prove this. The sky as such has no colour, and yet it can appear blue. The soul as such, for those who believe in the soul, has no sex, and yet it can appear sexed; for we make statements such as, I am a woman, I am a man, etc. Similarly, we claim caste, colour and creed, which have no connection with the I or the soul. The truth is that once we realize the necessity of the distinction between appearance and reality, no limit can be set to the amount of error involved, except where appearance ceases to be an appearance and becomes the very self-revealing reality that can never appear. We simply cannot infer the nature of reality from the nature of the appearance that we subjectively and erroneously superimpose upon it. There can be no real connection between them, much less any correspondence.

24. (c) Sri Aurobindo argues that the illusory must really exist somewhere. Only it does not exist in the place where it is

seen. The snake is real in the jungle, it is not real when it is seen on a rope. Similarly, the world must be real in itself before it can be superimposed upon Brahman. The illusion of the world thus presupposes the reality of the world.

This appears to us to be an erroneous view. It is called *anyatha-khyāti*, and it is held by Nyāya philosophers. It has been thoroughly refuted by Vedantic writers, and we need not repeat their arguments here. It is only necessary to point out that in order to perceive anything illusory, all that is essential is that an object of that sort ought to have been perceived before. We simply cannot superimpose a completely unknown entity upon one that is given. But the entity perceived earlier need not have been the object of a *true* perception. One illusory perception can equally account for a subsequent illusory perception. We have therefore to admit, in order to account for the illusory appearance of the world, a beginningless series of illusory perceptions, or what is called *pravāha-anādi*.

Sri Aurobindo says: 'The analogy of mental hallucination would only be applicable if we admit a Brahman without names, forms or relations and a world of names, forms and relations as equal realities imposed one upon the other,.....an attribution, it might be, of the activities of the *Saguna* to the quiescence of the *Nirguna*. But if both are real, both must be either separate aspects of the Reality or co-ordinate aspects, positive and negative poles of the one Existence. Any error or confusion of mind between them would not be a creative cosmic Illusion, but only a wrong perception of realities, a wrong relation created by the Ignorance.' (*Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 207-8.) If Sri Aurobindo is right, there can be no illusion at all. For nobody ever confuses, or can confuse, one real thing with another real thing existing separately. What is confused in an illusion is a *non-existent* and *purely imaginary* form of being with real being. Otherwise, it is not a case of illusion at all. The illusory is a new creation, the imaginary confused with the real, or what is called *anir-vachaniya-khyāti*.

It is true that there can be an error of perception in which two things of the same order of reality (*sama-satāk*) are involved. Two trees at a great distance from us may appear one to our perception. But this is not the kind of mental or subjective error we are here considering. There is no distinction here between the real and the illusory. We would even justify in a way the perception of their oneness on scientific grounds. It is simply the physical inability of our vision to discriminate a certain small distance

dividing two entities. If we took this line of thought, the whole perceptual world would still be unreal. Would not every solid object be a virtual vacuum in reality? Would not noises and visual objects, etc., be all illusory, since no correspondence can be established between them and what the physicist says there really is, namely some kind of radiant energy, waves, etc., without any sensible qualities? Leaving aside therefore the realm of these more or less physical, and so necessary, errors, we confine ourselves to errors where the mind plays the principal part and creates things which do not really exist. Here the status of the illusory cannot be that of a real thing existing in a wrong place, but that of a wholly non-existent and conceptual thing appearing in the place of the real and as one with it. The ground and the thing superimposed upon it can never belong to the same order of reality, and can never be both real.

(d) Sri Aurobinda admits that the process, whereby the One manifests itself in a reality of numberless forms and powers of its being, is a mystery, even magic. But, according to him, 'there is nothing to show that it is a magic of the unreal'. It is rather 'a self-creation operated by an eternal self-knowledge'. (*Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 209.) In our opinion, it is just the opposite. All magic is the magic of the unreal, the non-existent being made to appear as existent. This is the only magic, if there is any. Any operation upon the real would not be magic at all, but just an exhibition of the proper law of its own being. If God is the Great Magician, as is generally supposed, He can only be said to have brought into being a world that does not really exist or to have created an illusion of a world. If the world already existed in some form in God, and He *did something with it* in order to reveal it or to put it forth, He would not be the Master-magician controlling *māyā*, but Himself subject to the power of *māyā*; for He Himself would undergo a change in the process — what was potential in Him being made actual and manifest.

We conclude that the Real does not require to be created or made manifest. The Real is self-created and self-manifest. It is *unûpādeya* and *svaprakāṣa*.

Spiritualism, Materialism, Organicism

BY

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Herein is proposed another interpretation of East and West (as exemplified by India and America) and how they may, eventually, harmonize their differences. It is well-known that 'philosophy in India is essentially spiritual' (S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 24). American philosophy is predominantly materialistic. Spirit and matter are opposites. 'Never the twain shall meet.' The typical reaction of Indian thinkers to matter is to reject it as appearance, illusion, *māyā*. Their solution to the East-West problem is to spiritualize America. The natural attitude of materialistic Americans toward spirit is to condemn it as superstition. The normal desire of American good-willers is to solve the East-West problem by bringing machines and medicines, techniques and know-how, mass-production and efficient distribution methods to succour India's starving masses. It is the contention of this paper that both of these attitudes are false. Neither solution alone will work. I propose to locate the root of the problem — and consequently its solution — in the metaphysical predicaments inherent in the problem of the one and the many.

Spirit is one, simple, indivisible, unitary and eternal. Matter is many, complex, divisible, constituted of particles and temporal. A spirit is a single whole of which its many parts are matter. Whatever is spiritual is a unitary whole and whatever is a unitary whole is spiritual, whereas matter involves a plurality of parts and whenever we find a plurality of parts we have matter. Indian philosophy tends to be monistic, American pluralistic. Indians (with plenty of exceptions, of course) prefer intuitive apprehensions while Americans (also with exceptions) idealize analytical insight. American scientists abhor the term 'intuition', habitually recalling sayings about its being a sixth sense peculiar to women (i.e., unscientific people). They seek certainty in exactness of measurement, some going so far as to say that 'If it can't be measured it doesn't exist'. Indians stress the immediate, Americans the mediate. Therefore Indians seek to grasp reality itself, to find

life's goals already at hand, to live satisfied, while Americans try to deal with reality only at a distance, through means, tools, techniques, machines — always so busy ambitiously preparing a better gadget that they are shocked and amazed if asked to stop and appreciate a moment for what reality it has in itself. But if spiritualistic or monistic India and materialistic or pluralistic America are opposites, how shall they be brought together?

My solution may be called 'organicism', a view accepting the equal ultimacy of both matter and spirit, unity and plurality, wholes and parts. Organicism rejects Cartesian dualism, in which spirit and matter are given equal but independent status. Rather it recognizes their interdependence. Even as there can be no whole without parts nor parts without wholes, so there can be no spirit without matter nor matter without spirit. Since whatever exists involves both wholes and parts, spirit and matter are both all-pervasive.

Considering existence in terms of objective levels, a group is a whole of which persons are parts, a person is a whole of which his ideas and cells are parts, a cell is a whole of which molecules are parts, a molecule is a whole of which atoms are parts, etc. Is there a highest whole? Extreme monists not only say 'yes' but say it is most real, lower levels being less real, if real at all. Organicists say 'no' except in the sense that each whole is the highest whole of its kind. Are there lowest parts, indivisible particles, or quanta? Extreme pluralists not only say 'yes' but add that these alone are real, all else being merely aggregations. Organicists say 'no' except in the sense that every part-as-a-whole is indivisible and thus is a lowest part. While Brahmanism makes man unreal, except in so far as he partakes of the reality of Brahman, and materialism makes man unreal, except in so far as he embodies an aggregate of matter which can be neither created nor destroyed, organicism accepts man as real, as ultimately real, as much ultimate as any other existing being. The organic unity of whole and parts is real, not the whole abstracted from its parts nor the parts abstracted from their whole.

Considering existence subjectively, Hindus seek to grasp reality immediately (*Atman* is Brahman) whereas materialists fail even to consider that the real is anywhere but objective (to be found through telescopes and microscopes). But what the Hindu intuitively grasps as reality is depreciated as nothing compared with the completely ineffable freedom of being which is found fully only by escaping this life. The alleged immediate is really distant (even

if by a non-spatial distance). And what the materialistic realist (objects-independent-of-experience) claims as distant is nevertheless experienced (thus, in a sense, immediate). The supposed spatially-distant is immediately intuited (even if intuitions are aided by tools). Organicism accepts both immediacy and indirectness in ways of knowing reality, but denies that known reality is all of reality. Objects involve subjects and subjects objects, but that which is subject is not exhausted by its subjectivity and that which is object is not exhausted by its appearances. For extreme subjectivists, only the subject is real, objects are unreal. For extreme realists, objects are real — sometimes (as with Platonic Ideas) more real than subjects. The ultimate goal of knowledge is absence of distinction, for Hindus, and perfect clarity (mathematically precise analyses) of distinction, for rationalistic scientists; but organicists advocate acceptance of, and awareness of the desirability of, both some distinctness and some indistinctness, some clarity and some vagueness, in every experience, even as an ideal. Both those who over-eulogize 'scientific objectivity' and those who reject all objectivity as illusion are mistaken. Objects-for-subjects are ultimate realities which no amount of rationalizing can destroy.

But they are temporal, not eternal, whereas reality is eternal, Brahmins will object. My percept of the table is temporary whereas the real table continues, says the realist. Here, again, the organicist's solution is the same. The eternal and the temporal, or duration without change and passing events, are interdependent. Whereas for spiritualistic monists, eternity is real, time is unreal, and for materialistic pluralists, each separate event is real in itself but the series as-a-whole exists at no time, organicists see duration and events as inner and outer aspects of the same existence. A day is an event which comes and goes relative to its year which endures changelessly throughout all its days, but the day itself endures changelessly while all of its moments come and go. Each whole of time, like each whole of any kind, is, as whole, a spirit, and as spirit it is eternal. But that which exists as whole exists also as parts, as matter, as temporal, as passing. Internality is eternality and externality is temporality — so agree Brahmins, materialists, and organicists, only Brahmins deny externality to Brahman while materialists deny internality to the ultimate particles or quanta of time. Organicism may be summarized in Radhakrishnan's words (*op. cit.*, p. 379): 'Every existence is a mediation of two opposites, and so far as this world is concerned it is not possible for us to separate being and non-being (and, I would add, time and eternity, spirit and matter, subject and object, intuition and reason, etc.).

If we try to isolate either of them and determine it strictly by itself, it crumbles again, leaving mere nothingness behind.' Organicism is another call to 'the middle way', 'the Golden mean', 'the happy medium', even if in a somewhat different way.

How, then, can all this solve the problem of East and West? It advocates neither destruction of spiritualism nor abandonment of materialism except in so far as these are caught in tendencies toward self-strangling extremes. If East and West are polar opposites, then they are organically related and need each other as natural complements. Opposites correct each other's deficiencies. To harmonize is not to destroy differences but to let neither identities nor differences destroy each other. Harmony involves opposition, not mere monotony. Harmony involves sameness, otherwise there is only discord. Organic unity harmonizes the one and the many, spirit and matter, East and West. What is needed is greater awareness of the mutual advantageousness of harmonizing opposites. Critics may point out that organicism has little chance because its proposal is doubly-difficult, involving conversion of two sides rather than just one. Extremists are unlikely to be willing to recognize their extremity, for if they were willing they would already be rejecting it. But, in reply: If organicism is true, then opposite extremes cannot exist actually. India is already somewhat materialistic and America has always been partly spiritualistic. India is thoroughly committed to pursuit of scientific and industrial development and is making rapid strides. In America there are spiritualistic elements standing ready to welcome more spiritual insight from India. Gandhi is considered a saint by multitudes of Americans. India's naturalistic spiritualism may even become successful where supernaturalistic spiritualism (Christian trinitarianism) has largely lost (a loss that is being felt increasingly). The time has come for India to send more missionaries to America. No matter how inherently antagonistically we may picture opposition between East and West, the twain have met and will meet some more. I am optimistic in my belief that the organic relations actually existing between East and West will become more and more apparent.

T. H. Huxley on Progress

BY

REV. J. F. BUTLER, M.A., A.M., PH.D.

The major characteristic of Victorian thought was the working out of a scientific theory of progress; and the greatest of those who engaged in this task was T. H. Huxley. He was indeed a great man.¹ And his greatness lies largely in his clear and resolute thought in denying the brasher forms of the optimistic corollaries of Darwinism.

If there is one type of thought which is as dead as a doornail, it is the superficial optimism drawn from evolution uncritically considered. The great Darwin himself was an offender: he ended *On the Origin of Species* thus:

As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendents of those which lived long before the Cambrian epoch, we may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of great length. And as natural selection works solely for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection.

And the minor hierophants of the new cult trumpeted such brashness (and much worse; for Darwin, after all, was a great man, and though the great may at times write nonsense they are moderate in it) over the whole face of Victorian England.² Spencer

1. He is under a cloud now—his popular science is out-of-date; his anti-fundamentalist campaign no longer concerns a live issue; his rather hard, Millian style is unfashionable. But I believe that he, unlike Spencer, will come into his own again, because, on some subjects which are still important, he was a real thinker. His range of original thought, and his range of philosophical thought, were very narrow, and did not comprise the greatest problems; but within its range his thought was clear and honest. In his philosophy of evolution he went against the grain of the times; and he opposed the views of his personal friends and the popular interests of his dearest cause. That is real honesty, and is not found in a small man. The early-nineteenth-century great ones, like Keats, had their revival some time ago; the middle ones, like Tennyson, are now having their second day; Huxley's time will come.

2. Even so, I have seen nothing so expansive in the late Victorians as there was in the progressivist thinkers of the French Revolution. The late nineteenth-century was *fin-de-siècle* even in its optimism!

has been mistakenly regarded as a prophet of this movement; in this judgement Huxley has at times been included,³ but with even less justification, since his best-known work, the Romanes Lecture of 1893,⁴ is explicitly directed against it.

Unlike most pessimists, Huxley avoids the emotional temptation of overstating his case. There are several passages in which he is very cheerful about the future, at any rate the near future.⁵

For all practical purposes... it is enough that man may visibly improve his condition in the course of a century or so. And... I think it must be admitted that there has been a considerable change for the better.⁶

No one is less disposed than I to think lightly of the present dignity, or despairingly of the future hopes, of the only consciously intelligent denizen of this world.⁷

Thoughtful men... will find in the lowly stock whence Man has sprung, the best evidence of the splendour of his capacities; and will discern in his long progress through the Past, a reasonable ground of faith in his attainment of a nobler Future.⁸

A real and living belief in that fixed order of nature which sends social disorganisation upon the track of immorality, as surely as it sends physical disease after physical trespasses.⁹

The historical evolution of humanity which is generally, and I venture to think not unreasonably, regarded as progress.¹⁰

But, this being carefully allowed for, Huxley then proceeds to insist on three aspects of Darwinism which are hostile to progress:

3. E.g., Stanley Casson, *Progress and Catastrophe*, 15-8, which argues that the belief in progress is recent, being as it is 'derived from the extremely popular exposition of evolution made by Darwin and Huxley'.

4. *Evolution and Ethics*. With the *Prolegomena* of 1894, it forms the first part of Vol. IX of the *Collected Essays*.

5. There are, however, also a few passages which speak very meanly of mankind: they are collected in J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, 344-5, and include *Collected Essays*, I. 423 (*Government*: 1890).

6. *Collected Essays*, III. 33 (*Joseph Priestley*: 1874), (V. the whole argument, 30-6).

7. *Collected Essays*, VII. 153 (*Man's Place in Nature*: 1863).

8. *Ib.*, 154-5.

9. *Collected Essays*, IX. 146 (*Science and Morals*: 1886).

10. *Life and Letters*, III. 213 (*Prologue of Controverted Questions*: 1893). V. also the passages of confident expectation of a great advance in science in the next few centuries: *Collected Essays*, I. 17-8, 41 (*On Improving Natural Knowledge*: 1866); IX. 138 (*Science and Morals*: 1886); and the passage from *Life and Letters*, III. 172, cited *infr.*, in note 23; and that from *Collected Essays*, IX. 85, cited *infr.*, ref. note 27.

(1) In the first place, he insists that Darwinism is not committed to progress at all: the survival of the fittest is as compatible with mere persistence as with improvement:

It is one remarkable peculiarity of Mr. Darwin's hypothesis that it involves no necessary progression or incessant modification, and that it is perfectly consistent with the persistence for any length of time of a given primitive stock, contemporaneously with its modifications.¹¹

Any admissible hypothesis of progressive modification must be compatible with persistence without progression through indefinite periods.¹²

In the living world, one of the most characteristic features of this cosmic process is the struggle for existence, the competition of each with all, the result of which is selection, that is to say, the survival of those forms which, on the whole, are best adapted to the conditions which at any period obtain; and which are, therefore, in that respect, and only in that respect, the fittest. [Darwin's own note on this passage adds:] That every theory of evolution must be consistent not merely with progressive development, but with indefinite persistence in the same condition and with retrogressive modification, is a point which I have insisted upon repeatedly from the year 1862 till now [1894]. See *Collected Essays*, vol. ii, pp. 461-89 [presumably 75, at which the volume ends]; vol. iii, p. 33; vol. viii, p. 304. In the address on "Geological Contemporaneity and Persistent Types" (1862), the palaeontological proofs of this proposition were, I believe, first set forth.¹³

Nay more — so far from 'fittest' necessarily meaning 'highest', natural selection may work towards degeneration.¹⁴

By itself, this argument may not prove very much that is relevant. After all, no one denies that there are lizards today as well as apes, or that early strata which show no sign of mammal life do show shell-fish all of them much and some of them exactly like the shell-fish of today, or that epizoa are degenerates. The important message of the rocks is not that some species stand still or go back, but that some progress. However, the mere fact that

11. *Collected Essays*, II. 461 (*The Causes of the Phenomena of Organic Nature*: 1863): v. the whole of 461-2; cf. II. 89-90 (*Criticisms on "The Origin of Species"*: 1864) (in *Everyman ed.*, *Lectures and Lay Sermons*, 104).

12. *Collected Essays*, VIII. 304 (*Everyman ed.*, *Lectures and Lay Sermons*, 39-40) (*Geological Contemporaneity and Persistent Types of Life*: 1863). V. the whole palaeontological argument in pp. 289-304 (33-40).

13. *Collected Essays*, IX. 4 (*Evolution and Ethics: Prolegomena*: 1894).

14. *Life and Letters*, III. 171 (1890): cf. *Collected Essays*, IX. 80-1 (*Evolution and Ethics*: 1893); II. 91 (*Criticisms on "The Origin of Species"*: 1864).

progression is not a law of all life takes on a sinister significance if taken with Huxley's other two arguments.

(2) The second argument is—to piece it together in logical stages from the scattered presentation in Huxley:

(a) Vast 'catastrophes' are scientifically conceivable.¹⁵

(b) Some such catastrophe could create conditions in which the survival of the fittest would mean the survival of the lower:

So far from a gradual progress towards perfection forming any necessary part of the Darwinian creed, it appears to us that it is perfectly consistent with indefinite persistence in one state, or with a gradual retrogression. Suppose, for example, a return of the glacial epoch and a spread of polar climatal conditions over the whole globe. The operation of natural selection under these circumstances would tend, on the whole, to the weeding out of the higher organisms and the cherishing of the lower forms of life. Cryptogamic vegetation would have the advantage over Phanerogamic; *Hydrozoa* over Corals; *Crustacea* over *Insecta*, and *Amphipoda* and *Isopoda* over the higher *Crustacea*; Cetaceans and Seals over the *Primates*; the civilization of the Esquimaux over that of the European.¹⁶

(c) And (by an appeal, one takes it, to the Principle of Carnot) a catastrophe of that particular kind is not just a hypothetical possibility, but is a scientific certainty:

In common with many other excellent persons, Priestley believed that man is capable of reaching, and will eventually attain, perfection. If the temperature of space presented no obstacle, I should be glad to entertain the same idea; but judging from the past progress of our species, I am afraid that the globe will have cooled down so far, before the advent of this natural millenium, that we shall be, at best, perfected Esquimaux.¹⁷

(d) And the general conclusion is that retrogression is in itself as possible as progression, and will at one stage become inevitable.¹⁸

15. *Collected Essays*, V. 72-3 (*Scientific and Pseudo-Scientific Realism*: 1887).

16. *Collected Essays*, II. 90-1 (*Criticisms on "The Origin of Species"*: 1866) (in Everyman ed., *Lectures and Lay Sermons*, 105). An instructive gloss on the last phrase is Dr A. J. Toynbee's treatment of the Esquimaux: v. *A Study of History*, I. 230; many passages in III, *ad init.*, as Index, Vol. III, s.v.; and several passages in IV, as Index, Vol. VI, s.v.

17. *Collected Essays*, III. 33 (*Joseph Priestley*: 1874): cf. the passage from IX. 85, cited *infr.*, ref. note 29.

18. *Collected Essays*, IX. 199 (*The Struggle for Existence in Human Society*: 1888).

(3) That argument is important and valid enough; but it is not the original or the really deadly weapon in Huxley's armoury. That is his third one—his distinctive and justly famous contention that, when evolution has reached the human level, then true progress is ethical; but that ethics is not only not a logical development of the struggle for survival, but is actually opposed to it; progress, therefore, so far from being deducible from natural evolution, is something which happens against the grain of natural evolution.

This argument is the main theme of his famous Romanes Lecture of 1893, and its *Prolegomena* of a year later. Huxley in the *Prolegomena* starts from the premises that the mere occurrence of multiplication, inevitable in human society, will reproduce there the cosmic struggle, a not particularly ethical struggle for survival.¹⁹ He then draws out the implications of this:

I have termed this evolution of the feelings out of which the primitive bonds of human society are so largely forged, into the organized and personified sympathy we call conscience, the ethical process. So far as it tends to make any human society more efficient in the struggle for existence with the state of nature, or with other societies, it works in harmonious contrast with the cosmic process. But it is none the less true that, since law and morals are restraints upon the struggle for existence in society, the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the cosmic process, and tends to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that struggle.²⁰

It is further to be observed that, just as the self-assertion, necessary to the maintenance of society against the state of nature, will destroy that society if it is allowed free operation within; so the self-restraint, the essence of the ethical process, which is no less an essential condition of the existence of every polity, may, by excess, become ruinous to it.²¹

In the Lecture itself, he first stresses that the ethics of civilized man are opposed to those qualities which were the driving-force of earlier stages of evolution,²² and that 'fittest' in 'the survival

19. *Collected Essays*, IX. 16-23: cf. 202-12 (*The Struggle for Existence in Human Society*: 1888).

20. *Ib.*, 30-31 (*Prolegomena*: 1894): cf. 33-7. Huxley's own note on the passage quoted runs: 'See the essay "On the Struggle for Existence in Human Society" below; and *Collected Essays*, vol. i. p. 276 [-7], for Kant's recognition of these facts' [in the *Idee zur einer allgemeinen Geschichte*].

21. *Ib.*, 31: cf. 31-3.

22. *Ib.*, 51-3 (*Evolution and Ethics*: 1893).

of the fittest' has a non-moral sense.²³ He then proceeds to the often-quoted passage on the nature of ethics being to 'check' or 'combat' the general cosmic process:

The influence of the cosmic process on the evolution of society is the greater the more rudimentary its civilization. Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best.... Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.²⁴

(It may be noted that this is the point at which Huxley's argument which we have numbered (1) joins on to argument (3).)

A critic might now ask:²⁵ Why indulge in such a quixotic campaign against the universe? Surely if this is what morality is, it is foredoomed to failure, and even, if one may put it that way, is of doubtful morality. The answer is twofold. — Firstly, the opposition between the cosmos and human ethics is not complete; there is a good deal of common ground between them; social life and its ethical principles are a part of, have a basis in, the cosmic process which in another sense they oppose, somewhat as a governor checks the steam-engine of which nevertheless it is a part.²⁶ 'To pit the microcosm against the macrocosm' may seem 'audacious', but there is 'solid foundation' 'for the hope that

23. *Ib.*, 80: cf. 5 (*Prolegomena*: 1894) 'By surviving, [they] have proved that they are the fittest to survive', and the whole argument 65-6; cf. *Life and Letters*, III. 172 (1890): 'I am no pessimist — but also no optimist. The world might be much worse, and it might be much better. Of moral purpose I see no trace in Nature. That is an article of exclusively human manufacture — and very much to our credit.'

24. *Collected Essays*, IX. 81, 83 (*Evolution and Ethics*: 1899); cf. the whole of 81-3. Note that the passage is led up to by a passage on the greater fitness to survive, under certain conditions, of low forms, referred to in that connection *supr.*, note 14).

25. I do not think that Huxley ever explicitly puts this question to himself; but he implicitly answers it.

26. *Collected Essays*, IX. 114-5 (*Evolution and Ethics*: 1893); cf. the second sentence from the passage from *Collected Essays*, IX. 31, cited *supr.*, ref. note 20. Cf. a letter of 1893 (*Life and Letters*, III. 300): 'I really have been unable to understand what my critics have been dreaming of when they raise the objection that the ethical process being part of the cosmic process cannot be opposed to it. They might as well say that artifice does not oppose nature, because it is part of nature in the broadest sense.'

such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success'.²⁷ For the natural sciences have made vast advances, and it is 'irrational to doubt' that the sciences of human affairs will come to an equal effectiveness 'at no distant period'.²⁸ True, a 'downward route' will one day be commenced and 'the most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that the power and the intelligence of man can over arrest the procession of the great year'; and there are stubborn ethical enemies; nevertheless, Huxley sees 'no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may be done to change the nature of man himself.'²⁹

This argument is obviously of great importance for our present subject; but, despite its apparent clarity, it is not easy to assess its exact significance. Huxley himself takes it as pointing to the ethical neutrality of the cosmos³⁰ — or 'ethical indifference' would be the better phrase, since for Huxley natural selection does have ethical results, though varying ones: in the past and in the near future progress on the whole, in the far future degeneration. But this is rather an extraordinary situation — two orders in Nature in the main opposing one another: order and yet chaos. Huxley is not unaware of this difficulty: the passages cited in note 26 above, with the analogies of the steam-engine and its governor, and of nature and artifice, show this. One may ask how far these analogies hold. In any case Huxley is in fact — and who shall blame him for it? — frankly at a loss to explain the coexistence of good and evil tendencies in the same universe.³¹

Further, one may ask whether Huxley has not sharpened the antithesis between Nature and ethics to a point beyond what the facts require or even permit. On the one hand, Nature (that is,

27. *Collected Essays*, IX. 83 (*Evolution and Ethics*: 1893).

28. *Ib.*, 84.

29. *Ib.*, 85.

30. *Collected Essays*, IX. 202 (*The Struggle for Existence in Human Society*: 1888): cf. *Life and Letters*, III. 333-4 (1894): 'I don't see there is any real difference between us [Huxley and Leslie Stephen]. You are charitable enough to overlook the general immorality of the cosmos on the score of its having begotten morality in one small part of its domain': and *ib.*, 303 (1893).

31. *V. Life and Letters*, II. 453 (1886), on the riddle of the pain of Nature along with its 'superfluous loveliness'.

outside the human realm) is never *anti-ethical* as distinct from *non-ethical*: she may have whole species like tigers cultivating savagery to help them to survive, but she is never *gratuitously* cruel, except in ways in which cruelty is a by-product, not deliberately sought.³² On the other side, in ethics — Is that ever really good which tends to lead to racial extinction? There is indeed no doubt about the virtue, within limits, of gentleness and allied traits: but ought we to regard them as *unconditionally* good? I feel that much of our support for them is due to a reaction against the brashness of some utilitarianisms, and to a sentimental acquiescence in the pacifist equation of love with non-violence. Such virtues may, indeed, often lead the *individual* to his personal destruction — sometimes accidentally, sometimes with full willing of the action in full consciousness of its likely results. But, if destruction were to become their *general* issue, would they not cease to be virtues? I think this is how the unsophisticated³³ moral consciousness does in fact regard the matter: gentleness is taken to be the proper reaction up to a point, and after that courage takes its place — and the point where the change-over takes place is fixed by this very criterion of the distinction between personal and social danger. It is at least arguable that an amiable suffering of evil for one's race, as distinct from one's self, is no virtue but actually a vice.³⁴ Humans can afford to be more gentle than tigers (and should not that fact be set to the moral credit of the evolutionary process?), but not to be entirely gentle: and what is or should be regarded as a virtue is not absolute gentleness but

32. This saving clause is inserted to account for such cases as that of the cat playing with the mouse: there a ruthless faculty which is produced, not anti-ethically, to assist necessary hunting has incidentally achieved this by-outlet in play which inflicts pain without subserving any biological end, or at any rate any major biological end. That is why we call it cruel, whereas we do not call the cat's first leap on its prey cruel. But even in the play there is probably no rejoicing in pain for pain's sake, which is the really revolting element in human cruelty.

33. 'Unsophisticated' — not necessarily 'untrained'. There is an important difference: v. Aristotle on the *phronimos*: *Eth. Nic.*, VI.

34. I am convinced that we too easily let ourselves be browbeaten by the pacifists into talking of them as merely mistaken, not as morally wrong. That is a sentimental attitude, due largely to inferiority complex induced by their priggish self-righteousness. If in certain circumstances they will (even indirectly) their country's defeat, they are wicked and should be called such. (However, (a) if one ignores, as one normally should, accusations of personal cowardice, then their attitude is not selfish; and selfishness is a necessary ingredient of the nastier sins; (b) it may be politically wise to waive their punishment, in the cause of freedom of conscience.)

practicable gentleness. If there is one ethical lesson that can be drawn from recent politics, it is that the morals of 'appeasement' are at least as aberrant³⁵ as those of 'aggression'.³⁶

35. I use no stronger word, because of the considerations advanced in the last sentence of note 34 *supr.* But observe the *moral* element in current criticisms of 'Munich'.

36. I think that this ought to modify the way of presenting Huxley's argument: but, if it is a sociological fact that the gentler forms of government are in fact unwilling to use the forcefulness to which they are morally entitled (i.e., that democracies are normally unprepared and appeasing), then perhaps the real strength of his argument is not entirely destroyed.

Freedom

BY

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The concept of freedom can be determined in three stages : (1) the naturalistic stage, in which freedom is believed to be an actual quality of willing and the will itself regarded as wholly undetermined. Freedom here is placed in opposition to determinism, causality or law of any kind. (2) The stage of the emergence of moral values, in which freedom is understood as a progressive embodiment of value and is not identified with a fiat of the will. At this stage we distinguish between two kinds of freedom, the one related to the fact of willing and the other to the quality of the will or of the end willed. The latter is a conditional freedom, because it depends not on the willing but on the content willed. To act freely here is to act in accordance with the dictates of the moral law. Freedom is the exercise of the good will and not merely of the will as such. We may distinguish these two concepts of freedom, the naturalistic and the moral, as substantial freedom and qualitative freedom respectively. Substantial freedom claims to transcend determinism and regards the free agent's will in the light of an uncaused cause, an unmoved mover of its actions. In the second stage, namely, that of qualitative freedom, substantial freedom of this kind is regarded as a myth, because it is identified with indeterminism and groundless, motiveless and purely arbitrary acts of willing arising from nowhere. Such willing is regarded as of no value and significance for the moral agent who is attempting to realize a non-naturalistic value and who therefore values an action only when it is the product of a determinate character shaping itself and its actions in the light of certain ideals or norms of conduct. (3) The spiritual stage.¹

The purpose of this paper is to show that substantial freedom alone is freedom in the true sense, but that this freedom cannot be discovered in the naturalistic stage, where the concept of freedom

1. In the first two stages consciousness is centred in the life of impulse and the life of reason respectively, the difference being one of degree. An absolute difference emerges in the third stage, in which consciousness finds its true centre in the self or spirit.

is divorced completely from the concept of value. The substance which makes for substantial freedom is not the natural but the spiritual substance, which transcends equally the naturalistic sphere and the sphere of moral values and is realized at the level on which freedom and value are completely identified. In the naturalistic stage, there is a divorce between value and freedom. At the moral level these two are sought to be related. But it is only at a higher level, which we shall call the spiritual level, that these two are completely unified. At the moral level freedom and value determine each other, and each may be regarded both as a means to and as a condition of the other. I must be free to realize the moral value or goodness, but it is only in so far as I realize this value that I can regard myself as free. Each concept is determined and understood in relation to the other, and so the freedom at the moral level reveals no finally intelligible and self-contained principle but is at best a make-shift, a workable principle of the practical reason containing within itself a hint or promise of a clear and self-established principle of freedom to be discovered and made real elsewhere, by transcending the level of morality. The spiritual level contains the final truth and the proper fulfilment of the demands made in the naturalistic and moralistic stages. It is the level of freedom in which the sovereign will functioning as an uncaused cause or an unmoved mover embodies and expresses an absolute value. In it substance and quality, being and value, substantial and qualitative freedom, become inseparably one. An action issuing from the heart of Love or Supreme Bliss is the expression of such a sovereign Will embodying an absolute value. Freedom here is absolute and does not admit of degrees. It is what the Vedanta calls *Moksha* or rather *Jivan-Mukti*, since *Moksha* may be a quiescent and actionless state of being. Freedom at the moral level is different, firstly because in it only a qualitative and not a substantial freedom is operative, and secondly because whatever freedom it has is relative and conditioned. A conditioned freedom is in the last analysis a contradictory notion, and so the freedom we enjoy in the relative plane of existence has value not in itself but as indicating the possibility of realizing the true freedom of our being, which is absolute.

This distinction between the three levels of freedom can also be explained with reference to the notion of cause. In the first and the third stages, there is the denial of causality as a guiding principle or a determining factor, though cause is admitted as a determining agent. The second stage alone accepts the validity of the causal law, though it interprets causality in terms not of a mechanical sequence of events, but of a psychological determinism,

i.e., determinism by one's nature and character and rationally formed ideals of action. No doubt it recognizes and even insists on the freedom of the agent to fashion and alter, even radically, his nature and character. But the champion of freedom at this level must find himself in a quandary if confronted with the question: 'Does the will fashion one's character or does one's character determine one's will?' There is no escape at this stage from the circle of character-fashioning-will and will-determining-character. Even the attempt to resolve this problem is at this level misconceived, because it implies that here too we are seeking a substantial and not merely a qualitative freedom. Freedom here is not the freedom to initiate movements. It is not a freedom to act, but a freedom in a particular kind of action done, so that I am said to be free when my action is a good and not an evil action. The further question whether I freely will the good or am constrained to do so by my given nature and character does not properly arise at this level, and if it is raised it will receive no clear answer.

If we understand by cause a determining agent or mover of things and not merely a law or pattern of natural events, the three stages may be distinguished thus. In the first stage there is, properly understood, no cause, since there is no mover of things but only motion. Accompanying the motion there is a wholly illusory sense of a free mover who is unmoved. This is the mechanical aspect of causation. In the second stage there is no doubt a cause in the sense of a mover. But it appears to be present without actually operating as cause, for when we analyze the action performed at this stage we find that the agent, i.e., the moral agent, is not simply the mover but is itself moved to act by a determinate nature. It moves by being moved, and therefore strictly does not initiate movement but merely communicates a movement which it receives; just as when one billiard ball pushes another it merely communicates its motion to that other. At this stage, then, we at best vaguely feel ourselves to be a cause, but analysis reveals that this feeling is in a large measure, though not completely, illusory, and arises, as Spinoza pointed out, from ignorance of the actual causes of our actions. At this stage we will self-consciously but not freely. We cannot yet claim ourselves to be the unmoved movers of our actions. This is the teleological stage, where freedom is qualitative though it contains within it, in the irresistible feeling of the uniqueness of our individuality, a hint and a promise of a substantial freedom as well, which however can never be realized or made actual at its own level. In the third stage we truly know ourselves as cause, i.e., as unmoved and spontaneous movers of our

actions. Here the will is free in the sense of being sovereign. It transcends both indeterminism and determinism, since a sovereign action or will, without being chaotic, does not need to conform to law. Like the wind it bloweth where it listeth, for it moves without being moved. This is the spiritual stage, in which there is true and absolute freedom — for true freedom is necessarily absolute. This freedom is neither actual, if by actual we mean a mysteryless characteristic of our natural being, nor potential in the sense of an as yet unattained ideal emerging within our natural being, but is a transcendental fact or actuality which is to be realized.²

One of the most formidable problems of philosophy is to reconcile law with freedom, morality with religion, self-effort with redemptive grace — in a word, the natural with the supernatural orders of being. The dualism of the kind offered by Kant, which separates these two orders from each other and regards each as self-contained, is at best valid for drawing our attention to a real problem, but cannot be regarded as its solution. The supernatural must somehow be present in the natural order and the natural must contain within itself a clue or hint of the supernatural. Freedom, which is real at the spiritual level, must also be present at the moral level, and our moral consciousness must contain within it this higher freedom at least as a promise if not as an actual fact. If freedom were actually operative in the moral order, then there would be no need to transcend that order or postulate a supernatural end realizable only by the action of redemptive grace. If it were not present in the natural order, then we would have to admit 'a broad ugly ditch' between the natural and the supernatural, and the transition from the one to the other would remain unintelligible. The solution of this dilemma would appear to consist in the recognition of a freedom or Truth which can be present without actually operating, present but obscured or self-obscured behind a veil. We have to admit a secret will that in some way wills its own suspension for some purpose known only to itself. This may also give us a clue to the true relation, as far as the intellect can conceive it, of the Infinite to the finite. The Infinite is present self-veiled in the finite. It wills the suspension in the finite of its spontaneous will, obscures the light of its nature and conceals the delight of its existence. This of course is true of the

2. See my paper on 'The Potential and the To be Realized' published in the 1949 (Patna) *Proceedings of the Philosophical Congress (Part II)*: *The Philosophical Quarterly*, XXII, 3 (Oct. 1949).

Infinite in a particular centre of consciousness and not of the Infinite as such. We may say, if we like, that it is a portion of the Infinite that is self-veiled in the finite, only this way of expressing it rests on the error that the Infinite is divisible into parts.

This then is the explanation of the undeniable sense of freedom and the uniqueness of an individuality which cannot be resolved into a mere process of states and qualities, present as a datum in, or as a necessary implication of, our moral consciousness. The self and its freedom, or in other words substantial freedom, is present here, but at the same time does not operate or, what amounts to the same thing, operates in terms of our ignorant and conditioned nature. The ignorant mind then naturally interprets it as a divine sanction and justification of its ignorant action. It thus has and has not freedom. In the dark language of Heraclitus, 'We are and we are not'. The consciousness of 'ought' has then a double origin. It is a joint product of light and darkness, of a Divine impulse clouded and distorted by human ignorance. There is in it, as Kant recognized, an imperative call; but not, as the natural ignorance of the human mind led to believe, a call to perform duty for the sake of duty. The Divine imperative is translated by the ignorant nature as an ideal which is to be attained by a process of becoming. Our moral consciousness is thus founded on both truth and error. Its truth is veiled and is contained in the veiled presence of the Infinite in us; its error consists in attempting to reach the Eternal Source of our being through a time process or a process of becoming. This error has its own relative truth, but is not the ultimate truth and significance of the categorical imperative. This imperative is a call not to a life of duty for duty's sake, the observance of *dharma* and obedience to its laws, but to realize an eternal self and freedom through the total surrendering of the finite and separative will and personality in which the moral consciousness finds its natural centre. The moral will is free, but not as moral or as willing under the influence of our mixed moral nature. Its freedom is, as it were, to be freed by the destruction of ignorance that distorts the significance of its presence in the moral consciousness, by making the freedom operate under conditions of joy and light instead of from behind a veil, through the conditions of conflict and ignorance. The true categorical imperative is not a moral Law, but a call of the Spirit to the individual to rise from the relative to the absolute order of being. It is stated by Krishna in the eighteenth chapter of the *Gita*: 'Abandoning all *dharma*s take thou refuge in Me alone. I shall liberate thee from all evil.'

Knowledge and Truth

BY

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The object of this paper is to discuss the concepts of knowledge and truth as applied to synthetic propositions and to point out that these two concepts are superfluous.¹

Consider the two assertions (a) 'S is p' (b) "'S is p' is true'. Now (a) is an assertion and implies a positing of existence, that is to say it has an existent and not merely a possible content. But in (b) 'S is p' is a proposition (i.e., what is merely proposed) and not an assertion. Here 'S is p' means 'Maybe S is p'; it is a hypothesis which is merely entertained by the mind and as such neither accepted as true nor rejected as false. But (b) is an assertion which asserts that 'S is p' stands, i.e., 'S is p' can be asserted. So that (b) is merely an explication of (a), (a) and (b) are logically equivalent though different in form.² Thus to know (and, therefore, to assert) something is to be implicitly aware of its truth, and to assert its truth is simply to be explicitly aware of its truth. Knowledge of a fact may be accompanied by an explicit awareness of this knowledge as true, but a fact to be known need not be known explicitly to be true. If the fact known is found to be false, it is not regarded as knowledge but as a mere belief. This means that knowledge is implicitly held to be true, and there can

1. The same conclusion has been reached by Felix Kaufmann in a different manner. See his essays: K (1), 'On the Nature of Inductive Inference', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. VI, pp. 602-609. K (2), 'Rudolf Carnap's Analysis of Truth', *ibid.*, Vol. IX, pp. 294-299. K (3), 'Three Meanings of Truth', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLV, pp. 337-350. Rudolf Carnap opposes this thesis to his semantic conception of truth first introduced by Alfred Tarski. See Rudolf Carnap: C (1) 'Remarks on Induction and Truth', *Phil. and Phen. Research*, Vol. VI, pp. 590-602. C (2), 'Rejoinder to Mr. Kaufmann's Reply', *ibid.*, pp. 606-611. C (3), 'Reply to Felix Kaufmann', *ibid.*, Vol. IX, pp. 300-304.

2. Carnap admits this; see C (1), p. 599.

be no false knowledge.³ From this discussion it would follow that (b) is equivalent to 'S is p' is known to be true (c). If this conclusion is denied then (b) cannot be asserted but can only be entertained as a proposition which may or may not be true. If it is now asserted, '"S is p is true" is true', (d) then the proposition '"S is p" is true' must be *known* to be true. (For the subject of an assertion must be known in order that something may be asserted of it). Thus to assert either (b) or (d), each containing the predicate 'true' after the copula, is equivalent to knowledge of truth; and so, a proposition cannot be said to be true unless it is known to be true. In other words, that truth is independent of knowledge of truth cannot be asserted. And what cannot be asserted cannot be true.⁴ So the statements (a) 'S is p', (b) '"S is p" is true', (c) '"S is p" is known to be true', are logically equivalent. That is to say knowledge, knowledge of truth and truth are logically equivalent.

This is further clarified when we consider the meaning of knowledge of truth. A piece of knowledge is believed to be epistemologically neutral (in the sense that it is neither true nor false) and it is further known to be true or false by a process of confirmation. This means that knowledge is somehow known. Against this view we have two arguments (i) In order to know a piece of knowledge (to be true or false) we have to compare the knowledge with its object. For this comparison to be possible or meaningful, we have to hold the two together as distinct from each other. This is impossible, for while knowledge may be distinguished from its object the latter is never distinguished from the former; an object to be compared with its knowledge must first be known. Thus it is impossible to know a knowledge. Knowledge is ultimate like existence. Realists relate knowledge to its objects (being) by distinguishing the two, while the idealists relate them by identifying them. Both of these rival epistemologies are incorrect. (ii) In order that a piece of knowledge may be further known, we have to verify it by verifying its consequences that are themselves pieces of knowledge. But this confirmation is not a known character of knowledge confirmed. For if it were so, all cognitions would have to be continu-

3. This position is implied by the *svatah pramanya* theory of Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa. Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya upholds this view. See his essay 'Knowledge and Truth', Presidential Address at Philosophical Congress, 1927 (Logic and Metaphysics Section).

4. This refutes Carnap's opposite thesis, see C (1), pp. 598-600. See Kaufmann's refutation in K (2), p. 296.

ous and truth would have to be one whole.⁵ The confirming cognitions are not logically related to the cognition that is confirmed. The relation of implication subsisting between the set of confirming cognitions and the confirmed cognition is not strict or necessary but material. (This is because all empirical statements are contingent and all laws are probable). The confirming cognitions strengthen our belief in the confirmed cognition, but that is a psychological and not a logical relation. Thus knowledge is not (properly speaking) known through a process of confirmation. This is further made evident by considering the fact that confirmation is a never-ending process never yielding knowledge proper (of the knowledge to be confirmed). The confirming cognitions, which are the consequences of the cognition to be confirmed, are themselves to be confirmed. This lands us in an infinite regress.⁶

The above two arguments show that knowledge is not known in a proper sense. It is loosely said to be known. When that is said it only means that knowledge is accompanied by an awareness of itself, and this is also said to be a knowledge of its truth. As we have shown, knowledge itself implies knowledge of its truth, truth being no substantial or additional character of knowledge.

Thus it emerges that, as knowledge is never known, it can never be known to be true; it always runs the risk of being reversed or falsified.⁷ When so reversed it is to be regarded as a mere proposition or a belief, and not strictly knowledge. Thus there is no irrefutable knowledge, which means that there is no proposition which can be warrantably asserted to be true of reality or to be strictly knowledge. Refutable knowledge is no knowledge proper which implies truth. Thus in logical strictness 'true knowledge' is redundant, and 'false knowledge' is contradictory.

The outcome of our discussion above is that in empirical science we should consider any assertion (of facts and law) as a proposition to be accepted on certain grounds and not as knowledge.

5. Truth as one whole may be a spiritual ideal or a regulative principle for the establishment of standards of validation, but it is not an established thing. See K (3), p. 348. The so-called coherent system or systematic relation is but a projection or imaginary objectification of the subjective process of confirmation which is not objectively known as a whole, see K. C. Bhattacharyya, *loc. cit.*

6. See D. L. Miller, 'The Nature of Scientific Statements', *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XIV, pp. 219-223.

7. This is maintained by Kaufmann, who calls it 'the principle of permanent control'. See K (1), p. 603.

If we use the term 'knowledge' at all to designate such an accepted proposition, we have to clearly recognize that the term is used in its loose sense and that this so-called knowledge is reversible. Again, it is better to avoid the term 'truth' in connection with factual statements of science, for it is implied by knowledge and adds nothing substantial to statements when they are qualified by it. Thus both 'knowledge' and 'truth' are terms which are superfluous in the context of scientific statements.⁸ This fully agrees with Felix Kaufmann's conclusion: 'The notion of truth, understood as unalterable (timeless) property of synthetic propositions, and the notion of perfect knowledge related to it, cannot escape Occam's razor once the principles of empirical science have been clarified.'⁹

8. Carnap believes that the applicability in science of principles of deductive logic depends upon the notion of truth: see C (2). But this has been ably refuted by Kaufmann: see K (3), pp. 340-346. And as Kaufmann has indicated (see *ibid.*, p. 340) even in pure deductive logic the concepts of tautology and contradiction can replace those of truth and falsity respectively. That is to say, intensional logic can fully cover the internal relations of propositions and terms without requiring a general notion of truth.

9. See K (2), p. 299.

Some Metaphysical Questions about the Doctrine of the 'Specious Present'

BY

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Time is admittedly one of the embarrassments of the philosopher. But psychical research or 'parapsychology', that disconcerting branch of scientific investigation which during the past few decades has been quietly leading us away from the common daylight of the human mind, is today demanding a revolution in our fundamental notions of succession and becoming. The experimental evidence for precognition — the 'super-normal', non-inferential knowledge about the 'future' — adduced by Tyrrell, Rhine, Whately Carington and Soal, if accepted, would necessitate the most extreme reconstruction of scientific cosmology.¹ In my papers which appeared recently in *Mind*² and *The Philosophical Quarterly*,³ I have drawn the attention of philosophers to the magnitude of the problem. There are some simple yet far-reaching questions about the familiar doctrine of the 'specious present' that I should like to raise here. I propose to show that the commonly accepted interpretations of the doctrine beg the ontological question about the 'future'.

I

That perceived events are not instantaneous occurrences but have a durational stretch is regarded as a commonplace of textbooks. In the oft-quoted words of William James: 'The practically cognized present is no knife-edge but a saddle-back, with a certain

1. I have discussed the phenomenological side of psychical research, especially the evidential standards maintained in the investigation of the precognitive faculty, in a series of articles published in *The Astrological Magazine* (edited by Sri B. V. Raman, D.Sc.), Vol. XXXIX (1950), pp. 404-7; 456-9; 525-7; 581-3. Cf. Professor H. H. Price's critical notice in *Mind*, N. S., LVIII, No. 231, July 1949; Dr S. G. Soal's article in *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2, April 1950, pp. 230-9; and C. W. K. Mundle's recent note in *Mind*, N. S., LIX, No. 235, July 1950.

2. N. S., LVIII, No. 230, April 1949, pp. 218-21.

3. Vol. XXIII, No. 1, April 1950, pp. 1-11.

breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a *duration* with a bow and a stern as it were — a rearward and a forward-looking end.⁴ The argument for the psychological reality of this 'duration-block' consists in an appeal to experience. According to Bergson, Stout, Ward and others, we perceive that changes occur and also that they are *occurring*. In the 'specious present', we have an immediate awareness of the continuity of change; we do not perceive 'first X, then Y' but 'X *changing into* Y'. Since all changes take time, the 'specious present' must have a finite duration, a small temporal extension or breadth. Psychological estimates of it range from round about $\frac{1}{2}$ a second to 4 seconds.⁵ It is supposed to vary in different individuals according to interest and attention, the influence of drugs and other psycho-physiological conditions.⁶

Is the awareness associated with the temporal extension constituting our 'specious present' something that arises only at the end of it? Is it, in other words, a rudimentary memory or 'looking back'? Whitehead's statement that 'what we perceive as present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation'⁷ may perhaps incline us to this view. Wildon Carr, however, in his classical paper on 'The Moment of Experience', argued with persuasive logic that the contents of the 'specious present' are *perceived*, not merely remembered.⁸ In the perception of a shooting star or meteor, a rapidly moving luminous point appears as a line of light not for the dozen reasons that ophthalmologists and neurologists may assign, but because the change lies within the 'moment of experience', which has a finite duration. The limit of its duration is where memory takes the place of perception.⁹

Can the 'specious present' thus interpreted be regarded as a *veridical* perception of reality? I contend that for those who

4. *The Principles of Psychology* (Macmillan, 1901), Vol. I, Ch. xv, p. 609.

5. 550σ to 4000σ where $\sigma = \frac{1}{1000}$ sec.

6. For the literature, see J. A. Gunn, *The Problem of Time* (George Allen & Unwin, 1929), pp. 388-395, and M. F. Cleugh, *Time* (Methuen, 1937), Ch. I, pp. 16-35.

7. *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 73.

8. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N. S., XVI (1915-16), pp. 3-11.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 7, p. 9. Cf. Sturt: 'If memory were abolished, we should be unable to apprehend any period longer than..... 550σ .' (*The Psychology of Time* (Kegan Paul, 1925), p. 17.) Also Gunn, *op. cit.*; Cleugh, *op. cit.*; C. S. Myers, *Text-book of Experimental Psychology* (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1922), Part I, Ch. xxiii.

regard the 'past' as objectively non-existent, and therefore unavailable to present perception, the 'specious present' brings with it a profoundly disturbing possibility. Suppose I am aware of X moving from A to B *within* the 'specious present', then according to James, Wildon Carr and other orthodox exponents of the psychological doctrine, I *perceive* X's being at A when it is *no longer* there, i.e., when 'X's being at A' is objectively 'past'. Parts of time, which cannot objectively co-exist in any obvious sense of the term, *appear* to do so in the 'specious present'. It may be said that the objective 'past' is not just a nonentity; it is, on the contrary, metaphysically determinate and has an integral connection with the objective 'present'. But can it literally exist *now*? E. R. Clay, who (according to James) introduced the term 'specious present', was aware of the extravagance to which it seems to lead. He wrote: 'The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the past — a recent past — delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future..... Time, then, considered relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts, viz. the obvious past, the specious present, the real present and the future. Omitting the specious present, it consists of...[the] nonentities, the past, which does not exist, the future which does not exist, and their conterminus, the present.....'¹⁰

S. Alexander¹¹ and C. A. Strong,¹² realizing the gravity of the situation, have tried to persuade us that the 'specious present' is really specious. It is a peculiarity of our perceptual equipment and not of time regarded as objective succession. Even when there are no perceptible differences of quality within the luminous track representing for us the movement of a meteor, we are aware of the meteor having been at one end *before* it was at the other end. Alexander contends that every duration is a duration of succession; succession is not superadded to duration, but is intrinsic to it. If parts of time *appear* to co-exist in an 'enduring present', it is because our sensibility to succession is not as great as our sensibility to duration. Strong remarks that our hearing the stroke of a bell as a single occurrence is due to the fact that we are unable to perceive its temporal complexity. We are organized on too large a scale to glimpse the atomic and sub-atomic worlds. Obviously, the limitations of our perceptual apparatus can tell us nothing about the nature of time. The only useful way of con-

10. Citation by James, *op. cit.*

11. *Space, Time and Deity* (Macmillan, 1920), Vol. I, Ch. iv, pp. 120-4.

12. *Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind* (Macmillan, 1930), II, ii, pp. 75-6.

ceiving time, according to Strong, is to think of it as infinitely successive; every part of duration consists of parts and even smaller parts and so on *ad infinitum*.

The argument has led us to the notion of instants having temporal positions and relations but no temporal extensions. I do not propose to discuss here all the 'antinomies' to which the conception is supposed to lead. While few of us can pretend to be altogether happy about unextended temporal terms, few will dispute the logical validity of the processes—whether the orthodox mathematical technique as expounded by Bertrand Russell in various contexts¹³ or Whitehead's 'Method of Extensive Abstraction'—by which they are derived from finite durations that are also successions. All that I am concerned to point out is that the sophisticated conception of time as a linearly ordered compact series of instants—an oriented or directed line is a convenient image of the concept—serves to bring into focus the ontological problem which is implicit in the doctrine of the 'specious present'. Neither pastness nor presentness in the strict sense can characterize a temporally extended term like the 'specious present'. If a durational slice is past as a whole, some parts of it must necessarily be 'more past', i.e., farther away from the present, than other parts. Instants of time are successive; they come in a single column; *ex hypothesi*, no two exist at once. How then can *all* the instants in the 'specious present', which has an appreciable temporal extension, be perceived to exist?

To obviate the metaphysical difficulty, it might be suggested that real time consists of 'packets', 'bundles', or 'quanta', that changes, far from being continuous, take place by finite steps 'like the successive drops by which a cask of water is filled, when whole drops fall into it at once or nothing' as William James put it.¹⁴ The hypothesis is neither clearly stated nor adequately supported, and, even on the principles of modern quantum physics, it seems inapplicable to the macroscopic world of perception, where continuous time provides the background for a description of both discrete and continuous phenomena. One has the right to ask how long the perceived 'packets' of time are, and where one ends and the next begins; and this is introducing a continuous time parameter. To assert that the parameter can take on only integral values *may* have some queer justification in quantum physics, but the failure of the mathematical conception of continuous time in this domain

13. For instance in *Human Knowledge* (George Allen & Unwin, 1948), Part IV, Ch. v.

14. *Some Problems of Philosophy* (1911), p. 172.

does not arise from considerations suggested by the time of perception.¹⁵ The doctrine of the 'specious present', as expounded in text-books and papers, furnishes no decisive grounds for abandoning the hypothesis of a compact, metrizable time. It is stated explicitly by James¹⁶ and Wildon Carr¹⁷ that the 'specious present' includes distinctions of before-and-after. I need hardly say that every instance of such temporal asymmetry and transitivity implies succession or flux. And the admission of the reality of flux *within* the 'specious present' entails the difficulty about our *perceiving* a slice of a presumably non-existent past. The dimensions of the 'specious present' are much too large to enable us to avoid the impasse even with a 'quantized' energy.¹⁸ Wildon Carr brings to light the crux when he says that the 'specious present' is a psychical reality which has perhaps no objective or physical counterpart.¹⁹ R. G. Collingwood is more explicit in his paper devoted to 'Some Perplexities about Time'. Arguing on metaphysical grounds for the indissoluble unity of the past and the future in the 'living present', he nevertheless concludes that they are fused 'psychologically or illusorily' in the 'specious present'.²⁰

II

It is a distinctive merit of C. D. Broad²¹ that he admits frankly the paradoxical features of the 'specious present', slurred over by

15. Wildon Carr minimizes the technical difficulties in his paper contributed to the Aristotelian Society symposium on 'Concepts of Continuity', *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume IV*, pp. 45-49. L. R. Heath merely re-states Carr's views: *The Concept of Time* (University of Chicago Press, 1936), Ch. iv. For a more precise statement of the difficulty, see F. A. Lindemann's paper contributed to the Aristotelian Society symposium, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-41.

16. *Op. cit.*, pp. 309-10.

17. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

18. The quantum theory stresses the relation quantum of energy = frequency $\times$ Planck's constant of action. The highest known frequency of radiation (e.g., that of cosmic rays) would correspond to a 'minimum' period of time. The calculated value of this 'time-atom' (or 'chronon' as some have styled it) is of the order of 4.5×10^{-24} sec.; i.e., less than a million million millionth of a second. Cf. R. B. Lindsay and H. Margenau, *Foundations of Physics* (John Wiley, N. Y.), p. 77. There is little or no justification for taking the 'chronon' hypothesis seriously in discussing the status of the 'specious present'.

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

20. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N.S., XXVI (1925-6), p. 149.

21. *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1938), Vol. II, Part I, Ch xxxv, § 1.3 and § 4; *Scientific Thought* (Kegan Paul, 1923), Part II, Ch. x, pp. 348 et seq.

many psychological interpreters. He gives a clear-cut exposition of what he calls the 'wedge theory' of the 'specious present'. He substitutes the term 'presentedness' for the equivocal term 'specious present'. 'Presentedness' is supposed to be a psychological characteristic admitting of variations. In every prehended finite duration, 'presentedness' tails off from a maximum (presumably corresponding to the 'instantaneous present') to zero. No duration prehended as having the characteristic of 'presentedness' is identical with the period in which it is so prehended. On the contrary, it is the period that is just past, the relation of the two phases being one of 'adjunction'. Broad grants that, on this theory, there is a certain amount of error in all prehension of objects as temporal, but he adds that the error is of negligible proportions in view of the generally acknowledged narrow limits of the 'specious present'.

I do not think that as metaphysicians we can accept the consolation held out by Broad. Once we have made the demoralizing concession that 'misprehension'—or, to use the time-honoured word, 'misperception'—of time is a fact, it is open to a thinker like McTaggart to point out that any restriction of the amount of error is, from an ontological standpoint, perfectly arbitrary. Complacency in these matters must be deprecated. I think that McTaggart's use of the 'specious present'²² is more impressive than his purely logical arguments, some of which at any rate are just linguistic muddles. He rightly insists that if presentness in the strict sense can characterize only instantaneous terms, we are all grossly deluded. If presentness in the strict sense can characterize only finite durations, and if, as psychologists persuade us, the 'specious present' varies in different individuals and in different conditions, a man may *perceive* some events which his neighbour only *remembers*.

May not such arguments apply to the future as well? If a non-existent past can have the characteristic of 'presentedness', why should not the characteristic attach to a non-existent future too? To most contemporary philosophers in the West, the hypothesis seems fantastic and even outrageous. And why? Because they have tacitly taken for granted that the ontological status of the past is vastly different from that of the future. Both, of course, non-exist in the trivial sense that they do not exist 'at the present moment'. But the past, although it does not exist *now*, is supposed to be metaphysically determinate and causally connected

22. *The Nature of Existence*, II, Ch. xxxiii, §§ 342-347.

with the present. It is claimed that the past acts on us visibly. When we see a new star or nova blazing forth in the heavens, something that occurred perhaps before human civilization began is acting upon us through an intervening causal chain of events. Our anticipation of a future event, on the other hand, however vivid it may be, is not the event itself or a causal *product* of the event; at best it can be an *antecedent* condition of the event, as is the case when we execute a plan or purpose. The future not only does not exist *now* but is metaphysically a nonentity. It lacks 'actuality' and has the dubious status of a 'possibility'.²³ While the metaphor of objects 'casting shadows' is pronounced to be not altogether inappropriate in the case of past events which are remembered or inferred, it is condemned as self-contradictory when applied to future events which are anticipated.²⁴ The pseudo-judgment 'S is future', which seems to ascribe a characteristic to an actual event, is regarded as a trap for the unwary. In a two-valued logic, a judgment about the future is taken as either 'true' or 'false' with the proviso that 'at the present moment' we do not know which it is. Probability logic is a generalization of this two-valued logic. In a certain kind of three-valued logic, a statement concerning the future is neither 'true' nor 'false', but has a third value, 'possible' or 'indeterminate'. I must respectfully point out that this method of analysis is incompetent to fix the metaphysical status of the future. The belief that the past can act upon us owes its plausibility to arguments which *au fond* are partly ontological (assumption of *real* causality, etc.) and partly empirical (appeal to experience). Ontological considerations by no means compel us to assent to the view that the future is a nonentity, since real causality, or rather connectivity, to use the more non-committal term, may admit of all kinds of interpretation in a metaphysical context. If the status of the future is treated as an open problem, any facts or experiences which *prima facie* suggest that the future can act on us have a far-reaching metaphysical significance.

That current theories of time make gratuitous assumptions about the ontological status of the future will become evident to us if we discard the hypothesis that in the 'specious present' there

23. C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*, Part I, Ch. ii, pp. 66 *et seq.*; M. F. Cleugh, *Time*, Ch. xi; J. Macmurray, *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume VIII*, p. 160; A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 251; R. G. Collingwood, *op. cit.*; J. Wisdom, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N. S., XXIX (1928-9), 4, pp. 88-90; J. A. Gunn, *The Problem of Time*, pp. 404-410.

24. M. F. Cleugh, *op. cit.*, pp. 196f.
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is only a *delusive* perception of a slice of the past and adopt an alternative interpretation. William James' 'saddle-back' theory provides us with a 'maximal degree of presentedness' tailing off to zero in two intrinsically opposite directions corresponding to past and future. May not pastness and futurity be not only categorical features of time but also *empirically ascertainable* characteristics? Pastness, presentness and futurity may be determinate degrees of a single determinable characteristic, namely, psychological 'presentedness'. The 'specious present' may not only 'foreshadow' the future; it may *include* a tiny slice of the future without our being always explicitly aware of the fact. The question has been already mooted by psychical researchers like F. W. H. Myers²⁵ and H. F. Saltmarsh,²⁶ though their terminology is not one to which metaphysicians can reconcile themselves. A more rigorous formulation of the hypothesis should not prove impossible. To account for the ostensive prehension of distant future events, we have only to extend the 'saddle-backed specious present' beyond its hitherto acknowledged narrow limits. Metaphysical precedent for the step is not lacking. Royce argued for his Absolute by postulating what in effect is an infinitely extended 'specious present' which includes every past, present and future.²⁷ Even philosophers showing no idealistic leanings²⁸ have occasionally played with the hypothesis of a Being with a more extended 'specious present' than ours. It is open to the psychical researcher to assume that the entire life of a man constitutes the extended 'specious present' of his 'hidden' or 'subliminal' self. Precognition of events in one's own life ('autoscopical precognition' as Broad has called it)²⁹ would then receive some sort of explanation. And if we postulate a telepathic rapport between different 'subliminal' selves, we can deal with those cases in which a percipient has a 'supernormal' knowledge of a past which is not *his* past³⁰ or of a future which is not *his* future.

25. *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, Vol. XI, Part 39 (December 1895), pp. 342-44.

26. *Proc. S. P. R.*, Vol. XLII, Part 134 (February 1934), pp. 74-93; also *Foreknowledge* (Bell, 1938), Ch. vi, pp. 94 *et seq.*

27. *The World and the Individual* (Macmillan), Second Series, Lect. III.

28. For instance, Shadworth Hodgson, in a symposium on the status of the future in *Mind*, N.S., VI, 1897, No. 22, pp. 234f.; C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*, p. 362.

29. *Philosophy*, Vol. XXIV, No. 91 (October 1949), p. 301.

30. For instance, the extraordinary incidents narrated by C. A. E. Moberley and E. F. Jourdain in *An Adventure* (4th edition, reprinted 1948, Faber & Faber).

It may be tempting to speculate on these lines. There remain, however, difficulties about the 'shifting present' of the empirical ego. It will not do to say that this is an 'illusion' generated by successive terms in a linearly ordered non-temporal series acquiring and then losing a 'maximal degree of presentedness'. The acquiring and losing of psychological 'presentedness' (of a specified degree) presupposes transitoriness or becoming at some higher level.³¹ J. W. Dunne has emphasized the difficulty. All attempts to tackle the problem of precognition by interpreting temporal becoming as an alteration in the qualities or relational qualities of certain fundamental particulars (neutral 'sensibilia', 'cognita'³² and so forth) have to reckon with a 'regress' in time. Lotze propounded the metaphysical dilemma about time when he said: 'We must either admit becoming or explain the becoming of an unreal appearance of becoming.'

I hope I have made it clear in this paper that ontological questions about time can never be settled by logical and linguistic methods of analysis. The average criticism of McTaggart has tended to obscure this point. Logical positivism and empiricism in the West, while they have tidied up some corners of philosophy, have on the whole blunted a capacity for metaphysical speculation. The reaction against the woolliness and verbosity of metaphysical thinking may carry us too far. One of the problems for metaphysics is whether time can be a feature of reality in its ultimate or fundamental aspect. The problem is not unmeaning unless we arbitrarily fix standards of 'meaningfulness' and reject everything that does not square itself to our inadequate measuring-rods. If the ontological statement 'Time is not ultimately real' has no common-sense interpretation, it cannot, so far as I can see, be *incompatible* with the ordinary statements we make about 'before', 'after' and 'contemporaneous with'. I maintain that the empirical evidence for precognition is far more relevant to a discussion of ontological theories of time than an elaborate analysis of common-sense statements. The Self's capacity to transcend its spatio-temporal conditions points to those exalted states which usher the poet and the seer into regions

31. Hilda Oakley opines that an observer for whom his entire life is a 'specious present' could not have a history in the ordinary sense. 'As knowers we must recognise the fact of the 'specious present', but for action it seems that there must be an absolute moment.' (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., XXXII, (1931-2), pp. 235-6.)

32. Whately Carington, *Matter, Mind and Meaning* (Methuen, 1949), esp. Appendix III, 'Does Tomorrow Exist?'

Where beauty has no ebb, decay no flood
But joy is wisdom.....³³

It is the admission of such experiences that makes metaphysics something more than a tangle of pseudo-problems. Mysticism is not the simple anti-intellectualism that many take it to be. The attitude of mind that says to Reason 'Thus far and no farther' is no doubt irritating. But there is nothing insulting about the claim that Reason finds its true consummation in an ampler vision of Reality. A fresh approach to the doctrine of 'grades' or 'levels' of experience is necessary today. In my articles appearing in *The Aryan Path* and *Prabuddha Bharata*, I have dwelt on the implications of mystical philosophy for the modern research into selves. Time is sometimes pictured as a corridor stretching from a limitless past to a limitless future. I venture to think that, in the dialectic of mysticism, it is a labyrinth with the Self at the centre.

33. W. B. Yeats.

Cognitive Transcendence

BY

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1. A state of the mind, in so far as it is cognitive, implies or involves a reference beyond itself. By this it is not meant that knowledge is necessarily judgment. There may be indeterminate cognition of the *nirvikalpaka* type, or prejudgmental cognition like the 'simple apprehension' of Prof. Hobhouse; there may be 'knowledge by acquaintance' as distinguished from 'knowledge by description'; there may be 'experience in its primary intention' as different from its 'secondary intention', for all that we know. But in so far as a state of cognition (whether determinate or indeterminate) claims to be cognitive, it refers beyond itself.

2. The expression 'refers beyond itself' so frequently used in connection with our descriptions of the cognitive states needs explanation. At the outset, it seems to suggest that a state, in so far as it is cognitive, is not self-contained or self-sufficient, and has to 'fulfil' itself by moving beyond itself. This absence of self-sufficiency, this its incapacity to rest in itself, seems to constitute the 'self-transcendence' of cognition.

3. But such a description is evidently negative: to say that cognition refers beyond itself in the sense that it cannot rest in itself or that it is incomplete in itself, is to repeat the same thing in a negative way. To say that cognition does not rest in itself and that it refers beyond itself is not stating anything new. The pertinent question is: What does it do in so referring beyond itself, or: What can be this its 'referring beyond itself'? The answer, if found, will be the answer to the question: What is 'cognitive transcendence'?

4. What is cognitive transcendence? Let us ask: What is this reference beyond itself? Some may seek to escape the difficulty by suggesting that cognitive transcendence or 'the reference beyond itself' is a fundamental logical function, not further describable. It is involved in judgment in which an 'ideal content' is referred to Reality, or a part thereof. Or it may be said, as James has put it, that it is the 'process of termination of a concept in a

percept'. But such accounts are doubly objectionable. In the first place, such expressions as 'referring a content to Reality', or 'termination of a concept in a percept', seem to repeat the very thing to be explained. In the second place, the descriptions thus given are intended to cover cases of judgmental cognitions only, and so leave out the prejudgmental cognitions, in which there is no 'ideal content' to refer, no concept to work upon.

5. Of course, there are many who do not think that prejudgmental cognition involves any cognitive transcendence. In the prejudgmental cognition, it has been said, there can be no distinction between the act and the content, and thus to speak of cognitive transcendence in respect of such experiences is unwarranted.¹ Our experience, says James, is not indefeasibly dualistic.² The primary cognition, or experience in its 'primary intention', is an absolute entity, an unrelated 'that'. The splitting up of cognition into act and content can take place in the 'secondary intention' only, when cognition retrospects itself or reacts to itself as a content, and gets distinguished into an act having for its content an object transcendent of it. Thus James seems to believe that the duality of act and content is a prerequisite of cognitive transcendence, and, since no such distinction can be traced to experience in its 'primary intention', any attempt to prove cognitive transcendence in respect of such experience is milking a he-goat. That the distinction between act and content is an essential precondition of cognitive transcendence seems to be the general belief, and it is not peculiar to James alone. If there is no cognitive act different from the content, and no content apart from the act, the expression 'cognitive transcendence' seems to become meaningless, according to this belief. But does cognitive transcendence then mean *the relation of 'apartness'* between the act and the content? Is the content independent of, apart from, or outside the cognition?

6. This seems to be unconvincing. It is not by being distinguished from its content, nor by suggesting independence of its content, that a cognitive act seems to 'cognize' it, but by taking the 'form' of that content, or by being modified *after that content*. In cognizing the content the act seems to lose itself in the content. Its self-transcendence seems to mean its identification with the content. It is quite possible to split up a cognitive experience into its act-part and its content-part. Reflection, retrospection, or James'

1. *Meaning of Truth*, p. 12.

2. *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 9.

'secondary intention' may help us in achieving that. But it is not in being taken away from its content that a cognitive act becomes cognitive, but by losing its identity in the content, by being merged in the content. This its identification with the content seems to 'fulfil' its cognitive mission, seems to *render it cognitive*. For, if transcendence of cognition is its identity *with*, or its self-immolation *in*, the content, neither can the cognitive act stand apart from its object, nor can the object be taken apart from the act. In other words, if its non-distinction from its content constitutes its self-transcendence, no distinction between itself and its content in any shape can be conceived as furnishing the ground of that transcendence.

7. But how does a cognitive act fulfil its cognitive mission by transcending itself and merging in the content? The question is the same as: How does cognition conform to its object? This is radically different from the Kantian question: How does the object conform to the act cognizing it? Kant answered that the object conforms to the act of cognition, at first, by being 'given' in the intuitions of space and time; and thereafter by being *necessarily 'thought'* in terms of certain thought-functions or categories. This solution, though unassailable in its own way, is unsatisfactory, for two evident reasons. The object *as given* presupposes itself as the necessary precondition of its own 'givenness', and, since *the 'given'* alone is amenable to the discipline of the categories, the thing-in-itself necessarily remains unknown and unknowable. Moreover, it assumes certain ready-made *a priori* 'forms of intuition' and *a priori* 'categories of the understanding'; and the object by conforming to them becomes empirically real, but, to repeat a term of Hume, only 'habitually' so. The unavoidable necessity of its being thought *as that* does not satisfy fully our insistence on its unmitigated objectivity. Cognition in so far as it furnishes the 'forms' under which the object is *necessarily 'given'* and the 'forms' in which it is *necessarily 'thought'* seems to constitute it, and to *make it an object unto itself*, instead of *making itself a cognitive act unto its object*. In the last analysis, its object becomes an object unto it by being referred or 'thrown out' by the judgmental functions as a content *without and beyond* such functions. Thus the Kantian theory becomes an explanation of the *objective transcendence*, that is, of objects being transcendent of the cognitive act as embodied in the categories or judgmental functions. But it does not explain self-transcendence of the cognitive act itself.

8. But can a cognitive act become cognitive in 'throwing out' its content, or in referring to the content as what is beyond itself? This idea of cognitive transcendence (more properly describable as objective transcendence), originally implied in the Kantian doctrine of judgment, seems to have been, consciously or unconsciously, adopted by logicians like Bradley and Bosanquet. A cognitive or judgmental act, according to them, becomes cognitive by referring an 'ideal content' to Reality beyond that act. In other words, the Bradleian 'reference of an ideal content to Reality' becomes equivalent to James' *termination* of a concept in Reality or part thereof, if not 'in the percept', as James would have it. It is the ghost of the Kantian categories or judgmental functions, lying handy from the beginning and independent of the assertable content, that seems to 'shadow' our logical theories of judgment. This is evidently the reason why our logicians speak of the 'ideal content' as being *referred to Reality*, or of the 'assertable' as *being asserted*, implying distinction between the act of reference and the referred content, as also between the 'asserted' and the 'assertiveness of the assertion'. If, however, these distinctions are left out, if the disembodied act is allowed to form a part of the 'referred' or the 'asserted', the judgmental cognition comes to mean 'termination' or 'merging' of the entire conceptual representation in its appropriate object — a view similar to the one we now propose for consideration.

9. Thus the attempt to explain cognitive transcendence in terms of 'objective' transcendence becomes abortive at the end. It is not by 'throwing out' its content outside of itself, or by opposing itself to an 'other', that a cognitive act may transcend itself and become cognitive of its content. The alternative hypothesis, which has been referred to already, is that the cognitive act becomes cognitive and comes to transcend itself by 'taking the form' of the content, and in so doing *being non-distinguished* from its content. Epistemologically considered, cognition is a mental mode, a modification, let us say, of *antaḥkāraṇa*. There can be no cognition without a psychical mode coming to 'form' itself. Its formation in a specific way is however dependent on neural adjustment occasioned by psycho-physical causes. The object or content of cognition is that which is 'figured' in the psychical mode or *vr̥tti* as different from the 'figuring' or the '*vr̥tti*-hood' of the *vr̥tti*. In being 'formed' after, or in accordance with, its objective content, the *vr̥tti* or psychical mode becomes necessarily incomplete in itself. It becomes, so to say, a representation of the object. Cognition consists in the fulfilment by the *vr̥tti* of its 'representative' mission. This mission the *vr̥tti* fulfils by merging itself in the content

or object, and being *non-distinguished* from the object. When this is achieved, when the *vr̥tti* attains this non-distinction or self-immolation, it transcends itself and becomes cognitive by reason of that self-transcendence which thus consists in the identification of the *vr̥tti* with its content. If this is not fulfilled, if the *vr̥tti* fails to lose its individuality in the content it reflects, there can be no cognition. Not only that, its 'reflecting' a content, or 'taking' the 'form' of the content, necessarily means its being identical with the content. Before reflecting, the *vr̥tti* cannot exist as a *vr̥tti*, cannot have its specific form, and after it has assumed the 'form' of the content, it cannot exist except as being non-distinguishable from the content.

It may be asked: Is this not some form of representationism? Representationism, so far as we understand it, suggests a three-term relation in cognition. Even the contemporary school of critical realism distinguishes between act, datum or essence, and the object. But the present theory, like direct realism, may be logically construed to suggest a two-term relation. There is the psychical mode which reflects the content, and the content which is thus reflected. The psychical mode, logically describable as the cognitive act and psychologically and epistemologically describable as the *vr̥tti*, is a dynamic entity, a moving process. It cannot rest in itself; it fulfils itself by leading up to its content and losing itself in the content. But if it naturally and necessarily so fulfils itself, if to reflect the object and in so doing to merge into it be the inalienable characteristic of a state of cognition, how can there be any false knowledge or any illusory object?, it may be asked. The simple reply is: No cognition can be cognitive without belief in the necessary coalescence of the cognitive act and its content, or, to express the same thing in the phraseology of this new theory: No cognition can be there without the psychical mode identifying itself with its content; and hence all cognitions at the initial stage are intrinsically valid (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*). The invalidity of cognition is always due to extraneous references (*aparāmāṇyam parataḥ*).

10. But what about the objects of cognitions? Are they not independent of the *vr̥tti*? If so, can it not be supposed that they exist in the objective or neutral order in their own right? We answer: The self-transcendence of the *vr̥tti* or the cognitive state as explained above goes to suggest that the objective content of a state of cognition is *necessarily felt as without us*, but whether it is really so, or capable of existing in its own right as it is known by us (as realism seems to hold), cannot be ascertained or proved.

Our *vr̥tti* is our mode of knowing it, and, whenever we know, we know it as we know, and can never know it otherwise than as we know. So far it is *through* our knowing. But our knowing knows it, reflects it and cannot be itself unless it necessarily reflects it, unless cognition transcends itself and merges itself in its content. So far our knowing or psychical mode is 'for' it.

11. The more important issue, so far as this essay is concerned, is to show whether the cognitive transcendence as understood here can be proved in respect of all cognitions, prejudgmental and judgmental. We do not accept the view that knowledge is necessarily judgmental. But the difference between the judgmental and the prejudgmental does not consist in the presence of the distinction between act and content in the one case, and its absence in the other. There can be no cognition, it has been held, unless the act loses itself in the content and in that sense transcends itself. In judgmental cognition also it is not its distinction from the content that renders the cognitive act cognitive, but its non-distinction from it, or its identity with the content. The difference between the prejudgmental and the judgmental cognitions can be found in the simplicity and the complexity of the structure of cognitive states. The prejudgmental may be similar to the *nirvikalpaka* cognition of Rāmānuja, in which, although there is a cognition of a qualified content, the quality as characterizing that content is not conceived as a universal.³ Or it may be taken in the sense in which the author of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* takes it, i.e., knowledge of identity as illustrated in such statements as: 'He is that Devadatta', in which all extraneous relations must be left out in order to cognize the identity of Devadatta in varied contexts. The prejudgmental cognition may also be taken in the sense in which Naiyāyikas take it, or as James, Hobhouse and others take it. In short, we are not disposed to align ourselves with any particular school of thinkers. What all the views seem to have in common is that the prejudgmental cognition is the simpler of the two modes. It is the cognition of the given as given. The later Nyāya view⁴ that it is the indeterminate cognition of the predicative quality, the logical *prius* of the determinate but not psychological experienced (*atīndriya*), does not seem to fall into line with the others. But the difficulty may be avoided by refusing to accept the view that it is not psychologically experienced, or that it is *atīndriya*, for there

3. *Anuvṛttikāratā na pratiyati* — *Bhāṣya*, sec. 51.

4. *Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya jñānam prati hi viśeṣanātāvachedakaprakāraṃ jñānam kāraṇam* — *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 812.

may be cognition of the sensation-type in which the potential predicate is directly known as a given sensum like redness, or harshness, or sweetness. In any cognition of the prejudgmental type there is a psychical mode reflecting a content, and non-distinguishable from it; otherwise there could be no experience or cognition, no awareness at all. The objection of William James that in the primary or neutral experience the act-part does not stand distinguished from the content-part, and so there is no cognitive transcendence, thus cannot stand; since it is *only so far as the act-content distinction is absent* that cognition implies self-transcendence.

12. The case of judgmental cognition is epistemologically similar to the prejudgmental cognition. Only it is more developed, and in it effects of earlier experiences contribute to the determination of the psychical mode or *vr̥tti*. By this it is not meant that the judgmental cognition is a complex of parts. What a judgment *may be* logically analysed into, and what it functionally is when it actually operates, are two things and not one. Whatever may be its constituents in themselves, when these combine to constitute a judgment the resultant process becomes a simple whole. The plurality of determinants does not render it a mechanical whole or a 'complex' entity any more than the plurality of physical stimuli or light waves renders a colour-sensation a complex something. The difference between a prejudgmental cognition and a judgment seems to be thus one of degree only. If in a judgment the object or content is more manifest, the reason can be found in the more developed nature of the psychical mode which reflects or reveals it. The self-transcendence of this judgmental cognition, i.e., of the psychical mode which forms its epistemological basis, consists (as in the case of the prejudgmental cognition) in the identity of the *vr̥tti* with its content, its self-immolation in its content. As a cognitive process it is a simple whole; the presentative and the representative, the given and the conceptual factors into which it is analysed, do not stand distinguishable inside it. So it is not correct to say that in judgment concepts are referred to percepts, or that percepts are subsumed under concepts. Such a mechanical and atomic view of judgment is not only misleading but is basically untrue. Judgment does not combine percepts with concepts. There are no such distinguishable 'moments' in actual judging. Though given in the form of an abstract noun, the word 'judgment' does not really mean any substantive; it is a function, just as the expressions 'perception', 'conception', 'sensation', etc., signify certain functions. In its dynamic being, in its process character, the so-called parts cannot be distinguished, and when

through logical analysis such distinctions are made, the issue becomes dead and cannot be restored to life by any mechanical combination of the dead parts. The traditional logical analysis of judgments appears to be an ingenious attempt to make the dummy behave as a living being.

13. One suggestion more before we close. A judgment being a mode of knowing, there may be as many forms of judgments as there are modes (direct or indirect) of knowing. And, if we adhere to the Vedānta view that there are six distinct ways of knowing (and I do not know the reason why we should not do so), there may be as many basic ways of judging as there are modes of knowing. Traditionally, although a perceptual judgment is taken as a simple thing, our inferences and other modes of indirect cognition are understood as 'complexes' involving distinct propositions or judgments. There seems to be some basic mistake here also. The self-same logical method which leads us to view perceptual judgments as composed of perceptual and conceptual factors leads us to understand inference and other forms of indirect knowing as complexes of parts. It is necessary to take such processes as simple wholes, though analysable into distinguishable propositions.

14. When we actually know in the course of such indirect processes of cognition, their so-called logical factors or parts are not present in them as distinguishable factors. The premises of inference, for example, are not to be treated as separate judgments in themselves, not even as anything distinguishable or separate from the conclusion. The premises and the conclusion should be considered as a whole mental act cognizing or reflecting a content not knowable by any other means. In the so-called inferential judgment 'The mountain is on fire', it is the part verbally expressed as 'on fire' (*vahnimatvam*) that expresses the content of the inference. To lead up to the cognition of this content, the whole process is necessary. What is true of inference is also true of other modes of indirect cognition. These are all whole-processes and become cognitive in reflecting their appropriate contents and losing their own identities in the 'being' of the content which they reveal. This is their self-transcendence.

The Democracy of Religions

BY

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Some seek to establish a democracy of religions from a peculiar point of view. They contend that each of the religions exists in its own right and has in it something of value, although each of them is fragmentary. Sri Aurobindo is the most prominent among the exponents of this view. He maintains that every religion is good enough so far as it goes. As he puts it: 'Paganism enhanced in man the sense of beauty, heightened his feelings and broadened his outlook on life; Christianity vouchsafed to him the vision of divine love and quickened his sense of purity; Buddhism showed him the path to wisdom, gentleness and calm; Judaism and Islam taught him how to combine action with devotion to God; Hinduism opened to him profoundest possibilities.'¹ Each of the religions, Aurobindo points out, contributed a good deal to human culture; but none of them, we are told, should be considered as by itself complete. It would be a good thing, says he, if they could embrace one another, and if each of them could imbibe the fundamentals of all the rest. He is, however, very sceptical of any such relationship between the religions. He opines that dogmas, cults and creeds prevent any possible amalgam of the essentials of the different faiths. It seems that Aurobindo prefers an eclectic religion to any of the existing ones. An eclectic religion is admittedly one in which the fundamentals of the different religions are combined. But an eclectic religion, to say the least, is entirely artificial, and so lacks the vitality of a living one. That way, of course, we could get a good religious content. We would, however, invariably fail to give it a living embodiment. Obviously a religion grows and can never be made. In the fourth and the fifth centuries of the Christian era some Neoplatonists, for instance, tried in their own way to build up an eclectic religion. They drew upon the then existing religions and developed an international pantheon and an international form of worship. But, alas! the new religion, if it was a religion at all, was more or less confined to the intellectuals

1. *Thoughts and Glimpses*, pp. 37-38.

and had no appeal for the masses of the people of the time. The eclectic religion could not be made popular even with the patronage of Julian, the Roman Emperor. And the artificiality of the later Neoplatonic religion was brought into bold relief by its contact with Christianity. Christianity was then another new religion. But this religion was not in any way made. It took its rise from a spiritual fountain that was Jesus Christ.

All that Aurobindo means, we may be told, when he says that the religions must embrace one another, is this, that each of the religions could enlarge its content by imbibing what it lacks from all the rest. But it could not so happen. Dogmas and cults, he tells us, were the barriers between one religion and another. Here then there are two points which none should miss. They are: first, whether any religion is incomplete, in the sense that it is incapable of bringing fulfilment to the spiritual aspirations of man; second, whether dogmas and doctrines by their very nature preclude any commerce between the different religions.

To take up the second point first. It is well known that Buddhism spread to distant countries outside India long before the birth of Jesus. We have reason to believe that Buddhist ideas moved up to Greece, especially after Alexander's expedition into India. We can safely say that Buddhist monks were roaming Asia Minor and the adjoining countries, at least from the fourth century B.C. onwards, and it was partly through them and partly through Alexandria that the yogic and mystical culture of India gradually found its way into the spiritual centres of the Western world. It is no exaggeration to say, though it is difficult to prove, that Buddhism with its cult of *ahimsā* and its conception of monastic life contributed, at least in a remote way, towards the organization of the early Christian Church. Buddhism in its turn, as we know, was modified a good deal by the influence of Hinduism and possibly other religions. Buddhism in its original form was a way of meditation or *yoga* in a restricted sense. Later a new form of Buddhism arose out of the ferment of early Buddhist, Hindu and other ideas. The conception of *Bodhisattva* as the Saviour can well be traced to the Hindu conception of *Avatāra* or Incarnation. The worship of Buddha in any form was certainly adopted under the influence of Hinduism. Islam and Christianity in the elaboration of their major doctrines and dogmas drew upon the religion of the Old Testament. The Brahmo religion was indeed founded upon the inspiration of Ram Mohan Roy, but its outward shape derived, for the most part, from Christianity and Islam.

It may, however, be contended that Aurobindo is concerned with the present and has no need to look back upon the bygone times. The point Aurobindo tries to make, we may be told, is that there is as a matter of fact no commerce between the existing religions, particularly between the major ones — Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. It is indeed true that there is much in the votaries of each of the religions that makes for bigotry. And it is verily bigotry that makes us blind to the truths that religions other than our own represent. We cannot, however, say that the barriers, were there any, between the religions still stand intact. The technique of modern civilization has brought the different peoples far closer together than ever before. The contact between them took place at different levels. In modern times the first contact between Eastern and Western culture was effected through a contact between Christianity and the Eastern religions. However, the attitude of the Westerners to the Eastern religions was originally hostile. They thought that the Eastern religions had no worth, and they wanted to replace the Eastern Faiths by their own. But they forgot that Jesus Christ who gave them their religion belonged to the East. Now the boot is on the other foot. After long years of study of Oriental culture many in the West have come to realize that the religions of the East too have some value and contain a measure of truth. Further, the development of science has compelled a review of the religious dogmas and a re-interpretation of them. Scientific knowledge, in short, has widened the outlook of theologians and made them inquisitive about spiritual values. Anthropological researches have stimulated a study like comparative religion. Some of the leaders of the Christian Church now think it worth while to incorporate in Christianity whatever valuable elements are to be found in other religions. They think that by absorbing the essentials of other religions Christianity would become richer and fuller, although Christianity by itself is, in their opinion, and really, full and rich enough in its content.

One may now contend that we must not make much of this point; for it represents, one may point out, only the view of some broad-minded Christians, not that of Christians taken in the mass. It is true that, though political as well as economic imperialism is going to be curbed once and for all, yet imperialism of some other sort is still lurking in our minds. Even today many among us are firmly convinced that theirs is the absolute and eternal religion, and they dream of making the religion they themselves profess a world Faith. This is as much true of Christians as of Mohammedans, Buddhists and the old-fashioned and orthodox among Hindus.

Indeed, comparative studies made in the right spirit would go a long way to foster religious fellowship. But any comparative study of the religions alone cannot eliminate altogether the opposition, if any, between them. In some cases, on the other hand, a comparative study of the religions may end in accentuating the differences already marked between them. The difficulty is that we cannot hope to secure any universal truth by any merely speculative approach to the religions. We can thereby simply construe them one way or the other.

Ramakrishna's approach to the religions, however, was not in any way theoretical. His was not the way of speculating, but of verifying them through direct spiritual experiments and experiences. He demonstrated by his experiments on the major religions that they all lead to the same goal, that is, the Deity, and that through each of them one is quite capable of realizing God, provided one is seized with an intense longing for Him. Ramakrishna's demonstration set at rest all speculation as to which of the religions is better than any other or which is best. Ramakrishna's teachings are therefore calculated to instil into every sincere soul the sense of harmony among the religions and of spiritual fellowship. Ramakrishna's influence is spreading on all sides, and as a result of his healthy influence the barriers artificially erected between the religions are just beginning to break down.

Now to take up the first point, namely, whether each of the religions mentioned above is incomplete or fragmentary. According to Aurobindo, Paganism increased in man the light of beauty and inspired him towards all-round perfection. If Paganism is identified with the Greek or Roman religion or both and if 'all-round perfection' means harmonious development of all the aspects of our being, we may say that Paganism was much less than a religion or marked only a stage in the development of religion proper. The prime object of religion is admittedly God, no matter how vaguely He may be conceived. So a religion which takes any empirical object or end as on a par with God or evaluates anything above Him is not a religion worth the name. Anyway, the old Greek or Roman religion bore the stamp of the general culture that functioned as its background. And it is true to say that Paganism in Aurobindo's sense at some stage of its development heightened in its votaries the sense of beauty. We cannot, however, say that beauty as such and a sense of it had no bearing upon any other religion. It is common knowledge that one of the planks upon which Vaisnavism, particularly the Bengal school of it, stands is just the sense of beauty. Even in the Upanishads the

supreme Being is often conceived in terms of Beauty and Delight. In one context it is described as *Satyam Sivam Sundaram* — Truth, Beauty and Good. In another context *Brahman* is conceived as Delight, out of which proceeds the world with its things and beings. Thus it can be shown that the sense of beauty had a rôle to play in every religion that was in some way or other concerned with Love of God.

On the other hand, Aurobindo maintains that it was Christianity that gave man some vision of divine love and charity. Marcion in the second century A.D. spoke in the same strain about Christianity. He sought to establish that Christianity was superior to all pagan religions. He analysed in his own way the religions of the Pagans and pointed out that they could conceive God only as the Omnipotent Cause, or, at most, as the Lord of the universe. According to him, Christianity surpassed them all by its conception of God as Love. Christianity was indeed founded upon the revelation of the Deity as Love in Jesus Christ. We cannot, however, agree that the conception of God as Love is a monopoly of Christians. Marcion was a merchant and a convert to Christianity. We can understand his over-zeal for his new faith. But we cannot quite understand how a *savant* like Aurobindo can ever say that the conception of God as Love is entirely Christian. In Buddhism the cult of *ahimsā* does not mean anything negative. It means just love of humanity. Christ's precept 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' is an equivalent of what is conveyed by '*ahimsā*'. Love of humanity, love even towards lower creatures, is stressed in Buddhism. Buddha attained Light, or, what is the same thing, to Truth. Light divine that illumined his mind, and later through him illumined the world for a time, revealed itself in his heart as Love. So with Buddha Light divine was just love. Even today, if Gandhiji makes *ahimsā* or non-violence into something of a cult, it is not merely lack of violence. He does mean by '*ahimsā*' something profoundly positive, which is universal love. Again Sri Chaitanya was a living embodiment of divine Love. By his life and teachings he indicated how to spiritualize the deepest human love and realize Love divine.

Again, charity, fellow-feeling and the service of men are no peculiar or exclusive features of any particular religion. Lovers of God cannot but love His creation. In every religion therefore the service of men is a necessary adjunct to the service of God. It is one of the cardinal principles of Hinduism that Truth is that which does good to humanity. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, for instance, Sri Krishna exhorts Arjuna to do his work in such a way that he may

do good to mankind and also attain his own salvation. Sri Krishna asks Arjuna to work, even though he has already achieved salvation. Over-zeal for service explains the urge in Buddhism for the wholesale salvation of the human race. It was this that drove some Buddhists to formulate a god who would suffer for the sake of the world. The Vaisnavas again worked out in their way an equation of love for God and love of men.

According to Aurobindo, again, a combination of action and devotion is an exclusive characteristic of Judaism and Islam. But we find that in every developed religion action and devotion link up. In the Upanishads, for instance, the emphasis is laid upon both action and dispassion. As it is put in the *Īśopaniṣad*: 'We must seek knowledge and Truth, but we should not, in fact cannot, shun life.' Whatever be the conditions or circumstances we find ourselves in, we can never be absolutely passive. We have to act and work at least for the sustenance of life. So we have to turn action to the attainment of Truth. And this we can do only if we can work in a detached way with devotion to Truth. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* a religion of action, which involves the rudiments of the religion of knowledge and of love, is propounded.

Aurobindo, on the other hand, credits Hinduism with profoundest possibilities. But the point that we should take note of is that religion and, for that reason, every religion, has only one possibility, namely, union with the supreme Being or the Deity. Religion as such involves the postulate that this possibility can be actualized. So every religion holds promise of fulfilment of this possibility. The possibilities that Aurobindo discerns in Hinduism are all vague. It seems that the possibilities he speaks of relate to the fuller development of art, literature, philosophy and the moral life. But this is nothing peculiar to Hinduism. Historically every religion has exerted its influence upon culture in its own sphere and also outside it.

Now one must be wondering just why Aurobindo takes such a distorted view of the religions in relation to one another. If we read between the lines in his books, we shall find that he analyses the religions and speaks of their so-called respective contributions to human culture not primarily to show that each of the religions has its use and value. He considers them only to put them in the wrong before he can discard them. This comes out clearly as his motive when he says: 'All religions have saved a number of souls, but none yet has been able to spiritualize mankind.'² To

2. *Thoughts and Glimpses*, p. 38.

this end, he points out, we do not require cult or creed, but purely spiritual evolution. It is claimed that Aurobindo's mission is to spiritualize the material, to immortalize the mortal, and to divinize the human. Whether the wholesale spiritualization of the human race is possible or not is still an open question. Aurobindo, however, suggests that, though the entire human race cannot be at once spiritualized, yet through the spiritualization of a few individuals at first a new species of beings, namely, Supermen, would emerge out of the human race, who would be to men what men are to apes. It is obvious that Aurobindo attaches an altogether new meaning to the term 'spiritualization'. He tells us that Supermen would be spirits in the strict sense; in them all sorts of imperfection including bodily defects and deformities would be eliminated, and their bodies, unlike ours, would be the perfect moulds of spirit, which death would not touch. I cannot here enter upon any discussion of this theme, important and interesting as it is, for it would carry me too far afield. To say the least, I, for my part, regard Aurobindo's scheme of spiritualization as Utopian.³ All this, however, is not quite relevant to my present purpose. Here the point at issue is whether the religions have a common goal to reach and whether they alike lead or can lead to much the same goal, which is just union with the Deity. This is a problem which no intellectual analysis of the religions can solve. No comparative study of religion can straighten it out either. We can hope to settle it only if we take to spiritual experiments with the different religions. But this presupposes a colossal spiritual capacity which every one of us obviously lacks. Fortunately, however, during the last half of the nineteenth century Ramakrishna in India undertook such experiments in the interests of humanity. He demonstrated by his life and experiences that every religion is true and that every religion can lead one to the realization of God, provided one is God-intoxicated. Those who posit a value higher than the Deity and realization of Him only seek to discredit these religions, the avowed object of which is the supreme Being or God. If we, however, continue to believe in God and regard union with Him as the ultimate end of human life, all the religions stand on firm ground. To be sure, the religions are greatly reinforced by Ramakrishna's spiritual experiences and by his teachings.

3. *Vide my Sri Aurobindo and the Future of Mankind*.

The Subjective and the Objective

BY

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The distinction between the subjective and the objective aspects of experience and a recognition of their close interrelationship are among the commonplaces of philosophical thinking, although it is true that in the earliest stages of human thought this distinction, like many others, was not present. It was when thought became self-conscious, when the complexity and many-sidedness of experience threw up puzzles, that men abandoned the natural and naive confidence in the simplicity of nature and experience, and the consequent natural validity of thought. But there is no doubt that for a long time now the distinction has been recognized and accepted. It has also been generally accepted that as the subjective and the objective are two aspects of experience they are closely interrelated. There is however reason to believe that neither in philosophy nor in other studies is there a sufficient appreciation of this close relationship, nor a correct idea of the precise nature of this inter-relationship. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the nature of this inter-relationship and reveal its complexity.

But, in the first place, it may be pointed out that even the apparently accepted recognition that the subjective and the objective are two aspects of experience is not taken as seriously as it should be, and there is a bias in favour of the one or the other as the more real and the more important aspect. To an extent indeed it is inevitable that one or the other aspect of the situation should be emphasized at any particular time, for the human mind can only attend to aspects one after another. Nevertheless, there must be present the consciousness, at least among philosophers, who profess deliberately to think about things, that one is attending to an aspect only, and that the other aspect is equally important. The position at which I myself have at the moment arrived as a result of reflection over experience (and that is what philosophical reasoning means) is that these two aspects of experience are so curiously inter-related that each is the goal and the meaning of the other; that each both corresponds to and interacts on

the other, and yet they *are* also *different* and in a way even somewhat *opposed*. Any attempt to prefer one over the other from the point of view of worth or reality is futile and misconceived. I feel that this position is not generally accepted, and that this non-acceptance has led to a number of mistakes, exaggerations and omissions. I realize also that *prima facie* experience does not seem to support the view I have suggested, and that even when one realizes its truth it seems to give only a rather vague kind of guidance in practice.

An illustration will make my meaning and the complexity of the situation clear. Take a normal human being in the normal context of social life and activities. His life, as it appears to him and is felt and known by him, may be called the subjective aspect of his existence; as perceived and observed by others, it has its objective aspect. The questions for us to consider are: (i) Which of these two, if either, is the more real and important? (ii) What is their inter-relationship? Is a person what he feels and believes himself to be, or is he what others consider him to be? Let us keep aside cases of deception or dishonesty and unscrupulousness on either side — of self-delusion often due to vanity and likes and dislikes on the subjective side, and of reasons of practical interest on the objective side — although in almost all cases these factors do affect to a lesser or greater extent what we may call a man's subjective and objective existence. One curious thing is that there is always at least what one may call a time-lag between the two aspects. What you think me to be at the moment is what I have been so far, not what I am at the moment. If I have deteriorated or progressed you do not yet know it, although I may. Without wishing to deceive you, I cannot help doing so, for not until this deterioration or progress takes a concrete form will you be in a position to observe it. But this is not so serious after all, for you may and often do catch me up. But will my behaviour correctly represent my state, even my state of an earlier moment? May I not sometimes fail to do justice to myself (in illness, exhaustion or temper), and equally well hit the target even when like Winkle I did not even know that I was aiming at anything? When one moves amongst friends and acquaintances one cannot help feeling that the objective aspect of one's life is often not in consonance with one's subjective aspect. One feels powerless and ignorant when persons appear honestly to look up to one, and feels wise and strong when one appears to others to be in difficulties! One lives on one's reputation amongst one's friends and acquaintances, but on the other hand one has the consciousness that it is often ill-deserved either as too generous or too severe.

Great moralists have therefore told us to judge a man not by what he does but by what he means to do, and Kant says that, if the good will fails to be effective because of adverse and uncontrollable circumstances, it nevertheless remains equally good. It does not matter whether or not it issues in practical action. But the question for us is a practical one: it is whether a will is good because it is *felt* to be good. And we find it difficult to say that it is. For if objective behaviour does not give a sure indication of subjective reality, will subjective experience constitute unfailing evidence of it? Do I know what I am, introspectively? There is of course a difference between persons in this respect, *i.e.*, in self-knowledge; and it is true that some persons do understand themselves better than others; but this knowledge is often based on objective factors and is due to one's making a special effort to *see oneself as others see one*. Omitting that, and limiting ourselves to mere subjective experience — do we really have any clear idea of what we are? One appears to oneself to be a curious bundle of desires and aversions, insights and stupidities, potentialities and incapacities and vague aspirations, a creature whom a merciful God may be able to help, but no one else can or will!

But apart from this, supposing even that one introspectively experienced (*believed that one experienced*) oneself to be clever, or charitable or otherwise, would that mean that one is necessarily right? Obviously not, because one may deceive oneself. How then shall we distinguish between this illusory or deceptive subjective experience and the real one? Is there any other possible way of doing it except by saying, as Kant would say about the real dollars as distinguished from imaginary dollars, that the real one works in practice, produces results, and enables one in the above instances to *perform* clever actions or show charity? Can we at all understand charitableness or cleverness without necessarily associating it with generous or clever action? Is not the subjective itself thus only the potentially objective (just as we can equally well see the objective to be only the expressed subjective)?

The precise significance of what we have been saying so far perhaps will be better appreciated if we consider the philosophical view that subjective experience, say mystical experience, is the final test, criterion and evidence of reality. Without going into the details, one may say that according to this view the subjective experience of the true mystic has an independent and self-sufficient reality and significance, and is superior to any other measure of reality such as that afforded by consistency or correspondence. There are of course differences of opinion about the way in which

the mystic is supposed to be related to the rest of life. The true mystic is not, we are told, 'out of touch with facts', only he takes them so well into his heart that they lose their externality. If this means that the mystic state *has* reference to objective reality but has it more intimately than other states of subjective experience, then our thesis given above, namely, that the subjective has no meaning or reality apart from the objective, remains untouched. Personally I think that that is what is really meant by the upholders of mysticism. Like the Kantian man of good will the mystic may not actually realize his relation with the objective world, he will not be less of a mystic if he does not; but his state must *mean*, in order to be *genuine*, such a relation. I do not know however if this interpretation of the mystic experience will be generally acceptable. To those who reject it, my question would be not the one which they can easily answer, namely the status of the objective, but rather the reality of the subjective. For reasons which are indicated earlier in the case of cleverness, or charitableness, what is a mystic state apart from its content and relation to reality? It can be little more than a word!

Readers will remember the somewhat similar controversy regarding the *sthitaprajña*, the perfect wise man who perhaps corresponds, on the intellectual side, to the mystic on the affective side. The important point is not whether a *sthitaprajña* *should* or *should not* engage in activities of social utility but as to what he *does*, or, even better, *is*. And it will be found that in order to be a *sthitaprajña*, i.e., to have wisdom, one must necessarily be related in a proper and balanced way to the whole of the real. To know that the world is an appearance is yet to know and be connected with reality. Whether that relation results in actual activities is a secondary matter, but the knowledge or the subjective experience itself is not constituted except by implying relationship to the objective reality.

We have so far tried to show that subjective reality depends for its existence and meaning on the objective. The same can be shown to be true from the other side about the objective. Certainly so far as human reality or experience is concerned the objective divorced from the subjective is not itself. It is difficult to imagine these two aspects with regard to other reals, such as animals, plants and inorganic existence. But, if we base our conclusions on what we know in ourselves, there will be no difficulty in appreciating that the objective aspect of experience needs for its being a connexion with the subjective. The patent difficulties of all forms of ultimate realism prove this.

Let us now try to appreciate the interdependence in other ways. Curiously enough we find that the pathway to each lies through the other. If I desire to bring about any changes in my objective life, I can do it only by taking action on the subjective side, a desire which is itself the first step in the direction. On the other hand, if I desire a change in the subjective aspect, I have invariably to learn to cultivate new ways and habits of behaviour. I am not denying that within each aspect of experience there is a normal causal determination, but I do wish to point out that for all important transitions and modifications, at least those which matter in our life as progressive beings, we have usually to go for help to the other aspect. The routine activities of the body, which is the nearest sphere of objective experience, go on by bodily laws and initiative, but any important change (even bodily) which is to be achieved can only be achieved through the active co-operation of the subjective factor, or the mind, as we call it. Similarly on the subjective side, the normal laws of psychical life like those of association, etc., explain the routine, but important changes in it only come about by or through objective or environmental forces (sought by or forced on one). How do we become more wise or more virtuous or more refined, but by persistently cultivating the habits and performing wise or virtuous or refined activities? No practical man therefore ever attempts to bring about radical transformation in mental outlook except through a suitable systematic objective discipline. Our ancient thinkers laid great stress on *yama*, *niyama* or other forms of disciplined behaviour, because through them alone can one bring about that pure and concentrated state of subjective experience which leads to a state of wisdom and bliss. This is also the truth underlying the Socialists' or Communists' apparently materialistic insistence on the economic factor in life. The soul of man (the subjective side) can only be saved or can be best saved through his body and circumstances. If you wish to make men better and more useful, give them a better deal in life, and inevitably they will respond progressively on the subjective side.

So far our argument has taken us to a position where one realizes vividly the very intimate mutual dependence of the subjective and the objective aspects of experience. We have seen how each owes to the other its reality (or meaning) and progress. This is puzzling enough unless we are able to trace them back to a single underlying reality of which both may be considered to be stages. Nor perhaps can they be stages, because it is clear that they are aspects having correspondence. That the subjective and objective are aspects of experience cannot be denied, because it

is a matter of direct invariable experience in human life and is in fact the starting-point of our discussion. But it is at any rate not easy to understand how aspects which correspond can mutually interact as they clearly seem to do.

Nor is this the end of our difficulties. Not only do these two aspects correspond and interact, they also to some extent oppose each other. Perhaps the cosmic (not the physical) law of the conservation of energy requires that losses on one side should be compensated by gains on the other, and *vice versa*. At any rate it is a matter of common experience that one cannot in life have the best of both worlds. The genius and the poet, the philosopher and the saint must miss — whether they mind it or not is a different question — many objective things in their pursuit of subjective specialization. And the man of action in any field cannot often hope to have the luxury of subtle discrimination, or acute sensibility, without giving up his rôle in life. Introspective self-absorption inevitably leads to diminished objective activity, and whoever desires high objective achievement cannot afford to occupy himself too long with subjective observation and analysis of motives of action. The ideal life therefore we are told is a life of balance, a life not merely of contemplation, nor of mere activity, but combining both in a happy golden mean of contentment in harmony with objective progress. This means however that the claims of the two, being opposed, have to be moderated and harmonized into a single balanced whole.

The final position thus is that the subjective and the objective aspects of experience are at once corresponding, mutually interacting, and yet in a measure opposed. No one will succeed in dealing with them unless he realizes this complex state of affairs. Each aspect of the relation has a lesson for us if we care to learn it. The fact of correspondence suggests that, in cases where something is wrong in either aspect and does not seem amenable to direct treatment, it would be worth while to go into the other aspect and seek a cure there. Bodily and mental disorders not amenable to bodily and psychological remedies respectively thus will often be cured if we show imagination enough to switch over to the other side and attempt to set it right. The kind of mutual interaction which we have described earlier also suggests that, in the event of an apparent breakdown or deadlock on either side, the remedy would be to go to the other side and through suitable changes in that seek to cure the trouble. Not merely that, but this view of the inter-relationship also gives one a more balanced and correct outlook on things — it checks the extreme subjectivistic

tendency by reminding one that for its own existence in the long run the subjective needs the objective and has no meaning apart from it. It also checks and corrects the merely external view of things, as it tells us how mere objective existence is an abstraction and must look for support to the subjective for its being and progress. Finally, the perception of a degree of opposition or contrast between them is also necessary, because without it we should have returned to that naive point of view which in our earliest history led mankind to constant confusion and mistakes. It tells us that nothing can be had without its price and without the necessary discipline and effort, and that the belief in miracles of any kind is due to one's ignorance and weakness. There are no short cuts anywhere, in the spiritual any more than in the natural life.

Theoretically the complex practical relationship of these two aspects clearly suggests a basic identity of some kind. None of the usual accounts of that identity, (i) the Spinozistic one of mere identity of substance, nor (ii) the idealistic one of treating the subjective as more real, nor (iii) the materialistic one of treating the objective as more real, seem satisfactory. The metaphysical position which best brings out the peculiar inter-relationship is the one which treats the relation as one of reality to appearance, provided however that the common associations of the words with reality and unreality are given up. Reality is appearance and there is no reality apart from appearance, just as there is no form apart from matter. Once this is clearly understood, it will not much matter which of the two aspects one calls the real, and which appearance. From the subjective view-point the subjective is the real, and the objective is its appearing manifestation, from the objective standpoint, the objective is the real, and the subjective is the way it appears to the subject. Unlike two mere aspects, reality and appearance could mutually interact, because they are the same stuff; and yet they could have a certain measure of difference; and could also in a sense correspond because, although *distributively* the contents are identical, *collectively* they are different. I do not know if the description of this inter-relationship and identity as like the one between appearance and reality or form and matter can be considered altogether satisfactory; for it is in a sense vague, and it may be argued that, since we know little enough about the precise relationship of appearance and reality or form and matter, the comparison does not materially help us, does not at any rate give enough concrete knowledge or guidance. But I do not think that in these ultimate and universal matters we are right in expecting anything more than a general guidance. The situation is so complex, the matters dealt with are

so many and so all-pervasive, that precision and simplicity could only be secured at the cost of truth. Nevertheless, in two ways one clearly could benefit from the kind of general knowledge vouchsafed: negatively by knowing what extremes to avoid (and quite a few errors theoretical and practical are due to onesidedness and extremism); but secondly, and constructively, as in the case of all profound and general truths, it is of sufficient use in any particular situation. The adage, 'One step enough for me', is a very wise one, and if we find our knowledge is enough to deal with what we face at any particular moment we may trust it to do so again when there is need. In fact, the very complexity of the situation makes it impossible to make a general or universal statement, and the absence of it need not be too much deplored.

The Conception of Creation in Islamic Mysticism

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The world presented to us in experience consists of a plurality of things acting and reacting on one another according to uniform laws, co-operating in the production of definite results and reflected and reproduced in the consciousness of finite minds. Hence the deepest and the most fundamental problem of philosophy is that of the origin of the world of matter and mind. How did the world with its system of nebulae, suns, stars, planets and innumerable forms of living organisms and finite minds come into being? Whence did the multiplicity of things arise? How did they come together and produce through their interaction a single unitary system? These are the problems of cosmogony — the enquiry into the origin or genesis of the world. Let us consider the various hypotheses that have been suggested by the Muslim thinkers in answer to the cosmogonical problem:—

1. According to the *Ijadiyyahs* (the Creationists or the Transcendentalists) there was a time when the world was not. God created it out of nothing at a particular point of time. The simple belief of all Muslims is that God is One, He exists by His own holy Essence. He brought out all things from nothingness. All things are dependent on Him for their existence. He is not dependent on anything. He is unique in His Essence and in His attributes and in His works. Nobody takes part in His actions. His Essence and His knowledge are not like our essence and knowledge. Creating is His special attribute, for nobody can create a thing out of nothing. He is not contained in anything, nor does anything contain Him. He surrounds everything by His Essence and is near everything and with everything; but His proximity and propinquity are not understood by us. This is the philosophical aspect of the Ash'arite School also.

According to the Creationists the being of the world, though created by God and dependent on Him, is other than the being of God. God at first existed without any world. This was the *acosmic phase* in His life. But since creation, there have been two realities

— God or the Absolute Reality and the world of conditioned reality. Hence this phase of Divine life may be called the *dualistic* phase.

In opposition to the Ijadiyyahs are the Sūfis of Islam, who believe in Monism or the Unity of Existence. According to them there is nothing in being except God. God is all that is. He is the only reality, and all finite beings have no substantial reality of their own. He is One and all, the all-comprehensive, eternal, absolute, self-existing Being, and the independent existence of finite beings is only an appearance — appearance without genuine reality.

In the fuller working out of this basic conception there arose a difference between the two Schools of Sūfis — *Wahdat-i-Wajūd* (Unityism) and *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd* (Apparentism). An attempt is here made to give a succinct account of the teachings of these schools and show how they can be ultimately reconciled.

2. *Wahdat-i-Wajūd* (Unityism): The founder of this School is Shāykh Muhyid—Dīn Mahammad Ibn 'Alī, commonly known as Ibnul 'Arabi (or Ibn 'Arabi, particularly in the East) and Ash-Shāykhūl Akbar (*Doctor Maximus*) (560-638 A.H.).

Ibn 'Arabi maintains that Being is one — it is that which exists by itself and is conceived by itself. This Being is God. God is further believed to be the Absolute Knower. As the Qūr'an says: 'He knows everything.' In knowing Himself God knows all things in Himself and distinguishes them from Himself as objects of His knowledge. That is to say, 'knowing' implies 'knowledge' and the 'object known'. God knows His own thoughts, these being the objects of His knowledge. Now if God's knowledge is perfect (which *ex hypothesi* it is) His ideas or thoughts (objects of thought) are also perfect in every way. But God has knowledge, is a Knower, from eternity. Therefore His ideas are also eternal: they are uncreated. Knowledge is an attribute of God and cannot, therefore, be separated from Him. It constitutes the very essence of God. As God is eternal or uncreated, His knowledge (or ideas) is also uncreated or eternal. The difference, of course, does not impair the essential unity of knowledge, knower and known, but is none the less inherent in the nature of things, i.e., in reality as manifested to us. 'Triplicity', as Ibn 'Arabi says, 'is the foundation of becoming.'

Ibn 'Arabi calls the ideas of God *al a'yān al thābita*. He maintains that God reveals Himself to Himself in a state of self-consciousness (not at any point of time), and sees in Himself for Himself

an infinity of ideas or *a'yān* as determinate 'forms' of His Essence. And these 'forms' are what Ibn 'Arabi calls the *a'yān al thābita*. They are merely the 'ideas' in the mind of God. As ideas they cannot have any existence apart from the mind of God, just as our ideas cannot exist apart from our mind. As ideas or 'forms' in the mind of God the *a'yān al thābita* possesses limitation or determination or individualization. They subsist in the mind of the Knower (or God) and do not possess their own independent existence. They possess no positive attributes, e.g., life, knowledge, will, etc., though they possess the capacity of acquiring those attributes if given. They are passive, having no existence or existential attributes; they possess no activity of their own. On the other hand, God, the Knower, is free from every limitation or determination — has no 'form'. He exists in Himself, depending on nothing else but Himself, and possesses positive attributes and is active. It is because of this difference between ideas or the known and God or the Knower that a relation of otherness is posited between them, though as latent stages in the Essence of God, in the state of *Wahdat* or the first epiphany or particularization, they are one with God.

When God intends the creation of things, His Command is 'Be', and it is. Now it is clear that the Command 'Be' is given to a thing and it is created. The question arises that, if the thing was already there (and it is in this sense only that it could become the object of the Command 'Be') is there any sense in creating a thing which already exists? And again, if the thing which is the object of Command is a non-entity, how can it become the object of Command at all?

The only way out of this difficulty, says Ibn 'Arabi, is to maintain that the object of God's Command is the idea or *'ayn thābita*, which subsists in the Mind of God from all eternity. This intelligible idea in the Mind of God is manifested externally by the creative *fiat* of God, which is expressed by the word 'Be'. Thus, the *a'yān al thābita* must be taken as the essence of things, which when manifested are called 'external objects' or 'created things' or merely the 'many things' of the world.

But this does not mean that the *a'yān al thābita* themselves become concrete manifestations, for they are mere subjectivities and as such must always remain non-existent. They are ideas in the mind of God and will always subsist in His mind. As Ibn 'Arabi puts it: 'They have not smelt the smell of existence.' They never come out of the knowledge of God, leaving a blank there.

What happens is this—and this is also the Secret of Creation : God manifests His being in the forms of these *a'yan al thābita* which are to him like theatres, so that each *'ayn* perceives the other when God manifests Himself in this other, a fact which is usually described as a thing having acquired existence but which is nothing other than the manifestation or appearance of God in the form of that thing. The *'ayn al thābita* of the thing in question is non-existent (externally) and still remains in its state of latency.

3. *Wahdat-i-Shahūd* : The views of Ibn 'Arabi were not to be left unchallenged. Shaykh Ruknuddin 'Alāud-Dawlah was the person who disputed his position. He was the founder of the Shuhudiyyah School. He taught that the world was a reflection and not a manifestation or revelation of the Divine Being and that existence is separate from and external to essence.

With the Wajūdiyyah School, the external existence is the existence of God Himself. With the Shuhudiyyah, the *'adam* (non-being) is conjoined with the reflex or illumination of the *Asma'* (names) and *Sifāt* (attributes) of God.

This doctrine is clearly expounded by Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi, who is generally called the Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-thani (the Renewer of Islam or the Head of the second millennium of the Islamic Era). (d. 1035).

The Mujaddid maintains like Ibn 'Arabi that Being is One, and the independent existence of finite beings is only an appearance without genuine reality. How the world of finite things has acquired existence is explained by him in the following manner :

God is the Perfect Being comprehending all attributes of perfection in His Essence. Before the existence of the world there was this Perfect Being alone with all His perfect attributes and names. Now opposed to God's existence or *wajud* there is pure nothing or *'adam-i-mahād*, and opposed to His Life is a form of *'adam* called death, and opposed to His knowledge is a form of *'adam* called ignorance, and so on. Thus there are two sets of things : 'perfections', which are beings or *wajudat* ; and 'imperfections', which are non-beings or *'adamāt*.

When God decided to create the world He cast a reflection or shadow (*in'ikās* or *zill*) of His pure *wajud* or existence into its '*'adam-i-mutāqābila*' or 'opposed nothing', i.e., pure *'adam* or nothing, and there came to be finite existence. He cast a reflection or shadow of His life into its 'opposed nothing', death, and

there came to be finite life. In the same manner finite knowledge and power came to existence by the reflection of God's knowledge and power into the opposed nothing of ignorance and powerlessness.

Thus by the reflection or *in'ikas* of the attributes of God into its opposite non-beings there appeared realities whose 'matter' is non-being and whose 'form' is the reflection.¹ These realities are the essence of finite things.

In other words, the existence, the life, the knowledge, and the power, etc., of the finite, contingent being is the result of the mixture of *'adam* or non-being and the reflex of *wajūd* or existence, life, knowledge and power of God. The essence of the finite in itself, however, is pure *'adam* or non-being, the existence, life, knowledge, etc., which are found in it, are pure gifts of God. That is how the finite, contingent world has come into being out of nothing and has acquired actual existence.

Both Ibn 'Arabi and the Mujaddid maintain that God alone has real and actual independent being. He alone exists. Real existence belongs to God alone and God alone exists (Singularism and Unity of Existence). The being of the world is not more than appearance — appearance without real or genuine reality. And yet the appearance is not the result of our fancy or imagination, as a certain class of the Sophists maintained. It exists independently of our fancy or imagination. It is the fancy or idea of God. It is characterized by a superior vividness, regularity and coherence and is independent of the will or imagination of man.

The Mujaddid gives two illustrations to make his meaning clear. The first is this : Suppose you take a stick of wood, and put one end of it into fire so that it catches flame. Now you hold the other end of the stick and rotate it quickly round in a circle. As a result a circle of fire will appear. Suppose this appearance is somehow perpetuated and is made to exist by itself. The existence of the contingent world is just like the existence of such a circle — real to all outward appearance but having no independent existence of its own.²

The second illustration is as follows : Suppose a wizard by his magic produces the semblance of a garden. The garden bears fruit. The king who was watching the performance believed that if the wizard were to be killed instantaneously the garden would

1. *Maktubat* V. II, *Maktubi*.

2. Vol. III, Epistle 58.

continue to exist as a real and genuine garden. So he ordered the wizard to be executed at once. The story, which is of Indian origin, says that this magic garden still exists and bears fruit.³

Now the Mujaddid maintains that God alone exists in reality. There is nothing in being except God. God is all that is. The existence of the world is like the existence of the magic garden or the circle of fire produced by the quick rotation of the stick in flame. It is not real in itself. Reality has been bestowed on it, and it is a very unsubstantial kind of reality. But such is the artistry of God that He has disposed this reality in perfect order: 'The doing of Allāh who perfecteth all things.'⁴ So it has permanence, coherence and regularity. It is independent of the will or imagination of man. It is nevertheless ideal. Reality and perfection appertain to God alone, who is the only reality.

Now as *Shah Wali-ullah* has pointed out,⁵ if we leave simile and metaphor aside, this doctrine of the Mujaddid, which he calls *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd*, is essentially the same as that of *Wahdat-i-Wajūd* maintained by Ibn 'Arabi. Both agree in assigning reality to God alone. To say that the essences of the contingent beings are the names and attributes of God reflected in their '*adām-i-mutaqābilā*' or opposite non-beings, as the Mujaddid maintains, is practically the same thing. If there is any difference between the two doctrines, *Shah Wali-ullah* rightly maintains, it is so insignificant that it need not be taken into account. Ibn 'Arabi too means the same as the Mujaddid, and the controversy of *Wahdat-i-Wajūd* and *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd* is only a verbal rather than a real one. All that is intended by *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd* is to emphasize the perfection of the necessary and the imperfection or 'nothingness' of the contingent being. But Ibn 'Arabi has himself maintained that the contingent is insignificant and all perfection belongs to the necessary Being alone.

As we have seen above, according to Ibn 'Arabi contingent things are, internally, the ideas (objects known) of God. God, according to Ibn 'Arabi, being a Knower from eternity, knows His own thoughts — these being the objects of His knowledge. Now the ideas of God are what are called the essences of things (*ʿayān al ṭabīʿa* or *māhiyāt*), which when manifested or created are called contingent things of the world. Even as 'ideas', things are

not identical with the Essence of God. What constitutes the difference between God, the Knower, and the ideas of God or essences which must be termed the 'known', is exactly this: God is 'one'; His ideas are 'many'. God exists independently; ideas depend on the mind of God for their existence. The Essence of God is free from any limitation or determination; the ideas, though unlimited in number, are limited or determined in form, possessing their own peculiarities or essential nature, termed *shākilāt* in the Qūr'an. God possesses positive attributes, e.g., life, knowledge, will, power, hearing, seeing and speech; ideas, the essence of things, possess no positive attributes, that is to say they have only negative attributes of death, ignorance, powerlessness, etc.

From the above statement it is clear that the relation between God the knower and ideas the known is one of 'otherness', never of 'identity'. As the ideas are, according to Ibn 'Arabi, the essences of things, which when manifested are called contingent finite things, they may be regarded as the same as '*adām-i-mutaqābila*' of the Mujaddid into which the reflection or *in'ikas* of the attributes of God is cast and the contingent world comes into being.

Thus it is clear, as *Shah Wali-ullah* has pointed out, that the *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd* of the Mujaddid does not in any way contradict, but, on the other hand, confirms, Ibn 'Arabi's *Wahdat-i-Wajūd*. If real facts are taken into account and studied without their garb of similes and metaphors both the doctrines will appear almost the same.

This evaluation of the doctrines of *Wahdat-i-Wajūd* and *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd* is rationalistic, not based on first-hand mystic experience. As to the contention of the *Shahūdiyyah* that the mystic experience of the *Wajūdiyyah* is of a lower stage, and that it is possible to pass on to a higher and truer experience which is the experience of the *Shahūdiyyah*, it may be said on behalf of the *Wajūdiyyah* that what they (the *Wajūdiyyah*) experienced was of a higher stage and what the rival school experienced was really of a lower stage. The overwhelming majority of eminent Muslim Sūfis adhere to the doctrine of *Wahdat-i-Wajūd*. It is amply supported by the Qūr'an and by the esoteric sayings of the Prophet, and in no way contradicts the truth of Islam.

3. M., Vol. II, Ep. 44.

4. S. XXVII, Sec. 7.

5. See *Shah Wali-ullah*, in his *Tafhimat*, the entire *Maktūb*.

The Nature of Religious Experience

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The purpose of this essay is to analyse the concept of religion with a view to understanding the nature of religious experience. Such an undertaking is not new in the history of philosophical and religious thought. Discussions on the nature of religious experience have been legion. But religion is a dynamic concept. It reveals changes, and changes which are systematic and continuous. The panacea of the past is neither satisfactory nor intelligible. Each age requires a new climate of thought and insists on being spoken to in an idiom appropriate to itself, springing from the creative advance of life. Further, the personality of every individual demands critical inquiry and a revitalization of thought and life to secure a proper adjustment to the universe as a whole. Otherwise man cannot escape the suffering engendered by utter isolation. Scientific inquiry, philosophical reflection and religious experience are the different modes of adjustment to life. For the purpose of the present essay I am concerned with the third mode of adjustment to life — the religious. What exactly is the specific character or *differentia* of religious experience?

It is obvious that it is only rational beings, individuals in human society, that can be religious or irreligious. Attempts at defining the nature of religious experience have taken three forms : (1) The subjective or the psychological approach, in which the religious response is sought to be understood by an analysis of the mental experiences of religious persons — of persons who believe or act as though they believe in God or Gods. (2) The objective approach, in which religion is sought to be understood by a study of the religious practices of the different peoples of the world. (3) The third approach, which regards the subjective and the objective as the expressions of a higher spiritual process and religion as a unique mode of expression of the supreme, whatever the supreme may be. The last approach appears to be the most fruitful method of inquiry. No attempt is here made at an exhaustive criticism of the first two methods. I shall just deal with them to the extent necessary to define my position.

The psychological approach is based on the traditional analysis of consciousness into cognition, conation and feeling. Each of these aspects is emphasized as the characteristic attitude of religion, the emphasis depending upon the training or the temperament of the person examining religious experience. The most notable example is that of Schleiermacher, who found the spring of religious experience to consist in feeling. Religion, according to him is 'the feeling of absolute dependence'. A. Sabatier finds the basis of religion to lie in the conative aspect of our consciousness. Kant sees the foundation of religion in the depths of the moral consciousness which is the practical expression of the will. The metaphysicians have seen in religious activity something less than the philosophical activity, and religion at its best is sometimes thought to be identical with philosophy. It is enough to point out that even an elementary knowledge of psychology would reveal to us that consciousness is a unit and that in it all the three aspects — cognitive, conative and feeling — are inseparably blended.

Further, the merely psychological approach has resulted in regarding religion as a purely subjective response to an external world. Religion is described as merely an attitude, a way of looking at the universe as a whole. A psychological analysis of the mental experiments of religious mystics may sometimes reveal the same processes as in sex-love. In the one case the object of attention is God, and in the other a woman. These objects need not necessarily exist. They may be idealized objects as well. Similar experiences may as well be created by illusory or imagined objects. Freud describes the future of religion as 'the future of an illusion'. A psychological analysis of religious experience of individuals cannot, in the nature of the case, reveal anything about the object or objects that created the experiences. Psychology is a positive or descriptive science. Its function is to observe, experiment and formulate laws of mental behaviour. Much of speculative thinking has become futile either by the psychologist going beyond his limits or by the philosopher using the psychological analysis for wrong purposes. The function of philosophy is to interpret and evaluate the facts of human experience. While psychology lays bare the structure of religious experience, the philosophy of religion attempts to bring out the meaning, significance and value of such experiences to the individual, to the society in which he lives, and also to the Universe as a whole. The psychologist analyses religious thought into (1) a belief, doctrine or dogma; (2) the practical relation between man and the supernatural — God or Gods, and (3) the emotional attitudes of worship

and prayer. He analyses the processes of stress and strain experienced by the personality in normal religious behaviour, individual and social, and also in what is described as the supernatural mystic experiences of outstanding religious souls. In the conative life of individuals there is a sense of incompleteness, a poignant feeling of finitude, and also an irresistible impulse to achieve completeness and harmony. In religious language, this impulse is described as the hunger of the soul for union with God.

So far, I think, we are on safe ground. But it is further argued that, because there is the impulse to worship and prayer, there must actually exist a God deserving of such worship and prayer. I am not convinced of the logic of this argument. A desire, a wish, an effective want, are all states of mind and can never lead us to conclude that objects corresponding to them have actual existence. The psychological point of view in religion, though supplying the necessary material for philosophical interpretation, is inadequate and requires to be supplemented by other branches of knowledge, particularly sociology, comparative religion, epistemology and axiology. The supplementation is necessitated by the fact that the subject of religious experiences is not an isolated individual, but is in intimate association with nature, and with human life in all its numerous forms and varieties. He is a member of an enduring and systematic world from which he has sprung and to which he richly contributes. He is the subject reacting to an objective world order constituted by nature, life, mind, God or Reality. To be able to interpret the significance of religion we must have an understanding of the objective forms in which religion, individual and social, has expressed itself. Let us consider how far reflection on religious practice would help us.

One striking fact revealed by anthropology and sociology is that religion is a dynamic concept. The difficulties of defining religion are not a little due to the changing character of religious experiences and to the varied forms of their expression. While religion is a universal response of the human spirit to an objective system of things and persons, every individual and every age and every country have given it a unique expression, depending upon the level of development of body as well as of mind. Let me illustrate by a consideration of the object of religious worship. While the religious response has been constant, the object of religious worship has changed from time to time. Time was when man worshipped only stocks and stones, plants and animals. He worshipped the mysterious powers of nature, which were held in awe for their might and majesty. With the development of social

life and the quickening of man's powers of inventiveness and of critical reflection, the forces that made for social harmony took precedence. Faced with the forces of evil, natural and social, man looked up for support to a being more powerful than himself and clothed him with all the qualities that are the dream of the human heart and the aspirations of life. Also the modes of worship and prayer have considerably changed. From the crude form of prayer for food and drink, for power and pelf, the welfare of one's own family and nation, passing through the various stages, we endeavour to achieve the stage of prayer for the welfare of humanity and peace of spirit. The highly developed theistic religions of today regard God as a perfect personality. He is omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent. He is all-just and all-merciful, perfectly benevolent and good. The journey from the worship of stocks and stones to the worship of the highest ethical spirit is a long one. What right have we to believe that the journey has come to an end, and that the theistic God, be he Hindu or Christian, is the final achievement? Theistic religions have already shown themselves to be unsatisfying. They have foundered on the rock of the problem of evil. It is needless to repeat the much too common, but perfectly correct, criticism that if God has perfect knowledge and supreme power, why is there so much pain, suffering and evil in the world? That evil is God's test of man's capacity to endure and to overcome evil is no justification. Even if we admit this for the sake of argument, what a cruel test instituted by a benevolent and merciful God! This world of poison gas and atom bombs does no credit to the 'Grace' of the Divine. Further, if God is only one among a number of other persons, what becomes of his perfection? He is not the *all* of reality. My purpose here is not to criticize theism, but simply to point out that it is intellectually unsatisfactory and hence emotionally unsatisfying. The development of modern science and its application to industry, the study of comparative religion, and the study of modern psychology have been responsible for lack of faith in the ideals and practices of present-day religions. Religion has ceased to be an operative principle in our lives. But this is not a matter for regret. It is true that religion rests on faith. But faith not backed by rational thought stultifies itself. Vigorous intellectual criticism purifies and ennobles religion. The present chaotic condition of religious thought and religious practice is simply pointing to the emergence of a new religious outlook, possibly a new object of religious worship. What shall we worship in the modern world? Let me proceed to answer this question.

Our discussion, so far, has led us to believe that our conceptions of man and of God have been changing from time to time. Theories of religion based on the study of subjective expressions of the individual, or of the objective nature of God, are bound to fail, because the subject and the object cannot be studied in abstraction, when our purpose is to understand the experience that is foundational to religion. Both man and God are constitutive of religious experience. In order to realize the full significance or value of religion we must not ask, What is the nature of man?, What is the nature of God? How are they related?, as though man and God were independent of each other. On the other hand, we must ask, What is the nature of the experience described as religious and of unique value?, What are the elements that constitute such an experience?, What is the specific nature of these elements? Every experience is bipolar, and religious experience is no exception. Both man and God are distinguishable, but inseparable, aspects of experience which is unique, concrete and significant. It is for this reason that *a priori* conceptions of God expounded with great logical acumen and philosophical learning fail to satisfy the modern mind.

There have been in recent years very fruitful attempts at understanding the notion of the object of religious experience in the light of the notion of value. Value is an emergent experience springing from the interaction of subject and object, in which the subject is aware of the object and aware also of the worth of the experience. Every value has a forward-looking attitude and has the potency to create more value. It is the light that springs from the interplay of human interests, and these human interests are not self-created, but created out of the object. The value that is thus created is absorbed in the stream of life and becomes the basis for the emergence of fresh values. It is in and through conflict and co-operation, interaction and integration of individuals that the spirit expresses itself, creating and advancing the richness of our value-experiences in quantity and quality, in worth and dignity. The fundamental urges of human nature to know things and to understand the root of things, to appreciate and to delight in the perception of harmony, and the most fundamental urge 'to promote harmony, in the collective life of humanity', lead to what are generally described as the supreme values of life — Truth, Beauty and Goodness. There is no doubt that these fundamental values of life, which constitute the very substance of human experience, bring out the concreteness of the life of man in the Universe. But these values account for the philosophic (including the scientific), the aesthetic and the ethical aspects of life. The natural and the

biological may be regarded as only preparatory but still indispensable stages in the creative advance of the spirit. The pursuit of the supreme values invests our life with freedom and power, wealth and well-being, and joy in life. The above description appears to be pleasing. But is there any room left for religion? Most certainly there is.

The world of values is rooted in reality. The rich potentialities of the human spirit are not exhausted merely by the pursuit of any one of the intrinsic values. The experience of Truth in its forward-looking attitude is seeking a consummation in something, which is the substance of Goodness and Beauty as well. The value of a life of action pure and undefiled, devoted to the service of universal harmony, finds a realization in spirit which is also the realization of Truth and Beauty. Even so is the life of Beauty. The value of experience that may be described as Joy, Bliss, or *Ananda* is the aesthetic delight born of a steady realization of the joy of harmony. Thoughts like these drive us to the recognition of the concept of 'peace of spirit', as a value which the individual finds in himself as the supreme goal of all the human endeavour. It is here that we find the differentia of religious experience. *Religious experience emerges whenever we realize within ourselves the harmony of the intrinsic values of life.* It is a unique experience, born of the urge to the creation and experience of value. It is the irresistible urge to expression and the confidence that such a realization of value is possible, born of the values so far realized, that constitute religious faith. Such a faith needs no external authority of a transcendent God like that of theism. It is such a faith, faith in the possibility of creation and construction of values, that is bound to become a force in the society of the future. There is no reason why such a faith should not give a solid ground for hope in life and evoke the sincerest form of worship and prayer.

To conclude: Religion is neither subjective nor objective. It is not to be identified with any one of the intrinsic values — Truth, Beauty, or Goodness. It is a unique value-experience, more comprehensive and giving each of them a richer meaning or significance.

Is Spinoza an Acosmist?

BY

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That Spinoza is an acosmist, nay, even an atheist, was the considered opinion of many of his contemporaries, including Leibnitz himself. Since Novalis reported him as a 'God-intoxicated man' the charge of atheism is no longer so vigorously pressed against him, though he is not, and he cannot be, regarded a 'theist' in the technical meaning of that term. But the observation of Hegel, who compared Spinoza's substance to a lion's den with all steps leading to it, but none coming from it, has in no small measure influenced Spinoza's critics, with the result that to an average Westerner Spinoza is an acosmist. This small essay seeks to reopen this issue and to suggest an answer to the intricate question: Is Spinoza an acosmist?

An acosmist is one who does not believe in the real 'being' of the ~~cosmos~~. The empirical order with all its phenomenal contents, ~~things~~ as well as beings, is supposed to constitute the 'cosmos'. Now if a cosmos is to be distinguished from a chaos, something more than the phenomenal pluralities, some element of orderliness among them, will have to be admitted. A cosmos as distinguished from a chaos is an 'ordered whole' in which the parts do not clash, but fit in with one another, and together contribute to the life of the whole. The issue which is to be decided at the very outset is: Is the empirical order of reality with which we claim acquaintance at all conceived as a cosmos in this sense? Can it not be that our description of the world with all its contents as a cosmos is really figurative? *Prima facie*, the visible world seems not to be a cosmos at all. Though it would be too much to say that it is an unmitigated chaos, still all that we can say about it is what James had proposed, namely, that it is a cosmos in the making. If, however, we feel impatient at that moderate suggestion, and start with the *a priori* belief that it is a full-fledged cosmos, we will have to explain at first what exactly we mean when we call the world a cosmos, before deciding the point whether

Spinoza can be called an acosmist in the accepted meaning of that word.

What do we mean by the word 'cosmos', then? If by it we mean an ordered whole in which the empirical pluralities are harmoniously united, such an idea cannot be empirically or inductively acquired. In other words, the idea will have to be admitted as an *a priori* belief. In empirical generalization or induction we proceed from the parts to the whole. If the idea of the ordered whole we call the cosmos, or the universe, is to be empirically acquired through a scrutiny of the particulars or the parts, our task is sure to remain incomplete, even if the attempt to do so does not prove wholly abortive. Now, in an order or system, the idea of which is only *a priori* possible, it is the whole that unites the parts, vitalizes them, and makes them what they are. In other words, the parts will have to be necessarily regarded as organic to the whole, living in and through the whole, and becoming meaningful only through their reference to the whole. The question as to whether the whole is not equally dependent on its parts is irrelevant; for, even if that be true, it cannot alter the fact that the parts are necessarily so. If then the world is to be understood as the cosmos and its reality is to be admitted so as to escape the charge of acosmism, all that one is called upon to prove is that in the world pluralities exist, *not as isolated facts*, but only so far as they are related to their whole or unifying principle of which they are 'aspects' or 'moments' or 'members'. Leibniz claimed that he was a believer in the cosmos, though such a cosmos consisted in an order called the pre-established harmony, in which the plural particulars were but varied expressions of one and the same real order. Hegel also advanced similar claims, though in his system the parts are only 'moments' in the life of the whole. Let us now consider if Spinoza can be regarded an acosmist, when that charge cannot be substantiated against either Hegel or Leibniz.

Spinoza's system, it is well known, has three fundamental or basic notions from which all others follow necessarily like deductions in geometry. These fundamental notions are those of substance, attribute and mode. Spinoza conceives substance in three different ways. Firstly, substance is the pure being existing in itself and capable of being conceived by itself. The implication is that an absolute existence is not only an existence through itself but it must also be capable of being conceived by itself. If it cannot be conceived by itself but only by means of, or in relation to, something else, it cannot be held to be an absolute existence, that is,

an existence by itself and through itself alone. Conversely, if it exists in itself it can be conceived only by itself and not by means of anything external to itself. In other words, the mode of conceiving must adhere to the mode of being, and the mode of being must be in harmony with the mode of conceiving. The *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi* cannot be separated one from the other. Secondly, substance is the ultimate cause of everything that there is. This causal nature is not, however, extrinsic to it. It is not the fact that substance *at first* only existed in itself, and *subsequently* became the cause of everything phenomenal and temporary. Spinoza conceives of God as the eternal cause of all that is phenomenal or temporary. This is the conception of substance as *natura naturans*. Thirdly, substance is conceived as being identical with everything that exists. It is thus not only the cause of all, but, as Schwegler so beautifully puts it, it is itself everything. This conception of God as identical with the phenomenal pluralities is technically expressed by saying that God is *natura naturata*.

This threefold conception of substance—substance as the absolute one, substance as the eternal cause of all, and substance as itself everything, coupled with Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes and the modes, has given rise to certain grave difficulties, both theoretical and practical. It has been asked: If substance is to be conceived by itself and as existing in itself, how should we take our conceptions of it as the cause of all and as itself everything that is? In other words, how to reconcile these three different views of God—of God as the absolute one, of God as the cause of all, and of God as Himself everything? Of these three conceptions, the first one is the definition of substance with which the *Ethics* of Spinoza begins. The other two conceptions result from our taking the substance in the light of the doctrines of the attributes and the modes. The definitions of attributes and modes, though coming after the definition of substance, cannot, however, be regarded as less fundamental to the philosophical system of Spinoza. Without them Spinoza could not have elaborated even his doctrine of substance, and could not have built a system of philosophy. His doctrine of attributes and modes should, therefore, be understood as complementary to the doctrine of substance. In fact, his doctrine of attributes occupies the pivotal position in his system. It is the Gordian knot which must be cut in order to ascertain what philosophy Spinoza actually professed.

But the doctrine of the attributes which is to furnish the clue to the mystery of the relation of God to the finite world is itself ambiguous and baffling—that is the general complaint. It admits of,

we have been told, at least two different interpretations, formalistic and realistic, and it is not easy to decide which of the two faithfully represents what Spinoza himself had intended. According to Schwegler, his doctrine of attributes is the Achilles' heel of the Spinozistic philosophy. Spinoza defines an attribute by saying that it is what reason or the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. The formalistic interpreters at the instance of Dr Erdmann put emphasis on the first half of the definition and understand by an attribute that essence which the human understanding ascribes to substance, irrespective of the consideration as to whether substance really bears such an essence or not. The attribute thus, instead of being understood as an objective essence, comes to be taken for our subjective mode of conceiving the substance necessarily under that particular form. Two other issues, auxiliary to the doctrine of attributes, namely, that there is an infinite number of such attributes and that each attribute is in its own way infinite, are then sought to be reconciled to the formalistic version of the main doctrine. It is argued that an attribute being the 'form' under which the infinite is to be conceived by the human intellect has to be necessarily understood as infinite 'in its own way'. That is, as a representation of the infinite the attribute, though subjective, has to be taken as infinite. Again, since the substance is infinite, there should be an infinite number of 'ways' in which it can be conceived. The suggestion of a definite number of attributes in respect of the infinite substance is inadmissible, firstly because it would amount to limitation and so negation of the substance, and secondly because an infinite must be capable of being conceived in an infinite number of ways. This formalistic version, according to which an attribute is only a subjective ascription of qualities to the 'quality-less' substance, derives additional impetus from the Spinozistic dictum that all determination is negation — *omnis determinatio est negatio*. All determinations being negations, substance, it is held, can only be negatively described, and the attributes though infinite in number will have to be admitted as merely subjective, the infinite substance remaining indifferent to such subjective ascriptions. Lastly, the very definition of substance with which the *Ethics* begins seems to lend support to this formalistic interpretation. If substance is that which exists in itself and is capable of being conceived by itself, our conception of it in terms of infinite attributes must necessarily be regarded as merely subjective and ideal. If we adhere to this version, the charge of acosmism becomes inescapable. Only God or substance can be admitted as existing, transcendent of all determinations and all relations. The world with its multiplicities cannot be taken as

a real emanation or manifestation of God but only as an illusory appearance. Of the three conceptions of substance — substance as the absolute one, as the first cause of all that there exists, and as identical with everything that exists, only the first one can be held to be *metaphysically* true; the other two will have to be admitted as but epistemological determinations. Herein we have a view similar to that of Sankara Vedanta, but unsupported by the doctrine of *māyā* or cosmic nescience which constitutes both the metaphysical and the logical defence of the latter theory.

But the formalistic interpretation, besides involving certain grave logical difficulties, seems to misrepresent Spinoza. To be sure, Spinoza is a pantheist, believing in the complete immanence of God. That being so, the phenomenal pluralities will have to be conceived as manifestations of God, and cannot be repudiated as mere illusory appearances. If, again, God is to be the only reality, the only fact in existence, the attributes must necessarily belong to God and cannot be taken as mere subjective conceptions, for no subject can be there besides God and outside of Him to ascribe such attributes to God. The formalistic interpretation thus commits itself to a duality of substance and the human subject, which latter is held responsible for imagining certain attributes in the substance which are really not there. In its anxiety to defend the absoluteness of God, it ushers in some form of transcendentalism contrary to the pantheistic inclination of Spinoza himself. Moreover, by repudiating all subjective notions of substance as fanciful, it reduces Spinozism to agnosticism and irrationalism. For, substance in being indifferent to all rational considerations of itself must be regarded as unknown and unknowable, though Spinoza says that it is in itself and is conceived by itself. Lastly, though Spinoza himself seems not to adhere to the idealistic cleavage between thought and reality, between the thing as it is and as it is conceived, the formalistic version of attributes opens a chasm between substance as it is in itself and as we conceive it to be.

The root of all these troubles seems to lie in the Spinozistic dictum: All determination is negation. Spinoza was reluctant to admit any positive characterization of substance. All statements regarding substance should be, according to him, negative. Thus the statement that substance is one, is infinite, absolute, eternal and free should be understood to mean that it is *not* a many, is *not* finite, relative, temporal or bound. But is not such negative description as much a thought-determination as the positive descriptions are alleged to be? It does not seem probable that Spinoza, being both a rationalist and a realist, should be sceptical

of the capacity of reason to understand reality. In his philosophy the idea and the ideatum are but parallel expressions of the self-same core. Interaction or direct causation between the psychical and the physical series of events he evidently denies, but nowhere does Spinoza support any cleavage between thought and the thing thought of. Thus it seems to be the view of Spinoza that what understanding conceives about substance is not peculiar to itself; what understanding conceives *idealiter* is what is existent *realiter*.

The dictum 'all determination is negation' must not therefore be understood to mean that thinking is conditioning, and so there can be no thinking consideration of that which is 'unconditioned and absolute. The real implication seems to be that we must think of substance in terms of itself alone and not in terms of any genus or differentia, there being nothing outside or beside substance. But is not the conception of God as having infinite attributes, as the cause of all, and as identical with everything that exists, a determination in terms of something else? We fail to grasp how this can be necessarily so. Reason while conceiving substance necessarily conceives it as invested with attributes, since the attributes *are really there* and constitute the essence of substance. In being conceived in terms of its attributes, substance is really conceived in terms of itself, since the attributes are not different from it. Similarly, when conceiving substance as the cause of all phenomenal multiplicities, we conceive it in terms of itself alone, since, as the third conception of God suggests, the phenomenal multiplicities are not different from substance but are modifications of it. In a relation of causation conceived as emanation, the cause and the effect are not materially different. The phenomenal multiplicities, which are the effects of God, are as waves are to the sea; the difference is that the sea requires the aid of the winds to break into waves, but Spinoza's God does not stand in need of any extraneous help.

Spinoza's God is like an all-enveloping sea which is *one* in its all pervasiveness, is the *cause* of its waves in so far as the sea is the generating cause of its own manifestations in the shape of waves, and so, again, the *totality of its waves* in so far as the sea breaks itself into waves. In this way, we can reconcile the three-fold conception of Spinozistic substance as the absolute one, as the cause of all, and as itself everything. The most vital point of difference between Advaita Vedanta and Spinozism seems to consist in this, that while on the Advaita theory the phenomenal multiplicities are *pratibhāsa* of Brahman, *mere appearances* of the absolute, these are *real manifestations* of substance according to

Spinoza. Thus the charge of acosmism seems to be extremely unfair so far as Spinoza is concerned. All that he repudiates is that the pluralities or parts can be taken in themselves or understood in themselves. But the word 'cosmos', as it has been examined already, does not stand for an accidental or mechanical combination of parts or pluralities. In a cosmos, the parts live through their whole, their unifying principle. Spinoza also says that illusory knowledge consists in taking the world-multiplicities by themselves, and that the highest knowledge consists in taking everything in relation to God, as expressions of the Divine Nature — *sub specie aeternitatis*.

Affectivity and Recall

BY

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The repression theory of forgetting sets out to explain the fact that it is more difficult to recall an unpleasant memory than a pleasant one, other things being equal. Now it may easily be conceded that in the diverse psychoanalytical studies of individual cases, the other things are *not* equal, and no attempt is made by the analysts themselves to equalize them. So the repression theory, if true, would be a lucky though quite brilliant guess.

The present study does not touch the repression theory at all, for the repression theory explains the deep-lying mechanism of remembering and forgetting, while the present study is entirely concerned with the surface facts. Here again there is not the slightest intention of challenging the statement that it is more difficult to recall an unpleasant memory than a pleasant one, for *prima facie* there seems to be a presumption in its favour. However, it was felt that it was worth while seeking to ascertain the facts of the matter and to know how recall is affected by the hedonic tone, when other things are equal, to a much greater extent than is the case in the usual psychoanalytical studies. The following reports an experimental attempt to make the other things as nearly equal as possible and to see how later reproductions are influenced by the affective reactions to earlier impressions. However, no claim is made that in the following experiment all the other variables have been held rigidly constant and only affectivity has been varied. The object of the paper is to see whether a more precise and quantitative formulation of the facts of common observation regarding the recall of the pleasant and unpleasant experiences is possible, when the material is of a more determinate character.

The procedure followed in the present investigation into the correlation between the degree of pleasantness and subsequent recall may not find favour with the psychoanalysts. According to them — and it may be true for all I know — ‘the hedonic tone’ of a given idea (or impression) is by no means necessarily the same in the conscious and the unconscious layers of the mind. In this study no attempt is made to record feeling reactions that are

inaccessible to conscious introspection. This study confines itself to the area of conscious functions only.

The experiment was conducted as a group experiment in a post-graduate class of one hundred students. The subjects were asked to rate twenty pairs of words (a noun with an adjective) on a five-point scale of affective value. The points on the scale with their numerical values were: Distinctly Pleasant (2), Rather Pleasant (1), Average (0), Rather Unpleasant (-1), and Distinctly Unpleasant (-2). Of these twenty pairs, ten basic nouns were the words most frequently judged as pleasant and ten most frequently judged as unpleasant from Lanier's study of 'Affective Conflict'. To each of these nouns suitable adjectives calculated to evoke avoidance and approach responses were prefixed. The following instructions were read out twice, and those who did not follow them completely were encouraged to ask about their difficulties. Every attempt was made to see that everybody understood his task.

Instructions:—'This is an experiment in feeling reactions to different groups of words. The aim of the experiment is to study the feeling tone produced by some combinations of words. I will call out a group of words, and you are to record at once the pleasantness or unpleasantness produced by it. You are to judge the pleasantness or unpleasantness of each combination of words on a five-point scale by making a mark in the appropriate column. Use the column 'Average' when the words seem to arouse both pleasant and unpleasant feelings. Also use the same column 'Average' when neither pleasant nor unpleasant states are aroused. Record your judgement as soon as it is made, on the slip of paper providedReady.....'

Through the experimenter's instructions, it was hoped to equalize and control the factor of attention. By requiring the subjects to record, at once, the pleasantness or unpleasantness produced by a group of words, it was thought that initial registering of each impression would be ensured. By selecting a fairly advanced group of post-graduate students an attempt was made to control the dimension of meaningfulness of words. All the groups of words were certainly within the comprehension of university students of post-graduate status. However, I quite concede that the combinations of words might have varied along dimensions other than affectivity, like impressiveness, subjective associations, etc.

The time-interval between the calling out of a pair of words and the subsequent pair was of ten seconds, within which interval

the subjects were to record their feeling reactions to the groups of words. In this manner the entire series of twenty pairs of words was administered to the whole class.

After a filled interval of exactly half an hour a recall test was given with the following *instructions*:—

'I read out to you certain groups of words. I want to see how well you can remember them now. If you can remember in just the words I read, use those words; but if you cannot do that, tell in your own words, as well as you can, the combinations of words you heard.'

After exactly a week's interval a second reproduction was demanded with identical instructions.

Data and treatment of data:—Of the one hundred students who took part in the experiment only eighty-four gave their feeling reactions to all the stimulus material of twenty groups of words. For subsequent scoring only these eighty-four cases were considered. The frequencies of affective reactions of different intensities as measured by scale values (2, 1, 0, -1, -2) were counted.

TABLE I
(showing frequencies of different affective reactions)

Distinctly pleasant	Rather pleasant	Average	Rather unpleasant	Distinctly unpleasant	Total
(2)	(1)	(0)	(-1)	(-2)	
392	298	208	278	504	1680
23.3%	17.7%	12.1%	16.5%	30.8%	100%

It is interesting to note that when there was an equal number of words most frequently judged as pleasant and unpleasant (in Lanier's Study) there was a greater proportion of distinctly unpleasant reactions in this fairly advanced group of post-graduate students. Again, when the words were most definitely judged as either pleasant or unpleasant, in the present study, as many as 12.1% of the total reactions were average (i.e., either they produced neither pleasant nor unpleasant feelings or they produced both). This shows clearly that there is no such thing as the words in themselves being pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. These words, viz.,

'pleasant' and 'unpleasant', refer to the subjective feelings which vary independently of the stimulus identity.

To evaluate the subsequent reproduction the following procedure of scoring was adopted. In the first place, the frequencies of reproductions instigated by the corresponding affective reactions were counted. Secondly, the proportion of the instigated reproductions to their corresponding affective reactions was calculated. This proportion as measured by the per cent reproduced gives a rough indication of the influence of affectivity on subsequent recall. This may only suggest the tendency of differently toned words for being reproduced on a later occasion. A certain feeling reaction may arouse a subsequent attempt at recall, but that does not tell us anything as to whether the feeling reaction effectively determines the accuracy of the reproduction. For this purpose the various reproductions had to be scored for accuracy. The method of scoring was as follows:—The number of words correctly reproduced and the number of ideas correctly reproduced were separately counted. To assess the number of correct ideas expressed in different words in general, the Oxford Dictionary equivalents were accepted. By putting these separate scores together a composite score of correct words and correct ideas was computed. This composite score is the measure of the accuracy of recall. The idea was to give equal weight to the verbal and meaningful character of the memory response. The total number of words was also counted, to give an indication of the extent to which new words and ideas were brought in the reproductions. The results of the first reproduction (after a filled interval of half an hour) and the second reproduction (after a week) are given together in order to facilitate comparison:—

TABLE II

(showing the frequencies of reproductions instigated by different affective reactions)

	(2)	(1)	(0)	(- 1)	(- 2)
I. 206	131	62	52	185	
52.6%	44.0%	30.1%	18.7%	36.7%	
II. 145	88	40	35	122	
37.0%	29.5%	19.2%	12.6%	24.20%	

These results seem to indicate that the positive affective values instigate the greater number and the still greater proportion of subsequent reproductions.

Results regarding the accuracy of reproductions (as measured by the composite score of correct words and correct ideas) are given below:—

TABLE III

(showing the words correctly reproduced and the ideas correctly reproduced)

	(2)	(1)	(0)	(- 1)	(- 2)
I. 666	432	202	164	523	
42.2%	36.2%	24.3%	14.7%	25.9%	
II. 462	288	137	94	287	
29.4%	24.2%	16.5%	8.5%	14.2%	

The percentages given in this table are those of the possible correct reproductions of words and ideas. It is clear, within the limits of this inquiry, that the pleasantly toned words and ideas tend to be more accurately reproduced (whether we consider the absolute numbers or the per cent proportions).

The mean scores of correct words, correct ideas, composite and total number of words, with the standard variations of the last two are given below:—

TABLE IV

Correct words	Correct ideas	Composite	Total words	No. of Ss.
I. 11.2	12.3	23.5 SD 9	16.4 SD 3.6	84
II. 8.2	9.3	17.4 SD 9.3	13.1 SD 6.1	73

As is only to be expected, ideas tend to be more accurately reproduced than the words, and the proportion of important additional words increases with the passage of time. Again, it is interesting to note from the table that there is greater anchoring effect of

the text on the earlier reproductions than on the later, as indicated by the amount of scatter. The standard deviation of the score of total words in the second reproduction is 6.1 as against the standard deviation of 3.6 in the first reproduction.

The conclusions of this experiment are unfortunately not quite as unambiguous as one would wish. No doubt, on the whole, there is a clear tendency for the pleasantly reacted words to be better remembered. But if the pleasant-unpleasant tone by itself determines the recall, then the distinctly unpleasant words should show a less tendency to be revived. Actually, the distinctly unpleasant words are better reproduced than either the rather unpleasant words or the average words. To demonstrate a clear influence of affectivity on remembering we have to have an unmistakable progressive gradient from the minus values to the plus values of affectivity. If the distinctly unpleasant experiences are better remembered than the mildly unpleasant, then the generalization that on the whole the pleasant experiences are better remembered than the unpleasant ones loses much of its force.

What could be the reason of this discrepancy? Might it be that the distinctly unpleasant words are somehow more impressive than the rather unpleasant words? What is the nature of this impressiveness, and how it is related to affectivity, are the two important questions which urgently call for fresh experimental analysis. An account of the investigations into some of these problems is given in the second half of this report.

An Examination of the 'Wish-Fulfilment Dictum' in the Freudian Theory of Dreams

BY

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Sigmund Freud suggested a highly original interpretation for the phenomenon of dream, and his theory incorporates in it a great deal of truth, in that most of the statements he made are found to be true of dreams in some connection or other. But we cannot see eye to eye with him in respect of most of his generalizations. In this paper an attempt will be made to examine his favourite generalization that 'every dream is the fulfilment of a wish'.

Freud establishes his thesis of wish-fulfilment on two facts. In the first place observation and analysis show that a dream does not merely translate a latent content but always adds something to it. 'Something is invariably added which does not belong to the latent thoughts of the day-time, but which is the actual motive force in dream-formation; this indispensable component being the equally unconscious wish to fulfil which the content of the dream is transformed.'¹ Secondly, during sleep, with the ego's withdrawal of all interests, the ego returns upon itself, a state termed by Freud 'the Narcissism of sleep'. 'The Narcissism of sleep does indeed signify the withdrawal of cathexis from all ideas of objects, both from the unconscious and the preconscious part of them. If then certain "day-residues" have retained their cathexis, we hesitate to assume that they acquire so much energy at night as to compel attention on the part of consciousness; we are inclined rather to assume that the cathexis they have retained is far weaker than that which they possessed during the day. Here analysis saves us further speculation, for it shows us that these day-residues have to receive reinforcement from unconscious instinctual impulses if they are to act as shapers of dreams. This hypothesis at first presents no difficulties, for we must believe that in sleep the censorship between the Pcs and the Ucs is greatly weakened,

1. Freud, *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 198.

communication between the two systems being thus made easier.² The assumption involved is that the 'Narcissism of sleep' effects the consequent weakening of the censor as well as the 'day-residues', but fails to weaken the unconscious instinctual impulses, so that the ratio of strength between the censor and the unconscious impulse is reversed. The latter remains as strong as before and gains superiority in relation to the former, which was so long holding it under repression; so that repression fails, and the unconscious joins hands with the pre-conscious, presses on to the conscious, and, in so doing, takes along with it the pre-conscious day-residues, utilizes them as the material of disguise and forms the manifest content.

Of the above two considerations on which the 'wish-fulfilment dictum' is based, the second one shows that the day-residues unaided by the unconscious energy are not strong enough to generate a dream. So the unconscious impulse, which is always a wish, is needed to explain the formation of a dream. The first of the above considerations shows that this wish is not merely translated in the dream but is so metamorphosed as to be a fulfilment of that wish.

Thus we find that facts of observation as well as theoretical considerations led Freud to arrive at the generalization that all dreams are wish-fulfilments. At first it appears that theoretically Freud would have no difficulty in admitting non-wish-fulfilment dreams. But he does not admit them, simply because in fact they do not exist. 'My first answer to the question why dreams should not be many-sided in their meaning is the usual one in such a case: I do not know why they should not be so, and should have no objection if they were. As far as I am concerned, they can be so! But there is just one trifling obstacle in the way of this wider and more convenient conception of dreams — that as a matter of fact they are not so'.³ But later on he seems to find theoretical grounds for the dictum, so that he thinks that not only are dreams in fact wish-fulfilments, but also that they should be so and not otherwise. So the weak character of the generalization arrived at by simple enumeration finds its completion in the theoretical considerations.

2. Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 140.

3. Freud, *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 198.

We have seen what theoretic considerations Freud adduces in support of his 'wish-fulfilment dictum'. It was assumed, as we have seen, that the Narcissism of sleep weakens the censor and the pre-conscious thoughts; so that the pre-conscious thought, even when it is a wish left by the day's residues, not by itself strong enough to generate a dream, and as such it requires to get reinforcement from the unconscious wish impulse. This assumption created a great advantage for a Freudian. For when the analysis of any dream revealed in the latent content a thought other than a wish, a Freudian would say the analysis was incomplete; and he would carry on with analysis further until a wish was discovered lying somewhere in the chain of association.

From the above assumption it would follow that in no case should a dream be generated by pre-conscious thoughts. Or to put it conversely, the pre-conscious thoughts should in no case be able to generate a dream. But, curiously enough, Freud recognizes that in the case of children's dreams and the undisguised organic need dreams of adults, and some other form of adult dreams, like impatience dreams, comfort dreams, etc., the dream satisfies the pre-conscious wishes of the individual. Recognition of the undisguised dreams of children and the above-mentioned dreams of adults is enough to disprove the hypothesis involved in the depiction of the psychic situation deemed necessary for the production of dreams. If a pre-conscious thought can be strong enough to generate a dream in the case of children and in some cases in adults, it may be asked: Why should it not be able to generate dreams in the case of other adult dreams? When the analysis of some of the distorted adult dreams reveals the presence of manifold thoughts in the latent content, viz., resolution, judgment, plan, wish, fear, etc., and the dream may be satisfactorily explained as a case of concretization or simply reproduction of them, why should the analyst try to dive deeper and deeper until he can show the presence of some unconscious wish as the real motive force behind the dream production? At least there should be no theoretical need for such a search. Such an attitude of seeking for a 'dream-wish' in all cases, and not stopping until that is found, is not needed for any theoretical consideration. As a matter of fact such an attempt leads in many cases to unnecessary strain on the imagination and to a twisting of the materials.

With the theoretical ground removed, Freud might possibly take his stand on factual evidence. But facts also show contrary evidence; and some of them are so clearly contrary to the wish-fulfilment dictum that even twisted interpretation and stretching

of imagination do not help. All the investigators dealing with battle dreams are of opinion that these dreams merely show a tendency to repetition of the traumatic experiences. Dr William Brown, for example, says: 'Freud's theory that every dream is the disguised fulfilment of a repressed wish is difficult to reconcile with the "battle dreams" that were reported by our patients in such profusion during the war.'⁴ In the face of such evidence from battle dreams, Freud sometimes falters. In some of his writings he himself recognizes these 'battle dreams' as cases of repetition of past experiences. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, as well as in his *New Introductory Lectures*, he admits such cases. Even then, curiously enough, he does not feel the necessity of altering his views about the nature of dreams as wish-fulfilments; for he thinks 'the exception does not do away with the rule'.⁵ He is at best prepared to concede 'that the dream is an attempted wish-fulfilment'. But it is hard to see how, except for his fondness for generalization, Freud could see even an attempt at wish-fulfilment in these 'battle dreams'. Moreover the above view that 'the exception does not do away with the rule' involves a logical flaw. This leads us to the distinction between essence, property and accident. An exception might occur in respect of an accidental quality, but qualities which form the essence or follow from it cannot have exceptions. We cannot, for example, say that the essential quality of a triangle is its three-sidedness and still that there are triangles without this quality. Freud makes the same mistake when he says that a dream is wish-fulfilment (meaning thereby that a dream is essentially so), and still that there may be dreams without being so. If dreams may occur without fulfilling a wish, the essence of a dream is to be sought elsewhere. So Freud's theory involves a confusion between what is an accident and the essence. As a matter of fact even writers like Dalbeiz, who wrote in justification to the Freudian cult, had to admit that the recognition of these cases where dream experiences show nothing but repetition of traumatic experiences of the past constitutes a serious difficulty for the wish-fulfilment dictum. As Dalbeiz writes: 'In 1920 Freud slightly lessened the uncompromising rigidity of his theory of wish-fulfilment through dreams. He emphasized the fact that the dreams of patients suffering from traumatic neurosis are usually purely and simply reproductions of the accident which caused neurosis. This clearly squares very badly with his theory. Other considerations have prompted him further to admit "that

4. William Brown, *Psychological Methods of Healing*, p. 31.

5. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 43.

there exists in the psychic life an irresistible tendency to reproduction and repetition, a tendency asserted without taking any account of the pleasure-principle, and superior to it."⁶ This importance accorded to the automatism of repetition, which constitutes a serious modification of Freud's system, partly bridges the gulf which divides his conception of the dream from the commonly accepted ideas.⁷

Theoretical need as well as factual evidence being both proved to be unsound, what remains still of the wish-fulfilment dictum? If theory does not require that every dream should be wish-fulfilment, and if facts show that there may be dreams which arise out of other causes than wishes, then why should we, one might say, expect in all cases to discover a wish as the generating force behind the dream, and the dream as the fulfilment of that wish? It can as a matter of fact be shown that many of the dreams interpreted by Freud or his disciples admit of a simpler and a more natural analysis. We shall cite just two instances to illustrate our remark.

Case I. 'A lady once thought: "It is not worth making efforts in life; as soon as one reaches the summit, something happens to make one come tumbling down, and one has to begin all over again." She went to bed in this depressed state; just as she fell asleep she saw a cockchafer climbing a railing. Just as it reached the top a little girl touched its leg and it tumbled down, only to start climbing afresh. The lady was not at once aware that this hypnagogic vision was the expression in images of her conscious thought of the day before. Asked to observe the first thing that came to her mind when she thought of this image, she said: "You want to get on, and the devil pulls you back by the leg." Then the memory of her thoughts returned to her.'⁸

Here one can clearly see that the dream is doing nothing else but reproducing the latent thought. The dream is here nothing but, one might say, a repetition of the thought in a concrete form; so that the tendency to repeat is not the unique feature in battle dreams alone; but it might manifest itself in other cases also. But as this plain interpretation would not fit the wish-fulfilment dictum,

6. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 24 (quoted by Dalbeiz).

7. Dalbeiz, *Psychoanalytical Method and Doctrine of Freud*, Vol. I, p. 64.

8. Quoted by Dalbeiz in his *Psychoanalytical Method and Doctrine of Freud*, Vol. I, p. 94, from Salbine Spielrein's article in *Archives de Psychologie*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 320-1.

a Freudian would proceed with the analytic technique further and further until he could somehow or other detect a wish somewhere in the chain of association. But we have already said that, there being no theoretical need for such a procedure, any such attempt would lead to unnecessary twisting of facts. As a matter of fact, if our mind is allowed to float along, starting with any idea, it is likely to meet in the journey with all sorts of ideas, and amongst them a wish also — for broadly speaking, there is nothing in the universe which has no connection direct or indirect with all the other things. So the discovery of a wish in the long chain of association, pushed beyond due limit, is not unlikely. The idea of a flower may bring in its trail the idea of a dung-beetle also. The question is: How far are we to push along the line of association? We should know where to stop.

Case II. Dream: 'A scene at a customs house: A fellow-traveller opened his trunk and said nonchalantly, smoking a cigarette: "There is nothing to declare in that." The customs official seemed to believe him, but felt in the trunk again and found a strictly prohibited article. The traveller then said in a resigned way: "Well, it can't be helped!"'

Interpretation: 'The dreamer himself is the traveller and I, Freud, am the official. He is generally very straightforward with me, but had made up his mind to conceal from me a relation which he had recently formed with a lady, for he assumed quite correctly that I knew her. He displaces on to a stranger the embarrassing situation of being detected, so that he himself does not seem to come into the dream at all.'⁹

Here again the dream is a plastic representation of an apprehension. One cannot say that the wish to conceal the relation generates the dream, for in that case we may ask the question: 'Where is its fulfilment?' If the wish was 'to conceal', the dream shows the contrary; for the 'prohibited article' is detected. A Freudian might still say: 'Yes and no; concealing and confessing being opposites may find expression in the same way.' As Dalbiez writes: 'A very little reflection will show us that the desire to see something happen and the desire not to see it happen can only result, in a case of dream, in "visualization" in a plastic representation of the event in question.'¹⁰ It is against such an interpretation by reference to the theory of ambivalence in dream that

9. Freud, *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 174.

10. Dalbiez, *Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud*, Vol. I, p. 101.

some critics have remarked: 'Psychoanalysis could give no matter what interpretation of no matter what dream.' We do not go so far; but simply ask: Can we not equally see in this particular case a reproduction or a repetition of an actual fear of embarrassment? We are to answer the question in the light of what we have already discussed. We have shown that there is no theoretical need to assume the existence of a wish in each dream. We have also shown cases where dreams tend to reproduce an experience or thought in pictures. If so, what hinders us from accepting in this particular case the more natural explanation rather than the resourceful explanation by reference to the theory of ambivalence? The explanation suggested by us seems to fit in better, for the dream shows the presence of the actual feeling of embarrassment. A Freudian may still say that the real dream-wish in this case is unconscious and further analysis might reveal it. We have already said enough against such an attitude.

From what has been said it is evident that the dream need not, nor does it always, express or fulfil a wish. As a matter of fact some investigators, Pierce for example, have studied a large number of dreams and they have found that not even half of them can be explained as cases of wish-fulfilments. So that Joseph Jastrow rightly remarks: 'It is only the determination of the Freudians by hook or crook to make all dreaming repressed wish-fulfilment, that runs contrary to the findings of a wide and natural survey of dreams among all sorts and conditions of men, women and children, and is responsible for many a fantastic page in Freudiana.'¹¹

It may be added that the Freudian view that distorted adult dreams satisfy the unconscious wishes of the dreamer presents another difficulty, at least for theoretical understanding. Freud seems to think that the dream gives a genuine satisfaction to the wish; for he emphasizes the sense of reality in the hallucinatory experience. 'We say that the dream-wish is converted into a hallucination and as such commands belief in the reality of its fulfilment.'¹² 'The hallucinatory wish-psychosis in dreams or elsewhere performs two by no means identical functions. Not only does it bring into consciousness hidden or repressed wishes, but it also presents them as fulfilled, and that in such a way as to command entire belief.'¹³ This suggests that the unconscious wish

11. Joseph Jastrow, *Freud, His Dream and Sex Theories*, pp. 57-8.

12. Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 145.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-6.

drive finds actual satisfaction, for the hallucination is believed to be true. We concede only that the wish drive finds an outlet in the dream though in a distorted form, and as such the excitation gets released. But the Freudian meaning goes further than this: he is categorical in emphasizing that the wish not only gets expression, but also a positive satisfaction. This satisfaction becomes real out of the belief in the hallucinatory experience. But it is to be noted that the hallucination is a distorted one. If the wish is about the neighbour's wife, the hallucination shows the neighbour's car. Now, if the sense of reality is important for the real satisfaction, it is difficult to understand how the belief in the getting of the neighbour's automobile can give a real satisfaction to the wish about the neighbour's wife. So, even when an unconscious wish is the initiator of the dream, the dream simply effects release of the wish drive and does not give it satisfaction. If the pressure of the censor does not allow a repressed wish its satisfaction in the waking state, no more does it allow this satisfaction in dream.

Beauty and Truth

BY

REV. J. F. BUTLER, M.A., A.M., PH.D.

*'Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty, — that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.'*

Keats, *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, last lines.

These two lines are the subject of one of the most penetrating pieces of J. Middleton Murry's criticism (*The Mystery of Keats*, chap. vi, pp. 162-77).

At the beginning of that chapter (162-3) Mr Murry reviews the interpretations of his predecessors in criticism of these lines. The general consensus of opinion among the critics whose opinion is entitled to special respect because they are scholars as well as poets, and poets as well as scholars, is markedly unfavourable.

Robert Bridges indeed took them as redeeming a poem otherwise poorish; but Quiller-Couch held them to be 'vague' and 'uneducated', and only 'pardonable in one so young'; T. S. Eliot held that they were either meaningless or concealing a meaning to him unknown, and that they marred an otherwise good poem. I. A. Richards, who cannot himself be called a poet, but whose influence on the more thoughtful type of modern criticism is great because of his philosophical reputation, takes them as 'a pseudo-statement' (though this in I. A. Richards' vocabulary is a technical term and does not really mean anything so bad as it sounds) (*ib.*, 256).

In the face of opinions so weighty, how can these lines be defended? Or, to ask a question which must come before this, what were they really intended to mean?

To begin with, surely it is clear that these verses are not, as most critics take them, a statement (or, what is worse, an attempted statement which failed) of literal fact. (I think that Mr Murry may agree with this, on much the same grounds; see his pages 164-8; but I am not sure about this.) After all, they do come at the end of a poem designed to produce a quasi-mystical

state of consciousness, and which does succeed most admirably in this intention: if the poem is a real whole, these lines too must be intended (even if by a lapse of technique they may not succeed in being) as an enunciation of something far more twilight than prosaic fact. And I think it fair to assume, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, that the poem is a real whole. Keats was a great technician and very sensitive on such matters, and, though he was perfectly capable of writing poems which were far from great, I do not know that there is a single case where within the limits of a single poem he ever lapsed into prosaic bathos in the way in which Wordsworth, say, so constantly did. We must, then, if at all possible proceed on the assumption that Keats meant something both deep and difficult, in tune with the rest of the poem.

Perhaps the most obvious suggestion as to the meaning of the lines, if they are to be interpreted on the level indicated above, is Mr Murry's own, that they are to be taken as a metaphysical pronouncement, as equivalent to a statement — so far as what is essentially poetry ever can have its meaning translated into prose — that Keats had a vision of the soul of things as good, despite the obtrusion of evil. This is, of course, a theme which has inspired many poets to some of their greatest poetry: one may mention, as examples quotably short, the three great phrases which Mr Murry cites (169-74) 'God is Love', '*omnis existentia est perfectio*', '*e la sua voluntade è nostra pace*'.

But is this kind of thing at all in tune with the vision of Keats? Keats was a 'romantic', and he was as aware as any poet of the pulsing life in things: but was he a mystic in the sense in which 'mysticism' could be predicated of the three phrases quoted? And did he ever think in terms quite as conventionally philosophical as this problem? In a sense, of course, his whole life was an attempt to reconcile in a single vision the glory of the world that his romantic insight glimpsed and the ugliness and horror of the failure of his love for Fanny Brawne and of his brother, Tom's untimely death and of his own fatal sickness. Nevertheless his thought simply did not run along the conventional lines of this problem. Shelley's might have done so, had Shelley been similarly circumstanced. But Keats was not Shelley — their deep affinities must not hide their real divergence of temperament and expression. No; I do not think that we can interpret the sentence successfully as a metaphysical one. I think it must be taken as an aesthetic one — though an aesthetic one at so great a depth as to be very important for metaphysics.

Its prose translation — once again, so far as poetry can have a prose translation — would be composed of three propositions: (a) That art in which beautiful form is integrated with deep truth is of great value; (b) that other art is not; (c) that other truth is not.

The propositions imply answers to three well-known aesthetic problems:

(a) What is art? The answer implied is that art is an integration of beautiful form (directly known as such) with meaning. (It may be that there are few minor arts — such as arabesque and minor ballet — which are arts of pure form: but their value is slight.) 'Meaning' should be given in this context a wide connotation, to include not only what a logician would call truth but also the adequate representation of any experience or feeling.

(b) Why is art valuable? The touchstone of any aesthetic theory is: Does it justify our spending time on the second-hand experience of art instead of going to life itself, or to life itself along with the experience of natural beauty? The usual answer is two-fold:

(1) Extrinsically, art enlarges our experience — it educates us in types of feeling which we could not enter without help: e.g. Shakespeare or the great novelists take us into the company of more types of personalities and deeper representatives of these types than we would normally meet.

(2) Intrinsically, it (as a *sui generis* 'organic whole') has a greater value than the sum of its parts, so that the experience which fuses beautiful form with meaning is not only a new but also a higher type of experience.

This takes us a good way in the justification of art, but does not call for anything so drastic as the doctrine of Keats which we are considering. For that, we must come to the third problem:

(c) How is great art distinguished from good art? There is art of a type (call it Type A) which is entirely explicable in terms of the preceding paragraph — e.g., Robert Bridges' poem on 'Snow Falling': or any typical lyric of A. E. Housman. But there is also a type of art (call it Type B) which fuses beauty with great (as distinct from merely interesting) truth — e.g., Bach (as distinct from both, e.g., opera, which has no worthy truth, and e.g., Handel, where the integration though truly aesthetical has some elements of falsity); the Taj Mahal; Shakespeare's tragedies (as distinct

from his comedies and chronicles); Milton (as opposed to Homer — but here the judgement is obscured by Homer's greater range both of technique and human feeling. Examples of quotable length are — '*Tendebantque manus ripae ulterioris amore*'; '*E la sua voluntade è nostra pace*'; the end of *Samson Agonistes* :

His servants he, with new acquist
Of true experience from this great event,
With peace and consolation hath dismissed,
And calm of mind, all passion spent.¹

Now — wherein lies the utter supremacy of art of Type B over art of Type A? Part of the answer is simply that, intuitively, it is far greater. For the rest, we have to remember that all human values are engaged in a struggle for survival within our experience; our time, our attention, our opportunities, are limited; in the end, then, we can only afford the best. We do not have much time for art of any kind; in particular, art has to face the competition both of the thrills of direct living and of the moral claim of unsophisticated goodness; therefore in the long run, when inferior art has served its extrinsic purposes, only the best remains with sufficient claim upon us.

When we are young, and so much of our experience comes to us fresh, and so much more which art of the average type can still give can still be fresh, then art of Type A has great value: It widens us and deepens us; it is the educator of our personalities; it is what matures us. But as we get older its educative value decreases: education has served its purpose and is supplanted by achievement, and our personality has simplified. Hence at this stage of life the value of art of Type B increases in consonance with our developments. We come to have no time or desire or taste for any truth which is not beauty, or for any beauty which is not truth — i.e., for any art but that which is great philosophy, or any philosophy but that which is great art. And once we know this, it is all we know and all we need to know — it is the sign that we have arrived at our goal.

I am glad that my cultural youth was spent with Homer, Catullus, Keats and the great novelists. But I am looking forward to an old age with the Bible, Dante, a few plays of Shakespeare,

1. This distinction of Type B and Type A is not unconnected to Longinus' theory of the 'sublime', but the criterion is somewhat narrower, i.e., 'cosmic' rather than 'elevated'; and it is concerned more with matter and less with style.

Milton and Bach. (I have here set Keats on the wrong side of the fence; but I think this doctrine is his, and that because he saw it so clearly he too, had he lived longer, would have been among the great elect.)²

POSTSCRIPT.—Since writing this paper, I have seen that Sri Prabhas Jivan Chaudhury, in part of his penetrating paper 'A Sketch of a Theory of Poetry' in *The Philosophical Quarterly* (Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (July 1950), pp. 74-85; see especially p. 83) puts forth a view partly similar to mine, as does Mr Lascelles Abercrombie in his book *The Idea of Great Poetry* — I am grateful to Mr Chaudhury for having drawn my attention in his paper to this book, so full of good things. But on the main thesis of this paper they — and more especially Mr Abercrombie — seem to be opposed to what I have to say. Their 'great' poetry is such poetry of my Type A as excels in the range and depth of its feelings: and this is quite different from poetry dealing with a special class of feelings of a cosmic type.

2. This essay is written entirely from the standpoint of an Englishman, with references to the literature of England and England's cultural background of Europe. I would be much interested to know from those qualified by experience to judge, whether a similar thesis could be maintained with regard to Indian literature. If it could, then I think that fact is very strong support for my thesis. If it could not, then the question would have to be raised whether my thesis is wrong, or whether it is merely Western.

A Comparative Study in the Aesthetic Theories of Benedetto Croce and Rabindranath Tagore

BY

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Art must be distinguished from the philosophy of art. It is impossible to philosophize on art without being an artist, and contrariwise one may contribute to real art without any clear comprehension of its nature or essence. Croce is no artist himself in the general sense of the term, though his philosophy of art shows extraordinary insight into the real nature or essence of artistic creation. Tagore is an artist in the first instance and only secondarily a critic of art. It would appear that an artist who takes to philosophizing on the nature of art is obviously on surer ground than one who philosophizes on art without being able to produce real art. But that is not always the case, and as regards Croce it is certainly not the case. For though he has no artistic creation to his credit, he yet shows as a critic of art an insight and firmness of grasp which are rare even in poets and artists of great renown. It is Croce who installed aesthetics on its own pedestal. He has rightly been called the Adams-Leverrier, who discovered Neptune.¹ Like Adams, he vindicated the existence of another science as yet unknown and assigned to it its proper function. Thus Croce liberated aesthetics from subservience to philosophy and established its autonomy in the commonwealth of human knowledge and culture. This belief in the free character of aesthetics so boldly established and defended by Croce was shared by Tagore, the poet and *savant* of our country. Aesthetics was no handmaid to philosophy, nor to theology nor to ethics. Beauty was an independent human value conducive neither to morality nor to religion. It stands by itself and is judged by a standard of its own.

In Croce, we have the objectivistic view of spiritual life as objective self-fulfilment through objectified self-expression. The life of the spirit is unceasing self-objectification as intuition-expression of the spirit's inner 'sentimental tumult'. It is spirit's

1. See *Philosophy of Croce* by Wildon Carr, Preface.

a priori aesthetic synthesis of feeling and imagination, the intuition or objectified expression of its inner stirrings. But intuition is only the first stage of spiritual fruition, and this is the level of art, below the thought-level in point of time but not in dignity and value. Intuition, in its turn again, passes over into perception, i.e., into the knowledge of reality. Spirit does not stop at that. The logical synthesis again resolves itself into a practical *a priori* synthesis. Thus, in Croce's view, spirit moves on spirally from expression, through logic and practical synthesis, to renewed expression at a higher level, this circular movement being repeated at higher and higher stages as spiritual life advances. Tagore was also a subjectivist in art. He readily agreed with Einstein that had there been no human beings the Apollo of Belvedere would no longer be beautiful.² Beauty is subjective and it is only for 'me'. Tagore writes: 'It dawns in the East and in the West as I gaze at the sky. The rose is lovely for I call her lovely as I chance to glance at her.'³ Like Tagore, Croce is also an out-and-out subjectivist. In his theory of expression, the real is the imaginative reforming of the artist's expression or imaginative process. 'How could we judge', asks Croce, 'what remained external to us?' He denies the existence of extramental reality and holds that 'matter does not really exist but is posited for the convenience of exposition'.⁴

In Croce's view art is due to the activity of the spirit. It is neither the intuition of a concept nor the sensuous representation of the Idea, as Hegel had contended. It is an autonomous expression of the spirit, and it is universal. Tagore too speaks of this creative activity of the spirit and tells us that it is characteristic of all true artistic creation. Through this active expression the spirit in man responds to the Spirit eternal, and this response is art. To quote Tagore: 'A gigantic creative endeavour built up its triumph in stupendous carvings defying obstacles that were overwhelming. Such a heroic activity over the greater part of the Eastern continent clearly answers the question, "What is art?" It is the response of man's creative soul to the call of the real.'⁵ It is this activity of the Spirit in man that can effect the creation of true poetry. Without this activity art turns to be more photography, a mimicry of what is. Prof. Radhakrishnan envisaged this

2. Cf. *Studies in Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 10-11, by Prof. S. K. Maitra, M.A., Ph.D.

3. *Ami Syāmalī*, p. 6.

4. See *Aesthetic*, p. 121.

5. See *The Religion of Man*, p. 139.

type of activity of the spirit when he defined poetry as Nature idealized,⁶ and this activity of the spirit, according to Prof. Radhakrishnan, distinguishes naturalistic poetry from true poetry. Naturalistic poetry requires mere observation, while true poetry demands meditation on the material observed.

Thus both Tagore and Croce agree over the question of art being a result of expression. For Croce, intuition and expression were identical, and this intuition-expression, an elementary and spontaneous activity of the human spirit, was taken to be identical with art or imaginative experience. The 'intuition-expression' of Croce is independent and autonomous in respect of intellectual function. This expression should not be understood in the sense of the 'technique of externalization' of the already intuited matter on paper or canvas or stone. The essence of art is in the internal expression. The subsequent process of materialization does not come within the purview of aesthetics. Here Tagore agrees with Croce in a general way. Tagore considered expression to be the primary truth about art. Without expression, art fails to communicate the inmost reactions of the poet to his environment. In his paper entitled 'The Religion of an Artist',⁷ Tagore tells us: 'Things are distinct not in their essence but in their appearance: in other words in their relation to one to whom they appear. This is art, the truth of which is not in substance or logic but in expression.' But expression, for Tagore, is only the primary truth about literature. It is not the ultimate truth. For Croce, expression is the primary as well as the ultimate truth about art and literature. To quote Croce: 'One often hears people say that they have great thoughts in their minds but that they are not able to express them. But if they really had them they would have coined them into just so many beautiful sounding words and thus have expressed them.' 'The mute inglorious Milton' is a mere myth to him. He does not believe in eclecticism. Whatever may be the content of art, form makes it what it is. A flower on a crannied wall, a meeting with a former lady-love in a railway compartment, or the tragic end of an erstwhile chaste lady, are equally worthy to be the theme of any work of art. Croce treats the form and content of art as 'one inseparable entity' even in thought. But Tagore effects a compromise between the rival claimants—the form and the content. Tagore tells us clearly that the mission of art is not only to express but to express 'man as a complex of sense organs,

6. Cf. *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*.

7. See *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*.

mind and spirit. We do not only see that there is expression but also how much is expressed.⁸ In short, human personality, according to Tagore, is the proper theme of all artistic creations, and art cannot do without expressing the mental life of man. The birth of true poetry and literature is possible only where resides the essential man.

Tagore wants the human personality to enter the domain of art not in its colourful entirety. He restricts the meaning of personality to be only what man 'aspires to be',⁹ to his higher self. In common parlance, what we call great in man, what we call permanent and noble, that and that only can become the theme of art. Some critics take this narrowing and delimitation of the content of art to be a right step towards explaining the universality of art. But to us this does not seem to be convincing. To say that art is concerned only with the higher and the nobler aspects in man hardly bears examination in the light of empirical evidence. Such a standard would exclude Milton's Satan and Vālmiki's Ravana, as also Victor Hugo's Hans of Iceland, from the sphere of art, as not being fit objects for it. Art is as much concerned with the baser and ignoble passions in man as with his nobler and higher elements. Nay more, art does not even exclude the commonplace, and may choose even the simplest events of life for the creation of beauty, such as we have in Wordsworth's *We are Seven*. Tagore further explains the nature of this expression in art. He quotes from the Upanishads the oft-quoted lines: '*ānandrūpaṁ amṛtam yad vibhāti*' ('that which reveals itself as immortal joy'), and tells us that in our country there is a concept of the highest self: He is called '*Sachchidānanda*' (as the accomplished reality which as such is the identity of consciousness and bliss). This joy has a finality in itself and is the ultimate goal of all human enterprise. When herein resides the principle of expression, this joy and expression may be taken as identical. Again he writes: 'The joy consists in the revelation of myself to me.'¹⁰ Now this *ānanda* (joy) is the character of our true self, and it is found to be identical, on ultimate analysis, with the Universal Self. This Universal Self is '*ānanda swarūp*', according to the Upanisads, and Tagore accepts this position. Thus in expression we experience the highest type of aesthetic pleasure i.e., the *ānanda* of the Upanisads. This joy is the last word and there is none after it.

8. *Sahityer Pathe*, p. 171.

9. *Sahitya*, p. 64.

10. *Sahityer Pathe*, p. 11.

Through the experience of this joy we know the Universal Self, and through this knowing we realize our true being. In short, true artistic creation for Tagore involves self-realization, and this self-realization is effected through self-expression. Here Tagore comes near Hegel. For Hegel, the true self realizes itself in and through itself as presented in sensuous form. Tagore's insistence on the expression of the higher self in man as being the function of art reminds us of Hegel's theory of 'absolute content'. Art, according to Tagore, should express the higher self in man, which is the Universal Self. Here Tagore apparently confuses Croce's 'expressionism' with Hegel's notion of art as the sensuous presentation of the Absolute. We can find no explanation for Tagore's delimitation and narrowing of the content of art to what is universal and permanent in man, to what is nobler and higher, other than this secret influence that Hegel exercised on his thoughts.

For Croce, expression in art means always the expression of some individual experience and not of some super-personal reality. Thus he makes the problem of communication easier. Tagore, in our view, in limiting the content of art to some super-personal reality, to 'what man aspires to be', has made the problem of communication all the more difficult. Such uncommon experiences are not common with the ordinary man, who lives and dies on the 'black soil'. Moreover in art, if we try to adumbrate the universal notions, and if art does not represent the individual and the concrete as distinguished from the universal and the abstract, we would in that case have no art but only abstract philosophical speculation. To create is to particularize; to embody in an individual image 'the light that never was on land or sea'; and art, as creation as well as enjoyment, must necessarily aim at the concretely individual. The Universal either as Self or as Reality can be an object of abstract contemplation and thought, but not of creative activity. It is a truism to say that if we take art to express the common experiences of an individual and not the experience of some super-personal Reality, as Tagore conceived, we make the problem of communication easier. Our contention is this, that no art is worth the name that does not reflect both the nobler and the baser aspects of human nature. It is the magic wand of the artist that gives the glory of permanence and immortality to an individual character, however low and mean it may be, when judged by the conventional standards of our pragmatic life. The Falstaff of Shakespeare certainly does not represent any super-personal Reality. He represents the common man in us, the man as a tissue of inconsistencies and contradictions. Shylock the Jew stands as an immortal creation,

and he certainly does not represent any nobler virtue in man than inordinate greed for wealth and a thirst for revenge, so common in man. Iago, the villain in Shakespear's *Othello*, and Brian de Bois Gilbert in Scott's *Ivanhoe*, are certainly not types of characters that could be admitted by Tagore in his kingdom of art, if he remained true to his theory. So we hold with Croce that art is nothing but a de-subjectification of subjective feelings with proper psychological distance, that makes the essence of all true art. It does not require a super-personal Reality so much as a true expression, to make art what it is.

As a consistent subjectivist, Croce denies that any extra-mental matter is the content of art. When the world outside and nature in all her grandeur and glory are posited only for the convenience of exposition, and when both form and content come from the same source as one indivisible essence, we do well not to drive a wedge between the two. As a corollary to this position, we must deny reality-consciousness in art, as Croce did. He considered art to be below the logical level, wherein the distinction of reality and unreality is absent and is yet to emerge in the next higher level. But according to Tagore art should 'follow' reality, and should not only literally imitate. Reality-consciousness in the artist contributes largely to the excellence of the work of art. Life must bring her freshness and vivacity to lend colour and variety to the works of art. The 'content' of art has a big 'say' in making it a success. A grand and sublime content can only make an epic. But we fail to understand how a subjectivist can consistently plead for reality-consciousness in art, when both form and content come from 'within'. Art is not to be determined in any way by any extra-mental content, that is simply 'there'. It is the form that makes art what it is, and thus creates a reality which is far superior in dignity to what we call 'real' in the ordinary sense of the term. Reality in art does not mean approximation to what is: it means something else. Kumaraswami defines reality in art as that wherein we do not experience the same sense of want.¹¹ There is no resemblance between nature and the work of art; yet we do not feel it, for there is something else which satisfies our aesthetic faculties. From a distance, Kumaraswami tells us, a true work of art gives us the impression of the 'real', but viewed at close quarters the illusion is dissipated. It is no reality then, nor the representation of it. Reality in art constitutes a class by itself, and it is far from being a true replica of what we see around us. How we pass from the

11. See *Silpa drsti*, by Sri Nandalal Bose.

'presented reality' to the 'seemingly real' of art (if we are allowed to use such an expression) we can never know. The Tantras explain the nature of the artistic creation thus: 'The creation of the artist is like the flight of a bird from one tree to another, leaving no trace of its flight in the air'. This is true of all artistic creations. The spirit that creates soars higher than the 'presented reality' and the artistic creation is like a flight from one tree (presented reality) to another (the product of art), and we cannot trace the trail through which the artist passed from one to the other. The spirit recreates, or rather idealizes, the presented reality through imagination, and this re-creation, which we call art, is of a higher spiritual value. The poetic truth is far superior to truth in the sense of correspondence with factual reality.

Where Tagore is a poet, he upholds the superiority of poetic truth and the supra-real character of art. He writes:

'What you create is truer than what happens:
O Poet! thy imagination is more real than Ajodhyā, the
birthplace of Rama.'

But where he philosophizes on the nature of art, he overlooks this supra-real character of art and insists that art must express the personality of the artist. It should embody the higher nature in man. In his view a work of art should always be judged with reference to reality. Thus he contradicts himself; as a critic of art he repudiates what he wrote as a poet. Croce agrees with Tagore the poet, but his difference with Tagore the critic stands.

The Existent and the Real

BY

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I propose in this paper to distinguish and to define the two terms 'Existence' and 'Reality'. This distinction is arbitrary and these definitions are verbal. Only, it is hoped that their acceptance may bring some economy in thought.

Of the two, 'Existence' is, here, taken to be the wider term and 'Reality' to be of narrower extension, so that, though everything real is existent, not everything existent is real. Brahman (let us assume) is both existent and real, while the rope-serpent is existent but not real.

I

Let us define 'Existence' first. The 'existent' is that which is 'efficient' in some way, 'active' in some way. The existent makes itself felt, somewhere, somehow. That which does nothing is nothing; that which does something is something. What exists makes some difference somewhere. The Buddhists said that Reality is characterized by '*arthakriyākāritva*' (causal efficiency). Let us transfer this characteristic to Existence. On this definition our dreams and illusions exist, for they are causally efficient. They stir our experience-continuum a little. This is one way of putting it: we could put it in some other ways: e.g., 'Whatever exists must be a bit of experience.' Whatever is unexperienced, as, for example, a square circle or a barren woman's son, is non-existent for that reason. We may put it in a third way by saying: 'Whatever exists must have some meaning or significance, and whatever has any meaning exists.' This is, perhaps, the Vaisheshika view, which sums up all existence under *padārthas* — the meanings of words.

The above three ways of defining Existence are equivalent in import. For, 'meaning' has no other meaning than 'a bit of experience'. And experience is essentially dynamic, active or efficient. Every bit of experience, as it comes, feels like a ripple on

the background of some placid sea. (The placid sea in the analogy is, of course, the *continuum* of experience itself.)

From this *sui generis* notion of Existence we develop the concept of an existing thing. In the discussion that follows let us use the term 'efficient' for the unit of Existence. An efficient is the smallest bit of experience or meaning. It is what Russell calls an event. It is, perhaps, Leibniz's monad.

A group of efficientes constitute a thing or a substance when they cohere into a series of one out of two possible orders of Existence. We may call these orders the mechanical or material and the creative or spiritual. The efficientes in the mechanical order are so grouped that each one of them is a specific value of a differential equation where time and the point of observation are independent variables. Our several perceptions of a tulip are efficientes which form an order of this kind. Berkeley's motive in denying abstract ideas was to deny this kind of order, which is an abstract idea. He wanted to replace this order universally by the creative or spiritual order.

In the creative order the unity pervading the several efficientes is of that sort which we obtain between a free act of ours and our active self. A free act of will is not discontinuous with our whole personality. There is a nexus between the two. It is an act of our self. Yet it is not a mechanical resultant of the several factors composing our personality. It is not a specific value of a differential equation with time as an independent variable. The act is spontaneous, but not isolated. It forms a unity with our ever-growing self. This unity is the creative or spiritual order of efficientes. Our selves are, more or less, things of this order.

I say 'more or less', because it is not to be supposed that all things exhibit one or the other of these two kinds of order in a pure form. Pure spirit and pure matter are, perhaps, limiting concepts. Our spirituality is a function of our creative activity. If we are overpowered by *tamas* (inertia) and are slaves of habit, we are, so far, matter. And in so far as the so-called dead matter shows spontaneity, it is spiritual.

Dreams and illusions, which are not seen through, come in between. In dreams our selves are, as it were, scattered into various bits. The creative tension of spiritual activity is at its lowest. Likewise, the several efficientes constituting an illusion do not belong to the mechanical order. Hence the rope-serpent is not a material thing. Its perception by me is not an efficient connected

in a mechanical manner with the efficientes that we generally include in the logical construction called a serpent.

III

Dreams and illusions, however, exist. They are efficient, they are significant, they are bits of experience. They are not, however, real.

For Reality is another concept added to Existence. An existent thing (i.e., a unity of efficientes) is real when and in so far as we take either a direct interest in it, i.e., we value it for its own sake, or an indirect interest in it, i.e., we value it because it is instrumental to something in which we have a direct interest. The mirage-water is unreal if our purpose is to satisfy thirst; but, if we can enjoy the sight of it, as such the mirage is a real thing. The moon-like splendour of his sweetheart's face is real for the poet because, as such, it satisfies a felt interest of his. But it is not real for him if his interest for the moment is to see his path on a dark night. So long as his interests are riveted on a safe walk over the physical path, the light of an electric torch alone is real. But nothing compels us to stake our all on the procurement of physical goods. We may as well find our supreme interest in the ideal path that poetry reveals, and then the moonlight of the dear one's face may shed a real light on it.

IV

None the less, popular imagination has come to attach reality only to qualities apprehended by the senses. And of these the tactual quality is the most real. The reason is obvious. The quality in which, we, as biological units, must take most interest, on pain of annihilation, is the resistance which the other things may offer to us. The other qualities, such as colour, are largely taken as indicators of the tactual resistances we shall meet. This is, for instance, the 'New Theory of Vision' that Berkeley propounded. The tactual quality or solidity is thus taken to be the hall-mark of reality. Words like 'stubborn', 'solid', pass as synonyms for 'real'. Apparitions, illusions, etc., are supposed to be something vaporous, nebulous, penetrable, i.e., not offering any resistance. Macbeth's illusory dagger, 'the dagger of the mind', was 'sensible to sight' but not to 'feeling' (i.e., touch). Hamlet's father's ghost was 'as invulnerable as the air'. Our ideas, i.e., the pictures of our imagination, also lack the tactual quality and hence they are taken to be unreal. That is why Dr Johnson went about to refute Berkeley's idealism (which he thought made the world unreal,

mere ideas) by stamping his feet against the hard ground. The ground, he thought, was real and not mere idea, because it offered so much resistance.

The fact that the tactual quality because of its biological interest has come to weigh with us so much must not, however, blind us to the reality of other sense-qualities. For either we have a direct interest in these, as for example in music, or we must take their cognizance on pain of not obtaining many objects of our direct interests.

But, then, must we not extend these considerations to systems of efficient causes other than sensations? The mathematical properties are real because they act efficiently in certain systems in the ultimate result of which we have a direct interest. They make a felt difference somewhere. As James says, their truth has 'a cash value'. Since we have an interest in crossing the river, the bridge is real for us, and since the trigonometrical ratios are linked in an efficient manner to the construction of a bridge, the trigonometrical properties also are real.

If this be borne in mind, we would not hesitate to concede that the poet's fancies, or the visions of the seer, are as much real as, or possibly more real than, any of the so-called practical things of life, provided the poet and the seer respectively take a proportionate interest in them. They are not real or are not equally real to all men.

To the child his playthings are most absorbing, and they alone are most real to him. He wonders how grown-up people can take delight in all those formalities of life. We, in our turn, cannot understand the strange delight of children in gathering pebbles on the sea-shore. 'Irrational', we call it! The youth's being enchanted by the side-long looks of the damsel wears an aspect of unreality to the old man. In the very same fashion another man's bodily pain is unreal to us. We do not take an equal interest in his organic sensations.

V

By this pragmatic doctrine of Reality, however, we are not going to make Reality a totally relative 'concept'. For we hold that different interests (i.e., bits of experience in which we interest ourselves) have different objective values, and error arises when there is a disparity between the subjective mode of valuation and the objective scale of values. It is not for us, here, to discuss how

the disparity ever becomes possible. But on any theory of error, except, perhaps, the *akhyāti* theory of the Mīmāṃsakas, the fact of error cannot be denied. That is enough for us.

And we may then legitimately assume that there is an interest *par excellence*. This is the absolute good. And this also is the 'absolutely real'. When the Megarics said that the 'absolute being is absolute good', or when the Upanishadic seers declare that Brahman, i.e., the absolute Reality, is of the nature of bliss, they may have meant something very near our doctrine.

VI

Here, a comparison of our theory with Śāṅkara's doctrine of orders of Reality may be relevant.

He does not hold that the illusory serpent or the objects seen in a dream are non-existent. He accords them some kind of Reality, the *prātibhāsika* Reality. These things are to be distinguished from the *tuccha* (insignificant) things like a barren woman's son. These are absolutely unreal. On our theory, these have no chance of being real, because they do not exist. They are not objects of experience; they are insignificant.

To the multitudinous things of our mundane life, such as wealth, fame, social status, etc., Śāṅkara accords a higher kind of Reality, the *vyāvahārika* Reality. Our interest in these objects is deeper than in the dream-objects.

But neither the things on the *prātibhāsika* plane nor those on the *vyāvahārika* plane satisfy our deepest and most abiding interest. Hence Śāṅkara affirms the Reality of Brahman, which will answer to such an interest. It is real absolutely. It is real on what he calls the *pāramārthika* level.

The very etymology of this word shows that Śāṅkara's concept of Reality is similar to ours, though, it is to be remembered, he does not, like us, make a distinction between Existence and Reality. The word *pāramārthika* comes from '*parama*' = 'highest' and '*artha*' = 'interest'. The secular world is unreal not in the sense that it is not hard or solid, but in the sense that the physical objects do not satisfy our highest interests.

The Nature of Logical Knowledge and Necessary Propositions

BY

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We propose to discuss, in this paper, the character of logical knowledge — or, more precisely, whether reasoning possesses the character of *necessary truth*. Of the types of knowledge that are usually known as *necessary*, mathematical knowledge heads the list. Every one of us is absolutely certain about the necessity of mathematical propositions, say for instance, $2 + 3 = 5$. $2 + 3$ not only is 5, but must be 5; and this necessity is the characteristic mark of all mathematical judgements, by which they are distinguished from other, empirical, truths, which are merely contingent in character. The rising of the sun in the east is only a contingent truth, inasmuch as its opposite is not inconceivable. Geometrical truths are also considered as necessary ones, since they follow by logical necessity from certain axioms and postulates which are, by nature, necessary and self-evident. Formerly they were, and even to some extent now-a-days are, regarded by both philosophers and geometers as ultimate *a priori* principles which can never rationally be called into question.

The belief in the necessity and universality of axioms had so long been grounded on the notion of Euclidean geometry. But the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry has upset the whole structure of traditional geometry. Euclid's axiom of parallels has been questioned. In the language of Stace, as suggested by C. D. Broad, the axiom of parallels may be stated as follows: 'If L be a straight line and P any point outside, L , then there is one and only one straight line through P , and in the plane which contains P and L , such that it does not intersect L ' (*The Theory of Knowledge and Existence*, p. 263). It is against this axiom that Lobachevsky puts forth his hypothesis that 'through the point P more than one straight line may be drawn such that it will not intersect L '. Though on many fundamental grounds he agrees with Euclid, he is said to have verified his own hypothesis about the truth of non-intersecting straight lines by deducing from it a number of theorems

which constitute his geometry. And consequently he has proved that 'the sum of the three angles of a triangle is always less than', and not equal to two right angles as Euclid suggests. Further development is expected in the world of geometry when Riemann formulates his new geometry on the basis of his assumption that 'through the point P there are no straight lines which do not intersect L'. Thus from the view-point of Riemannian geometry we learn that 'two straight lines can enclose a space', and that 'the sum of the three angles of a triangle is greater than two right angles'. Einstein's theory of relativity has further strengthened the position of non-Euclidian geometry. Now it is clear that each of these three geometers is stating a truth which the other two do not accept. However internally self-consistent each geometry may be, as the mathematicians urge, it is evidenced therefore without question that Euclid's axiom is not a self-evident necessary truth which is incapable of being proved or disproved. Similar is the case with the axioms of non-Euclidian geometries. They are pure assumptions, and 'convenient' assumptions — convenient in the sense that no astronomical measurements or experiments can decide the question whether space is Euclidian or non-Euclidian. Whether one or the other of the three views can be established by any external empirical evidence is out of the question, since measuring a huge triangle in stellar space is impossible in practice. Even supposing that the practical difficulties are somehow got rid of, such evidence presupposes some other assumptions of astrophysics. So whatever experiments might be made in favour of or against any one of these truths are simply the means which enable us to assert that the one is the most convenient and the others not. Besides, if one or other of the axioms can be proved by any such empirical evidence, it liquidates its necessity — it becomes a proposition founded on experience. So, they can, by no means, be considered as necessary, as they stand. Wherein then lies their necessity? The only answer, we believe, is that it lies in their being 'thought as' necessary. Or, in other words, all these assumptions are necessary constructions of the mind. In this sense, mathematical assumptions are not anything peculiar or unique, which have no parallels in any other kind of knowledge. The construction of them need not be understood as something special in mathematical knowledge. Such assumptions are necessary in every piece of knowledge. The same construction, it may be shown, also exists in the knowledge of the sensible object.

Stace calls these geometrical and evidently mathematical constructions '*existential constructions*' and not unifactory ones —

'existential' because they deal with the question of the existence or non-existence of points of intersection outside the field of perception. For him the truth of mathematics consists in its empirical application to real things. Internal self-consistency is not the only criterion of mathematical truth — it refers to reality outside mathematics. And thus he repudiates Poincaré's view that to attribute truth to geometry is meaningless, and concludes that all the three geometries are equally true. They express the same truth in different ways. They are attributive truths. Hence it is not true that there is no truth in geometry. Rather it may be said that the necessity that seems to characterize mathematics is not a mathematical necessity, but a *logical necessity*. He has attempted to show that all mathematical propositions, which are self-evident, are analytic propositions, and that because of this analytical nature they derive their necessity not from themselves but from logic (*ibid.*, pp. 264-88).

Whatever may be the view of Stace on this point, it is evident that the axioms of geometry are not necessary truths. And this can be proved in regard to all other mathematical propositions. Again, it is also equally true that, unless there is any such necessity and universality in these postulates, they could not become the foundations of all empirical validity. So, the only alternative is that the necessity is to be derived from the very nature of rational thinking. The construction of all such sets of axioms is nothing but the *necessary expressions* of rational thinking. Hence the necessity we find in them need not be pressed too far — there is no ground for considering them as absolutely necessary principles. Stace would, of course, object to such a view as being subjective. Though he propounds the derivative necessity in mathematical propositions, he finds the original necessity in logical knowledge. But is logical knowledge a different kind of knowledge?

Stace proves the derivative character of necessity not only for mathematical knowledge but also in another important kind of knowledge which reigns supreme in philosophy; and that is what he calls '*categorical knowledge*' — knowledge through categories. Besides space and time, Kant attached necessity to the categories also which constitute the framework of knowledge. But are they all necessary? Without going into the detailed account of all these categorical concepts, we may mention one such fundamental concept, *viz.*, causality. Kant not only took causality as a concept but also in a sense took the meaning of the law as such, as the immediate given; and thus causality for him was universally valid.

Science did not go so far, but it had so long assumed the principle as such, and it sought to explain how far it was applicable to the various phenomena of nature. On this basis of the strict and universal validity of the principle of causality, scientific research was and still is carried on. When Hume robbed causality of its necessity and reduced the latter to '*custom*' and '*habit*', it was not only the world of philosophy that was shocked, but a great commotion was also created in the minds of the men of science. But the discovery of Heisenberg's '*uncertainty principle*' has again created the same sensation in modern times. The laws which were considered so long as causal are not really causal but *statistical*, and these statistical laws are not based on strict causality. They are simply probabilities. The natural phenomena which have been so successfully predicted are nothing but conclusions derived from the average happenings of a large number of individual events. This law of averages, which may be said to be certain and calculable in the macroscopic world, is not certain in the microscopic world. Eddington compares this law of averages with that of a Life Insurance Company. Max Planck and Einstein warn us against the misconception that we might derive from this principle of indeterminacy. Planck maintains the validity of causation under all circumstances, since it is transcendental in character, though the question of applicability remains unsolved to us. But our problem here is whether there is any meaning in a transcendental concept if it is not applicable or at least not known to be applicable in the empirical world. And on the analysis of its application, when found to be true in this world, if it is discovered that the character of the applied concept is not the same as that of the original notion, are we entitled to maintain the universality of the same concept? Or, in other words, if it is found in the world of causation that the nature of cause is quite different from the nature of the concept we are said to have possessed in us, shall we still say that causality is a necessary idea? However, it is certain that the uncertainty principle has put in question the *necessity* of causality. This cancels the necessity of scientific knowledge as well. If in order to avoid the scepticism of Hume we are to accept the *necessity* of causality, we may call it necessary in the sense that it is an unprovable assumption which the mind somehow or other forms or constructs. Certainly it is not necessary in the sense that induction is not possible without it. Nor can it be maintained, in this connection, that all the categories are not equally necessary, since there is no degree of necessity. We must recognize each category as either necessary or as not-necessary.

Stace has divided the categories into two classes. Some of them are necessary and some others possess no necessity of any kind. To the latter class belong the '*constructive concepts*', which must not be miscalled categories. They are not fundamental to thinking. To the former group belong the '*factual concepts*', some of which are again not necessary; and these are '*causality*' and '*reality*'. Causality for him has been wrongly called a category as '*its enormous importance in knowledge has been mistaken for necessity*'. (*Ibid.*, p. 337.) The necessity of other factual concepts i.e., the genuine categories, is also considered by him as derivative from logic. '*The genuine categories*', says he, '*possess necessity, but not in their own right. Their necessity is on a level with that of mathematics. It is derived from logic.*' (*Ibid.*, p. 338.)

Now then arises the question of the necessity of logic. But necessity presupposes the function of logic. What does logic do? What is its performance in the construction of knowledge? In a word, it may be stated that logic aims at consistency. Thus it has been said that the ultimate principle of logic is '*the law of consistency*'. The two divisions of traditional logic, viz., deduction and induction, ensure the same consistency — one is said to deal with *formal consistency* and the other with *material consistency*. It has been pointed out by some logicians that the syllogism, though formally valid, cannot give us a guarantee of material truth, and hence that in order for it to be fully valid its premises must be true. But how to obtain true premises? Had the premises of a syllogism been particular propositions, then it would have been admitted that they were obtained by direct observation. But, since one of the premises of a syllogism must be universal, the problem is: Where do we get this universal proposition from? It cannot be maintained that it has been obtained as the conclusion as a pro-syllogism, as this pro-syllogism necessitates another pro-syllogism, which presupposes another, and so on, to infinity. Another recommendation that we come across in traditional logic is that in order to avoid this infinite regress we must accept the universal proposition as something axiomatic, to be had by immediate intuition which needs no further proof. But the so-called axioms of geometry, as has been pointed out before, are not self-evident truths. They are mere assumptions. And as regards other self-evident truths, say for instance, the laws of thought, they may be said to be purely formal in character. How can they give us any information regarding facts? They are merely analytical propositions. The law of contradiction asserts that A cannot be both B and not-B at the same time; but does it thereby tell us whether A is

in fact B or not? But the major premise of a syllogism ('All men are mortal') must be a general principle which is concerned with actual matters of fact. Hence such an abstract formula cannot stand as a proof of this premise. What is the solution then? The only alternative, some thinkers observe, is that general propositions are to be had by inductive generalization. But this transition to induction does not solve the problem of deduction, inasmuch as it takes us outside the sphere of deduction. So, from what has been stated thus far, it is evident that a syllogism can at best prove a conclusion only when a certain belief is taken for granted. Deduction by itself cannot prove anything: without a set of beliefs it proves nothing. If x and y are believed to be true, the truth of z cannot be denied; or, in other words, it establishes that $(x + y)$ and not- z are inconsistent and impossible. In the language of Stace it may be put thus: 'Reasoning never tells us what we shall believe, but always what we shall not believe. It forbids us to believe P and not-P together. We have, as a result of reasoning, no positive knowledge of any kind.' (*Ibid.*, p. 346.)

Thus from this point of view deduction may be considered as not a method of proof but a method of ensuring consistency only. From this view-point also Mill's objection of *petitio principii* against the syllogism may be refuted. The charge of *petitio principii* against deduction is meaningless, inasmuch as deductive reasoning does not prove its conclusion. But this does not mean that the process of deductive reasoning is absolutely meaningless. It is useful in the sense that it consistently unfolds the implicit statement of the premise—it makes us understand the implications of our beliefs. As it is not a method of proof, it commits no fallacy of begging the question. Similarly the fallacy of infinite regress may also be refuted.

Then the question of inductive reasoning arises. It has been just mentioned that the mortality of all men is established not by a pro-syllogism, nor by axioms, but by induction. This vain attempt to prove it by means of induction is described by Dr Broad as 'the scandal of philosophy', inasmuch as all inductive leaps are nothing but 'illicit jumps' from 'some' to 'all'. Induction aims at generalization, and this generalization, it is said, is possible on the basis of observation of some particular instances. But what authorizes us to make a jump from the known to the unknown? The answer is: The principle of uniformity of nature. And what is the uniformity of nature? It is the law according to which the future will resemble the past—the uniform behaviour of natural phenomena.

Here again the same question arises: What is the source of the belief in the uniformity of nature? By suggesting that the source of this belief lies in spontaneous induction, the empiricists beg the question. The ground of induction itself becomes the ground of induction. Thus the paradox of induction is no solution to the problem. If deduction is vitiated by *petitio principii*, the same *petitio* spoils induction also. So it cannot be proved inductively nor can it be proved deductively, as there is no other higher principle from which it could be deduced. Science simply takes this as a self-evident truth. To speak in the language of Max Planck, it is something like a commandment, "Ye must have faith", written with golden letters over the entrance to the gates of the temple of science'.

The only valid conclusion is, then, that the principle itself is a pure assumption, necessarily constructed by mind. Stace draws a distinction between 'mental construction' and 'pure assumption'. By 'construction' he means 'something that is made by us, something that is invented, created or fabricated'. But such a meaning, according to him, is not to be applied to the principle of uniformity, which is an 'assumption regarding facts', which is 'factual' in character. On this ground he objects to calling uniformity a 'methodological assumption', as does Schiller. Stace is of opinion that in methodological assumption there is always our choice, but in true assumption there is no such choice. (He defines 'methodological assumption' as 'a proposition not known to be true, and the truth or falsehood of which is, for the limited purpose for which the assumption is used in knowledge, a matter of indifference, but from which it is known that true propositions can be deduced within a limited area of knowledge': *ibid.*, pp. 405-6.) The assumption of the uniformity of nature is simply justified by the factual events, and this justification is not the proof.

Whatever may be the justification for this distinction between 'assumption' and 'construction' or between 'assumption' and 'methodological assumption', we, on our part, shall conclude that they are all the mind's contributions, necessary contributions in forming knowledge. Though some of them have reference to factual events, their necessity, if any, lies in subjectivity. If all other necessities are pushed back to logical necessity, as Stace remarks, we fail to understand how we can accept the latter as something absolute and ultimate. Induction by itself is evidently an inferior type of reasoning. Strictly speaking it is no reasoning at all. It is nothing but an analysis of scientific methods. It also,

like deduction, proves nothing; it simply *discovers* some facts or laws. In order to 'ensure consistency' it depends on deduction. And the laws of thought are nothing but the necessary ways of thinking, and the necessity of some of these thoughts is, to some extent, determined by our customs and convictions. Instead of saying that a necessity of thought is a necessity of things, we conclude that a necessity of things is a necessity of thought. To express it in the language of Stebbing, 'the necessity of logical principles is nothing but the necessity of constructing a system'. (*A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 176.) The laws of logic are not the laws of things. So we do not subscribe to the view of the realists and explain away the necessity altogether, since reason cannot be altogether abolished; but what we want to envisage is that we deny the absolute significance of necessary principles.

The Individual Self in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara

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The problem concerning the individual self — its nature, status and destiny — in the *Vedānta* of Śaṅkara is a very complicated one; and recent attempts to understand Śaṅkara's resolution of the issues involved in the discussion of this problem in the light of the controversy which has been carried on in the West between the Absolutists on the one hand and Personal Idealists and Personalitists on the other has but added to the complication, especially because these discussions have expected from Śaṅkara a resolution of issues which were not present to his mind and of which there is no treatment in his writings.

There appear to be serious differences in the views taken by the interpreters about Śaṅkara's conception of the destiny of the finite self. Professor Ranade thinks that according to Śaṅkara beatitude 'consists in being finally attuned to Divinity and being absorbed in that Divine life in such a way that no trace of personal existence remains' (*Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 214). Professor Radhakrishnan rejects the view that for Śaṅkara freedom means the abolition of self 'and holds that the released soul attains at the moment of release a universality of spirit' but 'retains its individuality' (*I. P.*, Vol. II, p. 636; *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 306.) The question about the destiny of the individual self cannot be separated from the question about its nature. In modern Western thought the discussion about the nature of the individual self has centred around the question of the status of the self in its relation to the Absolute. And the issues which writers on Śaṅkara have raised in their treatment of his views and the trend which their expositions have taken appear to have been mainly determined by the discussions undertaken by Absolutist writers like Bradley, Bosanquet, etc. But the question which Śaṅkara has before his mind in his discussion of the nature of the individual and to a satisfactory solution of which he attaches so great an importance cannot be formulated in so simple a way as the following: Is the *jīva* real or an appearance? Does it possess a substantial or adject-

tival mode of being? And statements to the effect that 'the *jīva* in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is phenomenal', that 'it is an illusory imposition on *Brahman*' do not serve to throw any light either on the being and constitution or on the destiny of what the subject in the above propositions stands for.

The question which is central to Śaṅkara's discussion is the question whether the true life of the *jīva* is life eternal, i.e., life as *Brahman* lives it, or whether its true life is the life of temporal existence in which it is not able to rise above body-consciousness and all that it implies. The *jīva*, as it finds itself, is an embodied consciousness, and its whole life is defined for it by its continuous and continuing identification with the body, this identification having its genesis in ignorance or *avidyā*. But this embodied existence does not constitute the true life of the individual soul according to Śaṅkara. The embodied soul is not free, sacred, immortal. Its freedom consists in its rising above body-consciousness; its sacredness in its shaking off the impurities of transmigratory existence which are born of its association with the body; and its immortality in its regaining its real and inherent nature, which it had never lost absolutely. The regaining of its real nature by the *jīva* is what Śaṅkara calls '*aśarīratvam*', the 'non-embodied state' of existence; and the *jīva* who has attained this state is for him an '*āvirbhūtasvarūpa jīva*' (S. B., I. 3.30). '*Śarīrātsamutthānam*', 'rising above body-consciousness', '*ātmasvarūpāvagatiḥ*', 'regaining one's real nature', '*svarūpenābhiniṣpattiḥ*', 'fulfilment of one's own being', are the various synonyms of '*aśarīratvam*' used by Śaṅkara.

This *aśarīratvam* or non-embodied state of existence is another word for *Brahman* or *mokṣa* in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, and is eternal. It is not something to be brought about or to be effected and accomplished. And accordingly 'the embodied state of *jīva* is not the result of merit or demerit effected by the soul' (S.B. I. 1.4). 'The embodied state has for its cause the illusory knowledge consisting in the conceit of the self in the body' (S.B., I. 1.4). The non-embodied state or the *jīva* is 'original' and not caused by action, and consequently is eternal; and of that it cannot be said that 'it is possible only when the body is destroyed, not as long as a person is alive' (S.B., I. 1.4). The continuance or non-continuance of the body on earth is not what constitutes the 'embodiness' or the 'non-embodied state' of the *jīva*. And a person who has reached true knowledge is in the 'unembodied state' even while still alive. The conception of liberation as the attainment of the natural unembodied state of the self has nothing to do with the

physical survival or extinction of the body; and the later distinction between *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti* as different and progressive 'varieties' of *mukti* and the conception of *videhamukti* as being an eschatological conception are quite unknown to Śaṅkara.

The true life of the *jīva* is life eternal, life as *Brahman* lives it, because it is *Brahman* which, without subjecting itself to any modifications, sets itself up as *jīva*. (S.B., II. 3.17: *avikṛtasyaiva brahmaṇo jīvabhāvā bhyupagamat.*) It belongs to the very being of *Brahman* to exist as an individuated self also. *Brahman* is a creative life, and the process of individuation is the process through which the creative act reaches completion. Individuation is bringing into existence 'individualized' or 'particularized' life, i.e., consciousness. *Brahman* in setting itself up as 'individualized existence' does not forfeit its nature as being essentially and eternally an absolute life or consciousness. *Brahman*, therefore, according to Śaṅkara, exists, on the one hand, as an absolute life and, on the other, as an 'individualized life'. Both the modes of existence are equally necessary to *Brahman*'s life; and both the modes of speaking are equally required to state the whole truth about that life. (S.B., II. 3.17: *avikṛtasyaiva brahmaṇo jīvātmanā 'vasthānam brahmātmanā ceti.* S.B., II. 1.27: *yathaiiva brahmaṇo jagad utpattiḥ śrūyata evaṃ vikāra-vyatirekenā 'pi brahmaṇo 'vasthānam śrūyate.*) *Brahman* individualizes itself by limiting itself through the limiting adjuncts of the gross physical body, the internal organ consisting of *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *aḥmākāra*, the external organs, and finally *avidyā*.

The individual self is thus not an 'effect' or 'modification' of *Brahman* in the sense in which curd is a modification of milk or the physical world an effect of *Brahman*. It is neither *vivarta* nor *pariṇāma* of *Brahman*, neither an illusory appearance nor an actual transformation of it; no principle of causation is involved here. It is *Brahman* itself in an 'empiric dress'—*Brahman* appearing through the limiting adjuncts of body, etc. The individual self is thus substantially one with *Brahman*. The purpose which lends meaning to the process of creation is the realization that the universe is the expression of *Brahman*'s nature: 'I, *Brahman*, am all this' (*Aitareya S.B.*, II.1.1) or that the individual is 'one with that Bliss which is *Brahman*' (*Taitt. S.B.*, III. 1.1).

Is *jīva*, then, real according to Śaṅkara? Śaṅkara would say: In a sense, everything is real provided we do not take it for what it is not. This implicitly contains a reminder that in order to make the ontological predicate of 'reality' intelligible and significant we must

make within the general category of being certain distinctions between appearance and reality, between reality and unreality, and between different kinds of being. 'When we judge anything to be real or unreal we are not opposing a general class of unreal things to real things, but are comparing one particular reality with another from which it ought to be, but in a certain judgment has not been, distinguished' (Urban, I.W., p. 75). This demand for distinction between the ontological predicates would be unintelligible except as it presupposed distinctions of value. Every judgment of reality turns out to be a valuation. To separate reality from value becomes contradictory; and this very fact—the value-character of the ontological predicates—implies their relation in a scale or system of value. Śaṅkara recognizes the above truth, and accordingly judges the reality or unreality of things in terms of *Brahman* which, for him, represents the complete oneness of being and value and constitutes the supreme measure.

If *Brahman* itself exists as the individuated self and in this mode of existence no principle of causation is involved, the reality of the *jīva* is the reality of *Brahman* and in no conceivable way can we speak of the *jīva* as having any other, or other kind of, existence. It is not in its being to have any other. So Śaṅkara says that *sadātmanā* is *sat*; but if you abstract its being from *Brahman* and try to assess its native contribution to its make-up, according to Śaṅkara you will find the task an impossible one. He says that in abstraction from *Sat* or *Brahman* it has not even existential status; it is *asat*.

The question whether the *jīva* has an adjectival or substantival existence is not raised at all by Śaṅkara. The question about the relation between *Brahman* and *jīva* as present to his mind is not identical with the question about the relation between the individual and the Absolute which divides the Absolutists from the Personalists in modern European philosophy. In modern European thought the discussion concerning the nature of the individual self has mainly centred around the question of the reality of the 'subject' or the 'that', the *Vedānta* of Śaṅkara has been mainly occupied with the discussion of the appropriateness of the 'predicate' or the 'what' which can be attributed to the subject. The existence or being-aspect of the *jīva* was never a matter of doubt or discussion for Śaṅkara; it was the content-aspect of it which set up the real problem for him, and it was on this point that he had most vital things to say. Śaṅkara's philosophy is not concerned with the establishment of the 'factual existence' of the

jīva; statements about this aspect of the *jīva* are mere '*anuvāda*'. The central topic, the *pratipādyaviṣaya*, of the *Vedānta* represented by Śaṅkara is the content side of the *jīva*, its *Brahman*-hood.

For Bradley the individual is quite unreal from the side of the Absolute, selfhood being a vanishing distinction. The finite self is 'embraced and harmonized in the Absolute through its being suppressed as such'. The finite as such disappears in the Absolute. 'Merged', 'blended', 'fused', 'absorbed', 'run together', 'dissolved', 'destroyed', 'lost'—these are some of the words used by Bradley to express the disappearance of the finite individual in the Absolute. The reaction which this type of Absolutism has aroused has naturally assumed the form of an attempt to restore to the individual the place which had been denied to it by Absolutism. And we find thinkers springing up who make the central interest of their philosophy the hammering in of the point that the selves are real centres of existence and not points of intersection or radiating centres of a single force. They point out that the whole conception of 'blending' and 'merging' which gives to Absolutism its peculiar colouring depends on the failure to recognize that every real individual must possess a substantive existence in the Aristotelian sense. Being real centres of existence, finite minds cannot overlap in existence, though they may overlap indefinitely in content.

The age in which Śaṅkara lived and thought was faced with quite different issues about the nature of the *jīva*, and these determined the direction which Śaṅkara's discussion of the question took. The Absolutists in the West and Śaṅkara in the East were not busy with identical problems. Śaṅkara had to define his attitude either towards the thinkers who were preaching the doctrine of no-self or towards those others for whom either the self and God were distinct realities or the self was essentially a finite entity. There were no thinkers who like Bradley believed in an Absolute Reality and affirmed that selfhood was a vanishing distinction in it, that the finite as such was unreal from the side of the Absolute because it disappeared in being accomplished. The key-problem of Śaṅkara became not the affirmation and the substantiation of the self as a 'real entity' but the ascertainment of the 'true nature' and of the final destiny of this real entity which could be spoken of as a substance, if not in the Spinozistic, at least in the Aristotelian, sense.

Consequently to ask Śaṅkara 'whether the *jīva* is real or unreal or an appearance' would be to put a very awkward ques-

tion. He would insist on a restatement of the question and a reformulation of the problem about the *jīva*. This would be an inquiry about the nature of the *jīva*. But if Śaṅkara were compelled to state his answer in terms of the reality or unreality of the *jīva* he would say that the *jīva*, i.e., the entity which is the subject-matter of discussion, is real, but *jīvatva* is an appearance merely, which clings to this entity but which would finally disappear. The disappearance of *jīvatava* would not be disappearance of the real entity which lives and exists as the individual (*jīva*).

There is an 'ideal' nature of the *jīva* and there is also its 'actual' nature. Its ideal nature is its real nature, the most supremely real, what Śaṅkara calls its '*pāramārthikam svarūpaṁ*'. As it is *Brahman* which takes upon itself the *jīvāvasthā*. (S.B., II. 3.17: *jīvātmanā 'vasthānaṁ . . . brahmaṇo jīva-bhāvā 'bhyupagamāt.*) and receives the designation of '*jīva*', the *pāramārthika svarūpa* of *jīva* is *Brahman*. (S.B., I. 3.19: *tad eva ca jīvasya pāramārthikam svarūpaṁ.*) As *Brahman's* real being is *āśarīratvam*, non-embodied state of existence, *jīva* also in essence is *āśarīra*. The embodied existence of the *jīva*, its *saśarīratva*, is adventitious. *Jīvatva* is an office which *Brahman* or *Ātman* holds, and so long as *Ātman* holds this office, it exists as a bound soul. *Ātman* may give up this office, and its *pāramārthika svarūpa* will remain to it.

There is also the 'actual' nature of the *jīva*, what Śaṅkara calls its '*upādhikalpitam rūpaṁ*' (S.B., I.3.19), or '*jaivam rūpaṁ*'. This other *rūpa* of *jīva* has its genesis in *avidyā*, through the force of which the *jīva* identifies itself with a particular body which is a complex of psycho-physical factors. This identification turns the *Ātman* into a limited individuality, with the body as the constant centre of reference in all its movements, all activities proceeding from it and all experiences being directed to it. The *jīva* thus becomes '*saśarīra*', an embodied entity; it becomes the 'presiding lord' of the body, '*śarīrādhyakṣaḥ*', and as presiding over the body it becomes '*tadvāna*'. The ideal *svarūpa* of *jīva* is '*āśarīratvam*', and *jīvatva* or 'embodiedness' is its adventitious *svarūpa*. When Śaṅkara says that *jīvatva* is illusory he means to emphasize that *jīva*, in its real nature, is perfect, is *Brahman*. Its finitude is something which will ultimately be overcome.

In this conception of *jīva* there can be no question of *jīva* being annihilated or destroyed, but only of *jīva* regaining or existing in its own *svarūpa*. The *jaivam rūpaṁ* has reference to the existential being or status of the individual, the *pāramārthikam*

rūpaṁ to its valuational being or status. For Buddhism, which is unaware of the value-element in the being or constitution of the self, *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* is dissolution of the *saṃghāta*. According to Śaṅkara the individual is 'existence' (a complex whose elements are body, sense-organs, *manas*, and *buddhi*, etc.) plus 'value' (*satyam caitanyamātrasvarūpaḥ*). The Vedāntic self thus rises above the existential point, and Śaṅkara establishes the '*pārameśvara-rūpaṁ*' of the *jīva* by pointing out the 'adventitiousness' of the *jaivam rūpaṁ*. The annihilation of the *jaivam rūpaṁ* of the *jīva* is not annihilation of the *jīva*. (S.B., I. 3.19: *pārameśvaraṁ hi śārīrasya pāramārthikam svarūpaṁ. upādhikṛtaṁ tu śārīratvam. . . . jaivam rūpaṁ vilayenena pārameśvaraṁ rūpaṁ pratipādyate.*)

Śaṅkara speaks of the *jīva* as a 'reflection' of *Brahman* (*ābhāsa-mātram*). This is liable to be misunderstood, and the *jīva* is in danger of being treated as illusory. This has actually happened. But Śaṅkara by speaking of *jīva* as the *ābhāsa* of *Parmātman* simply wants to bring out that the *jīva*, in its *jīvāvasthā*, i.e., in its 'existential aspect', which represents the duality of value and existence which is characteristic of the created universe, is not same as *Brahman* or *Ātman*, in which value and existence meet and fuse in one. But Śaṅkara is careful to warn us that the *jīva* is not an entity wholly distinct from *Brahman*. (S.B., I. 1.31: *jīvaḥ . . . na sa eva sāksāt, nāpi vastvantaram.* S.B., I. 1.31: *na hi jīvo nāma atyantabhīno brahmaṇaḥ.*) because it is *Brahman* which exists as and receives the designation of '*jīva*' under certain special conditions. (Ibid: *buddhyādi upādhi-kṛtaṁ tu viśeṣam āśritya brahmaiva sañjīvaḥ kartā bhoktā ca ity ucyate.*)

The Place of Deity in Alexander's Philosophy

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This paper critically considers Alexander's concept of deity, which occupies so prominent a place in his *Space, Time and Deity*. Deity as an emergent character in Alexander's spatio-temporal universe is certainly revolutionary from the standpoint of traditional Western philosophy. The traditional notion of God as the first and the final principle in Greco-Christian thought revolves round the problem of the absolute existence of a first or final universal. The spatio-temporal world, a realm of particulars and perpetual flux, is completely excluded from the notion of the pure universal, permanence or eternity. Hegel's God, the final dialectic synthesis, the Absolute Idea, is connected with the natural processes, both being aspects of concrete spiritual process in relation. The Hegelian view of God as the final expression of the dialectic process is a concrete synthetic objective mental process, as against the abstract and extramental universal of Greco-Christian thought. The concrete spiritual principle of Hegel is the retrospective or prospective ground of the dialectic and the natural processes.¹ Alexander's notion of the mental, natural and divine processes are completely different from the Greco-Christian-Hegelian thought. Alexander strikes a realistic note in his philosophy, by starting with a hypothesis of a spatio-temporal matrix. The universe, to him, is completely relational and fluid.² The character or features of this changing universe are the various relations of space with time or time with space; space and time are continuous with each other, they are directive of each other; they are not merely operative as 'whole' but are operative as 'parts'—the parts of space and time are continuous spaces or times.³ The relativity and directivity of the 'points' of space and the 'moments' of time demonstrate the varied categorical features. The universals or categories of traditional philosophy are, to Alexander, the various characters

1. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel*; A. Seth, *Hegelianism and Personality*, Lectures iv-v.

2. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I, pp. 323, 342.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 186-9, 331.

or aspects of spatio-temporal relations. To consider them as absolutely permanent features or logical characters would be to suggest that the universe is totally dead without any vitality or potentiality. If God stands for a final universal or a prior condition for all reflective activity, to Alexander there is no such thing as God. To Alexander, the universal is not one but many; these universals are not mental, but objective spatio-temporal characters more fundamental and basic than the mental; they are not extramental or objective in any abstract sense of the term.

Besides this spatio-temporal world of process or categorical features, Alexander observes the emergent characters, which are non-categorical but are emergent upon the categorical bases; they are chance-characters and are more or less non-predictable for their qualitative peculiarities; whereas the categorical features are predictable as they are various relations of space and time, one becoming directive of the other relatively. To Alexander, physico-chemical process is emergent upon basic spatio-temporality, life is emergent upon the physico-chemical process, and mind finally is emergent upon vitality. Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity* is a thesis for accounting for the place of deity upon the final emergent process of mentality.⁴ Deity, therefore, has to be considered as an ideal emergent character upon mentality; it is not in the order of categorical experience. Unlike the existing or actual emergent characters, it is an ideal non-existent emergent character.⁵ The notion of deity is not only non-traditional but its position is very dubious in the scheme of Alexander's philosophy also. We are unable to accept the various admissions of Alexander regarding this notion, for it will be evident that, in trying to be non-traditional, he falls into a peculiar type of traditionalism which is not fundamentally different from the Greco-Christian-Hegelian type.

In this paper, we are primarily objecting to Alexander's notion of a purely spatio-temporal universe. His interpretation of the stable features as purely spatio-temporal relations, without any mental counterpart, is one-sided and arbitrary. His distinction of process from emergence is, again, one-sided. If process involves an advance from a prior condition or state to another — if, in other words, it has a prospect, a change or possibility, in any sense of the term — it cannot be merely repetitive, a mechanical or a quantitative process. His bifurcation between process and emergence,

4. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 14.

5. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 349.

in any fundamental sense, is unjustifiable; emergence, for instance, involves a novel element, a process of superior operation. Categories, according to him, are said to be begotten by time on space,⁶ and this operation of time becomes more and more conspicuous as one reaches the final category of motion, which becomes the basis for the emergence of qualities, the novel elements of the universe. There is an all-pervasive continuity towards complexity which attains a simplicity as it becomes the ground for a more complex quality. Though Alexander seems to create a gulf between the categorical and the qualitative characters, really there is no gulf between the two orders, for the categorical process does not exclude emergence; really emergence is involved in the categorical process. Only time, in accounting for the emergent qualitative character, becomes supremely directive and non-relative, a cosmic *gendarme*, the God of all emergent processes. The relative universe of Alexander becomes suddenly a directive universe; he unconsciously invokes the traditional God of Power, the ultimate substance or a final category.

While considering the various categorical features of space-time, Alexander restricts himself to a limited number of categories. Is there any ground for this speculative hypothesis? Accepting this statement with 'natural piety', do we not find that in the categorical determinations there is an order among the categories? Alexander admits not only an order among the categories, he also admits that, in the final category of motion, the full tale of the fundamental determination of space-time is told, and motion is the 'totality' of what can be affirmed of every space-time.⁷ If there is 'order' and 'totality' in the relational determinations of the categories, they cannot exclude the ideal background they have taken for granted in the determination of their final category of motion. The gulf between process and emergence ceases to exist; they become continuous and pervasive processes; they cannot, therefore, exclude the pervasive and continuous mental process that governs process and emergence.

Returning to the notion of time as absolutely directive, may we not ask the reason of the shift of standpoint? Does he not presuppose in this new function of time the operation of some ideal element he arbitrarily excluded from his notion of bare spatio-temporality? In Alexander we find that the function of time in

6. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 189.

7. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 323.

relation to space is the same as that between mind and body,⁸ but there is no admission of an all-pervasive mind-body relation in his system. Possibly there is a lurking fear of idealism which prevents him from admitting a pervasive mental process by the side of spatio-temporal process. He thinks of his spatio-temporal matrix as an all-complete principle, and he has no hesitation in admitting that in space-time as a whole the total time is the mind of total space.⁹ In spite of his realism is he not sticking to an abstract idealistic principle of identity? Why does he not admit the operation of a separate principle other than spatio-temporality, if it is a concrete experience of the universe? Alexander oscillates between abstract idealism and abstract realism, and does not realize the significance of a broader realism which may accept distinction among the relational aspects of the changing universe.

Besides this broad scheme of Alexander, distinguishing the categorical from the emergent qualitative aspects of the universe, there is an analysis of mental experience from the perceptual to the religious. In this context of mental experience, he goes from a relational to a directive notion of mental experience; just as time, in its purely directive aspect, becomes the basis of all kinds of emergent qualities, so mind, in its directive aspect, becomes the ground of all superior experiences, like values and religious experiences, which have no basis in the relational field of spatio-temporality as the veridical perceptual experiences. Deity, or God, in Alexander's system, is beyond the values and religious experience. Mind is said to have a *nisus* or appetite beyond itself, and this appetite is the cosmic directivity of time to which mind subjects itself. The place of deity in Alexander's philosophy is associated with the directive aspects of time and mind; it is non-categorical, non-existent ideal experience. Alexander is in search of this ideal quality, and his God is a deficient, imperfect God if its mission is to attain this final end. We shall see, however, that this notion is highly speculative, an inheritance of idealism, an adoration of a logic of identity.

In the analysis of mental experience, Alexander is faced with the problem of the 'existentiality' of some of the mental experiences, and the non-existentiality or ideality of some other experiences. Perceptual experiences which are true are 'existential', false and illusory experiences are non-existential; they are due to some

8. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 38-9.

9. *Ibid.* Vol. II, p. 39.

peculiar or abnormal operations of the mind. The experiences of values — truth, beauty and goodness — are understood in terms of some socially approved standards; they are our appreciations of ideal standards in relation to a society of minds; such appreciations are non-existential, they belong to a different order of experience. How can we account for these different orders of experience unless we presuppose an ideal and cosmic mental process, which can distinguish and evaluate the distinct orders of experience in emergence? On the level of mental experience also a distinction between process and emergence must be maintained; but this cannot be accounted for by the changing characters of emergent mentality. Religious experience, Alexander says, is beyond the experience of values; it is the feeling of the cosmic *nisus*, the directivity of time that lifts one from the triviality and limitation of mental experience. But may we ask: What is the ground of this superior inspiration? Can time, a mechanical directive process, provide us with all the subtle and refined feelings and experiences of religious experience? Alexander suggests: Just as space is apprehended by intuition, sensible qualities by sensation, universals by thought, and values by appreciation, so God is apprehended cognitively through religious emotion by the assurance we call religious faith — but does this statement contain any germ of religious experience? Unless one presupposes something superior to and different from the mental experiences, on the one hand, and the spatio-temporal experiences, on the other hand, one cannot account for the emergent character of the religious experience. One must also think of this principle as cosmic and pervasive, like space-time and mind, to account for the constant factor of inspiration that levels up all occasions to that superior experience. We may conclude, therefore, that religious experience, like all experiences, is a process and emergence. Process and experience, the existential and ideal orders of experience, may be distinguished in every aspect of experience, but they are pervasive and cosmic characters. Alexander cannot do full justice to religious experience by an emergent deity. He must distinguish the mental and the religious experiences from the spatio-temporal experiences, and they must be given separate and independent status with spatio-temporality. They are not dependent on the directivity of time; they are themselves directive of the emergent experiences associated with them; the future of realistic philosophy is in the direction of the realization of distinct characters of experience in relation. Alexander's one-sided scheme is inadequate to meet the changing demands of contemporary realistic philosophy.

