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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIII, No. 1]

[April 1950

AN ORGAN
OF 440
THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
AND
THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

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
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J. W. Dunne and the Misconception About Relativistic Time

BY

C. T. K. CHARI, M.A.

The death of J. W. Dunne has removed from the English-speaking world a thinker about the importance of whose work opinion has been strangely divided and is perhaps fated to remain so. If the critics are right, Dunne was either startlingly original and his books tantalizingly difficult to read, or he was naive and undistinguished and his writings full of muddle-headed ineptitudes. While J. B. Priestley has maintained that "Dunne's theory suggests a universe of the right size, complexity and richness",¹ Professor E. T. Bell has asserted that "Dunne's theory (and Wells' endorsement of it) is as hopeless a muddle of woolly thinking by means of metaphor and far-fetched analogies as any of the more childish efforts of the perpetual motion cranks to do the impossible".² I do not propose to attempt anything like a systematic exposition and criticism of Dunne's ideas. I have made some remarks about his conception of time in a paper contributed to *Mind*.³ My object here is to dwell on a misconception about Relativity for which he has been responsible and to suggest a perspective which might enable us to view his "Serialism," in its true proportions especially in its relations to metaphysics.

(1)

Notwithstanding Bergson's well-known protest against the "spatialization" of time, there have been thinkers in whose consi-

1. *Midnight on the Desert*.

2. *The Search for Truth*. (George Allen & Unwin, 1935), p. 36.

3. Vol. XLVI, No. 182, p. 163 et seq.

dered opinion our only hope of reaching a solution of the problem of change lies in adherence to the policy of "spatialization à outrance". The mathematician C. H. Hinton advanced the suggestion that our "time-sense" may be an imperfectly developed "space-sense" and that the "flow of time" may be a movement along an unknown "fourth dimension of space".⁴ An analogy will serve to illustrate his point. To a two-dimensional being or a "flatlander", the intersection with his visual plane of a three-dimensional sphere in translatory motion along the third dimension of space may well be the mysterious phenomenon of a circle the diameter of which gradually increases from zero to a maximum and then as gradually decreases to zero. For such a being, each state of the circle exists for an instant of time and then is "no more"; before it comes into his ken, it is a bare "not yet". Hinton argues that what we take to be instantaneous "becoming" in the material world may be the movement of a "three-dimensional field of consciousness" along a structured hyper-space. "Past", "present" and "future" may be determined by the differences in cognitive relations to a purely spatial continuum.⁵ H. G. Wells allows his imagination to play round the idea in his *Time Machine*.

In *An Experiment with Time*, Dunne appeared to lean on Hinton and Wells though he realized, as Hinton and Wells did not, that anything that moves along a hyper-space must take time over its travel and that this leaves the problem of time on our hands again. In *The Serial Universe* he sets out from the general idea that temporal becoming is analogous to qualitative change, that the statement "An event happens now" is analysable into the statement "An event acquires a 'now-mark'". The grammatical similarity between the sentences "The kettle becomes hot" and "The event becomes present" lures us into thinking that in both cases we are dealing with problems of the same order. Dunne insists that "events" exist in a "betweenness" order both before they acquire the 'now-mark' and after they lose it. He has then little difficulty in showing that the acquiring and the losing of the 'now-mark' by an event is itself an event of the second order and that we can analyse 'now' along these lines only by postulating an infinite regress in time.

4. *The Fourth Dimension*. (George Allen & Unwin, 1906), p. 25.

5. Cf. C. H. Hinton, *Scientific Romances* (George Allen & Unwin, 1898); P. D. Ouspensky, *Tertium Organum* (Kegan Paul, 1930), Ch. iv; *A New Model of the Universe* (Kegan Paul, 1934), Ch. x; W. Whately Smith (Whately Carington), *A Theory of the Mechanism of Survival* (Kegan Paul, 1920), Ch. iv.

Dunne was not the first, of course, to realize the inevitability of the regress on these premises. McTaggart and Broad before him had with penetrating insight dwelt on the implications of the regress. McTaggart regards it as on the whole affording a strong presumption against the reality of time. Broad regards it as an indication that we have made a false start in attempting to speculate on the nature of time. In his *Scientific Thought* he distinguishes the "change of time", or the change from "futurity" to "presentness" which constitutes temporal becoming, from qualitative change which is a "change in time". "We can hardly expect to reduce changes of time to changes in time, since time would then need another time to change in, and so on to infinity."⁶ Dunne argues that the regress is not futile, since it can furnish "new information."⁷ We are told that this is what distinguishes a "valid regress" from a "vicious circle". "Serialism" is not concerned with "explaining" or "getting rid of" time. Whether or no the universe by itself is a regress, a "flagrantly regressive method" is a valid account of it in relation to ourselves.⁸ As instances of the "new information" the method can elicit, Dunne refers to the "psychological tests" of his claims in *An Experiment with Time* and the "physical tests" in *The Serial Universe*. Admittedly, if the regressive method provides a point of view from which a number of otherwise unaccountable phenomena are seen to fall into perspective, no philosophical criticism of it will do. Much of the criticism⁹ in fact has missed fire and the point should not be forgotten by philosophical readers who find Dunne's style repetitious and his argument irritating.

In his later publications, Dunne urges, not without some justification, that the "spatialization" of time is for him a consequence of the postulated regress in time and not its presupposition.¹⁰ In *The Serial Universe* at any rate, temporal becoming is thought of in the first instance as analogous to qualitative change rather than motion. Since, nevertheless, motion or alteration of spatial position can be regarded as a species of qualitative change, it must be confessed that Dunne's way of handling the "past-

6. *Scientific Thought* (Kegan Paul, 1923), p. 65.

7. Vide "Note" by Dunne contributed to M. F. Cleugh's *Time* (Methuen, 1937), p. 188.

8. *The Serial Universe* (1st edition, Faber & Faber, 1934), pp. 27-8, pp. 35-6.

9. For instance, J. A. Gunn, *The Problem of Time* (George Allen & Unwin, 1929), pp. 404-410; M. F. Cleugh, *Time*, Ch. VIII.

10. *The Serial Universe* (1934), pp. 80-2; *Nothing dies* (6th Impression, Faber & Faber, 1946), p. 46 et seq.; also the "Note" in Cleugh's *Time*.

present-future series" renders a "spatialization" of it deceptively easy. The "spatialization" is, as I have shown in *Mind*, essential for Dunne's approach to Relativity. It behoves us to examine the steps by which the transmutation of time into space is accomplished. We have seen that we can talk significantly of a 'now-mark' characterizing successively the members of a series ordered by the partly symmetrical, partly asymmetrical, relation of "betweenness" only by postulating a second time-series. Suppose we choose to associate a metric with the two time-series and measure "intervals" along them. Let the event e_1 precede the event e_2 by t units of first-order time and let the second-order event e_1 's acquiring the 'now-mark' precede the second-order event e_2 's acquiring the 'now-mark' by t' units of second-order time. Then the "velocity" with which the 'now' moves along the first-order time-series is $t/t' = k$ (say) in terms of appropriate units for t and t' and $t = kt'$ may be interpreted as the "distance" traversed by the 'now' in t' units of second-order time.¹¹

It may not unreasonably be complained at this stage that to talk of the 'now' as traversing a "distance" is sheer nonsense, since the alleged "distance" is itself a time-lapse. Dunne, however, is concerned to maintain that every "interval of time" marked by a "regressive observer" has a paradoxical double character: it can be regarded as both a "time-lapse" and a "distance" traversed. If we confine our attention to the first term of a regressive time-series (and Dunne contends that common sense and classical physics stand committed to this restricted view), it is a "time-lapse". If we introduce the next term in the series and the "Higher Observer", it becomes "distance" along "an unsuspected dimension of space".¹² Dunne, it should be noticed, would raise no scruples or objections if the "extra dimensions of space" are regarded as "mathematical devices".¹³ What we are bound to notice, according to him, is that they provide an illuminating approach to Minkowski's four-dimensional space-time.

(2)

The term "space" originally signified no doubt physical space. To the Greek geometers and those who followed in their wake, points and lines were the points and lines of physical space. After Descartes and others had fashioned an analytical or algebraic

11. *The Serial Universe*, Ch. XIII.

12. *The Serial Universe*, Ch. IX; *Nothing Dies*, Ch. IV.

13. *The Serial Universe* (1934), p. 91.

geometry, it became possible to assign to points, lines and curves systems of numbers or equations. This led to an inversion in the meaning of "point", "line" and "space". A number x , or an ordered pair of numbers x, y , or an ordered triplet of numbers x, y, z came to be regarded as the fundamental objects of the science of geometry and these analytic entities were "visualized" as points in a line, plane or space. The term "space" in modern mathematics denotes any system of objects for which a notion of "neighbourhood" or "distance" is defined in a technical sense. Physical space is pictured as three-dimensional, because a three-fold ordering of objects is possible in it. But mathematical spaces may have more than three dimensions and there is not the slightest reason why any of them should be endowed with a metaphysical "reality". A point of n -dimensional space is by definition an ordered set of n real numbers $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$. The geometrical language is just as suggestive for the algebra of 4 or n variables. An ordered quadruple of numbers x, y, z, t may be said to represent a point in a mathematically conceived four-dimensional "space".

Now our techniques of measuring time entail our viewing it as a variable to be taken along with the three variables x, y, z representing the three dimensions of physical space. The t of physics has the range, continuity and other properties of the real-number continuum. In graphical treatment, time has always been a "co-ordinate", since the analytic representation of points in a line in terms of distance from an origin corresponds to the representation of time in terms of intervals from an arbitrarily chosen initial instant. Time is a one-dimensional continuum, because to specify the temporal position of an event relative to some unit and an origin, only one real number is necessary and every time-interval can be put in a one-one correspondence with the interval between two real numbers.¹⁴ Mathematical physics abstracts and isolates the extensive aspect of time from the closely related aspects. Thus "time is currently described as 'long' or 'short' in precisely the same terms as applied to a ladder or a broom-handle"¹⁵ and "the clock plays the same role in the measurement of time as the pair of compasses in the measurement of length."¹⁶

The idea that time can analytically be treated as a "fourth dimension" had occurred to Lagrange and D'Alembert. D'Alem-

14. V. F. Lenzen, *The Nature of Physical Theory*, Ch. III; R. B. Lindsay and H. Margenau, *Foundations of Physics*, Ch. II, pp. 72-78.

15. F. W. Lanchester, *Relativity* (Constable), § 17, p. 22. Cf. Dunne, *An Experiment with Time* (3rd edition, Faber & Faber, 1934), p. 130.

16. Carl Benedicks, *Space and Time* (Methuen), p. 25.

bert, who made the suggestion in the article on "Dimension" contributed to the "Encyclopaedia" edited by Diderot and himself, ascribed it to "a clever man of my acquaintance" (un homme d'esprit de ma connaissance).¹⁷ The fact that space can be graphed against time is naturally insufficient warrant for this speculation. Pressure or temperature may be plotted against time, but we have not found it necessary to amalgamate time and pressure or time and temperature. The hypothesis that the three dimensions of space and one of time form a single space-time continuum is fruitful in physics only when we are able to associate a metric with space-time, that is, assign a unique mathematical expression to the four-dimensional "separation" of any two events which remains invariant for specified transformations. With Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity came the opportunity for the geometrization of space-time. Suppose that the law of some phenomenon is framed by an observer S in terms of the space-and time-coordinates x, y, z, t and suppose that the law assumes the same form for an observer S' who moves with a uniform velocity relative to S and employs the coordinates x', y', z', t' , we can obtain the formulae for the transformation of coordinates when we pass from S to S' and *vice versa*. Einstein demonstrated that when the velocity of light c is constant for S and S', the transformation-formulae are those set down by Lorentz. A novel feature of these formulae is that time is not invariant for all observers, that is, t' is not equal to t even when measured from a common origin. I have discussed in *Mind* the "epistemological paradoxes" resulting from the change in the point of view.

In a famous lecture on "Raum und Zeit" at Cologne in the year 1908,¹⁸ Hermann Minkowski suggested that a geometrical "visualization" of the Lorentz-Einstein transformation-formulae was possible. If we regard the spaces and times measured by observers moving with different uniform relative velocities as arising from the arbitrary divisions of a single four-dimensional space-time, we can introduce a metric into the analytic framework supplied by the four variables x, y, z, t . The unique mathematical expression for the square of the four-dimensional "separation" of two events, invariant for all observers, is $x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - c^2t^2$. The corresponding expression for the square of the "distance" in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space is $x^2 + y^2 + z^2$. The metrical

17. R. C. Archibald, "Time as a fourth dimension", *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, Vol. XX, pp. 408-12.

18. *The Principle of Relativity*, a collection of papers by Einstein, Minkowski and others. (Methuen).

space-time of Special Relativity is analogous to Euclidean space, but the minus sign before the time variable constitutes an important difference. Although metrical space and "metrized" time enter into an "indissoluble unity", every division of space-time by observers gives a "time-like" and a "space-like" aspect. The three dimensions of ordinary Euclidean space are isotropic; backwards-forwards, right-left, up-down, however unlike they may seem to us in perceived space with its psychological peculiarities, are absolutely alike in the space of physics. The four dimensions of space-time, on the other hand, are not interchangeable. Weyl and others¹⁹ have described the space-time metrical manifold as (3+1)-dimensional rather than 4-dimensional. Minkowski, however, made another exciting discovery. If we substitute for the fourth or the time-coordinate the variable $T = ict$, where i is the "imaginary number" equal to the square root of minus one ($\sqrt{-1}$), space-time becomes completely Euclidean.²⁰ The expression for the square of the "four-dimensional distance" is $x^2 + y^2 + z^2 + T^2$.

The introduction of an "imaginary time" was perplexing, but it established the "mathematical equivalence" of space and time. The popular, and even the technical, expositions of Relativity resorted freely to this mode of picturing space-time and Minkowski's dismissal of space and time as "shadows" acquired a special significance in this context. Time was regarded simply as "the fourth dimension of Euclidean space" and the citation by Relativists of passages from Wells' *Time Machine* served to confirm the prevailing impression that "there is no difference between time and any of the three dimensions of space, except that our consciousness moves along it". The role of i remained a little mysterious. Lanchester observed that time is "Non-Euclidean but becomes Euclidean if multiplied by $\sqrt{-1}$ ".²¹ Eddington wrote: "It is not very profitable to speculate on the implications of the mysterious factor $\sqrt{-1}$ which seems to have the property of turning time into space. It can scarcely be regarded as more than an analytical device."²² Jeans spoke of $\sqrt{-1}$ as a "weird" unit for measuring time in Relativity.²³

Dunne claims that he can fit the pieces into a more intelligible pattern. He professes to be able to show, on his postulates, that

19. H. Weyl, *Space-Time-Matter* (Tr. by H. L. Brose, Methuen), p. 283. R. C. Tolman, *Relativity Thermodynamics and Cosmology*, p. 29f.

20. Minkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

21. *Relativity*, Preface, p. ix; also Addenda to Part I, A.

22. *Space, Time and Gravitation* (Cambridge), p. 48.

23. *The Mysterious Universe* (Cambridge), p. 110.

the use of "imaginary time" is not arbitrary. Returning to our earlier discussion, we see that a "second" ticked out by a clock can, in the "Serialistic" Universe, be treated both as a "time-lapse" t' and as a "distance" kt' travelled along a fourth dimension of Euclidean space. We have, analytically speaking, two time-axes, T_1, T_2 , perpendicular to each other one of which, T_2 , times the "travelling" along the other, T_1 . To interpret a "time-lapse" as a "four-dimensional distance", we must swing the time-axis T_2 through a right angle so that its divisions coincide with those of T_1 .²⁴ There is a well-known geometrical convention by which the rotation of a directed line through 2 right angles is represented as multiplication twice by the "operator" i (that is by $i \times i$ or i^2), or as a multiplication by -1 ($i^2 = -1$), from which it follows that $i = \sqrt{-1}$ can be taken as a symbol of rotation through a right angle. Reinterpreting a "time-lapse" as a "four-dimensional distance" in "Serialism" means, therefore, multiplying time-intervals not only by the "velocity of the 'now'" (k), as explained already, but also by the "operator" $i = \sqrt{-1}$. Dunne thinks that the "velocity of the 'now'" can be taken as the upper bound of the velocity of any material body in ordinary 3-dimensional space. If we identify the "velocity of the 'now'" (k) with the velocity of light (c) in physics ($k = c$), the adoption of $ict = T$ as the fourth dimension of Relativistic space-time ceases to be mysterious or puzzling. Minkowski's Euclidean representation of space-time, Dunne maintains, can be ultimately justified only from the standpoint of a "four-dimensional observer" to whom real time, the "going on" of the Universe, is represented by a fifth dimension. The reproduction in *An Experiment with Time*²⁵ of a letter to Dunne from Eddington, in which the Relativist admitted that the "going on of time" could not be found in Minkowski's picture, enhanced Dunne's prestige and popularity. In an article²⁶ he published shortly before his death, Dunne says that his "Serialistic" view of time is forced on us "unless we are prepared to rebel against the conclusions of the 'Special Theory of Relativity'".

(3)

Is Dunne's interpretation of Minkowski's "Euclidean space-time" valid? It is plausible, but is actually irrelevant to the

24. *The Serial Universe*, Ch. XIV; *The New Immortality*, Ch. XIV.

25. 3rd edition, Faber & Faber, Appendix I.

26. "A glimpse of the Real World" in *Enquiry*, April, 1948.

mathematical picture. I have in a series of papers²⁷ deplored the unfortunate emphasis laid by philosophers and physicists alike on the Relativistic i and attempted to unfold its true significance. Waiving technicalities, I may say that its origin must be sought in fundamental mathematical considerations pertaining to the way in which the metric of a Euclidean continuum is fixed. In elementary geometry, the Euclidean plane is represented as containing only real points, but from the analytic standpoint we can extend our notion of Euclidean space by introducing complex or imaginary points (that is, complex or imaginary numbers) which admit of no representation on paper. The Complex Euclidean plane so obtained has in it two exceptional imaginary points which determine uniquely the metric of the plane; they are left fixed by Euclidean transformations and yield the Euclidean measure of distance. I have elsewhere explained how the kinematically postulated constancy of light-velocity can be translated into the language of Classical Complex Euclidean geometry only by relating the "light-tracks" to the exceptional or critical imaginary points and how, to be able to reconcile the geometrical representation of light-propagation by "imaginary lines" with the data of experimental physics, we have to change the t of physics into $T = ict$. The $\sqrt{-1}$ which symbolizes rotation through a right angle has little to do with the Relativistic i which is a constant associated with the metric of Classical Complex Euclidean geometry. There is no unique epistemological or ontological "objectivity" about the Complex Euclidean representation of space-time in which time appears to lose all its distinctive characteristics. Other "models" or "maps" are available in which an unambiguous distinction between "time-like" and "space-like" intervals emerges.

Dunne's claim that the postulation of an infinite regress in time, and the consequent "spatialization" of it, furnishes information about Relativity, which is otherwise inaccessible to us, must be discredited. I suspect that the secret of his appeal to a wide circle of readers lies in his ingenious theory of precognition and the "New Immortality" it promises. It is this aspect of "Serialism" that Priestley has popularized in his play *Time and the Conways*. Neither Dunne's dreams nor Priestley's (nor Maeterlinck's²⁸ for that matter) constitute coercive evidence for supernormal non-

27. *The Mathematical Gazette*, London, Vol. XX, No. 239, pp. 408-9; *Mind*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 169-174, pp. 415-6, Vol. XLVII, pp. 550-2; Vol. LVIII, pp. 218-220.

28. *The Life of Space* (Tr. by B. Miall, George Allen & Unwin), pp. 115-138.

inferential knowledge about the "future". But the rigorously controlled experiments carried out by Professor J. B. Rhine and his co-workers in America, and by Messrs. G. N. M. Tyrrell, Whately Carington and S. G. Soal in England, do not leave much room for doubt. Broad in a critical notice in *Philosophy*²⁹ found the evidence for telepathic precognition "statistically overwhelming". H. H. Price and he have recently argued the case for psychical research and it is significant that both accept precognition as one of the "established results".³⁰

Ostensible precognition occurs in human lives and must be accommodated by any metaphysical theory of time. It must be said to Dunne's credit that he was the first to embark on a task which, with all its hazards and difficulties, is a high and urgent enterprise. The "three-dimensional observer", according to him, is included in all the "Higher dimensional observers". The "focus of attention" of the "four-dimensional observer" ordinarily coincides with the "moving focus" of the "three-dimensional observer", but when the latter relaxes his attention or "dreams", the "Higher observer" can take in cross-sections of a "four-dimensional manifold", some of which lie in the "past" of the "three-dimensional observer" and others in his "future". Dunne thinks that supernormal precognition does not give us an inexorably fixed "future"; for the "Higher observer" can, through his three-dimensional counterpart, interfere with the "four-dimensional manifold", as it is manifested in the "moving focus", and change instantaneously the entire structure of the field "lying ahead".

A great deal of all this speculation is probably mythology. One never quite understands in what sense Dunne's four-dimensional space is structured or what relation the geometrical structure bears to the psychological field of the "three-dimensional observer" with its *sensa* and images.³¹ One never knows just what the "moving focus" is. Spatial metaphors are nowhere more dangerously misleading than when we deal with temporal becoming. Time "flies" or "flows", but the medium of its "flight" or "flow" is not space in any obvious sense of the word. To the poet, time may be the "Old Gypsy-Man"³² who is ever on the rove with his caravan, the "Unfathomable Sea... whose waters of deep woe

29. Vol. XIX, No. 74, pp. 261-275.

30. H. H. Price, "Psychical Research and Human Personality" in *The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1949; C. D. Broad, "The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy", *Philosophy*, October, 1949.

31. Cp. Broad's criticism of Dunne, *Philosophy*, Vol. X, No. 38.

32. Ralph Hodgson.

are brackish with the salt of human tears",³³ the "vast shadow"³⁴ moving beneath Eternity. The personification or the image marks the poetic conquest of time and not the solution of a metaphysical problem.

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The only suggestion we can extract from Dunne's theory of precognition is that our "past", "present" and "future" may be psychological or epistemological characteristics that a "series", which is either not temporal at all or temporal in a totally unfamiliar sense, somehow acquires in relation to our empirical mental awareness. We all know how McTaggart, in attempting to dispose of the reality of time with one of the bolder gestures of the *a priori*, was involved in various linguistic and logical muddles. I submit that no analysis, however protracted or painstaking, of the ordinary statements we make about time can ever prove or disprove an ontological conception of time, be it the Idealistic theory that time is an "illusion" or the Realistic theory that events incessantly "become" and that the "future" is a "non-entity". Precognition, however, is an empirically ascertainable, and profoundly disturbing, fact. It makes it appear probable that we "misperceive" the nature of the Self, and consequently time, in a more radical fashion than we have hitherto supposed.

The defects of Dunne's exposition are redeemed by his ulterior aim. The postulation of an "observer at infinity" is, from the mathematical standpoint, a piece of tactlessness on his part; for, on his own showing, the regressive time-series can have no last term. But the postulate has a far different significance for the speculative philosophy of the West and the East. Dunne hated a bounded horizon; the 'brief candle' of life spelt no hope for him; the current materialism left him cold. In a materialistic universe, man with his insatiable thirst for the Ideal, and his habit of pondering over the so-called Imponderables, is *de trop*. The Ultimate Self, Dunne taught, is not in the "linear time" of physics and Its Immortality is not to be thought of as an endless prolongation of the time of our empirically describable consciousness.³⁵ An indefinite conception, it will be said. But does not the Self glory in being indefinite? Can It ever have a credible, visible existence, a vulgar roundness and relief? "The Self cannot be gained by knowledge nor by understanding nor by manifold science."³⁶

33. Shelley.

34. Vaughan.

35. *The New Immortality* (Faber & Faber), Part I.

36. *Katha Upanishad*, I Adhyaya, Second valli, 22; Cf. *Mundaka Upanishad*, III, second khanda, 3.

The Redundance of the Vyatirekee Vyapti of the Nyaya System

BY

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It is commonly held that according to the Nyaya theory the vyatireki Vyāpti strengthens the validity of the universal proposition used in an inference. I am not sure that the Nyāya system actually holds that the precative value of a universal statement is increased by the addition of the vyatireki vyāpti to an anvayī vyāpti. But I am sure that respectable authorities have so interpreted the Nyaya doctrine. Let me quote.

On page 86, Vol. 2 of his 'Indian Philosophy' Dr. Radhakrishnan writes that when we have to establish a universal relation between smoke and fire, "it is not enough if we observe smoke wherever there is fire; we should also notice that there is no smoke where there is no fire. Agreement in presence and agreement in absence are both necessary." Here we should note two things which Dr. Radhakrishnan asserts: (1) It is necessary for us to observe that there is no smoke where there is no fire. (2) Such an observation is agreement in absence.

Dr. Dasgupta interprets the Nyaya doctrine similarly. "But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke, there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all these cases where there is no fire, there should not be any smoke, i.e., not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of the fire but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke." (Page 346, Vol. I, 'A History of Indian Philosophy').

In their "An Introduction to Indian Philosophy" Drs. Chatterjee and Datta go to the length of saying that in case of the anvaya vyatireki inference, "...the knowledge of the vyapti or the universal proposition is based on the joint method of agreement in presence (anvaya) and in absence (vyatireka)...." 1st edition, page 216).

We may fairly hold, then, that the best authorities agree that according to the Nyaya system the Vyatirekee Vyapti has some real value, that it is necessary, that it strengthens the validity of

the universal proposition. Nay, more. Drs. Chatterjee and Datta regard that the addition of the vyatireki vyāpti to the anvayī vyāpti is similar to the Joint method of agreement in presence and in absence (presumably, the Joint method of agreement and difference, which we study in Western logic. Otherwise there is no reason why they should write a capital J.).

In this paper I intend to disprove this proposition. I intend to prove that the vyatireki vyāpti of the nyāya system has no value at all, that it does not increase the validity of the universal proposition, that it is redundant, that the process of adding the vyatireki vyāpti to an anvayī vyāpti is not at all similar to Mill's Joint method of agreement in presence and in absence.

The vyatireki vyāpti is to be understood with reference to the anvayī vyāpti. If you observe a number of instances (bhuyo-darśanam) of smoke accompanied by fire (without a contrary instance, i.e., an instance where there is smoke but no fire), you have an anvayī vyāpti or agreement in presence between smoke and fire. It is obvious that such an "induction per simple enumeration" cannot give us a universal or necessary relation. We can only say, "All observed cases of smoke are cases of fire" Now, apparently, it is thought that if we reinforce this observation, which may fairly be called agreement in presence, by the vyatireki vyāpti or the so-called agreement in absence, we will be on a better ground as regards the universal relation. This vyatireki vyāpti is then stated as "All cases where fire is not observed are cases where smoke is not observed".

Now, can we regard this last proposition as an independent proposition? Certainly not. It is but the full contrapositive of the proposition stating the agreement in presence. The proposition which states the agreement in presence is "All instances where smoke is observed are instances where fire is observed". Obverting this proposition we get, "No instances where smoke is observed are instances where fire is not observed." Convert this and we get, "No instances where fire is not observed are instances where smoke is observed." Obvert once more, and we have "All instances where fire is not observed are instances where smoke is not observed". This is the full contrapositive of the original statement, and this is the vyatireki vyāpti.

Now, if we can arrive at it from the proposition stating the agreement in presence (anvayī vyāpti) by a stroke of deduction, how can it make the universal proposition more probable? Is it not redundant?

When we employ Mill's Joint method of agreement in presence and in absence, the observed agreement in absence (difference) certainly strengthens the probability of a universal relation. For, the negative instances (which constitute the agreement in absence) which we select are instances where the absence of (to use Nyaya terminology) the original vyāpya is accompanied by the absence of the original vyāpak, that is to say, the absence of smoke is followed by the absence of fire. This is an independent proposition and is based on observation. But the vyatireki vyāpti as conceived by the Nyaya, stating that the absence of fire is accompanied by the absence of smoke is not based on observation in spite of the assertion of Kesava Miśra that such a negative concomitance is based on mahāhrde dhūmasya vyatireka darśanāt.

From this it would follow that every anvayī vyāpti has its corresponding vyatireki vyāpti, that there is no anvayī vyāpti which has no vyatireki vyāpti. But the Nyaya says that there can be an anvayī vyāpti which is only an anvayī vyāpti, that is to say, which has no vyatireki vyāpti. This is called the anvaya vyatireki vyāpti. As an instance of it, the Nyaya points out the concomitance between the knowable and the nameable. Everything knowable is nameable — an earthen pot, for instance. This is an agreement in presence, the anvayī vyāpti. Here, they argue, you cannot get the (so called) agreement in absence — the vyatireki vyāpti. You cannot point out an instance where the un-nameable is unknowable.

But this by no means proves that the process of getting the vyatireki vyāpti is not formal. By a formal process — by the process of contraposition — we can still get the proposition: "Whatever is not knowable is not nameable" — only in this case we cannot get an actual instance. The reason is that the class of things, 'not knowable and not nameable', is an empty class. But this is no argument against the formality of the process.

And if the process of getting the vyatireki vyāpti is formal, it follows that the vyatireki vyāpti is redundant so far as the validity of the universal proposition is concerned. It is not necessary as Drs. Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta think "that we should also notice that there is no fire where there is no smoke".

Personally, however, I do not think that the Nyaya system holds this view. Only the interpreters have so construed it, perhaps, in their zeal to show that our ancient lore is comparable, in every respect, with the Western sciences. Kesava Misra says that we can as well do with the anvayī vyāpti alone. He, at least, holds that the vyatireki vyāpti is not necessary. It is redundant.

Towards a Philosophy of Transcendental Personalism

BY

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What is so close and familiar to my thought, so near and dear to my heart as my own self? But the moment it is exposed to the searching light of knowledge it becomes mysterious and elusive. It threatens to remain a problem for all time to come. All attempts at solution have only taken the shadow for the real. They have concluded that an instant of a personality's life stands for all that it is. Consequently it is but natural that the answer given reduces the self to a physical something where the emergence of life becomes a problem, a living something where the intrusion of mind seems to be uncalled for, or a mental something where the spirit seems to be a chimera and an aesthetic illusion without any substance. What world is mine then?

The most primary function of myself is that I attend. Now my attention is sustained by a definite interest. It may become disturbed any moment. The disturbance may be wholly ideal. Some vague and indefinite feeling of the disillusionments I have met in life, some strong longing for the attainment of something of supreme moment or the memories of the past may take hold of me on a sudden and give a new direction to my attention. But it seldom dies away; it is only diverted. It is only in moments of illness that this tension of mind, *la tension Psychologique* as Janet calls it, relaxes. Even in sleep my attention is not wholly isolated from without but receives and moulds the material given it. I am in short never a closed window, seldom a blocked universe. Attention is equally exclusive and inclusive. Explicitly it excludes all that is not relevant to the present, but all that I am is implicit in it.

Descartes initiated the modern movement in thought not with that which is immediate and primary but with that which is secondary and phenomenal. Thought is but an 'after thought', it only bubbles on the surface of existence. 'Cogito' presupposes existence; it cannot create it. But thought, though it unavoidably issues from existence, informs it with a value. The glory and greatness of Man comes of his misery, said Pascal, and his misery

is born of his thought. We are no more thrown in the world as the existentialists of today cry in blank despair, but knowing where we are we can hold our own in the dust and ashes of here and now. Thought is an after-math of existence and grows and sprouts out of something more brutal and primordial. Attention then is an 'urerlebniss', a primary experience without which thought can not live and move. I may attend without thinking but I cannot think without attending. The lead of Descartes has done much mischief in modern thought. It tended to rationalism, to an exclusive emphasis on thought at the expense of every other activity. It made it impossible for the philosophers of the Enlightenment to do justice to the religious and aesthetic sphere, to the world of values other than the theoretical. Secondly, it led to the bifurcation of reality, to the dual world of Nature and Mind, of *res extensae* and *res cogitans* and to the creation of a mystery, the mystery of their relation.

But attention is only the beginning, not the end of my empirical existence. I remember and forget. Already in memory we find the gulf between life and death, past and present, bridged over. It makes me survive my own death. It makes the past live in the present; it makes the present more than the present; this is what Maeterlinck is hinting at in his 'L' Oiseau Bleu'. Thanks to the memory that I grow and my present becomes richer and richer. It gives me identity, and the moment memory begins to suffer I lose hold of myself, my thoughts begin to dissociate, the unity of the ego faces a disaster. I have thoughts which I do not own as mine, volitions before which I stand aghast. I am what I am because I remember the past that is mine.

But feeling is neither memory nor thought. It exists in its own right. I live and move in it. It suffuses life. It is not born of confused thought; it has a being of its own. The psychologists who have seen only pleasure and pain in it have missed its life. Wundt was the first to recognise its multi-dimensional character and his pupil Felix Kürger has found in it the quality of the whole. Pleasure and pain are only the superficial and outer layers of emotional life which allow access to thought. Beyond and below there is a world where pleasure and pain cross and blend in infinite hues. The misplaced emphasis on pleasure leads to the pernicious doctrine of utilitarianism, the morbid occupation with pain to pessimism. Leibnitz spoke of *les petites perceptions*, the little perceptions which go to the making of our consciousness, he could equally have spoken of the little pleasures and pains which go to build it up.

But man does not only attend and think, remember and forget, he desires and strives, decides and chooses, resists and struggles; in fine, his is a life of impulses and volitions. Schopenhauer and Maine De Biran stressed in different ways the dominating role of the voluntary factor. True, no doubt, that man's life is rent by motives that conflict, by impulses that are at war. From the cradle to the grave our life seldom stands still, but flows with a rage and impetuosity that varies from time to time. Man's life is swayed by ends and objectives, by an instinctive craving and an animal appetite which can be immediately satisfied and by an urge, a divine discontent, an *inquiétude puissante* which carries him on and on. It was Schiller who thought that even in the infinite desires of man the infinite in him reveals itself.

Thus when I reflect into myself as if I alone exist and take into parenthesis, to speak with Husserl, the wide and broad world without, I find myself obliged and driven to break through the confines of my ego, to go beyond the obscure labyrinths of my being into the realm of flowers and birds, of society and culture. The reflection on the self refers unavoidably to something beyond it; it transcends its own limits. The acts of consciousness are intentional. They intend something beyond them. In love when I seek the fulfilment of my being in another, in sympathy when I listen to the echo of another heart in mine, in knowledge when I recognise truth whether I will it or not, I am most definitely driven beyond myself. I find myself integrated into a larger whole.

But I am not an indifferent spectator of all that is going on round and about; I am also on the move. I grow and change; I am born of flesh and flesh is born of time. My attention reveals a present, my past proclaims itself in memory and my future announces itself in expectation. St. Augustine who has made some profound observations on the nature of time has seen all this very clearly. "The object of expectation passes by my attention to become memory. Future is not yet born (who can deny?), and still its expectation is already in our spirit. The present is without extension; it is but a fugitive point (who ignores it?), and still attention is durable." Time is experienced and lived through; it is what constitutes our finitude. It is not only a form of inner sensibility through which I become aware of the succession of the inner states of my consciousness; it is through time that everything living fades, everything existing disappears and receives the hall-mark of death. However we may like to leave it out of account, it takes the most drastic account of us all. But the

moment I transcend myself in love, sympathy and knowledge I have the struggle with a world of things which I experience as occupying space. Time and space are the conditions, as Kant said, not the objects of my sensible knowledge. But time, unlike space, though phenomenal, is not only a condition of knowledge, but its soul; it is my destiny. All existence is not space-bound, but all existence is bound in time and is made of such stuff as memory.

But my consciousness has not yet exhausted itself; it lives as the real and the existent, and refers to the ideal and the subsistent. Plato's Genius divined it long ago. It refers to values. I discover the values; I do not create them. I find their echo in consciousness. Values are not persons; they are not things. They are, as Rickert has emphasised, unreal. Theirs is the world of pure validity. They obtain; they do not exist. Our consciousness awakens to the values as ideal demands and finds their imperfect realisation in culture. As a moral being I have to listen to an "ought" which is there whether my will conforms to it or not. In the sphere of art, I contemplate beauty without any interest and without any end. Beautiful objects pre-suppose a consciousness to appreciate them, but Beauty as a value in itself and as an ideal demand for my consciousness holds good whether my soul awakens to its glow or not. Truth as a value has a beyond of its own, a beyond of human experience and human caprice. Plodding his own weary way, man slowly gains insight into its realm and acknowledges it in knowledge but cannot make it subservient to his purpose and a means to his end. Religious domain is again autonomous. True, religion as a part of history has taken its form and pattern from art and morality and has exposed itself to the danger of exhaustion in an alien world. The object of religion then becomes the good we strive to realise in our action, the Beauty we contemplate and in which we long to lose ourselves, the Truth we express in judgments of universal validity. The wholesome but misleading rapport that Kant established between morality and religion has been adequately exposed by R. Otto. Religion is essentially different. In its 'ultimacy' it asserts itself as a mystery that overpowers us (*mysterium tremendum*), and associating itself with moral categories it reveals itself as holiness.

What am I then? No doubt, states of consciousness, logical categories, realm of values are not all that I am and all that I am capable of referring to; a plus, a more remains. I attend, but I am not simply an act of attention. I feel, but certainly I am not

to be identified with a pleasure or a pain. The unconscious belongs to me with as much right as the conscious. The dream life is as truly mine as the waking life. My self is not an act. My person is an acting unity in multiplicity. Simmel has well elucidated the point. "In their application to the existence of the Soul which has formed itself into a personality all usual logical categories fail. How the individual elements live in the ego and the ego lives most intimately in the elements, how still they both stand face to face only to experience all the manifold relations of nearness and distance, contrast and assimilation, cannot be described but can be lived alone." Simmel finds an analogy only in the relation of God and the World which is so puzzling for logic. This is the ultimate fact, "Ur-phenomenon" where the subject becomes its own object, I become my own double and remain what I am. An interesting example is given in laughter. I laugh at my own failings and I immediately stand above them. But this metaphysical unity which overcomes its own divisions is very imperfectly realised in my personality. In lapses of memory, in dissociation, in distraction, in obsession my unity seems to split up. Strange thoughts crop up; queer-feelings hold me. I do not own them; they do not own me. My own action and decisions appear alien to me. Perhaps it was this apprehension of division, of seeming disintegration, of infernal conflict which beset the empirical self that led the profane wisdom of Goethe to save himself from the knowledge of self. But my personality with all its limitations refers to its own idea, to its own transcendence. True enough, my personality equally affirms values which are not its making but which make its life significant. This transcendence of values however need not blind us to the transcendence of existence which is involved in personality. Every moment of thought leads us to a life beyond its own and personality in all its fragmentariness refers to its own beyond.

Am I then a fugitive point, a passing shadow of time without freedom and without character? Or am I a *via media* between the ephemeral particularities of existence and the ever enduring subsistence of universal ideas? Do I really escape the shadow of morality that haunts individual existence by the noetic enjoyment of these eternal forces, as Plato held? Or is it with the consciousness of an unconditional moral imperative that I become aware of myself as a self-sufficient end and a prospective candidate of a realm of ends hereafter? Kant who has boldly and rightly based the freedom of the individual on his transcendence has wrongly brought the category of ends to apply to the per-

sonality which stands beyond all teleology and vital sphere? The category of end is indispensable in the sphere of economics, regulative in the realm of organic life, irrelevant in the domain of the beautiful and devoid of all significance in the sphere of pure transcendence. Only the self that has come to itself in its transcendence passes beyond the reach of hungry generations and beyond the shades of time and death. It does not become God; it loses itself in Him to find itself. Certainly it was with his eyes on the self *sub specie aeternitatis* that Bayazid Bustami cried out: Praise be to me, how great is my glory!

A Critical Study of Freud's Interpretation of Dreams

BY

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Dream interpretation has had great fascination for man from olden days. It was considered as a mark of wisdom and a singular distinction to be able to interpret dreams. It is no surprise, therefore, to find a modern Psychologist like Sigmund Freud coming forward with his interpretation of dreams. Freud attaches great importance to his theory of dreams. He calls it "the turning point in the history of analysis", which has changed his psycho-therapeutic method into "the psychology of the depths of human mind." It is the 'new foundland' of which he claims to be the first discoverer. He often makes it the starting point of his psycho-analysis. When the path of association is blocked by resistance, dream interpretation comes to his rescue. If the patient looks askance at Freudian hypothesis, his doubts are put at rest by translating to him the language of his own dreams.

Freud overwhelms his readers by an elaborate technique of dream interpretation. As in case of old fortune-tellers and sooth sayers, its appeal lies not in its veracity but in his bold claim to probe into the hidden mysteries of human mind. Where others confess their ignorance, Freud offers his explanation, which is at least interesting and impressive.

It is but natural that he should try to maintain his prestige and high claims of his psycho-analysis by ever-ready solutions of dream problems. It is to be remembered that he is a professional physician who accepts large fees for his services. He is like a translator in the foreign office of a country who cannot afford to betray his ignorance of a foreign language except at the risk of losing his job. This is perhaps the reason why we find so much hypothetical matter being posed as scientific truth. Freud does not seem to realize when he leaves the sure ground of scientific inference and begins to soar into uncertain regions of speculation. The result is that behind the apparent garb of scientific procedure there lies hidden much that is unscientific, dogmatic and even mystical in character.

Freud seems to show no respect for the law of Parsimony which lays down that entities or supposed existences should not be multiplied in a theory beyond what is strictly necessary. The unconscious, pre-conscious, Ego, Id, and superego, Death Instincts, Aedipus Complex, Castration Complex are but a few examples. Over and above these, Freud is always too ready to invent a new mechanism when a fact cannot be explained by old principles. The result is that all the facts are explained by creating new facts which themselves stand in need of justification. The mechanisms like identification, transference, inversion, ambivalence, masochism, sadism, condensation, displacement, representation or symbolization remind one of the days of Faculty Psychology, when by supposing a faculty for every function the uncritical layman was deluded into the belief that the demands of scientific explanation had been met. Or, we can draw a parallel between Freudian Psychology and the philosophical systems of rationalists like Plato and Leibnitz. The systems are very impressive and thorough-going in themselves. Everything is explained with an air of omniscience. Only the proof is lacking.

Another serious defect which renders Freudian hypotheses unscientific is their incapability to admit of any crucial test. A scientific hypothesis must enable us to predict. If the prediction comes out true the hypothesis is verified. But in Freud no such verification is possible. His mechanisms are such that they can accommodate all sorts of evidence. They are like double-edged weapons which cut both ways. If a certain phenomenon takes place, the hypothesis is verified. If just the opposite of it comes out true the hypothesis still holds good. If you harbour some ill feeling towards your father it is a proof of Aedipus Complex. If you love him dearly it is still, through identification, a corroboration of the same. If you dream that you are beating a dog it is disguised wish-fulfilment (probably an expression of your hatred against your brother). But if you see the dog biting you it is still the fulfilment of the same wish through inversion. Lest my statement should appear prejudiced and exaggerated I will quote a few examples from Freud's Interpretation of Dreams.

1. A man sees in a dream that he has been reconciled to a friend who had been dropped long before. The man had no apparent wish for such reconciliation. Freud, through mechanism of inversion, interprets it as expressing the wish to give up the remnant of consideration for him.

2. A young boy dreams that his father is scolding him for coming home so late. According to Freud it means that the boy is angry with his father because he always came home too early.

3. A young man dreams that his brother has sold the business which he (the dreamer) had reserved for his future. Freud interprets it as a masochistic wish to punish himself for the wrongs done to his brother.

4. A patient of Freud dreams that she is forbidden continuing her treatment, and Freud says to her (in the same dream), "I can show no consideration in money matters." Apparent facts in this case were against wish-fulfilment hypothesis, as the patient anxiously wanted to continue her treatment. But Freud is equal to any task. He refers the dream to another wish, i.e. to show that her brother, who was opposed to the treatment, was right.

5. A woman sees her daughter of 15 years lying dead in a box. Freud traces the dream to the days of her pregnancy 15 years back when she had quarrelled with her husband and desired that the child might die in her womb. An instance of symbolization, the box standing for the womb.

When Freud is unable to find any wish on which to hang a dream, then as a last refuge, he attributes it to the wish to refute his theory. This is his interpretation in the case of a young lady who dreamed that she was travelling with her mother-in-law to a summer resort, or in case of a lawyer who dreamed that he had lost all his law suits.

It is obvious that with such mechanisms in his possession, it is impossible to refute him. His fundamental notion of dream distortion, his mechanisms of dream work such as condensation, displacement, symbolization, inversion, etc. give him an advantage over his opponents. The fact is when you put an allegorical value on a thing you can prove anything to be equal to anything. You see your enemy in a dream and by condensation he can be shown to represent your father, your brother or your uncle, or all of them at the same time. You greet a friend most politely in your dream, and it may be proved to betray your wish to show extreme rudeness to the man, (through inversion). You go to visit the house of a friend, and through symbolization it can be shown to betray your wish to have illicit relations with his wife.

These examples and considerations may shake your belief in Freud's interpretation of dreams but you may say: what about the psycho-analytic evidence on which Freud seems to base his interpretations. In fact there is a great misconception about his Analysis. It is sometimes supposed that the revelations by the subject in the course of analysis are just like the admissions of an approver in a law court after which the case is proved beyond

every shadow of doubt. But I will remind you that there are police methods for extracting an admission from the accused. Similar may be the case in psycho-analysis. The prestige and the personality of the Analyst, the suggestibility of the patient, the abnormal atmosphere and long months of analysis can induce any complex in the subject which was not there.

Again the flow of ideas is far from being free. The subject knows or gets to know Freud's views. He already expects certain revelations in that direction. Over and above this, the very presence of Freud will direct and determine the course of associations. Just as the presence of a Stalin will lead one's associations to Communism, of a Churchill to war, similarly the presence of Freud cannot but lead to sex. Sometimes this prompting of associations is not even concealed. When the subject finds some difficulty in his path of association then Freud, with the excuse of lifting up the resistance, comes to his rescue, and by suggestions and encouragements actually prompts him.

Further, it will be wrong to suppose that there are only fixed paths of associations on which ideas can flow. New paths can be formed through suggestion or under the pressure of present purpose. Mind can find intermediary links between any two ideas not previously connected. So if an idea, through association, leads to some other ideas it is no proof that they were etiologically connected. The association forward and the association backward may not necessarily coincide.

I performed some interesting psycho-analytic experiments with some of my M.A. students. I gave them a dream which was not theirs (viz. the dream of being hanged). I asked them to sit comfortably, in a relaxed position, in the dim light of a room, with closed eyes, and imagining the dream as theirs to allow their ideas to flow freely without restraint or effort and to report to me whatever passed through their mind. The material that I got from this experiment was such that it could explain the dream exactly on Freudian lines. But there was nothing to be explained as the dream was not theirs. In fact the dream has been quoted by Freud as belonging to an author named Meier, being stimulated by the tight collar of his night shirt.

Similarly there are convenience dreams which Freud himself admits as of simple infantile type having no sexual significance, e.g.

1. Freud's own dream that he is drinking long draughts of water and then he wakes up to find himself thirsty.

2. In his youth Freud used to dream that he was out of bed and standing at the wash-stand. It was due to his desire to wake early.

3. The recurring dreams of the leader of a polar expedition about sumptuous dinners were direct reflections of his hunger as the rations had been exhausted.

Now my thesis is that if Freud and this leader of polar expedition were available for psycho-analysis these innocent dreams too could have been proved to be of sexual origin. As a matter of fact you can take any dream and psycho-analyse any person with it. You will find that it can easily hang on him and can be shown to have sprung from his repressed complexes.

There are several kinds of dreams in which Freud's method of interpretation fails us or seems to be unconvincing. Take for example self-imposed dreams of Maury.

1. He dreams that he is in Italy, perspiring heavily and drinking white wine. But only a drop of water was allowed to fall on his forehead.

2. He dreams of thunder, of heat and of a storm at sea. The light of a candle screened with red paper was allowed to fall on his face.

Again there are dreams due to Organic stimuli. A person suffering from the diseases of heart dreams of death under terrible circumstances. A man suffering from the diseases of the lungs dreams of suffocation. Dental irritation often gives rise to the dream of dropping teeth.

Moreover there are disagreeable or anxiety dreams. According to the researches of two psychologists, Sarahwee and Florence Halam, 58 P. C. dreams are disagreeable. Freud laboriously tries to reduce them to wish-fulfilment. The greatest weakness of Freud is that he does not credit dream work with honest expression. He always suspects dream of crooked ways and distortion. When the infantile type of dreams are recognized by Freud as being direct and simple, why not admit the possibility of the same direct expression in case of other dreams, e.g. anxiety dreams.

In fact dream phenomena can be explained more easily and convincingly if we take them not as fundamentally opposed to waking mechanisms. In our waking state sometimes our desires spur our imagination. Sometimes our fears and apprehensions fill up our imagery. A mother who hears a cry at a distance and

mistakes it for the cry of her absent child does not necessarily wish him ill. Why then the dream of a mother who sees her only child as ill should be taken to express her wish for his death? Can it not be interpreted, and more sensibly too, as the reflection of her anxiety for his health?

As Strumpell and Wendt suggest, most of the dreams can be interpreted by the ordinary phenomenon of illusions. Certain external stimuli (so far as they are accessible to the dreamer), and the organic sensations and images aroused by them, and associations released by them, the interests of the day and the recent impressions of a day or two, the dominating emotions combining and acting in different proportions are all that we should require to explain the variety and the complication of dream phenomena.

In short, Freud's hypothesis is not the only hypothesis nor the most satisfactory hypothesis. Jung, Adler, Janet and others try to explain dream phenomena in their own way, with equal plausibility. But I will go a step further and will suggest that you start with the most fantastic hypothesis imaginable and by mechanisms like those of Freud, you can find its corroboration in dreams.

Before concluding my essay a few words about Freud's symbolization will not be out of place. Symbols are the weakest spot of his theory. He believes that there are some fixed symbols which have always the same meaning in dream, e.g. king and queen refer to parents. Thieves, robbers and serpents represent brothers. A house or a room stands for a woman, and so on. But here too the question is: Cannot the dreaming mind be ever credited with straight thinking. In fact Freud himself admits this truth when he says in another context, "One does not know whether a particular dream image is to be taken symbolically or on its face value." But with this admission, the whole theory of symbolism falls to pieces, as there can be no reliability in any symbol.

But perhaps Freud would say that very often the dreamer himself recognises the symbolic meaning of a dream image. To expose his argument I will only remind you of the fact that according to Freud the symbol refers to the language of the unconscious which the waking ego does not understand. The admission of the subject in his waking state about the meaning of a symbol is as unreliable as Freud's translation of it. Moreover suggestion, as mentioned before, can do wonders. It can easily invest innocent ideas with symbolic meaning. Here I may refer to a very delicate law of human mind. Human mind is so flexible

that if you begin to search it for anything you will find it there. This is the danger of too much self-introspection. If you begin to search your mind with a suspicion that you do not love your friend, you will find proofs of your infidelity. If you begin your search for repressed sex complexes, such complexes will be formed merely by this delicate suggestion of your purpose. Similar is the case with symbols. Suppose you are talking to a lady friend about some philosophical problem. Suddenly you are reminded of Freudian symbols. Now all your innocent words appear as symbols, though you never meant them as such.

Now I will conclude my paper with a very interesting example of Freud's interpretation of dreams which will show you to what far-fetched limits he can carry the process.

A man dreams that it is raining heavily. There is water everywhere, water inside and water outside. Now Freud unravels the mystery of this dream through the following steps. Excess of water suggests over-flow. By a slight modification overflow leads to overfluid. Overfluid can be expressed as superfluid and superfluid brings to the mind superfluous. So the whole dream was woven to pronounce the judgment that something was superfluous.

I think it will bring the same word 'superfluous' to your lips as the best comment on Freud's interpretations of dreams.

**The Conception of "Al a'yan al thabita"
(or the Latent Realities)
In Islamic Mysticism**

BY

MIR VALUDDIN

In Islamic Mysticism God or Haqq is the Ultimate Reality or the Absolute which exists by itself and is conceived by itself. He is further believed to be the Absolute Knower. "He knows everything" says theh Qūr'an. In knowing Himself God knows all things in Himself and distinguishes them from Himself as objects of His knowledge. That is to say 'knowing' implies 'knowledge' and the 'object known'. God knows His own thoughts, these being the objects of His knowledge. Now if God's knowledge is perfect, (which, ex hypothesis, it is) His ideas or thoughts (objects of knowledge) are also perfect in every way. But God has knowledge, is a knower, from eternity. Therefore His ideas are also eternal. They are uncreated. Knowledge is an attribute of God and cannot, therefore, be separated from Him. It constitutes the very essence of God. As God is eternal or uncreated, His knowledge is also uncreated or eternal. The difference, of course, does not impair the essential unity of knowledge, knower, and known, but is none the less inherent in the nature of things, i.e. in reality as manifested to us. "Triplicity" as Ibnul 'Arabī says, "is the foundation of becoming."

Among the Mystics of Islam it is Shaykh Muhyid-Dīn-Ibnul Arabī who first calls the 'Ideas' of God "*al a'yān al thabitā*" (which may be rendered 'Fixed Prototypes' or 'Latent Realities') and has given them a prominent place in his Mysticism. He has tried to solve many a knotty problem of Metaphysics by an ingenious use of this fruitful conception. He derives his inspiration mainly from the Holy Qūr'an. I will make an attempt here to determine the exact connotation of the term *al a'yān al thābitā* and show how it may be used in the solution of various ontological problems.

As stated above, *al 'yān thābitā* is a technical name, given by Ibnul 'Arabī to the 'Ideas' of God. God reveals Himself to Himself in a state of self-consciousness (not at any point of time) and

sees in Himself for Himself an infinity of ideas or al'yān as determinate "forms" of His Essence. This state is technically called *Wahidiyat* or the Second Epiphany or Particularisation. As ideas they cannot have any existence apart from the mind of God, just as our ideas cannot exist apart from our mind. As ideas or 'forms' in the mind of God the al'yān al *thābitā* possess limitation or determination or individualisation. They subsist in the mind of the Knower (or God) and do not possess their own independent existence. They possess no positive attributes, e.g. life, knowledge, will, etc., though they possess the capacity of acquiring those attributes. They are passive, having no existence or existential attributes; they possess no activity of their own. On the other hand, God, the knower, is free from every limitation or determination. He exists in Himself depending on nothing else but Himself and possesses positive attributes and is active. It is because of this difference between the ideas or the known and God or the knower that a relation of otherness is posited between them; though as latent states in the Essence of God, in the state of *Wahdat* or the first Epiphany or Particularisation they are one with God.

Now, according to the *Qūr'an*, God is not only the 'Knower' but the 'Creator' of all things also. Says the *Qūr'an*,

"God is the Creator of everything".

And the Creator knows what He creates. As the *Qūr'an* puts it, "Should He not know — He that created? And He is the One that understands the finest mysteries (and) is well-acquainted (with them)". And when the Creator "intends (the creation of) a thing, His Command is "Be", and "It is"

Now it is clear that the Command "Be" is given to a thing and it is created. The question arises: If the thing was already there, and it is in this sense only that it could become the object of the Command 'Be', is there any sense in creating a thing which already exists? But again, if the thing which is the object of command is a non-entity, how can it become the object of command at all?

The only way out of this difficulty is to maintain that the object of God's command 'Be' is the idea or 'ayn *thābitā*' which subsists in the mind of God from all eternity. This intelligible idea in the Mind of God is manifested externally by the Creative Fiat of God which is expressed by the word "Be". Thus Al'yān al *thābitā* must be taken as the essences of things which when manifested are called "external objects" or 'created things' or merely the many 'things' of the world.

But this does not mean that the Al'yān al *thābitā* themselves become concrete manifestations, for they are mere subjectivities and as such must always remain non-existent. They are ideas in the mind of God and will always subsist in His mind. As Ibnul 'Arabī puts it, they "have not smelt the smell of existence". They never come out of the knowledge of God leaving a blank there.

What happens is this — and this is also the secret of Creation: The 'ayān have no existence apart from the one Universal Essence or God. As intelligible ideas in the Mind of God they are mere subjectivities. There is nothing in existence except God. He is the First, the Last, the Outward, the Inward. He is the substance of what is manifested and is the substance of what remains latent at the time of manifestation. As the Prophet has said: "You are the outward and there is nothing above you; You are the Inward and there is nothing below you; You are the First and there is nothing before you; and you are the Last and there is nothing after you." Thus by reason of His manifesting Himself in the forms of things God becomes the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward of things. That is how His proximity, nearness, omnipresence, in a word, immanence in everything, which is so much emphasised by the *Qūr'an*, becomes comprehensible.

From what we have said above it is clear that the *ayān al thābitā* occupy in Ibnul 'Arabī's system of Mysticism an intermediary position between the One as the Absolute Reality and the Phenomenal world. He calls them the "Keys of the Unseen" and the "first Keys", because they form the opening chapter in the history of Creation.

Now let us see how Ibnul 'Arabī tries to solve some very difficult and abstruse ontological problems by the use of the conception of *ayan thābitā*. Let us take first the problem of the One and the Many. We have seen above that the "Knower", the One, the Absolute or *Ḥaqq* manifests Himself in the form of the 'known', and is called the 'kalq' the Created. *Kalq* by itself is non-existent. 'It has not smelt the smell of existence'. As the *Qūr'an* has put it: "You are dead and they are dead".

Existence belongs to the Knower alone which is the only Reality or Existence. There is no duality of being or existence. Ontologically there is but one Reality (Singularism).

Existence is one but Ideas are many. They are co-eternal with the Knower. That is to say they are uncreated. For if the Ideas were created by the Knower, the Knower did not possess them before they were created by Him. But this means that the

Knower was ignorant of them before they were created. Nobody thinks of God as ignorant at any moment. Therefore the ideas, or the *ayān al thābitā* are co-eternal with God. They constitute the knowledge of God and do not exist separately from Him. Still they are not the same as God. As 'states' or 'modes' they are no more the divine Essence itself than our mental states are our minds. For various reasons given above a relation of 'otherness', not of 'identity', exists between the Knower and the Known. But Ideas possess no external existence. They merely subsist in the mind of God. God manifests Himself in the forms of His Ideas expressing their aptitudes in full and thus the world appears.

Another abstruse problem which has so far vexed and puzzled human intellect, is the problem of Free Will and Determinism. It appears that reflective thought has not been able to unravel the difficulties of this old problem and to offer a satisfactory solution of it. It is, again, by the use of the fruitful conception of *A'yan-i-Thābitā* that Ibn-ul-'Arabī has been able to suggest an ingenious solution of this problem.

We know that a '*yan-i-thābitā*' or the ideas in the mind of God are uncreated and unchangeable. They have their own essential nature or aptitudes. These aptitudes or characteristics are themselves uncreated and immutable. The ideas of God are what are called the essences of things which when manifested are called 'external objects'. Creation is an act of Will. The Will of God obeys the knowledge of God. Creation is nothing but the external manifestation or actualisation of the ideas of God or the essences of things. That which is manifested or actualised existed eternally in the mind of God as an idea. Ideas actualised are called external objects.

Now what we call 'Determination' is nothing but the temporal limitation of a thing's essential nature (i.e. its essence, i.e. idea in the mind of God). Whatever is contained in the essence is made manifest. "That which is in *thubūt* (latency) comes out in *Zuhūr* (externality)". "God gave you what you asked for". That is to say, God manifested externally what was contained in the 'essence' i.e. the essential nature of things. So every one's portion in this world is that which God knows he will receive and which is all he is capable of receiving. God Himself cannot alter it—for it is His own idea or Knowledge and God's Knowledge being perfect needs no alteration. The true believer here and now was a true believer when his soul existed only as an idea in the mind of God and the infidel of today has been an infidel from

eternity. Hence God says in the *Qūr'an*: "I do not do the least injustice to My servants"; i.e. as Ibnul 'Arabī explains, "I did not ordain the unbelief which dooms them to misery and then demand of them what lay not in their power to perform.... If there be injustice, they are the unjust." "Therefore do not praise any one but yourself or blame any one but yourself."¹

Human actions are self-determined because they are strictly in accordance with their essential nature. Man is responsible in the sense that his actions spring directly from him and are determined by his own nature and the laws which govern it. It is also true that God creates our actions. "God has created you and what ye make", because it is He who manifests externally what is contained in the 'essence' or '*ayn-i-thābitā*'. That is how Ibnul 'Arabī reconciles determinism and indeterminism in a doctrine of self-determinism.²

It has been clearly stated above that the relation between the Knower and the Known, God and His Ideas, is one of "otherness" and not of 'identity'. God is 'one', His Ideas are 'many'. God exists independently, Ideas depend on the mind of God for their existence. The essence or *Dhāt* of God is free from any limitation or determination; the ideas of *A'yān*, though unlimited in number, are limited in form possessing their own peculiarities or characteristics or aptitudes. These aptitudes are eternal. They are not created by the creative action of the Creator. For if *A'yan-i-Thābitā*, being the ideas of God, are eternal and uncreated, the aptitudes of the ideas must also be eternal and uncreated. These aptitudes are manifested by the Creative fiat of God. Hence, says Ibnul 'Arabī, evil relates to man ('*abd*') and not to God ('*rab*'). The *Qūr'an* has clearly expressed the idea when it says:

"Whatever good (oh man!) happens to thee, is from God; but whatever evil happens to thee, is from thy (own) soul". "*Nafs*" (soul) here means the aptitudes of the '*ayn*'. The same idea is clearly stated by Mulla Jami thus: "Whatever is good or evil of yours is entirely of your demand. Whatever your '*ayn*' demanded, My grace has granted it." A simple illustration makes this point amply clear. Each limb and organ in the body receives its strength from the soul, but manifests its own aptitude. The eye sees and does not hear; the ear hears and does not see. In the same way every '*ayn*' receives its bevolences or graces from

1. *Fus*, p. 160.

2. Cf. "The conception of Self-Determinism in Islamic Mysticism—a paper by the author published in the *Jour. of Hyd. Acady.* 1941.

the creator according to its own aptitude. The Creator manifests the aptitudes of A'yān. His action is not contrary to the aptitudes. Hence A'yān-al-thābitā are called "latent realities with their aptitudes" by Ibnul Arabi. As the aptitudes are limited and finite, only a limited amount of the positive attributes of the Creator e.g. life, knowledge, power etc, may be manifested through them. Evil arises out of this limitation of the absolute attributes of the Creator. Therefore evil relates to 'abd' and not to 'rab'. In this way the Conception of A'yān al thābitā is made use of by Ibnul 'Arabi to explain the vexed problem of good and evil.

From what has been said above it is obvious that Ibnul 'Arabi's a'yān-al-thābitā though resembling Plato's "Ideas" are not absolutely identical with them. The main difference lies in the fact that according to Plato's theory, 'Ideas' are substances. They are absolute and ultimate realities. They depend on nothing, but all things depend on them. They are the first principles of the universe. They do not depend even on the mind of God. But according to Ibnul 'Arabi's view, A'yān-al-thābitā are ideas of God subsisting in His mind and having no independent existence of their own.

Then, again, Plato's Ideas are universals. An Idea is not any particular thing. The Idea of the horse is not this or that horse. It is the general concept of all horses. It is the universal horse. For this reason the Ideas are, in modern times, often called "Universals". But for Ibnul 'Arabi, there are as many ideas as there are particular things in the phenomenal world, and they differ from one another, but they form a unified system, as with Plato. The absolute unity of the First Principle (God) is reflected in the system of many different ideas.

Reviews

SRI AUROBINDO, Indian Poet, Philosopher and Mystic. By G. H. Langley. Published by David Marlowe, Ltd., for The Royal India and Pakistan Society.

It is significant of the changing times and the new status of India that the Council of the Royal India and Pakistan Society of England should have sponsored this monograph on Sri Aurobindo. It was also in the fitness of things that Professor G. H. Langley should have been chosen to write it, for he spent the best years of his life in Bengal and could be trusted to bring to bear on the subject the critical outlook of the West and a sympathetic approach expected of a student of philosophy in India. An appreciative Foreword from the veteran pen of The Marquess of Zetland has added to the value of the publication.

It used to be a common gibe that India had no philosopher since the great days of the Vedantic acharyas. But the gibe does not hold now. If to Professor Radhakrishnan must go the credit of having created an interest in Indian philosophy in the whole English-speaking world, to Sri Aurobindo must go the credit of developing a system of thought, which seeks to combine the best in the philosophical legacy of the East and the West. Early in his career Sri Aurobindo had dared to declare that India "must send forth from herself the future religion of the entire world, the eternal religion which is to harmonise all religion, science and philosophies and make mankind one soul". After freeing himself from the entanglements of political India, he devoted himself to a deep study of her ancient culture and a practice of her ancient Yogic methods. The result we find in a stream of writings from the ashram at Pondicherry, culminating in the two massive volumes *Life Divine*, which seeks to fulfil the boast of his earlier years.

If philosophy in the West has tended to be true to the ideal of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, a disinterested pursuit of knowledge, the Indian thinker has pursued knowledge as a means to achieve moksha. Sri Aurobindo is true to type and can claim to be a genuine karma-yogin. In the spirit of the Gita he wants all spiritually-purifying actions to be done "without personal motives or preferences, without desire for fame or public recognition or worldly greatness, without vanity or self-assertion, or claim for position or prestige, but for the sake of the Divine".

It is a peculiarity of Sri Aurobindo that while he is steeped in Indian lore, he has not found it necessary to repudiate all that he has culled from the treasures of the West from his earliest years. Like the average Indian he too feels that India has something to teach which no other country in the world has got to teach, but he also feels that the West has something to teach which India cannot afford to let go. In plainer language he would spiritualise the West, but he would have India appreciate the worth of the physical as well. This is in short the mission of his philosophy.

Sri Aurobindo accepts evolutionism in the universe and in the individual. He teaches that the higher does not completely supplant the lower, rather the lower takes a higher form and lives in it, for the higher "is eternally present in the lower" and constitutes the eternal upward urge. It is this that makes him depart from the traditional Hindu view which makes matter an eternal enemy of the spiritual, so that moksha is spoken of as a complete freedom from the material. He is very explicit in his view: "If in passing from one domain (or level) to another we renounce what has been already given to us, if reaching to the mental life we cast away or belittle the physical life — which is our basis; or if we reject the mental and the physical in our attention to the spiritual; we do not fulfil God integrally". It follows that he does not champion the cause of asceticism, which has been so marked a feature of Hindu ethos.

In Western philosophy mind and spirit are very loosely used often as being synonymous. But in Aurobindo's philosophy they are quite distinct from each other, spirit being much higher than mind. Spirit has the capacity to comprehend the world in its unity, while mind proceeds more analytically. Here too while emphasising the superiority of spirit, he is fully alive to the importance of mind, for it acts as a check on the ipse-dixits of spirit. That is why he is conscious of the limitations of religion as popularly understood. "Religion has opened itself to denial by its claim to determine the truth by divine authority, by inspiration, by a sacrosanct and infallible sovereignty given to it from on high; it has sought to impose itself on human thought, feeling, conduct, without discussion or question". These wise words have an important bearing on the future of Sri Aurobindo's own teaching. What he teaches as a thinker is already even in his own life time becoming a creed: not to be reasoned about but accepted in the spirit of blind obedience. How else are we to explain the claim made by his disciples that India has won her freedom, not through

the preachings and sufferings of Gandhiji, but through the spiritual force of Sri Aurobindo exercised within the four walls of his ashram?

Sri Aurobindo's fame in the realms of philosophy and religion has overshadowed his work and worth as a poet. It was a happy idea of Professor Langley to devote the last chapter to Sri Aurobindo as a poet. The selections are good and bring out the extraordinary versatility of the Sage of Pondicherry. It is refreshing to note the patriotic ardour of the days when Sri Aurobindo was in the thick of the fight for the political freedom of India.

"India, my India, who dare call thee a thing for pity's
grace to-day?"

Mother of wisdom, worship, works, nurse of the spirit's
inward ray."

Though this is a translation of a hymn by Dvyjendralal Roy, it aptly echoes the genuine patriot in Sri Aurobindo. His life is finely summarised in a short poem *Transformation*:

"I am no more a vassal of the flesh,
A slave to Nature and her leaden rule;
I am caught no more in the senses' narrow mesh.
My soul unhorizoned widens to measureless sight,
My body is God's happy living tool,
My spirit a vast sun of deathless light."

Though the book is by no means a long one, an index would have added to its value. Another defect is that the author has not mentioned the sources from which he has quoted fairly profusely. Clear references would have been helpful to the student, and it may be presumed that the main object of the book is to lead the reader to the original writings of Sri Aurobindo. The best compliment that can be paid to Professor Langley is that he has produced an excellent introduction to Sri Aurobindo's works. It is characterised by poise and accuracy and a critically appreciative approach to his subject. It is free from the unbalanced excesses of his professed disciples. So it deserves to be called the best introduction one can have to the treasures that have been emanating from Pondicherry for four decades. Professor Langley has earned the thanks of all who wish India to be better known. Nor must we forget to thank the Royal India and Pakistan Society for having sponsored the work.

A. R. WADIA.


The Aryan Path: We have received the fifth number of the twenty-first volume of this magazine published at "Aryasangha", Malabar Hill, Bombay 6 (India). "It contains as usual, several important and thought-provoking articles and reviews of many outstanding new books. Every issue of this journal offers 48 pages of the most substantial, authoritative and stimulating reading material including a number of very striking and significant editorials, discussing with unprejudiced frankness the vital problems of the day from the universal and spiritual point of view.

The Aryan Path has been endeavouring for twenty years now to uphold the unchanging values of the spirit in a world of prejudice and of change, to bring together the peoples of the world in mutual sympathy and appreciation, and especially to interpret the East to the West and vice-versa."

Books Received

(1) "The Problems of Philosophy" by S. C. Chatterjee, published by Das Gupta & Co., Ltd. Price Rs. 6-8.

(2) "The Vedanta of Śaṅkara"—A metaphysics of value, by Prof. Ram Pratap Singh, published by Bharat Publishing House, Jaipur. Price Rs. 10.



Q.M. 2, N25

Printed by G. Srinivasachari, B.A., at the G. S. Press, 21, Narasingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras, and Published by the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, E. Khandesh.

N50-23-1