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PROF. N. A. NIKAM

PROF. S. C. CHATTERJI



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


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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY



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Some Points in K. C. Bhattacharyya's "Concept of Philosophy"

BY

G. R. MALKANI

I

Philosophy aims at some kind of knowledge. The knowledge that we actually have, or knowledge about matters of fact, is recognised by all. It is the sort of knowledge, for the justification of which Kant undertook an inquiry into the possibility of knowledge and the limits of knowledge. Must philosophy remain barren if it seeks to go beyond these limits? Our contention is that philosophy begins where this kind of knowledge ends.

A higher kind of knowledge is possible. The basis of this knowledge is certain of our beliefs. A belief is an expression of our theoretic consciousness. What is believed may be later disbelieved. But if it is a genuine belief, there is a demand to turn it into knowledge. Our beliefs about matters of fact are justified, or can be justified, by actual knowledge. There are other beliefs, not relating to matters of fact, which cannot be so justified. They can only be justified, if at all, by a higher kind of knowledge, which is the business of philosophy

A belief is always expressible in language. Our beliefs about facts are expressible in judgments of the form A is B or A is thus related to B. This is thought in the literal sense. Other beliefs, which philosophy tackles, are expressible only in *apparent* judgments. They have the form of judgment (X is), but not the reality of judgment. Accordingly, they are not informative, but still they are significant. If judgments in the literal sense have *meaning*, these apparent judgments have *significance*.

Let us say that meaning is determined by an objective referent. The content of empirical thought has a necessary reference to what can be perceived. The latter may be said to constitute its meaning. We may therefore say that an empirical judgment has meaning. It has an objective referent. It refers to what is perceivable in the Kantian sense. There are however other judgments which have no such referent. We shall call the contents of such judgments 'speakables' only. They do not refer to anything beyond themselves which may be perceived. They are understood only with reference to their speaking. No speaking, no entities of the kind can ever be understood by us. They are therefore properly called speakables.

Everything that is believed, and that is the object of our theoretic consciousness, can be spoken. But speaking may be contingent or otherwise. It is contingent so far as the contents of empirical thought are concerned. For these have meaning in perception. Accordingly, we speak of them, we do not speak them. It is just the opposite with contents of philosophic thought. They are spoken, and understood only as spoken, not spoken of.

An empirical judgment is *literal thought*. It contains two terms and a relation. It is a synthetic judgment of experience. Contents which are believed, but which are not informatively spoken, are matters of *symbolistic thought*. Some one or more elements of a real judgment are missing there. It may be that there are two terms, S and P, that are literally understood, but the reality of the relation is missing. We say, for instance, that X is, where X stands for 'pure object' and is for 'being regarded objectively'. Here the subject is already implied in the predicate, and the judgment taken literally will be a tautology. We say nothing about the pure object except that it has objectivity. This is the grade of pure objective thought or contemplative thought.

It may be that only one term, namely S, is literally understood, but the other term P is only understood as a symbol of S, and so also the relation of the two. We say, X is, where X stands for I and is stands for 'being regarded objectively'. The judgment 'I am' is here not a tautology, but taken literally a self-contradiction. For I is understood enjoyingly or subjectively and cannot be contemplated objectively. As we commonly say, subject is not object. But since the judgment is an expression of a genuine belief, the object is only the symbol of the subject. The combination of the two is also symbolic. This is the grade of spiritual or enjoying thought.

It may be that neither of the terms S and P is literally understood or spoken, but only understood symbolically. In that case the whole judgment is symbolic of something that cannot be literally spoken or *spoken only as unspeakable*. This is the grade of transcendental consciousness or truth.

Philosophy deals with the pure object called the *self-subsistent*, the subject called *reality*, and what is beyond both subject and object called *truth*. We have accordingly philosophy of the pure object called metaphysics, philosophy of the spirit, and philosophy of truth. Says Prof. Bhattacharyya, "Metaphysics, or more generally, philosophy including logic and epistemology, is not only not actual knowledge, but is not even literal thought; and yet its contents are contemplated as true in the faith that it is only by such contemplation that absolute truth can be known." (5).

II

Are not our beliefs concerning entities other than facts, *irrational*, since the contents of those beliefs are not actually known and are not even knowable in the ordinary sense? In this connection, Prof. Bhattacharyya finds fault with the arrogance of science in thinking that every object is of *right* knowable. "The implicit belief of science is that the object is knowable and usable *as of right*. This belief is at least questioned in philosophy to which it is an expression of solipsistic self-sufficiency on the part of the subject... It is the wrong spiritual attitude of science towards the object rather than the so-called contradictions and problems left unsolved in scientific theory — as imagined by the philosopher but never felt by the scientist — that suggests the need for a speculative theory of the object. The concept of the self-subsistent object is the first corrective that philosophy offers of the predatory outlook of the scientific intellect. Realism is a philosophical faith among faiths: the creed of science, if formulated, would be a pragmatist form of solipsistic idealism." (21) Again he says, "The self-subsistence of the object implies that the object *may* be in its very nature inaccessible to the mind. To contemplate the object as what would be if there were no subject to know it is to believe that it may be unknowable, that in any case it is not known as of right." (20)

It is evident that we have *no right* to assume that the object is in its own nature knowable. When the idealists hold the view that the object is necessarily known and that it is *nothing* apart from the knowledge-relation, they are repudiating the notion of the real object or the object as it is in itself. If anything deserves to be known, it is this. But then it is an open question whether it

is ever accessible to our minds, and that when we know it we truly know it. Unless the object in some sense *reveals itself* to us for what it is, there is *no guarantee* of truth. This is the philosophic notion of truth, it is not the scientific notion. And so Prof. Bhattacharyya says, "The notion that truth freely reveals itself and is in itself a mystery or even that it is its very nature to reveal itself would be scouted by science as obscurantist or anthropomorphic. To science, there is nothing in the object to make it known; it is just what is known and though it may be unknown, there is no question of its being unknowable." (20). This is certainly subjectivism of an extended and subtler kind. Philosophy in its search for absolute truth cannot possibly accept it.

The object in itself may not be knowable by us unless it reveals itself to us. But is not this very speculative notion of the object in itself a result of the realisation that the creed of science would land us in "a pragmatist form of solipsistic idealism," and that this would be opposed to any possibility of real knowledge? It does not therefore appear to be "the wrong spiritual attitude of science towards the object" that is entirely at fault; for what is not related to some kind of knowledge and is not knowledge itself can only be nothing. It is the *theoretical inadequacy* of its approach to the object that is mainly at fault, and that leads to the formulation of the notion of the pure object, or the philosophic object. In other words, it is the irrationality of our belief in the ultimate truth of matters of fact, that leads to the more rational belief in the pure object or the self subsistent. It is in the interests of rationality itself that we entertain beliefs other than and higher than our beliefs in matters of fact. Can we now brand those beliefs as irrational?

It cannot also be argued that the contents of these other beliefs have no *meaning* for us, for they refer to nothing that we actually know. "We *mean* only in reference to a belief. . . . A meaning that is not a believed content of one grade is a believed content of a higher grade." (Footnote, p. 70). Meaning therefore should not be understood as referring "to an object that is perceived or imagined to be perceived." Such reference is part of the meaning of the content of empirical thought only, not of the content of the higher grades of thought. The content of the latter is speakable only. These speakables are understood with reference to their speaking, and have in addition the quality of being self-evident in a certain sense.

Facts are never self-evident. They are always *taken to be* for what they are. There is an element of *supposition* in them. They

are subjective in an important sense. There is no such element of supposition in the contents of philosophic thought. Although spoken, they are understood as independent of the speaking; and this independence is part of their very meaning. Prof. Bhattacharyya says, "In philosophy, that content that is spoken is not intelligible except as spoken. Pure thought is not thought of a content distinguishable from it and is accordingly sometimes regarded as a fiction, philosophy being rejected as a disease of speech. Philosophical contents are indeed believed to be self-evident and the self-evident means what is independent of the spoken belief of an individual mind. This independence of speaking is, however, a part of their meaning. It is not part of the meaning of a scientific content which is understood without reference at all to the linguistic expression of it." (9)

The self-evident is independent of the speaking, although it is only understood with reference to this speaking. According to this definition, there can be different kinds of contents that are equally self-evident. Further, these contents may even be negated in the elaboration of the self-evident. This view of the self-evident is different from the one we find in Advait Vedanta. There, the self-evident is understood as self-effulgent and self-revealing, or *sva-prakāśa*. It is that which, not being known, is still capable of being spoken as immediate (*ajñāté sati aparokṣa vyavahāra योग्यत्वम्*.) What is common between the two views is that the self-evident is fit to be spoken, but need not be spoken, being independent of the speaking of it. Also, it is not actually known or even knowable in the ordinary judgmental way. It is only knowable in a higher sense, and without thought. The Advaitic notion of the self-evident however entails that there cannot be two entities that are equally self-evident, and further that the self-evident cannot be negated, or even elaborated. It appears to us that this is also the real background to Prof. Bhattacharyya's views on the subject. For he regards the function of philosophy to be the self-evident elaboration of the self-evident, and further that it is only the content of the last stage of thought, namely truth, that cannot be further negated. He could not possibly hold those views if different contents were equally self-evident. For the self-evident is the limit of thought beyond which thought cannot go, either by way of elaboration or by way of negation.

We shall go a step further. The elaboration in question may be said to start from the lowest level of knowledge, namely that of common-sense or science. Our higher beliefs or metaphysical beliefs are not unrelated to our beliefs in matters of fact. We

begin at the bottom, the knowledge of fact. Unless we realise its inadequacy, the next stage does not emerge. The next stage is the implication of the earlier, and can be got out of it through philosophic analysis. It is pre-figured in the earlier and is the true meaning and substance of the earlier. We can even say,—if this, then not this, but that. If the world, then not the world, but Brahman. Philosophical method is in this sense, the self-evident elaboration not only of the self-evident but also of the given and the sensible. We need to construct a ladder of philosophic thought, self-evident at each step, from the world of facts to absolute truth.

The philosophical analysis mentioned by us will not be purely logical, but also psychological. Logic deals only with objective categories. Psychology has no such restriction. It will have to be a sort of rational psychology, or psychology of the soul or self; for this is in a way, as we shall see later, a pivotal conception for philosophy.

The process of higher knowledge that philosophy aims at is a single process of negation and reconstruction. We cannot therefore unconditionally agree with the view that there is a philosophy of the pure object, a philosophy of spirit, and a philosophy of truth. All that we can mean is that a set of different problems is considered at each level, but that there is an inner logic of the levels themselves pushing us forward and to the top. Alternatively, and this is in a way a more profound truth, the object of knowledge at all the different levels of thought is the same. Only we misunderstand it in one way or another. What we really know at the scientific level is not the so-called facts, but the pure object. The pure object that is really known is not known in the objective attitude and is no object at all, but non-distinct from the true subject. The true subject is not enjoyingly known, and is not any individual subject, but the very truth that is beyond both the subject and the object. In the end, the Absolute alone is known if anything is known anywhere. Or as it is said in Vedantic literature, "the true Self being known, everything else is known after It." This means that the knowledge of the Self is logically prior to all other knowledge, there being no other knowledge apart from It.

A distinctively spiritual activity in which philosophy has its rise, it appears to us, does not come spontaneously. It stems from religious faith. How this faith arises is a matter of social environment and nurture. We believe, because we find others believe. Suggestion and imitation are our only ways of acquiring new experience. However that may be, the specific theoretic activity of philosophis-

ing only arises when there is a consciousness of conflict between our empirical beliefs and our spiritual faith. We cannot keep the two realms apart and owe equal allegiance to both. They overlap and challenge our theoretic intelligence. It is not as though we can give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and give to God what belongs to God. Truth cannot be diversified or have *orders* or *levels* in it. That may be so when we are evaluating. That cannot be so when we are concerned to know *the truth*. There can be no secularity or spirituality in the realm of truth. We cannot say, this is truth, and *that also* is truth, unless the two constitute one realm or one order of related being. If it is sensible, it is all sensible. If it is supersensible, it is all supersensible. It cannot be both without conflict or contradiction. Truth is in this sense one and indivisible.

It does not appear that we have a number of different beliefs unrelated to each other. All we can say is that we have different forms of experience which we speak differently. It is the business of philosophy to relate these different forms, and exhibit the logic of truth immanent in those forms. There can be higher and lower in these forms, because while truth is one, error can have different grades of nearness to the truth. Prof. Bhattacharyya has exhibited these grades in the following manner. "The judgment 'A is thus related to B' may be denied in the form 'that A is so related is not fact,' 'that A is so related' is no judgment, but what is nowadays called a proposition. The enunciation and denial of it are possible because we have already a belief in the self-subsistent. . . . So we may deny the self-subsistent in the form 'object is not', meaning 'what is other than the subjective is not a definite or self-identical content for contemplation'—a recognised philosophical view that is not *prima facie* meaningless. The denial is possible because we already believe in the subjective as enjoyed reality. We may also deny reality in the form 'I (as individual subject) am not'. This too is *prima facie* intelligible and it represents a new grade of negation. . . . Even as individual, the I is enjoyingly believed and the denial of such a content is possible because we have already the notion of truth beyond reality." (13)

It appears to us that each earlier stage is negatable in turn for certain logical reasons which are peculiar to that stage, and which reflection renders explicit. Further, this negation, of necessity, leads to the formulation of the belief of the next higher stage, so that the latter is not an independent and unrelated belief which we accept in order to negate, but that it is the very true meaning and implication of the stage before it. Thus the last level will be found

to be the true implication and the truth of the first. The last is really last, because it cannot be negated and because there is no further implication which may be drawn out of it. It is its own truth. It is literally self-evident truth. The problem of truth here terminates. We have that ultimate certitude where doubt and error are not logically possible.

We may put the process of negation thus : (1) Every fact can be negated, because it is found on analysis to have the nature of a supposal, and because it has the logical pattern of every fact that is known to be illusory and known as cancelled. (2) When we negate the fact, we do not negate the *object as such*. We believe that there is something there, the real object, that appears illusorily to us. This appearance is ours and subjective, the object itself is not ours, but in itself. We believe in this object. (3) But this cannot be sustained. Every object derives its objectivity from the subject. It is *the other* of the subject, and is necessarily related to the latter. What is necessarily related to something else cannot be in itself. Thus the very conception of an object being *in itself* is self-contradictory. We negate the so-called real object. (4) But when we have negated the object as such, we have not negated the subject in relation to which the object is realised. We believe in the subject as what gives meaning and reality to the object. (5) But we cannot stop here. The subject is understood by us as an individual. An individual subject involves self-contradiction, because its individuality is not original to it, but is derived through some sort of identification with the object. An individual subject is an object of a kind. It is not the genuine subject, which is no object of any kind. We negate the individuality of the subject. (6) What is left is no content of any kind which we may believe, either in the objective or the subjective attitude. We cease to have an attitude ; and if we still believe, it is a pure symbolic belief. The theoretic inadequacy and uncertainty of belief is replaced by truth itself, which is self-revealing and self-evident, and not open to negation. It is the ultimate subject that has lost its individuality, but not its immediacy (*aparokṣatva*) and its self-revealing character (*svayamprakāṣatva*).

Prof. Bhattacharyya says, "What transcendental consciousness amounts to and whether it remains consciousness at all when it frees itself from speech or individual subjectivity we do not know, for absolute or impersonal consciousness is only conceivable in a negative way. All that can be said is that truth which consciousness starts by symbolising continues to be believed and becomes more and more self-evident as the symbolising accomplishes its

purpose." All we have to add is that when the individual subject is negated, symbolising has really accomplished its purpose, and truth has become literally and finally self-evident. There is nothing left to be negated, and no content that is merely believed or accepted on faith. The question cannot possibly arise whether transcendental consciousness remains consciousness at all. We have just to perform the reverse operation, and question whether what we ordinarily take to be consciousness is consciousness at all, or only an objectivised and perverted image of it. That which is self-revealing and revealing of everything else cannot be doubted to be consciousness in the truest sense, if there is one.

III

What now does Prof. Bhattacharyya mean by the pure object ? It is just what is contemplated in the objective attitude, but is not in any way a matter of actual or possible perception. The pure object has no content. Although therefore we make a distinction between that which is contemplated, the self-subsistent, and the contemplation of it, it is a distinction without any difference. To be pure object is to be contemplated objectively. Accordingly, 'object is' is no judgment, being tautologous as judgment.

The pure object is not a *thing to be known*. It has merely the form of objectivity. This form is not intelligible by itself. It has a necessary reference to the subject from which it is distinguished. Prof. Bhattacharyya says, "One may be conscious of the object without being explicitly conscious of the subject, but object has no meaning except as the negation and the symbol of the subject." (27) Again he says, "The subjective is a positive entity through which the objective is understood. The concept of the object is not reached through a generalisation of the objective facts of science. Were it not for the direct consciousness and speakability of the subject *I*, the concept of the object would never be precipitated. The first person *I* is the primary instance of a content that necessarily refers to the speaking of it. It is in fact the spoken that is understood as the same as the speaking function." (12)

If the object is understood in this most general sense as having only objectivity, what can metaphysics study about it ? What can we understand by the philosophy of the object ? Let us suppose that this object has content, not specific but general, and that it can be differentiated into classes in accordance with this content. Metaphysics might study the nature of *matter as such*. What is material substance ? Science does not ask such a question. It merely studies the *phenomena of matter*. Matter as such is no

sensible phenomenon. Similarly, it studies the phenomena of life, not *what is life*. Questions about the nature of life may be left to metaphysics. Similarly, the question *what is mind*, as distinct from the phenomena of mind, is a metaphysical question. We have in this way certain questions about the object, which science cannot study, but metaphysics can and should.


Let us suppose that this is the case. We certainly do ask questions, what is matter?, what is life?, what is mind? But can philosophy really answer these questions? If it can, what is the method it employs in answering them? Can it employ the scientific method of observation and experiment? If it can, then how is it different from science? Must we not conclude that matter is just the phenomena of matter, life is just the phenomena of life, etc., and that in the end there is no real question here? If there is any problem, it is a purely verbal problem. Philosophy merely analyses and defines the use of words like matter, life and mind, but does not answer any real question regarding these entities.

Prof. Bhattacharyya does not accept this view. For him, there is a fundamental distinction between science and philosophy; and at the same time, philosophy is not a purely formal or verbal business, but a spiritual business of finding the meaning of concepts not in the objective use made of them, but in the corresponding personal or spiritual experience. We shall elucidate. Science is interested in phenomena only, and it studies them without reference to the subject. The phenomena so to say constitute a closed circle for it. Any reference to the subject is not only uncalled for, but positively harmful. It is just the reverse for philosophy. The concepts of matter, life and mind must have their counterparts in certain subjective experiences and derive all their meaning from those experiences. And so Prof. Bhattacharyya says, "Metaphysics elaborates the concept of the object in reference to the subject. The rationale of any distinction of metaphysical contents is to be found in an introspectively appreciable distinction within spiritual experience. Even the crude division of the object into matter, life and mind is not intelligible as an inductive classification of fact. That these *are all that is* can at least never be known by induction...." (28) Matter, life and mind are only the symbols of an introspective or enjoyed content. The fundamental experience is that of "the simple or unitary consciousness of oneself living in the body." In other words, "no metaphysical concept is intelligible without reference to the subject or spirit which itself goes beyond metaphysics..... Metaphysical reasoning is only the *systematic exposition of symbolic concepts*, concepts that are implicitly taken as symbols of contents that are enjoyingly believed." (29)

Matter, according to this view, would be all that is sensibly known. Matter, as dead, inert, external, etc., is simply the *implication* of this form of subjective experience. Even the idea that matter can exist without being known is only the implication of sensible experience. There is no distinct or separate experience of so-called independence of matter. Philosophy has simply no meaning for matter unrelated to sensation. Similarly, life would perhaps be that part of matter which is felt *from within* in some form of organic feeling, and is amenable to internal control. We know life primarily in the form of our own body which we so feel. We can lift our arm as we can never lift a book lying before us. Lastly, mind would be all those phenomena which are not known in either of the above two ways, which are wholly personal, and known only introspectively. We can close all our senses, and yet be aware of our personal cogitations.

It is possible that all these distinctions of the object are in the end artificial, and have no theoretical value. The object outside, called physical, is not really public, but only a part of my experience, like the object inside. A dreamer makes a distinction between the external world, his own body and the mental world. But all these different kinds of object have really the same status. They are all parts of one experience, which we call ideal or mental. Philosophy, it appears to us, has no ground in subjective experience for any clear-cut and ultimate distinction of matter, life and mind. They all have objectivity no doubt in common. But that is all that they have, and the further distinctions are not philosophically tenable, and do not belong to the real object or the pure object as it is called. If metaphysics seeks to get at the latter, it should go past these distinctions and raise some other more significant question about the object as it is in itself. We shall indicate the nature of this question.

The object may be of any sort or variety. But all its content has a necessary reference to the subject. Its empirical content is sensible, and has reference to our perceptual experience. If we say, it is physical or mental, that too has a necessary reference to some aspect of our experience as embodied. We analyse this experience of being in the body, and symbolise it by certain objective characteristics, e.g., physical, mental, etc. If we say that the object is a pure object and that it has no content or character except that of objectivity, that too is only intelligible with reference to the speaking subject and as the *other* of the subject. Here the analysis of the object ends. There is left nothing in the object that is truly *in itself*. We say, A is thus related to B. What does



the copula 'is' here stand for? It does not stand for A, or for B, or for any third entity that can be isolated from both A and B. It stands for objectivity as such. We can put the above-mentioned judgment in the form, A related to B is, or X is. Here existence, symbolised by *is*, is conceived as tantamount to objectivity; X is means X is object. It is thus that Mādhyamika Buddhists could deny all existence. What they denied was *real objectivity*. In this, they were really at one with Advaitists. All objectivity can be negated. But can all existence be negated? That does not appear to be possible. We suppress existence in one form, it props up in another. As a matter of fact, we need not equate existence with objectivity. When we have suppressed all objects, the suppression itself is significant only as it is revealed by a higher principle which cannot be objectified.

We know existence or being when we know anything. We say, the jar is, the cloth is, (*san-ghatah, san-potah*). This being is common to all things. It is like the carpet which fills all time and fills all space. Things appear in it and appear only in the relation of identity with it. We can truly say that things come from being, stay in being, and disappear into it. For what can elude being and be anything? Objectively therefore if there is anything real, it is this *being*. It is therefore equated with Brahman, the Absolute. It is the *sat*-character of Brahman. All things are super-imposed upon being; being is not super-imposed upon anything. The relation of things to being is merely conceptual (*kalpita*) and therefore false. It is the relation of false identity, which means that the thing falsely identified or super-imposed is illusory in character. We can thus negate every object. We can even negate its objectivity which is a derived character, and cannot belong to things-in-themselves unrelated to the subject. What we cannot negate is being or existence. For if we negate that, there is nothing left as the ground of the negation. Being then is the only *pure* object, if there is one. It has not even objectivity, which is a relative character. The philosophy of the object should elicit pure being. It is the only fit object of knowledge; and although we know it in a way when we know anything whatsoever, there is still some misunderstanding about it which requires to be eliminated, in order that our knowledge of it should bear fruit. We still contemplate being in the objective attitude, and thus attach objectivity to it, which is an error.

We may also understand the pure object in the context of the Kantian philosophy. When we know an object, the object is something to us (it is phenomenal), but it is also grounded in what

is in-itself or things-in-themselves or noumenal reality. The latter is known (like the *sat*-character), but not *as given* or *as perceived*. In terms of perceptual knowledge, it is unknown and unknowable. But it would be wrong to say that it is not known at all. In fact, if anything is really known, it is the things-in-themselves. Only this knowledge is confused with the error of supposing that the things-in-themselves are objective and external to us. If we could eliminate this confusion, and recognise the things-in-themselves in their true character, we should not regard things-in-themselves as either unknown or unknowable. They will not be *things*, which have necessarily to be conceived objectively, but as pure being itself or as *sat*.

In any discussion of the object, we have necessarily to consider it as substance. If anything is or exists, it is substance. It is argued that we do not know the pure substance, we only know its qualities; or we only know the substance together with its qualities. But then do we not know the substance as it is in itself? Here again there is misunderstanding. If the substance is not its qualities, then we must negate the qualities of it. What is left will certainly not be object of any kind which we can contemplate in the objective attitude. And yet, it is because we thus contemplate it that it appears to be mysterious and elusive. There can certainly not be many substances; for the many substances are distinguished only by their qualities. When we negate these, we negate the *many-ness*, and we also negate the objectivity. What is left is one substance of the nature of pure being, which appears many through the qualities. The mystery about substance disappears if we cease to seek it objectively.

The philosophy of the object must seek to know the real object in the way appropriate to it. The errors of thought indicated above have to be dissipated. But the truth has yet to emerge. This takes us to the next step in the logic of truth, namely philosophy of the spirit.

IV

We have seen that the objectivity of the object or the mere object is only intelligible in relation to, and in opposition from, the self. The self is believed and spoken in the apparent judgment "I am". Here 'I' is literally understood. It is not contemplated as object. It is enjoyingly understood. But the word 'is' is not literally understood. It is only an objective symbolism for enjoyed reality. "...In 'I am', *am* meaning self-subsistent being as

understood in the objective attitude is the symbol of *I* as understood in the subjective attitude. Enjoying understanding of a content in fact is the consciousness of it as symbolised by an objectively contemplated meaning. Without such a symbolism, the subject would be enjoyed but not enjoyingly understood.....This enjoying understanding is what we mean or should mean by introspection. Introspection proper is a form of the theoretic consciousness that implies an abjuration of the objective attitude.....Its content is *I* or implies *I*, and although it is spoken as though it were an object, it is understood as what object is not, as the speaking subjectivity." (32)

We may be conscious of the subject as what the object is not. But this consciousness may easily be mistaken. It may be the sort of consciousness we have of an objective content. We may merely *hold* the subject as distinct from the object. This would not be introspection proper. "Introspection cannot be like the knowledge of objective fact, which leaves the fact unaffected in being". It involves a new achievement. This achievement takes the form of "the consciousness of *being* what is spoken." The *I* is not contemplated from outside or felt from outside. The consciousness of *I* is the consciousness of *being I*. This consciousness may properly be called spiritual introspection to distinguish it from what is called psychological introspection, "the objective consciousness of the mind as distinct from the *I*". (33) The new achievement in consciousness of being what is spoken (*I*), rules out the possibility of contemplating the *I* as object. Accordingly, "spiritual consciousness is not mere consciousness of reality but is reality itself." The consciousness of *I* and the being of *I* cannot be distinguished. There is evidently here a deepening of consciousness.

If what we have said is true, the real subject introspectively understood is not to be identified with empty subjectivity or a formal entity like Kant's unity of apperception. It is more properly a spiritual being or reality. As Sri Sankarāchāryya says in his introduction to the commentary on Brahma-sūtrās, there are only two kinds of beings, and these have nothing in common and are absolutely opposed to each other,—the intuition of the object or the not-self (*un-atman*) in the form of 'this' or *idam*, and the intuition of the self (*ātman*) in the form of *I* or *aham*. Nothing can have both these characters at the same time. Like darkness and light, they so completely exclude each other that they can never reside in the same locus. Reality can be either of them, but never both of them. It can never be subject-object, or Self-not-self, or *ātman-unātman*.

The *I* is enjoyingly understood. But in this understanding, the *I* is not only symbolised by the object as we have already seen, but it is also *identified* with some object or other. The *I* is never enjoyingly understood in its pure form. Something else, of the nature of the object, is enjoyed with it. It may be the body, physical or mental. It may be the other selves in society with whom I am in relation. It may be an over-individual Self, as in religion. "The subject *I* is never accepted by itself in spiritual introspection. Something else is always enjoyed along with the subject and enjoyed in reference to it. This may be of three grades. There is in the first place the explicit consciousness of the subject as *unaccountably* embodied, this being the same as the consciousness of the subject as what the object including the mind is not. Next there is the consciousness of personal relation to other selves. Lastly there is the consciousness of the over-personal self. The study of all contents enjoyed in explicit reference to the subject *I* may be called the philosophy of the spirit." (34)

Prof. Bhattacharyya traces all differences of logic and metaphysics to different systems of religious thought, or the highest form of enjoyed reality in spiritual experience. "Every system of religious philosophy has its distinctive theory of the spirit, metaphysics and logic. The fundamental differences within logical theory are, as has been suggested, implicitly metaphysical, those in metaphysics are implicitly spiritual and those in the theory of the secular spirit are implicitly religious. Religions may indefinitely multiply and indefinitely get synthesised. So is there indefinite scope for differences and syntheses in philosophical theory in general. There is no question of philosophy progressing towards a single unanimously acceptable solution. All philosophy is systematic symbolism and symbolism necessarily admits of alternatives." (37)

In the enjoyed reality of the self, there is the self and some form of the object enjoyed with it. This forces upon us the distinction between reality and the shadow of reality. The self is the reality; the object enjoyed with it is the shadow, since it is only intelligible in relation to the self. The body, whether physical or mental, has only a derived reality through its identification with the self in the enjoying consciousness. Without the identification, there would be no apprehension of it at all; and with it, it is like the shadow without substance. The body, however, infects the self with a certain objectivity, and thus gives it the character of individuality which it could not possibly otherwise possess. I take on the characters of the body, physical and mental, and say, "I am

such and such." There is an element of empty subjectivity in this apprehension of the finite subject.

Similarly, another self is just a shadow of myself. He is to me "another I". He is only understood in relation to the I, or as the shadow of the I. If there is no consciousness of myself, there can be no consciousness of another self either. That there should be "another I" is really a self-contradiction. For the I is nothing if it is not the speaking I that can never be contemplated objectively; and yet "another I" can only be contemplated as some kind of reflected object or shadow of I. It is through this contradiction that another self is really understood. It is the shadow of the real self, and yet the shadow infects that of which it is the shadow with its objectivity and so individuality. I know myself only as an individual self distinct from other selves. Here too there is an element of empty subjectivity.

It is only in the religious consciousness of an over-individual self, that the relationship is reversed. The over-individual self is still to us a self, understood on the analogy of I. Theoretically, He ought to be a shadow as well. But we reverse the relation. We, in a sort of non-theoretic and voluntaristic way, retain the over-individual self as the only reality, and render ourselves into a kind of shadow of the same. We resign ourselves, abnegate ourselves in the sole reality of the over-individual self, so that the latter alone is and we are consciously nought. Here our finitude and our exclusiveness give place to the enjoyed fulness of being. It is still enjoyed reality; only our self has become the shadow, not the centre of this reality, in a non-theoretic consciousness of self-abnegation.

Religious experience in the above sense does determine our philosophical orientation. But this experience has several different forms, higher and lower, almost endlessly. Different systems of philosophy can be constructed to symbolise this experience at its different levels. But is philosophy ultimately tied to a non-theoretic form of consciousness? Can we not bring religion into subordination to a theoretic form of consciousness, which is the main concern of philosophy? The over-individual self has been conceived as transcendent to the individual self enjoyed only in the non-theoretic experience of communion. But what is the theoretic position? How are the two theoretically related? This brings us to the Vedantic solution of the question. The over-individual self is theoretically, in fact and in reality, the very self of the individual. There is no difference. There is real identity. Only there is ignorance of this identity, and because of this ignor-

ance there are all kinds of false conceptions. We can remove this ignorance, which is at the root of all evil, through knowledge of identity, which becomes the highest goal of the philosophic adventure. It is the higher kind of religion, reached through knowledge of the truth. Truth alone can make us free (*jñānāt eva tū kai-valyam*). Philosophy in this sense, i.e. as knowledge of the truth, replaces religion as the fruition of the religious consciousness.

V

In religion, there is self-abnegation, but no self-denial or self-negation. The individual self, however, can be denied. It is possible to say "I am nought." This is possible, because the I has been individualised through its association with the object. Only an object or what is related to an object can be negated. We can say about it that it is unreal or that it is really not. We cannot say this literally about the subject. Nobody can say literally, *I am not*. The denier cannot deny the denier. But the subject can be denied if it has been individualised, and made presentable to thought through its objectification. The individual subject is only a pseudo-subject. It is subject falsely identified with the object and rendered into a kind of object itself. When we negate it, what is left is the pure subject not mixed up with the object in any way. This subject is truly unrelated. If there is anything absolute, it is this unrelated subject.

The unrelated subject may appear to enter into a relation. But the only relation it can enter into is that of false identity, or *adhyāsic tādātmya*. This relation is wholly external to it and leaves it unaffected. Any other relation, which really relates, would have to be an internal relation which determines that which it relates. Such a relation contradicts itself; for the terms have no being apart from the relation. Paradoxical although it may appear, only the unrelated can be related. But then how can the unrelated be related? It can never be *really* related. It can only be related through the relation of false identity, through which it appears to take on the character of that with which it is falsely identified. But for this very reason, it has an appearance which is illusory, and which can therefore be negated. If we perceive the appearance, we do not perceive the reality, and vice-versa. Such is the relation between the individualised subject or I, and that which is reached through the negation of I. When the individualised subject is negated, what is left is the true subject, which is unrelated and absolute. Prof. Bhattacharyya says in this connection: "The absolute is not the same as the over-personal reality that is enjoyed in religion. It means what the subject I is not, but the reality

of religious experience while it is enjoyed and symbolised by *I* does not mean such theoretic negation of *I*. Reality as apprehended in religion is indeed symbolised by *I*, but so far as it is expressed as a self, it is expressed literally. The positive character of the absolute, however, is expressible only by the negation of *I* (or more accurately by "what *I* am not") and as such is not literally expressible at all. If then we say that the absolute *is*, we mean by *is* not reality but truth. Reality is enjoyed but truth is not. The consciousness of truth as what is believed in but not understood either in the objective or in the subjective attitude, as not literally speakable at all but speakable only in the purely symbolistic way, is extra-religious or transcendental consciousness." (38)

The absolute, as we have shown above, is not some neutral kind of entity, which is neither subject nor object. What is distinct from both cannot be believed in and cannot be even symbolically indicated. It is as nothing. It has no meaning for us. What is neither contemplated in the objective attitude nor understood subjectively in the enjoying attitude, can only be the self-revealing subject, to which no attitude is possible. This is the real meaning of the transcendental subject. It is not nothing. It is self-revealing. The self-revealing is never known in any attitude, either subjective or objective, either as *I* or as *this*. Why is the absolute *only* symbolised by the *negation* of *I*? The reason is that the *I* is the penultimate form of subjectivity, the negation of which leads straight to the real and transcendental subject, that can only be known as self-revealing. For the same reason, the absolute is on the one hand the negation of *I*, and it is on the other an identity of the *real I* with the infinitely great or Brahman. *Aham Brahmasmi* (I am Brahman) is the only way of the higher knowledge. Truth would not be self-revealing in any other sense. Only the Ultimate Subject is self-revealing. It is therefore the truth.

Advait Vedanta of Sri Saṅkarācāryya holds the real Self to be self-revealing or *sva-prakāśa*. It defines this notion thus: "That is self-revealing which, not being known, is capable of being spoken as immediate." The independence of speaking is brought out by the phrase "capable of being spoken (*yogyatvam*)," which means that it need not be spoken. Only the self-revealing can be literally unspeakable and spoken only symbolically. But when it is so spoken, it is spoken as immediate or *aparokṣa*. The only word that signifies the immediacy is the word *I*. There is no other word that signifies greater immediacy. And lastly, the Self that is thus spoken, is not really known (*ajñāté sati*), being neither object nor subject. It is a kind

of super-subject. It reveals everything else, and also reveals itself. It is like the lamp which does not require another lamp to reveal it. By whom can the knower be known, (*vijñātāram aré kēna vijñāniyāt*)? If this is so, then any doubt that transcendental consciousness may not be consciousness is really unmeaning. Rather it is the only real consciousness. What we ordinarily call consciousness, i.e. empirical consciousness, is consciousness only in a borrowed sense, and is itself enjoyingly understood. It demands a higher-order-consciousness for its understanding, and this consciousness must be qualitatively different from it. We cannot also agree with any possible suggestion that any kind of neutral absolute may be self-revealing, just because it is believed in and understood as literally unspeakable. (39) If anything is self-revealing it must be absolutely immediate and of the nature of the *ātman*, or the Self.

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All philosophical questions should really stop here when truth-consciousness is reached. The process of negation has reached its limit. There is nothing left except self-evident and self-revealing truth. But Prof. Bhattacharyya tries to go further and sees in the absolute an alternation of forms. "To be even symbolically spoken, it has to be believed as a distinct. As a positive to which even the *I* is but a symbol and therefore nought in itself, it has nothing to be distinguished from and is absolute. If, then, truth as absolute is distinguished, it can only be distinguished from itself. There is no necessity in this self-distinction. The absolute may be truth or it may be what truth is not or it may be their mere distinction without any unity in the background, which means their indeterminate togetherness which cannot be denied to be either of them." Again he says, "The theoretic consciousness of truth, then, is the consciousness of truth as distinct from itself as freedom and from this identity-less self-distinction or value. The absolute as transcending the enjoyed reality of religion is positive being (truth) or positive non-being (freedom) or their positive indetermination (value)." (39)

It appears to us that this further step in the self-distinction of the absolute is quite gratuitous. If the absolute is self-revealing, it cannot have any distinction or self-distinction within it. For this would involve a certain amount of objectivity and so knowability which is incompatible with its self-revealing character. To recognise something as self-revealing or *svayam-prakāśa* is to abnegate all distinctions; for the self-revealing cannot be distinguished either internally or externally, and it cannot have different forms. We shall go further and say that there can be only one self-revealing

substance or truth; otherwise the self-revealing will just contradict itself. Even for self-distinction, objectification is necessary; and no kind of object can ever be self-revealing. The self-revealing is neither object nor subject, nor is it knowable except in a kind of knowledge, which is not judgmental, which does not involve the duality of knowledge, and therefore the duality of being and knowledge itself. As the Upaniṣads appropriately say, the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman (*Brahma-vit Brahma-eva bhavati*). We cannot therefore agree with the view that "the absolutes reveal themselves and the *I* appears trinal only as their shadow or symbolism." (40) The very notion of *absolutes* revealing themselves appears to us to be self-contradictory; for the moment this plurality is conceived, the absolutes have to be interpreted in terms of lower forms of experience that can be negated. "The theory of truth can be the theory of the other two absolutes also" (41) only on condition that the three absolutes are not really three, but are only so conceived by us in error. It is a real substantive unity in which all differences are conceptual only.

The Universal and its Instances—An Indian Interpretation

BY

SREENIVASA SAHU

Ravenshaw College, Cuttack

The relation between a particular thing and the qualities which inhere in it is an intriguing one. Broadly speaking, two different theories are advanced. One view is that the qualities are different from the particular instance and that the former inhere in the latter: and the other, that there is no such difference between them and that the instance itself is a *realization* of the quality or qualities. The former holds that the quality as a universal *exists in* the given instance, and the latter that the quality has *no existence apart from it*. This paper is an attempt at suggesting an answer in the light of Madhva's doctrine of *viśeṣa*.

I

Though both the views were current since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the question assumed importance with the acute analysis of Duns Scotus and his attempt at bridging the gulf between 'Substance' and 'Quality'. He taught "that the individual alone possesses full and complete substantiality in nature (*secundum naturans*); the universal as an independent form is a product of thought (*secundum intellectum*). At the same time, the essence itself, which necessarily assumes individuality in the real world or universality in the sphere of intellectual thought, is something in itself (*secundum se*)", and corresponding to these three kinds of reality, he draws three kinds of *distinction*. "While the *distinctio realis* exists between two really different things and the *distinctio rationis* multiplies our concepts of one and the same thing, to enable us to consider it from different (*distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*) or identical (*distinctio rationis sine fundamento in re*) stand-points, the *distinctio formalis à parte rei* points in one and the same individual substance to the objective form or formalities that are realized in it and really in it *independently of any intellectual act of ours*".¹ "Universality is thus conceived as in the things, not by

1. DeWulf: *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, pp. 372-373.

a distinction of reason as moderate realism would hold, not by a *distinctio realis* as extreme realism would hold, but by a formal distinction which still showed it to be identified with the series of individual things".² It follows from this that, according to Duns Scotus, a particular instance cannot be broken up into its essence and existence; and therefore, its mere existence has no meaning without the essence which manifests itself in different forms, "independently of any intellectual act of ours"; therefore, the distinction that we sometimes draw between, say, a man and his humanity is only a formal distinction.

This doctrine was more explicitly developed by William of Occam. "His position is that 'a man' for example is not a subject of predication characterised by humanity; on the contrary his being human is identical with his being a subject of predication and his being a subject of predication is identical with his being human. The Schoolmen generally said this of God—that God's existence was identical with His being God i.e., with His essence, but Occam held that even in finite substances existence and essence were the same."³

For Plato however the difference between existence and essence is real. This is the outcome of his analysis of the proposition into the 'noun' and the 'verb'—the former being the substantive and the latter the attributive. On the metaphysical side this corresponds to his doctrine of Ideas. Every particular thing is an imperfect image of an eternal Idea. The relation between them is one of substantive and attributive. The Ideas inhere in the particular instance. It is for this reason that Hartmann calls Plato's Ideas "pure qualities."

Aristotle realized that this analysis is not correct. Closer bonds were established by him between the two, and the universal attribute, say 'humanity', is not made something independent of the so-called substantive 'man.' It exists, according to him, *not only* in the latter, *but only* in the latter. He therefore "substitutes for the mere forms and genera of Plato, the entelechies i.e., forms which no longer exist unchangeably beyond the sensible world, but as active forces which particularize themselves."⁴

Modern logicians have realized the importance of Aristotle's analysis. For Locke, and among contemporary philosophers, Moore

2. Stokes—*Encyclopaedia of Rel. and Ethics*. Article on 'Universality'

3. E. A. Moody—*The Logic of William of Occam*. p. 263 ff.

4. J. E. Erdmann. *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 150.

and his followers, the quality-universal exists as such in the particular. Any particular instance is therefore the resultant of a number of determinants or conjuncts, just as a given molecule or particle of matter is the result of the combination of a number of further elementary particles. The particular is therefore something which *has* a quality or qualities. But this is not admitted by others. As Cook Wilson says, "The particular is not something which has the quality, it is the particularized quality. This animal is particularized animality."⁵ "The universal as genus is not something in the specific universals with the differentia *added* to it *as something outside it*, so that the two together constitute the species. The species are forms which the genus universal takes."⁶ Those who do not agree and hold that an "instance is an existence with a substrate outside the nature of the universal in which the latter inheres and that as such the relation is dyadic, identify 'particularity' with 'thinghood.'" Nevertheless such a misunderstanding does take place because the quality-universal, or the generic quality appears to be removed from the particular instance and to be a determinant of its character. And this is due in no small measure to the fact that this determining character is identified with a determinate quality which itself is an instance of a determinable or generic quality and whose characterisation therefore is effected through the very instance under investigation. Examination reveals that what characterises the given instance is not really the determinate or specific quality, but the determinable or generic quality. "When we ask what is this 'characterisation' of their characters which leads us to place the latter under a given determinable, we find that it is the character 'characterising their objects in a certain respect', that is to say, it is a relational character which refers us back to the object again. What this suggests is that the 'respects in which objects are to be characterized' to which determinable adjectives refer, are related to the objects not less but more intimately than the determinate qualities which 'characterise' them in the strict and proper sense of the term."⁸ It follows therefore

5. *Statement and Inference*, Vol. II, p. 713. cf. "The function of a universal is to appear itself unmediate and to manifest its own nature; its function is not to underly or to cause a sense-datum (or other object) to have an appearance of a certain nature".—R. Ainscough—*Mini*, Vol. xxxviii, 1929, p. 148.

6. *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 336.

7. J. R. Jones—*The Philosophical Review*, March 1949, pp. 162-168.

8. A. N. Prior—*Determinable, Determinates and Determinants*.—*Mind*. Vol. lviii, No. 229. Jan. 1949, p. 13. For example, if an object is coloured red, it is red colour that characterizes it.

that the separation of existence and essence, substance and quality i.e., the separation of the thing from the qualities that make it what it is, is not logical. There is thus no dyadic relation between them, and the distinction that we do draw is only, in the words of Duns Scotus, a formal distinction.

II

In India too as in Europe, this question came to be discussed in connection with the question of the relation between God and His attributes. According to the general theory of relations as propounded by the Nyāya, there is difference between the substrate and the attribute. Difference is the generic relation and all other relations are specifications thereof. It is admitted however that the relation between a substratum and the quality is not one of *samyoga* i.e., external or spatial separation, but is one of *samavāya* or inherence.

Theistic philosophers like Rāmānuja who accepted this general theory of the Nyāya, found it difficult to reconcile this with the unity or *akhandārthatva* of God or *Īśvara*. He therefore was constrained to explain this by introducing an unanalysable concept which he called *apṛthaktva* or inseparability. The essence of a thing therefore is its inseparable quality (*apṛthaksiddha viśeṣaṇa*). Similar is the relation between a substrate and the quality. We have however to remember that "according to Rāmānuja *apṛthaksiddhatva* or inseparability only means that at the time of the union (of the quality and the substance) the constituent elements cannot be separated. The mere fact that the expression "blue jug" apparently means the identity of the blueness and the jug without any qualifying suffix denoting "possession", should not be regarded as actually testifying to the identity of 'blue' and the 'jug'." ⁹

This explanation is however not accepted by Mādhva. According to Rāmānuja a relation can exist only 'between' two separate or different entities. (Even if we say that the relation does not exist between two things, but is 'of' one 'to' another, the separation between the two is essential). 'Otherness' is the basis of all relations. This 'otherness' or separation means non-coextension or mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*). Take for example, the relation between the-man-with-the-staff (*dandin*) and the-staff-the-man-holds (*dandā*). The relation between the two is one of mutual non-existence; that is, there is difference between them (*danda*

9. S. N. Dasgupta — A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. iv, p. 96.

vyatirikto danḍativad bhinnah). But the relation however is a separable relation. The absence of the staff does not bring about any change in the man himself. But the relation between 'man' and the quality 'humanity' is of a different nature, in so far as man cannot be man without humanity and the two cannot be conceived as separate. They are thus, though external to each other, non-separable (*apṛthaksiddha*). The relation between God and His attributes is of this nature.

The question that would arise in one's mind is, what does 'inseparability' mean in the context of difference? It may mean either: (1) real inseparability, or inseparability of existence or Being; in which case, it means the same as identity and difference; and this would be just an appearance or a mental construction;¹⁰ or, (2) inseparability of 'essence' only, in which case, there is real difference. The general metaphysical position of Rāmānuja leads to the first alternative, though instead of making difference an appearance as Samkara did, he makes it a dependent category (*aupādhika*).

In that case, the theory that the quality-universal is different from, and that it exists in, the particular instance falls to the ground.

Hence Madhva and his followers do not accept this interpretation of Rāmānuja. According to them there is no difference between the *guṇa* and the *guṇin*. For example when we say 'white cloth', it does not mean that whiteness is something that inheres in the cloth. For, we do make use of the expression 'white colour.' Here whiteness does not inhere in colour. White colour has significance only as a determinate of colour. That is, colour has co-extension with white colour (though the converse may not be true). And co-extension is certainly the mark of Non-difference. In this case, the fact that 'white colour' and 'whiteness' have the same denotation, shows that there is no real difference between them. (*loke ca śukla paṭa ityādyām. tatra śauklyasambandhāpekṣayā śuklatvamiti cenna 'śuklo varṇa' iti prayoga darśanāt. tathā ca śruti 'svata rūpam' iti . . . sāmānyādhikarāṇyam hi sarveṣām abheda pramāṇam*).¹¹ How is it then that in spite of this identity we find some difference between them? It is not a mere

10. If it is asked as to how two things can exist in the same locus, the answer would be that one is *dravya* and the other *adṛavya*; therefore the question of two entities does not arise. See Dasgupta. *Ibid.* p. 97.

11. *Tattvapradīpa* of Trivikrama.
P. 4

appearance for we do perceive it. Nor is it at the same time real, or a difference in Being, for we do not find mutual non-existence. It is therefore only a 'formal distinction' or *viśeṣa*. It has the same function as difference or as it is sometimes said is the substitute or deputy of real difference (*bheda pratidinidhi*).

Where there is no relation of difference it supplies the ground for such usage. It is this same *viśeṣa* which makes us use such propositions as 'Time is always present', 'Being exists' and so on. In such propositions the distinction between the noun and the verb that Plato thought essential to all propositions does not seem to exist, nor is there ground for Rāmānuja's distinction of *dravya* and *adravya*.

The *viśeṣa* is therefore not a relation that exists between two things, for if it is so, we are led to seek for another relation between the relata on the one hand and the relation itself on the other, and so on *ad infinitum*.¹² And since difference is the most generic relation, in explaining a given relation we are led always to posit difference between this relation and the relation of difference that exists between them.¹³ Hence if *viśeṣa* is not a relation, what is it?

Is it something intelligible or not?

The answer is that it is the principle of plurality and that it is, therefore, not something different from the characteristic which is "related" through *viśeṣa*. This emphasis on the principle of plurality seems to be the greatest contribution of Madhva to Indian Philosophy. It appears that the story of philosophy has been a little lop-sided, greater pains having been taken to discover the principle of unity in what appears to us to be diverse, and very much less to find the principle of diversity in what appears to us to be a unity.

A reputed scholar in a recent book¹⁴ has suggested that "the Madhvas were more or less forced to this position of accepting the *viśeṣas*, as they could not accept the *samavāya* relation of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, which is rejected by the *Brahmasūtras*." This appears to us to be a wrong interpretation of the situation. *Viśeṣa* is not a substitute of *samavāya*, for their natures and functions are

12. cf. "if two things are related then this fact consists of their being related and is not explained by the existence of a relation between them". R. Ainscough—loc. cit. p. 141.

13. *Viśeṣa pratītiṣeṣa paṭasya bhedaṭṭivat. na hi paṭād bhedasya bhedaḥ anavasthānāt Tattvapralīpa*.

14. S. N. Dasgupta—*A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. iv, p. 127 fn.

different. For one thing, as the same writer says, "each whole or unity may be said to possess as many *viśeṣas* as there are qualities through which it expresses itself and each of these *viśeṣas* is different from the others according to the difference of the quality with which it is associated."¹⁵ But this is exactly what is denied by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. They argue that it is cumbrous to assume an infinite number of self-samenesses as the relations in question. Therefore for the sake of simplicity, *samavāya* or inherence which is one, has to be admitted. The plurality of qualities could therefore stand in one selfsame relation.¹⁶ Then again *samavāya* was introduced to connect or relate two discrete things and therefore the criticism that it leads to infinite regress¹⁷ is justified. *Viśeṣa* on the other, is introduced to distinguish or differentiate within the same locus. It has therefore been called the *bhedapratidinidhi* or the formal distinction within a given relatedness.

It follows therefore that the quality-universal in any given case, though apparently existing apart from the 'Substance' in which it inheres, does not really do so. The particular is a realization of the Universal and the latter cannot exist in any other form except as particulars. That in spite of this non-difference, we do speak of the quality as existing in something is due to *viśeṣa*. The latter is thus the principle that differentiates intra-individual characteristics; or, in other words, it is the principle of plurality. And therefore the particular instance is not something outside the universal which determines the character of the former, but is the universal as determined. We thus come back to the Aristotelian doctrine brought into prominence by Duns Scotus and William of Occam.

15. loc. cit.

16. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, 11.

17. *Tarkatān, ava, pariccheda, Samavāyavāda*,

The Jaina Conception of Fallacies

BY

PROF. RAJENDRA PRASAD, M.A.

The Jaina conception of fallacies is relative to their conception of the nature, number, object and result of Pramāṇas. The nature of Pramāṇa is such that it reveals itself as well as its object which was not known or definitely ascertained before.¹ Pramāṇas are two in number, namely, Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. The objects of Pramāṇa are things characterised by two kinds of properties, dravya and paryāya, or sāmānya and viśeṣa.² But sāmānya and viśeṣa cannot be objects of Pramāṇa when one is taken independently of the other, or even when both are taken together but independently of the thing to which they belong. As a result of Pramāṇa the knower is freed from false knowledge, acquires desirable objects, shuns undesirable ones and turns indifferent to other objects.³ The result of Pramāṇa is in one sense identical with the Pramāṇa while in another sense it is different from the Pramāṇa. It is identical with the Pramāṇa in the sense that the self is also changed in the form of the result when it is changed in the form of the Pramāṇa ; it is different from the Pramāṇa in the sense that the Pramāṇa is taken to be the instrumental cause of the result which is taken to be its effect. Now a fallacy is the semblance of Pramāṇa. It is a defective or vitiated Pramāṇa, it looks like a Pramāṇa but in reality it is not so. Therefore, fallacies being defective Pramāṇas, the Jaina thinkers present a four-fold classification of fallacies corresponding to the nature, number, object and result of Pramāṇa. These main classes are : Pramāṇābhāsa, Saṅkhyābhāsa, Viśayābhāsa, and Phalābhāsa. Of these four, Pramāṇābhāsa is shown to comprise a very complicated net-work of classes and sub-classes.

Pramāṇābhāsas arise when a Pramāṇa is vitiated by the defect of non-cognizance or non-establishment of the object of knowledge, or by that of knowing an object already known, or by that of doubt. The fallacy of the first kind is called Asva-Samvidita, the second Grihitārtha-darśana, and the third Saṁśaya. Saṁśaya is of three

1. Svāpūrvārtha vyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam — Parikṣāmukham.
2. Pramāṇasya viśayo dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu — Pramāṇa mīmāṃsā.
3. Yāḥ pramimite sa eva nivrittajñāno etc., — Parikṣāmukham.

kinds: *Samśaya*, *Anadhyavasāya* and *Viparyaya*. *Samśaya* takes place when there is a doubt about an object as to whether it is A or B. Here the mind wavers between two ideas but finds itself incapable of deciding as to which of these alternatives is the right one. *Anadhyavasāya* arises when an object is known simply as a 'that' and not as a 'what.' The knower knows only this much that the known is, but he does not know what it is. When a blind man touches a thing which he had not touched before, he knows that he is touching something but does not know what this something is. *Viparyaya* occurs when an object is taken to be just the contrary of what it really is. It is illustrated in the case of a diseased man when he tastes sugar and finds it bitter.

*Pramāṇābhāsa*s are again sub-divided into *Pratyakṣābhāsa* and *Parokṣābhāsa*, as *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa* are the two *Pramāṇas*. The essence of *Pratyakṣa* is clearness which means the absence of any intermediate knowledge. Therefore *Pratyakṣābhāsa* arises when an act of knowledge which involves an intermediate knowledge is regarded as *Pratyakṣa*. This fallacy is committed by the Buddhists who regard the knowledge of fire from the sudden perception of smoke as a case of *Pratyakṣa*. Here the knowledge of fire requires a previous knowledge of smoke which is given through perception. Therefore it cannot be regarded as a case of *Pratyakṣa*, but as an *ābhāsa* of it, which seems to be *Pratyakṣa*, though it is not really *Pratyakṣa*.

Parokṣābhāsa has got several sub-divisions corresponding to the various sub-divisions of *Parokṣa* into *Smṛiti*, *Pratyabhijñāna*, *Tarka*, *Anumāna* and *Āgama*. Hence the fallacies coming under *Parokṣābhāsa* are: *Smarāṇābhāsa*, *Pratyabhijñānābhāsa*, *Tarkābhāsa*, *Anumānābhāsa*, and *Āgamābhāsa*. *Smarāṇābhāsa* arises when we recollect A while we should have recollected B. When somebody remembers Devadatta where he should have remembered Jinadatta, he commits such a fallacy. *Pratyabhijñānābhāsa* takes place when out of two similar things one is mistaken for the other (as in the case of twins, or when in case of two identical things one is recognised not as identical with but as similar to the other, for example, when I see A and failing to recognise A as A I declare that 'it is just like A.') *Tarkābhāsa* occurs when concomitance is asserted in objects which are not actually concomitant. In *Tarka* we have a relation of inseparability between two objects, for example, smoke and fire, but when we regard objects not so connected as inseparable we commit the fallacy of *Tarkābhāsa*. *Anumānābhāsa* arises when any of its three factors (*Pakṣa*, *Hetu*, and *Dṛṣṭānta*) is defective. Therefore it splits up into three sub-divisions, namely, *Pakṣābhāsa*,

Hetvābhāsa and *Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*. *Pakṣābhāsa* is of two kinds, *Aniṣṭa* and *Vādhita*. The *Pakṣa* must have a *Sādhya* which is *Iṣṭa* (i.e. acceptable or desired) and therefore when it is not so, it involves the fallacy of *Aniṣṭa Pakṣābhāsa*. The *Pakṣa* must also have a *Sādhya* which is *Avādhita*, that is, unopposed by any other *Pramāṇa*. Hence a *Vādhita Pakṣa* is a fallacious *Pakṣa* and this fallacy is called *Vādhita Pakṣābhāsa*. It is of five kinds, namely, *Pratyakṣa-Vādhita*, *Anumāna-Vādhita*, *Āgama-Vādhita*, *Lokavachana-Vādhita* and *Svavachana-Vādhita*.⁴ *Pakṣābhāsa* is of the *Pratyakṣa-Vādhita* type when what is asserted about the *Pakṣa* is opposed by *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa*. If somebody argues that fire is cold as it is a substance like water, he commits this fallacy because the perceptual experience of fire is opposed to the statement 'Fire is cold.' The fallacy of *Anumāna-Vādhita* occurs when another statement about *Pakṣa* contradicting the present one is proved by another valid inference. If somebody argues like this:

Sound is not modifiable,
Because it is produced
Like a jar,

he commits this fallacy because another valid inference proves that sound is modifiable, e.g.,

Sound is modifiable,
Because it is produced
Like a jar.

The fallacy of *Āgama-Vādhita* is committed when something is said about the *Pakṣa* (the minor term) which is opposed to *Āgama* (i.e. Scriptures). If I say that 'Dharma will lead to pain' where 'Dharma' is the *pakṣa*, I shall commit this fallacy because this statement is contradicted by *Āgama*; for *Āgama* lays down that 'Dharma will lead to pleasure and not to pain.' The fallacy of *Lokavachana-Vādhita* is illustrated when somebody says about the human skull (where it is the *Pakṣa*) that 'it is clean', because the popular view (*Lokavachana*) does not regard it to be so. If somebody says that his mother is barren he commits the fallacy of *Svavachana-Vādhita* because his statement is contradicted by his own words (*Svavachana*). The very fact that he is arguing (that is, saying that his mother is barren) proves that his mother is not barren; had she been barren he should not have been born, what to speak

4. *Vādhitah pratyakṣānumānāgama lokasvavacanaih — Parīkṣāmukham.*

of arguing and discussing. Thus the very act of speaking disproves what is spoken.

Hetvābhāsa is the fallacy of the middle term. It is of four kinds: Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikāntika and Akiñchitkara. The fallacy of Asiddha Hetvābhāsa arises when the existence of the Hetu is wanting in the Pakṣa or there is doubt with regard to its existence in the Pakṣa. When it is wanting in the Pakṣa, the resulting fallacy is called Svarūpāsiddha Hetvābhāsa; and when there is indefiniteness about its existence in the Pakṣa, the fallacy is termed as Sandigdhāsiddha Hetvābhāsa. When anybody argues that 'Sound is impermanent because it is an object of visual perception', he commits Svarūpāsiddha Hetvābhāsa because 'the property of being an object of visual perception', which is the Hetu here, is wanting in the Pakṣa, namely, Sound. Sound is heard, and not seen. The fallacy of Sandigdhāsiddha Hetvābhāsa arises out of uncertainty about the Hetu. When we are not definite as to whether the thing coming out of the hill beyond is smoke or vapour, and on the basis of such an indefinite Hetu we argue that there is fire in the hill because something like smoke is coming out of it, we commit such a fallacy. The Viruddha Hetvābhāsa is said to be committed when the Hetu (the middle term) is such that it has got a relation of universal concomitance with the opposite of the major term, and not with the major term itself. It is illustrated in the following example:—

Sound is imperishable,
Because it is caused;

the middle term, 'the property of being caused' is inseparably connected with the 'perishable' which is the opposite of the 'imperishable' (the major term). The fallacy of Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa arises when the Hetu is such that it is found where the sādhya is, as well as where it is not. When a villager argues that there is smoke because there is fire, he commits this fallacy because the middle term 'fire' can be found where there is smoke as well as where there is no smoke as in red-hot iron. Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa is that kind of fallacy in which the middle term is useless. It is divided into two subclasses, Siddhasādhana and Vādhitā-Viśaya.⁵ The fallacy of Siddhasādhana is illustrated in the following example:

Sound is audible
Because it is a sound.

5. See Nyāya-Dīpikā of Abhinava Dharmabhūṣaṇa, p. 102.

Here the fact that sound is audible is accepted by everybody and therefore the attribute of being a sound which is used to prove the audibility of sound is useless. The fallacy of Vādhitā-Viśaya is the same as that of Vādhita Pakṣābhāsa. The last fallacy of Anumāna is Driṣṭāntābhāsa. As a matter of fact the Jaina logicians do not recognise the necessity of example in an inferential process, but they point out that it is unnecessary only for a man well-versed in thinking, while for the uninitiated or the beginner it is quite necessary. The fallacy of Driṣṭāntābhāsa arises when the example (Driṣṭānta) fails to serve its function as a suitable illustration. It is of two kinds: Anvaya and Vyatireka.

Among the fallacies of Anumāna, Māṇikyanandi includes one more, namely, Bālaprayogābhāsa. He points out that out of the five propositions of a syllogism as mentioned by the Hindu Nyāya, only Pratijñā and Hetu are necessary while the rest three are needed only when one has to make an inference clear to some children. Now the fallacy of Bālaprayogābhāsa arises when a logician while arguing with children omits one or more members of a syllogism, or alters their order; because by doing so, the syllogism ceases to be clear to the uninitiated or children.

The last fallacy under Parokṣābhāsa is Āgamābhāsa. Āgama or testimony is a knowledge of objects derived from a reliable person. This knowledge will be fallacious when the source of testimony is not reliable or is liable to deceive people.

With Āgamābhāsa, the fallacies under the head of Pramāṇābhāsa come to a close.

The fallacy of Saṅkhyābhāsa is a fallacy concerning the number of Pramāṇas. The Jaina logicians point out that this fallacy is committed by one who denies any of the Pramāṇas mentioned by them, or classifies them in a different order attaching different meanings to them.⁶ Such a fallacy is committed by the Cārvāka who denies Parokṣa Pramāṇa, and by the Hindu logicians who present a classification of Pramāṇas different from that of the Jains' classification into Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa.

The fallacy of Viśayābhāsa arises out of a misconception about the object (Viśaya) of knowledge. We commit this fallacy when we hold that the object of Pramāṇa is Sāmānya only or Viśeṣa only or both in isolation from things.

6. For the arguments in defence of the Jaina classification of Pramāṇas, please see the author's article. 'A critical study of Jaina Epistemology,' published in the Jaina Antiquary, January, 1949.
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The fallacy of *Phalābhāsa* arises out of the wrong understanding of the relation between a *Pramāṇa* and its results. We commit this fallacy when we say that the result is absolutely identical or absolutely different from the *Pramāṇa*. We cannot regard the two as absolutely identical, because we shall not be able then to distinguish in any case the one from the other, whereas in actual practice we do sometimes distinguish the one from the other. We cannot also regard the two as absolutely different, because then we shall have to say that the result of a *Pramāṇa* of one's own soul is different from one's own soul, but this will be simply absurd. Therefore the two extreme views are *Phalābhāsa*; and the right view is, the Jaina thinkers point out, that which regards the result and the *Pramāṇa* both as identical with, and different from, one another according as they are judged from two different points of view, which we have stated in the very beginning.

A Sketch of a Theory of Poetry

(Based on the Indian Theories of *Rasa* and *Dhvani*)

BY

PRABHAS JIVAN CHAUDHURY

1. Poetry is distinguished by a delight¹ of an extraordinary kind as its immediate end.²

This extra-ordinary delight (called *rasa* in Sanskrit poetics) distinguishes poetry from all other kinds of writing (excepting drama, novel and short-story which as literary arts have much in common with poetry).

This delight is different from the delight in knowledge of truth (as derived from scientific and philosophical literature), from the

1. *Longinus on the Sublime* speaks of this peculiar delight as transport and sublime joy (see Saintsbury's translation in his *Loci Critici*) Wordsworth, Coleridge and others call it pleasure, but they confuse this aesthetic pleasure with ordinary pleasure which has undesirable association with sensuous enjoyments, luxury and amusement which have so offended moralists like Tolstoy and Coomaraswamy. The word pleasure, moreover, excludes the relish of tragic emotions and, so, some have replaced it by aesthetic enjoyment. And way, the delight from art must be distinguished from other kinds of delight.

2. Poetry is defined in terms of its end because the latter is peculiar to poetry (of course, as a matter of fact, in common with the other fine arts). An extraordinary delight is the differentia of poetry (or fine art) distinguishing it from other products of human skill or activity, scientific and industrial works and handicrafts. Poetry is distinguished from other fine arts, which have this delight as their common end, by way of the means to the end, that is, the medium for achieving the end. This medium for poetry is words, spoken or written; and as noted before, in this poetry is not distinguishable from drama and other literary arts. This distinction is not philosophically important, and as held by Shelley, it is superficial or 'vulgar'. Poetry is not defined in terms of beauty for this concept has many associations and is itself to be defined. The peculiar delight (*rasa*) is a well-defined character on which we more or less agree as it is a distinguishable felt quality. It may be defined as the peculiar joy we experience while contemplating a feeling. Such a contemplation is not philosophical introspection but a spontaneous objectification of a feeling made possible by the suggestions in poetry. Though discursive reason is not operative in this contemplation, it is not an extra-intellectual process, rather conscious and unconscious intellectuality are involved in it. Now beauty may be defined in terms of this extra-ordinary delight, *rasa*. The beautiful is that which produces this delight in the beholder.

delight in goodness (as found in moral and religious literature), and from the delight in feelings and sensations such as love, conquest, enjoyment of worldly goods, utilitarian satisfaction, etc., (as found either in life or in realistic literature which copies life).

In poetry, however, this characteristic delight is often found blended more or less with other kinds of delight.³

Such poetry is as valuable literature, no doubt, as "pure" poetry, yet a poem is a poem by virtue of its characteristic delight (*rasa*) and not because of its delight in general.

2. This extra-ordinary delight, *rasa*, characterising poetry, is delight in expression⁴ of sentiments.⁵

That poetry expresses sentiments is well recognised. Wordsworth⁶ and Rabindranath Tagore⁷ have stressed the essentially human character of poetry. Even in bare descriptive poems the poet suggests human sentiments; the world is seen through a film of feelings and emotions.

Expression of sentiments when successful always produces a characteristic delight.

3. For instance, in moral, religious or philosophical poetry. In much modern aesthetical literature the functional value of art is recognised as a part of its aesthetic value and, so, propaganda poetry is recognised as art proper. The distinction between the useful and fine arts is regarded by some as false and misleading. (e.g. Anatole France and John Dewey). We admit that the fine and the useful are more or less interwoven in art-objects which are seldom either purely aesthetic (i.e. contemplative) or purely useful; but we wish to point out and insist on the clear distinction between the aesthetic value (consisting of *rasa*), and non-aesthetic values (intellectual, moral, utilitarian etc.).

4. Our theory is not Croce's expressionism. Expression is not a non-intellectual activity for us.

5. This includes feelings, emotions and moods.

6. Wordsworth writes: "Poetry relates all things to human emotions". "The appropriate business of poetry is to treat of things not as they are but as they appear, not as they exist in themselves but as they seem to the senses and to the passions". (*Essay supplementary to Preface, 1815*).

7. Tagore Writes: "The World outside us, when it enters into our consciousness, becomes quite another kind of world. Though its form, colours, sounds and the rest remain as they are, they become tinged with our approval and disapproval, our wonder and fear, our pleasure and pain; and thus variegated with the manifold qualities of our feelings, this world is wrought into one that is intimately our own.... But having taken its birth, this living world would fain be saved from dissolution, and so it longs to be given objective permanence. Hence, through the ages man's urge for literary expression". (*Function of Literature, Visva-Bharati Quarterly, May 1935*).

Wordsworth⁸ speaks of it as 'an overbalance of pleasure' and Shelley⁹ also recognises this. Sentiments when not expressed but actually felt in life, that is, suffered, are either pleasurable or painful, and the pleasure and the pain are different in taste from those experienced when the sentiments are expressed. Then they are actively contemplated and are touched and transformed by a characteristic delight. (How this happens we shall see in § 4.)

Expression of a sentiment uniquely determines the particular shade of it, though the class (of sentiment) is vaguely felt before expression is completed, and roughly classified under and denoted by a certain term, such as, pity, wonder, love, reverential fear, etc. Every expressed sentiment is a finished product and cannot be rendered into other words. So rendered it loses its original character and turns into a different thing. Thus the form and content of poetic expression, that is, its means and its end, expression and the meaning, are indissolubly fused together.

In this poetry differs from other kinds of composition where the subject-matter may be rendered into other words without loss to it, where expression is separable from and secondary to the matter expressed.

3. Expression in poetry is immediately or apparently of some object or event (imaginary or real), thought or specific feelings, or a combination of them, but it is ultimately of some dominant sentiment or transcendent mood over and above them. Poetic expression has thus grades or layers of meaning, each higher one transcending yet growing out of the lower.

Illustration: Wordsworth's *Yew Trees* describes objects, his *Nutting* some event, but each expresses ultimately some sentiment uniquely determined by it and only vaguely hinted at by such words as love and awe towards nature. Wordsworth's *Ode to the Intimation of Immortality*, Brownings *Rabbi Ben Ezra* or one of Donne's argumentative pieces expresses a thought, but beyond the thought and growing out of it is an unmistakable sentiment, an emotional attitude, which may be roughly indicated by certain terms which cannot reproduce it.

8. Wordsworth says that objects in nature excite in the poet sympathies "which, from the necessities of his nature, are accompanied by an overbalance of enjoyment". "The end of poetry is to produce excitement in co-existence with an overbalance of pleasure" (*Preface to Lyrical Ballads 1800*).

9. Shelley wrote, "Poetry is ever accompanied with pleasure" (*Defence of poetry*).

Again the immediate specific feelings expressed by a dramatic piece (e.g. Owen's *Strange Meeting* or Tennyson's *Maud* or one of Browning's monologues) express further meanings they have, overtones of meaning so to say, and this meaning is nothing but a particular sentiment uniquely determined by the expression itself.

As just noted, (in 2), expression of a sentiment uniquely determines the sentiment which cannot be stated in other words and which exists only in a vague and general form before the expression. Each poem builds up and defines a particular sentiment though we, for rough classification, group poems according to the sentiment depicted, love, heroism, patriotism, love of nature, devotion to God, etc.

Because of this fact no sentiment can be exhausted by poets and rendered stale or obsolete. Poets will find new expressions of love and heroism, pity and terror, and other dominant human emotions, and will offer fresh and vital poetry just because a new expression means a new sentiment though belonging, for rational purposes, to some old pigeonhole labelled love, heroism etc. (This point has been recognised by Aristotle,¹⁰ Tolstoy,¹¹ Tagore¹² and Ananda-Vardhan.¹³)

4. A sentiment is expressed through suggestion which is an indirect mode of expression.

Sentiments are not concepts and, so, cannot be properly represented by words. Nothing concrete is represented by such words as love, pity, terror, awe, etc. Each of these only conveys some broad and vague idea of a general sentiment which has many varieties and mutual differences. Even such more specific words as reverential love, intellectual love, passion, affection etc., cannot comprehend the individual character of a sentiment which can only be felt and conveyed through suggestion.

Illustration : Browning's *Incident of the French Camp*. An event is depicted. Napoleon and one of his soldiers are described and their meeting related. Through these the soldier's heroism and loyalty and Napoleon's love for his soldier are suggested which

10. Aristotle says that though the subjects of tragedy are limited tragedies will continue to be written each in a new way (*Poetics*, p. 53. Bywater's Trans.).

11. See his *What is Art* (1896) chap. 17. (Trans. A. Maude)

12. See *Sahitya* (1341 B.S.), p. 77.

13. See *Dhvanyaloka* IV 10.

could not be conveyed by such abstract concepts as love, loyalty and heroism. "The chief's eye flashed" when he heard that Ratisbon was conquered, "But presently softened itself, as sheathes A film the mother-eagle's eye. When her bruised eaglet breathes." The description of Napoleon's eyes suggests his love and pity for his soldier, the changes in the eye are bodily consequences represented by words while the feelings causing them can be suggested through association. Again, the heroism and loyalty of the soldier is suggested through his behaviour: his "breast was all but shot in two", yet he rode all the way to his chief who saw his wound and said, "you are wounded?", "touched to the quick" the soldier replied, "I am killed Sire? And his chief beside, smiling the boy fell dead".

There are different modes of suggestion. (a) The Characters, Napoleon and the soldier, call up certain associated sentiments. The former are called *ālabhāna vibhāvanas* in Sanskrit poetics, meaning supporting objects, on which are built up the sentiments. (b) The natural background, the war-field, the little mound on which Napoleon is standing and the distant walls of Ratisbon—these suggest certain sentiments. These are exciting causes (*uddipana vibhāvas*). In love poems, moon-lit nights, birds chirping, trees murmuring in soft winds, etc., are exciting causes. (c) The bodily features, gestures and postures, etc., suggest the sentiments which cause them. These are called *Anubhāvas*, consequential objects. In love poems tears, lowering of the eyes in shyness, blushing etc., are *anubhāvas*. (d) Certain feelings appear and pass away in quick succession which also suggest and nourish the dominant sentiment of a poem. These are called *vyabhichāris* or accessories. Thus Napoleon's anxious thought about the battle at Ratisbon, his sudden joy at hearing the news of victory and his pity on seeing the soldier's wound,—all suggest and nourish his love of conquest and love for his soldiers. The soldier's smiling face, his animated announcement of victory and his proud reply suggest his loyalty and heroism. In love poems such feelings as doubt, despair, jealousy, passion, suffering, etc., serve as accessories. These more or less simple feelings serve as means of expression for the more complex, richer and ineffable feeling which is the dominant sentiment or prevailing mood of a poem. (e) Sometimes a thought or an argument suggests a sentiment. Thus in Browning's *Last Ride Together* the hero's thoughts suggest his sentiment towards life and love. They suggest the high philosophical attitude of his mind which is led to contemplation by failure in love. Ultimately the thoughts reinforce the sentiment of love. So are the thoughts in *Evelyn*

Hope and in Donne's argumentative poems, e.g. *Good-Morrow* and *Ecstasy*. Portia's speech on mercy is a thought that vitalises the sentiment of mercy; and Keats' thought, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty" consolidates the sentiment of the poem of which it is no moral tag but an organic consummative part. (f) Metaphors, similes and other rhetorical means suggest a sentiment. Thus the simile of the eagle's eye when her bruised eaglet breathes is a powerful one to suggest pity and despair. Similarly death is suggested by poets through such expressions as untying of a knot or extinguishing of a lamp. In metaphors and similes the objects associated with or charged with some emotional content are described to suggest the latter. In other rhetorical means a certain unusual combination of words suggests a feeling. For instance, "I live on the Ganges" suggests that I live very close to the holy river to enjoy the coolness, purity and sacredness associated with it. "Come here if you are in love with death", suggests "Do not come here, for then you will be killed". "The sun has not turned my hair grey" suggests, "I have much experience, for I am aged". In each of these indirect modes of expression there is a sentiment predominating over the plain statement. In the last expression it is the pride of age and experience.

The modes of suggestion are thus seen to be modes of indirection. This indirection is necessary, for the sentiments, the objects of expression, cannot be directly expressed. Such words as pity, love, righteous indignation or reverential fear only vaguely indicate a sentiment. In poetry, where sentiments are to be expressed, the objects that are capable of suggesting the sentiments by association and also capable of being directly expressed are so expressed. Through these, the sentiments are indirectly expressed. This indirect mode of expression is suggestion. In a rhetorical expression, the direct meaning is felt to be not intended because of the unusual structure, and the indirect meaning is the intended and the real one. Along with this meaning is suggested a sentiment which is the ultimate object of expression. An indirect mode of expression arises from and reveals an emotional attitude.

The expression and the sentiment expressed are not separate, the means and the end form a concrete whole though they are distinguished by analytical thought. The sentiment exists only while the expression exists, i.e. when a poem is read or heard. The sentiment does not exist either before or after the poem. What is present in such a circumstance is a vague feeling, a mere shadow of the sentiment concretised in the poem. The poem or the expression is the sentiment which is not a thing apart from the former.

5. Sentiments expressed through suggestion are impersonal and universal in character; they are felt not as particular sentiments touching the reader or anybody in particular, but as universal ideal contents. As such they do not involve any personal attachment, in other words, they are not passively suffered but actively enjoyed. This enjoyment is aesthetic delight or *rasa*.

Therefore sentiments of terror, pain and pity as depicted in a tragedy are enjoyed for their own sakes. They then do not produce that disagreeable feeling which they do when they are experienced in actual life. Again, the pleasurable sentiments of love, conquest etc., when depicted in poetry, are touched with a tranquillity and serenity in art.

All this is due to 'psychical distancing'¹⁴ effected through the process of suggestion and universalisation or de-personalisation of the sentiments involved in suggestion. The excitants, supports, consequents and the accessories (referred to in 4) are all generalised and so the resultant sentiment is also a general one, a universal ideal content. Therefore it cannot affect us in the manner as a particular (or actual) sentiment does. In other words, a sentiment expressed becomes an object of active contemplation, while one experienced in actuality is blindly suffered. The characteristic extraordinary delight (*rasa*) from poetry is associated with spontaneous contemplation of the universal form of a sentiment inhering in a poem. The mind then adopts an impersonal knowing or contemplative attitude while it is narrowly individualistic and pragmatic when actually moved by a sentiment in life.

As stated before (in 2 and 4) the sentiment is a function (in a mathematical sense) of expression in the poem and, so, poetic contemplation does not mean pondering over some sentiment abstracted from the poem; it means reading, hearing or reciting from memory the poem and, following suggested meanings, participation in the generalised sentiments ultimately suggested by the poem. The poem is the real object of contemplation, not any abstract from it. This has been well recognised by A. C. Bradley¹⁵ who calls suggested content 'resonant meaning'.

Though the words of the poem through their fixed meanings and association determine the suggested sentiment uniquely, poetic contemplation works not as understanding, synthesising the mani-

14. See the author's article "Psychical Distance in Indian Aesthetics" in *Journal of Aesthetics*, Dec. 1948.

15. See his *Oxford Lecture on Poetry for Poetry's sake* (1901), P. 6

fold of sensations under concepts in a rigid and mechanical manner. Rather this contemplation is, as Kant held, a free interplay of perception and understanding, and no concept proper of a sentiment is formed while the latter is apprehended as the final meaning of a poem. This final meaning, the end product of a poem, is a felt truth about a sentiment and is a generic essence of it. As it is suggested by the poem, it transcends the latter though determined by it. This immanent-transcendent aspect of a suggested meaning in a poem has been recognised by A. C. Bradley.^{15a}

6. The universality of a poem depends on the extent of generality of the expressed sentiments. The poet expresses the sentiments as his own but he represents in himself more or less the universal humanity. The universal appeal of a poet's poetry, therefore, depends on the extent of his curbing his personal peculiarities, and on his identification of himself with the collective mind of men. The poet's self is a social self. (Tagore speaks of it as a "Universal self" and "large individuality",¹⁶ Keats as "no self",¹⁷ and T. S. Eliot advocates a poet's "self-sacrifice".¹⁸

Thus such poetry as expresses the most basic human sentiments such as love, affection, jealousy, pity, terror, patriotism, world-weariness and religiosity, are most extensively appreciated. To express any one of them adequately a poet has to express (as said in 4)¹⁹ many necessary feelings (which suggest it), besides depicting certain appropriate consequents, excitants and thoughts. Thus to express pity, for instance, one has to express pain, depression, recollection, stupefaction, self-reproach etc. Tolstoy recommends poets to represent the simple feelings of common life accessible to every one (such as pity, cheerfulness, merriment and tranquillity) and also religious feelings. But he denounces such feelings as pride, spleen, voluptuousness etc. for, he says, they are exclusively of the idle rich.²⁰ Tagore too is against the depiction of lower passions in literature; he advocates literature which expresses the ideals of man, and not the actualities which man has to transcend in the course of his evolution.²¹ Both Tolstoy and

15a. See *Ibid.* Note G.

16. See his *Sahityer Pathe* (1343 B.S.), pp. 168-9).

17. See his letter to Woodhouse, 27 Oct. 1817.

18. See his *Tradition and Individual Talent*, (1932).

19. Sanskrit poetics enumerates some nine basic sentiments called permanent moods. They are love, laughter, sorrow, anger, enthusiasm, fear, aversion, wonder and peace. Of course the list cannot be rigid or precise.

20. *What is Art?* (*op. cit.*), chap. 16.

21. See his *Sahityer Pathe* (*op. cit.*), p 173.

Tagore had some moralistic bias from which the classical Indian aestheticians were quite free.

As said in 3, no sentiment is exhausted and a poet has infinite scope for originality. For there are as many shades of sentiments under a common head (say, pity) as there are ways of expressing it. Thus it is that poems of love, though so numerous in any language, never appear stale or obsolete. Each new love-poem, if it is a successful expression, is a fresh sentiment, unique and inimitable. It presents a new aspect of love.

7. The greatness of a poem depends on its universality and on the richness of the sentiment expressed.

The most basic sentiments are most universal and they are the richest, as each of them involves as its accessories many subordinate and less basic feelings. Thus a poem expressing love is rich with such sentiments as passion and disgust, loyalty and suspicion, exultation and pathos, severity and anxiety, hope and despair and many more accessory feelings which appear and vanish to suggest and nourish the chief sentiment (or permanent mood), i.e. love. Thus it is that an epic poem or a drama of love and war is regarded as a greater poem than a lyric expressing some simpler sentiment, like filial love, bravery or hope. A lyric on love, even if it be perfect in itself, is not so great as a drama of love (like say, *Romeo and Juliet*) where the sentiment of love is expressed more richly and fully. Again, in an epic or a drama there are introduced many basic sentiments which harmonise with and support each other. In this manner we can see that a poem is great according as it has harmoniously and richly expressed a larger number of more basic sentiments with their accessories. (This view has also been put forward by Lascellas Abercrombie.²²)

The means of expressing a sentiment cannot be judged apart from the sentiment. If the sentiments in a poem are rich it means they have been adequately expressed and the language has been appropriate to the sentiments. The sentiments could not have been judged at all had the expression failed. This follows from the oneness of form and content of poetry.

8. Rhyme, metre and other poetical means are necessary and organic parts of a poem if they help to suggest the sentiments expressed in the poem, and if not, they are artificial and external charms which interfere with, instead of reinforcing, the dominant sentiment of the poem.

22. See his *"Idea of Great Poetry"*, (1925).

Viewed in this light rhyme and rhythm would be found to be unnecessary jingle in many poems and the free verse of much of our modern poetry would be justified. Tagore, a master of metrical composition, wrote poems in prose too, not because of weariness of metre but because metre would not suit the sentiments expressed in these pieces.

It goes without saying that not rhyme and metre but the extraordinary delight (*rasa*) resulting from expression of sentiments is the factor deciding whether a piece of writing is poetry or not. The distinction between prose and poetry is vulgar as Shelley held.²³

9. Poetry is mental, yet not subjective, but inter-subjective or objective. Its locus is the mental continuum of collective man or, in other words human culture. The words used in poetry and their meanings and suggestions all belong to human culture of a time and are a common possession of the culture-group. Communication is possible because of this.

Any poem which employs strange expressions whose meanings and suggestions hold only for the poet or a small circle of his and which expresses sentiments not shared by the public is no poem but a psychological curio. For it lacks communication and fails to afford the characteristic aesthetic delight which is a consequence of expression of sentiments. Expression fails if it does not express to others; a poem is written for others, as Tagore points out.²⁴

Again, any reaction to a poem, which is peculiar or idiosyncratic (due to the predominance of some individual complex) is not a true appreciation of the poem. A poem is a communication of an universal sentiment from a poet who approaches the universal human self of a reader who also is assumed to be a normal member of the human society and, so, a fair representative of universal humanity. Self-expression in a poet and individual appreciation in a critic both involve self-socialisation, and poetry is a social product.


It is needless to point out that the objectivity and universality of poetry is relative to human mind. They change with the language and sentiments of a society. Words which once conveyed a world of sweet associations may at another time be deemed vulgar, and a sentiment (e.g. of conquest and heroism in war)

23. See his *Defence of Poetry*.

24. See his *Sahitya* (1341 B.S.), p. 7.

once held noble may be abandoned as barbarous. For these changes much of old poetry becomes obscure and even disagreeable.

10. Poetry is valuable in itself as it affords its peculiar delight. Yet, by giving man insight into sentiments and enlarging his powers of contemplation and sympathies, it proves itself of value to morality which needs for right doing clear-seeing and imaginative sympathy. (Shelley wrote,²⁵ "The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person not our own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause").



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25. See loc. cit.