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
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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXII, No. 3

October 1949

Some Epistemological Problems about the History of Philosophy¹

*Notes for the Presidential Address to the History of Philosophy
Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, XXIV Session,
Patna, 1949*

BY

REV. J. F. BUTLER, M.A., PH.D.

A. PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AS A BRANCH OF HISTORY

History is the relating of the story of the past, compressed and organized according to concepts of deep human significance. Squeezed into this definition (whose defence would be too lengthy a business to attempt here: I am trying it on the full scale elsewhere)² are all the stock difficulties about the epistemology of history.³ These are general difficulties, applicable to all types of

1. In thinking out this paper, I have been greatly indebted to the following writings, although I agree with little in some of them: B. Croce, *Logic*, pt. II, chap. iv; pt. III, chaps. iii, iv, vi, viii; pt. IV, chap. i; *Theory and History of Historiography*, pt. I, chap. v; *History as the Story of Liberty*, Parts I and II; *What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel*, E. T., 108-110, 143, 216; R. G. Collingwood, *Essay on Philosophical Method*, 226; *An Autobiography*, chap. vii; S. Radhakrishnan, edition of *The Bhagavadgītā*; Raymond Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 99-102.

2. In a forthcoming book, which in the portion relevant here will be a re-writing of an article in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, xxi, 4 (Jan. 1949) 161-173.

3. These are conveniently summarized in M. Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge*.

history, and we cannot enter into such general discussions here. The only respects in which the epistemology of the history of philosophy, as distinct from other types of history, differs from the epistemology of those other types, are four:

(a) In the case of the history of philosophy, the stock question as to whether or not 'history' includes the story of the non-human world⁴ does not arise, since, so far as we know, only humans philosophize.

(b) Likewise, the stock question as to whether or not 'history' includes the story of the future as well as of the past⁵ does not arise (since no one, except perhaps the Marxists, makes predictions about the future of philosophy).

However, the history of philosophy has two other extra difficulties of its own — or at least it shares them with other branches of *Kulturgeschichte* as distinct from *Geschichte* (to adopt the significant German terms)

(c) Can 'the history of philosophy' really have a meaning at all? There does seem a sense in which 'history' is only or primarily applicable to political or at any rate to social life, all other 'histories' being side-issues and not histories in the full sense. Is this sense the really significant one, or is it a mere reflection of prejudice? However, in any case this problem is largely a verbal one.

(d) In the case of philosophy — here again, in common with other branches of *Kulturgeschichte*, but perhaps for philosophy more intensely — the stock problem of compression becomes one of great difficulty. In ordinary history, indeed, this problem is much stressed — the problem, e.g., of the truth-relation between the enormous mass of 'facts' known or knowable about the life of Marlborough (and each 'fact' on examination turns out to be shorthand for millions of 'facts' about atomic, etc., movements), a five-volume 'Life' of him, a one-volume 'Life' of him, an encyclopaedia article about him, and two sentences about him — but in ordinary

4. B. Croce, *Theory and History of Historiography*, E.T., 128-35 (I. ix); *History as the Story of Liberty*, E.T., 292-300; R. G. Collingwood, *Religion and Philosophy*, 156; *The Idea of History*, 54-5, 104-5, 115, 120, 129, 182, 199-200, 210-7, 220, 226, 302-15, 321-3; *An Autobiography*, 107-10 (Oxford ed.) (73-4 (Pelican ed.)), 128 (86-7); *The New Leviathan*, 64 (9.43); Raymond Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 25-39.

5. B. Croce, *Logic*, E.T., 340-1, 420-6; *History and Theory of Historiography*, E.T., 40, 64-82 (I. iv); *History as the Story of Liberty*, E.T., 30, 286-7; R. G. Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis*, 211; *The Idea of History*, 213-5.

history the problem is not (I have, again, defended this opinion elsewhere) of really formidable proportions. It may be difficult to explain how the various condensed accounts of Marlborough can be true: but we do not really doubt that they are true. But it is otherwise with the history of philosophy. For instance, can a paragraph, or even a short book, on Kant's philosophy be completely true, in any sense full enough to have real significance?

B. PROBLEMS OF THE RELATION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY TO ORDINARY HISTORY

Widely divergent views have been held about this. Near the one extreme, Hegel seems to have thought of general history as a sort of objectified philosophical dialectic: even more uncompromising is Croce's sheer identification of philosophy and history.⁶ At the other extreme, to the Marxists metaphysical doctrines are mere epiphenomena or functions of economic struggle. Perhaps these views do not call for explicit refutation: if we take each by itself, we can simply say that a *tour de force* is a *reductio ad absurdum*; if we take them together, then we can let opposing extremes cancel each other out.

The answer to our problem must depend partly on what we mean by 'philosophy'. Philosophy can be regarded as a narrow specialism on certain basic problems of ontology: as such it ought to be not much less impersonal, not much less affected by the chances and changes of ordinary history, than mathematics — history, that is, should decide whether or not and where and when it shall appear, but not what it shall be when it does appear — and as far as I can see for the most part that is what has actually happened. But if 'philosophy' is taken in the broad sense covered by the German word '*Weltanschauung*', in this sense it tends to become indistinguishable from the thought- or explanation-aspect of general history: e.g., the history of Western philosophy, in this sense, would have to take serious notice of Virgil's thought, both in itself and as the mouthpiece of Augustus.

The real difficulty is that most philosophy is a mixture, or rather an organic union, of the two types. The same book or system will contain both ontological doctrine and general reflections on

6. *Logic*, E.T., 324-6, 420-1, 433, 487-7; *Theory and History of Historiography*, E.T., 61-3, 83, 117, 119, 151; *History as the Story of Liberty*, E.T., 34-6, 140-6, 301.

life and politics; and, while in some cases the relationship between the two sets of ideas does not go very deep, in other cases it is integral. Thus, in Plato's *Republic* ontology and politics — the latter clearly affected by the facts and problems of his time — are an organic whole; Aristotle is more departmentalized, but his Unmoved Mover and slave-based society fit in well together; Epicureanism and Stoicism have in them, throughout, the flavour, decadent but brave, of the Hellenic decline; the conclusion of Hegel's *Philosophy of Law* is a notorious instance of metaphysics and politics in alliance. And throughout the centuries in India the metaphysic of *karma* and the sociology of caste have supported each the other. (Georges Sorel's books, and Prof. B. Farrington's *Pelican Greek Science*, ably work out this line of thought.)

Nevertheless, there does seem to be some considerable element of objectivity in philosophy. Philosophy, in fact, might almost be defined as the quest for objectivity in fundamentals. There are some bold thinkers — or are they really escape-thinkers? — who seek to deduce every detail in a man's philosophy from some detail in his biography: but there is little in such efforts but intellectual extravagance combined with spiritual meanness. True, every man's thinking bears the marks of his age and of his personal experiences — it would be dull and lifeless if it did not: but do we not all have some experience of the quest for intellectual honesty? Do we not all know something of the stresses and strains of 'thinking against the grain' of our environment and personal prejudices? Can we seriously judge the doctrines of Universals, of Cosmic Right, or of the Dialectic, as merely relative to particular historical situations? Is it plausible simply to identify reason and rationalization in that way?

I do not think that in actual fact much influence of an age seeps through into the inner fastnesses of metaphysics, except in the very general form of the effect of an age's inclination towards confidence or towards decadence. For the most part, such influence of this sort as is felt at all will be on the side of decadence: this is partly because 'the owl of Minerva only flies by night' (i.e., philosophy is a mode of activity not fully or deeply indulged in till a culture has lost its first zest — a Hegelian generalization which seems to me on the whole correct, though it has been much attacked, and is certainly difficult to reconcile with outstanding facts both in Indian philosophy and in Western Scholasticism): and partly it is because philosophy is largely undertaken by 'introverts' (almost by definition — though the admittedly vague

term might have some difficulty in covering Socrates and William James, and even some aspects of Śaṅkara and Aquinas), and introverts are more open to influence of that type than of the other. These are psychological facts which weight philosophy in the direction of ideas which make for world-flight rather than world-acceptance: and I suppose we ought to bear this in mind both in our assessments of our great predecessors and in our own attempts at philosophizing. But what does this influence really amount to? For instance, reading them against the background of their authors' biographies and contemporary history, it is not difficult to hold that the Absolutisms of Eckhart and Schopenhauer and Bradley are world-flights. But can one plausibly hold the same of Śaṅkara, Spinoza and Hegel?

C. PROBLEMS IN THE RELATION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY TO LIVING PHILOSOPHY

By 'living philosophy' I mean the philosophizings that are actually going on nowadays, including our own. Clearly the dependence of these on past philosophy is enormous. In nearly all of those of us who call ourselves 'philosophers', ninety-nine per cent of our philosophy is either Scepticism or discipleship or Eclecticism or discipleship tempered with Eclecticism — all dependent, that is, upon philosophical history.

I would like to analyse the phrases in that last sentence in which I have summarized the forms of our dependence, so that we can see more clearly the extent, both in open and subtle forms, of that dependence.

(1) *Scepticism*. Probably the old full-blooded, dogmatic Scepticism of the classical types of the Greek Sceptics (as collected in that much-neglected writer Sextus Empiricus) or the Buddhist *Mādhymikas* or *Śūnyavādins* is now rare: but there are modern attitudes which in the end amount to much the same thing, such as Logical Positivism, or the dilettante attitude for which we may quote John Buchan:

'My interests... lay not in the search for a creed, but in the study of the patterns which different thinkers made out of the universe. I had a tidy mind and liked to arrange things in compartments even when I did not take the arrangement too seriously. This meant that I inevitably missed much; *quidquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*. My quest for truth, unlike Plato's, wholly "lacked the warmth

of desire." It was a mental gymnastic, for I had neither the uneasiness nor the raptures of the true metaphysician.⁷

Such attitudes obviously leave little in philosophy except the study of its history; as a recent review puts it:

'We might be tempted to make the generalization that some would-be philosophers persist in the attempt to philosophize, while others, disappointed in their search, turn to the study of the history of thought.'⁸

It may indeed be said that not only full-blooded Scepticism of the old type, but also this vaguer defeatist attitude is rare among us — that most of us are really trying to grapple with the great questions and to find an answer; that though in the course of this we may aesthetically admire the patterns of thought woven by our great predecessors, nevertheless our real concern is with getting at the truth. Yes; but on what range of problems? Most of us, I suspect, have a few problems on which our minds really work; our genuinely philosophical reading is for the sake of the light that will be cast on those; the parts of our philosophical reading which do not serve this purpose will, in so far as they enter into our constructive thinking at all, do so only aesthetically, i.e., as thought-patterns appreciated for their skill and consistency, not as truths or possible truths.

(2) *Discipleship*. Discipleship relative to an individual thinker is no longer particularly fashionable — as it was in the days when the great Indian schools of philosophy were formed,⁹ or when the Greek Sophists and later thinkers each had his band

7. *Memory Hold-the-Door*, 38. The context of this passage, very relevant to the thought of it, is Buchan's description of how, as a young man, he had, and rejected, the chance of a career as a professional philosopher at Oxford. It is strange to find an attitude to the major issues of thought which is so fundamentally escapist, in a personality so practical and so pre-eminently balanced as Buchan's. (This illustrates the difficulties in psycho-analysing beliefs, to which we have referred above.) No doubt some of it is part of the strong influence upon Buchan of Walter Pater. In Pater's *less* tough-minded disciples, like Clive Bell, the dilettante attitude becomes far more marked, and far more dangerous. (See *Civilization*, 112, 129-30, 147-61, 169 (Chatto & Windus, 1925 ed.); J. C. Powys' *The Meaning of Culture*, chap. i, speaks indeed in quite dogmatic terms about 'philosophy', but the end of the chapter shows that 'philosophy' has rather a personal meaning for Mr. Powys and that his attitude to historical philosophies is not far removed from Mr. Bell's.

8. *The Times Literary Supplement*, No. 2471 (June 10, 1949), p. 386.

9. S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 62-4.

of followers,¹⁰ or when in the heyday of German metaphysics professors normally expected their pupils to believe in their systems. *Sancta simplicitas!* Nowadays one occasionally meets a thinker prepared more or less to swear *in verba magistri*: Professor H. F. Hallett's *Aeternitas*, aptly sub-titled 'A Spinozistic Study' was a case in point; and in this, as in much else, the Logical Positivists are a throw-back to an earlier age.

But a more subtle form of what is essentially discipleship has become fashionable nowadays, and that is devotion to what is taken to be the *philosophia perennis*. This rather vague term has come in the West to mean a Theism centring round recognition of the objective values of beauty, truth and goodness; and there is much to be said for the view that such is the norm of Western philosophy, of which individual systems can be regarded as personal interpretations and annotations. There now seems a movement in connection with Indian philosophy to apply the term to *advaita vedānta*¹¹ — a usage which is theoretically unobjectionable, since *advaita* has as much right as any other *Weltanschauung* to regard itself as the central, normal philosophy round which the history of philosophy revolves; but it is in practice undesirable, since the term has already been pre-empted by the Western Theism with which the Indian Absolutism and semi-Absolutisms should never be confused. But, to whatever system the name is applied, the principle involved is the same — a central core of doctrine is taken as normative; the various systems in the history of philosophy are studied as being all in their different ways interpretations of or comments on or occasionally criticisms of that doctrine, giving the same basic answers to the same basic questions, with some personal peculiarities and eccentricities indeed, but together yielding a gradual advance through the ages, an advance in the apprehension of the one central philosophy, by means of the accumulation of insights and sharpening of issues in debate. This is not indeed exact discipleship; but, though it follows no one thinker exactly, it follows many in a semi-discipleship, and clearly lays

10. Plato, *Protagoras*, 314e-315b, etc., etc.; J. M. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, s. v. 'Schools of Greece'.

11. Gerald Heard, in *Vedānta for the Western World*, 293-7: cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavadgītā*, 12, quoting Aldous Huxley — but even if Dr. Radhakrishnan is right in interpreting the *Gītā* in a semi-theistic way, the very strong pull in it towards *advaita* shows where the norm of Indian philosophy lies, whereas similar pulls towards Absolution in the West are there felt as eccentric.

great stress upon the history of philosophy as being an unfolding of the truth of thin

(3) and (4) *Eclecticism, or Discipleship tempered by Eclecticism*. Eclecticism of the old type, prevalent when the Greeks gave it its name, is now as much out of fashion as is the close adherence to 'schools' of which it was the professed opposite. Nevertheless, the basic attitude involved is a perennial one in philosophy, and it has its modern forms. It is seen in 'developments' or 'movements', such as that within the great German metaphysical flowering-time from Kant to Hegel and beyond. It is also seen in the literary form known as the 'critical study' — notable examples are Croce's *What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel*, Professor C. A. Campbell's *Scepticism and Construction* (on the basis of Bradley), and Bertrand Russell's early and most unjustly neglected *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*. But in work of this kind the constructive or personal element involved is so marked that further consideration of the issues really belongs to the next stage of our argument.

So much, then, for the importance of the history of philosophy as an element in modern philosophy. What are we to say about the element derived not from the past but from the present, not from other thinkers but from oneself?

I take it that no one nowadays wishes to make exaggerated claims for originality in philosophical thinking, such as Descartes made on his own behalf in his famous autobiographical accounts of the experience in the 'room heated by a stove'.¹² Such subjectivity would only be possible on the psychological background of an age like that of the Renaissance, both revolutionary and individualistic; and even in such ages it is the duty of the responsible thinker to keep his subjectivities within reasonable bounds, and to deal constructively and intelligently with tradition in his criticisms of it. In Descartes' case, his unbalanced and unscholarly subjectivity was a disaster both for himself and for his world; for himself — since had he understood the Scholasticism he undertook to destroy he might have been a front-rank philosopher instead of a mainly a rationalizer of a *Zeitgeist*; for his world — since a world taught to despise as superstition the wide, solid synthesis of Scholasticism and to regard any system of bright, random speculation as philosophy could hardly do other than in time drift into political chaos.

12. Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, sec. II, init.

One can see this need for a scholarly understanding of the past in a pitiable degree when one considers, as one occasionally has to, the attempts at philosophy of those who by accident or design have escaped any formal or even informal philosophical training, who are not even 'self-taught' in philosophy. Their constructive efforts, even when made by minds in themselves keen and experienced in life, are pathetically naive and unimportant. Theoretically, perhaps, there ought to be a springtime freshness about such thinking, and at least the chance of another pioneering Socrates, unhampered by the drag of dead learning: but for sundry psychological and sociological reasons it never actually works out that way. He is an unwise philosopher who neglects the wisdom to be garnered from chats in railway-carriages and choultries, clubs and tea-shops; but he is a very incomplete philosopher whose wisdom is confined to what such authorities can tell him.

Originality in philosophy, then, needs always to be combined with solid learning in the history of previous thought. But there clearly is an originality in philosophy which is desirable and indeed necessary for the fulfilment of the true function of philosophy.

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In one sense, indeed, some original element is inescapable, if there is any thinking at all. No one can think anyone else's thought *simpliciter*: in so far as one man thinks another man's thought at all, he thinks it — it is also a thought of *his*. And this rethinking cannot be a mere passivity, leaving the thought received quite unaltered. In so far as I think, say, Descartes' thought after him, a Renaissance man's thought is rethought by a modern man, in a mind that provides a modern context; and in the process Descartes' thought is, at the best, adjusted, and, at the worst, caricatured. This factor in rethinking may not be so important or so universal as some Idealists would maintain — for instance, I do not really believe that ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' means in itself something different to Einstein from what it means to me, although for Einstein the proposition glows with a magnificent penumbra of meaning in a system of theory of numbers, which it cannot even begin to have for me, who cannot accurately define 'addition'. But its application to and importance in all 'humane' thinking is self-evident. Even the most 'historical' of thought has two 'moments' — the past thought as received, the modern grasp of it as receiving.

That is true even of abstrusely intellectual problems (though perhaps not, as I have suggested above, of purely scientific ones). Watch the mind, say, of a Russell 'wrapping itself round' the old

paradoxes of Zeno.¹³ And in some types of philosophical problems, notably the religious or semi-religious ones of Theism and Absolutism, it is clear how the main work of the philosophical quest—its initiation, its development, its deepening—are all phases of an inner spiritual travail rather than of accumulation of book-learning—note the close connection in classical Indian thinking between *jñāna* and *yoga*.¹⁴

But though this 'moment' of construction, of personalizing, is in some degree unavoidable, its degree can vary. And therein lie the important differences, on various levels, between the mere scholar in the history of philosophy and the true philosopher.¹⁵ In this connection, the Indian tradition of discipleship to a *guru* is a classical attempt to provide instruction and continuity of tradition, while at the same time insisting on individual apprehension. Modern educational methods, even outside of philosophy, seek to do the same sort of thing in their own way.

The really good philosophical mind is not swamped or defeated by learning in the history of philosophy; it is kindled by it. The passage we have quoted above from *The Times Literary Supplement* continues:

'The generalization (that philosophers either think in a vacuum or turn in despair to mere scholarship) would cover a great number of instances, but it fails to take account of the rare scholar who, beginning as a historian of thought, and fully based upon a knowledge of the vicissitudes of philosophy, is compelled by what his studies reveal to become a philosopher in his own right.'

(The reference was to Mons. Gilson, a noble example indeed).

That is it.—The past story of philosophy must be mastered first—'mastered' in the sense of thoroughly learned and learned from. Otherwise we shall be mere ignoramuses, wandering among

13. *Our Knowledge of the External World*, lect. vi.

14. Some Western schools are now even insisting also on the connection between wisdom and dynamic social thinking and action. Cf. Marx's famous dictum on *altering* the world instead of *interpreting* it. But philosophy is not action; it should simply supply the objective 'moment' for action. (In any case, such outer, social action should not be confounded with a *yoga* of inner salvation, as it is, surprisingly, by Dr. Radhakrishnan in his *Bhagavad-gītā*, 96.)

15. Cf. the instructive comments, in some of his obituaries, on the status of A. E. Taylor, e.g., A. J. D. Porteous, in *Mind*, lv, 218 (Apr. 1946), p. 191. (Vico and Hegel identified philosophy with its history (B. Croce, *Logic*, E.T., 569, 486); not so Croce (*ib.*, 484-5).)

naïve fallacies or truisms, unaware of what the real problems and subtleties of thought are, with no discipline in our minds—for philosophy, after all, is not religion, is not life, is not intuitions; it is the disciplining and organization of those into a system, and only deeply learned minds can do that upon high themes. We must be raised by the great ones out of our own first infantile gropings into a following of their own splendid walkings on the mountain-tops—their majesties, their refinements, their great themes and daring quests. At that stage, perhaps some of us will stop more or less completely; and we shall have our reward, though it will be strictly an aesthetic and not a philosophical one. Philosophy lies beyond, when we begin to think on our own account. At that stage, we are still in debt to the great, and not only for the preliminary discipline. At that stage, they are 'mastered' in a further sense—they are *used* to kindle us—yes, even those great ones used, even for us. Not swamped by the mass of fact about them, not luxuriating in that fact for its own sake, not daunted by the manifold disagreements and inconclusivenesses among it, we become, by their help but on our own account, *thinkers*, speculators with system and sound order. That is philosophy, the life in which its adepts have found what they were constrained to call 'blessedness'.

Indian Philosophy and the West

BY

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

I

In his paper contributed to the Symposium on Oriental Philosophy in *The Philosophical Review*,¹ Professor G. Watts Cunningham raises fundamental issues in intercultural understanding, that need further consideration and criticism in order that there may be a better appreciation in the West of the nature and purpose of Indian philosophy. Choosing as his guide a modern expositor of Indian thought, he makes an experiment in understanding that thought, with a view to seeing if a meeting of minds between India and the West, so eminently desirable, is possible, and if Kipling's famous line about the unbridgeable gulf between East and West expresses only a superstition. The result of the experiment he finds disappointing to himself because, despite its eagerness to go Indiaward, the West, he discovers, cannot go far on account of an irreconcilable difference between the two metaphysical points of view. The trek Eastward is halted when the West comes to a blind wall barring its way—the wall of unreasoned intuition which to the Westerner seems to be the mainstay of Indian philosophy. The mountain, therefore, cannot go to the prophet; it is the prophet that must move and meet the mountain.

Professor Cunningham is not unaware of the possible areas of agreement between Indian philosophy and Western thought. Especially between those schools of Indian philosophy which go by the name of *Vedānta* and the Idealist tradition of the West there are significant points of similarity. The centrality of the Self in the final determination of fact and value, and the self-transcendence of conscious experience, stressed by the Absolute Idealists, are pointers, as Professor Cunningham recognizes, in the direction of India. Within the limits prescribed by the nature of Western thought, viz., that the truths of a philosophy must be

1. 'How Far to the Land of Yoga? An Experiment in Understanding', in *The Philosophical Review* (Cornell University Press), Vol. lvii, No. 6, pp. 573-589.

based on *reasoned considerations*, and that rational systematization must be grounded in facts or in postulates which generate inference, he is prepared to admit ' (a) that there are "imperceptible entities and facts which are beyond the capacity of sense observation" and which "must be reckoned with and understood" within any inferential structure which can legitimately claim to be ultimately satisfactory, and (b) that beyond the realm of "clear and distinct conception" there is a twilight zone of experience which necessarily functions within the intellectual enterprise as an integral aspect of intelligence itself'.

Having made these 'crucial admissions', Prof. Cunningham finds that they do not carry the West very far Indiaward, because it would appear that, according to him, in order to come to terms with India, the West would have to forswear its traditional lessons in logic and learn new and unfamiliar ones. These new lessons listed by him are: (1) the Western philosophers must learn the art of building their intellectual structure without recourse to the principle of non-contradiction; (2) they must learn to treat unreasoned intuition with greater respect than they commonly exhibit; (3) they must learn to place much more emphasis on the penumbral aspect of experience than they commonly do, thus developing an unaccustomed hospitality for mystic and occult phenomena; and (4) they have to learn that the desires and inner urgings of men are foundational in the intellectual enterprise, and not of derivative importance only.

Granted that these new lessons should be learnt by the West before it could approach Indian philosophy, it is obvious that such a procedure would be suicidal to the genius of Western thought, and Professor Cunningham's contention is perfectly intelligible, that, if such be the price asked of it, the West would prefer to have nothing to do with India. But are his inferences regarding the demands of Indian thought correct? Or, is there something wrong somewhere in the premises on which he builds his thesis? The crucial question is: Does the acceptance of the Indian philosophical attitude necessarily involve 'abnegation of the traditional Western faith in inferential reasoning in respect to both its rules of generalization and its certification of fact and value'? I am unable to agree with Prof. Cunningham in his answer to this question; for I believe that the Indian philosopher is behind no one in making the fullest possible use of the critical powers of the understanding in arriving at the truths of metaphysics. Philosophy, for the Indian, may be *more* than a rational interpretation of the nature and constitution of reality; but it is, certainly, *not less*. Before I

proceed to show how this is so, let me refer to two considerations which we should bear in mind in the present discussion.

The first is that, when the Westerner speaks of Indian philosophy, what he usually has in mind is one of the schools of *Vedānta* known as *Advaita*. For instance, the observation which Prof. E. A. Burt makes regarding what he calls the central theme of Indian philosophy, in his paper in the Symposium,² is true mainly of *Advaita*. The theme, as he formulates it, is the quest of each individual for ultimate self-realization, which consists in the discovery of the oneness of the individual soul with the universal soul or the Absolute. Similarly, what Prof. Cunningham has to say about the similarity between Absolute Idealism and Indian philosophy is strictly true of *Advaita-Vedānta*. Hence, I take it that the valuation of Indian thought which is to be found in Prof. Cunningham's paper applies primarily to *Advaita*. I have no ground to quarrel with the selection of *Advaita* for the Westerner's attention, because *Advaita*, which is the most popular school of Indian thought and which is considered by many to be the crown thereof, may justifiably be regarded as representative of Indian philosophy. But what I should like to make clear is that, in meeting the charges levelled against Indian philosophy, I shall adopt the standpoint of *Advaita* and not of any other school, because if I did not do so we would be talking at cross-purposes. The criticism that Indian philosophy is anti-rational, for instance, may be easily replied to by pointing to systems like the Buddhist schools and the *Nyāya* and *Sāṅkhya*, which seek to build metaphysical mansions mainly within the bounds of reason. I shall, however, follow what apparently seems to be the harder way and attempt to show that even in systems like *Advaita* adequate attention is paid to the claims of reason — reason, of course, as inference.

The second consideration is that we shall be concerned in this paper with the 'theoretical' aspects of Indian philosophy, and not with the 'practical'. The terms 'theory' and 'practice' have been used in various senses, and it is rather difficult to fix their connotations. When it is said that in Indian philosophy the practical motive dominates over the theoretical discussions, the word 'practical' means neither 'what is narrowly pragmatic' nor 'what is related to the will'. What is true of every system of Indian philosophy is that it does not stop with a rational or intellectual apprehension of reality, but goes further in discovering a method by

2. 'How can the Philosophies of East and West Meet?' (*Ibid.*, pp. 590-604).

means of which this apprehension may lead to a transformed life, generally called self-realization. It is, nevertheless, to be noted that the theoretical apprehension of reality (*parokṣa jñāna*) is no mean part of Indian philosophy. The 'theoretical' aspect can be distinguished from the 'practical'. And it is with the former that we shall be concerned in the present discussion, especially in view of Prof. Cunningham's declared intention to deal with 'the theoretical issues exclusively'. But unfortunately, contrary to this purpose, the title of his paper leans on the side of the practical, as the term '*yoga*' stands for the method of self-realization, and not for any metaphysical view. *Vedānta* is both *brahma-vidyā* (knowledge of Reality) and *yoga-śāstra* (teaching about *yoga*). The observations that follow will bear upon the former of these two aspects.

II

The first problem with which Prof. Cunningham deals is the problem of system, and the question of philosophic method which it involves. What is the dominant method pursued by Indian philosophy? Is it the method of logical reason functioning under its own systemic necessity and applying the principle of non-contradiction, or is it the method of the mystic with his visions and occult experiences? The real issue is between intellect and intuition, reason and revelation. Since to the Western critic Indian philosophy seems to favour the latter rather than the former, it does not answer to his definition of philosophy, and he has no difficulty in characterizing it as a fruitful field for the student of mysticism and not for the metaphysical inquirer. 'Unfortunately for the average Westerner', says Prof. Cunningham, 'in the brilliant light of the mystic experience symbols seem to become diaphanous and language, consequently, to fail and reason to disappear.'

I shall not enter here into the larger question of the relation between intellect and intuition. But it is necessary to remember that by intuition what the Indian philosopher means is not an infra-intellectual feeling, but a supra-rational apprehension which is an awareness that does not involve the distinction of subject and predicate, of knower and object known. Just as, in empirical knowledge, sense-certainty is the term of reference, so, in metaphysical knowledge, self-certainty is said to be the standard as well as the goal. The plenary knowledge of the Self, which is the ultimate reality according to *Advaita*, is to be gained by the higher intuition, and not by mere discursive thought. For reasons similar to those advanced by F. H. Bradley, the *Advaitin* maintains the need

for transcendence of logical reasoning. In order that it may function, thought must create division where there is unity. Judgment is impossible if a distinction is not made between the 'that' and the 'what', existence and content, subject and predicate. What thought does is to sunder the 'what' from the 'that' and re-unite it therewith by a sort of homoeopathic treatment as it were. But in this attempt at unification discursive thinking can never wholly succeed; for it has to grow on differentiation. It must distinguish; otherwise it will find its occupation gone. 'Thought is relational and discursive', says Bradley, 'and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide.'³ And yet, it must commit suicide in order that the real may be revealed. 'It must cease to predicate, it must get beyond mere relations, it must reach something other than truth. Thought, in a word, must have been absorbed into a higher intuition.'⁴

Such an absorption is inevitable, because thought or reason is but a secondary means of knowledge.⁵ The knowledge that reason gives is mediate; and mediate knowledge is that which depends for its validation on the validity of some other knowledge which is its ground. If this other knowledge is also mediate, we shall be launched on an infinite regress, without arriving at certitude. So, the proper ground of rational knowledge is immediate experience. That is why Idealists like Bosanquet say that the mind comes into contact with reality through a peep-hole in sense-perception, and then constructs its thought-system. The Indian theory of inference also recognizes the perceptual basis of *anumāna*. If one had not seen the co-presence of smoke and fire in a place like the hearth, one would not be able to infer the presence of fire on the hill from the perceived presence of smoke thereon. The immediacy of sense-experience is, no doubt, crude and vague, requiring the analytic and organizing operations of thought. In fact, the immediateness of its immediacy is only as compared with the mediate character of inferential knowledge. Strictly speaking, even sense-experience is mediate, because it depends on sense-activity; and hence it cannot be independent knowledge or indubitable. It is only when we rise to intuitive experience through rational thought that we have self-certifying

3. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 170.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

5. This and the next paragraph are adapted from a paper contributed by the present writer to the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy, Amsterdam (1948): 'The Place of Reason and Revelation in the Philosophy of an Early Advaitin.' See *Proceedings*, Vol. i, especially pp. 248-249.

and unerring knowledge. As A. E. Taylor puts it: 'It seems indeed as if the function of the mere intellect were always that of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a higher level of immediate apprehension. It breaks up, by the relations and distinctions it introduces, the original union of the *what* and the *that* of simple feeling, and proceeds to make the *what*, which it deals with in its isolation, ever more and more complex. But the ultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only satisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental development to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive whole in the immediate unity of its *that* and its *what*.'⁶

The only knowledge which is immediate and indubitable is Self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of, or more properly, knowledge which is, the Self. For lack of a better term, we call this intuitive experience *ātma-sākṣātkāra* or *anubhūti*. It is experience which is not distinguished into experient, experienced object and experiencing. It is consciousness *per se* which is the sole reality, according to *Advaita*. A glimpse of this we do have in rare moments of introspection and exaltation of spirit. Without our own knowing, we pass into it in sleep. But to realize it in eternity is the aim of *Vedānta*. The *Upaniṣads*, which are the end of *Veda* (*Vedānta*), contain the discoveries made by the ancient seers of India in the realm of the spirit; they are records of the declarations made by the sages, and are designed to initiate the votary into the secrets of the intuitive or mystic experience. Even as in the sphere of physical science an investigator cannot afford to neglect the researches already made by others in the field, in the realm of the super-physical also a seeker of the truth must take into account the experience of the sages. The appeal to the authority of Scripture in the case of *Vedānta* means no more and no less than that. The deliverances of Scripture may appear dogmatic to those whose inner eye has not been opened, as also to those in whom the spirit of inquiry has not been aroused; but they constitute the testimony of the most real experience to those who are awake in the spirit. The students of *Vedānta* are required to place faith in Scripture, even as the learners of science must begin with a sense of confidence in the scientific theories formulated by the master-minds in the field. The final test in *Vedānta*, however, is experience, just as in science the arbiters of theory are said to be facts. The end or goal of *brahma-vijñāna*, the inquiry into the nature of Reality,

6. *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 152-153.

says Śaṅkara, the greatest exponent of *Advaita*, is experience (*anubhava*).⁷ Scripture, to start with, is others' experience; and the knowledge one derives therefrom is but mediate (*parokṣa*). Unless this become immediate (*aprokṣa*), the goal of *Vedānta*, which is self-realization, will not be reached. Hence the faith in Scripture insisted on in *Vedānta* has but a methodological value, and has as its sole purpose the realization of intuitive experience. The knowledge that is revealed by Scripture must become a matter of experience; only then will revelation have fulfilled its mission. And for one who has realized the integral experience, there is no need to depend on any external authority in the form of Scripture or to subscribe to a formal dogma. His wisdom is self-certifying and self-revealed. To him the *Vedas* are no *Vedas*.⁸

It has been my endeavour so far to explain the reason why the Indian philosopher thinks it necessary to transcend reason. The transcendence of reason, however, does not mean the repudiation of reason; and the Indian philosopher, equally with his Western counterpart, 'can discover no reason in whose name reasoning must be forsworn'. We distinguished above between mediate knowledge (*parokṣa-jñāna*) and immediate intuitive experience (*aparokṣa-jñāna*). In the view of the Indian philosopher, the task of philosophy is not complete till the latter experience is gained. But on that account the value of the mediate knowledge of reality, which answers to the Western conception of philosophy, is not to be minimized. The highest intuition must be intelligible. Intelligibility in the light of reasoning (*upapatti*) is an essential mark of any sound philosophy. As Śaṅkara puts it, that which is accepted or believed in without sufficient enquiry is not only bad philosophy, but also prevents one from reaching the goal of perfection and results in evil.⁹ So, the method of rational enquiry is of the utmost importance to the Indian philosopher. It may be applied in two ways: one of them is to accept the intuitive experience of the sage provisionally and test its validity critically; and the other is to start on the stormy quest by oneself and to discover through the critical reason what it has to offer. In both cases, it is believed, the goal is the experience of reality. The process of enquiry is said to consist of three stages. The first is the stage of study and observation, called *śravaṇa*. The second is the stage of critical reflection, *manana*. The third is continued meditation, *nididhyāsana*, leading to and ending in intuitive realization.

7. *Commentary on Vedānta-sūtra*, II. i. 4.

8. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV. iii. 22.

9. *Commentary on Vedānta-sūtra*, I. i. 1.

In this scheme, the strategic position occupied by *manana* will be apparent. It is through *manana* that what has been studied or observed becomes intelligible. It is *manana*, again, that ushers in the new awakening. The way to *sākṣatkāra* lies through reflection.

Let me dwell here for a moment on the dialectical method adopted by the proponents of the different schools of Indian philosophy, which will illustrate my point that the demands of reason are in no way ignored by the Indian philosopher. There are three moments involved in the dialectical presentation of any philosophical position. First, the *prima facie* views are stated; then, they are criticized; and finally, the doctrine that is sought to be established is exhibited as being free from the defects shown in the *prima facie* views. It is to be noted that, both in the criticism of rival points of view and in the statement of his own, the philosopher makes use of the canons of logical reasoning. At every step in the argument, it will be found, the principle of non-contradiction is employed. Non-contradiction (*avyāghāta*) is the test of truth, as unsublatability (*abādha*) is the mark of reality. Hence there is no warrant for holding the view that the legitimate claims of reason are not recognized in Indian philosophy. It can be truly said that at the entrance to the mansions of Indian philosophy is to be found the sign-board: 'No admission for those who are intellectually indolent and cannot or will not think.'

III

I now turn to the other problem discussed by Prof. Cunningham, viz., the problem of fact. The question that confronts us here is whether the Indian philosopher is right in expanding his field of enquiry in his search for facts so as to include the states of experience other than waking. It is alleged that he, instead of keeping close to the realm of 'clear and distinct conception', looks for facts in the 'dark and hidden corners, the penumbral aspects of experience'. From the standpoint of the Western philosopher, this seems to be an unjustifiable proceeding. 'The unfortunate consequence is,' says Prof. Cunningham, 'that our most significant facts are apparently of only secondary philosophical importance to him, and his seem to us at best dubious and problematic.'

I shall not repeat here Prof. Burt's reply to the criticism that Indian philosophy 'sits loose to fact'. It does not appear to me that Prof. Cunningham takes a narrowly empirical view of fact. One of the two admissions referred to at the beginning of this paper, which, in the judgment of Prof. Cunningham, the Western

Idealist is free to make, is the existence of a twilight zone of experience beyond the realm of 'clear and distinct conception'. Only, this zone must necessarily function 'within the intellectual enterprise as an integral aspect of intelligence itself'. The Professor's criticism of Indian thought, then, amounts to this. What he calls 'the twilight zone' as such is not an irrelevant field for the philosopher's quest for facts; but those facts in that field which are supernormal in the sense of being unintelligible are irrelevant. And his contention is that, in so far as the Indian philosopher relies on these facts, he is unphilosophical.

My reply to this criticism is: 'Your conclusion is not valid because your assumption that the Indian philosopher builds his system on dubious facts is wrong.' Let us examine which of the facts listed as belonging to the so-called twilight zone are relevant, according to the Indian philosopher, and which are not. This distinction is of utmost importance, because a failure to notice it is the cause, at least in part, of Prof. Cunningham's charge. Straight away I must say that the supernormal factors in human personality enumerated by him are not relied upon by the Indian philosopher for his philosophic construction. Miraculous cures and supernormal control over the body; exteriorization of motivity and telekinetic phenomena; the aura and the astral body; materialization and ectoplasm; crystal gazing, automatic writing and automatic speaking; supernormal cognition and reminiscence of past lives — these are not taken into consideration by the *Vedāntin* so far as the construction of his metaphysical view is concerned. The practitioner of *yoga*, it is true, is said to acquire certain supernormal powers at a particular stage in his *yoga* practice. But these powers do not mark the goal of perfection, and indeed, if indulged in, will serve as obstacles in the way thereto. The books on *yoga* warn the unwary candidate against the supernormal powers (*siddhis*) which are neither practically useful in the path to perfection nor theoretically valuable in the construction of a true metaphysical system.

What about *yoga* itself? it may be asked; Is it not a land which will not brook the spotlight of reason? Does not the Indian philosopher transgress the limits of philosophy when he enters the mystic realm of *yoga*? Now, there is much misunderstanding about *yoga* which needs to be cleared away. There is nothing mysterious or irrational about the technique of *yoga*. The term itself, which is cognate with the English word 'yoke', means simply 'union', and stands for the method of concentration by

which the psychoses of the mind can be sublimated and the ultimate reality can be intuitively realized. In the classical age of Indian philosophy, the *yoga*-method systematized by Patañjali was associated with the philosophical school of *Sāṅkhya*. But the fact that the method was known even to the earliest thinkers of India, and that all seekers after perfection adopted it, no matter what their metaphysical persuasion was, shows that *yoga* is a technique which will be found useful in any attempt to transform the mediate cognition of ultimate reality to the immediate apprehension thereof. Since *yoga* disciplines the mind in concentration, it will be found useful even in the theoretical stages of the philosopher's quest.

We are now left with one more region of the twilight zone — the region consisting of some aspects of what has unhappily been called 'the Fourfold Being of Man'. The fourfoldness refers to the experiences of waking, dreaming, deep sleep and *Turiya*. It is obvious that the philosopher should concern himself with the relevant facts of waking life. But how are the other three states of experience relevant? Is it not a methodological blunder on the part of the Indian philosopher to have strayed away from normal waking experience into these other obscure and confused realms? In answer to this question, I should first point out that the *Vedāntin* enquires into the states of dream and sleep — leaving alone the *Turiya* for the present — as an individual in the state of waking, and not as either a dreamer or a sleeper. It is obvious that all philosophizing is possible only in the experience of waking. In other words, it is the logical reason that functions in the act of philosophizing. But, then, why does the *Vedāntin* consider the states of dream and sleep as relevant at all to his enquiry? The reason is that any satisfactory philosophical view is likely to result from a consideration of the whole of experience, and not from an analysis of only a segment of it. Unlike the other systems, both realistic and idealistic, which take into cognisance the waking experience alone, and seek to explain the ego and the non-ego of the world of waking, the *Vedānta* takes life as a whole and studies all its expressions. It is by an analysis of the three states of experience by a process which roughly corresponds to the method of agreement and difference, as also to the method of residues, that the *Vedāntin* arrives at the conception of the self *per se* as the unconditioned absolute Spirit.

The *Turiya* needs a special word of explanation. It is not a fourth state in addition to, or on a par with, the other three. That was why I said the expression, 'the Fourfold Being of Man' is

unhappy. By the *Turiya* what the *Vedāntin* means is the unconditioned Self. Prior to the intuitive realization of it, it is postulated on the ground of the analysis of the three states of experience and similar procedures of enquiry; and in the immediacy of intuition it is apprehended as it is in itself. Hence, far from being a centre of obscurity, the *Turiya* is, according to *Vedānta*, an unfailing light, omniscient sight.

Our discussion of the problem of fact, then, leads us to the following conclusion. If 'fact' be defined narrowly as 'sense datum', and if nothing that is not given to sense is to be regarded as a fact, then it is true that the Indian philosopher goes beyond facts. But such a restricted view of 'fact' is not accepted by many thinkers even in the West. One of Prof. Cunningham's propositions definitive of fact and knowledge is this: 'A fact is specifiable only within a body of knowledge, or what is supposed to be such, and a body of knowledge is at least a set of coherent propositions.' The Indian philosopher will whole-heartedly endorse this definition.

IV

That apologist for imperialism, Rudyard Kipling, wrote, it is true:

'Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never
the twain shall meet
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's
great Judgment Seat.'

But his poetic instinct made him also add:

'But there is neither East nor West, Border,
nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
though they come from the ends of the earth.'

It is beyond the scope of this paper to show how East and West can meet. Nor is it its purpose to maintain that there is no difference whatsoever between the philosophical outlook of the one and that of the other. What has been attempted here is to show that the best that India has to offer in the realm of philosophical thought can pass the test that the West prescribes, that, in short, when the Indian philosopher talks philosophy, he is not moving in a land of incoherent fancies or unintelligible fictions. Referring to the intelligibility of the Absolute Prof. Cunningham writes

elsewhere: '.....it does need to be emphasized, since some of the critics of absolutism have at times written as if they supposed the absolutist to assume that his conception of the Absolute were somehow logically privileged and not subject to the ordinary rules of logical procedure. It is clear that the absolutist assumes nothing of the sort, at least it should be clear to anyone who has taken the trouble to become acquainted with his argument. He is perfectly willing to subject the conception to the ordinary tests of intelligibility.'¹⁰ My claim on behalf Indian philosophy and *Vedānta* is precisely the same.

10. *Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy* (The Century Co., N.Y., 1933), p. 523.

The Potential and the To Be Realized

BY

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In this Paper I want to draw a distinction which is implicit in the Vedantic conception of the Self (*Atman*), but which as far as I know has not received the attention of those who are familiar with Indian philosophy and have understood the distinction between the *Atman* which, as the *Katha Upanishad* says, is 'to be realized', and the 'self' of European philosophy which if not reduced to a non-entity is regarded at best as a loosely constituted unity of the psychical series, the Self as pure consciousness transcending the psychical series being rejected as a 'monster' and a 'fiction'. It is the distinction of the potential and the 'to be realized'. This distinction raises important issues regarding the nature and reality of Time and its relation to the Timeless and is connected with the notion, wholly absent in all such European thought as has departed from the Asiatic tradition, of Regeneration as a necessary condition for realizing the Truth.¹ It is connected too with the question of the ultimate value of philosophy as a mode of speculation and of the need to transcend philosophy in *sadhana* for the completion of the philosophical quest.

I shall raise the main issue with a familiar quotation. 'Each soul', says Vivekananda, 'is potentially divine.' European Absolutists like Bradley and Bosanquet would very likely agree with this statement, because it contains the necessary modification in the word 'potentially'. To Vivekananda, who is merely restating the spiritual truth expressed in the *Mahavakya* '*Tat tvam asi*', the emphasis is all on the word 'divine', and the word 'potentially' does not in any way suggest a qualification or diminution of the soul's completely divine status. There is therefore a world of difference between the Vedantic teaching summarized by Vivekananda and the Bradley-Bosanquet doctrine that each individual is not merely finite, but 'finite-infinite'. The latter doctrine asserts that,

1. 'Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God,' John 3:3.
P. 4

though man is by nature finite, his finite nature is continuous with the Infinite, the Infinite thus being *potential* in the finite. It is not such a relation of the soul to God that was intended by Vivekananda. For him the soul is by nature divine, its finitude being only an appearance which has to be transcended or destroyed by knowledge. And yet these two very different teachings are apparently both capable of being expressed in the single formula 'Each soul is potentially divine'.

Of course Vivekananda could have expressed his meaning less ambiguously by saying simply 'Each soul is divine', and this expression would have been nearer to the Upanisadic '*Tat tvam asi*'; but what he wanted to express was not merely a metaphysical truth of the soul's identity with God, but the necessity of *awakening* to this glorious truth that puts an end to all suffering and ignorance. But to realize one's true nature, to know oneself as one really is, is not to make anything actual that was potential, just as one cannot say that a king who falls asleep and dreams that he is a beggar is only potentially a king and becomes a king on waking up. If then we wish to distinguish the Vedantic teaching concerning the soul's divine status from the theory that asserts man to be 'finite-infinite', we must reject the notion of 'potency' and other allied notions in giving an account of the *summum bonum* realizable by the so-called finite soul.

Let us see more fully what is implied in regarding the individual soul, or to use a better term, the self, as only potentially infinite. The main implications are as follows:—


1. The self is *not actually* divine, but has to be made or to make itself divine, just as a seed which is potentially a tree is not actually a tree.
2. Divinity must then be regarded as the distant goal of the self. It is something *to be attained* by a process of becoming.
3. This carries the further implication that, as all becoming is prospective, i.e., *forward* moving in the direction of an ideal, the self that becomes is taken for granted, is in a certain measure at least regarded, as *known*. To become is merely to modify that which is and hence there is in this process no suspicion of the possibility of a *radical* transformation or an apocalypse of the self that is seeking to become. Ramana Maharishi's prescription to the seeker after Truth to enquire 'Who am I?' can have only a relative and not the radical significance that the Maharishi himself gives to it. The enquiry into the nature of the self is not ruled out, but what is attempted is merely a theory of the self

constructed by thought out of the experience of the self as given in the stream of consciousness, and this enquiry is based on the presupposition that the self is a finite centre seeking a potential infinite, which the intellect constructs into an ideal. The Maharishi's question, however, rests on no such presuppositions, for it aims at asking 'Who am I to whom this thought arises that man is finite?' or 'Who am I that am aware of the mind's action of projecting and striving towards the ideal of the Infinite?' The demand here is for a radical discovery and not an intellectual clarification of what is already known.

4. Since what is sought to be made actual by a process of becoming is the Infinite, it would be a contradiction to assert that the self can become fully the Infinite at any stage in the temporal process. We cannot through time reach what, being the Whole, is timeless. Hence the self can only realize, i.e., make actual, more and more of the Infinite, but the process in the very nature of the case—as we are creatures of time—cannot be completed, can have no absolute fruition. It is either cut off at death or prolonged indefinitely, to what purpose one does not know.

5. We have therefore the notion of *degrees* of reality, truth or freedom. If freedom implies self-determination and so self-containedness, no individual is absolutely free, since the Infinite alone is self-contained. No one can totally transcend *nissus* and come finally to rest in a state of perfect peace or happiness beyond all conflict and sorrow. The Upanishad declares that liberation is an experience in which 'the knots of the heart are cut and all doubts destroyed'. This, according to the philosophy we are considering, is only relatively true, and those who claim it to be an absolute experience are only deceiving themselves.

6. As the *summum bonum* of the individual lies not in a *finality* of experience but in an indefinite growth, or absorption into himself, of the integral being of the Absolute unattainable in its completeness, there is only a forward movement in a single dimension of conscious being, and not an inward conversion or reversal of consciousness that brings about an awakening to a new dimension of existence. There is continued expansion of the mystery-less self, regarded as the unity of the *de facto* and therefore essentially known psychological filling of the individual life, but not a process of self-discovery in which there is a revelation or an *awakening* of the self to itself. There is change or growth which is, as Krishnamurti puts it, only a modified continuity, but not a radical transformation of being, a spiritual re-birth or *newal* which makes all things new. In short we are offered only



the refinement of man's animal nature and its unregenerate will through the instrument of reason, but not a total regeneration that reveals man as not animal at all, but a divine person whose centre of consciousness transcends the rational mind.

7. Finally, if there is an intrinsic relationship between wisdom and happiness, then, the wiser an individual grows, the more he embodies in himself the purpose of the Whole, the more he experiences true happiness. This makes the happiness realizable by an individual a matter of degree. But absolute happiness, the supreme *Ananda* spoken of in the Upanishads, is unattainable. Again, the highest degree of happiness possible to man is something *to be attained*. He has to *become* what he is not or what he is only potentially, so that the more of the potential infinite he brings into his nature the more happy he *becomes*. This contradicts the teachings of the Indian Sages who say that *Ananda*, (absolute Joy) is the *Swarup*, the essential nature of the *Atman*, and that the attempt to gain happiness through a process of becoming is the result of ignorance of one's true nature. *Ananda* is in the self as the property of burning is in the fire and is not to be attained.

To sum up, according to the Absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet the self is essentially finite and can be regarded as infinite only in potentiality, which potentiality it can never fully realize, as it is a creature of time, and the Infinite is eternal. Man's highest destiny, including his happiness, is something to be attained, and no stage of attainment can be final or have in it the quality of absoluteness. Finally the self is something already known and can only become more and more of what it already is or is known to be.

Vedanta asserts on the other hand that the Self is essentially infinite, timeless and full of absolute knowledge and bliss, but that this Self is 'to be realized' as the true Self of man, not through a thought-process or a process of becoming, but through regeneration or being 'born anew'.

The purpose of this Paper is not to determine which account of the Self is more acceptable, but to point out the difference and to suggest that, if this difference is clearly recognized and the Vedantic teaching is accepted, then we must admit certain important consequences that will modify our ways of thinking and modes of expression. The most important of these is the emergence of a new category of thought which has not been recognized so far by logicians and philosophers, viz. the category of the 'to be realized'.

The two categories of the 'actual' and the 'potential' are insufficient to explain the Vedantic teaching concerning the Self. Using the term '*Atman*' for the Self that is 'to be realized', we may state the full implications of this new category thus: The *Atman* though it is not an *actual* fact of experience (to those in ignorance) is yet actual, in the sense that it is the true nature of the individual. It is not potential, because the individual does not have to *become* the *Atman*; it is the *Atman* already in all its infinite glory. We may, if we like, say that the *Atman* comes under the category of the Actual, but then we would have to distinguish two different kinds of Actuality—the mystery-less Actual which is given as something known in the *de facto* consciousness of the unregenerate being and the Actual that is still 'to be realized' (not to be *attained*) in its true nature.

Let us return to the example of the king who falls asleep and dreams that he is a beggar whose aim is to become a king. Let us assume too that, in the dream, the dreamer can rise indefinitely in the social scale but never actually reach the top and become a king. Now if we were to confine ourselves to the dream, we would have to say that the dreamer is actually a beggar and potentially a king. But if we stand outside the dream, in what sense can we say that the dreamer is a king? Though actually a king, to the dreamer himself kingship is not actual but potential. But we cannot say he is potentially a king, because he is a king already and does not have to *attain* kingship by a process of becoming. We can only say that, though the dreamer is actually a king, his kingship is *to be realized*. Assuming that the dreamer is somehow made to understand that, though he actually finds or feels himself to be a beggar, he is really, not potentially, a king, to him the 'to be realized' would be a category other than the actual and the potential. And further, it is not by continuing the dream-process (rising higher and higher in the social scale) but by awakening to a higher dimension of consciousness that his kingship is realized.

In the same way when the Upanishad declares that the Self is the immortal and blissful *Atman*, the understood injunction is that this *Atman* is 'to be realized' and not to be attained by a development of the self-in-ignorance, just as kingship is not to be attained by the becoming-process of the dream beggar. As the 'beggar' must awake to his permanent kingly status, so the self-in-ignorance must awake to its divine status through a radical transformation of its being.

I shall conclude by briefly drawing out the implications of this new category of the 'to be realized'.

(1) Metaphysical truths are not merely propositions to be believed, but spiritual truths which are to be realized by an inner awakening. This means that philosophy, regarded as a system of reasoned beliefs, is not yet *knowledge* of the Real. It at best results in a dynamic faith in the possibility of such knowledge. Hence the need of *Yoga Sadhana* to complete the quest for Truth.

(2) The realization of the Truth or the Self, not being a process of becoming, cannot be placed in the time-process of the becoming self. It is not therefore an end to be attained in the future of the becoming process. From the ultimate point of view then it is not true to say that the Self is realized at a particular moment in time, prior to which it was still unrealized. The realization itself is never potential but always actual, because 'potential' has no significance outside the process of becoming. This is where the analogy of the dreaming king fails, as all analogies must at some point, in that the realization of his kingly status is potential in the dreamer's mind though not in the time of the dream. But the realization of the Self is a total awakening and is an absolutely unique experience and cannot therefore be regarded as potential in any time-series. This also throws light on the true nature of Time and its relation to Eternity-Time which is a condition of the becoming process, in which the future is potential in the present, is appearance, since it is the condition of the movement of the self-in-ignorance. True Time, however, is not appearance, and in the realization of the Self we have the meeting point of real Time and Eternity. Time and Eternity are the same Reality experienced at once as dynamic and static, and neither is an appearance of the other. In the Time which is the dynamic expression of Reality, the realization of the Self is never potential (potential has no significance here) but always actual. That is why when the *Jivanmuktas* are asked when, *i.e.* at what point of time, they became *mukta*, they invariably reply that they were always *mukta* (*Nitya Mukta*). In other words, the statement that the *Atman* is to be realized by the Self, ignorant of its true nature, is still a relative truth. Freedom is eternal in the dynamic play of Reality, and that none is bound, none freed, is, as Gaudapada says, the ultimate truth.

(3) The question then, 'How can that which is infinite and divine be ignorant of its true nature and fall a prey to the dream of finiteness?' arises only if we take the relative truth to be ultimate. What then is the ultimate truth of the statement that the self-in-ignorance imagines itself to be finite? The answer is that what has necessarily to be described as *avidya* from the relative

point of view is from the absolute point of view — *i.e.*, the point of view of the *Jivanmukta*; for the individual being infinite, not finite, can occupy the absolute point of view — not *avidya* at all, but a unique form of play (*lila*) in which the Infinite voluntarily assumes the role of the finite. The *lila* therefore has the sanction of the Infinite itself, and the rule of the game is that in the separative formation of consciousness (the finite personality) created by the pretence of finiteness the Infinite's consciousness of the play as play must not intrude, for, if it did, then the Infinite could not be said to play at being finite. Nevertheless the consciousness that it is only a play is *always* there supporting but not forming part of the finite consciousness, so that it cannot be said that at any time the Self is really deceived about its true nature.²

I have dealt with these points briefly, because an exhaustive treatment of the points I have raised would result in a thesis and not a paper. This paper is addressed to those philosophers who have realized that the Vedantic experience and the thought-system it generates are radically different from European Absolute Idealism to which they are often compared. My complaint is that this difference has not been clearly brought out and has been obscured for two reasons. Either the Vedantic teachings are clothed in the orthodox terminology of the *pandits*, so that they remain a guarded secret to those who are not brought up in the Indian tradition, or are grossly misunderstood by them; or, when Vedanta is made to join issue with European thought and sought to be presented in a form intelligible to European readers, a rather uncritical and confusing use is made of concepts, terminology and modes of thinking borrowed from the latter, the result being the hybrid product 'Vedanta in a Western garb', which may prove acceptable to European readers because of their ignorance of Indian philosophy, which ignorance the attempted exposition does little to remove.

2. This concept of play (*lila*) is another concept that is entirely absent in all European philosophy and needs the attention of Indian philosophers.

The Logical Problem of the Kēna Upanisad

BY

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1. In Chapter IV of his *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, Russell observes that the words 'true' and 'false' 'as applied to the sentences of a given language, always require another language of a higher order, for their adequate definition'; and he thinks that this hierarchy of languages has a lower limit but need have no upper limit. The higher language, he says, contains the lower. The lower limit he calls the 'primary' or 'object language'; without the lower limit the hierarchy could not get started at all; therefore, he observes, the hierarchy has a definite lower limit. The 'object-words' of the object language are learnt without the use of another language; and the *meaning* of object-language is not dictionary meaning but the meaning that is learnt in the presence or the absence of the object. In object-language there is no *judgment* and there is no *inference*; there are no logical words like 'true' or 'false' or words like 'all' or 'some', 'and' or 'or', etc., and each object-word in the object-language states an observable fact and each object-word has meaning in 'isolation'. There is 'seeing' or 'hearing' in the object language, but no judgment or inference *about* seeing or hearing, and the next stage in the development of language is, according to Russell, speaking *about* object-language; i.e., speaking about 'hearing' and 'seeing', etc. That is a necessary development in epistemology.

2. The *Kēna Upanisad* begins with an epistemological problem of this sort. It begins by asking a question about 'object-language'; about 'seeing', about 'hearing', etc., involving judgment and inference *about* 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. The eye sees, the ear hears, etc., and, in so far as they do, the eye and the ear are 'functions' or 'agents'. The question asked in the *Kēna* is about the Agency of *their* agency. '*kēnesitham pathathi presitham manaḥ?*' 'By whom impelled soars forth the mind projected?' The term 'by whom' implies that the function of 'seeing' requires a Function of a *higher order*, which explains the seeing of the eye and the hearing of the ear. Thus the question is about the Function by which the functions of the eye and the ear are possible.

This question involves an initial paradox, because there cannot be a question about the Function in the same sense as there is about the several functions of the eye and the ear, etc. There cannot be a question 'about' the subject, in the same sense as there is 'about' the object. This is the logical difficulty which corresponds to the kind of difficulty expressed by modern logicians like Wittgenstein, who says: 'Syntax can only be "shown" and not "expressed"'. There cannot be a proposition about the form of the proposition without implying that form. 'No Proposition can say anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the whole theory of types).' 'A function cannot be its own argument, because the functional sign already contains the prototype of its own argument and it cannot contain itself.' (P. 57. *Tractatus*.) The ambiguity of language is such that there is the danger of thinking a subject as an object. Therefore, the *Kēna Upaniṣad*, after answering the question asked, thus: *yad vachānbhyuditam yēna vāgabhyudhyate tadēva, brahma tvaviddhi*: 'That which is unexpressed with speech, (but) with which speech is expressed, know that as Brahma', it adds: *nē yadiadam upā-sathē*: 'not that which you think'; because it may be thought as an object, 'outside' and not identical with the self of the knower. The self is not the 'known' in the sense of known as an object, nor is it the unknown or the unknowable; there is 'knowledge by acquaintance', of the fact that 'it is that with which speech is expressed'. It can be 'shown' and not 'expressed', to borrow Wittgenstein's words.

The answer given in the *Kēna* to the pupil's question, therefore, involves what is now called the theory of 'types', viz., 'No function can be its own argument'. This is present in the *Kēna* in such phrases as: *srōtrasya srōtram, manasō manō*, etc., and these phrases imply 'the theory of types'. When analysed the phrases '*srōtrasya srōtram*', etc. mean that the explanation about the function of hearing must be sought, not in another ear, but in a Function of a higher order, which includes the lower and so it is its truth or its explanation.

This implies that *explanation* involves the notion of a hierarchy; the lower is explained by the higher; as Russell puts it, 'the higher language contains the lower'. This is what is meant in the hierarchy of the *Katha Upaniṣad*: *indriyebyah param mano manasasattvamuttam sattvādadhimahānatmā mahatō' vyakta uttamam, avyaktātu paraḥ purusho vyapako' linga ēvacha*:

'Higher than the senses is the mind;
Above the mind is the true being,
Over the true being is the great self;
Above the great is the Unmanifest.
Higher than the Unmanifest, however, is the Person, all
pervading and without any mark whatever'.
(*Katha*, II. VI. 7: Hume's translation.)

3. The theory of types arises from the fact that, in the calculus of propositions 'there are certain kinds of propositions about propositional functions which cannot be expressed in the calculus'. (P. 177, *Dictionary of Philosophy*: Runes. Philosophical Library, New York.) This leads to certain paradoxes; one of them is that the highest in the hierarchy cannot be expressed as 'the highest'. As Russell says, the hierarchy must 'extend upwards indefinitely'; this, I suppose, is what is meant when mathematical logic says that the Theory of Types of the order *omega* involves the Axiom of Infinity. The inclusiveness of the highest term in the hierarchy cannot be represented as 'the highest'; this term, gives, no doubt, 'the truth but not the whole truth', to use words used by Russell in another context. (*Principles of Mathematics*, Sec. 138.) Therefore, the inclusiveness of the highest term in the hierarchy could only be described or represented as 'higher than the highest', *aksarāthparāthaparah*: 'higher than the high Imperishable', as the *Mundaka* puts it. A similar paradox is asserted in the *Kēna* when the teacher warns his pupil thus: *yadi manyase suvēdēti dabra mevāpi nūnam tvam vettha brahmanō rūpam*: 'If thou thinkest that thou knowest the nature of Brahman well, then thou knowest only a part of it.' This is a warning; it is a warning against analysis and the logical doctrine of whole and part. It is a warning against that attitude which says that 'I know well' means 'I can give an analysis of'. Some philosophers (e.g., G. E. Moore) mean by 'know' 'to give an analysis of', and they call this 'analytic-definition'. The teaching of the *Kēna* may be taken as a warning against the exceeding of this kind of attitude. Nor is the *Kēna* giving expression in this way to an attitude which is not logical. Russell says: 'I have already touched on a very important logical doctrine, which the theory of whole and part brings to prominence. I mean the doctrine that analysis is falsification.' Russell asks us to note 'the very narrow limits of this doctrine': even so, it is necessary to note that, 'though analysis gives us the truth, and nothing but the truth, yet it can never give us the whole truth'. (Sec. 138, *Principles of Mathematics*, second ed.)

Also, the warning of the *Kēna* may refer to another aspect of the problem, viz.: metaphysics and the use of language. Russell refers to three classes of philosophers: those who say we know only words, those say there is a one-one correspondence between words and facts, and those who say 'that there is knowledge not expressible in words, and use words to tell us what this knowledge is'. Russell dismisses the last as self-contradictory. I do not agree with his view, and he is not right in inferring that the third view results in a 'metaphysical agnosticism' such that the 'metaphysical agnostic must deny that he knows when he uses a word'. This would be true if, and only if, the alternatives were: 'I know fully' or 'I know not at all'. These are not the only two alternatives. The *Kēna* says: *nāham manye suvēdeti no na vedeti veda cha*: 'I do not at all think (that) I know well; nor do I think (that) I do not at all know; (but) I know too.' (Tr. M. Hiriyanna: *Kēna Upaniṣad*.)

4. Russell says in his book, *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, that the problem for epistemology is the arrangement of what we know 'in a certain order'. 'In a perfected epistemology, the propositions will be arranged in a logical order, though not in the logical order that a Logician would prefer.' (P. 16, *ibid.*) Two questions arise: (a) What is the nature of the order? (b) What determines the order? The nature of the order corresponds neither to logical deduction nor to discovery, though, as Russell admits, it has affinities with both. There is, in fact, no opposition between the order of deduction and the order of discovery; and in 'a perfected epistemology' they should coincide; and they coincide in the *Kēna Upaniṣad* by the question asked: 'By whom?' The answer to this is 'that by which or by whom': *yan manaśa na manuthe, yēna āhuhur manōmatham* etc.: 'That which one thinks not with thought, (or, that which thinks not with a mind,) (but) that with which they say thought (*manas*, mind) is thought.' (Hume's tr.)

Now, the 'that by which or that by whom' comes 'later' in the process of knowing. Russell says 'that which comes later is known (if it is known) because of what comes earlier'. This is true; and this is the standpoint of a true Empiricism; it is, however, also true that the 'earlier' is known (if it is known) because of what comes 'later'. The truth of Empiricism is contained in principles which are not empirical. 'We shall have to admit principles of non-demonstrative inference', says Russell, which may be difficult to reconcile with pure empiricism.' (P. 22, *An Enquiry*) Therefore, a perfected epistemology involves principles which are not simply 'unknown', but are not known in an empirical sense

and are, therefore, 'other than the known', *anyadeva viditat*. And with regard to such principles it is true to say: *yat chaksusha na pasyathi yena chaksusmi pasyathi*: 'that which one sees not with sight (but) with which one sees sights'. Therefore, 'a perfected epistemology' exceeds Empiricism and Rationalism by reconciling them; and it has something of Scepticism in it, in so far as its attitude is, 'Why should I believe this or that' and not 'Why do I believe this or that?' as Russell says; or in so far as it involves, or ought to involve, the attitude, as the *Kēna* puts it, *yasya amatham tasya matham*, 'to whomsoever it is not known to him it is known'; therefore essentially free from Dogmatism, *nā aham manye suvēditi*: 'I do not at all think I know well.' As Russell puts it: 'The net result is to substitute articulate hesitation for inarticulate certainty.' A perfected epistemology is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge and Reality through all the modes of experience. It does not say 'I believe only in this and not in that', but says: *prathi bodha viditham matham amrtatvam hi vindathe*: 'When it (Brahman) is known through every state of consciousness, (then) it is rightly known: for (by such knowledge) one attains immortality.' Such an Enquiry, alone, we may say, is an Enquiry into Meaning and Truth.

Denotation and Connotation : A Critical Note

BY

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Mill, it is said, substituted for the traditional distinction between extension and intension of terms the one between denotation and connotation. His claim of greater advantage for this new distinction has been repudiated by some, including Joseph. In this essay I propose to state first what I believe to be Mill's version of the distinction, next to suggest certain deductions which I think consistently follow from it, and, in the last place, to examine how far Joseph's criticisms of Mill have been fair.

Mill does not inform us as to what he means by denotation or connotation except through what he considers to be the distinction between non-connotative and connotative terms. To quote Mill : 'A non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute. By a subject is here meant anything which possesses attributes.'¹ Now, if a subject is to be understood in the above sense, then it follows that a non-connotative term either names the subject only without referring to its attributes, or names an attribute without referring to the subject to which it may belong. Thus, if the usual way of taking a subject is to take it along with its attribute or attributes, and if the usual way of taking an attribute is to take it as a quality or character belonging to a subject it qualifies, in a non-connotative taking, according to Mill, we take the subject only without reference to attributes or take the attribute without reference to the locus in which it inheres. Mill's examples of non-connotative terms are the insignificant proper names and singular abstract terms. A proper name denotes an individual and its signification is limited to naming the individual without reference to its attributes. A singular abstract term is the name of a singular abstract quality and its signification is exhausted in denoting that quality. Some

1. Mill, *System of Logic*, Bk. I, Ch. II, Sec. 5.

seem to take a mistaken view of Mill's doctrine when they say that singular abstract terms are non-connotative because they have connotation only, or because they connote without denoting. This misinterpretation has been occasioned by the taking of the word 'signifies' as used by Mill in connection with his definition of non-connotative terms in two different meanings. When Mill says that a non-connotative term signifies a subject only, or an attribute only, the word 'signifies' has been taken by these ingenious interpreters in the first case to mean 'denotes' and in connection with the expression 'attribute' to mean 'connotes'. This wrong version has committed Mill's doctrine of non-connotative terms to the logical absurdity that even when a term connotes or has connotation, it is non-connotative because it does not denote or is non-denotative. It is similar to holding that a man is blind not because he has no clear vision but because he cannot walk! Mill's view seems to be that a proper name is non-connotative because it denotes or is the name of an individual but does not imply any quality of that individual, and a singular abstract term is non-connotative because it denotes or is the name of a quality but does not connote any quality of that quality. A general abstract term, according to him, becomes connotative in denoting the quality of which it is the name, and further connoting the quality of that quality, as an attribute which is general and is present in multiple instances connotes the common character of such multiple presentations.

To denote, according to Mill, is the same as 'to be the name of' or as the same idea may be expressed in our own terminology 'to be the *vācaka* of'. Joseph also confirms this rendering when he says: 'A word denotes anything of which it can be predicated as a name....'² That Mill adheres to this meaning will be clear as we distinguish the denoting aspect from the connoting aspect of the terms which he calls connotative. Any class-name, adjectivals like white, virtuous, significant singular terms like 'the author of the *Iliad*', and general abstract names such as 'fault', are connotative. In denoting all these become names of things or individuals which may severally, singly or collectively, be spoken of by them; in connoting they point out such attribute or attributes by reason of which the names are predicable of them. The term 'man' is connotative since besides being the name of, or besides denoting, the individuals who have the privilege of being

so named, it refers to that attribute which many commonly possess and by virtue of which they are so called. The term 'white' is connotative since it denotes all things that may be called white; it further connotes their common attribute called 'whiteness'. The term 'the author of the *Iliad*' is connotative because it, besides being the name of a singular individual, also suggests a peculiar quality of the individual on account of which he is so called. The abstract general term 'fault' is connotative because, besides being the name of an attribute, it implies 'hurtfulness', a quality which various forms of fault or faultiness have in common, and by virtue of which the slowness of a horse, the intemperance of a man, the extreme form of ingenuity of an interpreter, etc., may come to be denoted by that term. To quote Mill: 'Abstract names, though the names only of attributes, may in some instances be justly considered as connotative; for attributes themselves may have attributes ascribed to them; and a word which denotes attributes may connote an attribute of those attributes.'³ Thus if any distinction is to be drawn between singular abstract and general abstract terms, that distinction according to Mill will be that, while every abstract term denotes or is the names of an attribute, the general abstract term, besides pointing out the specific forms of such attributes, implies also the common attribute that such specific forms share. Hence a singular abstract term is called non-connotative not because it does not denote, but because it denotes, but does not connote any attribute of that attribute which it denotes or becomes the name of.

Mill's exposition seems to suggest that a term before being connotative must be denotative. Mill himself speaks of denotation as the primary and direct meaning of a term while connotation is referred to as an indirect significance.⁴ It also seems to be Mill's view that, while there may be non-connotative terms, there cannot be any non-denotative terms. The word 'connotation', says Mill, etymologically means, 'marking along with' or 'marking one thing *with* or *in addition* to another'. Etymologically, connotation thus stands for a general character which may be instrumental to or marking one thing along with others, or grouping of things into classes. In other words, it is that by means of which classification is done. The only difficulty in accepting this etymological meaning is that it does not cover the case of significant proper names, which according to Mill are connotative. But this difficulty too

2. *An Introduction to Logic*, p. 146.

3. *System of Logic*, Bk. I, Ch. II, Sec. 5.

4. *Loc. cit.*

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may be explained away if we remember how the significant proper names come to acquire a connotation. A significant proper name becomes significant by being linked with a general term which has connotation. 'The author of the *Iliad*', 'the father of Socrates', are connotative terms, in being further specifications or individualizations of the general terms 'author' and 'father'. In fact, they have greater connotation than the general terms of which they are specifications.

If we should not too much insist that there must be always some reason why a particular name is given to anything, then Mill would say that the connotation is that by reason of which a name is applied, it is that which fixes the denotation of a term. He however states that not every name has or can have a reason why it is applied to anything. But where names are given to things or individuals by reason of their having some character or attribute, the connotation will stand for that character or attribute. As a matter of fact there are cases where names are given to things or individuals or to qualities without any evident reason. Instances of such arbitrary naming are the non-connotative terms. They are unmeaning not because they do not mean anything, but because it is not on account of their meaning what they mean that they are used as names of individuals or qualities. Mill is not so explicit in respect of the non-connotative abstract terms, but he seems to be very clear, so clear that there should not have been such pointless discussions as we have had, as regards the non-connotative proper names. It is not because of any unavoidable reason that a proper name, and that name in particular, is given to anything or anybody. A woman is not named 'Latika' because of her feebleness, a man is not called 'Shakespeare' because he was destined to write certain masterpieces. This only proves that no name is ever given to anything or anybody for the reason that if that very name were not given to it anarchy would prevail; for if it were otherwise, you would prove that all terms are connotative, and so Mill's distinction fails. Mill desires to point out that in some cases there is no necessary connection between the names and the named, that in some cases no reason can be found why certain names, and specifically those only, should be given to certain things. And it is such names that are unmeaning, not because they have absolutely no meaning, but because they have no meaning by reason of which such names specially should be given. 'Connotative names', says Mill, 'have hence been also called *denominative* because the subject which they denote is denominated by, or

receives a name from, the attribute which they connote.'⁵ But proper names are attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on the continuance of any attribute of the object.

Besides constituting the reason why a name is given where naming would require justification and is not arbitrary, connotation is also described as that essence in terms of which we may define a term. The antagonists will have to show that the non-connotative terms of Mill admit of a logical definition, to prove that Mill's distinction fails. In this respect, therefore, the distinction between connotative and non-connotative terms is the distinction between such terms as are definable and such as are not. His opponents look askance when Mill says that proper names are unmeaning marks. They attempt to prove that they are not altogether unmeaning. In this they misunderstand Mill's intention. A logical meaning should be, according to Mill, a fixed meaning. This fixed meaning is the same as the connotation of a term, and a term which has no fixed meaning is called by him unmeaning for all logical purposes. If a term does not fixedly mean anything, it is difficult to say if it has any meaning at all.

Now, limiting our discussion to Mill's view of denotation and connotation only, we may settle on three very important deductions.

(1) 'To denote' means 'to be the name of' or 'to be applicable to', and 'to connote' means 'to imply' or suggest why something should be the name of, or be applicable to, anything when such a reason must be present. It should be remembered that in some cases a term need not connote, i.e., it may denote or be the name of something without connoting anything whatsoever.

(2) That connotation which constitutes the meaning of a term needs to be fixed for all logical purposes as also for the sake of clarity of language.

(3) That in connotative terms the connotation fixes the denotation, so that no change in the denotation can take place so long as the connotation remains unaltered. In other words, to alter denotation you must alter connotation, and so if you alter connotation denotation will also change. This is the modified way of stating the law of inverse variation of denotation and connotation. In what follows we shall examine this implication and find out what the so-called relation of inverse variation really suggests.

In the case of connotative terms, their denotation is fixed by their connotation. Of the different kinds of connotative terms, the general terms alone are connotative in the original or primary sense; the significant proper names are connotative in a derivative sense. Though in all cases of connotative terms the law that connotation determines denotation holds true, Mill illustrates this point with specific reference to general names. 'Virtuous', for example, is the name of a class which includes Socrates, Howard, the Man of Ross and an undefinable number of other individuals, past, present and to come. These individuals, collectively and severally, can alone be said with propriety to be denoted by the word: of them alone can this property be said to be a name. But it is a name applied to all of them in consequence of an attribute which they are supposed to possess in common, the attribute which has received the name of virtue. It is applied to all beings that are considered to possess this attribute; and to none which are not so considered. This being so, denotation cannot alter unless connotation is altered; and consequently, if connotation alters denotation must also alter. Although this determination is one-sided, that is, of denotation by connotation, in fact or practice it becomes a reciprocal one. The denotation of a general name is a whole of an indefinable number of individuals having a certain common character as their connotation. This whole in being determined by the given connotation ends in determining the connotation in its turn. One pound of sugar in being weighed by a one-pound weight may be said to end by weighing or determining that pound of weight in its turn. In this way, the originally one-sided determination turns out to be a reciprocal one. The implication of this relation is: No alteration in denotation is possible without change in connotation; and so, as a corollary from it, No change in connotation can take place without affecting the denotation. Not only that, but if one of them is to change in one direction, the other will vary in the opposite direction, just as in a balance scale if one side is arbitrarily made to go up the other side will go down. This seems to illustrate the so-called relation of inverse variation of denotation and connotation, and this is expressed generally as: If the denotation increases or decreases, the connotation decreases or increases, and *vice versa*. The statement however seems to be faulty and logicians seem to misunderstand the correct implication of this law.

If denotation is fixed by connotation, and in being so fixed fixes the connotation in its turn, it follows that no change in the one is possible without an opposite kind of change in the other. The correct statement should then be: If connotation is made to

increase or decrease, the denotation will decrease or increase and *vice versa*, the law being understood as expressing not a normal state of things but a state of things wholly unusual and arbitrary. In fact, *what this law establishes is not that the connotation or denotation of general terms is variable, but that it is invariable*. In other words, that the denotation and connotation of a general term vary inversely is an indirect way of proving that in themselves they are unchangeable and fixed. When two things are supposed to vary not concomitantly in the same direction, but inversely in relation to each other, the presumption is that their relation is a fixed one of reciprocal determination. If the denotation of 'man' cannot increase or decrease unless the connotation decreases or increases and if the connotation of man cannot increase or decrease unless the denotation decreases or increases, the only reasonable conclusion will be that they vary inversely not because they are variable, but because they are invariable and fixed. This can be put in the form of an epigram. The denotation and the connotation of a term may be made to vary or shown to vary inversely not because they actually vary, but because they cannot vary or are invariable. The law of inverse variation is thus an indirect statement of the law of fixed or reciprocal determination of denotation and connotation.

The above becomes clearer as we consider the process of formation of a concept or a general term. It is by arbitrarily fixing upon a certain common and sharable essence that we form a class-concept which then includes any and every individual, past, present and future, on the condition of its having that essence. The gate of denotation seems to be thus open for any new-comer provided it possesses the ticket of admission which is the connotation. Neither by the number of the new arrivals nor by the extinction of the old ones can the denotation of the term increase or decrease. Dead men or 'disappeared islands' continue to be referred to as 'men' or 'islands', and babies yet unborn and flowers yet to blossom are similarly referred to as future 'babies' or 'flowers'. Hence, denotation is really unchangeable so long as the connotation remains fixed. Again, connotation is the conventionally fixed essence of a general term, and so long as the convention persists it remains unchanged, and even when the convention changes it is the convention that changes and not the connotation, which means *any quality or essence that will be fixed by convention*. Thus the connotation of general names stands for any number of individuals that may be spoken of by the term on the condition of their having a sharable essence conventionally fixed, and connotation means

any such essence to be fixed by conventions whether of this millennium or of the next. Their essential indefiniteness is thus a guarantee of their definiteness and fixedness. And this fixedness is indirectly expressed by the law of inverse variation.

As regards the advantage which Mill has claimed for his distinction between denotation and connotation, it can be seen that if ascertaining the meaning of a term be our object this new distinction between denotation and connotation is not only more explanatory but also more cogent than the traditional one between the extension and the intension of a term. If the old distinction is explicative of a genus-species relation, the new one seems to apply unrestrictedly. But Joseph has complained that extension suggests but denotation does not suggest the range through which the intension is manifested, that intension suggests but connotation does not what we intend by a term.⁶ The charge seems to be hardly fair. Denotation shows the range in which the connotation is present and connotation shows us the way of determining the denotation. That this determination fails in the case of non-connotative terms is no more an offence than that the interrelation of extension and intension breaks down with individuals. That the law of inverse variation misrepresents the nature of things if applied to the extension and intension of terms, Joseph himself has pointed out at some length. But with the new concepts 'denotation' and 'connotation' it serves a very useful purpose, viz., indirectly illustrating the relation of reciprocal determination between them.

Value and Reality

BY

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The nature of value may be clearly understood by distinguishing a judgment of value from a judgment of fact. Of the two judgments, 'This is a temple' and 'This temple is beautiful', the former is a mere statement of fact, while the latter contains an element of appreciation or evaluation; it refers, that is to say, to a norm or ideal with reference to which the beauty or otherwise of the temple is judged. There are some philosophers, notably Prof. Urban, who urge that the distinction between value and fact, appreciation and description, is not absolute, for the appreciation of value is itself a fact. This criticism however does not remove the distinction between value and fact, for appreciation itself is not of a fact, though it may be *about* a fact. A fact as such is not really appreciated, it is simply cognized. What we really mean when we talk of appreciating a fact, say, a person's conduct, is that his conduct conforms or approximates to a type of conduct ideally conceived and that it is this conformity which we appreciate. The truth is that man is not a colourless and passive knower, and valuation is the most persistent and characteristic attitude in human nature. It concerns man's appreciation, enjoyment, love and admiration.

This peculiar feature in value, viz., appreciation which can hardly be reduced to bare cognition, has led some to think that value is indefinable. More says: 'If I am asked, "what is good"?, my answer is that good is good and that is the end of the matter. Good is a simple notion just as yellow and that is why it cannot be defined.' The chief significance of this view is that values cannot be reduced to the status of mere products of physical processes. A purely factual world which had no value in it could not produce the values which we experience. Far from explaining the nature of value, this view explains value away. Can we not explain the nature of 'yellow' by reference to its place in the scale of colours? Can we not, at least, try to explain the 'constants' in a value-situation and the locus of value? According to the realistic conception of value, value is the character or quality of an existent.

6. *An Introduction to Logic*, p. 147.

on account of which character or quality the existent is or can be the end of action. Laird thinks that there is no need of distinguishing between fact and value, between the actual and the normative. All facts are values; only, they are not indifferent to one another. Every thing is valuable to itself, or what is value.

It is true that the object itself possesses qualities or characters, but surely qualities are not values. This confusion is due to the failure to make a distinction between the qualities of an object as such and the qualities as related to my conscious need and desire, when alone the conception of value emerges. If values are to be identified with the qualities of the object, then anyone who perceives the qualities like the shape, size and colour of an object should also perceive its value. But facts do not corroborate such a view.

Among the realistic theories of value, that of Alexander seems to be the most cogent. According to Alexander, values have no reality or locus of their own; they are not the determination either of the Spirit or of Nature. Value emerges as a *tertium quid* from an intercourse between Spirit and Nature. Value is an emergent among other emergents. Alexander says: 'The tertiary qualities, truth, beauty and goodness — though they differ from the secondary and primary ones in being creations of mind are not the less real. They belong strictly to an amalgamation or union of the object with the mind.' But their dependence on the mind does not deprive them of reality. For Alexander urges that values are dependent on the collective consciousness and not upon individual consciousness. The knowing individual cannot possess truth for himself alone; truth exists only in so far as a majority of individuals make their contributions collectively to the whole system of true propositions. The individual cognizes truth only in so far as he is the representative of the social spirit. The same holds good of other provinces of value. Sociality is, therefore, a fundamental character of all values as much as subjectivity is. The chief merit in Alexander's analysis lies in the fact that he avoids both the extremes — the ways of thinking of value as purely objective and as purely subjective — either as attaching simply to things that we apprehend or as belonging simply to our attitude towards them. Values are, according to Alexander, subjectively determined objective qualities. But the question remains, Why should values as emergents emerge at all? In other words, What makes the emergents emerge? Alexander hardly gives a satisfactory answer.

The idealistic standpoint generally makes value the determinant of reality or identical with it. For Bradley, Bosanquet and others of the neo-Hegelian school, the supreme criterion of value is the harmonious organization of experience into a systematic whole, the fusion of all aspects of experience into a living totality, in which all differences are unified, all conflicts are healed, all discords are harmonized. In this harmonious totality the conflict between the 'is' and the 'ought-to-be', between the desired ideal and the achieved fact, is laid to rest. The whole is the all-inclusive individual experience in which all imperfect individuals are elements. Thus the highest value is the highest reality. The standard obtains for truth as for other aspects of value. The whole is the unit of value. Things have value inasmuch as they are completely organized, do not break, have parts or members which confirm and sustain one another. Bosanquet has done a service to philosophy by calling attention to the fact that value and reality cannot be held asunder. But the defect in his view lies in the fact that he has not pointed out the interrelation among the ultimate values, viz., Truth, Beauty and Goodness.

The difficulties of defining value as purely subjective or purely objective can hardly be over-estimated. Values involve both a subjective and an objective reference. Love is a subjective attitude, but it would be meaningless without reference to some object that is regarded as at least potentially lovable. Nevertheless, the fact remains that values cannot have any meaning whatsoever apart from the appraisal on the part of the individual, apart from the conscious desires and need of the individual self. Values have meaning with reference to the self. And if all value is for the self then there can be nothing higher than the self. Everything is dear or lovable only for the sake of the self. As the Upanishads point out: '*ātmanas tu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati.*' Thus when we say that anything has value, on the empirical plane, it is because the object in question has been falsely identified with the self. Values, in the empirical sense, are the projections of the essence of self upon a valueless non-real nature. Everything other than the self has only instrumental value. The attribution of value to an object is a kind of superimposition. This may be shown in the following way: We value objects not for their own sake but for the sake of a wider interest which has a higher or deeper value for us. This, in its turn, may be valuable only as contributory to some yet wider universe, which would thus have a still higher value, and so on. But can we have anything like primary value or value-in-itself? Can there be value of an object

for itself without reference to anything else? This is hardly possible on the empirical plane, where we have, at best, series of instrumental values. If anything, there is the self alone which is sought to be realized for its own sake. This line is taken up by Samkara. In being aware of the self, in acknowledging Absolute Reality, we have the consciousness that it is also value, that it is worthy of being. For Samkara, *Sat* is a value-concept; it is what always maintains its nature. According to him, intrinsic worth and absolute value must belong to what can be called an end-in-itself. The demand for Absolute Reality is the demand for what is an end-in-itself, what exists-for-itself. What is an end-in-itself is self-established, its being is its validity. Consciousness or self alone exists for itself. Hence the world of not-self, i.e., the objective world, gets its value and meaning by being falsely united with consciousness or self. Just as the musk-deer restlessly roams about in search of the fragrance of the musk, so also we hanker after wealth, beauty and many other things, looking upon them as so many values and forgetting all the while that value is my real self. In fact, objects are values to us, not for their own sakes but for the sake of the self. Samkara establishes his point by urging that all difference is unreal as contradicting and destroying itself; so the difference between Value and Reality is also unreal. Reality or self is supreme value and the centre of every other value that we have on the empirical plane.

Descartes' Dogmatism

BY

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It is commonly accepted that Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, started his philosophy by 'doubting every preconceived notion'. I intend to argue in this paper two things: (I) First, that this commonly accepted opinion about Descartes is not correct — that he did not doubt all preconceived notions; in other words, he was a dogmatist. (II) Second, the uncritical assumptions he made, while seeming to write on a clean slate, were responsible for the many grave errors in modern philosophy from which we have not been able to extricate ourselves, completely, even now. His sins are visited upon us, his children; and in that sense he is truly the father of modern philosophy.

I. Descartes' instinct was sound. He wanted to begin from the beginning. He wanted to write on a clean slate. This spirit is laudable. In this spirit he says: 'I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false' (Second Meditation). We naturally come to think that this is the most radical course for a philosopher to follow, that this will give us a most certain proposition on which to erect a systematic philosophy. We think that the supposition that Descartes made was a case of a very thorough-going doubt.

But it is not. The supposition 'All the things I see are false' is full of uncritical assumptions. And it will not, therefore, yield an element in our knowledge which is indubitable.

For, what did Descartes doubt? He did not doubt the whole fabric of our knowledge (which indeed would give us an indubitable proposition as the starting-point of all philosophy), but doubted the *existence* of all *things* that he saw and accordingly supposed them *false* — as are the objects in a dream.

Now in this (apparently radical) doubt, there are a number of assumptions:

- (1) Descartes assumes that he *knows* what he means by a thing's existence.
- (2) He assumes that to regard a thing as non-existing is to regard it as false.

- (3) He assumes that the objects seen in a dream are (non-existing and, therefore,) false.
- (4) In all this a particular theory of error is assumed; namely, in erroneous knowledge we know an idea 'within us' corresponding to which there is no 'external' object.
- (5) This theory of error assumes a theory of knowledge; namely, when we know a thing what we are directly aware of is the idea of the thing, and not the thing itself.

Now, all these are not only assumptions, but some of them are very naive and meaningless. Take the second of them. Can we admit that to regard a thing as non-existing is to regard it as false? Is it not plain that truth and falsity are properties of a proposition, that things by themselves can be neither true nor false? But Descartes says: 'I suppose, then, that all the things I see are false.'

By this he means to say that things do not exist. But this is to assume that one already knows what is existence. But I am not aware that Descartes has ever made clear what is existence.

Sometimes, however, he substitutes the word 'reality' for existence, so that to call a thing unreal, is, to him, to call it non-existing.

Descartes then doubted the existence of all things, and supposed them false and called them unreal—as if he knew what existence, unreality and falsity were.

What was the result? He came to suppose that the entire universe is an illusion. But can the entire universe be an illusion? Has the supposition any meaning? It has not. If everything is an illusion, illusion will be the sole reality that there is: it will be only another name for things as they are.

This difficulty arises because Descartes does not realize that illusion is a species of the existent (he admits this, very casually, in the Sixth Meditation) of which the other species is the real, while truth and falsity are attributes that do not belong to either the real or the unreal, but only to a statement concerning them.

What Descartes could legitimately have doubted was the entire fabric of knowledge. This doubt would leave as irreducible the very fact of a doubt; then he should have asked what this fact implies. Doubt implies a judgment. Judgment implies truth and falsity. Then he should have discussed the meanings of these concepts. In this way he would have been a logical positivist.

Or he might have taken this turn.—Doubt implies a judgment. The judgment implies 'positing something' or 'an assertiveness of the will'. Then this 'will' would be the most fundamental thing, and we would have had a Schopenhauer or a Fichte two centuries earlier. (Indeed it appears more convincing to say 'I will, therefore I am', than to say 'I think, therefore I am'; and it would not be too much to say that the latter owes its convincingness to the element of volition in thinking or judgment.)

Or, he might have defined existence as that which is causally efficient (*arthakriyākārīn* as the Buddhists said), and the real as the existence which is casually efficient for a given interest, and he might have postulated an ego as the organization of a set of interests.

But he chose to tread a different path. He questioned the existence of all things (he ought to have questioned the meaning of existence), supposed them non-existent, thought that this was equivalent to calling them unreal, and assumed that this (i.e., to call them unreal) means that these exist only as ideas within our mind. All these are assumptions piled one upon the other. The uncritical assumption was in the theory of knowledge, namely, that we know things by means of their ideas which are within our mind with absolute distinction between the body and the mind, the physical and the mental.

II. This brings us to the second point of this essay, namely, Descartes' responsibility for the sins that visit us in our philosophizing.

Once Descartes established a dualism between the body and the mind, the idea and the thing, it was left for the succeeding philosophers to tamper with it here and there and to see whether it fits with the world of our experience. Thus we get Malebranche's occasionalism, Spinoza's parallelism, Leibniz's pre-established harmony. Even Locke, the empiricist, could not get out of the groove carved by Descartes' assumptions. He unquestioningly accepted the notion that we know things by their ideas which are within our mind while the things are outside ourselves. These things were the external causes of our ideas and were unlike the ideas. They were unknown substances. Thus it was easy for Berkeley to explode this doctrine of an unknown substance as being totally unintelligible. Either the thing is like the idea and then we cannot differentiate the two, or it is totally unlike it and

then we cannot give any meaning to it. He therefore kicked away the things and retained only the ideas. To get the commonsense world out of these ideas, he bound them together by means of his God. Hume took away this thread in the form of God and then the beads (the ideas) were scattered. And then Kant had to invent the framework of the categories to keep order among them. This frame of categories was polished and varnished by Hegel; the picture (*i.e.*, the things in themselves) was thought to be mere lumber and was either put aside or amalgamated in the frame itself. Thus we get the Absolute of Hegel, Green, Bradley and Royce. And William James and Dewey, Russell and Moore had to fight hard against this Absolutism.

The whole trouble started with Descartes, the father of modern philosophy.

Recall of Forgotten Names

BY

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It is a common experience that sometimes we wish to refer to a name that is quite familiar to us and often we are unable to recall it, in spite of our strenuous effort. It is a peculiar experience of a missing word or a name. You feel the name to be there, tingling on the tip of your tongue, and yet you cannot speak it out. The name is there before your eyes, as they say, and yet you are unable to get at it. It is there, you can almost catch it in your hands, and still it eludes your grasp.

William James' description of this experience will enable us to identify the kind of thing I intend to refer to. He says: 'Suppose we try to recall a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with a sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another.....The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a sound to clothe it; or the evanescent sense of something which is the initial vowel or consonant may mock us fitfully, without growing more distinct.'

In this paper an attempt is made to describe this experience in detail, on the basis of a number of experimental observations, and to investigate into the conditions that determine this phenomenon. In the latter half of the paper an attempt is made to indicate what is considered to be the most effective method of recalling a lost word.

The method of this study is quite frankly introspective. In problems of remembering, I still remain an unrepentant introspectionist. It is not desirable, even if it were possible, to eliminate introspection altogether from the investigations into the nature of memory processes. If we draw our conclusions entirely from the objective results of memory functions, ignoring introspective reports,

we shall be losing significant information regarding the processes by which the results have come to be what they are. The introspections that are recorded here are not mere casual reveries but controlled observations by trained students of psychology.

The gap-experience which we are looking for is not one of just not remembering some impressions or of having forgotten a mass of past material. Impressions that are just blurred and faded do not seem to be severally and pointedly active. In fact, the notion of severally existing discrete, individual memory-traces is full of difficulties, as shown so ably by Prof. Bartlett. The experience which we are considering is rather a definite experience of a specific gap in memory. Impressions that are merely forgotten determine the recall by their mass-action. On the other hand, in this peculiar gap-experience, the missing word or name is specifically provocative and particularly insistent. The lost name or word serves as a specific point which is being persistently reacted to. It is a persistent stimulus that elicits a more or less sustained reproductive response. If you do not remember something — say Euclid's proof of the theorem that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the squares on the two sides — you either succeed or fail in recovering the lost material, and that is the end of the matter. Whereas the peculiar gap-experience that we are considering is such that it does not allow you to rest. The forgotten name has got to be recovered somehow or other. It is like an aching tooth, painful yet fascinating — you cannot help reaching your tongue at it. There is almost a hankering after the missing name.

The missing word is what might have been a dominant detail — to use Prof. Bartlett's phrase — which in fact should stand out but which actually is not emerging. It is a detail which though not actually dominant dominates the process of recall. Hence the fascinating character of the typical gap-experience. It is a determining detail.

These gaps in memory are quite specific. The gaps are not mere idle blanks into which you can fit anything. They actively resist some things. Incongruent suggestions of other names or words are rejected, actively thrown out as not fitting. The gap is not just emptiness but a determinate hole with specific forces of acceptance and rejection. Even when we have not recovered the missing word or name we can tell with confidence the number of syllables in it, its general shape, sound and atmosphere. Frequently my subjects used to report such things as the following: 'Oh, it is an old-fashioned name and it ends in Tai' or 'The missing word has

something to do with Tejas'. Once one of my subjects tried the suggestion of another similar word but rejected it instantaneously as being a bit too longish. 'Oh, I am sure it begins with a k sound', and such other remarks, were quite common.

It would be interesting to note what sort of materials give rise to this kind of gap-experience. In almost all the cases that I have investigated the missing element is a verbal one. Whenever I requested my subjects to supply me with instances of such gap-experience, they have almost always come forward with verbal materials. None of them ever reported some missing visual element causing a similar experience of urgency. I do not want to suggest that visual impressions are not lost, or that, when they are lost, they are not difficult to recover. All I say is that, within the limits of my enquiries, non-verbal elements were not reported as causing the typical experience in question. I am alive to the possibility that suggestion might play a part in determining an overwhelming proportion of verbal cases. For when I asked my subjects to look for such gap-experiences I used to give the following instructions: — 'Sometimes we wish to refer to a name or a word that is quite familiar to us and often we are unable to recall it in spite of our strenuous effort. We feel it to be there, tingling on the tip of our tongue, and yet we cannot speak it out. Now please tell me one such experience if you can.' These instructions might have been suggestive, but I do not know any other way of telling them what is it precisely that they should look for. I, however, submit that even outside the limits of this investigation nobody spontaneously reported a similar experience in the case of a non-verbal element.

In 50 p.c. of the cases the word sought after was a proper name. In 12.5 p.c. the missing word was a technical term which was really as specific as the proper name in the definiteness of its reference. In less than 20 p.c. of the cases the gap-experience was caused by common names, some at least of which were rather unusual. Only in one case was the missing element a line of verse, and the peculiar gap-feeling was experienced in an attempt to find suitable wording to fit the tune. Even in this case when I examine the protocol I find the following introspective entry: 'I felt the gap-experience but not with great intensity. There was not enough pointedness about it.' May it be that the unit was too big and massive to give rise to full-blooded vivid gap-experience?

Under what conditions then do we experience this peculiar feeling of gap? As is indicated by the kinds of materials that give

rise to this experience, it is some specific element, some well-defined small schematic unit, which calls forth this kind of experience. However, all names that are forgotten do not give rise to this experience. Had that been the case, proper names, which are known to be very difficult for being remembered, would in each case initiate such a feeling of gap, and consequently these experiences would be much more frequent than they actually are. Actually, it is the relative infrequency of these experiences that gives them their striking character. It is when you remember quite a good deal about the word except the word itself that you get this tantalizing feeling. You remember practically everything about the name, you can recollect its entire associative context, you are familiar even with the shape, sound and other general features of the name itself, but somehow you are not getting the name — it is then that you experience this gap-feeling. It is when you can reproduce the atmosphere, the colour, the context and meaning, in short, it is when you are thoroughly familiar with the name and still you miss it, that you get this typical fascinating experience. You have a gap-experience when you remember everything 'about' the thing but when you cannot say 'what' it is. Gap-experience results when you have every effective piece of knowledge about the thing and yet the thing eludes your grasp. You have got all knowledge of the thing and yet the name which is the reality of the thing escapes you. So it is an experience of contradiction. You have and have not got the thing with you. It is this contradiction which gives that experience its peculiarly fascinating character. All names that are forgotten do not give rise to the gap-experience, but only those which you think you have with you but which you are not getting at give rise to this experience. It is only the familiar when it slips away from you that leaves the sense of something missing.

Even a thorough knowledge of the associative scheme is not enough. It is necessary that the name or word itself should have been registered and fixated in the mind. The name itself must be 'there', properly fixated, almost enticing you and still out of your reach. You must be familiar not only with the associates of the name but with the name itself. Gaps, then, occur in the case of familiar and well-fixated words. You may remember everything about a person or a thing except the name, and yet the characteristic gap-experience may be lacking, if you are not very familiar with the name also. You must be quite the master of the name — the name dangling before your very nose, and yet it may run away from you, giving rise to the typical tantalizing experience. Thus, the familiar when it slips away from you leaves the sense

of something missing. All names that are forgotten do not give rise to this experience, but only those which you think you have with you, but for the present you are not getting at — give rise to the experience. Everything that is forgotten does not leave behind a gap-experience, but only an element of the schematic mass to which many associative links are anchored, and only when such an element is itself supported by strong interest, does it draw out this restless response of gap-feeling. Mere failure to remember a name 'about' which you know quite a lot does not give rise to the gap-experience. You must have an interest at the inner end of the process, sustaining the recall-set, and further you must also feel confident about your ability to get the name if only you make the necessary effort. When you are intensely interested and also confident about getting the element and yet there is failure to get it, then that gives rise to this exciting experience.

A question of much theoretical interest as well as of great practical importance is how to recover the missing word. A very widespread notion is that 'You cannot do anything by way of a deliberate effort to recover the name. The harder you try the farther does the word recede. All that you have to do is to give up the attempt and then after a time, perhaps after a few days or even months, the missing element may suddenly shoot up in your consciousness.' Apparently this means that all that you can do is to do nothing about it. It must be noted however that this advice to do nothing is given when quite a strenuous effort is already made to recover the name. A more plausible explanation seems to be that, by the concentrated voluntary effort already spent on the task, a mass of relevant associative material is activated half wittingly and half unwittingly. And by virtue of such subconscious activity the desired element may come up to the level of consciousness. In this connection I would like to quote at some length the introspective report of one of my subjects, a postgraduate student of psychology. He appears to support the view that the best thing to do is to do nothing. The protocol reads like this:—'Wanted to get the name of a girl but could not get it. I remember the name begins with P. I had a full mental picture of the girl; I narrated to my friends the whole incident about the girl, but I could not get her name. There was such a tension in my mind. I applied tremendous concentration on that point but there was a complete blank.....Then I diverted my energy and took a completely different course for about one minute's time (interval taken to walk from one lamp-post to another). Then I attempted once, and I got the name and finished.'

Now the subject says he diverted the flow of energy into an altogether different course. It seems to me that in one minute's interval it is exceedingly unlikely that he succeeded in banishing the thought of the name completely, especially when he tells us that he returned to the job (of recalling the name) after a short interval of one minute. I am rather inclined to think that his mind was set on the project all the while. The recall-set must have persisted.

I think this popular idea of withdrawing the mind from the attempt to recover the name, as the most effective method of recovering it, is an oversimplification of the real processes involved and therefore is highly misleading. One of my subjects, a lecturer in philosophy and psychology, held a similar view as regards the best method of recall. When he got stuck over a name, at my request he made a determined effort to recover it. After an interval of 45 seconds of thinking out aloud he recalled the name quite correctly. In the midst of this sitting he got interested in the sort of things we were doing and wanted to recall the name of a propaganda picture. After a few seconds' effort, again at my request, he gave up the attempt. Before we parted, I instructed him not to think of the matter any more and to report the name of the picture if and when it occurred. It is now nearly two years since then, and he has not yet reported his having recovered the name. In the cases that I have investigated, in more than 80 p.c. of the cases the lost name was recovered in intervals of between 10 seconds to 20 minutes.

Considering the cases that I have studied I am constrained to think that in order to recover the word the subject must be continuously oriented towards it and its schematic background. A steady pressure of a conscious or semi-conscious mental set must be maintained in order to overcome the blocking. Of course, the effort must not only be continuous but it must also be varied. As one of my subjects reports, one must be playing with the name, exploring all the divergent associative paths. One must manipulate the word in all possible ways, attacking it in turn on all sides, and only thus will this revived schematic mass pull up the word. There is a greater chance of fishing out the required missing word by repeating to oneself its closer associate. It may sometimes happen that the subject feels stuck in a sort of blind alley and experiences a sense of complete blocking. It is of no use obstinately persisting in the same direction in a foolish pigheaded manner. Keeping objective, the same strategy should be varied. This seems to me to be the truth of the popular supposition of

'not to think at all'. It does not mean empty the mind of all representational material regarding the thing or person. It only means think in a more mobile, versatile, resourceful manner. It is not that the intense concentrated attention to the missing element is forbidden, but that such an effort may be misdirected, and hence the need of distributing the attentive effort along other systems of connected material.

An analogy may perhaps make clear the sort of method which in my opinion is most likely to succeed. Just as in doing a mechanical jig-saw puzzle we do not try merely to force our way through sheer pressure but manipulate the pieces in all sorts of manners, similarly in this kind of memory puzzle, instead of directly forcing our way and getting stuck at a point, we should manipulate the memory pieces along many associative paths, in a trial and error manner. And just as, in solving the mechanical puzzle, in the midst of our fumbings the two pieces are suddenly taken correctly, even so here in the midst of complicated associative functions the memory gap is suddenly closed by driving in the correct missing link. Nearly all of my subjects report that suddenly the correct name shoots up in consciousness. (By the way, the Gestalt psychologists may perhaps resent my reference to the trial and error procedure; however, I hope they will welcome the idea of the missing element closing the memory gap.)

Another way of putting the matter is the following:—'We should cease to think of the name consciously; we are told, 'the missing word however may be thrown up some time later as a result of unconscious or subconscious activity.' Now I think there is no need of deliberately giving up thinking, though in the exigencies of practical life after a short interval we have to give up the deliberate attempt at recall. A lecturer in a class-room, when he is stuck over the name of a certain author, cannot afford to sit down indefinitely to recall the name. This fact accounts for the popular belief that the best method to recover the word is not to think about it at all. I am rather afraid of too frequent a use of such words as the unconscious and subconscious mind. I would rather speak of the degrees of accessibility. Some mental processes are easily accessible to introspective inspection, while others are relatively inaccessible. Thus in our effort to recover a lost name some remembering processes might be more obvious and straightforward, while others might be more deep-lying, subtle and quick, and so ordinarily beyond introspective grasp. The fully conscious processes, through faulty habits of thinking, may press along some

single narrow groove and thus may get shut in some blind alley. However, these conscious processes of attention may arouse a more diffused and nascent activity of a livelier and more varied kind. It is these diverse streams of suppressed activity which greatly help the recall of the correct name owing to their potency over a wider field of the past schematic material.

In what way, then, is the method indicated as the most effective by our data different from the one commonly suggested? The common-sense advice is not wrong. Scientific psychology would be in a very precarious condition if it were to declare all common-sense findings false. There is no need to inhibit all conscious processes directed towards recovering the name. There must however be a greater readiness to follow a different cue if the earlier one is found to lead to a sort of dead end. There is no dichotomy between the conscious mind and the unconscious and the subconscious mind. The conscious concentrated effort gets diffused in many subsidiary and subtle processes, which owing to their widespread ramifications are helpful in touching off the wanted name. So finally I submit that the deliberate effort to recall a lost name always pays, either directly or through a coincident arousal of subtler memory-processes.

The Aesthetic Gestalt

(A Study of the doctrine of Rasa)

BY

A. S. NARAYANA PILLAI, M.A., M.LITT.

'The true beautiful.....is spiritual being in concrete shape.'

—Hegel (*Aesthetik.*)

1

According to Abhinavagupta¹, Bharata's classical dictum, *vibhāva anubhāva vyabhicāri samyogād rasa niṣpattiḥ*², means this:—By the combined presentation to the spectator of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*, the *sthāyibhāva* of the spectator is roused and developed and experienced as *rasa*. It is the spectator who enjoys *rasa*; for this the outer representation of *vibhāvas*, etc., and the inner *sthāyibhāvas* must act and react upon each other.

Vibhāva, says Bharata, is the cause of *bhāvas* or mental conditions.³ The *vibhāvas* are the determinants or excitants. They are the objects and the occasions that stir up the appropriate sentiment. They are of two kinds, fundamental (*ālambana*) and subsidiary (*uddīpana*). The fundamental determinants are the hero and the other characters or personages in a drama. The subsidiary determinants are the circumstances of time, place, etc. The *anubhāvas* are the effects or expressions of these emotions. They are the external manifestations that indicate feeling, such as sweating, fainting, etc. The *vyabhicāribhāvas* are the accessory states that tend only to develop the main sentiment. They are transitory or evanescent mental states.

2

The *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and the *vyabhicāribhāvas* are objective stimuli that evoke the *sthāyibhāva* of the spectator of the drama. In the case of poetry images corresponding to these factors are supplied by the skilful descriptions of the poet. In both cases

1. Abhinava Gupta's exposition, based on the doctrine of suggestion (*vyañjana*), is adopted by the aestheticians as authoritative and satisfactory.

2. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, chap. VI, 24.

3. *Vibhāvah kāraṇam nimittam hatwi ithi paryāyāḥ*: op. cit.

the aesthetic scheme includes these factors presented to the spectator or reader for his aesthetic appreciation. The result is that his sthāyibhāva is roused and developed to that complex, synthetic experience called rasa.

The vibhāvas, anubhāvas, etc. present a well-defined structural organization, a coherent group or configuration. There is a scheme in their arrangement. Certain elements alone fit in and others are excluded. In an aesthetic composition where the leading sentiment is love, for instance, the fundamental determinants like the maiden, etc., the subsidiary determinants like the spring season, moonlight night, tender breeze, etc., the expression of glances, the horripilation and change of colour—all these possess a significant unity with one another and with the main sentiment. Their grouping is not arbitrary or casual but is determined by what may be called 'aesthetic necessity'. The vibhāvas, anubhāvas, etc. exhibit individually the characteristics of a partial and subordinate whole. Together they form the outer aesthetic object, supplying the objective totality of stimuli affecting the sahrdaya.

On the subjective side, there is the sthāyibhāva of the spectator. In the *Bhāvadhyāya* Bharata gives a list of eight sthāyibhāvas. The term sthāyin refers to a permanent mental condition. It is a system of operative forces and tendencies in the soul, the inner dynamic that reacts to the outer pattern.⁴ In the experience of rasa there is the interplay of these subjective tendencies and the content of external stimuli. Both the subjective and the objective factors, the sentiment and the stimuli, are necessary.⁵ Rasa is the experience of this aesthetic pattern. The poet or the dramatist expends his skill in the presentation of this pattern. The reader or spectator perceives its beauty.

3

This emphasis on pattern formation by the vibhāvas, etc., and on the sthāyibhāva of the spectator or reader invites comparison

4. Sander calls these subjective dispositional conditions the 'structure'. See *Psychologies of 1930* (Clark University Press, London), p. 192.

5. Cf. 'Rasa is declared to the giving of pleasure from a poem through the elements that consist of moonlight, discouragement, horripilation and the like and that find expression as vibhāvas, vyabhicāribhāvas and anubhāvas.' *Daśarūpa*, book 4, 54. Also: 'Love (rati) or other sthāyibhāvas brought out into manifestness by a vibhāva, anubhāva or vyabhicāribhāva attains to the conditions of a rasa in the men of poetical sensibility.' *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, chap. III, 1, text.

with the conditions of Gestalt experience. Gestalt psychology's central formula is 'What happens in the total is not conditioned by the nature of the parts'.⁶ This means that all experience is determined by constellations of stimuli which form patterns, units or 'figures'. It is the result of the organization of external stimuli into configurations. These configurations are not to be regarded as the products of 'collective attention', prior experience, memory or association.⁷ On the other hand, they are produced by the totality of conditions both within and without the organism. The given outer stimuli are formed into a pattern by the inner dynamic principle in us that demands this pattern-formation. The structural tendencies of the soul strive, according to the Gestalt school, to bring together all subordinate wholes and to subject them to a superior whole. Experience is not determined solely by physical causes but also by the scheme of the subjects' inner dispositional conditions. It is the interplay of subjective tendencies and the content of external stimuli that evolves a configuration, and gives rise to Gestalt-experience.

The vibhāvas, anubhāvas, etc. are a pattern of objects and actions. The sthāyibhāva is a scheme of attitudes and tendencies. Each is a pattern and discloses on analysis patterns within patterns.⁸ They act and react upon each other and produce in the aesthetic experience the synthetic experience of rasa.

4

The several aspects of this experience, its comprehensiveness and emphasis on the totality of impressions received, its normative nature which lifts it above the merely sensuous to the region of value-attainment, its characteristic of sympathy that results in our giving ourselves without stint or reserve to the world of beauty—all these may be emphasized by calling rasa aesthetic-Gestalt-consciousness. It is not a simple cognitive apprehension. In it are mingled cognitive factors consisting of sense-perception or imagi-

6. See Wertheimer, 'Ueber Gestalt Theorie', *Symposion*, I, 1927, pp. 39-60. See also W. Kohler, 'Some Tasks of Gestalt Psychology', *Psychologies of 1930*; W. Kohler, *Gestalt Psychology* (Boni & Liveright, 1929); G. W. Hartmann, *Gestalt Psychology* (The Ronald Press Co., New York, 1935); R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* (Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1931), for comprehensive accounts of the Gestalt standpoint.

7. G. E. Muller adopts this line of argument in his brochure entitled *Komplex Theorie und Gestalt Theorie*, 1923. Kohler has replied to this in an article under the same title published in *Psychologische Forschung*, 1925-6, pp. 358-416.

8. Refer to Appendix

nation of objects, feeling-tones of pleasure or pain evoked by the objects, emotions of love, anger, etc., comprehension of the unitary pattern and the contemplative enjoyment of the object. This complex Gestalt-experience is different from the ordinary perceptual or memory cognition. It is not imagination either, if by imagination is meant mere fancy which manipulates ideas in mechanical combinations.

Rasa is the experience which results when we sense the unitary structure and meaning of a dramatic or poetic configuration. We are taken straight to the heart of the aesthetic object and we perceive its pattern and expression. In this experience there is the play of feeling and imagination and sympathy and we feel the joy and the peace of contact with the Beautiful.⁹

5.

The importance of this Gestalt pattern presented has been well recognized by the Indian aestheticians. A flaw in the pattern indicates the failure of art, the incompetence of the artist. The aesthetic experience is marred, and if the mistake is great the experience itself does not arise. Such fatal mistakes are to be avoided.

The faults are mentioned as the *doṣās* or *ābhāsas*.¹⁰ Ananda Vardhana, for instance, explains how a rasa like *śṛṅgāra* (erotic) must not be so overdeveloped as to cloy.¹¹ Mammaṭa points out that the *vīra* (heroic) and *bhayānaka* (fearful) rasas should not be pictured as belonging to the same person. The hero must have the first, the hero's adversary may have the second. The erotic rasa does not go with the calm (*śānta*) rasa. Such incompatibilities must be avoided.¹² An instance of 'untimely introduction' is cited by the author. In the second Act of *Vēni Samhāra*, while the slaughter of numerous heroes is proceeding, the poet

9. See what a sober, matter-of-fact psychologist says of a Gestalt experience. 'And again, when the sub-structures, creatively asserting themselves in harmony with the whole, and finding their redemption articulate the total structure step by step, there follows the volant sensation of profoundest joy, in which all experience rounds itself into a complete whole.....' F. Sander, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

10. The aesthetic principle is known as *aucitya* or propriety. Cf. 'Aucitya is rasa and anaucitya is rasabhasa': V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts of Alankāra Śāstra* (The Adyar Library, Madras, 1942), p. 253.

11. See Dhvanyāloka, III Uddyota and the exhaustive discussion on the nature of *aucitya* in V. Raghavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-257.

12. See *Kāyyaprakāśa*, chap. VII, 64 text and commentary.

goes on to describe the loving dalliance of Duryodhana with Bhānumati.¹³

Viśvanātha states the incongruities among rasas which have to be avoided. The erotic is opposed to the pathetic, the furious, the heroic and the fearful. The comic is opposed to the fearful and the pathetic. The pathetic is inconsistent with the comic and the erotic; the furious with the comic, the erotic and the fearful; the heroic with the fearful and the calm; the fearful with the erotic, the heroic, the furious, the comic and the fearful; the disgusting is incongruous with the erotic.¹⁴

In representing the *vibhāvas*, etc., for producing certain rasas impropriety may arise. In expressing the erotic rasa, Viśvanātha points out, there will be impropriety if the love is fixed on the wife of the guru or spiritual guide, when it has many heroes for its objects, and when it does not exist in both the parties. So also there is impropriety in the furious rasa, if a guru be the object of anger, in the calm rasa if it dwells in a vile person; in the heroic rasa when the bravery is shown in killing a Brāhmaṇa, and so on.¹⁵

The various directions given to the playwright and the actors in the books dealing with dramaturgy have this aim only, viz., to indicate what is *ucita* or proper as helping to build up the aesthetic pattern. In adapting the story, says Dhanañjaya,¹⁶ whatever is unsuited to the hero or inconsistent with the rasa is to be omitted or arranged in some other way. For instance, the treacherous killing of Vāli by Rāma has to be omitted as inconsistent with the suggested character of the hero, Rāma. Dhanañjaya gives a few more instructions in the *Daśarūpa*. One should not make the subject-matter of a dramatic representation too disconnected by the excessive use of rasa, nor should one overwhelm the rasa with matters relating to the subject-matter or its embellishment.¹⁷ There should not be any visible representation on the stage of a long journey, murder, fighting, revolt of a kingdom or the like, a siege, eating, bathing, anointing the body, putting on clothing or the like.¹⁸ There should be no representation of the death of the principal

13. *Ibid.*, 60-62 (9).

14. See *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, chap. III, 242 text.

15. See *ibid.*, the examples given in chap. III, 243 commentary.

16. See *Daśarūpa*, III, 29 text.

17. See *ibid.*, III, 27.

18. *Ibid.*, III, 39.

character anywhere in the play, though what is inevitable is not to be avoided.¹⁹

The test in all these is *aucitya*, propriety or the harmony of the aesthetic scheme. The pattern should be perfect, without flaws. What elements should be omitted and what elements taken in is dictated entirely by the aesthetic necessity of the case. They must be, as Bridges puts it, 'in keeping' and contribute to the beauty of the aesthetic pattern. The secret of creative art cannot be put in words and no rules can define the work of genius. Nevertheless, these statements on *rasa doṣās* do give us negative guidance. They help us to avoid the ugly and the bizarre and serve to keep before our minds the grandeur and the wholeness of the aesthetic Gestalt which is the ideal at once of artistic creation and artistic enjoyment.

6

Rasa defines an aesthetic Gestalt and brings to light the conditions in which the value of beauty emerges and is apprehended. *Rasas* are classified as eight (or ten) according to the different *sthāyibhāvas*,²⁰ which are the 'structures' striving for the formation of aesthetic patterns. In this sense the classification is subjective: it is based on the difference between 'structures' which condition the aesthetic Gestalt. In another sense the classification is objective: it takes account of the outer aesthetic objects presented, *viz.*, the *vibhāvas*, etc., which supply the stimuli.²¹ This enumeration and description of the *sthāyibhāva* and *rasa* represent a valuable analytical work in the field of aesthetic Gestalt.²²

19. *Ibid.*, III, 40.

20. See Appendix: also *Nāṭyaśāstra*, chap. VI, 15. Regarding the question of the number of *rasas*, see V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas*.

21. Cf.: 'It is the paradox of beauty that its expressiveness belongs to the beautiful thing itself and yet would not be there except for the mind.' S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 292.

22. See Appendix.

Interests of Students in Topics in Psychology

BY

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A. PROBLEM

The study of educational interests has concentrated largely on the interests of students in the subjects in which courses are offered at educational institutions. The present paper reports an investigation of relative interests within the field of a single subject of study. It is a study of the relative interests of students of psychology at the Intermediate and the B.A. stages in the topics in their syllabus in the subject.

B. PROCEDURE

The subjects for this study consisted of 362 students of both sexes appearing in Elementary Psychology for an Intermediate Examination conducted by a Board of Intermediate Education in India and of 113 students of both sexes appearing in Psychology for a B.A. Examination conducted by an Indian University. The paper on Elementary Psychology set for the Intermediate students as well as the paper on Psychology set for the B.A. students contained ten questions, of which they were required to answer not more than five. The choices made by the candidates were obtained and served as the data for the study. These choices were taken as an index of their relative interest in the topics in their syllabus in the subject.

The author is conscious of some limitations of this approach to the problem. Firstly, the syllabus in psychology prescribed for each of the two examinations includes many topics besides those covered by the respective question papers. The Intermediate examination question paper covered the following topics: the value of psychology, the nature and methods of psychology, the nervous system, perception, memory, learning, emotion, imagination, reasoning, 'short notes'. The B.A. question paper covered the following topics: the nature and methods of psychology, 'the meanings of an assortment of technical terms', learning, memory, imagination, emotion, personality, intelligence, fatigue, 'short notes'. The choices of topics made by the candidates at the two examinations may be compared profitably with regard to the following topics which were covered by each of the two question papers: the nature and methods of psychology, memory, learning, emotion, imagination. Such a comparison, however, may not be made with regard to the following topics, which were covered at only one or only the other of the two examinations: the value of psychology, perception, the

nervous system, reasoning, 'the meaning of technical terms', intelligence, personality and fatigue. Secondly, there remains a possibility that a candidate, for the sake of getting more marks than he thought he would otherwise obtain or for the satisfaction of some other allied interest, could have chosen to answer a question which in itself he perhaps disliked answering or was not interested in.

C. RESULTS

Analysis of the data relating to the 362 Intermediate examinees shows that the frequencies of the choice of the different questions to answer, when arranged in a descending order, were as follows :

'short notes'	265	73.2%
memory	232	64.1%
the value of psychology	219	60.5%
emotion	189	52.2%
imagination	185	51.1%
perception	176	48.6%
learning	96	26.5%
the nature and methods of psychology	88	24.3%
the nervous system	79	21.8%
reasoning	10	2.8%

The most frequently chosen four topics were the 'short notes', memory, the value of psychology and emotion. The least frequently chosen four topics were reasoning, the nervous system, the nature and methods of psychology and learning. Imagination and perception occupied the middle places in the order of frequency of choice.

There was another act of choosing that the Intermediate examinees had to do. The 'short notes' question covered an assortment of four topics—sensation, personality, memory and dreams. Of these, a candidate choosing to answer the question was required to deal with only two. The frequencies of choice of these by the 265 students answering the question, arranged in descending order, were as follows :

memory	150	56.6%
dreams	148	55.8%
personality	139	52.5%
sensation	32	12.1%

The only common topic between this assortment in the 'short notes' question and the rest of the question paper was memory, and it occupied a high frequency of choice in both the choosings.

An analysis of the data relating to the 113 B.A. students shows the frequencies of choice of the different questions, when

arranged in descending order, to be as follows :

emotion	97	85.8%
memory	88	77.9%
the nature and methods of psychology	81	71.7%
'short notes'	80	70.8%
imagination	78	69.0%
'meaning of technical terms'	37	32.7%
intelligence	35	31.0%
learning	30	26.6%
personality	30	26.6%
fatigue	6	5.3%

The four most frequently chosen topics at this stage are : emotion, memory, the nature and methods of psychology and the 'short notes'. Of these, three were also among the four most frequently chosen by the Intermediate examinees. These are : emotion, memory and the 'short notes'. But the order of their frequency has undergone a change. The 'short notes', which occupied the top place at the Intermediate stage, now go down to the fourth position. Does this indicate that the Intermediate examinee is interested more in acquiring and showing a little information about many things in psychology than in a full length treatment of problems, and that a full length treatment of a particular problem interests a B.A. student more than a little information about many things? Memory occupied the second position with both the Intermediate and the B.A. student. The interest in memory thus seems to hold its place as the student passes from the Intermediate to the B.A. Emotion, however, seems to have gained in interest. For it goes up from the fourth place to the top place in frequency of choice. A still greater gain in interest goes to the nature and methods of psychology, which topic has gone up from the eighth to the third position. The value of psychology was set at the Intermediate examination and occupies the third place in frequency there, but was not set at the B.A. examination.

The four least frequently chosen topics at the B.A. stage are, in order : fatigue, personality, learning and intelligence. The only one of these that was also one of the least frequently chosen at the Intermediate stage is learning. Its position in frequency of choice is the seventh at the earlier and the eighth and a half at the later stage. No question was set on the other three at the Intermediate examination. Reasoning may be looked upon as very closely associated with intelligence. But while both of them occupy a very low interest position in the two lists, reasoning is at the bottom of the list at the Intermediate stage whereas intelli-

gence is at the fourth stage up from the bottom in the B.A. list.

It is interesting to note that imagination occupies a constant fifth place in the middle of the two lists of frequencies of choice. The sixth place goes in the Intermediate list to perception, which topic, however, was not covered by the B.A. paper, and this place goes there to a question on the meanings of an assortment of technical terms.

The 'short notes' question at the B.A. examination covered an assortment of four topics — instinct, perception, emotion and personality. Of these, a candidate choosing to answer the question was required to deal with only two. The frequencies of choice of these for the 80 students answering the question, arranged in a descending order, were as follows :


personality	66	82.5%
emotion	52	65.0%
instinct	35	44.0%
perception	5	6.3%

The topics common to this assortment and the rest of the question paper were personality and emotion. Emotion gets a high frequency of choice here as well as there. But personality here beats even emotion, while it there occupied a low position, indicating perhaps that the B.A. examinees were more interested in fragmentary bits of knowledge than in a comprehensive and systematic knowledge of personality.

D. SUMMARY

The relative interests of Intermediate and B.A. students of psychology in the topics in their syllabus in the subject were sought to be determined from their choices of questions to be answered out of those set in the question papers at examinations. Some of the major conclusions reached are these : Memory maintains a constant very high interest at both the stages. Emotion gains quite a high place in interest at the Intermediate stage but goes up to the top at the later stage. On the other hand, the interest in the 'short notes' question — requiring a little information about several things — goes down considerably in the transition from one stage to the other. The nature and method of psychology also gains considerably in interest. Curiously enough, learning is one of the least frequently chosen topics at both the stages. The author is conscious of some limitations of the approach to the study of educational interests adopted in this study.

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