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The
POLITICAL QUARTERLY

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STAPLES

DOES OUR MIGRATION POLICY MAKE SENSE?

By PROFESSOR BRINLEY THOMAS

IN the middle of last winter, after listening to a rather depressing account of the difficulties facing the housing programme, I remember feeling somewhat bewildered on seeing a report in *The Times* (November 2, 1946), that "two hundred skilled building trade workers, all single men, will form the advance contingent of the legions of migrants who are expected to avail themselves of the chance of migrating to the Commonwealth in the next few years under the Governmental Anglo-Australian scheme. They . . . will be followed early in the new year, as soon as shipping berths are available, by another body of 400 building operatives." It seemed a little odd that, out of the poverty of our man-power, we should be only too willing to bestow plenty of emigrants on the other countries of the Commonwealth. Can it be that the habits of a century of imperial squandering persist in a blind and automatic fashion though times have changed? Or are there new and decisive reasons why Britain, though prematurely aged by infertility and austerity, should cheerfully resume the expensive pastime of peopling an Empire?

There has certainly been a marked revival of interest in emigration, and the voluntary societies are going into action again. The Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Bessborough, President and Chairman respectively of the Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement, have appealed for funds to promote the emigration of the right types of men, women and children; and in doing so they stressed that "our survival as a great power depends, under God, on the stability and cohesion of the Commonwealth." (Incidentally, is it not about time that "Empire Settlement" was re-christened "Commonwealth Settlement"?) The Big Brother Movement has launched an appeal for £50,000 to enable it to carry out its plans for settling British boys between 15 and 19 years of age in Australia under the guardianship of prominent citizens. Meanwhile, the air resounds with warnings that in the present year the country must admit 100,000 immigrant workers; as the Government itself put it in its *Economic Survey for 1947*, ". . . foreign labour is the only substantial additional source of man-power which is open to us—especially for the under-manned industries . . ."

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There are many who urge that Britain needs a selective immigration of not less than 500,000 people over the next five years if the maladjustments in our economic system are to be ironed out. And the Chancellor of the Exchequer has declared: "We must export or expire."

Amid these discordant voices it is difficult to know where exactly we are going. On April 17th Lord Tweedsmuir asked the Government for a statement of its policy on the question of emigration from Great Britain to the countries of the British Commonwealth. In a vigorous speech in the House of Lords he urged that a fully-fledged policy of Empire settlement be re-introduced and that "we should redress the balance of our population from the hundreds of thousands of persons skilled in every form of trade and profession now in the displaced persons camps in Europe." Replying for the Government, Lord Addison said that, though we could not afford to lose the pick of our skilled artisans in large numbers, "the Government were aware of the obvious necessity, so far as was humanly possible, to increase British stock in the Dominions and other parts of the Commonwealth." He pointed out that "shipping accommodation was the limiting factor at present and it would be for some time, but His Majesty's Government were sympathetic to the spirit of the motion and were doing as much as was practicable."

The position now seems to be as follows. A revised scheme of assisted emigration to Australia is in operation, on the lines foreshadowed in Lord Addison's statement in the House of Lords on March 5th, 1946. It is in two parts: (a) the grant of free passage to suitable British men and women who were resident in the British Isles or were in the United Kingdom forces overseas on September 1st, 1938, and served in a whole-time capacity in the armed forces or Merchant Navy of the United Kingdom during the period of the recent war, and their dependants; (b) a scheme under the authority of the Empire Settlement Acts of 1922 and 1937 for passage assistance to approved emigrants and their dependants, who are normally resident in the United Kingdom and who do not come within the scope of the free passage scheme. Persons of 19 years of age and over will be required to pay £10 and juveniles of 14 to 18 years of age £5 towards the cost of a passage, the remainder of the cost, including free passages for children under 14 years of age, being borne equally by the United Kingdom and Australian Governments. Applicants have to be accepted by

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the Commonwealth authorities as medically fit and otherwise suitable for settlement. On March 31st of this year it was announced that these Free and Assisted Passage Schemes to Australia were in force and that applications would be considered by the Australian authorities from persons in the following occupational groups:— metal trades, including mechanical and electrical engineers, boilermakers, welders, sheet metal and foundry workers; textile and clothing operatives; building and civil engineering trades; brick and pottery workers; machinists in the clothing and textile, printing, canvas and leather trades; boot factory operatives; saw mill and timber workers; architects and surveyors; pharmaceutical chemists, doctors, and dentists; nurses and domestics. Full particulars are publicised at all local offices of the Ministry of Labour.

The first step has thus been taken; and in view of the equally strong demand elsewhere in the Commonwealth for a renewal of immigration from Britain, we may expect similar arrangements to be made with the other Dominions. Even though there is no financial assistance, movement to Canada is likely to be brisk as soon as shipping is available. In 1946 Canada received 71,719 immigrants who brought with them \$26 million in cash and settlers' effects. 48,000 of these came from this country, including 37,000 women, mostly war brides. The Dominion Government may open Emigration Offices in Liverpool and Glasgow, in anticipation of a considerable volume of movement this year. In New Zealand there is a feeling that any delay in initiating an immigration policy will mean losing not only potential British settlers but also people from northern and western Europe. The New Zealand Government's programme of industrialisation cannot go very far unless the supply of certain grades of labour can be increased, and it hopes to secure an agreement with the United Kingdom similar to the Anglo-Australian scheme. South Africa, with big developments in gold mining and other industries in prospect, has joined the other Dominions in the struggle for British immigrants. On March 3rd last the South African Parliament gave its blessing to the Government's plans and defeated a nationalist motion designed to keep out "unassimilable types" and to give South Africans a guarantee of protection against competition from newcomers. Field-Marshal Smuts has emphasised that the people they want are

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chiefly artisans who can help the country's industrial development.

There is a remarkable degree of unanimity in the four Dominions on the need for promoting a steady inflow of settlers over the next decade: the trade unions have modified their old exclusionist attitude and even the South African Nationalists are not against immigration in principle. The war gave a strong impetus to industrialisation in these countries; and no longer is it stipulated that the migrants must go on the land. On the contrary it is the young industrial worker who is now in demand, as is evident from the list of favoured occupations advertised in this country by the Australian authorities. Each Dominion seems to have the same ideas of imperial preference in this field: British first, North-West Europeans second, Southern Europeans third.

Judging by Lord Addison's statement of the policy of the British Government, there would be no objection to the Dominions taking their pick of British man-power immediately if only there were enough ships available. And yet the Government in Command Paper 7018 (January, 1947) emphasised how seriously undermanned certain of our industries were, the deficit compared with the mid-1939 level being 67 per cent in tinplate and sheet metal, 56 per cent in hosiery, 42 per cent in bricks, tiles, etc., 34 per cent in cotton, 31 per cent in iron foundries, 27 per cent in clothing, 22 per cent in paper and printing, and so on. Appealing to employers and workers, the White Paper said: "We must concentrate on increasing production in those home industries which supply the vital materials required for the necessities of life It is therefore a matter of overriding concern to all employers and workers that these essential industries be brought up to the necessary strength without delay." If this is so, why is the Government doing as much as is practicable to facilitate the movement to the Dominions of workers from these very industries? Neither in Parliament nor in the press has there been much discussion of the implications for this country of this sudden revival of emigration. That the economic position of the Mother Country has materially altered as a result of the War is obvious to everybody; and one would have thought that there is at least a case for re-examining the policy of Empire Settlement in the light both of its record between the Wars and of its bearing on this country's post-war condition. Too many of the enthusiasts

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seem to be content to take up the propaganda where they left off in the late 'twenties.

Let us look at the policy as it affects the interests of this country now and in the immediate future. Since those far-off days of 1922 when the Empire Settlement Act was passed, our position has changed in several important respects. First, Britain now has a chronic man-power shortage; she is a capital-importing country; and, far from there being a scarcity of investment opportunities at home, we anticipate several years of hard work to make good the arrears of six years of war and to pay off our debts. Secondly, anxiety over the coming decline in our numbers prompted the Government in 1944 to set up the Royal Commission on Population which is expected to report in a few months' time. This Royal Commission owes its existence to a widespread opinion that the State should do something to arrest the downward trend of the net reproduction rate which was so obvious in the 'twenties and 'thirties. Thirdly, the problem of defence has been revolutionised by the atomic bomb. This island has become extremely vulnerable; and the Chiefs of Staff are thinking in terms of spreading the population and industrial potential more evenly over the Commonwealth.

Here, then, are three criteria—the economic, the demographic and the strategic. From a strictly economic point of view, Britain should now become an immigration country. The golden age of emigration from Britain was the Victorian era when she was a great exporter of capital and when more than half her foreign trade was of the traditional type, namely, the exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials and food-stuffs. The last spasm was seen just before World War I when a considerable volume of emigration, particularly to Canada, coincided with a revival in foreign investment. Between the two World Wars Empire Settlement was very much of a hot-house affair confined largely to the few years before the World Depression. The net amount of emigration from Britain to the Empire fell from 112,624 in 1922 to 62,951 in 1929, and the proportion that had to be assisted rose from 23 per cent to 68 per cent. It was no surprise when the Committee on Empire Migration reported in 1932 that there was "a profound disharmony between the economic needs of Great Britain on the one hand and the Dominions on the other in regard to migration. Now that it might suit us to send large numbers of our people to the Dominions, it does not suit the Dominions to receive them. When the time comes when the Dominions will

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again welcome immigrants, it may not be to our economic interest to supply the need." The prophecy in this last sentence has come true, though not in the way expected by the writers in 1932. Experience in the Second World War has taught the Dominions how important it is to have an industrial back-bone; they want their populations to become bigger and more industrialised because in this way they think they will be more secure. The present position of this country, however, is well-known: labour is scarce, there is a crisis of under-production, and large borrowings from abroad are indispensable. What the *economy* of Britain now needs is clearly a large *inward* balance of migration.

When we look at the problem from the demographic point of view, we find the economic argument for immigration reinforced. For many years fertility has been below par, and as a result our population is becoming older on the average. A change in the balance between age-groups can have serious economic consequences. By the year 1971 there may well be three workers aged 45 to 64 for every two aged 15 and under 30, and about a fifth of the population will be 60 years of age and over. It is estimated that the cost of retirement pensions will go up from £238 million in 1948 to £501 million in 1978—a significant indication of the heavier burden to be borne by the youthful part of the community. One of the striking demographic effects of the war which we cannot afford to overlook is the loss of well over 100,000 young women who married members of the Armed Forces of our Allies. There may be differences of opinion about the efficacy of Government policy designed to increase the birth rate; but no one will deny that to absorb young foreigners into this country will help to offset the increasing weight in the older age-groups. And if these young immigrants come from countries where fertility is high, all the better. Assuming that, instead of promoting such immigration, we encouraged many of our young people to emigrate, the age-composition of the population by 1971 will be even more lop-sided than the present estimate promises it will be.

So far it certainly looks as if the argument is pretty conclusive. For economic and demographic reasons, Britain should emulate France and go in for an ambitious programme of planned immigration. But we have reckoned without the Chiefs of Staff. It is their duty to grapple with the formidable defence problems of an atomic age; and from what is known of the

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trend of their thinking, they are in favour of a redistribution of the population of the Commonwealth. At the meetings between the Prime Ministers of Britain and the Dominions held in London in April - May 1946 far-reaching plans affecting the future pattern of the British Commonwealth's ~~man-power~~ and industrial resources were discussed. Reporting these meetings, *The Times* (April 27th, 1946) said: "It has been evident during the discussions that the main burden of Commonwealth defence, whether regarded independently or as part of a future United Nations security organisation, would still fall, for many years to come, on this country. Industrial and scientific resources, as well as skilled man-power, are largely concentrated in Britain, the most vulnerable target to atomic weapons of any of the great Powers to whom the task of maintaining security will fall. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, is the most widely dispersed of the world's political groups, and offers incomparable opportunities for the redistribution of vulnerable industries and stocks, and for the posting and training of military, naval and air formations. The prospect opened up by such an idea has been before the minds of Commonwealth leaders for some time, but only now are some of its economic and political aspects being fully appreciated." Apparently the Ministers did not get any further than the exploratory stage; and at the end of the conversations there was no sign that any policy had been decided. The same ideas were discussed by Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke in an address to the Royal Empire Society on November 6th, 1946. Arguing that "modern weapons and the atomic bomb had seriously weakened Commonwealth security by greatly increasing the vulnerability of its heart," he asked: "Could we arrive at a more equitable distribution, from a defensive point of view, of our man-power and resources? Undoubtedly with the growth of the Dominions we were gradually working towards a better distribution of resources throughout the Commonwealth, but the process was slow. Was this growth sufficient, or should it receive any artificial stimulus, and, if so, how?" (*The Times*, November 7th, 1946).

This new conception of defence, with its stupendous implications for the economic life of Britain, would of course take a long period to evolve. Our horizon could not be less than twenty-five years. To be effective the plan would have to bring about a systematic contraction in the population of the vulnerable Mother Country and an increase in the strategically

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safer Dominions. Never has such a drastic operation been performed on an old-established and highly capitalised economy : there are no precedents to guide the surgeons. It would be a sorry result if the measures taken to protect the patient from the atomic peril were to make him die of heart failure following loss of blood. The economy of this island, which grew strong and mature through international specialisation, is a very complicated organism. It depends so much on the skill and adaptability of its workpeople. We now know to our cost how vital it is to maintain a proper balance between different grades of complementary labour.

In our present condition the main determinant of the level of unemployment is not monetary policy but the volume of coal output. Imagine what would happen if in the next five years two hundred thousand coal miners were to emigrate to the Dominions. The British tax payer might even help them to go if they could qualify for the £10 passage under the Anglo-Australian scheme and others to be negotiated ; and theoretically we can assume that these emigrants would enable the Dominion coalfields to expand considerably. On the face of it that would be an important instalment of the strategic plan. But it would be the economic ruin of this country. I realise that coal miners are not included in the list of occupations specified as desirable by the Australian authorities ; but almost every one of the grades of labour enumerated in that list are extremely scarce in this country at present. I need only refer to welders, sheet metal and foundry workers, machinists in the clothing and textile, printing, canvas and leather trades, architects and surveyors, doctors, dentists, nurses and domestics. The argument which is so strikingly obvious in the case of coal miners applies equally to the other groups. It does seem fantastic that the British Government is to-day actually prepared to spend money on the emigration to Australia of men and women from these notoriously under-manned occupations. Even a relatively small amount of emigration, if it is made up of key workers, can have the most damaging effect on the country's productivity. It would be bad enough even if some inadequate compensation were secured through a vigorous policy of immigration from the Continent ; but it is in fact all the worse since the trade unions are so reluctant to let this happen.

The conclusion seems inescapable that a "go as you please" attitude to emigration is incompatible not only with the economic recovery of this country but even with the achievement of the

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strategic end. We are deceiving ourselves if we think we can get the best of three worlds—maintaining unrestricted freedom to emigrate and the cold shoulder to immigrants, safeguarding Britain as a healthy and well-balanced economy, and making the British Commonwealth an effective atom-proof power group.

Are we then up against the old dilemma of Defence versus Opulence in a new and terrifying setting ? Must the citizens of Britain resign themselves to taking upon their weary shoulders a permanent load of austerity as an insurance against the possibility of World War III ? These are far from being academic questions. In the normal circumstances of a single country in an uncertain world there does not seem any reason why its expenditure on defence should be regarded as a deduction from the means available for its economic welfare. Why should the judge, the prison governor and the policeman be regarded as contributing to the social product while the soldier, sailor and airman are not ? Surely those who man the dykes that keep back the flood waters are no less productive than those who till the fields. When we are considering one single community the so-called conflict between Defence and Opulence lacks reality. But the problem with which we are confronted is not quite the same. The unit is not the United Kingdom but the British Commonwealth ; and the plan of defence involves a transfer of population and industries from the Mother Country to the Dominions. Those who are left in a smaller Britain would have a harder life, but they *themselves* would be no safer if the country were hit by atomic bombs. They will pay a heavy economic premium but will receive only a shadowy insurance protection for themselves. They are supposed to find comfort in the fact that the British Commonwealth, as a whole, is safer because it is a more balanced power unit with its industrial potential strategically spread over the world.

Undeniably the upsurge of opinion in the Dominions, particularly Australia and New Zealand, in favour of immigration is largely based on the strategic argument. Between the Wars the cement for Commonwealth solidarity came from Imperial Preferences. It was this country that was pushing Empire settlement : we tried to get the Dominions to do us a favour by relieving us of some of our unemployed, and they were not too enthusiastic. To-day apparently the position is reversed. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are anxious that we should do them a favour by running an ambitious Empire settlement policy. Commonwealth solidarity is now to be

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founded on a spreading of Britain's man-power. And for the next few years at least this will be a very costly concession for this country to make. There is an obvious conflict between what Britain must do to recover quickly from the economic effects of the War and what she is called upon to do in the interests of Commonwealth solidarity and defence. Moreover, the constitutional implications are rather disturbing. If Britain, though suffering from a bad attack of anaemia, is to be the blood donor of the Commonwealth while the Dominions continue in ever widening fields to assert their full freedom of action under the Statute of Westminster, the sooner we get Dominion status the better.

On this vital question of migration the British Government seems to be trying to do something to please everybody, and that is a poor substitute for a firm and consistent policy. Surely what the country needs is the short-term migration policy which will contribute most to our economic recovery; and meanwhile the strategic plan for Commonwealth settlement should be the subject for intensive study and not for piecemeal action on an experimental scale. This new conception of the needs of defence is much too formidable and far-reaching in its implications to be played with at this time. No one would wish to prevent anyone from emigrating who wants to go. But is there any sense at the present time in promoting the settlement in the Dominions of young people from our most depleted occupations? And what possible justification can there now be for the widespread reluctance of trade unions to admit foreign workers into this country? Every measure that makes our labour more scarce aggravates the crisis and ensures a more prolonged austerity. The "lump of labour" fallacy is unfortunately very much alive in many quarters. Indeed, there is a serious possibility that if our labour resources are not increased and distributed more economically, we shall find that, when we have to balance our external accounts unaided, the average standard of living will be uncomfortably low. There may well be permanent pockets of unemployment due to chronic shortages of certain kinds of labour and materials. Such a miserable prospect would greatly increase the desire to emigrate: a vicious downward spiral would be set in motion with incalculable harm to our economic life. Permanent austerity will make emigration out of Britain a natural process; but that would not be the kind of population transfer which would fit in with a strategic design.

THE MAN OF MUNICH

The paramount consideration for the immediate future must be the economic well-being of this island; and that entails an ambitious programme of immigration. Valuable time has already been lost in securing suitable workers from the continent. Meanwhile, careful and sympathetic attention should be given to the strategic plan for the British Commonwealth and Empire; and in a few years' time when Britain is again firmly on her feet, she can make her vital decision on it with a surer knowledge of all that it implies.

THE MAN OF MUNICH

By LEONARD WOOLF

THE official contemporary biography of a statesman, particularly if he has played a prominent part in great affairs, is nearly always unsatisfactory. The writer comes to praise Caesar, not to bury him; his work is either an encomium or an apology. Mr. Feiling in his biography of Neville Chamberlain* undertook a task which was probably impossible. His biography is an apology or rather a speech for the defence; though badly written, it is clever, in parts a little too clever, yet it fails completely. History will not acquit Neville Chamberlain, though, no doubt rightly, she will recommend him to mercy.

The verdict of the people was given when Chamberlain fell, and still more clearly in the post-war election. He and his party were condemned for the policy of appeasement, symbolized in the word Munich, and not merely because he and the policy failed. Ordinary people, who had endured the years 1940 to 1944 and knew what the country was capable of, were ashamed of our policy and acts between 1933 and 1939—they were ashamed of Neville Chamberlain. As is always the case, "the people's" feelings were not analyzed; they were half-conscious, but deep and in this case justified. It is easy to make out a superficial case for Chamberlain and his class and party, as Mr. Feiling does, by "blaming it"—usually obliquely—upon the ever convenient cat. In this case there are two cats, "the people" and the Labour Party. After all Britain is a democracy and statesmen cannot go further than "the people" in a democracy will let them go. When Chamberlain returned from Munich, with

* *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*. By Keith Feiling. Macmillan. 475pp. 25/-.

Hitler's signature to that fatuous international declaration in his pocket, and told the crowd from the window in Downing Street that he had brought back "peace with honour" and "peace for our time," did not "the people" by their ovation show that they were solidly behind him and were in favour of making every sacrifice, including honour, in order to get "peace with honour"? And did not "his old friend Kate, kitchen-maid in his father's house sixty years before" and a representative, as Mr. Feiling points out, of "the common folk," write to him: "I have felt so terribly thrilled and proud with what you are trying to do"? Thus obliquely is any blame for Munich and the failure of his policy and any slight miscalculation about peace or honour gently lifted from Neville Chamberlain's shoulders and put firmly upon those of Kate, the kitchen-maid, and other common folk.

And then there is always the wicked Labour Party. From 1922, when Lloyd George was driven from power by the Conservative Party, to 1939 was 17 years. In those 17 years a Labour Government was twice in office, both times without a majority. The first Labour Government lasted 9 months, the second two years and three months. For 14 out of those 17 years, therefore, a Conservative Government was in power. Yet the politically ingenuous reader of Mr. Feiling's direct attacks and oblique insinuations might easily conclude that the feeble drift of British policy between 1920 and 1939, the refusal to accept responsibility or honour obligations, the destruction of the League as a potential instrument for maintaining peace, the encouragement of aggression, the weakening of our defences and the failure to rearm when the rearmament of Germany was an obvious and direct menace both to Europe and the British Empire—all this was due to the policy of the Labour Party which supported the League and voted against armaments. There were serious defects in Labour's international policy which can be justly condemned by an honest critic, but it is necessary to rewrite history in the most squalid terms of party politics in order to whitewash the regime of Baldwin, Chamberlain, Hoare, and Simon by unloading their blackest sins upon the goatlike head of the Labour Party.

Though Mr. Feiling treats his biography as an apology or defence, it is characteristic of him and of Chamberlain that he is apparently completely unaware of the real case against his client. He thinks and writes, as did the statesman, entirely in terms of party politics. And the party politics of Chamberlain, Mr. Feiling,

and the Conservative Party were and are class politics. There are periods of history when the narrow, small-minded, acquisitive policy of the party or class politician can do little or no harm, when the kernel of conservatism—the determination to keep what we have and make it a little more—may have value even as a social stabilizer. But there are other periods in which the stabilizing of society as it is is impossible, when everything is in flux owing to some social cataclysm, and transition to new forms of political, economic, and cultural life are inevitable. At such times the narrow-minded politician whose imaginative horizon is never more than an inch from his own nose, because his vision is limited by his party and class interests, must infallibly lead his country into disaster. For in such circumstances the only statesman capable of preventing disaster is one who has sufficient intelligence to realize that the old world is dead and sufficient imagination to see the means by which a new world may be built peacefully upon the ruins of the old.

Few will question the fact that the war of 1914-1918 left us with an old world in ruins and with the necessity, whether we liked it or no, to make a new. The tragedy of the inter-war years was, in this country and several others, that power remained in the hands of politically the most unimaginative and unintelligent and economically the most reactionary of classes, the conservative business man. Internally their main object of policy was to keep what they had (Mr. Churchill extends it to imperial affairs) and to yield as little as they possibly could to "Labour" and socialism. Internationally their policy was to undertake as few obligations as possible and so to sterilize the League, but to do everything possible to weaken the Soviet Union. Their policy was always negative, and therefore in the world they lived in always stupid, being largely based on fear, fear of the working classes, of losing their possessions and power, of Bolshevism, of readjusting themselves to new conditions. Like the aristocrats of the 18th century, they were full of good intentions and anachronistic platitudes—read Baldwin's or Chamberlain's speeches—but the sclerosis of a sterile conservatism had drained them of all social understanding or creativeness, and their policy was therefore necessarily, whether the leader was an indolent man like Baldwin or an energetic man like Chamberlain, negative, timid, unrealistic, and unprincipled. They tried vainly to face the future by turning their backs to it.

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Neville Chamberlain might have been selected as a museum specimen to illustrate the mental characteristics of this social species, though no doubt if he had not reached the Premiership of Britain at the precisely correct moment, his class would have thrown up some one else equally capable of destroying it and his country. But fate had also given to Chamberlain a personal history and character which made disaster doubly sure. He had the primary and irretrievable misfortune of being the son of Joseph Chamberlain. The father had succeeded in doing on a smaller scale in the 19th century what the son accomplished between 1933 and 1939; by placing himself at the head of the forces of reaction and sterile liberalism, he destroyed the possibility of rapid and peaceful evolution, political and economic, which were becoming apparent in Gladstonian liberalism. It is nearly always a misfortune to be the son of a "great man," even if the "great man" has not been—as he nearly always has been—a major source of evil to his country and the rest of the world. Joseph dominated his son while he lived and dominated him after his death. His treatment left Neville at the age of 30 still a thwarted schoolboy with a sense of failure and therefore of guilt. He had failed to make his father's sisal venture a success. Embittered and reserved, despising and disliking the majority of individual human beings, he spent the remainder of his life, under the menace of his father's eye, eye-glass, and orchid, trying to make good, to prove to the grim father, now dead and therefore still more menacing, that he was not a failure, but, like every honourable Chamberlain, a success. Often consciously, probably always unconsciously, he made what he thought would have been his father's approval or disapproval the determining factor in his political policy and actions. Nothing in his career is more revealing than the mole-like persistence with which he prepared the way for tariffs and, when he had contrived to get them, the reverent tone of filial and parental triumph over the event in the letter which he wrote to the Duke of York. It took a long time for him to satisfy his father's ghost, and Lloyd George, who could not stand Chamberlain's "rigid competency" and "self-sufficient obstinacy," very nearly destroyed his political career altogether. But the malignant fates which hunt down men and nations were not to be balked of their prey. What made Chamberlain such a dangerous implement in their hands was that within limits he was a man of considerable powers. Incredibly stupid and blind where his interests and prejudices

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were concerned, he nevertheless possessed mental qualities of a high order. He was a man of immense energy and tenacious obstinacy. These qualities had given him success in business and had made him a master of local government and administration in Birmingham. When he got to Westminster, the same qualities made him formidable in the House and in the party and a highly competent Minister. Once in the Cabinet, under a flabby Prime Minister who could never make up his mind, he soon became the dominant person in the Government and the obvious heir-apparent.

When Chamberlain at last succeeded Baldwin, the stage was set for the final act of disaster. The class for whose interests he stood now had a highly efficient political leader. He could be counted upon rigidly to protect their interests, and he and they were in a very strong position. By some peculiarly dirty political tricks, by the errors, weakness, or worse of their opponents, they had established themselves with an overwhelming majority in parliament. Internally they had succeeded in clamping down upon the country a policy of hopelessness and frustration, of economic despair. The one active principle of social policy which animated them—to sweep back with their little political brooms the menacing economic waves which they knew as socialism—seemed to have succeeded. Lloyd George has said that Chamberlain belonged to a type "lost in emergency or in creative tasks at any time," and his handling of the economic crisis confirms the judgment. He seemed himself to regard the ruins of the distressed areas and the mass unemployment—"the large number of people for whom we can find no work"—with obstinate complacency, happy in the knowledge that he had prevented any active attempt to meet the crisis and any economic innovation except the paternal tariff.

Yet at the very moment that he and his class reached the height of their power and triumph, their doom, as in a Greek tragedy, was just round the corner. It came swiftly and inevitably when Chamberlain turned from internal to external politics and tried to deal with peace and war, with Hitler and Mussolini, by the methods he was accustomed to use in dealing with drains and rival interests, with capital and labour, in Birmingham. Mr. Feiling suggests that until all the archives of history are opened we are not in a position to know "the verdict of history" upon Neville Chamberlain. His own narrative of events, which is a speech for the defence, shows

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that this is not true; the verdict is implicit in the bare facts of this shameful and pitiable story. And the most pitiable thing in it—pitiable in the sense of deserving our pity as well as our contempt—is the Prime Minister. That he had a horror of war and a real desire for peace is indisputable. But from the start he and his class were the most convenient pawns in the hands of thugs like Hitler and Mussolini. He carried into the dangerous regions of foreign affairs the spineless, negative, beliefless attitude of his class in internal affairs, the desire to keep what we've got, to "do nothing," to avoid responsibilities and judgments of right and wrong. The way to treat Hitler or Mussolini was therefore to do a deal with them. So Chamberlain started his deal with Hitler. The story, even as told by his defender, is horrifying. It is still, even with the facts before one's eyes, almost incredible that any one could have been so rigidly obstinate as Chamberlain in wrong judgment and self-deception. Just after Munich Lord Hankey characteristically assured Chamberlain that "your touch was unerring, your vision prophetic." There is hardly a single judgment of Chamberlain's recorded by him at the moment in writing which was not wrong, not one prophecy which was not hopelessly wrong. Here are a few examples:

- 19 September, 1938 Of Hitler: "I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word."
- 2 October, 1938 "I sincerely believe that we have at last opened the way to that general appeasement which alone can save the world from chaos."
- From the window in Downing Street:
"This is the second time in history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time."
- July, 1939 "He still believed that Mussolini was against war, that Hitler had missed the tide, that his soldiers would not let him take the fatal plunge over so minor a cause as Danzig."
- August, 1939 "... he thought Hitler would not face the real thing and on August 16 went for a holiday to the far Highlands. He was recalled in four days."

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I have said that Neville Chamberlain deserves our pity. History will find him guilty, but rightly recommend him to mercy. But it is important not to manipulate or conceal the facts in order to protect his memory. A certain type of social thought and action, or rather inaction, was primarily responsible for the economic and political disasters which fell upon Europe in the years between the wars and finally destroyed our civilization in the war itself. It was Chamberlain and the class which he embodied and represented who stood for that sterile and stagnant policy which shirked responsibility and called it realism to drift before events and appease the international thugs and bandits, throwing the weak as a sop to the strong. We are faced today by a similar situation, though darker and more dangerous. It can only be met by clear thought and courageous action, directed by the political imagination which was anathema to Chamberlain and his class. But the Chamberlain attitude and policy are not dead either in this or several other countries. Mr. Feiling's book should be read as a warning rather than condemned as an unsuccessful speech of a counsel for the defence.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF GREEK DEMOCRACY 1933-1936*

By SIR SYDNEY WATERLOW

IV. FACTION IN MODERN GREECE

It is the essence of a balance to be precarious; so that a community based on the Odyssean virtues is likely, except under unusually favourable circumstances to be politically unstable, introverted and unconstructive, while the qualities of its individual members will degenerate easily into their excesses and defects. Add to this the effects of long oppression by alien rule, which always acts as a forcing house on the racial character of the oppressed, developing it in extreme directions whether for good or ill; then the weaknesses displayed by the modern Greek state since it was detached from the Ottoman Empire will seem less surprising than the real and solid progress that it made in spite of all natural handicaps.

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For instance, the spirit of individual enterprise—a virtue as characteristically Greek as it is British—is liable to become, not merely a rooted incapacity for team-work but a definitely disintegrating force, unless it has been matured and disciplined by history. Consider, again, what may be called the dialectical habit of mind which the modern Greek has inherited from the schools of the sophists, and which makes him as keen and critical a judge of the fine points of an argument as the Englishman is of those of a cricket match or the Spaniard of a bull-fight. This may be a noble virtue in the individual, an unfailing source of pure intellectual pleasure; but when it takes communal forms and unites with the instincts of the herd, it can easily have deplorable consequences. In the past it has roused mobs to destructive passion; as witness the streets of Constantinople and Alexandria flowing, in the fourth century, with the blood of those who affirmed and of those who denied the consubstantiality of the Three Persons of the Trinity—a controversy turning on arguments of the utmost subtlety and refinement, which tore the Christian world for generations. And on modern Greek life this dialectical temper, with its tendency to exalt the Word above the facts, has stamped its mark in many ways. It has loaded the statute book with a mass of legislation bearing, for the most part, little relation to facts and practical needs, largely unenforceable, and indeed hardly intended to be enforced, since too often the machinery for enforcement has been patently lacking; a mass so various that there is probably no other country in which so many laws have been enacted on so many subjects. This alone is a considerable evil; it is not well that the majesty of the law should depend, not on its orderly enforcement, but on the mere existence of a legal fiat; for thus the whole apparatus of government becomes infected with a certain air of fiction. And similarly with that other major Athenian industry, the making of new and the patching of old constitutions; it could not cure, it could not even palliate, the maladies of the community; it could only minister further to the national passion for forensic hair-splitting. Not that the dialectical temper has always been an unalloyed curse in its public and communal manifestations; on the contrary, it has blessed modern Greece with something unknown to any other Balkan country—a judiciary not, indeed, immune from political bias, but completely incorruptible, from the worst-paid magistrate of the remotest country town, to the most eminent member of the Supreme Court of the Areopagus. They

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are incorruptible because judicial corruption is repugnant to the national feeling; the courts would lose all their attraction as a stage for the display of a popular art, litigation all the savour of its appeal to the intellect, if suitors were to offer bribes or judges to accept them.

This is perhaps the brightest light in a picture otherwise sombre. The dialectical cast of mind tends, when it descends into the market place, to become an all-pervading spirit of litigiousness and chicane, and this in turn to breed faction in politics as inevitably as sin breeds death. The time factor must also be remembered. If Greece had developed a healthy system of democratic government on a party basis by the end of the 19th century, she would have done in two generations what it has taken nations with a less tragic history, our own included, centuries to accomplish. To expect this is to ask too much of human nature; it was impossible that the local magnates, to whom the Turks had always left a large measure of autonomy subject to the full and punctual payment of the tribute due from their districts, should in so short a space of time be transformed into respectable *bourgeois* party leaders, united some by conservative, others by liberal, principles; and it was impossible that their henchmen, who in each district owed allegiance to their chief in return for protection against the henchmen of neighbouring chiefs, and often in armed conflict, should with the same speed become a modern electorate voting for or against a party programme. The 19th century did indeed turn the local chiefs into politicians, by making democratic politics a profitable industry. The immediate result of their taking to politics in the metropolis, leaving local life to decay, and forming combinations to get and keep central power, was that they came into conflict with the Crown, which had no intention of sharing power with the faction leaders. The Wittelsbach Bavarian dynasty, to which Europe had given the Greek crown when the kingdom was created, and which, inspired by German love of order, had hitherto governed autocratically, was worsted in this struggle, and the Bavarians, having been obliged to flee the country, were replaced by a Danish prince of the house of Glucksburg. King George I maintained his constitutional position during the forty years of his reign by playing off the faction leaders against one another with great astuteness. But neither during that period nor later did the nature of the struggle for power undergo any real change. The leaders no longer wore the fustanelle and the richly ornamented girdle stuck with pistols and daggers;

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they became frock-coated and top-hatted; but they remained in essence what they had always been, a cross between the feudal chief and the Tammany boss, with the parties that they led held together, not by principles or programmes, but by personal rivalries and antagonisms.

In short, given this psychological and historical background, it was inevitable that the party system in modern Greek democracy should be dominated by faction. And when faction gets the upper hand representative institutions can strike no real roots. Their façade may long remain intact, the flood of democratic oratory, the appeal to the noblest ideals and principles, may flow for years, but behind the phrases and the voting urn an ever deadlier technique is perfected, with the faked election, the conspiracy, the *coup d'état* with military support, and the blood feud as the weapons of party strife.

The art of conspiracy has never been brought to the same pitch of perfection by the Greeks, who are a talkative race, as by their northern neighbours; to cross the border into Greece from Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, where conspiracy heavily broods, was (in the days when borders could be crossed) at once to breathe a lighter, happier air. But it was an air tense with excitement, most stimulating to the passions that keep vendettas alive, and after the first world war the faction fights of Greek politics settled into the form of a single nation-wide feud. This was a disease all the more intractable that it divided the electorate into two camps of equal strength, and that the division was along no line of principle, constitutional or other, but was nevertheless inflamed by a bitterness of which the quality can only be compared with that which religious hatreds have so often transmitted from generation to generation. Its origin was a breach between two individuals as dissimilar in their characters as in their respective backgrounds of tradition; between King Constantine, who enjoyed great popularity, and wished to keep Greece neutral, and his Prime Minister, Eleutherios Veniselos, who held that Greece could contribute decisively to the defeat of the Central Powers and that her future greatness depended on her joining the Allies.

It was in virtue of this breach, and not from anti-monarchical theory, that Veniselos became a republican, as it were by accident; and accordingly the political cleavage between his followers and their antagonists that resulted was primarily a matter of personal hatred, not of constitutional doctrine. Sentiment for or against the dynasty could indeed put a sharper

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edge on hatred, but in essence the formation of the two major political camps arose, not from this cause—the issue of Monarchy versus Republic never became a live question in itself—but from the clash of human temperaments, with the leaders on both sides encouraging a conflict which drew men of opposed habits of thought and feeling to attach themselves to one camp or the other, the more conservative-minded to that of the Anti-Veniselists, the more liberal and progressive to that of Veniselos. Thus faction, not programmes, continued to dominate the political scene in an even deadlier form after the first world war than before. The Veniselists held New Greece (Macedonia and Western Thrace) and the Aegean Islands, with a base in Crete and strongholds in the territory of their enemies wherever the refugees from Asia Minor were settled and wherever there was a centre of industry. The strength of the Anti-Veniselists was in central Greece and the Peloponnese, where some genuine royalist feeling long lingered. Under the monarchy Veniselos, braving the disapproval of the Protecting Powers, had united Crete, his native island, to the mother-country; he had enlarged the national boundaries by the inclusion of New Greece as the result of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913; and, when the Greek defeat in Anatolia had swept the monarchy away in 1923, his settlement with Turkey added to the population nearly a million Greeks by transfer from their Asiatic homes, where they had been rooted for generations. But unlike the creator of modern Turkey, he laid no foundation of national unity, although he destroyed many abuses of power and privilege and gave to the commercial classes their rightful place. Under his rule an out-worn semi-feudalism was converted into a semblance of bourgeois liberalism, but he did nothing to build up political institutions capable of standing the stresses of the post-war world. It was not merely that the refugees were for years an alien element, difficult to assimilate both socially and economically; the genius of Veniselos, a revolutionary in the grain, was not creative or constructive in domestic politics; on the contrary, it intensified and perpetuated the traditionally factious character of party strife. For a space his overwhelming personality kept the machine working somehow; then, as his star waned, the native vices of the party system first slowed it down and at last shook it to pieces. The sequence of events that led to this result was, in broad outline, as follows.

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V. THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC

Veniseles lost ground at the election of September, 1932; a second election in March 1933, followed by an abortive *coup d'état*, by a would-be dictator, the Veniselist General Plastiras, returned a chamber with a Veniselist minority. He still however, had, in addition to his following in the Chamber, a majority in the Senate, which he could, and did, effectively use to obstruct the measures of the new Government, formed under the leadership of Tsaldaris*, an elderly lawyer who led the largest of the Anti-Veniselist factions, the Populist Party. In June Veniseles' nerve was shaken by an attempt to assassinate him, and he was never the same man again; the car which was taking him and Madame Veniseles to Athens was riddled by bullets in a running chase of several miles through the suburbs, and the chauffeur was wounded. High officials were deeply implicated, and the delay of the government in bringing the criminals to trial—they let a year pass with nothing done—made compromise between the two camps even more impossible than before. Veniseles retired to Crete to complete his translation of Thucydides into the vernacular, only returning to Athens for a short visit in 1934 to agitate against the one constructive measure of his enemies, the conclusion of the Balkan Pact (February, 1934). Tsaldaris, the moderate head of a party moderate in everything, made several attempts at conciliation, which bore fruit in the agreed re-election of the aged Zaimis, a respectable figurehead, as President of the Republic, and the Veniselists, had they been capable of equal moderation, had a good prospect of soon returning to power. They had only to wait and to behave constitutionally, since there was little likelihood that the government would do anything to remedy the growing discontent of the people. But the provocations they had suffered and were suffering (for the government could not refrain from pinpricks) were intolerable to them; the rank and file were impatient and embittered; nor had age quenched or experience tempered the revolutionary fire of their chief. A conspiracy, well-known to the authorities, who, whether from inertia or in order to lure Veniseles to his doom, had taken no precautions, had long been brewing in the fleet, predominantly manned by Veniselists, and in certain army units in Macedonia and in the capital. When all was quiet on the surface the inevitable explosion came on the 1st March, 1935.

* N. Panagis Tsaldaris, a kinsman of M. Constantine Tsaldaris, the present Prime Minister and leader of the Populist Party.

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On that night—the night of carnival, and it was dark and stormy—the mutineers rose in Athens, while a band of Veniselist naval officers crossed the strait to Salamis, and, with the help of accomplices on the spot, seized the naval arsenal and the greater part of the fleet, the battleship "Averoff," the cruiser "Helle" and some destroyers. The mutiny in Athens was suppressed by dawn, but otherwise the government did nothing during the night beyond alarming the populace by firing blank rounds at intervals from a battery on the slopes of Lycabettus. In the small hours the rebel fleet sailed for Crete to make contact with Veniseles. The leaders appealed to him to join them; he agreed, called his Cretans to arms by an impassioned speech, appealed to Great Britain and France to support him, and put forth a manifesto exhorting the country to rally to the defence of its constitutional liberties, threatened by a Tsaldarist plot (which in fact was imaginary) to restore the monarchy by force. There was now a perspective of dangers—civil war and foreign intervention, with incalculable European reactions—but the threat was averted by the incompetence of the rebels; the fleet failed to deliver either of two strokes which the government would have been hard put to it to parry. These were to have joined forces at once with the insurgents at Salonica, or to have returned to invest Athens and the Piraeus, with a threat of bombardment. As it was, the fleet wasted time in making a round of the Veniselist islands in order to rouse the population, which responded but faintly. The government, who had meanwhile asked and received help from their Yugoslav allies in the shape of aircraft, were thus able to rush a sufficient, although ill-equipped, force to Macedonia. It was collected mostly from the Peloponnese and, under the command of General Kondylis, the Minister of War, it quickly crossed the Struma and put down all opposition, with negligible casualties on both sides. The fleet ran out of fuel and capitulated, after depositing Veniseles and a large following of rebel officers on an island of the Dodecanese, which they presently left for Italy. The movement had fizzled out in twelve days. Except in Crete, where Veniseles could still rouse mass-emotion by a word, the public had remained calm during its course, desiring only peace and quiet, and indifferent to the issue of Republic versus Monarchy by which the rebels had sought to justify their action. There is no reason to doubt the word of Veniseles that he was not privy to the actual outbreak, although both honour and inclination caused him to support his followers once they had

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struck; there is, however, some reason to think that it was favoured by Italian influence, to which Veniselos himself was not wholly a stranger.

So ended the last of those strokes, technically known as "movements" which had hitherto been a regular feature of Greek politics. It was significant that it did not bring with it the usual aftermath of bloodshed, although the blood of six royalist political leaders, executed by the Veniselists in 1922, still cried out for vengeance. Three subordinate rebels were court-martialled and shot before the excitement died down, but after that an unprecedented moderation prevailed. The victors purged the civil and military services of all Veniselists, they confiscated some Veniselist property and they set up courts to try, not only the military heads of the movement, but five prominent Veniselist political leaders on the charge of complicity. But they did not want blood, and the extremist groups associated with the Populist Party clamoured for it in vain. True, the rebels who had fled abroad, including Veniselos, were condemned to death; but this meant nothing, for they were outside the jurisdiction, and the five party leaders were acquitted, to the evident relief of the public. Combined pressure by the British and French Governments, who foresaw that a perpetuation of the blood-feud would end all hope of internal stability, contributed to this result, as did a statement in the House of Commons in which, on the 28th March, Sir John Simon counselled moderation; but the main credit belongs to Tsaldaris himself and to his party, whose attitude reflected the underlying feeling of the country. It would have been otherwise had the dynastic issue made any strong appeal to public feeling, as the course of the rebellion had clearly shewn that it did not. As a trumpet calling the Veniselist half of the country to battle it had been ineffective, and, as to the Anti-Veniselist parties, their attitude towards it (apart from certain groups of royalists noisy out of all proportion to their numbers and influence) was one of pure expediency. The question that agitated the politicians in power was, not whether a restoration would help to heal the maladies of the state, but whether it would strengthen their own position; and they were inclined to answer it in the negative, since the collapse of the rebellion had, by entailing the complete political obliteration of their enemies, given them a position that seemed impregnable for the moment. They calculated, therefore, that a restoration would be a dangerous gamble; it might (for its effects could not be foreseen)

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weaken them, and in any case it could not give them more power than they had already. This calculation confirmed the natural inclination of the Populist party and of Tsaldaris, a congenital temporiser, to play for time on the dynastic question as on all other problems.

The government now seemed to have the ball at their feet. The general election to which they proceeded in June was suitably rigged and was boycotted by the Veniselists, who alleged, no doubt truly, that they would have been beaten up if they had gone to the polls. It consequently returned a Chamber of almost exclusively governmental colour, but with a handful of communists. Thus events seemed to have conspired to give Greek democracy a last chance to shew that it had life in it. The Veniselists having been liquidated by their own rashness, the government could no longer plead Veniselist obstruction as an excuse for not putting in hand the reforms that the situation demanded. And the need for reform was urgent in every sphere. Not only was economic and social disintegration in full career, as described in Chapter I, but Greece was unarmed and defenceless, while the clouds of total war were banking up in Europe; she had ceased to count, even as a pawn, on the Balkan and Mediterranean chessboard. The mobilisation in March had made clear, what was never a secret, that the army, ill-officered, ill-disciplined, ill-equipped, with supply and medical services almost non-existent, was negligible as a fighting force; the air-arm was an unpromising embryo; and the navy, starved in any case of modern material, was immobilised by the loss of many of its best officers and of nearly all its non-commissioned officers through the Veniselist revolt and the subsequent purge. But not even a situation so critical as this could stimulate the government to action; nor indeed could any action have borne much fruit, now that the division of the country into two opposed and equal factions had been aggravated by the proscription of its more progressive and enlightened elements. It is, therefore, not surprising that the government should have remained impotent at this juncture, despite its overwhelming majority and despite the needs of the hour; energy was imperative but languor was imposed by the very nature of Greek politics.

What is surprising is that Tsaldaris should apparently have been unaware that his position, although it seemed unassailable, was in fact precarious. It was threatened both from the left and from the right; from the left, by the rapid growth of a

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well-organized communist movement, which, besides pervading the state educational system, was fomenting strikes and stirring labour to violence by exploiting working-class grievances in the towns; from the right, by the danger of a *coup d'état* engineered by some ambitious army chief. The second of these dangers was immediate, and it should have been obvious, since there was waiting in the wings an actor admirably equipped for the part. This was General Kondylis, who had ready to his hand as a weapon the moribund dynastic issue, which it was the policy of the government and of the Populists to touch only with the most hesitant fingers, but which the ultra-royalist groups on the fringes of the party were eager to revive and to exploit, if it seemed likely to put them into power. These groups the Minister of War had drawn into partnership with a military junta, thinking the moment ripe for the conversion of Greece into a permanently Anti-Veniselist state, with a figurehead King and himself as dictator. Statesmanship was not among the general's qualifications; but he was a man of action, a born guerilla leader, risen from the ranks and inspired by Napoleonic dreams, and, most important of all, the aureole of popularity which he had won by the quick suppression of the Veniselist rebellion was still unfaded. He took his first step on the 10th October, when he ordered Tsaldaris and his government to resign. The order was obeyed, for it had force behind it, and Tsaldaris was in any case spineless; he withdrew into obscurity and died in May 1936. The Presidency of the Republic was thereupon abolished, a National Assembly was substituted for the Chamber and Senate, the royal standard re-appeared on public buildings, and a provisional government of ultra-royalists was set up, with Kondylis as Prime Minister, which decreed a plebiscite on the 3rd November for or against the restoration of King George II. The plebiscite, managed with ostentatious cynicism, was duly announced to have given a 97 per cent majority for restoration, with the Veniselists abstaining. Negotiations with the King had been proceeding for some time in London, and on the 25th November he landed at Phaleron, accompanied by his younger brother, Prince Paul, as Crown Prince.

The republic was dead, after suffering the last indignities at the hands of its murderers. The Kondylis administration, uneasy lest its gamble with the dynasty might fall, had made hay while the sun shone, and, during the short period of its life, had broken all previous records for corruption and robbery of the

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public purse. Hitherto, governmental corruption had at least been decently veiled; from the 10th October until the King's return it was open and unashamed, systematic and enormous. And constitutional liberty seemed to have died with the republic, although the constitution of 1911 remained technically in force. But the appearance was deceptive. Throughout the year the unexpected had repeatedly happened—the outbreak of rebellion, its easy suppression, the collapse of the victorious party at a touch from the armed hand—and a last surprise, the most dramatic of all, was still to come.

Nothing was known about King George except that he had been bred a soldier, had lived twelve years in England and had visited India. Merely to secure his own position, to say nothing of salving the foundered ship of state, it was necessary that the King should have a thorough understanding of the conditions to which he was returning and the judgment to avoid fatal mistakes in a scene full of pitfalls. Nor would understanding and good judgment be enough; he would have to be prompt and energetic in action, patient under endless discouragement, unremittingly industrious, ready to renounce all reward in the shape of gratitude or personal popularity. Was it likely that a prince who had been forced to leave his country when young and inexperienced, should have developed these qualities in exile—that school in which, as history shows, emigrés have too often lost their native virtue? And, even if he were to prove an exception to the rule, was it possible that a restoration repugnant to half the country, exciting no popular enthusiasm anywhere, and planned for their own ends by a gang of unscrupulous adventurers, could succeed? The first of these two questions was answered by the King in person; no sooner had he arrived than it was evident that he had turned his exile to profit, that he had a full and detailed knowledge of the situation, that he knew how to meet it, and that he was confident, and justly confident, of his power to carry out his decision. But this, again, was not enough. Unless the Veniselist half of the country were to acquiesce in the restoration—its active support could not be expected—no statecraft on the King's part could succeed in the long run; and, in order to secure the acquiescence of the Veniselists, an action was required from their exiled and proscribed leader which might have been thought to stultify all his past. This was to advise his followers to accept the restoration as it were on approval, on the understanding that the King would do his best to maintain the constitution. This

action he performed from Paris. A week before the King's return, a letter was published in which Veniselos stated that he would recognise the restoration "on probationary tolerance," subject to the King's granting a general amnesty, and making it plain (as H.M. had already done) that he intended to be King of all Greeks and not of a party, and that he would insist on full guarantees for constitutional liberty. This was decisive. It could not make an atmosphere of enthusiasm for the King's arrival, but it made it less tense and gloomy. What negotiations between the King and the dying revolutionary, the enemy of his house, led up to this result is not known, but it seems unlikely that His Majesty would have accepted the invitation of the Kondylis unless he had been sure in advance that the Veniselists would tolerate his enterprise. He had, it is true, declared that if he returned it would be as King of all Greeks without distinction of party; but, without the endorsement of Veniselos, half the country would have regarded the declaration as worthless, and the King would have been caught in a dilemma—either to accept the role of puppet for which Kondylis had cast him, or to preside over the brewing of a second civil war which would have ruined Greece and would have ended in the expulsion, if not in the massacre, of himself and his family. As it was, the line taken by the Veniselists, while it could not guarantee success, at least made success possible. Without it there could have been no such reorganization of the state and revival of the national spirit as the King actually effected; without that, Greece could have made no heroic stand against the aggression of the Axis Powers; and, but for that stand, the cause of human freedom would have been, as we know, in worse jeopardy than it is to-day. Thus the part played by Veniselos in the restoration had a deeper import than he could have foreseen. History will surely record it as his best epitaph. He died at Paris on the 19th March, 1936.

VI. THE LAST ATTEMPT AT CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

The logic of the situation made an immediate trial of strength between the King and Kondylis inevitable, and it also furnished an issue on which neither could compromise, much less yield, without political extinction. This was the question of an amnesty for all persons implicated in the March rebellion. The aim of the Kondylis, an Anti-Veniselist state with themselves supreme, seemed within their grasp; only one last step was needed, its confirmation and consecration by the prestige of

royalty—the very purpose for which they had brought about the King's return. Kondylis therefore could not accept or proclaim an amnesty for the Veniselists, not even in the most narrowly restricted form. At the same time the King was bound by every consideration of honour and expediency to insist on the widest possible measure of amnesty, and without delay. Delay would have been fatal, since even the appearance of wavering on this point, to which he was virtually pledged, would have ruined his prospects at the outset; although he was free to set his face against the reinstatement of Veniselist officers in the armed forces, as he consistently did throughout the years that followed, much to the indignation of the party. Consequently, the King's first act on landing was to instruct Kondylis, as head of the Government, to proclaim a general amnesty for the Veniselist rebels. He refused, and was at once dismissed, thanked for his services and given a high decoration. The fact that this stroke of the King's was accepted both by Kondylis himself (who died soon afterwards) and by his followers, not only without resistance, but without a murmur, suggests that they were taken by surprise and were conscious that no action they could improvise (for they had not thought of organizing in advance against this event) would command popular support; but, whatever its cause, their collapse was instantaneous and complete; the lion in the path had, as so often, proved a phantom when faced with resolution. The royal amnesty was proclaimed, and the ultra-royalists, soldiers as well as politicians, all who had been loudest in their professions of loyalty in defence of the dynasty against the arch-traitor Veniselos, at once became the King's bitterest enemies, including some on whom he had counted as the inheritors of a tradition of loyalty.

Henceforward—these groups did all they could to thwart the King by their intrigues, but it soon became clear that they were no longer an active danger. The fall of Kondylis had drawn their sting, and when, in February 1936, a group of officers headed by the Minister of War made a last attempt to assert themselves, their bluff was called at once. They visited the King and invited him to hand over the government to themselves, with dictatorial powers, only to be peremptorily dismissed and to find, on returning to the Ministry of War, a new minister, General John Metaxas installed.*

* This incident stimulated Veniselos, a few days before his death, to write to a friend a letter, which was published in the Greek press, congratulating the King on having suppressed the militarists, and ending with the cry, "From the bottom of my heart, Long Live the King!"

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Metaxas had for many years been a stormy petrel of politics, a skirmisher in the Anti-Venelist host, but with no popularity in the army and with no political following save half a dozen deputies from Cephalonia, the island of his own birth. When the plans of Kondylis matured in the summer of 1935 he had faded into the background, and he had taken no part in the restoration, although—or rather because—he was a faithful servant of the exiled royal family. The King now had a free hand for the indispensable task of reorganizing and rebuilding the army and taking it out of politics; indispensable, because until it was complete, the foundations of the state must always be in danger.

But on what kind of foundation was he to build? The bankruptcy of parliamentary democracy was even more flagrant and complete in Greece than elsewhere in the Balkans (with the exception of Roumania), and its fate hung in the balance. Were the necessities of the times to force Greece along the path on which Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, with their veiled dictatorships, had already entered? Or would it be possible still to make representative institutions work? Even if he had not been committed to try the second alternative, the situation at the moment combined with his own inclinations to lead the King to try it. With the Venelists looking to him to maintain the constitution, he could not have attempted to rule Greece as King Alexander was ruling Yugoslavia, even if he had wished to do so; and he had no such wish, for his convictions were liberal, and they were strengthened by long familiarity with the workings of British democracy. Nor did it seem quite impossible that the parties should now begin to bury their hatchets and the spirit of faction to be exorcised, although there was little material which the King could work, and that little bad, time having removed the more responsible leaders by age or death, and having left in their place a breed of small fry, without experience, principles or capacity for cohesion. Still, the restoration had brought with it the atmosphere of a new start, so that an appeal to the country might possibly produce a government capable of governing. A general election might indeed return a Chamber without a working majority for either side; but even so there would still remain the possibility of persuading the two sides to agree to some form of coalition in the national interest. Two conditions would have to be fulfilled; firstly that the election should, so far as possible, be free from malpractices, so that neither side could

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complain that force or fraud had prevented it from developing its full voting strength; secondly, that it should be held neither too soon, before the public had settled down to the new regime, nor yet so late as to allow the situation to deteriorate. Accordingly the King's first step after dismissing Kondylis was to appoint a "service" or non-party government, with functions limited to those of a caretaker and to making preparations for an election. Its head was Demerdjis, an elder statesman of ripe wisdom and with no party ties, but failing in health, whom the King called from retirement to a task which was to cost him his life; he died worn out, on the 13th April, 1936. The 26th January, 1936, was fixed as the date of the election, and elaborate measures were taken to secure a free and genuine vote—a matter of no small difficulty, since Kondylis and Tsaldaris agents reigned unchecked in many districts, and falsification of the results, whether by forcibly keeping Venelists away from the polls or by the multiplication of sham votes, could not be altogether prevented.

(concluded)

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By W. ARTHUR LEWIS

WHAT the Negro wants is everything: full, first class citizenship in the United States of America, without discrimination or segregation of any kind—that is the plain outcome of the first of two recent books,* as indeed of every study of the subject. To English readers this does not seem strange; the Negro would be less than human if he were content to accept less than other Americans; what seems strange, rather, is that it should be thought necessary to ask twelve of the busiest and most distinguished of America's Negroes to take time off to say this in a symposium of essays. The result is not very interesting in itself; there is a moving essay by W. E. B. DuBois, and it is interesting to have something from the pen of A. Philip Randolph, the most prominent and militant Negro trade union leader. For the rest, the book is just a series of variations on what, for non-Americans, usually seems a rather obvious theme.

* *What the Negro Wants*. Edited by R. W. Logan. Milford and University of North Carolina Press. 352 + xxiii pp. 21s. 6d.
Black Metropolis. By H. R. Cayton and St. Clair Drake. Cape. 809 + xxxiv pp. 18s.

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Its chief interest lies in the fact that for Americans it is not an obvious theme, and that even for Negro Americans its clear and unanimous reiteration marks a relatively new phase in Negro thought and strategy.

That it is not an obvious theme for Americans is doubly emphasised by the special introduction with which the publishers have prefaced the book. The University of North Carolina prides itself on being in the vanguard of Southern liberalism. It is against the lawlessness and crudities of the South; it favours orderly Negro advance; and its press has a record of notable contributions to the subject. In the special introduction the press explains its disappointment with the way the book has turned out, and dissociates itself firmly from its general tone. Why?

The idea of the book had been carefully thought out. To advance the Negro cause the publishers were willing to sponsor a book which would show white America, especially Southern America, the legitimate aspirations of the Negro. The writers were carefully balanced; four radicals, four conservatives, and four moderates, from among the most prominent Negroes in the United States. No limitations were placed on what they should say; but what they were expected to say emerges quite clearly from this introduction. They were expected to say that they realise that the Negro race is a backward race, inferior by all accepted standards, but capable of improvement—perhaps even ultimately of equality—if given a helping hand: better schools and hospitals and economic opportunities, more support for those leaders who recognise the faults and weaknesses of the race, and generally a chance to reform itself. Instead what the writers say, all twelve of them, is that Negroes are as they are because they are treated unequally, that they have a right to equal treatment, and that it is scandalous and immoral of white Americans to deny them complete equality.

In terms of practical day to day measures the Southern liberal and the Negro leader want the same things—schools, hospitals, jobs. It is the strategy that is different. The liberals liked and supported the old Negro strategy. This took him, cap in hand, to sympathetic whites, asking for support. It concentrated all the time on abusing Negro weaknesses, and attributing them not so much to circumstance as to character. It therefore enabled white people to feel justified in maintaining the general pattern of segregation and discrimination—the *cordon sanitaire* against the admittedly inferior people—while at the same time

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making small concessions here and there. That was Negro strategy until nearly the outbreak of World War I, dominated by the personality of Booker T. Washington, one of the world's cleverest statesmen.

The new Negro strategy does not admit any Negro inferiority which is not due to inequality of treatment. It admits that there is more crime among Negroes than among whites; less skill; more poverty; less marital stability; less of nearly everything Americans consider desirable, and more of nearly everything they consider undesirable. But it denies that this is due to any difference between white and black; it is due solely to difference of treatment. The Negro gets less education; is forced to pay higher rents in slummy ghettos, is kept in the most menial and poorest paid occupations; and so on. And all this is due to white behaviour; treat Negroes equally all along the line, and there would be no Negro problem.

The new strategy owes its generalship to another of the world's cleverest statesmen, W. E. B. DuBois who from 1910 led the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, in direct challenge to Washington. The N.A.A.C.P. is a fighter. Its biggest battles have been in the courts, where it has sought to compel lawless states to respect the American constitution, which already formally guarantees to Negroes the equality that is all they ask. The popularity of this strategy was immediate; it appealed to Negro self-respect, and within a generation it has almost completely displaced that of Washington. Originally a middle class strategy, it has now permeated every stratum of Negro life. The workers have adopted it, organising themselves in unions, and fighting discrimination inside and through white trade unions. All along the line the strategy is protest; ask for everything; demand it as a right; shame the American people into giving it to you.

It is this that has made the racial situation in the U.S.A. so tense, more tense than it has ever been since the Civil War. The South is alert, and angry. It is all the angrier because the North has hit it, through science, a blow more vital than any since the Civil War. In the first sixty years of the nineteenth century Southern scholars had built up a strong and apparently impregnable science of Negro inferiority, through religion, philosophy, biology, history and every branch of human learning. All this the scientists of the North (and of the outside world) have swept away. The biologists have tested Negro blood and weighed the Negro brain; the psychologists have measured

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his reasoning; the sociologists have correlated his weaknesses with his environment. Everywhere the myth of Negro inferiority has been swept away. No one in any part of the United States can now utter a word of the old dogmas and hope to retain his claim to respect in intellectual circles. Science has deprived the Southerner of his sense of right, and made him all the angrier, and the more violent.

Negroes do not doubt the outcome. A lot of them are going to get hurt. The Ku Klux Klan, inactive during the thirties, has revived; lynchings are more numerous; the South will fight in the last ditch. Negroes do not doubt the outcome; they expect to win. The American conscience is on their side, their greatest weapon, and their mastery in its manipulation is unbeatable. Come what may, they will protest until America is shamed into granting them their rights.

II.

It is not, however, the case that American Negroes merely denounce the faults of others, and ignore their own weaknesses. On the contrary, no people in the world is more self-searching.

In further proof of this comes *Black Metropolis*, a sociological analysis, in over 800 pages, of the Negro community of Chicago, by two American Negroes. This is a first rate piece of scholarship. Using the very best American sociological techniques—and Americans are far ahead of the rest of the world in this field—they have produced a work which is not merely unrivalled on its particular subject matter, but also a distinct contribution to sociological method, setting a standard of how such studies should be done. In addition, it is beautifully written, and even a reader quite new to the subject must soon be fascinated by the book, and have difficulty in tearing himself away. There is everything here about Chicago's Negroes; what jobs they do, what part they have played in the city's dirty politics, how their mixed marriages get on, how and why they "shout" in church, their technique of social climbing; all displayed with dispassionate interest.

Black Metropolis is the latest in the series of Negro self-examinations which started fifty years ago, when W. E. B. DuBois first started to publish his studies. The list is now large; there can be no other community in the world, not excepting the Jews, whose members have so patiently and so scientifically dissected themselves, their ideas, their social relations, their weaknesses

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and their sources of strength, seeing themselves as others see them, and trying to learn from their mistakes.

This itself is typical of one characteristic of the Negro's determination to help himself out of bondage—his passion for education. Ever since the Civil War the Negro has placed more faith in this than in any other possible way of escape. There is no other people in the world, unless it be the West African Negroes, whose thirst for education is so great; who make such sacrifices to achieve it, and who turn every opportunity, however meagre, into a means of dispensing it. There is no other community where social status is so directly a function of education; where entry into the upper classes is determined not by wealth or by birth but by academic education, and where social stratification and the educational pyramid are so closely correlated.

And yet, not even this dogmatic faith escapes the searchlight; Negroes are dissatisfied with their education. It has not delivered the goods. In spite of all this education the economic position of the Negro has not improved but deteriorated in the last sixty years. The jobs which he was permitted to do in 1880, relatively skilled handicrafts, have become less important, with the advance of the machine, and, by and large, he has not been admitted into the new jobs which the machine has created. The urban Negro in 1880 was a skilled craftsman; in 1940 his relative position had declined in skilled and increased in unskilled occupations. The opportunities for employment were contracting from 1880 to 1914; expanded during the war, but contracted again from 1919. When the great depression came the Negro community ceased to be self-supporting; it bore the brunt of American unemployment and was more dependent on relief than any other community in the U.S.A.

It is not the fault of education that the Negro's economic position has deteriorated; that is the fault of the colour bar in employment. Nevertheless Negroes blame themselves for having too much of the wrong kind of education. They have not learnt enough of the things most likely to be useful in getting and holding jobs, and even their vocational schools have concentrated on training for declining crafts like carpentry, rather than the new and expanding mechanical skills. The truth is that there has been a circle. The Negro has been excluded from the new crafts, and not troubled to learn them; and because he has not learnt them, he could not compete in them, and could continue to be excluded.

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Education is blamed also for his failure to make good in business. In Chicago there are a quarter of a million Negroes living in a ghetto. They have a large purchasing power, but nine-tenths of it goes into white shops, and until very recent campaigns, the majority of the proprietors of these shops were not willing to employ Negroes. That there should be shops in the black ghetto serving almost exclusively Negro customers but refusing to employ Negroes is about the limit of insult. Boycott campaigns have improved the situation, but not much.

The obvious remedy is the organisation of Negro business. No one would suggest that Negroes should try to establish a completely self-supporting economy within white America. This is not, in the first place, practicable. Negroes cannot hope to control a sufficient part of the U.S. economy, especially of manufactures, to provide employment for all in Negro enterprises dependent only on Negro purchasing power ; and so long as millions continue to be dependent on white employment, any attempt to reserve Negro purchasing power for Negro enterprises runs the danger of disastrous retaliation. Nor is it, in the second place, what Negroes want ; their aspiration is full integration into the American economy, without racial distinction, and it is their only hope of salvation.

Nevertheless the immediate situation would be eased if Negroes were successful in business, and able to offer each other more employment. A good deal of thought goes into this ; there are associations supporting Negro business ; and thousands have ventured. But the results have been meagre. The Negro is not, on the whole, successful in business. The attitudes which he has picked up as a result of his oppression seem to unfit him for this type of competition. It appears that the average Negro *entrepreneur* does not work hard enough, saves too little, and gives his customers inadequate consideration, all characteristics springing from his eager urge to be accepted, and to be identified by upper class behaviour. He could do better if he received some business training, but Negro education has never run in that direction.

At the same time, it must be recognised that the failure of the Negro business man is paralleled by the comparable failure of small white business in the United States, where, according to one estimate 40% of all retail businesses fail within the first twelve months of their establishment, and the average shop has a life of only five years. The chain stores have played havoc with small business, black or white, their great buying power

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and superior merchandising proving too great for the small shop. White small business has reacted by organising cooperative buying by retailers; this movement spread like fire in the 1930s, and by the end of the decade the advance of the chains had almost been halted. Negro business, on the other hand, has not taken to cooperative buying, and has not held its own. It all comes back to education; business is a serious study, as worthy of intellectual endeavour as the more "respectable" subjects, which Negroes have preferred. Negro colleges are beginning to realise this; commerce is stealing slowly into the curriculum.

slowly into the curriculum.

To English students of the situation it seems odd that the consumers' cooperative movement should not have made greater headway in the ghettos, for cooperation seems the obvious answer to many of the Negro's economic problems. The reasons are not clear. The fact that the Negro is first and last an American is obviously one. Consumers' cooperation has made little headway in the U.S.A.; the American individualistic philosophy is hostile to it; and whereas in England the movement thrived on the inefficiency and abuses of private business, in the U.S.A. the rise and fierce competitiveness of the chains has made it both less attractive and less necessary. Such reasons may do for white America, but are not good enough in the Negro's situation. He could give to consumers cooperation a special asset, group solidarity, without which cooperation never succeeds, and with which it is invincible. If the American Negro took to cooperation his position would change beyond recognition.

The real trouble is that this kind of solidarity runs counter to the general trend of Negro strategy. He wants not to build up his own segregated economy, based on a restricted loyalty, but to be fully integrated into the American economy as a whole. No one will dispute that this is his proper aim, or that he is right to concentrate his energies on seeking to remove the barriers which prevent his integration. But neither can it be doubted that he would have accomplished this aim more rapidly if he had built up his own economy, and thus strengthened his economic position. Money talks. So long as Negroes are poor, there will be strong prejudices against them which will keep them poor. But if they can build up their own resources, by whatever means, they will win respect and assistance in destroying prejudices and barriers. To the outsider, self-help through cooperation seems now a most obvious line of strategy.

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III.

The American conscience and self-help; these are the Negro's two strongest weapons. They are really a single weapon, for self-help cannot directly improve more than a very small part of the employment situation; its value lies as much in reinforcing the weapon of conscience.

Now no people has ever been emancipated solely at the dictates of conscience. There must always be powerful forces which make what is just seem also to be profitable. The trouble in the United States is that many millions of whites are convinced that their prosperity depends on keeping the Negro poor. Until they can be convinced that this is not the case, the Negro's cause has no hope of success.

Two factors have worked against him: in industry the insecurity of employment, and in agriculture the fact that the South is an export economy.

American industry has been subject to violent boom and slump ever since at least the Civil War. Superimposed on this has been a constant inflow of population, which reached as high a figure as a million a year just before World War I. In such circumstances life in the labour market has always been insecure. Every worker has been conscious of the army of others waiting to take his job; racial feelings have been exacerbated, and those who held jobs were anxious to limit as much as possible the field of competition. Even organised unionism discriminated against the Negro. That he should be the first to be fired, and the last to be hired, if hired at all, is a rule which white workers did their utmost to enforce.

The cessation of immigration has removed one major source of strain. It became possible to organise unskilled labour, and the new unionism of the C.I.O. included and supported the Negro. He has ceased to be the scab, and the strike breaker, and is pulling his weight in the unions. The C.I.O. champions his right to work, and has gained him substantial successes. Even the A.F. of L. has had to modify its policies. The cessation of immigration, by ending the pressure on the labour market, will prove to have been a boon to the Negro.

On the other hand, its full effects were not realised in the thirties because of the great depression. Nothing would improve the Negro's position more than continuous full employment in the United States. Economic stability would destroy the white worker's fear of the Negro. He could no

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longer think that every Negro in a job meant one less job for a white man, and his antagonism would gradually subside.

As for the South, the reason why the whites consider that their prosperity depends on Negro poverty is that the South lives by exporting its products—to the North, and abroad. The interest of every business man is that his workers should be paid as little as possible, and other people's workers as much as possible, so that they can buy his product. Now, in the South the "other people" whose workers buy the Southern products are in the North, or abroad. The Southern planter wants workers in the North to be as rich as possible, but workers and sharecroppers in the South to be as poor as he can contrive—just as English landowners in the nineteenth century groaned in Parliament over the conditions of the industrial poor, while exploiting their own agricultural labourers. The friend of the Southern oppressed is the Northern producer, who sells to him, but the Northerner has no vote in Southern elections. If the South were not an export economy, the position would be different. There would be powerful classes inside the South producing for the Southern market, and interested in all efforts to improve that market. Some English readers may doubt this, thinking that capitalist solidarity must make all employers combine to keep workers poor. But this is so only in countries organised mainly for export. Manufacturers in the U.S.A. were "Keynesian" on wages long before Keynes. The "gospel of high wages" is an invention of the American twenties, a recognition on the part of American business men that their general interest is in keeping their workers not poor but rich. Exporting countries like Britain are slow to learn this lesson; for the simple reason that it does not apply in their case. But once the home market becomes the dominant market, men come to learn that they cannot grow rich by keeping their fellows poor. If the South ceased to be an export economy and became more industrialised and more interested in its own home market, it would not be long before the prejudices against the Negro ceased to be economically important.

Here time is definitely on the side of the Negro. The South is being industrialised. There is a double process. On the one hand labour is forced out of agriculture; cotton and tobacco are challenged by production abroad, and perhaps even more by a world shortage of dollars which sooner or later must make the United States cease to export primary products. And on the other hand industry is attracted to the South by wage differentials,

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and by the disappearance of the cheap labour pool in the North which immigration used to maintain. It may be that the transition will prove painful; that Negroes will be ejected from agriculture faster than they are absorbed into industry. But given, not perhaps full employment, but at least the absence of major slumps from the American economy, the industrialisation of the South, the growth of a strong liberal Southern faction interested in Negro prosperity, and the gradual removal of economic barriers, are certainties.

Now, if this analysis is correct, full employment policies and the industrialisation of the South are not only more important aids to Negro progress than anything else, but they are also *sine qua non*; and therefore the two objects of policy most worthy of Negro study and support. But in fact American Negroes are hardly associated with such matters. Here we come upon just one more illustration of their exclusion from American life. Negro thought is tied to the exclusively Negro problems. There are no Negroes in American politics, except Negro politicians. Negroes study no economics at the post-post-graduate level, save the economics of the Negro. A Negro scholar, however brilliant, is not encouraged, either by whites or by blacks, to be an expert on international law, or mediaeval European history, or the gold standard, or any other subject which is not of peculiarly Negro interest. And so the basic forces at work in the American economy are not his specialism; and Negroes are not to be found in the nation-wide public movements which discuss and influence such matters. American Negroes ought to be throwing themselves into the campaign to secure full employment policies for the United States; and participating actively in the determination of import, export and lending policy; of agricultural policy, which these will profoundly affect; and of all matters which determine how rapidly the South will be industrialised. But they do not.

The Negro has shown that he can do a fine scholarly job in any field of human endeavour; of this *Black Metropolis* is only one more piece of evidence. He has concentrated on studying himself, for this was his most urgent need. Now he must break out into the larger field of all-American studies, and make his contribution there. Some are already doing this. There are racial barriers, but these are the least formidable that beset the Negro. And it is not only the scholar that must participate more fully. In every aspect of American life there must be Negro participation; there is nothing American which is not of

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direct concern to him. The masses must cease to expect their best men to devote themselves exclusively to the narrower Negro causes. Good service can be done for the race by taking part in everything that is American—indeed in everything that concerns humanity. The American Negro of to-day must be the Negro American of tomorrow; that is his avowed aim, and he will find, in seeking to accomplish it, that what is specifically Negro will gain all the more as emphasis is shifted to what is of general interest.

IV.

Finally, in their battle for democracy, the Negroes are entitled to look for assistance to democrats all over the world. There is a simple way in which Englishmen can help, if they will. White Americans have rendered signal service to Indians, to Irishmen, and to British colonialism, and criticising it wholeheartedly. Britons are infuriated by this criticism. They point out, rightly, that most of it is ill-informed, exaggerated or untrue. Nevertheless they are sensitive to it, and American criticism has played no little part in stirring the conscience of Britain to improve the treatment of colonial peoples.

The British, on the other hand, are extremely reluctant to utter any word in criticism of American Negro policy, in spite of the fact that this is far more barbarous than anything with which Britain can be charged. Any American worth his salt makes it his business when he meets an Englishman to bring the conversation round within the first hour to the wickedness of British treatment of coloured peoples; he feels it a part of his bounden duty, as a Christian and a democrat, to show the Britisher the error of his ways. The Britisher, on the other hand, is courteous to strangers; he considers that such rudeness, such interference in other people's affairs, simply is not done. And so he neglects to do his duty to the American Negro.

Such squeamishness is unworthy and should cease. The American nation, like the British nation, has a conscience. Nothing but that conscience defends the weak; on it workers, Negroes, Jews, women, children, conscientious objectors, lunatics and all other weak classes depend for defence from exploitation, and it is the duty of us all to keep that conscience active. Democracy is one and indivisible; its defeat in any part of the world menaces its strength everywhere; that is why democrats the world over supported the recent war. It is the

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duty of every Englishman to denounce American Negro policy as fiercely as Americans denounce British colonial policy ; to do it as frequently ; to make every American he meets conscious that decent men abhor his country for it ; and so, in his small way, to contribute towards the extension of democracy. American Negro policy is one of the darkest blots on the whole history of human civilisation ; it is up to us all to contribute to its removal.

EQUAL PAY

By GERTRUDE WILLIAMS

THE Royal Commission on Equal Pay which reported at the end of last year was precluded by its terms of reference from making any definite recommendations. Its duties were "to examine the existing relationship between the remuneration of men and women in the public services, in industry and in other fields of employment ; (and) to consider the social, economic and financial implications of the claim for equal pay for equal work." Such a task does not lend itself to the making of a series of clear, unconditional statements for the complexity of the factors to be taken into account is so great that practically every word has to be hedged about with provisos and qualifications. This may be the reason why the Report has not been as widely and as fully discussed as it deserves. Many meetings of women's associations have been held to demand the immediate establishment of equal pay in the occupations with which they are concerned and the subject leapt suddenly into the forefront of political controversy during the Margate Conference of the Labour Party ; but the arguments have been pretty much the same as if the Commission had never sat. Those urging that equal pay be granted at once have taken their stand on justice and the only vocal opposition has stressed the heavy financial cost and the danger of inflation entailed in raising the rates of pay of women in the public services at the present time. The social and economic implications which the Commission was asked to explore have been completely ignored.

It is a pity that this is so, particularly just now when the acute manpower shortage is likely to enable women to establish themselves firmly in spheres of work from which they have been excluded ; yet it would be unfair to criticise the Commission for

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failing to give any clear and convincing lead which could act as a guide to policy, for the difficulty is inherent in the problem itself. The existing differences in pay do not spring from any simple or easily recognised cause ; they are bound up, to an extent that the Commission fails to appreciate adequately, with the whole structure of our social organisation.

Popular explanations of women's lower pay, which stress their lower value to the employer and their smaller needs, fall very wide of the mark. It is true that legal regulations prohibit the employment of women at night and beyond a certain maximum number of hours during the day, and that their household responsibilities lead to a fair amount of absenteeism. But Trade Union agreements have laid down a shorter working day for men than the law allows for women, and, though a man can legally be employed at night, the majority of industries are not organised in such a way as to demand it, except in such unusual circumstances as those brought about by the fuel shortage. Moreover absenteeism and bad timekeeping are not unknown amongst men yet nobody would suggest cutting all men's rates in consequence.

What about needs ? It is now generally agreed that men and women, as individuals, do not differ much in their requirements ; perhaps men eat more, but women need more for clothes and lodgings, and both have similar expenses to meet for fares, cigarettes, visits to the cinema, etc. Both again need somebody to cook and clean for them so that, although a man has to maintain a wife out of his income, a woman must pay a mother, sister, or landlady to keep house for her, or else do two jobs to the man's one. But most employed men, it is argued, have children to support and most women have not, and herein lies the explanation of the man's higher pay.

We are so accustomed to thinking of the "normal" or typical family as consisting of father, mother, and dependent children that it comes as something of a shock to realise how large a proportion of the population is not included in such a social pattern. According to the evidence given to the Commission, only just over half of the married men under the age of 65 who are covered by the contributory pensions scheme (the most comprehensive of all the social insurance schemes) have any children at all under the age of 16. If we take the entire adult male population without consideration of marital status, we find that the average number of children under 16 is 0.6, so that the total number of children dependent on the incomes of adult men

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is really very much smaller than we imagine it to be, when we think of the "average" family. The truth of the matter is that we usually fail to take into account the time element in family responsibilities. Most men are responsible for children at some time in their lives, but they do not remain in this position permanently. If we take three children as the average family (a number which is, in fact, too generous) and assume, as is quite likely, that they are born within a period of six or seven years, the complete period of dependency of the family is included within a span of about twenty-one years. The heaviest burden falls on a man's income when all his children are growing up but still at school, and it begins to lessen as the children go out into the world until, finally, his earnings have to bear the upkeep of only himself and his wife. For half of the forty-five years in which he can expect to earn his full adult wage he is likely to have no dependent children at all to support.

But there are other dependants besides children and here the picture is not so clear. Several attempts have been made to calculate the responsibilities borne by various categories of the community, but without results that can be considered anything more than indications of probabilities. The most important investigations were made more than a quarter of a century ago, and since that time the situation has materially altered. On the one hand, the number of people over earning age has greatly increased, but on the other, the social provision for their upkeep has become much more generous. How far the obligation to support aged or invalid relatives falls on women rather than on men seems impossible to determine. The women workers of a family are usually expected to shoulder a good deal of the burden of parents and younger brothers and sisters when their married brothers have young children to care for, but there is no doubt that later the older men, whose children have grown up, take their share of the responsibility and may even contribute more generously because their incomes are larger. As far as it is possible to judge from the available evidence it is probable that the burden falls just slightly more heavily on women than on men, but it certainly cannot be said to compare with the cost of maintenance of children. Children are not only completely dependent, but they remain so for a very long time. Many adults are not entirely dependent on those who care for them, nor do they remain so always for years together. Old parents often have a small income or pension, younger brothers and sisters grow up, invalids recover their health, and so on. The real

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difference between the needs that have to be met out of the incomes of men and women is found in the cost of bringing up children.

If we accept as a fact that, despite wide individual differences, men as a sex have heavier responsibilities for dependency than women as a sex, can we assume that this is the explanation of the differences in rates of pay? The question takes us into the very difficult terrain of wage theory. Why are any wages what they are? Is a worker's wage determined primarily by what it costs him to maintain his standard of living and meet the claims of those for whom he is legally responsible? Or is it payment for the work he has done and an inducement to do one job rather than another? Or does it represent what we think it is right and fair for him to get? If it is the first, how can we explain why a surgeon gets more than a navvy, or a skilled engineer in 1947 draws a bigger wage packet than the same man in 1937? By what criterion is one need greater than the other? Is the surgeon's pay higher because his standard of living is higher or his standard higher because he earns more? The two interact, but there is no doubt that the standard is the result of the pay rather than the other way round.

A wage is a price and like every other price it mirrors the relative scarcity of the supply. As long as we maintain freedom of choice of occupation (and that is one of the freedoms to which we cling most tenaciously), wage differentials are the only means for getting people into jobs where they are wanted and out of jobs where they are not. The changing emphasis of demands and changing techniques of production necessitate a constant shifting in the occupational distribution of the labour force, and wages rise and fall accordingly. Skilled engineers get more now than they did ten years ago, not because their needs have increased or because they now have more children than formerly, but because there is a greatly enlarged demand for their work and it takes a long time to add to the number of trained and qualified men. Their higher wage is simply the result of their greater scarcity.

Wage movements are not, in practice, so starkly economic as this seems to indicate, for there are two factors which influence them. In the first place there is a growing sense of social responsibility which does not allow wages to fall below the minimum which we regard as basic if a man is to fulfil the obligations which society imposes on him; and so by the social security schemes we indirectly establish a rock bottom to all

incomes. No matter how redundant labour might become in any occupation, rates of pay could not sink below this level. In the second place, there are certain conventional elements in most wage agreements. The parties to a collective agreement are not economic abstractions, but ordinary men and women who have grown up in a particular community and whose minds have been shaped by its cultural pattern and its acceptance of what is "right" and "proper" and "reasonable". Neither side begins wage negotiations with a completely blank mind; their ideas of what it would be reasonable to expect are moulded by the conditions to which they are already used. This is well illustrated by the long standing relationship between skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled rates of pay in most industries, which persists long after the functions performed originally by these groups have been fundamentally altered by changes in technique. Alterations do certainly take place if the provocation is sufficiently pronounced, as is shown by the relative rise in the wages of unskilled labour in the two war periods owing to severe shortage of manpower in general; but as most of us take for granted anything to which we are accustomed, both employer and worker assume that what is of long standing is natural. It is in this sense that needs and recognised standards of living have an influence on rates of pay; they slow down the wage movements that would result from purely economic influences, but, though they slow them down, they do not prevent them from taking place eventually.

As far as women are concerned both factors have worked in the same direction and reinforced each other; the conventional idea of what is the right and proper payment for a woman has confirmed the lower rate of pay that reflects the relatively smaller demand for women's labour. For although there is, as far as legal restrictions go, an apparently open field for women, there is (except when the exigencies of war blur it) a fairly clear line of demarcation between the kinds of work women do and the kinds they do not. Apart from the jobs in which great physical strength is needed—and these are rapidly decreasing in number as machinery replaces muscle—this has nothing to do with innate capacity; it is the combined result of the short term of women's industrial life, the opposition of male workers, and the restrictions imposed by social conventions. Practically all women work for wages before they marry; before the war only one in nine did so after marriage; and, as most women marry comparatively young, nearly half of all employed women

were below the age of 25. The transitional nature of their industrial life, and not any lack of ability, keeps them out of that wide range of jobs which require either long training or accumulated experience. These comprise not only the skilled trades, but that large indeterminate area of minor managerial work made necessary by the organisation of large scale production, with its thousands of semi-skilled operatives whose work must be supervised and directed. These are jobs which do not demand skill in the old sense of the term, but rather certain developed personal qualities, which women possess as well as men; but employers are unwilling to upgrade workers who are likely to leave just as they become valuable, and to tell the truth, the women themselves, for whom work is not a career but an inescapable necessity to be given up as soon as "real" life commences, are reluctant to take on the worries and trials of a responsible job.

If, then, in addition to the jobs which require great physical strength and endurance and those few which are prohibited by law, we exclude the skilled processes which demand a long training and the higher grade jobs which involve responsibility and experience, the field of employment is much narrower than appears at first sight. But even in what remains there are restricted areas, because some kinds of work are considered to be "unsuitable" for women. How do we classify these? Mostly by habit, for there is rarely any rational explanation. Even the physical strength test breaks down here for there is a great deal of work, such as heavy charring and home laundry, which everybody agrees to be women's work and which is much more physically exhausting than much of the mechanical work reserved for men. But these conventional ideas, whatever their origin, have remarkable tenacity and long life—as has been well illustrated by the announcement of the London Passenger Transport Board (later reversed under pressure) that they would soon cease to employ women bus conductors despite the general goodwill they had earned during the war for efficiency, good temper, courage, and resourcefulness.

The conventional boundaries change very slowly as a rule. Sometimes there is a frontal attack by men and women who resent the injustice to individuals that is involved, as was the case before the admission of women to the medical profession, but more often it is circumstances which bring about an alteration in frontiers. The first world war greatly widened the area for women's employment and, in view of the serious manpower

shortage with which we are now faced, it is unlikely that women will be ousted from all the new jobs they have taken on during the last few years.

This restriction of scope is not confined to industrial workers but is equally evident amongst middle class women. In the last century governessing was the dumping ground for the unfortunate woman who had to fend for herself; then, as general education improved, thousands of girls found it worth while to take the short extra training that admitted them to the rapidly expanding clerical and distributive trades, but, even though entry to most of the professions has yielded to the spirited attack of the feminists, the great bulk of professional women have gone into teaching and nursing which provide training at little or no cost to their parents and which offer security of tenure as soon as the training is completed. Middle class parents, like working class parents, and for the same reason, invest their capital in their sons rather than their daughters, and so those professions which demand exceptionally long training or in which the qualified person may need a few years in which to establish himself are not the ones to which the majority of women seek admission.

The upshot of all this is that before the war there were always a large number of women competing for a comparatively limited number of openings with the inevitable result of low pay. As competition for their labour has grown, their pay has increased, as is shown by a comparison of the wages of domestic servants at the beginning of the century and today. Similarly the recent rise in pay and conditions of the nursing profession is due, not so much to a change of heart on the part of the public or the hospital authorities, as to the serious shortage of nurse recruits owing to the competition of alternative employments.

Wages would, no doubt, have risen more rapidly and more uniformly had women been better organised, but the marriage factor is to blame here too in making them poor trade unionists. Would men's trade unions be so strong if nearly half of their members were under 25 and continually moving out of scope? Where women are admitted to an industry in which organisation is already strong, they usually join and abide loyally by the rules, but they do not take much part in its administration nor do they generally take any initiative in forming a union if it does not exist. But many unions have only recently admitted women to membership, with the result that they were first employed on jobs which were not covered by collective agreements and were

regarded as "cheap labour"—a label which it has been as difficult to remove as a dog's bad name. The assumption that women are naturally cheap labour is not confined to rapacious employers; it has been accepted just as wholeheartedly by women themselves, and by the men against whom they compete, for it fits so completely into the social pattern of a world in which men occupy all the most important positions and enjoy the greatest authority and prestige. The demand for equal pay is not, and never has been, voiced by women workers as a whole; it comes from the small group of middle class women in higher and professional jobs whose work is more often directly comparable to that done by men, who are keenly aware of the individual capacity they bring to it, and who fiercely and justifiably resent the implication of women's general inferiority which is symbolised by the sex differentiation in rates of pay.

What next? The Commission recognises that pay is only indirectly and remotely related to needs and that, even if it were more closely connected, the differentiation between the pay of the sexes is a very imperfect method of providing for family responsibilities. But they argue that such differentiation is the only practicable method of getting as close an approximation as possible to equality of living standards between persons working at the same jobs. This is a very odd argument. Granted that the proper maintenance of a family is a matter in which society as a whole has a concern, it is difficult to see why the burden should be laid on the shoulders of the women who happen to be working in the same occupation as the father. The sensible course would surely be to recognise that wages are, by and large, payment for work and to provide for family responsibilities by some fairer method which falls on the whole community. It could be done by more generous family allowances, by the provision of more abundant facilities in kind—free education, maintenance, school meals, etc.—and by more generous income tax rebates for dependants.

Suppose we agree that justice demands the rate for the job, could equal pay be established and what would be the results? As an act of policy it could be established only in those spheres of employment in which the Government has the deciding voice, for over industry and commerce as a whole wages are the subject of collective agreement. As a matter of fact, the area of overlap in industry is comparatively small; for the most part men and women work in different sections and even where they seem to be in competition they are not usually engaged on identical

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machines. Most male trade unionists have now learned by bitter experience that, for their own protection, it is essential to insist that women employed on the same jobs as men should get the same rate, but often enough this apparent equality is illusory, for the women are generally given the less paying parts of the work.

Far and away the most effective means of raising women's pay would be to remove more of the conventional barriers to the scope of their employment, but in the past new openings have mostly been made because of the temptation to use a supply of cheap labour, and, if there was general insistence that women should always receive the same pay as men, there is little doubt that a large number of employers would not feel the same inducement to overcome their traditional prejudices. Here is the dilemma. On the one hand sex differentiation in pay almost certainly increases the number of occupations open to women and thus sends up the wages of women workers as a whole, but it is unjust to the individual woman who does the same work as a man for less pay; on the other hand, equal pay probably bolsters up men's conventional reluctance to try women on new jobs, so that those who are employed are more justly treated, but fewer are engaged, and the probable effect would be to lower the wages of those engaged in exclusively women's jobs by raising the number competing for employment there.

The problem is entirely different in such occupations as teaching, the Civil Service, and Local Government. At present the employing bodies justify sex differentiation in rates of pay by the principle of "fair relativity", i.e., the rates fixed are intended to represent what would be paid to persons of comparable quality and attainments by good employers outside the government sphere. This principle could be abandoned as an act of policy if the Government so decided, and the case for doing so is particularly strong as the men and women in these professions do exactly the same jobs. In the Civil and Local Government services there is no distinction at all between the kinds of work undertaken, and in teaching, though men are usually employed to teach boys and women to teach girls, both have the same qualifications, training, and duties, and there are, in addition, a considerable number of jobs that are open to both alike. Many men fear that equality of pay would tend to their disadvantage, since authorities, faced with the heavy expense of bringing women's rates up to those of men, might be increasingly reluctant to allow any further rise in standards of remuneration.

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In the teaching profession, where women so greatly outnumber men (in the primary schools the ratio is two to one), this is a very real danger and it is difficult to see how it could be avoided unless the community comes to value education much more highly than it has done in the past. If the level of pay were thus kept down, the effect would be to lower the attractiveness of the profession to men of ability, so that the standard of boys' education might suffer seriously.

In the Civil Service there is little probability that such a danger would have to be faced. The proportion of women is comparatively small and despite the lifting of the marriage ban it is unlikely that any very large number of women will exercise their right to retain their jobs when they begin to raise a family. Here the problem may be that too large a proportion of able women will be attracted into the service to the detriment of other professions, for, even as things are now, the woman civil servant draws considerably higher pay than a woman of similar qualifications and ability in other occupations. To some extent this is true of the majority of male civil servants too; since the only respect in which the pay of the government official compares unfavourably with that of other professions is the very meagre differentiation made between average and exceptional ability. It is only those in the very highest posts whose ability and responsibility receive less remuneration than would be earned in other occupations. For women, whose opportunities in other occupations carrying the same degree of security and chances of promotion are much more limited, the effect of the rise in pay to men's rates would undoubtedly increase still further the relative pull of the Civil Service.

Yet when all has been said, one cannot help the suspicion that this discussion is somewhat academic, as the trend of events is set definitely towards equality. The injustice of paying one person less than the other when both are doing identical jobs is so obvious and so deeply resented that a change cannot long be resisted. The demand for equal pay on the part of professional women is not primarily motivated by economic considerations. They would like larger incomes—who wouldn't?—but the fundamental reason for the claim is resentment of the stigma of sex inferiority which the different rates imply. The insistence on equal pay is principally a demand for full rights of citizenship and that is a claim that cannot be denied whatever the economic pros and cons may be.

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By KINGSLEY MARTIN

ENGELS, the close friend of Karl Marx and co-founder of Marxism, once claimed for Marx a position in sociological thinking comparable with that of Darwin in biology. He was not far wrong. Looking back to-day, we find a large part of what Darwin thought has been outdated by subsequent research. But modern biologists are all Darwinians in the sense that they take the broad factor of evolution for granted. They can make no sensible generalisations about biology except on that basis. In exactly the same way, it seems to me, serious students of history and sociology must be in some degree Marxists; that is, they must accept the broad truth of some of Marx's generalisations, even though they differ on many points and find that the laws he laid down were oversimplified. The central Marxist proposition is that the long-distance trends of history have been determined not by individuals or by ideals but by economic and social forces.

It was this generalisation which Marx had in mind when he claimed that he was a scientist in comparison with the "utopian" socialists. Events could be foreseen; the social investigator, like the natural scientist, could divine the future if he understood enough about the social forces at work. Marx did not himself make the mistake of some of his followers who imagined that because they understood his generalisations about the class war and economic determinism, they therefore were in a position to make detailed prophecies which needed closer knowledge than they possessed or could have possessed.

Let me examine a little more closely this famous generalisation about the economic interpretation of history. The liberal historian is apt to interpret the past in terms of the ideas he thinks important. He may decide that the history of mankind is the story of man's upward striving towards ever greater individual freedom. Marxists say that this is a false interpretation because it assumes that the desire for freedom is in itself the moving force in society. Liberal historians point out, for instance, that the battle for toleration was fought and won in the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, and speak as if belief in toleration was the motive for the Protestant revolt against the Catholic Church. The Marxist replies that these wars, when analysed, prove to have been fought between rival economic and social groups struggling for power; and that

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they ended in some measure of religious toleration, not because people like Montaigne and Milton demanded it, but because Protestants and Catholics, each of whom wanted to destroy the other, failed to do so and had to recognise their special spheres of influence. Religion, moreover, was not the underlying cause of conflict. The religious wars followed naturally on the break-up of the mediaeval peasant community, the ideology of which was Catholic; Christendom gave way to the new nationalism, in which kings claimed to represent national aspirations against the demands of Pope and Emperor. Thus the Reformation was the ideological expression of an inevitable national development due to technical and economic factors, such as the discovery of America and the inventions of printing and gunpowder; these gave a chance to the merchant class in Europe, which, because it had economic power, insisted also on climbing into the political saddle. Britain became a Protestant nation, not because Henry VIII wanted a divorce that the Pope refused him, but because his power rested on his popularity with the new middle class; he cut off the heads of the barons, appointed commoners as his Secretaries of State and ruled with the good-will of a nationalist England.

If a measure of freedom and toleration was won in those struggles, that was because middleclass business men naturally preferred the Protestant faith, which laid stress on individual rights and duties, to the control of the Church, which forbade them to take usury and hampered all the activities of a free market. In the next two centuries, the middle classes steadily gained power and took their conception of freedom to the United States; civil rights were generally extended as the era of free competition developed at the expense of dying feudalism and monopoly.

Now we come to the point at which the difference between the Marxist and the 19th century Liberal is so immediately important for us. According to the Liberal, these middle class freedoms are fostered because men believe them to be good in themselves. According to the Marxist theory, they are precariously based on the fact that in a particular period of society it pays the ruling class to maintain them. When, however, monopoly capitalism leads to a period of contraction, the capitalist class will find itself forced to reduce the worker's standard of living and to withdraw from him those democratic rights which would enable him to resist this process. When the proletariat—the working class which is formed inside capitalism, just as the

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bourgeoisie once developed inside feudalism—becomes more powerful and threatens capitalism, the capitalists will stop at nothing to maintain their ascendancy. This prophecy we have seen fulfilled in our day in Italy, Germany and other countries. In general terms therefore the Fascist danger has always been understood by Marxists, though of course they did not accurately prophesy its nature. What Marx did prophesy was that what he called the “contradictions of capitalism” would result in slumps and booms and poverty in the midst of plenty, and that the time would come when the “class conflict” (*Klassen-Kampf* not *Klassen-Krieg*) would lead to revolutionary upheaval. He believed that in this struggle the international working-class would triumph over international capitalism, and he assumed, far too easily, that the emergence of a working class state would be a true democracy in which political freedom would be genuine because the economic domination of the ruling class would have disappeared.

Let us take a few examples to test this historical generalisation as the basis of prophecy. There are three elements in it. The first, as we have shown, is that ideas are derivative and not in themselves the determining factor in history. Economic determinism does not mean that the individual is powerless to affect events, but that he can only do so within limits. He cannot reverse the stream of history; he can only hasten or retard the flow and possibly, if he is a man of genius, divert its course by some degrees. To be effective, ideas must flow with the current of the age. Secondly, these social forces produce in any form of society an emergent class which struggles against the existing order. If we put this in Marxist terms, there is always “a thesis”, that is, an existing social compromise; an “antithesis”, which is the new concept of the oppressed and struggling class, and a new “synthesis” to be obtained when the existing struggle is resolved. Thus Christendom gave way to the nationalist middle class state, which in turn must yield to the working class state of the future. Thirdly, Marx insists that the course of this struggle is determined by technical advances. For instance, it was only when communications had been improved (note the invention of the mariner’s compass) and when the discovery of precious metals increased the quantity of money and therefore of trade, that the mediaeval peasant economy could be broken up. Such technical changes produced the middle class nationalism of the sixteenth century. In the same way the proletariat could only emerge when the industrial

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revolution in the eighteenth century had forced masses of men into factory life where they formed a new industrial class. To-day, the Marxist argues, new technical changes which give us wireless, aircraft and mass production make collectivist planning and international organisation the inescapable alternative to chaos.

From these generalisations, the Marxists have been able to make many striking prophecies. For instance, in the nineteenth century, when Liberal writers were all assuming that the existing social order would broaden down from precedent to precedent, until “the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,” the Marxist correctly argued that wars would continue as the result of the economic rivalries of national states, and end in proletarian revolutions. As long ago as 1888 Engels wrote to William Liebknecht, foretelling with remarkable accuracy both the military results of the coming war and that it would end, as it did end, with a proletarian revolution. He wrote:—

“... How things will turn out when it actually comes to war it is impossible to foresee. An attempt will no doubt be made to make it a sham war, but that will not be so easy. If things turn out as we would like it, and this is very probable, then it will be a war of positions with varied success on the French frontier, a war of attack leading to the capture of the Polish fortresses on the Russian front and a revolution in Petersburg, which will at once make the gentlemen who are handling the war see everything in an entirely different light. One thing is certain, there will be no more quick decisions and triumphal marches to Paris or Berlin.”

We note that Engels could not foresee the part that Britain and America would play in this war, nor did he know anything about its date. He obviously expected it much sooner than in 1914. But his Marxist outlook, coupled with his special study of military science, produced a prophecy which makes his contemporaries look as blind as bats. Later, Lenin took the Marxist analysis of imperialism a stage further, revived Marx’s insistence on the transitional phase of “the dictatorship of the proletariat” and added that the revolution would result from an organised communist party acting as the “vanguard of the proletariat”. He was able, as a result of this analysis, to make use of the unsuccessful revolution of 1905 in St. Petersburg, and to bring the revolution of 1917 to a successful conclusion.

The limitations of Marxian prophecy were well illustrated

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in the period between the two world wars. Thus Palme Dutt, the most doctrinaire of English-speaking Marxist dialecticians, held in his numerous writings published after 1918 that the next war would be fought between the United States and Britain. According to his Marxist analysis, the two great rival capitalist states had to clash sooner or later, just because they were rivals. But alack for prophecy! The prophets analyse social forces but are incapable of guessing at what point on the graph they will cross. As a result, they cannot tell whether two imperialist powers, like two competitive combines within a state, will continue to fight or will end by joining forces. In the period immediately before the last war, the Marxists thought it unlikely that Britain and France would go to war with Hitler, and expected instead we should join in a capitalist war against Russia. This very nearly happened, as Munich showed. That it did not happen was partly the result of the Soviet Union's own diplomacy. But the rulers of the USSR, with this analysis in mind, feared throughout the whole war that Britain would double-cross them and make a separate peace with Hitler. They imagined, for instance, that the British Government would accept the mediation of Hess, who flew to England to persuade us to make peace with Hitler and join him in the coming attack on Russia. As usual they grossly exaggerated the class feeling and underestimated the strength of national feeling and of *bourgeois* virility. Because the Russians held this theoretical view, they always exaggerated the importance of those groups which were more anti-Soviet than they were anti-Nazi, and their extreme suspicions were displayed in violent outbursts in the Soviet Press against this or that professional anti-Soviet politician, even when he counted for little in England. They assumed, by the same oversimplified analysis, that Anglo-American imperialism would necessarily attack the USSR. To-day they say that this is not inevitable. A slump in America, for instance, may result either in an internal economic chaos which would make America powerless and give the Soviet Union time to repair the ravages of the war and make herself impregnable, or, on the other hand, it may lead American industrialists to solve their economic problem by intensifying war preparation and organising the country on totalitarian lines. Either is possible: so is some other, at present unforeseen, development. We can analyse the trends and guard against the dangers, but not prophesy with certainty.

I can now perhaps summarise my view of the main historical

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theory of Marx. Historians used to ask how far history would have been changed if Cleopatra's nose had been shaped differently. If Cleopatra had not been beautiful, then it is likely enough that Mark Antony would not have been defeated by Augustus Caesar, and the immediate history of Rome would have been different. On the other hand, the Marxist would say, I think rightly, that Rome would still have become an empire because it was ready, economically, politically and technically for dictatorship at home and abroad. Similarly, the forces that broke up the Roman Empire would have been at work inside it, and it would have given way under the dual forces of internal decay and the external pressure of migratory tribesmen.

Or take another illustration of the economic and geographical factors versus the personal and accidental ones. Edmund Burke, it will be remembered, correctly prophesied that the French Revolution would end with a military dictatorship in France. If one can imagine a Burke with a grasp of the "class war", he would also have prophesied Babeuf's proletarian revolt, but he would also have prophesied that no such attempt could succeed until long after the French Revolution which was essentially a middle class rising against feudalism. He would have known that national movements would be strengthened throughout Europe by revolutionary wars, and he could accurately have prophesied that the 19th century would be a period of increasingly powerful national states. But no Marxist, however prescient, could have foretold that the military dictator of France would be a genius of the first rank who would invade Russia, retreat from Moscow and wage war for half a generation against the coalition of other powers, with far-reaching effects upon the whole subsequent history of Europe. All that the Marxist generalisation enables anyone to say is that, Napoleon or no Napoleon, the 19th century was bound to be a period of nationalism and of middle class states, which would themselves be challenged by proletarian upheavals. No-one could have foretold that Russia would be the scene of the first of these proletarian revolutions, or that the atomic bomb would be used first by America and not by Germany. Thus the philosopher-historian, dealing with long sweeps of time, will find a clue in the Marxist analysis and will decide that events are shaped less by human will than people usually imagine. But if he is wise, he will carefully refrain from detailed or short-term prophecy, because the emergence of genius (a separate biological accident) and the

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pace at which the events will develop, are unpredictable.

The ablest Marxist dialectician is comparable with the weather expert who tries to apply his knowledge to the extremely complex atmospheric conditions of the British Isles. He can tell us the seasons; he knows something of the general course of meteorological events. If he has detailed charts and an up-to-date information service, he can even tell us a few hours before the event whether it is going to be wet or fine. But about the thing we most want to know, neither the Marxist nor the weather prophet can pronounce with any accuracy. The weather expert does not know whether it will be wet or fine the day after to-morrow in any particular spot in England, nor can the Marxist tell us whether the social conflict at any particular time or place is going to result in a victory for Fascism or Communism.

Let me push this analysis a little further. It appears to me demonstrably true that there comes a period in capitalist societies when collectivism in some form is inevitable. The conflict in Germany during the great depression of 1930 could not be solved in any other way. Technically, somebody had to plan the economy of Germany. But it depended largely on outside forces whether this planning was done by socialists or by Nazis. The communists assumed, because of their Marxist training, that when this crisis happened in society—when, that is, wealth was concentrated in big monopolies confronted with a vast mass of unemployment and a lack of external markets—that the proletariat would succeed in overthrowing the *bourgeoisie* and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. They even for a time believed that Fascism was a stage that would lead to this conclusion. Perhaps on a long view, since Fascism and the war which resulted from it effectively destroyed the middle class, they were right. But they vastly underestimated the capacity of capitalism to refashion itself on the Fascist model. In other words, they were right about the technical necessity of a planned state economy, but not right in failing to foresee that such planning to abolish unemployment could be done either by socialists in the interests of common people, or by Fascists in the interests of monopolists who would seek to solve their problems by war.

In exactly the same way to-day, it appears abundantly clear that there is no solution of world problems except in One World. That has now become a commonplace. Society is confronted with sheer collapse and anarchy if national states

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continue to play power politics against each other, preparing ever more terrible weapons of destruction and refusing to unite for better distribution of raw materials and to plan a better standard of living for the world. But once again, technically, it seems possible that the problem could be solved either by greater private monopolists or by socialists, and neither I nor anyone else can say for certain which will win or even whether the struggle between the two will reduce our society to so low a level of misery that all these generalisations become irrelevant. The communist would say that even if international Big Business wins in the struggle in this century, the ultimate solution will still be found in the revolt and triumph of the international proletariat. However that may be, it is surely clear that such a monopoly, using all the weapons both of moral propaganda and repression might establish itself for a long period.

It is interesting to examine the views of various utopian writers on this point. Aldous Huxley, looking forward to the triumph of the scientific age in a *Brave New World*, thinks that the monopolists might achieve a stable society by regimenting, pithing, conditioning and propagandising the whole population. Wells, who tried his hand at a number of such prophecies, foresaw a scientific Utopia based on popular consent. But in an earlier book called *The Sleeper Awakes*, he pictured a society in which the monopolists had won; all the workers were kept working underground, and the story described their liberation by revolution.

There is a further consideration which is the basis of most of the confusion now to be seen in discussions between communists and their enemies. The communist, believing that he has a scientific instrument at his disposal, asserts that ultimately the proletariat must win. He bases himself on "historical determinism", and does not argue whether the result will be good or bad. He assumes that what must come will be good. His opponents deny the inevitability of proletarian victory, and assume that it would be bad if it were to be won. I don't myself take either of these views. I think the communist is probably, but not certainly, right in believing that the inherent difficulties of capitalism will lead after many upheavals and great social misery to a socialist world state. But there are many routes to this world state, and it is by no means certain that after the completion of this revolution, those who rule will still have in mind the objects for which their

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followers will have fought and died. For though the communist leader deals in social forces and puts aside moral considerations, his followers are inspired to struggle by their belief that they are fighting for freedom and the betterment of mankind. Too easily the leaders forget that means determine ends. The end is the liberation of the working classes through socialism. But the nature of the socialism achieved is not pre-determined; it can be good or bad. It will in any case be the result of a ruthless fight for power. And power, as we are so often told, has a corrupting influence. The internal developments of the U.S.S.R., in spite of its great achievements, are a terrible commentary on this generalisation.

The more intelligent communist to-day sees that the original Marxian conception of a proletarian revolution, won at the barricades against a dwindling capitalist class, is completely out of date. It was based on the experience of the 1848 risings, when the workers for short periods succeeded in various European capitals in overthrowing their masters. Since then technical changes have been profound. Governments have to-day means of defeating revolution which were not at the disposal of Metternich or Bismarck. Therefore if One World is to be accomplished without wars which devastate our whole planet, revolutions in industrialised countries cannot follow the Russian or classical Marxist pattern.

Stalin is clearly aware of this. In a recent interview with Professor Laski and other Labour leaders in the Kremlin, he freely admitted that Russia had won its revolution by "the hard way", and that the methods necessary in western democracy would be very different. He did not, I think, commit himself to the view that socialism could be achieved by Parliamentary democracy without any revolutionary upheaval, but he fully realised that in the very different conditions of Britain, socialism could not be achieved by the proletariat storming the barricades. In other words, the essential in every western democracy is electoral victory, which gives political power to a socialist government. How far it is able through Parliamentary institutions to overcome capitalist opposition remains to be seen. This problem can to-day be studied best in France, where the communists are the single largest party, but show every disposition to attempt a political revolution in temporary alliance with some groups of their opponents.

To me the result of re-viewing Marxism is clear enough. Marx was right in thinking that technical changes force mankind

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into some form of collectivism and world organisation. In countries where there is no democratic tradition of liberty, the result is likely to be totalitarian socialism. In the West, if civil liberty is to be maintained, the necessary change must be carried out, but the process must conform with national traditions and civilised values. In this sense the end is determined by the logic of history. But the future happiness of mankind depends on the means we employ, and they are largely of our own choosing.

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TRADE UNIONS, WORKERS AND PRODUCTION

By PROFESSOR G. D. H. COLE

CRITICS of Trade Union rules and regulations often speak as if there had been a golden age when every workman went all out to produce right up to his physical capacity, and as if the Trade Unions had brought this golden age to an end—exactly when, they seldom venture to say. The same, or other, critics often speak as if the higher productivity of the United States were due to the absence of Trade Union restrictions among the American workmen, and as if our productivity would speedily catch up if only the brake of Trade Union authority were removed. Neither of these criticisms is founded upon fact. Concerted regulation of output among British workers goes back a long way beyond the development of the Trade Unions in anything at all like their modern form; and it is fully as easy to point to drastic regulations of output among American workers as here—indeed, it is easier, because such regulation is, in certain trades, more openly pursued in America than in Great Britain.

The grain of truth to be found in these criticisms is that the regulation of the amount of work to be done, either directly or by regulating the conditions of employment, can be practised much more easily by slaves (or convicts) or by skilled workmen than by less skilled workers who can be more readily replaced. Slave-labour and convict labour are both notoriously inefficient because neither can be sacked for inefficiency—though the slave can be sold and punished and the convict punished. These penalties have nearly always failed to secure efficient labour, and under many conditions both slaves and convicts have shown a high capacity for regulating by open or tacit convention the amount of work they are prepared to do. With skilled workers the position is of course different, but often the result is much the same. In all sorts of civilisations, and with or without Trade Unions, skilled workmen have shown their ability to fix a 'stint' of work and to insist on conditions of employment, though of course their power to do this has been much greater when and where skilled labour has been scarce than in times of depression and unemployment.

The types of workers who find it hardest to regulate their output or their conditions of work are those who lie between these extremes, and possess neither the 'security' of the slave (or the

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convict) nor the often irreplaceable skill of the trained craftsman. The development of modern industry, in one country after another, has in its earlier stages led to the large-scale employment of factory and other operatives of this easily replaceable intermediate type, and has made it possible both to select by weeding out the inefficient and to hold the threat of loss of employment over most of the rest. Such workers, lacking the close bond of a common skill, and also liable at any time to discharge, have been in a very weak position for any sustained action in concert. They have been in a position to carry on occasional, and sometimes tumultuous, strikes, but not to build up any continuous solidarity, either by way of organisation or by unwritten compact among themselves. For this reason, countries which were developing the factory system usually experienced, in the earlier stages, a situation in which it was easy to drive the workers hard; but in the very nature of things this situation could not last indefinitely.

It could not last, because the factory system, as it developed further, called into being new skilled crafts—e.g., cotton spinning and engineering—which reproduced on a larger scale the conditions of common craftsmanship found earlier in skilled handicraft and workshop occupations. As this came about, the new crafts acquired the capacity, which had attached earlier to the journeyman working for the small master craftsmen of the pre-industrial-revolution system, to regulate their conditions of employment by mutual compact among themselves, so that the employer could not say them nay save in periods of trade depression and even then only in a limited degree. It was not essential to the growth of this capacity that the workmen should be formally organised in Trade Unions, or that the regulations which they imposed should be explicit or written down. Formal organisation could facilitate and extend, but was not necessary to originate, these practices, which arose naturally in men's minds out of the sense of a community of skill exercised in subjection to a common discipline.

These historical allusions are relevant to the conditions of to-day. If it were possible, as some Americans seem to think it, to tie down the Trade Unions with severe legal restrictions, or even altogether to break their power, the effect would not be to abolish concerted regulation of output and of the conditions of employment, except perhaps among unskilled workers. Among the skilled workers it would be to drive them back upon their natural, underlying solidarity as craftsmen, which their ancestors

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possessed before the Trade Unions were heard of—and who shall say whether, thus driven back to more primitive types of response, they would produce more or less than now? This consideration is doubtless more relevant to American than to British conditions; for no one here is seriously proposing a frontal onslaught on Trade Union rights. There is, however, a second consideration, closely related to what I have just said, that is much more pertinent to contemporary British conditions. For it follows from my basic contention that, even if the leaders of the British Trade Unions were to repudiate every regulation that can be regarded as having a tendency to restrict output, such repudiation would not by any means necessarily lead to the disappearance of restriction. Indeed, to the extent to which restriction and regulation of output do exist to-day among the British workers they exist very much less on account of any action taken by the Trade Unions than as a natural and instinctive response of the rank-and-file workers in industry to the circumstances of their employment.

If this is true—as I feel quite sure it is—the morals are important. There are only two practicable ways of getting rid of restrictive practices and of causing collective regulation to take a constructive instead of a restrictive line. One of these ways is that of reintroducing unemployment on a scale sufficient to make a high proportion of the skilled workers (who are the key to the problem) so afraid of the sack that they will not dare to act together; and it would probably be necessary, in order to render this method effective, to make the conditions of unemployment a good deal more deterrent than they are to-day. The other way is that of convincing the actual workers (and not merely the leaders of the Trade Unions) that their welfare and prospects depend on achieving the highest practicable level of output; for if they, or say the more active and intelligent half of them, can be convinced of this, their natural capacity for combined action will be directed towards achieving high output and they will modify their practices as need arises, usually without any formal changes in Trade Union rules or agreements being required.

Of these two methods, the first is for the present entirely ruled out. A Labour Government obviously neither would nor could pursue it; and a Conservative Government would not dare, even if it so wished, to pursue it nearly far enough to render it effective. Indeed, the only kind of Government that could attempt it would be a 'crisis coalition,' such as followed

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the debacle of 1931; and it is doubtful how far even such a Government would venture nowadays to go—say, in a crisis ensuing upon the using up of the American Loan. At all events, no policy of this kind is on the cards to-day, and for the purposes of this article I need not discuss it further.

There remains, then, only the alternative of convincing the workers, or at least enough of them to leaven the entire lump. This, let me say again, is a very different matter from convincing the Trade Union leaders; for, however fully these might be convinced, they would not in practice follow any policy inconsistent with the convictions of their followers. Nay more, they could not do so; and many of them would regard it as inconsistent with their representative function to admit that they were convinced, even if they were, unless they felt pretty sure of carrying the bulk of their members with them. This, of course, is not meant as a denial that the leaders of the Trade Unions can help a great deal in influencing their members; my point is that, somehow, the consciousness of the need must reach the main body of the workers—and not *only* their leaders—if any real results are to be achieved.

But, it may be said, I have been assuming throughout the foregoing argument that there are restrictions on output which need to be removed—restrictions, I mean, among the workers, for I am not now discussing capitalist restrictionism, of which I could have plenty to say if that were my present theme. Yes, I have been assuming just that; but I do not want to be misunderstood. I am sure that the main restrictions on productivity which exist to-day among the workers are *not* laid down in any Trade Union rule or regulation, do not arise out of any formal Trade Union action, and are not removable by any mere change in the terms of collective agreements or by the adoption of agreed resolutions on the matter by Trade Unions and employers' associations. No doubt, there are formal Trade Union regulations or terms of collective bargains that do restrict output by checking the introduction of improved methods of production; but I doubt if these are either very numerous or nearly as important as the restrictions that are nowhere written down or formally prescribed—restrictions of which, in many cases, the very workers who practise them are not conscious, or are barely conscious, because they arise naturally, without any need for awareness that they are being imposed. Let us recognise, to begin with, that the present industrial situation is highly conducive to this type of unconscious, or

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half-conscious, restriction. Where work is frequently held up by shortages of essential materials or components; where the supply of power is liable to serious interruptions; and where machinery is old and tends to break down more than normally, the effect is not to cause the ordinary person to make the very most of such chances as he does get, but is rather to breed slack habits and to induce a shrugging of shoulders which amounts to a repudiation of personal responsibility for poor results. Wherever conditions such as these exist, there will be an almost irresistible tendency to set the work target low; and, when it is set low, even the efficient employer or manager may well be helpless, if he can neither use the power of the sack nor remedy the shortages and inefficiencies which arise from causes beyond his control. Of course, inefficient management can, and often does, make the situation very much worse; but the point I am trying to put is that even efficient management is sorely handicapped in eliciting a response when it is impossible, owing to external factors, to keep up a steady and continuous flow of production.

I am far from suggesting that to-day in most industries the pace of work is any lower than one would expect it to be under the prevailing conditions, or that the main body of workers is not doing its best to respond to the national need by giving a fair day's work. Indeed, I am surprised that it is generally as high as it appears to be. What I am saying is that the conditions which prevail in the factories are such as to make even a good response by the individual workers ineffective in many cases and such as to require a special collective effort to overcome the unavoidable handicaps under which production is labouring in face of shortages and worn-out or obsolete equipment.

If shortages and plant inefficiencies are unavoidable—as they are in all too many instances for some time to come—it becomes vitally important to 'plan,' not merely by making overall plans for whole branches of production, but by bringing labour, materials, and capital equipment together in the right relative quantities at particular production points. We are seeing what happens when this is not done in the current experience of the building industry. If housing contracts are authorised so as to require in all more materials than can be made available, output per man will be low, not only because men will be standing idle for part of the time, but also because this standing idle will react on their productivity while they are at work. The very same thing is occurring to-day in a great many manufacturing

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establishments because of shortages of fuel, or again because some materials or components are in arrears of delivery, or because the labour force, or the available machinery, is lop-sided.

It may be said that such deficiencies are for the present largely unavoidable, and that accordingly nothing can be done. But in truth a good deal can be done by better and more realistic planning, which involves cutting the cost of production according to the cloth. Moreover, given this improved planning (but not without it), a great deal can be achieved if only the workers can be induced to see the real facts. The facts, however, plain as they may appear to the economist or to the financial expert, are still remote from the consciousness of the ordinary man, be he worker or manager or merely 'man in the street.' Any of these could see, in wartime, that the prospects of victory—and even of national survival—depended on getting the highest possible output and on welcoming every recruit to industry who could contribute to the national effort. It calls for much more imaginative insight to realise that Great Britain's prospects of economic survival now depend on sending abroad a great many things we would much sooner keep for consumption at home, and for still more to realise that these goods for export have to be produced at falling costs if British industries are to hold and to improve their place in the world market. Hitherto, it has been practicable to sell almost anything that could be produced, no matter at what price; and inevitably such a situation has resulted in rising profits at a time when wage-increases have been held deliberately in check in order to avoid too great a surplus of purchasing power at home. In this situation an exhortation to produce more is apt to look, to the worker, like a trick designed to persuade him to swell his employer's profits without getting anything extra for himself; and of course this is largely the direct result, though much of the effect is cancelled by high taxation of incomes on the one hand and on the other by subsidies in aid of really necessary purchases. The workman is not easily brought to relate these secondary readjustments to his own situation, or to understand that, in the final resort, his own standard of life is bound to depend on his success, in conjunction with his employers, in offering goods for sale at attractive prices in exchange for indispensable imports. Nor can he be made to understand this unless the Government's spokesmen both talk to him directly—and to some extent over his leaders' heads—in perfectly plain terms and give him clear indications that they have confidence in him and are asking not

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merely for his acquiescence but also for his positive collaboration in organising to achieve the required result.

It was a sad mistake that, when the war ended, Joint Production Committees, instead of being set up promptly in the industries that were being reopened or expanded, were allowed to run down in many of the establishments in which they had been most successful during the war. For the Joint Production Committee, however much it may be disliked by many employers and managers who are eager to return to the 'good old times,' is the indispensable instrument for securing high output under the conditions of to-day and tomorrow. With labour, and especially skilled labour, in short supply, and likely to continue so for some time to come, it is quite out of the question to drive the workers to higher output by the threat of the sack. Even if there were a surplus of workers, instead of a shortage, in the essential trades, the new social security measures would make the threat of discharge a great deal less formidable than it used to be. Under present-day conditions, political and economic, no one can *drive* the worker to increase his output or to abrogate restrictive practices against his will. He cannot be driven, but he can be persuaded, if only the approach is made to him directly, in human terms, and is coupled with the offer of responsibility and of some measure of freedom in determining how the response is to be made. Because this is the only way, it is most regrettable that Sir Stafford Cripps, in his recent utterances, has chosen rather to lay stress on the incapacity of the workers for industrial self-government than to encourage such capacity as they do possess; for however limited this capacity may be, it is the only solid foundation on which greater efficiency can be built and the only road by which labour restrictionism can be successfully by-passed.

For—let me say again—the roots of labour restrictionism lie not in Trade Union rules and regulations, though these are sometimes important outgrowths, but in states of mind. These states of mind are bred, fundamentally, much less out of class-war notions of capitalist exploitation than out of a natural and by no means reprehensible desire on the worker's part to set limits to the attempt to drive him too hard, or to compel him to speed up to the point of danger to life or limb or of shoddy workmanship, or, as he himself regards it, to the point of degrading his craft status. These motives, long antecedent to the rise of Trade Unionism in anything at all like its modern forms, have been

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powerfully reinforced in our own generation by the prevalence of unemployment and by the rapid growth of restrictionism among employers as a protection against the unfavourable consequences of competition in a limited market. The effect has been to set a slowish pace as the norm, not only for a good many workers but for many managers as well; and the temporary abrogation of the limits on production during the war, being felt as due to abnormal conditions, was followed by a strong reversion to pre-war practices as soon as the war emergency was felt to be at an end. Everyone was tired; and it was natural in a number of trades to fall back to a pace set by the unhappy economic experience of the inter-war years.

I do not at all mean to suggest that, to-day, most workers are consciously slacking or failing to do a fair day's work. This is certainly not the case. But I know from my own experience of team-work as well as from my observation of others that the speed at which an organisation requiring close collaboration among a number of people works is determined not so much by the effort which each individual is consciously prepared to make as by the spirit pervading the organisation as a whole. If the spirit is right, much more gets done, even if no individual is actually working any harder, or at any rate feels any more tired at the day's end. The reason for this is that, when the spirit of harmonious cooperation is present, there is ever so much less waste of effort—or of temper, which is even more wearing. If this collaborative spirit can be again aroused, as in many establishments it was aroused during the war, there will be not only a direct improvement in output, but also a readiness to interpret customs and regulations in a liberal spirit and to modify them wherever their literal enforcement can be shown to put real obstacles in the way of higher and less costly production.

This change of spirit cannot be brought about, under either public or private administration of industry, unless the worker can be made to feel that he is being really trusted and taken into working partnership, and not merely cajoled. To take a concrete example, the concession to the miners of the five-day week is a fine gesture of confidence, too long delayed; but it will not get the nation more coal unless it is followed up by a real concession of trust to Pit Committees, in direct touch with conditions in each separate colliery, and not merely to national and regional bodies on which the rank-and-file miners are but remotely represented. The difficulty, of course, is that this notion of trusting the miners is so novel to many colliery

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officials that they will be hard put to it to act up to it even if the National Coal Board gives them the correct lead. This same difficulty presents itself in every branch of industry, and is by no means exorcised simply by transferring the industry to public ownership and control; for it will have to be administered mainly by the same individuals whoever owns it, because nobody else possesses the requisite technical competence. There is no way at all of avoiding this difficulty, though it can of course be made much smaller by wise and imaginative behaviour among the people at the top, and by the giving of a clear lead by the Government in terms readily intelligible by the ordinary man or woman.

As for the rules that do obstruct higher production, most of these will be modified fast enough if the spirit of the workshops can be aroused in the right way. These rules fall, broadly, into four groups.

(1) *Rules against piecework or other forms of 'payment by results.'* These are most important in the building industry, where the best means of overcoming them is to ensure the prompt and regular arrival of materials and components, so as to avoid recurrent stoppages of work. They are no longer very important in most other industries, except where the workers have grounds for the belief that increases of output under piecework inducements will be taken unfair advantage of for cutting wages. Reasonable guarantees against such practices are usually effective, except where employers make the mistake of devising fancy schemes of 'payment by results' which it is nearly impossible for the ordinary worker to understand. Such schemes are fortunately a good deal less in fashion than they were a generation ago.

(2) *Rules regarding the operation of machines, limiting either the number of machines to be operated by a single worker or the types of labour to be used on particular machines.* Rules of these types are by no means wholly obstructive: they are sometimes of great value in protecting craft standards and in ensuring a continual supply of properly trained skilled workers. They can, however, easily become out of date as a result of technical development, and there is a tendency to cling to them whenever the workers concerned are in fear of a future shortage of jobs. The better assured the workers can be that the policy of maintaining full employment is seriously meant, the easier will it be to get unreasonable rules of these types altered, especially if, in each establishment affected, the workers are taken fully into the

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management's confidence, and shown both the necessity for the changes and the measures to be taken to obviate any adverse effects.

(3) *Rules limiting the number of apprentices, or putting obstacles in the way of the promotion of workers not formally apprenticed to skilled jobs which they are capable of doing efficiently.* Rules of these types are to some extent necessary and desirable in order to check the misuse of juvenile labour and to protect craft standards. Their abuse is largely a by-product of the fears of unemployment, and to some extent of a fear that special training schemes may be used as means of introducing cheap or blackleg labour. The nature of inter-war training schemes designed for unemployed workers at a time when the total demand for labour was short of the supply gave some warrant for these fears; but they are less felt to-day, and will be felt less still in proportion as the Government's ability to maintain a high level of employment comes to be more widely believed in.

(4) *Rules directly limiting the quantity of work to be done.* These, despite a widespread belief to the contrary among uninformed persons, are so rare as to be almost negligible. The notion of the 'darg' or 'stint' was widespread in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (and still earlier), but it is quite uncharacteristic of Trade Unionism to-day. What does exist in not a few factories is an informal and often unexpressed understanding of what constitutes a 'fair day's work'; and such understandings, as I have said, can be broken down only by creating a different spirit in the workshops to which they apply, and not by any formal agreement between employers and Trade Unions, or between Trade Unions and the Government.

In sum, then, there are a number of Trade Union practices which hamper industrial efficiency—paralleled by a number more on the employers' side. But these Trade Union practices are relatively unimportant: what really matters is that there is no adequate feeling in the factories in favour of reaching the highest possible level of efficiency, and no possibility, to-day, of increasing output per manhour, in the absence of this feeling, by driving the workers harder under the spur of the old methods of capitalist discipline. The only sensible course is to consult the workers in the workshops (and not merely *via* their Trade Union leaders) to the fullest possible extent, and not only to consult them, but to make it clear to them that their future standards of living depend on their own efforts, and that they

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are being *trusted*, and not simply exhorted, to make the requisite response.

I was correcting the text of this article when it was announced, in May 1947, that the Employers and the Trade Unions, through their Joint Advisory Council, had agreed to recommend the revival and extension of Joint Production Committees over the widest possible field, and that the Government, in acting on this proposal, would urge industries to provide for the representation of technicians and scientific workers as well as of the 'management' and of the rank and file workers on the Committees. The Minister of Labour, Mr. Isaacs, in announcing this new policy, stressed the point that as the Joint Production Committees are not designed to deal with matters which are handled by collective bargaining between employers and Trade Unions there is no good reason for constituting them to represent two 'sides' and two 'sides' only. The representatives of 'management,' he pointed out, sit on the Committees to represent not capital but management as a function, and there is every reason for bringing the technicians, who have hitherto seldom been adequately represented, into association with the Joint Production Committees in order to secure the fullest mutual understanding. The technician, as well as the manager, is apt to think of the problems of production mainly in terms of engineering, and to ignore or belittle the human element unless the actual persons who are required to carry out his plans are in a position to put their case before him at the stage of planning and preparation as well as when the plans are actually being put into effect. It is to be hoped that the fullest possible use will be made of the Joint Production Committees and that both employers and Trade Unions will do their best to afford them the widest possible scope. This will no doubt involve some problems concerning the right relations between Joint Production Committees and Shop Stewards Committees in a single works, but these problems have arisen already in a good many instances and the means of tackling them successfully are already known, though by no means generally practised.

BOOK REVIEWS

ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Edited by FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX (Prentice-Hall, New York. 637 pp.)

WE are living in the age of the administrative State. This applies to the United States no less than it does to Britain or to any other developed country, regardless of the extent to which its public policy leans in the direction of Socialism or Capitalism. If anyone doubts this he should consider the growth of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which was established in 1862. In 1905 its work could be carried on by 5,000 officials. By 1939, its functions had expanded so greatly that the Department required 82,000 officials, or sixteen times as many. In the light of this situation it is scarcely possible to overestimate the need for continuous and systematic study being given to the science and art of public administration.

The aim of the present book is to analyse, summarise and interpret recent American experience in this field. For this purpose Mr. Morstein Marx has assembled an able team of contributors who combine academic training with practical experience. They all either hold or have held teaching or research appointments in Universities; and they have all had the advantage of engaging in responsible administrative work. Their consistency of outlook and the care with which the book has been edited make it more than a mere collection of essays.

The first part of the book is devoted to The Role of Public Administration. It contains chapters showing the growth of public administration and its rise as a subject of study. Here we get a glimpse of the immense amount of research which has taken place in this branch of knowledge across the Atlantic. Professor Viég then disposes vigorously of some of the nonsense which is constantly talked and written about bureaucracy. Mr. Don Price analyses the essence of democratic administration in terms of the relationships between legislative and executive, between administrative agencies and the public, and between Departments. Mr. Marx then concludes Part I with a disquisition on the social function of public administration. In this he is concerned to reconcile the "American system" with the Service State, whose existence all the contributors regard as inevitable.

On the eve of the outbreak of World War II, Mr. Marx points out, the U.S. had long ceased to rely exclusively on private enterprise and had become a mixed economy in which both the private and the public sectors fulfilled essential tasks which were largely complementary. "It was apparent that a decisive weakening of the public sector would merely restore earlier conditions of social and economic vulnerability which today no other democratic nation in the world is willing to tolerate. On the other hand, all too many of us are still captives of obsolete slogans and stereotypes which depict the service state as a parasite feasting on the body of the 'American System'. This fundamental contradiction, more than anything else, accounts for the fickle climate of opinion in which the service state operates."

All this is really preliminary to Part II, which deals with Organization and Management. Professor John D. Millett opens with two excellent chapters in which he discusses, first, planning and administration and, secondly, working concepts of organization. Professor Millett has the

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good sense to relate planning activities to the question of planning personnel. This leads him to inquire not only into the qualities required for successful planning but also into the position which planning and planners should occupy in the administrative organization. "We should," he observes, "remember that planning is a management function; it is a technique, a method, an attitude. It is not some special body of knowledge."

The peculiar position of the Chief Executive at all levels of American government is well brought out in another chapter by Professor Viëg. The division between the legislative and the executive under the American Constitution is, as one would expect, a theme which frequently recurs through the book. Mr. Viëg emphasises the weakness of the Cabinet in the Presidential system and urges that the President should strive as part of any reorganization "to make greater use of his underdeveloped Cabinet." He prophesies that the President who first exploits the collective potentialities of the Cabinet will make an outstanding contribution to American public administration. Mr. Morstein Marx makes a similar point in his ensuing chapter on the Departmental system. The meetings of the Cabinet, it appears, are mainly occupied with summaries of developments presented by the President or with Departmental items brought forward by individual members. They seldom grapple with matters of wide general interest to the whole administration. Nor can this be done until an effective secretariat is provided for the Cabinet.

The non-departmental agencies have proliferated in the United States on an even more lavish scale than in Britain. Mr. James W. Fesler deals with the more general problems raised by the creation of numerous independent regulatory bodies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, etc. A large though varying degree of independence has been conferred on organs of this type mainly in order to keep them outside the range of the President's power. Public opinion often supports this tendency "as a means of bringing judge-like wisdom, balance and insight" into the process of regulating business and industry. Mr. Fesler and some of his colleagues think that too high a price has been paid by the public for independent Commissions, particularly on account of their reluctance to display vigour in administration.

Professor Key follows with an essay on Government Corporations, which figure as abundantly in the American scene as do public corporations in the British setting. Here again the writer objects to the fiscal and other aspects of independence which government Corporations enjoy. The rise of the public corporation, observes Professor Key, reflects the difficulties that surround responsible administration in the settled forms of the departmental system, and especially those which arise from the general controls exercised by the Bureau of the Budget and other supervising bodies. In his view, however, the way to overcome these difficulties is not through corporate autonomy but by giving to the regular departmental machinery a fuller recognition of the need for "creative freedom of public management buttressed by full responsibility."

In a later chapter on legislative control Mr. Key remarks that in the independent regulatory commission there occurs "the most striking splintering of administration by legislative action." In consequence of their exclusion from the Presidential power such bodies are supposed to

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be responsible to Congress, but in point of fact they are responsible to no one, since Congress is unable to exercise effective supervision over administration.

The weakness of the Congressional system emerges irresistibly from the volume under review. Congress, in its relations with the Executive, is induced by jealousy of the Presidential power to break up administrative structure and public policy into fragments rather than to foster integration. "All in all," declares Mr. Key, "the legislative forces playing on the administrative structure contribute to disintegration in management"; while Professor George Graham in a chapter on the essentials of responsibility, refers to the "suicidal tendencies" to be observed within the legislature at Washington. He criticises the allocation of committee chairmanships and other controlling positions at the Capitol on the basis of seniority and deplors the inability of the Assembly to control its committees. It is clear beyond doubt that Congress, as at present constituted, is wholly unfitted to discharge the functions which are required of the supreme legislative body; that it is far inferior to the executive and judicial arms of the Federal government; and that, unlike them, it has failed to advance during the 20th century in organization, quality of personnel or public spirit. Unfortunately there is reason to believe that some of the most serious defects of Congress do not arise from extraneous causes but have their roots deep in the Constitution itself, which makes radical change both difficult and unlikely.

Part II of the book is by far the most important and contains its core and substance. Part III, entitled Working Methods, involves a sharp descent to less essential matters which are dealt with on a more trivial plane. The chapters which it contains on the formulation of administrative policy, government by procedure, the tasks of middle management, the art of supervision, administrative self-improvement, morale and discipline are unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, they are often conceived in terms which are more appropriate to a training manual or handbook for practical administrators rather than a treatise for students of government. Second, they lack precise content. Nothing is more dreary and unilluminating than discussions about administrative practice which is conducted "in the air" without reference to actual situations.

In the fourth and last part some of the lost ground is recovered. This part deals with Responsibility and Accountability. Professor Graham contributes an interesting chapter on the essentials of responsibility. Mr. Don Price in "The Judicial Test" disposes of the legal critics of administrative adjudication a shade too lightheartedly and also condemns in sweeping terms the new Administrative Procedure Act. Is this not somewhat premature? Mr. Mandell writes on personnel standards. A chapter on fiscal accountability by Mr. Harvey Mansfield concludes the book.

On the whole, despite the unevenness which is unavoidable in a composite work of this kind, the book is a notable contribution to the science of public administration. If a revised edition is called for one would like to see some attention given to such matters as the strategy of administration; intelligence, research and public relations services; and establishment functions. Room might be found for these in place of some of the present chapters in Part III.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

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THE ANATOMY OF PEACE. By EMERY REVES. (Allen & Unwin. 252 pp. 7s. 6d.)

WAR, SADISM & PACIFISM. By EDWARD GLOVER. (Allen & Unwin. 292 pp. 9s. 6d.)

PEACE & THE PUBLIC: A STUDY IN MASS-OBSERVATION. (Longmans. 58 pp. 2s. 6d.)

IT is an instructive, though melancholy, experience to read Dr. Glover's book immediately after *The Anatomy of Peace*, or vice versa. The beliefs and arguments of each are in flat contradiction with those of the other. Each believes in a single cause of war and therefore that the only way to eliminate war is to eliminate the cause; but the two causes are poles asunder and each has the most abysmal contempt for any one who does not share his beliefs, his analysis, and his nostrum. Dr. Glover believes that the cause of war is psychological; that behaviour is not conditioned by external factors but internal (mental patterns); that the psychological cause of war is to be found, not in the conscious, but the unconscious, part of the mind, in the "primitive infantile phases of mental development"; that the cure of war must be sought in psycho-analysis. Dr. Glover is himself a psycho-analyst. Mr. Reves believes that the cause of war is institutional; that behaviour is conditioned by external factors; that the cause of war is to be found in the institution of the sovereignty of states in the modern world and in the aggressive nationalism which is the result; that the cure must be sought in federation.

Both books are able and interesting and each makes out about as good a case as possible for an untenable thesis. In each thesis there is probably about 25 per cent of truth and 75 per cent of prejudice, blindness, and muddle-headedness. It is almost certainly true that Dr. Glover's internal (mental) patterns in the unconsciousness and Mr. Reves's external factors relating to sovereignty and nationalism play some, probably a considerable, part in causing war; it is probable that the elimination or modification of either would increase the probability of ensuring peace; it is certain that the fundamental causes of war are not one or even two, but several and complicated, and that only an "expert" like Dr. Glover or an enthusiast like Mr. Reves could be so blind as to see only one and, of course, only one panacea.

Mr. Reves's thesis is, in his own words, "that it is the political *status quo*—the existing system of sovereign national states—that constitutes the insurmountable obstacle to all progress, to all social and economic efforts, that bars all human progress on any lines." He argues, and produces some evidence in support of his argument, that

1. Wars between groups of men forming social units always take place when these units—tribes, dynasties, churches, cities, nations—exercise unrestricted sovereign power.
2. Wars between these social units cease the moment sovereign power is transferred from them to a larger or higher unit.

"From these observations we can deduce a social law with the characteristics of an axiom that applies to and explains each and every war in the history of all time.

"War takes place whenever and wherever non-integrated social units of equal sovereignty come into contact."

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Peace is order based on law and you cannot get law through treaties made for that purpose by sovereign independent states, just as you cannot get collective security by such treaties. You can only get international law and collective security by abolishing the sovereignty and independence of the sovereign independent state, by establishing world government. Q.E.D.

There is, as I have said, a good deal of truth in all this, probably 25 per cent of it is true. But as an analysis of war and peace, it leaves out more than it reveals, and distorts the picture by its incorrigible mental squint. Some of what it leaves out will be found in Dr. Glover. The distortion is particularly noticeable in his treatment of the League of Nations and of the problem of international law. I am all in favour of world-government, but really one must be very, very simple minded to think that it is quite as simple as Mr. Reves makes out.

Turn Mr. Reves upside down and inside out and, hey presto, out steps Dr. Glover complete with psycho-analysis and primitive infantile phases of mental development. His book is an extended version of the original edition, which was published in 1933. The new essays which he has added and which deal with phenomena of the period leading to the war and of the war itself are as interesting and as unconvincingly one-sided as the original. I believe Freud to have been a man of genius who made discoveries of profound importance regarding the nature of the human mind; many of his psychological and some of his social hypotheses seem to me to be undoubtedly true. Unfortunately many of his disciples, practising analysts, anthropologists, and those who profess to apply psycho-analysis to politics or literature, by the catholicity of their arrogance, destroy practically every possibility of learning how usefully to apply the new knowledge to the lives and institutions of ordinary man. Dr. Glover is a good example. There is, I repeat, a high probability that his thesis is partially true, that internal (mental) patterns in the unconsciousness—primitive infantile phases of mental development—play a considerable part in conditioning international society for war and in causing the outbreak of war. But there is no proof at all—not even the shadow of an argument of proof—for Dr. Glover's thesis that the unconscious mechanisms are the only really important factors in the causing of war. Dr. Glover continually reminds us that he, unlike most people who write about war and peace, is a scientist. As a psycho-analyst, he is no doubt a scientist, but as an investigator of history and social behaviour and institutions he never even attempts to apply the methods of science. For instance he does not define his most crucial terms. For the purpose of his investigation and argument, it is essential that he should know exactly what he means by such terms as "war psychology" and "peace psychology," of "war preparedness" and "peace preparedness," but there is no attempt to give them anything but the vaguest and most fluid meaning. Secondly, there is no attempt ever to consider facts which *prima facie* are inconsistent with his own beliefs. None of the facts brought forward by Mr. Reves for instance in support of his thesis are ever dealt with by him, except with the arrogant contempt of superficial ridicule. Yet what is Dr. Glover's explanation of the immunity of Germans, French, and Italians, when called Swiss in Switzerland, to "war psychology" and war, as compared with Germans in Germany, French in France, and Italians in Italy? Do the primitive infantile phases of mental development work differently among the Alps? And even in his own field of psychology

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Dr. Glover does not display the scrupulousness or humility of the true scientist. He makes *ex cathedra*, categorical statements for which he gives and has no evidence. For instance, the following which he prints in italics: "As far as unconscious mechanisms are concerned, experience shows that under ordinary circumstances these are not modified." Finally, a word should be said about the unconscious flavour of Dr. Glover's polemics: it is remarkable that a psycho-analyst should so obviously show pleasure in the conviction that every one is hopelessly wrong (except himself) about the causes of war and that therefore war will continue.

The Mass-Observation Report was the result of an investigation undertaken last year for The New Commonwealth. It followed the usual Mass-Observation lines and investigated the public's attitude to the atomic bomb, UNO, the next war, and kindred matters. Here, obscured by reason and consciousness, is the raw material of what ought to be Dr. Glover's scientific investigation; no doubt, he will find that it confirms everything which he believes. And so, no doubt, will Mr. Reves.

LEONARD WOOLF.

THE COMFORTS OF UNREASON: A Study of the Motives behind Irrational Thought. By RUPERT CRAWSHAY-WILLIAMS. (Kegan Paul. 206 pp. 12s. 6d.)

A NUMBER of books have appeared in recent years of which perhaps the best examples are *Thinking to Some Purpose* by the late Miss Stebbing and *Straight and Crooked Thinking* by Dr. Thouless, setting out what may be called the logic of error, that is, the structure of fallacious reasoning. This is not the object of Mr. Crawshay-Williams' book. He is concerned rather with the psychological analysis of the motives which lead men to irrational beliefs. In this respect his study resembles that made on a larger scale by Pareto. Pareto sought to lay bare what he called the 'residues,' that is, the various ways in which the ultimate drives or impulses unconsciously affect belief and action; and the 'derivations,' that is, the various ways in which erroneous thinking is made plausible and acceptable. Mr. Crawshay-Williams attempts something similar under the headings of the motives for irrationality and the methods of irrationality. Unlike Pareto he makes use of modern psychology, though he does not pretend to go deeply into the refinements of psychological theory. The motives he sets out have a certain resemblance to Pareto's residues though the names he gives them are more self-explanatory. Thus, for example, the desire to understand, the longing for certainty is one aspect of Pareto's residue of combinations and is regarded by both of them as supplying the drive for both irrational and rational thought. What Mr. Crawshay-Williams calls the desire to feel good, the desire to conform, and the desire to have the approval of the herd are part of Pareto's residue of sociability. The desire for excitement corresponds in part to the residue of activity; the desire for self-assertion to the residue of the integrity of the individual. Mr. Crawshay-Williams's analysis of the ways in which these 'desires' tend to distort thought is undoubtedly very telling and his examples are always interesting and illuminating.

Under the 'methods' of irrationality Mr. Crawshay-Williams stresses the tendency to select those parts of the available evidence which suit our

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hidden impulses, the tendency to over-simplify by the adoption of what he calls 'comfortable concepts,' the tendency to reify or hypostatise abstractions, the tendency to emotional suggestion, and, above all, the tendency to indulge in self-deception and rationalisation. He might have mentioned others, for example, the readiness to generalise from a few instances when these happen to fall in with our hidden desires. Here again his treatment is reminiscent of Pareto. This is not surprising since both are concerned to disclose the hidden sources of prejudice and sophistication and neither claims to be exhaustive.

Mr. Crawshay-Williams's analysis of the irrational elements in popular thought is carried out with insight and good humour and will be found by many convincing. On the other hand, his attempt to apply the same methods to the motives which inspire philosophers is not so successful. It is easy to impute to system-makers the desire to find comfort in a unifying formula and no doubt in many instances the formula is too easily found. Nevertheless, the logical value of the formulae will not be shaken by a psychological study of motives for which there is in most cases no real evidence and which in any case is strictly irrelevant. Our author himself seems to sympathise with those philosophers who insist that the proper business of philosophy is to analyse the meaning of words. A sceptic applying Mr. Crawshay-Williams's methods might say that this preoccupation with words is only a way of finding comfort by running away from more difficult problems. The method of verbal analysis often provides philosophers with a justification for views which they had in fact arrived at before beginning their analysis and the sources of which may well be found in Pareto's residues or Mr. Crawshay-Williams's motives for irrationality. This is especially likely to be the case in dealing with problems of morals. Mr. Crawshay-Williams himself strongly dislikes what he calls the notion of an absolute good, just as Pareto could not bring himself to discuss calmly the theories of humanitarianism and of social progress. I do not pretend to know the psychological origins of this dislike, but it is apt to lead to an excessive readiness to accept relativist theories of ethics and an unwillingness to subject them to the critical verbal analysis to which the opposed theories are subjected. An illustration of this tendency may be given from Mr. Crawshay-Williams's own views on morals. He appears to favour the view that what moral judgments express is an emotion of approval widely felt in a given community for given classes of acts. If this were so, the way to solve moral problems would be to settle the question of fact whether approval is felt or not. If, for example, the people of a given community find that the good consists in the advancement of their own community even if this clashed with the well-being of other communities, they could not be morally condemned unless it could be shown that there was in fact a wider work opinion taking a larger view. This is not the procedure followed by Mr. Crawshay-Williams, who, nevertheless, feels fairly sure that the word "good" means the happiness and well-being of people and "of as many of the people as is practicable," and he roundly condemns as "futile" those who identify the good with the advancement of a particular nation. Perhaps this is the way Mr. Crawshay-Williams satisfies his own desire to feel good.

Many of those who have written on the irrationality of our age tend to argue, as our author would say, "emotively." Mr. Crawshay-Williams is not open to this charge. He writes with balance and restraint and know

when and how not to take himself too seriously. His book will be found very helpful by those who wish to understand the mentality of our age, and, contrary to his own prognosis, it may even lead some people to change their opinions.

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1945. By R. B. MCCALLUM AND A. READMAN. (Oxford University Press. 18s. net.)

Too much must not be asked of a work of this kind. The opening chapter, for example, traces 'the break-up of the coalition.' It is a judicious summary in which party tensions and constitutional procedures are given due weight. 'The country as a whole,' it concludes, 'appeared to be profoundly impressed by the record of the Coalition, and to consider unworthy the party squabbles over its dead body . . . It could scarcely be doubted then, it can no longer be questioned now, that the most ardent and enthusiastic of all [i.e., of all who find in politics their primary leisure interest] were the rank and file political workers of the Labour party who felt for the first time that power was near and within their grasp.' These sentences may be true. But who knows? Were there many people on the Labour side who really thought that 'power was near or within their grasp'? Were they in high party places as well as low? Who knows? . . . One of the difficulties of this book is that matters of opinion stand side by side with matters of observation, and of checked observation, and there is no means of telling, in hosts of cases, which is which. The authors aim at impartiality but the phrases occur on nearly every page which show that though they may have made a good shot at it, they haven't always succeeded. The history of a general election (like most other multiple phenomena?) may be impossible to organise and unite in the documentary way. The longer historical perspective may well give a truer picture than this pseudo-scientific analysis. The former was not the authors' job; but it would be a mistake to think that there is higher value in what they have attempted than in fact is the case. We may as well be blunt about it—this most readable and interesting book is not 'scientific' in any special sense. It reflects

inevitably the authors' limitations and the limitations of the material : and the comparison of constituencies is so slight that it amounts to little more (and it is quite a considerable thing) than an analysis of public material which the Election called forth. It throws light, as the authors intended, on the electoral process rather than the election as a historic event. But it often has these two functions so mixed up that its usefulness is qualified thereby. And this remark applies to the whole book and not merely, or primarily, to its opening chapters to which it is here appended.

The issues of the election are impartially analysed, again just so far as the verbiage, printed and other, makes feasible. There must, of necessity, be a considerable subjective element in such an analysis, but the authors do their work well—as well as may be. But who knows or can know how far the pronouncements affected voters? The chapter on the Election Addresses is novel and interesting—the most original in the book—but it is necessarily descriptive only, and no conclusion appears to emerge from it which throws light on the result of the Election. The Daily Press is examined in the same way, and with the same absence of conclusions. The Universities have a chapter to themselves—their electoral process is visible in a higher degree than that of ordinary constituencies—and it modestly concludes that ‘probably most people would agree that the House of Commons is enriched by the contingent of University members elected.’ The chapter on the Forecasts and the Results contains interesting comparisons with general elections in the past as well as the actual ‘guesses’ made by newspapers and others before the results were declared. The *News Chronicle’s* ‘Gallup’ Poll comes out an easy winner, having been accurate to about 1 per cent; but ‘with this one exception, in 1945, the forecasting can only be described as reaching a very high degree of political ineptitude.’ The chapter on *the Results Examined* is useful: it contains an examination of the extent of the ‘swing’ to Labour, relates it to possible changes in our electoral law, and gives it its topographical setting. A brief chapter of *Conclusion* stresses the return to the two-party system, but, if truth be told, has little else to say. The appendices are interesting. One examines the membership of the new House educationally and occupationally—this is now more fully done than was possible to the authors of this book by N. E. Robertson and J. A. Waites in the *British Journal of Psychology* (January, 1947) and by J. F. S. Ross in *Pilot Papers* (March 1947). Appendix II on the *Business Premises Register* shows that only three seats may have been affected by it. Appendix III on the *Relation of Seats to Votes* is important. It tries to ‘find out how far a

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British election is a gamble, or how far it is based on a system which, though it is arbitrary and unfair to minorities, and though it grotesquely exaggerates majorities, can be guaranteed to produce a particular result, given the proportion of people in the country who support each of the two major parties.' The result is more favourable than might have been anticipated.

H. L. BEALES.

THE LAST DAYS OF HITLER. By H. R. TREVOR-ROPER. (Macmillan. 281 pp. 10s. 6d.)

MR. TREVOR-ROPER, a historian, was entrusted in 1945 with the task of examining all evidence bearing upon what had happened to Hitler. His examination of available documents and witnesses was extremely thorough; the official statement regarding the death of Hitler was based upon his report. His book gives a very full account of the facts and evidence, though it was apparently written before the evidence at the Nuremberg trials became available. He has performed his task admirably and produced a remarkable book, which makes absorbing and horrible reading. It is clear that he has taken great pains to cross-check all material statements of witnesses and, where this is not possible, he informs the reader. He is satisfied himself of the substantial accuracy of the account of events, and, though there are still sceptics regarding the death of Hitler, it seems practically certain that we know the facts and that they are as given in this book by Mr. Trevor-Roper.

The story of Hitler's last day in the bunker below the Foreign Office in Berlin are fantastic melodrama. On the stage or in a novel it would be ridiculed as completely unreal and impossible. But the truth is that most of human history is more bloody and more silly than the silliest melodrama and the majority of people who "make history" have the primitive, adolescent psychology of readers of penny dreadfuls or the enthusiastic audience of some tenth rate gangster film. Hitler and his disgusting gang were true to the historical type, though cruder than Louis XIV, Napoleon, and Bismarck and without the veneer of culture or intelligence covering the barbarism of the others. The value of Mr. Trevor-Roper's book is that it does not merely unravel the facts about Hitler's death; it also provides invaluable material for studying the mind and motives of the Fuehrer, his generals, ministers, and creatures, and the working of the Nazi machine.

It would require a volume of many thousand words to give the results of such a study, though the inevitable conclusion can be found in a book written nearly 2,500 years ago in Athens. Here we have space to draw attention only to two secondary, but important, points. The first is the enormous power of the machine, not merely the material but the administrative machine, in modern times. Whether Hitler was or was not a genius depends largely on the meaning given to that much misused word. It is certain that he was always in many ways incredibly stupid and credulous, and administratively incompetent. He was also always, in the ordinary meaning of the word, insane. In the last year of his life he was so insane that facts no longer meant anything to him; he personally directed the operations of the German army, but his orders bore no relation to facts; for instance, he ordered movements of non-existent armies. But the power of a modern administrative machine like the German army is such that it will run efficiently for some time of itself even when controlled by a

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lunatic. It took five years for Hitler to destroy the German army and, in order to do so, he had to destroy millions of men, hundreds of cities, and the whole of European civilization.

The second point is almost a corollary of the first. The immediate circle or court of Nazis surrounding Hitler were the lowest scum of European civilization, thugs, gangsters, crooks, charlatans, imbeciles, and lunatics. But the controllers of the machine, the administrators, generals, and industrialists, were not like that, they were ordinary men who knew exactly what Hitler and his gang were like. They were not deceived; they had no illusions. Yet they put the power into his hands and ran the machine for him. That was why the machine ran and why it took so long to destroy it and with it Europe. The case of Albert Speer, Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production, a dominating figure in Mr. Trevor-Roper's book, is crucial. He appears to have been a more or less civilized man, with no sympathy for Nazis or Nazism. Yet for years he worked faithfully for Hitler, even to the extent of disobeying his lunatic orders. He salved his conscience by pretending, even to himself, that he took no part in politics. He did his job of work. He was "loyal" to his machine and to the Fuehrer, and so he put his machine at the disposal of a sadistic madman. In this "loyalty" of a man like Speer to his machine, to "Germany", and to the Nazi ruler of "Germany" one may see one of the chief causes of our ruin and the ruin of our civilisation.

LEONARD WOOLF.

LABOUR'S PLAN FOR PLENTY. By MICHAEL YOUNG. (London. Gollancz. 7s. 6d.)

IT is no easy matter for a party official to write a clear and honest account of the aims of his party. He is hampered by his special position. He has exceptional loyalties. He is tempted to evade difficulties, to emphasise the obvious, and to devote his major attention to the successes, and not to the failures of his leaders. It is because Mr. Michael Young has risen above these dangers, that his book deserves high praise. It is straightforward and it is concise. It is never dull; and it has the great merit of dealing with really complex issues in a way that makes them clear to anyone who will be at pains to give his whole mind to their understanding. The book is, in short, an admirable example of effective popularisation. It is not easy to see how it could have been better done.

It must be remembered that Mr. Young's purpose is essentially exposition. He would be the first to admit that the problems he has not been able to explore are hardly less important than the aims he is expounding. One would like to hear from him at length whether he thinks that the Government's machinery for planning is comprehensive enough or audacious enough. One would like to know whether he thinks it probable that the present personnel of the Foreign Office has the necessary power of turning its promises of action to be relevant to the purposes of a Labour Government. Is the speed of action of the Colonial Office proportionate to the scale of its problems? Can we really plan economic development in Malaya if we appoint as Economic Adviser to the High Commissioner one of the stoutest adherents of *laissez-faire* principles this country has known for many years? How far does he think nationalisation must go before we can be sure that the foundations of a socialist commonwealth have been effectively laid.

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Are the institutions satisfactory through which this nationalisation is to work? Does the evidence convince him that the new social order is successful in securing the new responses it clearly requires?

Mr. Young, in a word, has provided an excellent anatomy of Labour's record in the first fifteen months of power. What one would now like to see him attempt, with his obviously outstanding ability, is a physiology of how the aims in view are working out in terms of the men and the institutions through which they are seeking expression. What he set out to do he has done so well that it is impossible not to hope that he will move to that more difficult realm where his task is not exposition, but speculation.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

ASPECTS OF BRITISH ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1918-1925. By A. C. PIGOU. (MacMillan. 251 pp. 15s.)

BRITISH economic history in the period between the wars falls, without excessive manipulation, into three distinct phases. The note of the first, which ran from the Armistice to the return to the gold standard in April, 1925, might be expressed in the once fashionable formula, "Back to 1914." It was the assumption, which we now know to be an illusion, that, when hostilities end, peace begins; the conviction that, given appropriate measures, the pre-war economic order would, if with some delay, re-establish itself; and the attempt of economic and political leaders to act on the conclusions which these premises suggested. In the period which followed, that spell was thought for a time to be about to work. Once the events of 1926, commonly viewed in high places, not as a link in a chain, but as a mere interlude of un-reason, were out of the way, the country, it was argued, was on the way to recovery. Indeed, with unemployment averaging in the three years 1927-1929 only just over 10 per cent, it could even be held—such were the standards of the time—to be experiencing something in the nature of a mild boom. The American collapse in the autumn of 1929 opened a third phase. In the dreadful early thirties over one-fifth of the insured population were unemployed for two years, and one-seventh for six. The overshadowing fact was the depression. Down to the beginnings of re-armament, most British policies, whether business or governmental, were post-depression policies.

Aspects of British Economic History 1918-1925 is concerned with the first chapter of the story. Economic history can be written in more than one way. It may confine itself to developments and problems arising in a sphere which, whatever the interpretation placed on the ambiguous word "economic," everyone would agree in describing by that term. It may include a large slice of the policy of states. It may endeavour to treat the interests which are its special concern as one element, at once agent and object, in the many-sided life of complex societies, in which case it becomes general history seen from a stand-point in the past too much neglected and to-day the recipient of an attention that, if not excessive, is often, unfortunately, uncritical to *naïveté*. Professor Pigou's work originated, he tells us, in a study undertaken in 1941, at the request of the Government, for the use of the Departments concerned with the problems likely to arise on the conclusion of the second world-war. Naturally and properly, therefore, it is the conditions, not infrequently the pathological conditions, following the first war which form its main theme. The six and a half years

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from November, 1918, to April, 1925, saw the boom; the depression; the rush into de-control; an inflationary policy followed by a sharp deflation; a series of industrial disputes which make the brief and local stoppages of the last eighteen months appear like quarrels at a mothers' meeting; and, the Chancellor of the Exchequer's announcement, on April 27, 1925, that the Bank of England would sell gold for export without restriction at the coinage price. The period is clearly one of the first interest and importance; nor is it surprising that most discussions of it should hitherto have generated more heat than light. It is the great merit of the present book that it stands above the battle. It hugs the shore of ascertained facts; submits to a critical examination the evidence—sometimes, it seems, none too adequate—from which conclusions must be drawn; and, when it ventures on generalisation, does so with a cautious admission of uncertainties which adds to its weight. Thus, while the author does not attempt to offer a final judgment even on the economic aspects of a period in which extravagant hopes and bewildered disillusionment were strangely blended, he supplies a foundation on which future work upon it must be based.

If war be excepted, few spans of time of equal brevity can have experienced reversals of fortune so violent and unforeseen. The four segments into which Professor Pigou divides his subject—Breathing space (November, 1918, to May, 1919); Boom (May, 1919 to the end of April, 1920); Slump (summer of 1920 to beginning of 1923); and Doldrums (1923 and after)—provide a convenient framework. Employment, production, Government intervention, and monetary factors, as seen in each of these divisions, are successively examined. Transitional unemployment caused by the turn-over of industry from war to peace, which is thought to have been completed by the early summer of 1920, is estimated never to have risen much above one million, and, if so, was certainly less than had been expected. The date at which the situation took a sharp turn for the worse was the summer of 1921. "Partly as a result of the three months' stoppage in the coal industry which had begun in April of that year, the insurance figure of unemployment stood in June at over 22 per cent, and even in December, 1922, where the author places the conclusion of the slump, was just under 13. The gravest fact, later only too familiar, was then unexpected. It was the continuance of mass unemployment when other circumstances suggested that it ought to have disappeared. The existence of an "intractable million" during a period of partial recovery was disputed at the time, and the refusal of the Government to cope with the problem was defended on the ground that, even if it was a fact, it would automatically cure itself. Professor Pigou presents convincing proof that it was a tragic reality, and offers an instructive discussion of the causes which produced it. The movement of physical production agrees on the whole, with that of unemployment. It is noticeable, however, that, both in the boom and in the period of partial recovery which followed it, its level was about 10 per cent below that of 1913. The slump appears to have begun mainly as a home market decline. The low level of exports, as compared with 1913, in the years of the "doldrums" was not, it is pointed out, a phenomenon peculiar to this country. It was a particular case of a world-wide malady.

The part played in all this by policy is discussed at some length in a series of chapters on Government intervention in industry and on the monetary factor. "When it becomes possible," a correspondent of *The Economist* is

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quoted as writing in October, 1919, "to observe the economic effects of the recent war in true perspective, it will probably be found that the most outstanding result is a new lease of life for British trade." Seen from to-day, the brief St. Martin's summer which began in the spring of 1919 has the air of an orgy of credulous optimism. The hard-headed leaders of business were not troubled by the reflection that to step into the same stream twice is not given to man. To judge by their utterances, they appear, with some exceptions, to have expected, once the last shell was fired, to skip happily back into a pre-war world whose only significant change since it shot Niagara would consist, by a fortunate dispensation, in its more ravenous voracity for British goods. The principal remaining barrier between industry and that Elysium seemed the barbed-wire entanglements erected by the mischievous ingenuity of meddlesome officials paid, in the words of *The Economist*, "for putting difficulties in the way of private enterprise." To make short work of these abominations became almost a crusade. The Reports of the War Cabinet suggest that, in the later years of the war, more realistic alternatives than abrupt de-control were under consideration; but, after the Armistice, the anxieties of demobilisation, the pressure of business interests, the clamour of the Government's supporters, the well-staged hysterics of the Press, and prevalent illusions about the economic situation, all pushed in one direction. New capital issues were freed from control in 1919, for application at home in March, for use abroad in November. The majority of price-controls fell in that and the following year. The Ministry of Food and the Coal Control Department met their end on March 31, 1921. The last survivor, the Liquor Control Board, followed them in August. It had made a handsome profit, and part of its business continued when the Board disappeared, to be carried on by the Home office. The Geddes Economy Committee of 1922 was equal to the emergency. It condemned the experiment on the ground, not that it had been unprofitable, but that it might not in future be as profitable as in the past. A verdict so incapable of refutation carried instant conviction. The objectionable "state undertaking" was shortly after wound up.

Modern war is a dangerous surgical operation. The patient, when it is over, requires a special regimen hardly less than he did when his disease was at its height; and the attempt to dispense with that interval of convalescence does not hasten recovery, but makes certain a relapse. To one who recalls, for example, the plight of coal and cotton in the inter-war years, it seems evident that, in abolishing controls out of hand, instead of, as it might have done, discriminating between them, the Government—to put the case at its lowest—deprived itself of an instrument indispensable during the transition. He is likely, therefore, to agree with the verdict of Professor Pigou that, "with a less impetuous abandonment of them, the government would have had the power—though not necessarily the will—to enforce some evening out of industrial activity during the three years following the Armistice, and so might have rendered the distresses of the great post-war depression less serious than they were." The chapters on monetary history pack much matter into a small compass. The dominant preoccupation of the Treasury and Bank of England during most of the period was, not the industrial situation at home, but the state of the American exchange, and their principal aim to re-establish the country on a gold basis at the pre-war parity. To have permitted, however, soon after the war, the

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free export of gold would have meant starting peace with a depression. Hence, as a transitional expedient, the order in Council of March 31, 1919, prohibiting export, which became, if an indirect, an important, factor in enlarging the scale of the boom. Professor Pigou sees the principal cause of the ensuing slump neither in the deflationary policy of November 1919 and April 1920, nor in the collapse of the market for exports, but in the completion of work, such as the re-equipment of industry and railways and replacements of shipping losses, which, when done, was for the time being done once for all. In denying that bank rate manipulation played the dominant role, he crosses swords with Mr. Hawtry. Since, however, he agrees as to the importance of the monetary factor once the depression was under way, the difference is less profound, perhaps than, at first sight, it might appear. Here, as elsewhere, an anxiety to give all points of view their just due is conspicuous among the merits of the book.

R. H. TAWNEY.

STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY. By RUSSELL HILL. (Gollancz. 191 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THE spate of books on Germany continues unabated. All of them suffer from having been written at speed, and yet not written and published quickly enough to keep pace with events. A lasting study of the immediate post-war years in Germany has not yet been written. It probably cannot well be written until some settlement, good or bad, has been reached by the Big Four, until in fact the uneasy transition period has run its course. Until then, any book must compete with the ever-changing scene. The latest book, *Struggle for Germany* by the American correspondent Russell Hill, is no exception. But it stands out because it is an American commentary, written by an American with a deep sympathy for European problems. It is a well-informed book, full of facts, but somehow Russell Hill has failed to reduce his facts to any sort of pattern or logical sequence. This is perhaps because he stands too near the scene he describes. But this very fact, which weakens and scatters the book as a whole, gives real strength to each of his chapters taken separately. The wood was too close for him, but his focus on the trees is good.

Perhaps after all, that was what he intended. *Struggle for Germany* is in effect a series of 'shorts' (to use film language), and not a full-length feature or documentary. The 'shorts' are vivid and illuminating, but quite unrelated. The random chapters are, of course, chosen primarily to illustrate allied policy in Germany, and particularly as the title implies, the clashes between the Allies. But they also depict the general state of Germany. They are all written with admirable impartiality and insight into the motives of the Four Powers. Some of them inevitably make somewhat stale reading now. The book opens with the Potsdam Agreement. That particular acre of ground has been worked over so often now that the soil cannot yield any fruit of new interest. Much the same is true of denazification (though Russell Hill here sensibly includes a penetrating analysis of the strength of parties in the years before 1933), and the Level of Industry Agreement, signed in March 1946. But his chapter on the level of industry in Germany is enlivened by an account of the still-born Morgenthau Plan. This scheme to turn Germany into a truncated agricultural country was abandoned by the United States at an early stage, and is now only of historical interest. But it has not to my knowledge been published in any detail in this country.

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before, though its influence on American policy in 1945 was well known. Two of the best 'shorts' are the very full accounts of the campaign in Berlin and the Soviet Zone for the fusion of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties in the winter of 1945-1946, and the story of the repeated verbal battles between the British and the Russians on the existence of German military formations in the British Zone. This last story has generated much bitterness and mistrust: it is valuable to have it put in its right perspective by a competent American observer, who cannot be accused of bias.

Russell Hill naturally turns his attention continually to American policy in Germany, and to the ideological differences between the Americans and the Russians. The chapters devoted to these subjects are a valuable restatement of American opinion and practice. Particularly vivid is his chapter on American army morale, and the effect of redeployment on the troops. He describes the efforts of the American command to recreate unit loyalty and discipline by creating the new special Constabulary under General Harmon. The troopers of the Constabulary are dressed in paratroopers boots, Sam Brown belt, golden neckerchief, and blue and gold striped helmet liner. He quotes another correspondent's description (James O'Donnell of *Newsweek*) of General Harmon's arrival at Munich. "When his streamlined train roars into Munich, he is met by an honour guard standing at rigid attention. The cavalcade speeds off across the city with wailing sirens, and along roped-off thoroughfares. Behind snappy trooper cordons crowd the Münchener, who refer to this performance as the 'Second Coming.' Nothing irreligious—just that Patton was once here." This interpretation of the Münchener's remark seems somewhat naive. I suspect that the irreverent Münchener were thinking of the arrival of another leader a little longer ago.

But it is this essentially American approach that gives this book its value. And there is nothing naive about most of it. Russell Hill is one of those Americans—there is always a handful of them among American foreign correspondents—who have come to care deeply about the problems of Europe, and to interpret them with sure understanding. He believes passionately in Western democracy, and the rights of the individual against the state. Though he believes wholeheartedly in the American way of life, he does not think that Germany can "afford" capitalism any longer, any more than he thinks the British can "afford" it. He compliments the British on their determination to go ahead with the nationalisation of the German basic industries. He is ready sanely to criticise all four powers on certain points, and does not believe that the blame for the present deadlock can be placed squarely on any one power.

In his last chapter, he attempts to outline a solution for Germany. His solution is inevitably somewhat in the air, as it depends on the abolition of the zonal boundaries, and the creation of a genuine four-power inspection force, backed by an international army. All his earlier chapters emphasise the struggle and deadlock between the four powers, and their repeated failures to reach agreement on any matter of substance. He clearly does not know how to break this deadlock, nor how to bridge the gap between present reality and his future international inspection team. But then, who does?

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MUNICIPAL HEALTH SERVICES. By NORMAN WILSON. (*George Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.*)

THE impending revolution in public health caused by the National Health Service Act makes the present moment opportune for considering the health services which now exist. Mr. Wilson's study of the work of local authorities in connection with the personal medical services is, therefore, a useful addition to the Town and County Hall series of which it forms the latest volume. The functions relating to the control of the environment, such as sewage and sewage disposal, refuse collection and street cleansing, food and drug regulation, belong to a different part of the public health movement and are not included in the present work. This is somewhat regrettable since it unduly narrows the scope of *Municipal Health Services*.

As one reads Mr. Wilson's succinct description of the services now provided or at least authorised, half the time one is surprised to find how much has already been done. The other half of the time one is astonished to see how much has been left undone. Looked at as a whole the maternity and child welfare services, the medical attention provided for school children by local education authorities, the special provision of various kinds for those afflicted with tuberculosis, the treatment afforded to infectious disease patients, the vaccination and immunization facilities, the venereal disease clinics, the care of mental defectives and persons of unsound mind, the poor law medical services—all this adds up to a great deal. But the absence of any general domiciliary service; the lack in many areas of various kinds of hospital, specialist or consultant services provided by public authorities; the failure of the National Health Insurance scheme to make provision for the dependants of insured persons; the narrow limitations placed on the scope of the school medical service; the pitiful inadequacy of the medical aspects of our factory legislation and the complete absence of any attempt to impose a code of hygiene on shops, offices, restaurants, hotels and many other establishments which do not come under the Factory Acts: this in turn adds up to a great deal on the negative side.

The author knows a great deal about his subject; but he does not always succeed in conveying a great deal to the reader. The book tends to devote far too much space to describing the legal powers possessed by local authorities and far too little to explaining how they have been used, or even whether they have been used at all. It is not, for example, very illuminating to be told that "all institutions for mental defectives are subject to regular inspection by the Board of Control, and must be visited by members of the Local Authority or Committee of management." Such visits or inspections may mean anything or nothing. What we would prefer to know is how the job of supervision is actually tackled in good and bad areas, and how typical they are of the country as a whole. When Mr. Wilson tells us about an inquiry he carried out into the services provided by county borough councils before the war, he at once breathes life into his pages and makes us wish he had adopted an equally realistic method of expounding the subject more often.

W. A. ROBSON.

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SHORTER NOTICES

ASIA IN THE MODERN WORLD. By H. VENKATASUBBIAH. 119 pp. 5 rupees. ASIA: A SOUVENIR BOOK. 85 pp. 3 rupees. BOOKS ON ASIA. 111 pp. Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

THESE three books were published on the occasion of The Asian Relations Conference held from March 23 to April 2. They are well produced and interesting. The first gives a short account of the chief political and economic facts concerning the countries represented at the Conference, though Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Outer Mongolia had to be omitted "for lack of authoritative material." The second gives a shorter, brighter, and illustrated account of the countries. The third is a useful bibliography of books relating to the several countries.

THE NEW ITALY. By MURIEL GRINDROD. (*Institute of International Affairs*. 118 pp. 5s.)

Like most of the Institute's publications, this is a careful and sober book. The first chapter gives an account of Italy's experiences in the war, most of it dealing with events from the fall of Fascism in July 1943 to the end of 1945. The second chapter is concerned with politics, administration, and government; the third with the laws passed in 1944 and 1945 for the elimination of Fascism and the punishment of Fascist crimes, and the work of the Epuration Commission; the fourth examines Italy's economic position; the fifth analyses the provisions of the Peace Treaty. There are two appendices giving the manifesto of the Fascist Republican Party of November, 1943, and the Electoral Law of March, 1946, and there is a useful Chronology of Events from January, 1943, to December, 1946.

THE COMMON PEOPLE, 1746-1946. By G. D. H. COLE and RAYMOND POSTGATE. (*Methuen*. 742 pp. 10s.)

This book was first published in 1938; it is now republished in a second edition, enlarged and brought up to date. The last chapter deals with the war which began in 1939 and brings the story of the common people down to the end of the year 1945.

A PLANNED AUXILIARY LANGUAGE. By H. JACOB. (*Dobson*. 160 pp. 10s. 6d.)

Most books on an international language advocate or describe one particular variety. Mr. Jacob deals with the problem as a whole and the chief languages invented to solve it. The chief languages are five: Esperanto, Ido, Occidental, Novial, and Interlingua. In Part I of his book, Mr. Jacob gives the history of each and analyses and describes their structure. In Part II he discusses some of the structural problems of a planned language and in Part III he describes the present day movements for a planned language, including the work of the International Auxiliary Language Association.

THE SOUND OF THE TRUMPET. By SARAH GERTRUDE MILLIN. (*Faber*. 269 pp. 16s.)

This is the fourth volume of the well-known South African writer's diary of the war. It covers the period from September, 1942, to September, 1943. The diary is largely a day to day recording of the news as the ordinary person learnt it from newspaper or broadcast. But Mrs. Millin's brief comments give one a vivid and interesting picture of her own mind and character.

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STAPLES

INCENTIVES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

By P. SARGANT FLORENCE

IN the effort to increase national production and to strengthen the country's economic position by making labour more efficient, "incentives" are popularly accepted as playing a leading part. Before describing incentives and judging their relative importance in government policy it is essential to see how incentives fit into the whole effort, and what alternative or complementary means of increasing production are available.

To strengthen the national economy, labour must not only be more efficient at a particular job, but must also be mobile, so that bottlenecks can be cleared and man-power diverted to whatever front is necessary; and to make labour efficient and mobile without coercion, labour must be both willing and able to work and to move. If this approach or "model" is accepted, then the labour policy to be adopted if compulsory direction is not employed, may be summed up as a policy that will ensure labour being *willing and able to work and willing and able to move*. Incentives refer in common usage to means of increasing willingness to work; and sometimes of increasing willingness to move, though here the word *attractives* is more suitable. Means of increasing *ability* to work and move I shall refer to as *conducives*; they conduce to making incentives effective and, in any discussion to practical purposes, incentives cannot be considered without them.

Conducives to Work

In order that incentives to work may be effective the worker must be capable of work. Modern sampling research into nutrition associated with the name of Sir John Orr concluded that just before the last war it was only perhaps a 50-50 chance that any worker was sufficiently nourished for health and efficiency. The chief source of food for the worker is his wage and his largest item of expenditure is food, so that, other things such as wise spending and knowledge of food values remaining constant, the higher the wage the greater the proportion of workers rendered fully capable of work. Surveys conducted by Seebohm Rowntree and Prof. Bowley before 1914 found quite a high proportion of working families with wages insufficient for health and efficiency, *even if the wages were spent as wisely as possible*.

Since 1914 such "primary" poverty has been due to

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unemployment rather than to low wages. With the head of the family in employment, incomes wisely spent were insufficient only when the family was large. In the survey of Kingstanding (a Birmingham housing estate) we* found in 1938, when there was little unemployment, that the proportion in primary poverty increased ruthlessly, the larger the number of children in family. Among families with one child, 3% more in poverty; with two children 11%; with three children 27%; with four children 55%; with five children 60%; and with six or more children 82%. The introduction of family allowances should now have liquidated the number of children as a source of insufficient nourishment, and has brought the fight for the minimum wage to a successful conclusion. Except where the work is very heavy and requires food of abnormal calorie content, or where the wage is unwisely spent, efficiency is not likely to suffer in Britain to-day from wages insufficient to enable the worker to perform his job. Hence the importance of turning to incentives—the appeal to willingness—in the struggle to increase national productivity.

Incentives to Work : The Amount of the Wage

The word incentives is often used narrowly to-day in Trade Union circles to refer to some type of piece rate. An incentive, as we shall see, can undoubtedly be obtained by piece rates under certain circumstances. Methods of paying wages however are not the only means of increasing the willingness of the worker, and national policy should look also to the amount of the wages offered. The process whereby the amount of the wages affect incentive turns upon two psychological facts. The first is that people usually visualize what wages can buy; the second, that in their buying habits classes of people have certain similar standards of living in mind. Visualizing “beyond” their money wage to the things money will buy, I have called the transpecuniary incentive. The average worker is not a miser or a hoarder and he will want more wages only if there are more purchasable goods and services within his reach. If no facilities for pleasure are afforded by the locality in which they live and work, or if rationing or high prices restrict purchases, the transpecuniary incentive will be weak.

More important than people getting the goods and services they want is their wanting them at all. The standard of living is used here in the sense of some practical “ideal” way of life

* Souter, Wilkins and Florence, *Nutrition and Size of Family*.

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that the worker wants. This standard may be well above, near, or the same as the actual “mode” of living of his family. If the worker does not set his standard above his actual mode of living, and does not want more income to change that mode, an increase of hourly rates of pay will merely result in fewer hours being worked, and an increase of rates of pay per piece merely in fewer pieces being made. Increase in wages will, in short, be the opposite of an incentive.

This perverse situation does not appear exceptional in Britain, as the observations of Dr. H. M. Vernon in shipbuilding and coalmining testify. Among the shipbuilding crafts he found that lost time increased with increases in the scale of pay, and fell with a decrease in the scale. For instance, in the case of drillers “time-keeping was poor in 1900 to 1902 when pay was fairly good, whilst it was good from 1904 to 1909 when pay was low.” Then it gradually got worse again as pay improved and it was specially bad in 1912 to 1913 when pay was at its maximum¹. British coalminers’ wage-rates and therefore the earnings they could make were severely reduced between 1924-6 and 1927-8. Comparing ten thousand underground workers in the same pits in the two periods, Dr. Vernon² found absenteeism greatly influenced by the change. The reduction in wage-rates meant that the possible earnings of the coal face worker fell 32%. At the same time their time lost by voluntary absenteeism fell to a half. The other underground men were still more affected, for when their possible earnings fell 24% their absenteeism from voluntary causes fell 38%. This incentive, associated with a fall in wage rates rather than a rise, indicates that the worker is driven to work by encroachment on a low fixed standard of living rather than encouraged by the possibilities of rising to a more ambitious standard. Conservatism of this sort obviously sets up obstacles to an increased output per man, and can be partly overcome by tempting the worker with new types of goods and services. The appeal to save unless for some visualized object like a house, or a holiday, or winning a war has little incentive force. In spite of the obvious difficulties to-day, some transpecuniary objectives must be presented to the worker by the government, on which he may spend his wage.

Non-Financial Incentive to Work

Considered against the background pattern of modes and

¹ *Industrial Fatigue and Efficiency*, pp. 151-2.

² *Industrial Health Research Board Report 62*, p. 35.

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standards of living the amount of wages paid may thus be an incentive or be a deterrent to efficiency. Similarly the method of wage payment must be considered against the background of factory patterns, in particular the existing and possible non-financial incentives or motives. Elton Mayo and his associates, Whitehead and Roethlisberger have in their studies of the Hawthorne factory familiarized us with the anthropological view of a factory as a society or a set of societies with primitive customs and attitudes. As Professor Mayo puts it himself*, "the ordinary conception of management-worker relations, as existing between company officials on the one hand and an unspecified number of individuals on the other, is utterly mistaken. Management, in any continuously successful plant is not related to single workers but always to working groups. In every department that continues to operate, the workers have—whether aware of it or not—formed themselves into a group, with appropriate custom, duties, routine, even rituals; and management succeeds (or fails) in proportion as it is accepted without reservation by the group as author and leader." Here are some of the rules of etiquette forming part of the unofficial code of behaviour of the Hawthorne bank-wirers, rules many of which clearly run counter to the management's view of efficiency and lead straight to restriction of output.

- (i) You should not turn out too much work. If you do you are a "rate-buster."
- (ii) You should not turn out too little work. If you do you are a "chiseler."
- (iii) You should not tell a supervisor anything that will react to the detriment of an associate. If you do, you are a "squealer."
- (iv) You should not attempt to maintain social distance or act officious. If you are an inspector, for example, you should not act like one.

To those who have been "through the mill" of an English Public School this social situation will not appear improbable or unfamiliar. All these rules are there observed; though the names given to their violators were different. Rate-busters were swots; chiselers, slackers; squealers, sneaks. Americans apparently had no name for (iv) but the English slang was swank. This code was in the American factory and English Public Schools as inviolate as primitive rituals; to break it was taboo—simply not done, or if done the violation would lead to social ostracism. British enquiries into the social relationships within the factory have not been so thorough, but also supply an inkling of the importance of unofficial

* *Social Problems of An Industrial Organization*, 1945, pp. 81-82.

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group "codes" running counter to efficiency. In both countries the tradition of the group to which he belongs and his status in the factory hierarchy loom large to the worker.¹

Incentives, to be successful, must clearly take account of these behaviour and attitude patterns, and call for knowledge and social skill among all ranks of administrators from works and personnel managers to foreman. This "know-how" has become particularly necessary with the advent of full employment. No longer is there the incentive of fear of the sack. Though it is true that the average wage earner works satisfactorily without any need of this fear, a few slackers and near-slackers do not, as absentee records testify. To-day, with the desperate need for full production, incentives are required for all—average, near-slackers, and slackers. Every worker must somehow be got to identify himself with the organization in which he works, and to see the connection between his wage and his efficiency.

A century or more of capitalist exploitation for profit has left a psychological hang-over for which a year or two of nationalization is apparently an insufficient pick-me-up. To bring home to every worker that there is no longer a vast cushion of net, tax-free profit between his earnings and the price of his product, business accounts, in enterprises remaining private, must be made available to workers' representatives; while in nationalized industries Trade Union leaders must alter the under-dog outlook of their constituents and often their own. They must make it clear that management and foremanship is a skilled trade, if not a profession, and that there cannot be crude workers' control by elected representatives; but they should be familiar with the political science of Mary Follett² and insist upon labour being consulted in the early stages of discussion and as a continuing process. Otherwise, whether industries are nationalized or not, there will continue to be an iron curtain between the world of management and government concerned with efficiency, and the world of proletarians concerned with traditional patterns and looking merely for grievances in the orders imposed upon it from above and seldom explained.

Incentives to Work: The Method of Wage Payment

In discussing their incentive effects, methods of wage

¹ Industrial Health Research Board Report 69. Hall & Locke, *Incentives and Contentment*. Mass Observation, *People in Production, War Factory*. Marie Jahoda, *Some Socio-Psychological Problems of Factory Life*, British Journal of Psychology, January, 1941.

² *Dynamic Administration*, edited by Urwick and Metcalf.

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payment may conveniently be classified according to the following analysis :

- A. Time Rates.
- B. Piece Rates.
 - 1. Collective
 - Small Group.
 - Whole Firm (Profit Sharing).
 - 2. Individual
 - Straight
 - Progressive.
 - Degressive.

Comparing first time rates with piece rates as a whole, direct observation has shown, as might be expected, that more pieces are made per day when wages are paid by the piece than by the hour. In 1915 I recorded the output of two shifts of seventeen girls drilling fuses, in two consecutive weeks, one before and the other immediately after changing from a time to a piece wage*. The output of the day shift was 24%, the output of the night shift 40% higher on the piece rate than on the time rate. Yet probably less than half of all industrial jobs are paid by piece rates, and it may well be asked why, if piece rates are more productive, more industrial jobs are not paid in this way. The answer is that piece rates are often either impossible, or less efficient all-round, or dangerous to "morale."

On many jobs piece rates are impossible because there are no uniform pieces, or no pieces at all. There is much work like that of watchmen, policemen, transport workers, agriculturists, and shop-keepers where no measurable pieces are produced. Even if work does produce pieces, the number of pieces made may have no relation to the effort involved. Quantity of output is not the only test of efficiency. Piece rates often result in a speeding up that scamps the quality of work. I have known piece rates in certain processes to yield such a high percentage of spoiled work that the employer has deliberately changed to a time wage. Speeding-up may also affect the all-round efficiency of the worker, causing a high accident and absentee rate, not to speak of a lower output rate in the long run. That morale may suffer under piece rates has been brought out by investigations of the Industrial Health Research Board. One group of girls were found, when on piece wages, to have three times the number of quarrels and of complaints than when on time wages!

* Florence p. 254 *Economics of Fatigue and Unrest*.

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The case for piece rates is thus not a foregone conclusion, but the productivity per man hour which piece rates seem to stimulate is so much increased, and the increase such a major contribution to national efficiency, that an effort should be made by the government to extend piece rates wherever possible, in spite of (comparatively minor) difficulties. Spoilage of output through speeding up can be checked by more careful supervision, and by making sure by means of time study that speed is not excessive. Morale need not suffer if the method of time study is explained to the workers, and their suggestions and co-operation called for under a system of continuous consultation.

Though many jobs will remain which cannot be paid by the piece, there are always, even under a time-rate system, certain indirect financial incentives to output. A worker may be promoted or demoted to grades earning a higher or lower time rate, or be discharged altogether if his output or attendance is not satisfactory (always, of course, at the risk of strikes). To be effective this action on the part of the employer involves accurate records being kept of workers' productivity and absenteeism. Several firms in my experience, have found that such accurate records together with close supervision result in output as high as though paid by the piece. Usually a quota of output is set below which the worker must not fall, and there is careful scrutiny of results. The Industrial Health Research Board (Report 72) found that workers who are set a target figure or some other standard of attainment will improve in speed and accuracy, and will prolong their efforts, as against workers who have no set standard or who may adopt standards lower than those of which they are capable.

In teamwork, or wherever a large number of workers are engaged on a common task, output often cannot be attributed to each individual. In such a case, collective piece wages are often paid; the whole team or department receives a wage determined by the total output of pieces and this wage is then distributed among members of the team or department either equally, or on some pre-arranged system. The strength of this incentive seems to depend on the number of workers in the team or group. If a very large department is involved, incentive may be lost, since each individual will feel that his work has little effect on the total output, but if the group is small enough to have a "face to face" relationship, the incentive may be intense because slacking is noticed by fellow members who will feel that their earnings are being reduced by the lower output.

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Profit sharing may be referred to here since it is in the nature of a collective wage to the employees, varying with the market value of the output of the whole factory. Evidence collected since 1910 by the Ministry of Labour shows that the number of schemes rose up to 1929 but has since fallen, the failures not being replaced by an equivalent number of new schemes. Here the "collectivity" is probably too large for incentive effects; the individual worker cannot see how his particular effort will influence the output of a whole factory. Besides, there is always the possibility that profit or loss may be due not to the manual workers at all but to some success or mistake among the "brain" workers. A further explanation of failure is that the actual share of the profits forms on the average a very small part of the normal wage income. In the ten years 1929 to 1938 the average percentage addition profit shares made to earnings ranged only between 4.8 and 6.1.

To be an incentive to efficiency, then, schemes for a collective wage on output or a collective share in profits require a small "collectivity" and a fairly large addition relative to ordinary earnings. In a small face-to-face group whose earnings consist entirely in collective piece wages, incentive to high output and low absenteeism and turnover is likely to be strong.

The piece rates discussed thus far have been mainly so-called "straight" rates where wages earned collectively or individually are in strict proportion to the output. Variations however can be introduced particularly on individual piece rates. The wages may be arranged to vary "progressively" more than in proportion to output or "degressively" less than in proportion. Where a worker is operating or tending a costly machine the profit and the advantage to the nation from his output are *greater per piece* the more pieces he makes. For the overhead cost of the machine is constant whatever the output. If he makes twice the normal output his output is more profitable than that of two workers each making a normal output since their work involves depreciation and maintenance costs of two machines instead of one. The employer and the nation can therefore afford to pay the double speed worker more than double the two workers, and the exponents of scientific management from its founder Frederick Taylor onward were perfectly logical in advocating progressive piece-rate systems or at least lump sums added to straight piece rates when a certain number of pieces were achieved.

However in British engineering it is the opposite method

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of a degressive wage that appears to be more usual under systems such as the Halsey or Rowan "premium bonus." The more pieces a worker turns out the more he gets in aggregate but the less he gets per piece. The precise formulae used can be found in multitudinous text books but the results on efficiency are seldom chronicled. In my own experience both in Britain and America these degressive systems of piece work are associated with deliberate restriction of output.

The links connecting degressive piece rates with restriction of output are psychologically clear enough and do not necessarily involve Trade Union organization. If wage earners understand the formula of degression they may quite reasonably decide that after a certain output the diminishing return is not worth the effort. If wage earners don't understand the often complicated formula they tend to ask the foreman what precise output will satisfy the management and leave it at that. Thus a social tradition of stereotyped output grows up, or if already there, is reinforced.

If degressive piece-rate systems are associated with restriction of output, why, it may be asked, are they adopted in preference to straight piece rates, and why are progressive piece rates not more frequently tried, since, when carefully introduced and supervised, they usually result in higher output per man than do straight piece rates? The reason usually given is the fear of the worker that if he goes all out and makes large earnings, his rate will then be "nibbled" or cut. Such a cut or the fear of it will of course be a deterrent to output and is rightly condemned from the standpoint of efficiency. Yet few of the legion of critics of rate-cutting realize the employer's dilemma. Where there is any error in setting piece-rates for different jobs such that workers with similar skill and effort can make more wages on one job than on another, then the employer, if he cuts the rate on the favourable job, checks output on that job; if he does not cut rates, the worker on that job may earn say, half as much again as workers with jobs requiring similar skill or effort. This inequality usually results in envy, suspicion of favouritism, a feeling of unfairness in the department, and reduced efficiency all round. The only solution of the dilemma is to be more careful about setting the original piece rates. Indeed it is probably because he is not sure of the fairness of his time studies that the average British employer, in spite of its lack of incentive, adopts the degressive wage where no one worker can earn very much more than another.

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The government, however, should discourage degressive piece rates and by encouraging scientific development of time and motion study, stimulate the employer to embark on progressive piece rates.

Incentives and Conducives to Move

From at least the time of Adam Smith economists have always been exercised over the problem of distributing the supply of man-power over the various demands for it. Though keen enough in looking for the incentives to work on a given job, psychologists have unfortunately been blind to the national importance of the incentives to mobility, and can help economists but little in advising the government.

Adam Smith mentioned five circumstances "arising from the nature of the employments themselves," which

"make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments and counterbalance a great one in others . . . First the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves (further analysed into the ease and hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment); secondly the easiness and cheapness or the difficulty and expense of learning them; thirdly the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly the small or great trust which must be imposed in those who exercise them; and fifthly the probability or improbability of success in them."

Of these five circumstances, that of cost of learning and of "trust" can be put forward to explain the customary pattern of wage and salary differences between grades of workers within any one industry. Normally every industry contains within itself a traditional structure of basic wage rates whereby the skilled craftsman of various grades receives perhaps 20% to 60% more than an unskilled labourer. Similarly the the supervisor, administrator or the professional man gets higher pay than the skilled worker partly because of his still longer schooling and professional training, and also, perhaps, the trust reposed in him. The higher wages and salaries are thus an attractive to secure the necessary skilled and supervisory workers.

Circumstances other than the five mentioned by Adam Smith now appear important as attractives or deterrents. Recent enquiries point particularly to companionship. Factories, for instance, attract girls as compared with domestic service in households that only employ a cook-general; and as the Hawthorne experiment showed, workers are particular as to the people in their working group. The desire to have and keep

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friends and to stay a member of a small group—the gang-nexus—is also powerful in holding workers to their "home town" and making them less willing to move geographically.

Some of Adam Smith's "circumstances" have hitherto not been counterbalanced by wages as he supposed. Dirty work has been low paid and also work liable to unemployment and with little probability of success. When conducives to mobility (the means whereby labour is able to change jobs) are taken into account, a policy of counterbalancing wages, as we shall see, is of greater practical importance now than it has been in the past.

Where a change of jobs requires a change of homes—a geographical movement—conducives to that end are fairly obvious, but none the less difficult to achieve. At present the chief obstacle is shortage of housing. More miners and more agricultural labourers cannot be got because there are insufficient houses in mining and agricultural areas. Here the larger towns with diversity of trades are a national advantage.

Of course there are obstacles, technical psychological and sociological, to a change of jobs even though the worker need not change his home; but in my view these obstacles should be lessening. Economists, particularly Marshall and Taussig, have pointed out that Adam Smith's theory of wages counterbalancing the inherent disadvantages of different occupations did not work out in practice because there were strata of "non-competing" groups among workers. A labourer though his work was less agreeable and less honourable than that of a clerk, did not in compensation have higher wages nor would higher wages have conduced to make him a clerk. But with improving minimum standards of education the gulf is not so wide. Education too permits the short training schemes of the Ministry of Labour to take effect since printed instructions can be used.

Because of education and greater equality Adam Smith's notion has a wider application to-day than in his own time and a national wage policy must now pay attention to the counterbalancing of dirty or heavy work or lack of amenities. If *more* workers are wanted in any job, wage policy must *more* than counterbalance these (or any other) inherent disadvantages.

Wage differentials would be more important to-day as a policy for moving labour from job to job than ever before, were it not for the fact that wages will not buy what the worker wants. The uniform ration reinforces the conservative standards

of living mentioned earlier. The force of differences in wages may to-day therefore have to be strengthened by differentiation of rations. It happens that the jobs where man-power is needed are heavy jobs: mining, farming, foundry work. Since heavy labour uses up more energy and needs more calories it cannot be maintained that a considerably larger food ration would be unfair even at the expense of some cut in the normal food ration. It is therefore a doubly mistaken policy on the part of certain trade unionists to insist on uniform rations. It not only gives the heavy worker less than he needs for his job, but it fails to attract new workers into unpopular work.

Failure to use differential wages or rations as an instrument towards mobility throws us back either on a policy of differential hours which, *below the present fairly normal 44 or 40*, would produce the very disease of lower output we are trying to prevent or on coercion euphemistically called "direction." In their desire to be falsely fair, i.e., to give the same ration regardless of the calorie needs of the job, some trade unionists seem prepared to throw over the very basis of peace-time free society.

The notion of fairness applied to rations or wages policy needs overhauling. The wage has three functions in the national economy: to give workers the wherewithal to buy enough, and thus to conduce to efficiency at work; to counterbalance inherent disadvantages in different types of work including cost of training; and to attract or deter a supply of workers in accordance with the demand. The adjective fair is usually applied when wages satisfy either of the first two functions. The notion of fair is not usually applied, however, when wages satisfy the third function. If we accept this terminology then wages policy must, in the interest of labour mobility, often be unfair.

Summary

In a free society national efficiency requires willingness and ability to work and willingness and ability to move on the part of labour. In the last few years our economy has changed in three ways affecting these requirements. Thanks to trade union action and social legislation no worker need suffer in ability to work owing to low income; full employment is official policy and unemployment or fear of it is no longer an incentive to work or to move; industries are gradually being nationalized, and the unwillingness to work for somebody else's profit is having its foundations knocked away.

Under these new conditions national policy must consist partly in finding new incentives to work or move, and partly in overcoming the lag of ideas behind facts. Since at least some workers are not conditioned to other incentives, the old incentive of the wage cannot be thrown away as well as the fear of unemployment. With nationalization the wage comes closer to the net value of the workers' product without subtraction of capitalist profit, and government management should (and may without socialist qualms) make accurate time studies of the possible rates of output, and reward individuals and groups willing to work at a reasonable pace. Wage policy, too, may be used to move workers where they are wanted by paying higher rates. Though every worker must be given an incentive to work reasonably, only a margin of workers need to be moved. Incentives and conduces to move can therefore be more selective. Where the work is heavy, higher rations may be more attractive to some than higher wages, as well as a stronger incentive to work.

New application of the old incentives and the introduction of new incentives must be backed by knowledge of the social climate of the factory, mine, or building lot. It would well repay the government to endow more research into industrial anthropology as well as industrial psychology and industrial administration. Without the knowledge of habits and attitudes at work, and of the relations between workers and management, gained by such research, industries can never be both democratic and efficient.

CRISIS IN INDONESIA

By CHARLES FISHER

BEFORE President Soekarno's declaration of Indonesian independence on August 17th, 1945, awakened the western world to the realization that an Indonesian problem existed, Holland enjoyed an enviable and unique reputation as a colonising power. Even in America, where the term colonial rule has normally been regarded as a polite but insincere synonym for oppression, Dutch prestige stood exceptionally high. The parallel between the American abolition of slavery in 1865 and the Dutch termination of the culture system in 1870,

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both changes allegedly resulting from propaganda campaigns* which shamed the respective nations into revolutionary reforms, in part explains this point of view which, however, was by no means limited to the United States. The Dutch, it was felt on all hands, had by their "ethical policy" of 1902 more than atoned for the excesses of a discredited past, and their administration was generally regarded as a model of liberal and progressive trusteeship.

More recently, as the virulence of native passions in the Indies has become apparent to the outside world, this highly favourable impression has perforce been drastically revised. The Indonesian independence movement seems by all available criteria to be indisputably the most fanatical of the numerous nationalist outbursts in contemporary South East Asia, and the Dutch, clinging with pitiful obstinacy to the remaining trappings of imperialism, appear to display singular ineptitude in their attempts to deal with it. As the dismal story of hard bargaining, punctuated with exasperating and incomprehensible deadlocks, continues, foreign criticism has been ripening into open hostility, and the Dutch have come to be regarded as thorough-going reactionaries in the colonial field.

This violent reversal of world opinion is not unnaturally both puzzling and distressing to the Hollanders themselves. Having emerged barely two years ago from the Nazi occupation with a record of resistance which puts many another European nation completely in the shade, they are amazed at the obvious lack of sympathy with which their proposals are received, not only in Indonesia, but throughout Europe and America as well. While, as is almost invariably the case when the pendulum swings with such rapidity, neither of the extreme views can be justified in full, both nevertheless contain important elements of truth which no serious observer can afford to ignore.

In part the explanation lies in the mixture of motives common to all colonial ventures. The story of the Dutch East India Company is sufficiently well known to render futile any denial that the profit motive, in its most blatant form, provided the initial stimulus for Dutch enterprise in the Indies. Furthermore, no one who has witnessed the opulent way of life which prevailed there among the European community before the Japanese invasion could honestly assert that this motive had ever disappeared, or even been decently submerged. But it

*Max Havelaar, the novel by Douwes Dekker ("Multatuli") corresponds in this connexion to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

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is equally misleading deliberately to decry the sincerity, idealism, and not infrequent heroism of many thousands of devoted Dutchmen, who have given of their best as administrators, teachers, missionaries, or doctors. Every nation has its enlightened minority, and the history of the nationalist movement in the Indies shows clearly that the Indonesian peoples did not lack the sympathy of a substantial element among the Indies-Dutch.

Such Hollanders have long been aware of some, at least, of the shortcomings of the regime which prevailed in the Indies and during the years of forced inactivity—in the prison camps of the Japanese or Germans—seriously pondered over the mistakes of the past, and evolved far-reaching schemes of reparation and rehabilitation. Particularly in the educational field, where Dutch East Indies policy compared least favourably with that of neighbouring lands, elaborate plans were devised and are now being put into operation in the easternmost portion of the archipelago, the sole surviving remnant of Dutch administered territory in the region.

Thus when the capitulation of Japan heralded the liberation of both the Indies and the majority of their former Dutch administrators, many of the latter were imbued with an urgent sense of reforming zeal, and thrilled with the visions of fields white already to harvest. Their "interrupted mission" could now be resumed, and the years restored which the locust had eaten.

This enthusiasm however received a rude check. Like many another reformer before them, these missionaries of the new colonial policy found to their dismay that their message elicited no response. Though they in their exultation had been prepared to overlook the past, the Indonesian, hardly perhaps surprisingly, was not. Whereas before the war such schemes of responsible self-government and enlightened social reform as were now proffered by the returning Hollanders would unquestionably have satisfied even the extreme nationalists, then languishing in the remote concentration camps of Boven Digoel and Flores, now nothing less than the complete abrogation of all ties with Holland was demanded. Indonesia did not want Dutch reform; it preferred to work out its own salvation.

This brusque rejection of what were, in many respects, excellent proposals has proved a very bitter pill, and as yet the Dutch have not brought themselves to the point of swallowing it. But the game of political Micawberism in which they have

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indulged as an alternative is a dangerous one for a European nation to play with an Oriental opponent. Time has a habit of marching on its stomach in the East, and already the mood in Holland is changing to one of frustration, bewilderment, and bitterness. The Indonesians are sticking to their guns in more senses than one.

To the Dutch their behaviour seems to represent the nadir of ingratitude. Everything that makes Indonesia what it is has come, so they claim, from Holland. Were it not for the hygiene and sanitation introduced by them, Java would have a population of perhaps five million, as it had in 1800, instead of the fifty million which it supports to-day. Europeans, not Indonesians, introduced the cultivation of tea, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, cinchona, tobacco, and above all rubber, which now give the nationalists their economic bargaining power and focus the eyes of the world on their land. And, especially since the finances of the Indies were separated from those of the motherland in 1912, the proceeds from the sales abroad of Indonesian raw materials have been increasingly set aside for the provision of transport, irrigation, and land settlement schemes hitherto unequalled in any other colonial dependency. Finally, so many Dutchmen assert, Indonesian nationalism itself is a deliberate product of the "ethical policy," which not only aimed at the progressive, if gradual, training of the natives for self-government, but also, for the first time in history, diffused a common culture throughout the multitudinous islands of the archipelago, while simultaneously welding them into an economic unity.

Yet the problem remains. For if, as must surely be admitted, there be a substantial element of truth in all these protestations, whence arises the violent anti-Dutch feeling which only too clearly permeates the present nationalist movement? Various interpretations current in Holland deserve consideration, apart from that of a by no means inconsiderable group of wishful thinkers who insist that this attitude conforms to the views of only a small minority that has somehow seized power, and terrorizes the rest of the population into following suit.¹

Many Dutch citizens² believe that the violent passions which were suddenly aroused soon after the Japanese capitulation,

¹ e.g., the following statements of Dr. Frans H. Visman, in "The Situation in Java," (Netherlands Information Bureau, New York, November 1945): "Pure nationalism is safe in the hands of the Dutch . . . The Dutch are confident that the present Japanese and collaborationist-inspired hysteria going on in Java is a temporary aberration of extremist and terrorist minority groups and has to be distinguished well from the nationalism of the great majority."

² Especially women who had been interned in Java, and received from Indonesians various gifts and protestations of friendship immediately after the Japanese capitulation.

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leading to widespread bloodshed and atrocities, represent an uncontrollable reaction to the long period of suppression under the kempeitai (Japanese secret police). They point to the characteristic psychological instability of many Malaysian peoples, which finds expression in mass hysteria and running amok, and argue that the intense hatred aroused by Japanese brutality, but of necessity bottled up during the occupation, has since been transferred to the only available scapegoat, the returning Dutchman.

To anyone with experience of the impressionable character of the Indonesian peoples this suggestion seems highly plausible as a partial explanation, but other factors also play a contributory part. The most commonly held view in Holland today is that the real cause of all the unrest was the Japanese propaganda during the occupation period, skilfully directed, at least in the closing phases, with an eye to future Japanese fishing in these same troubled waters.

While everything was grist to the Japanese propaganda mill, three themes clearly dominated: the economic, the religious, and the racial. The first, seizing on the obvious gross discrepancy in standard of living between the Europeans and the Indonesians, made much of the extremely hard bargain which the Dutch had admittedly driven. This is borne out by the low pre-war wage-level in Indonesia which contrasted very unfavourably with Malaya, and incidentally led to considerable emigration across the Straits of Malacca.

On the religious side the Japanese excelled themselves by posing as the Protectors of Islam¹, except in the Hindu island of Bali and the widely Christianised tracts of Celebes, while at the same time Soekarno reciprocated by praying extensively at various Shinto shrines during the course of a trip to Japan.

But there is little doubt that "Asia for the Asiatics" was Japan's most powerful slogan, and through the innumerable local branches of the Hokokai² and the elaborate youth training organisations, the hatred of everything western in general and Dutch in particular was sedulously inculcated into the mass of the Indonesian people.

Though during the war the Dutch, for obvious reasons, had no opportunity effectively to counter this propaganda in

¹ e.g., the Muslims of Batavia were promised the largest mosque in Java, to hold 10,000 worshippers. See "The Undigested Indies," by Audrey G. Menefee, in "Asia and the Americas," February 1944.

² A fascistic Indonesian society introduced by the Japanese to replace the various pre-existing cultural and political societies.

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Indonesia, the answers were readily available, and have been supplied to the rest of the world through the Netherlands information services and, more latterly, in no uncertain terms to the Indonesians.

So far as economic prosperity was concerned, indeed, the situation under the Japanese spoke for itself. With the collapse of sea communications on which the insular empire of necessity depended, the highly organised interchange, carefully built up by the Dutch between the Outer Provinces with their big agricultural surpluses, and overpopulated Java, whose nascent manufacturing industries had been established to help in paying for food imports, broke down, and this, together with the loss of lucrative world markets for mineral and plantation products, led to a severe drop in standard of living throughout the archipelago.

Co-prosperity, in short, was a dismal failure in the Indies. Similarly much of the pro-Muslim propaganda of the Japanese was belied on numerous occasions by their callous disregard for any religious practices, such as the observation of rest days and fasts, which might interfere with military efficiency. Lastly, to any European observer who has had the misfortune to experience it, the swashbuckling arrogance displayed by the Japanese occupying forces to all and sundry, regardless of race, showed unmistakably that "Asia for the Asiatics" meant simply Asia for the Japanese. Hence the fervently held opinion one heard so frequently expressed in captivity by the more hard headed planters: "Well, whatever we did out there, it's nothing compared with what they're getting now. They'll welcome us with open arms when all this is over."

Logically such arguments seem unanswerable. By any tangible standards the Indonesians were infinitely better off under the Dutch than they were during the Japanese occupation, and only a process of malicious misrepresentation, such as the Japanese carried out at high pressure for three and a half years, could make the situation appear otherwise.

Yet, while it would be ridiculous to underrate the enormous importance of enemy propaganda on the uneducated peasant population of Indonesia, it nevertheless remains true that this audience showed a far greater pre-disposition to absorb its message than that displayed by any other colonial people in South East Asia. Those of us who shared long periods of captivity in company with Dutchmen from the Indies were invariably puzzled by a strange paradox that underlay so much of their conversation. The immense superiority of Netherlands

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Indies administration over that of British Malaya was taken for granted, and we were frequently informed that "even America admits that Holland is the finest colonising power in the world." But at the same time, almost to a man, the Dutch were obsessed with the idea that the Allies would never permit them to remain a colonial power after the war, and were tormented by the fear of what the natives might do to their women and children incarcerated in Java, if ever the Japanese control should break down.¹ Rightly or wrongly we formed the impression that the Dutch had a guilty conscience about Indonesia, and dreaded the denouement which they were powerless to prevent. Had we known that, in their penal camp at Boven Digoel alone, some 1,300 political prisoners had been interned a few years before the war, we should doubtless have found their uneasiness more comprehensible.²

Meanwhile Dutch governmental authorities in exile did their utmost to forestall the criticism and, if possible, the graver calamities which they knew might ultimately befall them. Thus Queen Wilhelmina's Pearl Harbour Day speech in 1942 promised a round-table conference once the war was over to frame a new Commonwealth structure wherein the Indies would enjoy a status equal to the Netherlands. Even before this, however, world opinion was being prepared for an unpleasant surprise. In a lecture delivered by Dr. G. H. C. Hart, then Director of the Economic Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Colonies, to the Royal Geographical Society (of London), on February 2nd, 1942, immediately prior to the invasion of Java, there occurs the following pertinent remark: "Once Japanese rule is established however there will inevitably be a change in the attitude of the people. The poisoning of gullible public opinion against the Dutch will begin at once; it will not even be difficult to persuade the masses that they have been oppressed and ill-treated and exploited for centuries and that the millennium has now come." Five times in the course of this same address, a detailed defence of Dutch colonial policy, the attempt was made to disarm any would-be critics by phrases such as "this anomalous situation I do not expect to continue in the future," or "I expect that constitutional reforms giving complete effect to this . . . will be introduced after the war."³

¹ Such fears are understandable, but it is noteworthy that British prisoners with relatives interned in Malaya did not share them, and also that the Dutch seemed far more worried about the Indonesians than about the Japanese.

² See *Indonesia at the Crossroads*, by J. A. Verdoorn, *Pacific Affairs*, Dec. '46.

³ *Geographical Journal* Vol. XCIX, No. 2, Feb, 1942.

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It is in fact impossible to resist the conclusion that, at the time when the Pacific War broke out, the Dutch in the Indies were sitting both metaphorically as well as literally on a series of volcanoes, and that they feared the consequences of the protracted removal of their elaborate precautionary devices in the political field no less than in the seismological.

What, then, was the trouble in pre-war Netherlands India? Fundamentally the problem was a psychological one, whose roots lay deeply buried in the past. An underlying antipathy prevailed between the majority of the Dutch and the Indonesian masses, marked by a conspicuous absence of mutual sympathy or respect. Though many Hollanders displayed a strong sense of duty to the Indonesians, almost all of them lacked the tolerant affection which characterised the British attitude to the Malays.² Not for nothing have these people, ethnically barely distinguishable from the bulk of the Indonesians, been called the "gentlemen of the East," and though this nick-name may perhaps be as much a commentary on the British superiority complex as on the charms of the Malays, it nevertheless does symbolise the harmonious relationship which prevailed in Malaya, where the friction normally prevalent in plural societies was surprisingly slight.

It would, on the other hand, be difficult to find two more irreconcilable types than the Indonesians and the Dutch. To what extent the "gloomy and austere discipline of Calvinism"³ explains the typical behaviour of a people well over a third of whom today are Roman Catholic is debatable, but certainly the Dutch, solid in body, stolid in mind, and unusually ponderous in both, take a pride in what they claim to be their national characteristics: business acumen, hard work, and *koppigheid*. The translation of this last word varies according to the mood and experiences of the interpreter; some would call it stubbornness or tenacity, others, less politely, pig-headedness or plain cussedness. But few, least of all the Dutch themselves, would deny its existence.

The Indonesians, by contrast, a graceful, light hearted and artistic folk, have evolved in response to the enervating climate

¹ Dr. Meijer Ranneft stated in *De weg voor Indie* (1945): "The Indies were more colonial in 1940 than they had ever been before, despite popular opinion to the contrary."

² The relationships between the British and the other racial elements in Malaya, however, was not always so harmonious.

³ See Hamilton Fyfe: *The Illusion of National Character*, p.62.

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of their bountiful lands¹ an *adagio tempo* in their way of living which may be described as laziness carried to a fine art. From the first, much to the annoyance of the Dutch, the Indonesians remained singularly unimpressed by the western merchants, or "grocers" as they sarcastically called them, and the ostentation² which the latter displayed did nothing to improve matters. In those early days the unwillingness of the native to emulate western methods, though thoroughly irritating, did not entail serious economic consequences, but in the nineteenth century an expanding European market for tropical produce caused the Dutch to introduce the culture system of compulsory agricultural production by the peasants.

This represented the forcing on to the native of the European tempo of life (a problem which largely solved itself in contemporary Malaya by the unrestricted immigration of Chinese), and caused resentment to be added to contempt. Under this system Java was transformed into a vast and immensely profitable plantation run by slave labour till, as the worst excesses eventually became known in Holland, a wave of indignant public opinion swept it away in 1870.

But not even the "ethical policy" introduced some thirty two years later, after an interim period of unbridled *laissez faire*³ had further undermined the toppling structure of native society, could efface the memories of the earlier days. The new policy, it is true, has been faithfully pursued in many respects, in spite of numerous unexpected snags. Thus, as every improvement introduced to raise the standard of living became reflected instead in an increasing population, the Dutch have energetically sought to alleviate distress by expanding agricultural productivity, colonising the Outer Provinces, and developing Javanese industry. But the gulf between the living standards of the native and European has not been bridged, and with the abnormal prices which Indies produce has at times commended in world markets, may even have widened. W. Middendorp in *De nationalistische beweging voor 1940* refers to the fantastic profits made from petroleum in 1920, when every director

¹ Nowhere else in the world does the combination occur of extensive volcanic soils in an equatorial climate. The effect of such a climate, in itself as productive as a hot-house, on normal soils is to leach them of all nutritive elements. In Java and Sumatra, however, volcanic action has preserved the fertility of the soils. Thus both climate and soils combine to give optimum conditions for rapid vegetational growth.

² See, e.g., Voice of the Netherlands, 5th April, 1947, "A last look at Batavia."

³ An important exception was the Native Land Act of 1870, prohibiting the sale of land by Indonesians to Europeans, and thus safeguarding native land tenure.

of the K.P.M. received not less than 50,000 guilders, a state of affairs which repeated itself in 1927.

Figures such as these effectively dispose of the somewhat facile claim that, since the finances of the Indies were separated from those of Holland, the latter has ceased to rely on the profits of the former.¹ None the less, vast sums have been spent² during the twentieth century on every conceivable form of public welfare, and, so far as material prosperity was concerned, Netherlands India before the Second World War compared very favourably with other colonial territories elsewhere in South East Asia. The sincerity of Queen Wilhelmina's speech at the opening of the States General in the Hague in September 1901 need not therefore be questioned, and the policy of "moral obligation" which it announced, aiming at the political, social, economic, and educational progress of the people in their own interests, was a model of enlightenment in its day.

But that day is nearly half a century ago, and meanwhile the Dutch, exulting in a glow of self-righteous enthusiasm, have completely failed to appreciate the significance of the rising tide of Asiatic nationalism. It is in this connexion that even the more idealistic Hollanders have for the most part erred so tragically. For, though doubtless inspired by the highest motives, they have never stopped to consider whether the reforms which they were so busy introducing were desired by the Indonesians. It is part of their "moral" or paternal concept that they alone are in a position to judge what is best for their children. The Dutch are firm believers in the doctrine of original sin, and laziness and incompetence figure high on their list of the major vices. The Indonesian's indifference to the virtues of commercialism has caused the Dutch to form an extremely poor opinion of his inherent capabilities.³ This in turn, coupled with the need to placate a large Eurasian element by giving it full scope in all branches of government service, accounts for the extreme hesitancy which has distinguished

¹ In any case this was frankly admitted by a commission of the Second Chamber in 1919, quoted by Middendorp, *op cit*, as stating that "the British colonial system which has become increasingly an intentional training for independence, is unsuitable for Holland, so long as we have need of the direct and indirect advantages drawn at present from the Netherlands Indies."

² For details see *Indonesia and the Netherlands*, by J. O. M. Brock, Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1943.

³ "The Indonesians were as inexperienced as the Burmese or the Filipinos in self-government; but Holland has been decidedly the most skeptical of the three colonial powers as to the political capacity of her wards."—*Government and Nationalism in South-east Asia*, by Emmerson, Mills, and Thompson, I.P.R., 1942, p.44.

educational practice in Indonesia from that in neighbouring lands.

Thus, although training for ultimate self-government has always been claimed as an integral part of the "ethical policy," ultimate seemed clearly to be the operative word, and it is not surprising that the small Indonesian minority which did manage to acquire a western education should become restive and suspicious of Dutch intentions. Koppigheid further aggravated the situation. The history of the official attitude to the nationalist movement consists of a melancholy record of curt refusals to discuss proposals for increased autonomy, either cultural or political, always on the grounds that the Indonesians were not ready for it. All would come in heaven's—i.e., Holland's—good time; meanwhile the Indonesians were told to be good children: they would understand better when they grew up.

Such tactics constituted a grave psychological blunder, for, as is now belatedly being recognized by the Dutch, "the natural aptitude of the Indonesian is no whit inferior to that of the European; his interests have merely led him in other directions."⁴ Consequently the policy of arresting his natural development produced an unhealthy reaction in the form of a severe personality disorder. His self-respect was injured, and he began to manifest all the more obvious symptoms of an acute inferiority complex.

Indonesian nationalism in its contemporary form, like the related movements elsewhere in Asia today, is an attempt to compensate for this attitude of mind. Fundamentally it is a psychological phenomenon, whatever political and economic consequences it may entail. This accounts for its unceasing preoccupation with spiritual rather than material values. Boedi Oetomo ("Glorious Endeavour"), founded in 1908, Sjarikat Dagang Islam, which arose a few years later, the Tamam Siswo school system, and more latterly Parindra and Gerindo, all major tributaries of the great nationalist stream, have to a remarkable degree ignored the economic aspect of the struggle. Even today the Dutch themselves remain confounded by what they regard as the complete other-worldliness of the Indonesians. "Only purely political problems appear of first importance to them; they pursue political activities for political ends alone. To them freedom means political freedom, political autonomy.

⁴ J. H. Boeke: *Conditions for Indonesian Independence*, Pacific Affairs Dec. 1946.

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Economic considerations are incidental, not ends in themselves."¹

In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in the Pacific the nationalists came to lay particular stress on the need for a common citizenship (*algemeen burgerschap*) for all peoples inhabiting the Indies, an obvious indication of the sense of inferiority under which they laboured. The Visman Report of 1941² contains the significant remark: "One of the deepest impressions retained from the hearings was the general urge among non-European representatives for complete equality with the European."

This sense of injured self-respect furthermore explains the tremendous influence which Japan could wield over the Indonesian masses. Ever since the Treaty of Portsmouth which marked Japan's victorious termination of her war against Russia, the subject people of Asia have, in their heart of hearts, looked to her as their champion. This is not a logical process of thought. The Manchurian "affair" and the China "incident" have clearly demonstrated the hypocrisy of Japan's "Sacred Mission," though it must be remembered that throughout South East Asia the ever present Chinese middleman enjoyed such an unenviable reputation among the indigenous population that opinion would automatically tend to side with his adversaries. Be that as it may, it is not easy to discount the words of a cultured and progressively minded Indian, holding a high post in government service in Malaya, who told me, only a few days before the capitulation of Singapore that, though his reason utterly rebelled against it, his sympathies instinctively ranged themselves with the Japanese in their fight against the Anglo-Americans.

The Indonesians experienced a similar dilemma. Men like Sjahrir and Sjarifoeddin, even when interned for their so-called subversive activities, saw through the empty tawdriness of Japanese slogans, and resisted the temptation to flirt with a power whose ideals were so inferior to, and incompatible with, their own. Instead they advocated co-operation with the Dutch, provided only that this was on a basis of equal partnership in a joint Commonwealth. In his diary kept in Boven Digoel, Sjahrir wrote on March 28th, 1938: "There is going to develop a real basis for co-operation between Holland and Indonesia." More recently still, a few weeks before the attack

¹ Boeke, loc cit. p.396.

cit. p.9 See also infra p.16.

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on Java, another prominent nationalist, later to be driven into collaboration with the Japanese by the rebuff he received, and now a leading member of the Republican Government, offered to rally the Indonesians to the Dutch cause against Japan, on condition that he could authoritatively promise them true democratic self-government within a Netherlands Commonwealth.

But such eminently statesmanlike suggestions, and countless others like them, were witheringly rejected as adolescent insolence. On February 23rd, 1940 an Indonesian member of the Volksraad, Wiwoho by name, urged the setting up of an imperial conference to consider the whole question of Indonesian status in relation to the Netherlands. It met with the usual delaying tactics. Some months later the official reply stated that, since Holland was (by that time) in enemy hands, it was not a fitting occasion on which to discuss reforms, but a commission would be set up to study the wishes of the people. So was established the celebrated "Visman Commission"¹ whose report, ironically enough, came off the press the day after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Once again hope deferred made the heart sick: Indonesia was promised that the matter would receive full consideration after the war, when an Imperial Conference would most assuredly be called. So paternalism and *koppigheid* won the day, and the Indies entered the war against Japan in a mood of cynical disillusion.

The course of events thereafter was not calculated to enhance Dutch prestige. The Japanese landed on Java on March 1st, 1942, and, after only a few days sporadic fighting, the Dutch surrendered. Never was so much face lost by so many in so short a time, and native opinion as a whole came out openly in support of the invader. Rohan Rivett, an Australian war correspondent, who landed on Java at this time in a gallant but abortive attempt to escape from Singapore, observes: "We had abundant evidence during our . . . journey that the bulk of the population welcomed the island's conquerors, and were emphatically anti-European."² Thus was collaboration born, not only among the masses but also amid the ranks of the political internees like Soekarno and Hatta, soon to be released by the Japanese.³

¹ So called after its Chairman, Dr. F. H. Visman. The full name was "De Commissie tot Bestudeering van Staatsrechtelijke Hervormingen."

² Rohan Rivett: *Behind Bamboo*.

³ Sjahrir and Sjarifoeddin were also released by the Japanese, but, greatly to their credit eschewed all forms of collaboration, and instead were active in the anti-Japanese underground movement.

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In the years which followed, the Indonesians had ample opportunity to discover the clay feet and hob-nailed boots of their new idol, and by 1945 most of them were longing for his departure. Food shortage, religious, cultural, and personal interference by the kempeitai, and general mismanagement counted for far more than the offensive bearing of the occupation forces. Indeed, humiliating as it is to admit it, the Japanese tended rather to be admired for his colossal swagger and self-assertion because he, an Asiatic, was behaving in an even more "European" way than the Dutch themselves. And many of the unrulier spirits, under the skilled tuition of the Japanese-organized youth movement, proved adept copyists of their new masters.

Carefully adjusting her tactics and timing to local circumstances, Japan everywhere proclaimed independence—within the Co-prosperity Sphere—to the occupied lands. Burma and the Philippines received theirs in 1943, and in September 1944 Indonesia was promised hers by Koiso, then Japanese Prime Minister. Various preparation committees were formed, and towards the end of July 1945, a final body, including Soekarno and Hatta, had been selected. On August 9th (after the first atomic bomb had been dropped), Terauchi summoned these two for consultations to Saigon, and told them to prepare Indonesia to receive its independence on August 23rd. By the time they had returned to Batavia, on the 15th, liberation had indeed come, though hardly in the manner anticipated.

Only those who went through it can fully appreciate the uncanny emptiness of the period immediately following the Japanese capitulation. The Allies, completely unprepared numerically to accept the instantaneous surrender of millions of men dispersed throughout an area several times the size of Europe, hesitated to expose themselves too quickly to the obvious possibility of revengeful treachery. Time, the Japanese, and the Allies all appeared to be standing still. Not so the Indonesians.

Having at last received their longed-for independence, they can hardly be blamed for consolidating it. The peasant population, dazed and bewildered by the nightmare which had passed, without, however, giving place to any normal awakening looked anxiously around for guidance. The native intelligentsia were ready and willing to provide it. Most of these, for the first time in their lives had held responsible posts under the Japanese regime, and dreaded the prospect of relinquishing

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everything to the returning Europeans. Throughout the length and breadth of the land Japanese-installed native administrators, food-controllers, and agents of all kinds stayed at their posts. It remained only to form a government, in which capacity the preparation committee could serve pro tem, and to proclaim the Republic. After a brief hesitation, Soekarno took the plunge.

From this necessarily summarized account it can be seen that the new state is cast in an essentially Japanese mould. But it is quite unjust to infer therefrom that "the fascistic origins of the so-called 'republic Indonesia' are unmistakable."* On the contrary, all the evidence suggests that the essential driving power behind the scenes today is the Indonesian peoples' passion for self-expression, an urge which existed long before the Japanese invasion, though stubbornly suppressed by the Dutch.

The English observer may perhaps derive illumination from the consideration of a remarkably similar case of a psychological impasse which occurred in our own modern history, namely in our dealings with Ireland. When, in the 1880's, Mr Balfour attempted to "kill Home Rule by kindness" he was making exactly the same mistake of trying to cure a spiritual complaint by economic medicines as the Dutch have made in Indonesia. In both cases the story was the same. For centuries the children had asked for bread and been given a stone; now after the glittering stone of independence had finally dazzled them into the belief that it alone provided the panacea they sought, they were belatedly offered bread.

After a few disappointing years England began slowly to realize that "kindness" would never kill Home Rule, but before any satisfactory alternative policy had been evolved the outbreak of the First World War afforded a welcome excuse for shelving the issue. England's difficulty, however, became Ireland's opportunity, and so the Irish Republic was born. To the English people, fighting as they were for their survival, the Easter Rising of 1916 seemed the basest form of treachery, to which the execution of the Sinn Fein leaders and the ruthlessness that later characterized the Black and Tan reign of terror were obvious reactions.

The Dutch story presents an almost complete parallel to this, and it is exceedingly difficult for the contemporary Hollander to regard President Soekarno as anything but a traitor. Nazi

*Dr. Frans H. Visman: *The Situation in Java*, November 1945.

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sympathisers in Holland received short shrift after the occupation as the recent trial of De Geer has demonstrated. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Dutch find it irksome to have to negotiate with collaborators in the Indies. Of course there is another side to the argument, but it is one that appeals essentially to the head rather than the heart.

Ultimately Ireland had to be permitted to do as she wished. Once the war had been well and truly won, and passions calmed down, the English finally admitted the stupidity of trying to force their ideas on to a people so fundamentally different in culture, temperament, and religion. Many, it is true, remained incapable of viewing the situation from any angle other than the economic, and were at pains to point out to the Irish that, merely out of self-interest, they would be well advised to maintain the *status quo* in their commercial relationships with England. All manifestations of nationalism, economic or cultural, provoked either merriment or gloomy prognostications of imminent collapse: the Irish obviously would never be able to govern themselves.

The Dutch today are using identical arguments in connexion with the Indonesian Republic. The incompetence of its leadership, the artificiality of its "synthetic" Malay language, and its dependence economically on Holland are all regarded as axiomatic. Like ourselves a nation of shopkeepers, the Dutch seem utterly unable to grasp the simple fact that man does not live by bread alone. His creative instincts must have an outlet; to thwart them is to court disaster, and leads almost inevitably to psychological distress. Doubtless, in the first flush of independence, an excessive importance may be placed on spiritual values, and the more mundane realities relegated for a while to the background. But it is quite beside the point to deduce therefrom that the people are not fit to govern themselves. Nobody ever is, until he has already begun to do so.

On the other hand it is impossible to view the immediate prospects of Indonesian rule with any high degree of equanimity. Freedom from external control is a prerequisite of responsible government, but it does not of itself ensure the existence of responsible government, properly so called. The fact remains that, to date, no independent Asiatic state has made conspicuous progress towards democracy. In Indonesia, as in Ireland, integration of very diverse elements has been achieved essentially on a negative basis, that of opposition to the alien ruling caste, and if this "anti" mentality persists when its justification has

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passed away it will assuredly stultify the growth of the new nation. Moreover the situation is grievously complicated by the presence of a middle element in the form of the Eurasians, who, by virtue of the insecurity of their position between the upper and nether millstones, tend to extremism. Thus, like the "middle English" in Ireland, and for the same reasons, they may provide outstanding nationalist leaders, while others of their number are characteristically "plus royaliste que le roi."

The Dutch have always been careful not to alienate the sympathies of the Eurasians, who comprise some 70 to 90 per cent of the so-called European population of the Indies, and have given them full equality, both in law, and, at least so far as government service is concerned, in opportunity, with full blooded Europeans.¹ Unfortunately, however, in placating the half-castes the Hollanders have offended the natives. Dutch and Eurasians, in that order, shared nearly all the best posts, Eurasians formed the rank and file of the civil service, and the native perforce took the rest. Hence arises the interesting anomaly that the Eurasian in Indonesia exhibits the traditional inferiority complex of the half-caste in only a comparatively mild form, while the native, hitherto relegated for the most part to the lowest level has become almost pathologically sensitive of his position.

So far as the native is concerned, this acute sense of inferiority provides an obvious clue to much of his present hysteria and suspicion of Dutch motives. But what makes the situation so serious is that this same attitude of mind is reciprocated by the Dutch themselves, giving rise to what the Netherlands press has aptly termed a "crisis of confidence." Already before the war many Dutchmen, painfully aware that in a world of great-power politics they retained their empire only on sufferance, were developing a sort of small-nation complex.² While to the outside world it showed itself in a sense of permanent deferentiality, within the Indies where koppigheid was less restrained, it took the more aggressive form of unnecessarily rigid control and suppression.

The particularly unfortunate course of the war, from the Dutch point of view, naturally aggravated matters. Long before the invasion of the Indies, Dutch prestige there had

¹ Dr. G. H. C. Hart, loc cit, stated: "I believe our system to be not only natural, but also politically wise: it has given us the support of many thousands of staunch Dutchmen who under another policy would have been malcontents, unhappy in the native camp and with a grudge against the nation of their fathers."—p.83.

² Leonhard Huizinga's short story *Het Wilhelmus* is a brilliant study of this.

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suffered badly from the over-running of the mother country in May 1940. And, unlike the Americans in the Philippines or the British in Burma, the Dutch did not have the opportunity of regaining face by an overpowering display of military strength.¹ At present a grave danger exists that the more reactionary elements in Holland will insist on using force against the Indonesians precisely for this reason if a suitable *casus belli* presents itself.

In the last resort, therefore, what distinguishes the contemporary problem in Indonesia from the otherwise not dissimilar situations in India or Burma, is that in the former both sides are suffering from the same psychological disturbance. The intransigent behaviour alike of Indonesians and Dutch betrays all the symptoms of over-compensation for imagined inferiority, and the intense bitterness of both the hitherto suppressed nationalists and the frustrated contemporary Dutch reformers arises from the thwarting of their creative impulses.

At the time of writing² the deadlock seems complete, and only a generous act of statesmanship, like that which Britain has recently performed with regard to India, can prevent serious deterioration. Unfortunately the Dutch do not feel sufficiently sure of themselves to take the step.

Yet, could they but realize it, the weakness of the Dutch might in reality prove to be their strength. Indonesia must maintain contact with the West³ but dreads the idea of falling completely into the hands of any one major foreign power. If mutual trust could be established between the Indonesians and the Dutch, Holland, a small but extremely advanced European power, of itself incapable of dominating Indonesia, might yet complete the useful and not entirely unprofitable mission of bridging the gap which still separates Indonesia from the West.

¹ The position of the French in Indo-China is closely analogous to that of the Dutch in Indonesia in nearly all respects.

² This article was written in June, 1947, i.e., before the Dutch attempted to settle the problem by force, but at the time of going to press no further comment can usefully be made.

³ If only because the West cannot afford to dispense with such contact, and will insist on maintaining it in some form or other.

INDIA AND THE FUTURE

By JOHN COATMAN

AUGUST 15th, 1947, witnessed the opening of what will surely prove to be one of the fateful movements in human history. Naturally, the world's attention hitherto has been concentrated on the events and persons of a swiftly developing drama, but now that power has been transferred from British hands we can ask ourselves what August 15th means to us and the British Commonwealth and the world at large. One thing is quite certain, and that is that what has happened in India will fire the imagination and stimulate the activities of subject peoples everywhere, whether inside or outside the British Commonwealth.

Discussion of the consequences of August 15th for the general pattern of world relations begins appropriately with the region of which India herself is the centre, namely, the Indian Ocean. Extending eastward from the Persian Gulf and Africa to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, and holding within its borders roughly a quarter of the human race, this is one of the key areas of the world, whether it is considered from the point of view of security and defence or of world communications. The heart of this region, both geographically and politically, India dominates its whole extent. Its north-western, northern, and north-eastern frontiers march with those of a fringe of Central Asian border countries, whilst in the extreme north-west, beyond the northern confines of Kashmir, its political sphere of influence under British rule touched the limits of Soviet Russia. In the north-west, Pakistan has a frontier with Persia through Baluchistan, and another with Afghanistan through the country of the hill tribes living between the administrative border of the North-West Frontier Province and the Durand line. On the north, India has frontiers with Tibet and Nepal, and, finally, the Indian Empire, which, until about ten years ago, included Burma, had a frontier with Siam. To all these external relationships, with all their problems and responsibilities, the successor states of the now-vanished Indian Empire, that is, Pakistan, India, and Burma, are the heirs. Their landward neighbours thus extend the scope of the region of the Indian Ocean into eastern and central Asia, and, through its interests in the Persian Gulf, into the Middle East. Hitherto all this vast area, together with those other components of the British Empire, Malaya and Ceylon, has formed one defence

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system based on British naval and Indian land power. For a century this has been one of the corner stones of world order and security, and now at a stroke it has all changed. The unity of India has gone, and British power can no longer operate in the Indian Ocean region decisively and unilaterally as it has done hitherto.

Two important considerations must be borne in mind at this point. The first is that it is not only in India that British rule has lapsed. Burma also has become independent, and her future relations with the British Commonwealth cannot at present be foretold with any great certainty. Ceylon is to have Dominion status, but, no doubt, her defence will remain an imperial responsibility. In Malaya there are stirrings of political life more vigorous and directed towards more fundamental objectives than ever before. The Government's policy there is to establish a strong central government and secure the basis of common citizenship among all the peoples who have their homes in the country. Clearly, their interests and opinions will increasingly influence the government of Malaya. However this may be, it is clear that the old unitary system of defence in the Indian Ocean region having been abolished, a new one must be built up, one which will depend on free and whole-hearted co-operation by three at least of the successor states of the old Indian Empire among themselves, and between them and Great Britain. No amount of good-will or of paper agreements or machinery of consultation will meet the needs of security in this area. Its defence cannot be ensured without British sea and air power, and Indian, Pakistani and Burma land forces and military potential of all kinds. Here, then, is a clear and urgent work awaiting the new governments.

But at this point we come to the second of the two considerations to which reference was made above. The problem of defence in the Indian Ocean region has been greatly complicated by the partition of British India into two separate countries. In place of one country we have two completely independent countries, namely Pakistan and India, and in view of the present policy of some important Indian States, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that ultimately more than two independent countries will be formed out of the old India. This division of one country into two, or possibly more, independent states alters profoundly the part which she and her peoples were expected to play in Asia, the British Commonwealth, and the world, and seriously affects her whole economic and military

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potential. Assuming for the moment that only the two Dominions of India and Pakistan will emerge finally, and that all the Indian States will adhere to one or other of them, no matter how amicable and cordial the relations may be between these two independent countries, the two together cannot equal the old united India in power and prestige. We can take for granted the fullest goodwill of the statesmen of the two Dominions and their earnest endeavours to establish a peaceful *modus vivendi* between their peoples. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the members of the majority community of a once united India, the Hindus, whether in India or in Pakistan, will continue to resent deeply the partition of the country. For them Pakistan must be always India irredenta, and this will poison relations between the two countries as long as the partition lasts. There is not one district in Pakistan, not even in the North-West Frontier Province or Sind in which there is no Hindu minority, whilst in some of them the minority is a material proportion of the total population. The truth is that the parts of what geography, economics, and 100 years of British rule have joined together into one country, have been put asunder by politics. There are no natural frontiers anywhere in the great sub-continent. The magnificent systems of communications on which the life of the whole country depends have been planned and administered on a nation-wide scale, whilst such truly vital undertakings to the life of the whole country as the great systems of irrigation, find that partition not only impairs their efficiency but actually threatens their continued existence. All these things set up all manner of stresses and strains which must seriously impair the strength and stability of the two new dominions. A united India could have been an incalculably powerful force for stability and protection in Asia and in the world in general, and could have spoken with a mighty voice in the counsels of the United Nations. But India and Pakistan, in spite of their size and populations, will not rank, at any rate for years to come, among the greater powers, for partition has probably weakened each of them militarily more even than it has weakened them politically and economically. The Indian Army has been divided between Pakistan and India, and neither of them has naval or air forces to be compared even with those of some of the smaller European powers. Thus we see that the break-up of the British hegemony in the Indian Ocean is accompanied by a fragmentation of the power of India inside that region, a fact which immensely complicates

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the problem of building up a new system of defence. It is further complicated by the fact that the relations between the two successor states into which British India has been divided, and between them and their neighbours and colleagues in the former Pax Britannica in the Indian Ocean, will not easily admit of their combining into the effective defence system which is required. Recent, and, at the time of writing, continuing events have made it clear that both Indian and Pakistan will be too busily occupied for some time to come, with pressing measures of internal peace and security to be able to turn to the remoter matter of external defence, no matter how overriding its importance may be in the last analysis. Burma is in the same case, and it is not possible to say when she, either, will be able to turn her attention to the question of her national defence. Of course, Great Britain is still actively interested in the Indian Ocean through Ceylon and Malaya, but it is obvious that no satisfactory new system of defence can be established there until India, Pakistan and Burma are able to play the fullest part consistent with their human and material strength.

Yet another complication arises from the fact that the eyes of the successor states are turned, so-to-speak, in different directions. India and Burma must inevitably be concerned with the affairs of South Eastern Asia, but Pakistan's interest in that region is more attenuated. Afghanistan, Persia, and the Persian Gulf and their affairs are more remote from India and Burma than they are from Pakistan which, in fact, will be closely and continuously concerned with the affairs of these places. Nevertheless, Pakistan must have some interest in South-Eastern Asia through Eastern Bengal, whilst India can certainly not be indifferent to what is happening in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. For one thing, the Persian Gulf and its littoral countries are already, in this nascent air age, rapidly becoming the highway to India. Suez and the Red Sea will be replaced by Baghdad, Bahrain, and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, India's and Pakistan's relations with Persia and Iraq, the countries controlling the immediate air approaches from the west, will be of crucial importance. For another thing, neither India nor Pakistan have any known oil deposits of any real extent, being dependent for supplies on Persia and Burma. For this reason again they are bound to be concerned with what is happening in one of their great oil supplying regions. But Pakistan is in physical touch with both Afghanistan and Persia, and her contacts with these two countries will

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increase for ideological as well as political and economic reasons. The government of Pakistan will probably take more interest in the Islamic countries lying to its west, from Afghanistan to Egypt, than in any of their eastern neighbours. Mr. Nehru, on the other hand, has been interested for many years in the subject of closer union of the Asian peoples. He sees India as the centre of Asia, the prime mover and principal organiser in any scheme of closer relations between Asian countries, whether on a regional or a continental scale. The Asian Conference which met at New Delhi from March 23rd to April 2nd this year was convened by the Indian Council for World Affairs, and was attended by representatives of practically every country in Asia except Japan. The Soviet-Asian republics sent fourteen delegates, a larger number than any other country excepting only Burma and Ceylon. The Conference was held nominally to discuss cultural problems, but, naturally, politics came in. Some of the Indian delegates made no secret of the leading part which they expected their country to play in schemes for closer union in Asia, but it is worth noting that the Chinese delegates did not see eye to eye with them in this matter, whilst the representatives of the smaller countries were not able to conceal a certain apprehension at the thought of their destinies being controlled by either or both of these potentially great powers. For, when the Conference took place, it was still generally assumed that India would remain one and united after achieving her independence. Significantly, the Moslem League was not represented at this Conference, and Pakistan is not likely to take any active part in organising any bloc or blocs, whether regional or continental, in Asia. But both India and Burma will continue to be interested in such matters, and so, as we see, Pakistan on the one side, and India and Burma on the other, will have their eyes turned in different directions as far as foreign interests are concerned. In one matter, however, they will certainly be united and that is in opposition to what they regarded as any manifestation of western imperialism, whether military or financial, in Asia.

Naturally, any discussion of the effect of August 15th on world relations must take account of Russia. Whether India and Pakistan, or the latter alone, will perpetuate the political relations which have hitherto existed between British India and the Central Asian principalities of Chitral, Gilgit and Hunza Nagar, it is impossible to say at present. They were originally the responsibility of Kashmir, but, of course, that State was

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unable to discharge that responsibility once the affairs of these remote places became mixed up with power politics of the last quarter of the 19th century, and *a fortiori* it will not be able to do so now. If Kashmir should decide to join Pakistan, it may be that the new Dominion will continue the relationships with these northern countries which had been established by the British Raj. However this may be, Pakistan and India can hardly avoid some dealings with Russia in Persia and the Persian Gulf. Russia's search for additional oil resources has already given the Persian Government cause for apprehension, and any extension of Russian influence or power in that country would be a matter of lively concern to Pakistan and India. The same is true of any extension of Russian influence in Afghanistan. There, too, Pakistan and India have a joint interest. No one can pretend to know what the rulers of the Kremlin have in mind with regard to India, but the fact remains that, as Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode pointed out at a meeting of the East-India Association in January of this year, Russia has developed during the last 50 years three avenues of approach by rail through Afghanistan to India. Moreover, the belt of black cotton soil on the northern border of Chinese Turkestan can be turned over to wheat growing in one season, thus providing wheat for a large army within as many hundred miles of India as it used to be thousands some years ago. The North-West is, therefore, still the Achilles heel of India as far as invasion by land is concerned, and both India and Pakistan are equally concerned.

But, in thinking of the relations between India and Pakistan and Russia, the extent to which Communism has made headway in the two Dominions is an important factor. It is not easy to be precise on this subject, although it can be said at once that in Pakistan there is very little, if any, Communism, and not much prospect of its extension. The greater part of the land of Pakistan is owned by peasant proprietors, who are, of course, the worst material in the world for Communism. Moreover, there are strong ideological reasons why the predominantly Moslem Pakistan should not be a good field for the spread of a system in which religion is bracketed with capitalism as "Public Enemy No. 1." Lastly, in Pakistan there are but few industrial centres, and thus hardly any urban proletariat which is the most fruitful ground for Communism. But in India the matter is more complicated. There are many large industrial centres in which Communism has already made some progress, whilst

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the extreme Left Wing sections of Congress, which show signs of an intention to hive off from the parent body, will, no doubt, develop into a regular Communist Party. Even the rural population of India has been influenced by Communism and will probably be influenced by it still more extensively when a strong and well-organised Communist Party comes into existence. For, in many parts of India, unlike the greater part of Pakistan, land is owned by big land-owners and the cultivators are either tenants, many of them rack-rented, or landless labourers. Against all this, the strongest influence in the Congress Party is exercised by the great industrialists and financiers. These and the great landowners will certainly fight resolutely against any extension of Communism, and their financial and economic strength will be reinforced by the powerful social and religious sanctions of the caste system of the majority Hindu community. Communism in India will certainly come up against these strong anti-communist defences, and thus, although both India and Pakistan will wish and will strive to maintain the best possible relations with Russia, the governing systems and ruling classes of both the Dominions will not be such as to commend themselves to the Soviet rulers.

Outside the region of the Indian Ocean, including in that term as we have done the landward neighbours of India and Pakistan, August 15th should not have any major international implications, at any rate, at first. India, Pakistan, and China are major stars in the Asian constellation, and there is no doubt that when the internal conditions of the three countries become more stabilised and their strength both at home and abroad develops in consequence, their relations with each other will acquire considerable importance. In any case, the South China Sea must become an increasingly important region in world affairs, and both the two new Dominions, perhaps India more than Pakistan, will desire the closest and most friendly relations with its countries. Here they will come into direct contact with the U.S.A., and although they will both be anxious to establish the most friendly relations possible with that great power, they will both be exceedingly suspicious of anything in the shape of dollar diplomacy and economic penetration. Similarly, French and Dutch colonial policy in Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies will come under their close scrutiny, more particularly, perhaps, that of India.

But when all is said and done, India and Pakistan are, for the present, at any rate, Dominions of the British Commonwealth,

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and as long as they remain Dominions they will no doubt use the existing Commonwealth machinery for consultation and information in foreign affairs as do the other Dominions. It would be an interesting, but at this stage unprofitable occupation to speculate on the chances of either or both of the new Dominions retaining their membership of the Commonwealth. This, however, may be said in view of the strains and stresses set up by partition inside each of the new Dominions and in the relations between them. Informed opinion in both India and Pakistan will recognise that by staying in the Commonwealth the two new Dominions will give themselves the best chances of solving both their domestic problems, particularly the communal problems which are the fundamental ones, and also the problems of their diplomatic relations with each other. They will realise also that continued membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations will be an exceedingly strong inducement to the great Princes to join one or other of them, whilst all who realise that revolution and violence can no longer contribute anything of value to India's life will also add their influence to the Commonwealth cause. To say more than this at the present moment would be mere speculation, but it is interesting to notice that the new Dominions are appointing High Commissioners to their sister Dominions, and both accepted an invitation by the Commonwealth Relation Conference convened by Australia in August at Canberra to hold preliminary discussions on the Japanese Peace Treaty.

India has, and for many years has had, close relations with many parts of the British Commonwealth and Empire because her nationals are to be found in every one of the Dominions and in most of the Colonies. There are at least three and a half millions of them in other British countries. Over a million of these are in Burma, $\frac{3}{4}$ million each in Ceylon and Malaya, over $\frac{1}{2}$ million in Mauritius, over $\frac{1}{4}$ million in the West Indies, not far short of $\frac{1}{4}$ million in South Africa, 85,000 in Fiji, 45,000 in Kenya, and so on. The majority of these Indians Overseas come from what is now the Dominion of India, but Pakistan is represented in all the Dominions and in most of the Colonies, notably in the West Indies. The great bulk of Indians overseas went as indentured labourers, but in every one of the lands to which they have gone there are among them a sprinkling of shopkeepers, artisans, agriculturists, and even professional men. Moreover, the Government of British India has had disputes, more or less bitter, with all the various Colonial and

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Dominion Governments in respect of the treatment of Indian nationals. As far as the Colonies are concerned, causes of dispute have been now almost entirely eliminated. With the Dominions, too, except South Africa, the Governments of India and Pakistan will have no cause of quarrel because, although the entry of their people into Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is strictly limited, once they are admitted they receive the full rights of citizens. The last traces of discrimination were found in British Columbia, where, until two or three months ago, Indians were not admitted to the provincial franchise, which, of course, debarred them from the dominion franchise. This last discrimination, however, was abolished this year, and now the two black spots from the Indian point of view are South and East Africa. There is no need to go into details of the treatment of Indians in these places. In East Africa the Colonial Office has considerably improved the situation of late years, but in South Africa it is, if anything, deteriorating. It is well known that Mr. Nehru, when head of the Interim Government which preceded the partition, brought the question of South Africa's treatment of Indian nationals before the United Nations, and India and South Africa have had no diplomatic relations with each other since 1946 when the Union Government adopted the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act. The General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution last year asking South Africa and India to settle their dispute but correspondence published on August 19th and 20th this year by Mr. Nehru shows that no basis for agreement at present exists between them, and diplomatic relations remain in abeyance. Obviously, this is an anomalous position, and it is quite certain that as soon as India, and Pakistan too, are free from their present grave internal problems, one of the first things to which they will turn their attention will be the position of Indians in South Africa. It is quite certain, too, that at the next Imperial Conference there will be some very plain speaking on this subject, and India and Pakistan will undoubtedly find support from other members of the Conference, notably Ceylon, who will be there in her own right. Indeed, it is possible that by using existing machinery for inter-Commonwealth negotiation, India and Pakistan will achieve far more for their nationals in South Africa than ever the India Office could do for them in the days of the British Raj. But, no matter what happens as a result of their action, a new and critically important, perhaps a creative, chapter will be written in the constitution of the British

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Commonwealth of Nations. Indeed, problems of emigration will be of the utmost urgency for India and Pakistan in the future. The population of the old undivided India was increasing by from 5 to 6 millions annually at the time of partition, and there will be a net increase of approximately 60 millions between 1941 and 1951. India and Pakistan cannot support this vast increase of numbers; emigration there must be, and the best outlets are in the British Empire. Imperial statesmanship will be taxed to its utmost to deal with this situation.

Finally, the new patterns of world relationships and strategic dispositions bring India and Pakistan into relations of mutual help and support with South Africa on the one side and Australia and New Zealand on the other. One of the results of the recent war has been some appreciation of the importance of regional needs and interests in defence policies, and the consequent desirability of organising our imperial policy on these terms. In the problems of the Indian Ocean, the interests of India, Pakistan, Africa, Australia and Great Britain are all conjoined, and there are thus the weightiest reasons for all concerned to make a whole-hearted attempt to reach some acceptable solution of the problem of Indians in South Africa. The British Commonwealth of Nations and the whole world stand to gain so much from the free and willing acceptance of membership of the Commonwealth by India and Pakistan, that people of good-will everywhere will watch with anxious interest the development of relations between the new Dominions and their sister countries. As far as Great Britain herself is concerned, the prospects for her future relations with India and Pakistan are more promising than they have ever been. She will have opportunities for sponsoring and helping them in the first difficult years of their independence, both inside and outside the Commonwealth, and these services can be accepted from a colleague. Nevertheless, there are certain difficult problems still outstanding, notably those arising out of the sterling balances, and Indian grievances in South and East Africa. To these will be added others from India's and Pakistan's future needs for emigration facilities inside the Empire.

As these words are being written terrible events are happening in the Punjab, and the possibility of the friendly, trustful, and fruitfully co-operative intercourse between India and Pakistan, for which we all hope so earnestly, trembles in the balance. Despite all that has been said above concerning the meaning of August 15th for Great Britain, the British

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Commonwealth, and the world, the instant, compelling tasks in foreign policy to which the two new members of the Society of Nations must devote themselves lie within the borders of the old India which they have replaced. The concept of a union of all India has gone. All the more reason, therefore, for replacing it with a policy of practical and loyal co-operation in all those fundamental activities which, in a nation state, fall to the central government—defence, communications, currency, trade policy, customs and excise, even, as far as possible, systems of education and law and order. These are not just words. It is the simple truth that unless India and Pakistan, by wise statesmanship and self-restraint, manage to restore as working arrangements the essentials of the economic and military unity of the former British India, whose children and heirs they are, they are doomed to frustration at home, weakness in British Commonwealth counsels, and impotence in the world at large. The restoration of such working arrangements is now the first priority of the foreign policies of India and Pakistan. With the Princes, too, both Dominions have many problems which are essentially problems of foreign policy, and until these and the others are settled, the two Dominions cannot attend to the many claimant duties in the outer world which are already knocking at their doors.

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By HEINRICH FRAENKEL

Since a winter of more than ordinary misfortune had turned into an uncommonly glorious summer, many a German (like Richard III) felt impelled to point to the cloudless sky and to remark on so generous an overdose of sunshine. "If only one could store this up for the winter!" was the sigh I heard again and again: and while the constant dread of the coming winter seemed incongruous enough when expressed by deeply tanned people basking in sunshine, it is, alas, only too grimly justified. I was soon to find that even in the Zone very little provision of fuel was being made, but in Berlin the position is still worse, and there are limits to what further inroads can still be made in the badly decimated timber-reserve of the *Grunewald* and the other surrounding woods and parks, some of which, like the *Tiergarten*, have practically ceased to exist.

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While the intensity and constancy of sunshine this summer were apt to colour the visitor's first impressions and to add a further touch of unreality to the complex German picture, there is always (and particularly in Berlin) the abundance of printed matter and the preponderance of "show business" to make any superficial impression more than usually deceptive.

Of course, for well over a year now the production of printed matter and of shows has been among the few going concerns in Germany—if not the only one, and while in the Western Zones the production of newspapers and books is somewhat curbed by the shortage of newsprint and paper, there is no such impediment in the Eastern Zone where paper supplies are more generous; and certainly not in Berlin where the Occupation Powers are vying with one another to put over their respective points of view, and where such ideological competition has resulted in generous paper allocations and in a glut of printed matter. Each of the Occupation Powers has its own more or less "official" organ among the fourteen or fifteen Berlin morning papers; all the others, as well as the two or three evening and Sunday papers, have some German party axe to grind. But there are also a great many periodicals, by no means all political; there are Weeklies, Fortnightlies, Monthlies, Quarterlies, Art Magazines, Women's papers, Sports journals galore, and all with larger circulations than were ever dreamed of in normal times. (A new fortnightly chess magazine, selling at 50 Pfg. (3d.) has a circulation of 30,000 in Berlin alone.)

Similarly, there is an abundance of shows of every kind and quality, and in this respect Berlin is, even now, one of the liveliest cities in Europe, though there is no (legitimate) night life, and shows have to start around 6 or 6.30, so as to give people a chance to catch the last Underground or *S. Bahn*. The Berliners have two good opera houses to choose from, and any number of concerts and stage-shows (from classical drama to modern American farce), cabarets, and cinemas. Film production seems to be the first German industry properly to get on its feet, and the end of this year should mark the completion of the first thirty or so of the new German productions, some of which are quaintly original and rather good, although (or maybe because) they have to be inexpensive enough to pay their way on the home market or even in the home-Zone.

There are two reasons for all this very partial prosperity: people wish to escape into a dream-world; and there is little

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else they can spend their money on. It is rather a case of having circuses for the lack of bread.

There are, of course, many other things people can (and do) spend their money on, if they have enough of it: the Black Market. Everybody uses it, and has got to use it to subsist. Legitimate expenditure such as rations, rent, fares, amusements, should average little more than M. 150 (just under £4) per month. Everything else goes on the Black Market: which means that a M. 500 a month family can eat their fill about once a month, and one with M. 1000 a month about once a week. (But M. 1000 a month net, after deduction of nearly as much income tax, is considered a very substantial salary, roughly corresponding to the status of a £2000 a year man in this country). When there is no money left, people sell (or swap for food) their remaining valuables and household goods. But most people have little left by now, even those lucky enough not to have been bombed out during the war.

The general deterioration, mentally no less than physically, seems well described by what a friend told me: "Last year we had still some reserves in our bodies, in our larders, and in our faith. Now we have nothing left." The loss of faith seems worst of all. When I first revisited Berlin eighteen months ago, I found less defeatism there than anywhere else in Germany. The Berliners had retained their sense of humour, and they hoped to rebuild their city and earn a reasonable living before very long. When I went there again last winter, I found much though not all of their self-confidence gone. This time it seemed to have vanished. With the rubble of Berlin still very much where it was two years ago—there just isn't enough machinery to clear it away—I found most Berliners resigned to see this state of things perpetuated during their life-time. They are now merely out to grab what they can for themselves, and the mere struggle to subsist absorbs almost all their thoughts and energies.

The moral deterioration is indeed most remarkable and appalling. Almost everybody cheats and steals, not excluding the police whose reluctance to catch criminals is said to be only equalled by their eagerness to relieve harmless foragers of a few pounds of dearly bought fruit or vegetables. They call it "confiscation" and generally give a receipt, but the Berliners call it sheer robbery. One cannot escape these stories about more or less ill-fated foraging expeditions into the countryside; it is the one thing people are really interested in.

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Aren't they interested in politics? The professional politicians are. (The would-be politicians even more). But the mass of the people less than ever. They seem to be fed to the teeth with it and call most of their party leaders blundering fools and parasitical *Bonzen* living on the fat of the land.

The reflection on honesty is certainly not fair. Most German politicians are relatively honest. (They take themselves far too seriously to be otherwise). Yet, like the Bourbons, German party politicians have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. They are, most of them, as intransigent as ever, as unwilling to compromise, and as readily inclined to apply the yard-stick of personal vituperation and recrimination. And that applies to most of them on both sides of the fence dividing East and West; and if some of them were humble enough to plead apprenticeship in the gentle art of democracy, they could all certainly claim the mitigating circumstance that their masters are not exactly giving them a shining example of democratic behaviour, and that too applies to either side of the fence—or the Iron Curtain as it has come to be called.

I found the "Iron Curtain" a state of mind rather than a physical obstacle, and I found it a vicious circle too. Heaven knows the Russians are not exactly trusting by nature, and their suspiciousness, encouraged by recent history, is frequently nourished afresh, which in turn makes them employ methods apt to provoke yet more reaction. Take the case of the "mass deportations" earlier this year when Berlin went wild with the story that many thousands, that night, had been picked up at a moment's notice and deported to Siberia. In point of fact, a few hundred specialised technicians had been taken to do some jobs near the Oder which, many months earlier, they had contracted to do. Whether or not they had signed under pressure, I do not know, but the fact remains that they were picked up at night, thus creating the exaggerated rumours which found only too willing listeners and disseminators. I asked a prominent Communist why on earth the Russians cannot act like the British, when they employ Herr Messerschmidt, or the Americans when they ship some *I. G. Farben* chemist. Why pick them up at night? Why not send them a note: "With reference to their undertaking of such and such a date, would they please report at *Stettiner Bahnhof* next week at such and such a time?" I got the surprising answer that, if so much warning were given, no man would report, and they would all nip across the Zone border. I do not know if they would,

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but the Russians think so and act on that assumption, and the resulting rumour-mongering obviously tends to confirm and strengthen their suspicion. They are well aware (and resentful) of the panicky fear they inspire in most "Western" Germans, particularly those with a "bourgeois" background. Of this I had frequent evidence this summer when there were some stupid but irrepressible rumours about the impending evacuation of Berlin by the British and Americans, and when dozens of Berliners, in a hushed voice, asked me the same fearful question "Are we to be left alone with them?" (I know at least one family fairly comfortably off in a Western suburb and actually striving, at great inconvenience and expense, to move to Frankfurt or Munich, merely so as to avoid any risk of being "left alone with them".)

Of such distorted views I had some further evidence when, preparing my own little trip into the Soviet Zone, I met with much incredulity and not a few warnings at my rashness to embark on so precarious a venture. But I was soon to find that on the other side of the fence one can meet with just as distorted views of the Western Zones. In this respect, indeed, as a mental barrier, the "Iron Curtain" is a formidable proposition. As a physical obstacle I found it non-existing, and the Russian authorities gave me all facilities to take a Berlin car on a week's tour through large parts of Brandenburg and Saxony. They gave me a conducting officer for the round-trip from Berlin, and yet another one to take me from Leipzig to Dresden, and while these two helpful and unassumingly charming young men made all travel arrangements most efficiently, they did not lack the tact of letting me have "unchaperoned" talks with Germans; moreover, I made two further outings into the Eastern Zone, completely independent day-trips, on which I used the car of a Berlin friend, quite unaccompanied by Russian officers or officials.

I found Leipzig true to its reputation of having more of its rubble cleared away than any other of Germany's badly bombed cities. I was glad to learn that two million volumes of the famous *Deutsche Bücherei*, as well as the million volumes of the University Library, are undamaged. Leipzig seems well on the way to recovering its traditional fame as a great centre of book production (though it seems unlikely that it will ever again enjoy the predominant position occupied in the centralised book trade of pre-war Germany). However, it speaks well for the capacity of the remaining Leipzig presses that since the surrender

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40 million books have been produced (half of them text-books for the new *Einheitsschule*), and at least two or three times as many volumes have been printed on reparation account for Russia.

This, to a certain degree, is said to be typical for the general industrial situation (for which no official figures are available). The Russians have taken away much machinery and many complete factories on reparation account. But what remains is working at full pressure, 25% for the German market and 75% for reparation, of which just about enough is being quietly "deviated" to the Black Market to even things out on a fifty/fifty basis. People are quite candid about this, and I found it confirmed at Meissen, the picturesque little town near Dresden where the famous "Dresden china" is being produced as beautifully as ever.

One of the most significant points about the Eastern Zone is the fact that, with bank accounts frozen and black marketeering not quite as easy as in the West, whoever wants to eat must work, with little chance for indulging a social superiority-complex in idleness, as so many students still do in the West, and even more would-be-students who have failed to get admitted to the already overcrowded universities. In the Eastern Zone there is no such overcrowding, because the social strata which would provide it, are being severely handicapped; indeed, they are being victimised, and there can be no doubt that the Russians, as well as the zealous S.E.D. authorities, are going too far in this matter of "curbing the bourgeoisie." Even if a person's political record is blameless enough, the mere accident of birth and a "bourgeois" background are a grave enough handicap for obtaining anything but menial work, let alone entry to the universities. Such routine discrimination is causing much grievance and frequently defeats its own object, inasmuch as the innocent victimisation of blameless people cannot but embitter them and make opponents out of people who originally were only too willing to co-operate. After two years of this, it would seem to be about time to stop taking the routine formula "Every proletarian a saint—every bourgeois a swine" for granted, and to start separating the wheat from the chaff in the various strata, and strictly according to a person's merit, rather than his background.

Yet there is something rather grand in what the Rector of Leipzig University described to me as a complete *soziale Umschichtung*. The majority of students recently matriculated

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have a working class background, and 40% are women. At one of the new institutes (at the *Ferdinand Lasalle Schule* in Leipzig), designed to prepare specially selected products of elementary schools for the universities, I was much impressed by the eagerness and brightness of the young men and women, picked for their proletarian background no less than their talents. The fact that well over 90% of them were members of the S.E.D. was explained with the assurance that the Christian Democrats and the Liberals were repeatedly asked to provide suitable candidates, but just haven't got many young people with the working class background obligatory for these courses.

As to the young generation, the new *Einheitsschule* is to give all children (irrespective of their parental purse) precisely the same chance of education, by starting them alike and by means of "horizontal transitions" giving them opportunities to drop an unpalatable subject for a more congenial one, thus finding their own niche and, if specially gifted, getting further chances for higher education. Vocational training (from 15 to 18) is provided with an additional 12 hours per week of ordinary schooling and a repeated opportunity of transition to Secondary Schooling. Religious teaching is strictly a matter for the Church, but no child, according to the new law, may be deprived of it against the parents' wishes; and I found it remarkable that in a rural district never known to be particularly religious, 95% of the children were attending scripture class in accordance with the wishes of their parents.

On a visit to the *Oderbruch* I had an opportunity of seeing the "land reform" at work. This is a district 50 miles east of Berlin and much devastated in the final stage of the war as well as through the severe spring floods of this year. I went to a little village (Gorgas) which, three or four months earlier, had still been under 6 feet of water. Yet, it had meanwhile been largely rebuilt; the fields were in full bloom; cattle, horses, and some agricultural machinery of the local Co-op had been restocked; and a few thousand chickens provided.

At this little place, formerly one single estate, there are now some 160 *Neusiedler* and their families settled, each on a few acres of his own, and, while they still had a great many difficulties to complain about (particularly lack of machinery and chemicals), they hope to make a much better living in a year or two, and even now they can just live and meet their quota of deliveries.

These quotas must be strictly adhered to, and in another village I attended a meeting of Russian and German authorities

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reprimanding local farmers for having not come up to scratch with their deliveries. But the farmers had a chance of stating their difficulties—chiefly lack of transport and machinery—and it was decided, as far as possible, to meet their needs.

Being no agricultural expert I listened to the objections of C.D.U. and L.D.P. critics against the (largely S.E.D.-sponsored) land reform. Most of these agricultural experts maintain that a routine division of the soil must be unfair as well as uneconomical, and that the far more sensible and appropriate *Kolkhoz* system was not adopted, merely on account of the Communists' reluctance to do anything that might be construed as imitation of Soviet methods.

Summing up my impressions of this short visit, the main negative point, to my mind, is the narrowmindedly routine discrimination against the "Bourgeoisie" coupled with other unpleasantly coercive aspects (most of them avoidable).

On the positive side it might be said that the food and fuel situation, though precarious, is slightly better than in the West. (At any rate the scanty rations are being met). Moreover, there is considerably more evidence of a constructive policy and more practical purpose, and it seemed rather significant that on the Leipzig-Berlin road, I saw more factories, houses, cottages actually being built than one would normally encounter in 1,000 miles of travelling in the West.

A word on the Russians' almost embarrassingly anxious desire to please, and to smooth the visitor's path. In Dresden, I was put up at a former Royal *Schloss* with a fantastic assortment of knicknacks, old masters and family portraits. As I was unpacking my toothbrush in the splendour of what seemed to be the erstwhile Royal Suite, my charming young conducting officer rushed in, beseeching me to move at once. He had just discovered that this was merely the second-best suite in the *Schloss*. At supper (around midnight) I made a chance remark about being an ardent chess player with never an opportunity yet of meeting one of the redoubtable Soviet players. Forthwith, the best available player was whisked to the spot. Back in Berlin, I found it far from easy to get an opportunity of retaliating for so much hospitality. Russians seem to prefer being hosts rather than guests. They should be less shy in this respect. A more regular exchange of civilities as well as of mutual information might do a power of good.

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By H. R. G. GREAVES

SO much attention has been directed to the Great Power veto in the Security Council that it is surprising how little dispassionate examination there has been of it in relation to the general subject of international voting procedures. It is, no doubt, all to the good that public attention should have centred upon the issue of greatest practical importance. For what is recognised as essential is a United Nations Organisation that can be relied on to work in an emergency, and such reliance cannot be placed in a committee which can be prevented by a single vote from taking any decision at all. But the veto clearly rests in part on the precedents of past practice in international bodies. It calls, therefore, for examination against the background of customary international voting procedures. These show more variety than is generally realised. In particular, some conclusions may be drawn from them about the conditions in which majority decision—the only alternative, of course, to unanimity or "the veto"—can operate.

The ability of U.N.O. to achieve its main purpose, however, depends on other considerations than those of procedure. That main purpose is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", and by the effectiveness of the Organisation for achieving that purpose it will be judged, whatever may be its value in other ways. Now success here, it is argued, depends on agreement among the Great Powers. If they agreed peace is assured, for they have the necessary strength to enforce it; while disagreement between them removes the only foundation of security for only a Great Power has the resources for modern warfare. Thus the Great Power veto is no more, the argument runs, than the recognition of political reality. It may be, nevertheless, that something less than Great Power unanimity would suffice to bring enough force to bear to deter or overcome an aggressor and so to maintain the peace. If so, questions of majority organisation, once more, become relevant.

II

With that preliminary, and before going on to consider such other voting procedures, past and present, it may be as well to have a closer look at that which has been established for the

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Security Council. Here it is necessary to make a threefold distinction:—between matters of procedure or administration, measures of conciliation or recommendations for pacific settlement, and finally measures of enforcement.

The first category is governed by a simple majority of any seven of the eleven members of the Council, which amounts to approximately a two-thirds majority vote. The four sponsoring Governments made clear in a statement at San Francisco that:

"This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; determine the method of selecting its President; organise itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; invite a member of the Organisation not represented on the Council, to participate in its discussions when that Member's interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute."

From this it is clear that matters of substance cannot enter into this category. Its limitations are strengthened by the further ruling that in cases of doubt as to whether a procedural vote should apply decision shall be taken by the qualified majority necessary for all non-procedural matters. But there is nothing to prevent a wider interpretation being made by future agreement.

Decisions relating to the pacific settlement of disputes are subject to the Great Power veto. That is to say they require at least seven affirmative votes which must include those of all the permanent members. There is a proviso, however: "a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting". The Council is governed by these stipulations when it wishes to decide to consider or discuss a dispute or situation, to institute an investigation, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, or to recommend terms of settlement. But they are of some ambiguity. Can a Great Power which is not a party to a dispute prevent such measures? It would seem so, but the already mentioned statement by the four sponsoring Powers asserts that "no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention". The statement goes on:

"Beyond this point, decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities

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to invoke measures of enforcement. . . This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation, or determines that the time has come to call upon states to settle their differences, or makes recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute."

It is clear, at least, that a Great Power which is a party to a dispute cannot prevent investigation and recommendation. In this field the Charter appears at its weakest.

The third category, enforcement action, is again clear. Here a decision can only be taken with the concurrence of all the Great Powers, whether parties to the dispute or not.

Such is the veto which is held to undermine the quality most essential for an effective peace system—the assurance that a definite lead will be given by the highest international authority with reasonable speed after the emergence of a threat to the peace. Much more, of course, is needed than the giving of a lead. But the last stage, that of action, cannot be reached until after the preliminary stage of adjudication and decision as to appropriate action. If this has been passed and international authority has been able to give the lead, despite possible minority obstruction, "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" proclaimed in Article 51 would become in fact enforcement action—in default of further Security Council decisions.

When this position is compared with that which prevailed under the League system, the differences appear to lie more in theory than in fact. It was at first the habit to claim that the potentialities of action of U.N.O. were much greater than those of the League because it had been given "teeth and claws", as though the Military Staff Committee and the obligation imposed on members to prepare joint measures of a military character provided some guarantee that they would be used. There may be, it is true, a certain deterrent influence in the existence of such machinery ready for use; although if a country contemplating aggression can comfort itself with the knowledge that it can forbid its use, the significance of such preparations is greatly lessened. It can be said, however, that there is a greater probability that action will be taken if plans are made beforehand, even if nothing more than that can be said. Had the wishes of France in 1919 resulted in the establishment of a similar joint staff body attached to the League Council, there can be small doubt that military collaboration against a renewed German aggression would have been easier. It is

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probable too that the existence of such preconcerted plans would have encouraged the countries which in the outcome were victimised in isolation to co-operate in resistance. But the existence of such instruments is no assurance of the will to use them.

The principal difference from the League lies in the much greater contrast between the rights of great and of small powers. The latter have considerably less influence. For one thing, the Assembly, where they predominate, is given no competence in matters of security. For another, they have unequal voting rights in the Security Council; indeed the principle of majority voting has in all matters been applied to them. While in the League Council it was theoretically possible for one small power to impose a veto, in the Security Council this requires the votes of five.

Thus it may be seen that the first object, certainty—or even probability—of United Nations action to maintain security, is no more assured than it was by the League. The fact that all Great Powers are members may mean that it is stronger than the League if they accept the same fundamentals of political behaviour; it may mean that it is weaker, if they do not, because any action connected with security can be even more easily stultified by the veto of any one of them. For it is weakened—relatively to the League as well as absolutely—by the greater emphasis on the principle of unanimity where the Great Powers are concerned than is to be found in Article XV of the Covenant, particularly as this was reinforced by the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Anglo-Turkish dispute. This is true even though it is strengthened by the exclusion of the unanimity principle where Small Powers are concerned. This last fact, taken alone, would mean a great step forward in the direction of international government from the formal provisions of the Covenant, though less so from the practice which had been growing up in the League, and especially in the Assembly, of submitting matters to committees which could decide by majority and whose reports were subsequently invariably accepted by the Assembly. Moreover, apart from security procedure, the majority principle also applies in U.N.O. in, for example, the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, where the votes of great and small powers count equally in form, though not of course in reality. But in the field of security the unanimity principle applied to the Great Powers means a more marked absence of any guarantee of authoritative international leadership at the most important point—a situation likely to endanger peace; for

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now, more than ever, it is precisely the Great Power which alone can really threaten war.

Is the second principal need of an effective security system better met by U.N.O.—that of agreement among the Great Powers? The most that can be said is that they are all in it, and that given the will to peace the existence of its machinery provides a means by which agreement can be speedily reached. The machinery constitutes a recognition of the need to agree—indeed, as has been said, it is built on the assumption that, unless there is active co-operation between all the Great Powers, security machinery will not work—rather than on any willingness on the part of the Great Powers to forego the legal right which the anarchic theory of national sovereignty gives them to reject the verdict of the rest of the world, or on any willingness to bind themselves to agreement in advance. Indeed, they show a nervousness about permitting any international opinion to be expressed officially which is itself an implied recognition of supernational authority. In the League it was possible for the weight of opinion voiced in the Assembly to be brought to bear. In U.N.O. the Assembly is precluded from considering a matter taken up by the Council, and, in sum, there is clearly less advance commitment on the part of the Great Powers.

III

Experience of the working of international institutions before 1939 had already produced much evidence of dissatisfaction with the working of the unanimity principle. Considerable inroads had been made into it. Some succeeded, some failed, others were in contemplation. The Assembly resolution of 1936 inviting views on methods of improving the operation of the Covenant produced answers from seventeen governments favouring modification of the unanimity rule. The U.S.S.R. was among those which proposed some form of majority decision under the sanctions Article 16. France and Great Britain joined the Soviet Union and eight others in recommending that parties to a dispute should not vote under Article 11. Examples could be multiplied. A few even favoured a qualified majority for recommending revision of treaties. The Montreux Convention contained provision for revising important Articles by a qualified majority—three-quarters of the Black Sea Powers.

What did such experience suggest as the conditions of replacing the unanimity rule by some form of majority? They are two.

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The first takes us into the field of basic democratic principle. In the development of democratic institutions the idea that a majority rather than a unanimity was the means of expressing the general will grew out of practical necessity rather than from any acknowledgement in theory of the right of the majority to speak for the whole. It is no less axiomatic in international than in national affairs that a group only accepts the idea that its will can be defined for it by a majority when it is united on fundamentals. Given agreement on general purposes and confidence that all alike share a common end, to accept the view of the majority as to the best means of attaining it becomes a matter of convenience. Since procedure does not involve principle it can be safely left to a majority vote. Better achieve the end even by disagreeable means than not achieve it at all. But that is only true if the end far outweighs the means in importance. So important, for instance, are the general purposes for which the Universal Postal Union exists, and so disadvantageous the alternative of leaving the Union, that it has even proved possible to enforce revision of its convention by majority. The more clearly the purpose of an international organisation can be defined and agreed, the more does decision become a matter of technical interpretation or of "procedure."

The second is the need to find an acceptable measure for expressing in terms of voting power the real inequality of importance of member-states. Here international society is still fumbling after a generally satisfactory formula, and were one to be found it might well prove to be the biggest step towards the organisation of international government. Many have been tried, and some have proved sufficiently lasting to merit attention.

It is clear at once that "the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members" has proved too unrelated to the facts of international society to offer it a workable basis, or indeed to survive the opening paragraphs of the Charter. Nowhere is the principle more consistently flouted than in the United Nations system itself, which starts its constitution by proclaiming it. But that is not to say that the only distinction found therein—that between Great Powers and the rest—goes more than a very small way towards providing an acceptable alternative.

Of little more value is the method by which the greater significance of certain powers is recognised by according votes to their colonies. Where, as in the British Commonwealth

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colonies have become independent states it is of course i though other countries often enough profess an ir understand this, and make it the basis for claims to additional representation themselves. It was on the argument that something less than independence marked the relations between the Dominions and the United Kingdom, and marked the Latin American states in relation to the U.S.A., that separate recognition in the United Nations was given to the two Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia. This affords an extension of the practice adopted much earlier by the Universal Postal Union. This gave separate recognition, for instance, to French Indo-China, to Algeria, to the remaining French colonies, as a group, to the island possessions of the U.S.A. and to the Philippines, thus conferring four votes on the French and three on the United States. Variants of this were also adopted in such bodies as the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Office of Public Health, the International Telecommunications Union, the Metric Union, and some others. Although this is some mitigation of the unrealities of state equality, the possession of overseas territories is no reliable index of relative importance; it would give Portugal more votes than Russia or China.

Plural voting has sometimes been made proportionate to financial contribution. There are again many examples and variations. The Institute of Agriculture was typical. Here there were five classes, each state being free to select to which it would belong. While votes increased in arithmetic progression, the units of subscription increased in geometric progression. Thus the first class had five votes for sixteen units, the second four for eight, and so on. In other cases, while such relativity was maintained, states were not free to select their class but had it determined by the original agreement or by relation to some such factor as the size of their population. While there is an obvious justice in this general principle, its weakness lies in the fact that willingness or ability to pay larger contributions is not a measure of right to influence. On the other hand, if the allocation of financial responsibility for U.N.O. were taken also as the scale of voting power, the result might not prove unreasonable. Approximate examples of the result would be: United Kingdom fifteen votes, United States twenty-five, South Africa two.

The attempt has also been made to relate voting power to interest. A pre-war example was afforded by the International

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Sugar Organisation, where votes were allotted in accordance with a country's interests, whether as exporter or importer, in the sugar trade. The United Kingdom and United States had seventeen votes each as importing states, compared with ten for Cuba, three for France, five for the Soviet Union, nine for the Netherlands, etc., as exporters. A more recent case is the complicated voting procedure established by the Bretton Woods agreement for the control of the International Monetary Fund. By this "Each member shall have 250 votes plus one additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to 100,000 United States dollars." That is the basic provision although it is subject to adjustment according to the purchase and sale of foreign currency holdings. Since the quota varies from one million or less to the United States quota of 3,175 million, the British quota of 1,300 and the Russian of 1,200, it would appear that voting power ranges from 260 to 32,000.

There have also been more arbitrary assertions of inequality. The European Commission of the Danube set up by the Treaty of Versailles contained representatives of only Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania, although other interested states could be admitted if the former unanimously agreed. Again, on the Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine, another Versailles creation, while Belgium, Britain, Italy and Switzerland were given two votes each, France had five, Germany four, and Holland three.

IV

The first conclusion to be drawn from past experience is both that inequality of voting power is likely to prove a condition of agreement by the larger and more important countries to submit to any kind of majority decision, and that there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of finding a formula for such inequality. Perhaps it may also be said that the more closely such a formula can be related to technical considerations the more likely is it to prove acceptable. A lesson may be learnt from the method by which the International Labour Organisation solved the problem of determining which were the powers of chief industrial importance entitled under the Treaty of Versailles to permanent membership of its Governing Body. The formula adopted was weighted according to the total industrial population; the proportion of the industrial to the total population; mechanical power; length of railways in proportion to area; merchant marine tonnage; volume of

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commerce, etc. Such a formula is not without difficulty as far as its origination is concerned, but its great virtue once established it can be applied by technical, statistical means without giving rise to diplomatic negotiation or raising issues of policy and principle. Some such formula is necessary for determining contributions to international expenses, and there is no reason why it should not be found for determining votes.

Secondly, agreement to submit to majority decision was confined before the war to relatively unimportant matters. While it had become the rule for procedural business and administration, for elections such as those of judges on the Permanent Court or of non-permanent members of the Council, and for committee work, it had rarely extended beyond these fields. Where it entered into matters of substance, such as the drawing up or amendment of conventions, these were usually merely recommendations, carrying no obligations with legal sanction, though sometimes with political or moral sanction, and in any case subject to formal ratification before attaining validity. And since any state was free to refrain from ratifying a convention or accepting a recommendation the fact that these could be decided by a majority vote did not mean that they necessarily were so in practice. On the contrary the need for unanimity in ratification or acceptance is apt to extend backwards to influence the stage of drafting, for it is generally thought that there can be little value in drawing up documents that are not accepted. To a considerable degree, however, experience would seem to belie this notion. Strongly contested conventions, for instance, which have passed against big minority votes in the Conferences of the I.L.O., the Pan-American Union and other bodies have secured wider ratification on many occasions than conventions which have been originally accepted with little or no dissent. Sometimes this has been because compromise has made the latter less valuable pieces of work. Thus, if the power to impose legal obligations by a majority decision scarcely existed, the capacity to give a lead by majority vote and so to create a certain political impulsion behind it had shown some signs of developing.

And thirdly, security matters apart, this tendency seems to have been strengthened in post-war international organisation. Everywhere except in the Security Council the majority principle has advanced in acceptance. Indeed it may be said now to have become the rule and to be no longer the exception for matters which are of the nature of recommendations to governments,

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and to have been applied for direct control in some cases—as of the International Monetary Fund. The guess may be hazarded that it will be most likely to prove real where, as in the case of the example just given, the vote is weighted according to the real influence of the member-states. Where it is not so weighted the majority will in fact tend to be modified by the need felt to win the acceptance of all the states most deeply concerned in the specific issue being dealt with. And decisions will tend to be taken less by vote than by agreement.

To this conclusion the Great Powers are perhaps an exception. They have been less willing to submit themselves than others to third party judgment. It is difficult to find any derogation from their sovereignty. The assertion that they are all equally subject to international law is replaced by the claim that since their responsibilities for its execution are much greater they should have the right to bend it to their will.

Finally, such progress as has been made so far in recognising the essential inequality between states has tended to divide them into opposed camps rather than to integrate them in a single world society. The most essential need is to convert the dichotomy dividing great and small powers into a unity built on an acknowledgement of the varying proportions of potential influence and contribution of all countries, big and little. That way alone can an exit from the impasse of the veto be found. In the debate in the Assembly in December, 1946 on reform of Security Council procedure a delegate, General Romulo, was probably giving expression to the factor of chief importance when he said: "We all know that the Soviet Union is in a hopeless minority in the United Nations as at present constructed, a minority out of all proportion to the real power and influence of the Soviet Union in the modern world. We all know that this is the real reason for the Soviet Union's insistence that the veto be retained." And he went on to argue that an age capable of inventing the atom bomb was capable of inventing a voting formula giving to each nation a power inside U.N.O. proportionate to its power outside.

HOW INTERNATIONAL IS COLONIAL TRUSTEESHIP?

By DAVID THOMSON

TWO years ago the Charter of the United Nations, drafted and agreed at the Conference of San Francisco, foreshadowed a new system of international colonial trusteeship. Articles XI, XII and XIII of the Charter were devoted to its outline and general principles. In the course of this year the system has come into somewhat belated and inauspicious existence. A vital piece of United Nations co-operation—affecting that seventh of the whole population of the world which lives in "non-self-governing territories"—has taken place almost unnoticed by the press and public opinion of this country. What does it mean, and how likely is it to succeed?

The first characteristic of United Nations 'Trusteeship,' as at present evolved, is that it springs directly, like its predecessor the League Mandates system, from the liberal tradition of western Europe and America. Ever since John Locke at the end of the seventeenth century spoke of all government as a trust, and Edmund Burke at the end of the eighteenth century applied the idea of trusteeship to British relations with her American colonies and her Indian Empire the notion that colonial government should be conducted for the benefit of the governed, and with the ultimate goal of their participation in self-government, has remained implicit in western liberal political theory. The idea was widened and deepened by the American War of Independence and by establishment of the federal Constitution of the United States. On the one hand, British governments drew the moral that self-government was likely to be the culmination of growth in settled colonies, such as Canada and Australia, and that even the administration of native colonial peoples should be designed to promote not only their immediate well-being but also their eventual enjoyment of democratic rights. On the other hand, in the process of American western expansion, a system of temporary trusteeship was evolved for the government of frontier territories on the model of the North-West Ordinance of 1787. The Union established first a Territorial executive government, then later added a legislature and restricted rights of representation in Congress, and finally acknowledged full Statehood with its right of representation in the Senate and

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House of Representatives. By that process the Union of thirteen eastern seaboard States grew into the present Union of forty-eight States. The British conception of Dominion status and the American conception of Union development have this in common: that both implied an intermediate, transition stage during which the colonial territory was administered for its own benefit and with a view to its eventual self-government. But they had this important difference: that the culmination of the trust's fulfilment was, for Britain, the Dominion's national independence; for America, it was the State's assimilation and incorporation into the federal Union. Trusteeship was, in its colonial applications, a British invention and an American discovery. In its subsequent international applications these two Powers have naturally taken the lead.

France, which did not 'settle' any colonial territories of importance after French Canada, was concerned almost entirely with colonial administration in the other sense—the government of backward native dependencies. But her own national traditions were sufficiently a part of the western liberal tradition for her to evolve a conception of trusteeship comparable more to the American than to the British pattern. Her normal aim in modern times has been imperial 'assimilation'—the training of her colonial populations to become citizens of France, with all the rights and duties and political obligations which the status of French citizenship involves. The present notion of the 'French Union' is the climax of this development. Direct representation of the colonies in a common assembly along with metropolitan France is intended to become the symbol of a united Empire which Marshal Lyautey called "a nation of one hundred million souls." France has therefore shared with Britain and the United States the lead in the international application of trusteeship. They have been joined, naturally and inevitably, by the British Dominions which had benefited from these ideals, and by Belgium which has always been powerfully influenced by France.

From the growth of these liberal ideals during the nineteenth century, and their intimate interaction with movements of humanitarianism and evangelicalism, several notable triumphs for the principle of trusteeship ensued. The most important was the abolition first of the slave-trade, and then of slavery itself, within the British Empire. Within a generation of this triumph in Britain the United States, too, abolished slavery. The international conventions about the Congo basin which

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were known as the Acts of Berlin (1885) and of Brussels (1890) were developments in concerted action about colonial territory which were significant in two ways: they insisted that the goal of the administering authority must be "the moral and material well-being of the natives," and they introduced the pledge of the "open door." They were otherwise remarkable only for the black record of abuses which ensued, and the total failure of the signatory Powers to impose any effective kind of supervision or control. But the total result was that by 1918 the ideals and principles of colonial trusteeship were widely appreciated and ripe for general acceptance as parts of western democratic idealism when President Wilson came to Paris. Lord Lothian's 'Round Table' group, General Smuts, President Wilson and many British socialists joined hands in welcoming the inclusion of a mandatory system in the settlement of peace.

In 1919, as again in 1945, it was comparatively easy to secure general international adhesion to a formal statement of the principles and purposes of colonial trusteeship. Such there was in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, and such there is again in Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations; there is even extension, since Article 22 applied only "to those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world"; whereas Chapter XI applies to all "non-self-governing territories." The fifth of President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' had stipulated "a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined." At the same time Mr. Lloyd George had gone even further, by asserting that "the general principle of national self-determination is as applicable in their cases (i.e., the German colonies) as in those of occupied European territories."

Hence arose the dilemma which has haunted the working of mandatory and trusteeship systems ever since: does self-government involve also political independence? In the British tradition and experience, it normally did. In the American and French tradition and experience, it normally did not: on the contrary, self-government was attained by the

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weakening of separatist forces and by assimilation and integration into the larger political unit. Article 22 of the Covenant compromised over this dilemma by enunciating that "the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances." The Powers acted on this compromise by distinguishing between the three categories of "A," "B" and "C" mandates, those territories under "A" being destined for relatively early independence, and those under "C" being administered virtually as a part of the territory of the administering authority.

The dilemma arose again at San Francisco. The Soviet Union and China wanted the Charter to state the ultimate aim of trusteeship-administration as "full national independence." The United States and some British Dominions disagreed, partly on the grounds that some areas might not want independence, and partly on the grounds that in the modern world to multiply separate national sovereignties is a more than dubious ideal. They preferred the alternative ideal of "self-government." To Soviet protests that this was too ill-defined an ideal it could be retorted that in modern conditions "national independence" is no more easy to define, either as an ideal or as a reality. The dispute lasted long and waxed furious. In the end, Article 76 of the Charter clumsily began:—

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system . . . shall be :

- (a) to further international peace and security ;
- (b) to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement . . .

Even this comprehensive compromise did not prevent bitter Soviet attacks on the terms of the trusteeship agreements submitted to the General Assembly by Britain and the Dominions last December, on the grounds that provision to administer the trust territory as an integral part of the administering State amounted to annexation, and was contrary to the expressed purpose of "self-government or independence." Russia

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therefore refused to consider self-government as attainable without independence—regardless of the history of her own states within the U.S.S.R. whose measure of autonomy and "self-government" she at other times exalts.

Despite these difficulties, it has been—as already said—relatively simple both in 1919 and in 1945 to discover a formula of agreed principles and purposes to which most States will adhere. It is vastly more difficult to reach agreement upon the exact kind of concrete international arrangement which shall be made for the supervision, inspection, control or even direct administration of mandated territories. The Covenant stipulated that each Mandatory should render to the Council of the League an annual report about the territory under its care. It set up the Permanent Mandates Commission "to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates." This Commission consisted latterly of eleven members, the majority of whom did not represent mandatory states, and was composed of experts and specialists who worked in close conjunction with the Mandates Section of the Secretariat. The United Nations Charter has provided for a Trusteeship Council, to consider reports, accept petitions which can be received direct from the people of the trust territory, and provide for "periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority." It consists of all trustee states, all permanent members of the Security Council, and of "as many other members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members . . . is equally divided between those members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not." A new distinction is made, too, between ordinary trust territories and "strategic areas." For the latter the supervisory functions of the General Assembly are assumed by the Security Council.

In view of the careful balancing and counter-checking achieved in the Trusteeship Council and the exaggerated claims which in some quarters have been made on behalf of the progress likely to be made by the Trusteeship System, it is important to record these limitations on the working of the whole system.

First, neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council has any sanction to apply against a trustee state which ignores its pledges, or violates its trusteeship agreements, other than

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that sanction which the Mandates Commission possessed—publicity and international exposure. The Charter provides for no authority to withdraw a trust or transfer a trust, any more than it provided automatically for the creation of a trust. It placed no territories whatever under the automatic care of the Trusteeship System, and made the creation of the Trusteeship Council itself dependent on the voluntary submission by members of enough trusteeship agreements to justify the establishment of the system. Possession which was not given by the Council cannot be taken away by the Council.

Secondly, as in 1919, all trustee states hold their trust territories actually and historically by right of conquest in war and politically by the fact of military occupation. In every case, in 1919, the mandate was approved as being exercised by the Power which already enjoyed military control of the mandated territory. Similarly, in 1945-7, every trusteeship agreement so far approved by Assembly or Council concerns confirmation of trusteeship authority in the hands of former mandatory states over former mandated territories, or—as with United States “strategic trusteeship” over Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific—recognises fresh facts of military and naval control. The Union of South Africa, desiring to continue to administer South-West Africa as part of her own territory, refused to enter into trusteeship agreements at all: and the United States, in the process of Security Council discussions of her proposed “strategic” trusteeship, made it very clear that the alternative to the Council’s approval of her conditions of unrestricted control in these islands was her continued control without such approval. The appointment of trustee states for Italy’s former colonies proved so controversial that it has been postponed, and their Fate is still in suspense.

Thirdly, all trusteeship agreements made so far (eight in December and one in April) provide for a closer degree of assimilation or integration of trust territories with those of the administering authority than was contemplated in the old “A” or “B” mandates. The United Kingdom agreements claimed to constitute the trust territories of Tanganyika, Togoland, and the Cameroons, held under the old “B” mandates, into “a customs, fiscal, or administrative union or federation with adjacent territories.” France, Belgium and Australia claimed to administer their corresponding mandated territories as an “integral part” of themselves or their empires. The United States claimed exclusive military rights and preferential trading

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privileges over the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands. New Zealand, who ruled western Samoa under a “C” mandatè, has laid less specific claim to such integration because there it is less necessary. This is a significant trend away from the aims of self-determination towards the aims of self-government through closer association: a shifting of the pattern of colonial development from the British model of the past to the American-French model of the past and present.

Fourthly, both in the Charter and in the subsequent separate agreements, there has been abundant other insistence on complete national sovereignty. Articles 78 and 80 of the Charter very clearly reaffirmed the preservation of complete sovereign rights as regards colonial administration, in addition to the general proviso (in Article 2) that “the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.” Intact and separatist national sovereignty is its refrain, even more insistently than it was the refrain of the Covenant: this spirit naturally pervades the sections on colonial trusteeship. Despite the fact that the supervisory authority of the Security Council over strategic trust territories is so limited in the Charter, and despite her possession of the veto in the Council, the United States—overwhelming possessor of the atomic bomb—fought hard to keep for herself a free hand in the formal agreements by which she put the Japanese mandated islands under the trusteeship system. Reassurance has everywhere been made doubly sure, that no action could ever be taken against trustees who default even from the meagre promises they themselves choose to draw up in their deeds of agreement. Voluntarism remains the key-note of United Nations action at every stage.

Fifthly, even with these abundant safeguards against effective interference from an international authority, no Power has so far shown any inclination to accept the implied invitation of the Charter to put under the system of trusteeship not only former mandated or former enemy territories, but also parts of its own imperial possessions. Although the general standards of colonial conduct embodied in Article XI apply to all colonial peoples, and all members of the United Nations have entered into the moral undertaking to conform to such standards, all still preserve strict formal differentiation between the mandated and non-mandated colonies under their charge. If the moral pledges of Article XI matter, and if the gist of the separate agreements is to assimilate trust with non-trust colonies, the

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difference between them would seem to be of purely historical interest and there could be no possible objection to placing all alike under the mild degree of international scrutiny required by Article XIII. Jealous preservation of the distinction is one index of the problematic value of the whole system. Why should only former mandated territories enjoy to the full the alleged benefits of international trusteeship?

Finally, as might be expected, all notions of direct international administration of colonies have been tacitly dropped, in spite of the one hint in Article 81 of the Charter that the administering authority might be "one or more States or the Organization itself." Professor Rappard, the most expert and famous member of the old Mandates Commission, described the mandates system as "a kind of compromise between the proposition advanced by the advocates of annexation, and the proposition put forward by those who wished to entrust the colonies to international administration." The trusteeship system suffers from no such tension.

The poles of tension between which the present system has been stretched are the Russian demand for national independence and political self-determination as the goal of colonial government, and the Anglo-French and Anglo-American demands that the goal be internal self-government and the achievement of democratic rights. This issue has often been obscured, partly because the Soviet Union accepted the inclusion of both aims in the Charter but continues to interpret both as tantamount to independence, and partly because both the British and Americans (though more reluctantly the French) have been ready to admit that self-government might often culminate in political independence and separatism. Behind this formal conflict of ideals and theories lies the realistic Soviet desire to see the disintegration of the western overseas empires and an interim system of trusteeship which gives Russia a share in the control of colonial territories; and the equally realistic desire of the western Powers to integrate their imperial possessions into economic and administrative units for the mutual benefit of both native inhabitants and home population. In short, the existing trusteeship system is fundamentally the product of fierce international rivalries, jealousies and tensions. It inevitably involves the subordination of all concerted international action to the separatist interests and aspirations of the major Powers.

Yet it would be wrong to regard this system, so oddly born, as likely to bring little or no benefit to the colonial peoples.

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It remains highly doubtful whether, in present conditions, they would derive any benefits from experiments in allegedly 'impartial' multi-national or international administration or control. Socially and economically, it is advantageous for territories such as Tanganyika, Togoland and the Cameroons to be linked closely with adjacent lands. From the native point of view, the familiar operation of a positive national system of government is in most cases preferable to the new intrusion of a hesitant and 'neutral' international administration. The example of international administration of Germany is an awful warning.

Progress in colonial development will therefore not primarily depend on the survival or development of the existing trusteeship system as an agency of international supervision or inspection. It will depend on the implementation by the several imperial Powers of the general moral promises made when they signed Article XI of the Charter. And this, in turn, will depend primarily on the operation of the socialistic and liberal-socialist forces within the democratic Powers during the next few years. Naturally enough the active social ideals of full employment, freedom from fear and want, social security and economic prosperity, are already spilling over from the European countries in which they originated to the colonial lands administered by these countries. If these forces make headway at home, progressively achieve social democracy, socialise nationalism instead of nationalising socialism, then the colonial peoples too are likely to be guided more surely towards the confessed goals of self-government—with or without political independence. If the liberal tradition declines in strength, if these forces receive serious check, or go down in despair and reaction, then colonial peoples will relapse to their old status of helpless pawns in the game of international politics. Colonial progress depends still on colonial policy: on the distinctive quality of the organization and rule provided by the responsible colonial service of each great Power.

But one principle, which the trusteeship system has inherited from the Mandates System, remains of importance. It is the principle of 'accountability' enshrined in Chapters XII and XIII of the United Nations Charter. The principle that an imperial Power is systematically accountable to an international organ for the honest observance and implementation of its trusteeship has in the past helped to raise the standard of colonial administration. It is important that this principle has

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been maintained, and even more important that it be in future extended. If a colonial Power has nothing to be ashamed of, it is better still that it should prove this by submitting to regular scrutiny and inspection. And even if progress must depend on national enterprise and sincerity, such progress can only be promoted and will not be impeded by international accountability.

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By E. C. S. WADE

IN a recent article one of the editors of this journal gave his views on legislative draftsmanship.* He laid stress on the character and importance of the legislative programme of the present Government in the field of public law and contrasted statutes which were concerned with the socialisation of industry, the social services, the control of land and the promotion of physical development with measures dealing with private law. The latter he regarded as primarily, or even exclusively, the concern of professional lawyers called upon to advise clients in matters of private rights; the former obviously tend to affect the public as a whole and in particular an understanding of them is required by those who are charged with the duty of their administration. If this contrast be true, the case for framing legislation in language more acceptable to an intelligent reader who is unversed in the law is difficult to contest; for it is clear that current legislation, including the mass of detail which is covered by the term, delegated legislation, affects the daily life of a high proportion of citizens and its provisions have to be implemented by an army of administrators, whose numbers exceed by many times the few thousands of the population who can claim any learning in the law. So far as lawyers and judges are concerned, the economic and social purpose of a law as a guide to the intentions of the legislature has produced theories which are more familiar on the Continent than here. How far these theories assist in clearing away ambiguity of language and thus help the process of interpretation, it is not easy to say, but the conclusion of a leading English authority on comparative law (Professor H. C. Gutteridge) is that judges of all jurisdictions display a like reluctance to put themselves in the

* Legislation Draftsmanship by William A. Robson, Political Quarterly, October-December 1946.

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place of the legislator, unless they are obliged to do so for the purpose of avoiding an interpretation which might lead to an obvious miscarriage of justice.

Complexity of subject matter

Dr. Robson's article listed some of the shortcomings of draftsmanship, namely, clearness, conciseness, declaration of principles, separation of procedure and detail from main provisions, systematic arrangement, provisos and enumeration of particulars: he concluded with a plea for the study of a science of legislation and in particular of legislative method. In the present writer's opinion the crux of the matter lies in the complexity of the issues which the draftsman is asked to solve. When one considers the range of activities which are being brought under statutory control, one can readily appreciate how difficult it must be to find much help from precedent to guide the draftsman when he sets out to reduce policy formulae to terms of law. It would seem to follow that the more difficult the task of reducing these issues to the language of a statute, the more important it becomes to allow extraneous information as a guide to the intentions of the legislature. If this be so, there is need for careful consideration of the rival merits of the English and Continental technique of interpretation—a matter which is fully discussed in Dr. C. K. Allen's *Law in the Making*, 3rd ed., Excursus B. So far as draftsmanship is concerned, the principles advocated and practised by Thring and Ilbert have not been lost sight of by contemporary draftsmen. Given the time and material Parliamentary Counsel are at least as capable as any of their predecessors of producing Bills which suffer from few, if any, of the shortcomings which have been listed above. Thus a statute directed to the fulfilment of a single purpose, such as the Roosevelt Memorial Act, 1946, is a modern example in the field of public law, albeit containing provisions which alter existing private rights, which may be taken as a model. In this Act the draftsman has resorted to the use of preambles in which are recited the purpose of the legislation—a device which will be discussed later—and the operative sections are set out in an order and in language intelligible to all who are likely to be affected by their provisions. If the point is that a draftsman must produce, for example, a planning measure which affects the whole of the land in the country, or a scheme for a new social service, in relatively few clauses, the impossible is being asked unless the critics are content to have Bills cover a few main

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principles and leave all the resulting detail to ministerial regulation. However convenient such a lay-out would be for the administrator, little would be gained by it, because the result would inevitably be to confine the parent statutes to such general terms as to fail to convey their implications and these would be buried in the obscurity of subordinate statutory instruments which it is beyond the effective power of Parliament to scrutinise, much less to control. This is, of course, a matter which has already attracted a good deal of criticism.

Contents of enactments in relation to interpretation

It is not usually the case that Acts of Parliament can be sharply divided into those dealing with private rights which can be assumed to interest chiefly the legal advisers of interested parties and those dealing with matters of public law. It is apparent that, so long as the policy which commands political support at the present time continues, the statute book must reflect in the field of administrative law the transfer of power from private to public hands. For this reason much of current legislation deals with compensating private owners for loss of rights; provisions to effect this are necessarily complicated and it may be some consolation to appreciate that these provisions will be quickly spent and in due course can be removed from the statute book. The critics would do well to examine the Education Act of 1944, which raised no question of compensation for private rights. Here is an example of a measure of first-class importance which made radical changes in educational policy and apart from its length calls for little criticism of its drafting. It will, however, be suggested that a scientific approach to legislative draftsmanship involves an analysis of powers and, where appropriate, of duties. The grant of powers normally means the taking away of rights from others; the conferment of duties necessarily raises questions of their enforcement. These are the questions of interpretation with which the lawyer is principally concerned and, it is submitted, it is here that a more scientific approach to draftsmanship would assist the task of interpretation. This is not necessarily a question of obscure legal terminology and it is one in which the administrator and the general public are at least as interested as is the lawyer. In this connection it is worth emphasising that words are a form of conduct and that the intention which they convey is necessarily conditioned by the context in which they are written. What, then, should be

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included in a statute in order that the words may be clear in the appropriate context? It may be argued that explanatory matter, and in particular material which does not raise justiciable issues, should be left out. But the result of confining a statute to justiciable issues would probably result in an increase of that lack of intelligibility of which the layman in particular complains. There are, however, some well-known devices which might be adapted to present needs.

Explanatory memorandum and similar devices

A public Bill is normally presented to Parliament with an explanatory memorandum, which is printed in front of its clauses. Even where this is omitted, a financial memorandum is required in all appropriate cases. There are rules and conventional practices regarding the contents of these documents; in particular an explanatory memorandum must not contain argument, but must be confined to a bare statement of the objects which are to be achieved by the Bill. The memorandum disappears when the Bill is reported back to the House after the committee stage and on enactment the Act is printed without any explanation of its contents. Nor indeed can the courts here be referred to any of the parliamentary history which its passage may have created. Of late instead of an explanatory memorandum an important Bill has been preceded by the issue of a White Paper, in which the objects of the forthcoming legislation are more fully explained and the various alternatives examined. It is the practice after a short interval to debate the contents of a White Paper and as a result the Bill may contain important points of difference in the policy finally adopted. In the nature of things it would assist little in the understanding of a Bill if the courts could be referred to the preceding White Paper.

The explanatory memorandum must be distinguished from the confidential notes on clauses or ministerial brief with which the Minister in charge of a Bill is furnished by his department to assist him in the process of securing its enactment. Unlike the explanatory memorandum, this brief, which in its most detailed form will be used at the committee stage, contains not only a statement of what each clause seeks to achieve, but may anticipate arguments for and against its enactment in the original form of words. This document is not made available even to back-bench supporters of the Government, much less to any members of the Opposition. From the point of view of

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Members of Parliament there is something to be said for a change of practice which would allow something of the character of notes on clauses to be included in an explanatory memorandum.

Preambles reciting the purposes of an enactment

Preambles, which in the past were invariably used to explain the background of a statute and which indeed formed the greater part of its contents, are seldom used in these days. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, is a well-known exception. They possess one clear advantage, namely that of permanency on the statute book, over memoranda, the utility of which is temporary and short-lived. While no one would advocate that the greater part of a modern statute should take the form of recitals followed, as in the past, by operative provisions in the form of grants, it is worth examining the attitude of the courts to the contents of a preamble. For it is by some such device that guidance can be given both to the courts and to the ordinary public of the intentions of Parliament. The courts have steered a middle course between two opinions on the effect of preambles. One view is that recitals in a preamble are not evidence of facts, but only of the opinion of the legislature or of representations made to and believed by it; the other is that recitals of fact amount to findings by the High Court of Parliament and are therefore conclusive and binding on all other courts, including the High Court of Justice, and upon all persons. A middle course which has found favour with the judges is to regard a preamble as conclusive in so far as it elucidates the intention of Parliament expressed in the enacting part, i.e., the sections and schedules of the Act, but as *prima facie* evidence only of the matters of fact. It is settled law that no court may impugn the validity of a statute upon the ground that its recitals are based on erroneous inferences as to fact or law, whereas the enacting part is conclusive of the intentions of the legislature.

If then it is agreed that there is need to clarify for the purpose of pre-natal understanding and subsequent administration the contents of an Act, there is something to be said for returning to the old usage of recitals in a preamble stating the object of the legislation, i.e., leaving the onus of proof of the correctness of recitals upon the party who challenges them. For there is no objection on the part of the courts to resorting to the preamble to explain the object or meaning of an enactment which is not clear. Moreover a preamble may indicate some limitation as to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply

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when general language is used in the operative part. In this connection a draftsman may be forced to use, particularly when operating in a novel field, general terms to give effect to a particular policy and a recital as to the object sought to be achieved should prove of assistance to a court to prevent it interpreting the enactment as applying for a purpose which was never contemplated by Parliament. It is a counsel of perfection to which it is most difficult to attain to avoid language which is capable of a wider construction when formulating a duty or conferring a power for a purpose which has never previously been the subject of statute law. Moreover, some such device would afford scope for explanatory matter of a kind more acceptable to the layman securing judicial notice without violating the rigid rules which exclude the introduction of extraneous information, such as the parliamentary history of a Bill, to assist in the interpretation of a statute. It would have the advantage of avoiding the introduction of theories of the social purpose of a law as an aid to interpretation, or at least severely limit the application of those theories about which it is so difficult to obtain agreement.

Elucidation of principles

It is sometimes said that it is more difficult to extract a principle from a statute than from the report of a decided case. This is probably true in the case of lawyers who have for so long been trained exclusively in the tradition of case books and the law reports and only dimly made aware by painful experience gained after the end of formal legal education of the importance of statutes as a source of law. The administrator and the public generally will have no acquaintance with the former, but may have to work with a particular statute and its supplemental code of regulations as a guide. It is useless to pretend that legislation can ever make easy or popular reading, but it should be practicable to limit the content of a parent statute to essentials, not all of which will be confined to matters of principle, and to reserve for supplemental regulations the details of application. In practice this is seldom attainable under modern conditions. The reason is not far to seek. The pace of legislation has for long been too fast and, moreover, draftsmen few and hard to find. To include all essentials means that all decisions of a permanent character must be made before the Bill is enacted and much that may be necessary for the working of a new service is only appreciated after the Act is on the statute book.

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Apprehensive of this, the draftsman is forced to rely on delegation to the Executive of the power to determine important matters and to give effect to them by regulations which incidentally suffer from the defect that they cannot be adequately considered, much less amended, by Parliament. Yet if our legislation is to attain a higher degree of intelligibility, the parent statute should be self-contained as to essentials. Where delegation is necessary, and much of it is inevitable, the parent statute ought to prescribe standards to limit the subject-matter for which it can be used. This is a task which on constitutional grounds, as well as for the sake of intelligibility, calls for attention as soon as the pace of legislation slackens. To abdicate legislative power over too wide an area is fatal to the successful working of parliamentary government, however convenient it may be to an over-worked parliamentary bureaucracy.

Classification of powers and duties

Mention has been made of the need to classify powers and duties if an approach is to be made to a science of legislation. Perhaps the most difficult tasks of the courts to-day in the sphere of public law are to determine :—

- (1) questions of the enforcement of discretionary powers, and
- (2) liability for breach of duty by a public authority.

This is not the place to review the massive array of case law which has been built up by the courts under these two heads, nor to examine the procedural limitations upon judicial review of powers and duties. But so far as the understanding of legislation is concerned, the task of interpretation is rendered more difficult whenever an enactment leaves open to doubt, as it so frequently does, the questions—Who can compel the exercise of a power or the performance of a duty?—Who can recover for loss suffered from negligent execution of either? In this connection it is important to recognise that Parliament may intend that no justiciable issue shall be raised by the conferment of a power on a public authority or that a special penalty shall be the only sanction for failure to perform a statutory duty. It is difficult to see why these matters are so frequently left obscure in modern statutes. The explanation may be that those who give instructions for drafting Bills have not directed their attention sufficiently to the legal problems raised by the enforcement of powers and duties, matters which from the administrative point of view are after all only incidental to the

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main task of giving effect to policy by the grant of powers for the creation of duties. Whatever the cause, few lawyers will question the need to clarify the nature and scope of the justiciable issues raised by these matters.

Common form clauses

There is a small point of drafting which would help both the general user as well as the lawyer in interpreting enactments. It is not infrequently the case that slightly different language is used to create an identical power. For example, in the course of examining a group of recent Bills, all of which conferred power on a Minister to give directions to a statutory body, it appeared that only two variations of such power were intended, yet different words were employed in nearly every case, even where no difference was apparently intended in meaning. A similar criticism could be made, at all events in the past, of the varying formulae to secure the laying of regulations before Parliament or of the use of indistinguishable differences of languages in Acts setting up new departments of State or constituting statutory corporations. It is suggested that more use could profitably be made by draftsmen of standard clauses for such purposes. Again there seems to be little consistency in the selection of material which can be relegated to schedules.

Whatever small improvements can be effected, it remains true that Acts of Parliament are not susceptible to revolutionary improvements simply because their contents contain a social or economic purpose which affect the lives of more people than ever before and engage more officials in the task of administration. It is only by clarity of exposition by means of pamphlet, explanatory note, circular or textbook that the content of legislation can be made intelligible to any but the highly trained mind. It is, then, important that those who are concerned with the preparation of such documents should themselves be competent to understand the material in the parent Act and the resulting statutory regulations.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY. WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMAN POLITICO-LEGAL THOUGHT. By JOHN H. HALLOWELL. (*Kegan Paul*. 141 pp. 12s. 6d.)

WITH admirable insight into the philosophical and legal aspects of German Liberalism, Mr. Hallowell traces its melancholy decline from the initial sublimity of humanism to the formalistic, pragmatic stage preceding its capitulation and destruction by the Nazis. Despite a certain repetitiveness his book is essentially clear and concise and its philosophical and legal arguments are presented in agreeably readable shape, free alike from cheap catchwords and from highbrowishness—two dangers to which the subject is inevitably exposed.

Let it be said at once, however, that the author might have made more of the two highwater-marks of German humanistic liberalism: its emergence in the 16th and its revival in the 18th century. Both serve to illustrate the fact, too little emphasized by Mr. Hallowell, that humanistic and liberal thinking in Germany stopped short every time of its application to politics. Luther himself, betraying the rebel peasants of 1523-25 and bowing with humble devotion to the princes and barons, is the outstanding example. Compare that with the behaviour of Wycliff and his Lollards a century and a half earlier and you have discovered the inherent and, one is tempted to add, "racial" weakness and self-limitation of German liberalism in its earliest beginnings. From such a chrysalis what kind of creature could emerge other than one that instantly shed religious fervour as well and became a will-o'-the-wisp lacking all reality and vital force.

The same process was repeated in the 18th century when Lessing and Herder, Schiller and Goethe, Kant and Fichte raised the German spirit to its highest power and spread the gospel of freedom throughout the world. German hearts and minds experienced a genuine revolution. Yet more than thirty German despots of the most execrable type were allowed to flourish at the same time and not one of those thinkers and poets attacked them seriously. At its zenith, as in its beginnings, German humanism and liberalism shied at any interference in the problems of government, in the relations between subject and state. There was a banner and a slogan, but never a weapon or a fighting force.

This is of incalculable importance in judging the German liberalism of the 19th and 20th centuries, with the failure of which Mr. Hallowell is specially concerned. He does not recognise that it was little more than the expression of a certain broadmindedness and desire for moral and cultural progress in the professional and middle classes: it did not come to grips with the problems of state and law. It was not borne up and goaded forward by creative religious and political ideals. Where the latter did venture into the open they were repulsed first by Hegelianism, which sanctified the state at the expense of the individual and then by Bismarckian power politics, which exploited vague liberal tendencies only to crush them when they had served their turn. They were brought out on Sundays with the best china, and were just as breakable: on weekdays they could scarcely be distinguished from the many other euphemisms for nationalism, if not for capitalism and imperialism. German liberalism has always abounded in enthusiasts such

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as those of 1848 and has always lacked fanatics of the calibre to offer an effective challenge to the subjugation of the individual by the state.

Things were to become still worse. German metaphysics, before and, more particularly, after Hegel (the Germans have always prized and taken pride in their metaphysical leanings), could be mobilised at any time in defence of the Empire, the Kaiser or, for that matter, any prince or princeling "by God's grace," in other words, as an extreme anti-liberal force. It was not, as Mr. Hallowell seems to assume, left to the so-called New-Kantians and New-Hegelians to drain the German conceptions of state and law of their liberal content. The very jurists whose sanctification of the state and denial of the transcendent rights of man he mentions were self-styled liberals of a pseudo-philosophical school. The writer of this review happens in his student days to have sat at the feet of most of them, as lecturers or authors, and can vouch that they used their "liberalism" only to adapt themselves and their doctrines to the necessities of the state. That these professors believed it their duty to become its defenders, its apologists, and even its panegyrists is a sign of spiritual weakness, the states and theirs. Liberalism, still useful in book-titles or chapter-headings had no suit from which to play, and no one even dreamed that it had any trumps. In a Kelsen or a Kohler it was a kind of by-product of general humanitarian feeling and in almost all the others it was just a stylish, not to say a stylistic embellishment of their officialdom. (Adolf Lasson, by the way, was not, in spite of his forbiddingly voluminous "System der Rechtsphilosophie," an independent juristic thinker, but, in this as in every other respect, the high priest of orthodox Hegelianism.) To call them the predecessors of Nazism is greatly to overestimate them. The most one can say is that they were all hypnotised by the state: to them, man was made for the law and not the law for man. Spiritually and otherwise they depended on the state and felt it incumbent upon them to give of their mental substance in return. They did not so much prepare Germany for Hitlerism as condition themselves or their disciples to receive it.

These observations take nothing from the essential value of Mr. Hallowell's book, but they suggest that, so far as German thought is concerned, it must be regarded as a purely theoretical study in law and liberalism. As such it is an unquestionably important contribution to the history of liberal thinking. An efficient apparatus of notes, a very helpful bibliography, and a good index make it the more commendable. One or two of the German quotations need linguistic revision.

HERMANN SINSHEIMER.

THE GREEK DILEMMA. War and Aftermath. By WILLIAM HARDY McNEILL. (*Gollancz* 240pp. 7s. 6d.)

IN 1936 General Metaxas set up his dictatorship in Greece; in 1936 General Franco with the aid of Germany and Italy rose against the Spanish Republic. In 1936 the Western Powers refused to intervene to help put down General Franco's rising; in 1944 British troops were used to put down the rising of EAM and ELAS, the Greek Left-wing resistance movement, which Great Britain had been largely instrumental in building up to harry the German lines of communication in the Balkans. Today to 'the Spanish problem'—that grim skeleton in the democratic cupboard—is added 'the Greek dilemma.' The dilemma of the Western Powers, as

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Mr. McNeill sees it, is that "they are unwilling to withdraw and hand Greece over to the Communists and Russians, yet unable with a good conscience to support what will to all intents and purposes be a Fascist State."

Mr. McNeill went to Greece as Assistant Military Attaché for the United States in November 1944, soon after the return of the Greek Government to liberated Athens. When he left in June 1946, the March elections had given victory to the Right; in September of that year the King of the Hellenes returned to Greece. Mr. McNeill's book was written before the United States began to take over responsibility in Greece from Great Britain, following the announcement of the 'Truman doctrine' and the U.S. loans to Greece and Turkey. His account of developments in Greece during and since the war is on the whole agreeably free from the 'holier than thou' attitude which colours the work of many American critics of British foreign policy and of the politics of other countries. He takes a great deal of trouble to place events against the background of Greek history and the world contest for power, unravels the tangled skein of Greek politics and gives useful facts about the past of the principal Greek politicians.

The British, he thinks, even under Churchill, never really wanted to support reaction in Greece, but would have liked to see a liberal society and government emerge after the war. Churchill was, however, primarily concerned to ensure a friendly Greek Government that would side with Great Britain in case of another war. The reason Churchill and the British Ambassador, Reginald Leeper, "so high-handedly supported Papandreu in December 1944" and used British troops against EAM, was because they believed that to allow EAM to gain exclusive control would not achieve the desired result. EAM was Communist-controlled, although the rank and file were by no means all Communists; they looked to Russia for moral if not then material aid. Mr. McNeill gives a reasonably fair account of the attempt by the embarrassed British Labour Government to combine continuity of foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean with economic help to Greece and encouragement to the non-communist Centre and Left. In November 1945, Hector McNeil, then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, went to Greece and drew up a definite economic and political plan. The Sophoulis Government was formed and, with the help of the British Economic Mission, put some order into the economic chaos. The plan failed politically because Sophoulis, a man of the Centre, had neither the support of EAM nor the Royalists, and EAM decided to boycott the election in March 1946. Incidentally, Mr. McNeill questions the figure for abstentions on the Left, given as 9.3% in the report of the Allied observers; he considers they were as high as 20%.

Mr. McNeill is convinced that Russia is seeking for strategic reasons to extend her influence in Greece by taking advantage of the deterioration of the situation there, and that Greece's northern neighbours, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, are not disinterested in their support of the Greek Left. In particular, he thinks that the situation in Macedonia, about which he gives some interesting facts, could lead to a clash involving the Great Powers. On the other hand, it emerges clearly enough that it was Great Britain (with the tacit support of America) rather than Russia and her friends who took the initiative in Greece.

BOOK REVIEWS

So long as tension between Russia and the West continues, Mr. McNeill sees no possibility of political stability in Greece. This tension, he says "almost guarantees continuance of the Communist-Rightist struggle within Greece. Each of the domestic factions looks abroad for moral and physical support. Each promises eventual victory to its adherents on the strength of foreign help." Far more than Greek incompetence "it is the strategic place Greece holds on the international scene" which makes solution of her economic, social and political problems at present impossible. He shares to some extent the view of Henry Wallace and Ernest Bevin that if economic prosperity would not guarantee stable and popular government "it would certainly make its achievement more probable." As he sees it, the major economic problem of Greece, like that of other peasant countries of Eastern and South Eastern Europe, is poverty and over-population on the land. He suggests that America should help by allowing a substantial increase of immigration into the States; financial aid too is needed to develop industry to absorb the surplus rural population.

This book provides a most useful background for an understanding of 'the Greek dilemma,' but Mr. McNeill suggests no answer to it. Indeed, it is not easy to find one. British support for the Centre has failed; increasingly the Western Powers have been driven to support the Right, and their attempts to exercise a restraining influence have not been very successful. The non-communist Left has been reduced to impotence; the Communists and guerillas have grown more and not less aggressive with repression and outside help. The 'Truman doctrine,' as far as Greece is concerned, has acted as a challenge rather than as a deterrent to Russia and her friends; the U.S. loan to Greece is being used mainly for the Greek Army and has led to more and not less fighting. Great Britain has been obliged to reduce her commitments in Greece as elsewhere. There remain two possibilities. First, the Western Powers could abandon Greece. But apart from the strategic problems involved, Russia, even if she had a free hand, could scarcely for a long time to come provide the essential imports of food, raw materials, and manufactures on which Greece, unlike Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, is completely dependent. Secondly, the United States could give greatly increased economic aid, insist that it be used constructively, and together with Great Britain bring influence to bear to stop repression and help the Centre and the Left. But will the United States, with her anti-Red fever, her dislike of political and economic commitments, do anything concrete and progressive? The ultimate solution of 'the Greek dilemma' must depend on agreement, or at least compromise, between Russia and the Western Powers.

HELEN F. GRANT.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF THE DANUBIAN STATES. By FREDERICH HERTZ. (Gollancz. 223 pp. 15s.)

THIS study is valuable because so carefully compiled and documented. Yet to those who are interested in the new economic developments, particularly the long term plans, it will offer little guidance. For it deals with the familiar theme of the evils of economic nationalism, showing the decline in real incomes in the years between the wars in Central Europe, and contrasting with it the steady rise in incomes in the far off happy years of 1900-1913. Austria-Hungary, according to Professor Hertz, was a

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etter place than the Central Europe of 1919-1939, and the reason was that was an integrated well-balanced whole.

But was there not in part a much more profound explanation for the rise in real incomes in Central Europe before the first world war? The world in which Austria-Hungary then existed was economically stable, by comparison with the nineteen-thirties. The period 1900-1913 was a period of steady world trade expansion: agricultural prices tended to rise, and real incomes in agricultural countries, including South Eastern Europe, rose also. But the second period, that of the nineteen-thirties, saw the world agricultural crisis, following very rapid expansion of grain production in overseas countries: it was the downward plunge of farm prices which led Europe in general, and not only the Danubian basin, into autarchy. The decline of inter-Danubian trade began, it is true, in the nineteen-twenties, as a result of inter-Danubian tariffs, but it was far less catastrophic in its effects for the Danubian basin than the crisis of the nineteen-thirties, and the tariff increases of the Western European countries.

The lesson which should emerge from Professor Hertz's study is that Central and Eastern Europe suffered from the same economic diseases as the West, though in a different form, concealed rural unemployment. The West could not include the East in an expanding economic system, because it could not itself create the conditions for steady advance. Nor could the Eastern countries, with their former political structure, create the conditions for capital formation and expansion.

If this point were clearly made, it would be easier to understand the changes in economic policy and orientation now in progress. It is because they are determined to end rural unemployment, determined also to end the danger of dependence on an unstable world economy, that the Eastern European countries are now planning industrialisation. That, from Professor Hertz's standpoint, may be just another extension of economic nationalism, yet what other remedy is there? It is 1947 now, and they cannot go back to Austria-Hungary, although that is what Professor Hertz seems to imply.

The value of this very scholarly work would therefore be far greater, if it bore some relation to the present and did not simply compare two periods of the past. Take, for instance, the chapters on the land reforms which followed the first world war; it is interesting to recall that the scope of the land reforms of that period was actually larger than that of the division of the estates now in progress, interesting to re-read one's own pessimistic reflections: but what are the alternatives? To return to the regime of the estates, on which Austria-Hungary maintained its stratified society? Alternative types of farm organisation are being tried out, to remedy the defects of the former peasant economy. The last peace settlement made many mistakes, and the new settlement has reversed them: surely it is time that Professor Hertz and Mr. Gollancz turned the next page?

DOREEN WARRINER.

FACING EAST. By L. B. NAMIER. (Hamish Hamilton. 159pp. 8s. 6d.)

THE impact of Hitler on Europe, followed by the bloodless revolutions in Eastern Europe under Russian influence and example, has created an intense interest in the present-day political and economic struggles of Central and Eastern Europe. Newspapers and periodicals are filled with

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articles on the Balkans, on Poland, on Germany, and on Russia, to an extent far surpassing the space devoted before the war to these "far-off countries of which we knew little." Interest is firmly anchored in the day-to-day events by notes of protest by the British or American Governments, by elections, "faked or free," and by a variety of economic plans. But the past is dim. It is as though an iron curtain had come down in time, either in 1933 or in 1945.

The great virtue of Professor Namier's book is that it raises this iron curtain in time. And, indeed, that is its justification as a book. For it is not a coherent whole. It is a series of book reviews, gathered together and reprinted, to form a bird's eye view of Europe, a bird's eye view both in time and in space. Most of the books which he reviews were published in 1945 or before, and his reviews presumably appeared more than a year ago. There is, therefore nothing contemporary about *Facing East*, but every word is none the less apposite and timely. Each essay is full of the author's vast knowledge of Europe and his considerable historical insight. This knowledge and insight illuminate the present scene, and provide, in the space of a few short essays, a valuable background for those too lazy or busy to read at greater length.

Two chapters are devoted to Germany, one an essay on A. J. P. Taylor's *The Course of German History*, and the other on *The German Mind and Outlook*, a collection of six papers given at the Institute of Sociology in 1942. Both books, as Professor Namier states, stress the continuing characteristics of the Germans, which culminated in the Nazi regime. One hopes that the Control Commission officials in charge of re-education have read these books, if only to disabuse themselves of the idea that the Nazi ideas have only to be wiped off the German slate, in order to reveal a nation capable and willing to work a free democracy. Too many British and American officials believe that Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and Rosenberg created the German mentality that produced Belsen. Professor Namier ends his essay on *The German Mind and Outlook*: "Many a reader will close this book with the feeling that there is such a thing as a Belsen of the mind and spirit." And clearly, Professor Namier believes that, though the churn houses and gas chambers of Belsen have been burnt to the ground, the spirit lives on, which could recreate them. Its eradication is not only a matter of defacing twelve years of Nazi indoctrination: it is a far deeper problem, stretching far further back in time, and therefore potentially reaching far further into the future. The Anglo-Saxon failure to realise this danger to the full is at the root of the French and Slav distrust of our policy in Germany.

Professor Namier brings the same historical approach to bear on Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Eastern European countries, in reviewing respectively a new history of Poland, edited by Bernadotte Schmitt, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* by Rebecca West, and *Eastern Europe between the Wars*, by Hugh Seton-Watson. Those who have been dismayed by some of the arguments put forward by the Poles in defence of the Oder-Neisse frontier (e.g., that much of the area was Polish in 900 A.D.) will recognise such arguments as a continuation of what Professor Namier calls "an intellectual pea-soup fog" which surrounded all Polish claims and rights before the last war. He condemns the book he reviews, because, far from clearing this fog, it contains essays of "blaring self-glorification."

The chapter on Yugoslavia is a delight and a pleasure to read, stemming

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as it does from Rebecca West's remarkable book, and profusely illustrated with quotations from it. Both the book itself, and in much shorter space, Professor Namier's essay, are an essential background to Tito's Yugoslavia. They reveal that extraordinary country in all its real and tragic diversity. By implication, Professor Namier admires the achievement of Tito, in creating Federal Yugoslavia, in which many of the old tearing feuds are submerged. Whether they are permanently submerged, only time can tell.

In the last three chapters of his book, Professor Namier deserts the bird's eye view of Europe for a wider problem, which he has very much at heart: the problem of the Jew in the modern world. He emphasises the fact that the geographical centre of Jewry has now shifted in a revolutionary way. In 1880, about 75 per cent of world Jewry lived in the Russian-Polish Pale and its fringes, with a fair percentage in Central Europe. Only about 4 per cent lived in the English-speaking world. By 1930, the figure had increased to about 30 per cent. He estimates the present number living in the English-speaking world at 60 per cent. He stresses the fact that, in the past, every great concentration of Jews in any one area has led in time to persecution. He wonders whether the English-speaking world can remain immune from this recurrent pattern. He seems not at all confident that we can remain immune, discerning as he rightly does, a dangerous increase in anti-Semitism in the United States and Canada, where the number of Jews is at its greatest. Professor Namier's analysis of the Jewish problem is erudite and fascinating. He does not allow his passionate concern to cloud his judgment or affect his facts. He wants a National Home in Palestine, but he does not use his faith or his knowledge as a stick to beat British policy in Palestine. As in all his essays in this book, he stops short of immediacy. But what he says is intensely relevant to the present tragic impasse.

The value of this book lies primarily in Professor Namier's own comments, and in the vast knowledge which he reveals, even in such short essays. But it is also valuable as a stimulant to the reader to turn to the books, which form the basis of *Facing East*, and thus to see the events of today in the perspective of yesterday.

ANNE WHYTE.

"THERE IS A SPIRIT IN EUROPE" *A Memoir of Frank Thompson Collected by T. J. T. & E.P.T. (Gollancz. 191pp. 10s. 6d.)*

FRANK THOMPSON, of whom this book is a memoir compiled by his mother and brother, was the son of Edward Thompson, and was executed after a mockery of a trial in his early twenties while fighting with the Bulgarian Partisans. He may be regarded as the Rupert Brooke of the generation of the second World War. A classical scholar of Winchester and Oxford, he had a genius for mastering languages, an understanding of the Slav peoples, and a conviction of a better age for the common man through communism. He was under twenty when he joined the Army, he saw service in Greece and in all parts of the Middle East, and finally he was dropped by parachute as British liaison officer in Bulgaria. By the Slav fighters he was revered as one of the heroes of their liberation. From the time Russia came into the war he had a premonition that the Bulgarian peasants would rise against the Fascist tyranny, and he prepared himself to help them by acquiring their language.


BOOK REVIEWS

The greater part of the memoir consists of extracts from his war diary and his letters to his family and friends. It contains also a few poems written before and during the war; of these, some are translations from the Russian. It was the peculiar excellence of Frank Thompson that he combined a love of Hellenism and of English literature with an understanding of the Slav culture and an intense interest in the social Revolution. The diary is full, too, of illuminating comments on life in the Army, and on the peoples and countries where he served. He could write with freshness and without inhibition of the Greeks and the Syrians, of Cairo and Jerusalem and Teheran, of flowers everywhere.

The title of the book is a bitter irony. He wrote in December 1943: "There is a Spirit abroad in Europe which is finer and braver than anything that tired Continent has known for centuries, and which cannot be withstood. It is the confident will of whole peoples, who have known the utmost humiliation and suffering, and who have triumphed over it, to build their own life once and for all." And again: "The war is demonstrating, beyond any hope of refutation, the Unity of Man."

Today the more apt title might be—"There *was* a Spirit in Europe." The ardour and faith of the writer, and of many other young men of the generation who fell, have been obscured by the irritations and frustrations of the peace. Why is it that the prophecy of the better age, which he foresaw in 1944, has today a mocking sound? In one of the last letters he wrote to his brother:—"My eyes fill quickly with tears when I think what a splendid Europe we shall build . . . when all the vitality and talent of its indomitable peoples can be set free for co-operation and creation." We have lost, since the war, what he felt to be the essential quality:—"close comradeship to a clearly sighted end." We have lost too the combination, which he embodied, of human-heartedness with dialectical materialism. He was free from any dogmatic approach:—"How rarely I have found myself marching down the stream-lined autobahn of my socialist theory. The only thing important, immortal if you like about a man is his individuality." A touching picture in the book shows a banner displayed in the Bulgarian town where he fell. The slogan on the banner stretched across the street runs:—"He who fell in battle for liberty, he does not die."

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BOOK REVIEWS

PALESTINE MISSION. By RICHARD CROSSMAN, M.P. (Hamilton. 256pp. 10s. 6d.)

REAL impartiality—which does not imply absence of opinion or belief—is almost unknown in the many books published which deal with the Jewish-Arab problem in Palestine. It is one of those man-made or statesman-made problems, too common in the contemporary world, for which there is no “just” or “right” solution; whatever is done, solemn pledges will be broken, rights infringed, large numbers of people injured and left with a grievance. Both protagonists are right and both wrong, and the blind, unreasoning passions with which they are both afflicted make any reasonable or civilized settlement impossible. Even the outside observer, who is neither Jew nor Arab and does not want to be pro- or anti-either, whose sole object is to find a “reasonable settlement,” soon finds himself sucked into the horrible vortex of Semitic or anti-semitic passions. Hence there is hardly a single book on Zionism or Palestine, written in the last few years, which is really worth reading or which has not done considerably more harm than good. And the self-righteous sadism of both sides and of their supporters, masquerading in the hypocritical cloak of misery, patriotism, or impartiality, is revolting. And the most revolting of all are the partisans who would have us believe either that there is some peculiar nobility and righteousness in the Arab determined to make life hell for the Jews in the name of a squalid or synthetic patriotism or in the Jew determined to make life a hell for every one because every one has made life a hell for him. What is happening in Palestine to Arabs, Jews, and British is brutal and brutalising; there is nothing noble in it at all; it is the result of diseased minds and stupid actions. One should pity the sufferers and try to cure them or prevent them doing further harm to each other; but one should refuse to be blackmailed into idealizing or heroicizing them. One should pity a homicidal lunatic, but it is dangerous to make a hero of him.

Mr. Crossman has written a very remarkable and brilliant book because he has forced himself to face his own prejudices as well as other people's, to face the realities in Palestine, to understand the minds and actions of both Jews and Arabs. It is a moving book because it is full of pity for the pitiable and yet uncompromisingly realistic. On the face of it it is a detailed account of his experiences as a member of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, and as such it is extremely interesting and amusing. But it is much more than that. It is an extraordinarily intelligent analysis of Mr. Crossman's own mind, including its passions and prejudices, as it reacted to the problem and the people and the investigation and the facts revealed. It is an experiment in political psycho- or self-analysis. In this analysis he is uncompromising both with himself and with other people, and he is determined to state the facts and the truth as truthfully as he can. The result for himself is a view of what should be done which he holds with passionate conviction; the result for at least one reader was that for the first time the facts and nature of the problem had been completely presented to him.

LEONARD WOOLF.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ON GOVERNING COLONIES. By W. R. CROCKER. (*Allen and Unwin*. 152pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE comparative study of politics might profitably be more often extended to the comparative study of colonial policies. Lieutenant-Colonel Crocker is well qualified to undertake such a study for Africa. He was formerly a District Officer in Nigeria, has since worked in the International Labour Office, and as a soldier during the war he has been back in Africa again. He writes with vigour, clarity, and incisiveness about what the British, French and Belgians have been doing in Africa. His solid, intimate sympathy for the peoples of Africa permeates all he writes, and his style has a soldierly downrightness which is refreshing.

He regards the main problem of Africa as nutrition, and therefore poverty. The problems of disease and ignorance are kindred but subsidiary problems. Nor will poverty be lessened mainly through industrialization: the basic source of wealth is agriculture. The author has high praise for Belgian colonial administration because it has seized upon these elemental facts. The French, by extensive use of African auxiliaries, have built a more effective medical service than the British, who have relied on highly trained doctors. It is through doctors and agriculturalists—but only through those who undertake their work in close understanding of the Africans—that the colonial Powers can best, in his view, fulfil their trust to Africa. Above all, as befits a former colonial administrator, the author sees the hard-working and over-burdened colonial service as the chief medium of colonial progress. His comparative studies of the colonial services and methods of the three colonial Powers are, in this connection, of immense interest and importance. France cherishes the aim of assimilation, or of turning Africans into good Frenchmen; her excessive centralization has its familiar defects; but he is not blind to the merits of clarity, practical commonsense and human devotion which French methods have produced. The British aim remains ultimate self-government, so that her administrators are expected to guide and preside over their eventual liquidation. Their lack of centralization and of system produces much confusion and wide diversity, but avoids the faults of heavy-handed centralization which beset the French. The Belgian system, less highly centralized than the French but more centralized than the British, clings to Ryckmans' doctrine of *dominer pour servir*, and does not encourage ultimate self-government. Belgian rule is more paternalist, perhaps, than the others.

The author has many pet enemies. Missionaries—or at least those who put proselytizing first, as do most of the Roman Catholics—are perhaps his greatest *bête noire*. He has equally hard words for the blimpist imperialists and for those well meaning but ill-informed radical and left-wing groups at home who seize over-readily on any accusation against the colonial administrations. He has a telling sally against the *New Statesman and Nation*, and makes several onslaughts on certain "lady colonial experts" of an academic kind. All these groups—so vocal and so influential in moulding public opinion at home about colonial affairs—pay too much attention to the literate minorities of Freetown and Lagos, and the over-rated *concitoyens* of Dakar. The result is excessive attention to politics and constitutional devices, and the obscuring of Africa's real needs: the needs of more than ninety per cent of her population—food, health, social security.

BOOK REVIEWS


He has, indeed, almost a phobia against European industrial civilization and its present-day concomitants. He sees its imposition on Africa as a disaster for human happiness.

It is not easy to convince the flatdwellers who man the Colonial Office and most of the other institutions concerned that there is a case against their philosophy of Ford's in his flivver, All's right with the world; that a high standard of life means paved streets, shop windows, neon lights, glossy advertisements, aspirins, several cinema shows a week, and wireless sets for every man which, in keeping with the B.B.C.'s self-dedication to making the common man commoner, will bring to the furthest desert well and to the remotest forest grove the saxophones wailing without end and the voices of jazz women previously heard only around Piccadilly after dark. The one people in the world who have not lost happiness are, with the best intentions, now being menaced with a life rich in gadgets but richer still in dependence, frustration, emptiness, and sorrow.

Colonial policy, in short, must always be framed looking at Africa "from the bush end, not from the colony capitals and ports."

Despite the frequent exaggerations, the obvious prejudices and the irritating repetitions in the book, it is written in such a challenging way, it contains so much first-hand experience and so large a fund of rich commonsense, that it deserves to become a classic of colonial writings, and a book for essential study by all who enter the colonial service.

DAVID THOMSON.



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those wanting
to know
what has been
and what is,
before deciding what is to be—

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

KEEP LEFT: By R. H. S. CROSSMAN, MICHAEL FOOT, and IAN MIKARDO
(*New Statesman pamphlet.* 47pp. 1s.)
CARDS ON THE TABLE: An Interpretation of Labour's Foreign Policy.
(*Labour Party pamphlet.* 18pp. 2d.)

FOREIGN policy has hitherto been the only part of the Labour Government's work to provoke a substantial body of criticism from among its own customary supporters. In these two pamphlets the differences between the socialists who support and the socialists who condemn Mr. Bevin's policy are, in traditional Labour Party fashion, dragged into the light of day for all the world to see.

Socialist discontent with the Government's foreign policy came to a head with the "rebellion" led by Mr. Crossman at the beginning of the present Session, but undoubtedly it still continues, and Mr. Crossman and his friends re-stated their case in the first of these two pamphlets, written in April of this year, and in effect answered by the second, anonymous pamphlet published by Transport House a month later.

It is only fair to say that *Keep Left* covers the whole field of present political problems, and, while bestowing much praise on many of the Government's domestic achievements, offers it also a wide miscellany of suggestions for further improvement in this sphere, and makes a very strong case for more rapid demobilization. But I hope its authors will feel it to be fair also to say that they are far less concerned about the way the Government is going at home than about its record abroad, and, further, that the crux of their differences with Mr. Bevin arises over his attitude to Russia. The question of policy towards that state is indeed the most important and the most perplexing problem facing this country to-day.

Now here *Cards on the Table*, designed no doubt to allow things to be said which the Foreign Secretary could not very well say himself, does not mince its words. "It is a major tragedy of socialist history," writes its author (p. 12), "that the advent to power of a pro-Soviet Labour Government in Britain coincided with the opening of a sustained and violent offensive against Britain by her Russian ally." The fifteen Labour M.P's. who jointly accept responsibility for *Keep Left*, actually written by three of them, agree (p. 36): "An attempt was made by Mr. Bevin in the autumn of 1945 to find a basis for Anglo-Russian understanding. But the Russians seemed to assume that a socialist government in Britain was simply the junior partner in a capitalist alliance against communism. As if to prove this, they launched a diplomatic and propaganda offensive against Britain..."

There is not, in short, much disagreement about the facts concerning the Russian attitude to us. It is over the question of what to do about it that *Keep Left* falls out with *Cards on the Table*. It is difficult not to feel that the latter, for all its robust, straightforward defence of Mr. Bevin, is not a little disingenuous in denying that we have leant more towards the U.S.A. than the U.S.S.R. "The fact is", it remarks (p. 15), "that we have found ourselves voting on the same side as the Americans against Russia on many occasions because on those occasions we considered that the Russians were wrong!" True: but we have, of course, voted with the Americans and against the Russians on many more occasions. Surely the truth is not only that the British Labour Government has found it easier to work with capitalist America than with communist Russia but also that, finding the policy of the former to contain no hint of aggression and that of the latter

A. L. Rowse

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to be enigmatic, it has felt bound to make its dispositions accordingly ?

The difficulty about the constructive proposals of *Keep Left* is that they are not really practicable. It proposes (p. 38) that, on the economic side, we aim gradually to remove the iron curtain in the sphere of trade. An admirable proposal, but not one, as subsequent events have confirmed, exactly easy to carry out. The same is true of the political proposal (p. 41): "We should try to expand the Anglo-French Alliance into a European security pact". That, incidentally, even if practicable, though pleasing to Mr. Churchill (whom both pamphlets attack), would be in the last degree displeasing to Russia without giving us in return the hope of security held out in the curiously illogical sentence which shortly follows: "A United Europe, strong enough to deter an aggressor, but voluntarily renouncing the most deadly offensive weapon of modern warfare, would be the best guarantor of world peace". The illogicality consists in thinking that a United Europe, without atom bombs, could possibly be strong enough to deter an aggressor armed with them. One wonders what in any case is the evidence that, even with atom bombs, a United Europe would have this strength, still more what is the evidence for ourselves alone (p. 47: the last sentence of the whole pamphlet) having the strength "to tip the balance against war..."

No, it is all a beautiful dream, and, like so many dreams, contains much muddled and much wishful thinking. The world is divided into two blocs, and we have not the strength to hold the balance between them; and Mr. Bevin—and for that matter Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Marshall also—have tried for more than two years to bridge the gulf between them with exemplary patience (except perhaps for a lapse on Mr. Bevin's part at the London meetings of the Security Council) and with, so far alas, complete lack of success. The latest Russian refusal—of the Marshall offer—has convinced public opinion here that we must do our best in this field to go ahead without them. Continued use of the veto will have the same effect in the United Nations' field. And would that be an unmitigated disaster? Argument has not led the government of the U.S.S.R. to cooperate with the west—experience may. It is hard to see how any amount of argument could convince "the scared men in the Kremlin" that the capitalist, and social democratic, world is capable of solving its economic problems without making war against the communist one, but what Stalin called "the logic of events" might, some fifteen years from now, have that effect if meanwhile the western powers had constructed a viable economy and a stable and obviously unaggressive political system. The policy of constructing such a system has its defects and its dangers, but fewer than any alternative that has yet been suggested.

FRANK HARDIE.

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SHORTER NOTICES:

THE SOCIALIST CASE. By DOUGLAS JAY. WITH A FOREWORD BY THE RT. HON. CLEMENT ATTLEE. (Faber. 298 pp. 12s. 6d.)

MR. JAY wrote his book originally before the war and it was first published in 1938. It is now re-published "with such minor revisions as are necessary to bring it up to date, and with alterations in the emphasis, but not the basis, of the argument." There is an interesting introduction in which Mr. Jay explains how the experience of the last nine years has strengthened his case for socialism and strengthened his convictions. The book is one of the best statements of the economic case for socialism which has been written.

REASON AND UNREASON IN SOCIETY. By MORRIS GINSBERG. (London School of Economics and Longmans. 327 pp. 15s.)

The title chosen for this book is likely to mislead the prospective reader. Professor Ginsberg has gathered into its pages sixteen essays on a variety of subjects, nearly all of which were originally lectures or articles. He is a distinguished sociologist and the correct description of his book is given in its sub-title, "Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy." Part I, which contains six essays, is concerned with the methods and tendencies of modern sociology, the theories of particular sociologists, e.g., Westermarck and Pareto, and the relation between social science and social philosophy. The four essays in Part II deal with particular questions such as the causes of war or anti-semitism. The six essays in Part III are heterogeneous and there seems no reason why one of them on Stammler's Philosophy of Law should not have been included in Part I. There is much learning and industrious analysis of other people's theories, but the outline of Professor Ginsberg's own thought tends to be somewhat blurred. The question of reason and unreason in society naturally crops up from time to time, but it is not, in any important sense, the central theme of the book.

THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD. PATTERNS OF JAPANESE CULTURE. By RUTH BENEDICT. (Secker and Warburg. 324 pp. 12s. 6d.)

Miss Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* has become in its way a classic, and everything which she writes has "quality." Her new book is extraordinarily interesting. During 1944 the American Government directed her to use her anthropological science and methods "to spell out what the Japanese were like." This book gives the results of her investigation. It is a very remarkable and fascinating analysis of a highly developed and complicated contemporary national culture. It takes one inside the Japanese mind and shows one how their actions are determined by their communal emotions, beliefs, traditions. After reading the book one feels at least that one understands the Japanese in a way in which one has never understood them or perhaps any other people before. Dr. Benedict's sympathetic understanding and objectivity are astonishing; indeed, our only criticism of her is that she is so sympathetic and objective that she sometimes gives one the impression that she thinks that, if one can explain why people are stupid and cruel, one must condone the results of stupidity and cruelty.

HERBERT FISHER. A SHORT BIOGRAPHY. By DAVID OGG. (Arnold. 205 pp. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Ogg has written a not too sympathetic biography of Fisher whose character and career are not unworthy of a little study by the student of

BOOK REVIEWS

20th century society. Fisher was born into the small circle of the intellectual elite in the year 1865; he was predestined by his looks, his mind, and his connections for success. He obtained it at once at Winchester and New College and his course was set for academic success as an Oxford don and a historian. Even to those who knew him well he seemed in these days a typical Oxford don who would probably reach the summit of academic success as Head of his College. The prognostication was correct, but Fisher's ambition was really for the life of action and politics. He attained his ambition as President of the Board of Education in Lloyd George's coalition Government. Opinions differ widely as to his achievement as a politician and as a historian. Mr. Ogg's book throws some, though not too much, light on the problem.

RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By H. LAUTERPACHT. (Cambridge Press. 442 pp. 25s.)

Everything which the present Whewell Professor of International Law writes is marked with peculiar distinction. His knowledge and learning are remarkable; his intelligence of a high order; but what is most notable in his work is its intellectual integrity. His present book is of the greatest value. It is an exhaustive study of a very complex question in international law, the recognition of states, governments, and belligerency. Professor Lauterpacht controverts the view held by a good many lawyers that recognition is not a question of international law at all, but purely of politics. He maintains that on the contrary the practice of states with regard to

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STAPLES

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

1939-1947

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

I

THE recent appointment of a Minister of Defence and a Minister for Economic Affairs, followed by the merging of the latter post with that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the resignation of Mr. Dalton; the creation of an Economic Secretary to the Treasury; and the inception of new planning machinery are the latest events in a series of far-reaching changes which have transformed British Cabinet Government in less than a decade. It is time that some of the wider implications of these changes were more generally understood.

The organisation of the central government has expanded on a vast scale since 1939. Omitting wartime episodes like the Ministries of Production, Information, Shipping, Aircraft Production and Home Security, we find that no fewer than 6 major Departments have been added to the central executive. These comprise the Ministries of Fuel and Power, Supply, Food, National Insurance, Civil Aviation and Town and Country Planning. This is by far the greatest increase of permanent Departments which has ever taken place within so short a time in British history.

Wars have frequently determined the growth and development of central departments. The outbreak of war with France in 1793 led to the appointment in 1794 of the first Secretary of State for War, who took over from the Home Secretary all his powers relating to the army. Seven years later all powers relating to the Colonies were transferred to the Secretary for War. In 1854 a Secretary of State for the Colonies was appointed, in order to relieve the War Office of colonial affairs during the Crimean war. The Indian Mutiny led to the creation of the Secretary of State for India in 1858. The First World War saw the creation of the Secretary of State for Air in 1918 to cope more effectively with air warfare. The Ministry of Labour was also born during World War I; and so, too, was the Ministry of Transport.

It will be noticed that all the new Departments which have recently been formed, with the exception of the Ministry of Supply, exist solely for peaceful purposes. And even the Ministry of Supply is by no means exclusively engaged on

I

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munitions work. Its aircraft side serves the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the air transport corporations; and many of the ordnance factories working under the Ministry of Supply are producing goods for civil consumption.* Hence we cannot say that the spate of new Departments was caused by military or supply needs arising directly out of the recent war. What occurred rather was that tendencies and influences which had existed for a considerable time suddenly became much stronger and more urgent under the impact of war; while resistances which had appeared impregnable crumbled overnight.

Thus, it had long been evident that a single Department was required to look after the various insurance schemes whose administration was scattered through half-a-dozen Ministries. Yet had it not been for the powerful popular support accorded to the Beveridge Report and the political importance attached to social security as part of the reconstruction programme, the Ministry of National Insurance would probably not have been set up for many years, if at all. In the field of town and country planning, the failure of the Ministry of Health had for long been painfully obvious; but it was not until the bombing of our cities awakened a widespread desire to make them finer and more beautiful, that reforms which had for long been sought by a small group of pioneers suddenly acquired an immense impetus. This led, among other things, to the establishment of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. The public interest in nutrition, which had been growing steadily during the inter-war period in consequence of many social and medical investigations, received institutional expression in the Ministry of Food, and assured its continuance after the War. A strong movement to dissociate civil aviation from the Air Ministry had existed in aeronautical circles for some years; but it was the demonstration provided by the war of our neglect to recognise the possibilities of air transport, and the Air Ministry's failure to give transport aircraft their due share of development, design and production resources, that led to the setting up of a separate Ministry of Civil Aviation. The immediate occasion for the establishment of the Ministry of Fuel and Power was the coal crisis of 1942 and the political opposition to the fuel rationing scheme which the Government proposed to introduce. But the causes both of that emergency and the more recent ones have deep roots which go back at least to 1918, if not much earlier.

* The powers of the Ministry of Supply were specially extended for this purpose by the Supplies (Transitional Powers) Act 1945.

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Here again the effect of the war was to speed up events, to lend vitality to ideas, rather than to introduce any revolutionary break with the past.

II

The wartime administrations of 1939-1945 were organised on quite different lines from the Lloyd George government in the First World War. In 1916, it will be remembered, an Imperial War Cabinet was formed to replace the larger Cabinet. It consisted of 5 members, of whom only the Chancellor of the Exchequer had Departmental responsibilities. The other members were able to devote themselves exclusively to the most important political, military and economic questions arising out of the general conduct of the war.

On the outbreak of the Second World War, Mr. Chamberlain formed a War Cabinet of 9 members consisting of himself as Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretaries of State for War and Air, the Lord Privy Seal, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and a Minister without Portfolio. On Mr. Churchill's accession to the Premiership, this was replaced by a War Cabinet of 5 members. Thereafter, the Coalition War Cabinets fluctuated between 5 and 10 members.¹ Mr. Churchill's conception of the Supreme Council of Ministers was entirely different from Lloyd George's. It was the exception rather than the rule for members of his War Cabinet not to be burdened with heavy Departmental responsibilities; and the idea of a small group of men, free from the worry, strain and pre-occupation of day-to-day administration, devoting themselves only to the large issues, did not commend itself to him.

Mr. Churchill combined the office of Prime Minister with that of Minister of Defence. In the latter capacity he frequently presided over meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Committee, which not only formulated strategy and approved plans but also issued to Commanders-in-Chief unified operational instructions and strategical guidance on the conduct of the war. "The duties of the Prime Minister as Minister of Defence were never defined," observes the White Paper on the Central Organisation for Defence²; and partly for this reason and partly owing to his personal qualities and great knowledge of military affairs,

¹ No more than nine members were ever regularly available in London. The tenth member was resident abroad, as explained below.

² Cmd. 6923, 1946, page 3.

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Chairman of the Joint War Production Staff and the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Research policy. His Department will provide the civil and military secretariats for the various inter-service committees and joint staffs. It will undertake the administration of Combined Operations Headquarters and other inter-service organs. The Minister's powers will include the determination of a common policy on questions where this is desirable—and presumably he will decide when it is desirable. Above all, he will apportion the available resources in manpower, munitions, money, research and development facilities between the three services in accordance with an over-all strategic policy laid down by the Defence Committee.

No student of government can fail to be impressed with the coherence and good sense of these arrangements. The need for a Minister of Defence to formulate a unified policy on Service matters is unquestionable. The separation of such an office from the Premiership is also desirable, not only to avoid placing an intolerable burden of work on the Prime Minister but also to prevent too great a concentration of power and influence in his hands. We may reasonably hope to see an end put to many of the internecine jealousies to which Service Departments seem to be particularly prone—or at least to a reduction of their influence on policy and administration. We may expect to obtain substantial economies in expenditure of money, men, and materials, through the extension of common types of supplies and services for the Navy, Army and Air Force in place of separate types. There should be many other positive advantages resulting from co-operation and co-ordination being imposed on the Services at the highest Ministerial level.

III

Several other changes in Cabinet government occurred during the wartime Coalition. Some of them were of short duration; others have endured. Among these we may note the appointment of a Minister of State. This office was first held by Lord Beaverbrook as a member of the War Cabinet.

The idea of Ministers stationed abroad at strategically important points was a brilliant innovation which solved many difficult political and military problems calling for a concentration of authority on the spot. Thus Mr. Lyttleton became Minister of State in the Middle East representing the War Cabinet in June 1941. He was succeeded on 28th March, 1942, by Mr. Richard Casey, who was appointed Minister of State in the

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Middle East and a member of the War Cabinet.¹ Lord Swinton was sent to West Africa in June, 1942, as Minister Resident with Cabinet rank but without a seat in the War Cabinet. Mr. Macmillan received a similar status in January, 1943, when he was appointed Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North-West Africa. Sir Arthur Salter served for several years in Washington while holding the position of Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport, where he played an important part as head of the British Merchant Shipping Mission there. Sir Ben Smith and Lord Llewelyn were also stationed in Washington for shorter periods while members of the British Government. The most striking example was, however, the appointment of Lord Halifax, then Foreign Secretary, as British Ambassador to the United States while still remaining a member of the War Cabinet. This was later explained to mean that he was a member of the Cabinet when in Britain. The Minister of State, from the time when Mr. R. K. Law was appointed in October, 1943, became an assistant or deputy to the Foreign Secretary, though enjoying full Ministerial rank.

The designation of Mr. Attlee as Deputy Prime Minister in the Coalition was also an innovation. It was obviously dictated by considerations of party prestige and political balance to ensure that the Labour party's rights were fully and ostensibly secured during Mr. Churchill's frequent and prolonged journeys abroad.

The Cabinet system showed its flexibility, adaptability and concentration of power to a remarkable extent during the war; and Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister displayed great ingenuity and readiness to innovate in this central feature of the British constitution.

IV

In peacetime the British Cabinet is normally much larger than those of other countries, though the French Cabinet was recently expanded for a short time to a much greater size, mainly for reasons connected with the uneasy equilibrium existing between the parties to the Coalition. During the inter-war period the British Cabinet usually numbered between 20 and 22 members. In August, 1939, it contained the following 23 Ministers:

Prime Minister.

Chancellor of the Exchequer.

¹ His title was changed on 9 October, 1943 to that of Resident Minister of State in the Middle East.

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Lord President of the Council.
 Lord Chancellor.
 Home Secretary.
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
 Lord Privy Seal.
 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
 Secretary of State for the Colonies.
 Secretary of State for India.
 Secretary of State for War.
 Secretary of State for Air.
 Secretary of State for Scotland.
 First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.
 President of the Board of Trade.
 Minister of Health.
 Minister of Labour.
 Minister of Transport.
 Minister of Supply.
 Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
 Minister of Agriculture.
 President of the Board of Education.

The only Ministers omitted were the First Commissioner of Works, the Postmaster-General and the Minister of Pensions who were regarded as Ministers of lower rank and who, as Sir John Anderson puts it, though fully responsible for their own departments were "not admitted to a full share in collective responsibility."¹

Mr. Churchill's shortlived 'Caretaker' Government had a Cabinet of 16. Mr. Attlee's Cabinet originally contained 20 Ministers. Its size has now been reduced to 17 members.

Its composition is as follows:—

Prime Minister.
 Lord President of the Council.
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
 Chancellor of the Exchequer.
 Lord Privy Seal.
 President of the Board of Trade.
 Minister of Defence.
 The Lord Chancellor.
 Home Secretary.
 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
 Secretary of State for Burma.

¹ The Machinery of Government. The Romanes Lecture, Oxford. 1946 p. 8.

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Secretary of State for the Colonies.
 Secretary of State for Scotland.
 Minister of Labour and National Service.
 Minister of Education.
 Minister of Health.
 Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Outside the Cabinet are the following "Ministers of Cabinet rank" as they were called until recently. They are now referred to as Ministers in charge of Departments:—

First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Secretary of State for War.
 Secretary of State for Air.
 Minister of Supply.
 Minister of Fuel and Power.
 Minister of Transport.
 Minister of Food.
 Minister of State.
 Minister of Pensions.
 Minister of Works.
 Minister of Town and Country Planning.
 Minister of National Insurance.
 Minister of Civil Aviation.
 Postmaster-General.

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

These 15 non-Cabinet Ministers, with one or two exceptions, are Privy Councillors. Most of them receive the full Ministerial salary of £5,000. Thirteen of them are in charge of large and important Government Departments. Their position cannot be regarded as in any way comparable to that occupied by the Minister of Pensions or the First Commissioner of Works before the war.

The reasons for not including them in the Cabinet are, presumably, twofold. First, it is necessary to keep the size of the Cabinet below rather than above its pre-war size if it is to be an effective body for deliberation of the highest issues. A Committee of 20 is already too large for the full participation of all its members if reasonable despatch of business is to be secured. A Council of 30 is on the way to becoming a public meeting. Secondly, the Prime Minister has evidently felt that the claims to Cabinet membership of the historically important offices, such as the Lord Privy Seal and the Lord Chancellor, could not be overlooked. This argument is greatly weakened by the demotion from Cabinet rank of the First Lord of the

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Admiralty—an office of great historical prestige—and the other Service Ministers.

None of the recently created Departments is represented in the Cabinet, though Mr. Shinwell was a member while he was Minister of Fuel and Power. Thus, Departments responsible for the newest and most significant tasks of government, are left to struggle along with Ministers not belonging to the Cabinet. Yet food, fuel, transport, civil aviation, national insurance, and the building industry are matters of greater importance at the present time than the affairs of Scotland or the work of the Home Office.

The appointment of the Minister of Defence was followed by the exclusion of the service Ministers from the Cabinet. This was a logical result. A similar result did not, however, follow the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps as Minister for Economic Affairs or the subsequent transfer of his functions to the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he attained that office, for the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Agriculture remain members of the Cabinet. It is difficult to see on what ground the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture are treated more favourably than the Departments responsible for fuel, food and transport.

The disadvantages of exclusion from the Cabinet are mitigated but not overcome by the fact that the Cabinet works increasingly through Committees; and Ministers not in the Cabinet are frequently members of Cabinet Committees dealing with matters which concern their Departments. It is also true that non-Cabinet Ministers are invited to attend the meetings of the Cabinet when questions affecting them are under discussion. But when full allowance has been made for these devices, the fact remains that for the first time a Ministerial hierarchy is emerging in the British Constitution. This is a new fact of great constitutional importance.

Leaving aside Parliamentary Under-Secretaries and Secretaries, there are at least 3, if not 4, more or less clearly defined ranks in the Ministerial hierarchy. At the lowest level are the Minister of Pensions, the Postmaster-General, the Minister of State, and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The first two of these Ministers are in charge of Departments which are regarded as of inferior status; the last two work under the general control of the Foreign Secretary.

The next rung in the ladder comprises the other Ministers in charge of Departments who are not in the Cabinet. They are

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all eligible, both constitutionally and politically, for Cabinet rank and no one would feel surprised if, for example, the Minister of Education were left out of the Cabinet and the Minister of Food or Transport were included.

When we come to the Cabinet itself it is possible to discern two distinct ranks in the hierarchy. There is an inner conclave of half-a-dozen of the most influential and experienced members holding key posts. The most obvious members of this inner ring at present, in addition to the Prime Minister, are Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Morrison, Mr. Bevin and possibly Mr. Alexander. And there is the rest.

There has in the past usually been an inner Cabinet consisting of the senior and most influential members, or those in whose wisdom the Prime Minister had most confidence and whom he consequently was most disposed to consult. The new feature of the situation is the tendency to institutionalise the leading position of certain Ministers.

Thus, the Lord President both during and after the war acquired a position of exceptional weight because of the great importance in economic affairs of the Cabinet Committee of which he was chairman. The Lord President's Committee had general control of home economic policy until Mr. Attlee's recent reconstruction. Now the Lord President's Committee has been superseded by a new Ministerial Committee presided over by the Prime Minister which supervise both domestic and overseas economic policy. Mr. Morrison's co-ordinating functions in the economic sphere have been transferred to Sir Stafford Cripps. The Lord President will, however, take over the task of co-ordinating the social services which had previously been carried out by the Lord Privy Seal. He will also presumably act in future as chairman of the Legislation Committee, which deals on behalf of the Cabinet with all proposals for new legislation. These functions, combined with the leadership of the House of Commons, will enable Mr. Morrison to maintain his position as a member of the inner Cabinet. The Minister of Defence, deputising for the Prime Minister as Chairman of the Defence Committee, will have an unassailable importance on service and defence policy.

This concentration of power among five or six Ministers at the top of the hierarchy is a matter which calls for reflection. It may lead—and has led in certain instances—to other Ministers jockeying for the support of this or that key figure. It tends to destroy equality of discussion both in Cabinet and Committee.

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It may even diminish the responsibility of Ministers for their Departments. It may promote factions within the Cabinet régime. It may lessen the possible range of choice for the party leadership.

The development of a Ministerial hierarchy has undoubted disadvantages. It means that a Minister tends to be less interested in the work of his Department than in the status which he enjoys as political chief of that Department. It may mean that the weight attached to Ministers' views and policies depends more on the position which they occupy in the hierarchy than on the wisdom and knowledge which those who express them possess. It increases the rôle of ambition in political life; and introduces new types of inequality among Ministers.

V

It is interesting to compare the recent developments in Cabinet government with the proposals of the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of Government.¹ The celebrated report of that body recommended that the Cabinet should be small in number, containing preferably 10 or, at most, 12 members. As we have seen, the present tendency is towards smaller Cabinets but this low figure has not yet been approached in peace time.

The Haldane Committee laid down two important principles regarding the central government organization. One was that each Department should be constituted, and its field of activity defined, according to the particular service which it renders to the community as a whole. In general, this principle has been adopted in regard to practically all the Departments which have been formed during the past 30 years. Moreover, a number of functions have been transferred from one Department to another so as to accord with the principle of "distribution according to the nature of the service to be rendered to the community as a whole."² For example, the Factory Inspectorate was transferred from the Home Office to the Ministry of Labour during the war; National Service was added to the latter Ministry's functions; and merchant shipping duties were handed over by the Board of Trade to the Ministry of Transport.

Much still remains to be done in this direction. The Home Office is an anomaly and has not yet succeeded in becoming a Ministry of Justice, largely owing to the opposition

¹ Cmd. 9230, 1918. Reprinted 1938.

² *Ib.* par. 19.

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of the legal profession, which fears political interference with the judicial process. The Colonial Office and Scottish Office are based on territorial concepts and constitutional principles rather than on the functional idea. Responsibility for housing is divided between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Works and several other Departments.

The Haldane Committee did not discuss the question whether the new type of Cabinet they recommended should consist of Ministers without portfolio or of Ministers in charge of the principal Departments of State. They went no further than to specify what they regarded as the main functions of the Cabinet and to classify the main divisions into which the business of Government should fall.

The former consists, in their view, of (a) the final determination of the policy to be submitted to Parliament (b) supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the policy prescribed by Parliament and (c) continuous co-ordination and delimitation of the activities of the several Departments of State.¹ The Cabinet should meet frequently. It should be careful to consult personally all the Ministers whose work is likely to be affected by its decisions. It should have a systematic method of securing that its decisions are effectually carried out by the several Departments concerned. All this is common form to-day and has become part of the normal practice of Cabinet government, though not always with the same degree of success, as our recent and present difficulties in the sphere of production and planning bear witness.

The ten main divisions into which the Haldane Report divides the business of Government are: (I) Finance; (II and III) Defence and External Affairs; (IV) Research and Information; (V) Production (including Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) Transport and Commerce; (VI) Employment; (VII) Supplies; (VIII) Education; (IX) Health; (X) Justice. The Committee was careful to add that more than one Minister would be required for some of these branches; but the idea seems to be implied—it is nowhere explicitly stated—that there would be a supervising Minister for each major division.

The appointment of a Minister of Defence and the attribution to a Minister for Economic Affairs of special responsibilities in the economic sphere indicates that there has been a trend in the direction advocated by the Haldane Committee. The merging of responsibility for finance and

¹ *Ib.* par. 6.

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economic affairs, including production, in the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer is not in accordance with their report. It must be recognized, however, that their analysis and classification is no longer adequate to the vast developments which have taken place since the First World War. The whole problem requires reconsideration in the light of present and future needs.

The proper organization of government is a matter of the widest public importance. It is in the general interest that it should be publicly discussed and examined so that all who have a contribution to make can participate in the search for improvement. Since 1918 there has been no public investigation; but successive Cabinet Committees have been devoted to questions relating to the machinery of government. The proceedings and reports of these Committees are secret. Their very existence is unknown to all but a tiny circle of Ministers, ex-Ministers and Civil servants. Even the composition of the Machinery of Government Committee is a secret. No outside voice penetrates to its discussions except by special invitation.

This is not nearly good enough in an era when the whole future of the British people will depend in large measure on the success with which the government machine discharges its immensely difficult and complex tasks, particularly in the economic sphere, during the next ten years. The inadequacy of the planning machinery has recently been revealed and admitted. Many well-informed persons have considerable doubts about the changes recently introduced. This and numerous other problems require impartial and objective examination by a small Committee similar to that which produced the Haldane Report. Lord Haldane and his colleagues brought to the study of the Machinery of Government not only exceptional ability but also great experience of public affairs, disinterestedness and freedom from Ministerial preoccupations. These are the qualities which are once again needed for a similar task.

THE WEBBS AND THEIR WORK

By DONALD G. MACRAE

THERE are certain periods of social history whose being is scarcely remarked, but whose content is revolutionary. Such is the period of Benthamism, such to a lesser degree is the age of the Webbs. Of course these reformers are noticed, criticised

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and utilised in their own day, but to a surprising degree they are accepted—even if also derided—accepted above all because of their genius for the necessary and the obvious. It is this that makes any appraisal of their work so difficult: it is so rational and so essential that it possesses no capacity to surprise. Once the careful preparation, the painstaking organisation and the personal sacrifice that are the prerequisites of all reform have taken place, then the battle is won and the victory accepted with a complete absence of understanding of how things could have continued as they had been, or of why any struggle had been necessary.

To anyone born, as was the writer, in the period after 1918, the end of the nineteenth century and the Edwardian period are strictly unimaginable. These are the glittering, halcyon and magnificent years of so many volumes of memoirs, of so many plays, novels and films of over-dressed and elegant splendour. The obverse of this heavy coin is in the *Survey of London Life and Labour*, *The People of the Abyss* by Jack London, the novels of Arthur Morrison and H. G. Wells in his realistic vein, writing from the heart of the mean, depressed *petit bourgeois* world. From these two societies resulted the political and economic protests of the Trade Unions, the I.L.P., the Labour Party, the Clarion group, the syndicalists.

This is a pretty and symmetrical picture, but it is obviously only partly true.

On the one hand the world of the rich was not so splendid, so epigrammatic, so powerful as the literature suggests—clearly it couldn't have been, and the evidence of the time confirms one in this denial. Nor were the poor all Arthur Morrison's children of the Jago, or they couldn't have built the British labour movement in twenty years. These are simple errors, perhaps not too difficult to correct: what is probably impossible is the reconstruction of the tone and experience of life in the years from, say, 1880 to 1910. The reason for this is double: we cannot reverse our technological experience nor can we abolish the social inventions whose most important single place of origin is in the work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. It is as difficult to fill one's nostrils with the stench of horse dung as against the vapours of petrol, as it is to relive the daily experience and contrasts, the mandarin rigidities of the old poor law, the unawakened local government bodies, the rudimentary or missing welfare services of the pre-1914 world. Above all, I feel, what one can never know is the *random* quality of private experience in a world without provision for individual disaster.

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The Webbs proved, so far as common men are concerned, the assertion of Machiavelli when he argued that "it is not unknown to me how many have been and are of the opinion that worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their prudence change them . . . and for this they may judge it useless to toil much about them, but let things be ruled by chance . . . At times I am partly inclined to share this opinion. Nevertheless that our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or thereabouts to be governed by us." And again, fortune "shows her power where no measures have been taken to resist her, and directs her fury where she knows that no dykes or barriers have been made to hold her."

The Webbs to my generation, then, are builders of "dykes and barriers" and engineers in the social order whose procedures can be applied even where they themselves had no chance to build. But that is clearly not all, either in praise or blame, for the Webbs are part of a history that extends far beyond their persons.

Intellectually they belonged to that high tradition of philosophical and sociological empiricism in Britain whose roots are in Locke, or even before him. Beatrice may have rejected Spencer—and who has not felt sorry for a moment about this tame intellectual lion, repudiated by a masterful girl? But he influenced her perhaps more than she knew, and through her he influenced Sidney.

The Utilitarians and Philosophic Radicals were saved by two things: the charming eccentricity of Bentham and the surprising, gentle humanity of J. S. Mill after his spiritual crisis. Beatrice, armour-plated by the philistinism of Spencer, had, it appears, no such crisis nor such doubts. Sidney, who read Rossetti to her, might have helped her but instead fell a victim to this attitude. The Fabians were not to be redeemed by the wit of Shaw or the brief Wellsian trajectory through their heavens, and though they were to play the rôle of the Utilitarians in our age, they were to fail seriously through this lack of feeling for the arts and the merely civilised.

Still this empiricism, though it might have served them better with another tempering, was the essential steel for their work as practising sociologists. Especially so as it was coupled with a passionate interest in institutions for themselves, and a caution like that of Burke's with regard to their unknown

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filiations and ramifications through the social order. (An awareness, however, that resulted in no Burke-like conservatism!) It was this institutional appreciation, for example, that allowed what can only be described as the *discovery* of the trade unions and their history which is embodied in the great *History* and in *Industrial Democracy*. "Discovery" may seem a strong word, but, like so much else, this enterprise only made sense once it was achieved, and, to a lesser degree, this was also true of the massive volumes on the history of local government. These revelations of our social fabric to ourselves are among the primary debts a new generation owes to the Webbs; it is only by reading earlier social historians that we can see how great the debt in fact is.

Their approach to social life in terms of facts and the problems of institutions was, of course, the source of that "gradualism" which still animates the Labour Party and the working-class movement in this country, and which is the strongest answer to the appeal of Marxism, just because, on the whole, it works, here and now. It also was the source of that policy of "permeation" whose success was, inevitably, self-defeating, and which does not survive in any important sense outside the Communist Party. In the first place permeation can succeed only by surprise; one can go on surprising people thus for years, but in the end one is found out. What is more its success both eliminated many of the objects of attack and aided the building of those mass bodies which could covertly carry on the tasks of reform permeation had begun.

It is to the Webbs that we owe our debt of not requiring massive social change in every detail of society as a prerequisite of reform, accepting detailed and informed local change and remedy for our abuses. And it is here that the Webbs were most original, most inventive. They did not, like Bentham, discover a new social philosophy, new techniques of social diagnosis, new vocabularies for sociology. Nor, like Marx and Engels, did they contrive a new *Weltanschauung*, a new key to history, or a new political economy, whose messianic appeal could animate an international movement unique, for good and ill, since the triumph of Catholicism. Their inventiveness was humbler, but likely to be enduring. They discovered a new and practical socialism, built on research and knowledge acquired not to prove a case—how different Marxian research!—but to initiate piecemeal change.

In so doing they gave the British labour movement its

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ideology and its method, and in consequence of them it has been able to sustain the blows of crisis and treachery, the attacks of revolutionary theory, and the perils of office without losing its grasp on the political imagination of its supporters. With the development of economic theory, the extension of statistical material, and the widening experience of public administration, the work and claims of the Webbs have been justified, and extended into fields they never conquered or even, I suspect, understood—especially, probably, in the Keynesian reversal of economic theory.

But the vitality of their invention is perhaps best guaranteed by the criteria of criticism in terms of operational efficiency which they brought to all their innovations. In this their common-sense and their scepticism of imponderable claims are peculiarly their own. The very obviousness of these standards of criticism is likely to blind one to their originality and importance as compared to the practice of, say, the U.S.A., or the canons of orthodoxy that so strangely mingle with questions of practical success in the U.S.S.R.

So much for praise of the legacy of the Webbs—a legacy not, of course, theirs alone, but one which would be deeply impoverished but for their pivotal achievements.

Graham Wallas in 1916 wrote of how he learnt “from Shaw’s exacting passion for artistic perfection and Webb’s almost incredible force and industry, that one could only get things done in politics by a steady and severe effort of will. And yet, in spite of the Fabian tradition of elasticity, and ingenuity, and efficiency, I always, after the first few years, felt rather restless in the Society, and in the end left it.”*

Wallas goes on to exhibit the cause of his unease, such as the failure of the Society to have “distinctive opinions on the Marriage Question, Religion, and Art . . . or any other subjects than its own special business of practical Democracy and Socialism,” its failure to declare itself on the Boer War, the subjection of India, etc., etc. In a word, Fabianism, fresh from the hands of the Webbs, had no *Weltanschauung*, no total philosophy.

But to have no world-view, is also to have one: in social philosophy every denial is also an affirmation, and it is to be doubted if the Webbs ever understood this.

Among the writer’s contemporaries I suppose the portrait of the Webbs drawn in Wells’ *New Machiavelli* is not treated with

* *Men and Ideas*, p. 105.

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much seriousness: it may or may not be accurate, what is important is that it is just not relevant to their work. In a sense I suppose this is a reasonable enough rejection, but for all his peevish indignation Wells was perhaps correct. The error of the Webbs was a failure of humanity. Not in friendship; the testimony there is overwhelmingly to the contrary—though Beatrice’s habit of docketing people as ruefully and affectionately recorded by Shaw is rather terrifying. But a failure of humanity, all the same.

Consider their attitude to the labour movement they served so long, so freely, so devotedly. Despite their work on the Co-operatives and the Trade Unions one cannot but feel that they failed fully to realise that it was above all a working class movement. They never, one suspects, understood the passion not for bread but for justice, the indignation and the fire on which Labour built itself. One cannot imagine any literary monument to the Webbs so warm or so enduring as Willie Stewart’s life of Keir Hardie. (At any rate Beatrice would have disapproved.) This is not merely a criticism of personality: without such an understanding even the most brilliant political and economic technologist could not prophesy or comprehend the actual sources of political life which animate judgments and events.

Perhaps this point is most obvious when one thinks of the tragi-comedy of the Half-Circle Club and Beatrice’s anxious efforts to teach the “manners and tone of good society” to the proletarians she had helped to bring to power. James Ramsay Macdonald needed no such help, or incentive.

Even this was part of perhaps their oddest defect: their failure fully to appreciate the importance of politics. Such a statement must seem paradoxical, but consideration will, I believe, justify it. Like Shaw the procedures of discussion, delay, consideration, which are the core of parliamentarianism in local or central government were a source of impatience to them. In a sense this is one explanation of the policy of permeation—partly, at least, a policy of haste. Their contempt for the “talking-shop” was, no doubt, a variable of circumstance, but it was always there and perhaps resulted in Sidney’s comparative parliamentary failure. They shared it with Shaw, and the experiences of 1931, of Russia, and their ambivalence towards the short-term and abominably costly successes of Fascism, confirmed them in attitudes now, I hope, unacceptably authoritarian.

This is, of course, an emphasis on a tendency rather than on

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a fact, but the tendency—always the temptation of those who worship efficiency—was real enough. Ultimately it originated from the root weakness of the Webbs, their incapacity for general ideas.

No doubt the lack of formal academic education was of value to the Webbs as it was to Shaw, but it produced in all alike an arrogance, a confidence in their rectitude, and an unwillingness to admit rival opinions or to reason in wide general terms, to indulge in the perhaps dangerous adventure of conceptual thought.

Sometimes the results of this are merely ludicrous—the few, inadequate words on the problem of war in *The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation* are so clearly unequal to their problem that the reader only smiles and is uninfluenced. But it is surely rather shocking that this terrifying and central problem of the twentieth century should almost have escaped their notice. The apocalyptic vision of Marxism, the grim pageant of history marching under the black flag of misery and the red flag of revolt towards its inescapable consummation and judgment is completely alien to the Webbs. No doubt in a sociological sense this is almost pure gain, but also, and as sociology, it does embody certain truths. It is possible for a sane man to see our society like that, and an increasing part of our experience, if in no detailed way confirming Marxism, yet allows us to feel like that. The history of the parish might have gained from a fuller context in the history of the world. General problems *do* exist.

Perhaps even the disinclination or disability for general ideas was rooted in the Webbs' lack of passion. Not in the sense of lack of devotion, or of patient vocation, but of an ultimate anger that can only result from irony and pity and sympathy. Sidney growing up in Leicester Square, Beatrice turning herself into a workgirl, yet managed for different reasons not to feel the inwardness of these fates. Sidney was always engaged in escaping this background by the strength of his preternatural industry and ability, and Beatrice was the great lady with the habit of power strong about her. To some degree these things crippled them. And yet, though all this seems true enough, and though this legacy of narrowness, lack of passion and sympathy, rejection of conceptual thought, would be an unfortunate inheritance indeed, the Webbs' virtues were to some degree a consequence of these defects, for it was from these failings that their empiricist and institutionalist methodology was confirmed and pursued.

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Wallas, however, was clearly right in any matter of ultimate judgment, and this can be most clearly seen in the Webbs' attitude towards imperialism. They do not seem to have realised how deeply questions of right and wrong were involved in the conquest of South Africa or the subjection of India. These were, by British standards of efficiency, backward and incompetent lands: then let them be ruled by the progressive and the competent. The error was double: the standards of Kipling had small intrinsic merit and no long term resources to guarantee success, and even if this had not been the case, morality cannot be equated with efficiency.

It was intrinsic to this outlook that the Webbs' method should have been the rather narrow one outlined in *Methods of Social Study*, and the reliance on careful card indices and secretarial assistance is progressively evident in their published work. The legacy of their method and their style is alike regrettable. The style rarely rises to the "heavy eloquence" that Mrs. Hamilton claimed for it at its best. More often it progresses wearily, remorselessly through the length of their books, unenlightened by economy or grace. Many of my generation must, as I did, have first come on the works of the Webbs in *Soviet Communism*. There the style and the failure lucidly to organise material is rendered only bearable by the interest of the description and the analysis. But these faults are universal: what reasonable mortal would, *a priori*, expect to find the core of their work on local government in the fourth of its ten volumes? Yet so it is, and even the history of the trade unions, as my students tell me, is rendered almost unsupportably tedious by its presentation.

Unfortunately the high tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—and indeed of some modern writers in these matters—has been almost killed by three things: the late nineteenth century prestige of the Germans, the ant-like and often futile industry of the Americans, and the example of the Webbs. If good writing and lucidity are matters of suspicion to many contemporary social scientists the Webbs must shoulder much of the blame.

In 1931 the last phase of the joint endeavour began. British Labour, it seemed, had failed, and while the patient non-conformist Lansbury rebuilt the Labour Party, the Webbs searched for new gods in Russia. They found them, for to people who loved order for its own sake, who distrusted parliaments and loved technological criticism, Russia under the

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Soviets had obvious attractions. The great work—the fullest account of the Soviets yet in existence—appeared in 1935. The treason trials that were to make the next few years hideous began immediately afterwards, and the Webbs reaffirmed their faith in the new Russia.

In one sense, no doubt, this was just, but so far as the present content of this “new civilisation” was concerned they were wrong, and perhaps most wrong in their sacrifice, entailed by their new love, of the gradualist, empiricist and institutional approach they had made to past social problems and to the total problem of socialism.

At the last their inability for conceptual thought, their anti-parliamentarianism, and their admiration for efficiency understood autonomously and without wider reference, had triumphed over their humanism, over the scepticism that is the normal consequence of empiricism, and over their distrust of total and violent social change.

Yet it would be completely unfair to end thus. *Soviet Communism* may have misled many, but after all the U.S.S.R. is perhaps the greatest constructive work of our age, and this is its finest monument, while the rest of their achievement is magnificent. Their methodology may substitute mechanism for life, but it led to real order and high standards of research in social work. Above all it avoids the statistical obsession, the passion to correlate the unknown and the undefined which nullifies so much American sociology, and it sets real standards of institutional analysis in the place of much wasteful arithmetic, while its bias towards the concrete and the observable has already been enough commented on and praised.

They opened a whole new terrain to history and pushed their researches far into it, so that trade union and administrative history were no longer trackless wastes, but a known country. From this labour their work on the poor law and the welfare services inevitably followed—bringing, alas, in its train the professionalisation of training for the social services. More than any others they gave to the Labour movement in Britain its theory and practical technique for political action, and through the Fabian Society, guaranteed to Labour a constant source of information and suggestion.

Indeed, though the Fabian Society may have turned more towards economic theory and statistics and too much away from political analysis and organisation, it is still in its ranks that the Webb tradition of socialism is most practically alive and

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most likely to endure, even if in a more academic form and with stronger liaisons to the older universities than the Webbs might have approved. Certainly the disagreement about the rôle of G. D. H. Cole is not likely to be repeated to-day!

And if there is a pride in their history and their achievements, a sense of historic purpose in the Labour movement and especially in the trade unions, surely among those who have inspired this the Webbs, as we have seen, stand first as innovators and not second in achievement to the Hammonds and Max Beer. It is perhaps more important to bind the generations thus together in common endeavour even than to find new fields for science and for scholarship.

More than their books, their greatest academic achievement is their foundation, the London School of Economics and Political Science—in its brief history already the primary centre of the social sciences in Britain, and the home of left-wing politics and right-wing economics. Without the School all the social sciences would not merely be poorer in content and resources for teaching and research, but their prestige would be less, and the Webbs' faith in informed and detailed knowledge as the source of adequate political and administrative action far less susceptible to proof. Like all successful academic bodies the School has transcended its foundation and developed its own life and internal springs of action: this does not make the foundation less important, less influential as an inheritance, but the better displays its worth.

Less ponderable is the personal impact of the Webbs, the confluence of their personalities with their example, which has not merely set the tone of much of our politics, but filled our civil service, our universities, our social servants and workers with their spirit.

In consequence all who are concerned with the human sciences and the direct service of man are their heirs, and they are our atmosphere, so that one may speak of them in the terms of Rilke's great poem as

“... given far and wide like fallen rain
and dealt out like a manifold supply.”

Unavoidable, all-permeating, the work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb is something that the latest generation can never fully judge just because we have never fully known a world which their labours had not transformed and, in the face of the forces of chaos and retreat, even improved.

BRITAIN, EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

By NILOTICUS

BRITISH forces entered Egypt in 1882 at the invitation of the Khedive Tewfik, ruler, under Turkish sovereignty, of the country, to restore the Khedive's authority after he had been driven from his capital by a revolt of his army, led by native Egyptian officers who maintained that the Khedive, an Albanian of the old Turkish Empire by origin, showed excessive favour to his Turkish officers and adherents. The mutinous Egyptian army was defeated by a British expedition under Lord Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir, Cairo was occupied, and the Khedive was restored to his capital on September 25th, 1882.

Since then British troops have remained in Egypt, but were withdrawn to the Suez Canal zone from Cairo and Alexandria in 1947, in accordance with obligations under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the execution of which had been postponed by the necessity of defending Egypt in the 1939-45 War. Their total withdrawal from Egypt, according to a new brief time-table, was promised, had the recent negotiations for a revision of the 1936 Treaty not failed.

The record of the British army in Egypt from 1882 to 1947 is good. It has never done anything for which Britons need apologise to the Egyptians. On the contrary, in 1884 it saved the Egyptian garrison at Suakin in the Red Sea district of the Sudan from being overrun by the Sudan Dervishes. In 1885, in face of incredible difficulties, it sent an expedition to the Sudan, which penetrated to within sight of Khartoum, in order to try to extricate the Egyptian garrison and civilians, and with them General Gordon, before the Sudan fell to the Dervishes. Officers chosen from it then trained an Egyptian army. In 1898 it constituted the spearhead of the new expedition to the Sudan and the destruction of the Dervish armies at Atbara and Omdurman. In 1914-1918 it successfully defended Egypt against a Turko-German invasion which penetrated to the east bank of the Suez Canal. In 1939-45 it again successfully defended Egypt against the German and Italian invasion, which came within 40 miles of Alexandria.

These have been no mean services. In fact it is probable that no foreign army has ever in history, over a similar period of years, rendered comparable services to another nation. And what in the meantime had been the record of the British occupation of Egypt on the non-military side? This extended

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from 1882, when the re-established Khedive Tewfik requested British advice in the administration of his country, to 1922, when the British declared the independence of Egypt and withdrew from responsibility for its government. In 1882, when British intervention began, Egypt was a non-sovereign autonomous province of the Turkish Empire. In 1914, when Turkey joined the Germans in the 1914-18 War, Britain declared the Turkish sovereignty at an end, and proclaimed a British protectorate over Egypt. Britain made good this protectorate in the heavy battles of the war against the Turks in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. Having finally defeated the Turks in 1918, and secured their consent to the loss of their rights over Egypt in the Treaty of Lausanne, Britain in 1922 abrogated her own protectorate over Egypt, and made Egypt a sovereign State and the descendant of the Khedives a king.

Between 1882 and 1922, under Britain's control of the Egyptian administration, Egypt was transformed from the conditions of a backward Turkish Province into a modern state, equipped in her larger cities with the amenities of civilisation, served by good railways, and endowed with a modern irrigation system based on great new dams, such as she had never known in all her previous history.

This record is such as Britain can look back upon with pride, and such as Egypt might rightfully have been expected to regard with gratitude. In the meantime comparable services had been performed also by Britain in the country south of Egypt, from which the Nile flows down into Egypt—the Sudan. In 1885 Egyptian rule over the Sudan, having lasted since Mohammed Ali Pasha sent an expedition into the country, which occupied it in 1821, had been terminated by a successful revolt of the Sudanese under the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed. In 1889, turning the tables, a Sudanese expedition invaded Egypt, but, in debouching from the desert towards the valley of the Nile, was defeated at Toski by Lord Grenfell. In 1896 Lord Kitchener, who had succeeded Lord Grenfell as Sirdar or Commander-in-Chief, made his first advance into the Sudan, which was to culminate two years later in the defeat of the Sudanese armies of the Khalifa Abdullahi, the Mahdi's successor, at Atbara and Omdurman, by British and Egyptian troops.

The destruction of the Khalifa's rule laid upon the victors the duty of organising a government for the Sudan in its place. The disastrous record of the previous Egyptian rule made it unthinkable that the Egyptians should be permitted by the

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British to inaugurate another round of an administration of similar type. The flags of both victorious countries were hoisted together, and negotiations conducted by Lord Cromer in Cairo led to the 1899 Agreement, by which a Condominium was established. Under this, full powers, executive and legislative, were vested in a Governor-General nominated by the British Government and appointed by the Egyptian Government. Lord Kitchener was appointed the first Governor-General, soon to be succeeded both as Governor-General of the Sudan and as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army by General Sir Reginald Wingate, who held these posts for 17 years and laid the foundations of a new and well-governed Sudan. But as soon as their own independence was granted to the Egyptians in 1922, they set to work to undermine the Condominium government in the Sudan. Two years of agitation culminated in the assassination in Cairo, in November, 1924, of Major-General Sir Lee Stack, Wingate's successor as Governor-General and Sirdar of the Egyptian army, while on a visit there on duty. Lord Allenby's drastic ultimatum to the Egyptian Government after this outrage had as its main result the withdrawal from the Sudan of Egyptian troops and Egyptian officers, who had been largely concerned in the agitation of 1922-24. It was impossible therefore that the Sudan Governor-General should continue to be Sirdar of the Egyptian army, and in that capacity an Egyptian official. Future Governors-General had consequently not the previous double tie with Egypt, but only that with the two Condominium Governments jointly, through representation of both.

In their 1922-24 venture the Egyptians met with no success. This did not deter them from their purpose of upsetting the Condominium Agreement of 1899, in the effort to obtain sole control of the Sudan, as soon as circumstances would again allow them to try. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the negotiation of which had split on this rock since 1924 and was only brought to a successful conclusion under the stress of the imminent Fascist and Nazi peril to Egypt, repeated, as regards the Sudan, the Condominium Agreement, with the addition of one or two "appeasement" clauses, admitting again Egyptian troops and some official representatives into the Sudan. No sooner however was the safety of Egypt secured by the British through the decisive battle of El Alamein than the intrigues for the termination of the Condominium in the Sudan began anew. Meanwhile in the Italian invasion of the

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Sudan in 1940-41 the British had successfully defended it, with invaluable Sudanese military and civil co-operation, while the Egyptians had remained neutral and lifted no finger in its defence.

In 1944 it became clear that a new round of the 1922-24 agitation in the Sudan was being planned, along with the concurrent agitation for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. The Sudan contains, besides the many tribes of Sudanese, an appreciable element of descendants of Egyptian immigrants of the 1821-85 Egyptian occupation, and many of these and their friends are in sympathy with the idea of a new sole Egyptian domination of the Sudan, which they envisage as likely to confer a preferential position upon themselves. The co-operation of many of these in the new movement was secured. They represent a disproportionately large element of those Sudanese who have received education since 1898, being mostly dwellers in the large towns.

The Egyptians postponed their formal move until December 20th, 1945, when their Government presented a demand for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. This Treaty was to run for a period of twenty years, but there was provision that it could be revised by mutual agreement after ten years. The British Government, in January, 1946, expressed its willingness to enter into negotiations as to revision. It is unnecessary now to enter in detail into the chequered history of these negotiations. Suffice it to say that a suggested time-table for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, which seemed to satisfy both sides, was worked out, but that the negotiations broke down upon the obstacle of the Egyptian determination that the Sudan should have no future except "under the Egyptian Crown," and the British determination that the right of the Sudan to choose its own future, whether under the Egyptian Crown or not, should be safeguarded.

Between the breakdown of the negotiations and Nokrashy Pasha's appeal to the United Nations, the Egyptian claims underwent further development. Their demands, as made to the United Nations, added the evacuation of British troops from the Sudan to the previously demanded evacuation from Egypt, and the termination of the present régime (the Condominium Agreement) in the Sudan, in favour of a sole Egyptian sovereignty. To this policy, the Egyptians give the specious title of "Unity of the Nile Valley."

The hearings in the Security Council of the United Nations opened on August 5th, when Nokrashy Pasha put Egypt's

case. Sir A. Cadogan replied for Britain that the only reason why the Egyptians finally rejected the texts of the drafts settled between Mr. Bevin and Sidky Pasha in 1946, after provisional agreement was reached, was the one point in the Sudan "protocol" which aimed at assuring the right of the Sudanese to choose the future status of the Sudan. The Egyptians wanted to limit the Sudanese choice to some form of link-up with Egypt. Egypt was not prepared to accord to the Sudan that freedom to choose complete independence, if the Sudan so wishes, which she herself received from Britain. The debate in the Security Council was continued until September 10th and came to an inconclusive finish, the question being left on the agenda. The most significant feature was the practical unanimity that self-determination for the Sudanese was an unassailable right.

In the meantime, during the revelation and public discussion of the acute differences between the two Condominium powers which together share the sovereignty over the Sudan, Sudanese political opinion has not stood still. On the contrary it has been stimulated to almost fever heat by the efforts, on the one side, of the very vocal pro-Egyptian element and, on the other side, of the solid mass of rural, as well as town, opinion which feels that, if changes are to be made, it wants them to be in the direction not of a change of external control, but of Sudanese self-government. In the face of this rising tide of the political aspirations of the Sudanese, the Sudan Government found it necessary to take steps for the study of ways and means to associate the Sudanese more closely with the central government of the country. An Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, composed almost entirely of Sudanese, was formed in 1944, which both proved the feasibility and established the desirability of further advance. About eighteen months ago, therefore, as a result of discussions in the Advisory Council, a Sudan Administrative Conference was appointed by the Governor-General to study the next steps for closer association of the Sudanese in the government. Its report was presented to the Governor-General last March, and was endorsed in May by the Advisory Council. The main proposals were accepted in principle by the Governor-General in Council in July, and were ordered to be submitted to the two Condominium Governments for consideration of the constitutional changes involved. This was done in August, and the replies of the British and Egyptian Governments are awaited.

These proposals may be summarised under three main headings :—

- (a) The development of the existing Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan into a Legislative Assembly for the whole country, including both Northern (Arab) and Southern (Negroid) Sudan.
- (b) The appointment by the Government of Sudanese members of the Legislative Assembly as "Under Secretaries" in the principal Departments of the Government; such members to be given appropriate administrative responsibility in their Departments, and to represent their Departments in the Assembly. Sudanese would thus be trained for the headship of Departments, which may one day be Ministries.
- (c) The evolution of the existing Governor-General's Council into an Executive Council of twelve members of whom six should be Sudanese chosen by the Government from among the "Under-Secretaries" referred to above; four should be, *ex officio*, the Civil Secretary, the Legal Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Kaïd (Commander-in-Chief) of the Sudan Defence Force; and two should be members nominated by the Governor-General.

The Sudan Administration Conference was composed of 21 Sudanese and 9 British members. The Sub-Committee to which it entrusted the drafting of its scheme for the closer association of Sudanese with the central government (another Sub-Committee dealt with local government) had 7 members, 5 of whom were Sudanese, a Sudanese being the chairman. The Conference's report, which embodies the work of the Sub-Committees, is an able and highly practical document. In it the Conference declares :—

"The basis of all the Conference's proposals is the desire of the Sudanese to govern their own country and the desire of H.E. the Governor-General to expand the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan into a more representative and responsible Assembly and to continue the policy of developing internal self-governing institutions . . . The Sudan should have a voice of its own; some body which can speak with authority in the name of the whole country. The Sudanese will not be able to govern themselves unless they have previously been trained in the art of government, and this in turn can be learnt only through

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the assumption of responsibility. This responsibility at any given time should be sufficiently great to extend fully the capacity of the Sudanese to shoulder it successfully; in this way their training will proceed at the greatest possible rate. The Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was the first step towards responsible self-government and it has had a three years' trial. . . The report which we are now presenting to Your Excellency is the outcome of the Conference's deliberations and expresses, in the main, the unanimous views of the members. At all times we have tried to confine our recommendations to the next steps which should be taken in any particular function of government, and with this in view we wish to record our opinion that any body which may be set up within the present constitution of the Sudan should be appointed for a period of three years; after which period it is anticipated that the time will be ripe for a further review of the situation."

This objective approach to the learning and practice of self-government is maintained throughout the report of the Conference. As regards the proposed Legislative Assembly the Conference has recommended that its initial number of members should be about 70. In considering the claims to representation of the eight Provinces that make up the whole Sudan, it adopted an electoral index giving to the various factors the value of 50% for population (based on official figures), 30% for education (based on output of elementary schools) and 20% for wealth (based on direct taxation). In accordance with this index 60 members are apportioned among the various Provinces. "We consider", they continue, "that in the present state of the Sudan's development there is a need to leave a certain number of seats for nomination by the Governor-General, to ensure the presence in the Assembly of specially qualified Sudanese who might not otherwise find a seat. Assuming there will be 60 elected members, we recommend that the number of nominated members should be 10."

As regards methods of election the Conference recommends an allocation of seats in each province by the Province Council, working as far as possible on the lines of the electoral index described above. Direct election is prescribed in municipalities and townships, but it is recognised that this method may not be practicable in rural areas. In such cases procedure may vary,

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but members should be elected by electoral colleges made up of representatives of the various units comprising the electorate. Candidates are to be males aged at least 30, resident in the area for at least two or three years, of sound mind and eligible for the issue to them of a Sudan passport.

The plan for the attachment of "Under-Secretaries" to Departments, to represent them in the Assembly while learning also the principles of their direction, is sufficiently outlined above. As regards its proposal for the setting up of an Executive Council the Conference states:—

"The present constitution of the Sudan provides that the policy to be pursued within the framework of the constitution shall be decided by the Governor-General assisted by his Council. It is here that the major decisions are made. We think that the Sudanese should now assume a reasonable degree of administrative responsibility at this level, as, in this way, not only will they be trained in the highest functions of government, but they will also be able to share in the formulation of the general policy of the government of their country. We therefore propose that the Governor-General's Council shall be reconstituted so as to include Sudanese in sufficient numbers to give them training and responsibility. We recommend that this reconstitution shall be as an Executive Council, with the Governor-General as President, having the same powers as the present Governor-General's Council, save in so far as their powers are devolved on to the Assembly."

The proposed composition of the Executive Council has been summarised above.

These proposed developments, which carry the endorsement of the representative Sudanese who shared in framing them, are in the authentic tradition of the British aim that all nations should progress towards freedom, whether freedom in sole future self-sovereignty, or freedom in partnership with a neighbour or a group. They are the fruit of 49 years of experience and advance since the battle of Omdurman in 1898, and they are not unworthy fruit. They would give the Sudanese the solid achievement of a share in the government of their country, and a confident trust that the government might one day be in their own hands. The replies awaited from the two Condominium Governments to the Sudan Government will show the Sudanese to what extent each Government sympathises with their advancement.

THE REVISION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

By J. M. E. DUCHOSAL, Secretary General of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

WOUNDED and sick, prisoners of war, civilian internees are words which to-day evoke the notion of international protection; they are linked in our minds with humanitarian principles that found their expression in a system of diplomatic agreements generally known as the Geneva Conventions. After the distressing experiences of seven bitter years, we must ask whether the conventions have proved beneficial to the victims of the war, and it is our duty—since such agreements are to some extent the reflection of public opinion—to enquire how to make them more effective.

We can now say that the Geneva Conventions were on the whole applied by the signatory parties. Exceptions and violations occurred, and they were far too many; but, leaving aside the problem of food rations, these incidents were occasional. How can we explain, then, so much cruel and unnecessary suffering, inflicted on so many thousand defenceless victims? Of the many reasons, the chief are as follows: not all the states at war had signed and ratified the conventions; the provisions were not worded so as to apply to all situations arising in a war of such unprecedented nature, e.g., sudden annexations, occupation of entire countries, rise of new governments during or after invasion, creation of underground forces, etc.; finally, the civilian populations had no treaty protection whatever. Revision of the Geneva Conventions is therefore not a mere question of amending existing provisions; the problem must be grasped as a whole. Though the agreements now in force have furnished ample proof of their value, and may constitute a sound basis to work on, future diplomatic instruments should cover a much wider field and protect a far larger number of persons who, in case of war, would be exposed to its direct or indirect effects, wherever they happen to be. The fall of a state and its annexation must not rob its captured defenders of their prisoner of war status, pending their definite release or the signing of a peace treaty by all parties; the momentary absence of any government capable of exercising authority over national territory, must not leave the population at the mercy of the occupant. The almost inconceivable hardships sometimes

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endured by civilians and prisoners of war in 1939-1945 were made largely possible by the fact that many military or political situations had never been foreseen.

In February 1945, therefore, when the war was apparently drawing to its close, the International Committee of the Red Cross addressed a memorandum to all governments signatories to the Geneva Conventions and to all National Red Cross Societies, expressing its considered opinion that the revision of these conventions was a matter which should be taken in hand and carried out with all due speed. Most of the governments concerned agreed to retain for this purpose the officials who had first-hand knowledge of the practical working of the Geneva Conventions. Red Cross societies, whose experience in war relief work or in prisoner information and civilian tracing bureaux, was similarly invaluable, were ready to co-operate. The International Committee started classifying and sifting the mass of data which it had been collecting throughout the war.

It may be asked by what strange circumstance a purely private body such as the International Committee should be called upon to draft treaty stipulations for discussion, amendment, and signature by a diplomatic conference, which thus become binding on all the states which choose to ratify them. In February 1863 five Genevese citizens met to consider ways and means of giving effect to the ideas set forth by one of them, Henry Duhant. They laid the foundations of the Red Cross and constituted the International Committee. In the same year, 1863, they called an international conference in Geneva which decided the establishment in all countries of Relief Committees for the wounded and sick of armies in the field, soon to become the first National Red Cross Societies. The conference recommended that governments should extend their patronage and support to these Committees or Societies, and that they should recognise the principle of neutrality for all wounded and sick combatants, for nursing personnel, and for the hospitals concerned. A year later, in answer to a summons issued by the Swiss Federal Government at the request of the International Committee, the representatives of fourteen states met at Geneva, and on the basis of the drafts prepared by the International Committee, adopted and signed the first Geneva Convention for the relief of wounded and sick of armies in the field (August 22, 1864).

Since that time great progress has been made in the field of international law and of its methods, but the practice has

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survived that any revision or amendment of the Geneva Conventions should be worked out in the first place by the International Committee, owing to its experience and the role of neutral intermediary it was invariably called upon to play in case of war.

Various conferences were called by the Committee during the years 1945, 1946 and 1947, of delegates from Red Cross societies, members of the Mixed Medical Commissions who had examined prisoners of war, representatives of international organizations who had given them intellectual and religious assistance, and finally, the government experts. These meetings, especially the Conference of government experts (Geneva, April 1947), which was attended by delegates of fifteen governments, have led to substantial agreement as to the drafting of revised and new conventions, namely the Geneva Convention proper (revised); the 10th Hague Convention for the adaptation of the Geneva Convention to maritime warfare (revised); the Prisoners of War Convention (revised); the Convention for the protection of civilian populations (new).

In September last, meetings of Red Cross Delegates in Geneva, held under the auspices of the League of Red Cross Societies and of the International Committee, allowed revision to be once more considered. It then appeared that the principles submitted by the Committee and consequent upon the preparatory work, met on the whole with approval. These are the principles which will be dealt with below, subject to reservation as regards their precise wording, which is still under consideration by the International Committee.

1. *The stipulations embodied in the drafts of the four Conventions shall be applicable, in all circumstances, to any armed conflict.*

In the three previous conventions (Wounded and Sick 1929, Hague 1907 and Prisoners of War 1929), no indication was given as to the time when the provisions should become applicable. Civil war, for instance, was not mentioned; it was also doubtful whether these international agreements applied to conflicts not recognised as a state of war by one of the parties concerned. During the late war, the latter circumstance often arose, thus depriving of protection many who specially needed it. During the war in Spain, it was due to the Committee's direct intervention only, in the spirit of a recommendation voted by the 10th International Red Cross Conference (Geneva, 1921), that some of the principles of the conventions were applied. By

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addressing itself to both parties and sending delegates to both sides the Committee ensured the practical observation of some of the chief treaty stipulations.

It is now proposed to add to the beginning of each revised or new convention a clause entitled *General Observations*, as a preamble forming part of the conventions, as follows:

"The present Convention is applicable between the contracting parties from the outbreak of any armed conflict, whether the latter is or is not recognised as a state of war by the parties concerned.

"In case of civil war, in any part of the home or colonial territory of a contracting party, the principles of the Convention shall be equally applied by the said party, subject to the adverse party also conforming thereto.

"The Convention is equally applicable to cases of occupation of territories in the absence of any state of war."

2. *Civilians shall be protected as well as members of the armed forces.*

There is no need to stress this point. The war has shown how deeply and directly civilians can be involved in a modern war. They can be wounded or killed by bombardments, interned in camps on security grounds, enlisted as workers to reinforce or replace national labour, and so on. The Regulations annexed to the 4th Hague Convention, 1907, mentioned certain groups of civilians who take up arms in defence of their homes against invaders. The 1929 Geneva Convention includes amongst the persons enjoying its protection "the other persons officially attached to the armies," and the Prisoners of War Convention provides that individuals following the armies, without actually belonging to them (correspondents and newspaper reporters, sutlers, or contractors), shall be considered, when captured, as prisoners of war. This was all.

In 1934, the Committee submitted a new draft convention to the 15th Red Cross Conference held in Tokio, which approved it. This Draft dealt with the protection of certain groups of civilians in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. It was forwarded in 1935 to the Swiss Federal Government, with the recommendation that a diplomatic conference should be called to discuss it. Unfortunately governments failed to agree on the proposed provisions; no other drafts being presented, the conference, due to take place in 1937, was adjourned. It was finally convened to meet in January, 1940. Thus, when the war broke out, there were practically no treaty stipulations

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affording effective protection to civilians. Attempts were made by the Committee to induce the belligerents to declare themselves bound by the so-called "Tokyo-Draft"; but they failed. However, the majority of the Powers concerned accepted the Committee's suggestion that they should, subject to reciprocity, apply to interned civilians those stipulations of the Prisoners of War Convention which could be made applicable to them. This was a partial success only. Interned civilians, i.e., civilians residing at the outbreak of war in the territory of a hostile state, and interned on security grounds, represent a very small fraction of the civilians who may become victims of the war.

That civilians ought to be protected is clear. Fortunately, the outlook is better to-day than it was in 1934; and all the delegates who met in Geneva during the last year, whether representing Governments, Red Cross Societies, or private associations, were convinced of the above necessity.

3. *No consideration of nationality, race, religion, or political opinion shall, on any account, lessen the degree of the protection afforded by the conventions.*

This principle, which applies, at first sight, rather to civilians than to members of armed forces, must be applied to all cases, and in all circumstances. Personal opinions or ideologies must not affect the attitude of official agencies or private individuals who detain enemy nationals. The treatment must be the same for all, and the liberty of the individual must be safeguarded with regard to his national or racial pride and dignity, religious faith and political views.

These principles should certainly be embodied in conventions whose origin was the virtue of charity and an ever-growing sense of humanity. But it was the duty of those who drafted the conventions to consider how they might be applied in war time, when passions were inflamed. This led to the fourth principle applicable to the four conventions:

4. *The provisions of the conventions shall be legally enforced. Wilful violations shall be considered as war crimes.*

Under the heading "Organization of Control," the Prisoners of War Convention had provided: "The High Contracting Parties admit that the regular application of the Convention shall find a guarantee in the possibility of collaboration of the Protecting Powers entrusted with the safeguarding of the belligerents' interests." The 1929 Geneva Convention had

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stated that the contracting parties should embody in their penal legislation such provisions as would be necessary for the repression of acts contrary to the convention. Both conventions had provided for an enquiry procedure.

The meeting of government experts held in April, 1947, decided, as a first measure, to propose the insertion in the four conventions of an article as follows:

"Should their penal law be inadequate, the High Contracting Parties shall take the necessary measures for the repression, in time of war, of any act contrary to the provisions of the present Convention."

As the war had shown the inadequacy of a procedure which left it entirely to the contracting parties to decide what should be considered as a grave penal offence, the conference proposed the following provisions which reinforce this article:

"Any wilful violation of the present Convention leading to the death of persons protected by its provisions, to grave ill-treatment of the said persons, or serious damage, shall be considered as war crimes. The individuals responsible shall be liable to appropriate penalties."

"The High Contracting Parties undertake to insert in their penal and military legislation provisions for the punishment of any infraction of the stipulations of the present Convention."

The Conference was of opinion that repression in such matters, to be genuinely and universally effective, must be placed in the hands of an international body; it therefore considered desirable that:

"As soon as an International Court of Penal Justice is created, this Court shall be charged with the repression of violations of the Convention, either directly or in the capacity of a Court of Appeal for the national tribunals."

The enquiry procedure, already provided by the 1929 Conventions, has also been redrafted, in order to make it more effective and applicable to the four Conventions.

The above principles are reflected in the four drafts and throughout their detailed provisions; yet they give an incomplete idea of the changes and innovations to be proposed to the diplomatic conference. The following are a few of the many stipulations intended to afford better and more effective protection to war victims.

The Convention for the Relief of the Wounded and Sick of Armies

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in the Field (1864-1906-1929) does not call for detailed amendment. The new draft, however, includes provisions relating to "hospital zones." The idea of neutralizing whole areas where wounded could be assembled has been much discussed during the last fifteen years, but has not yet found the unreserved approval of military circles, owing to considerations of strategy and security. As a first step, it is now proposed that belligerents may conclude *ad hoc* agreements in this domain.

One of the important features of the Geneva Convention was the neutralization of the army medical personnel and their assistants, so that they might go freely about their duties. The conference of experts, considering that the medical personnel is deprived of many of the privileges guaranteed to prisoners of war, has advised a reversal of the former policy. It proposed that such personnel shall enjoy the treatment accorded to prisoners of war, it being understood that while in captivity they may be entitled to such facilities as are deemed necessary to the exercise of their calling and that, as soon as they are no longer urgently required to attend to prisoners of war, they shall be repatriated.

The Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention (Hague 1899-1907) deals with matters of too technical a character to be usefully examined here. Mention should be made, however, of the protection which the new draft extends to wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of all vessels victims of a hazard of war, whereas the former conventions applied only to the members of the armed forces on board ship.

The Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929), as now redrafted, expresses the view that merchant seamen captured on the high seas should be considered as prisoners of war; those who are in enemy ports at the outbreak of war should be treated as civilian internees.

The new draft begins with exact definitions of the persons to be protected by its provisions; it then extends this protection to classes of persons who were not previously included, such as partisans or members of armed forces serving a government or an authority not recognised by the detaining power; it further provides additional rules intended to increase the protection of prisoners of war in respect of their living conditions, material and moral rights, and medical and hygienic care. Wages paid to prisoners of war for work done and means of transferring part of such funds to next of kin at home; facilities for the receipt of parcels; exercise of intellectual, educational, recreative

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and outdoor pursuits; liberty to abstain from work connected with active military operations or war production, and liberty to refuse all information regarding either the situation of their forces or of their country, or their personal situation—all these are the object of elaborate regulations. These are a few examples only of the extensive guarantees afforded to the prisoners by the new draft. The provisions relative to incoming and outgoing mail, to the notification of their capture and state of health, to repatriation or accommodation in neutral countries on grounds of physical disability, or ill-health, and repatriation on the conclusion of hostilities, are also considerably enlarged:

The Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, though making wide use of the principles laid down in both Geneva Conventions, must provide for quite distinct classes of civilians who may be affected by the war. These are, first, enemy aliens resident in the territory of a belligerent; further, the civilian population of territories occupied by a belligerent. For the first group the protective stipulations have much similarity with those relative to members of the armed forces; but for the second, the convention has to lay down special principles: measures of reprisal, the taking of hostages, collective penalties, the destruction of towns or villages, and all other means of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited; with the exception of mass evacuations rendered necessary by military operations, individual or collective deportations or transfers, carried out under physical or moral coercion, are also prohibited; the same applies to transfers inside occupied territory, except those enforced to meet the security requirements of the occupying power.

Other principles were the object of recommendations by the experts' conference to the International Committee for the final drafting of the texts. Thus, the introduction in the convention of the "Civilian Message Scheme," as operated by the Committee during the Spanish civil war and the war of 1939; the adoption of measures facilitating the reunion of "dispersed families" and finally, provisions for the establishment of "hospital zones or localities" in favour of civilians.

Altogether, the clauses relating to general principles or to detailed rules regarding the material, physical, and moral situation of civilians comprise some 150 articles, half of which are to be included in Annexes to the Convention proper.

A number of provisions cannot be treated in this very brief survey, but we have indicated the new tendencies which inspired

the preliminary studies for the revision of the Geneva Conventions and the drafting of a new convention on civilians. The present paper might lead to the belief that the experts were rather cautious in their proposals. It should be remembered, however, that the success of the first Geneva Convention of 1864 was largely due to its general character and great elasticity; precise rules may ensure strict protection, but make governments chary of binding themselves too closely—and especially in war time, when states want to enjoy as much freedom as possible to prosecute their efforts to victory; detailed clauses also run the risk of becoming restrictive—and this in war time again, when there must be no limit set to impartial efforts to protect the human personality.

Such as they are, these provisions as embodied in the four draft conventions, will be submitted for discussion to the International Red Cross Conference, due to meet in Stockholm in August 1948; they will also have to face the criticism of a diplomatic conference. May the ideals of which they are the expression be then recognised and accepted by all. The nations, who have suffered so severely from two world wars, and especially from the second, have the right to express this hope.

But, above all, may they never be applied. Giving expression to the inmost feelings of all those who have devoted so much time and knowledge to the revision of the Geneva Conventions, the government experts' conference, in its last session in April 1947, unanimously voted a final recommendation, as follows:

"The Conference, while submitting to the Governments for study Draft Conventions relative to wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians, in the drafting of which it has participated, desires to have placed on record its earnest hope that war may never again devastate the world."

THE GREAT POWERS' VETO: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

WHAT line should the British Government take now about the Great Powers' right of veto in the Security Council?

I

Misconceptions are so prevalent as to how the veto formula came about, what it amounts to as now interpreted, and how it

could be changed, that it may be worth briefly reviewing these questions as a preliminary.

When the British, American and Russian experts met at Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944 to draft the Charter, they agreed on three major propositions about the Security Council, all of which are now embodied in the Charter.

First, the Council was to have "*primary responsibility* for the maintenance of international peace and security." Secondly, it was to have (unlike the League's Council) a *measure of governmental responsibility*, being authorised to decide and act, within certain limits, on behalf of all the United Nations. The Council is to decide whether an occasion for preventive or coercive sanctions has arisen; the Council may then "*decide* what measures shall be taken"; and the members are bound to accept and carry out such decisions. Thirdly, each Great Power was to have a wide *right of veto* when the Council was making decisions on matters of substance (as distinct from matters of procedure) about a dispute. But on this last point agreement was not complete. None dissented from the view that the right of veto should be complete when the Great Power was not party to the dispute. But agreement could not be reached as to the Great Power's right of veto in disputes to which it was itself a party. Britain, holding to the principle of law that no disputant should be judge in his own cause, and mindful of the recognition of this principle in the League's Covenant, held that in such a case the Great Power should have no vote. The Americans rallied to this view. The Russians, with their authoritarian tradition, rejected it absolutely. The resulting deadlock was only resolved at Yalta, in Feb. 1945, when President Roosevelt proposed a compromise—or what looked like a compromise. The Yalta formula, embodied in Art. 27 of the Charter, says in effect this: When the Council is dealing with a dispute as a problem of pacific settlement (under chapter VI of the Charter) the disputant Great Power may not vote; but when the Council's decision would involve action (under chapter VII), then the Great Power, even though party to the dispute, recovers its right of veto.

So it should not be supposed that the whole of the veto provision was forced through by the Russians at Yalta; a large part of it had previously been agreed by all the three Great Powers at Dumbarton Oaks. And there was a reason for this. The Security Council was to be endowed with a governmental

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responsibility for taking decisions that might involve "major political consequences" for all the members, especially for those which command great power. And the three Governments were not then willing to commit themselves to this instalment of "world government," based on voting in a Council in which each State had one vote, unless they were protected by a right of veto. The British Foreign Office commentary on the Charter (cmd. 6666) puts this view with candour. "At least until some system is worked out and accepted by the majority of States ensuring that votes in a Council represent both the population and the real power of States, the special position which has been granted '(sic)' to the Great Powers for more than a century must be maintained." No doubt the U.S. Senate would have shared that view in 1945.

It is evident that, even on the narrowest interpretation of the Charter, the veto right is very extensive indeed. Beyond doubt, each Great Power is licensed by the Charter to bar any corporate decision by the Council that would involve preventive or coercive action either against itself or against any other state which it may choose to shield. (I will deal later with the action allowed under Art. 51 of the Charter.) Thus, the Charter accords to the Great Powers a privileged status "above the law"; it does not exempt them from the general obligation not to threaten or use force in any manner inconsistent with the pacific purposes of the United Nations, but it does formally allow them to be judge in their own cause in all decisions involving action by the Council. The Charter had to be a compromise between claims of power and claims of law. But this particular compromise represents a greater concession to anarchy than that made in the Covenant. It accords to the Great Powers a status irreconcilable with the principle of "equality before the law" and protects them (by Art. 108) from any unacceptable tampering with this privilege. Veto guards veto.

On paper, there are two important limitations of the veto right. No Great Power may veto decisions on matters recognised as "procedural"; nor may it vote on decisions solely concerned with the pacific settlement of a dispute to which it is itself a party. But the Russians, detesting any limitations on their authoritarian judgment, have claimed validity for a series of devices which would make the veto virtually unlimited in practice. They claim, rightly or wrongly, a right to veto decisions as to what are "procedural" matters.

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By Art. 34, the Council deals only with disputes on situations whose continuance it finds "likely to endanger" peace and security. The Russians claim a veto on decisions as to this likelihood.

Arts. 34 and 35 as first drafted at Dumbarton Oaks empowered the Council to investigate "any dispute," in order to judge whether it was likely to endanger peace; then the word "situation" was added, as an afterthought. But the Yalta formula, embodied in Art 27, refers only to a "dispute." The Russians claim that the limitation of the veto applies only to disputes, not to situations, and that decisions as to which label should be stuck on are subject to the veto.

Again, Art 4. says that new members are to be admitted to the U.N. by a decision of the Assembly, "upon the recommendation of the Security Council." Here too, the Russians claim and exercise a veto. Thus, a hole of incalculable extent has been driven through the limitations of the veto right which Roosevelt and Churchill ostensibly bought, from Stalin at Yalta.

Now suppose that these devices had never been invented, and that the right of veto had not been used so often by the Russians (more than twenty times), or used (as we think) as an instrument of national policy. Would the veto right, as limited by the Yalta compromise, afford a sound basis for the building up of a reliable system of "collective security"? I do not think so.

First, there is an inherent defect in this compromise. For decisions about "pacific settlement" may at any stage necessitate action as a sequel. The Council ought not to make corporate decisions of importance unless it can be reasonably sure of being able to follow them through without being blocked at a later stage by the veto. Thus the fear of the veto permeates the whole system. Such a system has paralysis in its blood. It is like a car whose starter is apt at any time to engage the mechanism for switching the engine off. The machine is ill-designed as well as ill-used.

Secondly, by conceding to each Great Power a wide license to be judge in its own cause, the Charter violates that principle of 'equality before the law' which it should be most concerned to assert and make operative. Anarchy as well as paralysis is in its blood.

Thirdly, the veto allows each Great Power to veto all decisions or disputes to which it is not directly a party; so that

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each can shield any "client" state which it may choose to protect. That means, in existing circumstances, that sanctions can only be counted on in cases where they are least likely to be required. The hypothesis that all the Great Powers would generally be at one in lifting the Charter's sword to protect the common peace may have seemed reasonable in October 1944, but seems a mockery now.

II.

What then should be the British Government's aim at this stage? Three kinds of policy are possible. I will label them "Wait and See," "Circumventing the Veto," and "Changing the Charter."

At this early stage in the United Nations' life, and at this time of dangerous tension between the Communist East and the non-Communist West, we might aim at limiting so far as possible the burden put on this Security Council, and discouraging all forms of challenge to the veto lest tension with the Soviet Union might be increased. The primary aim now, it might be argued, should be to stop this "cold war" and avoid the breaking of bridges between East and West, however frail. Any attempt to circumvent or limit the veto would, so the argument runs, serve only to exacerbate Russian apprehension of a line-up of the world which they label (with such wild imprecision) "Capitalist," for the conflict which they have been taught to regard as "inevitable."

Against this "wait and see" policy it might be said that, whilst of course we should make the most persistent, scrupulous, understanding efforts to end this "cold war," we must also make perfectly plain that we do not stand for peace at *any* price, that we reject the policy of neutrality in face of aggression, that we cannot afford to admit unlimited expansion of authoritarian Communist control any more than we can afford to let our economic recovery be blocked by Soviet opposition to the Marshall Plan, and that we dare not allow the open alliance against aggression, which a United Nations should and could become, to "die on its feet." We should assume—so this counter argument might run—that our enduring aim must be a protected peace system based on law and organised on a world-wide basis; but that if, owing chiefly to Soviet intransigence, "one world" is unattainable at present, we must make the best of a temporary division into two, not pretending that it does not exist or that it is not perilous, but not scared into hopelessness nor wavering irresolutely over taking measures

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necessary for mitigating the consequent dangers and for extending the rule of law so far as we can in the circumstances.

For my part, I am driven to conclude that this 'wait and see' policy would contribute nothing substantial to the abatement of Soviet hostility to the non-Communist West. That hostility, so continually paraded by Soviet spokesmen in Council and Assembly, is not, I fear, a temporary outcome of passing differences, but is, rather, an application of just such a policy as Lenin enjoined upon the comrades when the League of Nations was young—a policy meant to jam the machine, fan the sparks of conflict, and so "create a revolutionary situation" everywhere. The aim of extended revolution, the hope of conflict between the "bourgeois" states, and the expectation of collapse in the capitalist economies, might be countered by a demonstration of economic recovery in the non-Communist world; it will certainly not be appeased by a policy that involves the withering of hope and faith in the United Nations experiment. That withering is going on now, as the Canadian spokesman, Mr. St. Laurent, pointed out at the Assembly. It is evidenced by the experience of the United Nations Association in Britain.

I do not even believe that a "wait and see" policy is likely to lead to Soviet participation in that huge proportion of the United Nations enterprise—UNESCO, F.A.O. and so much else—from which the Union now, unfortunately, stands aloof. Such a policy is becoming invalid as a means of strengthening the bonds between East and West, and injurious to the effort to make a protected peace system based on law. The great majority of the delegates at the Assembly have taken this view; and I conclude, most reluctantly, that they were right.

Assuming, then, that the veto problem cannot well be left in abeyance, what should be done or attempted?

III.

The Little Assembly. The General Assembly has decided on the creation of an Interim Committee, the so-called "Little Assembly." It is to meet throughout the year, till the next General Assembly, following up the work of this Assembly and clearing ground for the next one. It is specially charged to consider the veto question.

It may deal with a situation or dispute which is not on the agenda of the Security Council, provided that a two-thirds majority of its members so decide; likewise, it may institute a commission of investigation "on the spot", subject to consent

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by the country in which investigation is to be made. At the time of writing full texts are not available, and it is difficult to judge how the new plan will affect the right of veto. Apparently the Little Assembly will in some cases be able to decide on making an investigation despite the fact that this could be blocked by a Great Power's veto if the case were being dealt with by the Security Council.

The plan has been denounced as "a violation of the Charter" by the Soviet spokesman, and the five other Slav spokesmen have dutifully followed suit. The Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, would never agree to the creation of such an organ "as long as we stand on the basis of the Charter of the U.N." All the six states are to boycott the enterprise.

So the breach widens. Perhaps the discussions will help the participants to discover common ground about the veto and other issues; they may dispel some illusions and bring out stubborn facts about American (and British?) unwillingness to forego the veto so long as the Council retains its present constitution and authority. Any proposal for restriction of the veto, either by agreement or by revision of the Charter, will assuredly be met by the Soviet's veto. And every grouping of states which may be willing to accept stronger obligations of peace-keeping and collective resistance to aggression, however sincerely intended as a buttress to an open alliance in support of the Charter's purposes, will doubtless be denounced by Communists in and out of the Soviet Union as another conspiracy by the "Fascist beasts," contrary to the Charter and directed against the Soviet Union.

Article 51. One proposal for such a grouping of Members has come from the directors of the American Association for the U.N. They suggest that the United States, "pursuant to its freedom under Article 51," should declare as a national policy that, if the Assembly finds that a Member State is the victim of armed attack and that the Security Council has failed to discharge its responsibilities for maintaining peace, the U.S. will, "in cooperation with other nations so inclined, take measures which it deems necessary in support of the nation so attacked. In case the U.S. deems action necessary before the General Assembly can meet, and gives assistance to the nation attacked, it will report both to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. It will be prepared to abide by the General Assembly's decision as to whether such aid should be continued".

I think this implies an excessively wide interpretation of

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the 'freedom' of action accorded by Act 51 of the Charter, which says that nothing in the Charter "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the U.N., until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council"

The plan would go far—surely, much too far—in liquidating restraints upon the self-judged use of force. And this licence, meant to facilitate sanctions, would be liable to prove two-edged: if it authorised instant use of American forces, say, to aid Greece against alleged attacks from the North, it might be cited as justification for instant moves, equally self-judged, by Soviet forces in the opposite direction.

An international Convention against aggression. An analogous proposal has lately been made by Lord Cecil. The international Law Commission would be asked to draft a Convention, open for signature by all U.N. members. This would bind the signatories, "jointly and severally," to accept the principle that aggression is an international crime, and to resist any actual or threatened aggression by any state. "If any signatory should be of the opinion that any state was guilty of actual aggression or was manifestly preparing for such aggression, it should either (1) in case of urgency take whatever steps it might think necessary to restrain the aggressor, or (2), if time permits, consult with the other signatories as to what steps they or any of them could usefully take with that object." In any case, the signatories should be informed as soon as possible, and if the majority thought no aggression had been committed or intended, action should be withdrawn or suspended. The Convention is meant to supplement, not supplant, the Charter.

Here again, I think, as in the American Association's plan, the safeguards against the self-judged use of force are dangerously loosed. And here, the signatories of the Convention would, it seems, make themselves arbiter, by majority vote, of the fundamental political issues which the Security Council is charged with.

The anxiety and exasperation which lies behind these projects is inevitable and justified. But are not the plans vitiated by failure to grapple with the main need—the need to build up the authority and power of "The Crown," as the authorised judge and guardian of "The King's Peace?" "Primary responsibility" for maintenance of peace and security cannot

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safely be assumed by any authority outside the very centre of the United Nations. And the judgment whether aggression is being prepared or committed cannot safely be transferred from the centre to the individual members or to the majority vote in a Committee less representative than the Security Council.

IV

So I come to the third kind of policy—"Changing the Charter." Is that practicable?

If the Soviet Union remains a member, it can block textual amendment by the veto. Even if this particular veto did not operate, the veto of other Great Powers would have to be reckoned with: and it is very unlikely that the U.S. Senate (or the British Government?) would renounce the veto right, so long as each state in the Council has one vote, and the Council has so wide a measure of governmental authority. Thus, it is unlikely that the veto could be pulled out of the Charter like a loose tooth; a major operation, affecting other Articles besides 27 and 108, would be required.

Could the states which want to break the deadlock withdraw from the United Nations? The Charter provides for expulsion of members, and suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, but does not mention withdrawal. Actually, non-participation which amounts to withdrawal cannot be prevented; and the Russians have in this respect gone very far already.

Suppose that, say, 45 Members, including, say, four Great Powers, were to denounce their signatures of the Charter, declaring that experience had already shown some of its central provisions to be unworkable, and that they could not afford to drift any longer without a sound foundation for the formation of a collective peace system truly based on law. "We tried," they might say, "to establish such foundations a few years ago; we made certain errors, now manifest; we are resolved to repair those errors, and build, with all the help we can get, an organisation better fitted than the old for preventing war, for establishing conditions in which justice and respect for law can be maintained, for extending and assuring essential human rights, and for promoting social progress and other standards of life in larger freedom." If such a radical move were made, with all its risks, the nations participating would at least gain freedom to devise a new charter, perhaps less ambitious in some respects, but more consonant with 'equality before the law' and

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less stultified by concessions to arbitrary power. It may happen that the course of Soviet policy, and a growing recognition of the defects of the Charter, as well as exasperation with the abuse of the veto, will force such a grim choice upon us before the United Nations is much older. But even if this does happen—even if the division into 'two worlds' becomes more explicit than it is now—the task of building a real collective peace system on a world-wide basis will remain. Sooner or later the nations will have to learn to pay their "minimum subscription" to some peaceful order which is compatible with essential liberties and protected by authorised power. And that achievement will have to be reached by "the laborious ways of genuine assent"—including not least the assent of the Slav peoples, now icebound by Leninist dogmas of "inevitable" conflict.

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By DR. GERTRUDE WILLOUGHBY

BOTH England and France, prior to the war, had set up social insurance schemes, but they were limited in extent and in no sense could have been said to provide security. Recent legislation in the two countries has extended the whole field and it is interesting to compare the means adopted to achieve a similar end. The demand for social security and the manner in which the demand is met will clearly be closely related to the economic and social structure of the country. And in this regard France and Britain present considerable differences. The occupied population is comparable, about 22,523,000 in this country, and 20,550,000 in France. But whilst Britain is largely a country of workers dependent on their wages, an important section of the French population is more or less independent of wages.

The 1946 census shows that France has still over 7 million people on the land, and of this number some 5 million are proprietors, mostly small peasant proprietors. Moreover, neither in industry nor in commerce has the little man been swallowed up by the big undertaking to the same extent as in this country. Petits commerçants and petits industriels still number about 3 million. And to this number should be added

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some 600,000 artisans, highly skilled men working on their own account. We have about one million of our population on the land, and the great majority of these are wage earners. It is estimated that in 1948 there will be 19,300,000 employed persons, and 2,800,000 self employed persons, that is to say employers and workers on their own account. This difference in the distribution of the occupied population will clearly have a predominating influence on the plan worked out by the state to achieve security for its citizens.

Beveridge made social security dependent upon the maintenance of employment and the prevention of mass unemployment. Unemployment insurance is capital to the whole British scheme. France has never had an unemployment problem comparable to our own, and she has not included unemployment benefit in her new Social Security Plan. From 1920 to 1938 the unemployment problem in this country was acute. But in France there was such a shortage of labour between 1921 and 1931 that two million foreigners were encouraged to enter the country. And though as a result of the world crisis the policy was not continued from 1931 to 1935, France has so little fear of unemployment to-day that she is planning to allow one and a half million people to enter the country, not only to offset her shortage of workers but also to aid her demographic policy.

Monsieur Pierre Laroque, Director General of Social Security in the French Ministry of Labour, speaking at a conference in London last year and referring to this British concern about unemployment said, "the dominating considerations in France are of an altogether different kind. They are, first, our preoccupation with the family and the decline in the population; therefore the necessity of giving substantial help to families in order to raise the birth rate, and to favour the formation of a numerous generation of young workers to repair the grave situation resulting from a steadily ageing population. The French plan of social security, therefore, has been built up not round unemployment insurance, but round as complete a system as possible of family allowances, a system of health insurance designed to protect workers and their children against the threat of illness and to restore the power to work of those who fall ill, and finally round a system of old age insurance, the necessity for which is each day more apparent."

Before the war both France and England had birthrates below replacement rate. But the situation in France is more

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critical than in this country, partly because the birthrate started to show a marked decline about one hundred years earlier. Moreover, whilst the mortality rates have, in general, declined in France the infant mortality rate remains very much higher than in this country. It was higher before the war and as might have been expected the rate increased during the war. In 1945 it reached the appalling level of 108 per thousand live births as against 46 in this country. The rate for 1946 is 67. But it is estimated that if France had the same infant mortality rate as in this country there would be ten thousand fewer babies die each year. In the light of these figures it is understandable that the emphasis in the French Social Security Plan should be on the family, and in particular on the health of the mother and child. The French Plan falls into three parts. Firstly there is the whole scheme of family allowances, secondly the social insurances proper, and thirdly the provision for industrial injuries.

France was the first country in which an attempt was made to meet the financial difficulties of the *père de famille* by a payment over and above his wage and calculated in relation to the number of his children. But it is doubtful if this voluntary effort, started in 1918, would have continued had not the number of employers willing to pay for family allowances increased and a method of equalising the burden between employers worked out. This was achieved by the creation of Equalisation Funds (*Caisses de Compensation*). These funds might be established on an industrial or a geographical basis. For example, the employers in the Lille textile industry came together and set up their own Equalisation Fund. But the *Caisse de Compensation de la Région Parisienne* groups the employers from a wide range of industries.

Up to 1932 the adherence of an employer to an Equalisation Fund, and therefore the payment of family allowances, was on a purely voluntary basis. But the movement had proved so successful that in 1932 a law was passed making it obligatory for every employer in industry and commerce to belong to an Equalisation Fund.

In 1946 a comprehensive Social Security Plan was elaborated in France, and it is intended ultimately to integrate completely the finance and administration of the family allowances with the general scheme. But for the moment this proposal has met with opposition and it has not been found expedient to put it into effect. The position to-day is as follows. There are one

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hundred and eleven Equalisation Funds financed, in the first instance, by the employers who pay thirteen per cent of their wages bill into the Equalisation Fund to which they belong. From the total sum thus collected the Funds pay out the allowances to the families, finance the important social services which many Funds have created, and meet the administrative costs involved.

Prior to 1947 the administration was almost completely in the hands of the employers. For some time the trade unionists had been claiming a share in the administration on the grounds that the family allowances did not represent a generous gesture on the part of the employers but were, in fact, paid by the wage earners either in higher prices or lower wages. Under the Social Security Plan this claim is recognised and the workers' representatives have been allotted half the seats on the administrative councils. The elections held in 1947 resulted in 61 per cent of these seats being held by members of the communist trade unions though a surprisingly large number of the Christian trade union representatives were returned. Since the administrative councils include representatives of other interested bodies the employers are now in a minority.

There are special Equalisation Funds for agriculture and for the self employed worker. These Funds are administered by the members themselves and largely financed by them. These, however, do receive a government grant. All civil servants and local government officials receive allowances which are financed from the public funds.

The principle that the cost of rearing a child is in large measure a national responsibility has been accepted in France and, though the allowances under the new Security Plan are not designed to cover the whole cost, the aid given is very considerable. The allowances in theory are closely linked to wages. The wage taken as base to which all allowances are related is that of an unskilled worker in the steel industry in Paris. Wages and the cost of living vary considerably in France as between geographical areas and as between town and country. Family allowances are adjusted to take account of this variation. The calculation of allowances in this paper is based on the Paris rate of 7,000 francs monthly. This basic rate, the *salaire moyen*, should be an average wage. But owing to the rapid rise in wages and to the fact that family allowances do not now automatically increase, this sum of 7,000 francs is estimated to be some twenty per cent below the lowest wage. The

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government is already being pressed to increase the basic rate on which the family allowances are calculated.

The allowances to-day are as follows. First, there is a maternity grant. This grant has been elaborated with the express purpose of encouraging the birthrate. It is only given if the first child is born within two years of the marriage or if the mother is under twenty-five at the birth of her first baby. When these conditions are fulfilled the mother receives a grant which amounts to three times the basic wage, that is to say 21,000 francs. Moreover, should another child be born within three years the mother will receive a further maternity grant of twice the basic wage. And for every child born within a period of three years from the last birth this sum of 14,000 francs will be paid. All women in France who fulfil the conditions have a right to this maternity grant. It is given even to foreigners if the child takes French nationality. Should the mother be the wife of an insured worker she will receive in addition a sum of 6,820 francs if she nurses the child herself. If for good reasons she is unable to do this she will receive monthly payments towards the cost of the milk.

The second and most important benefit is that of family allowances proper. The families of all the occupied population have a right to this benefit. The allowances are paid, as in Britain, for the second child but in France they are continued up to the age of seventeen for an apprentice and up to the age of twenty for a student. The amount to be paid to the mother is calculated as a percentage of the basic wage of 7,000 francs. The mother of two children receives twenty per cent of this sum monthly but for each additional child the allowance is raised to thirty per cent of the basic rate. Thus the mother of four children will receive a monthly sum of 5,600 francs this being 80 per cent of the basic wage.

A third benefit is available when the family is subsisting on a single income. In France a much higher percentage of women go out to work than in this country and the primary object of this allowance is to enable the mother to stay at home and look after her family. Nevertheless, the allowance is paid if the father for one reason or another stays at home whilst his wife goes out to work.

France, like Britain, is in urgent need of labour and the trade union leaders are urging the married woman to take her place in the factory. But it is generally agreed that the married woman who works outside her home is less likely to have

children. Moreover, the French figures show that the infant mortality rate is lower if the mother remains in her home. The official attitude is, therefore, to encourage the woman to stay in her home. If she has one child and does not go out to work she is entitled to twenty per cent of the basic wage until the child is five years of age. But as soon as there are two children she is entitled to forty per cent of the basic wage and for three children or more the allowance is fifty per cent. This payment is, of course, in addition to the family allowances so that the mother of four children in Paris will receive a monthly sum of 9,100 francs provided that she does not go out to work. Should she fulfil the conditions required to qualify for the maternity grant already described she will receive, in addition to the family allowances and the single income allowance, a substantial lump sum as each child is born.

No exact comparison can be made between the British and the French methods of aiding the family. The British give valuable services in kind through the maternity and child welfare service, through free medical care and subsidised milk and meals to school children. In actual family allowances a mother of four children in this country will receive three pounds a month, and this sum is subject to income tax. The French mother with four children, living in Paris, will receive 9,100 francs a month, roughly 18 pounds, at the present rate of exchange, if she stays at home to look after them and no income tax is payable on these allowances.

It is too early to estimate how far this French policy will achieve a higher birthrate and a lower infant mortality rate. But it is clear that the inferior economic position of the family with three or more children is to some extent already being adjusted. Criticism can be advanced against this policy, and frequently is in France, on the ground that it is the poorer sections of the community which are most likely to be influenced by it. Nevertheless, the middle-class family gains in that students receive allowances up to the age of twenty, and as had already been indicated the allowances are free of income tax.

At a recent conference in Paris on Population and the Family it was interesting to note the French reaction to the British plan of giving a relatively small cash payment but valuable services in kind. This method of helping the family, which is generally accepted in this country, was considered as an infringement of personal liberty and an affront to the prestige of the father. The cash allowances in France are paid

in the great majority of cases because the father works. They were, indeed, at one time called a *sursalaire familial*. And so the French consider that the prestige of the head of the family is maintained, an important consideration in a country where the *père de famille* still has important rights. And there is obviously more liberty if the mother is left to spend the money as she, and not the state, thinks best.

Thus the French may be said to have a policy for the family. At the moment the British have no co-ordinated policy; we await the findings of the Royal Commission on Population. But the Social Insurances proper present more features common to the two countries. With the exception of unemployment the causes of insecurity are the same, sickness, old age, death and accident, on these follow loss of income and the need for financial aid. But in finance and administration the measures adopted by the two countries to implement their social insurance policy reflect a fundamental difference in attitude towards the state.

Britain in 1911 began her state insurance scheme financed by the contributions of workers and employers and the state. Since that date there has been a more or less continuous development and the National Insurance Act 1946 brings the great majority of the population into the scheme. In the summer of 1948 the Act comes into operation. Employed, self-employed and non-employed persons will pay contributions which will be the same for all persons within the appropriate classes. The state pays all the administrative costs and a percentage of the benefits. It is estimated that in 1949, the first complete year of working, the state's contribution will amount to 118 million pounds. The scheme is administered by a department of State, the Ministry of National Insurance.

Social insurance in France has had a different history. Since 1930 there has been an insurance scheme covering workers against the risks of sickness, maternity, old age and death. There was an upper income limit and people earning above this limit did not come into the scheme. In finance and administration the scheme was adjusted to the extreme individualism of the French worker and his deep suspicion of state sponsored schemes conceived for his benefit. The whole of the expense of the insurance scheme was met by the contributions of workers and employers. The actual administration was in the hands of a multitude of separate Funds, *Caisses*, set up sometimes by employers, sometimes by the workers themselves, sometimes

by the state. Further, there were the *Sociétés Mutualistes*, mutual aid societies which, in addition to their friendly society activities, dispensed social insurance benefits.

With this background it would have been quite impossible for the French government to have set up an administratively tidy scheme like that of the British, even had they wished to do so. To quote Monsieur Laroque, "The French tradition in the field of social security, the traditions of mutual aid societies, together with the tradition of trade unionism, carries with it a tradition of self help by the insured population themselves. That is why the French plan of Social Security is entirely based on broad social and democratic principles. The French workers do not desire official guardianship, any more than they desire the guardianship of employers. They intend to manage their own affairs."

The French plan of which the main outline was announced in 1945, is clearly inspired by the Beveridge plan. It seeks to ensure security for all by bringing the whole population into the scheme, though the extension to certain sections of the community is delayed until France is in a sounder financial position. It seeks to concentrate finance and administration so as to enable the employer to pay one contribution covering all his social security payments and to enable the worker to draw all his benefits from one local office. To this end a series of Social Security Boards has been established. Each Department of France has a Primary Board which receives all contributions and administers sickness, maternity and industrial injury benefits. Above these are sixteen Regional Boards which co-ordinate the work of the Primary Boards and deal with old age pensions and long term illness and incapacity. And finally there is a National Board which operates at ministerial level.

The majority of the seats on the administrative councils of both the Primary and Regional Boards are allotted to the workers' representatives; on the Primary administrative councils the employers have only one quarter of the seats. The first election for the workers' representatives was held in April, 1947; the election gave 59 per cent of the seats to the communist controlled trade unions and 26 per cent to the Christian trade unions. The scope of these Boards is, of course, limited by the fact that the amount of contributions is fixed as are the rates of benefit. Nevertheless, the Boards have considerable freedom in administration and financial control.

In private industry and commerce the entire cost of social

insurance is met by the contributions of workers and employers. The total charge is 16 per cent of the wages bill borne as to 6 per cent by the workers and as to 10 per cent by the employers. All employed persons now come into the insurance scheme but after an income level of 204,000 francs a year the contribution of both employer and worker remains stationary.

Under the French scheme contributions vary and cash benefits vary. For example, the worker insured for an old age pension will receive at sixty-five a pension in relation to the wages he has received during the last ten years of his employment. There is a top limit to this sum determined by the top limit of contributions. Both in England and France old age pensions are a heavy charge on insurance funds. It is estimated that of the 86 milliard francs contributed by employers and workers in 1947 49 milliards will have been paid out in old age pensions leaving 37 milliard to meet the charges for sickness, maternity, invalidity and death. In Britain the steadily increasing cost of social insurance is due to the increase in old age pensions, the greater part of which has to be met out of taxation.

The French Social Security Plan brought into operation in 1946 has already had to be modified and it is not unlikely that further changes will have to be made. Flexible and democratic as the plan appears it has met with considerable resistance. It was intended to make all insurance payments through local offices of the Primary Social Security Boards. But whilst the trade unionists approved of this scheme the members of the Mutual Aid Societies would have none of it. They insisted that they must have freedom of choice and that they must be allowed to draw their insurance benefits from their Mutual Aid Societies as heretofore. In March, 1947 the government had to restore these facilities; the Mutual Aid Societies had won a battle which their British counterparts, the Friendly Societies, had lost.

Further the attempt to extend the social insurance scheme to the professional and self employed man has also met with resistance. It was intended originally to bring these sections of the community into the new scheme when the economic situation of the country had improved. But in September, 1946 the government hastily took the decision to extend old age insurance to the whole population; the contribution was to be nine per cent of total income. Money was needed to finance the government's scheme to extend old age pensions to all those over sixty-five who were in need, and it is alleged that an

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imminent election was not without influence on the government's action. But here again it has been found impossible to bring the act into operation. The refusal of shop keepers, of farmers, of self employed men together with all the professional men to pay their contribution has jeopardised this first extension of social security to those outside the wage and salary earning groups.

The reasons for refusal to participate in the government's scheme are manifold. Many people claim that this is a new tax and take no account of the fact that the payment, in the view of the government, is an insurance contribution which will give a valuable right in thirty years time. The continued fall in the value of money in France does not perhaps encourage long term commitments. And again these groups are composed of men with an extremely individualistic point of view, who prefer to rely upon their own efforts and see no reason why they should combine with their fellows. And lastly their political views are, in general, diametrically opposed to the views of the trade unionists who, it has been pointed out, have a majority representation on the Social Security Boards. Members of the large middle class in France who are independent of wages are most unwilling to share in a scheme which identifies them in any way with the communists.

Both Britain and France have launched their schemes in a time of rising prices and financial difficulty. In Britain the rise in the cost of living has been curbed by the government's policy of subsidies and controls. In France, and more particularly in the large towns, the cost of living is at least ten times higher than in 1938. This has necessitated a continual adjustment of social insurance contributions and benefits. It is maintained in France that the cost of social insurance directly influences the inflationary spiral. The worker pays his six per cent of wages and the employer pays ten per cent for social insurances, thirteen per cent for family allowances and about four per cent for industrial injuries. There is a further six per cent to cover holidays with pay which now have to be paid by all employers. These social insurance costs are brought into the selling price so that as the insurance burden increases prices rise. The demand for higher wages is met and, as the French legislator has related cash benefits to wages, benefits also increase. It would appear that Britain has escaped some of these disadvantages through refusing to make an automatic readjustment between wages and insurance contributions and benefits. Nevertheless, it may

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be argued that the French scheme is more delicately contrived than the British. The percentage contribution escapes the reproach of being a regressive tax and further there are obvious advantages in adjusting cash payment to standards of living.

It may also be argued that France has taken a more realistic attitude than this country in the weight to be given to the claims of childhood and of old age. France, with her straitened finances has had an exceedingly hard decision to take. Should she reward past services or should she look to the future and spend money on the coming generation? She has chosen the latter alternative though she has the highest proportion of people over sixty in her population of any country in Europe. To-day, the worker of sixty-five who has paid insurance contributions for many years and has brought up a family of three children receives a yearly pension of 25,000 francs for himself and his wife. This is the highest pension and is, indeed, augmented in recognition of the service rendered to the state in bringing up three children. It will be remembered that the maternity benefit alone amounted to 21,000 francs. Britain has followed the reverse policy.

Both in France and Britain the plans formulated to ensure freedom from want have met the urgent demand of large sections of the community. In both countries the economic and financial situation of the next few years is going to influence profoundly the realisation of the social security plans. But the position in France is more complicated than in this country. Social insurance there has become a political issue with the left in favour of the present plan and the centre and right in favour of considerable modifications. It is, for instance, fairly clear that if and when a more conservative government takes power the process of centralisation will be halted and family allowances, for example, will continue to be administered outside the general insurance scheme. But in the meantime the social insurance policy is strongly influenced by the communist trade unions, though in 1947 the elections for representatives to the Social Security Boards diminished the power of the communist representation. Nevertheless, a change in social insurance policy to bring it more into line with French individualism and previous policy may be difficult to effect. It may be argued that the nearer the French scheme approaches the British scheme the less is it likely to appeal to the French and that a retreat from Beveridge may be indicated.

[The scales of benefits given above are those in force in November, 1947]



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SURVEYS

PUBLIC OPINION: ATTITUDES TOWARDS AMERICA AND RUSSIA

WE managed to go on liking the Italians rather better than we liked some of our allies, even while we were fighting them. Long-standing national stereotypes die hard, and when at last Italy collapsed, for many ordinary citizens in Britain it simply confirmed what they had felt all along. Italians are lazy, peaceable, indolent, rather dirty but rather romantic people. They like the sun, and they don't like war. Mussolini got a hold on them, but they were never suited to fascism, and their natural propensity for running away from a battle was sure to find expression sooner or later.

Of course, the stereotype was shaken at times, but it remained there in the background, strong enough to enable many people to think of the Italians as a pleasant enough lot, even when they seemed unaccountably to be winning. It does not seem to matter a great deal if a nation goes out of character for a period, provided it reverts later. If the U.S.S.R. were to produce a workable plan for international peace and co-operation tomorrow, mass reactions would still probably take the predominant form of "I *knew* Russia would do it in the end," rather than surprise at, or suspicion of, a changed tactic.

American stereotype

This article is an attempt to review historically the changes which have taken place in people's attitudes to America and Americans, Russia and Russians, during the past seven or eight years. It is based on Mass-Observation material collected during this time, chiefly of a descriptive and qualitative nature, but with sufficient indication of frequencies and numerical trends for general guidance.

There have been several big blows to our conception of American characteristics during this period. Each tended to undermine a different trait of the stereotype, and the net result has been decidedly negative and disturbing.

Surveys in 1942 and 1943 showed the most liked characteristics of Americans to be: friendliness, openness, frankness, generosity and kindness; energy, efficiency, and general vigour and virility; democraticness and lack of snobbery. In this order of frequency these three basic traits topped the list. Most often disliked traits were boastfulness, bumptiousness, and

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baloney; materialism, get-rich-quickness, speed-before-thoroughness; and their language and accent.

Frankness and openness, on the credit side, correspond with boastfulness and bumptiousness on the debit side. Energy corresponds with speed-craziness; efficiency with materialism. And materialism laps over into a "self-centred" trait which is the reverse of generosity. Even kindness has its negative aspect in the idea that Americans are "too darned sure of themselves" and treat others like a charitable institution. The G.I.'s brought this out a little. So did Lease-Lend.

The picture is a delicately balanced one with few positives which cannot fairly readily change into negatives without fundamentally altering the pattern. Main plus score at that time was democraticness; main negative, language. If we take the stereotype at some other time, the chief difference is not that new and unsuspected virtues and vices appear, but that what seemed a virtue now seems a vice, or what seemed a vice has become a virtue. America today is "showing her worst side" to those who have come to dislike her, whereas Russia seems to be changing her whole character to those who have lately come to distrust her. Psychologically, the first process is very much easier to accomplish than the second. Hence people whose minds are changing tend to reserve judgment on Russia whenever opportunity arises; but have little difficulty in expressing their worst suspicions about the changes that seem to them to have come over America.

Pearl Harbour

Pearl Harbour was the first big blow to British conceptions of Americans. It undermined the efficiency idea. For America to be caught napping was a real shock, since the Americans were a people who were always on the alert. But Pearl Harbour was preceded by other precipitating factors. Although Lease-Lend raised statistically favourable opinion from a quarter to nearly two-thirds, towards the time of America's entry into the war a vociferous minority were saying:—

"If they feel so strongly this is a crisis for democracy why not come in and fight for us?"

"They are feeling too damn smug at kindly selling us armaments."

"Far too much talk and too little action."

When America came in because she had to, and began inefficiently as well, these latent irritations came to a head.

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The "bad" characteristics of boastfulness, over-talkativeness, and charitable present-giving had been displayed, and at the extremes people felt like these two women, glad that the windbag had been punctured and rather vengefully hopeful that *Uncle Sam* would be taken down a peg or two in his own self-esteem:—

"The only thing I've got against the Japanese is that they didn't start earlier. The Americans need a good shaking up. They should have bombed New York, not the natives on those islands. Why should the poor natives get it all. It's not their fault. I don't think it's fair; we've promised to help the Americans in their war with Japan, but they aren't doing much, to help us against Germany. That's what they always do, leave some one else to do the hard work. A few good bombs on the guts of them will do all the good in the world." (F45 Artisan class).¹

"I think it serves America right — they've been scared of them all along — fancy letting Japan declare war on them! *Infra dig* I call it — I suppose they wanted to be noble and say 'We weren't the aggressors'." (F45 Middle class).

The Americans eventually redeemed most of their positive characteristics in British people's minds in war, but it was a long process. The perennial story of the American who says something in an English pub to the effect that he has come over to win the war for Britain, is evidence of its persistence in the fear-fantasies of many people throughout the war.

Post-war

The story began to repeat itself, on a "peaceful" plane with the end of Lease-Lend. This gave rise to the expression of an always latent feeling that America was really only out for herself, generous to others for her own sake—the get-rich-quick and devil-take-the-hindmost trait, a negative aspect of "rugged individualism" and the "land of opportunity." The development runs consistently through news of the Marshall Plan, and gradual realisation of the snags attending the Loan. These new peacetime "Lend-Leases" seem to many to smack far more strongly of self-interest than the wartime one. Unfavourable

¹ F=Female; M=Male. Age is given to the nearest five years. Thus M40 = a man, forty years of age.

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comment to-day (Autumn 1947) far outweighs favourable, and typically takes this sort of form :—

“Don’t regard the Americans as friendly or allies — just as business men.” (F25. Middle Class. Voted Liberal).

“Like any other country, she is out to help herself. She could have helped us a little longer without hurting herself, I think. The whole World today is out to help itself.” (F45. Wife of Bank Official. Conservative).

“I think they’re making a fine rake-off us as they did during the war” (bitterly). (M40. Shoe Salesman, Labour).

“America is like an old miser hugging his dollars.” (M35. Working class. Non-voter).

The business-first trait, though in some cases it is half-dismissed with the added comment that all countries are the same, takes in its extreme form an anti-semitic turn :—

“America is like Shylock screwing the screw.” (M35. Working class. Labour).

“She is a devil. Just like a bloody Jew. They won’t give away a penny.” (M40. Working class. Labour). More commonly :—

“They’re a lot of greedy buggers. They won’t help unless they can get a lot out of it.” (M25. Working class. Non-voter).

“I think they’re perfectly dreadful — but it’s really big business—you can’t blame the people.” (F25. Artisan. Non-voter).

“They’re too greedy — should do more for us.” (M60. Artisan. Conservative).

“I think though we borrowed the Dollars, they’ve had it all back one way or another.” (M45. Artisan. Labour).

“I’m not wrapped up in them, never have been. They want to go through a little bit of what we had in the War over here.” (F45. Artisan. Labour).

The word Dictator is often used :—

“Don’t care a lot for them. Too much a Dictator — if we borrow money from her, she’ll tell us what to do.” (M50. Artisan. Voted Conservative).

“She’s out to dominate the World. America is trying to do what Hitler did and she’ll take a fall like he did.” (M35. Working class. Labour).

“She should mind her own business and not try to

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dictate so much to the rest of the World.” (F35. Middle class. Conservative).

Favourable to America

Favourable comment, about half as frequent as unfavourable among three London samples taken between March and September 1947 by Mass-Observation, is weakening in tone. It now comes mainly from Conservatives, and where it is not openly political it generally takes the form of rather feeble gratitude :—

“They’re very good to help us at all.” (M45. Artisan. Conservative).

“I think we are unkind considering what she’s done for us.” (M50. Middle class. Conservative).

“It’s pretty good of her to take our immigrants.” (F30. Working class. Labour).

But favourable remarks have recently taken on an increasingly well-defined political complexion :—

“America is quite rightly approaching the world situation from a business man’s point of view. She won’t have anything to do with inefficiency and that is why she won’t help us as much as she might. She doesn’t trust this Government.” (M40. Middle class. Conservative).

“I think they would help us a lot if we could change the Government. They don’t like this Government.” (F45. Artisan. Conservative).

“America is being hard on us because they have no confidence in the Government. If we had a Conservative Government they would be more helpful.” (F45. Middle class. Conservative).

“I agree with the Americans. The biggest bugbear of the lot is this nationalisation. I believe this Government should not have taken power when it did.” (Cinema Commissionaire. 71. Conservative).

But there were fewer favourable comments than there were Conservatives in the whole sample, in M-O’s most recent opinion-check.

Roosevelt

Two lately-recorded comments :—

“America has treated us very badly indeed — it’s a shame. I think it would have been different if Roosevelt had lived.” (F30. Artisan. Non-voter).

“I think they served us a dirty trick. They’re greatly

indebted to us. Part of America would have been no more if it had not been for us. One thing that I do believe: Truman is not the man to England that Roosevelt was." (M50. Foreman. Labour).

Shortly before President Roosevelt's death, Mass-Observation chanced to ask Londoners, in the course of its regular news-surveys, the question "If one of the Big Three had to die, which would you rather it was — Stalin, Churchill or Roosevelt?" Roosevelt was less often mentioned than either of the others (who came too close for a clear distinction to be made on a small sample).

Before the outbreak of war Roosevelt had come to be looked upon here as one of the chief leaders of the opposition to the Axis. Indeed he was often believed to be more strongly opposed than any of our own leaders. A Mass-Observation report shortly after his re-election in November 1940 says:—

"The two most talked of events of the week are Greece and Roosevelt. Interest in these subjects has penetrated even into the quiet atmosphere of our Western study village. An old labourer of 70 who until now has shown the absolute minimum of interest in anything outside the two mile radius, registered positive delight at Roosevelt's re-election, commented on it spontaneously. After Churchill, Roosevelt is probably the most popular figure in Britain to-day.

"Opinion on the result of the American election are almost unanimously approving. There is a general, if vague, feeling, that America has done the right thing by Britain, and a feeling of friendliness towards America more marked than at any time previously."

In the middle of the night of April 12th, 1945, the news of Roosevelt's death reached Britain. Here, in her own words, is how one British working class woman felt about it:—

"I heard it last night. It was in the 12 o'clock news. My chap woke me up—well, I wasn't really asleep, sort of half and half, and he said, 'Roosevelt's dead.' I said, 'My God, the country won't half be in a mess.' And he said, 'What are you talking about, it's not Churchill, it's Roosevelt.' I said 'Ooohh'—just like that, proper flat, and I went all cold, as if I'd lost a friend I'd known for years and years. D'yer know I couldn't get him out of my mind for the rest of the night. Shame isn't it? He

was a fine man, a proper gentleman if ever there was one. I don't know where we'd be if it wasn't for Roosevelt sending us food and munitions on that Lease-Lend plan. It was all his idea. Yes, he made his countrymen agree to it—they weren't particular but he told them flat that if we lost the war, the Nazis would be in America and their turn would be next. I expect Churchill will go next. I liked Roosevelt better, he was a man of the people. The others where I work, they're terribly grieved. Shame Roosevelt didn't live to see the war out. I expect the strain and worry finished him. We've certainly lost our best friend."

Roosevelt typified and symbolised the honest-to-goodness, down-to-earth democratic trait which endears Americans to many Britons. They were able to identify themselves more unreservedly with him in this sense than with any of our own leaders, and it is doubtful whether the death of any British politician for many years past would have inspired so deep a sense of personal loss.

Truman

Of Truman they knew nothing, inclined to believe from the first that he was "very ordinary," and certainly that he'd find it difficult to follow Roosevelt. Indeed, one woman seemed to think the new president would be little more than a figure-head, and that the Roosevelt family would carry on where the old President left off:—

"Oh, it's a sad loss, isn't it. I don't think I know much about the new one really, I don't know his name. I think his wife will be more really, I mean Roosevelt's wife. I don't think it'll make all that difference to the peace conference, but I think they will have it with one of Roosevelt's sons. Stalin, Churchill and one of Roosevelt's sons, if they have a Big Three meeting."

President Truman has remained a lay figure to most Britons. People do not, as they did with Roosevelt, differentiate between nation and leader and hopefully expect that, when the Americans "aren't particular" their President will remind them of the "good" side of our American stereotype, and persuade them to live up to it. So we are left with just the Americans to react to. And just at present, it takes an Irishman to be unreservedly enthusiastic:—

"I think they're a great country. They're doing all they

can to help without jeopardising their own security.”
(Irish Rubber worker, 40).

Nation and Individual

But we must distinguish between attitudes to the Americans ; to America ; and to the nature of the individual American. The foregoing applies to Americans-in-general, to the country insofar as it represents to people this block conception, and to the individual insofar as he carries many of the generalised traits. Ideas of country, race and personality overlap and interact on one another.

Of the country, America, one woman said :—

“ Well, there’s part seems all for us. But America’s so large. You don’t know what the Middle West thinks. You don’t even know where the Middle West is.”

Of the nationality, American ; a middle class male view :—

“ There’s no such thing as the American people. They’re just a lot of half-castes.”

And of the individual, an American, the following extract from a Mass-Observation bulletin¹ sums up a general conception :—

“ There arise two sharply contrasting and yet fundamentally similar groups of opinion. In the one the American is immature emotionally and intellectually ; he is boastful and flamboyant, bad mannered and full of intolerance to any minority group. But in the other he is simple and ingenuous, impulsive and uninhibited, friendly, kind-hearted and generous. In either case his likeness to a child is stressed with notable frequency.”

The feeling that Americans are immature branches over into a feeling, more often implied than explicit, that the Americans are (despite their central heating, business efficiency and industrial superiority), still the younger cousins of the Britons. And this feeling in turn carries with it the idea that the Americans *ought* to behave with proper respect towards us ; and a quick and ready resentment if they don’t. In an early wartime survey one man complained that “ there’s not enough English blood ” in America ; others said there were too many Germans there. To-day, resentment at the unBritishness of the Americans is taking on, at one extreme the current anti-semitic pattern, appropriately to the Loan, which raises comments of Money-lender, Shylock, Jew, and *Uncle Sam*².

¹ Mass Observation Bulletin for April, 1947.

² Uncle=Pawn broker.

Anglo-American Co-operation

When the Atlantic Charter was signed it raised minimal enthusiasm in this country because, by that time, people were expecting much bigger news from America and were disappointed that she had not entered the war. The outcome of the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting came as an anti-climax because it produced only a piece of paper. At the time of writing it seems probable that the fruition of the Marshall Plan, if it comes at all, will also come as an anti-climax—too little, not because it is not acceptable, but because it comes so late. Someone was overheard saying shortly after news of the Atlantic Charter was published :

“ And I said, ‘ Hello, Joe, what’s the good news ? ’

He laughed and said, ‘ No, it’s a bugger, it’s nowt ’ ”
—an appropriate comment when the mountain labours to produce a mouse.

Six years ago many people were thinking of post-war economic co-operation with the U.S.A. in these sort of terms :

“ We ought to have a customs union and a common currency. That would help to solve a lot of trade problems.”

“ We should pool our resources economically throughout the world.”

“ We should work out a general division of the resources of the world, so that everyone gets a fair share.”

—and they were only jarred out of such optimistic hopes by the sudden, unprepared-for end of Lease-Lend. But as far back as early 1942, when hope still ran high of a new world after the war, the majority foresaw difficulties arising. More than half of the difficulties mentioned, in a survey carried out in Jan. 1942, concerned big business and vested interests ; and national selfishness. Here are some comments of that period :

“ We shall have to play second fiddle—safe but no longer powerful.”

“ The U.S.A. will always expect to be the petitioned, not the petitioner. She’ll always expect to lead the way in any proposition.”

“ America will drive hard bargains.”

“ We shall be reduced to the position of a very junior partner.”

So, for many, the event has been a disappointment, but not a surprise.

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U.S.S.R.

If the action which would most quickly reverse people's present views on U.S.A. is a big-hearted gesture of spontaneous generosity, tension over Russia would be quickest relieved by some sort of world-shaking plan put forward by that country.

People's views on Russia are not complicated by any elaborate conceptions of what the Russians are like. Russia is an idea, while America is, in the last analysis, a too, too solid Yank. And it is a much slower and more painful process to accept what appear to be inconsistencies in the former than in the latter.

Tom Harrisson, in an article in this journal in December 1941, showed how sympathy and admiration of the U.S.S.R. survived through the Finnish war. It was justified in World War II and was as strong, if not stronger, at the end than it had been before the war started.

Very few people to-day express reserved judgments about America. In the case of Russia, reserved judgment is almost a majority attitude at times. Expressed in opinion-poll statistics, shortly after an incident has blown over which provoked criticism of Russia the "unfavourable" group shows a tendency to decline, and the "don't know" group to swell to unusually large proportions. People change over quickly from an attitude of antagonism to one of "wait and see." Underlyingly, this wait and see outlook has characterised the whole trend of changing opinion since the war.

Over British policy towards Russia we find the same tendency to reserve judgment. A Gallup Poll, published this November in the *News Chronicle*, typically shows one-third approval, one quarter disapproval, and an almost record high of 41% "don't know"; it comments: "grounds for these opinions were most mixed; some persons gave contrary answers for exactly the same reasons"

Three sample enquiries by Mass-Observation in London between March and September this year on the question "How do you feel about Russia at present," have recorded respectively 53%, 44%, and 41% of undecided, vacillating and don't know comment. When the statistically undecided group reaches these proportions, it becomes of major importance. In this case it is especially so, since much of the unfavourable group consists of those who have always been opposed to Communism, and favourable comment is increasingly confined to the politically interested.

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Somewhere around half, perhaps less, of the "don't knows" are simply not interested. Many of the rest are very interested indeed, but continue to hesitate over changing their minds. Many say that time will tell:

"Time will show exactly what is going on in Russia.

I think things are all right, but you get such completely opposite stories. I've not made up my mind about it."

Others feel that Russia is a mystery—that she will produce something out of the hat in good time:

"My opinion of Russia is, she's weighing things up. She'll probably say her piece when things are right for her to do."

"She's a little mysterious and that's not doing her any good."

"Well, I don't know, she may be a friend or she may not."

"There's something doing over there. I shouldn't be surprised if they weren't arming themselves."

Many comments classified as unfavourable are plaintive rather than hostile:

"Russia's acting a bit difficult. She seems to be against everything."

Or, on the favourable side, over-protesting:

"Russia? They've always been friends of mine and still are."

News Distrust

One of the keys to people's unwillingness to commit themselves is to be seen in the remark of the middle-class woman who said:

"I suppose I'm reacting to propaganda. I'm beginning to dislike Russia."

An important reason why so many are still reserving judgment is their distrust of news-sources where Russia is concerned.

It was this, by then almost instinctual, suspicion of news stories from Russia in the press which largely enabled people to continue through the Finnish war with the persistent belief that Russia would not be on the wrong side for long, and had her own good reasons for fighting on the wrong side temporarily. Here they appeared right, and the newspapers dramatically wrong. Stories of cardboard tanks and inefficiency, then, probably play almost as an important part in determining to-day's attitude as what Mr. Molotov says, now.

Analysis of a small sample enquiry last March showed that there were more people expressing anti-American feelings and fewer who expressed pro-Russian ones among those who claimed to "understand fairly well what's going on," than among those who said they "didn't feel quite clear about it." To be pro-Russian at present carries the idea of being able to read between the lines of the newspaper news.

There are certainly many signs that anti-Russian feeling is hardening to-day, slowly and painfully, but steadily. But it would, so far, be very easy for a single dramatic conciliatory gesture on Russia's part to change the picture entirely. While, statistically, the balance of pro- and anti-opinion is very similar in the case of both Russia and America at present, and in both cases is heavily weighted towards antagonism, America is the less disturbing factor in people's minds. They hope that America will change, but are not greatly expecting it. They expect Russia to change, but are slowly becoming accustomed not to hope for it.

H. D. WILLCOCK

SOME RECENT FRENCH BOOKS

THE universal or international nature of all sciences is to-day seriously jeopardized, for the present difficulties in travelling abroad or in importing books from other countries force us into an artificial insularity which must ultimately become detrimental to the aims of objective and impartial research. These difficulties apply not only to the sciences proper, but to the social sciences as well. I have recently spent several weeks in Paris and I had the opportunity of discovering a considerable number of books of which some may not be known to fellow-workers in this country.

I begin with works on economic history. Of Henri Sée's *Histoire Economique de la France*, which has first been published in German under the title *Französische Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, the second volume, dealing with the period from 1789 to 1914, is now available. (Armand Colin, Paris, 1942.) The French edition of this great work is much better than the German version. Its text has been completely revised and the extensive bibliographies have been brought up to date. The book is undoubtedly a classic. Henri Hauser's *La Pensée et l'action économiques du Cardinal Richelieu* (Presses Universitaires de France,

1944), a small book of some 200 pages, is an outstanding study on the social and economic history of the seventeenth century. Hauser analyzes with penetrating accuracy the psychological, administrative, and politico-economic ideas and practices of the great Cardinal who left his uncompleted work to Colbert.

Georges Duveau has published, in Gallimard's fine series *La Suite des Temps*, a masterly work on *La Vie Ouvrière en France sous le Second Empire* (Paris, 1946) which testifies to the fruitful influence of the great French economic historians Simiand and Labrousse. It is an exciting book which in spite of its length (605 pages) deserves to be translated into English. Duveau describes the industrial evolution in France under Napoleon III; he analyzes the working conditions, salaries, and finally the mores of the French proletariat under the Second Empire.

Maxime Leroy's *Histoire des Idées sociales en France: De Montesquieu à Rousseau* (Gallimard, 1946) is an indispensable book. The author writes with a superb knowledge of the texts which gain under his hands new significance. Two previous books by the same author: *La Pensée de Sainte-Beuve* (Gallimard, 1940) and *La Politique de Sainte-Beuve* (Gallimard, 1941) should also be available in every British University library. In both volumes Sainte-Beuve appears rightly as one of the great social and political thinkers of the 19th century.

The perennial theme of the French Revolution of 1789 is resumed in several books: Daniel Guérin has recently published two volumes: *La Lutte de Classes sous la Première République. Bourgeois et 'bras nus' (1793-1797)*. (Gallimard, 1946) These volumes portray "l'embryon de révolution prolétarienne . . . dont celui-ci s'insère dans la révolution bourgeoise." Guérin covers the period from the fall of the Girondists to the execution of Baboeuf. Octave Festy has devoted a volume to the history of French agriculture during the great Revolution: *L'Agriculture pendant la Révolution française. Les Conditions de Production et de Récolte des Céréales. Études d'Histoire économiques 1789-1795*. (Gallimard, 1947). Nor should we forget to mention the important study by Frédéric Braesch: 1789, *L'Année cruciale*, published by Gallimard in 1941. (It appears that the book is now out of print). The author's intention is "mettre en pleine lumière les faits les plus décisifs pour l'avenir parmi tous ceux de l'année en question; méditer les événements auxquels il convient d'attribuer l'échec de la tentative de compromis et de Révolution pacifique; voir si, et à quelles conditions, celle-ci n'aurait peut-être pas pu réussir; rechercher enfin par la faute

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one of the richest periods of French history. Incidentally the great new edition of Proudhon's *Oeuvres Complètes*, published by Marcel Rivière, is on its way to being completed. The most recent addition is a volume which contains Proudhon's *Philosophie du Progrès* and *La Justice poursuivie par L'Eglise*.

Of the more recent works in the fields of French constitutional history and law I mention Maurice Duverger's: *Cours de Droit Constitutionnel* (Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1947) of which the fourth edition has just been published. Duverger writes in the tradition of the great French constitutional lawyers. Whereas the first part of this admirable book develops a general theory of the State, the second part gives a masterly sketch of the constitutional development of France from the Ancien Régime to (and including) the Fourth Republic. Professor Duverger has also written another book which, though more popular, is not less interesting: *Les Constitutions de la France*, published in the excellent series of the Presses Universitaires de France "Que sais-je?" Olivier-Martin's condensed and profound *Précis d'Histoire du Droit français* (Petits Précis Dalloz) has recently been published in a fourth and revised edition. This book, too, is by now a classic.

Two books, devoted to the immediate present of French politics, shall conclude our summary report: Jacques Fauvet's small book: *Les Partis Politiques dans la France actuelle* (Le Monde, 1947) has just come out a day or two before the municipal elections. These pages give the most up-to-date account of the French party structure. Michel Derré's *La Mort de l'Etat Républicain* is a formidable and pertinent essay in administrative criticism written by a 'Maître des Requêtes au Conseil D'Etat.' It bears the significant epigraph: Il n'y a point de patrie dans le despotisme.

This small selection of important books must suffice. French spiritual life is as rich as ever. Perhaps it is the very wealth and density of French culture which makes French day to day politics so difficult, if not impossible. The *clarté française* is not ready to compromise with the task of the day. And it is the art of compromise which is the secret of politics.

J. P. MAYER

BOOK REVIEWS

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS. By BERTRAND RUSSELL (*National Book League and Cambridge University Press*. 29 pp. 2s. 6d.)

ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING. By E. F. CARRITT (*Oxford University Press*. 186 pp. 10s.)

PRACTICALLY every one agrees that politically and economically the world is in a nasty mess, and the mess has grown steadily nastier and nastier since 1914. The degeneration can be observed most easily in the world of things and in the society of men: the most savage wars, civil and international; enormous destruction of human life and wealth; persecutions, cruelties, instability, miseries, and want on a gigantic scale. But the degeneration can also be observed inside men's heads and is almost certainly related, both as cause and effect, with the degeneration of their political and economic life. The savage, persecuting, vindictive political ideologies which are produced by the catastrophes of our own age are of the same nature as the savage, persecuting, vindictive religious ideologies which produced and were produced by similar catastrophes in the 17th century.

The books by Bertrand Russell and Mr. Carritt are well worth reading for the light which they throw upon this terrifying contamination of communal psychology. Though they differ considerably in many respects, their resemblance is more remarkable and more important. Both are extraordinarily English in their approach to the science, philosophy, and art of politics and both combine wisdom with a very pretty wit; indeed part of their Anglicanism as philosophers and sociologists consists in their conviction that it is disastrous to be serious all the time about such serious things as philosophy, the state, patriotism, or the proletariat. For if you take Luther's view of religious dogma, or Hegel's of the state, or Marx's of economic determination, or Hitler's of Jews or Germany, or the communist's of capitalists or capitalism, you cannot joke about them, you must be deadly serious all the time—in every sense of the word deadly. The conclusion of Russell's book is summed up in the following sentence:

"I conclude that, in our day as in the time of Locke, empiricist Liberalism (which is not incompatible with *democratic socialism*) is the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who, on the one hand, demands some scientific evidence for his beliefs, and, on the other hand, desires human happiness more than the prevalence of this or that party or creed."

Absolute beliefs and belief in absolutes are more corrupting of human beings and of human society than even absolute power, and scepticism and agnosticism are among the most important ingredients of civilisation, the surest antidotes to the poisons of savagery, persecution and tyranny. Civilization begins only when men say: "I believe, but I may be wrong"; it ends when men say: "I know; I know the truth; I know what you ought to do and it is my mission and duty to see that you do it." In philosophy the empiricist's theory of knowledge is, as Russell puts it, half way between dogma and scepticism. He believes because he must, but he holds that "almost all knowledge is in some degree doubtful." In politics the empiricist will refuse to use every means to attain an end which he thinks good, because he may be mistaken about the end, and he will therefore refrain from inflicting "a comparatively certain present evil for the sake of a

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comparatively doubtful future good"; unlike the dogmatic fanatic, he will be cautious, tolerant, compromising.

Mr. Carritt divides his book into two parts. In the first he considers "ethical thinking", such subjects as morality, rights, obligations; in the second he considers "political thinking" and the relation of ethics to politics. It is a very interesting book. Mr. Carritt argues that a man's obligations to his fellow men can be shown to be beneficence, improvement, and justice. In his application of ethical principles to politics he is essentially an empiricist. One example will show his method; he prefers democracy or majority government to other forms, because it is a "device which we ought to adopt and maintain not for its own sake but for its results, though among the results for which we ought to adopt it is justice."

LEONARD WOOLF.

PERSONALITY IN POLITICS. Studies of Contemporary Statesmen, By SIR ARTHUR SALTER. (*Faber & Faber*. 253 pp. 12s. 6d.)

To treat this very interesting book adequately would require much more space than is available for a reviewer. It has two facets, one extremely entertaining, the other immensely complicated, obscure, but of great historical and social importance. The first is described in the subtitle. Sir Arthur has had, owing to his career, unusual opportunities of studying at close quarters, often intimately as well as at their work, those who, in Britain, America, France, Italy and China, have "at the highest level" been making the unfortunate history of the last half century. The book contains studies of the character, methods, and achievements of nine Britons, six Americans, three Frenchmen, three Chinese, and one Italian. The studies on the surface are what the journalist call sketches, biographical portraits of the kind which A.G.G. years ago made so popular. Sir Arthur is a highly skilful portrait painter; he draws the mind and manners of his sitter with firm strokes and makes the portrait live both by his sympathetic understanding and personal reminiscences. Practically all the portraits are good; particularly interesting are those of Balfour, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, Clemenceau, and Chiang Kai-Shek. We have only one reservation to make here. Sir Arthur records the faults, frailties, and failures of his sitters as he saw them, and the sincerity of his record is not open to question; but the book as a whole leaves one with a feeling that there is something just a little wrong with the general standard of judgment. It is too favourable, too kind, to the actors. If the protagonists of statesmanship were quite as remarkable as Sir Arthur sees them, would the results of their statesmanship be quite so lamentable?

This brings us to the second facet. In a first chapter and a last chapter Sir Arthur considers the relation between the persons who at the seat of power deal with, and appear to control, events and the events themselves, and in all his portraits and studies he has this problem at the back of his mind. How far does this great man really control events or make history? This is a fascinating subject of great importance, and Sir Arthur has many interesting things to say about it. But it would be absurd to attempt to discuss it or his views in a short review.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

FAREWELL TO EUROPEAN HISTORY OR THE CONQUEST OF NIHILISM. By ALFRED WEBER. (Kegan Paul, Ltd. 204 pp. 16s. net.)

THIS is a difficult book to read and understand. But it is worth reading and understanding. It is the work of a German philosopher of history, brother of a famous sociologist and philosopher, Max Weber. The two are in the line of the great German figures of the early 19th century. But there is something in the German mind and expression which makes their thought difficult to translate. German philosophers often appear to aim at profundity by obscurity. They are overwhelmed by their learning. Sentences packed with polysyllabic words and involved parentheses stretch over half a page and leave the reader gasping. The translator of the book has done his work almost too faithfully. He will not omit any of the compound words or any of the parentheses, which may seem natural to a German but not to the English reader.

The book was written during the last phase of the war, when it was clear that Germany must collapse. It is a searching examination of the political causes of that disaster, and an attempt to show how the nihilism, which has resulted from the betrayal of the spiritual principles of European civilisation by Germans, may be overcome. It is Germany, and not the rest of the world, which has bidden farewell to European history. Professor Weber traces with breadth of knowledge the history of Europe, political, social, and cultural, over a thousand years. He picks out the supreme thinkers and creative artists of that period to indicate the development of ideas. Dante and Shakespeare; Leonardo and Michelangelo; Pascal and Rembrandt; and so on. One of his root ideas is that there are transcendental forces beyond the material world, which man must respect if he is to achieve his destiny. These forces are embodied by Shakespeare as fairies and spirits; by Michelangelo in his supreme sculpture and painting; by Rembrandt in "the light that never was on sea or land." It was an essential trouble of the 19th century, the "age of will" and of "the unlimited prestige of science," that the Germans, and to a less extent other peoples, took no heed of these forces; and in the end the daemonic forces of evil broke out and plunged mankind in catastrophe. That significant idea is wrapped up bafflingly at every turn. An example may be found in the account of the tensions between the Church and the State in the Middle Ages:

"All these tensions and polarities between freedom and unfreedom, which with their powerful undercurrents have constantly shaken Europe and characterise her political being, and lastly the yawning disparities between the privileged and the unprivileged ending in conscious revolution—grew out of and flourished on the hot-bed of that original paradoxical antithesis between the homogeneity of straightforward youthful instinct and the schismatic and ascetic tendencies that later supervened."

Or again about the French Revolution:

"What underlay the spiritual ferment that could lead to so tremendous a thing as the French Revolution, with all its consequences for both good and ill, was nothing less than an actual and factual break-through on the part of mankind into a new, deep-lying layer of Transcendence. It was completed and made effective in that intoxication of optimism with its notion of man's perfectibility. But when even the biologist

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to-day defines man, in contrast to animals, as "the life-carrier born to freedom," we should be quite clear by this time that the capacity to use freedom properly, and the way *special to and specific of man* by which this capacity may be reached, are two different things."

The Survey of European history till the 19th century leads on to the kernel of the book, which is an examination of the thought of Nietzsche, for whom the writer has almost unbounded admiration. Yet he recognises that Nietzsche's doctrines of the worship of power and of the superman were the spiritual forerunners of Nazi brutality and bestiality. Nietzsche is "a phenomenon which is more massive and more cloven almost than that of any other great man." But while he exposed the hollowness of the bourgeois society of the 19th century, he sowed the seed for the destruction of the 20th century. "I exult," he wrote, "in the progressive militarisation of Europe and in its inner anarchy: the days of sneaking hypocrisy are numbered." War indeed begins in the mind of man; and Nietzsche's picture of the master-class which should take the place of the servile democracies led on to the unrestrained will to power of Hitler. Weber is almost forthright in his condemnation of the doctrines:

"Of double-crossing, duplicity, defamation and all the Machiavellian 'virtue' so applauded by Nietzsche, down to the depths of swinishness, we have had such a sickener to-day that we hope it will rid us for centuries to come of the notion that we need cultivate evil in order to balance a too cosy life."

He is forthright, too, in his condemnation of the acts of the German people:

"Has the bulk of our thinking youth felt the regime of terror for what it was, or for what every earlier generation in our history would have felt it to be—a disgrace that destroyed our country's dignity? . . . The essence of what has happened since 1933 is not the shattering of old prejudices and their replacement by something more genuine, not the expiry of outworn ideas, which were no longer able to control life in practice, and the emergence of new values that would have done away with them, not the destruction of a dead by a living world—not a bit of it."

When he comes to the remedy for the destructive nihilism of the last generation, his writing attains a certain directness. He expresses an admiration for the Anglo-Saxon peoples who achieved, as he thinks, the government of the masses in freedom, while in Germany the masses, "brutally expropriated of the intimations of transcendence, have become herd-minded and debased." There must be in Germany a reform of education, and a new elite of those who have intellectual integrity, in order to train

"a people that has newly apprehended the transcendental meaning of existence, proud to live for a humanity understood in all its diversity and profundity: to live in 'oneness,' in a freedom grounded in Transcendence but—what has never happened in Germany before—continued into practical life and politics . . . Our business is to talk of man and to think of him as man, and of the individual man in the mass."

His book is written for those who would dedicate themselves to the realisation of a spiritually active elite. "It is presumptuous folly to work to create the super-man; let us first create man."

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In the final chapter he gives examples of intimation of transcendence which may be sought in the physical, biological, and spiritual ideas of the time. Again he becomes so involved in expression that the sense is obscured. But as an analysis of European history and thought, particularly of the German contribution to it, of the disaster which has overtaken Germany and with it European civilisation, and of the way to recovery, the book, in spite of its frequent obscurity of substance and of style, is a serious and a significant contribution.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

ARGENTINA. By NORMAN MACKENZIE. (Gollancz. 136 pp. 6s.)

SPAIN is not the only surviving fascist and pro-nazi country. Mr. MacKenzie regards Argentina as being in a worse plight politically than even that unfortunate country. Yet in winning international recognition, membership of U.N.O., and even relatively friendly association with the democracies, General Peron has succeeded where General Franco failed.

Can it be that our own close trading links with Argentina and our economic needs have blinded us to the detestable nature of a regime with which we maintain friendly relations? This interesting and readable book can be recommended to anyone who is concerned with the conditions in which British foreign and economic policy must operate and with the international political future.

For the dangers are clear. A close watch was kept during the war on the efforts of Spanish propaganda, under Falangist direction and Nazi inspiration, to develop and use "hispanidad" or the sense of community between Spanish-speaking nations as a weapon of attack on the democracies. When the latter were fighting in a life and death struggle, allied with communism, and led by a liberal-minded United States, this had little immediate effect. Division among the victors may give to fascism its opportunity, and this is particularly the case in the states of north and south America. General Peron is described in this book as a "Nazi agent . . . a man who throughout the war acted in the closest association with the Nazi political and military intelligence services and who has consistently protected the efforts of the Nazis to preserve some remnants of their economic power and their ideology." This does not mean that he will subordinate the interests of Argentina, as he sees them, to the interests of Germany or even of Spain; but it is patent where his sympathies lie and that he has applied the Nazi methods to win electoral victory and maintain his power. The ambition to form a South American bloc dominated by Argentina remains. Such a bloc might rapidly become of immense economic and political power. The main prerequisite for its formation is a similar fascist development in other Latin American republics bordering on Argentina. Their own social difficulties combine with Peron's success to favour just such a development.

Nor is it wise to overlook the present Argentine concern with efficient preparation for modern warfare or with the building of a strong economy and a strong industry as its necessary basis. Mr. MacKenzie tells us that more than half Argentine state expenditure goes to her armed forces, a striking condition for a country which can be in no fear of invasion.

It is a pity that the book gives no reference to sources and no bibliography.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

BOOK REVIEWS

JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. By WILLIAM A. ROBSON. Second edition, revised and re-written, 1947. (Stevens 25s.)

TWENTY years ago Mr. W. A. Robson wrote his *Justice and Administrative Law*, a pioneer's exploration of an unmapped country. It estimated the contribution which the law-courts make to society; it described the work of many departmental tribunals and assessed their advantages and disadvantages. In effect the book asked us how judges could be made more administration-minded and how administrators could be made more judicial.

In 1929, a year after Mr. Robson's book appeared, Lord Hewart in *The New Despotism* almost created the impression of claiming that the function of decision was the monopoly of the courts. Was it true, we wondered, that administrative bodies could not be trusted to adjudicate? Forthwith Lord Sankey set up the Committee on Ministers' Powers to answer that question among others. Official committees are not encouraged to wander outside their terms of reference, and here the terms were deliberately limited. It is not the national habit to institute roving investigations into the philosophy of law and government. The committee's conclusions, reflecting that effort of compromise with which so variously selected a body must purchase unanimity, were reassuring to the uncritical. Mr. Robson had been an indispensable witness before the committee, but his views, though mentioned with respect in the report, were not accepted.

Now, twenty years after his first edition, he has published the second. Today there are many more tribunals to describe (he has had added personal experience of the work of some of them) and he has naturally seized the chance to re-argue, in a separate new chapter, his differences with the committee. Some of his questioners were not the least shrewd and waywise administrators of their generation. Whatever we may think of the unusual candour with which he diagnoses their unreceptive hebetude, we can all congratulate an author who, after twenty years of striking changes in public affairs, happily finds so little of his earlier convictions to alter.

Controversialists in this particular field sometimes suffer the affliction of the builders of Babel. What has "administrative law" meant respectively to Sir Albert Dicey, Lord Hewart, Sir Maurice Amos, Dr. C. K. Allen and Mr. W. I. Jennings? "Semi-judicial," remarked Lord Greene in the Plymouth case recently, is an expression "well adapted to mislead" unless the context be watched carefully. "I could wish," said Lord Thankerton in the *Stevenage* case, "that the word 'bias' had been confined to its proper sphere." And, when the meanings of words are agreed, the variety of the phenomena, and of the different blends of fact, law, and policy, will still obstruct classification. Sometimes the department decides at firsthand, sometimes on an appeal. Housing and planning issues might form one group, pensions questions another, and professional standards a third. An unphilosophical Englishman will ask to see specific instances before (if ever) he generalises. He might find some small-scale stuff if he picked a handful of sample jurisdictions out of the Home Office bag. Take Sunday cinemas in rural districts. The 1932 Act requires a local inquiry for ascertaining whether local opinion is for or against. We can imagine the cinema interests organizing one petition for the Ayes to sign, and a minister of religion another for the Noes; the average inhabitant probably takes no side. Thirty people may attend the inquiry, ten to speak and twenty to applaud. The barrister appointed to inquire will probably report "I

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consider that public opinion in the district seems to be in favour." The Home Secretary then frames his order and submits it for the approval of Parliament. Here we see an ideal procedure—facts found by an independent tribunal, executive action taken thereon, and finally parliamentary control. Thus the steam-hammer cracks its nut. Somewhat similar, but with more departmental discretion, are the appeals of dismissed policemen. Unless the Home Secretary thinks the appeal can be decided without oral evidence, he appoints a tribunal (containing the element of police experience) to inquire and report. The notice of appeal, the appellant's documents and the tribunal's report are considered by the Home Secretary who can either dismiss or allow the appeal or vary the penalty. The samples shade off into jurisdictions vital to the individual but mainly executive in pattern, like the authority to approve a chief constable's appointment. We may guess that the local appointing body submits a short list to the Home Secretary and asks if there are any names to which he objects. He presumably gathers his information from his inspectors of constabulary. He must not blackball a candidate capriciously, but there is no open inquiry at which the rejected candidate can confront his detractors.

From these mole-hills it is a long stride to the mountains of the New Towns Act or the Planning Act of 1947, where the local inquiry is just an early stage in the process of decision. There will thereafter be frequent communications and interviews with town clerks or other officials, and Parliament may go so far as to exclude the common-law rule of natural justice, emphasized in the Errington case, that the local inquiry must not be resumed in private, with audience to one party alone. Somehow, we tell ourselves complacently, the thing works. More desperate remedies, like the Administrative Procedure Act adopted by the United States in 1946, might not suit us here. On the whole Mr. Robson can claim that his ideas are being carried out. His worst disappointment is the failure to accept his administrative court of appeal to which he would grant jurisdiction to revise the decisions even of 'domestic tribunals'—for instance, the expulsion of a member from a social club. Jeremy Bentham, we remember, wanted a system of "several administrative and virtually judicial tribunals," and thought of allowing an appeal to the Prime Minister as umpire. Mr. Robson's scheme has better prospects, especially if the competence and integrity of our civil service should fall away. In words which did not appear in his first edition he warns us of the dangers of using "low-grade personnel appointed from outside the civil service on the cheap."

His volume, as might be expected, is a vigorous study of an important subject, covering far more than this review has managed to suggest. Readers may not always agree with Mr. Robson, but they cannot afford to neglect him.

CECIL CARR.

COAL. By D. R. GRENFELL, M.P. (Gollancz 8s. 6d.)

THIS book by the former Secretary for Mines (wrongly described on the dust cover as Secretary of State) runs to 202 pages of print, of which 111 consist of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, and 24 of other Appendices and diagrams not referred to in the general body of the book, leaving 67 pages of text as the effective content, deemed, apparently, by the

BOOK REVIEWS

publishers to warrant a price of 8s. 6d. Unfortunately the high price set upon these few pages is far from justified by the value of their contents. The book claims to examine the defects from which mining has suffered and to advance proposals for remedying them. In fact it does nothing of the kind. It preeminently lacks any of the planning which Mr. Grenfell points to as so essential in mining, and consists of little more than a series of very imperfectly related snippets of more or (often) less accurate information and statistics about coal, coal-mining and coal miners, from which one gathers that there is a lot of coal in the world, that coal is very fine stuff for which no alternative is in sight, that research is a "good thing," and that conditions of work must be greatly improved if the industry is to be made an attractive one. On the technical side little is said about the recommendations of the Reid Report, though one seems to detect an undertone of disagreement with them. A few thought-saving suggestions, such as underground gasification, have been stirred into the mixture.

Mr. Grenfell's working places in the mine, in Parliament and elsewhere have provided rich reserves of material from which he might well produce an interesting human document. It is a pity that he should have elected, instead, to tackle a subject in which it would require more ability to organise, handle, and analyse the vast reserves of material available, and more appreciation of the psychological and technical problems of the coal industry, than he appears to possess.

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JONATHAN CAPE

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

MINORITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD. By A. H. HOURANI. (*Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press.* 10s. 6d.)

MR. HOURANI has supplemented his admirable study of Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate by an exceedingly useful survey of the innumerable minorities of the Arab Middle East. Defining a minority as a community possessing legal nationality but differing from the prevailing majority either in religion (i.e., not Sunni Moslem), or in language (i.e., non Arabic speaking), or in both, he distinguishes 43 such, mostly religious (including Protestants as one), amounting to some 26% of the total population. After explaining with great clearness how they differ from the dominant community and from one another, he discusses their past and present status and circumstances, and speculates briefly about the probable future evolution of the problem.

The problem is the intense feeling of separateness of those communities, their frequent lack of any consciousness of loyalty to the governments under whose control they happen to be, and their tendency in the past to look for foreign western aid. Hence the reluctance of the governments concerned to grant them the wide autonomy which they usually claim, as a matter of right rather than sufferance. Mr. Hourani rightly remarks that many of them tend to forget that majorities also have their rights.

Most of these minorities, as a matter of fact, already enjoy considerable freedom. The Turks, under whom all of them lived until 1919, granted to every religious community the right to control its members in matters of property, marriage and divorce according to its own ecclesiastical laws; and little attempt was made to impose the Turkish language and education. Hence an astounding variety of schools, producing, often in the same family, children with very different cultural backgrounds. This diversity the Turks encouraged, the unity of their subjects being the last thing they desired, and after the first world war the Mandatory powers left the system unchanged. But the newly-independent Arab states hesitate as to the degree of integration which can be enforced, while the minorities, now deprived of foreign help, hesitate as to the degree of assimilation which they can accept without losing their identity.

It is, of course, the entanglement of nationalism with religion that is the main trouble, each cutting across and exacerbating the other. Until events show which of these two forces will be ultimately the stronger, speculation about the future is futile, and Mr. Hourani wisely concludes that "the sense that anything may happen" is at present the prevailing feeling.

One or two minor points may be raised. On pp. 13 and 14 occur two contradictory statements about Lebanon; the latter is the correct one, to the effect that no group there has an absolute majority, neither Sunni Moslem nor Maronite Christian. As regards French influence in that country, it is clear, two years after Mr. Hourani wrote, that, however weak it may now be politically, it is far from dead culturally. Finally may we observe that half a guinea is a great deal for a book of 140 pages, excellent as it may be in itself?

R. H. SOLTAU.

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SALARIES AND CONDITIONS OF WORK OF SOCIAL WORKERS. A Report by a Joint Committee under the Chairmanship of T. S. Simey. (*National Council of Social Service*. 86 pp. 2s. 6d.)

THIS important report is the work of a very strong Committee whose members have a wide experience of social work both voluntary and statutory. Great weight must therefore be attached to its recommendations. The essential facts had already been revealed in the report prepared by Miss Younghusband for the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust and published earlier in the year, and there is no serious disagreement about them. Miss Younghusband's enquiry was directed primarily to the question of training and Professor Simey's Committee was mainly concerned with salaries, but the two problems are obviously related. Low salaries are an obstacle to improved (and more expensive) training, while inadequate training is an obstacle to higher salaries. This vicious circle is not, however, entirely unbreakable as is shown by the fact that both training and salaries have improved in recent years. Nevertheless the situation that the Simey Report seeks to remedy is serious enough.

The major difficulty is not so much to secure respectable starting salaries for social workers, though these are undoubtedly still too low, but rather to provide for adequate increments which are not dependent on promotion into one of the very few supervisory or administrative posts. Social work is a personal service for which talent and skill are required in the ranks and cannot be concentrated in an officer class. The finest qualities may be best employed in the humblest posts, and they deserve to be rewarded. Nevertheless there may be room for some reorganisation of the hierarchy with a view to extending the influence of the most talented and improving the service rendered by the less gifted, and the Committee might perhaps have given more attention to this problem.

An analysis of the salaries of over 500 workers of all ages in various fields shows that 69% receive less than £300 a year and only 5% more than £500. The Committee recommends that the minimum starting salary should be £300 and that an experienced worker (without administrative responsibilities) should get from £350 to £450. In addition it proposes that dependants' allowances and pensions, already provided to some extent, should be general. Particulars are given of the Pension Fund started by the National Council of Social Service last year.

These demands are modest enough, and yet the voluntary organisations are not in a position to meet them. Nor is the situation likely to get better. With the spread of the statutory services and in conditions of full employment there may well be a decrease in voluntary contributions and also in the supply of voluntary workers. To meet these difficulties the Committee proposes more grants to students in training, more subsidies out of public money to voluntary agencies, and, if necessary, a curtailment of the work of voluntary agencies sufficient to bring their expenditure within the limits of their income. It recognises that a tightening of control must accompany these measures, and makes two suggestions—first, that a Permanent Joint Committee representing the National Council of Social Service, the British Federation of Social Workers, and the Joint University Council for Social Studies and Public Administration should establish suitable salary scales, and secondly that public authorities should make their grants "conditional

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on the voluntary agencies following a sound policy of recruitment and training and adopting satisfactory scales of remuneration."

The truth is that the major voluntary agencies are now semi-public bodies whose work is essential to the fulfilment of state policy. They must be organised and supported accordingly. But it follows that they are only semi-voluntary, and it may need more than a mere declaration of faith to keep alive that "voluntary spirit" to which the Committee attaches great importance. That the most powerful national organisations should combine in an effort to win for social workers full professional status and adequate salaries is in every way an admirable thing, but it is important that centralisation and uniformity should not be carried too far. Room must be left for experiment and variety, for it is here that the voluntary principle can operate most freely. No doubt the Committee would agree, but it does not precisely examine the applicability of all its proposals to cases of this kind, and there are one or two passages in the Report which have a faintly imperialist flavour. This may merely reflect the impossibility of avoiding demarcation disputes when discussing social work. But whatever definition is adopted, the field covered is bound to include a great variety of services and of individual jobs. The Committee has set out the facts service by service, but its arguments and recommendations are couched in general terms. This is in accordance with its terms of reference. Its task was to explain the nature and magnitude of the problem and to devise machinery for the improvement of salaries and working conditions. It has fulfilled this task, and the ground is prepared for more detailed discussion. It is to be hoped that this will include some systematic "job analysis", for without this a thorough overhaul of training, salaries, and organisation will hardly be possible.

T. H. MARSHALL.

ITALY. By ELISABETH WISKEMANN. (Oxford University Press. 150 pp. 5s.)

ITALY since the war has been too much neglected in this country. The storm centres of Europe have been elsewhere. But the emphasis is now shifting. Since the formation of the Cominform, with the Italian Communist Party as a foundation member, it has become clear that Italy shares with France the uncomfortable honour of being the arena where the struggle between extreme left and right is at its most intense. The struggle in Italy is not yet so intense as in France, because the Italian right has not yet found its de Gaulle. But the present violent strike tactics of the communists, together with the tragic weakening of the Socialists through the Nenni-Saragat split, must lead sooner or later to the emergence of an extreme right-wing "strong-arm" movement. The moderate Christian-Democratic government of de Gasperi can not long survive under such conditions. The situation bears an alarming resemblance to the chaotic days of pre-fascist Italy. If it is true that the situation brings forth the man, then Italy may well be due for a neo-fascist revival.

The publication of Elisabeth Wiskemann's short history of Italy is therefore very timely, since in a short space it provides a reliable guide to present-day Italy. It is a brave attempt at an almost impossible task: to contain the history and spirit of Italy in 150 pages. Miss Wiskemann

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contrives to condense all the essential history of the pre-fascist parliamentary monarchy, and of the fascist regime itself; without knowledge of this history an understanding of Italy to-day is impossible. A great lover of Italy for many years, she nevertheless sees her subject clearly, though with deep sympathy. It is this personal, yet critical approach which lends the book its chief asset: the presentation of the people of Italy in all their diversity. Her book is never just history: it is throughout the story of the Italian people, the people of whom Paolo Monelli wrote (quoted by Miss Wiskemann):

"The Italians have certain qualities in common—among others *gentilezza*, a word which can be translated into no other language—sobriety, compassion, realism, a sense of property and of personal rights, of equity, of logic, and we have above all an equilibrium of the emotions which causes us to emerge quickly from anger or despair, from folly or joy. These are the qualities which degenerate into excess in individuals or classes of people suddenly divorced from their natural environment, or in a large part of our people in certain periods of suffering and distress. The *gentilezza* degenerates into softness and servility, patience into cowardice, realism into dishonesty, the sense of property into avarice and jealousy, the balanced emotions into scepticism or inertia; our imaginativeness makes us into liars, our artistic proclivities into buffoons and windbags, our vitality makes us tragically obsessed by sensuality."

Unfortunately, the Italians are now living in times of suffering and distress. The years of fascism were succeeded by the deep disillusionment that followed the fall of Mussolini, when the Allies failed to trust the Italian resistance movement, into which the Italians threw themselves with great courage and abandon. Few people in this country have any idea of the magnitude and achievements of this second "risorgimento," because it happened at a time when all our attention and emotions were inevitably and naturally directed towards the German war. Miss Wiskemann's full and moving account of those exciting days can do much to dispel our ignorance, but it cannot touch the Italian disillusionment which followed. To this disillusionment was added some bitterness, when the terms of the Peace Treaty became known, terms which Italians of all parties feel to be unjustifiably harsh. And now, in 1947, the Italians are faced once more with the instability and weakness of their parliamentary democracy, powerless, as it seems, to check black markets and corruption. The wheel has come full circle to 1920. No wonder that the tendency, noted by Monelli, of their many fine qualities to degenerate in times of distress is made manifest once more. In such circumstances, the Italians are only too likely to turn to a communist dictatorship, or, probably more likely, to turn once more to a fascist type of government, promising order, efficiency and national greatness.

One of the weaknesses of this otherwise comprehensive book is its failure to analyse the economic causes of most of the present Italian difficulties. The widespread black market, the administrative corruption, and the ever rising prices all spring from the present acute shortage of food, coal, and raw materials of all kinds. Italy was almost the last country in the world that should have been subjected to the absurd unrealistic autarkic policy of Mussolini. The effects of that policy are still apparent: they are now aggravated by the world shortage of coal and food. The result is the

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appalling economic plight of Italy, which has now earned her a first preference in the American interim foreign aid scheme.

It is perhaps too much to expect that this short study should add the economic scene to the historical, cultural, and political, but without it the picture is not complete. However, the economic aspect has recently been covered with clarity and vigour by Ivor Thomas, in his *Problem of Italy: an Economic Survey*: in compensation, Miss Wiskemann's book includes much on the political and cultural side, that has not been so well done since the war.

ANNE WHYTE.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN PEACE AND WAR: SOME REFLECTIONS ON OBJECTIVES AND MECHANISMS. By LIONEL ROBBINS. Macmillan, 3s. 6d.

THIS very little book—there are only 86 loosely printed pages of it—is in the nature of a confession of faith. What Professor Robbins is attempting to do is to re-state his economic attitude in the light of his wartime experience as a temporary Civil Servant largely concerned with government control and planning of economic affairs. The effect of this experience has been substantially to modify his pre-war vehemence on the side of unregulated private enterprise but not to cause him fundamentally to shift his ground. He has no doubt that war controls were necessary or that the state in wartime must, under modern conditions of warfare, take full command of all the national resources, including the national manpower; but his strong propensity to favour private enterprise leads him to devote a considerable part of his space to developing this somewhat obvious point, and even to appear at one stage to take seriously the notion of conducting war under the institutions of the free market. Having demolished this 'Aunt Sally,' Professor Robbins proceeds to consider the very real difference between control and planning in wartime, when the ends are from the standpoint of planners essentially non-economic and given, and similar control in time of peace, when there is no corresponding agreement about objectives. He rightly concludes that, in time of peace, the purpose of the economic system must be broadly that of satisfying the consumers' desires, but he is much more willing than he used to be to admit that these desires cannot be simply taken as given and that the state must set out to influence them by regulating the distribution of income in the community. He continues, however, to believe that the correct instrument for this regulation is the tax system, and to object to any sort of planning which involves substituting for the consumers' actual desires, as modified by adjustments in the distribution of income, decisions of the planners about people's needs or what they *ought* to want—at any rate where this goes beyond the realm of collective goods such as education and health services. He discusses briefly the proposals put forward by Lerner and others for a planned market economy, using consumers' offers as the basis for its decisions about production; but he is suspicious of this, mainly on grounds of the large element of bureaucracy which he thinks likely to be involved. He comes down finally, for peace-time, on the side of a mainly unplanned market economy; but there is a pleasant change in his latest exposition of his views from the harsh dogmatism of his earlier writings.

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THE GOLD STANDARD IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By R. G. HAWTREY.
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THE first edition of this well-known book consisted of the four lectures which Mr. Hawtreay delivered to the Institute of Bankers in 1926 shortly after the restoration of the gold standard. It was twice reprinted in the crisis year of 1931. In 1939 Mr. Hawtreay revised it in a new edition, making it more of a whole and more suitable for the general reader. The present is the fifth edition, brought up-to-date, principally by an account and criticism of the Bretton Woods plan. The great objection to the plan, in Mr. Hawtreay's view, is its failure to provide any safeguard against unlimited monetary expansion. The book is invaluable to any one who wishes to understand the many intricate problems connected with a monetary standard.

CONSTITUTION, ELECTORAL LAWS, TREATIES OF STATES IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. By HELEN MILLER DAVIS. (Duke University and Cambridge Press. 446 pp. 27s. 6d.)

This is a very useful book for the advanced student of politics, since it contains material not easily obtainable elsewhere. The countries covered in the first part are Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Turkey. For each is given the law or instrument establishing the constitution, while in some cases treaties or other documents relevant to the constitution are added, e.g., the treaty of alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq of June 30, 1930. The second part contains multilateral treaties and agreements, e.g., the Pact of the League of Arab States of March 22, 1945.

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1947. Edited by G. W. KEETON AND GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. (Stevenson. 344 pp. 20s.)

This is a new annual sponsored by the London Institute of World Affairs. It contains twelve papers, ranging over a wide field of international politics and economics. The authors are authorities and the standard remarkably high, as one would expect from the editors. One of the best papers in the volume is on Permanent Features of Soviet Foreign Policy by Dr. W. Gurian. Professor Keeton's article on Nationalism in Eastern Asia deserves study by any one concerned with the impending "settlement" of eastern Asia. International Law and Society by Dr. Schwarzenberger and The Future of International Economic Institutions by Professor A. G. B. Fisher are also particularly interesting.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE—AN EXPERIMENT. By H. G. SCHENK. (Kegan Paul. 228 pp. 10s.)

Dr. Schenk, who is a lecturer in history at Oxford University, has produced an extremely scholarly and valuable work which throws new light directly upon the past and by reflection upon the present. His learning is immense and only occasionally does he yield to the Germanic tendency to allow it to dominate the author and the book. We are passing to-day through the same kind of after-effects—though intensified—of a great war which Europeans had to struggle through between 1815 and 1825. Dr. Schenk's book is a study of the political and economic problems and troubles of the earlier period. In Parts I and II he is concerned with the origins of the Holy Alliance and the working of the Concert of Europe, the political instruments

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by which our ancestors attempted to stabilize the new order. Part II however, which is the best part of the book, is much more than a study of the political machinery, for it contains a brilliant analysis of the social and economic condition of the principal European countries. Part III, which is the least satisfactory portion of the work, traces the dissolution of the Concert.

DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINIONS. By ALEXANDER BRADY. (*Canadian & Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press.* 475 pp. 21s.)

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH & WORLD SOCIETY. PROCEEDINGS OF THIRD UNOFFICIAL CONFERENCE RELATIONS, 1945. (*Royal Institute of International Affairs & Oxford University Press.* 204 pp. 15s.)

Students of the British Commonwealth and its problems owe a debt of gratitude to the Royal Institute for the preparation and publication of these two books. The first is a comparative study of the political institutions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. But it is something more than that, for the political machinery is studied in relation to the background of geography, race, economics, etc. It is a book well worth close study. So is the second volume. It contains a summary of the discussions held at the third conference on Commonwealth relations which met under the auspices of the Institute. The subjects discussed included security, economic problems, migration, colonies, and racial problems. The calibre of the conference can best be shown by the fact that among the British delegates were Mr. Creech Jones, Lord Hailey, Mr. John Coatman, Sir Walter Layton, Mr. Lionel Curtis, Sir Frederick Whyte, and Professor Allan Fisher.

COMES THE RECKONING. By SIR ROBERT BRUCE LOCKHART. (*Putnam.* 384 pp. 18s.)

OLD DIPLOMACY. THE REMINISCENCES OF LORD HARDINGE OF PENSHURST. (*Murray.* 288 pp. 18s.)

These two books may be read for entertainment or for the light which they throw upon the Foreign Office, the art and practice of diplomacy, and the history of the last 67 years. Both authors began their careers in the Foreign Office. Sir Robert is a K.C.M.G., though he does not announce the fact upon the title-page of his book; on the title-page of Lord Hardinge's book there appears the following letters after his name: "K.G., P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., LL.D." The difference is not unimportant. Lord Hardinge, who entered the Foreign Office in 1880 and whose reminiscences go down to the year 1924, was probably the most successful British diplomatist of his generation. He belonged to the old school and conformed to its traditions; his book, though interesting and informative, is, as one would expect, urbane and discreet. It deals with his diplomatic career only, and a further volume will deal with his experiences as Viceroy. Sir Robert belongs to a much later school; he is a rebel against much of the Foreign Office tradition and something of a stormy petrel. He left it after the first war and returned to it during the second and became in time Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive. He is a natural raconteur and has refined his natural gift by a good deal of art. His book is therefore extremely entertaining, but the historian will find that it throws much light—often rather surprising—upon events and the persons, great and small, who dealt with those events during the war.

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THE year 1948 finds the United States confronted with the international problems which are shared in greater or less degree by all nations of the Western world and numerous domestic matters which may or may not be peculiar to it. And serving as a sort of backdrop for most of these there is the presidential election which during the early months of the year is in the preliminary and behind-the-scenes stage but will come into the limelight when the national party conventions convene in June and July and the campaigns get under way shortly thereafter.

Unlike the corresponding period after the first world war the international and domestic situations now share the scene fairly evenly in the United States. There are, of course, very sizeable elements in the population which display primary interest in purely local problems and there are others which concentrate on international matters to the exclusion of domestic problems. But Americans in general, whether they like it or not, are now reasonably alert to the necessities of the world and agree irrespective of political complexion that careful attention must be given to various international matters.

The past year has seen the fear of the Soviet Union mount rapidly, until in the opinion of many responsible persons it has attained alarming proportions. Most serious-minded Americans do not believe that the U.S.S.R. desires war, at least during the immediate future, and there is slight indication of anything like a war spirit among the 145 million people of the United States. Nevertheless, the fear of an open outbreak of war, perhaps as a result of some unforeseen incident, seems to some observers to have reached an almost hysterical stage. It is difficult to put one's fingers on the exact causes of such a striking phenomenon. The record of the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations, the news coming from the satellite countries of Eastern Europe, the oft-repeated jeremiads delivered against the United States by Molotov and Vishinsky, the organization of the Cominform, the activities of the Communists in France and Italy, all doubtless enter into the picture, but they do not seem to account entirely for the violence of the fear.

It might be supposed that the impact of the atom bomb has been so great that many Americans have developed an almost paralyzing fear of war in the abstract and looking about for a

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possible foe see in the Soviet Union the sole possibility. But despite the dire predictions coming from former Ambassador Bullitt and others, there has been little or nothing done toward constructing underground cities or moving from urban places to the less exposed rural areas. Indeed the census estimates indicate that the population growth of the cities is probably at a higher stage at present than it was a decade ago.

The deep-seated fear of the U.S.S.R. has had many manifestations. The report of the President's Air Policy Commission, the renewed plea for universal military training, the proposals looking toward the assembling of vast stockpiles of metals, raw rubber, and various other materials essential for war, and last not least the Marshall Plan E.R.P. are all to a considerable extent tied up with the Russian phobia.

While it might be reassuring to consider the Marshall Plan the exclusive result of an impressive long-range view of the future or the manifestation of a deep spirit of humanitarianism on the part of the American people, it would not be realistic to omit the rôle of the Soviet Union in this connection. That is not to say that the humanitarian angle is entirely lacking, for there are considerable numbers of Americans who regard the welfare of other peoples as outstanding in importance. There are many business men who look at the E.R.P. as a device for keeping the world economy on a fairly even keel, and there are doubtless some who regard it as a means of promoting markets abroad for American goods and farm products. But there are also a good many members of Congress and large numbers of citizens who are so much individualists, so absorbed in their own personal plans and problems, that they fail to see that the United States has any degree of responsibility for what other countries may be unfortunate enough to suffer. Nevertheless, even these have been aroused by the reports brought back by congressmen who studied the European situation at first hand during the past summer and autumn, and by the dire warnings of Secretary Marshall, Secretary Forrestal, Mr. Dulles, and others that the protection of the United States against the Soviet Union depends in the last analysis largely on keeping Western Europe from economic collapse. And they have moreover reluctantly concluded that this calls for financial assistance from the United States.

Though the State Department followed a course of advising participants in the E.R.P. to scale down their estimates of essential needs prior to President Truman's presentation of

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formal recommendations, it has recently taken a firm stand against cuts by Congress, insisting that every penny of the amounts named must be authorized. With the Republican Congress and the Democratic President manœuvring for the upper hand, such a policy on the part of the State Department has been severely criticized in some quarters. Indeed it has been interpreted as an example of military techniques mistakenly applied to the political field and even as something of an insult to Congress. Congress has the responsibility for the purse under the laws of the United States and only Congress can decide when to spend, the objects of expenditure, and the specific amounts required for various items. Yet despite this firmly established prerogative, here come the Secretary of State and others to tell Congress that President Truman's recommendations must be taken without change. Certain Republicans apparently favour making a partisan issue out of the E.R.P., but thus far there appears to be little organized opposition to the Marshall Plan as a basic principle. The statement on the part of former President Hoover came as a surprise to many and gave comfort to those who advocate a drastic cut in the amount to be appropriated for the E.R.P., but it has thus far apparently had less practical effect than might be expected. The opposition to the E.R.P. remains scattered, but at the same time the reaction to the psychology displayed by the State Department and the attitude of independence on the part of Congress seem to point in the direction of some reduction in the amounts to be authorized, at least for expenditure during the first year.

Suggesting the title of a current Broadway hit "Strange Bedfellows," the Progressive Citizens of America and Henry A. Wallace, despite their general antipathy to the Republicans, have joined die-hard isolationists among the Republicans in opposing the Marshall Plan. Among the 74 resolutions recently voted by the Progressive Citizens of America in backing Wallace for President, and setting the wheels of a third party moving, was one taking a position of categorical opposition to the E.R.P. The P.C.A. are not, of course, hostile to American assistance to foreign countries, but they favour a programme to be administered by the United Nations and applicable to all nations in the world. They regard the E.R.P. as intended to isolate the Soviet Union and therefore as likely to promote war. It is too early to determine the influence of the Wallace group in the final action on the Marshall Plan. If it should develop that the

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fight in Congress is long drawn-out and very close in result, it is possible that the Wallace influence would be sufficient to swing the determining votes, but it would be a very bitter pill for the Republicans to swallow. At this stage (February, 1948) it seems likely that the impact of the P.C.A. and Wallace will be negligible as far as the E.R.P. is concerned.

Turning to the domestic side of the picture, one may note the fading of some issues that were highlighted a year ago and the increased focus on others. The labour debate which raged so sharply a year ago has largely subsided. There is considerable difference of opinion as to the Taft-Hartley Act, with few maintaining that it is all that it might be. Nevertheless, labour troubles have been less evident than for some time and the days lost as a result of strikes are now greatly reduced over a year ago, though there are predictions of a new outbreak. The most insistent domestic problem which was far less in the limelight a year ago is that of commodity prices and the cost of living.

According to the Federal Bureau of Labour Statistics, retail prices on January 15, 1948, stood 71 per cent. above the level of August, 1939, 27 per cent. above June, 1946, and 13 per cent. above June, 1920. Food prices in January, 1948, were actually 110 per cent. higher than the 1935-39 average. While farmers and industrial workers still enjoy greater purchasing power than in 1939, the plight of the white collar worker, the professional classes for the most part, and those with fixed incomes is serious. The President's Council of Economic Advisors, the Federal Reserve Board, and many private individuals have warned of the great danger involved in spiraling prices.

In the special session of Congress called in November, 1947, President Truman asked for a resumption of certain war-time controls, but Congress displayed slight enthusiasm toward the request. The action which it finally took was so weak as to be hardly worth the effort. The truth is that the Republican majority in Congress feels that it would be politically expedient to saddle the onus of high prices on the President and the Democrats. President Truman, facing an election, naturally has no desire to assume such a liability and attempts to shift the burden to Congress. Under these circumstances any decisive action this year seems highly problematical.

The policy of President Truman and his associates looking towards a very high national income and full employment

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seems to depend more or less on keeping the level of prices high. There is a feeling in many quarters that any substantial reduction in prices would bring a recession and possibly a major economic depression, with widespread unemployment and many business failures. The national debt of more than £62,500 million, and the heavy interest charges which run to more than £1,250 million per year are such as to require large sums of federal revenue. Moreover, the heavy expenses for national defence, foreign assistance, and various elaborate domestic programmes are related in no small measure to high levels of federal revenue. And large federal revenues depend upon an inflated national income or a sharp increase in the already heavy income tax rates.

The break in the grain and livestock prices which started in late January of 1948 has been accompanied by confusion in the stock market and some fall in general commodity prices. The impact of sharply falling grain prices on the general level of retail prices has thus far been slight and announcements are made almost daily to the effect that clothing and other important items will be even more expensive this spring. The significance of the drop in grain, livestock, and corporate stocks has been variously interpreted. Some profess to see very little long-term meaning, maintaining that the decline is purely temporary. Others see at least the beginning of a far-reaching price adjustment. Some welcome the development, while others view it as the indication of a major economic collapse. There is a feeling in some quarters that it may help the Marshall Plan by removing the fear of further inflation caused by purchases in the United States made under such a programme. With few exceptions those who comment on the price break, which in the case of grain is the sharpest ever recorded by the Chicago Board of Trade, do so with caution, noting that neither the basic causes nor the full significance are clear at this time.

Closely related to the general problem of prices is the meat supply. Meat prices have risen more sharply than most other commodities, and it has been estimated that an industrial worker may spend as much as six weeks out of a year earning enough to purchase the annual supply of meat for his family. For some months there have been predictions of a serious meat shortage which would become widely apparent in 1948 and which would in all probability drive meat prices still higher. Even within the Republican ranks in Congress there has been a group led by Senator Flanders which is pushing for legislation

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which would authorize meat rationing if the situation becomes sufficiently serious and in the meantime would provide for the printing of ration books and other preparations which would be required for the application of such a system. Congress remains highly sensitive to the suggestion of a return to war-time controls, and it is doubtful whether any steps in preparing for meat rationing will be taken, particularly when the meat packers oppose, maintaining that rationing would merely have the effect of driving the existing supplies into the black market. Public opinion in the meantime remains largely dormant on the matter, perhaps because of more pressing matters which are to the fore and also because the estimates of the Department of Agriculture have proved on various previous occasions to be inaccurate. Nevertheless, a serious meat shortage in a country whose people are as meat hungry as the United States would have important consequences in a presidential election year.

Despite the phobia which seems to attach in official circles to any and all sorts of price control, the pressure has been such that Congress has never dared to dispense entirely with controls on rent. When other price control measures lapsed, temporary extension was provided for rent control and this has been renewed periodically. The real estate interests have been most active in pushing for the abandonment of any limitations on the rentals which may be charged, maintaining that there would actually be slight increases and that the present controls are responsible for the present housing shortage because they encourage a wasteful use of space. However, the experience in certain areas where rent control does not apply, hardly bears out the assertion that the removal of official regulations would have little effect on rental levels. Organized labour and other elements of the population believe very strongly that a return to unregulated rental charges would mean a serious increase in the general cost of living and they have thus far been able to bring sufficient pressure on Congress to prevent the decontrol of rents despite the Republican distrust of such legislation.

Whether the people are deeply stirred up over the present rates of federal income taxes may be a question. Some of the public opinion polls seem to indicate that the majority sentiment favours a reduction in the national debt rather than tax favours. But irrespective of the popular reaction there is and indeed has been in Congress for some time, a vociferous element which has regarded tax reduction as more important than anything

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else. The chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Representatives since coming to his present position more than a year ago has apparently had no other major concern than personal income tax reduction. The corporate income tax rate was cut substantially two years ago and the Republicans now feel that their basic reputation depends in large measure on cutting the personal income tax rate.

Bills providing for such reduction were passed twice last year, but in both cases vetoed successfully by the President. But with an election year at hand even the President in his 1948 messages to Congress has taken a stand in favour of some change in personal income tax burdens, though he insists that the loss in revenue should be made up by an increase in corporation income tax rates because of the need for large federal revenues and the inflationary effects of a general reduction in taxes. The proposals made by the President would take some millions of small taxpayers off the rolls entirely, and would give a \$40 cost of living allowance to every taxpayer and to each of his dependents. The Republicans originally favoured a straight twenty per cent cut across the board which would, of course, have saved large taxpayers many thousands of dollars but small tax payers relatively little. However, the influence of public opinion has apparently caused the Republicans to modify their position so as to weight the proposed cuts more heavily in favour of the little man, though they profess to consider the presidential plan as unworthy of consideration. There is little question that some action will be taken by Congress so as to make a show of cutting the tax load, but whether the President will approve such action and if not whether Congress can pass such a bill over the veto are matters for speculation.

The presidential election has thus far seemed rather vague in outline. There is naturally little activity among the Democrats since the nomination of President Truman is taken for granted. However, the Democrats do have a new national chairman and propose to change the rules regulating delegates to the national convention by giving a bonus of four seats to those states which have given loyal support to the Democratic ticket in recent elections—thus yielding in some degree to the demands of the Solid South for greater recognition. On the Republican side there has been less activity despite the unusually early planning for the holding of the national convention at Philadelphia in June. Various reasons have been advanced for the slow development of definiteness on the Republican side,

but perhaps most frequently mentioned has been the question of whether General Eisenhower would be a candidate.

In the public opinion polls General Eisenhower has displayed impressive strength in contrast to the other Republican hopefuls: Dewey, Taft, and Stassen. Indeed, he has been the only Republican possibility to exceed Truman in strength. Republican leaders have professed to regard the public opinion poll results as relatively inconsequential, but some of this has obviously been of the whistling-in-the-dark variety. Nevertheless, there is apparently a considerable feeling that the Republicans can capture the presidency despite the apparent preference of the American public for Truman rather than Dewey, Taft, or Stassen.

The letter written by General Eisenhower to supporters, in which he stated that he was not a candidate and could not accept nomination were it to be tendered, has naturally received front-page publicity throughout the country. His statements that the military should remain subordinate to the civil and that his background would not constitute the needed experience which a President should possess have been highly praised. And both the Democrats and the Republicans seem relieved to have General Eisenhower out of the picture. In the case of the former such an attitude is perfectly understandable; in the case of the Republicans it is a little startling, for it suggests a preference for defeat unless a Republican "regular" can be elected President, or at the very least the willingness to take a considerable gamble on the outcome. At any rate the elimination of General Eisenhower has had the effect of clarifying the Republican part of the scene and bringing about more of the usual election year pre-convention activity.

The announcement by Henry Wallace that he would be a candidate for the presidency received wide publicity despite the fact that there had been rumours to that effect for some time. But various pressures had undoubtedly been put on Wallace by his former political associates, and there was always a feeling on the part of some that he would not actually run. That attitude is still to be found in some quarters since Mr. Wallace apparently left the door open to withdrawal during the summer by stating that he had made his decision on the basis of the Truman record.

The entry of Wallace into the race has stirred up diverse emotions. The Republicans in general have professed distinct jubilation and probably have been genuinely delighted at the

announcement. The Democrats have frequently declared that the Wallace candidacy made little difference to them, and some of them may actually see little diminution of Democratic chances as a result of his candidacy, but there is little doubt that many Democrats view the situation with varying degrees of alarm. Wallace votes will not come from Republican circles in large numbers and they may not come from old-line Democrats either. But they are likely to come from groups that have been supporting the Democrats during recent years.

The Progressive Citizens of America, the Wallace organization, is still manoeuvring for position, though it held a national conference in Chicago in January and drafted a platform containing 74 points. Already it is apparent that it is not going to receive some of the support which it hoped to have. The Congress of Industrial Organizations has recorded a decisive vote of 33 to 11 on the part of its executive board against supporting Wallace, while the corresponding board of the American Federation of Labour has turned Wallace down by unanimous vote. The Railroad Brotherhoods have refused to support Wallace also, thus throwing the major labour organizations without exception in opposition. The American Labour Party which is active in New York will be a Wallace backer, but it will lose many of its members. The important Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, for example, has already pulled out of the American Labour Party as a result of the Wallace candidacy.

Even the most ardent supporters of Wallace do not maintain that he can be elected, but they apparently feel that their cause is a worthwhile one because of the influence which they may have in swinging the election. In the public opinion polls Wallace has been drawing from five to ten per cent. of the support, which could not conceivably give him even a fighting chance of election. Among the farmers he might be supposed to have distinct popularity because of his able record as Secretary of Agriculture under Franklin D. Roosevelt, but the polls show that his popularity among farmers is actually less than his following in the general voting population. Outside of the South, Wallace has received 7 per cent. of the farm support, but in the Southern states he has a much smaller following. Among Veterans the Wallace strength goes to 10 per cent.

The significance of the Wallace candidacy is related to the influence of a few so-called "pivotal" states in electing a President. New York State, for example, has almost one-tenth

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of the total 531 electoral votes and in a close election might have a great deal to do with determining the winner. The Republican and Democratic strength is fairly evenly divided in New York State, with the independent vote decisive. The independent vote has ordinarily gone to the Democrats in recent presidential elections and its shift in any large measure to Wallace might well mean a Republican victory in that state which in turn might possibly determine the national outcome. And Wallace's strength in New York is placed as high as 15 per cent. of the entire vote. In the South and in the strongly Republican states of the North the Wallace candidacy will, of course, be of no practical importance, though even in these states it may result in adding to the bitterness with which extreme left-wingers are being increasingly regarded.

A good many thoughtful persons regret the Wallace move on two grounds. In the first place, it may have an important bearing on a realignment of voters in the political party system. At present neither party has sufficient uniformity to enable it to take a decisive stand on important issues. Especially is this true in the case of the Democratic Party which includes in its membership the reactionaries of the South, the middle-of-the-road Democrats of all sections, and the New Dealers and other left-wing groups. A strong third party would seem to offer a good many advantages to the United States, and there have been certain indications that such a party might actually be feasible within the near future. The record of the Wallace group may be such that the organization of an enduring third party with major status will be considerably delayed. As far as can be determined at present the Wallace movement will have the full support of the Communists, and that in itself is likely to stir up deep-seated antagonism despite the general admission that Henry A. Wallace himself is not at all a Communist. The failure of the Progressive Citizens of America to achieve concrete results in connection with its liberal 74-point platform, may discourage progressive movements in general, especially if the net accomplishment would be the throwing of the election to the Republicans.

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL

By MARGERY FRY

THE Criminal Justice Bill should not be regarded as an isolated piece of legislation. The whole structure of our criminal justice has for long been pretty generally recognised to be in need of a complete renovation, and in the reports of committees and commissions a perfect library of blue-prints for such a renovation already exists. The enquiries dealing with persistent offenders, the probation system, the employment of prisoners and their after-care, capital punishment, corporal punishment, the qualifications of Clerks to the Magistrates, and poor persons' defence have all contributed useful and authoritative material. The Royal Commission on the appointment of Magistrates is still sitting, and, most important of all, the Lord Chancellor has lately promised an overhauling of the statute book, which, he estimates, it will take some fifteen years to complete. Taken together these reports shadow forth a completely revised system, delivered from ancient anomalies and "sleeping laws," offering greater security of justice in the Courts' decisions, a wiser treatment of those who are found guilty, and a better definition of the actual position between the state and those who seek their own advantage to the detriment of the community as a whole. One would like to think that the revision of our laws could also mean a lessening of forbidden actions. But, though we shall probably be relieved of obligation to refrain from various acts we have no mind to, such as levelling a turn-pike gate or depraving the book of common prayer, it is pretty clear that we cannot yet afford the general loosening up of control we all so much desire, and that in consequence our courts will have, for years to come, to deal with many offenders who are not of what is vaguely known as "the criminal type."

It would perhaps have been more logical if the actual building of the new structure of criminal justice had begun by revision of the appointment of Magistrates and Clerks, proceeded to the financial arrangements of our courts (which badly need bringing up to date), then clarified the law itself, and proceeded at the very end to deal with the treatment of offenders.

But in the meanwhile we should be continuing to increase crime by the use of inefficient methods of counteracting it,

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and so mortgaging the future for the sake of a logical sequence. It is therefore a matter for satisfaction that the series of reforms is being begun at the "treatment" end. And in this connection we may claim the new "Children Bill" as another proposed measure which should diminish the supply of crime in the future. Law-breakers are early made; one could probably find some psychologists to maintain that more are manufactured in maternity hospitals than in prisons. It is almost startling to find, in the Children's Courts, how closely delinquency is associated with unhappiness, and, though fortunately many child delinquents grow up quite normally into good citizens, much evidence goes to show that the adult criminal has usually begun his law-breaking career early. The best hope of preventing future crime lies in the reclamation of young people of this type, or, if one prefers to use words which imply less of moral judgment, in their adaptation to the claims of our actual society; an adaptation which does sometimes involve regrettable mutilation of the untamed personality.

"Civil must conquer, where't other 'twere worse—" if the wild bird cannot accustom itself to the limits of the cage it will batter its life out against the bars, but our "socialisation" probably does turn some eaglets into chickens.

Actually evidence accumulates to show that a main trouble of the lawless young thing is the failure to grow the roots of that social sense, which for the majority makes commerce with the community essential, during the unconscious or dimly conscious years of childhood. The unloved child may grow up unloving and the attitude of "I cares for nobody, no, not I, and nobody cares for me" leaves it to the sanctions of law to enforce conduct which most people conform to voluntarily, rather than incur the blame of society and their own consciences.

In this sense the Children Bill, seeking to make good in early years the lack of normal home life, may be said to offer the preliminary stratagem of an attack on crime which it is designed to follow up by those parts of the Criminal Justice Bill concerned specifically with young people. Some of the provisions of this Bill are for removing forms of penalty which risk increasing the anti-social tendencies which they too unintelligently aim at curing. Thus the growing habit of sending young people between fourteen and seventeen to prison, on the ground of their being too unruly to be detained elsewhere is checked by a clause forbidding Summary Courts to send any person under seventeen to prison, whilst the higher courts can

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only use imprisonment for people over fifteen. No person under twenty-one can be imprisoned by order of any court "unless the court has obtained and considered information about the circumstances, including the character of the said person, and is of opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate," a Magistrates' Court being further required to state its reasons for rejecting other methods in the warrant of commitment.

Moreover, power is taken in this Bill for raising at some later date, up to a maximum of twenty-one, the age below which courts may not sentence to imprisonment, or commit to prison for non-payment of fines, etc. The rather curious proviso is added that such a power may be exercised regarding one of the sexes only.

It is obvious past the need of argument that it is in the interests of the community as well as of the young people themselves, to prevent mere boys and girls from gaining acquaintance with prison or its older inhabitants. The difficulty of devising an alternative is equally obvious, and most glaring of all, that of providing such alternatives in the present state of the country's resources. So the clause which authorises the establishment of Detention Centres for young people between fourteen and twenty-one is permeated by a patent doubt as to their speedy materialisation. The *plan* outlined is for such centres to be used, within the limits of age, for detention, usually for three months (for offences for which the maximum penalty is less than three months imprisonment) with powers in exceptional cases of graver crimes to detain up to six months.

Around this proposal hopes and fears are jostling each other. There are those who dread the establishment of a chain of miniature prisons for boys and girls, with "short and sharp or give 'em Hell" for their motto. That such a result *could* follow from the proposed law is true, but the recent record of the Prison Commission does not justify the assumption that it *would*, except perhaps when one considers the conditions under which Borstal lads whose licences have been revoked are living to-day. If those conditions were to be multiplied up and down the country a retrograde step would have been taken. On the other hand if the spirit (though not alas, the actual environment) of the forest camps of California, where a few months of rough but healthy conditions with useful, and sometimes adventurous, employment are found to work wonders with city boys of the pre-criminal type, can be imitated, a serious gap in our penal

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system might be filled. To send an adolescent to a Borstal Institution for a possible three years segregation, followed by a year's supervision, is often an interference with individual liberty quite disproportionate to the occasion, even where probation has been tried and found to fail. A complete break, a physical and mental change, in healthier surroundings, with a chance of gaining new ideas and making new habits, would frequently give opportunity for turning in a new direction. It is perhaps in the (usually vain) hope of giving a "salutary jerk" of this sort that magistrates continue to send young offenders, even on their first conviction, for prison terms.

In 1945 3,390 youths between their sixteenth and twenty-first birthdays were sentenced to imprisonment, of whom 37.7 per cent. had not, so far as is known, previously been proved guilty of offences. Very nearly 3,000 of them received sentences of three months or less. The similar figures for girls are 792 imprisoned, 34 per cent. not known to have been previously guilty, 634 receiving sentences of three months or less.

It is to be hoped that magistrates would welcome an alternative to a practice which is annually deplored in the prison reports.

If these detention centres are to be established there seems little excuse for passing one of the controversial clauses of the Bill lowering the qualifications for a Borstal sentence to the commission of *any* offence carrying a penalty of imprisonment however short (in place of one carrying not less than a month) with a less stringent insistence on incipient criminality in the offender, the court being obliged only to have "regard to his character and previous conduct, and to the circumstances of the offence"—a very wide discretion. To the present writer it seems that such an extension of the power of the courts over the lives of young people should not be granted at the very moment when they are to be provided with an alternative to Borstal, which should either obviate the need of long segregation from normal life or, if it fails, add an important proof of its necessity.

The permission to use the new Remand Centres to be set up not only for young people between seventeen and twenty-one, but for those between fourteen and seventeen who are certified as too unruly or depraved for a remand home, or as needing observation which cannot be provided in such a home would do away with the lamentable practice of sending unconvicted children to an ordinary prison, on remand, a practice which

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has shown signs of increasing of late years. But it is a remedy of dubious character. The "unruly" boy of 14 *may* be able to hold his own in the company of much older adolescents, he will probably be uplifted with pride at being one of them, but the cases needing observation, whether of their physical or mental condition, will often be of the types to whom the surroundings will be too strange and painful to be at all propitious for diagnosis and the official view of "unruliness" has a wide scope. Moreover, there are indications in the Bill that both the new remand and the new detention centres to be set up may be lodged in prison premises. If this threat becomes a fact we are in danger that the new law may increase the very evil it is intended to avoid. It is naive to believe that rechristening the whole or part of a gaol changes the attitude of the public towards it. Send your boy of fourteen to the local prison under any other name, he will have "been in clink," admitted with all the ceremony of locking and unlocking, familiarised with prison gossip and the grim implications of a prison building.

These establishments must be separated from prisons if the Bill is to be a measure for carrying out what Sir Alexander Maxwell lately claimed as the first of the Home Office functions in relation to prisons—keeping as many young people as possible out of them.

For the treatment of those in prison various changes are proposed; notably the abolition of the distinction between penal servitude and imprisonment and between the three Prison Divisions, and the disuse of the now almost meaningless term "hard labour." Preventive Detention would no longer be a separate sentence, served after a term of penal servitude, but a special sentence of imprisonment ranging in length from five to fourteen years. A new form of sentence is proposed for a third or subsequent conviction of serious crime, called "corrective training" intended to check recidivism.

The decision to abolish corporal punishment is the logical result of the report of the committee which unanimously recommended this step. It is regrettable that this abolition does not extend to punishment for prison offences. Happily the inflictions of such punishments show a tendency to decline, and one may hope that they will die out as an anachronism as the newer type of prison discipline replaces the old. The grimmest anachronism of all, the gallows, is not dealt with in the Bill as it stands, and the conversion of the Home Secretary

in favour of capital punishment seems unfortunately likely to be a reflection of one section of Home Office views. Into this well-worn topic this article does not offer space to go in detail. All that Beccaria and Bentham urged against this irrevocable penalty holds good after nearly two centuries. It has been reinforced since by the successful experiments of our neighbours round the North Sea, as well as in many other parts of the world. It remains for the free vote of parliament, upon the amendments to be proposed, to determine whether what Westermarck called the last remaining human sacrifice is still to defile our statute book and throw its shadow on our prisons.

Capital punishment is the ultimate expression of the belief in deterrence by fear, and also of the possibility of assessing responsibility with unerring accuracy. If the Bill, as drafted, shows no intention of abandoning this double creed in the case of homicide, it shows the beginnings of a change of attitude regarding offenders of other classes. The view of the doctor and the view of the executioner are diametrically opposed; here the essential need to understand the influence of a man's mental or physical condition upon his actions receives important recognition in the proposals that, besides remanding a culprit for medical examination to prison between conviction and sentence with a view to obtaining a medical report "before the method of dealing with him is determined," a court may alternatively grant him bail with a condition that he should undergo a medical examination outside prison. Equally important is the provision that the undergoing of treatment for his mental condition may be made a condition in a probation order.

This is only one amongst a number of other proposals for strengthening the probation system, of which the most valuable will probably be the grants of public money for probation homes and hostels, and for the needs of persons under supervision orders.

With regard to the homes and hostels the method largely employed already by the Home Office in financing approved schools run by voluntary bodies is adopted. There is need to safeguard these large grants made to private bodies and it would be desirable for some control over the appointment of governing bodies receiving grants to be retained by the Home Office.

Magistrates of Children's Courts will probably be inclined to oppose the loss of the entirely illogical, but very convenient, fiction, by which a person may be found guilty, and put upon

probation by the Court "without proceeding to conviction." So long, at least, as we remain without any simple classification line between grave and trivial offences it is a great advantage that not only the consequences, but the very name of conviction should be spared to offenders whom the lower courts desire to treat by probation. The Home Secretary is endeavouring to resolve the struggle between the legalistic and the humanistic views on this matter by finding a "formula," but the difference of opinion is a very real one, and no mere drafting ingenuity can reconcile the two views.

On the whole the Bill will be welcomed by those who desire the betterment of our penal system. Some matters remain for fierce debate upon the Report Stage but there is a large measure of agreement upon its aims and much of its contents. It will stand an unfinished structure until the other reforms mentioned at the beginning of this article appear upon its flanks but it will stand in its own right as a piece of legislation, useful at once and with large capacities for future good to the community, when its schemes can be provided with suitable equipment.

WORK AND INCENTIVES IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

By J. D. SUTHERLAND

ALTHOUGH innumerable articles have been written during recent years on the subject of work incentives, I am venturing to add yet another, because I have formed the impression that certain fundamental aspects of this matter are not yet widely appreciated. In particular, a major omission is frequently those psychological considerations which are raised by the phrase in the title—"in a democratic society." It is to those aspects that I should like to draw attention.

It will perhaps clarify matters if we look first at some points affecting the significance of work to the individual. It is commonly said that man works because he must earn money. Certainly in our society he has to acquire money in order to satisfy the basic biological drives of hunger and sex. Nevertheless, it is clearly not enough to leave the matter with this over-simplified answer. As Professor Mace has pointed out,¹

¹ *Occupational Psychology*, Vol. XXII, No. 1. January, 1948.

we only begin to understand what the pay packet theory means when we know how men spend their money and their time. Other motives have been added to the monetary one, but underlying most incentive schemes in industry is the psychological theory of the individual in regard to his work that is best described by Elton Mayo's term "the rabble hypothesis."³ On this view, "economic man" is a self-contained unit whose activities are governed entirely by certain internal needs, and he can therefore be induced to work by the offer of various rewards through which he can satisfy these needs. It would seem to be irrelevant to this theory that man happens to be a social animal, *i.e.*, that groups of men create psychological forces which are specific to the group situation. Groups of "economic men" are merely aggregates of self-regulating units so that the whole is not different from the sum of the parts.

The contradictory and confusing results of various incentive schemes expose the limitations of the rabble hypothesis. Monetary rewards and many other "incentives" have very little controlling influence on the amount of effort the worker puts forth once certain basic needs are satisfied. What, then, are the forces that are not only untapped by the usual "incentives," but which often give the impression of acting as "counter incentives"? Some insight is gained if we look at the major satisfactions which workers rate as of higher priority than wages *when these satisfy basic needs*. Security, opportunities for acquiring more skill and other general developments, and a square deal as a human being are rated more highly. Now these needs are recognised by many industrial executives and many firms have made sincere efforts to meet them; nevertheless, even these efforts have not been altogether successful in removing the manifestations of dissatisfaction in work. There persists, in a universally recognised way, a part of the worker's energies which is not given to his job as it might be. There are, in fact, all the signs of the frustration of other major needs.

When a situation is frustrating we expect reactive attempts to undo the resistances to achieving satisfaction, and for a time these reactions will be increasingly aggressive as the frustration continues. Though a source of trouble for the executive, such aggressive behaviour is a good sign for the community, because it indicates an active concern about the situation. If the frustration persists indefinitely, then active aggressive responses

³ *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation*, Harvard Business School, Boston, 1945.

may be replaced by regressive behaviour, *i.e.*, a returning to more primitive illogical and more emotional ways. This trend is seen in the allergic irritability to everything associated with groups in authority and in the readiness to adopt unreasonable, hostile attitudes to all kinds of actions carried out by those individuals or groups. Still further frustration may lead to fixation or to apathy. Fixation in the individual means a blind adherence to such partial satisfactions as have been obtained, and a dread of making new adaptations so that, for example, new technical methods are resisted. Apathy is even more serious, for it may produce an irreversible abandonment of all positive attitudes.

The origin of these major frustrations in industry today is clear. It lies in the needs of the individual to take part in a working group in a democratic fashion, *i.e.*, to have power and responsibility in regard to what his group is doing. Our long political struggles have won these psychological satisfactions for the individual as a citizen. But the citizen who is also a worker has to live in two cultures, a democratic one outside his work and an authoritarian one in it, and the meeting points of different cultures is a notorious breeding ground for psychological unrest. In his behaviour as a worker, the needs and values of the citizen have to be exchanged for those of the donkey, the animal whose output is regulated by the carrot and the stick. The democratic man, however, cannot give up his need to know what the load is he is being asked to drag and why, and who is offering the carrot or cracking the whip—and why.

It may help to bring out some of these issues more fully if we consider the significance of work to the developing personality of the boy in our society.

Modern psychological work makes it more and more plain that the main features of our adult personalities are largely laid down in our earliest years. It is almost certain then that our attitudes to work and our deeper feelings about it are affected by its significance to us at this early stage. In recent years the work of the child-psycho-analysts has shown that there are created in our early years the needs for love and reparation to the parents, particularly to the mother, needs which are amongst the great unconscious driving forces shaping our future character, interests, and attitudes. Now the methods of reparation as demonstrated to the boy by his father are very intimately connected with the medium of work. To the child,

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his father's omnipotent power is centred round this mysterious rite in which all men take part for so much of their time. The boy longs to be identified with this privileged group, and all his strivings to independence and maturity are connected with this theme. In the deeper layers of his mind work signifies a powerful reparative or giving process which is bound up with phantasies about masculine potency and creativity. In the traditional agricultural community the weaving of work into the fabric of life, its significance in the fundamental processes of giving and taking, were clearly demonstrated and, indeed, the boy could share directly in his father's work. He could grow up within a living panorama of "visual and tangible aids" in his education for life. The conscious aims of work in the life of the community were clear as was the inter-dependence of the various workers, who were, indeed, often named after their particular contribution. And because he could control his means of production, because he could decide what and how he would produce, his self-expression through his work was normally of a deeply satisfying kind, *i.e.*, the unconscious needs were also satisfied.

In the industrialised community, however, the role of work is complicated for the boy. All he sees of it are the outer walls of the factory or office, and the rather disturbing repercussions that have so frequently come outside in the form of his father's frustrations. He finds that his father is not really independent after all, for his powers are at the mercy of vague persecuting figures called "bosses," who can apparently dispose of his father at will, or who certainly do not appear to accept his father's offers of "love," *e.g.*, in the form of his ideas.

The existence of powerful altruistic motives underlying work must be inferred if we are to explain the social development of man. That work is closely connected with deep love or co-operative impulses, is seen in the almost universal inhibitions and conflicts over work which are to be found in those who suffer from emotional disorders, conditions which Freud elucidated by relating them to abnormalities in the development of love relationships. Another manifestation of this connection is the great guilt which individuals feel who cannot work for nervous reasons. The profound significance of work for the individual's well-being may also be seen if we consider the devastating effects of unemployment on the personality, or even in the dissatisfactions commonly expressed when there is not enough to do in a job.

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With work being of the very warp and woof of life in social groups, the individual's expression through it must permit of certain satisfactions. Most important, there must be a feeling that it is something freely given to others and that it is wanted by them. It must also have some features whereby it can signify the uniqueness of the worker's contribution to his fellows. This is not to say that the individual works for a remote "society"; on the contrary, it is to say that it is the quality of the satisfactions that he receives in his face-to-face daily relationships with fellow-workers that matters.

Attitudes to work under conditions approximating to those described are to be seen in our society in some professional workers. It is an entirely unfounded assumption that the very high degree of spontaneous effort and output of these workers is a psychological characteristic of only a fraction of mankind, and not a result of the psychological conditions in their particular field. The recent reaction of the medical profession to what was felt to be a threat to some of these deep satisfactions in work had a little-noted implication. Most of the frustrating conditions so sharply dreaded by the doctors have had to be endured by the industrial worker for the last two hundred years.

In short, when its object is a truly common purpose, there is no need to look for inducements to make people work. Incentives are the artificial forces that have to be created when work is being asked for purposes that are felt to be, at least in part, private. In our culture the basic drives of the individual and all his socialised attitudes and activities press him to work. But in his work the human being must feel that he is a mature independent person with appropriate power and responsibility in what he does. In other words, the important psychological forces in work are those that affect the promotion of spontaneous co-operation or conflict in the working group.

When we look at industry today from the point of view of the scope it offers to the realisation of these conscious and unconscious forces, we cannot but marvel at the capacity of the individual to endure privation and frustration. In the first place, what he shall make has been largely out of his control, either directly or indirectly. The efforts of his fellows, because of economic compulsion, may be forced into producing goods which none has any desire to see made. (The increasing control of industry by the State during the last year or two alters this.) How and when he shall work is decided for him. The break-up

of jobs by production engineers has been done without any reference to him until he is left with some fragment of a task which is so limited in scope as to permit of no self-expression whatsoever. The depressions of the years between the wars made it plain enough that the so-called right to sell his labour has little psychological reality. Again, where he can work is not his affair, yet a man and his family root and grow in their social soil, and uprooting is a serious move which no one with a family can undertake lightly. The history of the increasing bitterness in the relations between various groups in industry, e.g., owner and worker, management and worker, or between sections within the management hierarchy, which has been the course of the industrialisation of our society, need not be described. The outstanding effect has been that the need for co-operative relationships was met by the development of groups whose aim was not that of the production of goods, but the opposition to some other group or groups.

What is to be done?

What has been implied so far is that the human problems in industry are mainly derived from the fact that we have not yet progressed to the stage when the patterns of human relationships in work are democratic instead of authoritarian. How is this development to be achieved? Clearly the lead must come from the existing sources of responsibility for what is done, viz., the various individuals and groups in executive positions. It is unlikely that relations can be fully democratic, and therefore fully satisfying to the mature individual until he shares fully in the responsibility for what is produced. This may be a lengthy process, but immediate steps are feasible to start the change of the existing patterns with their frustrations. "Participation" is becoming a familiar word. Techniques of introducing participation, however, are too often formal rather than real. Management has got to learn that participant relations in the factory represent a way of life and not a chart of the hierarchical representation of workers on a Joint Production Committee where management and workers may face each other across the table, with the essential tensions between them covered by a veneer of armed neutrality.

Whether the eventual authority for production rests with the state or with the private firm merely means a possible change in the composition of management. In the one case the worker will have to delegate to the state the power of appointing

management; in the other he finds a management chosen more arbitrarily. Now while the former undoubtedly introduces a different field of psychological forces, nevertheless nationalisation does not remove the need to satisfy the social give and take of the individual in the character of the face-to-face relations of his working group. Indeed, the psychological "distance" of the source of authority under nationalisation may become so great, that just as intense feelings of having things done *to* them rather than *with* them may arise in the worker groups or in sub-management groups towards central authority. Signs of this difficulty have, of course, already appeared from time to time amongst some mining groups.

It demands considerable resources from a management hitherto backed up by such powerful sanctions as "the sack" to change to a relationship in which obvious capacity to cohere the efforts of a group around a common task will be what counts. On the other hand, many executives, because of their conditioning to an authoritarian culture are more apprehensive than they need be about the effects of a change of relationship. The alternative to imposed discipline is not chaos but self-discipline. Democracy in industry, it is often thought, must involve an endless waste of time and valuable productive hours in group discussions, committee meetings, etc. And faced with complex problems in their inter-personal relations, many groups may feel that democracy is much more painful than they had envisaged. On these scores, there will certainly be at times movements towards the resumption of an authoritarian leader-led relationship in which, paradoxically enough, the led will press in the same direction as the impatient autocrat. Two considerations should be kept in mind. First, the cost in time of not having participation can be seen daily in the manifestations of non-co-operation, from the various restrictive practices to absenteeism, high sickness rates, and even to the strike. In the second place, democratic groups do not abandon leaders with executive power. They confer such authority on leaders and expect it to be used at appropriate times. But over a period there is a considerable difference in the responses to emergency decisions by the leader who holds his position by consent and he who is there by imposition from above. Actually, the resources of groups and their appreciations of their limitations are grossly underestimated, as is the capacity of most groups to reach and to abide by sound decisions, provided the full facts are made available. There is no getting away from the fact

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that the psychological environment in industry has hitherto done little or nothing to nourish the personal development of its workers. The remarkable thing, indeed, is that there has been so little permanent damage to industrial man. Not only are the capacities of groups high, but their speed in learning to use them under proper conditions can be quite astonishing. Moreover, the influence of group opinion on the conduct of its members is very great. Many of the so-called disciplinary problems in the factory can never be treated by authoritarian management, for these manifestations are expressive of frustration and resentment against the total situation. Imposed discipline may remove one symptom, but inevitably a new one will appear. Self-discipline, on the other hand, is more effective and more lasting—the internalisation of a group conscience into the individual's mind exerts a considerable pressure on his behaviour, whether the boss is present or not.

It would be out of place for me to suggest any detailed schemes whereby such changes might be instituted.³ I have been concerned with raising certain aspects of a highly complex problem, hoping that those who are in positions of responsibility in industry may see something useful in them. It is almost certain that we do not realise the kinds of difficulties that will arise in the introduction of satisfying participation procedures, and it is to be hoped that much research will be done on this problem soon. One or two pilot studies carried out by teams of social psychologists working along with keen executives will throw up most of the typical problems and the solution to some of them. Psychologists, educationists, and other social scientists have also been just as much conditioned by their culture as have executives and many theories of learning are essentially based on an "economic man" type of individual. The fact that learning all kinds of skills is heavily influenced by the quality of the relationships within the group and, in particular, between the teacher and the class, is only now beginning to get the attention it requires. Social science, however, has made great strides in the field of group behaviour in recent years. The experimental work of Lewin and his pupils has demonstrated the all-round superiority of democratic groups, e.g., in output, constructiveness of ideas, care for property, independence of the workers, and in freedom from internal tensions, as contrasted with the groups led by an

³ J. J. Gillespie has made many interesting suggestions in his book, *Free Expression in Industry*, Pilot Press, 1948.

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autocratic or a paternalistic leader. Participation and democratisation have, therefore, passed beyond the phase of being articles of faith; they are scientific facts as conditions for satisfying group relations and performance.

Industry and Democracy.

While concern over our production requirements is driving us to recognise the need for democratising industry, concern for democracy as a way of life must also drive us in this direction. Industry provides a group experience during one-third of the worker's life. Unless he experiences democracy there, how can he exhibit it elsewhere? Democracy as a way of life demands that all our groups shall conform in their pattern—the family, the school, the factory, the community. We are far from this goal, but the work of the Civil Resettlement Units⁴ has shown that experience of a democratic society, even for a few weeks, can have a remarkable effect on the all-round behaviour of the individual. The cure of many of our individual behaviour disorders lies in improving the atmosphere of the family. It is not easy, however, for parents to be mature in their relations with their children, when they are themselves perpetually subjected to a child-like role at work. It was not a coincidence that the peak of the "economic man" era was accompanied by the Victorian pattern of strict authoritarianism in the family, or, as Elton Mayo⁵ puts it in another connection, the corollary of the "rabble hypothesis" is the repressive authority of the state. Reaveley and Winnington⁶ raised the important issue of what work in our society did to the personality of the worker, and their conclusions were disturbing. We cannot ignore this question if we are to preserve our society as a virile group. Problems of political apathy are far more likely to be solved by the stimulating effects of democracy in the factory than by propaganda campaigns, however skilful. And the more the worker has had opportunity for self-realisation by free expression in industry, the more will he be able to respond rationally and constructively to the larger group issues of the community.

⁴ *Transitional Communities and Social Re-connection; a follow-up of the Civil Resettlement of British Prisoners of War.* By Adam Curle. "Human Relations," Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2.

⁵ *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation*, Harvard Business School, Boston, 1945.

⁶ *Democracy and Industry.* By Constance Reaveley and John Winnington, Chatto and Windus, 1947.

THE FRENCH CRISIS

By DOROTHY M. PICKLES

At the beginning of 1948 the French post-war crisis no longer looks like a repetition of the familiar pre-war crises, such as those of 1926 or 1936, for example. It threatens the existence of the new Fourth Republic, perhaps even the future of French democracy.

The first two years of liberation were bound to be critical years. In addition to the moral and material stresses resulting from the war and occupation, there were deep-seated political and economic problems, which the Third Republic had failed to solve, and which had now to be solved, in infinitely more difficult conditions, by the Fourth. The task demanded almost superhuman qualities. It demanded clear-sighted, long-sighted and courageous leadership, a high degree of administrative and technical efficiency, and, perhaps most important of all, a spirit of civic discipline and comprehension, such as had been conspicuously lacking during the critical years of the Third Republic. Yet, at this time, France's political leaders were depleted by age or collaboration, and her young resisters lacked political experience; her administration, already inadequate before the war, was disorganised by the occupation and by the purge of collaborators; and the public, exhausted by the strain of occupation, was to have its new civic good intentions undermined by a particularly severe winter and by the discomforts and shortages resulting from the continuation of fighting on French soil, right up to the summer of 1945. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that France's achievements during this period, considerable as they were, should have failed to come up to the expectations of the public and of some of her friends outside France.

Perhaps the biggest single factor responsible for the failure of political hopes and intentions was the strain imposed on new and untried loyalties by the tasks of constitution making. The three Left-wing parties which, from 1945 onwards, constituted four-fifths of the strength of the National Assembly had learned to work together against a common enemy, when ideological differences could be shelved for the time being. They intended to keep them in the background until the first stages of reconstruction had been completed and they had agreed on the steps to be taken as soon as liberation was achieved. A constitution is not, however, an emergency measure, but, in

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theory at least, a permanent document, whose elaboration demands discussion of, and agreement on, certain fundamental political principles. So the differences were bound to be fought out, and the return of the three parties as virtually equal partners, for a period of seven months only, was bound to exacerbate the differences by introducing electoral and demagogic calculations into the argument.

Nevertheless, in spite of all the difficulties, by the end of 1946 France had a constitution and a regularly-elected Parliament. Her transport system had made a magnificent recovery, and her agriculture was basically sound, in spite of the shortage of labour, fertiliser and mechanised equipment. Her political parties were re-established, and five main tendencies seemed to be firmly developed, thus offering a prospect of greater political responsibility and stability than had the shifting groups, centred round persons as often as policies, which had been characteristic of pre-war politics. The weak spot was the inability of successive Governments to deal effectively with the Black Market and to arrest the perpetually rising prices of essential commodities. But even here, once the uncertainties of the provisional period were over and, when, after an inauspicious start, the first Parliament had agreed virtually unanimously to accept the leadership of Léon Blum and a Socialist Government, more effective action was hoped for. The Socialists had a policy and were ready to put it into practice. The psychological atmosphere was favourable. Tripartite disagreement was at a minimum, and the public was on the side of the Government.

The "Blum experiment" began well. The first 5% instalment of price reduction was effective. But by the time the second instalment was called for in March, M. Ramadier had replaced M. Blum and the tripartite formula had been restored. The attempt to peg wages, and at the same time to alleviate the real hardships suffered by the urban workers, by introducing a legal minimum wage of 7,000 francs a month and levelling up those wages which were still below that figure, had been welcomed. But the hoped-for reduction of prices had been temporary only, and, after a few weeks, they began to rise again. The March reduction was much less successful than the first, for technical as well as psychological reasons and, from then on, prices never ceased to rise. By June, 1947, the situation was again out of hand. Between December, 1946 and December 1947, five Governments tried to grapple with the problem. The fifth, which took office in

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November, 1947, is well aware that the battle for stabilisation of prices and wages has, by now, become the battle of French social democracy and, perhaps, of Republicanism as well.

Excluding the possible explanation that the situation was in itself beyond the capacity of even the most resolute and clear-sighted Governments, without outside aid such as is now contemplated by the Marshall plan, there are three main explanations of the failure of successive Governments to arrest the inflationary movement during 1947. They are related in the sense that they influenced each other and together created the vicious circle from which the present Government is making desperate, if belated, efforts to extricate French economic affairs.

First, as has just been said, the strains and stresses of the immediate post-war period caused both political parties and public to return to old—and sometimes bad—political habits. Politicians manoeuvred in press and Parliament for position, and the public, at first disillusioned, became progressively apathetic and resentful. The three governmental parties depended on the support of the organised urban workers. Their policy of socialist or socialistic planning had little to recommend it to the peasants, who were hostile to it in principle, as they always had been, and now in practice more than ever, since it threatened their new prosperity. Unfortunately, in their quest for votes, the three parties did not have the courage to threaten it enough. They therefore discouraged their supporters without attracting any substantial support from their opponents. Indeed, they succeeded in alienating the sympathies of many middle-class people who were prepared to support economic planning in the immediate post-war years, not out of conviction, but as the best way of liquidating the system introduced by the Germans with the help of the collaborators, and of setting French affairs in order again. For these people, the test was a practical one. Planning must work. It must succeed in suppressing the Black Market, in imposing a rational distribution of essential goods and in controlling prices and wages. When he saw the Black Market continue to flourish, while both price and wages control remained ineffective, the ordinary non-political elector vented his discontent on the parties responsible for the management of affairs, the Left. The workers, under communist and, to a lesser extent, socialist leadership, called on the contrary for more and better planning. And so, gradually, the old divisions on economic policy returned.

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New conservative parties replaced the pre-war ones which had disappeared as a result of their association with Germany; first, the Republican Party of Liberty, standing for conventional conservatism and for the removal of controls in the economic sphere; and later, as the situation worsened, General de Gaulle's French People's Rally. By the autumn of 1947, France was divided, as she had been before the war, into Left and Right, with a precarious Centre group, threatened on each side by the appeal of simpler and more violent solutions of the problem which had so far proved insoluble by parliamentary methods. France had lost her great opportunity of bringing socialism peaceably.

It was certainly unrealistic to expect that planning would show spectacular results overnight, particularly in the peculiarly difficult post-war conditions. Moreover, it is doubtful whether even the most efficient of Civil Services could have tackled successfully the problem of controlling agricultural production and distribution in an economy such as that of France, in which there are some two and a half million small farms, most of which employ no labour at all outside that of the family. The French public service, depleted both quantitatively and qualitatively as a result of the war, and never enjoying a very high reputation for efficiency, could not begin to tackle the problem in circumstances which had given the peasants and the Black Market alike a four years' start. But the public could hardly be expected to look at the problem so objectively. If controlled wheat prices meant that the farmers fed wheat to animals destined for sale in the meat market at exorbitant prices, while Parisians ate bread made largely of imported maize, then, to the ordinary citizen, there was something demonstrably wrong with the working of controls. The same conclusion was reached by the worker, struggling to feed his family at prices which, if supplies at controlled prices were available, as they often were not, still took anything from 60 to 80 per cent. of his monthly wage, excluding supplementary purchases (always necessary) in the Black Market. In the towns he was surrounded by evidence that *some* people were well able to afford the prices demanded, however much they rose. In the country he saw that there was plenty of food for peasants and farm animals, though not for him. He was therefore less and less likely to be restrained from striking for higher wages by reminders of the vicious circle of inflation which he would be helping to create if wages chased prices. In the debate which ended in

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the dismissal of the Communist Ministers from the Government, Jacques Duclos stated that his party "could not allow the costs of French reconstruction to be borne by the working class alone."

The first stage in the creation of the present crisis was, therefore, the loss of faith in planning. By the summer of 1947, workers' and employers' representatives were reverting to some extent to the principle of collective bargaining, and even agreeing on an 11 per cent. increase in wages in privately-controlled industries, and on the need to suppress price controls in all but the vital sectors of industry. A number of price controls had already been abandoned—those of eggs, potatoes, meat, for example. Clothes rationing had been abandoned without any apparent effect either on prices or on demand. The prices of bread, milk, meat, transport, had increased so as to wipe out the benefits of the increases in wages in the nationalised industries. By August, 1947, the retail price index in Paris, which had fallen from 865 in December to 856 in January (1938=100), stood at 1.068. Wage increases, granted under pressure of the strikes during the early summer of 1947, had placed an unbearable strain on the budget, led to further price increases, and so imperilled the export situation. The industrial crisis had given way to a financial crisis. And the Government's failure to make controls work, together with the industrial disputes which were at the same time a contributory cause and a consequence of the failure, had cost the Socialist and Progressive Catholic M.R.P. much of their support, and led to the growth of a strong conservative public opinion, ready and willing to go back to the old-fashioned alternative to socialist planning.

The industrial disputes during the months of May and June constituted the second factor contributing to the present crisis. They confronted the Government with an insoluble dilemma, and, by providing the public with the spectacle of Governmental inability to maintain order, they still further discredited it in their eyes. There were three main motives for the strikes. Some were technical and concerned with sectional and normal frictions or with the difficulty of putting into application the Government's decision on production bonuses. These were few and unimportant in themselves. It was the economic and political motives that led to the dilemma.

In practice it is difficult to separate the political and economic motives, and doubtless many of the strikes had mixed motives.

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The workers had genuine economic grievances, as was recognised on all sides. The trouble was that to remedy them was impossible, short of a complete reformulation of economic policy, and that was impossible for political reasons. There could be no lasting improvement in the situation until the prices of agricultural products (which the Blum experiment had left virtually untouched) were reduced. That meant dealing comprehensively with the farmers, which was politically impossible and economically risky. To encourage the farmers to grow—and deliver to the authorities—more wheat, it would be necessary to increase the price paid to the producer. As it was, it paid the farmers better either to grow other cereals or to feed their wheat to the animals destined for the meat market. The immediate result would be, not a fall, but a rise in the price of bread. But, in July, the Government was obliged to abandon the bread and milk subsidies as part of the economy campaign, and this meant a rise in the prices of both bread and milk. Any appreciable rise in the prices of essential food products was bound to be followed by intensified wage claims and this, in turn, would lead to an increase in industrial prices, whose profit margin had already been reduced by the Blum price reductions. The already considerable difficulties of exporters would be further increased and the financial problem, therefore, intensified. The only way of preventing the wages-prices race from entering on a new lap was for the workers' increase of remuneration to result directly from an increase in production, in the form of production bonuses not affecting the general wages level. Yet it was virtually impossible to step-up production appreciably without additional supplies of raw material, and primarily of coal. Imports from the U.S.A. had halved during July, and the solution of the German problem seemed too far away to offer any reasonable prospect of an increase in supplies of Ruhr coal in the immediate future. The vicious circle was complete. In the circumstances, strikes could only aggravate the problem, since they actually diminished the level of production. The coal strike of June lasted a week, and deprived France of three-quarters of a million tons of coal.

Nor could the Government enforce a reduction in the price of bread, because to reduce the profits of the farmer, excessive though they were in relation to those of other sections of the community, was to risk an actual reduction in production. Forcible measures to compel the farmers to serve the community instead of holding it to ransom could succeed only if

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they had the weight of public opinion behind them and were backed up by an efficient and incorruptible bureaucracy. Neither condition was present in 1947.

The degree to which the strikes were deliberately encouraged by the Communist party to further political ends, irrespective of the economic merits of the case, or even of the economic possibilities, is not exactly determinable. The Communist party appeared to be quite willing to assume responsibility for them. "In many parts of France," said Frachon, in May, "the workers have already forced the employers to grant production bonuses. We shall generalise these concessions, fighting our claim if necessary from factory to factory."

On the other hand, this explanation does not fit *all* the facts. Some of the strikes, beginning with the Renault strike, which was the issue on which the Communist Ministers allowed themselves to be dismissed from the Government, were not started by the Communists, and were even opposed by them. It was often only when the strike had become important enough to constitute a challenge to Communist claims to be the exclusive leaders and representatives of the working classes that the Communists came in and took it over, thus saving face by avoiding, in Duclos' phrase, "being outflanked on their Left." Even after they became an opposition party, the Communists remained in favour of the pegging of wages and prices and were, indeed, anxious to come back into the Government.

Still, there is no doubt that the Communists did actively support a number of the strikes, and for political motives, clearly, since the strikes could only be economically abortive, and the Communists must have been as aware of that fact as everyone else. What is more difficult to establish is precisely what their political motives were. If they hoped to return to the Government, then they were fouling their own nest, or defeating their own ends. In fact, they were surely doing both, for they were making future collaboration with the Socialists and M.R.P. less and less acceptable to both, and at the same time, by weakening the Government's prestige, contributing to the failure of the experiment which they could be assumed to have at least as much at heart as their former colleagues. In particular, the encouragement of strikes in the newly-nationalised industries seemed designed to discredit at the same time the experiment and those responsible for it, among whom the Communists had been the most enthusiastic. It is true that the Communists refrained from bringing matters to a head.

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"We prefer guerilla tactics," said Frachon. But once or twice they came dangerously near to forcing the Government to choose between its responsibility for the maintenance of essential services and its position as a workers' Government. Indeed, it was only thanks to great restraint on the part of the Government and to great patience and skill on the part of the Socialist Minister of Labour, Daniel Mayer, that this Communist policy of leaning out of the window as far as possible without actually falling out did not meet with disaster.

That that was their policy seems clear from a study of the facts. Why they were pursuing it remains their secret. The exasperation of tempers was bound to cause resentment among the workers and to discredit socialism with the general public. After all, as M. Ramadier pointed out at the end of June, most of these strikes were not against "rapacious capitalism," but in the nationalised industries. If the Communist aim was merely the short-run and short-sighted one of creating difficulties for their chief rival, the Socialist party, then the price in economic loss and political risk seemed high, for they could not guarantee to escape splashes from the mud bespattering the Socialists. France will forgive a great deal of political irresponsibility, but public patience was not inexhaustible, nor were the workers necessarily bound to be grateful to Communist tactics when they were accompanied by tangible disadvantages without any compensating advantages.

The third factor directly responsible for the present crisis was the abrupt Communist change of front as a result of France's acceptance of the offer of help through the Marshall plan. This brought about three major changes in party relationships, one of which has led to a new battle for French democracy and for economic recovery. First, the Communist machine was concentrated on an all-out propaganda campaign in press, party and Assembly against the British, the Americans, the Socialists and the Gaullists. This campaign was intensified after the Warsaw declaration and the formation of the Cominform. Socialist leaders, and Blum in particular, were abused as traitors; the British were accused of refusing Ruhr coal to France and of excessive tenderness towards "the poor little lambs across the Rhine." The dismissal of the Communist Ministers was belatedly discovered to have been carried out "on the express orders of American reaction." It was also (additionally or alternatively) "a manoeuvre of Léon Blum or Ramadier." On Thorez's return from Moscow in October, he

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reported that the party now recognised that it had been guilty of serious mistakes. "In order to defeat Gaullism, to prevent a *coup d'état* and an Imperialist war," he said, "it is necessary to establish a democratic Government in which the working classes and their Communist party will at last play a leading rôle."

The second change was the emergence of the Gaullist People's Rally as a national party appealing for public support on a platform of opposition to Communism and to the "*régime* of impotence" into which the Communists had transformed the Republic. The results of the Municipal elections held at the end of October revealed how attractive, in the prevailing conditions of frustration and deadlock, the old conservative policies could appear. General de Gaulle offered the French the equivalent of Mr. Churchill's "blood, toil, tears and sweat," but as the price of "stable political conditions," of "increased production" and, "within the framework of a general plan," of outlets for "freedom and initiative . . . elsewhere than in the Black Market." The Trade Union movement was to be "entirely freed from all politics," and its representatives "freely chosen by regular, secret ballot." Heads of enterprises were to enjoy "authority and initiative." In towns with a population of over 9,000, the Gaullists polled over a third of the votes; in the twelve hundred odd towns and villages with a population of over 4,000 they won nearly 20 per cent. of the seats; in Paris, while the M.R.P., Socialist and Communist polls fell in every arrondissement (the first very heavily), the Gaullists polled over 40 per cent. of the total votes cast in every arrondissement, including the working class suburbs of Ménilmontant and Belleville. In the fashionable eighth and sixteenth they polled over 70 per cent. In the Communist-dominated department of the Seine there was a Communist majority in only 20 of the 80 municipalities after the election, as contrasted with 60 after the previous elections. The total Communist poll in the towns remained constant, but the concentration of votes from the Radicals rightwards meant that the Communists lost their majority in many towns. A quarter of the towns had Gaullist majorities, and therefore Gaullist Mayors. The number of Communist majorities was halved.

There were some ugly incidents when the new Mayors were elected. Paris had had a transport strike on the eve of the elections, which doubtless helped the Gaullists, although the

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Communists were not responsible for it in the first place. But they *were* responsible for the wave of strikes which followed the elections, which involved at its peak about two million workers, and which was accompanied by serious attempts at sabotage on the railways.

It was during the strike that the third change in the political scene began to take definite shape. The Government was re-formed at the end of November under the premiership of the former Minister of Finance, M. Schuman, and with a Radical anti-planner at the Ministry of Finance. The Socialists and M.R.P. form the backbone of the Government and Socialist Ministers occupy all the key industrial posts. Its programme is one of firmness towards strikers threatening the security of the state, and of financial reform and economy along the familiar lines advocated by liberal economists. The socialist experiment is, for the time being at least, over. France is making a desperate effort to tighten her belt and pay her way along somewhat similar lines to those taken in this country, but with the significant difference that Socialists are not in charge, and that the Government's objectives are strictly limited to the immediate measures of economic recovery, on which there is agreement, or at least acquiescence, among its supporters. Beyond that, the *Third Force*, as the parties supporting the Government are now officially known, is held together only by the negative force of a common dislike of the first and second Forces of Communism and Gaullism, and by a general attachment to the institutions of the Fourth Republic and to parliamentary methods. Its parliamentary majority is small. France has now passed, in Léon Blum's phrase, "from the provisional to the precarious."

At least there is a gain in clarity and in political honesty. The Socialist party has its energies less sapped by the Left-wing pretence that it is necessary, justified or possible to work with the Communists, or by Left-wing fears of the electoral consequences of working with a Catholic party. The non-Communist elements in the Trade Unions have repudiated Communist domination, camouflaged as unity and, although faithful to their Syndicalist traditions of political independence, are co-operating with the Government. For the first time a serious attempt is being made to break the Black Market and to force out peasant hoards.

It is much too early to predict either success or failure. The withdrawal from circulation on January 29th of 5,000-franc

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notes, the commonest unit of the hoarders and constituting a third of the circulation, revealed some surprising hoards in rural areas, and has effectively confronted a number of people with the necessity of answering some awkward questions as to how these notes were earned, and why the appropriate income tax was not paid by the holders. The possibility of checking tax evasion and Black Market transactions is there if it is properly used. What is more important is to re-organise the financial machine and reform the tax system so as to make evasion and corruption more difficult in the future than it has been in the past. Without a more efficient system of assessment, collection and inspection, the new agricultural taxes and the increased income tax on the higher income groups will go the way of previous attempts to solve this problem. And no system is proof against a systematic attempt on the part of a sufficient number of the public to evade their obligations to the state. Already the Communist party, which has led the outcry against Black Marketeers and profiteers, is urging the repayment of the called-in notes, with no questions asked!

The devaluation of the franc and the creation of a limited free market for certain hard currencies and gold are both measures which, like the French sponsorship of the "new look," are something of a gamble, and a gamble which, if unsuccessful, is likely to injure both the originators and their clients. As Léon Blum has pointed out, if there is no confidence in the future of the franc, then the holders of dollars will be no more likely than before to exchange them for francs, however favourable the rate may be. And if the Communists launch a further strike offensive, for example, they could well prejudice what chances of success would otherwise exist. If the French authorities prove in practice less capable than they anticipate of preventing undesirable leakages—and there is little reason to expect them to undergo a sea-change overnight—then unexpected and dangerous developments could occur, which might damage still more the weakened credit structure of Western Europe, on which the future prosperity of France, as well as of her neighbours, depends.

In the last resort, the problem for France, as for this country, is moral as much as economic. A successful pegging of prices and wages will demand much more discipline from workers, traders and the general public than France has so far shown herself capable of exercising in the economic sphere, and not merely discipline during a brief, acute period of emergency,

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but perhaps over a prolonged period. The French have never hesitated to die on the barricades for France. They are likely to find it much more difficult to live an unspectacular, austere, and law-abiding life, inadequately remunerated and heavily taxed. In a word, they are no longer required to blow up German trains, but merely to cross their own line by the footbridge, which is something they have never yet learned to do.

The alternatives are more spectacular, but may well involve the disappearance of the parliamentary *régime* and perhaps of democracy. If the Third Force fails, France is left with the choice between Gaullism and Communism, with the uncertainty as to whether the supporters of either will accept the choice of the rival; in other words, with the danger that either will bring revolution, sooner or later. All but the Communist "militants" will be prepared to pay a high price in order to receive Marshall help and avoid the fate of the "Eastern democracies." All but a very few Frenchmen will realise, as they make their choice, that they are setting out on a road which has certain disquieting resemblances to one they trod in 1848 and which, in 1851, led them into a political wilderness from which they escaped only at the cost of further revolution twenty years later.

A POLICY FOR AGRICULTURE

By PETER SELF

THE Agriculture Act, 1947, is a landmark in the chequered history of British agriculture. Under it, the Government assume the responsibility for providing farmers with guaranteed prices and assured markets in perpetuity for three-quarters of their produce. This arrangement is intended to give to farmers a degree of security, and a sense of confidence, that they have not known since the repeal of the Corn Laws a century ago. It is hoped that, thus armed and protected, they will now proceed forthwith to invest new capital, expand production, and raise efficiency. The Minister of Agriculture has publicly stated that, as far ahead as he can foresee, all that the farmers can produce, with the possible exception of oats and sugar-beet, will be purchased by the Government. Thus, not only is the price guaranteed, but the market is more or less unlimited; and the minimum prices which have already been fixed for several years ahead are generous enough to give the majority of farmers a satisfactory profit per unit of output. The stage is set for perpetuating the wartime prosperity of the industry; and even if, eventually, the fixed prices are lowered and quantitative limits placed upon their applicability to some branches of production, nonetheless the industry is in no danger—short of a repeal of the Act, whose main principles have the approval of Opposition as well as Government—of losing its new-found stability.

But generous and comprehensive guarantees to an industry, however desirable, do not by themselves constitute a policy; rather do they make it urgently necessary to formulate a policy for guiding the industry's development. The nation is going to purchase for all time, either directly or indirectly, most of what the farmer can produce. It must therefore take steps to see that the farmer produces what is most needed, in terms both of consumer demand and of the saving of foreign exchange, and that he does so as cheaply and efficiently as possible. More than this, the nation having bought the farmers' produce must ensure that it is utilised and disposed of in the most satisfactory manner, an aim which entails far-reaching control over the marketing, processing, and distribution of home-grown produce. Permanent Government control of food supply is thus implicit in the terms of the Agriculture Act, as well as in the general assurances that have been given by both Government and

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Opposition. The vital question is what shall be the form of this control and in whose interests it shall be administered. A satisfactory policy needs both to improve the quantity and quality of domestic food supply, and also to adjust British agriculture to the availability of food imports and of foreign exchange. I shall deal first with the international aspect of agricultural policy.

The Government's present policy for agriculture is a direct response to the dollar crisis. The aim is to expand domestic food production as rapidly as possible, especially in those directions which are capable of saving the most dollars. Ever since the end of the war, the Government has attempted to restore the numbers of livestock at least to their pre-war level, but their efforts have been persistently thwarted by the world shortage of feedingstuffs. Assumptions on this score have been far too optimistic. The British grain acreage was allowed to decrease considerably, with the result that when imported grain failed to materialise the programme of livestock expansion had to be put into abrupt reverse. On top of this, a year of unsuitable weather reduced the 1947 volume of production to the lowest point since 1943.

Now, reconstruction is to recommence on a safer basis. The main aim, once more, is a large increase in livestock production—for this is the main field for dollar saving. Imported feedingstuffs are expected to become increasingly available and there should be some improvement this year. But the Government is unwilling to take another risk on this score, and it has set new crop targets whose fulfilment will require almost as much land to be put under the plough as was the case in the peak wartime year of 1943. The Government has outlined a five-year programme of expansion, to be completed in 1951-52. It will be necessary in that year for about 8,200,000 acres to be under wheat, oats and barley (taken together) compared with less than 5,200,000 acres before the war. In general the arable acreage will need to be put back on its wartime footing (although the emphasis will be less on wheat and potatoes, and more on barley and linseed). What is asked for is an intensity of production that has not been approached in this country since the eighteen-seventies. The livestock targets for 1951-52, as percentages of the pre-war base, are 150 for eggs, 125 for milk, 110 for beef and veal, 90 for pigmeat, and 78 for mutton and lamb.

Altogether it is intended that the net agricultural output

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(that is the value of produce *ex* the farm, less the cost of imported feedingstuffs) shall be 20 per cent. higher than at present. This is by no means the limit of potential expansion for livestock, although it certainly should be for crops. The pig and sheep population will not be fully restored by 1951, and milk production will be capable of further increase. The value of the net output, due to the greater emphasis on livestock products, will eventually be a great deal higher than in 1943, as well as being far above pre-war.

It is impossible to quarrel with the general objective of expanding the size of British agriculture. However the picture as it is usually painted is far too simple. The amount of foreign exchange which is actually saved, and the cost to the taxpayer of implementing this programme, will depend quite simply upon the relative movement of home-produced and imported food prices. The price index of all main agricultural products (1911-13 = 100) had risen from 130 in 1938 to 286 in July of 1947. The index of imported foodstuffs only has risen during the same period from 110 to 255. The price of both home-produced and imported food has therefore more than doubled since pre-war, and the two price levels have kept roughly in step. Before the war, the price of imported food was appreciably cheaper than that of domestic produce, and it is still so today. There has, however, been little change to date in the relationship of the two price levels.

The crucial question, in the economic sphere, is whether this relationship will continue—or whether from now on the price levels will diverge. In my opinion, the latter event will happen—although it may not do so for a year or two. From 1949 onwards, however, I expect home-produced food to become increasingly dearer in relation to imported food. This movement is likely to go on all the while British agriculture is expanding. In the end its cost per unit of output may be a great deal higher, both absolutely and in relation to the cost of imported food, than was the case before the war.

In offering this opinion, I am assuming that the Government's agricultural policy will be continued along its present lines. The key point in this policy is the payment of guaranteed prices for three-quarters of the farmers' output, which are settled annually in consultation with the National Farmers' Union. A convention is growing up that these prices shall be fixed on a cost-plus basis. This premise is not explicitly accepted by the Minister of Agriculture, who reserves the final right to decide

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prices in the light of all relevant circumstances. However, he has accepted the principle that any appreciable rise in farming costs which takes place between the dates of the annual price reviews shall be passed on, in full and without question, in the shape of price increases. A concession like this, made during the year, cannot be easily withdrawn when the next annual price review comes round. Farming costs are still rising steadily, and the nature of this negotiating machinery does nothing to discourage the process. Farm wages are almost three times what they were in 1938 and may easily rise still further. Indeed, it would be excellent social justice to let them rise further—so long as this is compensated for, to some extent anyhow, by a rise in efficiency instead of being promptly relayed in full either to the consumer in the form of higher prices or to the taxpayer in the form of higher food subsidies.

Moreover the Government is deliberately using the machinery of price increases to stimulate the farmers to higher production. The first step in its expansion programme was to award new and very considerable price increases, varying from 10 to 20 per cent. or higher, for most guaranteed products, as a measure to impart confidence to the industry and to provide it with capital. In addition, new acreage subsidies are to be offered for wheat, rye, potatoes and the ploughing-up of old pastures. The additional cost of the new price schedule will amount initially to around £75 million a year, rising with output. Exact forecasting is impossible; but it is probably not far wrong to assume that—when and if the projected 20 per cent. increase in output is obtained—the total cost of home-grown food will be up by 40 per cent. on its present high level—that is, of course, assuming no further price adjustments are made. The cost per unit of home-grown food is thus still rapidly increasing.

The outlook is very different with food imports. Here the present high cost is due not to the operation of a price guarantee, but to the grave excess of the effective world demand over its supply. This disparity between supply and demand will be steadily, even if slowly, reduced as production is restored in devastated and war-affected regions and as new sources of food supply are opened up in the Empire and elsewhere. Production is running at a very high level in the great food-exporting regions of North and South America, and a large export surplus—possibly larger than before the war—will continue to remain available as demand (internal as well as external demand, in all probability) drops. It seems highly probable therefore that,

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in a few years' time at any rate, world food prices will start on a downward trend which will gather speed as it goes. The shape of things to come can already be seen in the difference in the price of Canadian wheat—which is fixed by a long-term contract that takes account of probable future trends—and Argentine wheat—which is governed exclusively by what the traffic will bear. The latter costs nearly twice as much as the former.

I will admit that one circumstance could defeat this prophecy—namely, if a crop failure in the Middle West due to soil erosion coincided with the maintenance of the present level of high employment and inflation inside the United States, thus driving America to stop exporting and perhaps even to enter the lists as a net purchaser of foodstuffs. This contingency is perhaps unlikely, but it should be taken account of in framing British policy. In the long run, the losses from soil erosion should be balanced by conservation measures and greater efficiency in American production; and in the shorter run, I still believe that the fall of 35 per cent. in British import prices which took place between 1920 and 1921 will be repeated, albeit on a smaller scale.

The saving on foreign exchange, derived from the expansion programme will be equal to the 1951-52 cost of importing those extra products which are, in fact, grown at home in that year. This saving may therefore be less than the £100 million which is the value (at current internal prices) of the increased output which it is hoped to obtain. In so far as this increased segment of production will cost a great deal more to grow here than it would do to import, a heavy new burden will be placed on the taxpayer. The figure for this is impossible to estimate, but speculation might put it at somewhere around £60 to £80 million (in respect of this extra portion of output only).

I do not mean to imply that the Government's policy of expanding British agriculture is wrong in principle. In a world of rational international trade it would be. In such a world, the Government guarantee to British agriculture would still no doubt be sound policy for social and strategic reasons, as well as safeguarding it from the chronic and harmful instability from which it would otherwise suffer. But a price guarantee is one thing—an out-and-out expansionist programme, irrespective of cost, is quite another. Under rational trading conditions, there could be no case for procuring a large extra quantity of food at home if it could be imported far more cheaply. Yet, as I have tried to show, this is precisely what is likely to happen.

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However, rational conditions of world trade neither exist today nor can they be safely forecast for the future. Britain can only import as much food as in the first place is available and as in the second place can be paid for by the export of goods and services. The physical availability of food from overseas is a short-term, rather than a long-term problem; but the means of payment for it is a different matter. British goods will certainly be available for export in sufficient quantities. But whatever the advantages, to both parties, of trading manufactured goods against food imports to the fullest possible extent, the plan will not work if markets are closed to us by import quotas and the like. In this connection, it is necessary to remember that, due to the operation of full employment and social security measures, the potential demand for food inside Britain is and will remain a great deal higher than before the war. To do away with rationing, there needs to be available at least the pre-war volume of food imports *plus* the full output of a greatly expanded domestic agriculture; and the restoration of imports to the pre-war level depends, in its turn on an expansion of exports to at least 75 per cent. above the 1938 volume. Therefore, to secure satisfactory living conditions, *without* expanding British agriculture, requires the attainment of a yet higher export target. Such an achievement is by no means an impossibility—to say it was would be premature pessimism. But Britain has always been extremely vulnerable to world trading conditions; under her new circumstances, this vulnerability is greatly increased and her very existence turns on the inevitably fluctuating fortunes of the export trades. The world is quite liable to collapse into conditions of economic insanity. In all these circumstances, it is a necessary prudence to take all available steps to reduce an economic vulnerability which in any event must be extreme, by growing increased quantities of food at home.

But this policy cannot be pursued regardless of cost. There may come a point when the rising cost of British in relation to imported food, and the consequential sacrifice involved on taxpayer or consumer (or both), puts a heavy strain on the export trades themselves and threatens the very stability of the economy which the programme is designed to support. The Government has to beware of this pitfall, and to stop short of it. This means that it must take care that domestic and world food prices do not get too far out of line.

The only solution is in raising the efficiency, as well as in

increasing the output, of British agriculture. It is not just a matter of replacing imported food with home-grown food; it is, in the long run, equally crucial for the dollar problem whether the extra cost involved is small or great. That there must be some real extra cost in following a programme of expansion seems undeniable; that the cost need be so high as is implied by the new schedule of guaranteed prices I do not believe. The price of food imports will, in my opinion, start falling comparatively soon; need the price of British-grown food actually then rise—and rise considerably? I do not believe it. The expansion of production beyond a certain point involves a rising cost curve, and this point may already have been reached for cereal crops, and perhaps for milk. As regards most livestock, there are preliminary expenses in launching a programme of expansion, but a rise in average costs should not as a rule take place. In any event, it should be possible to obtain such an increase of efficiency—side by side, and in conjunction with, the programme of expansion—as to prevent farm prices at least from exceeding their present level. The lack of any attempt to realise this end, and the apparent acceptance of a permanently rising spiral of costs, constitutes the most serious weakness of agricultural policy at the present time.

I now pass to the purely internal aspect of agricultural policy. How can costs be kept down and efficiency raised? Broadly speaking, there are two possible routes to this objective—that of coercion and that of providing suitable economic pressures and incentives.

The Agriculture Act gives the Minister of Agriculture an array of coercive and advisory powers, including the right to serve directions on and, in the last resort, to dispossess those farmers who fall below a proper standard of efficiency. These powers are formidable in theory, but how extensively will they be used in practice? In the first place they are to be administered in the main not by zealous departmental officials, but by county agricultural committees, a majority of whose members come from panels nominated by the farmers', landowners', and agricultural workers' organizations. From the decision of these committees, the farmer can usually appeal to an independent tribunal, composed of a legal chairman, a farmers' representative and a landowners' representative. This tribunal cannot be overridden by the Minister. At the worst, therefore, a bad farmer gets tried by his peers, with right of appeal, and his peers are not likely to be too hard on him. The industry is not being

disciplined from without, but is being asked to maintain a very modest level of professional competence, determined and imposed by itself.

It is hard to say in any detail what constitutes good farming. Farming techniques are continually on the move, and the best farmers are always a long way ahead of the solid body of traditionalists. Moreover, the applicability of standards of management to a particular farm is a tricky matter, since soil, services, and equipment vary so widely. The low-production farm often has the excuse that it is badly placed and inadequately capitalised (and cannot get new equipment). For all these reasons, it is improbable that the coercive powers of the Minister will do much to raise farming standards, beyond the removal of a small handful of really bad farmers. Much more result is to be expected from the purely advisory activities of the new National Agricultural Advisory Service.

In any event, it is the Government's policy to wheedle, not to coerce, the farmers. Coercion is regarded as undemocratic and unpopular—which it is. In the short run, it is not a paying proposition, because of the mistrust, opposition and sabotage it would create; and in the long run, compulsion on the necessary scale is unthinkable in a democratic country.

It is, of course, true that the Government may have to re-introduce compulsory cropping orders in order to attain its targets of crop production. The Minister hopes to dispense with this measure, but he may find himself without a choice. However, compulsion in this sense does nothing to raise efficiency—quite the opposite; and the same means are not, of course, available for stimulating livestock production.

Therefore the argument returns again to the price issue and to the proper use of economic incentives. In the remainder of this article, I have only space to point to some of the measures which might be taken instead of the (to my mind) dangerous and unsatisfactory device of simply inflating farmers' incomes and hoping that both higher production, and technical improvement, will follow of their own accord. Despite the large wartime increase in mechanisation—instanced especially in the enormous increase in numbers of tractors—it is agreed that British agriculture is seriously undercapitalised. This is especially true of fixed equipment. A majority of farm buildings are outmoded, only a third of farms possess a piped water supply and a very small proportion use electricity for power. The Government has designed its new price schedule with an

eye to giving farmers the finance to increase their stock and improve their equipment. Such deliberate price inflation encourages dangerous expectations for the future; equally, in some cases, it makes the existing turnover too profitable in the present. Surely this is a very costly and unselective way of doing things—especially when the desired equipment is in very short supply? The difference between farmers' profits is enormous. Many already possess ample finance to undertake improvements, if only they could obtain the equipment. Their demand will now be further inflated, whilst the poor farmer—even with the price increase—may hesitate to embark on new ventures and may also find his demands squeezed out.

The old-fashioned method of giving direct subsidies for capital improvement is surely much more satisfactory. These subsidies need to be carefully weighted in favour of those farmers whose need is greatest and whose means are smallest. In addition, they must be designed to promote a switchover of farming into those channels which will save most dollars—the re-equipment of farms so as to handle more cattle deserves especial financial favour. The subsidies need to be designed and administered with considerable ingenuity and skill.

The lay-out of most British farms is also highly unsatisfactory for modern farming purposes. The only effective remedy is to redraw farm boundaries over a wide area, and to do this the whole area should preferably be under single ownership. The Land Commission which has been set up under the Agricultural Act as an expert body for managing state-owned agricultural land has been given some useful powers in this direction. It can undertake experimental schemes for reorganizing farm lay-out in a few sample areas, and it is to be hoped that these powers will be fully utilised. They should, however, be extended. The need to increase the average size of farms, to redraw their boundaries, and to invest substantial new capital is a potent argument for state ownership of the land. Without such a step, progress will be piecemeal and faltering and an appreciable proportion of public money, given in the form of subsidy, will leak into the pockets of private landowners. Outright nationalisation of all the land in the country is not included in the Government's present programme, and it is perhaps best not to attempt it anyhow in one step. What the State could do at once is to purchase large areas of land and, through the medium of the Land Commission, reorganise farming therein on the best modern lines. This would raise

efficiency immediately, set an example to the whole industry, and demonstrate—I hope—some of the advantages of public enterprise.

I turn finally to the vital question of marketing policy. Agriculture is in danger, under present conditions, of getting too far removed both from the needs of the consumer and the capacity of the taxpayer. Farm produce is in fact paid for largely on a cost-plus basis; it then passes through the long and involved chain of marketing, processing, and food distribution and each handler of the produce receives from the Government a guaranteed margin of profit (sometimes for doing nothing). The controlled prices charged to the consumer, which are determined by the Government, bear little relation—either collectively or in the case of individual products—to the costs of production and distribution. The net deficit on the whole operation of food supply—which, as is well-known, is at present running at more than £400 million annually—is simply charged to taxation. There are two particularly vicious features of an unsatisfactory system. No attempt is made to distinguish between producer subsidies and consumer subsidies—so that the real cost of the Government guarantee to British agriculture, and to its individual branches, is left obscure; and there is no mechanism for translating the pattern of consumers' preferences back to the producer so as to persuade him to cater for public taste and so as to secure him an appropriate premium for better-quality production.

The latter point at any rate cannot be properly met so long as consumption is strictly rationed. The recent report of the Lucas Committee which was set up to review the working of the Agricultural Marketing Acts (H.M.S.O. Price 2s.) points the way to the system to be aimed at. It suggests that an appropriate number of Commodity Commissions should be set up, each of which would have full responsibility for the disposal and utilisation of some commodity, or related group of commodities, which attract the Government's price guarantee. By guaranteeing the price in each case, the nation is the real purchaser; and the job of a Commodity Commission would be to dispose of the produce in the most efficient and profitable way so as to reduce the net cost to the taxpayer to a minimum. The committee makes the assumption that this disposal will eventually take place in an open, unrationed market, in competition—in many cases—with imported foodstuffs. In such circumstances, the trading deficit of each Commission would represent the

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economic cost of subsidising its particular branch of domestic production. Each subsidy could then be varied as required by circumstances (which would include the availability of overseas produce), and the Commissions should of course be given at the least a consultative rôle in the fixing of the guaranteed prices to farmers. Moreover, they could be given exclusive responsibility for adjusting prices according to seasonal factors and grades of quality (thus linking production to consumers' preferences), and also perhaps for any scheme for relating the price offered for a commodity to the quantity produced—an arrangement which was carried out under the pre-war Wheat Act and may again be found desirable at some future date.

The nature of their work would make these Commodity Commissions in part trading bodies, part regulatory agencies. Their trading activities would vary in accordance with the circumstances of each product and the efficiency of private enterprise in handling it. Powers should certainly be available for the Commissions to hold stocks and to run processing units, such as canning factories, abattoirs, flour-mills, bacon factories, etc., where the needs of efficiency require. In any event the Commissions, both severally and jointly, would need to take drastic steps to bring about a rationalisation of marketing and distributive channels. I cannot here go into the technical aspects of the marketing and distribution of home-grown food. It is certain, however, that hardly another nation of comparable economic stature is so backward in this respect as is Britain and the scope for improvement is enormous. Inefficient marketing has always been responsible to a considerable extent for the unfavourable price of home-grown produce. Whilst the exigencies of wartime forced the Ministry of Food to take important steps in the right direction, the Ministry has not evolved a satisfactory permanent system of marketing and distribution. Nor, on present showing, does it seem likely to do so. The Ministry, being largely recruited from their ranks, has inevitably too great a tenderness for the distributive trades to do the job well. In any case, as I have tried to show, the marketing of home-grown crops and livestock should be regarded as a gigantic trading operation. There is general agreement that a Government department is not the right body to make the complicated and quick decisions at all levels which the job requires.

The sooner Commodity Commissions of the sort recommended by the Lucas Committee are set up, the better for

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agricultural efficiency. It is essential that their personnel should not be the representatives (official or unofficial) of either producers or distributors. Independent experts should be chosen, in so far as they are available, together with men of business experience in other fields and economists and administrators of proven ability and flexible ideas. The job is an important one, for the Commissions would occupy a key position in relating supply to demand, in promoting farming efficiency, and in reorganizing the whole apparatus of marketing and distribution. They have to initiate a forceful policy in the interests of efficiency and not just hold the ring for some sectional interest.

In conclusion, I must refute the charge that mine is a "taxpayers' policy," designed mainly to reduce the cost of operating the Government's price guarantee to agriculture. This is not so. I do indeed want to get down the costs of both production and distribution—but not at the expense of the farmer, who must and will be guaranteed a decent living, nor at the expense of the consumer, for whom the provision of cheap food has become a vital social service. My economies are to be achieved by installing a greater efficiency into the whole system; and this can only be done if public money is spent with greater care and discrimination, and if the prices paid all the way down the line are brought into closer relation with market demand.

This need not mean that food becomes much dearer. Consumer subsidies for lowering the cost of nutritionally valuable foods such as milk should continue to be paid out, as well as the producer subsidies. Only the two sets of subsidies should be kept carefully distinct. For only in this way can an economic yardstick be found for measuring the efficiency of the several branches of British agriculture, and for guiding their development; and strong economic guidance is essential if the industry is to play a much bigger rôle in the national economy without thereby distorting it or weakening it.

SOCIALISM AND PSEUDO-SOCIALISM

By MICHAEL LINDSAY

HOW to find a satisfactory economic system is one of the most serious challenges which our civilization faces. For better or for worse, modern society has adopted an economy which depends technically on a very highly developed social division of labour and cannot give up this system without a drastic fall in the standard of living or in the population or in both. The problem which has not been solved is how to find a system of organisation which will enable society to make effective use of the technical possibilities of production. But in modern society a government must stand or fall by the extent to which it does manage to keep the economic system functioning with reasonable efficiency. The history of the last thirty years or so would seem to show that no government can retain power in a democratic state which allows the economic system to break down. A breakdown in economic organisation always seems to produce political extremism.

This country is now engaged in an economic experiment of world importance. It is trying to work out a system which can attain some of the advantages which socialism and planned economy seem to offer over capitalism without the authoritarianism and loss of political liberty which have marked the introduction of planned economy in Eastern Europe. This experiment is being seriously endangered by a very fundamental confusion. On the one hand the government is unwilling to take the steps that might make capitalism work, and on the other they have not been willing to face the problems involved in providing a new form of economic organisation which can work better than capitalism.

What is required by the situation is a new outlook on economic policy. The pure free enterprise capitalist system is a theoretical limiting case like the non-viscous fluid or reversible heat engine of natural science. Even the governments which have most believed in *laissez faire* have to some extent controlled and regulated the economic system and now even the United States has a considerable degree of state enterprise and state regulation. But as long as the economic system is predominantly capitalist it has a certain automatic character. Economic adjustments are not made as the result of conscious decisions

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but are the product of numerous individual decisions interacting on the market. Consciously planned economic policies are applied against a background of a self-regulating economic system which is not anyone's responsibility. There may be planned action to remedy deficiencies of the capitalist system or policies designed to control the working of the capitalist system but the assumption behind all economic policy is that an automatically working capitalist system is there to be regulated or to have its deficiencies corrected. This assumption is seldom explicitly stated and is, for that reason, all the more deeply rooted in people's thinking.

There is, however, a limit to the extent to which a basically capitalist system can be controlled and regulated without impairing its qualities of automatic working. It is at this point that a real divergence appears between different views of economic policy. It may be argued that the automatic working of free enterprise capitalism is a more efficient method of regulating the economic system than any other known alternative; that economic control and planning should, therefore, be limited by the consideration that the automatic working of the capitalist system must be left unimpaired; that the losses and hardships which may be involved in adjustments through the automatic working of free markets are a price which it is worth while for the community to pay to secure the general efficiency of free enterprise. This sort of view is generally held in the United States and would be accepted by many conservatives in this country. As against this capitalist view of economic policy, a socialist view would be much more sceptical about the efficiency of free enterprise capitalism and more optimistic about the possibilities of alternative methods of regulating the economic system. It would, therefore, argue that the community should not feel bound to limit economic controls by general principles or to put up with injustices or losses involved in the automatic working of the market system. The basic socialist position is that economic policy should be determined entirely by the criterion, "How can the economic system be run most efficiently for the benefit of the community?", without any limitations in principle on the extent of economic control which this may imply. (The Communist position would differ from this in being very much more dogmatic about the economic changes which this criterion implies.)

A change from the capitalist to the socialist position involves a big change in outlook. First, it involves a willingness to

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accept much greater responsibilities. The repudiation of limitations on the extent of economic control is also the repudiation of any limitation of responsibility for the results of the workings of the economic system. Secondly, many policies whose object was to correct defects of capitalism become meaningless or harmful when powers of economic control exist which could prevent these defects from appearing.

Present economic policy in this country has not accepted the limitations implied by a capitalist policy but it has also failed to make the change in outlook implied by a socialist policy. A good deal of the present economic confusion is due to a refusal to accept responsibilities commensurate with the present degree of economic control and to the persistence of the tendency to think in terms of the background of an automatically working capitalist system. Paradoxically enough it is often the people who reproach the government with not being sufficiently socialistic who are most inclined to advocate policies that are meaningless except under capitalism.

The commonly held view that material controls are more socialist than financial controls, or even that controls in themselves are somehow socialist, is a good example of this confusion in thought. Partly the reaction against the capitalist system in which control by prices and the working of the market is the master has produced a prejudice against using this form of control even as a servant. In fact, if control of any section of the economic system by free enterprise and the market actually gives the most efficient regulation in the interests of the community, then the criterion of socialist policy would indicate that this method of control should be used.

The more common argument is that there is a necessary contradiction between just distribution and regulation by prices. It is continually argued that the regulation of consumption by rationing or licences is a socialist policy and that regulation by prices should be opposed because it must be unfair as between rich and poor. But this argument depends entirely on the assumption that the division of the community into rich and poor is part of the order of nature which cannot be changed. If the distribution of money is determined by the automatic working of the capitalist system which cannot be controlled, then it is quite reasonable to argue that just distribution can only be obtained by methods which ignore differences in money. However, at the other extreme, a completely controlled socialist economy would simply be pursuing contradictory policies if it

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distributed money incomes on one pattern and then tried to nullify this by a different distribution of real incomes through rationing. If the distribution of money can be controlled, then it is not reasonable first to allow some people to have much more money than is considered socially desirable and then to take a lot of trouble to prevent them spending it on anything. Under present conditions the question whether a socially desirable distribution of real income can best be secured by financial controls or by rationing should depend on considerations of practical convenience and cannot be decided on general principles from socialist policy.

There may be a case for rationing some commodities even in an economy with complete control over the distribution of money. It might quite reasonably be decided that everyone should have an equal share of certain basic necessities even though there should be a fairly wide range of incomes to provide incentives or for other reasons. These two objectives may be incompatible without rationing. To secure a reasonably equal distribution of, say, meat or fats under present conditions in this country by purely financial controls would demand a very far going equalisation of money incomes. This provides a case for the rationing of basic necessities of life, at least in abnormal times, and this is the kind of rationing which can in practice be done with fair honesty and efficiency.

The argument that socialist policy should work through material controls has also been influenced by a capitalist tendency to ignore social costs. The only costs which show in the national budget are those of administering the controls. But suppose that the government also had to pay private firms and individuals for the cost of the clerical work needed to comply with controls and to pay damages in all cases where controls caused losses through delays or confusion. These are all perfectly definite costs to the community even though the government does not pay for them. The government is behaving on capitalist, not socialist, principles if it ignores costs because it can push their incidence on to other people. If a socialist economy went in for really accurate cost accounting people should be paid for the time they have to wait in queues. The fact that private firms decide their policies without reference to the part of the real social costs involved in their actions for which they themselves do not have to pay is rightly held as a defect of capitalism which could be corrected under socialism. But a government which neglects the real social costs of its

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actions is behaving in exactly the same way as a private capitalist firm.

In fact, a great deal is already done to regulate the distribution of money. The spendable income left in the hands of surtax payers is now only 3.3 per cent. of the national income as against 7.2 per cent. before the war, and even then there was a considerable degree of control. However this money is spent it cannot produce a very big diversion of national resources. The group which can really afford to disregard restrictions imposed by prices is a very small one. Less than 1,000 people had spendable incomes over £4,000 in 1945-46. If this were the complete picture it would not be necessary to go much further to produce a distribution of money incomes with no more inequality than was necessary from considerations of social or economic policy. It is probable that the differences in spendable incomes in this country are already less than those which the Russians consider necessary to provide economic incentives.

In fact this picture is not complete because there is a great deal of personal expenditure from sources which are not liable to tax or from incomes which have evaded tax payment. This provides a reason for continued regulation by non-monetary controls. But a socialist policy of securing the desired control of real incomes most effectively and at the least social cost would almost certainly lead to a concentration of effort on closing the gaps in the control of money expenditure with a corresponding relaxation of other controls. For one thing the non-monetary controls provide the foundations for the black markets which are a big source of large tax evading incomes.

The failure to face the responsibilities implied in a socialist policy show in many ways, such as the long delay in the wages policy which is a necessary condition of economic stability under conditions of full employment. However, to keep within the limits of one article, it is simplest to discuss the question in terms of one industry, namely electricity supply, where the technical problem is comparatively straightforward.

The demand for electricity, at present prices is greater than can be supplied from existing generating capacity. Generating capacity cannot rapidly be increased so that demand must somehow be restricted. Also a large part of the demand is from domestic consumers who are not only consuming much more than before the war but also a larger share of the total.

The action taken to meet this situation has been : appeals to

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the public to reduce consumption (unenforced regulations such as the ban on electric heating during the summer would come in the same category); load shedding; and, more recently, staggered hours. Appeals for reduced consumption, in so far as they are effective, amount to rationing on the principle of maximum allocation to the consumers with minimum public spirit. Load shedding is an arbitrary limitation of supply imposed, with no regard for priorities, on groups of consumers chosen by the largely random principle of location in particular areas. Staggered hours involve a worsening of working conditions in many of the industries into which it is most socially desirable to attract labour.

A government acting on socialist principles, which accepted the responsibility of seeing that the economic system was efficiently run in the public interest, would long ago have felt that this situation was intolerable. It is fairly certain that considerations of national interest would lead to priority for the needs of industry. This would mean that load shedding would be ruled out except in emergencies and that staggered hours would be considered very undesirable. The problem would then be how to reduce domestic demand. Appeals for reduced consumption are not effective and, even if they were, are bad in principle. A considerable proportion of the public are willing to make sacrifices for the community without bothering too much about contributing more than their fair share. But it is one thing to appeal to public spirit to meet an emergency when it is more important to get something done quickly than to count the exact cost or work out its distribution; it is quite another thing to ask the more public spirited section of the community to accept a definite system under which they contribute more than their fair share in order that the less public spirited section may contribute less. A society which systematically penalizes public spirit in this way is likely to end by destroying it; and when public spirit has declined to the point where most people try to evade even their fair share of obligations to the community, society is well on the way to disintegration.

The arguments against any effective action to deal with the problem have nearly all assumed that the government is responsible for the results of its actions but not for the results of its inaction. Possible plans have not been judged according to whether their results would be better than the existing situation but by whether, in themselves, they would be completely fair

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between different classes of consumers. Whether the situation produced by inaction may not be still more unfair has apparently been considered irrelevant. This again seems to be a case where policy has been based on capitalist assumptions. Under a capitalist system based on free competition it is very important that government action should not be unfair between competitors while the government is not held responsible for any unfairness which results from the workings of capitalism or any loss to the community caused by inaction. This produces a criterion for economic policy in a capitalist society which gives more weight to securing equal incidence in the effects of government action than to the interests of the community as a whole. This criterion has even been used to justify the infliction of completely unnecessary losses on one section of the community to compensate for unavoidable sacrifices imposed on another section. For example, during the fuel crisis last year, the use of power produced by windmills was prohibited because of the coal shortage and the public was not allowed to have any weekly periodicals because some of them were printed by electric power.

A socialist approach to the problem of electricity distribution would not accept this criterion but would argue, "The national interest demands that domestic consumption must be reduced enough to avoid load shedding and staggered hours; how can this be done with the least unfairness?" If the problem is put in this way it should not be insoluble. For example the present system of charging under which prices fall with increasing consumption might be reversed and a low price charged for a basic quota and sharply rising rates for excess consumption. The only complication compared with existing practice would be the fixing of basic quotas by some formula based on the size of household and the use of electric cookers, etc., which could not be replaced by devices not using electricity. In any scheme of this kind there would be some anomalies, for example the problem of shilling-in-the-slot meters. But the question would be whether the disadvantages of such anomalies were less than those of load shedding, staggered hours and appeals to public spirit. There must be many possible schemes which would make them much less.

The bog of the rich consumer who would be undeterred even by penal prices does not provide a valid argument. If the community has allowed some people to have more money than is considered socially desirable and it is not prepared to take

it away from them, the question is how can the claims on social production represented by this money most easily be satisfied? If rich people are prepared to pay far more than the ordinary price for electricity, the community can satisfy their claims on it at less cost by selling them electricity than by selling them things for which they would only pay normal prices.

There has also been a curious failure to realise many of the advantages which even quite limited economic planning should have shown over capitalism. The advantages which socialism should theoretically show are that greater foresight can be exercised for the benefit of the community and that different parts of the economic system can be more effectively co-ordinated. But when there was obviously going to be a shortage of generating capacity and scarcity of fuel, local authorities were allowed to put up "all-electric" houses and the Ministry of Supply concentrated on making electric fires which are the least efficient of all systems of domestic heating. Again there has been no attempt to co-ordinate the housing and electricity supply programmes to secure the important permanent fuel economies which can be secured by combining electricity generation and the supply of low grade heat for central heating and hot water supply.

There has been nothing exceptional about electricity supply apart from the comparative simplicity of its basic problems. A similar analysis of most other fields of economic control would show a similar failure to apply the basic socialist principle that the economic system should be run for the benefit of the community and similar confusion caused by the retention of essentially capitalist principles in determining what was supposed to be a socialist policy.

A more general problem is whether the present degree of economic control by the government can be carried out efficiently without very far reaching changes in organisation and methods. The controls now exercised over many sections of the economic system are so detailed that they practically involve the government in participation in management. But the controls are administered by organisations whose traditions include a respect for precedent and an unwillingness to admit mistakes and are applied by legal or quasi-legal regulations. The result is both bad management and bad law. The duty of a manager is to attain the results which form the objectives of his organisation as effectively as possible. The actions implied by this will seldom fit any system of rules and precedents.

SURVEYS

PUBLIC OPINION: ATTITUDES TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

DURING the air-raids of 1940-41 Mass-Observation units visited most of the major blitz-towns of Britain immediately after the raid, and were sometimes still there during a subsequent follow-up attack. After the original "blitz" on Coventry, Tom Harrisson, who had just returned from installing a Mass-Observation team there, gave a postscript to the nine o'clock news, in which he remarked on the absence of any spontaneous demand for reprisals among the bombed population. The attitude of those who now say of the German people "They brought it on themselves. Let them suffer" owes its persistence in part to the offensive morale and reprisal-mindedness which was then getting under way. It is of more than academic interest to recall what really happened.

In a *post-mortem* on the reprisals issue, written for the *Cambridge Review* six months later, Harrisson recalled published reactions to this broadcast, and summarised Mass-Observation experience during eight months' blitz-town study.* We quote from the unedited Ms.:

"It was with Coventry that the press and newsreel uproar began. The immediate assumption of journalists and commentators was that the people of Coventry were screaming for the same thing to be done back on Germany. Thus the B.B.C. 6 p.m. news bulletin next day opened as follows:

'This evening's best news of the war in the air—particularly for the people of Coventry—is that squadrons of British bombers last night made a terrific raid on the city of Hamburg.'

Hilde Marchant occupied one of the biggest headlines ever used in the *Daily Express*, and a lot of subsequent column-space, to announce:

'The Whole of Coventry cries BOMB BACK AND BOMB HARD.'

I only know what I saw and heard within a few hours, and what my staff of investigators there reported continuously for many weeks afterwards. As it is my job to try honestly to report the state of public opinion, in order to avoid any subjective bias I naturally said, in broadcasting about Coventry, that I heard no demand for reprisals there. This inflamed journalists and politicians who had staked 100 per cent. verbiage on Coventry's reprisal feeling. Hilde Marchant wrote a furious article, inferring that such a reflexion of local opinion was 'a squeamish, sentimental outcry.' Writing in the *News Chronicle*, Mr. A. J. Cummings, who has a strong personal feeling in favour of reprisals, and has constantly urged them in his column, remarked:

* It is symptomatic of the social pressures of the time that Harrisson found it necessary to make a sort of inverted apologia for the "poorer sections of the community" in the blitz towns, who, after a heavy raid "are so upset and their reactions so personal and passive, that their whole current of feeling is not in the dynamic direction of vengeance." Contemporary Mass-Observation reports are as near-objective as anything published at the time contrived to be. But, in retrospect, it is clear that mass-observers were not entirely immune from the subjective bias of their own offensive morale when interpreting the morale of others.

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'In the Saturday evening broadcast I heard it suggested by an observer who had paid a brief visit to Coventry that Coventry did not want a reprisal. Who, I wonder, told him that?'

Note the use of the adjective *brief*, to infer that the visit was therefore inadequate. I was particularly amused to find that A. J. Cummings hadn't been there at all.

I was in Coventry again immediately after the big April raid, and still there when the third big raid developed on Good Friday evening. During the whole of that time neither I nor any of my assistants heard a single person suggest reprisals, or anything like them. That has been our experience, too, in Bristol, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Clydebank, Swansea, Cardiff, where we have collected many hundreds of interviews and thousands of verbatim conversations, without finding a single case of spontaneous reprisal demand from the people actually inhabiting the heavily-blitzed areas."

Mass-Observation regularly found the demand for vengeance coming, not from those who had themselves suffered or seen suffering, but from those who had acquired their knowledge at second hand. The more qualitative and non cross-sectional assessment which Mass-Observation made from spontaneous talk is fully borne out by statistical questionnaire treatment. In April, 1941, after the reprisal campaign had had six months' run, a zonal survey by the British Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll)* found 53 per cent. of Britons saying they would approve if the R.A.F. adopted a policy of bombing the civilian population of Germany, 38 per cent. disapproving, and 9 per cent. undecided. In wartime, this extent of disapproval of a measure which had received considerable leadership support was evidence of very substantial resistance to the reprisal idea. Regional differences were major and unambiguous. The proportion who said they would *disapprove* of civilian bombing by the R.A.F. were:

	Per cent.
Inner London	47
Glasgow, Tyneside	43
Midlands	40
S.E. England and outer London	37
West Riding	28
North Riding, Cumberland, Westmorland	15

B.I.P.O. commented:

"People in heavily-blitzed areas are noticeably *less* in favour of reprisal bombing, than those in areas which have escaped the worst of the raids on this country. . . . It would seem that sentiment in favour of reprisals is almost in inverse ratio to the amount of bombing experienced."

The demand for indiscriminate revenge was thus, in those early days, predominantly a demand for revenge of *others'* sufferings. Those who had themselves suffered least often favoured treating the enemy population in the same way.

* Results published in the *News Chronicle*, May 2nd. Additional data kindly supplied by the editor at the time.

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1942.

Almost a year later Mass-Observation made a survey among its National Panel of observers (a predominantly middle and artisan class group of more than average intelligence), in which they were asked to say what was their present attitude towards the German people, and whether it had changed since war began. Statistically, opinion among this group divided as follows:

	Per cent.
Favourable	54
Moderately antagonistic	23
Very antagonistic	20
Unclassified	3*

Moderate antagonism was taken to cover general dislike, disappointment and distrust, but not explicit hatred and vindictiveness. "Very antagonistic" covered generalised hatred, belief in retribution, in punishment of the whole nation, and feelings that the German people were not only to blame, but incurable. Half of the "very antagonistic" group admitted to a change of attitude during the war. In all, 25 per cent. said that their views had changed, all but 1 per cent. in the direction of greater antagonism. Although those who made a clear distinction between people and leaders were in a majority, it was clear from replies that many of them *believed themselves to be in a small minority*.

Of special interest today are the admitted, self-observed, changes in attitude. Although a quarter were aware of a change, however, many changes had undoubtedly taken place unnoticed. Casual disclaimers of more extreme feelings which were assumed to be widespread give evidence of a mental climate which is already difficult to recapture. One man begins as follows:

"Although I feel that rationally the German people must not all be put into the class of wild animals that must be destroyed . . ."

Here are two specimens of hardening attitude:

"I used to think that the German people weren't altogether to blame for the war, but that they had been duped and their self-pity played on by their leaders. But since the war started I have decided that any feelings of pity I might have for them as *people* must be over-ruled by the fact that they are as a *nation*, cruel, aggressive and morally decadent, and that they are a danger to the world, and that it would be best for us to exterminate every German, even children of school age."

"I have deep and real hatred of the German people, and think the best German is a dead one. My attitude has changed since the war began. At first I thought that only Hitler and his party were to blame, and that on the whole the German people weren't too bad. But now, especially after the terrible things that have happened in Poland and Russia, I think they are always the same and always have been."

Another man, who says that at the beginning of the war he thought the German people were "more sinned against than sinning," claims to have retained this view for about nine months, but then:

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" . . . I woke up and eliminated from my system all the ridiculous ideas about the German man and woman being 'a decent person just like you and me.' There was a saying in the last war which should never have been forgotten—'Once a German always a German.' This is almost eternal truism, for I am convinced now that the average German revels in brutality and perfidiousness, taking the view that ends justify means."

This type of attitude was expressed by about one in ten of a predominantly intelligent group who, from the very fact that they were helping voluntarily in Mass-Observation's work, might be assumed to have more than average interest in keeping their own minds clear of the processes they were called upon to record in others'.

Vindictive Peace

A repeat of the same question to the same group a year later, however, showed no significant shift of opinion. Mass-Observation surveys among the general public on what should be done with Germany after the war showed no consistent trend with time either towards, or away from, the desire for a vindictive peace. The "normal" vindictive figure between 1940 and 1945 was in the region of one person in four, but it tended to be higher when atrocities and military reverses coincided. Fairly consistently throughout the war this proportion made suggestions like the following:*

"Shoot them all because they have made others suffer so much" (F35C).

"We ought really to kill them all, but I suppose we can't do that. I think they ought to pay for all the misery they've caused" (F20C).

"Make them pay for what they've done. They deserve to" (M55D).

"I'd like to annihilate the lot of them. They've always been a menace to the world in general. . . ." (M25B).

After nearly three years of peace it is difficult to recall the atmosphere in which such comments were commonplace, or to imagine a middle-aged woman seriously meditating aloud:

"Well, in my opinion they should all be killed. But still, that's rather drastic really. Because, after all, they've got fathers and mothers, haven't they? They're just brought up that way—they're brought up to believe that war's the only way to end evil—but it isn't, is it?"

Apart from revenge, one of the *concrete* suggestions most often made was that Germany should be split up into small states. Typically:

"Slice it up" (M25D).

"There's only one thing to do, and that's to leave it to America and ourselves to split them up into little states, so that they can't arm again. Police it right the way through. It's the only thing we can do" (M30D).

"Cut it up into small states and let each state govern itself, so that they'll be busy with their own squabbles" (M45D).

* Symbols indicate sex, age and class: M—Male. F—Female. B—Middle Class. C—Artisan class. D—Unskilled working class.

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comment, and suggests a deliberate turning away from the German problem. In a survey made this winter among the National Panel, several people remark on their own tendency not to think about Germany:

"I swing between not thinking about them at all, and thinking we cannot let them starve, or really do without them. We cannot write off a whole nation. We need their brains."

"In spite of taking a deep interest in world affairs, I find it almost impossible to have any clear thoughts about the German people. I read a lot about the German diet, and the awful conditions, but very little seems to be written about the Germans themselves. I certainly do not hate them, yet I have no particular love for them. I should like to know what the significance of this is, because I am very interested in the situation in France and Italy, and even in the Balkans, but I cannot work up much interest in Germany."

One reason why, in the present transition stage, strong feeling seems notably lacking is the very considerable readjustment that many of those now favourably disposed have had to make in their attitude, and the absence of any target for the aggressive feelings of those who retain their wartime hates. Here are two people, a doctor and a housewife, failing to come to any clear conclusion:

1. "I have a complex about the Germans. Pity for their misery when Gollancz and the better newspaper men report it. Pleasure when I think what they brought to the rest of Europe. However, it appears to *pay* to act Christianly—i.e., to let them reconstruct so that they can produce and not have to be supported by us. That, plus improvement in our coal position, would put Europe on its feet. But the Germans will always hate us. I don't feel inclined to send them any of my rations. However, the guilty feeling returns again, and I wonder should we let them stew in their own juice, as they are doing at present. . . . Conclusion: indecision."

2. "I'm puzzled. One part of me says 'Remember Belsen,' and suchlike. The other part says we'll have to forget and build up. Then one hears of Naziism not being dead, and one feels one can't be too strict. I am all at sea about Germans. . . ."

And a journalist of 25, who saw Belsen:

"Three years and more ago I had my answer pat, and I don't suppose it would have changed much—but I saw Belsen a few hours after the first troops got in there. Since then my views of the German people have been so conflicting that I can say almost nothing which I would not disagree with almost immediately I had written it."

Few express the conflict in any such clear-cut way, or indeed *say* they hold conflicting views at all. But from the way attitudes have developed over eight years of war and peace it seems fairly clear that some such feelings lie behind many pat and flat formal expressions of sympathy today. The statistical index has shifted towards "favourable." There is a long way to go before it registers "friendly."

H. D. WILLCOCK.

RECENT FRENCH BOOKS

The massive and great general history, published by the Presses Universitaires de France under the direction of Professors Louis Halphen and Philipp Sagnac appears to be completed now (*Peuples et Civilisations. Histoire générale*). Two recent volumes cover *La Fin de l'Ancien Régime et la Révolution Américaine* (1763–1789) published in 1941 and reprinted in 1947, and *Démocraties et Capitalisme* (1848–1860), also first published in 1941 and now out of print. The former volume is by Sagnac, the latter by Professor Pouthas. Both volumes are equally brilliant. They certainly supersede the respective volumes of the Cambridge Modern History. Both authors penetrate deeply into the socio-economic framework of the 18th and 19th Centuries without neglecting the political and cultural developments. This stress on economic history is perhaps the greatest merit of these volumes. Professor Sagnac's pages on the social, economic, and moral transformations of 18th Century England are of particular value to British readers. His book leads us to the threshold of the French Revolution of 1789. The following sentences give an idea of the ecumenical perspective with which this eminent historian writes: "L'état est en train, dans les grandes monarchies administratives et bureaucratiques, de réaliser l'ambitieux dessein de s'emparer de toutes les forces matérielles et spirituelles de la société. Il y procède avec continuité en Prusse, en Russie, dans la monarchie des Habsbourg, en Espagne. En France, on n'a eu jusqu'alors que des tentatives, abandonnées, puis reprises, suivant les caprices de la politique, mais qui seront renouvelées au jour, quand il n'y aura plus ni Parlements, ni noblesse, ni Église, ni grande propriété. Cette conception de l'État unificateur, directeur de l'éducation, de la religion, qui serait maître de la pensée même des sujets, se heurte à une autre conception formulée par les philosophes français, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Turgot et les encyclopédistes, comme aussi par les théoriciens anglais depuis Locke: L'État fait pour l'individu, et non l'individu pour l'État, quoique nul ne songe à contester la nécessité de sacrifier les intérêts particuliers au bien général. C'est en somme, la conciliation des droits de l'homme avec les besoins essentiels de la société. D'un côté, l'absolutisme le plus complet, de l'autre, la liberté et l'égalité des droits des citoyens, tempérés et limités par l'utilité générale. C'est pourquoi, en France, les philosophes et les élites nourries de leur doctrine veulent abattre l'absolutisme de l'État. Ils ont sous les yeux, vers 1789, l'exemple de deux régimes politiques étrangers: le régime anglais et le régime américain. Tous deux exercent sur leurs esprits une grande influence; mais ils n'acceptent, en fin de compte, aucun des deux modèles car ils ne veulent ni du premier, qui donna tout à l'aristocratie, ni du second, qui ne vaut que pour un État fédéral: ils emprunteront à l'Angleterre et à l'Amérique, mais en créant une constitution adaptée aux circonstances où les événements les placeront." Apart from the modern idea of the state which this epoch has transmitted to us there is another important contribution which this quarter of the century before the French Revolution has made towards our contemporary consciousness: the idea of nationality. The latter is still embedded in a wider European or humanitarian attitude: "La Révolution Française," writes Professor Sagnac, "sera à la fois nationale et humaine."

M. Pouthas' volume must probably be regarded as the most com-

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prehensive general history of the period from 1848 to 1860. Many apparently historical works which have been written on the Revolution of 1848 and its aftermath suffer from partisanship. M. Pouthas comes nearest to the substance of an epoch which in Alexis de Tocqueville's *Recollections* has found its most objective contemporary witness. It is in sentences like these that Professor Pouthas' mastership reveals itself: "Dans l'Europe de 1851, triomphent donc les forces du passé et les traditions historiques. Triomphe d'apparence; la révolution a trop profondément labouré l'Europe, et si la terre est rase à nouveau, des semences y ont été déposées, qui donneront une végétation nouvelle. Les auteurs de la révolution de 1848 étaient une élite d'intellectuels. Leurs doctrines démocratiques exigeaient qu'ils appelassent au pouvoir les masses. Mais les masses n'avaient point l'éducation politique, que demandaient l'exercice du suffrage et la lutte des partis. Les révolutionnaires furent les victimes de leurs théories, qui supposaient une forme plus évoluée de société. La révolution de 1848 fut ainsi la liquidation d'une idéologie et d'une génération. Son expérience a rendu possible l'avènement de la société moderne; celle-ci naît, non pas d'elle, après elle."

From these two volumes of general history we turn to three historical works of a more specialised character. Édouard Dolléans has now completed his *Histoire du Mouvement Ouvrier* (1871-1936) of which the first volume dealing with the period from 1830-1871 was published in 1936 (Librairie Armand Collin, Paris 1947). M. Dolléans does not quite fulfil what he promises. His work is not a history of the working class movement, but rather a preliminary study. The author writes in some detail on the French socialist movement, but his treatment of the workers' movements outside the French frontiers is extremely sketchy. It is, for example, surprising that an historian of M. Dolléans's stature has next to nothing to say on the history of German socialism which offers so many lessons to the sociologist. M. François Goguel's two volumes on *La Politique des Partis sous la IIIe République* (Aux Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1946), are full of weighty and interesting material though I disagree with his fundamental thesis. He attempts to prove that the French party structure is governed by a dichotomy which he signalises by the characteristics "Order" and "Movement." The author knows, of course, that this thesis contradicts what Thibaudet and André Siegfried have taught us on French party politics, but he nevertheless clings to it. Thus his work is seriously jeopardised by over-simplification.

Another great work has recently been completed: Georges de Lagarde's *La Naissance de L'Esprit Laïque au Declin du Moyen Age* of which the first two volumes, so admired by all students of the transition from the medieval world to the modern age, had been published in 1934. M. de Lagarde has now added four concluding volumes to the first two. Vol. III *Secteur Social de la Scolastique* and Vol. IV *Ockham et son Temps*, both published in 1942 (Éditions Béatrice, Saint-Paul-Trois-Châteaux); the last two volumes: Vol. V, *Ockham: Bases de Départ* and Vol. VI, *Ockham: Le Monde et le Droit* appeared in 1946. (Éditions Béatrice). These four books have all the merits of their two predecessors: superb mastery of the most difficult detail without losing sight of the great trend of the argument. I know of no other work of the same high standard which has brought us the late Middle Ages so near. It is impossible to indicate here the riches the reader will find in these volumes. There are, for example, fifty pages devoted to

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a digest of *La Sociologie Thomiste* which are magnificent. M. de Lagarde builds with the experienced hand of a great architect the dome of Thomist sociology: "Philosophie de principes. Les lignes de force sont tracées, Les détails restent à débattre. Mais l'ensemble est à la fois original et cohérent... Il s'agit, en fait du premier essai tenté dans le monde occidental chrétien pour jeter les bases d'une philosophie sociale digne de ce nom." It is Ockham who destroys the unity of the Thomist system. Compared with Ockham, Marsilius of Padua's philosophy reminds M. de Lagarde of Hitler's primitivity. Thus he writes of Ockham: "Il ne s'agit pas de cette grossière et enfantine opposition entre le monde positif et l'au-delà; c'est au coeur même du monde positif que la distinction est imposée en vertu des lois dictées par ce Dieu que l'on situe dans l'au-delà. C'est lui qui a cerné d'un trait si précis et si net le petit corps des préceptes qui représentent sa présence permanente au milieu de nous, c'est lui qui en a distingué tout le reste en l'abandonnant à notre absolue autonomie. C'est donc lui qui a lui-même défini les bases de l'autonomie laïque en face des prétentions abusives du pouvoir religieux. On ne pouvait avec plus de science dissocier ce que la pensée médiévale avait si obstinément et si consciencieusement uni. On ne pouvait mieux préparer les voies au rationalisme laïcisant des temps modernes." This monumental work replaces whole libraries which have been written on the end of the medieval world.

I have no other excuse to offer that I mention now two books on Proudhon and a fine volume of hitherto unpublished letters by him than my own predilection for this great lonely figure of Western socialism to whom someone ought to devote some time the monograph which he deserves. Sainte-Beuve's *Proudhon* has been republished by Alfred Costes (Paris, 1947). It is still the best book on Proudhon though it has unfortunately not been carried further than 1848. Madeleine Amoudruz's study, *Proudhon et l'Europe. Les Idées de Proudhon en politique étrangère* (Éditions Domat Montchrestien 1945) is a well-informed and scholarly short book which is full of interesting material. Proudhon's *Lettres au Citoyen Rolland* (1858-1862), (Grasset 1946) is invaluable for any future adequate interpretation of Proudhon's life and work. This volume contains some of the finest pages Proudhon has ever written: "J'aurai dans six semaines 52 ans. Comme j'ai travaillé dès avant l'âge de dix, je puis dire qu'il y a plus de quarante-deux ans que je lutte contre la pauvreté, la mauvaise fortune; que je me dévoue au salut des autres, que je vis de privation et que je me sacrifie à ce qui me semble la justice et la vérité en pure perte. J'ai eu le malheur de déplaire à bien du monde; il y a eu de ma faute, je le crois; mais il n'y a pas eu rien que de ma faute. Comment se fait-il que je sois si abandonné, si seul?" Proudhon not only talked socialism, he lived it.

So far we have discussed mainly works of history. Its theme is perpetual change. Yet Frenchmen have not been idle to inquire into the persisting element of the historic process, which is man and his essence. The harvest of French philosophy and psychology has been immense in recent years. A book, for example, like René Le Senne's *Traité de Morale Générale* (Presses Universitaires de France, second revised edition, 1947) is without parallel in this country. A sketch of historically important moral philosophies is joined to a systematic treatise of ethics. I found the latter section somewhat conventional, but the bibliographical material which the volume contains is


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extremely valuable. Jean Piaget has published another of his great monographs on aspects of child psychology: *La Formation du symbole chez l'Enfant: Imitation, jeu et rêve. Image et représentation* (Delachaux & Niestlé, Neuchâtel et Paris, 1945). With the growing understanding that political beliefs are of mythical character, this book on the formation of child symbolism is of greatest interest to the student of politics.

On the latest fashion in philosophy, existentialism, I recommend the sober and clear book by Paul Foulqué (Presses Universitaires de France, 1947). "L'existentialisme," writes M. Foulqué, "a bien mis en relief ces idées qui ne sont, somme toute, bien qu'un peu oubliées, que des vérités de sens commun." It is wholesome to be told that all great philosophers from Plato onwards have been existentialists, even if M. Sartre had never been taught to hold a pen. The French mind is restive in spite of its rationalism or perhaps just because of it.

French thought, like French politics, is still mankind's greatest laboratory. It appears that already Montesquieu has realised the advantages and the disadvantages of this strange diversity in the French spiritual and political make-up. "Une des choses que l'on doit remarquer en France, c'est l'extrême facilité avec laquelle elle s'est toujours remise de ses pestes, de ses maladies, de ses dépopulations, et avec quelle ressource elle a toujours soutenu ou même surmonté les vices intérieurs de ses divers gouvernements. Peut-être en doit-elle la cause à cette diversité même, qui a fait qu'un mal n'a jamais pu prendre assez de racine pour lui ôter entièrement le fruit de ses avantages naturels."

J. P. MAYER



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BOOK REVIEWS

THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE CHANGING STATE. By H. R. G. GREAVES. (Harrap. 240 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE REFORM OF THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE. A REPORT BY A SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE FABIAN SOCIETY. (Fabian Publications and V. Gollancz. 61 pp. 2s. 6d.)

ORGANISATION AND METHODS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE STAFFING OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. FIFTH REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ESTIMATES. (H.M.S.O. 4s.)

OUR ability to overcome the difficulties which beset us in Britain at the present crucial stage of our history will depend in large measure on the efficiency, creativeness and adaptability of the central government. It is therefore fortunate that some first-rate thinking is being done on the civil service and the organisation in which it works. For it is quite certain that considerable reforms are needed in personnel policy and public administration generally; and while some of these are at least partly in sight, others are at present entirely beyond the horizon of those in high places who decide these matters.

Mr. Greaves's book and the Fabian report cover much common ground. They are both mainly concerned with the administrative class and the professional grades; they both discuss recruitment, training, transfer, retirement, morale and welfare. They both deal with Treasury control; the relations between public boards or corporations and government departments; the application to peace-time economic purposes of the joint staff system which was successfully developed by the Service Departments during the war; and with research and public relations. Yet each makes a distinctive contribution on these and other matters. *The Civil Service in the Changing State* surveys the field more broadly than is possible within the confines of a brochure of 60 pages. Its treatment of the problem is more substantial. The Fabian report, on the other hand, is based on a wider knowledge of government departments and greater practical experience since it is the work of a number of civil servants who have served both in war and peace.

Mr. Greaves opens with a historical account of the evolution of the civil service in the 19th century. He analyses the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms by the light of contemporary needs and subsequent developments. The next chapter is devoted to an evaluation of the administrative class, in which the author gives not only his own views but those of informed critics in recent years. He emphasises the absurdity of the theory of interchangeability between members of the Treasury classes unless regard is paid to the personal attributes of each official considered in relation to the qualities required for each job (pages 57-8). In this chapter the author remarks that "the high barrier to promotion from the lower to the upper division of the service has prevented the replenishment of the latter by people of different experience. . . . Undoubtedly an effect has been to strengthen the tendency for the higher ranks to be recruited from a closed caste, socially as well as educationally. . . ." This statement is not borne out by a table in the Fabian report (page 29) showing from a representative sample that in 1946 the promotees from other grades numbered 6 compared

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with 17 direct entrants among the permanent secretaries; 17 compared with 26 among deputy secretaries; 48 compared with 64 among under secretaries; 239 compared with 201 among assistant secretaries; and 359 compared with 228 among principals. The point made by the Fabian group is that promotions from other grades were made too late to be conducive to the overall efficiency of the service, and in such a manner as to destroy the proper pyramid of promotion.

An important proposal made by the Fabian report with the object of enabling men to reach the higher posts before they are too old is that the promotion should take place only from certain age-groups. Thus the "promotion zone" for an assistant secretary would be 32-40 years of age; for an under secretary 35-49; for a deputy head or head of a department 40-52 years. The corollary of this is retirement at an earlier age than at present for those who do not get promoted. Hence a principal at 45, an assistant secretary at 52 or an under secretary at 55, would become ineligible for further promotion and would also become liable to compulsory retirement on a proportionate pension, subject to retention in special cases. This is the system which exists in the Navy; and while it prevents the lower ranks of officers from being filled by elderly disappointed men, it inevitably results in large numbers of lieutenant-commanders and commanders who have spent 20 or 25 years in the Navy being thrown out of the service in the prime of life, with a small pension and few qualifications for obtaining work other than odd jobs such as the secretaryship of a golf club. The Fabian report makes no attempt to estimate the social and human costs of this policy.

Mr. Greaves and the Fabian writers are rightly anxious to lower the barriers between the administrative class and the professional, executive and specialist classes. They make many useful suggestions for interchange between departments and public corporations, local authorities, overseas posts and even private business. One would like to add international organisations such as U.N.O., the International Labour Office or the International Civil Aviation Organisation. Neither study mentions the need for attempting to plan the careers of civil servants: nothing of the sort is at present done.

Full recognition is given in both publications to the immense importance of scientific and technical work in modern administration. Mr. Greaves devotes an entire chapter to the growth of the specialist services. Perhaps he accepts a little too readily the belief that the assimilation of the scientific civil service to the administrative class has been generally adopted. Even the Barlow report made this difficult by not aligning salaries of scientists and administrators above the initial stages. The views of establishment divisions as to what constitutes work for which scientists are eligible constitutes a further barrier. Much of the more responsible work in public administration to-day requires a combination of scientific or technical knowledge and administrative ability. In designating posts the only safe test is to inquire what are the *predominant* requirements; but this is not normally done. It is also necessary to see that administrative and scientific officers are deployed in close formation and not segregated in separate units. Both the Fabian report and Mr. Greaves's book stress the importance of securing fuller recognition of the contribution which the specialist can make to the formulation of policy.

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The Civil Service in the Changing State contains an interesting chapter on the public service corporation in which the author challenges the conception that the independent board is a superior form of organisation for running socialised industries and similar undertakings. Mr. Greaves argues his case with courage and conviction. He disposes of such contentions as the need for freedom from Treasury control by asserting that it is Treasury methods which must be changed rather than the fundamental doctrine of ministerial responsibility abrogated or modified.

The Fabian writers advocate the reduction of Parliamentary questioning within due limits, in order to reduce the "astonishing verbosity" to which civil servants are prone in their attempt to state in writing the reasons for every decision in case one day an inquisitive M.P. shall ask a question in the House. Ministers, they think, could do a good deal by refusing to go to much trouble to answer unreasonable questions; and they should be more ready to admit that mistakes have been made. The Public Accounts Committee in its turn should be more willing to forgive genuine mistakes. The discussion on Parliamentary control by the Fabian group is somewhat superficial and perfunctory. There is no attempt to consider the type of control over administration at which a legislative assembly should aim; or what methods are likely to prove effective in achieving it.

The subject of Treasury control figures largely in both books. Mr. Greaves has an admirable chapter on Treasury Control and the Machinery of Government in which he reviews the subject in its widest aspects. He urges that there must be much more central supervision and co-ordination of departments if efficient planning and administration are to be obtained. He contrasts the work of the Treasury as a Ministry of Finance with its entirely different task as the central department for over-all questions of machinery and personnel. He is rightly dissatisfied with its performance in the latter capacity but he does not consider, like some critics, that the Treasury should be superseded in this respect by another organ, such as the Cabinet secretariat or a public service commission. In his view, the Treasury must remain the central department; but in respect of its civil service and general functions it should work to the Prime Minister as First Lord of the Treasury instead of to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is already fully occupied with financial and fiscal business. There is much to be said for this proposal. It is a painful fact that no Chancellor within living memory has taken the slightest interest in the functions of the Treasury as the central department of government.

This central aspect of the Treasury, Mr. Greaves insists, must be given greater weight relatively to its financial duties, and the latter be subordinated to the former. He asks for "an authoritative body to create, maintain, and overhaul machinery of government—a directive authority for the scientific ordering of public administration in the much bigger and vastly more complex connotation of that term in the modern social service state with an important sector of socialized industry" (page 187). His detailed proposals are worked out in a separate chapter on the machinery of Central Direction. Several of these were already being carried out before Mr. Greaves's book had been published. We may regard this as a tribute to his prophetic insight into contemporary needs.

The Fabian group, while accepting the need for general financial supervision over expenditure, urge that the Treasury should delegate

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financial powers to departments on a more generous basis than at present. They suggest that one form of this delegation could be by block grants allocated to particular purposes, such as equipment for research, which would then be expended at the discretion of the Department. The Fabians wish to see the preoccupation of the Treasury with finance and finance officers widened to embrace a more general view of the organisation and layout of departments and the tasks with which they are concerned. Within each department there should be a similar integration of finance officers and those responsible for formulating and executing policy.

On the organisation of departmental work the Fabian report offers both pungent criticism and sensible advice. The Fabian group emphasize the need for speed in public administration, which is at present so often sacrificed to consistency. They write with inside knowledge of such matters as the lack of modern office equipment, typing pools, messenger services, office accommodation, antique routines, the handling of correspondence, the absence of sufficient background information about policy among the lower grades. These matters form the bread and butter of day-to-day administration: they are not irrelevant details. The report pays special attention to the need for improving the Organisation and Methods work which is going on both in the Treasury and in the Departments.

This brings us to the Fifth Report of the Select Committee on Estimates, which is entirely devoted to O. and M., as it is called. The committee refers to the "almost complete failure by the Treasury (between 1919 and 1939) to foster the systematic study of organisation as applied to Government Departments." It traces the steps by which a handful of Treasury Investigating Officers developed into Organisation and Methods Division in 1941. Similar sections were set up in 20 of the larger Departments, under the aegis of the Principal Establishment Officer.

The purpose of O. and M. is "to secure maximum efficiency in the operation of the Government's executive machinery; and, by the expert application of scientific methods to organisation, to achieve economy in cost and labour." The central division in the Treasury is the focussing point and radiating centre for O. and M. work throughout the service. Its duties consist partly of conducting general investigations and partly of making studies for some 80 departments which do not possess O. and M. branches of their own. It is assisted by an advisory committee of leading industrialists and business men. The Treasury O. and M. is thus concerned with matters of general interest, such as methods of staff payment, office machinery and the dissemination of satisfactory practices throughout the service; and also with purely departmental problems. The recent reform of the method of obtaining passports is an example of the latter. It has carried out assignments for U.N.O., U.N.E.S.C.O. and Colonial Governments and is at present assisting the new Central Land Board. It acts as a clearing house for information and carries out training work. The departmental branches vary enormously in size and effectiveness. The Ministry of National Insurance has 23 officers engaged in O. and M. work, which is taken very seriously in connection with the great new schemes of national insurance which are now impending. The Ministry of Fuel and Power has only 3 such officers and one has yet to hear of any significant contribution they have been able to make to the work of the department.

The real trouble, as the committee points out, is that O. and M. in the

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Civil Service "has not yet been developed to deal with questions of administration and organisation at the highest level." Too many departments—including the Post Office—regard O. and M. as a method of improving "minor changes in clerical processes" rather than a group of specialists able to think creatively on the larger problems of organisation and procedure. The committee consider it essential that these questions should be approached scientifically and not dealt with piecemeal whenever the strain leads to a breakdown of some part of the machinery of administration. "The part played by O. and M. technique and knowledge in this re-designing" they declare, "must be that of planning the structure and machinery of government rather than that of attending to its plumbing and maintenance" (paragraph 49). One is glad to note that a first step in this direction has been taken by the transfer of machinery of government work in the Treasury to the O. and M. Division and the promotion of its Director to the status of an under secretary.

Mr. Greaves, the authors of the Fabian report and the Select Committee on Estimates may be congratulated on their respective contributions to the improvement of our public administration.

W. A. ROBSON.

THE STEEP PLACES. By SIR NORMAN ANGELL. (*Hamish Hamilton*. 207 pp. 8s. 6d.)

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD. By JAMES BURNHAM. (*Jonathan Cape*. 254 pp. 10s. 6d.)

FOREIGN POLICY: THE LABOUR PARTY'S DILEMMA. By LEONARD WOOLF. (*Fabian Publications and Victor Gollancz*. 34 pp. 2s.)

DESIGN FOR EUROPE. (*Design for Freedom Committee*. 24 pp. 1s.)

"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma . . ." That is what Mr. Churchill said on 1st October, 1939, and his words are *more* true now than when they were spoken. With the solving of this riddle all these four publications are occupied, in greater or lesser degree. Their solutions differ. Mr. Burnham has no doubt of a fixed communist goal of world conquest. This is a belief more widely held in his country, the U.S.A., than in ours. But those who drew up for the Design for Freedom Committee the report called *Design for Europe* express the similar view that "Russia is bound, explicitly and implicitly, to the Marxian technique of seeking the destruction, by revolution or rot, of all nations that stand for the freedom of man." The leading member of this Committee is apparently Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, and this view is, of course, a common conservative one in this country. But it is backed here by some powerful reasoning: "The present rulers of Russia must maintain a tyranny in order to maintain their power, and indeed their lives. They must, therefore, seek the destruction of the idea of freedom wherever it exists, for they remember what we are inclined to forget, that freedom also is by its very nature propagandist . . ." Sir Norman Angell states the same premiss: "In agreeing that nations of different political, economic and social institutions can live together in peace . . . Russia would, in her relations with foreign states, be applying principles she refuses to apply at home to Russians." He adds, however:

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"But recent declarations by Molotov and Stalin indicate that there is hope of agreement along this line." Mr. Leonard Woolf, after pointing out (a) that "the doctrines of communism and the practice of the Soviet Union attack and challenge the whole conception of Western democracy," (b) that the Russian Government has, since the end of the war, used unscrupulous means to spread communism and totalitarianism in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and (c) that "it is inevitable that our sympathies must be on the side of American resistance to the Soviet policy in these questions," surprisingly adds that this "American resistance is itself the political kernel of the American-Russian hostility . . ." This is to beg the not unimportant question of "who began it?" Is he really saying that there should be no resistance to expansion of this kind? But to ask this question is to anticipate the question of remedy and wander from that of diagnosis about which Mr. Woolf has disappointingly little to say.

The wisest word on it is here spoken by Mr. W. N. Ewer in the Critical Comment on Mr. Woolf's thesis which concludes the Fabian pamphlet. Mr. Ewer points to two possible explanations of Soviet expansionist policy. The first is that "it is positively expansionist and therefore potentially aggressive," the second that "recent Soviet acquisitiveness is strategic and defensive . . ." Now these two interpretations, says Mr. Ewer, "are not mutually exclusive. Political motives are usually mixed, and political thinking usually muddled. And, moreover, even in a disciplined party, there are different views and different thoughts." In other words, the answer to the question so often asked nowadays: "What are the Russians really up to?" is "Very probably they don't know themselves."

So much for diagnosis. It will be seen that the subject is one about which these various writers differ. But what is significant and encouraging is that when it comes to policy they all, with a single exception, agree. For what Sir Norman Angell, Mr. Burnham, Mr. Ewer, and Mr. Thorneycroft and his friends all want to do is to organise the free world under, inevitably in present circumstances, the leadership of the U.S.A. And they are not to be frightened off this policy by being told that it makes war inevitable. On the contrary, they see it as the most likely means of preventing, by deterrence, a third world war.

I do not, of course, mean that there are no differences of opinion between them. I do mean that they could enter a conference room and thrash out in it a programme on which they could all agree, down to a quite considerable degree of detail. But, on present showing, no amount of argument by the others at such a conference would make Mr. Woolf agree with them. He describes his policy—for Britain—as "independence and impartiality in the power politics of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R." (One enters, in passing, a protest at the all too familiar assumption that there can be powerless politics, and the failure to distinguish between the misuse and the good use of power.) Such a policy, he says, is "not neutrality nor isolation." But this distinction is hard to reconcile with his later statement: "we should act internationally on the assumption that there will be no war or that, if there is one, we shall play no part in it." Surely to act on this latter assumption is tantamount to making a declaration of neutrality similar to that issued by the King of the Belgians in 1936, and incidentally also one as liable to be shown to have been, not merely worthless, but positively harmful, by the event?

One cannot help thinking that Mr. Woolf's case is ill thought out.

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Right at the start of his argument, for example, after analysing various Labour Party pronouncements on foreign policy, he remarks that "they show that the Labour Party has declared officially four principles or aims of its foreign policy: (1) peace; (2) security; (3) independence; and (4) prosperity." He goes on: "Everyone would agree that these are eminently sound principles . . ." But would everyone agree that they are placed in the right order? Would not most of Mr. Woolf's fellow-citizens put independence first, security—as, if obtainable, the necessary precondition of independence—second, and peace quite definitely third? In other words, do not most of the inhabitants of these islands still think, as they did in 1940, that the possibility of independent national survival is of far more importance to them than the preservation of peace? If the answer is "Yes" then there is, of course, no chance of Mr. Woolf's policy being adopted by any British Government. He may say that the view that independence is of more importance than peace is a mistaken one, but he would agree that it is one for which a very strong case can still be made.

Of these publications it is *Steep Places* which covers the widest ground and is the most likely to survive, if only for its wit as well as its great wisdom. But it is the Fabian pamphlet which says most in the shortest space, and part of Mr. Woolf's thesis being that there can be no such thing as a socialist foreign policy it is as suitable reading for non-socialists as for socialists. Those who read it may not choose the same horn of the dilemma, posed by Mr. Woolf, as he does himself, but they will be grateful to him for posing it so effectively. For myself, much as I admire him for being so provocative and yet positive in so few pages I admire even more Mr. Ewer for being so constructive as well as critical in even fewer.

FRANK HARDIE.

EGYPT. AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS. By CHARLES ISSAWI. (Oxford University Press. 220 pp. 15s.)

THE AWAKENING OF MODERN EGYPT. By M. RIFAAT BEY. (Longmans. 242 pp. 15s.)

It is a striking feature of the cultural renaissance of the Middle Eastern countries that nationals of Egypt, Syria, and the Lebanon now produce studies of the historical, economic, and social development of their countries which are at once objective and critical. They are not propaganda and not chauvinist; but serious contributions to knowledge. These two books on Egypt have eminently this character. One is concerned with the economic and social conditions of Egypt to-day, and is written by a professor at the American University of Beirut. The other is a historical study of modern Egypt, from the rise of Mohammed Ali till the end of the 19th century, and is written by the former director-general of the Egyptian Ministry of Education. Both authors are graduates of English universities, and show the profound influence of western thought. They illustrate equally the fitness of the nationals of a country "to express the true feelings and reactions of their fellow-countrymen to the ideas and the events that confront them."

Professor Issawi's book is packed with information, lucidly and accurately set out, and well documented. It is packed also with definite judgments. He has a critical mind, and has no reticence in expressing his views. Two

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

outstanding features of the economic and social conditions are: (1) the high birth-rate, second only to Palestine's, and the high death-rate, second to none, and (2) the over-population of the country. The social services are still poorly developed; and public finance does not correct the bad distribution of wealth. Fiscal reform is an essential necessity. The waste in the government offices is alarming, and only in a small fraction of them was there an audit. Few classes have justified their existence so little as the Egyptian landlords "who have all the defects of a privileged class unredeemed by any of the virtues of a ruling class." On the other hand Egypt has the benefit of great social fluidity: "There are no differences of accent between rich and poor, nothing corresponding to the 'h' barrier, and conversations between members of different classes are free from that feeling of uneasiness which is so evident in England." A social consciousness is beginning to manifest itself among the small peasants.

Professor Issawi is appreciative of the achievements of the British occupation: "It becomes clear that the British were neither a gang of Machiavellian schemers nor a host of St. Georges in shining armour, but in the main, honest and efficient administrators suffering from the limitations which fatally beset any attempt by one people to govern another, and which, because of the reactions they provoke and the consequent waste of energy, bring it about that foreign domination, however efficient, is no adequate substitute for self-government." As to the remedy for the present ills he suggests planned development of industry, to take off the surplus agricultural population, and a large-scale emigration to the neighbouring under-peopled countries of the Orient.

Rifaat Bey has made his mark as a historian of the period of Mohammed Ali. In this book, which is concerned rather with the interpretation than the marshalling of facts, he shows a gift of dramatic writing. He makes Mohammed Ali and his son Suliman and Ismail Pasha, the first Khedive, live again. The story of Egypt's emergence after the Napoleonic wars, of the conquests and constructive reforms of Mohammed Ali, of the digging of the Suez Canal, and of the fabulous extravagances of Ismail, has been often told before, but not with the same sympathetic understanding. And the historical judgments are clear and vivid. The paramount duty of enlightened government in Egypt is to rescue its cultivable lands from the desert: "Sand and water—two elements, the one meaning death and the other life—have always been in constant struggle in the Valley of the Nile." Like the other author, Rifaat Bey is fair in his appreciation of English control: "It was well for the Occupation that, during the first twenty years, it should find the country in such a state of political apathy that practically no obstacles impeded the work of the reformer. It was also well for the people that their political loss should be counter-balanced by material profit." The English succeeded in principle but failed in details: "It was a pity that in reforming the internal administration with its permanent contact with the people, they should insist on degrading the (Egyptian) mudirs, and shaking their authority in the sight of their fellow countrymen by holding fast to the system of provincial English inspectors."

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOTING PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS.
By WELLINGTON KOO, JR. (Columbia University Press. London,
Cumberlege. 349 pp. 22s.)

DR. KOO was a member of the Chinese delegation to the conferences at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, and was present at the meetings of the Committee of Five which determined the formula of voting in the Security Council. His book is valuable for the material it provides upon all of these, but especially on the last. There is indeed a close and careful documentation of the whole proceedings from which emerged the final result of the machinery in actual operation. This constitutes the main body of the work. But the book contains also useful studies of voting procedures in the institutions like U.N.R.R.A. that immediately preceded U.N.O. and in the other organs of the United Nations, where a simple or a two-thirds majority suffices. It is contended that here decisions are advisory or are not "political" and that majority decision is justified because it does not commit governments to action. On the level of such contentions, which belong to the more fundamental study of political science and the conditions of international order, Dr. Koo's book is less satisfying than in his description of the conference discussions and his analysis of the machinery they established.

The book supports the principal theme of the United Nations system, that "in matters of importance affecting the interests of the great powers it is provided that the Organisation shall not act without the concerted approval of the permanent members of the Security Council." This may have been, as Dr. Koo says the small powers realised, the condition of having a world-wide organisation of any kind. That fact is enough, on one line of current argument, to excuse acceptance of U.N.O. as it is—as a smaller evil than the absence of a world organisation of any kind; it does not make of U.N.O. an effective institution for maintaining world order. But it is not so much on the argument that this is the best we could have as on the claim that the machinery of voting is a recognition of "political reality" that the author endeavours to justify it. His claim is a two-fold one. First, international action to enforce the peace cannot in fact be taken without the active concurrence of all the great powers. Yet Dr. Koo admits that the existence of the veto is an encouragement to dissidence among the great powers while thus asserting that their agreement is a *sine qua non* of the political life of U.N.O. Secondly, he asserts that "the hard fact learned from the political failures of the League of Nations was that a great power cannot be coerced peaceably by an international organisation to do that which it deems opposed to its own interests." But, surely, such arguments do not face the real issues. For instance, Dr. Koo seems to admit it as a merit that when the Security Council has failed to reach unanimity the veto of one great power has in practice been overridden by the decision of the others to take action of their own responsibility disregarding the veto. Again, it is hardly consistent with the main argument to claim that the need for unanimity was used as a cloak to hide the weakness of the western powers when they failed to deal with Japanese aggression in 1931. Is it not better sometimes to call a spade a spade even in international affairs? And would it not have been to the general advantage if in 1931 the failure to carry out the obligation of defending the territorial integrity of China had been clearly attributed to the unwillingness

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or "weakness of the western powers" instead of to an abstraction somehow considered as existing apart from them, called the League of Nations? And what in truth is "the hard fact learned from the political failures of the League" but that we cannot have our cake of international security and eat it by way of guarding the right to refuse to prepare and apply superior force?

It makes nonsense of the power to use the world's coercive authority if the test is whether it can be used "peaceably." Much though it may be deplored, there is no escape from the fact that ultimately the only remedy to force without authority is to oppose force to it. Yet Dr. Koo writes: "If action is decided upon regardless of the consent of the power concerned, then coercive action can only be effectively sought through direct military pressure upon the offending party, in which case the function of the organisation as an international body to maintain peace and security will have broken down anyway. Thus from the very beginning of the debate, a clear realisation was had as to the scope of the enforcement functions of the Security Council, and it was clearly seen that by far the greatest proportion of its activities would be in the field of pacific settlement of disputes, before they ever reached the stage where enforcement action might become necessary." At the same time Dr. Koo admits that the weakest part of the Charter is precisely that which deals with the pacific settlement of disputes. It is indeed an interesting tribute to the potential political significance of a mere recommendation, without the power of enforcement, on the part of international authority that so much attention should have been directed to preventing such a moral lead unless all the great powers concur in it. Is it so much worse to have such a lead given, even if it is not enforced owing to the unwillingness of one great power to agree to its enforcement, than to have the prospect of no such lead being given at all? If the policeman is paralysed, is it an advantage that the judge should be dumb? For, while it would appear that the Security Council can probably discuss a dispute or situation likely to endanger peace despite the opposition of one great power, and can do so certainly if that great power is a party to the dispute, it cannot "investigate" it or recommend a settlement; still less can it order enforcement action, for this requires the concurrence of all the great powers, even if parties to the dispute.

For a balanced picture, however, such fundamental weaknesses have to be set against the important advances in the acceptance of majority decision in the Assembly, the Social and Economic Council, the Trusteeship Council and elsewhere. It is a pity that in his useful account of these, Dr. Koo has not dealt more fully with the question of the connection here with the problem of weighted voting. His work is nevertheless a useful addition to that of Professor Riches in this field.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

THE HISTORY OF *The Times*. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1884-1912.
(*The Times*. 862 pp. 21s.)

This third volume is far more interesting than the two which preceded it. Indeed for the historian the story which it tells is fascinating. It has some annoying faults. A great deal of the writing is curiously bad, repetitive and stiff with the kind of verbal creaking and jolting which make it too often necessary to re-read a sentence in order to understand its meaning or relevance. Sometimes the writer falls between two stools, when he deals with foreign affairs, and one wonders whether one is reading a history of *The Times* or a history of Europe.

Despite these blemishes, it is a book of the greatest interest and importance. There are three main foci of interest. The first is the story of the Parnell letters and the Commission which destroyed Pigott and very nearly destroyed *The Times*. For the first time it is possible to see exactly how the paper was led to make the charges, based upon forged documents, which it failed to substantiate, which cost it £200,000 and permanently crippled it. The main responsibility for accepting and publishing the letters rests upon Buckle, the editor, and MacDonald, the manager, and their behaviour seems to be inexcusable, in view of the fact that Sir Henry James, whom they consulted, "expressed doubts of the authenticity of the letters, begged the representatives of *The Times* to be most careful and discouraged publication." There is no dispute that the famous letter containing the word "hesitancy" was forged by Pigott. One is left with the impression, possibly mistaken, that the writer of this volume thinks that some of the letters were genuine. I can see no reason at all for believing that any of the incriminating letters were genuine.

The most important sections of the book are those which deal with the relations of *The Times* to foreign affairs and its influence upon British policy. The paper's greatness and uniqueness are to be found here. Its influence was immense and for years it acted as a second, and by no means, secondary, Foreign Office. Its power came from its system and the calibre of its foreign correspondents. Wallace in Printing House Square, with Blowitz, Saunders, Chirol, Steed, Bouchier, Lavino, and Morrison in the several foreign capitals, provided a service unrivalled for its understanding of foreign affairs and policy, for its power to obtain information, and for its prestige with foreign governments. One of the oddest things is that the efficiency of the foreign service was combined with an extraordinarily inefficient and illogical organization in Printing House Square itself. Although there was an editor there, Buckle, a Foreign Department with a Head, Wallace and later Chirol, the man who really corresponded with and controlled the foreign service and news was the manager, Moberly Bell.

Lastly there is the melodramatic and tragic story of the paper's financial difficulties, its purchase by Northcliffe and his ruthless and treacherous destruction of the "old gang." It is a pity that the Northcliffe part in the story stops in the middle and will be continued in the next volume. One looks forward eagerly for the next instalment.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT. By G. D. H. COLE. (Cassell. 15s.)

THE reform of local government is a problem of great national importance and urgency. Post-war legislation has proved disastrous to local government by denuding local authorities of many of their most important functions, such as hospitals, highways, public utilities, etc. The main reason why this has occurred is because municipal areas and authorities are utterly unsuited to contemporary political, administrative and technical requirements. The Local Government Boundary Commission has been set up to grapple with the problem, but its powers are at present inadequate for the task.

Professor Cole's new work is a most timely study, and one is glad that he has retained the interest in this subject which he first showed many years ago in a book entitled *The Future of Local Government*.

The point from which the author starts is the essentially sound proposition that the central purpose of local government should be the making of local communities or the enhancement of the community spirit as a living reality. There is an excellent chapter on the meaning of local government, followed by another on the planning of town and country, in which Professor Cole describes the civic institutions, and the way in which they should be disposed, in order to make a suburb or a town a true centre of social living instead of a mere collection of dwellings.

The book contains by far the most detailed and comprehensive scheme of local government reform which has so far been published. In *Local and Regional Government* one can find not only the general principles which the author recommends for the new structure, but their detailed application to specimen areas. We are told exactly how Devonshire and Norfolk, Manchester and Liverpool—to name only a few examples—would fare under the proposed policy.

"I am a Regionalist," writes Professor Cole, "and at the same time a keen believer in local self-government." He has, therefore, like most other students of government, arrived at the conclusion that larger areas of self-government are required in the conurbations than are provided at present by either county boroughs or county councils; and also that smaller organs are required for purely local purposes than any which now exist in towns or large urban areas.

These conclusions lead him to recommend a directly-elected regional council in each of the great conurbations (or metropolitan cities as the Americans call them). These include not only London and the giant areas centred on Manchester, Birmingham, Merseyside, Tyneside, Leeds and Sheffield, but also a number of smaller cities, making 13 or 14 areas for which a regional planning and administrative council would be set up. One could criticise the proposed areas in detail, but the general conception is unquestionably correct. Elsewhere the county council would remain the major organ, with the important difference from the present system that the areas of county boroughs would no longer be excluded from its jurisdiction.

The largest regional councils would be autonomous, apart from central government supervision. They would be required to form joint authorities with neighbouring councils for purposes of consultation in arriving at a coherent policy in matters concerning still larger areas. The smaller

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regional councils would be compelled to participate in federal bodies for planning purposes, which would have executive powers over them.

Below the major authority would be a second tier of elected councils, to be called Incorporations, which would replace the present county district councils and the county boroughs. These would usually be centred on a town or city, large or small, but would include also suburban and rural areas adjoining cities. The whole county outside the great conurbations would be divided up into units of this type, which would thus cover very diverse areas. In reducing the unnecessary and meaningless complexity of the present lower deck authorities to a single uniform type, Professor Cole is again on very firm ground. In Devonshire, the 32 urban authorities and 17 rural districts which now exist would be replaced by about a dozen town-and-country Incorporations based either on market towns or holiday resorts, together with the main cities of Exeter and Plymouth.

For London, the author indicates a regional area containing 9½ million persons. His second tier of authorities would consist of only nine councils. Eight of these would each contain a population ranging from 1 to 1½ millions. There is no explanation of the reasons for the selection of such immense local authorities in the metropolis, and one feels they are much too large for the purpose. A great deal of evidence and argument is needed to justify this feature of the scheme.

Below the town and country Incorporations Professor Cole envisages a third tier of smaller authorities. These would consist of Parish councils in the county areas and small elected bodies (corresponding to Sir Patrick Abercrombie's neighbourhood units), in London and the great cities. The author is a firm believer in the parish council as an instrument for expressing and fostering genuine local democracy. He urges, indeed, that parish councils should have much more power and larger resources than they possess today. They would exercise both direct and delegated powers, and also act as agents of the larger authorities.

In the result there will be a triple-deck structure throughout the country, and in many areas where joint planning bodies are set up there will be four separate tiers of authorities. I have grave doubts whether it would be possible to make so complex and cumbersome a system of elected bodies operate in an effective way or to ensure active co-operation and interest by the citizen. I am not aware of any country—including Great Britain—where three layers of local government have not been found to produce that dispersion of interest which is the most deadly enemy of local democracy. Oddly enough, Professor Cole makes little or no attempt to dispose of the known difficulties which have been experienced in the attempt to keep three sets of local government authorities functioning simultaneously.

Local and Regional Government is not a very easy book to read, but it constitutes a major contribution to the subject with which it deals.

W. A. ROBSON.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA, 1929-1941. Volume I, 1929-1936.
By MAX BELOFF. (Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of
International Affairs. 261 pp. 15s.)

MOST recent British writers on the Soviet Union conceal a profound anti-Soviet bias under the façade of impartiality, but Mr. Beloff's book does the opposite, and he conceals an impartial judgment under the appearance of bias. On the surface he appears to be anti-Soviet, and on many minor points he gives an impression of prejudice, but none the less the main impression left is the consistency of Soviet policy in the period under review. This consistency is the more impressive in that Mr. Beloff does not emphasise it, and is certainly not concerned to reveal it. The main outline emerges clearly: in the early post 1919 period, Britain and France were the enemies, since Britain had fought a war of intervention and France was mainly interested in recovering the pre-war debts, while Germany, with its political forces still in the balance, was a potential ally; then, with Hitler's first victory in the 1930 elections, the direction begins to change, and the Soviet Union turns steadily towards an alliance with France and Britain and towards collective security. Mr. Beloff, who, one assumes, was not at any time in Germany during the period under review, believes that the Comintern misapprehended the nature of Nazism and contributed to its success: but however much both Social-Democrats and Communists in Germany were to blame for not uniting against the common enemy, it is wholly untrue that they did not realise its dangers to them: Hitler himself

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gave them no choice but to realise it. This misinterpretation upsets the balance of an otherwise well developed argument.

By far the best chapter is that dealing with the Russian security pacts; this contains, however, a rather surprising statement that "it is not clear" whether the proviso in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact of 16.5.35, that it came into force only if France honoured her obligations under the Treaty with Czechoslovakia of 18.10.25, was introduced by Benes or Litvinov. In fact it was quite clear that it was Benes who introduced the proviso, according to Litvinov's speech at the Sixth Political Commission of the League Assembly in September 1938.

Apart from this error the book is well documented: almost too well documented in fact, since it relies too much on the documents and lacks any profound insight into the motives of policy and first hand knowledge. But to-day there is no living writer on international affairs who can reach the level of *The International Anarchy* or *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, and books on international affairs tend to fall into two classes, the reliable but heavy compilation, non-interpretative and unstimulating, and the forceful personal record which reveals only trivialities. Mr. Beloff's book falls into the first class, and of its kind is reasonably good.

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

INDIA CALLED THEM. By LORD BEVERIDGE. (Allen & Unwin. 418 pp. 18s.)

LORD Beveridge has written a book of great and varied interest. It is the biography of his parents, two remarkable people, but it is also something more than a filial biography. Henry Beveridge, born in 1837, and Annette Susannah Akroyd, born in 1842, both came from typical, middle class families of northern England and Scotland which developed such strength and displayed many limitations in the early years of the 19th century. Both of them went to India independently, Henry as one of the earliest to enter the Civil Service through the competitive examination, Annette as an educational pioneer to open a school for Indian girls. In India they met and married and reared a family of four, and when, at the age of 55, Henry, after 35 years' service, retired, they had another 36 years of married life before them, for they both died in 1929, Annette aged 87 and Henry aged 92. These two people were inordinate letter writers and much of the story of their lives and minds—and that is the kernel of the book—is told in the letters which all through their life they wrote to each other. Psychologically the book is fascinating. They were both extremely interesting characters, intelligent and intellectual. They had the passionate curiosity which the Greeks considered to be the root of truth and philosophy, a rare integrity of mind as well as of conduct, and an outlook upon politics in the widest sense which, at least in Henry, always remained well ahead of his times. It was indeed Henry's advanced views, his open dislike and criticism of the Sahib attitude towards India and Indians, that ruined his prospects of promotion in the Service.

LORD Beveridge's book gives an admirable personal portrait of his parents and that in itself was worth giving. But in doing so, he has very skilfully done something more. One sees these two people as the products of their families and ancestors, the careers and characters of whom he sketches. One sees them too as the mental products of their age, and here it is interesting to observe how similar their spiritual and mental outlook is to that of Lord and Lady Amberley as revealed in *The Amberley Papers*. Finally the book is historically and sociologically valuable for the light that it throws upon conditions in India and the Indian Civil Service during the last half of the 19th Century.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

RUSSIAN ZONE. By GORDON SCHAFER. (*Allen and Unwin*. 192, pp. 10s. 6d.)

This might have been an important book. Ever since the Red Army swept into Germany in 1945, the Eastern Provinces of Germany have been virtually closed to outside observers. This is not to say that the Soviet Military Administration have forbidden all visits of all foreigners. Groups of British, American and other correspondents have visited all the provinces on conducted and pre-arranged tours of several days duration: four-power inspection teams have visited industrial areas under the auspices of the Demilitarisation Commission: for two years in succession, Leipzig has been thrown wide open to all comers for the period of the industrial fair. But all these opportunities were limited in one or other respect. The most serious limitation imposed on all individual observers has been the constant presence of a Red Army officer. The result has been that Germans, often only too intent in setting one Ally against another, have been the chief source of information about the Soviet Zone. They alone are quite free to come and go between Berlin and the surrounding countryside. If some of their more fantastic anti-Soviet stories are widely believed in Berlin, the Soviet authorities are in large measure to blame because of their extreme secretive policy.

Gordon Schaffer was the first foreign correspondent allowed to stay in the Soviet Zone for as long as ten weeks. He was also apparently allowed almost complete freedom of movement and privacy. He is therefore better qualified than any other English-speaking writer to date to give an objective account of the Soviet Zone, and to dispel some of the more irresponsible rumours current in Berlin. Unfortunately, Mr. Schaffer is far from objective. He clearly went on his journeys with the fixed intention of proving that the Soviet Zone is a free progressive democracy in the Western sense—a formidable undertaking.

His method is simple. Throughout, he consistently underplays the part played by the Socialist Unity Party. As a result, many of the achievements which he describes appear like conjuring tricks. This is particularly true of his description of the various "non-political" organisations which now play a considerable part in the life of the zone: Peasants Mutual Aid, People's Solidarity, the Women's Anti-Fascist Committees, the Cultural League, and Free German Youth. These energetic organisations, in the apathetic hungry Germany of to-day, are quite incomprehensible if divorced from the political direction that gives them life and purpose. Mr. Schaffer nowhere makes clear that they play an immensely important political part if only because they are entitled to put up candidates for election to the Landtage.

Having reduced the importance of the Socialist Unity Party, he then sets out to bolster up the Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Party, as independent and important political forces. (It is unfortunate for Mr. Schaffer that the Russian campaign to remove Herr Jakob Kaiser from the leadership of the C.D.U. precisely because he was too independent should come so soon after the publication of this book.) But not even Mr. Schaffer can get round the fact that these two parties have to discuss all policy in private with the Socialist Unity Party, before presenting a united front to the various Landtage. And on all important measures, the policy of that front is essentially Communist or Socialist.

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

It is a great pity that Mr. Schaffer has wasted so much good material and so unique an opportunity in trying to prove the impossible. For there is good and interesting and new material in this book. The danger is that the reader who knows anything about Germany will be so put off by the many dishonest (or blind) judgments that he will not persevere to the end. As with all cases of special pleading, it is hard not to mistrust unknown statistics and facts when known ones are wrong or misused or incomplete (like his curiously one-sided account of the fusion of the Communists and the Socialists, which he half-dismisses by the convenient statement: "It is not my task to go over the story of the quarrel of the S.E.D. in the East and the S.P.D. in the West," as though the quarrel had not originally been with the S.P.D. in Berlin and in the East.) Nevertheless, this book does fill a gap in our knowledge of Germany. If he had taken the bull by the horns and admitted that the Soviet Zone is a thinly disguised one-party state, he could have written a much more convincing book.

There is much to be said in favour of Soviet policy in Germany. The blocking of bank accounts from the very beginning, the determined land reform policy, the realistic approach to the peasants to get them to give up their quota of food, the concerted efforts to get all sections of the community to help in rebuilding their towns, the constant pressure to get the local Germans to welcome and help their fellow-countrymen driven out from Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere: all these measures are important contributions to the rebuilding of a stable Germany. A full and honest account of the way these measures are carried out by the Soviet Military Administration through the Socialist Unity Party would have been of great value to our understanding of the problems facing all the occupying powers. It would also have been interesting to know more of Soviet industrial policy, and the way it works. A strong case can be made out that the Soviet approach is the sound one, in the chaotic conditions prevailing in Germany to-day. Certainly, the results of Anglo-American policy in the West do not breed great confidence in western methods. The Germans, in 1945, so ready to welcome us as liberators and upholders of free democracy, are becoming increasingly distrustful of the efficacy of our policy, and increasingly hostile. If Mr. Schaffer genuinely admires the achievements in the Soviet Zone, it seems absurd that he should take so much trouble to prove that they have been carried out by the methods of a free democracy. For the methods and the achievements are inseparable.

ANNE WHYTE.

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FELLOW MEN. By DR. ALBERT MANSBRIDGE. *Dent.* 116 pp. 15s.
Dr. Mansbridge, as was to be expected, has known many distinguished and interesting people and his book consists of short pen-portraits of them. Some of them are extremely well known, for instance, the late Dr. Temple, Bishop Gore, and Philip Kerr. Others are less famous, for instance, the Astronomer, Professor Turner, and a man like Charles Wright, who was well known in Sutton and on Lloyds, but probably not very widely elsewhere. Dr. Mansbridge has something interesting to say about nearly all of them and some of the portraits of the less well known people are even more interesting than those of the distinguished.

WHEN SMUTS GOES BY. By ARTHUR KEPPEL-JONES. *Collins.* 252 pp. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Keppel-Jones is senior lecturer in History at the University of Witwatersrand. He has written an unusual and amusing book. Its sub-title is "A History of South Africa from 1952-2010, first published in 2015." It purports to tell the story of what happens in South Africa when the Smuts regime comes finally to an end. It really by implication retells a good deal of past history. The government of South Africa in Mr. Keppel-Jones's book naturally falls into the hands of the Africans and the author does not take at all an optimistic view of what the result will be.

ON ART AND SOCIALISM, ESSAYS AND LECTURES. By WILLIAM MORRIS. SELECTED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY HOLBROOK JACKSON. *Lehmann.* 335 pp. 8s. 6d.

This selection was well worth making. William Morris has fallen into undeserved neglect, for he wrote a great deal both in prose and poetry which is still worth reading. Mr. Jackson has made a very good selection under three headings. The first deals with Art, the second with Art and Industry, and the third with Socialism. The division is rather arbitrary, for Morris in his essays was always inclined to be thinking and writing about Art, Industry, and Socialism at the same time. It is evident even from the titles, for in the first section of the book is included such essays as that on Art and Socialism written in 1883 and Art under Plutocracy written in 1883. They are all well worth reading.

THE END OF AN EPOCH. By A. L. ROWSE. Macmillan. 323 pp. 15s.

This is a collection of Mr. Rowse's journalistic contributions to various papers from *The Times* to *World Review*. There is quite a lot of interesting matter in these articles, but there is too much flummery. Mr. Rowse takes himself much too seriously as a thinker and a writer, and, when he is most prejudiced, tries to impress us with his impartiality, continually reminding us that he is a historian. He is also far too fond of trying to impress us with the fact that he was a prophet.

HISTORY OF THE HOMELAND. By HENRY HAMILTON. *Allen & Unwin.* 597 pp. 18s.

This is the fourth volume in the valuable series which began with Hogben's *Mathematics for the Million*, and is worthy itself to take its place in that series. The form of the book is extremely interesting. It is a history of Britain, but not a chronological history. It treats of particular parts of the history of the people of Britain, for instance, Part I deals

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with "our needs" and the five chapters in that Part deal the with Land, the System of Farming, the People's Food, Dress, and finally Health. The four other Parts deal with work and the economic system; with what are called human relations including the Labour Movement and the place of women in Society; "Other Human Beings," a rather miscellaneous section which begins with Communications and ends with Economic Imperialism and the Employment of Native Labour; and lastly, with Government, Social Security, and Education.

AUSTRIAN REQUIEM. By KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG. *Gollancz*. 270 pp. 7s. 6d.

This book is of considerable historical interest. It is divided into three parts. The first begins on the 12th February, 1938 when Schuschnigg was Chancellor of Austria and was summoned for the interview with Hitler which was the prelude to the end of Austria. This part ends with his arrest. The second part, which consists of nearly 100 pages, is a dissertation on the events which led up to Hitler's invasion of Austria. The third part contains Schuschnigg's diary which he kept during his imprisonment from October, 1939, to his release by the Americans in 1945. There is also an extremely interesting appendix containing a record of the conversations by telephone between Berlin and other capitals while Austria was being invaded.

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INSIDE THE RUSSIAN ZONE, 1945-1947

By PETER NETTLE

THE conception of post-war Germany as inevitably divided into East and West is coming to be generally accepted. Although there are considerable differences in spirit and method between the British and American Zones, and still more between the Anglo-U.S. bi-zone and the French Zone, the general idea of Germany divided into East and West is justified on political grounds. The French, however much they may differ from the British and the Americans in their intentions, are compelled to align their occupation policy with that of the other Western countries for geographical and economic reasons: the French Zone cannot be entirely independent in every respect either of the rest of Western Germany or of Western Europe. In a general sense therefore it is justifiable to discuss the German problem as the problem of Western Germany and that of the Russian Zone.

Apart from the fact that the Russian Zone is something of an unknown quantity for the general public of England and, indeed, for the world, and an examination of it will be of general interest, this would further serve in enabling us to decide whether it is likely that Germany will once more be united and, if so, on what terms. Moreover, a study of the Soviet Zone of Germany provides an insight, such as is unfortunately all too rare, both into Soviet administrative Government generally and Soviet foreign policy. The Eastern Zone of Germany is the only part outside the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Zone of Korea where the Russians have undisputed Sovereign power in law as well as in fact, for the authority of the Allied control council is really inadequate to qualify this supremacy.

There is great difficulty in obtaining accurate information on the Russian Zone. Except for our officials and troops in Berlin and a permanent military mission at Potsdam it is only rarely that British people may enter the Russian Zone except on special occasions such as the Leipzig Fair. Even our officials in Berlin are unable to enter the Russian Zone except in transit to our Zone, and their direct observations are limited to the Russian Sector of the City of Berlin. Nevertheless it is from Berlin that information on the Russian Zone must be obtained. As far as the Russians are concerned their Zonal administrative Headquarters, both Russian and German, is located in Berlin, as this city provides the obvious geographical and political centre of their Zone. The political parties of

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Germany are equally well represented in Berlin ; those functioning in all four Zones as well as those limited to the Eastern Zone have their headquarters there. The SPD, which is prohibited in the Russian Zone proper, has a considerable organisation in Berlin, as it has powerful popular support there. Thus being the allied capital of Germany as well as a German state within a state it is still very much the centre of activity and better situated for studying present-day German affairs than any other town. Recent events show that the Russians clearly appreciate the value of Berlin to the Allies. Apart from the question of prestige, it is clear that as long as the Western powers remain in Berlin the iron curtain will continue to have a large hole in it, and through this hole the world will continue to gaze on the Russian system as it really is.

Nevertheless the British Press correspondents in Berlin, whose duty it is to inform the British Public of the affairs of the Russian Zone, have not succeeded in giving their readers a clear picture of what is going on. Their information seems to be confined to announcing certain events with or without comment which, added up, form an unconnected and often contradictory chain of events, leaving their readers often unaware of the background in which these events occur, unenlightened and therefore disinterested. I shall therefore attempt here to provide this background so that past and future events may become generally comprehensible.

The Russian organisation for administering their zone is fundamentally similar to that of the British, American and French. Apart from their representatives on the quadrupartite organisation they have a Zonal headquarters with subordinate regional or lander military government headquarters. At the lower levels there are military government detachments controlling a kreis, a German administrative area roughly equivalent to a French sub-department, and a Commandantura in certain towns. The control of the military government and the command of the Red Army, though vested at the top in a C. in C. and Military Governor, Marshal Sokolowski, is divided into two separate and independent administrations, a distinction similar to that between the control commission for Germany and the British Army of the Rhine in our own Zone.

The standard of the Russian officials varies considerably and it is difficult to form any general judgment. Almost all of those in military government are extremely hard workers and intent on doing a successful job. This is due, apart from an

INSIDE THE RUSSIAN ZONE, 1945-1947

inherent capacity for hard work, to the continual pressure put on every man and woman from above, and to the lack of security of position which is noticeable in the Russian administration. At the higher levels the officials are usually expert in their own field, and there are some who are well acquainted with German and English affairs and speak foreign languages fluently, particularly those who were members of various missions in London and Washington during the War. At the lower level this careful selection is not so noticeable. The change-over from soldiers to civilians which has been general among the higher officials has been limited among the others. There are a considerable number of cases of minor Russian officials and officers who are employed in work of which they know next to nothing and are therefore compelled to find suitable Germans to carry out their task.

The spirit of the administration is highly centralised but the emphasis is on the one great centre at Moscow. This means that the Commander-in-Chief in Berlin, being in the same way directly controlled by Moscow as the regional commanders, has only limited authority over them, and is really a *primus inter pares*. Moreover it has been a Russian principle to send a number of missions with special tasks, such as dismantling of factories and the seizure of war booty, to Germany under direct control of Moscow, the commander-in-chief in Berlin having no control over them. This system has led to signs of considerable independence on the part of the regional commanders at the expense of the zonal headquarters in Berlin and has caused difficulties in effective zonal administration.

The political influence among Russian officials is very strong. This task of political supervision is carried out by the chief of political administration together with the MVD, the descendant of the NKVD and GPU. These are very much in evidence ; every unit of troops in a certain area and every headquarters large or small, has a contingent of MVD officials attached. In this way the political officers have a powerful voice in the running of the Russian administration, and the occasional conflict between the technical expert and the political official brings out the larger struggle between the political and the technical aspects of Russian administration in Germany which will be noticed in almost every sphere.

In their relation with their German subordinate officials and with the German population generally the Russians again vary considerably. The Russian approach to the German does

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

not seem to follow any general principle. In some cases it is purely machiavellian; if a man is useful, he will be treated well. The ration scale and its application are based on this principle. On the other hand, in a moment of anger, natural or alcoholic, Germans whom the Russians previously had been at pains to flatter might find themselves abused or dismissed. Politics naturally play a considerable role as far as mutual relations are concerned and stories of relations with the Russian authorities vary considerably from one German to another, according to the latter's political colour. On the whole, however, the Russians seem to have made a better impression on the Germans than was originally expected.

Whatever a German may think of the Russian personally there seems no doubt that he has a high opinion of him as an administrator. The hard work and energy of the Russians appeals to the similar qualities of the Germans and the somewhat flamboyant nature of the Russian Military and Civil administration as well as its totalitarian spirit seems to call forth an echo of approval. Among many Germans the feeling exists that if they prove themselves deserving the Russians will help them to rebuild Germany. They seem to contrast favourably the attitude of the Russians who, they feel, do not at the moment help them with that of the British who apparently cannot help them.

This does not mean that the Germans in the Eastern Zone are in the majority pro-Russian. Present circumstances and their general environment have made many both anti-communist and anti-Russian. The political organisation of the Eastern Zone, which benefits only those who are either professing communists or else for one reason or another useful to the Russian authorities, is not calculated to endear Soviet rule to the great majority. Those non-communists who understand the full implications of the political and economic policy of the occupation are its determined enemies. It is, however, a dangerous fallacy to suppose that everybody in the Eastern Zone, except for convinced Communists, are violently and openly anti-Russian and would willingly exchange Russian rule for that of the Anglo-Americans. It is more a policy of sitting on the fence; having in many cases little to lose, the Germans are not declaring themselves openly but are waiting for future political developments to take shape before coming to any decision. In this respect their attitude is similar to that of the population in our Zone.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The political situation in the Eastern Zone dominates every

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sphere of life. At the beginning of the Russian occupation there were four parties in existence in the Eastern Zone, similar to the four main parties in the British and American Zones. They corresponded roughly to a communist party (KPD), a socialist party (SPD), a new centre Christian Democratic party which consisted of many of the remnants of the former centre parties as well as the former Christian Trades Unions (CDU), and finally a resuscitated liberal party (LDP). Half-way through 1946 the KPD and the SPD were amalgamated into a newly-formed socialist unity party, SED, corresponding in many ways to the democratic "bloc" or "front" of the Communist and Socialist parties in the Balkan countries and Poland. This amalgamation was officially designed to strengthen the left wing element in the Eastern Zone and particularly in Berlin; to avoid a split vote in the workers' parties by combining the powerful SPD, which had been among the first parties to be reactivated in 1945, with the energetic communist party under Russian support, thereby weakening the representation of what are known as the "bourgeois" parties, the CDU and the LDP. Considerable difficulty was experienced in persuading the leaders of the SPD in Berlin to support this amalgamation. Many of them had been active in the Social Democratic party in its struggle with the communists before 1933 and were not friendly to the Russian-dominated communist party of 1945. However, by offering them positions of importance and promising equal representation and a socialist rather than a communist bias in the future policy of the SED the Russians persuaded some of the higher functionaries of the SPD in favour of amalgamation. The exact offers made at that time, or the amount and kind of pressure used, are not yet known. Only two days before the amalgamation took place, Grotewohl, who had been the head of the SPD in Berlin and is now the joint leader of the SED, had pronounced against the fusion by quoting Luther's famous words at the Church Convocation: "Here I stand, I can go no further."

The Russians also intended to split the "nonconformist" SPD and thereby to destroy its popularity and strength. As expected by them, a number of the SPD leaders in Berlin refused to accept the amalgamation and the SPD Party Headquarters in the West strongly pronounced against it. Therefore the Russians hoped to show that in pronouncing against the fusion, the SPD leaders were adopting a reactionary policy and had refused to submit to the desire of the democratic

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majority of the two socialist parties for amalgamation; that they were in fact, the tools of Western capitalism.

As far as the Russians were concerned an effort had indeed become necessary to counteract the SPD influence both in Berlin and in their Zone. The SPD had come to look to the socialist government of England as their chief support and had definitely adopted a "Western" policy. The Russians who wanted to make themselves the exclusive champions of socialism in Germany, had therefore to contend with a powerfully organised and popular party which was socialist, but looked for support to England and the West. Therefore, as it was held that the fusion of the two parties had been carried out as a result of the demands of the majority of both parties, the SPD was declared to be no longer in existence and therefore forbidden in the Russian Zone. In Berlin, however, which was governed on a quadripartite basis the SPD, being officially recognised by the English and the Americans, continued to operate alongside the SED, now its mortal enemy.

The reactions of the German population to the fusion varied considerably. In Berlin, where the SPD continued to function and where it had always been very strong, the elections of October, 1946, showed a strong majority in its favour. In the Russian Zone a considerable number of former SPD members joined the SED in the hope that their strength in the newly-formed fusion party would enable them to keep the communists out of the chief positions and to moderate the policy of the new party. In the selection of the party officials the choice between former KPD and SPD members was at first evenly balanced. On the headquarters staff of the SED, the central secretariat, there were actually more former Social Democrats than Communists, although the key appointments, such as the control of the information service, party propaganda, and personnel selection, were given to reliable Communists. Usually two officials, one from either party, were chosen to head each department; in this way continual check by the Communists on the potential reactionary influence of former Social Democrats was possible. The policy of the Unity Party gradually swung more and more towards the communist interpretation. Many Social Democrats, although not in agreement with this new direction, felt themselves tied by their original adherence to the SED and acquiesced against their inner feelings. They knew that if they did not agree they had little political future and would lose the privileges which they

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enjoyed as functionaries of the SED. They had, as it were, crossed the Rubicon to the communist camp and found that they could not easily go back.

The SED naturally occupies a predominant position in the Russian Zone. Apart from the fact that its policy has at least the open support of the occupying power, it receives invaluable material assistance from the Russians. In a country where the very essentials of life are hard to obtain, regular supplies of paper, food, and funds, together with priority on accommodation, travel and transport, are invaluable for a political party. A considerable part of its policy is in actual fact dictated by the Soviet authorities themselves. From them issue instructions regarding the attitude to be adopted by the SED to the Social Democratic Party in Berlin and the parties of the Western Zones. The direct Russian influence is enhanced by the number of SED leaders who spent the years before and during the war in Soviet Russia, where they were being actively prepared for the coming task of ruling Germany. Many of them were then active in working out the plans of present policy such as the radical land reform and the re-organisation of economy. Others were active in recruiting among the many German prisoners in Russian hands, in which connection they organised and ran the so-called anti-Fascist schools to which prisoners, who appeared likely candidates for future use, were sent from preliminary courses in their camps to higher courses at a number of special institutes. In this way a considerable number of recruits were gained, among them a proportion of regular army officers who formed the nucleus of the "Committee for Liberation" and the "Seydlitz Army." By the end of the war a corps of political and administrative officials who were loyal to the Russians and their policy, some of them even adherents of doctrinal communism, was ready to start organising the administration of the Eastern Zone.

The SED has in fact been successfully organised as the primary means of carrying out Russian policy in Germany. Many measures seemingly proposed and put into effect by this party are in fact of Russian origin, but having the appearance of spontaneity redound to the credit of the SED. This party, which exclusively claims to represent the workers of the Eastern Zone, has a large part of the machinery of government under its control, and thus again obtains the credit for any measures beneficial to the population which are carried into effect by that government. The party itself consists of four distinct

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groups, but the control is exclusively in the hands of men and women who are pledged to carry out unquestioningly the wishes of the occupying power. Apart from the former Social Democrats and the Communists who have been trained in Russia, a group of Communists who spent the time of the Hitler regime in concentration camps and a considerable body of opportunists who hope to find personal advancement and position in the SED make up the remains of the active membership of the party. The fact that it is the chief instrument of Russian policy and is therefore obviously in high favour with the occupying power, receiving every kind of material assistance, makes its present political position predominant and unassailable.

On the other hand this obviously strong position is misleading. Its political predominance in the Eastern Zone is not backed by correspondingly strong popular support. The Germans in the Eastern Zone are not vitally interested in politics any more than they are in ours, and in spite of a sustained campaign of political propaganda the polling at elections is and remains on a relatively small scale. Moreover the personal position of the SED functionaries, many of whom are living on a scale unattainable by most of their fellow countrymen make them a subject of popular dislike and envy. These *beati possedentes* are held responsible for the radical policy of sequestration and nationalisation which has been carried out in the Eastern Zone, in most cases without any form of compensation for the dispossessed. The very fact that the SED is known to be the instrument of Russian policy caused the blame as well as the credit for that policy to be laid at its door. Further, the leaders of the SED know full well that they will remain in power only as long as the Russians actively support them, and they will only do that as long as the SED continues to be useful to them.

The leaders of the SED are thus fully aware of their precarious position. From the very start the officials of the party were instructed to make themselves and their party as popular as possible. This campaign for increased popularity has been one of the main features of SED policy. Frequent attempts have been made to interest the public with political questionnaires and public opinion research teams. A number of social reforms have been put into effect with all possible speed in spite of the severe shortage of both men and means to carry them out. These will be examined in detail later. At the same time, through the land reforms and the sequestration of industrial

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enterprises, a new class of *de facto* and *de jure* proprietors has come into existence in Germany whose interests are irrevocably bound up with the regime. The standard of work of party functionaries is relatively high as severe proceedings are supposed to be taken against those who fail to reach this standard.

The appearance of outside strength, qualified at the same time by a number of potential weaknesses, is evident also in the internal organisation of the party. I have shown how the SED was formed and of what groups it now consists. In spite of its seeming solidarity an increasing number of former Social Democrats have recently left it and have declared their adherence to the Social Democratic Party of the West by crossing the demarkation line into the British or American Zones. At the same time as the Communists gained increasing control of the SED a further number of former Social Democrats were being gradually undermined in their position and in some cases even threatened with arrest although they professed continued loyalty to the policy of fusion. This state of affairs naturally endangers the position of the remaining Social Democrats and does not tend to increase the prestige of the SED in the eyes of the public. Among the Communists themselves certain differences are appearing. Some of the old German Communists who had been followers and adherents of Rosa Luxemburg and Ernst Toller, although they emigrated to Russia early in 1933, are by no means in agreement with the present Russian trend of self-aggrandisement. At the same time those communists who were in concentration camps in Germany are inclined to regard jealously those, especially favoured, who emigrated to Russia before and during the Hitler regime and have occupied the best positions in the political field. However, these differences will not at present detract from the predominance of the SED.

Compared with the SED the two other parties are of far less consequence. The CDU which is organised on an interzonal basis is the stronger of the two "middle-class" parties. Its position, however, is awkward in the Russian Zone. Although the leaders of the party must naturally be opposed to the strongly socialist measures, such as the radical land reform and nationalisation, which are being carried out in the Eastern Zone, they are forced to voice approval of these measures in order to avoid being stigmatised as reactionary. Most of their leaders in the Eastern Zone accept this position with as good a grace as possible and try to co-operate with the SED in work of re-

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construction, as it were, on almost a non-political basis. A number of them in the provincial governments and central administrations are indeed doing able work in this respect, but as individuals, not as CDU politicians. The fact that the CDU in the Eastern Zone has to subscribe to the majority of the measures taken there brings it into strong opposition to that wing of the party working in the British and American Zones, which has declared itself strongly against nationalisation of any sort. In fact the CDU is inter-zonal only in name and, whereas in the British and American Zones it occupies a relatively powerful position, it is confined in the Russian Zone either to co-operating with the SED or keeping quiet. It is still, however fairly strong among the middle and upper classes; in Berlin where it enjoys freedom of action under quadrupartite administration, it succeeded in obtaining second place and thus defeating the SED in the municipal elections of October, 1946.

The third of the political parties in the Eastern Zone, the LDP, is led by men active before 1933 in the old German Liberal Party. Its position corresponds on a smaller scale to that of the CDU and it has the same difficulties with its branches in the Western Zones. Both the CDU and the LDP represents the "bourgeois" bloc in the Eastern Zone and are under the continual suspicion of reaction.

These three parties between them make up the entire political scene in the Eastern Zone. In order to insure that no real opposition to the policy of the SED takes shape, all three parties have been formed into an anti-fascist bloc which is controlled by the SED. Committees of all three parties sit in the various towns and rural administrative areas to assist and advise the German administrative bodies. They are designed to anticipate and occasionally to deflect discussion in the Land electoral diets. Other committees deal with denazification and sequestrations and thus enable the SED to exercise a controlling voice in day to day local affairs. Finally most of the local government officials are themselves members of the SED, their positions being either elective or, in technical functions, co-optive.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

The close affinity between the political and administrative control exercised by the SED is noticeable when the administrative organisation of the Eastern Zone is studied. In accordance with quadrupartite policy the province or Land is officially the

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biggest independent political unit in the Eastern as well as the Western zone. There are four of these provinces in the Russian Zone. The most important is Saxony with its capital at Dresden, consisting of the old kingdom of Saxony with districts of former Prussian Silesia joined to it. Next in importance is Thuringia, which consists of parts of Prussia, and the formerly independent duchies of Gotha, Meiningen, and Weimar and has its capital at Weimar. Saxony-Anhalt, with its capital at Halle consists partly of former Prussian territory, partly of the independent duchy of Anhalt. The two other provinces are Brandenburg, consisting of the former Mark-Brandenburg with its capital at Potsdam, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, capital Schwerin, consisting of the former two duchies of Mecklenburg and a part of Prussian Pomerania as far as the River Oder. These two latter provinces suffer in importance, particularly from the fact that they are economically poor and politically of very arbitrary creation. There are few local political movements of any solid strength in them, a fact clearly appreciated by the Russians.

Each of the Länder or provinces possess an elected diet and an executive government chosen from the leaders of the three existing political parties. Although nowhere in possession of an absolute numerical majority, the SED predominates in each land. At the same time there is a Russian provincial military administration in each of the five state capitals as supreme provincial authority. The organisation of ministries and their responsibilities vary considerably from state to state. This lack of uniformity is partly due to the Russian desire to put the maximum power and responsibility into the hands of reliable communist ministers while appearing to observe impartiality between the three parties. Thus in Thuringia there is a Ministry for industry, economy, and labour which combines the three essentials of economic control under a reliable communist minister, Appelt. Similarly in land-Saxony the ministers for the interior, Fischer, and the minister for economic affairs, Selbmann, occupy positions of exceptional importance beyond their obvious ministerial responsibility in the affairs of the state and may be said to have the controlling voice in policy. Both are Russian trained and one of them is reputed to be a Russian citizen. The same is true of Mecklenburg where the minister for economic affairs, Warnke, is reputed to be the virtual dictator of the Cabinet. Apart from making predominant those ministers whom they consider most reliable the Russians

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have insured that the posts which control important administrative organisations, like the police and the railways, are held by men who will unreservedly carry out their policy.

At the same time the independence of the land governments, directly controlled as they are from the Russian point of view by the Soviet Provincial Military administration from above as well as by communists from within, has come to be partly curtailed by the establishment of a number of central administrations in Berlin. These were founded early after the end of the war from July, 1945, onwards. They were at first designed to act merely as the right arm of the Russian Zonal military government to insure that the orders of that authority were promptly and efficiently carried out. They had thus merely administrative functions and depended entirely on the SMA (Soviet Military Administration in Berlin) for their orders. They were really a German administrative staff equivalent to and working alongside with the Russian functional staff of the SMA to conform with the Russian principle of maximum administrative centralization. As their function, then, was intended at first to be merely administrative the choice of the heads of the various administrations depended more on administrative or technical capability than on their political views. Men were chosen to important positions in these central administrations who could not by a long way be considered mere tools of Russian policy. Among them were prominent leaders of the CDU and LDP and above all of the old SPD who, before the fusion, actually constituted a majority of the personnel of the central administrations.

In course of time this very limited function gradually came to be modified, as the central administrations began to grow and to increase the range of their activities. The officials of the central administrations became gradually more experienced in their work and more and more responsibility was placed in their hands. At first they were permitted to act only in minor matters without previous recourse to Russian permission, and instructions from the SMA were, according to Russian principles, still complete down to the minutest administrative details. Gradually however, although such detailed orders are still frequently issued, certain departments acted merely under general Russian instructions and were left to find by themselves the best means of putting the policy into effect. Sometimes proposals of an administrative and even legislative nature came to be worked out in the first place by the central administrations

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and submitted to the SMA for approval, after which they were either issued, in matters of importance, as commands by the head of the SMA, or in less important matters of administration, returned to the central administration whence they were issued as instructions to the provinces on the authority of the president of the central authority. In certain cases, indeed, presidents and vice-presidents of the central administrations had been appointed as early as 1945 with the particular object of carrying out certain reforms planned by themselves and these were then prepared by their administration, the SMA confining itself to giving its authority to the new reforms. This was the case with the land reform which had been planned by the German president of the central administration for agriculture and forestry, Herr Hoernle, in Moscow during the war, and which was put into effect under his authority on his return to Germany.

This gradual change in status which increased the powers of the central administrations raised two important problems. In the first place now that the central administrations had acquired a measure of independence and had begun to think as well as merely to act, the problem of the political attitude of the officials of the central administration became vital for the Russians. The more liberty of independent action the central administrations obtained, the less freedom of individual political opinion could be allowed. Complete agreement with Russian policy became essential. Thus gradually the different experts whose task it had been merely to carry out Russian orders unreservedly with a maximum of technical and administrative skill were submitted to increasing political supervision. The majority of those Socialists who disagreed with the fusion of the two workers' parties resigned from their positions, and, of the higher officials, all those that wished to remain were compelled to join the SED or at least one of the other officially sanctioned parties. A system of close political control and investigation was instituted.

The greatest importance was naturally attached to the presidents and vice-presidents of central administrations, of which there are by now fifteen in number. In the great majority of cases these leading officials are either members of the SED or non-party men who may be regarded as entirely reliable by the Russians. The position of first vice-president is however, with one exception, invariably reserved for experienced and whole-hearted communists. These are the political *eminences grises* in their respective administrations; they are responsible for

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the personnel department and in many cases receive confidential reports to which not even the president has access. They form the link between the political departments of the SMA and the central administration and co-operate with the Russian political intelligence liaison staff attached to each of the latter. In order to carry out their special task many of them have built up a system of informers within their administration which keep them closely informed of the political tendencies of officials down to the grades of typists and chauffeurs. Employees considered unreliable by them are often dismissed without further ado; in some cases their arrest by the Russians has even taken place.

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At the same time there has been instituted a system of personal benefits for officials of central authorities, which, in the present state of universal penury, are important in keeping them subservient. A general issue of cigarettes is made to all employees ranging from one hundred to three hundred a month according to rank. Certain officials of higher grades receive extra rations of meat, butter and soap. Employees of the central administration obtain the assistance of local authorities in matters of accommodation, transport and generally in the procurement of everyday necessities which otherwise are almost unobtainable. A generous tax reduction in salaries, which are in themselves relatively high, plays its part in controlling the possible disagreements of officials with the policy they have to carry out. Although the conception of professional civil servants (Berufsbeamten) has been officially abolished, a new privileged class of state employees is thus in the process of formation.

Nevertheless a considerable number of the most capable officials have left in the course of the last eighteen months. At first the "recalcitrant" members of the SPD resigned, followed shortly by those members of the CDU and LDP who were not prepared to renounce the fundamental anti-communist principles of their party. Of those that remained a number were dismissed by the Russians on a variety of personal and political pretexts, if they were felt to be hostile to Russian policy. Those non-communists that remain to this day are fully aware of the precariousness of their position and are careful not to do anything politically which might compromise them. Their attitude is that in remaining at their posts they can give better service to the rebuilding of Germany in their own particular sphere. The SED, needless to say, encourage this

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spirit of non-political co-operation with themselves as much as possible where experts are concerned.

Thus with the gradual change in the status of the central administrations there has been a corresponding change in personalities. As these administrations gained in importance and independence, they lost in quality. Today they are undoubtedly controlled completely by the communists, partly through the fact that the great majority of the officials are members of the SED, and that the positions of controlling influence are occupied by reliable communists of that party, and finally through the amalgamated Trades Unions (FDGB) which are communist-dominated and which every official in the central administration is compelled to join. Nevertheless the standard of the central administrations should not be underestimated. Although a considerable number of experts, whose work originally gave the central administrations their deservedly high reputation, have now left to be replaced, in some cases, by nonentities of mere political importance, the central administrations are still the best and most efficient administrative organisations in the whole of Germany. The quality of each individual administration naturally varies considerably, depending on the personality of its president, vice-presidents, and heads of departments. Some administrations have indeed been able to preserve their high standard throughout as their personnel has been relatively little changed. In others there still exists a sufficient number of able administrators to cover up the mistakes of their less competent colleagues. In certain cases where the technical work of departments has been entirely overruled by political considerations and by constant changes in personnel, the administration concerned has gradually lapsed into relative unimportance and its work has come to be absorbed by others. The process of sacrificing technical ability for political reliability is still continuing, although recently there seems to have been a slight change of policy in this respect, particularly in those central administrations which have direct control over the work of subordinate executive departments such as the administration for statistics and for foreign and inter-zonal trade.

The second result of the alteration in status and the gradual increase of powers of the central administrations has been a change in their relations with the provincial governments. At first the powers of the central administrations, being merely the German arm of the SMA, had not conflicted seriously with the independence of the provincial governments. Orders

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from the central administration in Berlin were accepted by them as emanating directly from the SMA at Karlshorst. As the central authorities gradually increased their power in shaping administrative policy and in issuing their own administrative and technical instructions, the provincial governments began to regard the existence of the former as a potential threat to their independence. From that time dates a quiet, but most persistent, struggle between these two rivals for power.

The outcome of this struggle depended entirely on the wishes of the Russian occupation authorities. They had originally agreed to the independence of the provincial governments together with the other three occupying powers, as a first and obvious means of destroying the centralised power of the Nazi government, and as an immediate guarantee against any resuscitation of Germany. Its logical corollary was the setting up of strong and independent Länder governments. However, the Russians were not content with a mere negative policy. I have already commented on the, in some cases, purely arbitrary formation of new provinces to conform to the cession of German territory to Poland, and the consequent lack of strong local tendencies in these new administrative creations. This absence of local patriotism is particularly noticeable in the areas of Länder which were part of the abolished state of Prussia whose tradition as a corporative political unit goes back two hundred years. Moreover the formation of governments in the provinces did not conform to a general plan and the responsibilities of ministries varied in one province from another. Thus responsibility for road transport and maintenance rests with such widely differing authorities as the ministry of finance in Brandenburg and the ministry for economics, labour, and industry in Thuringia. The drawbacks of regional independence are most apparent in the re-organisation of German economy in which the Russians claim to be the only power unselfishly interested. Therefore it was felt that some check should be put on the independence of the provinces, tending as it occasionally did towards administrative anarchy. The central administrations seemed the obvious limiting factors. They had shown themselves to be capable and had above all the advantage of being under the direct control of the central Russian headquarters. Such direct control enabled the Russians to have a complete survey of all zonal affairs at their finger-tips in Berlin, and was of particular importance to them in such matters as the organisation of systematic dismantling of factories. An economic situation

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as complicated as that in the Russian Zone could only be satisfactorily reconstructed and administered centrally. Political motives, the model organisation of Eastern Germany as a communist example of perfection, demanded central control through German as well as Russian authorities.

There can be no doubt that many of the original presidents of the central administrations had been led to hope that they would in course of time attain ministerial status. Their pay scale was already close to that of a minister of the former Reichs Cabinet. They felt that their achievements of reconstruction in the last two years provided good reason for their elevation to this rank. Altogether, when one regards the central administrations closely, one is immediately struck by the fact that, although they had been primarily formed as the prolonged administrative arm of the SMA, they could without difficulty be turned into independent ministries, if necessary for the whole of Germany, at very short notice. Such a move, has however, not taken place. Although emergency powers were granted in the summer of 1947 to the central administration establishing temporarily their increased control over the provincial governments, the tendency has recently begun to change again in favour of the continued independence of the provinces. To appreciate this change of policy it is necessary to take into consideration what are probably the most important factors influencing Soviet policy in Germany at the moment.

SAXONY: THE MODEL PROVINCE

I have already discussed the fact that of the provinces in the Russian zone Saxony occupies an unique and predominant position. Together with Bavaria it is the only state in present-day Germany whose boundaries of administration are historic, corresponding generally with those of the kingdoms of Saxony and Bavaria before 1870. There is therefore in Saxony a strong tradition of regional independence and outlook. Its powerful position in the Russian zone is further enhanced by its economic predominance. Since the war it has been governed by men of considerable ability who have made full use of the independence of the provincial government to insure Saxony's leading position in the Russian Zone. Their task has been made easier by the fact that in the predominantly urban industrial population of Saxony both socialism and communism have the roots of a long pre-war tradition, when the province earned the nickname "Red" Saxony.

Among the Germans governing Saxony are a number who

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have been trained in Russia during the time of the Hitler regime, and who have been active in converting their theories into fact since the war. They have made Land Saxony the model province of the Eastern zone from the Russian point of view. Their correct appreciation of the position can be seen from the fact that if a measure is approved in Saxony it has often without further hesitation been made general throughout the Russian zone. This fact has played a considerable part in the struggle between provinces and central administrations for supremacy; although in many ways centralisation is obviously advantageous to the Russians, it would mean the abandonment of their whole-hearted and able supporters in Saxony who had been so successful in applying Russian ideas in their state.

The struggle between central administrations and provinces tended to resolve itself into a personal struggle between the most active presidents of the former and the chief ministers of Saxony. This rivalry was noticeable not only in technical and administrative business, but also in the purely political field.

It is impossible to know what form the struggle took on the political battlefield within the SED, or how embittered it was, as such matters are always kept a close secret. We must therefore rely on the few public results of these meetings and on conjecture. Logically the chief personalities of the SED might seem likely to support the claims of the central authorities, as the SED is itself highly centralised and the independence of its members in the provincial government might cause a certain independence to become apparent in the regional organisations of the SED. In order to guard against such a trend repeated instructions were issued by the central executive of the party and by its provincial organisation in Saxony that members of the party in official administrative capacities must consider themselves primarily members of the party and work for its authority and prestige within their administrative organisation. Such an instruction, would, no doubt, have at least the approval of the Russians. At the same time, the SED made what seems a bid for direct supremacy in administration as well as in politics. A number of functionaries were recently appointed to the newly formed executive staff of the zonal economic commission (consisting of the presidents of the "economic" central administration together with a few trades unionists and officially sanctioned by the Russians in July, 1947) who were not only members of the SED, but actually important functionaries in the central executive of the party. It can

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therefore be inferred that the party headquarters was making an attempt to identify itself with the executive administration by placing its own party officials in positions of importance in the central administrations. The logical conclusion of this would be that the leaders of the party would at the same time be the chief administrators of the zone and that zonal policy, as far as it was in German hands, would in fact be made behind the closed doors of the party executive. Such a system would approximate closely to that in existence in Russia.

The position is therefore roughly as follows: on the one hand the provincial governments, dominated, inspired, and represented by the provincial government of Saxony, consisting of able ministers who had worked to achieve a model communist state there. On the other hand the central administrations, with a record of capable administration and the hope of becoming a government for the Eastern zone, influenced to an ever increasing extent by the party headquarters of the SED. Finally, in supreme control, the Russian authorities who had created these two instruments of government and had now to decide which of the two should have the greater authority. Political reasons on the whole seemed to call for a decision in favour of the central administration and the SED and it is at least possible that some of the political staff of the Russian headquarters advocated this course.

SOVIET REPARATION POLICY

Against this political reasoning there is a strong factor which calls for the preservation of the *status quo*, the relative autonomy of the provinces, and the consequent economic anarchy and political difficulties. It is an economic factor, and to appreciate it a survey of economic conditions is necessary. The obvious way for Russia to recompense herself for the enormous losses inflicted upon her by the war was through economic reparations from beaten Germany. The first of these was dismantling and removal of German capital goods. The phase of dismantling dominated the early part of the Russian economic policy of occupation. It was considered of such importance that it was controlled directly by Moscow and special teams of experts were sent from there to supervise it. Obviously, dismantling is an open and evident process. If a factory is dismantled and removed, it remains empty and it is impossible to hide from the world that dismantling has taken place. Therefore it is easiest and best to organise and control

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this process from the centre. The central administrations, consciously or unconsciously, assisted in this process; the statistical data and reports of the administration for industry, fuel and power, and transport made a general survey of these respective fields a comparatively simple matter for the Russians. In some cases the process was repetitive; if a factory or railway workshop had restarted work to any extent after original dismantling, it could be, and often was, dismantled a second time.

Gradually the general emphasis of Russian economic claims shifted. Not all factories could be satisfactorily dismantled and re-established in Russia, in some cases it was not possible to evacuate the German technical staff together with the factory, in others the process of dismantling had been so clumsy that much of the machinery was ruined and became useless in transit. Certain factories, although highly desirable for the Russians, were so closely tied to their locality that their removal was impossible. Finally there were limits for political reasons to what the Russians could dismantle with impunity. Therefore profit had to be made from German capital goods *in situ*. The most obvious means of doing this was the taking over and running of German factories by the Russians for their own use. This was the function of the Soviet Aktien Gesellschaften, the Russian owned companies registered either in Russia or, in some cases, in Germany, which operated the works for the benefit of the Russian state, one or several Russian officials being usually designated as nominal directors and shareholders. Now although these SAG's are controlled centrally in Moscow and a control liaison staff of the combined group exists in Berlin it was obviously not desirable that the German central administration should have any say in their control. In fact it was highly essential that no non-Russian and only few Russians should have an overall picture of the activities of these Soviet companies. If economic control was to be centred in the Administrations in Berlin, it would be a matter of simple arithmetic to discover the extent of Russian property within German economy. Certainly no German could be entrusted with such knowledge, particularly as the SAG's benefited only the Russian communist at the expense of his German brother.

But even the activities of the SAG's were bound to have limits. Although it was impossible to gain an accurate overall view of their activities, careful collation of information from the provinces could produce a fairly accurate picture. It was not possible to keep Russian ownership of a factory secret in

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its immediate vicinity. Thus a third means of obtaining reparations was evolved, although it was against the provisions of the Potsdam agreement, which stated that no reparations were to be taken from current production. Orders were placed by the Russians with German firms for a wide variety of semi-manufactured and fully processed goods for use in Russia. In certain cases the raw material was supplied, in the majority of cases, however, it had to be taken from the German firms' own stocks or purchased by them. Many firms had thus to resort to wholesale "scrounging" of scarce raw materials in order to carry out their reparation orders. This system of reparations also embraces the exploitation of large quantities of German resources of basic raw materials such as brown coal, potash, wood, and in certain cases even food.

Not all these reparation goods went to Russia. Considerable quantities are exported by the Russians to obtain foreign currency for the Soviet Union. For the Russians, the necessity of keeping overall reparation figures in the dark, remains imperative. Such reparations, particularly their re-export abroad on Russian account, were strictly against the Potsdam agreement. As this agreement has often provided the Russians with a stick with which to beat the Western powers, the extent of its infringement in the Eastern zone could not be allowed to become a matter of public knowledge. An exact insight into Russian ownership and control of factories in the Eastern zone might become a serious threat to the reputation of the economic experts of the SED, one of whose chief weapons of propaganda is to point to the full employment of factories in the Eastern zone as a credit to Russian, and their own, economic policy. In any case, all industrial and commercial statistics are treated as secret by the Russians, even plan figures.

Apart from these three major means of exploiting German economy for their benefit, the Russians employ a considerable number of lesser finesses, such as their custody, during disputed ownerships, of undertakings sequestered as formerly belonging to Nazis or war criminals; the purchase through German middle men, of German real estate; and finally the operation of an "official" black market to obtain scarce goods from the other zones of Germany.

Russian interests have therefore directly and indirectly become integrated into the German economic system to such an extent that a central re-organisation of German economy is impossible without the wholehearted co-operation of these

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interests. This would mean that the firms concerned would have to operate again on German instead of Russian account, which seems a most unlikely contingency at present. Yet without them it would be extremely difficult to reach any degree of industrial prosperity in the Eastern zone of Germany. Even if it were, by chance, possible to plan any sound reconstruction of German economy by writing off Russian-owned interests the calculation of the sum total of these manifold interests would still be an impossible task.

The effects of this economic policy are all important. They conflict with the idea of centralisation. It is impossible to say whether there are open protagonists of these contradictory views in the SMA or at Moscow, but it is clear that official Russian policy has not yet identified itself wholly with one or other of these trends, rather confining itself to following each of the alternative paths at different times. It may be possible to connect the tendency towards centralisation with the political difficulties during the formative stage of the present political organisation of the Eastern zone; and the decentralising influences with the recent emphasis on Soviet economic policy, characterised by the prodigious activities of the Russian trading companies operating in Germany (Rasno, Techno, etc.), and the foreign currency bonus of seven and a half per cent. which was to be granted as an encouragement to German firms engaged in export. (The remaining ninety two and a half per cent. still going presumably to the state bank of the Soviet Union.)

If these conflicting tendencies of Government are born in mind, many of the seemingly inexplicable actions of the Russians during the last two years become clear. Above all it will be seen that the organisation of the Russian zone is still in a formative stage; there exist still too many unresolved conflicts for a crystallised overall organisation to become apparent. Until the Russians have themselves decided exactly what their own final conception of the Eastern zone is to be, they will not be in a position to put forward any definite ideas for the future of Germany in the meetings of the four occupying powers. At the same time they will resist any immediate plan for complete organisation of Germany, originating from the other occupying powers. They have therefore been compelled until now to use every means of preventing any concrete results at the foreign ministers' meetings.

THE PROSPECT OF FOUR POWER AGREEMENT ON GERMANY

The Russians are not likely to accept any plan for Germany

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which includes their zone, unless it is based on the organisation at that time existing there. At the moment, therefore, when a definite and detailed plan for the future of Germany appears in the official Russian press or is announced in Moscow, it is certain that a final organisation, both economic and political, for the Russian zone will have been decided upon and will already be in operation. It is therefore necessary to examine finally both the probable future organisation of the Russian zone and the basis on which Russia is prepared to plan the future of Germany. The political organisation of the zone has already been enlarged upon as a direct instrument of Russian policy. Concurrently with the reparations aspect of Russian economic policy in Germany there has been much activity in establishing German economy on Marxist lines. This has been achieved by a drastic policy of nationalisation (or socialisation, as it is called in Germany). Strangely enough this nationalisation has not been, as in other socialist or communist countries, on the Marxist basis that industry vital to the life of the nation should be in the hands of the state. Instead it has been embellished by the official Russian claim that only the undertakings belonging to Nazis and war criminals would be made over to the provincial governments. Thus the necessity for paying compensation was avoided and the middle classes might have been lulled into a false sense of security. The results were the same as if an open policy of general nationalisation had been followed, since the great majority of firms of any size or importance were made over to the state government by the simple means of using the good offices of the commissions for sequestration sitting in each area to brand the owners of the firms concerned as fascists. It is impossible to see a convincing reason why a policy of open nationalisation was not adopted, especially since in other legislation no hesitation was shown in openly carrying out a radically socialist policy. The fiction of sequestration deceived no one for long. The majority of large and medium sized factories, commercial and even municipal undertakings, such as tram and bus companies, are now state property. Nevertheless the small and under-privileged private firms are still comparatively active and are now being encouraged to some extent by the Russians as a means of bringing in foreign exchange for them.

SOCIALIZATION

Saxony is naturally the state whose economy is most highly organised. The Minister for economic affairs, Selbmann, is an

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able administrator and at the same time a convinced Marxist. He has been primarily responsible for the foundation of the Saxon industrial corporation (Saechsischer Industrie Kontor) which is the headquarters organisation of Saxon industry. This organisation directly controls the nationalised industrial firms and in effect the private sector as well. The state control of raw materials has been insured by the setting up of such control authorities as the Central German Brown Coal corporation (Mitteldeutscher Braunkohlen Kontor, the successor to the Braunkohlen Syndikat of former days). The Saxon Government has been equally active in controlling both its inter-zonal and foreign trade by means of a state-controlled firm (Import-Export Gesellschaft) which books all orders to German firms for export and whose consent is necessary before any foreign transaction may even be brought up for final approval of Russian commercial authorities. In this way the Saxon Government has control over its industry and trade based on its local organisation with which the central administrations in Berlin can hardly compete. In the other provinces, whose economy and its organisation by the provincial government are less highly developed, the central administrations have correspondingly greater control, though the economic picture is fundamentally similar.

In the organisation of transport also the conflict of Russian interests and German organisational problems is evident. The heavy dismantling and removal of railway track were primarily due to Russian domestic shortages, although many Germans read into this more far-reaching considerations of strategical importance. There seems, however, to be a contradiction between the theory that Russia desires to make a desert of railway communications in the Eastern zone and the very definite evidence of her present economic investments there. The great majority of main lines have been reduced to single track; the wave of dismantling during August, 1947, completing this process, and removing altogether a number of local branch lines in the Brandenburg and Mecklenburg area. The German railways have had to furnish considerable quantities of locomotives, passenger and goods wagons for the use of the Red Army, the numbers being estimated at about nine thousand locomotives and well over thirty thousand goods wagons. In addition the German railways have to provide trains on snap demands for movement of reparation goods. Some of these trains are held up for a considerable time in Russia and Poland,

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and occasionally do not return at all. A considerable number of motor vehicles, particularly passenger cars, and sea-going and inland waterways transport have been requisitioned.

The organisation of the German transport system has become highly centralised. The central administration for transport is divided into three departments for railways, road transport, and inland waterways transport. The functions of the Reichsbahn (German State Railways) have been confined to a purely executive sphere, the administration of day-to-day running, while the directing organisation has been absorbed by the headquarters of the central administration for transport into an overall transport planning board. Similarly the departments for road transport and waterways transport have a relatively strong control over the executive departments of the ministries in the provinces. Great efforts have been made to cope with the heavy transport demands on the depleted stocks of the railways. Detailed planned figures are constantly issued which become increasingly difficult to fulfil. It must nevertheless be admitted that under present conditions the railways are functioning adequately.

Nowhere has the new policy been as radical as in agriculture. The land reform was planned in Moscow before the end of the war to be put into effect as soon as possible after the Russian occupation. A detailed plan covering the whole zone was prepared and ratified by the five provincial parliaments. It provided for the breaking-up of all large and medium sized estates and vastly increased the small peasant proprietor class. In order to squash any future claims by former proprietors the land registration records in some areas have been burnt (Mecklenburg). It is difficult to estimate the results of this policy on agricultural production. One German authority in the Eastern zone considered that the average land holding was sixty per cent. of the minimum size necessary for effective cultivation. A number of the new proprietors did not stay on their holdings, but pocketed the original grant provided by the provincial government and returned to the towns. There appears to be some evidence that the collection and distribution of last year's harvest were muddled owing to the inexperience or incompetence of some of the local "farmers" and officials. A further difficulty is the shortage of agricultural machinery of which the purchase is often beyond the means of a great many of the new farmers. To counteract this and to increase the solidarity of the agricultural proprietors and workers, a mutual farmers benefit organisation (VDGB) was formed on the lines of a trade union,

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which is supposed to provide machinery, instruments, and, in some cases, money to its members on a co-operative basis. This organisation is strongly influenced by the SED and may justifiably be considered "state" controlled in spite of its co-operative label. So far there has been little evidence of its becoming the eventual means of organising agriculture on a collective basis, though this is perhaps not impossible.

SOCIAL SERVICES

The political importance of many of the social measures which are being put into effect in the Russian zone has already been discussed. As far as the professional services are concerned the new measures have been implemented on a paradoxical basis; while they are to be greatly extended, the staff has been radically decreased by the usually comprehensive ban on all former members of the National Socialist party. This contradiction is evident in the re-organisation of education. Under the civil service law of 1937, all teachers had to become at least nominal members of the party. By dismissing all these the educational authorities in the Russian zone are left with an enormous deficit of staff. Yet at the same time an ambitious scheme of adult education has been added to the already existing school and university services which themselves are to be extended. In order to fulfil these demands on staff, the training of new teachers has to be rushed through in minimum time and therefore falls well below the pre-war standard. The emphasis in teaching is again to a considerable extent political. Not only teachers but university students are required by way of an examination to discuss questions of political importance, and are judged, at any rate partly, by their attitude thereto. After an abortive attempt to re-establish student movements in 1946, these have been forbidden for the present "until the proportion of working class students at the universities will be sufficiently great to counteract the present reactionary influences," to quote one of the leading German authorities. However, even if the standard of education is not in accordance with the highest principles of education in Europe, the enthusiasm and prodigious activity of the authorities in the Soviet zone have produced a considerable impression among the German population. Nor should the results be underestimated, particularly in comparison with the West. In the publication of school books, for instance, the Eastern zone is some way ahead of our own, although this is achieved at the expense of newsprint.

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In the re-organisation of medical services the picture is similar. Former members of the Nazi party have not been banned altogether but have been compelled to achieve their rehabilitation by work in refugee camps and potential epidemic areas. A zonal scheme under state control for the establishment of full-time factory clinics and poly-clinics in urban areas has been put into operation. Owing to the shortage of doctors, many of whom fled to the Western zones at the end of the war, compulsory powers of direction have been given to the provincial medical authorities to withdraw the residential permit of any recalcitrant doctor. Similarly the independent nursing services as well as the German Red Cross have been disbanded and replaced by a State Nursing Service (VWF). An attempt has been made at the same time to facilitate medical training at the universities and to provide "refresher courses" for those whose medical training in the German Armed Services' university training scheme had not been completed by the end of the war.

A NEW LEGAL SYSTEM

One of the most significant effects of Russian occupation can be seen in the new legal system. The administration was faced with a great shortage of judges and barristers as the ban on Nazis was most rigidly enforced. A new legal system has been put into operation "to establish the dispensation of justice on a democratic basis," on the principle that "justice is the step-child of popular democracy." This system gives the central administration for justice considerable powers over the legal hierarchy. In 1946 a judge, giving an unsatisfactory verdict in the trial of some former Nazis, was dismissed and conscripted for hard manual labour at the instigation of the Russian authorities. Replacements for the old judges have been ensured by the establishment of so-called people's judges (Volksrichter). These are originally chosen from locally prominent citizens on the proposal of the anti-fascist party-bloc in each province, and are submitted to a short oral examination, including a number of political questions, by the provincial ministry of Justice. They are trained at one of the five courses in the zone, one per province. The emphasis during these courses is predominantly on criminal law as civil law is not considered important by the Russians. The courses are of eighteen months duration, at the end of which a further examination is held. Normally only some twenty-five per cent. of those originally proposed finally pass the course.

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The average output seems to be between thirty and fifty per school on one course. The newly trained lawyers then act as assistants to judges for a time before a number of them take over the functions of judges themselves. Many lawyers pensioned off before 1933 and those few who worked during the Nazi regime without becoming members of the party have been reinstated.

The institution of this system of legal training was at first proposed in a much modified form by a number of able lawyers working in the central administration of justice. The system, originally designed as a temporary stop-gap, has, however, been extended so drastically and political considerations are playing such an ever-increasing role in its operation that most of the originators of the scheme have left the central administration and have refused to associate themselves with its present policy. One of these officials considers that at the moment only some ten per cent. of those candidates finally accepted will ever be really suitable to perform their functions.

ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

The organisation of labour in the Russian zone is also of considerable importance. The Soviet authorities have by no means neglected the possibilities of using German labour for themselves, either in the Soviet zone or in the USSR. There have been repeated drives to enlist skilled and unskilled labour for work in Russia, culminating in operation "Ossawakim," the most comprehensive transfer of labour to date. This recruitment of labour has been carried out partly by the Russians themselves in factories and camps which they directly control, partly by using the German labour organisation for purposes of registration and enlistment. A certain amount of recruitment is also believed to have taken place in the refugee camps under the control of the central administration for refugees. No exact figures of German labour recruited since the war by the Russians are available, but among technicians and engineers it appears to be particularly high, three thousand being often mentioned as approximately correct. As against that, over 200,000 workers with families have been deported to Russia. The recruiting methods employed vary between the offer of a generous contract, permitting the family of the person concerned to accompany him, sometimes emphasized with varying degrees of pressure such as a period of "house arrest" on the one hand, and simple kidnapping on the other. In the latter cases the eventual destination remains a matter for conjecture; but persons

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concerned are believed to have been taken to Russia together with a number of political prisoners who had similarly disappeared.

The German labour offices have been extensively used to recruit labour for Soviet undertakings in Germany, the principal of these being the uranium mines in Saxony. Considerable propaganda has been made in political circles with regard to these; the mayor of a town in Saxony stating in a speech that every German should be glad to assist Russia to counter the threat of atomic bombs from America. Frequent accidents there show that work is strenuous as well as dangerous. As a rule, waves of recruitment by the Russians can be adequately measured from the number of refugees entering the British and American zones at particular times, the one being directly proportional to the other.

The Trades Union movement is strong in the Russian zone, membership being obligatory for the great majority of workers. The movement is controlled by a central union organisation (FDGB) which works closely with the central administration for labour and social welfare. Being centralised and officially unpolitical, the FDGB lends itself to propaganda for Russian policy and, owing to its deceptive appearance as a spontaneous workers organisation, provides the best vanguard of all the official attacks against the Western zones and the Western powers. The FDGB has also been used as a means of gaining influence among the trades unions in the Western zones, where it has been active in calling for a unity party on the lines of the SED. The leaders of the movement are mostly trades unionists who were active before 1933, among them a number of former members of the small communist revolutionary Trade Union movement (RGO), while the larger Christian Trades Union movement of the Weimar Republic is only represented in a small minority. The majority of the leading members come from the former Socialist trades unions, and have now joined the SED. As with that party, the main strength of the FDGB is derived from above, not from below. It is not a workers' organisation, but an organisation of the workers. This is evident from the sustained advertisement of the FDGB as a benefit to the workers; a trades union solidly supported by its members does not have to make propaganda for itself among them.

THE POLICE

As in the Western zones, the police was at first placed under the control of the provincial governments. This led to

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differences in pay, organisation, and methods, and made any zonal policy difficult to enforce. But the institution of the notorious fourteenth administration was designed to effect more than just the eradication of these differences. Formed originally in October, 1946, it was designated "German Administration for the Interior," the customary word "central" being omitted from the title. From the beginning its work was kept a close secret, its representatives hardly ever attended the interdepartmental meetings of other administrations. Unlike the others this administration does not use the public press as a propaganda vehicle. It is concerned not only with the main branches of the German police, the Administrative, the General uniformed (ORPO) and the criminal branches, but also with the railway and water police, formerly under the transport administration, and the fire brigade. As part of the criminal police (KRIPO) a branch exists under the title, "Bureau for occupational affairs," which is believed to be a future political police in embryo. It is headed by a former KRIPO official, who is spoken of as a violent communist. The president and the three vice-presidents of the administration are all particularly rabid in their profession of communism, Reschke, the president, is believed to have had a share in the murder of two racketeers in Saxony-Anhalt in 1945. Wagner, one of the vice-presidents, was in prison before 1933 for espionage in Germany. Relatively few regular police officials seem to be employed in the administration, among the heads of departments, only one.

The official reason given for the continued secrecy regarding the work of the administration is the fact that plans are still in preparation. This is no doubt true to the extent that the Russians are not yet prepared to announce the official existence of a highly centralised police ministry, the designation of internal affairs being in any case merely a cover. For the moment the ministries of interior in the provinces have been asked to co-operate whole-heartedly with the Administration, at least two of the ministers concerned, Fischer of Saxony and Busse, until recently minister of Thuringia, being personal friends of the president. At the same time the German police are being used increasingly for political arrests by the Russians, and are sharing the work of guarding some of the internment camps. SED membership is compulsory for most official police appointments. Direct Russian participation in the work of the Administration through the MVD appears to be increasing. It will therefore occasion no great surprise if the final organisa-

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tional plan for the Russian Zone, which will be produced at the appropriate moment, includes a ministry for police, with considerable powers and a widely-spread influence extending over most spheres of life.

CONFLICTING TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY

Russian policy at present seems then to be divided into two major trends. The one follows closely on the policy of Russia towards the former allies of Germany—Hungary and Rumania. It attempts to build administrations favourable to the Soviet Union. This is to be achieved by popularising communism and the Soviet Union as its chief exponent (it must not be forgotten that Russia claims the exclusive representation of true socialism), by legislation to bring industry into the hands of the state, by land reform, by establishing a strong central government (in the Eastern Zone the accusation of federalism is today as dangerous to the accused as it was in the France of 1793 !), by propaganda and by the liberal use of the term fascist as a weapon for the condemnation of all opponents. This weapon, which provokes roars of derisive laughter in England, has been greatly underestimated. If somebody is accused of being a fascist, the fear of supporting this universally condemned creed silences the majority of those voices which might otherwise have defended the person concerned.

The effects of this policy in Germany should not be underestimated. The material position of the working-class would be no better under any system at present, and many of the officials in Central administrations and Provincial Governments do work hard and enthusiastically to achieve definite improvements. The atmosphere of enthusiasm among them is by no means wholly false. The existence of a privileged political class, while arousing envy and disgust, also brings forth opportunist "yes-men," just as did the Nazi party. Most of the SED leaders are fully aware that they would be swept away in a free general election, and are anxious to obtain popular support. The emphasis is increasingly on a policy of making themselves more acceptable to the electorate. This is to be achieved by pointing to the achievements, great and small, of the SED in the East as compared with the atmosphere of stagnation in the West. Some of the examples cited of this are pure fiction, as for instance the continual reports of food exports from the British Zone, and the rumour of the universal compulsory sale of German patents to American monopoly capital in the

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U.S. Zone. Nevertheless they are not denied sufficiently frequently in a way audible to the Germans in the Eastern Zone to prevent a number of them believing these official rumours.

But in pointing with pride to the smoking chimneys of the East, the SED have to admit at the same time that many of the biggest and busiest are smoking for the Soviet Union. The vast Russian owned interests provide considerable economic benefit to the Soviet Union, but are the biggest stumbling block to the success of their political policy. In Hungary, for instance, where Russian economic interests are relatively small and partly confined to one-sided economic agreements between the two Governments, which can be "dressed up" to make them palatable, the political policy has been correspondingly more successful. In Germany, this fundamental divergence dominates the purely domestic conflicts, the struggle between central administrations and provincial governments, between nationalised and private industry. It has even played its part within the stronghold of the SED and has been responsible for the defection of many a convinced communist, for it clearly distinguishes those who desire a Germany organised on communist lines and closely allied to Russia (represented by a number of former "concentration camp communists") and those that have been in Russia long enough to see everything from the purely Russian point of view. They would like to see Germany entirely at the disposal of, if not incorporated in, the Soviet Union. There are men among the latter, occupying important posts in administration, who are actively anti-German.

I have deliberately used the phrase "at present" in the opening sentence of this final section. For this duality will have to be absorbed into one single policy, irrespective of whether Germany becomes united or not. If present economic policy remains predominant a long Russian occupation is probable, with a puppet government on an even less popular basis than the present one. Germany would remain divided between East and West, unless the allies are prepared to agree to a unified Germany by acknowledging Russian interests in the East with the possibilities of their further extension. This would mean writing Germany off as a Russian sphere of influence with all its possible consequences for Europe. As allied agreement to this is improbable, this policy means the definite end to all hopes of German political and economic unity in the near future. Although incorporation of the Eastern zone into the USSR is unlikely for geographical and political reasons,

the occupation will continue until the Government of the zone is organised on a basis acceptable to Russia and her interests are guaranteed. One of the more immediate effects of this policy would probably be the defection of most of the old socialists and some communists from the SED and the re-establishment, in supreme control, of the KPD.

If the emphasis is to be on the political policy the fate of Russian interests in the Eastern zone becomes the major question. If reliable Germans can be found to manage those interests for the Russians without usurpation, this pretence at transfer may take place. At the moment this does not appear at all probable. On the other hand the SAG's may be used as bargaining counters in return for other economic concessions by Germany and the Western powers, such as preference in trade or the first option at low prices for a certain quantity of German industrial output and raw material production. At the same time the indirect interests will not be sacrificed. Judging by the value of the openly Russian-owned undertakings, the concessions Russia would expect from a united Germany will be considerable.

The adoption of this second policy would leave the hope of the economic and political unity of Germany. This hope of economic unity would be more justified providing clear agreement on a central government predominantly under Russian political control is reached. As the Russians have the nucleus of a Central German Government ready in the shape of the Central administrations, and are thus well in advance of the Americans and ourselves, the latter demand seems a distinct possibility. The two years' experience of the officials of the Central Administration would give them a distinct advantage over the officials from the West, most of whom have little or no effective experience of administration, much less of government. The policy likely to be adopted by any central government controlled by the SED can be gauged from the foregoing pages.

These conjectures, however, are based on the future. The two opposing policies have not yet been reconciled, and therefore the Russians have not yet produced either a detailed and comprehensive zonal or national German policy. Until this has been done it seems safe to say that a Germany united either politically or economically is not in the interest of the Soviet Union, and will therefore be resisted by her. Whether such a Germany will be in her interests afterwards remains an open question.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CANADA

By J. A. STEVENSON

THE Canadian people count themselves very fortunate to be living in North America, the most favoured corner of the post-war world, and the state of their economic and political fortunes shows many points of similarity to the situation which prevails for their nearest neighbours, the people of the United States. Like the mighty Republic, Canada has been enjoying a post-war industrial boom, which has raised her gross annual production, her national income and her export trade to record heights. But in both countries a shadow is cast upon this bright picture of unprecedented prosperity through the mounting discontent of the mass of their populations with their costs of living, which are pressing very severely upon them at a time when the industrial and business corporations are showing the largest profits in their history. Today the economic fortunes of the two countries are so closely intertwined that any serious recession in the United States would immediately have an adverse impact upon Canada's prosperity, but there are grave apprehensions that Canada may experience a setback before her neighbour because her national economy is much more precarious. There is nothing new in this precariousness, which arises from the fact that about 35 per cent. of the productive capacity of the Dominion caters for export markets and everybody is aware that Canada's export trade has since the end of the war only been maintained at its present high scale by the heavy purchases of Britain and other countries through financial credits furnished by the Canadian Government. These credits are now nearing exhaustion and, unless ways and means can be found through the Marshall plan or some other method of financing the payments for Canada's exportable surpluses of wheat, lumber, fruit, nickel and other commodities, they will pile up unsold with the result that production will have to be curtailed; the purchasing power of the producers of such goods will shrink, industrial activity will slacken, unemployment will raise its head and the national income will contract, while the heavy burden of public debt incurred through the war will remain.

Even now the King Ministry is grappling with an acute economic and financial crisis produced by the collapse of the

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arrangement known as the "Atlantic Triangle", under which, in the pre-war era, Canada was able to liquidate every year her obligations to the United States with funds procured from her export sales to European countries. When the reduction of these funds to a mere trickle coincided with abnormally heavy imports from the United States, mostly essential for the fuelling of Canada's industrial machine, the Dominion's reserves of American dollar exchange fell to such a dangerously low level that the Government was compelled last December to take drastic action before the situation became unmanageable.

So it decreed a new austerity programme, in which one of the chief features was very severe restrictions upon imports from the United States. Inevitably this scheme was responsible for a widespread dislocation of the plans of Canadian industry and business and a barrage of protest and criticism was directed against it from many quarters. The Winnipeg Free Press, the most influential Liberal paper in Canada, denounced it as "viciously protectionist" and charged that it imposed unfair burdens upon the agriculturists of western Canada, and all the opposition parties in Parliament combined to attack it with the result that the Government only secured authority for it by the narrow majority of seven. Already it has been compelled to make considerable readjustments for the alleviation of hardships imposed on different industries, but the claim is made for the programme that the gradual increase in the reserves of American currency, visible since last December, already affords adequate justification for it. But the critics of the drastic trade restrictions, which are now being applied, contend that it will be found that a temporary alleviation of financial difficulties has been purchased dearly by an aggravation of Canada's basic economic problems.

In the field of politics, another parallel with the situation in the United States exists. The Liberal party, which has won the last three general elections and been in power at Ottawa since 1935, owes its ascendancy to the same solid core of voting support in French Canada as the Democratic party commands in the southern states of the American Union. Out of the 126 members who provide the King Ministry with its slender overall majority of seven in the House of Commons, no fewer than 80 are either French-Canadians or owe their seats to a bloc of French-Canadian voters in their constituencies, and since the great majority of the Catholics of Irish blood are in the same camp, the political and economic conservatism of the

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Roman Catholic Church operates a powerful brake against any radicalism in the councils of the Liberal party. Indeed it is a very curious political paradox that the votes of conservative Roman Catholics have been the chief factor in giving Canadian Liberalism a marked ascendancy in an era when the Liberal parties of other countries have either become extinct or been reduced to the position of helpless minorities.

Such a feat could only have been accomplished through the leadership of a political strategist of the first order and history will rank Mr. Mackenzie King as such, although it may deliver a less favourable verdict upon some fruits of his statesmanship. However, he is now in his seventy-fourth year, an ageing and tired man and he has intimated publicly his desire to be relieved of the burdens of office and the leadership of the Liberal party, which he has held since 1919. At any rate the managers of the Liberal party are acting on the assumption that he intends to retire as soon as possible and so plans are being laid to hold at Ottawa, on August 5th, a national convention of the Liberal party for the purpose of dealing with the problem of its leadership and revising its programme.

The disappearance from the political stage of a man who has held the office of Prime Minister of Canada longer than any of his predecessors, and will soon have beaten the record of Sir Robert Walpole as the longest occupant of this office in the British Commonwealth, cannot fail to leave an enormous vacuum in the public life of Canada. But the Liberal party is fortunate in having available a fairly wide range of choice for the selection of a competent successor to Mr. King. The latter, whose influence could probably be decisive at a party convention, has given no public indication of his partiality for any candidate but there is a widespread impression that he favours the claims of Mr. St. Laurent, his Minister for External Affairs. It is held that Mr. St. Laurent would not have abandoned his intention of leaving politics and returning to the Bar at the close of the war, unless he had been given an assurance that Mr. King wanted him to succeed to the leadership of his party and would back him in a contest. Anyhow, Mr. St. Laurent is now an active candidate for the leadership and, without any endorsement from Mr. King, is at present the first favourite in the race on his own merits.

Born to a French-Canadian father and Irish mother at Compton in Quebec in February, 1882, he was educated at Laval University and, choosing the law as his profession,

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showed such outstanding abilities as an advocate that by his middle forties he was one of the recognised leaders of the Bar of Quebec in possession of a large and lucrative practice. He was from his youth a staunch Liberal, but he had never taken any active part in politics until in 1941 Mr. King, deprived by death of his ablest French-Canadian lieutenant, the late Mr. Lapointe, persuaded Mr. St. Laurent to take his place as Minister of Justice. Elected to the House of Commons for Quebec East in February, 1942, he soon revealed a natural flair for politics, which many able lawyers, who have taken to them late in life, have failed to show, and proved that inexperience of them was no handicap to him as a parliamentary debater and administrator. It is now many years since a lawyer of his high quality was in charge of the Ministry of Justice and, before he had been a year at Ottawa, he had come to be rated one of the dominating personalities in the King Cabinet and the leader of the French-Canadian wing of the Liberal party. In 1941 his successful management of the Department of Justice led Mr. King to transfer him to the Department of External Affairs, which he had always kept in his own hands, and Mr. St. Laurent has now the responsibility for the conduct of Canada's foreign policy and has enhanced his reputation by his creditable representation of Canada at the Assembly of the United Nations and other international conferences.

For his candidacy he can rely upon the virtually solid support of his racial compatriots, who will supply at least one-third of the personnel of the Liberal convention and, since the Irish strain in his blood prevents him from being an extreme French-Canadian racist, he is *persona grata* to many English-speaking Liberals and can count upon numerous votes from other provinces than Quebec. He is not without critics in his own party as, being a devout Roman Catholic, he is a firm opponent of any reform of the divorce laws of Canada, which are notoriously archaic, and is also as former corporation lawyer suspected of a conservative bias on social and economic issues. He can therefore be classified as belonging to the right wing of the Liberal party and will never countenance any socialistic adventures for it. But on the other hand he is a sincere Liberal internationalist, who has courageously fought the isolationist element in his own province, and he has given proof that in politics he is no docile henchman of the Roman Catholic hierarchy by his vote for the condemnation of Franco's regime,

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which was given in defiance of strong pressure for a contrary vote from the leaders of his Church. At Ottawa Mr. St. Laurent is held in high esteem for his abilities, character and personal charm and he is by far the most attractive politician that Quebec has produced since Laurier vanished from the stage. So there is a general agreement that, if he becomes the successor of Mr. King, he will lead the Liberal party with ability and distinction.

If seniority in the party hierarchy were the determining factor about the leadership, Mr. Ilsley, now Minister of Justice, would have the best claim to it, as he has been in Parliament since 1926 and has held Cabinet rank since 1935. Before assuming his present post, he had a very creditable record in the Ministries of National Revenue and Finance and he is widely respected both in Parliament and the country as an honest politician and able public servant. But, being a shy man, very diffident about his own powers, he has never shown much relish or aptitude for partisan warfare and many Liberals feel that, although at the age of 54 he is still in his prime, he would not give the party sufficiently aggressive leadership.

This disability could not be urged against another senior Minister, Mr. J. G. Gardiner, the Minister of Agriculture, who is an avowed aspirant for the leadership, because he is the most unbending partisan politician in the Cabinet. He is more closely in touch with the Liberal machine than any other Minister and, since in conformity with such contact, he has the reputation of looking after the interests of his political friends, he has a considerable personal following in the country. Moreover, he is one of the most formidable debaters on the Liberal side and has been a diligent and efficient administrator of his department. But in the contest for the leadership he labours under two serious handicaps. His policies about the marketing of farm products and particularly the Anglo-Canadian wheat agreement have incurred the displeasure of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, the most influential Liberal paper in Mr. Gardiner's own territory, the prairie provinces, and after its persistent campaign against them it could not endorse his candidacy. Moreover, a politician who cannot hold his own province for his party, inevitably loses roses from his chaplet, and Mr. Gardiner, who, before he came to Ottawa, was Premier of Saskatchewan, has since 1944 had the mortification of seeing the voters of that province turn against him and elect both in a provincial and a Federal election, Socialist candidates for the great majority of its seats and very few Liberals.

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Mr. St. Laurent cannot hope for an unopposed path to the leadership. For one thing the younger and more radical element among the Liberals in the English-speaking provinces dislike the idea of entrusting their party's destinies to an elderly corporation lawyer, who is now in his 67th year, and their choice would be Mr. Douglas Abbott, K.C., a Montreal lawyer, who at the age of 49 has made very rapid progress in politics since he entered Parliament in 1940 and now holds the important post of Minister of Finance. But he has eliminated himself by declaration that he will not oppose his friend Mr. St. Laurent and is content to bide his time. However, another group of influential English-speaking Liberals think, that the interests both of the Liberal party and the people of Canada would be served, if the leadership were not presented on a platter to a French-Canadian politician. They hardly hope to defeat Mr. St. Laurent in a contest, but they feel that substantial support for some candidate of British stock at the convention would serve notice on the French-Canadians that they do not yet control Canada and help to curb their racial aggressiveness. These Liberals, however, are not enamoured of Mr. Gardiner and, if they could persuade Mr. Ilsley to enter the contest, they would concentrate their forces behind him. So all the portents indicate that the national convention of the Liberal party, which will probably be held early in August with Ottawa or Winnipeg as its scene, will be as lively and contentious a gathering as the last convention of the party, which was held as long ago as 1919 and at which Mr. Mackenzie King was elected leader after a very close contest.

In the present Parliament the Liberals, as the result of the operations of mortality upon appointees for life, have in the Senate a majority of more than three to one but in the House of Commons their position is distinctly precarious, for their majority has fallen below ten in several divisions during the present session. But such are the divergences in the ideologies and practical programmes of the three opposition groups that they are only on rare occasions able to present a united front against the Government and it can probably live out its term of office without defeat. Moreover, a run of Liberal reverses in by-elections has been checked and the latest tests of the Gallup polls reveal that the Liberals, thanks mainly to the fidelity of the French-Canadians, have still a good lead over all the other parties in popular favour. But the older school of Canadian Liberals, nurtured in the faith of Gladstone and

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Laurier are very uneasy about the morale of their party. They bewail a number of serious departures from the fundamental ideals and principles of Liberalism and lament that none of the younger leaders of the party seem to have any but a very faint conception of these principles or, if they are aware of them, are willing to fight for their practical application.

This disquietude was lately voiced in an article in a national magazine, styled "What's wrong with the Liberals," from the pen of Major C. G. Power, who was Minister for Air up till his resignation in 1944 and is now the doyen of the House of Commons. The chief counts in the indictment brought by Major Power and other malcontents, who demand a rebirth of genuine Liberalism at the approaching convention, are what the *Winnipeg Free Press* called "the shameful defiance of the law" in connection with the arrests and trials for espionage of the Canadian accomplices of the Russian Embassy, the indefensibly harsh treatment of the Japanese citizens of Canada, the unfair discrimination applied in immigration regulations against the Chinese and serious capitulation to high protectionist influences.

It was indeed a melancholy commentary upon the mentality of most of the present Liberal Ministers that their highly illiberal policy towards the Canadian-born Japanese evoked from a Progressive-Conservative, Mr. John Hackett, who is a corporation lawyer, the best exposition of liberal principles that has been heard at Ottawa for many a long day. The internal infirmities of the Liberal party might not bring it to defeat at the next general election, if the present wave of prosperity did not subside before it occurred, but if a serious recession in business befell, the idea that the time had arrived for a change of government would spread rapidly and in default of a revitalisation of the party its chances of securing a fresh mandate would be exceedingly slim.

But whether the Progressive-Conservatives, as the Rightist party of Canada now style themselves, could secure a clear majority is very dubious. This party forms the official opposition and, since the last general election held in 1945, its fortunes have made a considerable recovery from the low ebb to which they fell in the years following the migration in 1935 to the British House of Lords of the late Lord Bennett, who gave his party very vigorous leadership from 1927 to 1937. Its present leader, Mr. John Bracken, was a very strange choice for it, as he was originally a Professor of Agriculture, who made his political

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reputation by governing the western province of Manitoba for 20 years as a Liberal-Progressive Premier, and his earlier record as a resolute advocate of low tariffs is a very awkward burden for the leader of the traditionally high protectionist party of Canada to carry. The economic and social programme, to which he has committed the Progressive-Conservative party, differs only in minor shades from the Liberals' programme. There is, however, in it stronger emphasis upon the value of Canada's partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations and the need for an energetic policy about immigration. But its advocacy of the encouragement of immigration does not improve its prospects of overcoming its greatest handicap for the attainment of a clear majority, namely its inability to win the forgiveness of the French-Canadians for its support of full military conscription during both the world wars. Today the French-Canadians have, on the evidence of vital statistics, some justification for their confidence that, if they can only prevent any large influx of immigrants of British stock, they will achieve a numerical ascendancy in Eastern Canada at least, at no distant date. So they sense the advantage of preserving their solidarity on the side of the Liberal party and retaining control of its policies and of keeping out of office a party which would open the doors wide to immigrants.

The artificial equilibrium produced in Canadian politics by the incapacity of the Rightist party to tap in any serious degree the great basic reservoir of conservative sentiment, French-Canada, promises to continue until there emerges a strong Leftist party commanding such nation-wide support that it would force a merger of the two historic parties. But this desirable development will remain a vain dream as long as three discordant factions are competing for the Leftist vote and waging a three-cornered internecine feud. Of these three, the co-operative Commonwealth Federation is by far the strongest and it has a great asset in its Federal leader, Mr. Coldwell, one of the most attractive figures in Canadian public life and the ablest parliamentarian at Ottawa. Its programme of moderate Socialism is closely modelled upon that of the British Labour party and it is a curious trick of fate that it has been provided with its first laboratory for practical experiments in collectivism by the voters of Saskatchewan, of whom the great majority are farmers, hitherto regarded as passionate devotees of rugged individualism. The record of the results of these experiments is not uniform, but some of them have achieved sufficient success

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to cause anxiety in financial and industrial circles in Eastern Canada. Anyhow, their ultimate success or failure will have an important bearing upon the future fortunes of the C.C.F., as the party is popularly called, but it cannot hope to offer any formidable challenge to the two senior parties until it increases materially its present feeble voting strength in the provinces lying East of Ottawa, which, after the pending redistribution of seats in the Federal House of Commons, is accomplished with return of about two fifths of its membership.

The Social Credit party has provided Alberta with provincial ministries and held most of its Federal seats since its founder, the late Mr. William Aberhart, who blended expert demagoguery with religious revivalism, captivated its debt-ridden voters with his new financial gospel. Any semblance of the Social Credit system which was to make Alberta a Utopia, still awaits inauguration but the fantastic band of politicians, who represent the party at Ottawa, harp *ad nauseam* upon its merits as a panacea for all the economic and financial ills of Canada and upon the thesis that it offers the only hope of rescuing mankind from the baneful tyranny of a greedy gang of international financiers. Violent opponents of internationalism in any shape or form, these Social Crediters denounce U.N.O. and all its agencies as subtle instruments devised by the sinister international bankers for the perpetuation of their stranglehold upon suffering humanity. As a natural corollary, most of them are ardent Imperialists and hot gospellers of anti-Semitism and the bitter feud which they carry on with the C.C.F. makes them zealous defenders of the system of free enterprise. A creed which is an extraordinary farrago of illusions and prejudices seemed to have made no serious headway outside of Alberta until in October, 1946, the capture by a Social Creditor of what was regarded as a safe Liberal seat in Quebec, showed that it had made numerous converts among the French-Canadians; some of their younger clergy, being forbidden by their leaders to countenance Socialism, are apparently attracted by Social Credit. This development has not passed unnoticed by the managers of the Progressive-Conservative party and Liberal papers give chapter and verse for their allegations that they are planning working alliance with the Social Crediters in the next Federal election. But at the moment the Social Credit party is troubled by a revolt in Alberta of simon-pure Douglasites, who accuse their leaders of backslidings from the true faith.

The third Leftist faction, the Communists, now disguised

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under the label Labour Progressives are in very bad odour and have lost strength since the espionage trials disclosed the complicity of some of their leaders, including their solitary representative in Parliament, now serving a prison term, in the activities of the Russian Embassy. But it still retains a hard core of fanatical zealots, who are powerful in some of the unions, and it has lately abandoned its vendetta with the C.C.F. and, to the great embarrassment of the latter, has promised its co-operation with it at the next election.

Any prophecy about the future course of Canadian politics and in the years that lie ahead is obviously very hazardous and it will probably be determined by the state of the national economy. Another unpredictable factor is the consequence of the retirement of Mr. King. Ferdinand VII of Spain once said "Spain is a bottle of beer. I am the cork. Take away the cork and the bottle will bubble over." For many years now Mr. King has been the Canadian cork and, when he is removed, the Canadian bottle may bubble over in unexpected fashion.

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BOOKS

I. A PLEA FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

By M. HOOKHAM

SINCE the coming to power of the Labour Government there has been a considerable strengthening of the powers of central government. At the same time there has been developing a corresponding weakening of the powers of the local authorities. It is only in the last few months that this has been recognised as a very serious danger to the whole basis of local government. Mr. D. N. Chester writing in the Spring number, 1948, of *Public Administration* says: "During the past two or three years . . . the growth of detailed central control over local authorities has been astonishing . . . strangely enough the central government appear more willing to trust monopoly or trading interests than the elected councils and the first-class staffs of the local authorities". How recent has been the realisation of this danger may be seen from the proceedings of the East Midlands Regional Group of the Institute of Public Administration. In the Autumn number, 1947, of *Public Administration* there appeared the answers submitted by this group on behalf of the Institute to a questionnaire submitted by the International Congress of Administrative Sciences. The group state "the general conclusion concerning the relations between central and local authorities is that there is no sign of the development of a highly centralised government. As the national consciousness develops there will naturally develop an institutional expression of it, but our feelings are still towards freedom of the individual and freedom of the group . . . The larger local authorities in some cases would like to draw less assistance from the central government in order to retain greater freedom of action". On 2nd March, 1948, at the meeting of this group in Leicester the Director of Education for the County Borough of Leicester said, with the apparent agreement of all present, "that since the passing of the Education Act, 1944, the central government had passed from exercising a general supervision of educational administration to the exercise of full control. By increasing the central government grant by about two per cent. it had reached the position of exercising a 96 per cent. control of the administration."

The feeling of alarm and concern about the future of local government has been growing for some time. Mr. Charles Barratt in *Your Local Authority* raised the note of alarm in his final chapter "What of the Future?" Sir Malcolm Eve has

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asked "Is the lower tier to be given a worthwhile job to do, or are the members of local authorities to be allowed to lose interest, as well as the public they serve? Are they, in fact, only to be allowed to empty the bins, bury the dead, and cleanse the streets?" The Conservative Party at its congress in October, 1947, made much political capital out of this and Mr. Elliot characterised the Labour Government's policy as "an assault on local government". In the Labour Party itself the same uneasiness can be detected. There has been a strong movement in favour of decentralisation of government for Scotland and Wales. The whole tenor of the Labour Party's discussion pamphlets, *The Future of Local Government* and *Local Government Reform* is an indication of the concern about the future of local government which has developed in the party. There are references to the wide "indifference to what goes on in councils" as a "deadly enemy of enlightened progress."

There appear to be three main points. First there is a weakening of the smaller units of local government, in particular, by the removal of many of their old functions either to the larger units or to the central government itself. Second where the old functions remain as a responsibility of the local authority, the central government is exercising such a rigid and detailed control of the administration as to remove any opportunity for local initiative. Third that as a result of the operation of the tendencies in these first two cases, the local authorities have become so weakened as to be unable to arouse any interest in their work amongst the vast body of the citizens in the locality.

I think that the first point that has to be established is that the problem is not wholly new, though in its present form it has become far more dangerous. Professor Robson as long ago as 1932 in his *Development of Local Government* raised a warning note about the apathy shewn in local government elections. Local elections have frequently been uncontested. Where local elections have been contested a very low poll of about 30 per cent. has been quite normal. Professor Cole, dealing with this problem in his *Local and Regional Government*, writes: "the current lack of interest in local government problems is due, not simply to the uninterestingness of the sanitary functions out of which most modern local government has developed, but to an utterly wrong conception of local government which we have inherited from the days when it was in general assumed that its functions should be essentially residuary and that it should deal only, or at any rate mainly,

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with indispensable tasks that could be performed with even tolerable adequacy neither by self help on a voluntary basis, nor by philanthropy nor by profit-seeking enterprise". This, in my opinion, is not wholly true. In the same work he states: "the City or Town Council of the Victorian era developed as an essentially middle class institution, in which power rested with a local aristocracy of manufacturers and tradesmen, but these 'aristocrats' of the new town communities ruled not irresponsibly as the 18th century Corporations had done, but as the responsible representatives of the 'respectable' citizens". It was in fact the great merit of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, that it did establish a democratic system of local government for the newly enfranchised middle class. This new system of local government was a political victory won in the same way as the franchise had been, and covered all those functions of local government which were recognised as spheres fit for state interference. As the century developed, new governmental functions were vested in the *ad hoc* boards with little contact with the political battles around the local government machinery. The newly enfranchised classes towards the end of the century achieved another democratic victory when the pattern of local government was established and the spheres of its activity covered a wide field of social services. Each development was a political victory as a result of campaigns organised with popular support. This is reflected in P.E.P. pamphlet No. 261 which states: "Out of the chaos of 19th century development there had at last arisen a system which fulfilled the elementary requirement of being systematic. This appearance was, however, largely misleading. Although the forms of local government were taking shape the content was constantly changing. The problems of large scale planning, the determination to achieve uniform standards of social services, provided a centripetal pressure which steadily removed local government functions from small to large authorities and from large authorities to the central government".

The figures for local elections are most disturbing, even though particular reasons may be given for their lowness. P.E.P. pamphlet No. 261 gives the following figures for municipal elections in the City of Bristol.

1937	...	...	52.8 per cent.
1938	...	...	50.7 " "
1945	...	...	43.1 " "
1946	...	...	42.3 " "

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The last two figures it excuses on the grounds that there was an extended register, new settlers had come into the town with no local roots, and with more wards contested there were more elections where the result was a foregone conclusion. The county figures for Gloucester are, however, even less satisfactory.

1937	...	...	42.2 per cent.
1946	...	...	35.5 " "

(with a vote as low as 20.3 per cent. in the Cheltenham rural district area). At the last municipal elections in November, 1947, a revival of interest could be seen in the elections (with polls in some areas as high as in the previous general election), but the issues on which they were fought were largely national ones. *The Times* in its leader on the day of the elections pleaded that "boroughs are now more concerned than at any time in their ancient history with affairs directly and sometimes painfully affecting all citizens". A strong condemnation of the tendency to fight elections on national issues was expressed and a plea made for "the return of many councillors chosen on their merit among their neighbours". Here was a pathetic plea for the good old days. Two days later, reviewing the election results, *The Times* writes: "the change in the manner of municipal elections must impoverish local life and, though it may have been inevitable, it is in many ways regrettable, because it leads to the choice of councillors not for their local services, but as representatives of one political party or another, and because it compels the elector to vote not on local issues but on national policy. It is certain that on Saturday many, probably most voters were thinking rather of their disappointment with the fruits of the government's policy than of the needs of local housing or of a new borough library".

These attitudes were reflected in the local press. *The Leicester Mercury* for 17th October, 1947, in its leader, said: "Many observers see in present tendencies a distinct threat to the old conceptions of direct representation and the possibility of a widening gap between the local community and the authorities in control". Sir Miles Mitchell, the representative of the Manchester County Borough Council, at the meeting of the Association of Municipal Corporations on 18th November, 1947, is reported in the press as saying that "powers are now passing away not only from the county boroughs but from local government generally". *The Times* hints that this process

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may be inevitable and this idea is present in the Labour Party's pamphlet *Local Government Reform* when it says that "the man in the street knows that a change in national government may make a decided difference to his everyday life, but he finds it hard to believe that the same is true of changes in local government".

The problem, in the terms in which it has been stated, is widely recognised and many solutions have been offered. Much can be done by popular presentation of the citizens' civic rights and duties, though this has been very well done in some areas without any noticeable results in interest. All parties have expressed a desire for a loosening of central government interference in local affairs. This idea was expressed as long ago as 1925 by Professor Laski in his *Grammar of Politics*. "Once they are free to exploit the genius of their neighbourhood there is no reason not to expect such a flowering of local patriotism as marked, for instance, the Italian cities of the Middle Ages or the Hansa towns." Professor Cole more recently in his *Local and Regional Government*, makes out a strong case for reviving local government, with a lower tier concerned with community building in close and intimate contact with the people. The larger authority (the county, county borough and conurbation) with a regional planning authority superimposed, would be concerned with the administration of practically all governmental activity and planning. The whole pattern, however, is offered for consideration by the Boundary Commission which is operating in terms of reference far too narrow to adopt any of the suggestions. Mr. John Parker in *Labour Marches On*, points out that up to 1930 the Labour Party policy, following Fabian lines, was continuous support for the expansion of local government within certain services. Pressure was growing up locally for extension beyond these limits and the breakdown only came when the rating system proved inadequate as a source of finance. With the large block grant came central government control. Mr. Parker argues that the time has come for the Labour movement to think out its local government policy afresh. "Local government cannot be allowed to atrophy by having most of its interesting work taken from it," he says, and offers two solutions: "First of all there must be satisfactory links between the new nationalised industries, particularly those which directly affect the consuming public and the local authorities. Secondly a general study of local government services must be made to

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decide which unit of government can most satisfactorily carry out a particular service".

The position of these new public service corporations has been examined by Mr. R. H. Thornton in *Public Administration*, Spring, 1947, and Mr. H. R. G. Greaves in his *Civil Service in the Changing State*. Both of them show strong opposition to their present position and recommend that they be brought under the full control of a responsible Minister and Parliament. Mr. Greaves points out that the public service corporation as a new type of government organisation has been accepted as a compromise between private enterprise and state control. He urges that its lack of theoretical justification makes "its re-examination all the more necessary". Mr. T. H. O'Brien in *British Experiments in Public Ownership and Control*, written in 1937, specifically refers to the rejection by Mr. Morrison of the municipal control solution for the administration of London Transport and his preference for the "business board" as being more efficient. In fact the chief argument in favour of the corporation free from political interference is that it is more efficient. This is of course the argument for the City Manager in the U.S.A. and there has been a noticeable expansion of this type of government there. The danger of this argument can perhaps best be seen in Professor Robson's comments on German Local government in the *Political Quarterly* for October-December, 1945. "The efficiency of German local government in the past has been high, especially in the larger cities; but its efficiency was mostly achieved at the expense of democracy. It was therefore of a kind which inculcated in the German people that appalling absence of any sense of political responsibility which proved so fatal to their own interests, and which made them utterly indifferent to the rights of others, and which eventually had such disastrous consequences to the peace and welfare of the whole world." Mr. Morrison, however, persists in rejecting the popular democratic control of these corporations and this seems to be extensively accepted by the leadership of the Labour Party. On the 4th March, 1948, speaking at Manchester, Sir Walter Citrine pleaded strongly for keeping politics out of the British Electric Authority. Even in its new policy of industrial democracy whereby joint councils of labour and management are to be set up in all industries a word of caution goes out to "a few" who "unwisely try to use Production Committees as a platform for political agitation". This is the conception

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revealed in Sir Oliver Franks' *Central Planning and Control in War and Peace*. "The Government does not do the work on which the realisation of its programme depends. The work is done outside Government by managements and workers on whose co-operation the government must rely for the accomplishment of its policies." "It is at once the task and the miracle of statesmanship to translate them (the plans) into terms which have meaning and inspiration to ordinary men in ordinary circumstances." There are thus two tasks for the central government: to give the citizen a broad picture of the national plan and to show the citizen what are his tasks. The whole democratic machinery of local government is thus completely ignored.

The concept of local government was enunciated by John Stuart Mill and praised by Von Gneist and de Tocqueville as a broadening of the participation of the people in the process of government. In 1860 Von Gneist saw "the system of self government in its present day form" as the "administration of localities by unpaid officers belonging to the upper and middle classes, according to the laws of the country, through local taxation". It was this "glowing centre of the constitution" that aroused his admiration for our system of government. It is important to realise that (as Von Gneist realised) this development in England had brought only the upper and middle classes into the machinery of government and not the working class. The active participation of the working classes in the machinery of local government developed in the 20th century and during this period the central government has gathered in the threads of control to prevent full flowering of this last development in local democracy. When the Poplar councillors began to exercise these democratic powers in a way that brought them into conflict with ideas of the ruling class at the time, they were rigorously restrained as effectively as any departmental *préfet* in France has restrained the growth of local democracy. Consciously or unconsciously the Labour Government has continued this policy. In P.E.P. pamphlet No. 277 they are given the benefit of the doubt. "It is one of the paradoxes of the British policy in Germany that the paramount importance of decentralisation is being urged at a time when in Great Britain more and more responsibility is going from smaller to large authorities, and from local to central government—not presumably on principle but because the needs of the situation are thought to demand it."

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I think that there always has been in the Labour Party a complete lack of understanding of the real nature of local government and a failure to see the local authorities as part of the machinery of the state. In its many years out of office the Labour Party, under the Fabian influence, regarded local authorities as a weapon to use against the central state power, or as purely administrative machinery. Professor Cole in *Local and Regional Government* starts by trying to define local government. He realises that "there is no clear line of division" but suggests that local government is "a matter of detailed administration, involving the determination of principles largely as an incident to decisions on particular cases". "It by no means follows that when it comes to administration there need be the strict party alignments which are unavoidable when policy is being determined in full council." Again Professor Cole, like most writers on this subject, makes a comparison (or contrast) between local government in the western democracies and in the U.S.S.R. Even the bitterest opponents of the communist way of life grant that the participation of the people in operating the machinery of government in the U.S.S.R. is an outstanding phenomenon of the Soviet system. Mr. Rudolf Schlesinger in *The Spirit of Post War Russia*, has calculated that ten million citizens take an active part in political life. What nearly all of them fail to realise is the different context of a society in which one-party government exists where a serious change in the whole basis of society is not on the agenda of people's thoughts. So long as in the western states there are two major political parties in conflict over the nature of the foundations on which the society is to operate, the political struggle between those parties is all-important. This is what I think Engels was referring to in the idea of the change from the administration of people to the administration of things. Western parliamentary democracy is faced with the most urgent question of developing its economy under central government direction with the major part of its resources in private ownership. The stresses and strains to which this system is subject can be read in the economic surveys of 1947 and 1948. In addition the whole force of the political machinery is operating to hold in balance any further swing to a more definite decision in favour of public or private ownership. The political question at the moment is therefore merely who shall control the existing machinery. Over that it is possible to have sporadic national political battles quite meaningless for

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the people in terms of their locality. It is not possible either in such a nice balance of forces to allow any effective power to pass from central to the local government organs. As the situation becomes more difficult to control power passes to the centre.

These facts can be seen in the Town and Country Planning machinery set up under the Act of 1947. The County and County Borough Councils now empowered as planning authorities are called upon to conduct an economic, physical and social survey of their area with a view to preparing a development plan within three years of the appointed date (now likely to be 1st July, 1948). If this were operated quite seriously a solution would have to be found to the complex problem of town versus country areas and a host of social and economic problems of reconstruction. The Labour Party discussion pamphlet written in the narrow terms of the old concept of local government as the instrument of social services, asks courageously (in questions for discussion) "what do you regard as the main planning deficiencies in your area? What action should your local authority take to overcome them? How would you encourage public enthusiasm and participation in the job of making a plan for your area?" The answers to these questions must be wholly unsatisfactory if the local authority is so limited in the range of its effective powers as to be quite incapable of doing anything more than recommending where new roads should be laid, new houses erected, and land scheduled for development. These are all desirable things but we have seen such things done in the Middlesbrough, Worcester, Herefordshire, Devon and Cornwall surveys. In every county the disagreement between the county authority and the authorities of the County Boroughs is so serious as to make any hope of co-operation over immediate problems quite impossible. Anyone who has had to deal with these problems must be bewildered at the sight of councillors of the same political party, but representing different areas, in violent conflict only to be united in abuse of the central government.

It seems, however, to be an inevitable corollary that so long as our economy remains a compromise between private enterprise and state control the central organs of the state must retain most of the powers of government in order to keep the unsteady balance of the compromise. The local authority and local democracy in such a situation would be doomed to atrophy. Houses and schools will remain unbuilt for years, however carefully and enthusiastically the local authorities

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may plan them, so long as our whole economy is operating in the low gear of a compromise. The power of control necessary to keep this balance, however, is limited by the overworked capacity of parliament and in a time of crisis (especially in economic or foreign affairs, both of which are possible in the near future) would lead dangerously near to fascist control or revolution filling the political vacuum. The time available for a reconstruction of the pattern of local government, as Professor Cole has suggested, or for experiments in "social technology" as Dr. R. K. Popper has suggested in *The Open Society*, is dangerously short. Whilst everyone agrees about the unsuitability of the existing local authority areas, and disagrees about the reshaping of them, the urgent need is for an immediate grant to the local authorities of much fuller powers. Every local authority in the country has within its area untapped material resources and enthusiasms of its people which could be called into action for the solution of the economic stagnation in which we exist if only the powers were granted to it to take the action. Were this new activity undertaken the political parties would work out a new conception of the relations of central and local authorities on which a workable pattern of areas and powers could be based.

It is no answer to say that political conflict is the greatest enemy of efficient administration. It is the price that has to be paid for winning the enthusiastic participation of people in working out their own policy and operating it. Three million pounds a year spent on government advertising is a very high price for the hardly noticeable results that social surveys have been able to attribute to it. The price of political conflict would be negligible in comparison with the results to be achieved in the revival of local democracy and enthusiasm in rebuilding the economy of the country. No political party which has in its programme the word "democracy" can afford to neglect the lesson contained in my quotation from Professor Robson above. Nor should the Labour Party overlook the words written by Professor Laski in reviewing Mr. Michael Young's book *Labour's Plan for Plenty* in the *Political Quarterly*, July-September, 1947: "How far does he think nationalisation must go before we can be sure that the foundations of a socialist commonwealth have been effectively laid. Are the institutions satisfactory through which this nationalisation is to work? Does the evidence convince him that the new social order is successful in securing the new responses it clearly requires?"

II. THE REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

IN the preceding article, Mr. Hookham has analysed some of the forces, both internal and external, which have sapped the vitality of local authorities and reduced the sphere of local government.

The malady is a complex one; but in my view no single factor has contributed so much to the present dangerous decline of local government in Britain as the obsolete organisation of areas and authorities. With the present system, even the best friends of local government found it difficult to argue that local authorities should be permitted to retain the services which require large-scale development and administration; while any substantial extension of municipal functions of the kind which the Webbs foresaw in their *Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* was impractical without a modernisation of the entire structure. In consequence, those who can see no virtue in local self-government except for the conduct of a limited range of police functions and social services have been able to indulge their passion for centralisation without let or hindrance; while those who believe profoundly in local government have been occupied in urging the need for a general reform of municipal organisation in the face of bitter opposition from the existing local authorities and their associations, and indifference on the part of Ministers and parliamentarians.

This is the background against which the recent *Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission* must be seen.¹ It is the first sign from any official body which indicates either the parlous state into which local government has fallen or the kind of change which is necessary to effect even a partial recovery. The Report is a brief and businesslike document. It makes no attempt to trace the historical development of the present condition, nor does it attribute blame or criticism for what has occurred among those who are responsible. It wastes no words on eloquence. Its essential purpose is to describe shortly the causes of weakness in local government and to prescribe remedies.

The weaknesses, the Commissioners point out, are due to

¹ *Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission for the year 1947.* H.M. Stationery Office. 1s. net.

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the disparity in size and resources of individual counties, county boroughs, and county districts; the failure of the local government system to adapt itself to the changing pattern of modern industrial England, particularly in the case of the great conurbations in the Black Country, Manchester, Merseyside, Tyneside, the West Riding, Tees-side, and elsewhere; the increased central control which has deprived local authorities of a large measure of their independence; the haphazard allocation of functions among local authorities on a piecemeal basis; and, above all, the conflict between county councils and county borough councils which has arisen from the constant pressure on the part of the big towns to extend their boundaries and the desire of non-county boroughs to acquire county borough status. This conflict between town and county has been gnawing at the vitals of local government with increasing intensity for half a century.

The Commissioners rightly point out that it is "a matter of first importance to the future of local government that this very natural antagonism should cease, and that these frequent battles should not take place." They have therefore sought a remedy which "removes the causes of the battle rather than one which disables either combatant." This, indeed, is the chief aim of the Report.

At present there are 83 county boroughs and 61 administrative counties in England and Wales. Within the administrative counties is a second tier of county district councils consisting of 309 non-county boroughs, 572 urban districts and 475 rural districts, making a total of 1,356. In the rural districts there are about 7,000 parish councils, which form a third tier, but this may be ignored for the purpose of distinguishing between the two main types of one-tier and two-tier local government. Broadly speaking, two-thirds of the population live in the county areas and one-third in the county boroughs.

The Commission recognises that in terms of certain types and sizes, one-tier government is preferable and that elsewhere the two-tier system should prevail. It is in their application of this principle that the Commission departs largely from the present arrangements.

They recommend that henceforth the whole of England and Wales should be divided into counties, each with its own county council. Most of the present counties would continue unchanged as major authorities, though some of the smallest

¹ Page 7.

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counties would be merged with others and the largest ones divided. There would, in addition, be a number of new counties consisting of large cities and towns, sometimes associated with the surrounding urban, rural or semi-rural environs. These new counties would in some instances have one-tier administration (and would therefore resemble the present county boroughs), while in others there would be a two-tier form of local government. The general aim would be to provide a population of between 200,000 and 1,000,000 for each new two-tier county, and a population of 200,000 to 500,000 for every new single-tier county. (London is not within the jurisdiction of the Commission, so this would not apply in the metropolis).

County boroughs would not disappear, but they would no longer be entirely separate from the administrative county for all local government purposes. What the Commission calls "new county boroughs" would form a new category of lower-tier authorities which would have a superior position to county district councils, but which would form part of the county for certain purposes. They would (unlike county districts) be autonomous local authorities for education, health and medical services, the care of the aged and the disabled, and perhaps the care of children under the new Children Bill. They would be authorised to claim responsibility for executing the repair, maintenance and construction of classified highways though the finance of these highways would be a county council function. They would have a separate commission of the peace, a coroner and a sheriff, and discharge the duties relating to the administration of justice. They would prepare the detailed plans for their own areas within the framework of the town and country plan prepared by the county council. They would be given all the functions at present performed by the largest non-county boroughs in regard to housing, reconstruction areas, slum clearance, town improvements, sewerage and sewerage disposal, allotments, libraries, museums and art galleries, civic restaurants, food and drugs, cemeteries and crematoria, mortuaries, parks, open spaces and playing fields, baths and wash-houses and many other matters.

The principal differences which would exist between a new county borough and the present ones is that the county council and not the county borough council would be responsible for the main town and country plan, for the police force, the fire service, land drainage, small holdings, remand homes,

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approved schools, road fund and local taxation licences, the diseases of animals and the finance of highways. Thus the largest and wealthiest towns would be brought into the county system for a few—in my opinion, far too few—purposes. They would continue to exercise autonomous powers over a wide range of local government functions. They are correctly described in the Report as "most-purpose" authorities, to distinguish them from the county district councils, which are not to be given so large a degree of responsibility, and the all-purpose county boroughs of today.

It will be seen that all major organs of local government are to become counties. There are 17 cities or towns which the Commission considers suitable to be governed by a single-tier county council. These are Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Coventry, Derby, Kingston-upon-Hull, Leeds, Leicester, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Nottingham, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Sheffield, Southampton, Stafford North (Potteries), Sunderland, and the urban complex centred on Brighton. All but four of these are at present cities or county boroughs. Most of them have, or will have if their demands for extended boundaries are met, populations within the prescribed limits of 200,000–500,000. Birmingham stands out as a monster with a population of 1,085,000; and should therefore have two-tier local government in accordance with the general standards laid down. But the Commission does not recommend this course, although they express the view that more local interest would exist in Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool if the populations were divided for local government purposes. The reason in the case of Birmingham is believed to be the simple one that no one at the city hall wants a change of this kind.

Manchester and Liverpool are to be dealt with on very different lines. There are at present no less than 17 county boroughs in Lancashire; and in their previous report, the Commission explained that the proposals already before them for creating and extending county boroughs would, if conceded, reduce the population and rateable value of the Lancashire County Council by at least 63 per cent. In order to prevent so impossible a result from coming about, the Commission suggest a radical transformation. North Lancashire is to be united with Westmorland to form a new county of about 280,000 population and 796,000 acres. The rest of Lancashire (with the Wirral and parts of Cheshire) would be split up into four new counties which would include within them all the existing

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county boroughs with the possible exception of Bury, which may revert to a non-county borough status. There would thus be (1) *Lancaster Central* (1,180,000 population) containing Blackburn, Blackpool, Burnley, Preston and Southport; (2) *Lancaster South* (1,040,000 population) containing Bolton, Rochdale, St. Helens, Warrington and Wigan; (3) *Lancaster South-East and Chester North-East*, with over one million population and containing Manchester, Oldham, Salford, Stockport and Stretford. This county would be based on Manchester and neighbourhood; (4) *Lancaster South-West and Chester North-West* (1,385,000 population) centered on Merseyside. This would contain Liverpool, Birkenhead, Bootle and Wallasey.

Yorkshire would be treated in a similar way, excluding Bradford, Leeds, Kingston-upon-Hull and Sheffield which, as we have seen, are destined to become single-tier counties. Outside these cities the county would be divided into four administrative counties (in place of the three Ridings) which would contain the remaining county boroughs. Staffordshire is also to be split up into three administrative counties containing the several county boroughs. Stafford North, based on the potteries, would have single-tier government, while Stafford Central and Stafford South would each have a double-deck structure.

Now for the amalgamations. East and West Suffolk are to be merged; so too are Hereford and Worcester. Cambridge is to be allowed to swallow up the undersized Isle of Ely, Huntingdon and Soke of Peterborough; while Rutland will be united to Leicestershire. Lincoln (parts of Kesteven) will be joined with Lincoln (parts of Holland) and the City of Lincoln to make a new county of Lincoln South. Lincoln (parts of Lindsey) which is already much larger, will be joined with Grimsby to make Lincoln North.

The Commission rejects without a reasoned argument the majority recommendation of the Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside area¹ for a unified body to cover the whole lower Tyne area together with the rest of Northumberland. They substitute a curious plan for dividing up Tyneside between Newcastle-on-Tyne, Northumberland and Durham, with Tynemouth, Gateshead and South Shields as new style county boroughs. Tees-side, by contrast, is to be treated as a single area included within York North.

The position of Wales is indeterminate and the Commission

¹ Cmd 5402/1937.

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adumbrate several possible alternatives. (Have they read Alderman Chappell's admirable little book on the government of Wales?) The administrative county of London is excluded from their jurisdiction: once more, as in 1835, the metropolis has been "protected" from the cleansing winds of reform which are permitted to blow freely through the rest of the country. The Commission has, however, been given the task of dealing with the outlying portions of the metropolis; and, before attempting it, they wisely inquire whether it is seriously intended that the boundaries of the London County Council are not to be reviewed by some authority. It is absurd and intolerable that a line drawn in 1855 should be permitted to remain unchanged in the London of today.

The Commission had already recommended in their earlier Report¹ that the functions of county districts should be assimilated, regardless of their division into urban districts, rural districts or non-county boroughs. This remains an important feature of the proposed reorganisation. In the present Report, however, the Commission makes the novel proposal that each two-tier county shall have its own individual scheme of delegation of functions by county councils to district councils. The idea is that Parliament will enumerate the functions which may be delegated, leaving it to each county council and the county district councils (or an independent body in consultation with them) to frame a scheme suited to the needs of their particular area. The general principles on which such schemes should be based would be laid down by Ministerial regulations to be approved by Parliament. "Whatever method is adopted," the Commissioners remark, "it must be flexible. We are sure that what is right for one county is not necessarily right for another and that what is right for one county district is not necessarily right for another in the same county."²

In addition to their delegated functions, districts councils—and this applies *a fortiori* to county borough councils—would also possess their own inherent powers, conferred upon them either by statute or charter. The Commission does not express a favourable view about the system of delegation to divisional executives introduced by the Education Act, 1944. Delegation, they consider, must always be less effective and convenient than autonomous provision of a service by a local authority of the appropriate size. For that reason they recommend autonomous

¹ Report for 1946. Par. 33.

² 1947 Report. Page 30.

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powers whenever possible. But for certain services and in certain areas delegation is not only valuable but an essential form of co-operation.¹ At the lowest level of all the Commission wishes to retain parish councils and also to extend the idea to neighbourhood units or wards in towns, which might have their own small community councils.

It is interesting to compare the present major authorities with those which would exist under the Commission's plan. There are at present 49 county councils and 80 county boroughs in England. There would be in future, 67 new counties, of which 47 would be two-tier and 20 one-tier. In addition, there would be 63 county boroughs, which would no longer be primary organs as they are at present.

Any scheme of local government reform must be judged by three main criteria. First, it must stop, once and for all, the conflict between county councils and county borough councils which has been gnawing at the vitals of local government for the last 30 or 40 years. Here we can say that the scheme is an immense improvement over the present situation. In several places it would achieve the fundamental aim of integrating the big town with the surrounding countryside or of linking it for local government purposes with the rest of the county. It does not go the whole way in this respect, for reasons which will be explained shortly; but it does at least abolish the fatal separation of town and country in watertight compartments which was made in 1888.

A second object of local government reform should be to eliminate the unfit units and to replace them by others of suitable size and with adequate resources. Here again we can approve the Commission's plan, at least as regards the disappearance of the weakest existing county councils and county boroughs from the list of new top-tier authorities. The Commission has adopted the right method of fixing maximum and minimum standards of size and moulding the structure to comply with them. I do not consider that the new units satisfy contemporary requirements, for reasons which are explained below, but that is a different point.

The third object of local government reform should be to provide areas and authorities which are capable of carrying on those services which require large-scale planning and administration. There can be no doubt that the Commission's plan fails in this respect.

¹ Page 10.

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Their failure is partly due to the superficial consideration which the Commission gives to the size of local government units. The Report discusses the matter cursorily in three pages and makes no attempt to analyse the requirements of the various services. The Commission in the end takes as its general aim, maximum population figures of 500,000 for a single-tier county and 1,000,000 for a two-tier county; but this is not based on any scientific investigation. It appears to be no more than a mere guess.

The Commissioners never for a moment turn their eyes towards the regional movement which has wrought havoc with local government. They do not ask why responsibility for electricity and gas supply, civil airfields, hospitals, trunk roads and other services, has recently been taken away from local authorities and given to regional or central bodies; or under what conditions it might be practicable for these functions to be restored to the realm of local self-government. The Commissioners apparently accept as a *fait accompli* the deplorable state of diminished power, interest and responsibility in which local government finds itself at present, without diagnosing the underlying causes or seeking a fundamental remedy.

Yet surely there are some extremely important lessons to be learnt from recent events. It is not an accident that the public utility, road transport and hospital services require regional administration and planning. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that, if local government could be projected on to a regional scale; if elected councils could be set up covering regional areas which technical reasons render necessary for public utility services, town and country planning, hospital administration and other services, it would be practicable to contemplate a reversal of current centralising trends. If there were an *available alternative* to centralisation, the outlook would be entirely changed.

Unfortunately, the Commissioners have had neither the courage nor the imagination to consider these aspects of the matter. They accept by implication the reduced status of local government as final. Indeed, their proposals for several areas will result in the creation of substantially smaller authorities even than the present ones. This is so notably in Lancashire and Yorkshire.

The excessive caution and lack of boldness of the Report is evident if we compare its proposals with those which were made recently in Manchester at a conference attended by mem-

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bers of Manchester and Salford, 14 non-county borough councils, 14 urban district and three rural district councils. The sub-committee issued an admirable report advocating a new administrative county for Manchester and district. After explaining the increasing difficulty experienced by county boroughs in maintaining local interest in civic affairs, the report declared, "The real remedy lies in the assimilation of the local government system in the region to the wider area of community; to do this a regional authority should be responsible for the major or regional services and local authorities should be responsible for the local services and, in appropriate cases, for the day-to-day local administration of regional services."¹

The area suggested for the new county of Manchester and district would cover 457,000 acres. It would have a population of 2,630,000 and a rateable value of £19,000,000. It would comprise the county boroughs of Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale and Salford in Lancashire, and Stockport in Cheshire; 11 boroughs in Lancashire, 6 in Cheshire and 2 in Derbyshire; 25 urban districts in Lancashire, 12 in Cheshire and 2 in Derbyshire, together with several rural districts in Cheshire, Lancashire and the West Riding. This would be a much larger and more powerful organ than the county for South East Lancaster and North-East Chester proposed by the Local Government Boundary Commission, which, as we have already noted, would have a population of only 1,069,000 persons. The difference between the two sets of proposals can be seen from the fact that the former would probably have resulted in Lancashire being divided into three parts, centered on Manchester, Liverpool and Preston respectively, whereas the Boundary Commission divides the county (with neighbouring territory) into five pieces. This signifies more than a difference of emphasis. It is a different conception.

Another striking contrast is between the position of the county boroughs under the Manchester proposal and under the Local Government Boundary Commission scheme. The Manchester report divides functions into three categories. [a] Services to be provided, financed and administered solely by the county council. These consist of water supply, police, fire brigades, public assistance, sewage disposal and welfare of the blind. [b] Services which should be financed, planned, or organised by the county council for the whole county but administered, either wholly or in part, by the district councils as

¹ Par. 65.

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agents. These include education, health (including maternity and child welfare), town and country planning, main sewers, county highways, street lighting, libraries, museums and art galleries, regional parks and open spaces, cemeteries and crematoria, certain functions relating to housing and slum clearance, small holdings, and food inspection. [c] Services which are essentially local in character and which can be left entirely to the lower tier authorities.

The Local Government Boundary Commission scheme brings the county borough into the county system for very little beyond the fire and police services, town and country planning and the finance of highways. The large town would, in my opinion, remain independent of the county for far too many functions. It must be borne in mind that the new county boroughs will contribute towards county revenue for only those services which the county council provides in their area and not for the others. Since the Local Government Boundary Commission proposes to confer county borough status on ten non-county boroughs with populations exceeding 60,000, the counties in which they are situated will, *ceteris paribus*, be in a substantially worse position than they are at present, both financially and administratively.

My general conclusion on the Report is that while it represents a great advance on any previous official document on the subject, it does not go far enough. Its policy of restoring the county borough to the county is sound in principle but its proposals are half-hearted. Its fear of being accused of recommending regionalism has led it to ignore the whole regional problem. The settlement advocated by Manchester and its neighbours for their own area is much preferable to the Commissioners' scheme. The Manchester plan was, admittedly, strongly opposed by most of the county boroughs concerned. In seeking to pacify the county boroughs the Commission have produced a very astute Report, but political considerations must not be allowed to obscure the disadvantages of leaving the county boroughs still too largely separated from the counties. Above all, we must not be content with a mere "equalising" reform, which lops off the very small and very large authorities without paying proper regard to the organic relation between structure and function.

EDUCATION AND THE SCHOOLS

By NEIL SMITH

GROWTH OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROBLEM

Apart from poverty and war, the multipliers of all social evils, the problems confronting modern society have, broadly speaking, a threefold aspect. First—political, or securing efficient, democratic government in the interests of the people by those most fit to wield power and least likely to abuse it. Second—economic, or making property socially harmless and no longer a base of power or a main goal of effort. Both problems have become more complex and formidable as industrialism has taken social life farther away from the natural, primitive forms of existence, and instinctive types of social organisation and of leadership have given way to governmental organisation based on mass politics.

This is true also of the third problem, that of education. In a feudalised agricultural community custom and tradition do the work of education for the masses, and little formal schooling is needed except by the hereditary ruling class and the legal and priestly professions serving and sustaining it. The situation changes as capitalist production and the division of labour replace production for use, a local economy becomes national and then international, trades and crafts multiply in expanding urban areas, private property accumulates, social classes fission, and the intricate relationships between men, now inadequately regulated by weakening custom and tradition, have to be increasingly governed by *ad hoc* law. Industrial society has appeared and with it the reign of middle class commercialism, interpenetrated by feudalism and sacerdotalism and modified by liberal radicalism and working class democracy. Paralleling these great changes but by no means keeping pace with or matching up to them, a school system develops. Old foundation schools are taken over and reorganised by the upper classes, imitative new ones set up by the middle classes, and some of the poor are taught the scriptures in church schools. The point then comes when governmental convenience and the need for literate workers force the state to build schools where the masses can be compulsorily taught the three Rs, adulterated by theology and political quietism, and partly trained for their work.

Such was the school structure in existence in England at the turn of the 19th century. Since 1900, English society

(still, however, retaining many of its former characteristics) has been transformed into a social service state. After 1900, also, state secondary schools were set up to cover the classes not catered for under the older arrangements, and a path to the universities opened for some of the poor. The Education Act of 1944 has now universalised secondary schooling and is turning all state schools into social welfare centres for the children of the wage earning classes.

Present-day schooling is a compromise with few avowed purposes and is therefore well spoken of in all quarters. Conservatives are unopposed to it as its teachings do not threaten the *status quo*. Liberals find some of their tradition in it. The educational ladder is approved by Labour. Bookish people applaud its bookishness and religious zealots its respect for religion. Traditional, utilitarian, dogmatic, and humanist strains mingle confusedly in our schools, and nearly everybody can find something in them of which he approves. Yet, despite the many changes made (and indeed, partly because of them), that part of the educational problem of modern society it is the function of the schools to solve remains unsolved, and our school system taken as a whole measures up to the times no more than it did fifty years ago. The fundamental reason for this is the unawareness of the extent to which the educational problem has changed since the main school traditions were established.

THE NATURE OF THE MODERN PROBLEM

One of the most marked changes of the past century, and the one now emerging to dominate all others, is the trend towards the total state, together with the growth of its correlative, mass politics. Inherent social and political forces in industrialism and in political human nature as we know it are promoting a uniform type of society throughout the civilised world. After three centuries of far ranging development and comparative freedom, into which were compressed enormous changes in the material circumstances of social life, we seem to be moving forward (or, as some would say, backward) to a resumption of the authoritarian regimes and compulsive social routines of the past, but ones which will be more massive, more deliberately conceived and organised, and with greater and more intimate effect on ordinary lives. Closed and corporate forms of social organisation are arising based on the overwhelming supremacy of the state over all lesser groups and

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individuals, and their complete dependence on the initiatives and directives of those who control the political machine. In Russia, the state's Midas touch has already turned almost everything the citizen sees and does into a political event. Russia is the most advanced society in the world in this respect, but in Britain and U.S.A. also the long arm of the state lengthens year by year.

The main reason for this trend is organisational: industrialism has not only created new problems but has turned problems once capable of being solved by individual or local effort into communal problems which can only be solved by political action on a national or international scale. Alongside the trend towards the integrated state and the politically directed form of social life there has been the corruption of democracy by mass politics; and this is due to the fact that social co-operation in an industrial society has little basis in instinct and the uneducated mind has no understanding of the problems raised by industrial modes of life nor the political capacity to deal with them by intelligent common effort. The inadequacy of instinct and the lack of mental preparation for life leave a vacuum which is being filled in Britain and U.S.A. by herd sentiment and tradition, reinforced by industrial ways of life and governmental pressure so as to produce uniformity of thought and behaviour over large areas, with the addition, in Russia, of a state creed, rigorously enforced. But manufactured herd sentiment is not the same as a common citizenship, nor a sense of collective destiny an effective substitute for a common social purpose. The failure of educationists to fill the vacuum with those individual qualities of mind and those desirable social attitudes and responses which, for want of a better word, we call citizenship, is the measure of the extent to which they have been corrupted by the obscurantist forces at work in their field, misled by their own obsolete traditions, and failed to grasp the scope and nature of the problem to be solved.

Obvious perils lie ahead. Most men are easily led and wish for the quiet life. They do not themselves desire power nor value freedom enough to reject the efforts of the masterful minority to hold them in bondage. Servitude is easier than freedom, ignorance than knowledge, conformity than critical and constructive dissent, imitative custom than original thought, resignation than effort, despotic government than self-government, being told what to do and think than making a rational choice between different alternatives and having a mind

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of one's own—in short, the leader-and-followers psychology is more natural than democratic psychology to uneducated or miseducated men; and among such men the natural goal of present trends is the heavily bureaucratised police state or more subtle and scientific forms of tyranny not yet devised. The problem facing teachers and others is not the negative one of averting the consequences of tyranny and slavery, though neither could survive in an educated populace. Their task is the creative one of rearing men and women who will understand, value, and develop free and democratic ways of life and be able to co-operate for common purposes, so making realisable the potential benefits of science; for the same technical and social forces which are gradually enslaving whole populations to the mercy of large organisations and which have already intensified the striking power of the national, power-seeking state to the point where all that civilised men most value in their lives may be destroyed, can also be turned to an enlargement of life and freedom hitherto unexperienced except by a fortunate minority. Educated men will diminish social strife, liberate energy and talent, use the power of organised society to promote well-being, simplify the organisation of their daily work, make good lawmaking easier and more effective, and get the better government they deserve.

THE TASK OF THE SCHOOLS

Education, therefore, has to enlarge the narrow circle of the mind so that it intersects at more points with other minds, though naturally and unavoidably not centred as these other minds. It must harmonise desires so as to lessen social conflict; teach the art of social adjustment; and promote the intelligence and spread the knowledge which would make free co-operation for common purposes possible. It has to cultivate the life-giving and life-preserving impulses which drive all virtuous conduct. It must stress, not by lectures but by teaching skills which absorb random energy and give delight, the contrast between those slow and difficult forms of creative and restorative work which bring order and beauty into the vexed world of man and put new powers into his hand, and the many kinds of destructive activity, some of them now socially approved. It has to lead children away from the self-centred individualism and the narrow self-regarding and tribal sympathies of untutored natures. It has, in short, to adapt the human animal to the requirements of a complicated and civilised existence. In

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working for such ends in the schools teachers will, at the same time, be fulfilling many of the ideals they have traditionally valued.

A school system has to gather children into attractive centres and there isolate out and pass on to them those parts of the accumulated experience and knowledge of mankind as are appropriate to their ages; to give them a truthful conspectus of the society in which they live, and its relations to other societies, past and present; to develop the civil virtues; to detect and correct the inborn and acquired physical, mental, and emotional faults; and to foster individual talent.

Some obvious changes would be needed in our school system and in what it teaches.

We must first break up its class structure and cease to educate differentially and unequally on grounds which have no relation to merit. To implement the Fleming Report and fill 20 (or 90) per cent. of the vacancies in the independent schools from the wage-earning classes is no cure for this disease but will merely spread it wider. Only in a classless school system can children be nursed in ideals of individual and social excellence applicable to the whole community.

Church schools have no place in any defensible school system. A third desirable step is the provision of schools for the supernormal as well as for the educationally subnormal so that children of advanced mental age and exceptional generalised capacity can work at their own speed and in their own groups unhampered by the difficulties which now beset them.

Of the essential knowledge to be taught and its presentation, the best and shortest discussion of this incessantly debated question known to me, giving "the irreducible minimum of knowledge for a responsible human being to-day" and "the main beams and girders of the mental framework which must be laid down before the close of adolescence," is a Presidential Address by H. G. Wells to the Education Science Section of the British Association in 1937, entitled the "Informative Content of Education." The comprehensive, practicable scheme of mental preparation and of instruction set forth here would lead the normal child step by step to a degree of self knowledge and understanding of modern life and history unattainable through the present curriculum—an understanding which when it is attained by adults is due to self-education and the thoughtful interpretation of experience, not to any help the teacher has given. The present curriculum in the primary and secondary

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stages is a pointless compromise of tradition and specialist enthusiasm, leading nowhere except to the school certificate examinations. What Wells asked the teacher to do would not leave undone the great educational task of building up in the child's mind a consciousness of his social role, an awareness of his lifelong dependence on others and therefore of his obligations towards them, so stimulating his imagination and widening his sympathies as to make them co-extensive with the whole species and not merely one fragment of it. Such a mental awakening and widening is the indispensable counterpart of the political and economic interrelations which have been creeping from frontier to frontier since the industrial revolution and are now, at last, world wide. It is not produced by daily experience in the minds of ordinary men, nor do our schools at present give it.

A great deal of basic information and specialist knowledge could be taught by good teachers with modern aids in small classes if felt by both teacher and pupil to be interesting and important, and therefore taught and learnt without boredom and weariness. At present, much in the schools promotes this boredom and weariness—dismal buildings, some of them quite ghastly in their ugly drabness, large herdlike classes instead of small homogeneous groups where the active and intelligent and the inert and dull do not hamper each other, poor teaching and a scrappy curriculum unrelated to living experience and to the aptitudes of the pupil, so killing natural curiosity.

Propaganda for any faction or sect is not to be tolerated in schools because dogma is incompatible with truthfulness and the development of intelligence. But this does not mean that schools of older children should bar the free and informed discussion of the problems and issues of the day. Home, radio, newspaper, and cinema make the adolescent aware of social questions. As he moves into the adult world he will argue about them, take sides, form judgments, cast votes, perhaps take an active part in public affairs. Is the school to do nothing to prepare him for all this, to fortify his mind against political passion and narrow dogma, or to protect society against the consequences of ignorance and feebleness of grasp? People may be sensible and considerate in their personal relations, but if they remain insensible to their fellows in the mass and to the problems of organised society, the power of that society may be evilly used, as it was under the Nazis, whilst the ordinary run of men are anything but evil.

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Nothing is worse in the schools than that kind of teaching which leaves unsaid much that the intellectually honest teacher knows should be said. The two chief enemies of truthfulness in the schools are nationalism and religion. The latter is also an enemy of moral earnestness and the religious spirit. Religious instruction has no place in an enlightened curriculum and should be disallowed in state schools. No harm would come from this, and most parents, who would be equally ashamed to be known as freethinkers or as a bit "religious," unlikely to object.

WHAT OUR SCHOOLS ARE DOING

Against the educational problem as stated, set the views of those to whom education is simple literacy, preparation for a job or for leisure, training in loyalty to the state, or a device for emphasising or improving social status. And then consider what is being done in our schools under the ægis of the Education Act of 1944. The Public Schools remain unchanged. Of the schools in the state system, a large fraction are church schools, practically run on state funds, whose main object is to turn their pupils into supporters of the vested religious interests managing them.

In the primary schools, children are given simple instruction and, for the rest, perplexed and stuffed with theology, trivial history, and other stale cultural leftovers of the past, and schooled into general conformity. At this stage, as at others, the incompatible purposes of English schooling are at work, and the obscurantism propagated by nationalism, dogma, and a ceremonial kind of traditionalism conflicts with the liberal and humanist ideals professed by teachers. Most of those concerned with the schools have little idea what to do with the children except to carry on in the routines bequeathed to them. Make the children good citizens, upholders of the existing order, cultured ladies and gentlemen, useful workers, churchgoers and chapelgoers, examination passers, sportsmen, potential soldiers! All the doctrinal winds blow through the classrooms of the state primary schools where harassed teachers (now also in England part-time meals supervisors, milk helpers, and cod liver oil servers) instruct their pupils, zealously or mechanically, in the mangled compromises of the curriculum, while the children themselves, caned less and better clothed and fed than ever before, suck in their real lessons with the rank air of a commercialised civilisation, growing up in most cases to be neither learned, diligent, honourable, virtuous, nor wise.

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To improve this state of affairs, the 1944 Act has raised the school leaving age and made all schooling secondary after the age of 11 plus. Endorsed by progressive opinion on one ground or another, an unacknowledged reason for this step is the desire to shield the growing adolescent as long as possible from the full blast of the life of the streets and work places—the world of the parents into which, after years of compulsory herding into ugly buildings under the jurisdiction of sometimes barely qualified teachers, the greater number of boys and girls emerge unread, unqualified, semi-loutish and semi-barbarous, with little training in the arts of civil life and none in the understanding of modern society; each boxed up in himself and subsequently drifting complainingly or stolidly to the hazards of an unregulated and purposeless life; unfitted, in Milton's phrase, to "perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war," but made rudely governable by their ignorance of the world and of public affairs, their distrust of others, the difficulties of making a living, and the acquired awe of established authority.

SECONDARY SCHOOLING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Such have been the main results of universal primary schooling. Even its claim to have made the whole population literate is untrue.*

Now consider the secondary schools. Under the 1944 Act all these schools are theoretically equal, but what the Act has merely done is to give secondary status to the former senior and central elementary schools while the others—independent fee-charging, assisted and direct grant grammar, and county schools—remain precisely where they were except for one or two quite minor administrative and financial changes. The renamed schools now given secondary status are vigorously imitating the pretensions of the county and grammar schools, themselves imitators of the older foundations. What is happening, therefore, is that a schooling originally meant for a leisured class, and which emphasised culture and, up to recent times, the culture of antiquity, is being given in debased and diluted forms to masses of children who must work for their living and face the problems of industrial society. The intellectual influences of secondary schooling are mostly negative since ordinary human nature has little appetite for the grammar school culture taught

* Field-Marshal Montgomery has recently stated that 10 per cent. of the recruits entering the army cannot read or write.

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in most of these establishments; but the downward spread of the social ideals and ideas encouraged in them is more serious and deplorable.

As to the culture, what the advocates of higher education for more of the children of England have usually meant, if they knew it, is more Latin and French for those who cannot yet write a sentence of good English, more Anglo-Saxon literature in the original, more algebra and geometry for those who cannot yet do arithmetic, more tinkering in physical and chemical laboratories, and more history taught, not as the slow emergence of ever enlarging units of organised neighbourliness out of primitive disorder, and as the gradual spread of light and knowledge into regions where darkness and passion had prevailed before, but as series of national triumphs and as episodes in the lives of egotistical conquerors. All this instils new prejudices, fails to widen the mind's natural parochialism in time and space, and multiplies the number of philistines with a veneer of culture and pretensions to it. Young people with none of the advantages of money and nepotism are made unfit for many skilled and manual occupations and untrained for any profession, the time that is not whiled away in sporting contests being wasted in learning a smattering of this and of that, so that they emerge qualified in nothing but without the advantages of honest ignorance.

As to citizenship, the wider diffusion of grammar school expectations of life will build up false economic and social hopes which neither a capitalist nor socialist state can satisfy. Secondary schooling will make the masses of the young less resigned and simple and more discontented with their lot, but give them no vision of a better society to which they might attach their hopes. All our schooling implants little of the sense of social obligation but breeds rather unattached, semi-lawless, self seeking types of persons with little social feeling and consciousness. Thus we get adults with no sense of attachment to others except when war chains them by a common fear and hatred, and society is divided into thousands of little cliques and sub-divided again into millions of lonely individuals whose contact with their fellows is shallow and ephemeral. Yet industrialism and the large scale organisation of their lives stamp them more and more deeply with stereotyped modes of thought and behaviour. Outwardly conforming and drifting herdlake to the compulsions of authority and

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manufactured mass stimuli, they remain inwardly divided and hostile to each other.

SCHOOL REFORM NOT IMPOSSIBLE

In a totalitarian state where the schools and politics were of one piece, a revolution would be necessary to reform the schools. No such dilemma confronts English educational reformers. State control of the English schools has increased but it is not political and bureaucratic in the Russian manner. Much can be done within the existing social order.

Moreover, none of the consequences of present-day schooling are the work of Squeers and Thwackem, but result from the conscientious activities of thousands of teachers, most of them well meaning, kind to children, hard working, and personally and professionally no worse than any other group in the country. Our schools mirror the life in the streets and their standards parallel those of the social classes they serve. What is done in them has the approval of most of those concerned. Many teachers would work to a new set of objectives if it was expected of them, and others could be trained to do so.

What of the parents? What would be their attitude to schools which, though not avowedly reformist, necessarily worked against some of their ideals and practices?

Parents are of three main types—(i) The bad or ignorant. (ii) Those who accept the claims of the schools and wish their children to make the best of the given opportunities. (iii) Those who are critical of the schools but must take them as they find them. Group (iii) would welcome reforms in the schools. Of group (i) it must be asked: Are schools to conform to their ideas and the children to be educated, as the 1944 Act would say, in accordance with their wishes?

As to the second group, the largest, two considerations should be borne in mind. First, most parents wish their children to grow up to be like themselves. It is not therefore a task of the schools to set son against father or daughter against mother. Yet, progress is uncertain, perhaps impossible, if children grow up to be like most parents. No matter how good the apparatus of social control may be in a commonwealth, it will rot from within unless it breeds the right types of men and women. Progress in the short run is the rooting out of the grosser social evils: in the long run, the multiplication of superior persons. The aim of the schools, therefore, is to multiply the number of superior persons entering adult society,

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and to do this without arousing the resentment of parents or creating feelings of superiority or separateness in the child. This is not an insoluble problem for, second, if parents wish their children to be like themselves, they also want them to be happy and desire their welfare. A New Deal in the schools would need to be carefully explained by the authorities and the teachers; but in the end, parental doubts could only be removed by children who had obviously been improved by their schooling. Ideals of health and beauty are now valued and worked for, and ideals of superior mental and moral breeding could also be made acceptable and desirable provided that what is done in the schools is done, as everywhere, by men and women who themselves incarnate the superior virtues; for education is the force of knowledge, example, and persuasion, inspired by friendly feelings.

TEACHERS

All this bears on the vital question of the quality of teachers, the crux of the educational problem in the sense that the quality of the governing order is the crux of the political problem. A school system is as good as its average teacher. H. G. Wells in the Presidential Address cited declared in his provocative way that "There are teachers at work in this country who haven't been painted inside for fifty years. They must be damp and rotten and very unhealthy for all who come into contact with them. Two-thirds of the teaching profession is in urgent need of being either reconditioned or superannuated." This is true, and the situation is not being improved by the hasty dilution of the profession now going on.

Apart from the clergy, no body of men and women mean so well, try so hard, or accomplish so little as teachers. The fault is not entirely theirs, for the system holds back many of them and demoralises others. Teaching cannot attract the first rate minds in the community until a reorganised school system is playing a vital educational role in it. As things are, teaching is not attracting even the academically best, as recent complaints testify.

TEACHER AND STATESMAN

Education is all the pressure brought to bear and all the social influences at work that turn a child into one sort of man or woman and not another, and it does not begin in the schools nor end there. Daily activity and experience educate the man, not only the schoolmastering he has received. In a civilised

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scheme of things children would be educated by their daily contact with civilised adults and get much formal instruction from them as well. In a less civilised one, the burden on the schools is all the greater. Yet bad circumstances corrupt education and the schools, and make the worst of human nature, and teachers everywhere in England daily see their work undone by the decivilising influences of the child's total environment. A few wise parents and teachers strive to rear children whose enlarged minds and disciplined instincts enable them to rise superior to circumstances: children who, if numerous enough, would later make those circumstances more conformable to their inward virtues. But when the perfect teacher and parent have done their job, and been helped in it by native sensitiveness and high intelligence in the child, social evils remain, poisoning and degenerating those who unavoidably live in their midst. Hence the functions of the teacher and the statesman are inseparably twinned. The teacher liberates the young human animal from its servitude to instinctive lusts and fears, develops its unique talents, prepares it for its role as citizen, and gives it a Baconian and scientific view of human life and its possibilities in place of the resigned and helpless pessimism embodied in so much of our literary tradition; but the statesman must create the social circumstances in which virtue is pleasant and vice painful.

At best, the task of parent and teacher remains a hard one, and the rearing of highly developed and civilised human beings, individualised yet sociable, energetic and impulsive yet harmonised in thought and feeling with other equally keen and self-expressive persons, will always be an extraordinarily difficult and delicate operation even when social life has been cleansed of the worst forms of that barbarity it now stamps on the minds of us all, but especially on the minds of the uneducated and miseducated.

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BOOK REVIEWS

OUR PARTNERSHIP. By BEATRICE WEBB. EDITED BY BARBARA DRAKE AND MARGARET I. COLE. (Longmans. 544 pp. 25s.)

MRS. WEBB'S *My Apprenticeship* stands in the front rank of modern autobiographies; its continuation, *Our Partnership* is equally, if not more, remarkable. It covers the years 1892 to 1911. Beatrice Webb died in 1943, and it was her intention to continue in other volumes this account of her life and Sidney's, one of the most complete, satisfying, and fruitful partnerships that any human beings have enjoyed; unfortunately this work now can never be completed, though the time, no doubt, will come when her diaries, upon which the autobiography is based and which she quotes extensively, will be published.

One feels that it is impertinent to write a short review of this book. The merits of most first class books are usually limited to a few facets, but this autobiography is fascinating, amusing, important from all kinds of different angles. In a few hundred words one can only inadequately attempt to point out one or two of its many remarkable attributes. The primary achievement of the Webbs was, of course, their influence upon political and economic thought and upon the political history of their times. By all ordinary standards that influence was very great in both fields, and they did what they did very deliberately and consciously in two different ways. They wrote a large number of important historical or sociological books dealing, e.g., with trade unionism, the co-operative movement, local government, socialism, based upon what they always called research. In this work they regarded themselves as scientists, social scientists, and their object was to ascertain by research the truth and the facts regarding the process of government or organisation in human society. Their attitude was, however, not that of the "pure" scientist; they did not wish merely to ascertain the facts, they wished to ascertain those facts which could be applied to certain purposes. Their position was that of the scientist who is interested, not in discovering the facts which will reveal the laws of physics, but in those facts which will enable him to make radio work as effectively as possible. The Webbs had decided views as to how society should be organised and made to work; their research was directed to ascertaining how it could be made to work most efficiently in that way and their scientific books were intended partly to give people the facts and partly to induce them to take the Webbs' view of how society should be organised.

But they were also practical politicians. They descended from their study into the arena of every day politics and took an active part in them and here again their object was not personal, but social; their sole object was to get the principles of social organisation in which they believed applied anywhere and everywhere, in the central government at Westminster, in the L.C.C., in the trade union, the co-operative store, the Fabian Summer School, or the workhouse. And their methods were peculiar to themselves. It is true that Sidney was for years the most influential member of the L.C.C. and that late in life he entered the House of Commons, the Cabinet, and the House of Lords. But the Webbs' usual method of political action was not to enter the political machine, to direct its operations, to be a member of the ruling class, but rather from outside to manipulate

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the manipulators and rule the ruling classes, by "influence," propaganda, permeation, and to put it plainly, as Beatrice Webb herself does, by intrigue. In none of their activities was the partnership more formidable and successful than in this.

The book is of immense interest in so far as it recounts, with astonishing frankness and in great detail, what the Webbs did and what they felt about their objects and actions (and those who helped or hindered them) in both spheres of action. They worked themselves for the most part behind the scenes, but in politics and history the most important events so often take place, not on the stage, but in the obscurity of some "great man's" study, in the wings or lobbies, or even in a dressing-room. The Webbs worked in the places where history is made and intimately with those who made it. Hence as a study of the political and social history of the years 1892 to 1911 in Britain this book is absorbing.

It is absorbing in many other ways. Perhaps the most remarkable part of it is psychological. Very few people are as ruthlessly self-analytical as Beatrice was, and she did not, as so many people do, practise the art of self-analysis in order to delude or console herself. She had the courage not only to uncover her own thoughts and feelings, her motives and actions, to herself, but to put down the truth, pleasant or unpleasant, in her diary—and the supreme courage to transfer it from the privacy of the diary to the publicity of a book.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE INTELLIGENT MAN'S GUIDE TO THE POST-WAR WORLD. By G. D. H. COLE. (Gollancz. 1143 pp. 21s.)

THERE are 1,143 pages, index included, in this book. I have not read them all. I have sampled them, picking out topics from the index (40 pages), and I have examined the bibliography (10 pages) carefully. The index, full enough for most purposes, needs more cross-references, but the bibliography is neither full enough nor discriminating enough for a work of reference (which I take this volume to be). It lists, for example, nine titles on the Soviet Union, nine on the Far East, one on migration (with a cross-reference to a dozen books on population), six on the United States. Professor Cole would be the first to admit that this is inadequate, especially as there is a varied, almost a rich, contemporary literature (if that is the right word) on all these subjects. This grumble apart, the text itself is surprisingly full and, so far as I could detect by my sampling, adequate for most purposes for which it is likely to be used. There is, refreshingly enough in these days, the absence not of a point of view but of emotional bias and over-loading, and it is this, along with the fullness of its information, which gives it its value. This guide has the rationality which we expect from its author. It is well up to his standards, and is one more example of that disciplined and amazingly rapid habit of work, for which, in so many fields, we are in his debt. If I were to call Professor Cole the socialist McCulloch of our day, it would be a tribute not to any sort of doctrinal rigidity, but to the astonishing grasp of contemporary fact, and the equally astonishing power of keeping his massive range of fact related and meaningful, which made that economic lexicographer's dictionaries significant a century ago in a period of similarly rapid transition from one sort of economic order to another. For a very big public, a still widening circle of general readers and of professional students, Mr. Cole's Guides—to World Chaos, to Politics, to the Post-War World—are indispensable. If paper and enterprise could be found, their amalgamation into a renewable reference-book, an index *raisonné*, or whatever the name should be, to the dynamics of our perplexing world would be a public service of the most valuable kind. For these volumes are an essential unity, valuable apart, it is true, but more valuable together. And the world of today needs a year-book (which might even be triennial, if necessary) to supplement those now existing, at once less conventional and stereotyped, more aware of the values and strengths of the political Lefts of our world and more willing to look controversy straight in the eye than any we have. Such a year-book could be established on the basis of the Cole guides. Its character and value could be simply put in these terms: it would bear a direct relation to current reality, not a refined, remote or intellectually desiccated relation to it. In politics the people who wish to protect us from our own dangerous or myopic selves are a nuisance. The Cole index to world affairs would be blunt and direct—as truth tends to be nowadays.

In sampling this book I found things that left me unsatisfied. If I name one or two, it may be useful. Migration, for example, does not come together. The problems of physical, occupational and social mobility very rarely do, it may be admitted, but they are of greater importance than ever in a world of planned and semi-planned economic systems. Full employment policies can break on that issue. Many readers will look for

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possible light on this year's Presidential election in U.S.A., but they will get less help than they should from these pages; and they might ask for some amplification of the various sections on Latin America. . . . On the other hand, readers who had gone through Mr. Cole's pages on Czecho-Slovakia would have been well prepared for what is now happening.

Altogether, how useful this volume is. Any criticism I have made is a recognition of its merit. Professor Cole has confirmed old and established new debts. Somebody, public or private, should now give him a research team to keep these amalgamated books of his continuously going and get them unified. It would be worth while, and would even pay.

H. L. BEALFS.

THE GOEBBELS DIARIES. TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY LOUIS LOCHNER. (Hamilton. 458 pp. 21s.)

NUREMBERG. THE FACTS, THE LAW AND THE CONSEQUENCES. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. (Chatto. 176 pp. 8s. 6d.)

THE GREAT ASSIZE. By J. H. MORGAN, K.C. (Murray. 44 pp. 2s.)

THE Diaries of Goebbels might have been written as a show-up, or as a show-down, of dictatorships and totalitarianism. They certainly expose the hollowness of the Nazi claims to efficiency. Although the extracts stop short in December, 1943, before the final collapse had come, it is manifest that the system could not stand when it was seriously challenged. It had no reserves of strength; it had not even inner loyalties. The leaders were intriguing the whole time against each other. An impossible burden, as Goebbels states already in March, 1942, was imposed on the Führer. "Even physically it is impossible for one person to carry such a gigantic load over an extended period. Added to this he lives practically in a concentration camp. The solitude in which he is compelled to perform his duties must sooner or later affect him deeply." Goebbels, who had more realism and intelligence than most of the rest of the gang, recognised also the irreparable loss which the Nazis suffered by their rejection of science and the expulsion of the scientists. By the middle of the war their air force was helpless. The Diaries are the frank daily jottings, at inordinate length, of the director of Nazi Propaganda. Presumably he recorded each day his view on everything in the world, for the purpose of his articles and his broadcasts and his directives. It is a lucky chance which has preserved a considerable part; for they are raw material of history. The extracts, which are less than one tenth of what was rescued from the rubbish heap, cover periods in the years 1942 and 1943. The editor has made a selection from the entries of each day. It is unfortunate that the period covering the débâcle at Stalingrad is missing. When his vanity about his own performance is not concerned, Goebbels can be a shrewd judge of events. He describes the official communiqué about the Moscow Conference as "a jumble of Bolshevik and League of Nations phrasology"; and the conference itself as "more a theatrical display than a meeting of minds resulting in practical achievement." Franco is "this inflated peacock." He regrets the constant meetings of Gauleiters and Reichleiters. "One can find any amount of more important things to do than sitting at Munich for three days,

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but there is nothing to be done against this method of party leadership." It would be absurd to expect a philosophy or an ideal in the Diaries. Nor is there any consistency whatsoever in the opinions about men and things. Goebbels is a weathercock; and he thinks and writes only for the day. One of the few constant things is the Jewish question and the use of anti-semitism as a major political weapon. He echoes in all this his Führer, who in May, 1943, insisted that "Anti-semitism must again become the focal point of our spiritual struggle."

He reveals the tremendous devastation caused by our air-raids in the two years, 1942 and 1943. It is to be said for him that he had a sense of duty to his Gau, Berlin, as much as to his Führer, and he was always on the spot in and after the raids. He had some concern for the common people: "When I awoke, the tragedy of the hard-hit city was again in my mind. I shall leave nothing undone to assure some kind of decent life for the unfortunate people who were stricken." What he brings home also is the weakness of German man-power in the west in 1943, when Italy was breaking. It would seem that, could we have invaded then, the collapse would have come quickly. About one thing only he is never perturbed: his infallible genius in propaganda. While he admits that "our enemies are superior to us in political strategy, I know that I am free from blame in this matter." German leaders made mistakes, and "our military propaganda has failed completely. If only the Führer would decide to subordinate it to me!"

The editor has added many notes about the personalities mentioned. He had known Goebbels before the war, and had an intense hatred of him. That is a pity, because it makes his introduction partial and leads him to introduce petty scandal which is irrelevant. The translation is competent. Goebbels is no stylist; but his German is not as heavy as some, and the translator does convey his liveliness as well as his childish Little Jack Horner vanity.

Mr. Calvocoressi gives the other side of the picture: the world judgment on the Nazi leaders and organisations which carried out the crimes against humanity. Goebbels eluded that trial and judgment, for he had the realism to put an end to his life as the curtain fell. It is the fate of almost all books on contemporary events that, before they are published and read, they seem to be still-born. Events move faster than the printers and binders. This description of the Nuremberg trials and the plea of the English advocate for its justification appear, in 1948, to belong to a past age which still believed in the rule of law and the continuous co-operation of the Four Big Powers in establishing that rule. The author indeed does comment that Nuremberg marked the end of an era and the end of the collaboration against Germany. But he holds that the trial was not only just and necessary, but also of immense practical importance to the world through its effect on International Law. He does not write as a lawyer, and his lay-mind is uncritical of the Charter of the Court, but critical of the acquittal of the General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces. On that he agrees with the Russians that the German military caste was the root of evil.

The account of the trial is clear, and the description of the accused in the dock has a certain spiciness, and makes us regret that he does not say more about the members of the Court and the prosecuting teams. The

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main part of the book, however, is an explanation for the common man in common parlance of the jurisdiction, the law, and the evidence. It is competently done, though it skates over some of the fundamental difficulties. A prologue about the degradation and dehumanisation of Germany seems a little inconsequent; and an epilogue about the consequences of the trial and the dangers of national sovereignty is a little remote. The conclusion reads wryly today. "International law stands at the heart of the endeavour; and here the three aspects of the trial meet, Law, Justice and History, seeking to find whether they have a future . . . The voice of law is the harmony of the world." Would the Soviet rulers subscribe that aphorism?

The book is commendably concise. One third of it is taken up with appendices, which include the dissenting judgment of the Russians on Schacht and a summary of the evidence about the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto—as an example of Nazi brutality.

Mr. Morgan's book, which is a reprint of articles published in the *Quarterly Review*, is a complete contrast. He is critical of the jurisdiction of the Court, and challenges the legality of its judgment on the counts of conspiracy, aggressive war, and crimes against humanity, as not being justified in International Law. He is no respecter of persons, and is caustic about the heads of the prosecution and English jurists, though conscious of his own views and knowledge. The charter which laid down the law for the Court is, in his opinion, an act of attainder and not a legal indictment. There is some force in his conservative and legalistic standpoint, which is supported in a foreword by the authority of a former Lord Chancellor, Lord Maugham. But the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal must be regarded as itself a source of International Law, and in that aspect the trial does mark an advance in the rule of law.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN AN ENGLISH MIDDLETOWN. By HERMANN MANNHEIM. (Routledge. 131 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THE HOME OFFICE. By SIR ALEXANDER MAXWELL. (Stevens. 22 pp. 2s. 6d.)

DR. MANNHEIM stands in the front rank of our small band of criminologists; in this book he continues the detailed and scholarly examination of the incidence and causes of crime which his readers can safely expect of him. *Juvenile Delinquency in an English Middletown, i.e., Cambridge*, is at once a plea for, and a model of, a local statistical enquiry into lawbreaking by children. The author undertook it as a result of the evacuation of the London School of Economics to Cambridge during the war, without the team of investigators who might have helped to supplement the official records. To some extent the book suffers for this. For instance, owing to the curious dispensation under which, whilst it is the duty of magistrates to follow the results of Probation and Supervision Orders, no information is supplied to them regarding the careers of children sent to approved schools. Therefore Dr. Mannheim's investigation had to omit this class of delinquent. Since it is very often a major argument in favour of school treatment as opposed to probation that the child's home is unfavourable, its inclusion would almost certainly have weighted even more

BOOK REVIEWS

heavily the evidence for the overwhelming influence of bad home conditions in producing delinquency. "Bad homes" are, of course, themselves products of many factors, listed here in the table of "Bad Points," whose presence gives warning of a grave situation, under several heads—such as illegitimacy, lack of parental control, family quarrels, drink and so on. Now a vital question, for which as yet we have not enough evidence from any locality, is how far these factors are themselves due to sub-normal intelligence in the parents. Even with regard to the children themselves, our information is lamentably sporadic. Dr. Mannheim points out with regret that "psychological or psychiatric examinations were ordered by the Court in less than 15 per cent." of the cases under investigation, though several more would have indicated to the "careful observer" "the urgent need for instant expert advice."

Even this, of course, would not be enough from the point of view of research. Nothing less than the system adopted by the Bristol Juvenile Court of sending for observation all cases remanded in custody or on bail as a matter of routine, and checking the results by a carefully selected control group of non-delinquent children, will suffice. Are the startling Bristol results showing the correlation between low mental status and delinquency confirmed in other towns? And what are the facts as to the incidence of subnormality over the whole country? The "ecology of delinquency" may well prove to resolve itself into a special case of the "ecology of low mentality," a subject of even wider and more urgent national interest. Are there patches of feeble-mindedness in the country at large, and, if so, are local causes discoverable, such as too great inbreeding, too little supervision of the deficient, even perhaps such purely physical factors as an impure water supply?

These questions can only be answered by detailed enquiries in different towns and districts. The local authorities have the opportunity of rendering immense service, not only in the treatment of individuals, but in the general interests of the prevention of crime, by the full development of their Child Guidance Organisation.

In a useful and humane review of the whole complicated work of the Home Office with regard to the treatment of offenders, Sir Alexander Maxwell stresses, amongst other things, the need for Criminal Science, for the computation and presentation of information by scholars "who pursue knowledge for its own sake and are trained in methods of research and critical analysis"—Local Authorities, without for an instant diverging from their primary duties of administration, may well consult the needs of such researchers in the compilation of Court Statistics. Dr. Mannheim has given the scholars a lesson in how to use them to advantage.

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THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH.
By HAROLD D. LASSWELL. (*Kegan Paul*. 21s.)

THE blurb of this book tells us that the science of politics has been "transformed by the newer sciences of psychology and sociology." These new sciences, it continues, have not merely wrought a transformation—they have also provided us with a "technique of controlling" human behaviour. This may or may not be true, it may or may not be fortunate if it is true, but it is quite certain that Professor Lasswell has succeeded neither in demonstrating—far less extending—this transformation and these techniques in the heterogeneous papers which make up this volume.

What he has done successfully is to document two of the more distressing trends in the contemporary American intellect. We are all only too accustomed to the odd and authoritarian uses of the word "democracy" in modern Russia. Many Americans have a similarly private, jealous and intolerant habit of thought in the same name, and this appears not merely in the unholy succession of Dies and Rankin or in the fetishism of the flag and the persecution of Jehovah Witnesses; it appears also in the basically technological approach to politics of many academics. Professor Lasswell would doubtless deplore the work of the Un-American Activities Committee, but his attitude of detailed persuasion to an "instrumental democracy" in which "the personnel of authoritative agencies be chosen by a procedure which involves the participation of most, if not all, of the community" (p. 138) conceals only the desire for a uniformity without variety, eccentricity, or the leaven of ultimate discontent and rebellion which lies at the heart of liberty. Such an uniformity is regarded as a technical achievement, and it may well hide a fundamental hostility to all change and deep but unadmitted fears of what the future may bring in the teeth of this technological optimism. (Such fears, of course, are quite probably all too just and rational.)

Professor Lasswell writes in a manner so cumbrous, so vague, so involute and so portentous that he might almost be caricaturing the style of American sociology at its worst. There are curious neologisms such as "rivalrousness" (for "rivalry"?) and an infinity of sentences of the order of "The conventionalisations which are imbedded in the super-ego, and which are externally buttressed by proper conduct in formal social situations, together with institutional ceremonialism and symbolism, give way under the impulsive pressure of private, intimate ties" (p. 189). Useful thought *can* be carried out in these terms, but too often they are merely an impressive substitute for genuine mental effort. Nor is the text redeemed by an apparatus of massive bibliography and reference which surprises mainly by its irrelevance—as when (p. 47) we are referred in an article on legal education to the fact of economic crisis, and hence to five comparatively elementary works on political economy.

After all this it is only fair to add that the article on Hitlerism must have been acute and useful in 1933, that the study of Italian élites is interesting, and that the reading of other of Professor Lasswell's writings suggests that this selection may do him less than justice. The most terrifying single paper is that on *Radio as an Instrument of Reducing Personal Insecurity*, and the most incredible—occupying one-third of the book—is that on *Legal Education and Public Policy*.

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ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY. By MAX WEBER. Translated, with an Introduction, by H. H. GERTH and C. WRIGHT MILLS. (Routledge. 21s.)

SINCE R. H. Tawney introduced Max Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* to British readers, Weber's sociology has increasingly roused the interest of the younger generation. The present volume may serve as a useful introduction to his work which in its original language presents considerable difficulties. Selections from the many writings of a thinker like Weber are by no means an easy task. The editors' choice is apt, though one might have wished that they had included some examples of his methodological studies which form such an integral part of his life-work. Several sections of the volume have been translated into English for the first time: for example the lecture on *Politics as a Vocation* and on *Science as a Vocation*. Both lectures were given during the last years of Weber's life and had a considerable influence on the generation of German students after the first world-war.

The second part of the volume contains selected sections from *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, probably Weber's main work. Here his universal outlook which combined equal familiarity with Western and Eastern cultures is integrated with his unsurpassed power for sociological generalisation. Weber's early training as a lawyer bears here full fruit.

The third and fourth part of the present book give important chapters from Weber's studies in sociology of religion which are not contained in the *Protestant Ethic*. The sections *The Social Psychology of the World Religions* and the *Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism* are of particular interest to those who are already familiar with Weber's earlier book on *The Protestant Ethic*.

The fourth part of the volume is entitled: Social Structures. Here the editors print two studies on *The Brahman and the Castes* and on *The Chinese Literati*; both contributions are again taken from Weber's essays on the sociology of Religion. The section *Capitalism and Rural Society* is a welcome reprint of an almost forgotten lecture Weber had given in St. Louis during the Universal Exhibition in 1905. There is no doubt that Weber's universalism is not free from a German bias. His conception of the state as the ultimate appeal to coercive measures need only be compared with Maitland's sociology of the state in order to reveal its limitation. Nor is Weber's historical sociology entirely free from the heritage of the German historical school. But even where Weber errs or where he is partial, he is always instructive.

The translation is careful, though Weber's peculiar and exceedingly difficult style could not be retained. The editors' introduction gives an admirable account of Weber's life, his political concerns and intellectual orientations. Perhaps one might have expected some more references to the not inconsiderable literature on Weber, an omission which might be amended in a second edition.

The wide ramifications of Weber's sociology to which this volume, in spite of its selective character, testifies, may give the student of today some idea of the universal and synthetic orientation which the present generation has lost. Such awareness might become the first step towards regaining the full depth of a classic in sociology, for as such Max Weber will continue to exert his influence.

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EDUCATION: THE NEW HORIZON. By H. C. SHEARMAN. (*Nicholson & Watson*. 128 pp. 6s.)

It is a perpetual mystery why ninety-nine per cent. of books and lectures on education are so dull that only devotees can read or listen to them; that public meetings called to discuss educational problems consist almost entirely of the converted; that a debate on education in Parliament empties the House. After all, education is a universal process. We have all been submitted to it and we in turn all submit our children to it. It is more universal than any other human experience, except birth and death. To set against this apparent lack of interest on the part of the public, there is no surer way of getting people in any walk of life to talk than to ask them if they think that children of today are taught better or worse than in their day, and hardly any subject upon which employers of labour will debate more readily than the deficiencies of the products of the schools of today.

Various explanations of this apparent contradiction suggest themselves. Although education is a universal process in this country there are sharply differentiated methods employed which have acted as a dividing and not a unifying element in our national life. The product of Eton or Winchester would have difficulty in sustaining a conversation on old school days with the product of a modern secondary or grammar school. England suffers from this division more than any other country and books on education are mainly written by people who belong to one or other half. But as if this fundamental difference between the upbringing of children was not enough, educationalists have over the past hundred years invented a particular terminology which has become increasingly obscure with each succeeding education act. How, it may reasonably be asked can people who talk and write about Controlled, Aided, Special Agreement, Maintained, Voluntary, Direct Grant, Independent, Public, Multilateral, Comprehensive, Tri-partite, Omnibus schools and Divisional Executives, ex Part III authorities, Excepted Districts, and hundred per cent. special places, etc., etc., expect the public to be anxious to learn and discuss rather than to be actively repelled? Terminology as well as ideology can divide people.

It is the great merit of this book *Education: The New Horizon* that the author manages to make the subject interesting and appealing to the ordinary man or rather the ordinary parent. Mr. Shearman has had a more varied experience than most educational writers. Formerly a teacher, then a W.E.A. tutor, then the Education Officer of the W.E.A. and now Vice-Chairman of the L.C.C. Education Committee, Chairman of a Divisional Executive and Academic Adviser for Tutorial Classes in London University, he knows more sides of education than most "experts." But he does not allow his accumulated knowledge to clutter up his writing—rather it is felt behind his clear descriptions and provocative remarks. After a brief historical description up to 1944, he describes the new act and discusses the developments that may result from it, including what some hold to be most important of all, what will be taught in the schools. Although it is impossible to explain the Education Act of 1944 without using technical terms, he uses the minimum and explains what they mean. The particular value of his book however lies elsewhere. He does not avoid controversial issues, stating his own position quite clearly. Above all, he rejects the theory, held surprisingly by some in high places, that education ever was or ever can be divorced from political influences. A historical study of the

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curriculum in both the old elementary and the secondary school shows how it was shaped by the social philosophy of each age with its conceptions of the place in society respectively of the "rich man in his castle and the poor man at his gate."

"Education is at once conservative and revolutionary. It preserves and hands on the lore and the values of the past, and so with many pupils, perhaps with most, its influence is largely conservative; it moulds them to the traditional pattern of their nation. But it has always other potentialities; for to give knowledge to youth is to bring together the two most revolutionary forces in the world. The challenge to educators in a rapidly changing world is to use the knowledge of the past to equip youth for the future" (p. 86).

The illustrations and diagrams—isotypes—with which this book is plentifully supplied surpass even the high standard reached by other volumes in this series. Particularly striking are the diagrams of the number of children attending school in England and in the U.S.A. and the number of university students in the countries of North West Europe and in the U.S.A. The importance of the interaction of educational opportunities and social backgrounds is brought home forcibly by charts showing the previous education of students at Oxford and Cambridge in 1940, and of Members of Parliament between 1918 and 1936. Of those whose educational history was known, 81 per cent. of Conservatives came from the Public schools, 75 per cent. of Labour from the elementary schools. It would be interesting to be able to compare this chart with one of the present Members of Parliament.

SHERA D. SIMON.

DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE, 1938-1939. By L. B. NAMIER. (MacMillan. pp. xviii, 503. 18s.)

READERS of the *Political Quarterly* will welcome the appearance in book form—and with much equally valuable additional material—of those enlightening articles which Professor Namier wrote during the war, upon its origins, and which he called *Coloured Books*. They were a comparative analysis of official publications, mainly German, Polish, French, and British, in the form of a vivid account and commentary on the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of war.

They are now supplemented by information from the Nuremberg documents and from the personal memoirs that are now beginning to appear. The latter form the basis for Part II of the book, which adds to the chronological treatment 1933 to 1939 in Part I, a series of "Episodes and Men." This the author expects to expand as more is published. There is one chapter here on Franco-Polish relations, the chief sources of which are the personal memoirs of General Gamelin, Georges Bonnet (*Défense de la Paix. De Washington au Quai d'Orsay*), and Léon Noël (*L'agression contre la Pologne. Une Ambassade à Varsovie*). This is interesting and important both because it brings together into an integrated story the experience of different actors of the scene, and because the sources are less familiar on this side of the Channel. Another chapter derived from Ciano's *Diary* 1939-1943 paints the portrait of those strangely little men, Ciano and his father-in-law. How revealing that the former could write of Mussolini that he decided on alliance with Germany, the "Pact of Steel," in a fit of wounded vanity, and that he determined to attack Greece also in a fit of pique and against the

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advice of the three heads of the general staff. Such is the way of dictators. But how revealing too, though for different reasons, that Ciano could note of the document left with him by the British Ambassador at the moment of the invasion of Albania: "The memorandum which Lord Perth left with me in the course of a cordial visit might have been composed in our own offices." All through this book echo over and over again those words of President Masaryk: "Oh, how small is the policy of the Great Powers!"

The key to Professor Namier's approach is in these words from his introduction: "The second German bid for world dominion found Europe weak and divided. At several junctures it could have been stopped without excessive effort or sacrifice, but was not: a failure of European statesmanship... Janissaries and appeasers aided Hitler's work: a failure of European morality." That is the unifying theme; it could be illustrated from almost any page.

But it is to the new chapter, some seventy pages, on Anglo-Russian negotiations in 1939, which immediately follows those that have already appeared, that everyone would be well advised to turn. No one should miss this masterly analysis; indeed it might well be reproduced as a pamphlet in order to give it the widest publicity. It is as true that this is the core of the book as that "The tragic core of diplomatic history during the half-year preceding the outbreak of war is in the Anglo-Russian negotiations. It is difficult to write about them without the painful consciousness that here was perhaps the one chance of preventing the Second World War, or of ensuring Hitler's early defeat. But such were the prejudices, miscalculations, and suspicions on both sides that only on June 22nd, 1941, through Hitler's supreme blunder and Churchill's instantaneous action, was that unity established which foresight should have built up two years earlier."

It is impossible to do justice to the subject in the few words of a review. Would a firmer European statesmanship and morality have been capable of overcoming the "prejudices, miscalculations and suspicions"? That is impossible to answer conclusively. Two facts, at least, are clear, however. The first is the almost unbelievable blindness to political and strategic realities on the part of London—in Downing Street and the Foreign Office—a blindness largely induced by dislike of communism. The other is that greater blame in this case attaches to the west than to the east of Poland, with a very large share of the responsibility for her own downfall being enjoyed by Poland herself. Not merely is it a picture we see of small men, of pygmies indeed, caught in the mesh of events they could neither understand nor master; it is worse, an unforgivable and all but unbelievable ballet of make-believe, of dolls having no reality of life in themselves, a rake's progress to common and inevitable disaster. The rot can be rightly traced to this: "Ramsay MacDonald's 'Four-Power Pact' of 1933, associating the Western Powers with the Dictators delineated the pattern of policy which led to the Munich surrender." (Had not the Kremlin the right to regard this as the confirmation of its most fundamental beliefs on the international tendencies of capitalist democracies?)

Is not the following a theme which should be written over every Foreign Office desk today? "For twenty years mutual dislike and distrust subsisted between the ruling strata in Great Britain and in Soviet Russia. In either country sinister intentions were ascribed to the other, and, what was worse, such suspicions and charges were turned to domestic use. Soviet

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Russia was an argument rather than a reality in British politics, and so was Great Britain in Russian home propaganda: a 'Red letter' in a general election, or a 'sabotage' trial of British engineers, was staged and exploited for internal purposes without regard for the way in which it affected relations between the two countries. Even a defence of Soviet Russia by the Left in Great Britain was inspired by opposition to the Conservatives rather than by a correct appreciation of the Bolshevik system, and was apt to topple into pained disapproval whenever the lack of spiritual affinity between Lenin and Mr. Gladstone was too crudely revealed. Moscow, in turn, had mostly contemptuous rebukes for its liberal-minded foreign sympathisers—it is often more difficult to satisfy the Bolsheviks as a friend than as an opponent, for the actions of the declared opponent have at least the merit of conforming with their expectations and theories. What a distance, what a burden! And yet how much depended on an Anglo-Russian agreement" . . . And depends today.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

STUDIES IN FINANCIAL ORGANISATION. By T. BALOGH. (Cambridge University Press. 319 pp. 21s.)

THE author describes this work in his Preface as "a fragment of an international enquiry into the working of the Western European monetary and banking systems and capital markets undertaken in 1939." It is a part only of the British section, confined to the subjects of the clearing banks, the discount houses, and other private financial institutions. The project was interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1939, and the undertaking of further works on the Bank of England and the Treasury, and on the Stock Exchange and other agencies for disposing of savings, was suspended.

Faithful to its title, the present volume deals with organisation rather than policy. There is much material to draw upon, and in particular Mr. Balogh has made full use of the Report and evidence of the Macmillan Committee. He has also squeezed the last ounce out of the available statistical data.

The business of the Clearing Banks is described under the heads of their principal kinds of assets and liabilities. Bankers have become somewhat reticent in regard to their practices. When pressed, they are apt to take refuge in platitudes or in statistical material already familiar to everybody. At the time of the Macmillan Committee they were sensitive to the criticism that the growing depression was due to monetary causes. Only Mr. Hyde of the Midland Bank "stated frankly that his lending was limited by his lack of cash. All other bankers were anxious to assert that they were never confronted with a necessity of refusing credit—for a 'meritorious case'" (pp. 80-1). Mr. Goodenough of Barclay's Bank admitted, however, that "his standards as to what constituted a meritorious case varied" (p. 81).

But cash is not the only factor entering into "the ratio sensitiveness of bankers" (p. 34). When cash has to be replenished, that is at the cost of drawing upon the other liquid assets (money at call and bills). Since the First world war the banks' large holdings of Treasury bills have made the replenishment of cash reserves so easy, that attention has been diverted from the cash proportion to the "Secondary Liquidity Reserve" (pp. 56-70). A bank cannot afford to go on indefinitely drawing upon its liquid assets.

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If the bills it holds are declining, it must sooner or later take steps to restore them, not of course by parting with cash, but by realising other assets. Medium or long-term Government securities can be sold; they are in fact as liquid as can be desired, and about the bankers' attitude to them there is some ambiguity (p. 72). Perhaps the really significant ratio is that of *advances* to deposits. Advances can only be restricted or called up by direct pressure on customers, and the bankers' reluctance to apply that pressure makes advances the least liquid of all the banks' assets.

From the Clearing Banks the book proceeds to the Discount Market, and gives a clear and concise account of its character and functions. Chapter 10 is devoted to a description of the varieties of bills dealt in, Chapter 11 to the volume of bills and particularly to the decline in commercial bills. This, along with the diminished supply of Treasury bills in the market in the nineteen-thirties, drove the discount houses to acquire medium-dated Government securities. They became "by far the most important gilt-edged jobbers in London" (p. 190).

The third and concluding part of Mr. Balogh's book relates to the "other Banking and Finance Firms in London." Here, though he does concentrate the available information in useful form, he seems a little less sure of his ground. Even his nomenclature does not precisely conform to usage. Accepting houses and issuing houses he calls acceptance houses and issue houses. He rejects the familiar term merchant bankers, on the ground that "not all of them have grown out of merchant firms" (p. 228). And when he describes the accepting houses as "endorsing" their clients' bills (p. 231) he is relapsing into a looseness of phraseology which may cause confusion in the minds of those unfamiliar with the business.

More might have been said both of the nature of the merchant bankers' business and of their special position in the financial life of London and the world.

Much of this concluding portion of the book is devoted to capital flotations and the functions of various classes of issuing houses. The treatment of that topic has suffered from the circumstance that the book is a part of an uncompleted whole. It is not possible to give an adequate account of the machinery of capital issues without reference to the Stock Exchange. The issuing business makes capital rights *marketable*. The market to which it obtains access is the Stock Exchange; its functions are not adequately dealt with in brief references to the "use of a brokerage house to place an issue" (p. 290), or to a "Stock Exchange Introduction" (p. 291). Nor is it easy to follow a discussion of expenses of issue which contains "brokers" and "brokerage" as two separate items, without distinguishing payment to the issuers from payments on allotments (p. 293). The reference to underwriters (pp. 290-1) is very inadequate, and seems to imply that underwriting is only resorted to when an issue is being placed by "a brokerage house."

But even here the book does present us with a compilation of useful and, on the whole, reliable information which will make it a valuable work of reference.

It should be mentioned that the value of the book is enhanced by the inclusion of appendices, on the Floating Debt, 1914-39, by Mr. F. W. Paish, and on the London Gold and Silver Markets by Mr. Paul Bareaux.

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YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1946-47. (United Nations. 991 pp. £2 10s.)

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RECORD OF THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT IN THE SOCIAL SERVICES

By BARBARA WOOTTON

I

CREDIT for the Labour Government's work in the social services must, as is generally recognised, be shared with Lord Beveridge. During its first two years of office, the Government was chiefly occupied in writing the Beveridge report into the statute book: and now, just over six years after Beveridge first published his proposals, the job is pretty well finished. That must surely be almost a record for speed of legislative parturition. The history of the Poor Law since the Commission of 1909 and the history of the House of Lords since the Parliament Act suggest that thirty to forty years is a more normal period of gestation for changes of great social or constitutional importance. Nor can it be said that what may be called the Beveridge Acts were, in effect, agreed measures. It is true that the Coalition Government had given the whole plan a mild—very mild*—blessing when it was first proposed; and true also that the House of Commons did not divide on the second or third reading of either the main National Insurance Act or the Industrial Injuries Act. Approval in principle is, however, easily compatible with opposition to a given practical interpretation of that principle, as has been shown clearly enough by the fierce controversies provoked inside and outside the House by the National Health Service Act. In practice, Lord Beveridge will—deservedly—enjoy the credit for the ideas behind the new social security scheme; and the Labour Government will—no doubt also deservedly—reap the blame for whatever difficulties and annoyances have emerged from the actual laws in which those ideas have been embodied.

If we look at the results as a whole, there are, I think, three questions to be asked. First, have the Labour Government's measures filled the gaps in our social security provision and raised its level so thoroughly that we can claim to have freed ourselves "once for all of the scandal of physical want for which

* "The general lines of development of the social services laid down in the Report are those that the Government *would wish* to follow." Sir John Anderson in the House of Commons. Hansard, 16th February, 1943. Italics mine in both quotations.

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there is no economic or moral justification"?* Second, have the differences between one type of benefit or scheme and another, which produced such ludicrous anomalies under the old order, been successfully removed under the new? and are the services sufficiently neatly joined for the seams not to be irritating to the individual citizen who uses them? And third, is the plan as a whole sensible, efficient, and consistent with the claims of the citizens of a democracy to take an active part in the management of their own affairs?

The first question is a double one, relating both to the scope of the scheme and to the level of benefits. On the matter of scope, the answer is not in doubt. The insurance umbrella covers practically everybody: and the few who are not sufficiently protected by this are housed in the National Assistance Board's tents. The National Insurance Act indeed goes beyond the Beveridge proposals in providing as generous sickness benefit for the self-employed as for the employed, and in omitting the elaborate scheme for bringing old age pensions only gradually up to the standard level. Completeness may of course be regarded as an extravagance rather than as a virtue, inasmuch as it is admittedly wasteful to provide benefits for classes who are well enough off to do without them. Such a view is not, perhaps, impressive in the field of national insurance, since the beneficiaries pay—directly and heavily—for what they get: more forceful criticism can be made of a system which allows people of substantial income to put themselves to sleep with vitaminics and barbitones provided by the taxpayer. Nevertheless, I am sure that in the interests of the long run it is wise to make light of this aspect of the matter. If a service is available for *everybody*, that spells the end both of means tests and of bureaucratic decisions as to who is inside and who outside the scheme. It is worth wasting a few favours on people who don't need them in order to be rid of these pests. Indeed, in the case of very expensive services, it may be preferable to provide something less ambitious for all, rather than a better service for a limited class. The Family Allowances Act, which just anticipated the Labour Government, with its five shillings (less tax!) for the children of our few surviving millionaires was a fine example in this respect.

The worst gaps that needed to be (and have been) filled were certainly those concerned with ill-health. On the financial

* (Beveridge) *Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services*. Paragraph 455.

LABOUR GOVERNMENT IN THE SOCIAL SERVICES

side, the assimilation of disability with sickness benefit has established the principle that sick pay goes on at an unchanging rate as long as you are ill: instead of, as formerly, dropping to a lower figure when your illness had continued for a long time and your own resources were likely to be exhausted. As for needs, the demand for medical and dental attention and appliances has, as everybody knows, enormously exceeded expectation. Three million people have obtained or are in process of obtaining spectacles and 130,000 are going to the dentist every week.* There is no particular pleasure in wearing spectacles if you do not need to, still less in visiting the dentist. I do not see what interpretation can be put upon these events except that enormous numbers of our fellow citizens must have been enduring preventable bodily inconveniences because of the cost involved in getting these attended to.

Whether we can yet congratulate ourselves on the adequacy of protection against want is not so certain. One of the saddest experiences of those who have fought long and zealously for real security for all has been to watch the inflation insidiously catching up on their advances. The standard rates of benefit that Beveridge proposed in 1942 were 24s. for a single person, 40s. for a married couple: the actual rates under the present Act are 26s. and 42s. respectively. There are no really reliable indices which enable us to estimate whether the increase in the cost of living since the end of 1942 has been more or less than 8½ per cent. But there is a great deal of tragic experience about the difficulty of living on 26s. a week at present prices. True, if that is literally all you have, the National Assistance Board will help with the rent: but that involves a means test again: and the world in which we all pay our insurance contributions, secure in the knowledge that these do really provide enough to fall back on in sickness, unemployment, or old age, seems as far away as ever. I do not suggest that it would have been feasible in present circumstances to have provided more generous benefits: but it is depressing to have to run so fast in order so nearly to stay in the same place.

II

On the second question, that of anomalies, there is much to be set on the credit side. In the insurance fields, at any rate, we

* Hansard, 21st January, 1949, 533.

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have travelled much nearer to a simple, unified system. Basic rates for old age, sickness, and unemployment now all march in step: and there has been a great deal of tidying up (and levelling upwards) of regulations about dependants, both adults and children, whose very existence was previously recognised or ignored according to the caprice of the particular Act under which benefits were claimed. Gone are the days when a man went off the panel before he was well, because to be officially sick was so much worse a financial proposition than to be officially unemployed. Gone too are the days when the level of sickness benefit that a man could draw, or his chance of getting false teeth off the panel, depended on the health records of the other members of his approved Society, or the efficiency of the Society's administration.

One big discrepancy does, however, remain. Rates under the National Industrial Injuries Act are still much ahead of ordinary insurance benefits. This is in line with the Beveridge Report, though the Act goes further than Beveridge proposed; and it is certainly also in line with trade union policy. What is sometimes called the "blood-money argument"—that anyone who is injured at work not only needs, like other invalids, medical care and something to live on till he gets better, but must further be compensated for the added injury that his accident would never have happened if he hadn't been an employed person—this argument has always carried great weight with the unions. There are some practical grounds for respecting it, chief of which is the risk that if special rates are not paid for industrial injuries, there may well be a spate of common law actions for negligence by workers against their employers—many of which will be lost at the cost of everyone's time and temper. Moreover, the assessment of industrial injuries on the basis of the percentage rate of disablement marches in step with the treatment of war wounds: and that perhaps makes sense. Nevertheless, the arguments for a single insurance system in which equal provision is made for all who are unable to earn, for whatever reason, are also very strong. The leg which is broken because its owner slipped on the stairs at work takes no longer to mend, and presumably feels just the same, as the leg which was broken on the domestic doorstep.

Whatever view we take of the differentiation in rates of benefit, the transfer of provision for industrial injuries from "workmen's compensation" to the general insurance scheme is a most

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powerful solvent of vexatious anomalies. Seldom can the funeral of a body of statutes have evoked less mourning than the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Acts. Here and there an occasional lawyer perhaps wiped away a surreptitious tear for the litigation which will be no more; but even the insurance companies, to whom a vested interest in the old system has sometimes been attributed, appear not to have regarded it as really lucrative business. And the citizen, who has now to master one procedure instead of two, and whose right to benefit now depends upon his own insurance status and not on the solvency of his employer, has everything to gain from it.

Outside insurance matters, the Health Service and the National Assistance Act between them have turned upside down and inside out the machinery for looking after the sick and the aged. Old boundary lines have been wiped out, and with them old anomalies swept away; but the soil around the new boundaries is disagreeably fertile for the growth of a fresh strain of anomalies. The aged in particular are so much everybody's business that one fears lest some individual Darby or Joan should end up by being nobody's business. In the social services generally, it is perhaps possible to discriminate between people who are well and people who are ill: but as we grow older, the no-man's-land between these two clear categories—the state of ailing without being definitely sick—becomes larger and larger. This led to tiresome regulations in the old days when the Assistance Board could give "extra nourishment," while only the Public Assistance doctor could order medicines, and all the patent foods had to be classified on one or other side of the line. Now we have a new division of function: the local authority is to look after the old people in their homes, providing, for example, home helps to do the housework: the National Assistance Board is to pay them their pensions: and the Regional Hospital Board is to take them into hospital when they are no longer fit to manage for themselves. It will be a miracle if this trinity manages to keep such a harmony of spirit and action that the citizen preserves faith in its unity.

And the new anomalies are by no means confined to old age. Who, for instance, should cut our corns under the new dispensation? The chiropodist is not a doctor, so perhaps the National Health Service ought to keep out of it: but then why should feet be treated differently from eyes or teeth? Or take the problems of convalescence. If you go straight from

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hospital to a convalescent home, that is all part of the free service ; but if you go home first, and then find that you're not really fit and must get away for a while, the local authority will charge you a guinea a week for a " recuperative holiday " : yet in the very next bed you may find the straight-from-hospital convalescent paying nothing at all. That must seem very unfair.

Perhaps these are trivialities. But they are the kind of trivialities which are apt to get out of proportion in the eyes of the consumer of the social services. It is encouraging, therefore, to find that at other points the consumer's feelings have been clearly imagined and properly respected. In this connection, even changes in vocabulary have their significance : we can, for instance, rejoice to see the end of the " homeless " and the " destitute." In more substantial matters also, a proper regard is shown for personal dignity. As the Minister of Health emphasised in introducing the second reading of the National Assistance Bill, those who are in receipt of allowances from the Assistance Board will handle these themselves, so that the old age pensioner living in one of the new homes for old people " goes in a perfectly respectable and dignified way to the hotel and pays the charges that the hotel makes " and " so far as such a person's neighbours are concerned in the same hotel, they do not know who is putting that person in a position to pay the charges."*

III

My third question demands a rather broader view of the social services than that of the individual consumer. From such an angle, we must, I think, admit that many imperfections are still visible. One cannot help feeling that the social security scheme is rather like the picture which would result if a canvas were divided into squares, and a number of artists independently commissioned each to fill one of these. The result is bound to be bizarre, even if care has been taken to choose all the artists from the same school, and even if they have sometimes discussed the project with one another. I have in mind particularly, in the use of this analogy, the complexity and confusion of the back-and-forth payments between the citizen and the state. We are now directly paying out insurance contributions and income tax : and we are getting back insurance benefits, food

* Aneurin Bevan. Hansard, 24th November, 1947. Col. 1616.

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subsidies, family allowances, and income tax allowances. It does begin to look as if there was a place for some version of the project originally associated with the name of Lady Rhys Williams and recently brought to the fore again,* which would in effect strike out the items that balance on both sides of this account. The common feature in all the variants of this plan is the direct payment to every individual of a regular monetary allowance from the cradle to the grave, with the consequential abolition on the one hand of some, or all, of the allowances now payable in special circumstances only (such as old age or incapacity), and on the other hand of allowances and differential rates of taxation under income tax law. Perhaps also we have here the answer to the vexed question of the food subsidies. These payments, which must surely be included in the social service programme, are one of the most severely criticised features of the Government's policy. Personally I have never been able quite to share the fury which the subsidies arouse amongst many economists : chiefly because they seem to me to provide a necessary protection for the very poor, and to provide it in a form which is distinguished by the virtue of generality which I have already applauded. But the subsidies are expensive: at their present rate of £484 millions a year, they are running at just about £10 per head per annum. Also from the Government's own point of view they are a most ungrateful form of expenditure : how many families of three remember to thank Sir Stafford for a contribution of £30 a year towards their food bills ?

The attraction of the Rhys-Williams type of proposal would be that it might achieve the object of the food subsidies (as well as those of insurance benefits and tax allowances) in a much less objectionable (and less administratively cumbrous) form. Moreover, a direct monetary payment to all and sundry is the perfect anti-slump weapon—very handy to have in the armoury just in case full employment is not as well established as it appears to be. You put the payment up if a slump threatens, and cut it down in an inflationary situation. But for everybody to become a state pensioner (and no questions asked) would mean a tremendous shock to deep-seated conventions. It has taken us a century to get emancipated from less eligibility : this new proposal might be described in a slightly different sense as no

* In Professor James Meade's *Planning and the Price Mechanism*, p. 43, and (in a diluted form) in the programme of the Women's Liberal Federation.

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eligibility at all! Yet it is possible that, whatever the colour of our next few governments, something of the kind is not very far away: it is talked of, for its anti-slump virtues, even amongst American economists. The question whether it appears as a revolutionary innovation or merely as a simpler method of continuing what has in fact been going on for a long time, is no doubt a matter of the complexion of the Government which happens eventually to introduce it.

Finally we must consider what is probably the most formidable indictment against the broad design of the Government's social security scheme—the familiar charge of bureaucratic administration and excessive centralisation. The detailed accusations on this charge sheet are numerous and inter-related, but they may perhaps be conveniently grouped under the heads of the Government's attitude towards voluntary societies: towards local authorities: and towards direct or indirect methods of democratic control.

The record about voluntary societies is mixed. A passion for tidy and unified administration has not prevented the National Assistance Act from leaving doors wide open for co-operation. The National Assistance Board has amongst other things the duty "to make provision whereby persons without a settled way of living" (what a gentle and charming description of tramps!) "may be influenced to lead a more settled life."* For this purpose the Board is to maintain its own reception centres; but equally it may contribute towards similar centres run by voluntary organisations. Similarly local authorities may use voluntary societies as agents in their schemes for the welfare of blind, crippled and otherwise disabled persons. But on the whole voluntary organisations have certainly suffered more casualties than they have won victories. The disappearance of voluntary hospitals alone would tip the balance; but to that we have to add the expulsion of Friendly Societies and Trade Unions from the administration of the insurance scheme—a step which goes far beyond the recommendation of the Beveridge Report that the level of benefits payable under the Acts should no longer be at the mercy of the balance sheets of financially independent Approved Societies. The wisdom of this decision is not easy to assess: it must largely depend on administrative considerations not readily accessible to the outsider. Moreover, discussion of the merits of the case has been

* National Assistance Act, Section 17.

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obscured by the fact that it has been widely regarded as a breach of election promises. Perhaps it is sufficient to remark that there must have been very compelling reasons to induce a Labour Government to take a step which was both open to this charge and so extremely annoying to the Trade Unions.

Local authorities, also, have suffered heavy losses. There are no new duties substantial enough to fill the gap left by the loss of hospitals and public assistance. On the other hand, in administrative matters, the merits of local variety have not been ruthlessly discounted. The Labour Government was not, of course, responsible for the Education Act of 1944; but it has had to shoulder the task of shaping the large administrative changes necessary to carry the Act into effect; and in this instance, at least, the result has not been to force local authorities into a strait jacket. If one authority submits a scheme for a system of multilateral schools, its neighbour can, and does, propose the opposite plan; and both are sanctioned.

Indifference to, if not actual preference for, indirect methods of democratic control is illustrated by the preservation, not to say the elevation, of the Assistance Board, which is now re-christened with yet a third name, and acquires the prefix "National." Apart from the question of principle involved, the matter is not perhaps of first-class importance, for the Board itself costs only a few thousands, and does neither good nor harm. But it was conceived in sin—the sin of the timorous Government of 1934 which hoped that it could devolve on to a non-elective Board blame for unpopular policies in matters (in this case the treatment of the unemployed) which are any government's primary responsibility; and the provision by which the salaries of the Board are carried on the Consolidated Fund so that its members may be immune from parliamentary criticism is a monstrous constitutional anomaly. In practice, the original hope has not been fulfilled: the appropriate Ministers, now chiefly the Minister of National Insurance, have had to answer to the House for the doings of the Board, and the Board itself is not much more than a phantom. But it would have been pleasant to see the sin of 1934 expiated (and a little money saved) by its demise.

Questions of democratic control are raised also—and on a scale likely to be of much greater practical significance—by the constitution of Regional Hospital Boards. The Boards are not elected authorities answerable to their electors. They

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have, it is true, a responsibility to the Minister of Health, and through him, formally to Parliament; but neither the Boards themselves nor their officers are under the direction of the Minister as civil servants would be. Constituted as they are in such a way as to include representatives of hospital and specialist services, of the medical profession and of local authorities and other interested bodies, they may well feel themselves agreeably independent of the public whom it is their business to serve.

All these developments raise quite fundamental issues. Approval or disapproval of the direction in which we are clearly travelling must turn on personal judgement as to the part which the ordinary citizen ought to play in the management of public affairs in the modern democratic state; on the limitations of the stage on which that part should be played; and on the areas in which the variety and the personal satisfaction derived from independent local or voluntary action are insufficient to outweigh the conveniences of uniformity. On these enormous subjects it would, I suggest, be wise to adopt an experimental attitude, and to watch the harvest of experience very carefully. It is not at all clear that the division of function between elector, elected representative, and independent expert on which our society happens (more by chance than design) to have alighted at the moment is of necessity the right one either for now or for all time. *Some* degree of increased centralisation is a proper consequence of the increased mobility of the modern world: London is not as far from Manchester as it once was. And the growing complexity of contemporary social life makes it quite reasonable, and not at all undemocratic, for the citizen to welcome relief from the burden of responsibility for everything from sewage to poor relief. Certainly I am myself uneasily aware of a conflict between traditional theory and the facts of experience which suggests a very pressing need for fresh and untrammelled thinking. Traditionally, democratic theory teaches, for instance, that democracy works best, and is at its liveliest, in small groups, and particularly in local communities concerned with the management of their own affairs. Yet in this country interest in national politics is widespread and reasonably alert: interest in local government seems to be almost exclusively confined to the members of local authorities and their immediate friends and relations, or to politically-minded folk who are interested in securing predominance on the local council for a political party which they favour on account

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not of its local, but of its national policy. The county councillors fought and wept for their lost hospitals: do the patients know or care? And if they don't, does that, or does it not, justify the trend towards centralised and non-elective authorities?

IV

The greater part of the Labour Government's record in the social services is concerned with social security—the greater part, but by no means the whole. Indeed the difficulty of covering that record adequately within a single article illustrates very cogently what a crowded story it is. If social service means the provision for the needs of ordinary people, a high place in the list should have been given to the establishment of Rent Tribunals, a measure which has freed thousands of unprotected people from often shocking exploitation; and something should be said for the extension of legal aid to the large classes previously excluded, either by the nature of their suits, or by the fact that they were one or two rungs above the very bottom of the economic ladder.

Certainly the record cannot be concluded without some reference to the Children Act of 1948. The passage of this Act, which carries out the main recommendations of the Curtis Committee (again after an exceptionally short interval), was marked by inter-departmental battles on the grand scale at both national and local levels. Champions of the Ministry of Education and of the Home Office fought for the bodies of our "deprived" children, and many a local Education Committee viewed the establishment of an independent Children's Committee with savage jealousy. On the face of it, the Act does indeed appear to be concerned chiefly with administrative matters: the responsibilities of local authorities for children who lack parental care are increased: there are new rules for boarding out: and the appointment of children's officers becomes an obligation on the local authorities concerned. Yet in terms of potential contribution towards the personal happiness of flesh and blood people—and small, defenceless people at that—this Act may well rank second to none; though, the elimination of bad habits of mind, bad buildings, and bad staffs is such a slow business that the general election will have come and gone long before most of us appreciate the measure of what has been done.

Such is the record, with its bold achievements, its generous and dignified provision for common human needs, its hesitations and its muddles. "The sacrifice [of the middle class]," says *The Observer*, "is not without reward. It has saved the country from the bitter class struggle which threatens others."* Certainly, for my part, when I look at the local babies and think of the steady decline in infant mortality: when I note the unadorned observation made by the United States Government for the benefit of its business men that "Rationing of food is still *effectively applied* in the United Kingdom":† when I see a grandfather reading the evening paper with his new spectacles—I do find a new and deep satisfaction in life under the Labour Government. And that satisfaction, *The Observer* notwithstanding, is not just relief at having bought off revolution.

THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT'S RECORD IN FOREIGN POLICY

By W. N. EWER

FOREIGN policy is not decided by the will of governments. It is, far more than is usually realised, determined by factors quite outside their control—by, amongst other things, the actions and purposes of other governments. A Foreign Minister is not a free agent. He is "in the fell grip of circumstance." His freedom of action is limited, and his policy often inevitably dictated, by environment and the impact of events.

We have then, in considering the foreign policy of the Labour Government since 1945, to take account of the world pattern in which that policy has been operating. It is a pattern which very few foresaw when Ernest Bevin replaced Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary.

The shape of things to come, and the policy which it required on the part of the British Government, then seemed plain enough. The shape would still be that which had been created and imposed by the facts of war.

* Leading article in *The Observer*, 13th February, 1949.

† United States Department of Commerce: *International Reference Service* Vol. V, No. 127. Italics mine.

There would be the grand alliance of the United Nations, transformed into the "peacetime organisation." And the core of this organisation would be the solid partnership of the Big Three (or Four or Five) which had been the chief factor in achieving victory. Theirs would be the chief responsibility for making the peace and in safeguarding it against any revival of German (or Japanese or Italian) aggressiveness. And they would, in concert, take the lead in the great work of reconstruction to which the United Nations would devote itself.

So the firm basis on which the new order would be built would be the partnership of the Great Powers. They would not dominate, but they would have to lead. Because major responsibility must be theirs, major decisions must be theirs. And these decisions would be taken in unison, by partners who might disagree, who might have differences to adjust, but whose aims and purposes were broadly identical.

And so the first objectives of British policy must be to strengthen and develop the United Nations, and, within it, the partnership of the Great Powers which would be the steel framework of the new world structure.

These were the assumptions. But they had in fact no relation to reality. They were false because they were based on a false axiom. And the story of British post-war policy is mainly one of the reluctant abandoning of false assumptions, and the gradual acceptance of unpleasant realities. It is a process of adjustment which, unhappily, entails not only practical difficulties, but emotional stresses.

The false axiom was that there was any real unity of purpose between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. They had had one aim in common—the defeat and overthrow of the enemy powers. That common aim cemented the alliance. Once it was removed by victory all unity disappeared. For the post-war aims of the Soviet Union and of the Western Powers were as opposed as their wartime aims had been identical.

There had been premonitions of this. President Roosevelt had been disturbed by the thought that "the nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors." The Soviet demands for territorial acquisitions (in spite of the solemn pledge in the Anglo-Soviet treaty), Mr. Vyshinsky's coup in Rumania, the veto controversy, the arrest of the "sixteen Poles," the demands for Kars and Ardahan and for bases on the Dardanelles, had all aroused anxiety.

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But all these were regarded as "differences," to be adjusted by negotiation. What was not realised was that the cleavage was not superficial but very deep. There was a belief that the Soviet leaders, in becoming nationalist, had ceased to be Communist. The tempting but misleading analogy of the French revolution was cited. It was forgotten that evangelism and imperialism can go hand in hand. Because Russian purposes were misunderstood British policy became confused and frustrated—and, at times, angry.

Let us first consider Europe. The expectation of the Western governments, and of Western public opinion, was simple enough. The overthrow of the Nazi Empire would be followed by a restoration. The countries which Hitler had overrun would regain their independence: and—with, perhaps, some adjustments—their former boundaries would be re-established. In all of them democratic institutions (as understood in the West) would be revived. This would be true, also, of Italy and the "satellites." Germany must remain under Four-Power control and tutelage, until she, too, was safely "democratised."

But the Soviet leaders (they would otherwise have been disloyal to their own convictions) looked forward not to restoration but to revolution. And when talk was of "democracy" they meant entirely different things from their Western Allies.

Now in the West, with its long political traditions and its comparative social stability, restoration came about easily and automatically. Nor did the Russians make any serious effort to interfere with the process. It was in Eastern Europe that conflict came.

Here, for historical reasons, there was no automatic tendency towards "restoration." The pre-war regimes had no deep roots. They had been, for the most part, corrupt, oppressive and unpopular. The post-war situation was unstable. Big changes were inevitable. And, by the accident of war, Russian power was, in this area, supreme.

It was inevitable that the opportunity so presented should be seized. Russian purpose was dual, but definite. There was the Communist motive—the desire to use power to bring about changes in accordance with Leninist-Stalinist tenets. And there was also the new-old urge, deeply ingrained in Russian thought, to extend Russian (as distinct from Communist)

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influence, to uproot and remove Western influence—political, economic, cultural—from the Slav countries, and to build there a new system which would look for inspiration and authority eastward to Moscow, not westward to Rome or Paris, London or New York. There was, too, though it is less important, the unshakable military conviction that security can be assured by the extension of territory: and also (as witness Stalin's outburst about Lvov and his broadcast on VJ Day) a cruder, old-world desire for aggrandisement for its own sake.

This Soviet will to dominate (or "liberate") Eastern Europe was perhaps the most important fact in European politics at the end of the war. The will, and the ability, in terms of power on the spot, to translate will into achievement.

Had this been realised, both by the governments and the public opinion of the West, either of two policies could have been adopted, though each would have been difficult.

The Western Powers, which, though weak "on the spot" had, at the time, a massive "global" military and economic preponderance, could have made it at once clear to the Soviet Government that any attempt to establish a Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe would meet with their resolute opposition: that it would bring the immediate break-up of the alliances: that it might lead to a new war. That might have proved effective. For there were many signs, at the time, of a hesitation, of a division of council in Moscow. There is, perhaps, an analogy with the situation when Hitler first announced German rearmament, and then regarrisoned the Rhineland.

But such a policy was, in fact, impracticable. Even had the Western governments realised what was happening, they could not have secured the essential popular support for such a policy. The desire for peace and demobilisation was too strong. No policy which seemed to involve even the remote risk of a new war would have been tolerated. The belief in the reality and the necessity of "Allied unity" still dominated popular thought.

The other alternative was to come to an arrangement with the Soviet Union on the basis of "spheres of influence"—to recognise that, within a certain area, Russia could do as she chose without interference or protest from the West: on the understanding that she would be content with this and would abstain from any intervention beyond the agreed line. Again, there is evidence that the Soviet leaders might have accepted such an arrangement, that they desired it, indeed, that they

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believed that it was being tacitly made. Churchill and Roosevelt had acquiesced in Russian demands for territorial expansion. Churchill had "informally" agreed that, if the Soviet Union would not interfere in Greece, Britain would allow it a free hand in Rumania. The Russians had made a deal of precisely this character with Hitler in 1939. There is every reason to suppose that they would have been ready to strike a bargain with Britain and America in 1945. Whether they would have kept the bargain is a matter for idle speculation. Certainly they seem to have been implicitly offering it.

Yet this second policy was as impossible as the first. For, in the first place, acceptance of the idea of "spheres of influence" would have involved renunciation of that conception of the "one world" of the "United Nations," in which Western thought at the time passionately believed. It would have involved renunciation, so far as Eastern Europe was concerned, of the ideals of free democracy and of national independence for which we believed ourselves to have been fighting. And, in the case of the East European allies, it would have meant the deliberate and cynical desertion of precisely those elements which had fought with us against Hitler even in the dark years when Stalin was virtually his ally. British public opinion, in 1945, would neither have understood nor tolerated such a policy.

Neither of the two logically possible policies was, therefore, politically possible: since neither would have had public support. And the Government itself wavered between the two impossible possibilities. It could neither condone nor oppose Soviet—or Soviet-inspired—actions in Eastern Europe. It hoped for the best and then angrily protested against the worst. It supported, but could not protect, those parties or persons which it regarded as democratic, but which the Russians regarded as "reactionary" and, above all, as "Westernized": thereby confirming Soviet suspicion that the Mikolajcziks and Petkovs were "Western agents," who must be liquidated if their countries were to be made completely "loyal" to Moscow. It was not until the "rape of Czechoslovakia" that reality was faced by public opinion. And by then it was too late either for resistance or for appeasement.

The consolidation of Eastern Europe under complete Soviet control was an accomplished fact: nor was the position seriously affected by the revolt of Yugoslavia.

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Already, a few months before, Russia had openly avowed her policy. Any pretence of desiring unity had been dropped: first by the compelling of the "satellites" to reject the offer of "Marshall Aid," then by Zhdanov's proclamation at the founding of the Cominform, that the old doctrine of the division of the world into two hostile "camps" was again a fundamental article of Bolshevik faith.

The turning point had been Mr. Molotov's visit to Paris to discuss the Marshall offer with Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault. The invitation to Russia to participate in a joint plan for European recovery was the last attempt at four-power co-operation and at the restoration of any kind of European unity. Mr. Molotov's withdrawal was decisive. And British policy, hesitant for two years, suddenly became positive. Four-power unity, European unity, were dismissed as unattainable. The East of Europe was clearly lost. The purpose now became to unite the West and to link it with the American continent, both for economic recovery and for security—in case the Soviet "camp" should become materially as well as ideologically aggressive. "O.E.E.C.," Western Union, the Atlantic Pact, "European Union" are the component parts of the new policy. Its basis is the acceptance—since there is no alternative to acceptance—of the thesis of the two camps.

Inside Europe Germany has, for obvious reasons, presented problems of its own. And yet the overall picture is the same. From the signing of Potsdam onwards there was sharp contradiction between theory and reality. The theory was that Germany would be governed in "matters affecting Germany as a whole" by the Four Powers in unison. The Allied Control Council would determine policy for the whole country. Each commander-in-chief would put that policy into effect in his own zone. Those are the principles of Potsdam. But they have never, from the very beginning, been put into effect. They could not be, for they postulated a unity of outlook and purpose which did not exist.

In Eastern Germany, as in Eastern Europe, the Russians acted without inhibitions. Their zone was sharply separated from the West, while inside it swift and drastic changes were made which were to give it a political, economic, and social shape which would accord with Soviet ideas. In Western Germany the British (and, in varying ways, the Americans and French) hesitated for two years to do anything which might

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prejudice the restoration of an Allied unity which had never in fact existed. Fusion of the British and American zones (though vehemently criticised by the Russians) did not really change the situation. And it was not until after the collapse of the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference in London in December, 1947, that decisive steps towards organising Western Germany as a separate and self-contained political and economic entity were taken. The parallel with Europe generally is almost precise.

Here then is the clear pattern of British policy in Europe since (practically simultaneously) the war ended and the Labour Government came to power. First it was conditioned by the desire and belief that there could be a community of policy, based on a community of purpose, between Russia and the Western Allies. Then, very rapidly, came partial disillusion. In Eastern Europe the Soviet Union was pursuing, by methods which British Socialism must condemn, aims which it might partly, but could not entirely, approve. Condonation was impossible. So was opposition. The outcome was ineffective protest, irritation and angry acceptance of the unavoidable. Then came a further, reluctant, realisation. The formidable system which had been created in the East might be not static but dynamic in quality: it might, under the double urge of Communist evangelism and Russian imperialism, attempt the overthrow of the divided and discordant "capitalist regimes" of the West. That realisation has brought the third, and present, phase—the effort to unite and organise Western Europe with American support—the calling in of the New World to redress the balance of the Old. It is a policy which has been dictated by events, not by desires.

Spain and Greece lie, largely for geographical reasons, somewhat outside the main European pattern. Relations with Spain, in this period, have been mainly a sentimental subject, hardly worth serious consideration. Greece, in international politics, belongs rather to the north Middle East than to the European continent. In this area too the main determinant factor of policy has been Russian pressure. The Soviet revival of demands for bases on the Straits and for the cession by Turkey to Soviet Armenia of Kars and Ardahan, the suggestion to Greece that Russia might lease a base in the Dodecanese, Mr. Molotov's claim to a Soviet trusteeship over Tripolitania, all gave cause for misgivings about the possibility of a renewal of the old Tsarist

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southward expansion. And it was Soviet activity in Azerbaijan, coupled with the Soviet Government's failure to withdraw its troops from Northern Persia on the day appointed by the treaty, which brought about the first Anglo-Russian clash in the Security Council.

The sequel is suggestive. These were areas in which—unlike Eastern Europe—British and American armed strength could be brought to bear as rapidly and effectively as Russian armed strength. "Vital interests" were endangered. Not only communications, but oil: in the case of Britain not "oil profits" but oil supplies essential to her economic life. It was clear that here Russia could only advance by means of actual aggression, and that aggression would almost certainly mean collision. The Soviet Government hesitated and waited. President Truman's pledge of support to Turkey (and by implication, Persia) in the event of attack was decisive. Plans for expansion southwards were called off, and the Soviet leaders contented themselves with angry denunciation of the "Truman doctrine" as evidence of the aggressive intentions of Anglo-American imperialism.

But the British Government was left disastrously entangled in the internal politics of Greece. In Greece when the war ended, British policy had a free hand, and was not acting under pressure. For Stalin at the beginning kept his "informal" promise to Churchill and did not intervene. The Soviet Government did not lift a finger to help the Greek Communists when their revolt of December, 1944, was crushed.

In the autumn of 1945 there had seemed a fair chance of recovery. If the British Government had then insisted (as it could have insisted) on a wise clemency, on economic and administrative reform, and on the postponement of political issues until conditions were stabilised, the story might have been very different. But the Greek Royalists, whose strength was waning, clamoured for early elections. Right inclined British officials were not unprejudiced in their favour. Mr. Bevin was persuaded that it would be "democratic" to hold early elections, and, moreover, that when a duly elected Government was in power, the country would settle down and the British troops could be withdrawn. The Left parties protested, the Liberal Premier protested, several Ministers resigned in protest. But Mr. Bevin (well-intentioned but ill-advised) was insistent. All Greece drew the deduction. Britain obviously

wanted the restoration of the monarchy: and, unless the monarchy were restored, British economic aid would cease. The elections were held. The Royalist and reactionary "Populists" got their majority.

That was the decisive moment. From April, 1946, reaction has been in power. All hope of appeasement, of reform, of progressive democracy disappeared. A new Communist-led revolt began. And, without having intended anything of the kind, the British Government found itself more and more committed to the support of the legal (though corrupt, incompetent, and reactionary) régime against Communist-led rebels, who now received plentiful encouragement and assistance from the Soviet satellites across the frontier. And the rebellion has grown in strength. In 1946 the forces numbered 7,000; in 1947, 20,000; now 30,000. There is no end in sight, nor any way of escape from the dilemma. To-day the choice has become one of continuing Anglo-American support to what is, in effect, a monarchist-militarist dictatorship, or of allowing the establishment of a Communist military dictatorship, which would involve the advancement of Soviet power to Crete and the Dodecanese, and a dangerous near-isolation of Turkey.

The evolution of Eastern Europe has been one of the Government's chief external preoccupations. The other has been the evolution of Southern Asia.

It was already accepted that the purpose of British rule in Arab and Asiatic countries must be to bring about its own end. The protectorate over Egypt, the mandate over Iraq, had already been relinquished. India, Burma and Ceylon had been "trained" through the years for self-government. But there was still hesitation to take the final step, to withdraw all British control, to hand over all power and all responsibility, finally and irrevocably, to the Asiatic peoples of the Empire. Nor was that hesitation purely an "imperialist" one. There was genuine apprehension that withdrawal might, especially in India, be the prelude to civil war, anarchy, and collapse.

The risk was a real one. But it had to be taken, sooner or later. And the prolongation of British rule would not have lessened it. That essential fact was realised, and the bold decision taken. The results have proved its rightness, though there have been many anxious moments, and—especially in Burma—anxiety is not ended. But the great operation (one without parallel in history) has been accomplished with less

conflict, less suffering, and less disruption than could have been expected in such circumstances. The leaders of India, Pakistan and Ceylon have fully justified what was, in essence, an act of faith in their political capacity and political wisdom.

The policy of decisive evacuation has proved successful in India. Why has it been so tragic a failure in Palestine? On the surface the problem was a similar one. Was it not equally soluble by partition, followed by withdrawal?

But though there are similarities there are also great differences. In India Hindu-Muslim rivalry was acute. But underneath it there was a certain sense of unity, much mutual understanding, even a long habit of co-operation as well as of conflict. The gap between Jew and Arab in Palestine was far greater. It was not a clash of creeds but of peoples entirely strange to each other, with different ways of life. And the Jews were newcomers.

The Hindu might fight with the Muslim. He did not object to his presence in India or wish that he could be driven out, bag and baggage. The Muslim might fight the Hindu. But he had no vision of converting all India into a Muslim National Home, in which a great incursion of Muslim immigrants should outnumber the Hindus.

Yet even in Palestine partition, firmly decreed and established as a condition for self-government, might have been accepted by both sides. But Palestine was not, like India-Pakistan, a self-contained area. Nor was it part of the British Empire. The problem was, unhappily, an "international" one: so that the temptation to pass it for solution to the United Nations was very strong. Nor, when that decision was taken, had the weakness and ineptitude of the United Nations become plainly apparent. The Assembly, be it remembered, did accept the responsibility, and did call for an immediate British evacuation. Blame for the consequences does not by any means rest solely with the British Government.

And even so, though the manner of evacuation is easy to criticise, the policy of evacuation was, in itself, probably wise. In the long run the problem which has been created by the coming of the Jews can only be solved by Jews and Arabs themselves. Either there must be a *permanent* foreign garrison and a *permanent* foreign administration or, sooner or later, Jew and Arab must be left alone, to find a settlement by force or by agreement. There is no third way.

It may prove that these six months of fighting have been (as in other cases) the inescapable prelude to a settlement. And that a settlement not imposed but reached by the parties themselves will make possible not only peace in Palestine but co-operation between Israel and the Arab States. If so the British Government's policy (though not the details of its execution) may be justified by its final result.

For the problem of Palestine is only a part of the wider problem of the Middle East and of all Southern Asia: how to free that whole vast area from European rule and European control, and how at the same time to ensure for it security, stability, internal freedom and economic prosperity. Main responsibility for the success or failure of this revolution (for it is a revolution) must lie with the Eastern peoples themselves. But the transfer of that responsibility is the final task of the former rulers. And the contribution of these four years to the carrying out of that very difficult task may come to be seen—when it can be seen in perspective—as one of the greater achievements of British statesmanship.

The darkest spot in the Asiatic picture is not Palestine but the South East. There the problems have been more intricate. A great Chinese immigration has complicated the question of nationality. The years of Japanese occupation destroyed any continuity of evolution. The French and Dutch Governments have proved wanting both in imagination and in courage. Now comes the possibility of a Chinese pressure akin to that of Russia in Europe, inspired by the same dual motives of Communism and nationalism.

Both in East and West great changes have come about in the world pattern in these four years. They have been brought about by "dynamic" forces, inspired by revolutionary aims. The British Government, seeking stability and peaceful evolution, has come everywhere into conflict with the "camp" of violence and "dynamism." That has not been a deliberate choice, but the inevitable outcome of events. The criterion by which its policy will, in the long run, be judged is whether or not conflict brings war. But either way it will be a crude judgment. For the answer to that tremendous question depends upon a whole complex of factors beyond the grasp of any Minister or any government.

"APARTHEID"—SOUTH AFRICA'S NEW NATIVE POLICY

By I. S. LLOYD

IN a speech to the Foreign Press Association in London, Mr. Eric Louw, the South African Minister of Economic Development who represented Dr. Malan at the Commonwealth Conference, sought to disarm what he described as a campaign of criticism¹ against the new government in South Africa, a campaign especially directed against its native policy. Employing such broad and unscholarly epithets as "moonshine" he endeavoured to induce his listeners, and the British public, to accept the argument that "apartheid" was a constructive policy which paid great attention to "the most elementary human rights," and which provided the only practicable foundation for racial harmony and co-operation in the Union. This policy he said had been "variously represented as one of aggression, racialism and unjust discrimination," and his further remarks implied that this was a gross distortion of its motives and methods.

Such a vigorous defence must have caused some surprise to those who thought that no defence was possible. But a mere denial, however vigorous, is not really a defence, and it is therefore of considerable interest to enquire whether such a defence is in fact possible. To do this, it will be necessary to consider the policy and the background of political and economic realities in South Africa against which it must be set.

If there is to be any considerable discussion of apartheid—and it is most important that there should be for the policy is one which affects not only South Africa, but the whole southern African continent—it is necessary that the full facts of the situation should be made widely known. This will not redound entirely to the disadvantage of Dr. Malan's government, though it will certainly show that little credit should be given them for their policy, for it is the purpose of this article to show that the policy has been produced by long-run trends in South African society, and that an explanation of racial discrimination must be

¹ Since Mr. Louw is justifiably resentful of what he regards as ill-informed criticism emanating from those inexperienced in South African affairs, it is necessary to state at the outset that the author is a South African born and bred, who has recently had the opportunity of spending five weeks in the country since the new government's accession to office. After an absence of three years on research at Cambridge, this visit presented a unique opportunity to a South African to observe the changes which have taken place.

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sought not in the steaming kettle of present-day politics, but in the volcanic subterranean forces which have produced the great upheavals in South African history, and which may be about to extend the geologically unique great rift valley into a racial rift which will be no less perceptible and no less unique. The forces with which the South African government is tampering, under the misguided impression that it controls them, are of cataclysmic strength, and every civilised European, both within and outside the continent, is not only entitled by a concern for human rights, but obliged by pure self-interest to observe the actions of the admittedly sovereign South African administration. Any intelligent European who has eyes to see what is happening today in Asia and Africa, will show no less concern for the outcome of events in South Africa than that which he should show for the outcome of discussions on the international control of atomic energy. The South African administration is sensitive to the force of world public opinion, a public opinion which finds its outlet and influence very largely in the Anglo-American press, and however much it may deny the fact, its actions will to some extent be guided by the anticipated reactions abroad. If these reactions are informed and intelligent, based on a real understanding of a most complex situation, they may indirectly make a very considerable contribution to the solution of the problem. It is the purpose of this article to contribute in some small measure to this understanding, and to share with a wider public the reactions of a liberal-minded South African who has had a unique opportunity to observe his country anew and to acquire a new perspective in so doing.

The most remarkable thing about South Africa under Dr. Malan is that to the outward eye, and even on quite close analysis, it is very little different from the South Africa which existed under General Smuts, or, for that matter, under his predecessor, General Hertzog. The physical changes are hardly noticeable, the basic economic and social trends are exactly the same, and the forces which are moulding the destiny of native and European in South Africa still operate with all the thoroughness which Longfellow attributed to the mills of God, mills that to the average South African are completely silent, their ominous grinding drowned by the prosperous thunder of the great presses of the Witwatersrand. A large number of people in Great Britain seem to think that the

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advent of Dr. Malan, whom they imagine as a sort of academic Chiang Kai Shek, or a bearded republican who has his doormat designed like the Union Jack, has brought a sudden reversal of policy which in itself will aggravate racial tension to such an acute degree that it will lead to open racial strife and political crisis in the near future. There have been published recently a number of lurid and imaginative books, some accurate, some mischievous, which describe the deplorable conditions of racial discrimination and suggest the inevitability of most improbable and unlikely events. With its characteristic lack of perspective and historical objectivity the yellow press has taken up the cry and is endeavouring to inflame opinion in this country and elsewhere not against the endemic bacteria of fear, prejudice and ignorance, but against the endermic symptoms of political change.

The most significant changes in the country are hidden from these observers. These are the attitudes and opinions of one's friends and acquaintances, who seem unfortunately to be even less capable of objective and unbiased thought where the problem of racial co-operation is concerned than they were at the end of the war, and, most significant of all, the attitude of the Bantu. There was nothing more striking and disturbing than the change in the temper and disposition of the average native whom one sees in the streets or meets as a servant in private homes or in offices. His cheerful, optimistic and long-suffering tolerance is becoming more and more conspicuous by its absence, and in its stead has developed a sullen resentfulness and discontent, an unco-operative attitude that is based on fear and mistrust. It seems that the native in South Africa is now in the mood where he is almost prepared to do himself irreparable harm and cause himself great privation and inconvenience if he can in so doing cause his European masters equal or greater loss and inconvenience.¹ It is the attitude of complaint against forces which he can neither defeat nor understand, a situation which has produced in all highly industrialised countries the phenomena of protest against the unsatisfactory

¹ D. J. Golding, President of the Coloured Peoples' Union at the Cape, declared to the press, shortly after the introduction of colour segregation on the Cape trains, that "a spirit of intense hatred towards the Afrikaner and the European in general is beginning to show itself . . . Those of us who feel our responsibility in regard to this matter are finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile our people to the belief that our fight must be carried on without losing respect for our fellow S. Africans, and without resorting to irresponsible actions." (*Cape Times*, 10.9.48.)

Professor Z. K. Matthews of the University College of Fort Hare has also stated in an article, published in the *Johannesburg Star* that, "In my opinion the signs indicate that the African will increasingly spurn the European hand of friendship."

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motivations of industrial life—Trade Unionism, the strike, go-slow practices and so on—and which is producing in South Africa a group of equally irrational phenomena by means of which the non-European will endeavour to make his protest against racial discrimination and intolerance effective. Just as these attitudes are deeply ingrained in the minds of the industrialised worker, and have a habit of transmitting themselves from one generation to another (and thus retarding the solution of problems arising from fundamentally changed conditions) so is it highly probable that the next two generations in South Africa will pay a very high price in terms of racial antagonism and social and economic inefficiency for the revulsion which present policies and practices are producing in the minds of those natives whose hopes and ambitions are being continually thwarted. This revulsion has the more immediate effect of contributing to a crime wave which is characterised by violence out of proportion to the objects of the crimes committed, and which has done much to harden the intolerance of the negro-phobe, and to narrow the vision of the liberal-minded. There has been no real effort to analyse the real reasons for this crime wave because the real reasons are unpalatable and unpopular.

But though Dr. Malan's advent to power may be looked upon as a symptom of the underlying trends in racial tension this does not justify any attempt at an apologia for the new government's theories or practices. The former have no moral content or logical structure, and the latter are as little capable of achieving their avowed objectives as they are of receiving the support of any intelligent South African or the co-operation of the coloured population in their execution.

The policy of segregation and the practice of racial discrimination are nevertheless nothing new in South Africa. The conflict of liberalism on the one side, racial prejudice and protectionism on the other, and the very largely independent physical, economical and social realities of South African life have been going on for a very long time. A great deal of South African history can only be explained by this eternal triangle and cannot possibly be explained by purely political, economic or racial theories. Dr. Malan's government is a consequence of the operation of these forces in the past, and the future of the country will be dependent on the outcome of the conflict of nationalist policy and administration with the same forces of liberal and progressive opinion (which should not be unduly

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underrated) and with the intractable and inexorable economic and social facts. There is nothing so dangerous and misleading as the attempt which some people make to find a facile one-coloured explanation of recent events in South Africa. They are not really happy until they can apply European political catchphrases to a situation to which they are about as applicable as house varnish to a battleship.

This article thus has a threefold purpose. It must first describe what the present government is doing, and why it thinks it is doing it. This will be followed by a description of the economic and social environment which will very largely determine the outcome of their policies, and finally some attempt will be made to explain why the forces of racial prejudice and intolerance have been generally in the ascendant. Against this background it will be possible to attempt some assessment of the future.

Dr. Malan's government achieved power through the adroit exploitation of a slogan, a slogan which the Nationalist party alleged to be a new solution to the problem of racial conflict. They called it "apartheid" which may be literally interpreted from the Afrikaans as "a state of separation." It is merely a new word for a very old policy, and the Nationalist election victory shows that it is still sound politics to put old wine in new bottles. Vintage prejudices, like vintage wines, appeal to the connoisseur. The old word, in English, was segregation, and this is a policy and practice which in its many forms is as old as South African history. What does it mean? The Nationalist politicians have found great difficulty in defining it, not because it is difficult to define, but because it is exceedingly difficult to give any definition the appearance of novelty. The Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Donges, has defined it thus :¹—

"The policy of the Nationalist party with regard to apartheid means that in their national development there shall be separation between Europeans and non-Europeans, and this will give the non-Europeans an opportunity of developing their own national character."

(The national character of the Bantu is something for which the European in South Africa is always showing the greatest possible solicitude). Though the above is a recent definition by far the best definition of the "new" policy was made before the war, not by a South African nationalist, but by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins, who found

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21.4.48.

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the precise elaboration of the details of his policy far less embarrassing than the members of the Nationalist party have found it.

"While there is yet time and space the country should be divided into separate areas for black and white. In the native areas the black man should be allowed to rise to any position to which he is capable of climbing. Every step in the industrial and social pyramid must be open to him, excepting only—and always—the very top. The native may be his own lawyer, doctor, builder, journalist or priest, and he must be protected from white competition in his own area. In the European area the black man, will be welcomed when, tempted by wages, he offers his services as a labourer, but it will be on the understanding that he shall merely assist and not compete with the white man . . . The interest of each race will be paramount in its own sphere."¹

This definition would almost certainly be accepted wholesale by the present South African Cabinet. It is precisely this policy which they are endeavouring to formulate in practical administrative measures, and to apply even more rigorously than it has been applied in the past. The disturbing feature—and it is this which is quite legitimately causing the liberal press some concern both in Great Britain and in South Africa—is that finding the negative aspects of such a policy far easier to apply than the complementary positive (if paternalistic) aspects, the government, partly for political reasons, is applying the former first. So the tenuous representation which the natives enjoyed, and which the Indians were promised, in the House of Assembly, is to be abolished. It is, of course, much easier to do this than it is to create the structure of limited self-government which the natives are promised in their own areas in return. Likewise a strict colour-bar is now being enforced on the trains in the Cape in order to bring this area into conformity with the rest of the Union. This measure has already caused considerable tension and disturbance in the Cape peninsula. The franchise of the Cape Coloured—a long-standing remnant of the liberal policy of the old Imperial government—is to be abolished. Apartheid is also to be introduced into the universities, access to which has always been very limited to the non-European, before any provision for separate higher education in native territories can conceivably be created on the scale that is required.² Residential segregation is to be strictly enforced in all new development areas, and in old areas where possible, a measure which can only lead to even more serious overcrowding

¹ W. K. Hancock—Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 11, Part 2, p. 101.

² Official pronouncements on the University question have been somewhat contradictory. The Minister of Education has stated (in the budget debate on the education vote) that there is no intention to interfere with the autonomy of the universities.

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of the legitimate native residential areas. The existing monopoly of all skilled trades which European labour possesses is to be safeguarded by prohibiting the entrance of natives to any skilled trades and professional occupations in European areas, and since nearly all basic and secondary industry is in the European areas (for the simple reason that the reserves are closed to European capital by law) the opportunity which the natives will have for acquiring these skills elsewhere will be negligible. Conscious—however reluctantly they admit it—of the complete dependence of the Union's economic structure on the labour of two or three million natives, Dr. Malan's government has decided that this system must be bolstered where possible by migratory labour, thus ensuring the economic without in any way endangering the political and social hegemony of the European. Where residential urban labour is unavoidable, it is to be strictly segregated in special townships which are known as locations. These measures are intended to be coupled with a considerable development of the reserves and native areas though these are generally admitted to be overcrowded and underdeveloped, suffering from severe soil erosion as well as from the even more dangerous, if less evident, social disruption which is caused in a primitive tribal community by the annual migration of a high proportion of the able-bodied men to the mines and industry. Here, when the almost unlimited demands of the European economy have been met, the native is to be encouraged "to develop along his own lines." The picture which this phrase brings to the mind of those who use it is that of an amiable savage, the miraculous recipient of all the virtues, and none of the vices of European civilisation, sitting contentedly in a Transkei cottage weaving homespun while his family study the Old Testament in Xosa. Imbibing only the practical knowledge and none of the intellectual curiosity or philosophical ideals of western education, he will be content to leave his own political destiny in the hands of his all-wise and benevolent masters. Contemptuous alike of economic and political ambition he will achieve in this blissful territorial isolation a degree of cultural integration and refinement that will rival the greatest achievements of Greece and Rome.

This in brief is the philosophy and the intended practice of apartheid, or, as it is probably more aptly described, segregation by numbers. Setting this policy against the realities of economic and social life in South Africa, and, ignoring for the moment

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the very important question of whether or not the coloured races in South Africa intend to co-operate in the fulfillment of this histrionic policy on which he has not been consulted, the question may be asked "is it possible?" If the answer to the first question is "no," the reader will be entitled to ask why such an impracticable policy has been formulated and why it is the subject of serious political discussion in South Africa.

The facts are very simple and intransigent. The population of the Union of South Africa is composed of two and a quarter million Europeans, just under eight million Bantu, just under a million Cape Coloured, and a quarter of a million Indians. The Cape Coloured, as their name suggests, are confined largely to the Southern and Western Cape. The Indians are confined largely to the coastal belt of Natal to which they were originally brought as indentured labourers for the sugar plantations, and the Bantu are of course spread all over the whole country. As it is primarily the Bantu, or natives as they are commonly called, against whom the policy of apartheid is directed, the policy will be discussed mainly in relation to their position in the economic and social system of the country, since what will not work for the natives will most assuredly not work for anyone else. The native areas which comprise 13½ million morgen (10 per cent. of the land area of the Union) and which it is intended to increase to 17 million morgen contain a population of 3,100,000. They are barely self-supporting agriculturally, badly eroded and overstocked. There are in the European rural areas a further 2,900,000 natives scattered all over the Union and employed mainly as farm labour. In the urban areas of the Union there are 1,719,000 Europeans and 1,794,000 natives, a ratio of 49-51 per cent. In addition there is an urban coloured population of 740,000. The ratio of non-European to European has been increasing steadily throughout the country and there has been a steady drift of all races to the towns, the European leading proportionately in this particular movement. A large amount of the labour in the mines is migrant labour which returns home every year or so. Much of this labour is imported from territories outside the Union under agreements with their governments.¹ But even allowing for the migrant labour, over half of the Union's natives are

¹ The Fagan report (Commission on Native Laws) gives the figure of 111,000 for native labour employed in mines and industry from territories beyond the Union, including the British protectorates of Basutoland and Swaziland. It also estimates that there are 45,000 illegal immigrants from Mozambique employed elsewhere in S. Africa.

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more or less permanently established in the European areas. Here they are more or less indiscriminately enveloped by the customs, attitudes, laws and mechanism of European civilisation which soon efface the anaemic and attenuated moral restraints of tribal law and organisation. The non-European is of course subjected to discriminate legal restraints of a particularly obnoxious and unnecessary character. Of these the Pass laws are the outstanding example. It is indeed surprising that under these circumstances the non-European, observing that the European regards his standard of living as a product not so much of the productive genius of western industrial organisation as of the subjugation of the non-European, does not come more readily to the complementary conclusion that his attainment of an equally high standard of living depends on the complete and indiscriminate abolition of racial discrimination. It is interesting that few responsible native leaders have ever seriously advocated such a policy, though it is frequently advocated abroad.

The Native Laws Commission under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Fagan, K.C., has pointed out that if apartheid were to be fully implemented in the Transvaal the area of the reserves in that province would have to be quadrupled. In Natal only 387,000 of the population of 1,700,000 natives live in the native territory of Zululand, and in the Orange Free State the ratio is even lower. Only in the Cape is the percentage at all high. The Commission has also pointed out that an increase in production in these areas would require a reduction in population, both animal and human, assuming no startling changes in productive methods, and that it would also require a very much greater percentage of better trained male labourers who are at present employed in the mines and industry. The Fagan report also estimates that in the Ciskei 20 per cent. of the cultivable land should be withdrawn from cultivation completely, if the territory is to be saved from the most serious erosion.

These are the bare facts, mainly demographic, which make apartheid a totally impractical policy. Its application even to a limited extent would probably wreck the economic foundations of the country, yet, like so many other policies with political appeal, it can scatter the ugliest crowd of facts with a whiff of prejudice. Its foundation is a system of migratory labour which is uneconomic and socially destructive, and which has been condemned by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, by a Nyasaland Government Committee,

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by no less of an interested party than the Transvaal Chamber of Mines,¹ and by every responsible body which has had cause to examine the system impartially.

Why then does Dr. Malan seek to apply and to develop such an absurdly impractical policy? Is it because the Nationalists have for so long been preaching to the converted that they have completely lost touch with reality? This may be so, but it is a superficial reason. The policy is the logical outcome of the belief which has been fostered and developed by frightened people wherever civilised European races with a high standard of living have come into contact with uncivilised coloured races with a primitive standard of life, the belief that the latter can develop only *at the expense of* the former. Finding its most deep-seated psychological origins in the fear of miscegenation and inter-marriage, developed, as it has been in South Africa, by the savage conflicts which marked the earlier phases of European expansion into the hinterland, and boosted by faulty economic reasoning which argues that black skilled workers must displace white skilled workers, this deep-seated prejudice was responsible for the Great Trek—a trek away from the slave-freeing liberalism of the British government—it was responsible for the establishment of the Transvaal and Orange Free State republics on the declared principle of inequality between black and white in church and state, it is responsible for the intensely restrictive attitude of European skilled labour, and it is undoubtedly the most important single factor in South African economic and social life. This attitude—and not Dr. Malan—is responsible for the acceptance and propagation of apartheid. Its elimination is South Africa's only real hope and consequently should be the major task of education and politics. It will take a century at least, and the proponents of the most radical solutions cannot hurry the pace unless they are

¹ Sir Ernest Oppenheimer has stated that it is the intention of the mines developing the new gold field in the Orange Free State to house their labour in village communities, and not in compounds as is done on the Witwatersrand. Yet in their evidence to the Native Laws Commission the Gold Producers Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines put forward the argument that they were opposed to the establishment of a permanent labour force since it would

- (a) Destroy the tribal system in the reserves which they considered should be "preserved" as long as possible.
- (b) In so doing destroy a system of "social security" which the reserves provided gratis as it were.
- (c) Involve the provision of medical services by the mines on a scale which they could not contemplate financing.
- (d) Probably increase the native silicosis rate which is at present kept very low by long periods of absence in the reserves.

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prepared to advocate the withdrawal of all Europeans from the Southern African continent overnight. Reason and persuasion are its most powerful antagonists, force and violence are grist to its mill. It will nevertheless be quite fatal if the South African government considers that it has a century in which to solve the problem.

In his brilliant sociological study of Brazil, *The Masters and the Slaves*, Gilberto del Freyre has shown that this fear need not develop if, as in the case of the Portuguese colonisers of that country, there is no colour consciousness to start with—due to Portugal having been overrun by the Moors. This has not been the case in South Africa, and the historical trends have in consequence been markedly different to those in Brazil.

That great social anthropologist Malinowski, has defined magic as "a supernatural technique by which man can, in his conceit, bring about all that which his rational technique fails to accomplish." Rational technique cannot accomplish the social and political separation of ethnic groups whose economic activity is indissolubly linked, and whose economic interests are interdependent and seriously impeded as it is by the application of a rigid industrial colour bar. No one has ever suggested measuring the economic loss for which the disincentive of the colour bar is in itself responsible. Apartheid may be able to achieve this separation and to ignore this disincentive, but if it does it will be entitled to be ranked as a supernatural technique. If not it will richly deserve the adjective with which Mr. Louw berated his critics.

What then is likely to happen in South Africa? Prophecy is a very dangerous thing, but it would not be altogether surprising if the present government, while trumpeting a fanfare of oppression and discrimination to bolster its European political support (politicians in all countries have their careers to consider), discovers quite soon that its policy is unworkable, not only because of the facts enumerated above, but because of the active opposition of the natives themselves which is bound to increase and to become more skilful in enlisting the aid of world public opinion. Having discovered this, the present government will probably seek to cut the ground from under the feet of the opposition, and to disarm criticism abroad, by a degree of paternalism towards the natives which will be to the undoubted economic advantage both of the natives and of the country, and which will in any case be enforced on any European administration sooner or later by the overriding necessity to

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safeguard European health, by the requirements of economic efficiency, and by the force of liberal opinion in South Africa itself.

Professor Hancock has stated that in South Africa it is not the South Africans, but the situation which is abnormal. It is probably nearer the truth to say that both are abnormal but that they are closely correlated. It follows that the best line of attack on the racial problem in South Africa is on the abnormality of both the situation and the attitudes responsible for it. Above all there must be understanding, tolerance and patience.

It would seem reasonable to conclude that reason and logic are on the side of the Bantu rather than Dr. Malan—they are certainly not employed by his policy makers—and that the fundamental interests of European and Bantu in South Africa are convergent. If the concept of common wealfare can once be established it is not unlikely that mere economic self-interest will achieve what idealism and reason have so far failed to achieve.¹ This stimulus is likely to be particularly strong if the economy of the Union should be required to face a severe contraction of the gold-mining industry, though this is an unlikely eventuality provided that the economic policy makers of the United States government continue to prefer altruism to logic.

The attitude of the present government may very well be that of the Emperor Claudius who, on setting out to subdue the rebellious Queen Zenobia, informed the Senate that "whatever we do shall be sufficiently great." We are entitled to object to such an attitude, and it is correct that our objections should be persistent and vociferous, for every civilised European has a legitimate interest in what is happening in South Africa. But it is unwise and unconstructive to pretend that the mote in Dr. Malan's eye is big enough to build a bridge over the Iron Curtain.

It is easier, said Gibbon, to deplore the fate than to describe the actual condition of Corsica. The pessimist will apply this eloquent remark unreservedly to South Africa. The optimist however, will conclude that it is only by the most persistent and thorough attempts to describe the conditions in South Africa—both to South Africans and to those who think they can do better—that some future historian will be saved the Herculean and distressing task of describing the gradual elimination of European civilisation in South Africa. For it is only an awareness of these conditions that can lead to an awareness of their cause and cure.

¹ The Industrial Legislation Commission which sat in 1935 came to the pregnant conclusion that the choice for South Africa lay not between white prosperity and black prosperity, but between poverty and prosperity.

HUMAN RIGHTS

By B. A. WORTLEY

I.

AN old and valued friend asked me, the other day, whether the immense effort to formulate common principles in the shape of a code of human rights, was worth while; and he pointed out the immense divergencies of national traditions and practices which might be serious obstacles in the way of achieving such a common code. My friend's question is an important one: many serious people are asking it to-day; far too often have they seen draftsmen fall into the temptation to achieve a mere "*unité de façade*" when formulating a statement of principles. Politicians and draftsmen are so often tempted to risk concealing difficulties by agreeing on formulas which are deliberately vague and ambiguous. On the national plane, legislative draftsmen are often pressed to achieve a draft which will mollify the opponents of a government, and such pressure may sometimes lead to last minute changes and hasty and ill-thought out amendments in order to secure the passage of some fiercely debated bill. Such changes and amendments settle nothing. Litigation becomes inevitable: so does further legislation. On the international plane the position is even more difficult. After hotly contested debates in international assemblies draftsmen are also confronted with language difficulties, as well as by wide divergencies of drafting styles: there are, too, the vastly different psychological approaches to problems of international law and order which embarrass even the most well-intentioned draftsmen working with foreign colleagues on any international treaty or code.

Perhaps my friend's query may be put differently: can an international code of human rights be formulated, and if so, will its formulation be likely, in the end, to do more good than harm?¹

Obviously any attempt to formulate general principles will raise vital issues and reveal differences perhaps hitherto unsuspected between friendly nations. Should we let sleeping dogs lie? Is this desire for a code of human right merely a symptom of the desire of the modern mind to tidy up; to

¹ The question of enforcement measures lies outside the scope of this article and has not yet been fully gone into by the Human Rights Commission.

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streamline legal arrangements for the sake of an abstract theoretical ideal? These are legitimate questions and they demand an answer, for large quantities of essential resources in men and money are being used in the work of trying past violators of human rights, and in making charters, declarations and covenants of human rights to guard against violations in the future; considerable energy is being spent in discussing the nature of "genocide," an expression which, the Soviet Union representative has suggested, means, "the extermination of, or the attempted extermination of, racial, national or religious groups of human beings."

The facts are that large groups of mankind have recently endured unparalleled horrors in warfare and others have been submitted to unequalled persecutions at the hands of their own government, at the hands of the very body to which they would normally look for protection. The right of innocent human beings even to continue to live has been seriously put in doubt in many places, indeed the right of every human being to be considered innocent of crime, and to be considered as of "good character" in the absence of clearly proven evidence to the contrary, a right recognized by the common law of England, has too often been brushed aside in the interests of doctrinaire prejudices. It is therefore not perhaps strange that those who believe that the law exists to protect the innocent weak against the strong, even against a strong government, should be pressing for clear statements that all forms of oppression are not only *prima facie* wrong but also illegal, and that elementary human rights can and should be clearly and publicly enunciated. The idea that law exists to protect the innocent weak against the powerful, is as old as Aristotle; it is, as we shall see, at the basis of modern social legislation; it is at the root of all civil law; and it is the justification for all action under international law in respect of denial of justice; it explains the *temperamenta* or limitations of force in customary international law.

Against this traditional humanitarian view, is that held by the modern "Leviathanists," who hold that only certain special races, social classes, or religious adherents are entitled to the protection of the law, and that those who govern must on no account be resisted or criticized, and that there must be no limit to the manner in which war is waged, and that only the interests and lives of the self-elected elect should be sacrosanct.

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But if we admit that the Leviathanists are wrong, and that the humanists have right and justice on their side, the question still remains, is the formulation of human rights worth-while?

Recently, important documents embodying statements of human rights have been produced as a result of the setting up of the commission on Human Rights appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, under Article 62 of the U.N. Charter; the Economic and Social Council works under the direction of the General Assembly of the United Nations which is charged with the "initiation of studies and the making of recommendations on human rights," by Article 13 of the Charter.

The "United Kingdom Draft of an International Bill of Human Rights,"¹ was communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in June, 1947, for presentation to the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission has more recently (17th December, 1947) produced for presentation to the Human Rights Commission a draft International Covenant of Human Rights which closely resembles the British Draft Bill of Human Rights. This Covenant is intended to be the basis of a binding treaty. The Commission has also provided a draft *Declaration* of human rights which is not intended to be more than declaratory.² Does the production of these documents justify the labour and energy bestowed on them? We cannot set the documents out *in extenso* here, but we can consider them in relation to some of the fundamental propositions embodied in them.

We might ask, for example: Is it worthwhile declaring, as does Article 4 of the draft International Declaration on Human Rights, that "Every one has the right to life, to liberty and the security of person?"³ Is it any use covenanting, as proposed in Article 5 of the draft Covenant of Human Rights, which takes over Article 8 of the British Draft,⁴ that "it shall be unlawful to deprive any person of his life save in the execution of the sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law?"⁵ What, if anything, is the value of such affirmations? Whence comes this declared "right to life?"

¹ June 1947, H.M.S.O.

² Also on 17 Dec. 1947, Social Economic Council Supplement No. 1. Report of the Commission on Human Rights, Lake Success, New York, 1948. For convenience, in this article, examples are taken from the draft Declaration and Covenant in this document, though a later revision of the text of the declaration (hereinafter called the revised declaration) is to be found in print in 1948 U.N. Bulletin (Vol 5) p. 522-4.

³ Economic and Social Council Supplement No. 1, Report on Commission on Human Rights, p. 15, this becomes Article 3 in the revised declaration.

⁴ H. M. S. O. 1947, U.K. Draft of an International Bill of Human Rights.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 25.

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Is this right absolute? Can it be taken away? And, if so, for what reasons? If, on the ground of crime, for what crime?

Certainly a mere declaration which does not purport to set up machinery to secure the right to life can be of little value as a means of securing enforcement of the right to live. Such a declaration may have a normative effect like any other platitute; but will it have any effect upon those who consider that all rights derive solely from the state, are created by the state and cannot exist outside the state? The declaration that "everyone has a right to life," is a statement expressing something inherent in the nature of man, a right arising from the mere fact of man's creation or existence, or, in other words, in the eyes of Christians, and other Theists, it is a God-given right. Such, of course, is the traditional view of the Anglo-American Common law which, having got rid of serfdom and slavery, recognises and protects a right to life which can be claimed by anyone, and allows a free choice of that domicile upon which personal status depends. At Common law no man can be without a domicile and therefore no man can be without a personal status; the courts of Common law, moreover, refuse to recognize or enforce foreign penal or disabling statutes. For the courts of Common law protect rather than create rights.

States that are members of the United Nations already have international treaty obligations under the United Nations Charter, which include, in a general way "... promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (Article 1(3)). Similar clauses appear in the Treaties of Peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, who are not yet members of the United Nations. It should be recalled, however, that the domestic jurisdiction of a state will not be lightly interfered with. The Charter of the United Nations recognizes this when it provides that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State..." (Article 2(7)). Attempts upon life, freedom or property of foreigners depend on the ordinary international law remedies for "denial of justice," after the exhaustion of local remedies; though this conception of the "denial of justice" is not universally treated with the same respect; can it therefore be said that a non-binding declaration of rights would add anything to existing treaty obligations, or

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even do much to clarify the international law? A non-binding declaration would certainly not protect a man's right against his own state; a treaty might do so, however.

The draft covenant, produced by the working group under the chairmanship of Lord Dukeston, follows very closely, as we have said, the terms of the British Government Draft Bill, though whether such a covenant will be likely to attract the support of countries which have large minority groups is somewhat doubtful. The covenant, however, does aim at creating definite treaty obligations, that is, obligations to which presumably specific reference might be made in any allegation of a denial of justice to a foreigner, and a valid treaty on human rights giving a right of appeal to an international body might even be used to afford a man some protection against his own state. The draft covenant might well be accepted by the states of, say, the Western Union: it might conceivably provide the basis for a future written constitution of that body and probably also for the nations of the British Commonwealth which have to a considerable extent a common conception of the nature of man on which to build. Such a conception may well permit the building up of a common statement of legally protected constitutional rights, since the countries mentioned have certain common standards; but it is most unlikely that such a paper constitution could ever, by itself alone, be sufficiently dynamic to produce a common background where none previously existed. A constitutional document may express but can rarely create a common conception of the nature of man. A written constitutional document, or bill of rights, in practice requires a common conception of man to support it, otherwise the interpretation and enforcement of it tends to become a mere squabble about words, and encourages the worst sort of legalism, chicanery and quibbling. If there is no common view of man to begin with, those whose job it is to interpret an international bill of rights will tend to rely upon the dangerous maxim, *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, and a bill which starts as an attempt to state general principles may become a mere catalogue of rights, and, what is intended to be a statement of minimum rights may well, by literal interpretation, develop into a statement of maximum rights. Moreover, the drafting must be adequate to the task. We have already pointed out elsewhere,¹ for instance, that the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest (so embarrassing to tyrants, and yet the basic principle of

¹ 1 Camb. Journal, p. 587 at p. 601.

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the rule of law) is stated in Article 9(3) of the draft covenant (following Article 10(2) of the British Draft Bill) in terms which, as drafted, would not give as much protection to the individual as does the ordinary English law. For it cannot be too often insisted that English law carries its presumption of the good character of every man to the length of insisting that a man be told of the reason for being arrested *at the moment the arrest takes place*, as laid down recently by the House of Lords in *Leachinsky v. Christie*. The ordinary English law then, rightly goes further than would the British draft Bill, since the draft Bill would only require a man to be brought before a judge, *without delay*; the ordinary English law, too, goes further than the draft Covenant, which would only require a man to be informed "*promptly*" (Article 9(3)) of the charges against him.

There are grave dangers in too hasty enunciation of general rights. There would be even greater dangers in substituting general statements for the well-trying protection which already exists in England. The final form of any draft Covenant should at least come up to the standard set by the Common law.

II.

But this is not all. Let us return to Article 5 of the draft Covenant dealing with the right to life. Article 5 impliedly recognizes that the right to life is not absolute. This article, following the view expressed in most legal systems, recognizes that an innocent man's right to life is absolute, but that when a man ceases to be innocent his right to live may be taken away by the execution of the sentence of a court of law. Now is this the same thing as saying that a man's right to life is given by the state and is at the entire disposal of the state? The state by its judicial officers may take life away in certain circumstances when the life in being has ceased to be innocent of crime. But the state does not create life. We have not yet arrived at the condition where, as in Huxley's "*Brave New World*," the state determines who shall be born, and for what purpose. Nor is the state's right to dispose of life unlimited. The state may not lawfully take life away, says Article 5 of the draft Covenant, except after a "*conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.*" What does this mean?

It means first that the penalty of death must be provided by law at the time the crime is committed. The imposition of a death penalty *after* the commission of a crime by *ex post facto*

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legislation would not be in accordance with the spirit of the Article. Second, Article 5 means that innocent life is not to be taken.

But what test determines whether a person is innocent or guilty? At first sight the local law of each country will settle this question. That is, the law of each territorial state and, possibly, we may add, international law as applied by the state which punishes pirates and war criminals. But are there no limits to state power? Might not a state virtually destroy the right to life by creating numberless capital crimes and yet comply with the letter of Article 5? By making all crimes capital, from sheep-stealing to that most vague of all crimes, treason, the human right to life can be negated.

Clearly Article 5 is useless unless there is some common basis of consent about the meaning of guilt and innocence, unless it is agreed that human life is not to be lightly taken away, or on any pretext, but rather spared, protected and preserved where at all possible. It is on this assumption that public international law, as understood in the west, has attempted, where local remedies have failed, to provide for compensation where the courts or executive officers of a country have failed to come up to the general civilized standard. It is on this merciful assumption that law exists in society to protect innocent life, that the rules of international law regulating the treatment of prisoners, sick and wounded, and non-combatants, can alone be explained. It is on this ground, too, that all crimes against humanity, whether by the gassing of political opponents, or the working of them to death in quarries and mines, stand condemned. It was on this basis that Victoria, the Spanish founder of modern international law, condemned those Spaniards who would have put to death innocent American-Indian children, on the ground that to allow them to live would be to allow the opponents of future wars to be bred up. Humanity has always revolted against totalitarian doctrines which would destroy all who differ, or might possibly differ in the future, from the opinions of those in power.

Life may be taken when a man is proved to be guilty, not when he may be guilty at some undetermined future date. The strength of the modern Common law is that it presumes every man, of whatever race or class, to be innocent and of good character. And good character means of good moral character. And in the English-speaking world and in Western Europe this means good character as understood through centuries of the

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great Judæo-Christian tradition. This tradition is the strongest safeguard against the abuse of legislation by the multiplication of capital offences.

The taking of innocent life by a judge is judicial murder, the taking of such life without trial, even by a state officer, is also murder. It is murder by English law for an unauthorized person to kill a man who has been condemned to death. The basis of the English Common law is also the basis of the internal law of the civilized nations of Western Europe and America, as well as of the extradition treaties now existing between them. Nor does murder become legitimate by being done on a big scale for political reasons, as it was done in Nazi Germany. Even Goebbels in his diary referred to the murders of Jews and Poles in Eastern Europe as "pretty barbaric." Genocide is mass murder, it is against international law, whether allowed by a state law or not. And in this sense it is unlawful whether a declaration be made to that effect or not. The Nuremberg trials are now precedents, but even without Nuremberg, mass-killing, even of a state's own subjects may well threaten world peace and thus be a ground for forcible intervention by foreign states in the interests of humanity. It is a serious commentary on our contemporaries if this form of taking innocent life on a vast scale needs an international declaration to force the point home: in any case, like disease, the habit of murdering of innocents for political ends has a way of creating problems which transcend state boundaries and, if uncontrolled, may threaten world peace and thereby may justify intervention or reprisals: even war itself may be a lesser misfortune than the continued and widespread practice of political murder, or genocide.

III.

It may be urged, however, that even if one admits the value of stating the right to life, as a statement of a common moral background of the law, it is no use merely declaring the existence of the right to life if society does not take positive steps to see that life continues once it is started; for all life is innocent when it begins. Here we come to a grave criticism of the British draft Bill, and the draft Covenant. Neither document mentions the provision for the right to the means of living. The right of property is, it is true, mentioned in an indirect way. Article 8 of the draft Covenant and Article 9 of

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the British Bill forbid slavery, and Article 18 of the Covenant and Article 16 of the British Bill mention that the right of assembly is subject to restrictions "for the protection of life or property." But what is this right of property, over what does it extend? Is it vital in the literal sense of the word?

Now it is a fact that a man's physical nature can only go on existing if he daily exercises the ultimate right of property; that is, men can only live by destroying, by consuming physical things existing outside himself; food and sometimes fuel and shelter are "proper" to man's being.

A constitution or a treaty which enunciates the right to live in a society when that society does not assure the right to sufficient property to sustain the life of its members, is a sham. It is not enough to condemn slavery, or serfdom; a well-drawn covenant of human rights will specify affirmatively that a man has a right to own property and to social security. "Every person has a right to own property," reads Professor Cassin's suggestion in the draft Covenant of human rights.¹ The necessary corollary followed: "No person shall be deprived of his property except in the public interest and in return for just compensation." These suggestions do not appear in the draft Covenant. This is unfortunate, because the rule of law requires adequate recompense for property lawfully owned and lawfully taken away: *a fortiori* the law must compensate for any wrongful taking of property. Failure to provide compensation for any loss leads to the arbitrary exercise of power, and to discrimination as between different owners without any legal justification. Expropriation of an innocent owner without compensation is a common ground for diplomatic complaint, it is a wrong in international law: confiscation or expropriation may, of course, be legally justified when a man has been proved guilty of a crime incurring forfeiture, or more rarely, in the public interest for the common good, always to save innocent life. Even "bad character" does not itself affect the right to own property and to live: the commission of crime is something to be proved in detail: mere "bad reputation" is not enough to convict. Marx himself bitterly inveighed against the unfairness of the Enclosure Acts in England and thus protested against the unfair expropriation of the innocent.

The right of property like the right to life may, then, be lost by the unlawful conduct of its possessor; property may be

¹ E/CN/4/21, p. 55.

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subject to regulation in the common good, by way of taxation, rationing and the administration of the law. The French draft recognized this when it said: "The State may determine the property capable of private appropriation and regulate the acquisition and use of such property."¹ The omission of any reference to property is a serious omission from the draft Covenant. In this respect the draft Declaration of human rights is more satisfactory: it reads, "...no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."² In the writer's view it is also a serious omission in the draft Covenant to fail to include a statement that, "Every one has the right to social security." An article to this effect was suggested by the Human Rights Division of the United Nations' Secretariat,³ and appears in the Declaration.⁴ Its inclusion is more than ever desirable in the covenant in relation to states which have increasingly cut down the scope of right of private property by measures of socialization. To give the right to social security alone to the exclusion of the right of property would, in our view, be to pave the way to totalitarianism, to re-establish the possibility of recreating slavery by the arbitrary withdrawal of ration cards. The complex conditions of modern industrial life may require a delicate adjustment of the rights of property and social security, but, we submit, neither right can be omitted without grave danger to liberty in the present state of industrialized and populous societies.

To pay lip-service to the right to life and not to safeguard it by practical means is, we repeat, empty talk. A man without property and social security is far on the way to that slavery which any reasonable declaration of rights forbids.

But perhaps the quest for the physical means of life and shelter is ultimately the least of man's worries. Is it not possible that, with the increase in cheap power by atomic development, and with the increasing progress made by chemical synthesis, material needs will be easily supplied in the future, as Vergil Jordan has suggested in his "Manifesto for an Atomic Age"? Further industrial developments may well take place in the future which, as Jordan suggests, may make the taking away of German machinery look like the action of an old junk man. But industrial advancement is conditional upon the preservation of the peace, in this atomic age. Even the rights of states, are ultimately bundles of human rights, and the preserva-

¹ E/CN/4/21, p. 55.

² E/CN/4/21, p. 21.

³ Art. 13(2), Art. 15(3) in the revised declaration.

⁴ Art. 26, Art. 20 of the revised draft.

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tion of those rights by all peace-loving states is the essential problem of to-day. The destructive atomic cloud, the advances in bacteriological warfare, and the development of the long-range atomic rockets may well, if not controlled in the interest of human rights, prove the end of all civilized society, of all social security. The ultimate will to peace is a psychological factor, and if legal arrangements cannot put a high premium upon this will to peace, then our civilization may be doomed to destruction. The enunciation of human rights and their validation by 'peace-loving' nations, may yet prove to be the mainstay of our civilization. What is the 'air lift to Berlin' but a recognition of the elementary human rights of the ex-enemy population? And what is the demand for compensation in respect of the loss of lives and property in the Corfu Channel case if not a claim for the recognition of these rights?

Respect for human rights is at the very basis of the rule of law. And men like Thomas More, acclaimed by both the Catholic Church and Soviet Russia, have gone to the scaffold to establish the existence of human rights which limit the powers even of the most exalted sovereign. But the enunciation of these rights is no easy task and should not degenerate into finding the lowest common denominator but rather be directed to discovering the highest common factor in the legal systems of the world. The higher the view of man and his destiny, the nobler will be the enunciation of his rights, and, we trust, the more likely to achieve that peace which is the tranquility of order, and order enforced by objective law based on objective and not subjective conceptions of justice in a dynamic society.

Perhaps in the end real peace will indeed be attained in the world by concentrating on practical measures to secure individual human life and liberty, rather than on grandiose plans for dealing with nations as a whole? Time is short: in our view the enunciation of human rights should be attempted and should be accompanied by a determined attempt to enunciate some measure of uniform criminal law in order to check possible abuses of state power and state legislation: existing extradition treaties might well form foundations on which to build. The technical task of enunciating a uniform law is very difficult, as the writer knows from experience, but it is not impossible where there exists a considerable common moral and social background. Might not a start be made in the states of Western Europe and the British Commonwealth as a practical expression a spiritual unity?

THE SILENT REVOLUTION

By MAX K. ADLER, B.Sc. (Econ.), D.Sc. (Pol.), F.S.S.

A SILENT revolution has occurred in Great Britain and because it is silent not many people have understood yet its implications. This revolution can be defined in a few words: the rise of the working class; but it needs much more than that to explain its full impact on the social, cultural and economic life of the country.

The proof for such a revolution having occurred is hidden away in statistical tables which, just because they talk the language of figures have escaped the attention of the world of social science as much as that of business. Yet, to recognise its importance is vital to both of them.

What then are the facts? Money buys different things in the hands of different people and, therefore, the value of money will also vary according to its owner. The cost of living assumes a different aspect if we apply it to the various classes of the community, instead of the whole population.

COST OF LIVING OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL STRATA¹

	1938	June 1947	May 1948
Working Class† ...	100	161-2	174
Lower Middle Class ...	100	166-7	179
Clerical Employees ...	100	168	180
All Salaried Personnel ...	100	169-70	182
Upper Middle Class ...	100	185-6	198-9

† 1937-8 = 100

These figures convey two distinct impressions. The cost of living has risen since 1938 for all classes and it is still rising. But it has risen least for the working class, and the higher we go in the social hierarchy the more the cost of living has increased. There are several consumer currencies in this country: one for the working class with the greatest purchasing power, one for

¹ Adapted from Dudley Seers, *The Increase in the Middle-class Cost-of-Living*, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, Vol. 10, p. 257.

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the lower middle class whose money is worth less, and one for the upper middle class which has to pay much more for the goods and services customarily required than the other classes pay for their commodities.

We know that all these goods and services available to the home market are called the national income. If one class is able to receive more from that common pool, the others are bound to get less.

PRIVATE INCOME FROM WORK AND PROPERTY AFTER TAX.¹

	1938	1945	1946	1947
Wages ...	100	113	113	113
Salaries ...	100	92	96	83
Interest, Profits and Rent ...	100	92	89	97

The wage-earners' share of the national income has risen to a great extent since 1938, and the working class was able to defend its newly won position. The share of interest, profits and rent fell after the war, but has recovered of late, even if it is still smaller than in 1938. The main sufferers are the salary earners, the lower middle class, whose share on the national income is fast and steadily decreasing.

THE SHARE-OUT AFTER TAXES ON INCOME.²

	1938	1947
Wages ...	35	37
Salaries ...	22	16
Interest, profits, rent, etc. ...	34	30
Taxes paid to the Government ...	9	17

Total ... 100 100

¹ Adapted from Labour Research, May, 1948, p. 82.

² Adapted from the official booklet *Our Money*, H.M. Stationery Office, 1948, p. 10.

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The advance of the working class can be seen again here, and when we come to think of the fact that it comprises 80 to 85 per cent. of the whole population it can easily be understood that even a comparatively small advance increases its purchasing power by hundreds of millions of pounds.

Comparing this success with the decreasing share of the other classes, we feel entitled to speak of a revolution—a revolution not less violent in its impact on society because its path is not stained with blood.

The whole situation is admirably summed up in the sober words of the economist*: "Between 1938 and to-day, while total national income has remained roughly constant, the standard of living of the average working class family has risen by 10 per cent., and that of the pre-war 'submerged tenth' by considerably more. The standard of the average salary earner has fallen by about 20 per cent.; and the 4 per cent. who are the richest families in the country have experienced a cut of about one-third in their living standards."

These are the facts of the Silent Revolution. What about its cause and its consequences? We know from the experience of two world wars that one effect, for victors and vanquished alike, is an increased social and economic status of the lowest class of society. In some countries, revolutions have occurred, so obvious and striking, that no one could overlook them. In Great Britain and elsewhere they also happened, but less visible because without the shadow of violence. Whatever the means the result was the same. In this country, the Labour Government—the direct result of the Silent Revolution—has kept faith with those by whom it was elected. There is hardly any measure, taken for whatever reason, that does not strengthen the working class relatively to the other classes.

It is a matter of opinion whether this development is welcomed by the individual or not. A man's political views will be largely, but not exclusively, influenced by his own social position, and by the way the changes have affected him. Some of us will yearn for the good old days when a gentleman was a gentleman, and the others knew their place. Another body of opinion will appreciate the change as an advance of the common man and will consider the Silent Revolution as a step towards a more equitable society. However we react towards the undisputed events, all of us should be clear what they mean to the

* Mark Abrams, *British Standards of Living*, Current Affairs, No. 63, p. 13.

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individual's relative standing in society, and to society as a whole and living body.

A revolution, especially a silent one, takes more than one day to accomplish its work. The process may be put in motion suddenly, as when there is a complete change of government caused by a general election. But it takes many years to fulfil its destiny. While the revolution progresses towards its goal the facts forming its basis are changing themselves. At the beginning of its march the aim seems clear, but on its way it is exposed to wind and weather; society aches while it is transformed.

Thus, we see in the realm of civilisation happenings which when unrelated to each other and to their cause, cannot be explained at all, or only superficially. Have we not experienced in the last decade a tremendous rise in the appreciation of serious music and of the arts generally? Is it not true that, at the same time, the less desirable amusements have become the largest industries in the country, like dog-racing and betting? We can explain these facts independently of each other by the wish of some people to escape from the harsh realities of the war and post-war period on the one side, and by the urge for excitement, caused by the over-heated atmosphere of our time, on the other. These are explanations with which the easily satisfied observer of events may rest content. But do they tell the whole story? Is it not so that the educated middle classes, having lost that part of their income which they used for the preservation of their status, have been turning to activities which are cheap in the monetary meaning of the word and, therefore, within reach of their pockets? And do they not use this recently acquired taste to draw again a dividing line between themselves and the working class?

This latter, on the other hand, finds itself now in a position in which it never was before during its whole development. The Silent Revolution has put more purchasing power into the hands of a large part of the workers than ever before. For the first time an appreciable number of them can play with more money than they need to keep body and soul together. Having been undereducated, they use this surplus in a way which may meet with the opposition of many well-meaning people, which, however, fulfils their wishes and their tastes: more dogs, more pools, more beer, and more cigarettes.

Thus it seems that the Silent Revolution has deepened the rift between the working class and the middle classes at least

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on the cultural level. But again it would be unwise to jump too quickly to such a conclusion. For it is part of that very revolution that the working class will be better educated; and everything that has been done since the war in the field of education points towards a comparatively quick advance. More and more working class people will be given the mental tools of discovering the spiritual inheritance of the nation and of mankind. Many of them exchange already beer for books, and dogs for concerts. Thus, the defence of the middle class status in the field of culture is being undermined all the time. Where it seemed that the gap widened, it is in reality taken in storm by the élite of the working class. This élite is small, as an élite always will be. But it is already large enough to turn from time to time the Haringay Arena from a boxing ring, or dog racing place, into a concert hall. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the lesser amusements will yield to the cultural activities of the time. While the upper part of the working class grows into the middle class habit of appreciating cultural values, the Silent Revolution enables ever growing numbers in the lower strata of the working class to have that surplus money in their pockets with which they will, for a long time to come, support and patronise anything that promises change and amusement after the day's work is done.

There are no individuals and no classes which will abandon their social position if they can help it. On the contrary, they will do everything to strengthen their position and to make it a stepping-stone to further advance. What they have gained in the economic sphere, they will want to support by attacking the very foundations of society. The working class wants to translate its economic gains into political power.

This power had been so far in the hands of the middle classes. The Silent Revolution deprived them in one stroke of the most important part of it that can be found in a democracy: the parliamentary majority. Having been given this powerful weapon, the working class began at once to use it for the pursuit of its economic interests; with the result that was statistically described above. But its spokesmen at least know very well that the new achievements in the economic field will be lasting only when they can entrench themselves in society itself. It is extremely surprising that the Labour Government has never disclosed the most important motive for its policy of nationalisation. All the reasons given are debatable

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and have their pros and cons. The actions of the parties in parliament and in the press, show that the problem of power has not been at all in the mouths of the protagonists on both sides though it certainly must have been in their minds. It also may be that both the Government and the Opposition do not want to be too outspoken on this matter of nationalisation in order not to alienate that part of the lower middle classes on whose support the Government depends for its continuous existence, and by whose votes the Opposition hopes to win the next election. However, we are here only concerned with the consequences of the Silent Revolution and with the efforts that are being made to keep its economic advantages for the working class. Nationalisation is only the social expression of these economic facts, but it is the most important one. For nationalisation means not only more power for the one class, but less for the others. It is this very shifting of power which must be—implicitly or explicitly—behind the policy of nationalisation.

The ownership of industry is not only a means of making profits, if in private hands. It is also a very great source of power and he, who has that social power, is able to transfer it to the economic field as well. The working class, in its endeavour to keep what economic advantages the Silent Revolution has given to it and, if possible, to increase them, must become master over the most important industries. If it cannot get into this position the very real danger arises of not only losing what has been gained, but more.

The Silent Revolution has also introduced completely new factors into the home market of great and increasing importance to trade and industry. If the upper and lower middle classes cannot spend as much as they could before, obviously that part of industry which catered for the needs of these classes will have to reorganise their business. On the other hand, the increased purchasing power of the working class will provide for a much larger market than ever before. Quite generally stated, a contraction of the luxury industries will be compensated by an expansion of the mass production industries.

This generalisation is, however, only partly true. It is not feasible to speak of the population in its capacity as a consumer in terms of three classes only. While there is much more conformity of consumer habits at the top of society—though the individual belonging to it may pick and choose very carefully before spending his money—the same is certainly not true of

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the huge majority of the population which we called the working class. From a sociological point of view this class consists of many layers: from the unskilled labourer and old-age pensioner to the working class "aristocracy." Each of these groups has a different purchasing power, and also spends its income on different goods and services. But taken together their importance for industry catering for the home market cannot be overrated.

The general rise of the economic status of the working class has made its large lowest stratum into important consumers for the first time in history. The "submerged tenth" which was discussed above does not exist any more; or, to modify this statement, it exists, but it is not submerged any longer. It has become an effective buyer in the home market, and its needs will be the same as those who were working class consumers before the Silent Revolution. Although the individuals of which that market consists have changed, the market itself has greatly expanded. For it should not be forgotten that the general rise in the working class income has not taken place in the case of every individual, and a great many people are just as well or badly off as they were before. These people increase the working class market described above. Their number cannot be stated in exact figures. But it should prove a conservative estimate when we assess it to be one third of the population including the formerly "submerged tenth."

The other part of the working class consumers is certainly not a uniform group. The Silent Revolution has, among other things, created consumer groups which existed before potentially only, but not effectively. The highest stratum of the working class always aspired a middle class life; now it has the power of doing so, and there is no doubt that it will considerably widen the lower middle class market already existing.

In addition, completely new demands on industry are coming now from quarters which formerly had no or only very little purchasing power. One very important group is the adolescents who, having no family responsibilities, spend their money in their own way. They know exactly what they want, and the sooner industry realises the potentialities of this "teen-age" market, the better for all parties concerned. The same is true of what could be called the "baby" market, a still largely unexplored field. Many mothers who spent much of

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their time in make do and mend, can spend their money now on the youngest among the rising generation. Although the number of babies born will become smaller, the market catering for them will increase in size and, at the same time, the demand for quality will grow to an even greater extent.

The lower middle class market will not become smaller because of the restricted purchasing power of that group of people, for we have seen that a certain proportion of the working class will buy in that market. Yet, it is to be expected that quality will have to be lowered and quantity increased. So much so that it will sometimes be difficult to define the boundary between the lower middle class and the working class markets.

The real victim of the Silent Revolution in its consumer aspect is the upper middle class. Not only is the purchasing power of that group greatly diminished, but large numbers of upper middle class people are becoming lower middle class, much as they struggle to keep their status. The market for high quality goods can, therefore, be expected to be restricted more and more. The smaller it becomes, the more expensive will the goods produced for it be; and the less people will be able to buy them. Thus, a vicious circle is set in motion restricting that market even more.

Has the Silent Revolution come to stay? He would be a rash prophet who would make predictions in this respect. The stability, or otherwise, of the new social and economic system which the Silent Revolution introduced depends on a great variety of factors. History has known cases when a revolution was succeeded by a counter-revolution which restored the status quo and, moreover, strengthened the forces of the participating classes. But this need not happen. If the working class can entrench itself successfully by way of the nationalisation of the key industries, and if their organised cadres are not split by dissent and schisms, then there is not much doubt that the new social order has come to stay. On the other hand, if the middle classes, having so far refused to be organised and to use trade union pressure group methods, should recognise their economic and social downfall, and draw from this knowledge political conclusions, then the working class organisations will be weakened to the same extent as the middle classes grow stronger. That in this case a struggle will ensue, there cannot be any doubt. But what the result of that struggle will be, lies unknown in the pages of future history.

CENTRAL ADVISORY COUNCILS FOR EDUCATION¹

By SIR FRED CLARKE

PARTS I and V of the Education Act of 1944 have now been in operation for rather more than four years, and Parts II and IV since April 1st, 1945. Part I, coming into operation at once upon the passing of the Act, deals with central administration. In clause 4 of that Part, provision is made for the setting up of two Central Advisory Councils for Education, one for England and one for Wales. Both were duly constituted by the Minister and commenced work early in 1945.

So much has happened since then, some of it not anticipated, that it is probably still too early to attempt any firm estimate of the value of these two bodies, or even to indicate precisely what functions are open to them which they can discharge more effectively than any one of the more specialized bodies now in existence. Here, as in so many other respects, concerned as we are, on the one hand with a statute so rich in possibilities, and on the other hand with a future still so problematic, it is well to keep our minds fluid. Facing such a prospect, we should be ill-advised to talk as though we had already all the answers long before the relevant experience has had time to have its effect upon us.

Nevertheless, after nearly four years, it may be well to pause and take a few bearings in face of a situation which, in some important respects, may be rather different from that contemplated by Parliament when the Act was passed. It is the purpose of this article to attempt a few such bearings.

The main provisions of clause 4 are, that there should be set up two Central Advisory Councils for Education, one for England, and one for Wales and Monmouthshire, whose duty it would be "To advise the Minister upon such matters connected with educational theory and practice as they think fit, and upon any questions referred to them by him"; that the Minister should appoint the members, the Chairman, and an officer of the Ministry to be secretary; that "each Council shall include persons who have had experience of the statutory system of public education as well as persons who have had

¹ It may be proper to observe that, in this article, the author speaks only for himself and is alone responsible for what the article contains.

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experience of educational institutions not forming part of that system"; and that the Minister should make regulations concerning such matters as terms of office, procedure and the like.

Debates on this clause were lively and marked by deep and genuine concern. A study of them leaves one in little doubt of the considered intentions of Parliament. What is still to be determined is the extent to which the Councils can actually give effect to Parliament's intentions and the form in which this can be done. There are factors in the situation now which were little in the mind of Parliament at the time, and to these the Councils have necessarily to give a good deal of anxious consideration.

One thing, however, is quite clear; the Councils are to enjoy a greater degree of independence than was the lot of their predecessor, the Consultative Committee which was set up under the Board of Education Act of 1899. The simple phrase, "as they think fit," makes that quite plain. And there is every reason to believe that the Ministry itself shows scrupulous respect for this independence.

The reason for such a change, as will be suggested in a moment, may be not unconnected with the whole scope and purpose of the 1944 Act itself.

Not much debate took place upon the time-honoured proposal that the Councils should have executive as well as advisory functions. There was general agreement that the responsibility of the Minister should not be encroached upon. Debate centred rather upon the question of the *scope* of the commission that should be entrusted to the Councils. The limiting words of the Act itself are "matters connected with educational theory and practice". An attempt to substitute for these the one word "education" was argued down on the ground that it made the commission too wide, and, more specifically, that the Councils were to be concerned with what actually went on in schools and other educational institutions. That is, with matters of educational content and method. It was made clear, however, that the Councils would not be precluded from considering matters of administration if, in the course of any enquiry, it was found to have administrative implications.

All this being agreed, the composition of the Councils became a matter of importance. The debate upon this revealed a strong disposition to urge that the Councils should not be

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composed wholly or even predominantly of people engaged professionally in education. Indeed, one amendment was debated which stipulated that not more than one half of the members should consist of such persons. Strong pleas were also put forward for representation of such special interests as those of technical, rural and adult education.

The only stipulation to appear in the Act is that already quoted, requiring the Minister to include in his appointments both persons who have had experience of the statutory system of public education and persons with other kinds of educational experience. This is to be construed, however, as a safeguard against the complete exclusion of the professionals rather than as making the Councils bodies of "educational experts." The difference of conception from that which governed the composition of the former Consultative Committee will not pass unnoticed.

There can be little doubt what the intention of Parliament was. It was to set up bodies which, while containing a sufficient number of members who were professionally experienced in education, should nevertheless be regarded as representative of the national interest in education both as a whole and in respect of specific departments of it. Words used in the debate by Mr. R. A. Butler, then President of the Board, are emphatic on the point. He said: "We want the representatives on the Councils to be practical people who can make the bridge between the world I have described and education. One object is to avoid education being an isolated compartment in our national life. For too long has education been so regarded by the people of our country generally. I want the country to feel that education is being brought into touch with all that is best and vital in the country's life. If I were to be responsible for choosing members I should see that they should have sufficiency of good working life before them—and not all of it behind them, and should have experience of the different aspects of life to which I have referred."

It may be thought a little over-sanguine to hope for all this as the result of the setting up of two Advisory Councils. But there can be no doubt of the intention. They were to be broadly representative bodies, with a considerable element of non-professionals, which, as bodies, both learnt and taught. They would learn to understand the aims and the possibilities of the scheme of national education as set out in the Act, would

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watch over its development and would take the best evidence they could get towards plans for its further improvement. Then, in the form of advice to the Minister, they would announce to the country their conclusions and so help to create a well-informed public opinion, not so much on this or that technical detail as on the whole scope and progress of the national effort.

If this is so, certain conclusions follow concerning not only the composition of the Councils, but also their procedure and the form in which they should deliver their findings. If each is just a representative group of citizens, in effect if not in form addressing the general public, it is plain that the precedent of the Consultative Committee hardly applies. That Parliament was fully aware of this is abundantly clear from the debates. The whole tone is that of men who knew they were making a new departure—not just recreating the old Consultative Committee in a modified form. And the reason for this new departure was quite obviously the nature of the Act itself, at long last a fully thought-out and comprehensive plan of national education.

The work of the Consultative Committee was finished: one might almost say more than finished. For Parliament was now prepared to do much more than that Committee had ever dared to ask. It had been through long years of painstaking and very fruitful labours, and in the later years was very obviously straining at the leash, aware that the really desirable things could not be achieved without far-reaching new legislation. If the full extent of the national need was at last understood, a large share of the credit must go to the Consultative Committee.

But never at any time did it venture to ask anything like as much as the Act has now conceded. The legislative edifice is now built, and the objects for which the Consultative Committee strove are fulfilled in so far as legislation can fulfil them. It would be well if this were more generally understood than it appears to be.

A new kind of instrument for another kind of purpose has therefore to be designed. In shaping it Parliament would seem to have avoided any tendency to be over-rigid in its prescriptions. Apart from the one limitation to "matters connected with educational theory and practice" a wide margin is left for adaptation and experiment. How will these work out?

By way of answer it may be repeated here that no firm estimate can fairly be attempted yet. For example, in their very

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composition the Councils are frankly experimental. It is not easy to find a precedent for advisory bodies attached to a central Ministry composed partly of professionals and partly of those whom we may call, we hope without offence, "interested amateurs." Moreover the whole situation created by the Act is so novel, so penetrated by implications that are at variance with some elements of tradition, that even among professionals one can find those who have difficulty in assimilating its pre-suppositions. So not only have the members of the Councils to shake down into an efficient team, working in full mutual understanding, they have also to accept and absorb the principles of the new order, recognize the practical implications, and reach some agreed standpoint from which they can approach their task. All this must take time: a new tradition is not built in a few days.

Again, in any excursions the Councils may undertake they have to avoid encroaching unduly upon ground that is already fully occupied. The Ministry, the local authorities and the various governing bodies are already well-established in their respective functions. Though the Councils are free to offer advice concerning any of these, they will take care not to seem to interfere. They are no busybodies.

Moreover the Minister retains and exercises freely the power to set up councils, committees, working-parties and other bodies to advise him on all sorts of specific matters. Nor is this all, there are also a number of voluntary and semi-official bodies that are directly concerned with the schools. Such are the School Broadcasting Council, and the National Foundations for Educational Research, for Adult Education, and for Visual Aids respectively. What is to be the relation of the Councils to this rich growth already on the ground and to more that may be coming?

In some quarters a comprehensive simplification is suggested. It is proposed that our Advisory Council should be an *ad omnia* kind of body to which the Minister refers any and every kind of matter, even technical matters, upon which he seeks advice. But such a proceeding would be quite out of harmony with what appears to have been Parliament's intention. It would place an impossible load of work upon the shoulders of men and women already busy enough with their own affairs, leaving no time for any quiet thought. Moreover, the Councils as now composed are not designed to discharge such duties. If they

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were called upon to do so, it would be necessary to reinforce them with so great a number of technical experts that they would swell to the magnitude of a U.N.O. Assembly and their primary function would disappear.

Another suggestion is that the Councils should formulate a national philosophy of education. Now it is true that, amid so much preoccupation with machinery we are apt to be lacking in sense of direction. The Councils have a clear duty here. But the terms in which we define it are all-important. If it means that the Councils are to evolve a philosophy of their own from their collective consciousness and then strive to "put it across," the risks are obvious enough. The country would hardly stand for that. If it means that each Council should survey the variety of beliefs, ideals and principles which operate as sanctions for conduct among Englishmen and Welshmen (and so may serve as a basis for a philosophy of education) and then set itself to achieve an agreed formulation which covers them all, then it must be answered that the Council for England has already tried to do this very thing, and has confessed failure.

Yet that bodies so constituted and so charged are deeply concerned with the philosophy of education is beyond all doubt. What, then, should they do? May not their surest and safest course be to watch closely the *practical* working-out of the Act, and derive pointers as to direction from that?

Instead of evolving aims and objectives from their own consciousness they will be watching the artists and craftsmen at work and then setting themselves to formulate in communicable terms and to illustrate by examples, the conceptions by which good practice is inspired.

Shelley told us that the poetry of Rome lived in its institutions. In much the same way the philosophy of English education lives in its best practice. It is there already, only needing now, as never before, to be isolated and articulated, and so made available for general communication. Pursuing a continuous watching-brief in this way, the Councils will be led into important and fruitful fields which no other body is occupying in quite the same way. For example, though we are hearing much to-day about secondary education, it is also true that the position and the possibilities of primary education have been profoundly changed as a result of the Act. The Councils may therefore find themselves revising that very valuable report on the primary school which the Consultative Committee produced some years

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ago. The primary school of those days differs from the primary school of to-day.

Doubtless in all their work the Councils will keep steadily in view what is central in the Act, namely the child himself and his interests. The life of the child to-day is impinged upon by so many agencies, official, semi-official, unofficial, and informal, that there is great need for a group of experienced and sympathetic people, enjoying some detachment and independence, to sit and contemplate him in himself in the midst of it all. For the agencies may pull in different directions, and not all are disinterested.

To preserve the balance and unity of child life and growth amid so many crowding impressions and so many conflicting pulls and pressures is no small task. The Councils will perform a supremely valuable service if they can shed some light on the problem of how this is to be done.

A PROBLEM IN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

By MARJORIE NICHOLSON

GOVERNING subject peoples has never been an easy task for any imperial power. There are, however, some problems of colonial administration to which much time and thought have been given, and to which fairly obvious answers can be found. Are the people backward? Then they must be given education. Are they poor? then develop their resources. Are they diseased? Then build hospitals, train doctors, drain swamps, send out travelling dispensaries. Even if such answers are difficult to translate into action, at least there is no doubt that they are the right ones, and that if money, resources, and personnel can be found, the lot of the subject people can be greatly improved. But there are other questions to which it is not so easy to provide a solution. Are they confident, or has their initiative been sapped? Are they frustrated? Do they clamour for political rights? Are they capable of governing themselves? To these Britain has gradually evolved a reply over the last two hundred years: "They may not be capable

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now, but one after another these peoples will emerge into the status of self-governing Dominions; when they reach that stage, they may leave or stay within the British Commonwealth as they choose; in the meanwhile, they and we must work together to prepare for that day."

This is by no means a simple answer, and there is no evidence that very much thought is being devoted to one of the major complications involved in it. It is an answer that can readily be given where a single people is developing its nationhood, but what happens when the territory concerned is populated by different communities, with different traditions, speaking different languages, living at economic levels separated by the gulf between the primitive and the civilised?

The difficulty is not new. Britain met it in Canada, in New Zealand, in Ireland, Burma, Ceylon, India, and Palestine. What is new is the tempo of the age in which it has to be solved. The conditions in the Colonies which have yet to achieve self-government are not as easy as they were in Canada, where the settlement between the French and British communities, imperfect though some of them may think it, was arrived at in a period of continental expansion. They are not even as easy as they were in India, where there were no recent immigrants and the members of the different communities had been, willy nilly, subjected to the same overall cultural influences for generations, and to the British *raj* for a hundred and fifty years. The people of the Colonies in which the problem now presents itself are more deeply divided than were the religious communities in India—there was nothing there comparable to the gap between the Masai and the Englishman in Kenya, or between the Chinese and the Dyak in Sarawak, and in India a non-communal national movement had been built up over a period of time and under a superb leadership which find no parallel elsewhere in the British Empire. Such a movement *might* grow in Kenya in sixty years, but sixty years are no longer available: the full light of international criticism, often much harsher than the situation warrants, is cast on the Empire in the weary and abortive but much-publicised debates of the United Nations; the shadow of South Africa lengthens over its neighbours; worst of all, Britain is no longer regarded as the epitome of liberal progress and power, but is recognised as a struggling exponent of social democracy in a world in which a more extreme form of socialism holds for coloured people all the attractions of a doctrine of racial equality.

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Neither in Asia nor in Africa, then, can Britain evolve a policy free of entanglements.

The position in Africa is made the most pressing because of prevailing conditions in the south, where Dr. Malan is busy implementing the policy of *apartheid* on which he won the recent general election. The practical meaning of *apartheid* was explained by the Prime Minister in the Union House of Assembly on September 2, 1948:—

“ . . . there must be two spheres in the country, call them that, different areas where the Europeans and the non-Europeans must be separated from each other. Social: for example, on the trains. Political: so that Europeans and non-Europeans will not sit here together in the same Assembly, because if you permit that and the colour bar is taken away there, where can it be upheld lower down? Nowhere. Then residential, but residential separation that is effective, not such as the previous Government tried to apply, that is only scratching on the surface of the whole problem. And industrially, so far as it is practicable.”

As Dr. Malan expounds his policy, he does not imply complete suppression of the non-Europeans—they are to be excluded from the Union Parliament, but to have their own representative institutions; they are to be excluded from European residential areas, but to have their own Reserves in the country and their own locations in the towns. But to the African, segregation in fact does mean suppression, for the spheres of influence reserved for the European are the ones that give power: he is not to be a slave, but is to occupy an inferior position even more galling than slavery, for it is to be held in sight of privilege and despite the possibility of equality.

It is no wonder that South African policy, as it stands, should overshadow the whole continent. The gloom is deepened by the absence in South Africa of any party, except the numerically insignificant Communist Party, whose programme does meet African aspirations to equality. General Smuts and Mr. Hofmeyr are the alternative to Dr. Malan, but their theory is almost equally unacceptable—that political advance shall proceed concurrently with the advance of the non-Europeans towards “civilisation.” Africans may see a gleam of hope here, but to Indians such a policy is insulting as well as unpromising. The full impact of South African “native policy” on the non-Europeans can only be grasped, therefore, if it is realised that to non-Europeans practically all Europeans appear the same. “We go forward with hate in our hearts,” said a Cape Town Coloured

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leader recently. And the hate spreads far northwards into the Rhodesias, and engulfs “liberal” as well as fascist Europeans.

This is the point at which South African conditions have a bearing on British policy. The Union is the only British Dominion in the continent, the one area in which the demand of the Europeans for self-government was granted. But if the Europeans in the Colonies have their way, they will not be far behind. Southern Rhodesia already has internal responsibility, with the safeguard of the British power to veto discriminatory legislation. This power has been demonstrated to be useless during the last three years. If Britain considered that it was too late in the day in 1945 to disallow the Land Apportionment Amendment Act, and too late in 1946 to veto the Urban Areas Act which enforced segregation in the towns, will the power of disallowance be used if Southern Rhodesia pursues the declared policy of its “liberal” Prime Minister to remove Africans from the common voters’ roll and give them instead representation in their own separate assembly? Southern Rhodesia has “got away with it,” the Africans think. Will it be followed by Northern Rhodesia, and later by Kenya? Can and will the British Government resist the claims of the European minorities in these countries until the Africans are able to share in self-government on an equal basis?

The question is not an academic one, for the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia have already demanded responsible government. The Colonial Office rejected the demand this year: when the Europeans in the legislature sent a deputation to press their demand, the local Government sent delegates also from the African Representative Council. Responsible government and amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia were rejected; two Africans, it was agreed, should sit in the legislature and the door was to be kept open for African representation in the Executive Council, but the European unofficials are to have much greater control over the executive, and *federation* with Southern Rhodesia is still regarded by them as a possibility.

The Colonial Office has similarly cut the ground from under its own feet in Kenya. Here also an unofficial majority in the legislature has been granted, and local Europeans have been associated with the work of the Executive Council so closely as to occupy almost the status of ministers. It is true that the composition of the Legislative Council has been altered to deprive the elected Europeans of their previous majority on the

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unofficial side: this now consists of eleven Europeans, four Africans, five Indians, and two Arabs. There remains the official bloc, entirely European. If the Kenya Government is prepared to cast the official vote on the side of the Africans, their position can still be protected. But is it?

In Kenya the Colonial Office faces its most delicate task. Here there is a total population* of nearly 4 million, of which 3,852,000 are Africans. Of the non-Africans, the Indians form the largest group with a population of nearly 74,000; there are over 24,000 Arabs; and over 23,000 Europeans. The Europeans have hitherto dominated Kenya's political life, and they are in possession of their own "reserve" of good farming land in the "white" highlands. While some of them have shown some sympathy with African aspirations, there appears to be none who envisages ultimate equality. Indeed, when the formation of an inter-territorial organisation for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika was under discussion, they were loud in their protest against the original Colonial Office Paper No. 191, which provided for parity of representation as between the races in the Central Assembly. Their protests were effective, for a subsequent Paper, No. 210, reduced the proportion of Assembly seats to which the principle of parity was to apply. Nor is there any reason to think that they will react differently from the Europeans in the Union or the Rhodesias when African advance is accelerated. Everything goes to show that as the Africans gain education and political consciousness, racial relations become more difficult, not less. A humanitarian outlook may be feasible while Africans are primitive, but the ultimate claim to equality means literally the engulfing of the Europeans. When that claim is pressed, Europeans elsewhere have become hysterical. Similarly, in Kenya, any suggestion that Africans from the eroded Reserves should be settled, under supervision, on even the uncultivated portions of the "white" highlands produces a hysterical reaction which bodes ill for the future. It is clear that the Colonial Office cannot hope to solve the problem ultimately by persuading the Europeans to accept African advance by stages. In this context, the inevitability of gradualness is unlikely to lead to the logical conclusion—it will lead to greater intransigence as the goal of African equality draws nearer.

Is there anything, then, that can be done? One possibility is a complete reorientation towards a long-term policy of

* Estimated, December, 1944. *Colonial Office List*, 1946.

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integrating the communities. It can be carried out only by using the official vote, and by relying on the support of the non-Europeans, instead of being frightened of the settlers. It will involve very great risks, but no risk so great as the alternative of allowing Kenya to drift into race hatred and consequent anarchy. Such a policy might proceed as follows:

The Kenya officials must be compelled to act in such a way that their impartiality as between the communities is obvious. At present, they naturally tend to mix socially largely with white settlers: they are members of the same clubs, their children attend the European schools or are sent home to England; worst of all, some of them intend to retire to Kenya, and safeguard their future by buying themselves residential plots or even farms while they are still officials. This last practice should be totally forbidden, not only because it identifies the officials with the settlers in the African mind, but also because it bedevils the civil service controversy. The pay of European officials is held to contain an element of expatriation pay, although the salary is not formally divided. Can an official be reasonably held to be "expatriated" if he has his wife and children living with him in a country to which he intends to retire? No Indian and no African believes that he can. Similarly, no Indian and no African can understand why a European recruited from Kenya should be paid the same salary as the expatriate officer, although Africans and Indians must take less. In other words, there is an element of prevarication about the whole civil service position which must be eliminated if non-Europeans are to have full confidence in the administration.

Secondly, segregation in education should not be countenanced by the Government. Nobody can stop the European and Indian communities running separate schools for their own children, but if this is what they want, they should pay for them entirely themselves. Except in the towns, it is unlikely that children of the different communities would come together in school on any large scale, and there are obvious educational reasons why it might be undesirable to try to teach them together in the primary stages. But at the secondary stage, when the non-Europeans have learnt English, there is no reason why common education should be regarded as impossible. The Kenya Government already pays grants-in-aid to European and Indian schools which have better buildings, better staff, and equipment better in every way than that provided for the

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Africans. The alternative would be to pay grants per head of the school population, without regard to race, and to prevent any school in receipt of Government aid from excluding any qualified student on grounds of race alone.

The Africans are thirsting for education, which they naturally regard as the key to equal treatment. They have a burning sense of injustice when they see the European children's schools and compare them with the Government's Development Programme which offers *half* of their children primary education *within ten years*, even in Nairobi. The Indians have the same sense of grievance, though to a lesser degree. It is true that much more Government expenditure is scheduled for African than for European education, but it is also true that the plan lays down that Africans, in the rural areas anyway, will build their own schools, and their children will pay fees. These contributions seem to be generally forgotten in the sordid controversies which take place from time to time as to how much Africans contribute to the general fund of taxation, and how this sum compares with the contributions of Europeans and the expenditure on both communities.

The only way in which the communities can hope to come together in the future is through the common education of their children. Bearing in mind the risk of provincialism to which all small settler communities are prone, it is obvious that an attempt to build a cultural pattern including all races in Kenya would be positively beneficial to the Europeans. Even if this is not seen, the Government should at least undertake the task of removing from the education system of the Colony the crying scandal of the present injustice. Without spending a penny more than the sum already allocated for the purpose of raising the standard of Makerere College in Uganda—which is ultimately to become the University of East Africa—the three East African Governments could ensure that representatives of all races sit on its governing body, and that its doors are open equally to African, Indian, Arab, and European students. Already the Kenya Europeans are finding it difficult to pay for their children to have the customary English university education: the time will come when they will be only too pleased to give them university training at home. A start should be made with Makerere College straight away, so that it may develop into a genuine cultural centre for the whole people of East Africa.

An even more urgent question in Kenya is that of land

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Every "race" difficulty is exacerbated by increasing African pressure on the land that has been set aside for them. African methods of agriculture are considered to be backward—they work with primitive implements without knowledge of such necessary innovations as contour farming and crop rotation, and they have the primitive man's common objection to killing their cattle, whether of good stock or bad. There is therefore some justification for the European settler's view that to allow Africans to settle on the "white" highlands would merely be handing over more land to destruction, but this is not the main reason why such settlement is refused. There are at present in operation several major Government schemes for assistance to African farmers, both in demonstrations of improved methods and in re-settlement of people living in eroded areas. The whole psychological approach of the Africans to these schemes would be altered overnight if any group were permanently settled on land reserved for European occupation. The re-settled group would require constant supervision over a period of years, but so it would if resettled on poorer land within the African Reserves; if settled on good land, the people would see better results for their changed methods than if settled on land little better than that from which they had been removed; if given an assurance that the land was to be theirs and that they would not be moved again, they would be likely to work with greater enthusiasm than they now show. All these arguments are swept aside in the general fear of the settlers that the highlands also will become "black" if once the thin end of the wedge is inserted. This attitude cannot be justified and should not be recognised, even implicitly, by the Government. As long as it is accepted, there will be no hope of obtaining African co-operation.

To establish confidence, the Government should also take steps to introduce an element of security into the lives of the African "squatters" on European farms. These farm-workers live on their employers' land, but are normally allowed to keep cattle for themselves and perhaps to grow some crops. Until recently, many of them had assumed that they had security of tenure—now they are being asked to reduce the number of their cattle and to make agreements including conditions which deprive them of what they had considered to be their customary rights. No doubt it is economically necessary to regularise their position as farm employees, but the implementation of the Government's programme, declared over three years ago, of

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establishing coherent villages in the highlands in which "squatters" might live, would go far to convince them that the change in status is advantageous, not detrimental, to them. At present they regard themselves as a community subjected to discrimination, and in this they are perfectly correct. Until the Kenya Government can act as though it believes that African, Indian, Arab, and European rights deserve equal consideration, the land question will continue to poison the very springs of its policy.

It may be contended that such proposals are impracticable. This does not alter the fact that some such policy is essential. At present there is no consistent argument from the European side. They object to the Indians on the ground that their loyalty is to India, not to Kenya, but persist in opposing equal rights for Indians who have no other home but Kenya. In the next breath they will claim special privileges for themselves, demonstrating by their fear of African expansion that they have not reconciled themselves to living in an African country as part of the African population. If the Government could be seen to act impartially, without distinction of race in its policy, the Kenya Europeans would perhaps begin to see that Kenya is condemned permanently to communal politics, if they, the dominant community, think and act as a separate community. It may be a counsel of perfection to suggest that a change of heart should be induced from the top, but that does not alter the fact that no change is showing itself at the bottom. If no change of heart takes place, Kenya will be heading straight for anarchy.

A second illustration may be drawn from an area with very different conditions—Malaya. Here, the immigrants outnumber the local people, if Singapore as well as the Federation is taken into account. But the immigrants are all Asiatics, divided from one another by no chasm as wide as that which separates the Kenya European from the African tribesman. Nor is there any large European community in Malaya, with the result that the officials do not appear to be so closely connected with a section of the population as in East Africa. The Government may be accused of supporting plantation or mining interests, but even these are not entirely European; they may be accused of favouring the Malays, but such partiality, if it exists, is more easy to justify than the partiality which is shown to an *immigrant* community in Kenya.

Political organisation across communal divisions is already visible in Malaya, even though on a small scale. The concep-

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tion of a common Asiatic culture is not as outlandish as that of a common African culture in which Europeans and Indians play their part as minorities. Indeed, the idea has already been conceived, and placed in opposition to the identification of "civilisation" with European culture which still prevails amongst the Africans. In the light of the Carr-Saunders Commission's recommendations for the establishment of a university in Malaya, a most striking article has already been published in the student journal of Raffles College. "We, the students," the article says, "are the products of a culture and civilisation which is foreign to the people. Any prestige which we enjoy is derived from the prestige of the foreign culture predominant in this country. . . . That foreign cultural predominance has served its purpose in stirring the consciousness of the people. Any future progress will have to be a departure from it. There may have to be a synthesis of Malay, Chinese, Indian, and European elements, in the cultural life of Malaya . . . It is for us now to rise to this new responsibility."* In this they have recognised that the real work of integration must be carried out by the people themselves.

There are, however, in Malaya, two problems of immediate importance in which the Government cannot avoid acting. The population of the Federation of Malaya includes over 2 million Malays, half a million Indians, and 1,882,874 Chinese.† Most of the Indians are estate workers, and as a community they are poor. But the Chinese dominate in commerce and in tin-mining, and the majority of them are aliens. Moreover, they have brought with them their own forms of organisation, both in secret societies and in political parties divided along the line of cleavage in China, not Malaya. From the Malay point of view, they are rather formidable lodgers to have in the house. The Government has recently taken the bold step of granting citizenship to those immigrants who have demonstrated their permanent interest in Malaya by a long period of residence and by choice. It is to be hoped that it will not be deflected from its course by the violent uprising of the Communist section of the Chinese community, and that registration of new citizens will be pursued. It remains for action to be taken to persuade the Chinese Government to drop its policy of refusing to recognise that a Chinese can ever cease to be Chinese. Dual

* Leading article from Raffles College Union Magazine. Quoted in the *Straits Times*, June 3rd, 1948.

† 1947 Census.

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nationality is practicable in some other countries, but it is most undesirable in the circumstances of Malaya. After the events of 1948, the local people are fully entitled to demand that every citizen's allegiance shall be recognised as owing to Malaya alone.

The Government is also compelled to make an early decision on the constitution. At present, all communities are represented in the Federal legislature, but there is no franchise. A complicated system of selection according to interests has been adopted, the High Commissioner nominating the candidates put forward by such groups as "labour," "mining," "commerce," together with representatives from the Malay States (all Malays), the Settlements of Penang and Malacca, and the Eurasian, Ceylonese, Indian, and Chinese communities. Such selection has the advantage of avoiding direct communal representation in the majority of the unofficial seats, but it is hardly a method which can be maintained for long. Indeed, it is not intended to maintain it, according to statements that a franchise will be considered when it is known how many of each community wish to become citizens. When that time comes, the Government will no doubt be beset by claims for special weightage for the minority groups, for special protection for the Malays, for separate electoral rolls, and all the paraphernalia of communal representation at present operative in East and Central Africa and now being abolished in India.

The experience of India in this matter should be carefully studied—it reveals, to my mind, that constitutional machinery can itself become a factor in retarding or assisting the advance of a population into nationhood. Separate electorates have the merit of ensuring that every community gets some representation, but they also predispose politicians to appeal only for the votes of their own kind—they never need to gain support from others by studying their problems and trying to devise a policy acceptable to all communities; their organisations are inevitably built on communal foundations. Moreover, representation in the legislature is not enough if a community feels its status to be in doubt—the agitation is then transferred to the demand for weightage in excess of their proportion to the population; thence it proceeds logically to a demand for *parity* of representation; and finally to a campaign for communal parity in the executive. An examination of the development of the policy of the Muslim League in India, of the contending groups in Ireland, or of the Zionists in Palestine, demonstrates that a

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demand for separate communal representation leads logically to a final demand for partition of the country, since it is based on the assumption that religious, racial or linguistic divisions must necessarily prevail over political and economic programmes. There is no possibility of partition in Malaya. The only hope, therefore, lies in the avoidance of communal representation from the beginning, so that communal divisions never have time to harden into political lines of demarcation. Once again, it must be admitted that such a programme will not be easily accepted, but that does not alter its basic correctness. It can be carried out only by a Government in which all communities have confidence because they are satisfied that it is strong *and just*. If this condition is satisfied, then there will be no mechanical obstacle to the development in Malaya of a genuine national movement which can weld the people together.

Such suggestions are made in full knowledge that they touch only the fringe of the problem presented by the existence of plural societies in the Colonies. It happens, however, to be the fringe for which the British people are constitutionally responsible, that is, the part played in directing the development of these societies by the local governments. These governments must rule as far as possible according to the desires of the people they administer, but where there is no single desire in a country they stand unavoidably in the position of arbiter. They must govern "in that spirit of equity, that spirit of justice, that spirit of protection, that spirit of lenity, which ought to characterise every British subject in power." They must do more—they must realise that time is short, and that their role must be that of builder as well as arbiter, their task one of integration that must be achieved before the reins of power are finally handed over to the self-governing peoples who will one day displace them.

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RECENT FRENCH BOOKS

THE year 1948, now drawing to its close, has naturally been the occasion for many books dealing with aspects, problems, or phases of the revolution of 1848. The *Presses Universitaires de France* have published a series of some twenty small books, entitled *Collection du Centenaire de la Révolution de 1848*. Not all the volumes are of equal value, but some are more than merely informative, for example *Le Quarante-Huitard* by Jean Cassou, *Proudhon et la Révolution de 1848* by Édouard Dolléans et J.-L. Puech, both leading Proudhon scholars, or *Raspail* by Georges Duveau. Other contributions in these series rise hardly above the level of popular summaries like *L'Avènement du suffrage universel* by Paul Bastid or Auguste Cornu's *Karl Marx et la Révolution de 1848*. Both publications do not indicate the deep shock which the plebiscitarian use of universal franchise caused to European political opinion.

Within the context of centenary publication belongs Paul Bastid's study *Un Juriste pamphlétaire. Cormenin. Précurseur et Constituant de 1848* (Hachette), a comprehensive and solid book, but somehow failing to give the perspective of the revolutionary process as a whole, which is shown brilliantly though rather from a leftist angle in Professor Gaston-Martin's *La Révolution de 1848* (in the *Presses Universitaires* series *Que sais-je ?*). Léon Blum's great oration *La Révolution de Février* to which one listened with profound emotion at the Sorbonne last February has been buried in *La Revue Socialiste* (Marcel Rivière). It is probably the finest product of the 1848 centenary, infinitely rich in political and human wisdom.

Amongst studies of the sixteenth century Gaston Zeller's *Les Institutions de la France au XVI^e Siècle* (*Presses Universitaires*) provides an admirable synthesis of French political institutions within the territorial and social framework of this century. I add two more volumes on the sixteenth century which though not recently published may have been overlooked by scholars in this country. *Le Problème de L'Incroyance au XVI^e Siècle. La Religion de Rabelais* by Lucien Febvre (Albin Michel) is like all works of this great historian without comparison. Perhaps no other living historian can revive, as he does, the breath of a past epoch. "N'est-il pas curieux," Professor Febvre writes, "de noter qu'un Paracelse, demandant que la médecine soit avant tout affaire d'observation sensible, recourt à tout un lot d'images acoustiques et olfactives plutôt imprévues pour nous ? Il la veut 'non moins retentissante à nos oreilles que la chute du Rhin ou le tumulte des flots sur l'Océan'; il la veut employant ses narines, elle aussi, 'à discerner l'odeur de l'objet étudié'." Professor Febvre does not measure the sixteenth century with the yard-stick of our problematical perfection. Pierre Mesnard's first French translation of Jean Bodin's *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (*Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres*) was published in 1941. It is an exemplary illustration of French editing.

Pierre Gaxotte's *La France de Louis XIV* (Hachette 1946) is noteworthy for its synthetic view. The chapter "L'honnête homme et l'esprit classique" should find its way into every text-book. Research on Montesquieu, this great transmitter of the British political myth, has not been idle either. Joseph Dedieu's volume *Montesquieu. L'Homme et L'Œuvre* (Boivin et Cie)

is a brilliant short study based on the same author's well-known works on the Baron de la Brède. It supersedes, I believe, Albert Sorel's short book on Montesquieu. In comparison with it Pierre Barrière's large volume *Un grand Provincial: Montesquieu* (Delmas) is slightly pedestrian. Maurice Halbwachs' commented edition of J. J. Rousseau's *Du Contrat social*, published in Aubier's admirable *Bibliothèque Philosophique*, may perhaps have escaped the attention of British librarians as the volume appeared in 1942. The book is noteworthy for its method, for, after a profound introduction, it provides a commentary on each sentence of the *Contrat*, a method from which we could profit on this side of the Channel.

General surveys of French history have been attempted by various writers during these last years. Not all have succeeded, but Lucien Romier's recently published *L'Ancienne France. Des Origines à la Révolution* (Hachette), the last work from the pen of this writer, is remarkable for the ease with which it handles administrative and social facts. The book is a valuable introduction to French history up to 1789.

Charles Petit-Dutaillis's *Les Communes françaises. Caractères et Évolution des Origines au XVIII^e Siècle* (Albin Michel) is, unfortunately, also a last work. Petit-Dutaillis, the subtle commentator and critic of Stubbs, needs no recommendation to British readers. This volume is an immense legacy of a life's work. The sociological significance of French "local government" is perhaps the key to an understanding of French politics. The volume is invaluable in detail and synthesis. The portraits Petit-Dutaillis gives of Bodin's and Montaigne's philosophies of local government are indeed masterpieces.

Charles Pomaret has presented us with a new appreciation of *Monsieur Thiers et son Siècle* (Gallimard), a rich and solid study of the career of political common sense. Georges Sorel's *Lettres à Paul Deleselle. 1914-1921* (Grasset) are indispensable for an understanding of the last period of Sorel's complex thought. Some of his remarks throw new light on the development of Marxism. Thus Sorel writes on May 9th, 1918: "À l'origine de sa carrière, Marx a été, comme presque tous les jeunes gens de sa génération, ébloui par la Révolution française; il a cru que le prolétariat aurait une histoire très analogue à celle de la bourgeoisie. Le Manifeste communiste est écrit sous l'influence de cette hypothèse que Marx a été obligé d'abandonner, sans cependant jamais la condamner en termes bien explicites. On peut dire que son expérience de la vie ouvrière anglaise a pour principe la reconnaissance de plus en plus nette de l'autonomie du développement du prolétariat industriel, au moyen des associations syndicales. Je ne crois pas cependant que Marx soit jamais parvenu à l'idée qu'il existe une évolution prolétarienne aussi créatrice et aussi imprévisible que l'évolution darwinienne." Even if one cannot accept Sorel's own theory of the proletarian evolution, his criticism of Marx remains formidable and justified.

"Le révolutionnaire," continues Sorel in the same letter, "se donne une fin qu'il regarde comme aussi certaine qu'un fait historique; sa foi absolue le met à même d'être un martyr; Marx avait peine à croire que cette fin ne fût pas, dans une très large mesure, un résultat scientifique. Son illusion fut entretenue par l'observation qu'il pouvait faire du fanatisme pseudo-scientifique qui exista en Europe au temps de sa maturité." These sentences reveal the independence of Sorel's critical mind.

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Nor is this all. He adds a few more lines which give his fundamental criticism of Marxism an even wider historical perspective. "Les questions les plus intéressantes," we are still quoting from the same letter, "que peut soulever la critique du marxisme se rapportent à l'influence qu'a dû exercer sur son esprit, le romantisme et par suite l'histoire légendaire du Moyen Age (ne pas oublier qu'il fut un contemporain de Michelet). Il a dû souvent réfléchir au sort des corporations ouvrières des Flandres et d'Italie. Les tisserands de ces deux pays soutinrent des luttes sanglantes que aboutirent à la victoire des bourgeois-capitalistes et des princes qui surent s'entourer d'armées et d'administrations sévères. Lorsque nous voyons aujourd'hui tant d'écrivains prophétiser la ruine prochaine de la république russe des soviets, il n'est pas douteux que ces auteurs pensent aux histoires de Gand et de Florence. Marx n'était pas sans être, quelque peu, effrayé par cette expérience historique; car il n'a parlé qu'avec répugnance de ce que ferait le prolétariat triomphant; en 1847 il avait, dans le *Manifeste communiste*, suivi les indications que lui donnaient les membres de la Ligue révolutionnaire qui l'avaient chargé de rédiger ce document, mais en 1875, dans la Lettre sur le programme de Gotha, il s'occupe du présent beaucoup plus que de l'avenir. À regarder les choses de très près, on pourrait s'apercevoir que la lutte de classe a été conçue par Marx sur des modèles médiévaux; une des raisons pour lesquelles la lutte de classe n'existe pas (ou presque pas) dans Proudhon, c'est que celui-ci était bien moins romantique que son rival." Sorel was a great Marx scholar.

Élie Halévy's posthumous *Histoire du Socialisme européen* (Gallimard), based on notes by friends and students from his lectures at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, will find many admirers in this country, for Halévy belongs to France and—to England.

Maurice Duverger has now enlarged his *Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel et de Sciences Politiques* (Presses Universitaires). He is one of the few contemporary political scientists who knows that political science cannot be separated from sociology. The new edition is particularly valuable for its extensive treatment of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. The same author has also recently published a small volume *Les Régimes politiques* (in the series *Que sais-je?*, Presses Universitaires) which contains after a general (sociological) analysis of political régimes a comparative interpretation of the English, American, and Russian types of government. A short, but penetrating book *Histoire des Doctrines politiques en France* (*Que sais-je?*, Presses Universitaires) must be particularly recommended to beginners in the study of French political ideas. Professor Droz has compressed the wealth of French political thought from Pierre Dubois to Maritain into 120 pages.

Recent French party developments have been described by Paul Marabuto in a large volume entitled *Les Partis politiques et les Mouvements sociaux sous la IV^e République* (Recueil Sirey). This work is mainly factual, not interpretative, but as such reliable and instructive. Those who wish to follow the sociological problems of political parties more closely might profitably read a valuable collection of papers, published under the title *Études de Sociologie électorale* (Colin, *Cahiers de la Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques*). Charles Morazé, one of the most brilliant amongst the young French historians, contributes a suggestive essay on *Quelques problèmes de*

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méthode. The same author has also recently published *Trois Essais sur Histoire et Culture* (Colin) in which he pleads for an integration of the social sciences, yet it seems to me that Morazé dwells too much on methodological problems, important as they are. His earlier book *La France bourgeoise* did not quite fulfil what his methodological studies appear to promise.

Though an American historian of sociology has told us that systematic sociology is at an "approximate end," European writers still seem to be able to produce systematic sociological works. Two books should be mentioned in this context. *Sociologie générale* by Eugène Dupréel (Presses Universitaires) and *Traité de Sociologie* by Gaston Bouthoul (Payot). Both works are universal in scope and extremely suggestive in detailed observations and interpretations.

Amongst philosophical books I mention only three recent publications which are near to my personal interests. André Lalande's well-known *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la Philosophie* (Presses Universitaires) has appeared in a fifth enlarged edition. It is the life work of a great scholar and an invaluable guide to clear thinking. All philosophical terms are given in French, German, English, and Italian and its historical parts—the history of philosophical concepts—are a mine of information. To the lover and student of Leibniz I recommend Jacques Jalabert's *La Théorie Leibnizienne de la Substance*, a worthy volume in the long list of Leibniz studies in which Frenchmen have always excelled. Another smaller study is of considerable interest: *Les constantes de la Pensée française* (Presses Universitaires) by N. Baladi. Here the author attempts an analysis of the permanent features of French philosophical thought. He achieves a remarkably subtle synopsis which goes far to explain the essentially human and anarchic structure of the French mind (anarchic in comparison with the communal structure of English thought). M. Baladi writes significantly: "Montaigne ne comprends pas qu'il ait à se soumettre à des lois, à une charge, même honorifique. Il s'étonne de ce que, parmi ses contemporains, ceux qui veulent être libérés du joug d'une église, tolèrent celui d'une autre, et non moins pénible. Il avoue qu'une certaine duplicité s'impose à quiconque acceptera de vivre sous un régime politique plutôt que sous un autre. L'anarchie, si elle ne présentait des dangers pour la liberté elle-même serait aussi supportable que la monarchie ou la féodalité." Perhaps we should quote Montaigne himself who notes in his *Essais* "Si celles (les lois) que je sers me menaçaient seulement le bout du doigt, je m'en irais incontinent en trouver d'autres, où que ce fût. Toute ma petite prudence en ces guerres civiles où nous sommes, s'emploie à ce qu'elles n'interrompent ma liberté d'aller et venir." (III, 577). Freedom is a No. "Non, toujours, non," as Bossuet has taught. It is the wonderful but dangerous French conception of freedom.

I conclude this survey with two books on Switzerland. William E. Rappard's *La Constitution fédérale de la Suisse* (A La Baconnière, Neuchâtel) is a fine historical account of the making and of the development of the Swiss Constitution; André Siegfried's *La Suisse démocratie-témoin* (from the same publishers) should become a classic. The Swiss political example has always attracted the political sociologist. M. Siegfried continues where Tocqueville, Bryce, and Max Weber left off. He is their worthy successor.

J. P. MAYER

BOOK REVIEWS

PROUDHON. By EDOUARD DOLLÉANS. Gallimard. 528 pp. 600 fr.

IT is a strange thing that while the flow of writings on and around Proudhon has gone on steadily for fifty years and shows no signs of abating, full length studies either of his life or his works have remained both few in quantity and inadequate in quality. The most recent and the only one in English is Professor Brogan's short book, published in 1934, which, for all its qualities, was and claimed to be no more than a short and popular summary of known material. The most understanding work before that was Sainte-Beuve's biography (recently re-published), but Sainte-Beuve stopped short at 1848 and tried to present only the man and his style: he neither understood nor approved of Proudhon's ideas. Droz's biography, written for the Proudhon centenary in 1909, was friendly but incomplete and not always understanding. In German, Karl Diehl's two massive volumes were complete and learned but unreadable, while another German work by Muelberger was a part of the first anti-Marxist reaction (it appeared in 1899) and made exaggerated claims for Proudhon.

M. Dolléans's book therefore fills a big gap. But it does much more than that: it provides the most complete guide to Proudhon so far attempted. It handles its subject with both affection and objectivity, and it treats it in the way that Proudhon, perhaps more than any other author, demands. The ideas of all three of the leading schools of socialist thought in France in the first half of the nineteenth century were heavily coloured by the experiences, the prejudices, and even the personal tastes of their inventors, but this was truer of Proudhon than of either Saint-Simon or Fourier. One can cut out the brass bands and the arcaded streets from Fourier and still leave all the essentials of his system, but if you take away Proudhon's innate and acquired prejudices you strike at the roots of every one of his ideas. If he could claim, above nearly all else, to be logical and yet boast of having no system, that is because the real links between his apparently contradictory conceptions lie in his private experiences. The passion for justice which dominates his whole life, and the interpretation of it in terms of the bourgeois virtues of honesty, chastity, and diligence, can be traced to childhood teachings, and the social forms in which he tried later to clothe the private virtues go back to equally identifiable later experiences.

M. Dolléans's book is illuminating because he starts from this view and follows Proudhon's life and ideas steadily side by side, not in rigidly chronological order, because the roots of many of the later Proudhonian attitudes lie far back in experiences that seemed to have little effect on his then current writings, but in the truly logical order that relates his correspondence, his diaries, and the successive phases of his private life to the chronology of his intellectual evolution.

It is a book for connoisseurs, rather than for beginners (though I do not see how the student newly come to Proudhon can now begin with any other). Instead of stepping aside to analyse each work as it came, it assumes rather that the reader is familiar with Proudhon's books and already troubled by their contradictions. It seeks, then, not to resolve the contradictions, but to illuminate the turbulent mind that was responsible for them and to show the ideals to which it remained sternly and rigidly faithful.

Proudhon has always been a problem. He achieved fame by proclaiming in 1840 that property was theft, and wrote in one of his last works that it was

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liberty; he preached liberty and affirmed the permanent subjection of women; he said that "God is evil" and that God is "the conscience of humanity"; he called himself a socialist, but reserved his bitterest attacks for other socialists, and obstructed them at vital moments; he denounced Louis Napoleon, but wrote a whole book on the *Révolution Sociale démontrée par le coup d'état* and got in the way of a democratic victory at the elections of 1863; he pleaded for peace and wrote two volumes in apparent glorification of war; he urged the emancipation of the workers through their own action, but distrusted elections and detested strikes.

Monsieur Dolléans brings to the solution of these puzzles, not many new theories, but an awe-inspiring familiarity with Proudhon and all that has been written about him. He has had access to Proudhon's "carnets"—the diary he kept from 1843 until his death and of which, until recently, his daughter, Madame Henneguy, had released only fragments; he knows the fourteen volumes of correspondence and the many letters released since the first collection was published, and he has the advantage of the studies in which Puech, Guy Grand, Duveau, Amoudraz, Lubac and the editors of the new edition of the collected works have examined the problems mentioned above as well as of Duveau's "*Vie ouvrière sous le Second Empire*," which throws light into every corner of the period of Proudhon's maturity.

M. Dolléans has welded all this brilliantly together and added his own sympathetic insight and critical judgment. The result is the most attractive as well as the most accurate portrait of Proudhon so far. Some ideas still stick in one's throat, even after M. Dolléans's careful presentation of the context in which they were evolved—Proudhon's pathological anti-feminism, for instance, and his intolerant denunciations of fellow-socialists from whom he expected (and mostly got) a much greater degree of understanding than he was ever willing to accord.

M. Dolléans presents these and other weaknesses as the defects of Proudhon's virtues: the anti-feminism as a part of the revulsion of a sternly self-disciplined moralist from the *masquerade* of the closing years of Saint-Simonism, the intolerance as part of his unyielding individualism. The truth, as it emerges afresh from nearly every page of this book, is that Proudhon combined an immense receptiveness and a mind perpetually questing along new paths of inquiry with a quite special capacity for focussing his whole mind and energy on his latest intellectual discoveries. He saw each one as it came with a peculiar intensity of illumination and wrote of it in a state of acute intellectual excitement that multiplied his eloquence, but blinded him to whatever truth there was in anything else, including his own past writings, which he condemned as readily as he did those of his opponents and (still more) his friends. He was too completely individualist ever to sacrifice so much as a comma to any need for common action. "*Le socialisme*," he wrote, "*c'est la révolution. De cette révolution, je me trouve être la première sentinelle et je n'ai pas de caporal qui me donne la consigne. Je fais donc ce que bon me semble.*" In this monolithic frame of mind, he was always convinced that he had said the last word and that no reader could fail to be convinced by it,—and that not only as a young author, but in his maturer years.

That is not intellectual arrogance but the crusading spirit that sees one enemy at a time and charges it with a confidence born of passion rather than

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B O A R D M A N

14, Cockspur Street, London, S.W.1

of judgment. M. Dolléans leads us through the long succession of Proudhon's crusades and paints a portrait of the crusader that inspires respect and sometimes affection, even for his most exasperating virtues.

There is, as I have said, only one book on Proudhon in English and there are no translations, except of one or two of his earliest works. That no doubt, is in part because he is too French to translate. His best passages, have some of the finest prose of the nineteenth century, his ideas on mutualism and pluralism and federalism are still worth studying for their own sakes, and some of his more prophetic remarks, as for instance on the dangers of demagogic dictatorships and of muddle-headed revolutions, are depressingly topical, but all his writing is so charged with purely French (and sometimes purely nineteenth century) overtones that it goes flat and insipid in translation. Consider, for instance, the title of his greatest work, "*La Justice dans la Révolution et dans l'Eglise*": who can render into English all the decades of conflicting emotions that go into the three key words of that title? It is partly, too, that, despite the contradictions and perhaps because of them, so much of what he wrote makes sense only in the context of all the rest of his works, at any rate within each of the three periods into which M. Dolléans divides his life, and the whole is too voluminous to find a market here, so he must, presumably, remain inaccessible to those who cannot read at least a dozen volumes of his passionate, cascading, erudite prose. To these people, M. Dolléans's book offers a synthesis which they will find nowhere else and for those who already know Proudhon he brings together the keys to a dozen problems.

W. PICKLES.

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MAKERS OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT. By MARGARET COLE. WITH A FOREWORD BY HUGH DALTON. (Longmans. 319 pp. 15s.)

THE history of a great movement, profoundly modifying form and content in the social, economic, and political spheres of life and producing new attitudes, new kinds of men and women, for the furthering of its ends, can possess more than the intrinsic and obvious values of scholarship in such a field: such a history can make or destroy the living subject of its study. So far the British labour and socialist movement has had no such history, for even the noble effort of Max Beer suffers from the haste with which it was written, the date at which it was written, and the style of its author. Mrs. Cole does not pretend to furnish such a history, but her vantage point in time, the new sources and judgments made available by a whole new range of experience, enable her frequently to see more deeply into the causes and motives of the working-class movement and its makers than has any previous worker in this field.

Her approach is biographical, and the standard of these fifteen short biographies varies a good deal. At first sight the selection of subjects looks arbitrary, but reflection and a reading of the text convinced the present writer that a better choice would be hard to make. There is one serious omission: MacDonald. His absence is not properly explained, and, distasteful though he may be, one can surely think of no career more clearly demonstrating the weakness and the strength of British labour.

The book falls naturally into two sections. The first from Paine to Mill, is competent, lucid, and contains nothing but material familiar to most trade unionists and Labour Party members who are at all interested in such things. The second section is much more valuable and much less even in quality. This part of the book dares to deal with the dull but important—such men as Mitchell and Applegarth—with ideologues of influence, such as Morris and Wells, and propagandists of genius, almost forgotten by the younger generation, such as Blatchford. All these are vivid and useful portraits (save that of Wells) of figures of essential importance in a past too old to be held in memory by the young, too recent to gain entry into "respectable" history.

This recent history, made accessible by the easy path of biography, is of peculiar importance both practically (for there is a recurrence, both of types of personality and of situations and problems, in labour history from which much can be learned), and as a source of genuine inspiration and that feeling of kinship with the past which guided Mrs. Cole's choice of epigraph:

"He who dies shall not die lonely; many a one has gone before."

He who lives shall bear no burden heavier than the life they bore." (Mrs. Cole has clearly a fondness for Morris, and her essay on him here is perhaps the most attractive in this book.) It is especially important that the variety (and sheer oddity!) of these labour pioneers should be made apparent at a time when Marxist writers are probably the most active workers in the field of working-class history, claiming the most improbable people for their own and enormously magnifying the parts played by such men as Ernest Jones or John Maclean—important though both of these certainly were. Nor, on the other hand, does Mrs. Cole fall into the opposite error of over-estimating the Anglican contribution to labour history.

For the person, then, who wants to find out about the roots of the

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labour movement here is a compact, clear and attractive introduction, complete with index and a useful, short bibliography. But there is one serious fault: to reach the appropriate audience the book should cost 3s. 6d. or, better, appear as a Pelican. Fifteen shillings is far too dear for the rank and file member who is the truest maker of the British labour movement.

DONALD G. MACRAE.

THE HABSBURG MONARCHY. By A. J. P. TAYLOR. (Hamish Hamilton. 272 pp. 15s.)

WRITING in 1913, Wickham Steed remarked that the Habsburg Monarchy had ever been a butt for epigram. Mr. Taylor carries on this tradition in his new version of his book first published in 1941. But Wickham Steed, having lived in Vienna, the heart of the Empire, for ten years, was concerned to penetrate deeper into the complexities and contradictions of the Monarchy, which made it so easy a target for destructive criticism, and to announce his faith that convulsions should herald not the approach of death, but the entrance into a new life. Mr. Taylor, surveying the tangled story from a comfortable distance in time, is concerned only to prove that the Monarchy was dead or dying long before its final collapse. Events proved Wickham Steed wrong. Mr. Taylor, knowing the final verdict, was in a stronger position to see in the convulsion the seeds of decay, and not the seeds of healthy change. But he weakens his case by overstatement. He employs every weapon in the brilliant armoury of his mind to attack the Monarchy and to lay bare the dead weight at the centre. Paradoxes and epigrams abound. But he seems to have confused life with power. That Austria-Hungary ceased to be a real European power after the defeat by Germany at Sadowa in 1866 is true: that she ceased thereafter fully to exist is not. Similarly, France finally ceased to be a real power after the German defeat in 1940: she did not cease to exist, not only because the French nation is indestructible, but because she remains a European necessity. Mr. Taylor constantly points out that after 1866, Austria-Hungary remained a European necessity. Yet he is concerned to prove in *The Habsburg Monarchy* that all talk of "lost opportunities" is merely a "liberal illusion." It is interesting that he admits that he himself suffered from this illusion when writing the first version of this book in 1941. In his preface he writes: "These regrets are no part of the duty of a historian, especially when the story which he tells makes it clear, time after time, that there were no opportunities to be lost." The trouble is that his story does *not* make this clear.

On the contrary, he makes it clear that both the chief European powers and the various nationalities within the Empire wished to preserve the Monarchy. If Austria collapsed, the alternative would have been either Greater Germany or an extension of Russian power or a combination of both. Neither alternative was acceptable to Great Britain, France, Germany, or Russia. And within the Monarchy, the Austrian Germans did not wish to be swallowed up in Greater Germany; the Hungarians knew that Great Hungary would be great no more if Austria disappeared. The Czechs, Poles, Ruthenes, and Slavs preferred Austrian hegemony to the prospect of German or Russian rule. There was therefore an underlying unity of

purpose in a desire to maintain the Habsburg Monarchy. Yet in the years following 1866, little constructive was achieved. It is impossible not to believe that opportunities were lost by Francis Joseph.

In Mr. Taylor's book, little space is devoted to Francis Joseph. He appears, as a *deus ex machina* who appoints and sacks ministers at will, bent only on maintaining his imperial prerogatives. The various national figures appear as puppets, holding the stage and the limelight for a while, only to disappear abruptly in a stormy crisis. Mr. Taylor sees them through the wrong end of the telescope mostly absurd figures, smaller than life, fit subjects for sneering paradoxes.

This attitude of mind makes a lively book, eminently readable; there is not a dull or pedestrian sentence from beginning to end. But it raises the doubt: surely this is not the whole story, not the objective historical approach. Mr. Taylor has read widely in contemporary documents and books published during the last fifty years. He has achieved a miracle of compression, which, brilliant though it is, inevitably means that he takes for granted in the reader a wide knowledge of European events. This book will therefore be of most value to those who are already familiar with the complex story of the Habsburg Monarchy, and who can supplement from their own knowledge the brief, often cynical, but entertaining, references of Mr. Taylor. He is one of the most original historians writing to-day, with a superb command of language. It is to be hoped that he will one day find a subject which engages his sympathy as well as his profound critical faculties.

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THE WHITE HOUSE PAPERS OF HARRY L. HOPKINS. An Intimate History
By ROBERT E. SHERWOOD. Vol. I, September, 1939-January, 1942.
(*Eyre & Spottiswoode*. 491 pp. 25s.)

CIANO'S DIPLOMATIC PAPERS. Edited by MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE.
(*Odhams*. 490 pp. 17s. 6d.)

Up to the twentieth century, policy and diplomacy remained an aristocratic preserve and the common herd were not allowed to catch a glimpse of what went on behind the scenes among the chief actors until all of them had been safely dead and buried for a century or more. Only in our own day would the publication of these two books be possible. Here we can see exactly what went on "at the highest level" in the fashioning of high politics—the exact words which Ministers used to one another and the cigars which they smoked. It is a fascinating, if at times a revolting, spectacle.

The American book is much the more fascinating and important. Harry Hopkins was a very remarkable man. He belonged to the type of politician which the United States is happy in possessing—Winant was another—the passionate idealist of immense practical ability. He began his career as Secretary of the Board of Child Welfare, joined the Red Cross in the 1914 war, and after the war took a job in the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor. The turning point for him came when in 1928 Roosevelt was elected Governor of New York and set up the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration; for Hopkins became first Deputy Chairman and later Chairman. This was the beginning of Hopkins's association with Roosevelt. When the latter became President, Hopkins became the Administrator of the gigantic relief programme and a pillar of the New Deal. During the war he was a kind of Grand Vizier to the President and his most intimate friend. He lived in the White House and conducted the most vital and delicate negotiations for Roosevelt in Washington, London, and Moscow. All the time Hopkins was a very sick man, often on the brink of death, but his energy was colossal and he never spared himself. In Mr. Sherwood's book we see the man exactly as he was and it is a fascinating picture. But the book is much more than a biography; it is of outstanding historical importance, for it gives us in great detail, and often in secret documents, the inside history of the most crucial negotiations and decisions that determined American and British policy during the war.

Ciano's diplomatic papers are also of some historical importance. They cover the years 1936 to 1942 and are a record of negotiations and conversations with a large number of statesmen and politicians. The most interesting are, perhaps, two in which Ciano himself played no part. The first is Grandi's long, detailed report of his meeting on February 18, 1938, with Chamberlain and Mr. Eden in which the British Prime Minister, after secretly negotiating with the Italian Ambassador behind the back of his Foreign Secretary, double-crossed his colleague in the presence of and to the delight of Grandi, never realizing that he himself was being double-crossed by the Italian. This is a record of the most ignominious and shameful action in the history of British foreign policy. Another conversation of considerable interest is one between Mussolini, Franco, and Sener at Bordighera in February, 1941, when the Duce, at Hitler's request, tried unsuccessfully to get Franco to enter the war.

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Though one can read the account of Neville Chamberlain's behaviour, referred to above, only with shame, the two books are legitimately a source of pride and comfort to the Anglo-Saxon. In both we can read exactly what the statesmen and other public men in Italy and Germany on the one hand and in Britain and the U.S.A. on the other said, did, and thought. If one excepts Chamberlain, the standards of political and, indeed, human behaviour in the Anglo-Saxon countries are infinitely higher than in Italy and Germany. The Foreign Secretaries of the two Axis countries were vulgar, stupid, tenth-rate crooks, Hitler and Mussolini crude gangsters, and not one decent, honest man or public servant appears in their entourage. The Americans and British who appear in Mr. Sherwood's book belong to a different world, a world in which there is a high standard of human decency and public morality.

LEONARD WOOLF.

TWENTIETH CENTURY EMPIRE. By H. V. HODSON. (*Faber*. 186 pp. 15s.)

COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BURMA AND NETHERLANDS INDIA. By J. S. FURNIVALL. (*Cambridge University Press*. 568 pp. 36s.)

MR. HODSON and Mr. Furnivall start from different premises and it would be surprising if they arrived at similar conclusions. Mr. Hodson preaches a new gospel for an old empire. Mr. Furnivall, analysing the methods and results of empire-building in Burma and the Netherlands East Indies warns us not to try to do it again. He recognises the logic as well as the justice of independence, appreciates its problems, and hopes that the result will be friendship between East and West. Mr. Hodson, on the other hand, still plans to apply a strategy based on "Land of Hope and Glory" to regions where the people tend increasingly to listen to the tune of the "Internationale."

Britain itself, Mr. Hodson points out, was the core of empire defence for the best part of two centuries. Though the cemeteries of Flanders are scattered with the graves of British citizens of all colours and creeds, it is true of course that the strategic buttons were pressed in Whitehall and that red-hats usually sheltered white faces. The British Empire, Mr. Hodson maintains, was the chief factor in securing world order from the Treaty of Vienna in 1914. In 1948 he still believes that world order must be "either an adaptation or an enlargement of the British Empire system of world peace." The *cordons sanitaires*, "held by the strength of the British Empire," localised wars and this was "the main boon that British imperialism afforded to the world at large, and in the eyes of the world it was the Empire's main justification." Its continuation, Mr. Hodson argues, is required as the condition of Britain's survival as a great power, which in turn is required by the world to make peace possible. He goes so far as to say that, if it did not exist, "this thin red line" of empire would have to be invented, on the assumption—which is fundamental throughout his book—that the main problem of "twentieth century empire" is the Soviet Union's bid for world domination.

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TIME LONGER THAN ROPE.—By EDWARD ROUX. (*Victor Gollancz Ltd.*
399 pp. With Index and Maps. 18s.)

"OF South Africa's eleven and a half million people only two and a half million are white. Nearly a million are coloured persons of mixed blood, including the descendants of the Hottentots. Over a quarter of a million Indians live chiefly in Natal. The vast majority, over seven million, are Bantu." It is of this vast majority that Mr. Roux writes.

It is a sad tale, with a title appropriately taken from a proverb of West Indian slavery: "Time longer dan Rope." The belief that slavery will ultimately disappear, that improvement *must* come with time, is the belief that gives hope to the Bantu, no longer legally slaves, but in every other sense suffering the burdens of the underprivileged. It is a belief which must often seem to be derived from the hope of desperation rather than from an objective analysis of the facts, for the Bantu have not always been slaves, and have little on their side but the weight of their majority. As time has gone on in South Africa, their lot has in many respects become worse, not better, and the current utterances of South African politicians (they can hardly be called "statesmen") indicate that worse is yet to come.

Mr. Roux begins his story with the meeting of the Portuguese and the Bantu in the neighbourhood of Delagoa Bay. When Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape in 1497, the Portuguese found the southern portion of the continent peopled with the ancestors of the present-day Hottentots and Bushmen. "It was not until they came to Delagoa Bay that they saw the first black men and heard from them stories of a great black kingdom in the heart of the land, the Kingdom of Monomatapa," of which very little is known. The Zimbabwe ruins remain to indicate that a people more than primitive once lived in Central Africa, but the causes of their decline and the heights they may have achieved in their zenith remain to be discovered by the archaeologist and the anthropologist. Mr. Roux merely mentions their existence in passing, for he is not concerned, in this book, with the cultural potentialities or contributions of the Bantu, but with their struggle to assert themselves in the last two hundred years of South African history.

As the Bantu moved southwards, they met the outposts of the advancing Dutch settlers, who established themselves in Cape Town in 1652. Along the south-eastern stretch of coast, from the Fish River to Natal, the Bantu and the Europeans, both Dutch and British, fought for the right to settle the south and west of South Africa. The contest was not as uneven as might be expected, for some of the Bantu—notably the Zulus—adopted methods of organisation for war which were vastly superior to the development of their weapons, and the Europeans were always divided amongst themselves. Not only had the English and Dutch their own conflicting loyalties, but there were sections amongst the Europeans of both communities who differed profoundly from each other in their attitudes towards the Bantu. Moreover, circumstances altered as the settlements advanced and the Europeans became more numerous. At the beginning, there had been a surprising amount of intermarriage between them and the Hottentots, and the people of various groups, such as Malay or Negro, who were brought into the Cape as labour. But as they moved forward, and came into contact with the more formidable Bantu, conceptions as well as necessities changed. After the Great Trek, the Transvaal began

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its life with a policy of full-blooded racial discrimination, while in Natal Shepstone's policy of "indirect rule" did indeed aim at raising the Bantu to the European level of civilisation, but was based on segregation.

Today, European influence has penetrated into the heart of the continent, while the Bantu are spreading in ever greater numbers into the extreme south-west, coming in as labourers and workers of every description. The clash between the two now takes place over the whole area of South Africa, and the milder social climate of the Cape is being disturbed by the conflict. The last remnant of the early "Cape policy of identity" is being assailed by Dr. Malan's attack on the status of the coloured people. The conflict in South Africa today, then, is a conflict which ranges the Bantu with the peoples that they themselves pushed southward and westward, with the Hottentot and Bushman, with the coloureds of the Cape, as well as with, in this century, the Indians in Natal. As the struggle has proceeded, the Bantu have entered into industry, they have become politically conscious, and many of them have gained education, but all of them, as they have had increasing contact with the European, have felt increasingly the insult as well as the injury involved in the colour bar. On the European side, it has become increasingly difficult to stand for "humane" treatment of the Bantu, for humane treatment is no longer sufficient, in face of a claim to complete equality. It is clear that the day is not far off when South Africa must cut the knot, and proceed either to cultural integration or to the permanent inequality which Dr. Malan envisages. If the second choice is made, there can be nothing but catastrophe at first, and only in the long run will it be seen whether time is indeed longer than rope.

If the choice is to be integration, the first requirement is that South Africans of different colours shall cease to think of themselves as water-tight communities, and shall look back on their past history as a pattern woven by a multitude of hands with many strands of thread. Mr. Roux follows one strand only in his book, but it is an essential strand, without which the pattern could not have been made, and which is generally ignored. He sees South African history through the eyes of the Bantu rather than through those of the Europeans. He sees it, therefore, as a struggle for land, as a history of retreating boundaries, defeats, labour organisation, strikes, and a hunger for education. His heroes, too, are not those of the Boer child's textbook, but Makana, Tshaka, Moshesh, Kabavu, Kadalie, and, in the present day, an Indian, Dadoo. It is a part of history that must be known, and it is the great merit of Mr. Roux's book that he makes it known clearly and in detail, confident that in doing so he is making a contribution to the solution of the problems of sick South Africa.

His book is, therefore, of extreme importance. The whole of Africa is watching what goes on in the South. If South Africa is able to conquer its difficulties, there will be hope for many miles further north. There can only be two ways—either integration or anarchy. If it is to be integration, then it will become possible to write a real history of South Africa, in which the whole pattern is woven. Mr. Roux brings us one step nearer to that goal by illuminating the part of the pattern that may turn out to be the most important part.

MARJORIE NICHOLSON.

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN SWISS EXPERIENCE (1291-1948). By WILLIAM E. RAPPARD. (*Allen & Unwin*. 150 pp. 12s. 6d.)

LA CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE DE LA SUISSE 1848, 1948. By WILLIAM E. RAPPARD. (*La Baconnière, Neuchâtel-Suisse*. 478 pp.)

THE MOST CIVILISED PEOPLE IN EUROPE. By HAMILTON FYFE. (*Allen & Unwin*. 102 pp. 3s. 6d.)

SWITZERLAND has more than five centuries of experience as a loose confederacy. It has just completed a further hundred years as a federal state. By geography, tradition, by its economic and social history, and by the development of its social and political ideas it belongs to western Europe, in the growth of whose civilisation it has so intimately shared. What further contribution has it to make, what lessons does its long federal experience offer, at a time when closer union—whether a league, confederacy, or federal state—is on the practical programme of the countries of west European and Atlantic contact?

Some contend that Switzerland is too small, and its erstwhile sovereign cantons too infinitesimal by comparison with modern states for any useful conclusions to be drawn from Swiss experience. There can be no doubt, and indeed it emerges from Professor Rappard's pages, that the principle of neutrality to which the Swiss have so resolutely, and until now so wisely, clung has done much to preserve their union. A country called upon to play the part of a great power participating in the wars of Europe could not have hoped to hold together such diverse and independent entities as those which the Swiss Confederation comprised. Neutrality has played for Switzerland the part which the balance of power has played for England in her international relations; each was a guide to and almost a condition of survival. But size is a deceptive argument. When the balance of power concept was being developed by England, her population was much the same as that of Switzerland now, yet no one would question the continuity of policy between England of then and of today. And the very independence of the Swiss, with their insistence on cantonal rights, served to strengthen their unity as a means of securing their independence against the outside world. There is no reason to suppose that their independence of spirit would have been greater or less according to the size of the political units into which they were gathered.

Once it is admitted that Swiss experience may be of wider federal significance, there is much in it that may be found suggestive and illuminating. The Swiss never found it necessary to create a federal supreme court to interpret their fundamental agreements, but were able to rely for this upon their normal political machinery. The Swiss supreme executive has always been an elective and representative council and never a single man as president. If both these facts provide a tribute to the maturity of political judgment and the ready spirit of compromise which they have developed over centuries of almost uninterrupted self-government, they also suggest that certain federal institutions which are peculiarly difficult to envisage for western Europe may not be necessary for its integration. In some ways, too, federal Switzerland appears a microcosm of western Europe, with its linguistic differences, the keen conflict of religious creeds, the contrasting economic and social character of its rural and urban cantons, their divergencies between oligarchy and democracy which so actively divided them in the past.

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Professor Rappard's answer to the question how and why the four religious conflicts between Swiss cantons prior to the French Revolution never led to the disruption of the Confederation is as follows. "The main reason therefore, I believe, is to be found in the very fabric of that ill-jointed but strangely resilient body. Had Switzerland been a rigidly unified state, and not a very loose alliance of sovereign commonwealths, it may be surmised that one of its two religious groups would have crushed and suppressed the other or perhaps have led it to seek salvation in foreign intervention and secession. As it was, when one party had prevailed over the other—none of the Swiss wars of religion ever ended in a military stalemate—the cantons, both Protestant and Catholic, which had not been immediately engaged in hostilities, brought their whole united pressure to bear on the belligerents to bring them to terms and to induce them to accept a peace of moderation." But that is to reveal a continuing spirit of unity in the Confederation as a whole greater than the momentary, though violent, discord between some of its members. And when this basic unity was undermined by a political discord so keen that some of the cantons felt a greater affinity with the French revolutionaries than with their own ruling families, then only did the Confederation break down; it collapsed in face of the French invaders, not through any diminution of Swiss military valour, but through political disintegration within its own territory. Apart from this one experience, Professor Rappard's account of the working of Swiss collective security shows the astonishing extent to which the Swiss unity in military alliance was carried. His book on this subject is of remarkable insight and fascinating interest.

That field of the constitutional history and political interpretation of modern Switzerland which Professor Rappard has made so eminently his own, whether in his study of the federative cantonal pacts or in his pre-war "L'Individu et l'Etat dans l'Evolution Constitutionnelle de la Suisse," is that of his new work on the Federal Constitution of Switzerland after a century of its life. Here he discusses how and why the ancient Confederation became the Federal State of 1848. He then examines the constitution as then established, and proceeds to an analysis of subsequent revisions and the principal developments which have taken place under it. The whole work is in a relatively short compass a comprehensive and invaluable study which is likely to remain for many years the chief guide to the subject.

Mr. Fyfe's little book is the work of a journalist written for a very different audience. If it succeeds in exciting the interest of the casual tourist in the way of life of the Swiss people, it will have done a useful job.

BRITISH CINEMAS AND THEIR AUDIENCES. By J. P. MAYER. (*Dobson*. 280 pp. 15s.)

FOUR or five years ago, when Mr. Mayer turned his sociological eye on the English film audience, one rather wondered what would come of it. Pubs and coronation days had lately been spied out by the Mass-observers; here was Mr. Mayer, with a somewhat different method and manner, quizzing among the crowd that gapes at a screen. The girls who frequent picture-palaces may (as the rhyme assures us) have no use for psycho-analysis, but they responded to Mr. Mayer's questionnaires. He arranged

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competitions in *The Picturegoer*, he got school-children to write essays, he grasped at statistical surveys, and armed with these documents and a boyish enthusiasm he set the formidable apparatus of his own learning in motion. Its first product was *Sociology of the Film*; the present volume is the second, and there will be more to follow.

The documents are fascinating. "Most of all, I think, films have made me dissatisfied with my life. I know that all the stories are not true, and the characters merely exist on celluloid—I have told myself that hundreds of times—but somehow my brain refuses to accept it and I am more dissatisfied than ever. Films are like a drug—the more one has the more one wants, and yet, after seeing a film there is no satisfaction. Everything seems flat and dull when the last scene flickers out, and knowing that—I still go." The writer is a typist aged 19, daughter of a miner; not many are as intelligent. Most are dazzled and want to be; they fall in love with their favourites, pick up American slang and imitate hair-do's, learn new ways of kissing, wish to enjoy luxuries, to travel, to go on the films, to be frightened and rescued by the right man. One, a medical student, recalls that at the age of fifteen her tastes were for a while masochistic; another finds that, after enjoying a film, she goes home and answers letters. A woman of thirty, who had once studied Christian Science for Mary Pickford's sake, now truly believes in the survival of souls since seeing *Topper Takes a Trip*; and a boy clerk finds himself "more receptive to love-making, though I am sorry to say is of very little use to me as I am very shy towards where girls are concerned." There are even a couple of highbrows, one male and one female, rather lost in this stampede of the herd.

Fascinating! And how different from their texture is Mr. Mayer's: "... a fine example of what William Stern has termed *Angstlust*. *Angst* is what Goethe described as an *Urphänomen*. Kierkegaard and the existentialist philosophers..." The page (147) fairly staggers with quotations, references, footnotes, and names, while all that has been said is that an element of pleasurable fright is involved in play. At times the awful dignity of Mr. Mayer's approach may remind one of an Emmett train, with every bell ringing and all the pistons on show.

But there is method behind the manner, and that's more than can be said for a Mass-Observation report. Mr. Mayer realises that his cross-section has been taken from a special class—those, among the readers of a film-magazine, who will spread themselves on paper. He accepts, too, the fact that the replies were to some extent guided by the questions. When allowances have been made, he thinks, the evidence is still characteristic and valuable; and probably there he's right.

Two points emerge, then, clearly from his inquiry: that children and adolescents are the chief filmgoers, and that this early film-going administers shocks of a more or less serious nature. How far such shocks would be avoided by staying out of cinemas is, of course, endlessly debatable. Does the horror film corrupt or purge? Are our tendencies to violence stimulated or assuaged by the screen gangster? Mr. Mayer, I suspect, disapproves of all such films on principle, assumes that what distresses him will harm others, and would meet the situation with government censorship. There many of us will disagree with him. So far as the evidence goes in these pages Mr. Karloff, that bogey of millions, has done no more harm than

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many an ill-looking tramp in a lane, and the one confession of masochism (already referred to) owed its origin to a Laurel and Hardy comedy. I doubt whether even the benevolent Mr. Mayer would have spotted danger there.

Ignore, however, the gently legislative mood and the unwieldiness of manner, and how much are these "sociological studies" likely to teach us? Quite a lot, I believe. They pin down what is commonly ignored or taken for granted. Film producers are interested only in the length of queues, film critics in aesthetic appeal, and the government in a rich field for taxes: Mr. Mayer does really take us a little way into the audience with its individual thoughts and feelings. For that we should all, in our better moments, be grateful to him. He has an explorer's zeal. It is the strongest of passions that has brought together two such disparates as Mr. Mayer and his subject.

G. W. STONER.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. By P. M. S. BLACKETT. (Turnstile Press. 216 pp. 12s. 6d.)

A SUBJECT of such importance as the coming of atomic energy demands the calmest appraisal. Can it be that the dramatic circumstances in which the two atomic bombs were used have been the enemy of this, and that the full and excellent publicity which has been given to their effects has produced an emotional response conducive more to hysteria than to reason? That is a part of Professor Blackett's theme in what is perhaps the most important book on this subject of life-and-death significance for mankind which has yet been written. "With its aid," wrote Mr. Stimson of the atomic weapon, "even a very powerful and unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one." Such a statement Professor Blackett clearly regards as the reverse of calm appraisal, but as representing a view that has had far-reaching consequences in American policy.

In large measure the effect of the two bombs upon the public mind has been due to the Japanese surrender which immediately followed them and which appeared therefore to be directly attributable to them. But Professor Blackett offers evidence that seems incontrovertible for his claim that Japan had already decided to surrender before the decision was taken to use them and that the American high command was aware of this. Thus the American decision was not the last act in a war already over, but the first act in the cold war with Russia aimed at preventing effective Russian participation in the victory. If this claim is substantiated it would do much to explain later developments in the general relations between the Soviet Union and the West as well as in the specific proposals for dealing internationally with the control of atomic power.

The general effect of Professor Blackett's study is to put at a much lower level of military significance than that accorded to it in current discussion the whole development of atomic power. He asserts that exaggerated claims are made for it both from the strategic and the political angle. The possibility of its use against small countries is discounted by the natural desire of a great power to preserve a territory which it hopes to subject and wants to find in a productive condition. That there is any possibility of employing the bomb against the United States in the next five years he does not credit. He argues too against the prospect of its use by the Soviet

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THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Union either in that period or a much longer one. For its value for military purposes depends on a military follow-up before the victim has had time to recover, and there are no prospects of this in a war between Russia and the United States, were the bomb to be used by the former.

On the other hand, with forward bases in Europe from which with the present development of aircraft bombing attacks could be launched against the Soviet Union, the American position is a very different one. Even here, however, Professor Blackett discounts the argument that the sole possession of the atomic weapon would necessarily prove effective either in the short or the long run. It is not more effective against small targets of military importance than the high explosive bomb, and the use of the latter against military targets in Germany during the war proved of much less military value than was anticipated. It also proved inconclusive except where it could be accompanied by the movement of armies.

It is impossible to do justice here to the careful examination of bombing loads, of aircraft potential, and the many details with which Professor Blackett builds up his argument on the military consequences of atomic energy. Unfortunately much the same is true of his treatment of the political consequences. Everyone who is concerned with this urgent present problem should read his book and carefully weigh his thesis, so different is it from what is currently accepted among western diplomats and politicians and in actual public opinion.

Above all is this true of Professor Blackett's condemnation of the Baruch Plan. This he claims to be calculated to secure a permanent American advantage and to have only a thin facade of internationalism. Far is it from being that grand unselfish gesture which it has been acclaimed by responsible statesmen in the West. So little does it have to offer in advantage to Russia that he believes it could not have been put forward save as a move in a cold diplomatic game, aimed not at its acceptance but at impressing opinion by an apparently generous offer which in reality would give nothing away. In all this Professor Blackett does seem to give too little weight to the moral advantage which the United States has in the much greater information of its armaments that country supplies than Russia. But the real weight of his arguments is scarcely affected by that over-emphasis.

One fact of major importance does emerge from the international discussions. That is the much greater significance attached by the U.S.S.R. to the potential use of atomic energy for industrial purposes than by the U.S.A. This side of the question has been all but lost sight of. So dramatic are the military and strategic consequences of atomic energy, so much have they been over-dramatised if Professor Blackett's view is accepted, that they have drowned all proper consideration of the possibly vast increase in world productivity for peaceful purposes which atomic energy brings in its train. Can it be that this is intentional? There is evidence of opposition by vested interests. Surely the displacement of economic empires which would result from a wide development of atomic power, substituting itself for actual sources of industrial power, has profound political implications. Are the authorities in the West, and particularly in this country, sufficiently aware of the political moves which economic empires make to prevent their ultimate overthrow?

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A HISTORY OF THE LABOUR PARTY FROM 1914. By G. D. H. COLE.
(Routledge. 516 pp. 18s.)

This book is a sequel to Professor Cole's *British Working-Class Politics, 1832-1914*. It is an admirable book, far and away the best that has been written about the Labour Party or labour politics. It is a straightforward, chronological history of the party, its policy, triumphs, and disasters from 1914 to the General Election of 1945 and there is an epilogue dealing briefly with the first two years of the present Labour Government. Professor Cole always gives all the relevant facts accurately and lucidly and he handles his mass of material with such skill that the book is eminently readable.

SOCIALISM THE BRITISH WAY. Edited by DONALD MUNRO, with a foreword by Herbert Morrison. (Essential Books. 345 pp. 10s. 6d.)

The nature of the book is indicated in its sub-title: "An assessment of the nature and significance of the socialist experiment carried out in Great Britain by the Labour Government of 1945." The assessment is carried out departmentally by eleven different authors, predominantly Fabian. The first chapter provides an admirable survey of the economic problems of the Government by the late Evan Durbin. Professor Cole and John Diamond, M.P., deal with industry and Mrs. Cole with the social services. The contributions of James Callaghan, M.P. on social equality and Harold Nicolson on foreign policy are particularly interesting. Michael Young, of the Labour Party, deals with the problems just ahead. It is a stimulating book.

NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION. By ALFRED COBBAN. (Oxford Press and Royal Institute of International Affairs. 186 pp. 15s.)

This is a thoughtful and useful book. Dr. Cobban knows what he is talking about and uses his knowledge to good purpose. He begins with a survey of the theory and practice of self-determination before 1918. He then deals in two chapters with the application of the principle in the peace treaties at the end of the 1914 war and the sequel in the years between the wars. This leads him to the conclusion that a reconsideration and new definition of self-determination is required. The remainder of his book—two-thirds of the whole—is devoted to this task. First he examines self-determination in relation to the national state, nationality, sovereignty, and democracy and then in relation to the policy and practice of particular states, e.g., the British Commonwealth of Nations, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. Chapter 12 deals with non-European peoples, Chapter 13 with regionalism, and Chapter 14 with economic problems. His last chapter deals with the limitations of national self-determination and the survival of small states.

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1949. (The London Institute of World Affairs and Stevens. 342 pp. 20s.)

Professor Keeton and Dr. Schwarzenberger always get together a number of admirable contributions to this annual and the present number is well up to standard. It begins well with a very interesting paper by Dr. Schwarzenberger himself on the study of international relations. Dr. Haden

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THE DREAM AND THE BUSINESS

By PROFESSOR G. D. H. COLE

FOUR years of Labour Government have carried Great Britain a long way. No doubt, a part of what has occurred here since 1945 would have occurred if the Conservatives, instead of the Labour Party, had won the election; for much that the Labour Government has done has been either a necessary response to circumstances, or in accordance with unmistakable trends of popular feeling of which *any* Government elected by a free vote would have had to take account. Any Government so established would have had to implement the greater part of the Beveridge Report, to set up some sort of National Health Service, to build houses at a heavily subsidised cost, and to tax heavily both the rich and the poor in order to find the money for these things. Any Government would have had to keep a strict control over imports, to make bulk arrangements to ensure needed supplies of food and raw materials, to take measures against inflation, and to accept the economic and political consequences of a resort to American aid. I think, too, that any Government would have had to nationalise at any rate the coal mines, and perhaps the gas and electricity services and civil aviation as well. Just as the Tories could not undo the bulk of what the Labour Government has done, were they to be returned to power next year, so, if they had won power in 1945, they could not have avoided doing a good deal of what their opponents have actually done.

There is, in effect, a trend in British politics which, though it can be speeded or retarded by the way men vote, cannot in the short run be reversed. The Tories set up the B.B.C., the Central Electricity Board, the London Passenger Transport Board, and a number of other collectivistic institutions: they were responsible, between the wars, for large extensions of social insurance: they shared with Labour the first steps towards the planning and subsidisation of British agriculture: they subsidised housing and controlled rents. No doubt, they did some of these things in ways Labour disapproved of, and some of them much less than Labour desired. Nevertheless, the historian of the future, without belittling the sharp differences of policy between the two main parties, will assuredly discover ample evidence of a continuous underlying trend—a trend both towards greater social and economic equality and towards a

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rapid increase in the range and extent of collective action in the economic and social fields. Did not the Labour Government of 1945 find in the Butler Education Act, passed by a Coalition under the auspices of a Tory Minister, a good enough foundation to begin building the more democratic educational system to which it is pledged?

These considerations are of importance in considering what proposals the Labour Party ought to put forward for the "second five years" of office which it hopes to enjoy. The "continuity" in British politics, which this underlying trend implies, cuts both ways. It makes both claimants to political power not so much free agents in carrying through any policy they please, and can cajole the electors into accepting to the extent of voting for their candidates, as interpreters of the trend, with a limited power to speed things up or slow them down, or to deviate to either side of the road without actually getting far away from it. Moreover, in addition to this conditioning of what a victorious party can set out at once to do, there is the further limitation that, economically, not much room is now left for further re-distribution of the existing real income, and that, in certain respects, no British Government can be fully a free agent until this country is able to stand firmly on its own feet, without requiring economic aid from any source.

In all these circumstances, Labour's programme for the second five years was bound to be something of an anti-climax—the more so because of the unexampled thoroughness with which the party, in home affairs, has done since 1945 exactly what it promised to do. The next five years, under any Government, are bound to be mainly a period, economically, of "consolidation," which means not only completing structures now but half built, but even more paying the full cost of commitments which are bound to rise sharply as the new services come increasingly into practical operation. Even if there had been no political obstacles, the Labour Party could not have offered the electors a second programme at all resembling that on which the last General Election was fought. There is no room for fresh promises involving re-distribution of incomes on a comparable scale, or for spectacular *new* achievements in the creation of the social service state beyond what is due to occur under plans already launched.

All the same, it can be argued, there was nothing to prevent the Labour Party from going forward with a second socialisa-

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tion plan as ambitious as that of 1945. I think there was. Even if we ignore the possible repercussions on Marshall Aid, there was the plain fact that socialisation for its own sake, or for the sake of socialism, has little power to move the main body of the electorate *either way*. Just as the Tories have found it impossible to vamp up popular opposition to the nationalisation of road transport, or electricity, or steel, so the Labour Party knows that it could not create any popular enthusiasm for an ambitious socialisation plan. The coal mines were another matter, both because the controversy over them was of long standing, and because most people realised that they presented an urgent problem that seemed insoluble with the old owners in control. There was no great popular excitement either for or against any of the other socialisation measures; and none could be expected as a response to further proposals of the same order.

The plain truth is that the electors voted in 1945, not for socialism as an economic system based on public ownership of industry, but for more speed in developing the social service state, for less social inequality, and for full employment policies as a means to social security. The main body of voters was interested in these ends, rather than in the means of getting them; and the question of means comes to the fore only as the ends having been conceded, their realisation has to be fitted in with a social structure which cannot easily or simply make room for them. Convinced socialists may argue that the human requirements of the social service state are inconsistent with the maintenance of capitalism as an economic system, and that the people, having willed the end, must be taken as having willed the necessary means as well. The fact remains that the bulk of those who voted for Labour, or may vote for it next year, are not conscious of having taken this further step, and are unlikely to be aroused to any enthusiasm for a programme which implies that they have taken it, and are as convinced of the need for socialism as of their desire for social security.

Indeed, the very fact that the Conservatives, should they win in 1950, would be unable to undo more than a fraction of Labour's achievements in the social service field now turns into a handicap to the Labour Party, because it leads men to take what they have got for granted, and accordingly to discount it in deciding how to vote. The one part of the Labour appeal of 1945 to which this does not apply is that which is concerned

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with "full employment"; for, with the memory of the inter-war years yet green, the working-class electors are still deeply afraid of unemployment, and for the most part well aware that the Labour Party is much more likely than the Tories to make a whole-hearted effort to avert it, should it threaten to recur on a large scale. With a large section of the working class, this is Labour's strongest electoral card, but one that it is more than a little afraid of exposing boldly. For the Labour leaders dare not say that they know how to prevent a serious increase of unemployment in the event of a general world depression. No one honestly can say that. The most that can be said in honesty is that much more is now known than formerly about the right methods of mitigating unemployment in such a situation, and that Labour would use these methods much more fully than the Tories would be likely to do. What Labour dare not say is that it could prevent an increase in unemployment if there were simultaneously a sharp fall in exports, a diminished ability to pay for imports of foodstuffs and raw materials, and a swing-over in America from willingness to help European recovery to a scramble to export unemployment by raising tariffs on imports and by dumping American surpluses on the world market.

Nevertheless, the main body of the manual workers is well aware that its chance of good employment in a world slump is a great deal better with a Labour Government in power than it would be with the Tories; and accordingly any turn for the worse in American economic conditions near the date of the election is likely to improve Labour's chances by making the fear of unemployment a bigger factor in the electors' minds. So far, Labour has been under no need to do anything to increase the volume of employment, as distinct from seeking to improve its distribution by making new openings in the Development Areas and by influencing its flow into industries that are holding up others because they are undermanned. This situation, however, may not last until 1950; and before Labour faces the electors it may need to stress its employment policy a good deal more than it has done in its draft programme. Indeed, this may, after all, prove to be the determining issue; but no one can tell that yet.

Provided Labour has something else on which to make its popular appeal—employment policy or whatever else may offer the best prospect—it can, I think, afford to put into its

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programme substantial further instalments of socialisation without much risk of losing, or prospect of gaining, votes. Certainly, it can well afford the very limited further measures which do figure in the draft programme. The case against going faster with socialisation is not nearly so much that it would antagonise the marginal electors as that the Labour Party has not itself thought out at all clearly what more it does want, or how to go about getting it, and that it would be difficult for it to sound as if it had. For, manifestly, whereas it has been easy to isolate and to unify under public ownership the industries and services that have been taken over so far, as soon as any attempt is made to apply nationalisation to ordinary manufacturing industries much bigger difficulties of demarcation are bound to arise, as they have done already to some extent in the case of steel, and the establishment of the right kinds of controlling administration will present much more complicated problems. For my part, I welcome strongly the suggestion in the new programme that socialisation may need in future to be applied less to whole industries than to particular firms, groups, or sections; but I think no one will venture to say that the techniques of this kind of socialisation have yet been thought out—much less made intelligible to the key body of Labour supporters who will have to put the case for them across to the mass of the voters.

Over and above all this, Labour, before it can advance much further along the road of socialisation, needs to come to terms with the co-operative movement, which is at present in an unconstructively suspicious mood, and concerned much more to defend what it already holds than to consider seriously the place it intends to occupy in a predominantly socialistic system. Labour has also to solve the problems of administrative efficiency and adequate incentives in socialised services—the right degrees and forms of decentralisation compatible with central direction of policy, the advances to be made towards industrial democracy, the checks to be used in measuring the efficiency of performance in place of the private enterprise checks of potential bankruptcy and collapse. It is no bad thing to have a lower rate of advance in socialisation, provided that the pause is used for finding answers to such problems as these. The danger is that the pause may lead, not to a later advance on an improved basis, but to a lasting loss of impetus, and to an acceptance of a "mixed economy" as a permanent resting-place.

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I call this a danger, not because I am bent on socialising everything for socialisation's sake, but because I feel sure that, in the long run, a "mixed economy," resting on a continuance of capitalism over a large part of the industrial field, simply cannot be made to work, in the environment of social security and full employment to which the Labour Party is pledged up to the limit of its powers. After all, the driving force behind capitalism was the existence of a "reserve of labour," that is, of a situation which kept a high proportion of the workers in a perpetual "back-of-the-mind" fear of being out of a job. This was not, of course, the only incentive on which capitalism relied. There were also the allurements of possible promotion and of piecework payments for additional output; but these would not have sufficed to keep the labour force up to scratch unless the fear of the sack had been there as well. Piecework incentives, in particular, are notoriously inadequate where collective resistance to speeding up is strong; and the hope of promotion appeals only to a small minority, mainly among the more skilled workers, and is often offset by sentiments of trade union, or of workshop, loyalty. The conditions of social security and full employment call for an appeal to other sentiments besides—above all for a clearer understanding that a higher standard of living can be procured only by higher production, which it is the collective responsibility of the working group to promote to the best of its members' power. This sense of responsibility should be a good deal easier to arouse where there is no problem of division between wage-earners and profit-seekers to get in the way; but it is already clear that socialisation by itself will not suffice to bring the new incentives into play, and that the right forms of consultation and control of socialised industries are also indispensable.

Such matters as these, however, cannot loom large in an election programme. They are for experiments, rather than for slogans; and in the nature of things they can have no strong appeal save to those who are directly concerned. The aspect of socialisation that is of electoral importance is rather the need to convince the voters that they cannot have, as consumers, all the benefits of a socialist distributive system without having a productive system to correspond. The Labour Party can fairly argue that, in all the circumstances of to-day, it cannot go into the coming election with a big programme of socialisation, to be carried out within the next five years. But what

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is it expecting to do after that, when the enforced pause is at an end, and the situation makes possible a further advance?

Unless, by that time, the Labour Party has succeeded in convincing a majority of the electors of the need for a big further advance towards socialism, it will be reduced to a condition of political bankruptcy, with nothing at all to put in the shop window and little prospect of offering even a maintenance of what has been already set on foot. But this process of converting the electors to socialism, and not merely to the desirability of the social service state, cannot be put off till the next election but one; for, if it is put off, the arguments against going into the contest with a forthright socialist programme will be still valid in six years' time. The Labour Party, if after the pause for consolidation it really means to make a big further advance, must begin at once upon the task of convincing the electors of this necessity. To urge this is not to urge that the party should put all that it has in mind into its immediate election programme, but only that it should direct its propaganda to its long-term as well as to its immediate objectives, and should take its tasks of socialist education a good deal more seriously than it has done hitherto. In the absence of any agency fulfilling the functions which the I.L.P. and *The Clarion* used to fulfil in the Labour Party's years of adolescence, the responsibility now falls on the party for making socialists as well as for getting votes: nor can it ignore the one without imperilling its success in the other.

It may be, no doubt, that in its inner mind the Labour Party leadership is ceasing to believe in socialism as a way of life, and is coming to believe in a "mixed economy," not merely as a temporary resting-place, but as an abiding solution of the social problem. It has happened not once but many times that a party starting out with what seemed an immense reforming impulse has quickly carried out most of its immediate programme, and thereafter has simply petered out. This happened to the Liberals after 1910, to the Whig Reformers of 1832 within a very few years of their triumph, and to both parties within a decade of the Reform Act of 1867. Maybe it is going to happen now to the Labour Party, which has gone ahead so fast as almost to finish its first five years' programme with a year to spare. But there are very cogent reasons why it should not be allowed to happen now, if there is any way of preventing it. If I am right in believing that the social gains of the past

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four years cannot be held unless they are reinforced by the development of a mainly socialist productive system, and if the people are firmly set on retaining the benefits of the social service state, the effect of a relaxation of the Labour Party's will to achieve socialism is bound to be a widespread disillusionment that will be able to find no outlet except in communism; for Toryism will be even less able than a temporising Labour Party to give the people what it wants.

Accepting the necessity for an economic pause both in the re-distribution of incomes and in the socialisation programme, I am led by these considerations both to stress the need for a great campaign of socialist education, and to look around for alternative forms of more immediate advance towards socialism. It is in the absence of such alternative projects, and not in what it contains, that the most serious weakness of the new programme seems to lie. In particular, on the economic front, the obstacles to further re-distribution of incomes appear to me not to apply to proposals for the better distribution of capital. I should have liked to see, not a mere modest increase in Death Duties on large estates, but a radical attack on inheritance of wealth beyond a moderate maximum. Why cannot the Labour Party take up now the Rignano-Dalton plan whereby all estates, beyond a maximum amount, would escheat to the state at the death of the owner, subject to an annuity payable to the heir for life, and perhaps, on a reduced scale, for a second life? Why cannot we have a capital levy, which, though it might not bring in a great net revenue, would do much to diminish the inequality of fortunes and thus to prepare the way for a classless society? Why cannot we have a fresh acceptance of the fact that the rich, since they no longer provide capital by their "abstinence," have lost their social title to own capital at all, and that in future we must look to public, instead of private, investment as the source of capital accumulation?

Such an attack on the inequality of possessions could be logically complemented by an attack on class-distinctions in their political and social aspects. I have argued elsewhere that the new Labour programme ought to have included the outright abolition of the House of Lords, both because the continued existence of hereditary titles is utterly inconsistent with the democratic spirit and because now, when the legislative programme looks like not being overfull, is the best time for tackling a problem that must be tackled some time on the way to

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socialism, and is best tackled before peerages have become the common reward of long service in denouncing them. I should have liked to see, in addition, indications of a desire to reduce the inflated salaries paid in big business, and in the top ranks of some of the professions, rather than of a readiness to raise salaries in the public services, including medicine, nearer to the big business levels; for, now that the state is meeting more and more of the costs of higher education, the case for big salaries as a reward for expensive training is greatly weakened. The way to achieve the classless society is emphatically not that of promoting functional class differences in the spirit of the so-called "managerial revolution."

In sum, I am disquieted by the new programme, not because of what it says, but because of what it leaves out. I recognise the necessity, for the next five years, of completing the economic changes already set on foot and of postponing large further commitments until they can be met out of increased output without dependence on foreign help. I am not a doctrinaire "nationaliser": indeed, the fewer industries it is necessary to put under great centralised public corporations and the more varied and decentralised forms of social control the Labour Party can devise, the better I shall be pleased. I do not at all object to the continuance of a "private sector" of small-scale enterprise, provided that the main industries and services are, in one way or another, made directly amenable to public control. I want to add the joint stock banks to the socialised sector (but without amalgamating them into a single bank), because I regard their public conduct as indispensable to the effective maintenance of full employment in case of a world depression; but apart from this I have no strong feelings in favour of adding to the party's schedule of plans for early socialisation. I want an agreed policy with the co-operative movement, rather than a drift towards conflict; and I want a reform of Local Government that will strengthen the small units of neighbourhood as well as make larger units for the conduct of regional services. But these proposals could be put into the draft programme without changing its essential moderation and realism on the socialisation side. Where I feel much wider differences from those who have drafted it is where it touches—or rather fails to touch—the problems of class-structure. I do not believe in the possibility of the durable success of socialistic economic policies in a society still ridden by class-distinctions, and even

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set on accentuating them where they arise out of "earned" incomes, and by the conferment of titles on trade union and co-operative leaders. I am a radical individualist as well as a socialist; and I am convinced that the Labour Party, if it forgets its radicalism, will speedily lay aside its socialism as well. I am not saying that this has happened yet: indeed, I rely on the party stalwarts in the trade unions and the constituencies to prevent it. Nevertheless, I do get an unpleasant hint of it between the lines of the somewhat uninspiring document entitled, "Labour believes in"—not socialism, but merely "Britain." In what sort of "Britain," pray? Surely in a socialist Britain, even if the advance towards it is bound to be slower than the socialists, who made the party and put it into power, have been used to believe.

MUSIC IN MOSCOW

By LEONARD WOOLF

THE position of the artist in the totalitarian state is a difficult one, but the position of the totalitarian state and its dictators in the world of art has its own difficulties. The police state of Louis XVI did its best to keep its writers and musicians in order, but Voltaire, the Encyclopædists, and even *Le Mariage de Figaro* played an important part in destroying it. In our age of large scale industry and large scale empires and governments and armies, the police state, no doubt, is much more efficient than it was in the 18th or even the 19th century. During the last 30 years in Germany, Italy, Russia, and Spain, where the methods of the Greater Police States can best be studied, the scale of persecution of groups, individuals, and ideas by governments has, like the scale of all state enterprises, reached a size undreamt of even in the rosiest dreams of dead dictators. Efficiency in state suppression of persons and thoughts has probably increased as much as the scale. If you kill, imprison, or deprive of his means of livelihood one man in a population of millions because he persists in believing that two plus two equals four, you will probably have no effect upon the belief of the rest of the population regarding the sum of two and two; but if the number of persons liquidated runs into hundreds of thousands, I and many other people may find it advisable to

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revise our beliefs about arithmetic. And if the state tells the artist who expresses ideas in words, paint, or notes of music what he is to say and how he is to say it and gives him the alternatives between obedience and silence, death, or starvation, the great majority of artists will naturally choose either obedience or silence, and the government and its police state will triumph. Hitler enjoyed this kind of triumph and so today does Stalin, and yet, as we shall see, the position of neither dictator in this world of policed art and obedient or liquidated artists has been altogether easy.

The Soviet Government and the Russian Communist Party have had considerable trouble with the problem of fitting art and artists into the totalitarian, police state. Up to last year they had confined their attention mainly to the painters and writers. Artists in the Soviet Union enjoy freedom, but it is the kind of freedom which is enjoyed by the fly entangled in the spider's web. They have their own organizations or unions in which they manage their own affairs, but their unions are entangled in the all-embracing web of the Communist Party, and the Communist Party is the instrument of the spider, the Government or dictator who sits in the middle of the web. The Party issues its orders or directives on what kind of works of art should be produced and how they should be produced—sometimes in the form of decrees of the Central Committee of the C.P.—and woe betide the artist or union of artists if the order is not obeyed. For the free artist of the Soviet democracy who does not obey these orders will, at best, find that his books are not published or his pictures are not exhibited. The difficulty is that the Party line on art is not always a straight line; it has a tendency to wobble into a curve. For instance, at one time Soviet pictures had to be "modern"; the Soviet Democracy had to show that it was ahead of the world in everything and therefore more up to date than the day after tomorrow. So there was a riot of abstract art. But when Stalin and his stooges saw these works of art, they were outraged; they felt exactly what the President of the Royal Academy feels when he looks at the works of Matisse, Picasso, or presumably Glotto. The taste of Hitler, Stalin, and The Royal Academy is the same; in their view the more nearly a picture resembles a coloured photograph, the greater it is as a work of art. But in Russia the mere coloured photograph painted in oils which satisfies our Royal Academy is not enough

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The Communist dictator has enacted that the Soviet Academician shall show that he is different from the bourgeois Academician of Burlington House; he must not only paint pictures that look like photographs; their subjects must be proletarian and communist, appeal immediately and directly to the ordinary man, celebrate the glory of Russia, the Soviet system, and Marxism, and reflect the healthy optimism of the People's Democracy in contrast to the pathological pessimism of the decadent, bourgeois, western art. I have had no opportunity of seeing the products of Soviet art, but from all accounts the "strictly realist—socialist realist—pictures in which preferably Lenin and Stalin figure"* are, as works of art, indistinguishable, except in subject, from those painted in Berlin under the auspices of Adolph Hitler or in London under the auspices of The Royal Academy.

The history of literature under Russian communism followed much the same course as that of painting. In the early period, when the Government had its hands full with war and economics, here was no time to tighten the screws of the police state on the writers and they were left more or less alone. There emerged several interesting and original writers, particularly short story writers or novelists, though none of them was comparable to the great novelists of the Tsarist era. But freedom, even of the novelist, is incompatible with the existence of the police state, and after a time the Government decided that the writer must write only what the dictator told him to write. The screws were turned; popular writers who had been previously held up as glories of the Soviet system, like Zoschenko and Anna Akhmatova, were publicly attacked by Party mugwumps, like the great Zhdanov; the shutter came down even upon Sholokhov. The effect has been to reduce Soviet literature to the level of Soviet painting. The process is described by Mr. Werth as follows:

"The writer, in Stalin's phrase, must be the 'engineer of human souls'. Literature, in post-war Russia, is expected to be *functional* and *educative*: its purpose is to *inspire* the readers to acquire and develop a Party-consciousness, a Soviet-consciousness, and all those other civic and political virtues with which the heroes of modern Soviet fiction are so richly endowed. Literature has become

* Alexander Werth: *Musical Uproar in Moscow* (Turnstile Press, 6/-). Mr. Werth, far from unfriendly to Soviet Russia, is an unprejudiced witness to the effects of communism upon Russian painters.

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a sort of School of Citizenship which teaches you to love your Soviet country, to be a good Communist, to love Stalin, to hate the American Warmongers, and to despise everything foreign that is not distinctly pro-Soviet. The success of a novel or a play in Russia is not left to chance, or to the whims of the reading or theatre-going public. If the Government and the Party approve of a play like Simonov's *Russian Question*, it will not only be played in 600 theatres throughout the country, but will also be turned into a film, which thousands of cinemas will show. Very few foreign countries were tempted to translate Fadeyev's *Young Guard*—a dreary hack-work in which the heroic passions and deeds of the underground resistance organisation are described with the literary finesse of Ethel M. Dell. Nevertheless, as Fadeyev boasted at the Wroclaw Congress, two million copies of this work have been published in Russia."

Music in Moscow was more fortunate than its sister arts; for a time the Party and the Government, for the most part, left the composers alone. The nature of music makes it less easy to pervert it into a crude instrument of political propaganda than a book or a picture, the authors of which can be drilled or starved until they say what their masters order them to say. A symphony or a concerto cannot say anything in that sense at all, and is not an instrument which can "develop a Party-consciousness" or "a Soviet-consciousness" or can teach any one to be a good communist or love Stalin. That perhaps was the reason why there was not much interference with music, though there were some premonitory grumblings and threatenings from the mugwumps in 1936 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party rapped the composers' knuckles in an article in *Pravda* for not writing music which expressed "Soviet realism." The attack, however, was not followed up and the achievements of Soviet music were tremendously boosted. In the next 12 years the Big Four Russian composers emerged as the most praised and boosted, the glory of Soviet music: Miaskovsky, Shostakovich, Prokofiev, and Khachaturian. Their position seemed unassailable; they were officially proclaimed to be the greatest of living composers and continually rewarded with Stalin prizes.

And then suddenly in 1948 the Government applied to music the process which it had previously applied to literature and

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painting. In January, 1948, Zhdanov of the C.C., who two years before had violently denounced Zoschenko and Anna Akhmatova, called a conference of musicians and denounced the Big Four. In the following February the C.C. published a Decree on Music in which "Comrades Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian, Shebalin, Popov, Miaskovsky" were condemned as adherents of "the formalist and anti-people school"; "their works," says the decree, "are marked by formalist perversions, anti-democratic tendencies which are alien to the Soviet people and their artistic tastes." Mr. Werth's book, which has just been published and from which I have already quoted, *Musical Uproar in Moscow*, makes it possible for the West European to study the facts of this strange performance. It gives the Decree and also a verbatim report of Zhdanov's conference, his own speech and the speeches of the unfortunate musicians who had to kow-tow to authority. For the first time we get a real glimpse behind the iron curtain of the domestic relations between the state and its servile artists, of the way in which the Soviet bosses treat art, thought, and civilization. * It should be read in conjunction with another book on Russian music, also just published, *Realist Music*, by Rena Moisenko (Meridian Books. 15s.). Madame Moisenko gives an account of the lives and music of the leading Soviet composers. But the important fact with regard to her book is that she is a wholehearted follower of the Party line and that her book was written before Zhdanov's attack upon the Big Four and their condemnation in the Decree of the C.C. She, therefore, tells us that it is a fallacy to believe that "music in the Soviet Union is State controlled, that the Soviet composer is not a free agent." It is to be hoped that in a new edition she will give us her reflections upon the events revealed by Mr. Werth. Those events have, of course, also made her judgments of individual composers out-of-date, and they too will need revision. Though the premonitory rumblings against Shostakovich, Prokofiev, and even Khachaturian's "Symphony-Poem" on the ground of "formalism" are faithfully recorded and reflected, the "great" composers are praised for possessing precisely those qualities, "attuned to the epoch of socialism," for not possessing which they have now been denounced by the Soviet rulers.

* It is significant that, according to Mr. Werth, the Soviet papers announced last March that the verbatim report would shortly be published. It was published, but only a very few copies were on sale. It looks as if, when it came to the point, even the Party bosses became uneasy at the probable effects of these revelations upon the reputation of communist society.

SOVIET STUDIES

A Quarterly Review of the Social and Economic Institutions of the U.S.S.R.

THIS new quarterly journal, which began in June, is intended primarily for specialists on the U.S.S.R. and in the social sciences generally. It will also appeal, however, to many non-specialist readers who seek responsible and intelligible information on these subjects—information prepared by scholars and presented without political bias.

BASIL BLACKWELL · OXFORD

more important the question of government and side, and the point of view of Zhdanov and the ignored as "a and sometimes he Big Four, "formalism" anti-people." learn what this far as it is not say any thing a portrait of d for political masterpieces of t der Fuge, a eethoven, and in a capitalist m or politics. human mind are concerned ng to do with ak Zhdanov's okofiev wrote o their lights, language, not igh they were othing about s to be learnt rdinary man, opera, cannot unless he has iage. To say, el before him can be imme- pple" strikes patest achieve- ate instructed mathematicians and physicists that they must not work with any figures, formulae, or ideas which are not immediately

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intelligible to the man in the street. The whole thing is nonsense, but for the Russian people it is tragic nonsense.

The motive behind the nonsense is obvious. The dictators in a totalitarian police state become the prisoners of their own system. They begin with the theory that political freedom of thought and any political "deviation" are too dangerous to be tolerated. Gradually the necessity to extend the sphere of control from politics proper to all other departments of human life and activity asserts itself—power, unless it is itself controlled, always acts like a cancer in the human mind and human society. The time soon comes when the artist has to be made into a cog in the machine of power. He must say only what the machine says, and the machine says only what the dictators say. He must be "party conscious" and "Soviet conscious"; he must sing the praises of the machine and of those who control it. His art must be transformed into an instrument of the machine's propaganda, and he must speak the language, not of his art, but of the people, for propaganda which is not "immediately understood by the people" is obviously useless as propaganda.

These facts explain the attitude adopted by Zhdanov and the Soviet dictatorship to music and musicians. The "formalism" of the symphony writers is condemned precisely because the symphony cannot say any thing, can be neither capitalist nor communist. The composer who writes a symphony manages to wriggle out of the grasp of the machine. He is teaching no one to be "party conscious" or "Soviet conscious" or to love Stalin. He is using a language which has nothing to do with politics and is not even understood by the majority of the population. He is, therefore, anti-people. Hence Zhdanov's condemnation of the "symphonists" and their excommunication by the C.C. And hence the "directive" that composers must write popular songs, operas, and programme music which every one can understand, which are "realist," and which can teach the common people to love communism, the party, the machine, Stalin, and Russia.

The effect of this system upon the artist is catastrophic. If society dictates to the artist, within limits, *what* he is to say, some of them may well be able to produce good or great art within those limits. If society demands pictures of a religious content, representing Madonnas and Holy Families, many artists—though not all—will be able to make the subject subserve their art and may produce masterpieces. What is

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fatal to all art and artists is that society should dictate to them, not merely what they shall say, but how they shall say it. For the artist is then forced, not to make his subject subserve his art, but to force his art to subserve the subject or, what is worse, a lifeless political machine or an ignorant or crazy dictator. The result can be seen in the pitiful spectacle which the composers present in the report of their conference with Zhdanov. The genuine artist, like Miaskovsky or Shostakovich, is either silenced or browbeaten into unhappy confusion; the lickspittles and timeservers stab them in the back and then climb over their backs into the seats of favour and power.

The reply of the communist to all this is that the bourgeois artist in the capitalist world has never been free; he has been the instrument of capitalism. It is true that capitalist society, by its laws and its own economic system, has interfered with the complete freedom of the writer, painter, and composer, and it has often in doing so damaged them and itself. But it has never attempted to control the artist in the way in which the state is now controlling him in Russia. It has sometimes told him in a general way what he must say and what he must not say if he is to be successful; it has never given him minute directions as to how he shall say it. Some genuine artists have been perverted by desire for wealth which is one of the diseases of the capitalist system; but the system allowed the artist sufficient freedom to develop his art in his own way, whether he was El Greco or Rembrandt, Dante or Boccaccio, Bach or Mozart. None of these artists would have been tolerated in the Moscow of Stalin and Zhdanov: they would have been denounced as "formalist," "anti-realist," and "anti-people."

In the previous paragraphs I have been discussing the effect of this kind of totalitarianism and dictatorship upon the artists and art. It is completely destructive of both. A good many people realize this, but few see that it is equally destructive to the dictators, the Government, and the people. To strike at the roots of human freedom in the realm of thought and art, as the Soviet Government and the Russian Communist Party are doing, is to strike at the roots of civilization. To force the artist endlessly to repeat in words or paint or to the accompaniment of simple tunes the stale dogmas of communist politics and economics and mechanical hymns of praise to communism and Stalin degrades the artist by turning him into a frightened parrot, but it degrades even more hopelessly the people and the

rulers of the people. The kind of intellectual degradation which appears in the Central Committee's Decree, Zhdanov's speech, and the ludicrous speeches of the composers is a fatal symptom in any nation or Government. A society in which, from top to bottom, all belief in the values of truth and art has been lost is in a perilous condition. For the rulers themselves lose all touch with reality. You can see this in Zhdanov's speech; he not only talks nonsense; he lives in a world of nonsense; he has lost touch with reality and has no conception of what is happening in the world outside the narrow circle of communist politics. It is the fate which sooner or later overtakes all dictators who, because they are all-powerful in a narrow circle, come to believe that they are so powerful that they can ignore facts and truth. The nemesis of facts is inexorable to those who think that by telling lies and forcing others to agree with your lies you can abolish truth. Some will object that I am making too much of this musical interlude in Moscow and that it does not matter much if Stalin and Zhdanov talk nonsense about so unimportant a thing as art. But it is a mistake to think that a Government which apotheosizes nonsense in thought and art can confine their own delusions to "unimportant" questions. The dictator who begins by ignoring non-political facts for political or economic purposes ends by ignoring political and economic facts for political and economic purposes, and then he is a menace not only to other people but also to himself.

UNIVERSITY DEVELOPMENT

By KENNETH LINDSAY, M.P.

THE present crisis in British universities depends very largely on the question of numbers, but even if the pre-war figure of 50,000 students had remained constant instead of jumping to 83,000, there would remain two significant questions outstanding, namely the selection of students and the re-statement of purpose in the light of modern scientific developments. It is true that the increased financial contribution from the Treasury has to some extent changed the nature of the University Grants Committee, but there is a wide measure of agreement on the broad questions of academic freedom and university autonomy. Some legitimate direction must be given

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to the development of specialist studies, in order to secure a balance as between different universities, but these are matters which can be hammered out amicably by the University Grants Committee and the various universities receiving grants.

The basic question is numbers. In an age when few parents can afford the outlay of £250 for three or four years it is inevitable that the majority of students must be assisted partly or wholly, both in respect of fees and maintenance. Indeed the universities have approached an era comparable to that of secondary education, but with one important difference. In the field of secondary education, there is at present a second or third alternative. A child may qualify for an extended grammar school education or for a secondary technical or for a secondary modern education probably finishing at about the age of 15 or 16. Moreover the law of the land is secondary education for all, according to abilities and aptitudes. The principle of universality is accepted, whatever the precise arrangement of schools. But in the case of the university no principle is accepted, each institution is responsible for its own selection and intake, no intelligence test is remotely agreed, and no comparable alternative course of studies exists, except perhaps the Senior Technical College and a variety of part-time evening and correspondence courses which preclude some of the essentials of a university life, as conceived in this country.

There is involved a further question of public policy which, sooner or later, demands an answer. On the one hand the state has some responsibility to see that certain national needs, in the shape of trained men and women, are met. This responsibility prompted the publication of the Barlow Report, which was primarily concerned with the training of scientists. But there are other needs. The National Health Act could not work without the requisite number of doctors and dentists, including specialists. The universities themselves will break down without a larger number of trained lecturers. The National Education Act of 1944 is already running into difficult waters due to the shortage of graduate teachers for specific subjects, particularly science and mathematics. These basic needs of the modern state could be multiplied to a point which would necessitate X number of students being trained if necessary at Government expense.

On the other hand a university policy which concerned itself solely with meeting basic national needs would quickly

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degenerate into a narrow professional outlook and the whole conception of a university would be changed within a decade. It is one thing to pay regard to the absorption capacity of the professions, but quite another to base the university curricula on such a straitened and closed conception of national welfare. The fact remains that eleven out of sixteen students will be wholly supported by state or local funds, taxes or rates, and a powerful body of opinion represented by the Trades Union Congress, the National Union of Teachers, and the National Union of Students is campaigning for free university education.

The problems raised by central planning, on the lines adopted by the University Grants Committee, raise no questions of such far-reaching importance as those outlined above. As the * report of the Committee says "The principles of central planning and of academic autonomy are not irreconcilable opposites. Far from that being so, we believe that the relationship between the state and the universities which is now being evolved may properly be conceived as a form of partnership" and again "The very large sums voted by Parliament are entrusted to the universities without the detailed control of expenditure which is no doubt proper in some other fields of government subvention." This happy relationship is largely due to the tactful disposition of Sir Walter Moberly. It is significant that in the same report he writes of the problem of selection of students: "What basis of selection then is the university to adopt for the majority of its students? . . . There is an unsolved problem to which universities must now address themselves. It is to devise a method of selection or a combination of methods, which facilitates the intuitive discernment of excellence and which will not only be, but also be seen to be, fair as between man and man." It is even more significant that in a more recent work† he writes: "Beneath the facade of development and hopefulness, the British universities to-day share with the universities of the world a peculiar malaise and impotence. There will be much profitable discussion of these larger issues in the years to come, as indeed there has been since Newman wrote the *Idea of a University*, but it is high time discussion also condescended to particulars and dwelt on the more mundane matters of finance, selection, employment of

* *University Development* (1935-1947), being the report of the University Grants Committee (H.M.S., 2s.).

† *The Crisis in the University* (S.C.M. Press, 15s.).

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graduates, technological colleges and the role of local education authorities."

The essential problem can be stated in another way: "Accepting the assumption that there exists a great reserve of uncultivated capacity, what proportion of its population is society prepared to withhold from gainful occupations until the age of 21 or 22?" This question is asked by the *Nuffield College Report. It should be noticed that with 18 months National Service the age of 21 or 22 might well have to be raised to 23 or 24. Moreover the bulge in the birth-rate, coupled with larger numbers staying on in the sixth forms of secondary schools, will aggravate the problem of numbers seeking university education. Superficial comparisons with the United States may be discounted, partly because the whole American economy is differently geared and vertical mobility in society is still more flexible than in any other country, and partly because the American College is a peculiar and native growth related to an entirely different system of public education. The distinguished President of an American University has doubted whether the universities in a laudable endeavour to give everyone what they want will not end by giving nobody what they want. The element of intellectual competition is almost wholly missing from American education, whether in the selection of students, in the award of scholarships, or in the progress of students. For this and many other reasons it is now proposed to finance deserving students by federal aid, to assist the establishment of two-year colleges, and thus to save four-year colleges and universities for students who are worthy of the longer course. The root difference between the American and the British conceptions of university education lies in the place of professional training. Much of our professional training takes place outside the university: most if not all professional training in America takes place within the walls of the university. The control of higher technological education in Britain rests uneasily divided between the University Grants Committee and the Ministry of Education. This is one reason why we have suffered from the lack of colleges of university rank in which engineering and allied subjects are taught. Although the Percy Report was published five years ago and although Sir Henry Tizard and others have pointed out the supreme importance of developing a limited number

* *The Problem Facing British Universities*. (Oxf. Univ. Press, 5s.).

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of technical colleges into institutions of university status, no action has yet been taken.

It is far too early to say what the effect of the new General Examination will be on university recruitment and studies. Over-specialization may be an unmitigated evil, but in recent discussion its incidence has been exaggerated. A complete absence of specialization is no less dangerous. At the age of 16 boys and girls are ready and anxious to concentrate their energies and interests in a more restricted field, and from such work they will receive their main educational stimulus. The requirements of the universities will largely dictate the pattern of sixth form work: the universities are responsible to see that their entrants have a well-grounded education. The compromise solution arrived at by the Secondary Schools Examination Council, whereby no boy or girl may take the Public Examination until the age of 16, has forced schools and universities to re-consider the fundamental question of general and specialist education. It would appear that even the words "general" and "specialist" need re-definition in the light of modern knowledge. The idea of a liberal education has suffered some rude shocks in recent years and few people would agree on the essential ingredients of a liberal education in 1950. It would, however, be generally agreed that a university is distinguished by its range of studies, as contrasted with more specialized institutions and also by the character of the teaching which assumes that a proportion of the teachers are also interested in advancing the frontiers of knowledge, sometimes called research. Some would say, with the Nuffield Report, that the university's part remains primarily the study of fundamental sciences that underly professional studies.

If these general definitions are accepted, the outstanding question is to relate the numbers desiring a university education to the numbers capable of profiting from a university education. In the field of grammar schools the answer is obtained by a combination of examination, intelligence tests, and school-reports. By a curious irony of events the competition to enter the grammar school is more severe to-day than before the 1944 Act was passed. Unless new university institutions are created there will be equal competition to enter existing universities for the simple reason that both ancient and modern universities, have, with few exceptions, reached their optimum size. There must be some selective process at work right through

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the educational system, if as in the past private finance is not to be a powerful, albeit unconscious, factor. If the principle is accepted that fee-payers, by virtue of parental income, are not to enter the university at a lower standard of attainment, then the universities must find ways and means of selecting some 16,000 entrants a year. No mere change in the nomenclature of schools or examinations provides any escape from this dilemma. A recent* broadsheet from P E P suggests that universities should devise some preliminary hurdle which fairly and effectively reduces the field for careful selection to manageable proportions. It remains to see whether local education authorities will be content to act as paymasters, divorced more and more from personal responsibility for the holders of their local bursaries. The final solution of this division of labour, as between university, state and local education authority has not been thought out. Still less has any acceptable method been suggested for providing a clearing house between university and university. In this respect perfect fairness cannot be realized, but a much nearer approach to rough justice is now necessary. When I was in the sixth form of a London grammar school thirty years ago, it often happened that a boy would sit three or four times before securing a scholarship to one or other college at Oxford and Cambridge; he would then apply to numerous Trusts and Foundations to supplement his scholarship. To-day the problem is different. A boy or girl may well apply to half-a-dozen different universities before securing admission; if then he or she lives in a generous area, the local education authority will pay the full cost of education and maintenance subject to a parents income test. The effect of this change is to distribute students on a more national scale, though of course local education authorities, with their rising expenditure, may begin to raise objection to sending students to distant universities. This is perhaps an additional reason for increasing the total number of institutions in the country. There is room for experiment in the type of institution, as there is in university curriculum, and the proposed college at Stoke, sponsored by Oxford, Manchester and Birmingham universities, has the opportunity of pioneering in an area long famous for its adult education classes.

If it is not feasible to permit more than a small percentage of students to enter within the walls of a full-time university

* *The University Student*. (Published by P E P, 16, Queen Anne's Gate, S.W.1. 2s.).

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course, there is happily no limit to the development of extra-mural study. Universities have now carved out regions for adult education and more and more, as with training colleges, are tending to take many branches of higher education under their wing. In each case the living link is the university teacher, while often the library and other amenities are widely shared. The only practical answer to the question of numbers is to bring the university to the people. Indeed the Report of the University Grants Committee speaks for extra-mural education as a necessary and integral part of the normal activity of a university. It adds an important rider that the special function of the universities is to foster intensive study and to maintain a high standard of qualitative achievement among those engaged in it.

The consensus of informed opinion in Britain comes down heavily on the side of quality and standards as against a merely quantitative conception of university development. It is not only a question of national finance: much more it is the preservation of a unique relationship between teacher and taught, combined with a period of common living preferably in a residential hall or college. With the existing student population there will be required a capital outlay of over £50 million on halls of residence, with a corresponding demand on labour and materials. In like manner a considerable increase is required in university staff, if there is to be any pretence of preserving the personal contact between students and matured minds. Thus, while there are some alternatives to a full-time university education and while we may hope to see some material increase in professional training in outside institutions, there is a practical limit to the development of universities within the next decade. Wisdom dictates that we consolidate the hurried advances of post-war years and concentrate all energies on raising standards to the level of the best. Britain needs a larger university population, but it needs equally the stamp of quality on its university products.

SOVIET LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS

By PROFESSOR JOHN N. HAZARD

FOUR years have passed since the end of the war, yet the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has not yet held an All-Union Congress. The party deputies from the provinces and Republics last gathered in Moscow ten years ago. The Congress is, therefore, seven years overdue since the party rules require All-Union Congresses to be held not less often than once in three years. Confusion caused by the war can be accepted by foreign students of Soviet politics as the reason for part of the delay, but much time has passed since peace has been restored. The Communist Party alone of Soviet political institutions has not yet resumed its peacetime schedule of meetings for its mass organization. The Soviets, the trade unions, and even the Communist Party's youth organization, the Komsomol, have all held meetings of their all-union mass agencies since the war. Is there significance in the delay, and what may be expected when a congress is finally held? This paper will suggest some of the lines of approach to these questions.

I.

Preparations are apparently being made for an All-Union Congress of the party. Party conferences have been held in provinces, and party congresses have been held in Republics during the past twelve months. Under the Communist Party's system of representation, no All-Union Party Congress of delegates chosen since the war could be held until the provincial conferences and republic congresses had met. Unlike the Soviets, the delegates to the All-Union Congress of the party are not elected directly. Party members vote directly only as members of their "Primary Party Organizations" for representatives in the district or city conferences. These agencies in turn appoint representatives to sit in the provincial conferences in the largest Republic, the R.S.F.S.R., or in the Republic congresses in the fifteen Union Republics other than the R.S.F.S.R. The largest Republic has no Republic congress, for its provincial conferences rank equally with the Republic congresses in the smaller Republics. Delegates to the All-Union Congress come forward from the provincial party conferences in the R.S.F.S.R. and from the Republic party

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ongresses in the other fifteen Union Republics. They could not have been selected since the war, therefore, until the lower agencies of the party had met and voted.

Such an indirect system of election obviously retards election procedures. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was elected shortly after the war, and met in March, 1946. The elections for Supreme Soviets in the Republics were not held until 1947, and elections for provincial and local Soviets not until late 1947 and early 1948. The system of direct election of deputies to Soviets at all levels permitted relatively prompt reforming of the various Soviets from the top down. The party organization could not proceed in this fashion. It had to reform from the bottom up. But so did the trade unions and the Komsomols. Their rules call for similar indirect elections. The deputies in their top bodies come from agencies at the lower levels in the case of the Komsomols, or from the All-Union Congress of each trade union in the case of the All-Union Congress of trade unions. The indirect system of election in the Komsomols and trade unions took time, apparently, for their All-Union bodies did not meet until early in 1949. These facts provide evidence in support of a thesis that the mechanics of election could account for much of the delay in calling an All-Union Party Congress, but it is not sufficient alone to explain all of the delay. There seem to be more impelling considerations.

The provincial conferences and Republic congresses left a record which provides some clue as to what may be delaying the holding of an All-Union Party Congress. Two themes appear in the Communist Party press concerning the work of the provincial conferences and Republic congresses. One has to do with the inadequacy of political education among party members. The other concerns the role party members should play in the conduct of affairs of state. The themes bear examination.

Political education among party members was found to have become inadequate from top to bottom during the war. Criticism was levelled not solely at the rank and file of party members, but at the party officials on the provincial and Republic levels as well. They were accused of being inadequately schooled in party doctrine, namely the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. They were not evil deviationists. They were simply uninformed conformists.

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Schooling was ordered for all. As an example it has been explained that in a province of the Komi Autonomous Republic, 5,000 party members were carrying on no political studies whatever. A higher school under the Central Committee of the party has been created, while a network of party schools has been established at lower levels. All party leaders in provincial and lower party agencies have been ordered to attend them to improve their political education over the next three to four years.

Statistics on membership support the thesis that large numbers of party members are untrained for the type of leadership Lenin originally conceived. Lenin had called in 1903 for a party composed of professional revolutionaries who understood what they were doing and who were prepared to work. Lenin's formula had been diluted in practice to some degree after the revision of the rules in 1939, and less emphasis was placed upon political education. Members were admitted in such numbers during the war that political education must have suffered. The party had 2,400,000 members and candidates in 1939. On the eve of the German attack in 1941 the total had risen to 3,800,000. At the end of the war in 1945 the total was 5,700,000 and by 1947 it was 6,300,000. It has held above 6,000,000 to the present day.

Not only has the membership increased sharply, but there has been a marked turnover in the individuals comprising it. From scattered statistics, it is possible to compute that during 1942 alone about 500,000 party members were killed. Soviet policy of placing party members in perilous positions of leadership during the war and Hitler's policy of executing party members who were captured seem to have depleted party ranks. The influx of young battle and production heroes during the war raised the total membership to the highest levels in party history, but the political quality was reduced. It was like monetary inflation—more party members but the leadership "buying power" of each one was seriously impaired. When the war was over, the party announced in 1946 that two-thirds of the members and candidates had been admitted during the preceding five years. Of the total membership and candidates, two-thirds were said to be under thirty-five years of age, and 18.3 per cent. under the age of twenty-five, compared with 8.9 per cent. under the age of twenty-five before the war. Clearly, the bulk of the party

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membership was youthful and relatively unschooled in political theory and practical politics. Schooling was to be relied upon to improve the members.

The role party members should play in the conduct of affairs of state is reported as the second major theme of the provincial conferences and party congresses. It was explained that during the war party members had been drawn into operating functions of government. There is evidence at the top that such was the case, for on the eve of the German attack in 1941 Stalin had assumed his first governmental post in becoming Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. After the attack he assumed the post of Commissar of Defence. The published accounts of western statesmen who met Stalin at Teheran and Yalta indicate that he was engaged in the day to day detailed conduct of military operations.

Party commentators explain that involvement in operations of government was necessary and desirable during the war, but that the time has now come for party members to withdraw from operations. Persons conversant with Soviet affairs know that party members have always been scattered through many units, whether they were factories, universities, Soviets, ministries or farms. Nevertheless the pattern of organization usually called for a technical director, or a Dean, under the party member who headed the agency. Policy was guided by the party member, but paper work was carried out by the technical director or the Dean.

At the war's end, Stalin withdrew from his post as Commissar of the Armed Forces, leaving it to another member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party, namely, Bulganin. Stalin retained his post as Chairman of the Council of Ministers (as it was renamed in 1946 with the abandonment of the historic title "Council of People's Commissars"). Reports indicate that even in this post he has been less available to outsiders, such as ambassadors or special envoys, to discuss detail. He has apparently reserved himself for policy alone. To be sure, his advancing age and what must have been a measure of war weariness could have accounted for this withdrawal from operations, but the record of the provincial conferences and Republic congresses indicates that the reason may have been less personal and more a reflection of general policy. Party members were all advised to withdraw from operations.

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Personal elements and changes in the tactics of foreign policy may well have influenced the series of changes in top administrative positions in 1949. Molotov has turned over his foreign affairs portfolio to Vyshinsky. Mikoyan has delivered his papers as Minister of Foreign Trade to Menshikov. Bulganin as Minister of Defence has been replaced by Marshal Vassilevsky. All three men who have been withdrawn seem to have retained their positions on the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party. It may be that their change in position is symbolical of a mass withdrawal of policy makers from operations, so as to permit them to think through the exacting questions of postwar policy. The postwar All-Union Congress of the party may have been delayed, in part, by the necessity of clearing the desks of party members of operating documents awaiting their initials so that they could give full attention to the policy questions for which suggested solutions must be presented to the All-Union Party Congress when it next meets.

II.

The agenda for the first postwar All-Union Congress of the Communist Party will probably include two principal items: revision of the party rules and adoption of a new party programme. The first of these should not be exceptionally complicated to prepare, but the second will probably introduce important new matters into Communist Party politics. There are some foreign students of Soviet politics who believe that this fact alone could have been sufficient reason for the delay in holding the All-Union Congress.

Revision of the party rules is expected to centre on the question of admission to membership. Malenkov, who was then Third Secretary of the Party, after First Secretary Stalin and Second Secretary Zhdanov, announced in the autumn of 1947 that the provisions concerning membership were being reconsidered. The statistics already set forth indicate the extensive growth of the party during the war. This had been possible, partly because of the relaxation of requirements for admission in 1939. A reflection of the changed attitude may be found in the fact that with 1943 the differentiation between candidates for membership and full-fledged members was no longer made in the announcement of total membership. Prior to that time, and as late as 1941, the statistics were given in

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two columns and a distinction drawn. No one had been surprised that the distinction was drawn, for the period of candidacy was important as a training period. It was set in the rules applicable before the 1939 revisions at one year in duration for the preferred categories of applicants and two years for others. Even with the revision in 1939 the period of candidacy was not reduced below one year.

The history of revisions in the party rules indicates a series of changes in the severity of requirements for admission. In 1905 the second congress of the party had rejected the principle of self-enrolment, but it established no principle of individual examination in a precise, concrete form. The sixth congress in August, 1917, provided that applicants must have the recommendation of two members of the party. The eighth congress in December, 1919, established a stage of candidacy and graduated it in accordance with one's social background, it being not less than two months for workmen and poor peasants and not less than six months for others. In exceptional cases, a person with recommendations of two party members who had joined before the October revolution of 1917, could be admitted without a period of candidacy, if it were in the course of a "party week" and in conformity with the instructions of the Central Committee of the party.

The perils believed inherent in the development of the new economic policy with its emphasis upon a measure of private enterprise seem to have been reflected in the revisions of 1922. The eleventh party congress in April, 1922, resolved to change the basis for admission into the party in order to restrict admission of elements not purely proletarian, and three categories of applicants were created: (1) workmen, and soldiers who came from worker or peasant families, (2) peasants and handicraftsmen not exploiting the work of others, and (3) others (office workers, etc.). For both the first and second categories the recommendation of three members of three years' standing was required. For the second category there was the further requirement of confirmation by the provincial party committee. For the third category, the recommendation of five members of five years' standing plus confirmation by the provincial party committee was required. Periods of candidacy were established at not less than six months for the first category, one year for the second, and two years for the third category applicants.

A reduction to two recommendations by members of two years' standing, from the previously required three recommendations from members of three years' standing, was voted at the twelfth party congress in April, 1923, for industrial workmen, working at the bench. Special concessions were also made to those who entered the party from the ranks of the Komsomols. The period of candidacy for the second and third categories was extended temporarily by one year so that no applicant would be admitted during 1923-24 except from the first category of industrial workmen. This principle of exclusion was extended further in 1924 by the thirteenth party congress, which voted to close admission of all non-proletarian elements. Bench workmen who could not provide recommendations because they were not acquainted with members were to be aided. They could be admitted after the party organization with the help of a general meeting of workmen in the place of employment had verified their records.

Subsequent changes eliminated the exclusion of non-proletarian elements, but requirements for admission were very strict. By 1934 the rules had established five categories: (1) industrial workmen with a record of five years' production; (2) industrial workmen of less experience, workers on state farms, soldiers of workman or collective farm origin, and engineers or technicians working in the shops; (3) collective farmers, artisans working in co-operatives, and elementary school teachers; (4) other employees; and (5) former members of other political parties. The number of recommendations required varied from three members of five years' standing in category one; five recommendations of party members of five years' standing for the second category; the same requirement for the third category plus the recommendation of a representative of the political department of the local machine tractor station or of the District Party Committee; five recommendations of party members of ten years' standing for the fourth category; and for the fifth category five recommendations of party members, two of whom had been members before the revolution and three of whom were of ten years' standing, plus the endorsement of the Central Committee of the party.

The 1939 amendments to the rules reduced the requirements as indicated, and eliminated the distinction between the first four categories, leaving only the fifth category with special

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requirements. This change benefited the peasants primarily, and was in accord with the principle of equality between workman and peasant, which had been established in the electoral provisions of the 1936 constitution.

Malenkov's comment as to the necessity of strengthening the requirements for admission indicates that the next All-Union Party Congress will move away from what has been the practice under the existing rules. In view of the emphasis upon the achievement of socialism with the attendant equality between workman and collective farmer, it seems unlikely that there will be a return to the system of categorization depending upon social origin or occupation. The only steps possible within the limits of current general policy would seem to be an increase in the number of recommendations required, or in the period of candidacy. Present rules call for ratification of all proposed admissions by the district or city party committee. It might be possible for the party to require ratification by the provincial or Republic party agencies before membership is complete, but there has been no indication of such a decision, for there has been no demonstration to date of a lack of confidence in the district party committees.

Revision of the party programme will be a major event in party history. Unlike the rules, which have been amended frequently, the programme has remained unchanged since 1919. The party has recognized the need for change by appointing a committee to revise it. This committee was given its mandate at the last congress before the war, in 1939, but it has not yet presented a public report. Nothing has been stated as to its deliberations, except the remarks of Malenkov in 1947 concerning the rules. He declared that a revision of the programme was also in process.

The party has had a tradition of making few changes in its programme. The first programme was adopted in 1903. This was revised subsequently after the events of 1905 to reflect the experience of the "revolution." Lenin prepared a second revision in 1917, but it was not adopted. The second revision occurred only in 1919, and it stands today as the official programme in spite of the change in the state structure, the economy, and the world political scene.

Lenin may have provided a clue as to why the programme has remained without amendment since 1919. He explained

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to the congress which adopted it, "We are convinced that in spite of numerous literary and other defects it has already taken its place in the history of the Third International as a programme which summarizes the results of a new stage in the world movement for the emancipation of the proletariat. . . . Our programme will provide powerful material for propaganda and agitation; it is a document which will lead the workers to say: 'Here are our comrades, our brothers, here our common cause is being accomplished.'" Lenin seems to have indicated that the programme was considered as an instrument in the world propaganda struggle, the "cold war" of the early days of Soviet existence.

If it is correct to conclude that the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has equal if not greater importance as a world propaganda document than as a guide to policy within the U.S.S.R., it may be that the fluid stage of development of world communism has made it difficult to decide what programme can be expected to appeal to the Chinese, Poles, Yugoslavs, French, and even the English and Americans. Events may move faster than the draftsmen anticipate, or they may come to a standstill through some unanticipated opposition.

Much of the 1919 programme is now out of date and requires rethinking. There are the apparently outmoded calls for privileges for the industrial proletariat as the "more concentrated, united and educated section of the toiling masses, hardened in battle"; the replacing of antiquated methods of housekeeping by house-communes, public kitchens, etc.; the organization of elections by production units; the ultimate replacing of the system of punishment by measures of an educational nature; free education for all children up to the age of seventeen; the ultimate abolition of the bank with transformation of it into a central bookkeeping department of the communist society; the goal of the abolition of money; and the working away from personal taxation to direct conversion of a part of the income, derived from the various state monopolies, into state revenues.

A new programme recording the developments of the past thirty years and plotting the domestic path for another long period of time is obviously difficult to draft. In addition to the details, there is the broad sweep toward communism to be considered. In 1919 no one anticipated that a state, in the sense of an "apparatus of compulsion," would be in existence

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when communism had been achieved. There was even language in the 1918 constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. anticipating the disappearance of the state in the stage of socialism. Yet the U.S.S.R. declared in its constitution of 1936 that socialism had been achieved, while the state was obviously still extant.

In 1939 Stalin discussed the future of the state with the congress of the party. He considered the interesting doctrinal question whether the state as an "apparatus of compulsion" would exist even under communism, or would have "withered away," as Engels had seemed to anticipate. Stalin voiced his opinion in terms of two possibilities. He expected to find the state continuing even under a communist economy, when each would receive in accordance with his need, provided that the capitalist encirclement had not been liquidated and provided that the danger of foreign attack had not disappeared. He foresaw the atrophying of the state only if the capitalist encirclement were liquidated and a socialist encirclement had taken its place.

Many of the countries bordering the U.S.S.R. now might be classed within the belt of a socialist encirclement, although they are called by the distinguishing term People's Democracies rather than Soviet Socialist Republics. Some significant gaps appear, however, in the chain of People's Democracies, and even if these were filled, there would still be an outer ring of non-Soviet states. Stalin's statement might be interpreted to require the change in the economies of all states sufficiently powerful to threaten the peace before the Soviet state could be expected to "wither away."

Sufficient has been said to indicate the basic questions of theory, international politics, and domestic development which require resolution before the drafting committee can present the draft of a new programme. Presumably, most, if not all, of these questions, have been answered in working documents in the files of Soviet leaders, so that they may continue to perform their duties, but such working documents are beyond the reach of the B.B.C. and the Voice of America. It can be supposed that the answers to the questions will not be brought to the bar of world opinion before Soviet leadership believes that the opposition abroad, and within the People's Democracies, if not within the U.S.S.R. as well, can make no capital of them in any propaganda war.

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III.

Questions such as those which have been reviewed might seem to indicate that the delay in calling a nineteenth All-Union Party Congress is a mark of weakness on the part of the Soviet leadership. Such a sweeping conclusion, if it were thought to suggest the break-up of the Soviet system, would probably be erroneous. To be sure, the Soviet leadership has severe problems; an expanded unskilled leadership at a time when a devastated country and sometimes discouraged people need to be reconstructed and enthused; a constantly changing international situation which cannot be thoroughly understood; and a political philosophy which is facing conditions Marx and even Lenin never foresaw completely. In addition there is the imponderable of the ageing top level of party cadres, including, most importantly, Stalin himself.

Indications from the domestic situation are that the party appreciates its difficulties. It is moving slowly and keeping some of its major decisions out of the newspapers. Nevertheless, the domestic situation also offers indications that the party is not alarmed, and that it is not losing control. The apparatus of government was restored to its peacetime procedures with the liquidation of the State Committee for Defence on September 4th, 1945. Drafting of new codes of law has been progressing in accordance with the constitution's requirement that these codes now be enacted by the federal government. Proposals for changes in the codes include suggestions that the escape clauses in the criminal and civil codes be eliminated in the interest of stability of law. Judicial decisions are being published which indicate the Supreme Court's concern over adherence to the rules of legal procedures designed to assure acquittal of the innocent. The death penalty has been abolished in peacetime for all offences, even treason.

Granted that there may be, and probably are, violations in practice of the principles emerging in the published record, it would seem that there is a tendency to act less hastily than in the past and to show confidence in the stability of the leadership in spite of its obvious problems. Refusal to permit the Soviet wives of foreigners to leave the U.S.S.R. and similar recent actions of Soviet officials would seem to indicate pride or bureaucracy or sheer misunderstanding of world opinion rather than fear lest the leadership be harmed.

THE LATIN AMERICAN APRISTA PARTIES

By ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

IN recent years the masses have begun to play an increasingly active part in the political life of the Latin American countries. As a result, the traditional conservative and liberal parties, with their quarrels over the status of the church, have in most countries become less important. In their stead have come groups with different appeals and programmes, directed more towards the working class, peasants, industrial middle class, and intellectuals.

Some of these parties are patterned on European models—socialists, communists, radicals. Others, however, are indigenous. Such are the Peronista and Aprista groups of parties. The first of these, which takes its name from Argentina's President Juan D. Peron, would perhaps be labelled "fascist" by the less sophisticated, but it is fascism with a difference, which draws most of its support from the trade unions and the working class in general, and is bitterly opposed by both the landlord and capitalist classes.

The Aprista parties, which are the subject of this article, form a group made up of parties which have grown up independently in their respective countries, which have had relatively little contact with one another, at least in their formative period, yet which have developed in a parallel way, due to the force of circumstances which are common at the present time to most of the Latin American countries.

The name for this conglomeration of parties comes from the senior member, the Partido Aprista Peruano, or People's Party of Peru. It has been formally organized as a political party since 1931, but its origins go back to the period following the 1914-1918 war. The other Aprista parties are of more recent origin. They include the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Autentico), generally called the Autentico party, of Cuba, which was organized in the middle 1930's by Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin; the Partido Accion Democratica (Democratic Action Party) of Venezuela, which was established in its present form in 1941, though its origins can be traced back to 1937, and which ruled Venezuela from October, 1945, until November, 1948.

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Other Aprista parties are the Partido Social Democrata of Costa Rica, established since the second world war and the dominant factor in the Revolutionary Junta now governing that country; the Partido Febrerista of Paraguay, which was organized in the middle of the 1940's; and the Mouvement Ouvrier et Paysan of Haiti, headed by Dr. Daniel Fignolé, and established after the revolution of January, 1946. The Popular Democratic party of Puerto Rico, headed by the island's governor, Luis Munoz Marin, should probably be included in this group, although it is not operating in an independent country.

The general principles of the Aprista parties are similar, though adapted in each case to the situation existing in the specific nation. It must be emphasized, however, that the programmes of the individual parties have grown up as the result of specifically local conditions, and that there is no central "brains trust" or directing authority. The similarity of approach on the part of the different groups results from the fact that in their individual countries, the parties have to face the same kinds of problems, and experience has taught them what they believe to be the correct approach to these problems.

The Aprista parties are young and have not developed political philosophers, with the exception of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, the great leader of the Peruvian People's Party. Therefore, there is no fount of given doctrine, and the remarks which follow concerning the programmes of the Aprista parties are derived from many discussions which this writer has had with leaders and rank and file members of the various Aprista parties, and from the actions of the parties themselves.

The programmes of the Aprista parties can probably be summed up in nine major points. Political democracy, agrarian reform, overall economic planning, industrialization, socialization of industry, social security, education, nationalism, and interamericanism are the principles for which these parties stand.

The Apristas are among the principal exponents of political democracy in Latin America. Of course, in the world to-day it is virtually inconceivable for any political group openly to come out in opposition to the principle of democracy. Opposition is expressed through "interpretation." The Apristas do not try to interpret democracy out of existence. For instance, Haya de la Torre, and Romulo Betancourt, leader of the

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Venezuelan Accion Democratica party, have taken a strong position against the outlawing of any political party, even a totalitarian one. They justify their position on several grounds. In the first place, as believers in political democracy, they think that it is wrong in principle to outlaw any political group. They believe that suppression does not solve the problems which give rise to the growth of totalitarianism. Judging from the experience of his own party, Haya de la Torre feels that suppression is likely to make the totalitarians stronger by creating martyrs of them. Finally, they feel that the ideas of the communists and any other totalitarian group can be met and worsted in the field of argument, and if argument is backed up by effective action to end the conditions which give them a sounding board, the totalitarians need be no danger.

In actual practice, the Aprista parties have been almost unanimously democratic when they have had an opportunity to act otherwise. When the Peruvian People's Party won an election in 1945 and had an administration which, though not made up of Apristas, was friendly towards them, the party took no move whatsoever to persecute its defeated enemies, in spite of the fact that for fifteen years those enemies had kept the Aprista party illegal and had hounded its leaders and members unmercifully.

The Democratic Action party of Venezuela, which came to power in a *coup d'état* in October, 1945, carried through reforms which brought real political democracy to Venezuela for the first time in its history. A new constitution was written, which for the first time adopted the principle of universal adult suffrage with the secret ballot.

Both the Accion Democratica régime in Venezuela and the pro-Aprista government in Peru were notable for the liberty which the average citizen enjoyed during them. For example, the trade union movement in both countries had been severely restricted previously, with frequent police intervention in the meetings of the labour organizations. Indeed, in Peru under the pre-1945 dictatorship it was impossible for a union to hold a meeting without a police officer present. All of this changed with the advent of the Apristas to power or the fringes of power. For the first time in their histories the labour movements of Venezuela and Peru were able to function freely without any interference from the police.

The same general picture can be obtained from the experience

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of the Autentico government which has ruled Cuba since 1944. Although that government in many ways has not lived up to the hopes which were placed in it, the régime has steadfastly rejected all suggestions that it suppress civil liberties, and it has maintained the freedom of expression for all, from the communists to the reactionaries.

The only serious breach of democratic procedure by an Aprista party was committed by the Partido Social Democrata in Costa Rica, which, after it came to power in a civil war early in 1948, outlawed the communist party, which had been one of the principal supports of the defeated opposition. This writer was in Costa Rica about the time this decree was issued, and talked with leaders of the social democratic party and of the government, and in spite of the arguments put forward by these people, he feels that a mistake was made in taking this action—for much the same reasons put forward by Haya de la Torre and Betancourt.

Political democracy—defined as a régime in which there is freedom of press, speech, thought, and organization, in which rights of the parties opposed to the government are protected as well as those of the government supporters, and in which government is through duly elected representatives of the citizenry of the country—is, then, the first plank in the platform of the Aprista parties.

Perhaps the most revolutionary stand of the Apristas is their advocacy of agrarian reform. This problem is of varying importance in each country, but is most pressing in Peru. Most of the land is in the hands of large landowners, and from time immemorial they have had a running struggle with the ancient Indian communities which existed before the arrival of the white man. For the Indians it has been a losing battle.

The Apristas have sought to reverse this trend, to restore to the Indians the titles to their ancient lands, and then to help them adapt their age-old communal system of agriculture to modern agrarian techniques. At the same time, the Apristas have sought to push forward a great system of irrigation along the hot, dry coastal areas, which, indeed, under the ancient Incas were rich agricultural areas.

During the short period of legality of the Aprista party from 1945-1948, it carried on a vigorous campaign on the behalf of the Indian communities. Indians would walk into Lima from as far as a thousand miles away to present their

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problems to the Aprista party, and the party carried their case before the proper governmental authorities. It was also pushing through parliament a general measure to allow confiscations in the case of land which was unused, or where the Indians were being brutally exploited. Their pushing of these measures probably had more to do with the Aprista party's being outlawed once again, after a coup in October, 1948, than anything else in their programme.

One of the most notable agrarian reform programmes of an Aprista party is that of the Popular Democratic party of Puerto Rico. This group, when it came to power in 1940, found that there was on the statute books an old law passed by the U.S. Congress in 1900 and reiterated in 1917, according to which the amount of land which could be held by corporations was limited. This law had never been enforced. However, the Popular Democratic régime, under Senator Luis Munoz Marin (now governor of the island), set out to enforce the law, and to give small plots of land to the "jibaros" or agricultural workers. Of course, Munoz Marin and his friends realize that there is not enough land on the island to go round, and they are therefore advocating industrialization and other measures, but the agrarian reform programme is one of the keystones of the party's policy.

In Venezuela, too, the Accion Democratica régime has carried out interesting experiments in agrarian reform. The government already owned a great deal of land, which had been confiscated from the estates of defunct dictator Juan Vicente Gomez. On these and other government-held lands the Accion Democratica régime began experimenting with various kinds of settlements. Some of these were co-operatives, where the land was owned by individuals, but farmed jointly. There were some cases in which land was given outright to individual farmers. There were yet others which were real collective farms. Also, the government experimented with settling some of the immigrants, whom they were attracting to the country, on these farms. In most cases, foreigners were mixed with native Venezuelans.

The Apristas are generally in favour of over-all government economic planning. They are not dogmatic in this regard, and have no specific means of achieving this planning upon which they all insist. And the degree to which the Apristas advocate general planning of the economy differs with the various

parties. It is probably true that the Autentico party has pushed this aspect of its programme less than almost any other of the Aprista parties. On the other hand, the Peruvian People's Party has the most all-encompassing outline for economic planning of any of the Aprista groups.

Under the leadership of Haya de la Torre and of Carlos Manuel Cox, the Peruvian Aprista party's economics expert, the party has worked out a programme for an economic congress, to be the principal element in the planning of the country's economy. This is to consist of representatives of the principal functional groups in society—the manual workers, the white collar workers, the armed forces, the native industrialists, the foreign industrialists, the foreign and domestic mining interests, and various others.

It will be the duty of this economic congress continually to study the economic situation, and to draw up plans and programmes for the economic development of the nation, which will be submitted to the political congress, which will continue to be based on universal adult suffrage exercised on a geographical basis, and will remain the legislative branch of the government.

The Venezuelan Democratic Action government got a chance to put into operation its ideas concerning general over-all planning of the economy. It organized the Venezuelan Development Corporation, which invested in a great many agricultural and manufacturing enterprises. Its work was co-ordinated with that of other government enterprises, such as the Agricultural and Grazing Bank, the Institute of Immigration and Colonization, to direct the economy along the lines adopted by the government. The Accion Democratica government frankly adopted the policy of "sowing petroleum." The country is now experiencing a great boom based on the exploitation of its petroleum wealth. It is realized, however, that this wealth will not last for ever, and the Accion Democratic government decided that it would make the greatest possible use of this wealth to develop agricultural and manufacturing resources which would give the country a balanced economy when the petroleum is all gone.

Other Aprista parties also favour over-all guidance of their countries' economic life. The Social Democratic government of Costa Rica, for instance, took immediate steps to give the government powers of general direction of the economic system,

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by nationalizing the banks, and laying the groundwork for the establishment of a National Development Corporation.

Even the Autenticos have followed a policy of having the government direct the general lines of economic policy. Traditionally, they have sought to stabilize the price of sugar, the country's main product, while at the same time developing other industries which can reduce the exaggerated dependence of the island on its principal crop.

The Aprista parties have all supported the principle of industrialization. For the most part they have thought of it in terms of their own particular nations. However, Haya de la Torre has had wider visions of developing industrialization on regional lines. Thus as part of his programme for inter-americanism, he has advocated the planned development of manufacturing industries, and particularly of heavy industries among the South American countries, so as not to have duplication and to make the best possible use of the available resources and capital. The principle of stimulating industrialization through the mechanism of a Development Corporation has won the approval of all of the Aprista groups.

As an ultimate objective, the Aprista parties are generally in favour of socialization of industry. However, they are far from doctrinaire about the matter. Haya de la Torre has probably done more thinking on the subject than most of the other Aprista leaders, and his position is that though the party will probably one day ultimately want to socialize industry, that is not at the moment a pressing problem. As he explains, "We are not now faced with the problem of dividing the wealth, but with that of creating it."

The countries of Latin America, though possessing considerable wealth in natural resources, are poor in so far as actual factories, transportation facilities, and profitable agricultural establishments are concerned. And the Apristas feel that the immediate task is to develop the resources of the region and gain for its inhabitants a standard of living commensurate with Latin America's possibilities.

In line with this, the Apristas are anxious to get investments of all sorts. They realize that there is not enough capital in Latin American countries to push forward industrialization at the rate which they would like to see it develop, and that much of the capital already in Latin America shows a tendency to remain in comparatively unproductive types of agriculture or

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to go into commerce and urban real estate. Therefore, the Apristas recognize the need for the introduction of foreign capital into their countries. This matter will be discussed in another connection further on.

Although not pressing nationalization of industry at the present time, the Apristas will not refuse to socialize any industry on principle. They judge each case of nationalization on its merits. In practice, the problem more frequently arises as to whether the government shall take the initiative in launching a new enterprise. However, as instanced in the case of the nationalization of the banks by the Social Democratic party government of Costa Rica, the parties will nationalize if they think necessary.

As popular parties, appealing especially to the urban workers, the Aprista parties are strong backers of social security. Thus the Venezuelan Accion Democratica government pushed the development of a social security system, establishing it first in Caracas, having as its objective the extension of the system throughout the nation. In Peru, the Apristas drew up a project for a cradle-to-grave social security scheme, which they would have put into practice, if they could have stayed legal long enough. In Puerto Rico the Munoz Marin régime has co-operated with the United States Federal Government in establishing a social security system in the island.

One of the cornerstones of the Aprista programme is a crusading belief in the education of the masses. The original Aprista movement in Peru began right after the first world war as a move on the part of a group of students in Lima's San Marcos University to carry out an adult education programme among the workers of Lima and Callao. When the government interfered with this, the students and their working-class allies turned to political action, and the Aprista movement was born. Ever since those days the Peruvian Aprista movement has been founded on an alliance of part of the country's intellectuals with working-class elements, and the People's Party has taken a lead in conducting adult education work itself. During its period of legality from 1945 to 1948, the Aprista party established throughout the country a series of "popular universities" where workers could take a great variety of courses from reading and writing through advanced economics, history, and foreign languages. Each Aprista member who was able to do so was required to devote at least

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some time to instructing in these "popular universities." Those who needed to take the courses had that as part of their party duties.

In Venezuela, the Accion Democratica government's educational programme during its three-year period in office was the most spectacular part of its entire administration. Attendance at the country's schools was doubled, the student body in the normal schools increased three- or four-fold, new school buildings went up, the educational system was extended into the countryside, which had been virtually without schools hitherto. Vast adult education programmes also were carried out.

In Haiti, the new Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan of Professor Daniel Fignolé lays great emphasis on worker education. Part of the headquarters of the movement is used as a school, the organization has established smaller adult education centres in the countryside. Fignolé himself is a teacher, and was for a short while Minister of Education after the 1946 revolution.

Traditionally the Aprista parties are nationalist. The original Aprista party of Peru started in part as a movement to resist "Yankee imperialism," and the Cuban Autentico party was founded on a similar basis. Although the direction of their attack has been somewhat modified in recent years, the Aprista parties are still nationalist. However, they are not usually jingoistic.

Instead of pushing—as in times past—for the expulsion of foreign capitalists from their countries, the Aprista groups now express their nationalist sentiments in seeing to it that these companies live up to the social laws of their respective countries. And the Apristas are interested in finding new ways in which the investment of foreign capital in their nations can be intensified without the usual risks to the national sovereignty. In this connection, the Accion Democratica government of Venezuela worked out a very interesting arrangement with Nelson Rockefeller for the establishment of companies with participation by Rockefeller and the Venezuelan Development Corporation, and with the proviso that the Venezuelans would have full stock control of the new enterprises within ten years.

The nationalism of the Aprista parties is much more akin to the universalist feeling of Mazzini and his friends in the nineteenth century than that sword-rattling jingoism of Hitler and his associates in the twentieth. It is not isolationism.

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One of the five fundamental propositions upon which the Peruvian Aprista movement was first launched was unity of the Latin American nations. Years later, in 1941, Haya de la Torre published a Programme for the Americans in which he advocated the immediate establishment of a customs union among the Latin American nations with a unified currency, customs regulations, etc., and then the formation of a continent-wide economic unit, including both Latin America and the U.S. and Canada. At the same time, he advocated the establishment of an inter-american mechanism for the maintenance of democracy within the republics of the hemisphere.

In practice, the Aprista parties have carried out their belief in inter-americanism. It was the Betancourt government in Venezuela which proposed the establishment of a customs union among Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama, a project which was finally agreed to at a conference in Quito, Ecuador, in the middle of 1948. In Costa Rica, the Social Democratic government has advocated the establishment of a Central American customs union, and also sent an observer to the Quito conference.

The broad outlines of the programmes of the Aprista parties are similar. Likewise, the groups to which they make special appeal are broadly the same. First of all, they have a large following among the intellectuals in virtually every country in which they operate. The principal leaders of the Aprista parties are themselves intellectuals.

Their appeal is also to the urban working class. In every country where they are allowed to function freely, the Aprista parties either control the organized labour movement or are one of the two groups fighting for control. In recent years the Apristas won out over the communists in the labour movements of Peru, Cuba, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. In Paraguay, the Febreristas and communists are the two principal forces in the labour movement. In Puerto Rico, the Popular Democrats have a large following in the unions.

The Aprista parties make an appeal to the agricultural workers. During the 1945-1948 period, the Peruvian People's Party laid special emphasis on helping the Indians and on recruiting among them. In Venezuela, the Accion Democratica people organized the first Agricultural Workers' Federation in the country's history in 1947. In Cuba, the Autenticos have always had considerable support among the

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1947 by the United Nations that it should come to an end, was nearly two million. Of those, 1,200,000 were Arabs and 650,000 were Jews. Now in the Israeli territory, the population is roughly one million, of whom only 100,000 are Arabs. The Jewish immigrants are pouring into the land from all corners of the earth, at a rate of a quarter of a million a year. Some three-quarters of a million Arab refugees, who fled from the Israeli territory, are living a precarious and hopeless existence, supported by the relief of the United Nations and voluntary agencies.

Palestine was known as the Land of the Three Faiths, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Israel to-day is by contrast the land of faith. The Jews, after 2,000 years of statelessness and of sufferings and frustrations such as no other nation has experienced, have a home and state of their own. They are possessed with an incredible elation and creative energy. Many of those who have returned, particularly the groups from the Oriental countries and North Africa, believe that the days of the Messiah have come. But all, whether they believe in the fulfilment of prophecy from religious faith, or are upholders of the Marxian dialectical materialism, are convinced that the age of miracles has returned, and that everything is possible in the land of unlimited possibilities. Their faith has been justified by the extraordinary events of the last year. They are prepared to receive all the Jews who wish to come to the National Home. Indeed, they make every effort to force the pace; and they pile up economic and social problems with the firm conviction that they and Providence will find a solution.

The flight of the great majority of the Arab inhabitants from the Israeli territory has made it possible to find homes, perhaps temporary homes, for the immigrants. Thousands have been placed in the abandoned Arab quarters of Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Haifa, and in the abandoned Arab villages. The government of Israel, following the practice of the British Mandatory during the world war with regard to German property, has appointed a custodian of the abandoned lands, and taken active steps to bring them into fruitful production by the settlement of Jewish cultivators. The proportion of the immigrants who are placed on the land and engaged in agriculture is likely to be similar to that of the established Jewish community. A quarter will be an agricultural population; and the rest urban. The available housing accommo-

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dition has now been exhausted; and a vast enterprise of housing must have a high priority in the constructive programme of the government. A scheme has been drawn up for the building of 80,000 housing units, which would provide for an incoming population of some 300,000. The estimated cost is £80 million. That sum does not perturb the financial and economic experts of the government and the Federation of Labour. It will be provided partly by the contribution of the Jewish communities outside Israel, and partly by loans. During the year of the struggle for existence, the government of Israel received a contribution from these sources that approaches a hundred million pounds. That was a much bigger item in the national income than the proceeds of taxation, although the Provisional Government immediately raised steeply the income tax and other dues.

Israel is suffering at the moment from inflation and a very high cost of living. The purchasing value of money is less than half that in England; and the rate of wages has risen in proportion. An unskilled labourer receives 30s. a day, and a skilled labourer anything from £2 to £5 per day. The Arab workers are paid at the same rate as the Jewish. The need of reducing the cost of living is recognised; and the industries of Israel can only hope to compete in world markets if some drastic operation is carried through. The financial problems of Israel resemble those of Great Britain in that imports greatly exceed exports; there is a shortage of consumer goods; and the contributions of the Jewish people in other countries to Israel take the place of Marshall Aid to England. In Israel, as here, the highly organised trade union movement is willing to consider the national interest. Israel, however, has immediate economic problems greater than those which face this country. It has to absorb and settle a vast immigration of persons who bring no material capital, and who have lived for years in conditions of oppression and want. It faces this year an extraordinary testing; but the dynamic enthusiasm which pervades the people may carry it through.

One of the large new developments which is certain to be fostered, with all the energy of a confident nation and the support of the state, is marine industry. The people of Israel feel that they have a destiny on the sea. In that respect they are heirs of the Phoenicians as well as of the ancient Jewish people. During the year of war, they built up a small navy of which

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of Israel with the historic Jewish tradition, and, on the other, to make it a socialist community and "democratic" in both the western and eastern interpretations of that ambiguous term. It starts with a preamble which gives expression to the will to rebuild the National Home "in accordance with the ideals of peace and righteousness of the prophets of Israel, to welcome home every Jew who seeks entry, and to promote the security and well-being of all who dwell within our gates." The right of every Jew to return and settle within the territory of Israel, "subject only to such regulations as may be enacted by the Chamber of Deputies," is put in the forefront of the general provisions.

The first part includes provisions concerning fundamental rights and religious and minority rights, so as to give effect to the principles contained in the Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the Assembly of the United Nations last year. The state shall ensure the sanctity of human life and uphold the dignity of man; and there shall be no penalty of death.

An article which guarantees the liberty of the person also lays down a procedure on the lines of the English Habeas Corpus, which was included in the basic law of the Mandatory Government of Palestine. Freedom of speech and the free expression of opinion are limited by an exception for utterances or declarations which are designed to stir up racial or religious hatred, or which advocate the suppression of human rights or the democratic system of government. The right of assembly is limited by a similar exception. The rule of law, in the English sense, is maintained. Any officer of the state who violates the rights and liberties of any person shall be liable to proceedings under the civil and criminal law.

The draft constitution goes on to prescribe the principles of social justice and the socialist order which are already established. All natural resources shall belong to the state, subject to any rights vested in any person or body, and shall be controlled and administered by the government of Israel. Every citizen shall have an equitable share in the national economy, a right to social security, and a right to work. The state shall endeavour to ensure to all its citizens, without distinction, a decent standard of living and a fair and equal opportunity of earning a livelihood. Legislation shall be enacted for the provision of state insurance against the risks of accident, sickness, old age and other causes of

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undeserved want. Protective measures shall be enacted for the benefit of working mothers and children. Care for the health of the population is a primary duty of the state. Legislation shall provide for the establishment of a national health service, the protection of motherhood and child life, and state aid towards the construction of hygienic workers' dwellings—a critic has commented on the limitation to workers' housing, which appears to be unreasonable discrimination; in short, a Beveridge plan for Israel, plus a little something.

The provisions about the legislature and the executive of the government of Israel envisage a centralised democratic state. The legislative power is vested in a single Chamber of Deputies, which shall be elected by equal, direct, and universal suffrage on the basis of proportional representation. The author of the draft constitution in an explanatory note has given the reasons for a single legislative chamber, and rejects the arguments for attempting to form a second chamber which should have power of checking hasty legislation. The Chamber is elected for four years, but may extend its term in the case of war or emergency. The President of the Republic generally has the powers of an English king, and not of an American president; but he may dissolve the Chamber before the end of its term if the Executive Council in office has resigned, and no alternative Council can be formed which can command the support of a stable majority. The initiative in introducing legislation rests with the Executive Council. A Deputy may propose a bill; but it will be referred to a select committee, and only submitted to the Council if recommended by a majority of the committee.

The President is elected by secret ballot of the Chamber; and if no candidate receives an absolute majority in two successive ballots, on the third attempt one who receives a relative majority will be elected. The provision has been criticised on the ground that it gives to a party which commands the largest number of votes in the Chamber the opportunity of insisting on its own candidate, even though he does not command general acceptance. The President holds office for five years, and may be re-elected, but for only one additional term. He is not given independent executive power, except with regard to the dissolution of the Chamber. Every official act must be countersigned by the Prime Minister or a member of the Executive Council.

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Seventy years ago the English novelist, George Eliot, interpreting the vision of the Jewish people restored to their original centre in Palestine, wrote: "There will be a community in the van of the East which carries the cultures and sympathies of every great nation in its bosom. There will be a land set for the halting place of enmities. . . A new Judea poised between east and west will be a covenant of reconciliation between the peoples." That prophecy may sound fantastic to-day after the years of bitter strife. Its fulfilment would be regarded by many as a miracle; but Palestine is again a land of miracles.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WESTERN GERMANY

By ALDERMAN J. W. F. HILL

WHEN the war ended it was generally assumed in this country that part of the allied task in the occupation of Germany was to introduce democratic institutions there, not so much because they were good in themselves, as because they would provide some safeguard against the re-establishment of a bureaucracy which might once again become a tool in the hands of a dictator or a clique. The governing principles were laid down in the Potsdam Agreement. Article 3 (IV) stated that the purposes of the occupation by which the Control Council should be guided were *inter alia* to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful co-operation in international life by Germany. Article 9 dealt more specifically with measures to be taken, including those relating to local government:—

"The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles, and in particular through elective councils, as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation . . ."

A few days later Field Marshal Montgomery echoed this clause when he said in a proclamation to the German people in the British zone that, "We aim at the restoration of local self

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government throughout Germany on democratic principles, and it is our intention that the Nazis removed from office shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, can assist in developing genuinely democratic institutions in Germany." The use of the word "restoration" indicates, as Professor Robson has pointed out,* that the British authorities seemed to think that they had only to return to the pre-Nazi state of things and all would be well.

This illusion did not long survive a study of the subject. *The Military Government Directive on Administrative, Local and Regional Government and the Public Services*, second edition (revised 1 February 1946) acknowledged that the problem went much deeper:—

"It is this steady and thorough democracy building which is the special task of the Administration and Local Government Branch. Such principles, new to German ideas, as direct popular control of government at every level, the transformation of the *Bürgermeister* from a long-term politico-administrative official into a short-term popularly-elected head of an administration, the complete subordination of decentralised public services to elected bodies, and the creation of impartial bodies of servants of the public, are among the aims which have been set for us as necessary to give the freest kind of democracy a chance to grow and flourish."

In the several forms of local government with which the Germans were familiar before 1933 there were certain fundamental features. All had a council with a separate executive. The executive might be one man, the *Bürgermeister*, or a committee, the *Magistrat*. The *Bürgermeister* held office for twelve years, and was a professional salaried officer. The *Magistrat* often comprised both lay and official members, the latter having votes, and the whole presided over by the chief official. In practice it was not difficult for the official class to gather effective power into their own hands, leaving the council to elect the officials at appointed times, pass the budget, and adopt resolutions expressing their views. Many of the officials were also civil servants, serving two masters; and, still more significant, when functions were delegated by the state to the local authority it was assumed that, these being executive functions, they by-passed the local council and went straight to the local officials.

The Control Commission have made a conscientious attempt to carry out their mandate in respect of local government. They

* *Local Government in Germany*. Political Quarterly, October-December, 1945 (Vol. XVI), p. 285.

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invitation to visit this country and see our system in operation has been extended to many Germans concerned with local government, and is one of the most valuable undertakings of the Governmental Structure Section of the Control Commission.

Another feature introduced by the Commission is the committee system. Here again there are difficulties: the Germans see no objection to setting up committees of non-councillors, or co-opting non-councillors, including officials (even appointing one as chairman), to an extent which leaves the councillors in a minority. To argue, in terms of English legal principle, that the elected representatives are trustees of the community, and that a trustee cannot delegate his trust, apparently means nothing to them.

Experience has shown that at council meetings there is little regard for standing orders. A member speaks as often and as long as he likes, and there is no idea of keeping to the subject in hand, or even of excluding topics which have no relation to local government at all. The lot of the Commission's officials in face of such difficulties is not a happy one.

The remarkable thing is that so much has been achieved, having regard to the dearth in the ranks of the Commission of men of great experience of British local government. One might have expected to find town clerks or county clerks who had reached or were nearing retiring age who were willing to give a year or two of their lives to work in the British zone, and provide guidance on large questions of policy with at least some degree of emancipation from military control. Apparently there are few, if any, such. The system of recruitment and salary is of the rigid civil service variety, framed in quarters which have no understanding of the special problems of control in Germany. But even so, men of limited local government experience and of none have done a good job of work, and deserve more encouragement and appreciation than they have received.

As a result of the power restored to the *Laender* of framing their own local government systems with the consent of the Regional Commissioner, discussion of the various alternative constitutions has been going on for some months. The *Staadtetag*, or Association of Towns, has published drafts of a new *Gemeindeordnung* or municipal code which sets out the alternatives. It has this preamble:—

“The basis of the democratic State are the communes under the administration of their citizens. As in the past so also in the future self-government

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of the commune shall give scope to the civic virtues of the free citizens. In it the citizens shall be trained to act responsibly for the weal of the local community and of the State. It directs all tasks arising in this local community and generally also all other public matters to be dealt with in the territory of the commune. In the administration of the commune the citizens and their elected representatives are assisted by an expert, efficient body of established public servants.”

The adjectives in the final sentence, and the reference to the past as well as to the future remind us of the interpretation likely to be put upon Article 1 (i) of the Basic Principles of the draft Communal Charter:—“The communes, administered by their citizens, are the basis of the democratic state.” Article 6 sets out the main principles of the various alternative constitutions:—

A. “The commune shall be administered by the council and the chief executive officer.” It declares that all communal matters must be decided by the council or a committee to which it delegates its powers. The policy is carried out by the chief officer.

B. “The commune shall be administered by the council. The chief executive officer shall conduct its affairs.” Decisions of importance shall be taken by the council, but others may be left to committees or the chief executive officer. Certain defined matters, such as the election of officers, passing of the budget, disposal of communal property, and extension of public facilities, are reserved to the full council.

C. “The commune shall be administered and represented by the council. The chief executive officer shall be the chairman of the council: he manages the affairs of the commune.” Certain matters are reserved to the full council; others may be left to committees or the chief executive officer, who manages the business of the commune, and represents it externally. He prepares the subjects for discussion, and he is obliged to oppose a resolution of the council if he is of the opinion that that resolution is in opposition to the existing law or jeopardises the welfare of the community. If so, the objection must be debated at a subsequent meeting of the council held at least three days later. If he opposes a resolution passed at this later meeting he must refuse to carry it out, and the council have an appeal in the *Verwaltungsstreitverfahren*. He holds office for twelve years although the councillors only do so for four years; and he can only be removed by a two-thirds majority of the council at two meetings held at least four weeks apart.

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D. "Any matter of importance to the commune shall be decided on by the council and the *magistrat* by common consent. The *magistrat* shall manage the affairs." This is the two-chamber system. If the *magistrat* refuses approval of a council resolution it shall communicate its reason for refusal in writing to the council. For the purpose of arriving at agreement either chamber can propose a joint commission. Failing agreement the matter must go to a higher local government unit. The *magistrat* consists of the chief executive officer, his first assistant and other full-time or honorary assistant executive officers. Generally the chief officer is elected by the citizens and the others by the council. Paid officers hold office for twelve years, and are only removable as under C.

E. "Any decision of importance to the administration of the commune shall be taken by the council. The management of the business will be in the hands of the *magistrat*." This is the one-chamber system with collegiate execution.

The preface to the draft reviews the history of German local government, referring to the Nazi period in somewhat neutral terms save that it affirms the necessity of eliminating the leadership principle; and it concludes that there are certain fundamentals of decisive importance to the efficacy of local government:—

- (a) the responsibility of the commune to manage its own affairs as a rule by the free, uninfluenced and autonomous decisions of its own citizens;
- (b) the safeguarding of communes against interference by outside agencies; especially after 1933 local tasks were increasingly taken from local administration and transferred to special agencies;
- (c) the commune must have freedom of action in the financial sphere.

The English student knowing the German tradition may be excused if he reads with scepticism that "all drafts—with greater deviation in the case of the Magistrat constitution and the two-chamber system which is of similar nature—allot the key positions in the administration to the council directly elected by the citizenry." And the real preference for control in the hands of "the expert, efficient body of established public servants" comes out again in the passage: "the prerequisite

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besides democratic reliability, will have to be largely past experience and knowledge; on the other hand it will be necessary to ensure long-term employment and independence of the repercussions of any change in majority parties, particularly in so far as the higher posts are concerned. In this respect the drafts retain the earlier principle of appointing higher communal officials for a period of twelve years; only in a very special case, with especially aggravating attending circumstances, should it be possible to remove the chief executive officer from office before his contract expires." (It came as a surprise to the Germans at Hahnenklee to be told that the English town clerk had no security of tenure, and being impartial, was not prejudiced thereby.)

Last summer a team of lecturers, with varied experience of English local government, some as elected representatives and some as officials, visited Hahnenklee, and had an opportunity of studying these drafts, the views of the German students, and the results of the experience of officers of the Control Commission. Having no previous knowledge of local government in Germany, and certainly no desire to dogmatise on the strength of a short visit, they nevertheless came unanimously to conclusions which they ventured to submit in official quarters. They formed the impression that, if the Germans were left to their own devices now, they would probably revert to systems which would negate the work that British officials have been doing in the past three years. They realise that as time goes on it will be increasingly difficult to prescribe in matters of detail; and if under the Occupation Statute the Military Governor is left with only a power of veto he will not be able to influence legislation except in a negative sense. They therefore suggested that it should be laid down in advance of the Statute that no legislation should be permitted which would infringe certain general principles. One such principle would be that effective control of policy must remain in the hands of elected representatives; a second that the servant of the local authority must not also be a servant of the state; and perhaps a third that the chief executive officer should not be given security for a term longer than that of the elected councillors. Other principles could no doubt be framed, which together would make up a simple code of rules by which German legislation could be tested.

It must be acknowledged that the attempt to mould German institutions in the British zone has its difficulties, which are

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mounting. In the first place the government of a democratic state like ours does not take kindly to the task of imposing a democratic polity on another state: of "teaching democracy by numbers," as it is called. Secondly, there is irony in the fact, well known to Germans, that at the very time when we are imposing federalism and decentralisation in Germany we are centralising administration here, and setting up the "special agencies" which the *Stadttetag* document condemns, outside local government altogether. Thirdly, our version of democracy is not the same as the American version, and still less is it like the principles of the French occupation. Fourthly, it may well be that the whole of our work may be swept away by a wave of nationalist feeling, not on account of merit or demerit, but simply because of its alien origin; the progress of industrial recovery since the currency reform may bring nationalism upon us quickly. Fifthly, there is the danger that a harassed Foreign Secretary, beset by difficulties from beyond the Iron Curtain, may be tempted to sacrifice long-term policy to the short-term advantage of buying German support against Russia.

All this makes 1945 seem remote and the Potsdam Agreement naïve. Nevertheless, its difficulties and discouragements notwithstanding, it seemed to British visitors at Hahnenklee that the attempt to establish democratic institutions in Germany is worth making. Already some German elected representatives and some officials are convinced of the merits of the system, and given time and sympathy, and methods of persuasion rather than dictation, with constant visits from each country to the other, there is a chance that democratic institutions may take root in German soil. And it must be remembered that the experiment was undertaken not merely because democracy is good in itself, but as a measure of international security. Any such measure ought not to be lightly abandoned in the world as we know it to-day.

THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

By R. V. SAMPSON

IF India is to succeed in playing her full part in Commonwealth and world affairs, she must be assured of internal political stability, the essential foundations of which it is the task of her Constituent Assembly to build. Originally summoned to frame a Constitution in which the federal government was to be confined virtually to foreign affairs, defence and communications, this Assembly first met at the end of 1946, only to find within nine months that the nature of its work had been radically altered by the passing of the Independence Act on the basis of partition. By February, 1948, however, the Committee's Draft of the Constitution was ready for publication. It is by any standard an exceedingly long document; and it is not anticipated that the Constitution, in its entirety of 315 Articles and 8 Schedules will finally pass into law much before the end of this year. Although at the time of writing less than a half, some 147 Articles, have actually been adopted in their final form, it is now clear that in substance at any rate, there is little likelihood of any serious departure from the original Draft.

The new Union of India will consist of the nine Governors' provinces which remain after the Partition, the five Chief Commissioners' provinces and over five hundred Indian States. In the case of these last, however, a major task of assimilation and consolidation is still in process. A large number of the smaller States have been absorbed by neighbouring Governors' provinces, while many others have been fused to form self contained units, which should when the process is complete number about twelve. Each of these will be a fully integrated unit of the Union of India and will come under its authority. There can be no doubt that the replacement of the old chaos of administrative areas by an Indian Union, consisting as it will of approximately twenty principal States, the smaller Commissioners' provinces and the scheduled areas, represents a very considerable achievement.

As space will not here permit anything approaching a study in detail of the Constitution,* I propose to discuss first the main principles informing the actual machinery of government, and

* For a detailed study of the drafting, *vide* Sir Ivor Jennings's articles in *The Hindu* (Madras), 26th, 27th, 29th, 30th November, 1948.

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then to examine some of the Constitution's underlying assumptions in the light of its charter of individual rights. It will be convenient to describe the machinery of government under the following heads:—(a) the Executive, (b) the Legislature, (c) the Division of Powers between the Union and the States, (d) the Supreme Court, (e) the machinery of constitutional amendment.

This list in itself at once lays bare the federal structure of the Constitution. The supremacy of a written Constitution, the distribution of powers between bodies of limited and coordinate authority, the establishment of a Judicature with vital constitutional powers—all the classic features of Federalism, in fact, are clearly marked. Yet for all that, the actual executive and legislative machine, in contrast to the constitutional law designed to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution and individual rights, is essentially British in character. That the framers of the Constitution preferred the model of the British Cabinet system to that of the American Presidential system, was however by no means a foregone conclusion arising out of Indian experience of British practice. It was in fact only after long debates in the Assembly that the present system was adopted.

Although the supreme executive power of the Union is vested in the President, the fact that the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) is collectively responsible to the popular House, makes it clear that the function of the President will be essentially that of the present Governor General. Instead of being appointed by the Crown, however, he will be elected by an electoral college consisting of the members of both Houses of Parliament and the elected members of the State Legislatures, voting by proportional representation. Once elected, the President will hold office for a period of five years, subject to the right of Parliament to impeach him for a breach of the Constitution. In the President is vested the duty of summoning, proroguing, and dissolving Parliament, but in the exercise of this prerogative he is obliged under the terms of the Constitution to summon Parliament at least twice a year; and to dissolve the popular House after a maximum of five years, unless he has proclaimed a state of emergency, in which case he is empowered to extend its life by a year at a time. His legislative powers are important. All Bills must receive his assent before passing on to the Statute Book; and he is specifically empowered to withhold that assent. He may also refer back a Bill (other

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than a Money Bill) for reconsideration or amendment. Against misuse of these powers of veto the Cabinet's only weapon is resignation.

The President will appoint the Prime Minister, who will then advise the President which M.P.s he wishes to be appointed to the Council of Ministers. A Minister need not necessarily, it is true, have a seat in Parliament at the time of his appointment, but he must obtain a seat in one of the two Houses within six months on pain of resignation from office. The doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility to the popular House is specifically enacted.

The Union Parliament will consist of the President and a bicameral Legislature, the second chamber going under the name of the Council of States, the popular House being entitled the House of the People. The latter, consisting of not more than 500 members will be directly elected by universal adult suffrage, on the basis of one member for every 500,000 to 750,000 of the population. The Council of States, on the other hand, consisting of 250 members, will with the exception of 15 nominated by the President for distinguished service in various fields, be indirectly elected through the media of the State Legislatures. Like the American Senate, the second chamber will not be subject to dissolution, one third of its members retiring every two years. Like the House of Lords, it will possess no powers over any Bill, certified by the Speaker of the popular House to be a Money Bill, although it is empowered to make recommendations. Otherwise the legislative powers of the two Houses are coordinate. A Bill, that is, may originate in either House and must pass both Houses before going for the Presidential assent. In the event of a disagreement between the Houses, it is the President's function to summon a joint sitting, which will decide the issue by a simple majority vote. In view of their respective strengths, this provision underwrites the supremacy of the popular assembly,—a supremacy already secured by the provision enabling it to dismiss a Ministry which no longer commands its support. Before leaving the subject of the Legislature, mention should be made of the clause which disqualifies for membership of Parliament anyone "under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign power." Whether or not this is specifically aimed at communist representation remains to be seen.

Turning next to the division of powers within the Union.

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the Constitution follows fairly closely the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. While three lists of powers are defined in detail, those of the Union, those of the States, and those of a concurrent list on which authority is coordinate between the Union Government and the States, the residue falls to the Union. In other words, the powers of the Republic, like those of the Dominion of Canada and unlike those of the United States Government or of the Swiss Confederation are indefinite, while the authority of the States is rigidly defined. Further the Union Government will enjoy considerable powers of control over the State Legislatures. The Union Parliament for example will be able to legislate even on subjects enumerated in the States' list, provided such a step is sanctioned by a two thirds majority vote in the Council of States, or alternatively if a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation. In the event of disagreement between Federal and State legislation, the former will automatically prevail.

The constitutional safeguard against the abuse of these vast powers at the expense of legitimate State autonomy is provided for by the institution of a Supreme Court on the American model. The Court will consist of a Chief Justice together with a minimum of seven other judges, all of whom will be appointed by the President. Security of tenure is provided by the clause requiring an Address to the President, supported by a two thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament, to remove them. The Court will exercise an original jurisdiction in any constitutional dispute between the Government of India and any of the States, as well as in disputes arising between the States themselves. It will also exercise an appellate jurisdiction from the lower Courts, where a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution is involved.

The amendment of the Constitution is likely to prove a difficult matter. An amendment, before qualifying for the Presidential assent, must pass each House by an absolute majority and by at least two thirds of those present and voting; while if the amendment seeks to change any of the lists of legislative powers, the representations of the States in Parliament or the powers of the Supreme Court, it further requires the ratification of a majority of the States before it can become law.

From this brief survey of the mechanics of the Constitution (the State governmental machinery will be substantially similar to that of the Union), we may now attempt an appraisal of the

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Constitution in relation to present Indian capacities and needs. It is a commonplace of political experience that institutions which grow out of long practice in experimenting with the solution of familiar problems are more likely to endure than highly rationalist structures with no roots in popular custom. None the less, occasions arise in the life of nations as of individuals when the experience of other traditions has to be called on to meet a crisis without precedent in one's own experience. Burke was less than true to himself when he overlooked this fact in his tirades against the French revolutionaries. Few would criticise India for availing herself of the best she can find in the constitutional practice of other nations, nor is it necessary to seek for precedents in the precepts to be found in the *Arthashastra* of the fourth century B.C.

More to the point is the query whether institutions, which were largely fashioned in the eighteenth century in Europe and America and slowly adjusted to developing democratic needs, are likely to be suited to the needs of a vast and largely illiterate population. Democracy can only function effectively if there is some tradition of tolerance, some willingness to compromise, and a widely diffused sense of public responsibility. One of the fundamental problems which faces the western democracies today is the problem of bridging the gap between the sense of narrow private interest and of the interest of the common weal. To make public affairs and responsibilities meaningful in the context of individual human lives dwarfed by the giant impersonality of the modern State is an urgent problem confronting the most highly developed democracies. How much more difficult will be the task of bridging the gap between the Government of India and the ignorant kisan, fighting a desperate and only too often a losing battle to secure a bare margin of subsistence! Yet not only the people of India have a stake in the solution of this problem. With many other Asian countries looking to her for a lead, and with communism threatening to establish itself over vast areas of the Asian continent, it is essential to the survival of the democratic way of living, to the belief that in the last resort the individual has some rights which remain rights even though denied by the state, that the Indian constitutional experiment should succeed.

For these reasons the Indian Constituent Assembly is to be congratulated on having had the courage to give the peasant the right to vote, in order to give him the opportunity to learn

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to walk in the paths of civic responsibility, without which opportunity no man may truly call himself free. It is true that the strength of an institution can only be measured by the capacity of those who have to work it; but progress is never achieved by those who fear the challenge of an ideal, while denying to the downtrodden the stimulus of the right to strive for that ideal after their fashion.

Written into the Constitution in the form of fundamental rights are the political and civic ideals that have long been cherished by civilised peoples. The rule of law, equality before the law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and assembly, the protection of children from exploitation are among other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In view of the enormous influence wielded by Gandhi, it is not surprising to find also that untouchability is abolished in all its forms. On the other hand, there is no mention of Prohibition nor any provision for the right of conscientious objection to military conscription, both of which constitute essential elements of satyagraha.

Most praiseworthy in its progressive attitude is the section dealing with the thorny problem of religion. While full religious rights are guaranteed to all citizens, state education is to be completely secular, no religious instruction being permitted in state educational institutions. It is curious that the land which has suffered so much from religious strife should be foremost in the complete secularisation of education.

The enforcement of all individual rights under the Constitution is secured by the additional right to move the Supreme Court in the event of their alleged violation. The form which it is proposed to give to the protection of minority rights, however, has provoked controversy. No one could quarrel with the protection of cultural, religious, linguistic rights in themselves, but the proposal (not yet debated) to reserve seats in the Union Parliament for certain minorities, including the Muslims, and the Christians of Bombay and Madras, is resented by many as a relic from the hated system of communal electorates. While Indian sensitivity on this score is understandable, it would be rash to assume that in an electoral system, which could not possibly be based on any form of P.R., minority rights would be fully safeguarded by simple majority voting in a society where communal feeling is, to say the least, still latent.

In addition to the list of rights which can be legally enforced,

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the Constitution presents the unusual feature of an outline of social principles which ought to inform the policies of state administrators. Some of the goals enumerated bear little relation to the realities of possible achievement within any foreseeable future. The most abandoned optimist would have to admit that India has a long and hard road to travel before she can for example, hope to ensure for her people a decent standard of life with "full enjoyment of leisure, and social and cultural opportunities." While the development of a comprehensive scale of social services covering unemployment, old age, sickness and maternity is to be a directive principle of policy, in the case of free compulsory, primary education, the further and ambitious step is taken of prescribing a time limit of ten years.

While the wisdom of including what is tantamount to a political manifesto in a constitutional instrument may be open to question, it should at any rate diminish the possibility of appeal to a rigid constitution as a means of blocking social progress. The Constitutions of the United States and of Australia, for example, which were drawn up in times when laissez-faire assumptions as to the nature of the state's functions were still widespread, have been repeatedly appealed to by conservative interests, affected by changing conditions. Such action should certainly be more difficult in India, where the Constitution specifically enjoins the States to prevent "the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment," and to secure that "the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good."

At the moment the Congress, united by the long struggle for swaraj, is overwhelmingly powerful in India. Even in the former Indian States, admiration for the Congress's unrivalled achievements is widespread. But with the passage of time, the normal social and economic conflicts which provide the staple of political life in most countries today, will come increasingly to the fore. In the process, the democratic institutions now being forged will inevitably be subjected to considerable strain, and it would be rash for any foreign observer to pretend to predict the outcome. But it can be said that the new Constitution is an instrument which promises well for the future, if India's leaders prove equal to the challenge of educating the people to the high level of social responsibility, which the Constitution must ultimately demand of them.

CITIZEN OR EX-SERVICE MAN

By F. GEORGE, *Ex-Sergt. The Sherwood Foresters*

A CAMPAIGN is being waged by Commander A. Pursey, R.N., the member of Parliament for East Hull, against the British Legion, and Poppy Day collections for distressed ex-service men. He has declared that the British Legion is now redundant, and that Poppy Day is no longer necessary owing to the social security measures which have been introduced by the present Government. He also makes other statements concerning the political activities of the Legion. He has of course been counter-attacked by the Legion, but neither of the protagonists appear to have said anything about a fundamental factor which should be considered in connection with the British Legion, all other service charities, and political activities. It is the relationship of an ex-service man as a citizen to charitable funds and political desires.

The word "ex-service" is only superimposed on citizen. It does not obliterate it, any more than when a soldier enlists. He does not cease to be a citizen; his official character is superimposed on his civil character.

For very many years before the Crimean War, and after that campaign right up to 1914, the soldier and the army were apart from the nation. Men who had served as soldiers were discharged to sink or swim, live or starve. The soldier became an outcast and pauper, begging in the gutter, a tramp on the roads, or was an inhabitant of a workhouse. As a citizen he was outside the pale of society.

Today that treatment has been changed, not in principle, only in procedure. One does not now see the individual ex-soldier begging. It is done for him in an organised manner, by people who sit in luxurious offices, in considerable numbers, and are paid for their services to beg. I am well aware that a similar position exists with some civilian charities. The structure of our society and a national characteristic have allowed this position to develop. But it should not be duplicated for the ex-service man, when the existing charities can help him as a citizen.

The British Legion is the widest known to the public as a charitable body for, and of, ex-service men, principally through its Poppy Day activities, when it asks for charitable contributions to carry on its work. The institution of Poppy Day by the British Legion, and the growth of other large and overlapping "Service Charities," have become inherent in society from the

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days of long ago. The giving of a poppy in exchange for money is simply a symbol of protection from being badgered for more from the many sellers in the streets. They, in their efforts, are only doing in a different way what the old soldier himself did in the past, except that he did not give an emblem for what he received. And to do this sort of thing, taking figures from the Annual Report and Accounts of the Legion 1947-48, under Benevolent Account we find these items:—Appeals Administration Expenses, £37,616, Cost of Poppies £97,200.

The total income of the Legion for the year ended 30th September, 1948, was £1,464,600 of which the most interesting items were: Poppy Day, 1947, £934,218, Grant from Army Benevolent Fund, £35,000, and a grant from the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund of £9,000. The last two items are clear evidence of how the Service Funds overlap, as both Funds make their own appeals, for the Army and Royal Air Force, but part of the money goes to the Legion. I do not think that the public realises that fact.

The following is an extract from the Annual Report of the Executive Council of the Legion:

"Once more the Council has to record a year of activities and responsibilities. Branches have increased and membership continues to rise by an influx of men of the Second War. In spite of the steps which during the year have been taken in regard to State Social Services, the work which falls upon the Legion in augmenting these Services continues—as was anticipated—to increase from almost every direction. At the conclusion of the period under review it is a little difficult to assess the ultimate result of the State Schemes upon the general work of the British Legion. Whilst they may eventually, after a considerable period of time, result in a certain saving on various Benevolent Schemes, it is equally certain that there remains a vast field of assistance not covered. The first indications are that the new State Schemes will most certainly not reduce the work of the Legion or many other organisations, who for years have operated in the general field of voluntary Social Service. It is clear that the State Schemes cannot offer the advice and personal contact and sympathetic consideration which is forthcoming from the voluntary organisations, whose impetus is not solely the handling of cash assistance to individuals and families who may come to them, but the establishment of such individuals and families upon a permanent basis of happiness and prosperity which springs as much from things of the mind and spirit as from the provision of money."

I would call particular attention to the words printed in italics. Those many other organisations doubtless deal with individuals as citizens, and, if the British Legion was abolished, they would continue to do so, including ex-service men. I am in full agreement with the last sentence of the paragraph concerning personal contact and sympathetic consideration from voluntary organisations who assist citizens in distress.

Reading in the Report of the activities of the Legion, I can find only two activities which cannot be dealt with through the normal channels of civilian commercialism or civilian charitable

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organisations. They are the assistance given for relatives to visit abroad the graves of those who have been killed and the activities of the Legion for increased pensions for disabled ex-service men. With regard to the former, the Corps and Regimental Associations should be able to do this, by the same method as the Legion. The Associations in most cases have large sums of money. To take one case only, the Airborne Forces Security Fund help, where necessary, those who cannot afford the full amount for the pilgrimage to Normandy and Arnheim.

Concerning expenditure to carry on the general activities of the Legion the Annual Report shows a total of £90,650 15s. 11d. for General Administration, and £213,041 2s. 10d. for Cost of Service. Staff Salaries, Wages, and State Insurance amount to £15,082 15s. 2d. and £69,650 11s. 6d. respectively. Printing, Stationery, Advertising, and Publicity come to £8,565 1s. 3d. and £9,008 15s. 9d. under the two headings. We read that the publicity van had a successful tour travelling around the country visiting most counties, and that attractive pamphlets were produced and a number of special display boards were designed and painted. And it is to be observed that the Legion is now having large new offices built in Pall Mall, one of the most expensive sites in London. All this expenditure to obtain money to help men who have served in the fighting forces, whereas they can and should obtain their requirements and desires as citizens, irrespective of their service as sailors, soldiers, or airmen.

The most extraordinary thing is that millions of men who have served in the fighting forces in the two wars still support, as citizens, the same principle through the British Legion, the Army Benevolent Fund, and Corps and Regimental Benevolent Funds, the priority palliative of charity for ex-service men, *i.e.*, themselves. Why? It would appear to be an application of the mass mind to a convention that it is "just done" without thought or consideration that they are dragging the nobility, honour, history, and traditions of the fighting forces to the level of the gutter.

There is no nation wide begging for distressed dockers, miners, railmen, transport drivers, munition workers of the war, and other civilians who have been engaged on national service. They have retained their position as self respecting citizens whereas the man who has served in the fighting forces becomes an object for begging from the public.

As an example of citizenship take the position concerning

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the great question of housing. In this respect an ex-service man is treated on an equality with other citizens. Where there are heavy claims from residents of many years standing the Local Authorities will not usually give him any preferential consideration; he must await his turn on the list. Some ex-service men are inclined to think that they are outsiders when an application for a house is not promptly satisfied. This is an erroneous impression. The ex-service man is treated on the same plane as his fellow citizens.

It can be argued that other charities exist for various organised bodies of civilians such as musicians, actors, variety artists, seamen, and others. Then why not for ex-service men? With so many ex-service men in the nation a man may have been, as a civilian prior to his service in the Forces, in any trade or profession which has a Benevolent Fund. As a citizen he can appeal to that if he wishes to do so. With both these and the Service charities open to him, human nature being what it is, abuses take place and the "scrounger" is made.

By all means let the British Legion carry on as a spiritual organisation in its activities in association with Remembrance Day, and also if desired its social activities through clubs, but social service to the citizen has advanced far in the last two decades, and with all that is now being done all service charities should be completely abolished. It is worshipping a false God this charity for ex-service men. Pure charity is a very beautiful thing and I hope it will ever remain so, but it is a prostitution of it that because a man has served in the fighting forces, nation wide begging should be made to help him in difficulty or distress. He should be treated as a self respecting citizen on an equality with all others.

Ex-service men themselves must take the initiative if the charity fetish and ramp is to stop. They should act to this end as citizens, holding their heads high with self respect, and not allow new entrants to the army and air force to think that charity is the first priority palliative for them on the termination of their service.

In the political field I have no doubt that professional politicians will endeavour to use the member of the British Legion, or any other ex-service organisation, for party purposes, and so cause confusion with regard to legitimate claims. It has happened in the past, and was revealed again in the House of Commons on the 26th April in the debate on War Pensions.

The ex-service man of to-day is not the old professional sailor and soldier fighting for justice as in the years previous to

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1914. The service of the citizen soldier has been an episode only—a terrible one it is true—in his life. Civilian interests are paramount. Many want to forget that they ever served in the fighting forces. Their economic and political future lies in civil life.

If ex-service men, as such, desire to remain outside party politics they must define clearly in their minds where the line begins and ends, politically, between their position as a citizen and as an ex-service man. They will find it difficult. Professional politicians, inside and outside the ex-service man movement, will use the ex-service man as a side issue for vote catching. Ex-service men who stand for election to Parliament will not present themselves on a straight vote as an ex-service man to be elected to watch only ex-service matters in the House of Commons. They would not stand a chance of election unless they introduced into their candidature such political policies as affect voters as citizens in their economic life. The only way ex-service men can gain what they desire through the House of Commons, must be to use the man in the House of Commons, who has been elected for their constituency, on a citizenship franchise, whether he be conservative, liberal, or socialist, to watch their interests.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By HAROLD J. LASKI. (*Allen and Unwin.*
78s pp. 25s.)

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. By ALFRED H. KELLY and W. A. HARRISON.
Norton, New York. 940 pp.

AFTER reading Prof. Laski's study of America, I recalled my own sensations of mingled excitement and bewilderment when I first travelled by rail across it, from ocean to ocean, stunned by its vast spaces and dazzled by its variety of detail. In this immense book, which runs to nearly 800 pages, one travels with the author through time as well as space. Into it he has packed his observation, reading and reflection, over a period of thirty years, since his first experiences as a lecturer at Harvard. I hardly know which of his many gifts impressed me most deeply. His vivid historical imagination enables him to relive the past and to talk of Jefferson or Calhoun as if he had met them in the flesh; his powers of observation and sympathy help him to think himself under the skin of human beings far removed from his own outlook, the negro for example, the party boss or the fundamentalist preacher; lastly while he analyses, criticises and peers into the future, he views the society he is studying as a thing of flesh and blood, with its human frailties and its epic grandeur. He has read with omnivorous voracity and retained what he gathered in an orderly memory. He has learned much from many friends, ranging from his pupils up to the three great judges, Holmes, Brandeis and Frankfurter. His attitude to America is friendly; he resents the mingled snobbery and envy of many European critics and he does full justice (it may be a little more than justice) to the originality of America's creative culture and the achievements of her scholars. But he writes boldly and bluntly about the uglier aspects of her civilisation, the worship of success, the power of her "invisible government," of millionaires and bosses, her inability to solve the internal contradictions of capitalism and the menace of her own peculiar brand of imperialism.

The scope of this big book is encyclopaedic. It ranges over the growth of the American tradition, the influence of the Constitution, the character of the parties, literature, the educational system, the press and the radio, the professions of law and medicine. It would be easier to mention one or two omissions, than to catalogue all it includes. The discussion of the problems of soil erosion and deforestation might with advantage have been fuller. Laski is at his best when he is dealing, in the concrete, with groups of men and women. He writes some brilliant pages on the character of the business man, noting his virtues no less than his disastrous failings. From intimate experience he gives us a disturbing picture of university life. I should pick out as his best chapter that which he devotes to the churches and the religious tradition. He gives us a contemptuous picture of the subordination of the churches to the mill-owners in the South, who pay their ministers to dole out "opium" to their employees. And yet he manages to give us a psychological interpretation of Fundamentalism which does not lack sympathy. His pages on the plight of two of the racial minorities, the negroes and the Jews, are deeply moving and

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scrupulously just. He bridles his anger against anti-semitism and tries to understand it as the search in a disintegrating society for a scapegoat.

He is right in saying that Catholicism is still not quite integrated into the traditional American pattern, though its growing political influence was obvious during Roosevelt's long reign. What I wonder, will happen if the next Pope should be chosen from one of the many American cardinals? In recent decades the Irish and the Czechs have come nearer to attaining the status of equality which Germans and Scandinavians always enjoyed; but Italians, Poles, Slovaks, Greeks and Mexicans (in that descending order) are still among the depressed and under-privileged stocks. Among the best sections of this book are the pages, as sympathetic as they are informing, in which Laski describes, as an eye-witness, the misery of the growing rural proletariat—the share-croppers in the eroded Southern States; the indebted small tenant-farmers and the four or five millions of homeless labourers, who wander over the continent, reaping the harvests of the mechanised farms. His description of "boss" rule in the cities stresses with much intimate detail its kindness as well as its corruption.

The main theme of the book, recurring in many contexts from the first chapters to the last, is a socialist's criticism of "the American way of life." Laski can appreciate the value of the Jeffersonian tradition; he can admire Roosevelt and his liberal helpers; he reminds us again and again of the American genius for experiment and revolutionary improvisation. But when all is said, he doubts whether the invisible government of property and finance-capital will ever allow internal consumption to overtake production, restrictive though the monopolists tend to be. Will it ever, he asks, tolerate the taxation required to fit the environment of the rural proletariat for a decent human existence and to raise its purchasing power? Will it ever, faced with the rival demands for re-armament, carry out the programme, sketched first by Wallace and then by Truman, for distributing in backward regions of the earth the equipment needed to raise their standard of life? The probability is, he fears, that America will follow a policy of economic imperialism, not indeed, by annexation, but by penetration. Marshall Aid combined with re-armament is not a re-assuring solution. He might have added a further question. Can a creditor Power conduct with stability a great career of foreign investment, so long as it insists on maintaining a surplus of exports over imports? It cannot receive the interest on its investments (save through the tourist traffic); it can only re-invest its gains abroad. This means that its objective is not the enjoyment of its gains, but the steady increase of its power. There lies the menace of "the American century."

Laski investigates, not too hopefully, the political prospects of a change in the balance of class power. He doubts whether there is, or can be, any substantial difference in the outlook and policy of the two ruling parties, though he notes that the younger and therefore on the whole the less wealthy electors tend to be Democrats. He stresses the incoherence and disunity of the liberal groups. Though he faces all the difficulties, psychological, financial and constitutional, that a third party must overcome, he pleads persuasively for the formation of an effective Labour Party. Desirable as this solution is, I cannot feel hopeful of its realisation. He devotes some space also to the need for changes in a constitution devised for the

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running of a negative state in a primitive agrarian community. It did evolve during Roosevelt's four terms towards a new relationship of the federal government towards the States; the Supreme Court is no longer the solid bulwark of property it used to be; regional units comprising several States began to function, not only in Tennessee Valley; the Trade Unions acquired a better though still precarious status. But the old checks and balances are still formidable enough to thwart even a strong President.

The constitutional reforms which Laski proposes are designed primarily to ensure the President's ability to act throughout his period of office. His term should be lengthened to six or seven years; re-election should be forbidden, and he should have the power to dissolve the Senate. The case for these reforms is ably argued. They might achieve their purpose, but would not corresponding changes be necessary in the timing of elections for both Houses of Congress? The Constitution is a sacred fetish and I doubt if amendments so radical are feasible. Able as Laski's critical review of the various organs of the Constitution is, he has a bias in favour of the Senate. Certainly it has dignity, until a filibuster starts; it has always included a number of able men among its members; its record of thoroughness in its investigations is remarkable. But in it the voice of the progressive industrial populations is grossly under-represented; the small, backward, rural States are heavily over-weighted; indeed, as he himself points out, less than one fifth of the American population elects a majority of the Senate. In principle he does well to defend its right to control foreign policy; but to me his defence of its record in exercising this right is unconvincing. Every Senator feels that he personally owns a ninety-sixth part of America's sovereignty; he guards this property with excessive jealousy against the President, and also against any international organisation.

This able and sympathetic book ranks high among the few studies of its kind produced in this century. If it has its faults, they could be corrected when a second edition is called for. There are far too many repetitions; for example, two long and telling quotations, one from Bishop Lawrence, and another from Daniel Webster are both cited twice in full. Laski seems to have aimed at completeness, where he would have been wiser to select; he mentions briefly far too many minor personalities and unimportant books. Again, his younger English readers would welcome, I imagine, in many places, a few words or sentences of explanation. How many can now recall the horror of the Homestead strike; how many know that Miss Marian Anderson is a brilliant and cultured singer of Negro birth? But I will not end on a note of criticism. This book is a worthy contribution towards the understanding of a great and vital nation; it is also a notable addition to the socialist case for a society of equals.

The study of the American Constitution by Mr. Kelly and Mr. Harbison is a competent and well-arranged text-book. It traces the history of the Constitution from its origins in Colonial times down to the most recent interpretations of the Supreme Court. Its many quotations make it a useful book of reference. The writers rarely obtrude their theoretical views. They dislike (and misunderstand) Beard's brilliant economic interpretation of the Constitution, but are liberal enough in their individualism to recognise the need for some planning (but not too much) in the modern world.

H. N. BRAILSFORD.

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ESSAYS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By C. H. WILSON (Ed.). (Basil Blackwell. 18s.)

COMPARATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By G. MONTAGU HARRIS, O.B.E., M.A. (Hutchinson's University Library. 7s. 6d.)

BRITISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By E. C. R. HADFIELD and JAMES E. MACCOLL, J.P. (Hutchinson's University Library. 7s. 6d.)

LOCAL COUNCILS AND THE CITIZEN. By R. SIMON. (Stevens. 5s.)

IT is nearly ninety years since John Stuart Mill set before himself the problem as to "how the transaction of local business can be made most instrumental to the nourishment of public spirit and the development of intelligence." He reached the conclusion that "the authority which is most conversant with principles should be supreme over principles, while that which is most competent in details should have the details left to it." He took this to mean that "the principal business of the central authority should be to give instruction, of the local authority to apply it. Power may be localised, but knowledge, to be most useful, must be centralized."

Whatever the value of this conclusion—and it certainly states the principles that underlie and inform the inspecting functions of central departments—of more significance is the nature of the problem posed, and the quality of the discussion which Mill undertook. For Mill was concerned with nothing less than the *raison d'être* of local government. It is to this question that Mr. Wilson returns in his most able and stimulating opening contribution to the volume of *Essays on Local Government* which he has edited. "What is the political theory of local government?"

It was perhaps Mr. T. S. Eliot who said that we should know better what democracy was if only someone would say something *against* it. But we have been made sufficiently aware over the last two decades of the rise of alternative ways of thought and life, and one result has been a new attempt on the part of political thinkers to re-define the essential doctrines of democracy. More recently and within our own democracy there has developed what amounts to a challenge to local government. Mr. Wilson seeks to make use of the re-definition and defence of "democracy in general" in order to re-define and defend "the fundamental purposes of the English local government system."

The importance of this attempt can be expressed in terms of the reasons which Mr. Wilson gives for making it. In the first place, it is only in this way that the deplorable gap between reflection on political principles and discussion of administrative machinery can be closed. Far too many accounts of our local government system neglect the philosophy which it expresses, and far too few debates on the meaning of democracy draw their illustrations from the practical exploration of that meaning which takes place at the local level. Secondly, only an attempt of this kind can in the present reorganisation of local government counteract the influence of "those whose whole attention is fixed on the administrative question." Mr. Wilson does not state the dangers too strongly when he asserts that if such men "should succeed in shaping local government solely from the standpoint of administrative convenience they will dissipate by an act of outstanding political folly the slow gain of centuries of political experience."

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Defining the "constitutive principles" of democracy as participation, education, and discussion and consent, Mr. Wilson points out that certainly the first two, and probably the last demand the establishment of representative institutions in the locality as well as at the centre. He believes with Mill that it is especially in relation to political education that local self-government is invaluable, and it is for this reason that he views with concern those present developments which lessen the intelligibility of the machinery of government to the citizen. To avoid this, there must be a "major reform of local authorities."

Mr. Wilson does not put forward any scheme of reform and indeed it would be outside the scope and purpose of his essay to do so. We may nevertheless discern the lines along which he appears to consider reform should move. Attention must be concentrated on the field of "intermediate government lying between the centre and the locality." At the same time, this should not be taken to imply support of "full-fledged regional democracies, with consequent decay of minor institutions"—let alone regional offices of central departments. Whether Mr. Wilson is in favour of indirect election to regional councils is not clear. He contents himself with stressing the importance of ensuring that "the new areas are not constructed merely on the basis of administrative convenience, but correspond as nearly as possible to areas of genuine common interest and local individuality" and that "delegation of responsibility to subordinate authorities is effectively provided for and does not remain a dead letter as with the counties and their districts under the 1894 Act."

The five essays which constitute the bulk of the volume do not attempt to develop the views of the editor. They are the work of Research Assistants at Nuffield College, and are devoted to historical surveys of certain special aspects of local government—"Development of area and boundary changes, 1884-1934," "The Local Government Act of 1929 and subsequent legislation," "Development of the Grant System," "The control of local authority borrowing by the central government" and "Joint Authorities." Yet they have at least one quality in common with the opening essay; they fill another of the important gaps in the book literature of the subject. For it is a fact that there is very little available between the general descriptive accounts and the minute and technical surveys of highly specialised fields.

The essays are well-documented and competent. That on areas furnishes a useful and interesting part of the background to the work of the Boundary Commission and underlines, by its account of the old machinery of area amendment, the need for this more effective device. In the same way each of the others, while content for the most part to describe and analyse trends, points to conclusions which are of marked relevance at the present time. The volume includes a useful digest of recent proposals for the reform of local government.

In attempting a short account of *Comparative Local Government*, Mr. Montagu Harris is dealing with a subject which if not as neglected as the political theory of local government, is at least not yet adequately covered by reliable critical accounts. He is at the same time dealing with a subject in which he has done much of the pioneer work. If therefore this present account is in some ways less than satisfactory, it may well be because of the

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task involved. The author has selected various headings—underlying principles, finance, areas, control, and so on—and gives a brief description under each of the practice in the more important (and even some of the less important) countries. A great deal of material is thus brought together in a fairly convenient form, and Mr. Harris has been able, through his position as President of the International Union of Local Authorities to give us up-to-date and accurate information.

Dissatisfaction arises because this information is presented without any significant context. There is, for example, little attempt to relate local government practice to the general historical and institutional background of the countries concerned in such a way as to bring out its meaning. That, it is true, would require a much expanded treatment. But neither is there any real attempt to evaluate the political or even administrative adequacy of the systems described. The last chapters on "Public Relations" and "What of the future?" are an improvement, but even so the book remains more a small reference work than a discussion of comparative local government.

British Local Government by Messrs. Hadfield and MacColl, covers more familiar and less uncertain ground. The book falls into two parts, the first descriptive, and the second more discursive. The former is a compact and readable summary which calls for no special comments (though it is surprising to be told that "there is in England and Wales no limit to a candidate's expenditure on his candidacy"!) and by itself would perhaps hardly warrant publication. The book is justified by the latter portion which contains admirable discussions of the party system, public relations, the councillor and his relations with officials. That on the party system is particularly useful. The account of its development emphasises that it illustrates "one way in which democracy adapts itself to new problems"; it is less the "arbitrary intervention of the party politician" than the result of "the integration of national and local social policy." At the same time the authors are not concerned merely to explain it away. A brief but interesting analysis of the Labour Party's "model set of Standing Orders for the guidance of Labour Groups on local authorities" shows that although dangers are present, they are often exaggerated and too little account is taken of the different but equally serious dangers of any alternative system. It is especially welcome to find stress laid on the positive role of party in securing that consistency and co-ordination of policy which the legal structure alone is as yet scarcely able to ensure.

Mr. R. Simon has produced an excellent little book in Stevens' "This is the Law" series. It is concise, accurate and well-arranged, and should prove invaluable to many social workers and others who come into contact with local authorities in the course of their work as well as to new councillors and new employees who require a short introduction to the subject. The first part deals with the structure, organisation and function of local authorities, the second with the various local services. The latter is one of the best short accounts of local aspects of recent social legislation at present available. Of both parts of the book what is important is that although the treatment is strictly descriptive and concerned with the legal framework, arid formality has been avoided by clarity of expression and knowledge of the actual working of the system. W. H. MORRIS-JONES.

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INEVITABLE PEACE. By C. J. FRIEDRICH. (*Harvard & Cumberlege*. 294 pp. 26s.)

MOVED by the circumstance of the United Nations being born in the 150th year since the Essay on *Eternal Peace*, the Professor of Government at Harvard conceived a book which, planned at first as a "brief study," together with a new translation, of the Kantian Project, was presently expanded into this distinguished contribution to "the history of the idea of universal order under law." Its occasional references to the U.N. Charter might perhaps have been spared: but the sketch given of the evolution and progressive secularization of the law of nature; and the showing forth of the relationship between Kant's idea of peace, as the goal of civilization, and the rest of his philosophy, appears, at least to one comparative layman, of outstanding value. And this from no merely academic point of view. For, as the author convincingly claims, there may be point in the opening up for discussion of theoretical issues which have lain dormant too long. Even to-day, he judges, the world is far from a realization of the full significance of Kant's doctrine. It is partly, though not solely, to this that he imputes a now prevalent "propensity to accept ideological conflict as an inevitable cause of war." What is needed is "a new and different approach to our problem." In particular "it behooves (sic) us" to inquire into the antecedents of the bourgeois ideas on war and peace. And so to Kant, whose analysis of the problem "in terms consonant with the Charter's approach" is the most penetrating yet.

Professor Friedrich propounds a wholesome counsel of perfection. "If we will only make sure that we understand and after understanding will not misrepresent the ideas held by others. . . ." In this, for the most part, he gives us a good example, as well as a helping hand. For we cannot all seek our Aquinas and our Althusius, our Hooker and our Hume, our Suarez and our Spinoza, at the source. Nor without guided access to the background of its thinking can we well construe for ourselves the detail of the Kantian scheme. That scheme itself is rightly shown as suffering from its author's failure to be clear as to whether his universal law was to bear on states, or on individuals, as such: and indeed it is less remarkable for any light it may throw on present problems than for the fact of having been produced when it was. Its ideals were peace and freedom; but its context the Prussia of its day. What Kant sought to show was that eternal peace was not only desirable but necessary and eventually inevitable. This view rested upon "his extraordinary philosophy of history," the adaptation in secular terms of a key conception of Christian theology. There were assumed an order of nature, a hidden hand of nature, and a hidden plan, whereby, despite man's disposition to strife and struggle, the moral autonomy and universal freedom which, with their prerequisite of world-wide law and order, were likewise assumed as the end and purpose of men's existence, would inexorably come about.

But, as Professor Friedrich duly observes, Kant's theory had weak points at the time. And further "serious difficulties" have become explicit since he wrote. "Modern sociology, psychology and anthropology" have raised new queries for the quest for peace to face. And upon this theme, while touching it suggestively here, Professor Friedrich gives us hopes of a further book. Neither a Kantian nor a Marxian himself, he sees the

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necessity for an understanding no less of Marx than of Kant. These two, by the way, are "complimentary (sic)" to each other in their thought. And Vico lives to 105! And, being now on this fault-finding note, one is just a little tempted to wonder whether, in his remarks on Professor Northrop, the author has sufficiently regarded his own excellent precept: "If we will only. . ."

C. A. W. MANNING.

TRIAL AND ERROR. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHAIM WEIZMANN. (Hamilton. 608 pp. 21s.)

MAHATMA GANDHI. By H. S. L. POLAK, H. N. BRAILSFORD, and LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE. (Odhams. 320 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH. By M. K. GANDHI. (Phoenix. 420 pp. 21s.)

DR. Weizmann's autobiography is an important book. It is not merely a fascinating biography, but it is a historical document of inestimable value to the student of those events connected with Zionism and Palestine which will probably have profound effects upon the history of Asia and Europe. The tripartite volume on Gandhi is in part a biography of that strange man, and in part a sympathetic appreciation of his character, methods and achievements. No better authors than Mr. Polak, Mr. Brailsford, and Lord Pethick-Lawrence could have been chosen for the purpose. Mr. Polak was Gandhi's closest associate during the stormy South African period of his life in which he first found himself morally and politically and performed perhaps the greatest feat of his career. He carries the story of Gandhi's life down to the end of this period and he writes about it with unrivalled authority. Mr. Brailsford had not Mr. Polak's advantages, but he knew Gandhi well, and, though puzzled by many of the Mahatma's views and actions, writes brilliantly and sympathetically about his way of life, philosophy, policy, and leadership in the years between the wars. Lord Pethick-Lawrence writes a plain narrative of the last years, and adds a chapter on Gandhi's role in history. The third book, in which Gandhi gave an account of his life down to the year 1921, raises some interesting questions in the ethics of editing and publishing. It was published many years ago and C. F. Andrews used a great deal of its material in his book on Gandhi. In the present volume not a word is said about this. The book is fascinating and invaluable for the information which it gives regarding the first part of Gandhi's life, but the reader should have been informed when it was written and when first published.

In some ways it would be difficult to find two men more dissimilar than the Indian Mahatma and the first President of Israel. But the dissimilarities are superficial; fundamentally there is between them a remarkable resemblance in their aims, their methods, and their achievements, and reading their biographies or autobiographies fills me with the same admiration and the same melancholy and despair. The one was and the other is indisputably a great man in the sense in which historians and the rest of the world are accustomed to use that dubious title. Unlike most

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great men, their motives were of the purest, their aims of the highest, their hands of the cleanest. They were, above and below everything, nationalists. Gandhiji, "Bapu," as India his vast disciple affectionately called him, was, as so many have claimed, a saint. But he used his sainthood, like everything else, for one great object, the emancipation of Indians and the creation of an independent India. Dr. Weizmann is a distinguished scientist and a highly civilised and humane man, but he has subordinated science and everything else to one great object, the emancipation of the Jews and the creation of an independent Israel. Both were consummate politicians, possessed of that rare kind of relentless will which enables a man to pursue a single object throughout his life impervious to doubts, hesitations, events, or failures. Both were successful; much can be said for the claim that the Republic of India today owes its existence to Mahatma Gandhi and the Republic of Israel owes its existence to Dr. Chaim Weizmann.

The motive and object were in each case, I repeat, of the highest order. That the record of their achievement should rouse feelings of melancholy and even of despair is, I suppose, merely a proof of the melancholy and desperate quandary into which our political civilisation has got itself. It is a proof of the conflict in the heart of modern nationalism to which Gandhi himself was partially and Dr. Weizmann is almost completely blind. I agree that the freedom of Indians and Jews was an object of the greatest importance and that the British domination of the one and the persecution of the other were unmitigated evils. But I cannot accept the implicit assumption of these two great men that freedom and nationalism are intrinsically good and must be pursued irrespective of consequences. Gandhi would certainly and Dr. Weizmann would possibly have denied that they made the assumption, but it is in fact implicit in their actions, and the result is that their objects were achieved at the cost of evil and suffering equal to that which they were combating. The nature of Gandhi's nationalism can be seen in his negotiations with Jinnah, and a direct consequence was the massacres and misery which preceded and accompanied partition. The fact that libertarians can ignore or condone such horrors in the pursuit of liberty accounts for the plight of liberty in the modern world. Nothing ever embittered Gandhi and he was always anxious to understand his opponents. Dr. Weizmann has only bitterness or contempt for anyone who does not accept his own view of the Zionist position. He cannot believe that any one can be disinterested in questioning the Jewish right to Palestine or the actions of Zionists in asserting the right. I cannot, however, see that there is anything more sacred in the nationalism of Jews than in that of Arabs or vice versa, and to ignore or condone the slaughter and misery which has accompanied the creation of the State of Israel is the surest way of perpetuating those very evils in the world which Gandhi and Dr. Weizmann set out to combat. I do not believe that the freedom of India or of Israel is going to be of much account so long as people in either country believe that a dead or starving Muslim is of less account than a dead or starving Hindu, or that a dead or starving Arab is of less account than a dead or starving Jew.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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THE WORLD CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT. By MARGARET DIGBY. (*Hutchinson's University Library*. 163 pp. 7s. 6d.)

MISS MARGARET DIGBY knows a considerable part of the world's co-operative movement, not only from her studies but also from personal experience. As Secretary of the Horace Plunkett Foundation she has visited many countries in Europe and overseas and has the opportunity to study on the spot the organisation and functioning of different branches of co-operative effort.

Miss Digby approaches the subject by describing the co-operative movement functionally. She starts by giving the historical background of the development of co-operative ideas in general and follows it up by summarising in one or more chapters the position in each important field of co-operative activities. The first three chapters are devoted to the consumers' co-operative movement, and are followed by a chapter on productive co-operation, two chapters on co-operative credit and one on insurance. Agricultural co-operation is dealt with more extensively in the following five chapters, covering the supply of farm requirements, the marketing of agricultural produce and the organisation of rural productive effort through the collective farm, and fishing and forestry co-operative societies.

After presenting a detailed picture of co-operative developments all over the world and analysing the achievements and shortcomings of the movement in each separate field, Miss Digby endeavours to present in the last three chapters "the integrated, interlocking and inter-acting character of the movement, which gives it so much of its character and vitality." She comes to the conclusion that the two fundamental motives to which the co-operative movement as a whole owes its origin often conflict in their manifestations.

"The movements are, in fact," writes Miss Digby, "built on two distinct, though not irreconcilable principles—the satisfaction of human needs as the mainspring and purpose of economic activity, and the recognition that among human needs is the need to carry on useful work chosen by the worker, to enjoy self-government in work, and to be rewarded for the work when it is done. Hence springs a real difference of outlook and at one, though not the deepest level, a real conflict of interest." (P. 142.)

Miss Digby remains very doubtful if this conflict of interests can be reconciled by state planning which, she believes, "leaves them little initiative or bargaining power."

This leads to the consideration in Chapter XVI of the relation between co-operation, the state, and the community, and Miss Digby emphasises in the beginning of the chapter, quite rightly, that "the co-operative movement does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of an ordered society and an ordered state. The state impinges upon it at many points."

Miss Digby recognises, however, that "it is almost certain that the world of the future will be a world of planned and in a large measure of socialised economy." She admits that "it is strange that comparatively little thought seems to have been given to the shape and size of the co-operative sector in the new world."

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It is evident that this is the main failure of the modern co-operative movement and one can only agree with the author that

"The co-operative movement for a number of years past has been adjusting itself fragmentarily to each new situation, but the pace and pressure of war and revolution have left little opportunity for the revision or re-affirmation of co-operative policy, which can only be made internationally and inter-functionally, on the basis of an appraisal of co-operative economy in relation to world economy more elaborate, searching and statistical than can be attempted here." (P. 155.)

The book summarises simply and clearly the working of the co-operative movement all over the world, and presents to the reader the main problems which face the movement in present-day transitional economy. It can be heartily recommended to every student of co-operation and to its practical workers.

N. BAROU.

LABOUR. By P. SARGANT FLORENCE. (*Hutchinson's University Library*. 230 pp. 7s. 6d.)

AMONG the providences which direct academic study, one is generally unadmitted, yet powerful: this is the "examinability" of a topic. The classical languages, logic, mathematics, the natural sciences, economic theory in the form of equilibrium analysis, all lend themselves to the easy and precise assessment of undergraduate attainment and ability, and an appraisal of how far the attention of economists has been controlled by this fact, and by a desire to produce pages of impeccably "scientific" appearance would probably surprise and amuse. Professor Florence has never been the victim of these tendencies, and the present excellent little volume is a foray into reality, into the distressingly alive and pushing jungle that is the frontier between economics, sociology, psychology, and physiology. It is all the more impressive that, in the first two parts of this book at least, he has imposed an order and an elegance on a chaos of facts, hypotheses, and dubious experiment.

This book is concerned with labour as a factor of production. In its author's words, it does not ignore "what labour is ultimately for, and in this book the consumer's demands and needs" are "kept in view, as well as the satisfaction of the producer's 'human nature'." The first two sections deal with the present situation and controlling factors of labour supply and use. The treatment of these problems is good,* and the frank recognition that English class-structure is a primary enemy of labour efficiency, the stress laid on cross-mobility of occupations between industries, and the balanced, lucid exposition of industrial psychology and sociology, and the measurement of the involved factors are all impressive. The realism of the book is consistent, and Professor Florence's own experience can throughout be felt checking and controlling the argument, and manifesting his shrewdness in such judgments as that on the relation of saving to incentive, or in his condemnation of the British custom of degressive rate-fixing.

* The book, of course, contains, blemishes, obscurities, and mistakes. E.g., the comparative neglect of the impact of trade unions on ideology, the gaps in the bibliography, the mysterious passage relating psychological malaise to a spectrum (p. 24), "1929" for 1921 (p. 18), the wide powers credited to the thermometer as a measuring instrument (p. 74).

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It is in Part Three that one begins to feel the limitations of such manuals as this. The account of the facts of unemployment with which it opens is well done, but over-familiar and too brief. The following chapter on the prevention of unemployment is at once too compact and too superficial for the student working by himself, and is superfluous for anyone else.

Part Four is of more interest, but "The Direction of Labour Policy" cannot adequately be dealt with in forty pages, and here also the reader may for the first time suspect Professor Florence of an inadequacy of vision. This section is technical and adequate so far as it goes, but its generalisations on the rôle of labour in time are at once timid and a little thin, as though the writer were afraid of the non-quantitative and the risk of being wrong about the future. Probably this is unfair, and Professor Florence feels that the making of those general propositions, of which the construction is man's chief end, should take place elsewhere, away from the needs of the student who should find plenty to stimulate him in this conclusion and start him in such new fields as the history of trade unionism, the study of prices, and the whole vexed question of the interaction of politics and economics.

On the whole, then, a good and much needed book which begins with fact and detail, and ends with something of a sweep and a questioning. That even on the present basis of knowledge such a work is possible, is extremely encouraging and doubly interesting in its revelation at once of our knowledge and our ignorance of the human foundations of the economic order, and in its demonstration of the comparative irrelevance of much that is taught as economic analysis to any appraisal of economic reality. If we do not hope for too much and push too far ahead under the guidance of our desires—as perhaps Elton Mayo is inclined to do—the marriage of sociology and economics may prove fruitful in policy, practice and theory, and even gain full respectability by becoming a fit subject for examination!

DONALD G. MACRAE.

A SURVEY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. By HAROLD ZINK. (MacMillan. 809 pp. 24s.)

THIS is an abridgment with new material of an earlier book, *Government and Politics in the United States*. I do not know what has been omitted or what has been added, but the net result is a comprehensive survey of American political institutions, federal, state and local, of over 800 pages. It would not be unfair to say that throughout the survey of the structure and the work of the political institutions there is little penetrating or even critical discussion of the problems which are involved. This is not from any lack of knowledge or critical desire on the part of Professor Zink himself. It is the result of a deliberate policy of understatement and restraint which he has imposed upon himself, so that his work might fairly be described as a survey. He has painted his grey in grey, so that the relations and proportions shall at no time or place be distorted by a touch of malice, wit, or passion. There is no special theme controlling the survey of essential facts. The survey is an atlas in which every map is on the same scale and not even the capital cities, or the scenes of massacres or battles, are allowed an inset on a larger scale. The result is an extremely useful text book for any teacher who may have to take a class in American government. He

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will know the ground which might be covered. However warm his interest in some special field he will be compelled to see that it is but a part of one stupendous whole. From the index and the lucid table of contents he will be able to inform himself about recent developments in every phase of American political institutions. He has in his hands an American Whittaker embodied in a clear narrative. It is fair, impartial, and up to date. But although it is never stale, it is so flat that it is not as profitable as one feels it might have been.

I do not want in any way to belittle a most useful work. Professor Zink has set himself the highest standards within his deliberately selected scope. He never allows himself to distort his pattern because there happens to be some especially meaty body of documentation on a particular theme. He is writing a text book in political science and that, as we all know, should mean a statement of what is known to be what it is, unsullied by any vagaries of speculation or criticism. It is the works and not the life which can be given. A competent physiologist in his account of the head will not trouble himself about "what dreams may come" nor in his account of the heart will he mention the "reasons" which Pascal had in mind; and the belly and its adjuncts will be surveyed and no whisper of Rabelais be heard. Professor Zink is not quite so detached as this. He is after all writing for American students, and they have a keen interest in the facts of life, political life included. When they study a political system they require that nothing should be hidden, and it is when they are given "the low down on the high spots" that they feel they are being brought nearest to the real nature of what they seek to understand. It is to meet this most legitimate claim that Professor Zink has added some personal touches. "The President himself," he remarks, "may read books which reflect the conclusion of certain experts." Even more exhilarating than the knowledge that a President may read is the recorded habit of one American Ambassador of shocking his official hosts by parading round a presidential mansion on all fours so happy was he in his intoxication (p. 545). At a less personal level is the interesting item that Mr. Hoover discovered that forty different agencies in Washington and thirty-four in the field purchased supplies for the federal government.

The merit of the book is that it does indeed survey its chosen field. It differs from the usual English book on political institutions by including a description of the functions and organisation of the administrative departments within the same covers as a discussion of the nature of the parties and of the presidential system. It is as though the *Cabinet System* of Sir Ivor Jennings, the *Whitehall* series on government departments, and Erskine May's *Parliamentary Procedure* had been distilled into one clear text. The English student may suffer from our habit of impressionistic studies. He may think that he knows his country when he only knows a party. Professor Zink is determined that he shall know only what can be certain. There is never, if I may say so, any hint of the nature of the cerebations which underlie the fields of government which he has so carefully surveyed. He never uses an epigram as a substitute for argument. Difficult problems may be mentioned and, if they are not probed, they are never hidden by a play of words. The one real weakness of the book, within its scope, is I think that the historical sections are too brief.

K. SMELLIE.

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THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS. A HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS OF HITLER AND MUSSOLINI. By ELIZABETH WISKEMANN. (Oxford Press. 346 pp. 21s.)

MISS WISKEMANN has done a masterly job in her study of the Axis. It is the first study of the subject, and should prove of lasting value to historians of the period. But it is not a specialist's book. It has the fascination of all "behind-the-scenes" accounts of recent diplomatic events. It is, as she says, a labour of Sisyphus to attempt to write about recent events. No period in history is so rich in official documents, diaries, and accounts of diplomatic missions. She has selected her material from these sources with skill, and has added to them from her own private sources, which were extensive as a result of her long connection with Italy, and her work in Switzerland during the war. In order to reduce the book to a reasonable length, she has omitted any account of events not directly bearing on her subject, which have already been chronicled adequately. This means that the wider framework in which the Axis worked is only sketched in lightly. This is no great disadvantage, now, when the major events of the war years are still fresh in the reader's mind. But in later years, it will become a greater limitation.

The Rome-Berlin Axis begins with a short examination of the formative years of the two dictators. Here, and throughout the book, she stresses the influence of Nietzsche. She notes that Hitler was born in the year that Nietzsche became permanently mad: "the thought is irresistible that Hitlerism was a form of Nietzsche's madness." The admiration of the two supermen for each other was not at first mutual. Hitler, writing in *Mein Kampf* of the year 1923 said: "At this time, I confess frankly, I conceived the deepest admiration for the great man south of the Alps." But Mussolini, in 1930, according to Prince Starhemberg, had doubts of Hitler's sanity, and deplored his racial theories. He was won over in time by Hitler's mesmeric personality, and above all by Hitler's admiration for a fellow superman. Mussolini was a vain and vacillating man. By appealing to his vanity, and to his will to power, Hitler bound Mussolini to him, in spite of the continual conflict of interests between Germany and Italy.

Miss Wiskemann sees the events of these years as a chronicle of rivalry and duplicity, not of co-ordinated actions by the Axis: duplicity on the German side, over Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and rivalry on the Italian side in attempts to impress Hitler and steal the limelight in Abyssinia, Albania, and Greece. She sees the story consistently from Rome, but the facts seem to bear out this interpretation, facts which reveal Mussolini as a tragic clown. His will to power and greatness blinded him to reality. He appears in stark contrast to another character in this astonishing drama of irresponsible supermen, who managed to keep his feet firmly on the ground: General Franco. It is impossible not to admire Franco's dealings with Hitler. In this den of thieves, he knew how to strike a hard bargain. In September, 1940, Hitler informed Ciano, in Miss Wiskemann's words (presumably taken from Ciano's diary though she quotes no source): "The Spaniards ask for 400,000 to 700,000 tons of grain, the furnishing of all the fuel they require, the military equipment they lack, and the troops and weapons necessary for the capture of Gibraltar; they also ask for Morocco and smaller gains. In return, they promise their friendship." Hitler refused these terms, mainly because he found co-operation with defeated

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France a less expensive operation. As a result, Gibraltar was never attacked and Franco is still with us. Mussolini, who never stood up to Hitler in such concrete terms, fell in 1943, and earned from his fellow superman the insulting epithets of "unrevolutionary and bourgeois."

No-one who reads this book can fail to be horrified by the naked revelation of power politics. Hitler is certainly the arch-fiend, but Mussolini, with his illusions of grandeur, aided and abetted him at every turn, whether from rivalry or weakness. National differences were deliberately increased for the sole purpose of creating a state of tension favourable to Hitler's aims. Towards the end, when the war was going disastrously for Germany, Hitler lived in the hope that the inevitable differences between Soviet Russia and the Western Powers would break out, and save him and Germany from destruction. His hope was not realised. The German menace bound the Allies together to the end. But his analysis was not wrong in the long view. In December 1944, Hitler wrote his last New Year letter to Mussolini. "One thing is certain," he said, "and that is that neither Fascism nor National Socialism will ever be replaced in Europe by democracy." He has not yet been proved decisively wrong. As Miss Wiskemann says, "Both the New Order, and the struggle against it were so costly that we do not know yet whether the price paid was not civilization itself. That would be the fulfilment of Hitler's suicidal dream."

ANNE WHYTE.

PLANNING AND THE PRICE MECHANISM. By J. E. MEADE. (Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.)

MR. MEADE, in a sub-title, calls his book "the Liberal-Socialist Solution"; but it is not easy to see where the socialism comes in, unless any wish to decrease the inequality of incomes is to be regarded as socialism. This wish is unquestionably very strong in Mr. Meade's mind, and he puts forward a number of tax proposals which would go a long way beyond the existing system of taxes, subsidies, and social services towards bringing it about. But there is almost nothing else in his book that is even mildly socialistic, except a preparedness to try out a form of public ownership as a remedy for special cases of monopolistic exploitation. For the rest Mr. Meade shows himself essentially not a socialist, but a liberal believer in the beneficent workings of the competitive price mechanism as applied, not only to goods and consumable services, but also to labour.

The extent to which Mr. Meade is an anti-socialist (for he is) may be concealed from some readers by the fact that he is, in a certain very limited sense, a planner. He wants to plan the national income and its broad distribution between consumption and investment. He wants to use drastic monetary controls, coupled with taxation, to keep the total demand for goods and services (for both consumption and investment) down to a level that will both come within productive power and release enough production for export to pay for required imports. But he wants to achieve this balance by monetary and fiscal methods, with the very minimum of planning of the productive system itself—except that he again and again

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stresses the need to check investment under present conditions. Such a system as he has in mind is not really "planning" in the sense in which that term is ordinarily used: it is little more than the old-style policy of deflation by central bank action coupled with an advanced programme of redistributive taxation.

It is no more than this, because Mr. Meade believes so fervently in the sanctity of the price mechanism, which socialists have been accustomed to denounce, at any rate in its application to capital investment and to the determination of wages and other incomes. He favours, for example, a rise in interest rates (regardless of its effects on socialisation programmes), a removal of most of the food subsidies, a deliberately induced rise in the unemployment percentage (in order to weaken Trade Union power and stimulate mobility of labour), a sale of import licences to the highest bidders (regardless of the utility of the purposes for which they want the goods), and a wholesale elimination of controls in order to give the limited supplies of most things to those who are prepared to pay most for them. In fairness it must be said that, if his proposals for still more redistributive taxation were adopted in full, such a "free market" mechanism would work much less objectionably than if controls were abolished without them, and also that he makes drastic proposals for dealing with monopoly practices—but not with any greater success than his liberal predecessors in showing how they could be made effective. The general drift of his argument I have called "anti-socialist" because what it seems to come to is that the further we go in limiting and redistributing incomes the less socialistic we shall need to be.

There are other things in Mr. Meade's book which seem to me to invalidate wholly any claim on his part to be regarded as even the mildest sort of socialist. One is his treatment of Trade Unions, of which he writes as if they were exactly on a par with capitalist monopolies and were thoroughly anti-social forces, and without any recognition that they constitute an essential element in the real democracy at which real liberal-socialists aim. Some of his suggestions are sheerly fantastic—for example, the tentative one that all combinations of workers working for different employers should be forbidden as well as all combination among business firms. He also proposes that, in order to secure a right distribution of labour, wages should be varied both between occupations and between localities to a sufficient extent to achieve the desired result. This is the old fallacy of writing about human beings as if they were fluid ounces of labour power. As for his proposal to go back to an induced unemployment rate of 4 per cent., it is surely bound to be shocking to any real Socialist.

With all this, Mr. Meade has a real humanitarian desire to uplift the poor and a real ascetic scorn of those who make claims to a superior standard of living at the expense of those lower down the social scale. His programme is radical, though it is not socialist, and if it were carried out in its entirety would bring about a sharp intensification of recent trends towards a less unequal distribution of incomes. All this, however, depends on the political practicability of a very high level of redistributive taxation, including a drastic limitation on the right of inheritance; and it is much to be feared that the effect of his writing will be to encourage those who wish to attack trade unions and full employment without adopting the other more

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radical methods which he puts forward. His book is indeed unrealistic and academic in the bad sense of the term, for he writes again and again as if human beings were mere units in an arithmetical total, with stomachs to be filled but no idiosyncrasies or group differences needing to be taken into account.

G. D. H. COLE.

LES GRANDES ŒUVRES POLITIQUES. DE MACHIAVEL À NOTRE JOUR. By JEAN-JACQUES CHEVALLIER. (Armand Colin, Paris 1949. 600 f.)

TO what extent are political ideas expressions of their time, to what extent do they make history, how can they be linked together? Or is the political philosopher ahead of his time? And why is it that our own era is so desperately poor in political ideas? Is it possible that the age of specialisation has shifted the centre of political philosophy to economics as the example of Keynes might indicate? These and similar problems face the historian of political ideas.

M. Chevallier has avoided many of the difficulties, if not impossibilities in view of the backward stage of political sociology, which these problems represent by writing the histories of some great political works. He outlines their thought process, their relation to the problems of the age in which they are embedded, he sketches their immediate reception and also, though less convincingly, their influences on later periods. The term "great" needs qualification. Not all "*grandes œuvres politiques*" are literary masterpieces. Some, like Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, are even bad literature. Yet: *habent sua fata libelli*.

Machiavelli's *Prince*, Bodin's *Republic*, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, and Bossuet's *Politique* are analysed in the first part of this intriguing volume. The four works of these thinkers all serve the cause of absolutism. In the second part the attack against absolutism is led by Locke's *Second Treatise*, which is followed by Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*, Rousseau's *Contrat social*, and Sieyès *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?* The consequences of the French Revolution are illustrated by commentaries on Burke's *Reflections*, Fichte's *Reden an die Deutsche Nation*, Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, constituting the third part of M. Chevallier's book. A fourth part, entitled Socialism and Nationalism: 1848-1927, presents interpretations of Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto*, Charles Maurras' *Enquête sur la Monarchie*, Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*, Lenin's *State and Revolution*, and Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. The selection of M. Chevallier's is, surely, a personal one. Accepting his method, the student might easily apply it to Joseph de Maistre's *Du Pape*, Mill's *Representative Government*, or Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* and many others. I believe M. Chevallier did not intend to claim any exclusiveness for the works he has chosen to consider.

His treatment is an example of lucid and condensed exposition, though not all the studies reach the perfection of the chapter on Montesquieu which shows that M. Chevallier is thoroughly familiar with British constitutional history. The Bodin scholar might probably prefer to M. Chevallier's essay on *Les Six Livres de la République* Pierre Mesnard's more comprehensive exposition of Bodin's main work in his great *Essor de la Philosophie Politique*

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au XVIe Siècle. Nor do I think that M. Chevallier's study of Tocqueville does full justice to the influence of British political institutions on Tocqueville's mind. Moreover, it seems to me that the *Democracy in America*, particularly its important second part, to which M. Chevallier—in contrast to Sainte-Beuve and Bryce—pays due homage, has never had the influence Albert Sorel has assumed. M. Chevallier follows Sorel too readily.

Yet M. Chevallier's learning and grasp of filiations between the different political philosophies is remarkable. For example, he links Bodin with Machiavelli, Hobbes with both, and again Montesquieu with Bodin and Locke. There can be no doubt that since Janet's *Histoire de la Science politique* no better book has been published in France, and perhaps not only in France, on the history of political ideas.

I am confident that this admirable volume will soon be translated into English. If that should be the case, I venture to suggest that some of M. Chevallier's references for further reading should be expanded; for instance, research on Burke has considerably grown since Morley; Miss Osborn's book on *Rousseau and Burke* (Oxford 1940) and some others should be included; or Pierson's important *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (New York 1938) ought to be referred to. M. Chevallier might as well have deleted the reference to Hobbes's *De Corpore politico*,—an unauthorised and distorted version of *The Elements of Law natural and political*.

But this is the only error I have found in a work which certainly can claim its rightful place among the all too few standard works on the history of great political works.

J. P. MAYER.

INDIA: By PROFESSOR C. H. PHILIPS. (Hutchinson. 176 pp. 7s. 6d.)

IT is only the rare historian who in a time of political strife can avoid partisanship. From apologies for the Raj, by English "liberal" historians, too numerous to mention, to the ferocious indictment of Palme Dutt's *India Today* the subject of Indian history has provoked a steady stream of tendentious writing. Notable exceptions there have been, but there is no popular account of British India which would be likely to command the respect and confidence of responsible scholars in both countries. The conditions for the meeting of such a long felt and urgent need were at last created by the passing of the Indian Independence Act in 1947, reflected already in a level of mutual understanding and good feeling never before equalled in the history of the two nations.

It was accordingly with high hopes that I picked up Professor Philips's book on India, in the popular Hutchinson's series, and read in his introduction that he proposed to undertake "the description of the establishment and extension of European political rule and of the fierce nationalist reactions thereby provoked in the hearts and minds of Indians." He further proposed to treat of India's "difficult transition through turmoil and suffering from despotic to popular rule." Few would underestimate the courage needed for a scholar to embark on the task of expounding a subject, so long contentious, in a work which has to compress into some 170 pages the story of India from the earliest archaeological records of the

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Indus valley civilisation of five thousand years ago to the partition into the two Dominions of today.

From this purely technical point of view, the book is undoubtedly skilfully conceived. The lucidity of the exposition and the smooth and dexterous handling of this vast unwieldy material leave little to be desired. The reader will look in vain for any reference to Macaulay's "Black Hole" or to the Bengal famine of 1943. Otherwise almost everything is touched upon in its appointed place, from a description of the gentle Buddhist qualities of Asoka to an analysis of the consequences of a current increase in the birth rate at the rate of eleven or twelve a minute.

It was, however, with a growing sense of disappointment that I discovered in Professor Philips's account of British-Indian relations that his introductory promise exceeded his achievement. Conscious of his responsibilities as a scientific historian, he reveals a generally admirable restraint in his treatment of explosive issues. Yet in his anxiety to avoid the pitfall of permitting his writing to be coloured by a suppressed emotionalism, he has allowed himself in practice to fall into the opposite error. He fails to perceive that where a highly charged emotional tension is a central element colouring every aspect of the relations between two societies, the historian is failing in his duty if he does not succeed in conveying to the reader the precise explosive nature of that relationship.

Whatever one's judgement, for example, as to the nature of the responsibility for the appalling tragedy of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in 1919, it does less than justice to the truth to minimise the extent to which the news of the tragedy threw its shadow over the length and breadth of India and even to this day rankles in the minds and hearts of many Indians. Yet Professor Philips contents himself with baldly recording the "break up (of) a large crowd with gunfire," occasioning "a violent outburst of feeling against the Government." Such treatment is inadequate to the evocation of any imaginative insight.

The English reader, not previously familiar with the subject, will gain from these pages little imaginative realisation either of the sinister way in which the imperial connection inevitably poisoned individual British-Indian relationships or of the tremendous fervour awakened in Indian hearts by what at worst many of them regarded as harsh oppression and at best an insult to their self-respect.

It must not, of course, be thought that Professor Philips is altogether uncritical of British rule. "In India," he writes, "power confined rather than corrupted the British." While he sees the broad justification of that rule in the transformation of "a static into a dynamic civilization," he is not blind to its shortcomings, condemning in particular the tardiness of English concessions to India's legitimate aspirations, and the disproportionately low expenditure on urgent social services. On the other hand, his criticisms of the attitude of the Congress High Command on the occasion of the Cripps offer are also justified, and he does not attempt to conceal his dislike of the present necessity for partition, which reflects the limitations of statesmanship on both sides and must inevitably impose a severe economic burden on an already cruelly impoverished people.

R. V. SAMPSON.



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Publication—End of July

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JOHN MURRAY

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SHORTER NOTICES

Among books on social and economic subjects the following should be noted. A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE OF THE PRESS. By NICHOLAS KALDOR and RODNEY SILVERMAN. (Cambridge Press. 200 pp. 15s.) This book is the result of research undertaken in 1943 under the auspices of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. Its object is to discover "the main facts about advertising in relation to the national economy." 1935 was taken as the basic year for statistics, but the period 1934-8 was also examined in detail. The chief subjects investigated were the total expenditure on advertising in the United Kingdom, the relation of advertising expenditure to manufacture and retail sales by commodity groups, and the contribution of advertising to the revenue of the Press. OVERHEAD COSTS. SOME ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, by W. ARTHUR LEWIS. (Allen & Unwin. 200 pp. 15s.) Professor Lewis in his first six chapters deals with six different problems connected with overhead costs, e.g., fixed costs in relation to the competition between road and rail transport. In a seventh chapter he discusses overhead costs in relation to the administration of socialist enterprises. The following are two important statistical studies: COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY, published under the auspices of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. By L. ROSTAS. (Cambridge Press. 263 pp. 18s.) CHANGES IN THE COST-OF-LIVING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME SINCE 1938, published under the auspices of Oxford University Institute of Statistics. By DUDLEY SEERS. (Blackwell. 84 pp. 6s.) An important document is INTER ALLIED REPARATION AGENCY: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE YEAR 1948 (Inter Allied Reparation Agency, Brussels. 98 pp). Among much other information it contains a list of plants made available and allocated by the Agency in the American, British and French Zones. Two books of a more general nature should be noted: THE ECONOMIC ORGANISATION OF ENGLAND, AN OUTLINE HISTORY. By SIR WILLIAM ASHLEY. (Longmans. 271 pp. 8s. 6d.) was originally published in 1914, and has frequently been reprinted. It is now published in a new edition with three new chapters by Professor G. C. Allen which brings the book up to date. It is a useful handbook for students. THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILISATION. By ELTON MAYO (Routledge. 148 pp. 12s. 6d.) is the second in a series of three books by a well-known American professor. The book is based on what Professor Mayo calls "the clinical approach" to industry, i.e. he studies intensively the interaction of industrial organisation and the psychology of individual workers and groups of workers. For instance, a good example of his method of research is a detailed account which he gives of an investigation into the causes of unsatisfactory labour turnover in the mule-spinning department of a textile mill near Philadelphia.

The student of imperial affairs should not miss two books. THE ECONOMY OF CEYLON. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (Oxford Press. 224 pp. 10s. 6d.) is an admirable book by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ceylon. It gives a clear and very interesting account of the economic and financial organisation of Ceylon, of education, public, health, and the social services; it provides statistics where they are available. A HISTORY

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OF THE GOLD COAST. By W. E. F. WARD. (*Allen & Unwin*. 387 pp. 21s.) This a straightforward history of the country from the earliest times to the present day by an author who has a considerable knowledge of the territory itself and who has collected material for his history from Africans. The last two chapters deal with the political and constitutional history from 1874 to 1946. Another history which deserves attention is A HISTORY OF PALESTINE FROM A.D. 135 TO MODERN TIMES. By JAMES PARKES (*Gollancz*. 391 pp. 21s.) Dr. Parkes is an authority on Jewish history and anti-semitism. His new book is invaluable to any one who wishes to understand what has happened and is happening in Palestine. The first 15 chapters give the history of Palestine down to the end of the 1914 war; the last three chapters deal with the period between 1918 and the abandonment of the mandate. It ends with the appointment of Count Bernadotte as Mediator.

Two more volumes have been published in William Hodge & Co.'s War Crimes Trials series: THE BELSEN TRIAL, edited by RAYMOND PHILLIPS, with a foreword by the Lord Chancellor. (749 pp. 30s.), and THE NATZWEILER TRIAL, edited by ANTHONY M. WEBB, with a foreword by the Attorney-General (233 pp. 18s.). The first volume tells the horrible story of the Belsen and Auschwitz concentration camps, and contains the verbatim record of the trial of Josef Kramer, Commandant, and 44 others. In the Natzweiler trial, there were nine defendants who were charged with killing four British women prisoners of war in Natzweiler Camp. These books are documents of the highest importance for the light which they throw upon the problem of establishing and developing international criminal law.

Another book which deals with a different side of international law and relations is ATLANTIC PACT, COMMONWEALTH AND UNITED NATIONS, prepared for the United Nations Association, by ANDREW BOYD and WILLIAM METSON (*Hutchinson*. 100 pp. 8s. 6d.). It is a useful handbook which first gives the history of the Pact and then discusses its relation to the Commonwealth and the United Nations system. The authors are wholeheartedly in favour of the Pact and in the last chapter answer objections to it raised by communists and liberals. They argue, perhaps rather optimistically, that it will strengthen the United Nations. It might, however, be argued that the Pact was born of the impotence of the United Nations, and that, so long as UNO remains impotent, the Pact must supersede rather than strengthen it.

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**A REVIEW OF SOCIALIST FINANCIAL
POLICY 1945-1949**

By DONALD BRUCE, M.P.

IT is no longer possible to discuss financial policy within the somewhat narrow connotations to which we were accustomed prior to the War. Progressively from 1940 a whole series of economic factors, formerly left very largely to the free play of the "market" within the overall conditions influenced by the Budget, had to be adjusted continually to conform with the general design of the Government's financial policy as a whole. "The financial policies of the Government throughout the war were always 'impure'" write Messrs. Hancock and Gowing in *British War Economy** "in the sense that they were interwoven with the manifold intricate threads of the nation's economic and social life." Some part of our attention will therefore be directed to the question as to whether or not it was desirable, after the conclusion of hostilities, to endeavour to disentangle financial policy from its myriad connections and to contract it progressively into its former "legitimate" field. It will consequently be necessary to make some assessment of the position obtaining in the autumn of 1945 and to formulate the main problems arising from it.

The Immediate Post-War Position.

It is clear from the White Paper† published in Dec., 1945, that Britain lost approximately one quarter of her national wealth in the course of the struggle. A rough estimate, at 1945 prices, of our pre-War wealth put the figure at about £30,000 million. After what Lord Keynes described as "a war-time story of financial imprudence which has no parallel in history" and coupled with the damage inflicted by the enemy, that figure become diminished by no less than £7,000 million. A brief summary of our losses foreshadows some of the main problems that followed in their wake:—

Financial Losses:—

Sales or repatriation of overseas investments...	£1,118 mil.
Increase in sterling balances and overseas loans	£2,928 "
Depletion of gold and U.S. dollar reserves ...	152 "
	4,198 "

* H.M.S.O., price £1 1s. 6d.

† *Statistical Material Presented During the Washington Negotiations* (Cmd. 6707) H.M.S.O., 3d.

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Physical Losses.

Destruction and damage to property	£1,450 mil.
Shipping losses	700 „
Depreciation and obsolescence not made good during the war period	900 „ £3,050 mil.
Total	£7,248 „

These figures moreover take no account of the substantial running down of stocks of clothing and household goods or of arrears of normal maintenance of private residential property.

As a deliberate act of policy during the war we had sacrificed approximately two-thirds of our export trade. Our economy was distorted from top to bottom to enable the maximum war effort to be made. And in mid-1945 the number of people serving in the armed forces and civil defence and employed in war industries aggregated over 9 million as against 2 million in 1939.

Our internal financial position gave cause for grave concern. Despite war-time efforts to keep inflation within manageable limits the note circulation had increased from an average of £446 million in 1938 to £1,310 million in Sept., 1945. Bank deposits had risen from £2,277 million (including £1,244 million on current account) to £4,898 million in Sept., 1945 (including £3,266 million on current account). The purchasing power of the £ over the whole range of consumer goods and services, taking 1914 as 100, had declined from 65 in 1937-1938 to 43 in 1944-45. And the National Debt had leaped from £7,130 million in 1939 to the colossal total of £21,366 million in 1945.

The country's standard of living had fallen heavily, though it was minimised for millions of people, by a policy of "fair shares for all" pursued resolutely by the Coalition Government. Ironically enough large sections of the population had enjoyed a better consumer standard of life in war than they had experienced in peace. Nevertheless between 1938 and 1944 British expenditure *per capita* on consumer goods and services had declined by 16%—a sharp contrast to both the U.S.A. and Canada whose individual consumption in each case had increased by 16% over the same period. In the autumn of 1945

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our people were beginning to feel the strain not only of their exertions, but also of the physical conditions and stresses to which war had subjected them.

The Financial Problem.

The principal economic problem confronting the nation, and one to which financial policy had to conform, was that of building up our export trade to a point where we could pay our own way in the world. Bound up with this problem were several other interrelated ones. A vast capital investment programme was absolutely imperative, not only to replace the losses we had sustained in war and the accumulated obsolescence of those industries that had emerged more or less intact, but also to make up for pre-war neglect. Some easement was necessary too in the standard of life of the civilian population. This was not merely confined to a restoration of pre-war effective consumer standards. Implicit in it was the carrying through of a revolution in the economic and social life of the people wherein those social priorities to which the urgent necessities of war had given sanction could reach a fuller fruition in time of peace.

Production was obviously the key. Only a vast production effort, comparable with the total war effort, could extricate the nation from the economic perils which confronted her as an immediate consequence of the war. And the greatest domestic threat to this production task lay in the danger of open inflation. Here the Government were faced with several contradictions simultaneously. The diversion of goods from the consumer market to export purposes or the diversion of labour and materials from home consumption industries to those engaged on export work meant a continued denuding of the home market not necessarily compensated by imports received in exchange from abroad. Part of the resultant imports, even on the assumption that the terms of trade did not deteriorate (which in fact they did) was required for the capital investment programme or for further stocking up of the export industries themselves. A high export programme thus became directly inflationary. In the capital investment field, to the extent that expenditure on the programme was not covered by personal savings and company reserves a further inflationary pressure would present itself, and this would be aggravated by projects of long overdue investment in the Colonies.

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The whole question of incentives was closely involved with these factors. A continued shortage of consumer goods, however necessary the sacrifices for the export market, would not be conducive—unless it were thoroughly understood—to a social atmosphere favourable to production enthusiasm. The efforts exerted on the capital programme would yield little immediate increases in the flow of consumer goods. And the endeavours devoted to the less productive side of the capital programme—to houses, hospitals, schools, etc., all in urgent social demand—would obviously be at the expense of the industrial sector and would, in addition, throw a new burden on the national exchequer which could only be satisfied out of further taxation. Unless, however, the inflationary pressures inherent in these factors were kept in check the cost of living, already high, would rise still higher and diminish incentive to a more marked degree. In general, the economics of the post-war position generated in their severity exactly the opposite instincts amongst individuals to those self disciplines and restraints that were vitally necessary. Any re-distribution of the national income necessary to mitigate the marginal effect of these factors had, in stimulating the indirect incentives implicit in the expanding social services, to take account of the dangers of direct disincentives likely to affect the willingness of the *entrepreneur* to organise production in the vital private sectors of industry.

Overshadowing this central problem of inflation there lay three other factors. Firstly the impoverished position of the country made her dependent on outside aid the moment that Lend-Lease from the United States ceased. The market value of British overseas investments in 1943 was estimated by N. Kaldor in the *Economic Journal* of June-Sept. 1943 to be approx. £5,000 million. Of this total, as we have seen, £1,118 million were realised during the War. The bulk of the remainder were mortgaged as security for the other indebtedness we incurred. Consequently there remained no margin of overseas investment which, even were it considered desirable, it would be possible to realise—as was done before the war—to cover any transient balance of payments difficulties. Any worsening in the terms of trade would therefore, in the absence of outside aid, immediately threaten the delicate balance of the country's internal economy and the relationships established within it. But the adverse balance of payments, far from being a temporary phenomenon, was in fact a chronic hangover from the inter-war

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years laid bare by the decline in our invisible income consequent on our investment realisations. And it was accentuated by a production disparity between the Western Hemisphere and Europe as a whole which had been greatly aggravated in the the course of the war. Such measure of economic independence as remained to Britain in 1939 had gone—it was no longer a fact but an aspiration.

Secondly the circumstances of the ending of the war made it inevitable that, for some time at least, a large amount of our manpower and a corresponding amount of finance would be required to implement our foreign policy commitments in terms of armed forces. This consideration would, moreover, be operative at precisely the time when manpower needs were clamant and when every pound spent for this purpose would exercise an inflationary effect.

Lastly, we were a democracy. The carrying out of policies, however correct they might be, was largely dependent on the ability of the Government of the day to carry popular, and frequently uninstructed, opinion with it. This is not always possible, even in times of maximum political unity and mortal national danger. Thus, for example, the Coalition government proposal to abolish the basic petrol ration in 1941 had to be postponed until 1942 in deference to public pressure from the quarters affected; and violent public opposition forced the government to abandon the fuel rationing project that it brought forward in 1942. In time of peace, with the apparent urgencies of the moment of seemingly less import, and with vigorous party opposition expressed through the overwhelming mass of the available propaganda media under Conservative ownership, it is perhaps unnecessary to give further emphasis to the likely difficulties of a Labour government in this respect.

In the face of all these considerations it is unarguable that the Government were correct in their major basic decision to continue to use in the peace the same instruments of financial policy as had served the nation during the war and to maintain the close integration between financial and economic policy which its conduct had necessitated. The soundness of the financial policies actually pursued can now therefore be examined in relation to the tasks which faced us.

Balance of Payments.

At the end of the war and with Lend-Lease still in operation

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Britain's exports stood at under 40% per month of their pre-war volume. The abrupt cessation of U.S. aid announced on 24th August 1945 thus created a problem of the first magnitude. In Sept., 1944, agreement between the U.S. and Britain had been reached in principle for a continuation of Lend-Lease during what was termed "Stage II", i.e., the period elapsing between the defeat of Germany and the end of the war with Japan. The period envisaged was approximately 18 months and it was thought that during that time substantial progress in regaining her lost export trade would be made by Great Britain. In the event that period was three months; but it would have been quite immaterial had it been longer, for in April 1945 the whole of the principles and plans agreed at Quebec and Washington for Stage II were swept away by a directive issued by Mr. Truman shortly after he became President. Great Britain was plunged straight away into Stage III—full and unaided reconversion of her economy from war to peace-time purposes.

Negotiations were thereupon opened in Washington which culminated, after much argument, in the granting of the American Loan amounting to \$3,750 million. Four months later this was supplemented by a loan from Canada amounting to \$1,250 million—thus providing Britain with a total of some \$5,000 million which, it was considered, would enable her to effect her Western Hemisphere purchases over the ensuing four or five years while her export trade was being re-established and expanded. Though there was considerable misgiving in some quarters concerning the financial provisions of the Bretton Woods Agreement which were linked with the Loan agreement, anxiety focused principally upon American insistence that, within one year from the effective operating date of the Loan, sterling should be freely convertible for the purposes of current trade and that there should be non-discrimination. These provisions were fraught with danger, since few imagined that Europe as a whole or the sterling area would have recovered sufficiently to make this course feasible. The alternative was, however, the rejection of the loan. Should the Government have decided on this course?

Though our position was extremely vulnerable we were not entirely defenceless. As Mr. Churchill had indicated, some five years previously, to President Roosevelt, the stripping of Britain to the bone "would not be in the moral or economic interests" of either of the two countries.

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"We here should be unable, after the War, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United States over and above the volume of our exports which is agreeable to your tariffs and industrial economy. Not only should we in Britain suffer cruel privations, but widespread unemployment in the United States would follow the curtailment of American exporting power."*

The success of this bargaining factor depended, however, on how much weight the American people were prepared to attach to it. In the immediate post-war atmosphere of relief and anticipation it was at best a very negative and remote consideration. Neither were the British people psychologically prepared for the hardships that would have ensued had the "bluff" been called. Indeed, with some justification, they felt morally entitled to the aid proffered them. And although the loan failed to achieve its full purpose it did assist Britain to increase her exports by August 1947 to 17% above the 1938 level. At the end of 1947 our adverse balance of trade, despite prodigious effort, stood at £438 million. But had the terms of trade been the same as those obtaining in 1938 this figure would have been approximately £147 million, or some £148 million less than the average unfavourable visible balance from 1936-1939. Instead, the terms of trade deteriorated rapidly.

Taking 1938 prices to be an index of 100, import and export prices were in approximate equilibrium at 196 and 195 respectively in December 1945. By July 1947 the figures were 252 and 230. American prices showed an even more marked movement. From December 1945 to July 1947 they had risen by approximately 45%, largely as the result of the abolition of internal war-time price controls. The drain on the American loan was correspondingly greater. Drawings which, in January 1947, were of the order of \$200 million a month, gathered momentum and reached a figure of \$700 million in July, being heavily weighted in that month and until convertibility suspension on 20th August, by a run on sterling for dollar purchases. By then our total net expenditure in the Western Hemisphere had reached a total of \$3,115 million. Allegations that the American Loan "went down the drain" or were wasted were disposed of by a full analysis of dollar expenditure given by the Chancellor on 24th October 1947 which showed that, with the arguable exception of some \$234 million spent on "keeping Germans alive"—which could be justified on other grounds—the dollar

* *Their Finest Hour*, by Winston S. Churchill. Cassell. £1 5s. 6d.

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purchases, even at their greatly inflated prices, helped Britain, the Commonwealth and the rest of the sterling area very considerably in the rebuilding of their economies. Aside from the increase in exports already mentioned Britain had, for example, made a net capital investment of £1,400 million (\$5,600 million) in the same period.

Sterling balances held by other countries had increased from £3,052 million in August 1945 to £3,559 million in August 1947. But £1,700 million of these were blocked. Of the remainder the Dominions held £400 million, leaving £1,259 million in the hands of our colonies and other countries. From July 1946 to 31st August 1947 drawings on these had amounted to some £230 million for the whole of the sterling area, and only a small proportion of this sum had been converted into dollars. Suggestions therefore that by some "negligence and mal-administration" the Government had allowed large quantities of dollars to seep away in this direction were quite wide of the mark, besides ignoring considerations of international good faith and the necessity of helping backward, if creditor, countries.

Even before the coming into operation of "convertability" on the 15th July 1947 it became obvious to the U.S. Secretary of State that the external aid already made available to Europe was unlikely to achieve its purpose. Further assistance in the form of Marshall Aid was offered on condition that the countries participating should combine together in a joint plan for European recovery. The necessity for some such steps was realised by UNO in its 1945-1947 report* published in January 1948.

"The impoverishment and dislocation of the economy of Europe resulting from the War has drastically reduced the ability of European countries to finance from exports and other means of payment the huge increases in their import requirements for re-construction. Since the War a serious disequilibrium in the balance of international payments has existed, the current effects of which are reflected in the present 'dollar crisis' and the longer term effects of which may be felt for many years."

By the end of 1947 Britain's adverse balance of payments with the U.S. had risen to £655 million. Dollar expenditure could not manifestly continue at the current import rate without running down and exhausting our reserves. It is hardly surprising that Britain took the initiative in organising OFEC

* *The World Economic Situation 1945-47*. H.M.S.O. 12s. 6d. p. 168.

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and that she agreed, within the Marshall Plan, to make sterling similarly available to European countries in deficit with her under similar conditions.*

This time it seemed that American aid to Europe generally and to Britain in particular would serve its purpose. Britain's adverse balance of payments with the Western Hemisphere declined by the end of 1948 to £340 million. But her overall current account deficit was, largely owing to a revival in European trade and successful efforts to switch purchases away from the dollar area, only £120 million. Her exports had reached, furthermore, a figure of 50% higher in volume than in 1938. The road appeared clear, despite the approaching end of the sellers' market, for those further increases which were necessary for the achievement of economic independence of extraordinary aid planned for 1952 in the Four Year Plan submitted to OEEC.

Other factors soon began to assert themselves. Signs of a recession in the United States had been apparent for some time and unemployment in June 1949 reached approximately 4 million. President Truman, in his mid-year report to Congress, stated:—

"The decline in United States business activity is reducing imports and this is an important factor affecting the ability of foreign countries to earn the dollars required to restore their economic health."

For Britain, both as a separate economic entity and as the banker for the sterling area, the results were serious. In addition to a decline in imports by the U.S. from Britain assisted by persistent rumours of devaluation, there was a sharp diminution in American raw material purchases from the sterling area—particularly in wool from Australia, jute from India, cocoa from West Africa and rubber from Malaya. Britain's deficit with the U.S. rose to £160 million.

She was thus squarely on the horns of a dilemma. Her balance of payments problem had long been aggravated by a continued rise in raw material prices. By June 1949 a slight decline in import prices occurred without a corresponding decline in her export prices. Yet it was precisely this decline in raw material prices which now threatened her as banker for the sterling area whose members were principally affected by shortfalls in U.S. imports. At the time of writing, devaluation

* It should be noted that Britain herself, in a period of four years has made loans and grants to other countries in need amounting to no less than £900 million.

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of the pound, though opposed by the Chancellor, has been widely canvassed as a solution. We cannot see any advantages in this until U.S. deflation has either been halted or has run its course and unless there can be some firm undertaking as to the future policies of the U.S. in relation to its own level of employment and business activity. In the meantime, and fully aware of the hardships likely to be involved, we concur in the view expressed by Dr. T. Balogh that :—

“ Should the U.S. continue to be plagued by business fluctuations, give no commercial concessions, or diminish or discontinue the supply of dollars and breach the organisation of a viable economic unit in Western Europe by insisting on non-discrimination, the inevitable logic of events will push Britain and Western Europe to a much greater degree of national autarky combined with bi-lateral deals and closer economic relations with the Soviet Union. It is to be hoped that an early Conference will be called to avoid a disintegration among the Western World by co-operative action.”*

But how far has Socialist financial policy been responsible for this present *impasse*? The apparent remedy for the situation, insofar as it rests in Britain's power, is a further increase in her exports—particularly to the dollar area. Responsibility for this lies in the hands, not of the Government, but of private manufacturers and exporters. Mr. Paul Hoffman is of the view that much more can be done in this direction. And there is much evidence to show that under “sellers' market” conditions British exporters have made no very considerable effort to ply their wares beyond the Eastern seaboard of the American continent. It is natural in such circumstances that complaints should be made of the high level of taxation, a factor that does not directly enter cost to its detriment, as one of the reasons for uncompetitive price levels. But export prices are higher, over certain ranges of commodities, than home market prices. The remedy here lies more in a reduction in the actual cost of production by an increase in both technical and organisational efficiency—matters in which it can hardly be said that the Government has been backward in materially encouraging over the last four years. This question is, moreover, linked with production increases and incentives discussed later in this paper.

Though comparisons are of little assistance in our present difficulties we are at any rate entitled to point out that our export record to date is such that had the cost of our imports in 1948 risen by only the same proportion as our exports, our

* *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics*. July-August, 1949.

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adverse visible balance of trade of £218 million would have been a favourable balance of about £40 million. Neither was the rise in the prices of our imports due to inefficient buying. On the contrary, although U.S. prices had moved, taking 1938 as an index base of 100, from 245 in 1947 to 268 in the first half of 1948 and 264 in the second half; our import prices stood at 214, 236 and 241 for the same periods. As the 1948 report* of the Economic Commission for Europe puts it :—

“ The explanation of the relatively low prices paid by the United Kingdom for its imports of food and raw materials appears to lie largely in the extensive use which it has made of long term contracts and bulk purchase agreements covering a large portion of its purchases.”

It is not without significance indeed, however thorny the road still to be travelled, that Britain is the only country in Europe simultaneously to raise her exports above their 1938 level whilst keeping her imports below those of 1938. This result would have been quite impossible without the financial and economic planning of the Government which encountered considerable opposition, political and otherwise, in its emphasis on the necessity for progressively higher export totals. A return to the “free market”, without carefully conceived import programmes and insistence on export quotas as a condition of materials allocations, would have brought complete disaster.

The War Against Inflation at Home.

From the outset the Chancellor of the Exchequer was at pains to emphasise that he intended to pursue a “cheap money” policy. In his first Budget speech in October 1945 he announced a reduction of $\frac{1}{2}\%$ in the rates on Treasury Bills and Treasury Deposit Receipts, a course cordially approved by Sir John Anderson on behalf of the Opposition despite some vehement opposition expressed in the City of London. Shortly afterwards he took steps to reduce the rate on long term securities. The yield on $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ Consols declined from 2.8% in October 1945 to 2.54% in October 1946 after which it increased to 3.22 in March 1948, fluctuating round that figure until January 1949 when it stood at 3.21 and was followed by a sharp increase. Mr. Dalton was initially anxious that capital reconstruction should not be prejudiced by paying more than the minimum feasible rates. By April 1947 he was able to announce that the policy had saved the Exchequer some £37 million since

* *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*. H.M.S.O. 12s. 6d.

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October 1945, that local authorities and ratepayers had been saved a £1 million, and that his move had helped to ease the interest burdens of Commonwealth Governments. That the Government were unable to sustain the policy in the face of fierce City opposition is not so much an indication of its incorrectness as it is of the inability of their power to enforce it. As Dr. Dalton put it on 7th March 1948, some little time after his resignation from the Chancellorship :—

“the powers at present possessed by the Government over the gilt-edged market are not sufficient and . . . my Rt. Hon. and learned friend at some stage will be well advised to take powers of direction over capital . . . any large holders such as insurance companies, investment trusts, large industrial reserve funds and so on, where there is, say, more than £1,000,000, to take a rough figure, of investible funds outside any particular business, it should be made a requirement that a certain prescribed percentage of that amount should be invested in gilt-edged securities.”

It was alleged that the “cheap money” policy, while it was sustained, was responsible for the inflationary pressure to which the country became increasingly subject. Yet no critic has yet been able successfully to explain how lower rates of interest can be inflationary at a time of strict government control over the level of capital investment.

The more likely answer to the question lies in the existence of a pent up consumer demand and in a continuation of war-time deficit financing till well beyond the end of the war; a course made necessary by the slow running down of war-time munitions contracts and the discharge of war terminal charges. Thus the deficits of £2,200 million and £569 million incurred in 1945-46 and 1946-47 undoubtedly played their part, despite the deflationary effect of external aid. The *Economist* view of the 1946-47 Budget was “competent and sober” and it in due course described the 1947-48 proposals which provided for a surplus as “a move in exactly the direction that his deflationist critics have urged him.” It is difficult to avoid the conclusion therefore that criticism of Dr. Dalton had but little regard for the facts of the situation.

The growing dimensions of the capital programme supplied the main source of the growing inflationary pressure which reached its peak in mid-1947, though it was aggravated by the effects of the winter fuel crisis upon production generally in February and March of that year. Proposals* were therefore made to cut expenditure in this direction. At the same time a

* Capital Investment in 1948 (Cmd. 7268). H.M.S.O. 6d.

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Minister of Economic Affairs was appointed whose office, subsequent to the resignation of Dr. Dalton, was amalgamated with that of Chancellor of the Exchequer. These events came shortly after the 1947 balance of payments crisis examined above and were powerfully influenced by the uncertainty of further American aid. The proposal to reduce total capital investment from £1,600 million in 1947-48 to £1,420 million did not materialise. Instead the figure achieved amounted, at market prices, to £1,850 million. For once Marshall Aid became an established fact it was decided to proceed ahead on a scale in excess of that originally planned. By the end of 1948 Britain had achieved a gross capital investment at home amounting to approximately £5,900 million or, after allowing for depreciation, £3,400 million net. Making adjustments for price rises since 1945 this means that over two thirds of the war-time physical losses had been made good.

But this effort engaged no less than 22% of the entire national product in 1948 as against the 1938 figure of 15%. In the year 1948 it was accomplished with the aid of a budget surplus of £636 million in the fiscal year 1947-48 and £684 million for 1948-49. The taxation to support these surpluses and the diversion of labour and materials implicit in the programme supported by them represents a severe inroad into consumer standards. It is a measure of our production effort that despite these inroads, and owing to a marked and progressive expansion of the total national income, the total amount of personal expenditure on consumer goods and services, revalued at 1938 prices, had reached their 1938 level. The 16% drop in the national standard of life suffered during the war years had been in total, regained—though within narrower limits of choice and different standards of quality.

Despite exertions in the field of capital investment, though powerfully assisted by outside aid, the inflationary pressure showed signs of easement during the last eighteen months. Wage rates rose from an index of 100 in June 1947 to 108 in June 1949. Retail Prices rose from 100 to 111 over the same period and the level of output per man, taking 1938 as the base of 100, rose from 97 in 1946 to 108 in 1948. Though bank deposits at 31st March 1949 showed little shift from the March 1948 figure of £5,609 million, the note circulation dropped by £453 million during the same period. In some sections there has been a marked relaxation in buying pressure of which a

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decline in 1947-48 in the number of passenger railways journeys is but one symptom. On the other hand not all the de-rationing measures introduced have been successful. Sweets are but one example of this, and rationing by the purse is evident in other fields. The indications are that although unemployment at approx. 250,000 remains extremely low, the financial policies pursued by the Government, in conjunction with a generally loyal adherence to the policy on *Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices** published in February 1948, have held inflation successfully in check.

Financial Policy and Incentives.

It has been the policy of the Government throughout the four years under review to effect a re-distribution of income in favour of the lower income groups. In four years 3,750,000 people have been taken out of the range of Income Tax. Significant changes have occurred, in addition, within the various classes of persons remaining liable. Thus for example a married man with two children earning £400 a year who paid £39 per annum in Income Tax in 1945-46 now pays only £3. The comparable sums paid by a married man with two children earning £1,000 a year are £301 and £180 respectively. In the higher income groups and in the case of recipients of unearned income there have been some reliefs, but these are far less marked. The fact that the total yield from Income Tax was substantially the same at £1,367 million as it was in 1945-46, despite total tax reliefs over the four years of £570 million, is due to a general rise in money incomes and a considerable increase in the numbers gainfully employed.

All sections of the population, whilst retaining more of their incomes for their own personal use than in 1945-46, have a less proportion remaining to them than they would have had at 1938-39 rates. For the group receiving under £250 per annum it amounts to under 1% less; the £250-£499 group retains 5.7% less; rising progressively to the £10,000 and over class which is 21.7% poorer in comparison. Even before taxation the numbers of those in various income groupings have showed a considerable shift from 1945 to 1947 (the latest date for which figures are available). Those in the £250-£499 group had increased by 2,500,000 to 7,900,000, and those in the £500-£1,000 class by 450,000 to 1,850,000. On the other hand

* Cmd. 7321. H.M.S.O. 1d.

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the £1,000-£2,000 class declined by 35,000 and the £2,000-£10,000 by 48,000.

Aside from the considerable sums spent by the Government in servicing the National Debt and on the Defence and Supply Services, expenditure which is estimated for 1949-50 to total £1,245 million, the Government embarked deliberately on a policy of expanding the social services. The cost of these services, including assistance to Local Authorities and the food subsidies, has risen from about £978 million in 1946-47 to an estimate of £1,537 million in 1949-50. The benefits made available by this expenditure are in the nature of a social wage. Family allowances go some way to ameliorate the financial disadvantages of the married man. Food subsidies have played a very important part in shielding the lower income groups from the effects of rises in price of the basic foodstuffs and have helped to stabilise the cost of living. The National Insurance and National Assistance expenditure has brought a reasonable sense of social security and abolished abject want in the sense experienced in the pre-war years. And the National Health Service, whilst enlarging the scope of the facilities available formerly to the lower income groups, has brought even more tangible relief to the middle income groups not previously eligible under the pre-war Insurance scheme.

Against the background of these and other social services, indirect taxation has however increased—both in amount and as a proportion of the total taxes levied. The £446 million extra raised in 1948-49 compared with 1945-46 is in part due to the rise in consumption of commodities subject to customs or excise duties. This consideration applies to Purchase Tax which, even after reliefs amounting to £60,000,000 over the four years, yields £173,000,000 more than in 1945-46. But other duties, notably on tobacco and intoxicants, have gone up sharply and the ratio between Direct and Indirect Taxation, which stood at 2:1 in 1945-46, is now about 4:3. With a progressive re-distribution of incomes and the growth of the social services this is inevitable. The more fairly the national wealth is distributed the better is the case for individuals levying taxes upon themselves according to what they wish to buy.

Experience in the War showed that a fairer distribution of the national income was an indispensable aid to the national production effort. It is now for consideration whether the total burden of taxation which is in part responsible for real income

re-distribution is, in itself, a disincentive to work. In the case of direct taxation this is clearly the case in many instances and has given rise to many suggestions for increasing the number of "steps" in which the rates of taxation are expressed, as well as by proposals to exempt overtime from taxation. Relief in the direct taxation field is quite clearly desirable on the assumption that such easement is possible. It would of course necessitate cuts in Government expenditure, and it is here that the problem arises in its acutest form. The term "welfare state" has acquired a not altogether deserved prominence. Far from being a welfare state we are more of an "investment" state. If economies are considered desirable beyond those dictated by normal prudence then there is as much case for directing attention to expenditure on Defence and on the financing of the Capital Investment programme, as there is to the social services.

The dimensions of such disincentives as are inherent in all taxation depends on the extent to which the benefits arising from its expenditure are appreciated by those affected, and on the degree of understanding, by the population as a whole, of the aims and purposes of national policy. Here the Government appears to have regarded itself as constitutionally inhibited from giving dynamic expression to these aims and purposes in themselves, or to explain the progress made towards their achievement. Thus the Labour Party itself has a great responsibility for education which is, indeed, a battle for democracy itself. For whatever the government, the great majority of our people would not tolerate a mutilation of the social services. A scaling down of the investment programme would prejudice our eventual recovery still further. And a cut in defence expenditure appears, so far, to be difficult of accomplishment within the existing world situation. The Labour Party's failure to implement this educational task would be followed, not by the financial policies of "free enterprise" which stultified British production capacity in the inter-war years, but by totalitarian finance in a totalitarian state.

On the whole it does not appear likely that this will happen. British productivity is still rising—though it must rise yet faster. And it seems rather more than a coincidence that Britain, whilst erecting a fabric of social services unequalled anywhere, and despite devoting a greater portion of her national output to capital construction than most other nations, has nevertheless the finest recovery record in Europe.

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By THE RT. HON. R. A. BUTLER, M.P.

FOR the next few months the political scene will be dominated by two events—the deepening crisis of Britain's economy and the inevitable approach of the General Election. The one patriotic course for politicians, who are preparing for the latter, is to regard the former as of paramount importance. But at the same time it is permissible for, and indeed incumbent upon, any political party to make clear its policy upon many matters which are not immediately and obviously related to the present economic crisis, or even to events of the next few weeks. The electorate, when entrusting the Government of the country to a party, are entitled to know not only how the first and pressing difficulties will be handled but also the sort of world towards which that Government intends to lead the nation.

That is the distinction between a programme and a policy. We have seen recently how in the lifetime of one Parliament many situations can arise on which no party has a clear mandate. A programme cannot cover all eventualities. But a policy can show how a political party would approach any new situation and the lines along which the national life would be developed. The Conservative Party have thought it right, therefore, to set out well in advance of the election a broad statement of its policy in all the major fields of political discussion.

The economic crisis will, I believe, be used by future students of political thought in this country to illustrate the differences between the major British political parties. It will never be cured by political nostrums but the general approach of the political parties has had and can continue to have a profound effect on the situation.

The present Government's economic policy seems at the time of writing to have reached a dead stop. Nationalisation has made no contribution to the solution of our problems. The Government has tried the Dalton experiment of strong inflation and drastic controls. It has tried the Cripps experiment of marked austerity. The current dollar crisis, the solution for which will be most difficult to find, is only a symptom of more deep-seated ills and vividly illustrates the precariousness of our economy. A well-founded system should be able, without too much difficulty, to take in its stride the short-term changes and chances of overseas trade.

To deal with the dollar gap there were three possible courses of action, all of which had to be pursued; first to sell sufficient exports at the right prices, second to secure our essential imports as cheaply as possible and as far as possible from non-dollar sources, and third to encourage the investment of American capital in this country and the Empire. It is not wholly the fault of this or any Government that we have not achieved all these ends in the time available. But we are entitled to require that the general policy of the Government should have been designed so as actively to encourage these objects. Instead we find ourselves today so far from achieving success that there is a general loss of confidence in sterling and a serious threat to employment and the social services.

The first essential is to restore confidence. This will return only when there is a clear and determined lead such as is now lacking in almost every department of Government. Crises are postponed; but the underlying problems are left unsolved. Strikes trail to their end; but industrial unrest remains widespread. Industries are nationalised; but their problems of organisation become more difficult. Are we witnessing the rear-guard action of a party retreating to prepared positions, or the bankrupt's efforts to gain time in case something turns up?

I do not attempt to answer that question in this article but I can put forward an alternative policy which could be put into practice and which will reverse what is noxious in present policy.

Perhaps the favourite gibe against Conservative policy is that it is socialism under a different label. It is true that, apart from nationalisation, both parties agree on certain objectives. Both parties want to see full employment; they want more houses built and they want to maintain, and to encourage an organic development of, the social services. Agreement on fundamentals is in the tradition of our Constitution. But between the parties there are great differences of method. Some of these differences may be in such sharp contrast as to represent clashes of principle.

Therefore, while Conservative economic policy would retain some controls for which the necessity is dictated by events rather than by Governments, there would be a very marked change in other directions; especially in our approach to Government expenditure, in our efforts to reduce taxation, in our determination to restore incentives and in our decision to remove from industry the threat of further nationalisation.

Whatever view is taken of the present Government expenditure, all must recognise certain facts. The higher the level of taxation the more likely it is to discourage the individual from otherwise desirable activities. At present the high rate of taxation on industrial profits is making it difficult for undertakings to finance their own capital re-equipment and extensions at present prices. Further, because high taxation has in both these ways discouraged savings, the Government has been obliged to finance a large volume of capital expenditure out of taxation.

It seems to Conservatives, therefore, that if we wish to encourage the individual to make an extra effort or to undertake further enterprises and responsibilities, if industry is to keep its equipment up to date, and if personal and company savings are to match the large amount of capital expenditure needed in the future, there must be a substantial reduction in Government expenditure. That is an argument which Conservatives have always put forward since the war. It has been given added force by recent events. There is a clear loss of confidence in sterling emphasised by the steep rise in interest rates. It may well be that the choice before any Government in the next few months will not be between maintaining or reducing its expenditure, but between making reductions at a chosen moment and in directions of its own choice, and making cuts under the compulsion of events and by the means of something like the Geddes Committee—an experience which nobody wishes to see repeated. There is more than a suggestion of the Geddes Committee in the clumsy and apparently ineffective ultimatum forbidding all supplementary estimates. Like the Geddes axe this injunction fails to treat each department and item of expenditure on its merits. If economy on the main estimates were seriously practised, vain threats about supplementary expenditure would not be necessary.

Nobody who has any knowledge of Government administration can doubt that, if the will were there, a very large amount of purely administrative economy could be achieved. New ministries have been created; divisions have been added to existing ministries and huge overheads have been incurred, for example, on publicity and travelling.* So long as the Government budgets for a surplus, and indeed so long as the customary checks of the Treasury on departmental expenditure

* The recent reports of the Estimates Committee furnish several notable instances of waste.

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remain gravely weakened, so long shall we have to wait before the public's money is treated with care and economy.

It is on the weight of taxation that the clash between Conservative and Socialist policies is sharpest. As I shall show, the same divergence of approach will be found in other subjects of policy and the battle will be joined as circumstances demand. Fundamentally this division springs, we Conservatives believe, from the different attitudes of the two parties towards the relationship between the Government and the individual, their respective functions and the nature of their activities.

The over-simplifications of political propaganda may represent all Conservatives as Manchester Liberals and all Socialists as Kremlin Communists. Some interpretations may, especially if for consumption within a particular party, represent some Tories as true Socialists and some Socialists as good capitalists at heart. The truth lies between these extremes. We say in *The Right Road for Britain* :—

“We insist on individual liberty not in order to proclaim anarchy, but because we fear to see freedom crushed out and human personality forgotten altogether.”

The Socialists, as Professor Cole has pointed out, are in a dilemma. They must either reconcile themselves to the perpetuation of a mixed economy, or they must make up their minds to a long term policy of progressive nationalisation. In *Labour Believes in Britain* they show every sign of accepting a mixed economy. Yet judging by their next five years' programme and by their speeches, they clearly have not reconciled themselves to the implications of such a practice. It is vain to attempt to run a mixed economy with all the trappings of a socialised state. If free enterprise is not merely to be allowed to continue, but is expected to make the major contribution to the British economy, it must be given the conditions in which it will work and the stimulus to which it can respond.

Apart therefore from any political theory, the Government is in practice and in logic wrong to treat private enterprise as something to be let out on licence and to be viewed with the utmost suspicion and to be ordered and dictated to on a large number of details.

Such an attitude is also historically wrong. British democracy has for many generations rested on the basis that the government

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of the day has had not only a Parliamentary majority, but—what is far more important—the willing acquiescence and collaboration of the greater part of the population on all fundamental questions. The present Government, and especially the Chancellor of the Exchequer, recognise this in some spheres. They have made great, but unhappily largely unavailing, efforts to spread as widely as possible the knowledge of economic facts. But in other respects they have failed. Many would claim that this failure springs from an attitude which has been most clearly stated by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury :—

“The housewives as a whole cannot be trusted to buy all the right things, where nutrition and health are concerned. This is really no more than an extension of the principle according to which the housewife herself would not trust a child of 4 to select the week's purchases. For in the case of nutrition and health, just as in the case of education, the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is good for people, than people know themselves.”

(Douglas Jay *The Socialist Case*)

It is, of course, quite true that the gentleman in Whitehall knows far more than the housewife about the mysteries of exchange rates and of rates of interest. But this quite sound point is being elevated by Mr. Jay and those who agree with him into a first principle of administration. They seek to dispose of the entire national resources according to the plans of the gentlemen in Whitehall. What is left in the pocket of the private citizen is not what he needs in order to maintain his standard of living or even to enjoy the benefits of a free life. He is allowed what is left after all the gentlemen in Whitehall have spent all they want. This is a dangerous principle to apply to the economic life of the country. There seems to be no reason why Mr. Jay or someone else should not one day extend it to other matters. The gentlemen in Whitehall probably know a great deal about politics, more perhaps than the housewife. Yet we should all shrink before the suggestion that bureaucrats should cast all the votes and thus become themselves a self-perpetuating and ever-ruling corporation.

Another factor contributing to the Socialist attitude springs from its historical aim to transfer power and wealth to a particular class of the community. Today the objective of nationalisation has shifted, for good or ill, from workers' control,

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which the present Government opposes, to industrial efficiency. The emphasis has been shifted from producers' cooperatives and syndicalisation to central planning, from municipalisation to centrally appointed and controlled Hospital Boards. Socialism in practice tends to become the transfer of power not to the community but to a group at the centre. Such a group is given the means of self-perpetuation. Even paternal despotism easily loses its sentiments of affection. Through centralisation the seizure of more and greater power is made easy. That is why socialism cannot be a permanent barrier against communism and is so often a Trojan horse.

The Conservative Party has never believed in the omniscience and omnicompetence of Government. The rights and duties of the individual require, for their protection, positive action by the Government. If *The Right Road for Britain* has any title to historic interest, this lies in its restatement in the middle of the twentieth century of the Conservative attitude to the relations of the state and the individual.

For many years Britain has been more than a simple type of parliamentary democracy. Its form of society and its constitution have been more complex and less centralised than, for example, in France. I do not refer merely to the greater flexibility between social classes. In Britain we have had a far greater measure of decentralisation of authority in our lively and responsible local government. The individual has found protection of his interests and an outlet for energy and enthusiasm in the wide variety of voluntary organisations such as the trade unions and clubs of all kinds. Conservatives stress also the influence of a widespread ownership of property in affording protection and status for the individual.

Socialist theory contains a grain of truth when it claims that property can be identified with certain kinds of power. But its deductions are wrong. If the ownership of property results in the concentration of power, then the assumption of the control of property by the state will result in the concentration of power in the hands of the Government of the day. Such a concentration will deprive the individual of any defence against oligarchy. The correct deduction, and that most consonant with the British way of life, is to secure as wide a diffusion of property and therefore of power as possible. This aim Conservatives seek to achieve by encouraging personal thrift, by developing a prosperous agriculture, by favouring agreed

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schemes of co-partnership and profit sharing, and by promoting house-ownership, not at the expense of houses built to rent, but by a speeding up of the rate of housebuilding.

Everywhere we look we see spreading this regrettable tendency to centralise property and power. The unofficial strikes are a symptom of the weakening of the hold of the trade unions on their members. The "absentee landlordism" of the trade union leaders, who have "left their estates and gone to court", that is in modern parlance to the nationalised boards, has contributed to this result. Again, the removal of the Friendly Societies from the field of national insurance has resulted in an easier swallowing of the individual by the state. Local Government, and especially the smaller unit, has lost much of its power to central authorities. In addition interference in the details of administration has clipped local initiative and dulled personal responsibility. The failure to achieve anything approaching the pre-war rate of building has been reflected in the much restricted private ownership of homes.

It is, however, in the economic field that the greatest change has been seen, not only in those industries that have been nationalised, but also in the Government's attitude to free enterprise. There is no dispute that nationalisation has proved more difficult a process and less satisfactory in its results than was anticipated. The enthusiasm of the advocates of nationalisation wanes as the complex and less easily segregated industries are placed on the operating table. Apart from financial issues, the nationalised industries have been afflicted with two types of problem: that of size which besets all organisations and *a fortiori* monopolies on a national scale, and the problems which arise from the peculiar and ill-thought out relationship of nationalised undertakings to the state. The question of size may with time and well-directed energy be solved, if general experience is pooled. The problem of the relationship of nationalised industries to the state, which covers such questions as the position of the trade unions, the right to strike and the accountability to Parliament, requires a great deal of fresh thought.

Thus Conservatives have adopted an eclectic policy of denationalisation which has great practical merits. Some of the nationalised industries are beset with technical problems which are basic to the welfare of the nation. In this time of economic danger, we intend to direct all the best brains of the

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industry towards the need for great productive and commercial efficiency. We have in *The Right Road for Britain* set out schemes of organisation and responsibility for those industries which remain nationalised. Our design is once again to restore responsibility, power, and detailed decisions to the smallest reasonable unit.

We are completely opposed to the further proposals for nationalisation put forward by the Socialist Party. We oppose their proposals for taking over particular firms and for starting up Government owned factories in some industries. It seems to be at best doubtful if these suggestions have been thoroughly considered. They lead to one conclusion only, that in current socialist thought no limit is set to what the state should undertake or to its powers of intervention.

As I have already said, Conservatives reject this doctrine of the omniscient state, whether it manifests itself in industry or in local government or in any other sphere. Our view is that there is in any circumstances and period of time, a right division of functions between the Government, voluntary organisations and the individual. Nobody who studies the *Right Road for Britain* can doubt that we place heavy responsibilities on the Government. But we also set sharp limits on Government intervention. Even on practical grounds a mixed economy could not be run successfully on the basis that the state has an unlimited right of interference. Industry must have confidence in the future. Capricious interference strikes at the root of business confidence.

It is the task of Government, Conservatives believe, to set out the conditions within which the individual, whether in industry or in other spheres, can rise to his greatest capabilities. It is the business of Government to encourage and inspire or to restrain and curb far more often than it is its duty to undertake the execution of details.

Our attitude to taxation is inspired by our belief that the citizen should be given the widest possible opportunity to spend his money in his own way. Similarly in the Worker's Charter we rely on establishing good relationships in industry by agreement and example and not by coercion. For the same reason the Conservative Party is officially and fully behind the modern conception of the social services. We accept them because they ensure greater opportunity for all through education and family allowances, and also because through

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insurance benefits, pensions and assistance they mitigate the effects of misfortune. We recognise that the consequences of a widespread system of welfare will be a redistribution of income and wealth and a more closely knit society.

At the same time we combat the idea that, because some redistribution of wealth is desirable, complete equality is essential. We believe in fair shares in order to provide a basic minimum. We recognise that in any form of society there must be failures. But one of the greatest motive forces of society is success and it is the task of Government to encourage success. The social services and the high standard of living of Britain have been built upon success. Unless success is encouraged and rewarded further advances will not be made.

The danger today is that under an increasingly centralised form of Government the basic minimum will become an average. Eventually it may well become a uniform and universal standard if the successful are depressed. Socialism is not to be criticised because it has adopted the conception of the welfare state but because it is developing the Administrative State where the interest of the private citizen is sacrificed to the convenience of the Government.

Conservatives therefore feel impelled to stress that the need today is to humanise organisation, not to organise humanity, just as in the last century we called in the power of the Government to redress the balance of unrestrained *laissez faire*. Society and Government exist for the individual and not the individual for them. There has been in Britain, as in almost no other country in the world, a long period of organic growth in the form of society. We have now reached a stage in which society, although more complex and with a more closely interwoven pattern, has by these very characteristics made ever more complete provision for the individual to fulfil his needs and aspirations, spiritual as well as material. It is this process of historical change which Conservatives wish to continue, to develop and to guide. We believe that this steady growth is threatened by the spread, partly deliberate and partly unwitting, of the conception of an omniscient and centralised state.

HOW ISOLATIONIST IS STALIN?

By ALEXANDER WERTH

One of the few completely unmistakable themes—as unmistakable as the Siegfried motif in the *Ring*—that emerge every now and then from the 600 pages of Mr. Deutscher's *Stalin* (Oxford University Press, 25/-) is his hero's desire to put Russia first, and the world revolution (insofar as he was interested in it at all) second. Throughout his seventy years, he has spent only a few weeks abroad—a month or two in Austria before 1917, one week at Teheran, in the company of Churchill and Roosevelt, and finally, a few days at Potsdam. All the rest of the time he has lived in Russia; in 1917, he was the only prominent man in Lenin's *entourage* who had won his spurs as a revolutionary Bolshevik without at any time having been an *émigré* in the West. His knowledge of local conditions, especially in the industrial centres of his native Caucasus, and of the Russian people's psychology was exceptionally good; he had also an unsurpassed first-hand knowledge of the great nationalities problem which, in 1917, was calling for urgent and careful handling. His flair in feeling which way the wind was blowing, and what the innermost desires of the Soviet people were, largely explains why Stalin, and not Trotsky won, when it came to a showdown after Lenin's death. Mr. Deutscher rightly points out that, in the midst of all the doctrinal verbiage of those years, it was often hard to discover any substantial difference between Stalin's views and Trotsky's views (except that the latter were always "so much more brilliantly" expressed), but that there was always, first a subtle, and then a much more obvious, difference in emphasis—Trotsky (as well as Lenin before him) taking world revolution, with Western Europe as its real storm centre, much more seriously than Stalin; and Stalin often doing little more than paying lip service to this world revolution. The fundamental quarrel was, somewhat artificially, but most effectively in a tactical sense, brought into the open by Stalin when he opposed his bold new "socialism in one country" doctrine to Trotsky's doctrine of the "permanent revolution".

Trotsky—a Jew into the bargain—was internationalist by temperament and upbringing; Stalin was not, and his proclamation of "socialism in one country" was something that strictly corresponded to the aspirations of the Russian people at the

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time. It was a sop to their vanity; it promised stability; it created clear and concrete objectives before them; in the 20's, and even more so, in the 30's, it made them supremely conscious of the fact that Russia was not to be treated—as so many of the Old Bolsheviks would have it—as the periphery of a Socialist Europe, as "the manure for the world revolution"—but that she was to become the centre of a new civilisation. Already in 1917, as Mr. Deutscher notes, Stalin placed greater emphasis than either Lenin or Trotsky on Russia's peculiar socialist mission.

No doubt, Mr. Deutscher is outraged at some of the things Stalin did; he speaks contemptuously of the mumbo-jumbo and the Asiatic splendours of Lenin's funeral—a performance, staged by Stalin, which was to lay the foundation for a "Lenin cult" which—before very long—was to become a "Stalin cult".

Mr. Deutscher admits, however, that the mausoleum and the "Asiatic pageantry" and the semi-religious approach to the leader's embalmed body in its glass case gave the Russian people something they had been missing during the first years of the revolution.

Throughout his book, Mr. Deutscher is highly contemptuous of Stalin's style of writing and of his oratory. In 1917 already, he notes, "Stalin's writings were the small change of bolshevik propaganda". What he wrote was written in short, simple sentences, and thoroughly intelligible to millions of people who dreaded to read Marx and Lenin, and who found Trotsky too clever and intellectual. "Stalin," Mr. Deutscher says, "was interested in the practical use of Leninist gadgets, not in the Leninist laboratory of thought". It was surely not as simple as all that, and one has the impression, in reading Mr. Deutscher's book, that like nearly all western writers on Russia, he has a soft spot for intellectual Trotsky and is inclined to subscribe to his sweeping verdict that Stalin was a "dull mediocrity".

As a practical politician Stalin was anything but that; nor can he really be called a mediocrity as a writer. Mr. Deutscher admits that "the style emerging from his confidential service messages [during the civil war] was clear and cutting, concise and precise", but that "face to face with a mass audience, he was incapable of striking a spark either in himself or in his audience".

It is true that Stalin is a very bad speaker, with a mumbling,

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monotonous delivery; but no one who, like the present writer, has observed Russian audiences listen to Stalin speeches during the war, can fail to have been profoundly impressed by their effect on the people: they were, just like his service messages, 'clear and cutting, concise and precise', and the way in which he managed, in every sentence, to hit the nail on the head, testified to a profound understanding of the audience which, in the case of his broadcasts, meant practically every man, woman and child in the country. I was not in Russia during Stalin's rise to power, but, reading his speeches and articles now, I can quite see how his statements provided people with that clear guidance they were not getting from others, and how it was that Stalin acquired his ascendancy, in the eyes of the people, over all the other bolshevik leaders of the time. It might be called demagoguery; but that is precisely what it was not; it lacked all the flamboyance that one associates with demagoguery, and was so readily accepted because it seemed so much more like common-sense than what the others were saying. This was one of the secrets of Stalin's success in his rise to power; another reason why he succeeded where Trotsky failed was that, for several years, he was content to concentrate his energies on gaining control of the Communist Party and to work behind the scenes. That he was egged on by personal ambition and a hatred of Trotsky is, in a sense, true, but it is also true that he had a policy which was not all his own invention, but which, nevertheless, he was the first to apply in practice on so gigantic a scale. If, in 1928/29, he embarked on his series of five-year plans and on collectivisation, it was not only because he considered them to be essential for the survival of Russia, but also because he had his fingers firmly placed on the country's pulse, and seemed to know exactly how much support he could count on, and how much the country could stand—for the sacrifices entailed would be terrible. Commenting on the industrial revolution in England, Marx had written: "Capital comes into the world dripping from head to foot with blood and dirt", and the same was even truer of the birth of "socialism in one country". Yet, despite immense difficulties with which both industrialisation and collectivisation were faced, the net result, as seen in 1939-40, was unquestionably impressive, and allowed Russia to withstand the shattering German invasion of 1941, and, ultimately,—with considerable, but not enormous help from outside—to smash the greater part

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of the Wehrmacht. (Lend-Lease—though some of it vitally important—certainly represented no more than 10 per cent. of the Red Army's equipment towards the end of the war, very much less in 1943, and almost nil at the time of Stalingrad.)

* * *

Stalin's concern for Russia's security was at the back of the famous purge trials of the late 30's. I found this part of Mr. Deutscher's book the most valuable of all. As distinct from the earlier parts of the book, where he seems somewhat overwhelmed by the abundance and contradictoriness of the material, and even tends to be infected by Trotsky's brightness and his thesis that Stalin was "a dull mediocrity" (sometimes he even accepts uncritically some of the more blatant of the Trotskyist apocrypha, such as the story of the "suicide" of Stalin's wife in 1932) Mr. Deutscher's chapters on the purges are admirably clear, and explain more fully, satisfactorily, and simply than any other book I know what was really behind them.

They came at a time when Russia was at last, after 20 years of hardships, emerging on to the highroad of (relative) economic prosperity, and in the midst of what seemed to many (though it was scarcely that) a period of "liberalism".

This "liberalism" took the form of various amnesties in favour of repentant kulaks and other offenders, and of the "Stalin constitution" of 1936 which many interpreted as a first step in the direction of greater freedom. That it "re-enfranchised" many categories of citizens is true enough.

1935-36 was also the only period of the Stalin era when, as Mr. Deutscher rightly notes, Stalin, realising that he had been "accepted" by the mass of the people, began to appear personally at prize-giving ceremonies, and to receive bouquets from little girls, amid stormy cheers from thousands of youngsters of the new "Stalin generation". There was method in this, too. Unlike Hitler, Stalin is not interested in being "adored"—and, indeed, in the "adoration" of Stalin there never was anything in the least pathological—but he must have felt that, with the five-year plan succeeding, the establishment of at least occasional personal contacts with the people would be good for morale. Altogether, on the home front, things were looking up, and slogans like "Life will be better, life will be jollier" belong to that period. Jolly and even "crazy" films which, in 1946, would have made Zhdanov

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explode with rage, were, in the mid-thirties, being made by the dozen. All seemed to be going much better in Russia than Stalin had hoped for, in moments of discouragement, four or five years before. But—there was Hitler. And Stalin seemed convinced, as early as 1935, and especially in 1936, after Hitler's re-occupation of the Rhineland and the outbreak of the war in Spain, that war—and war against Russia—was a matter of a few years. Stalin could never forget Trotsky's threat that, in case of war, he (Trotsky) would be the Clemenceau of Russia, who would make the life of the government in office a misery. Everything might be lost, in case of war, if control were to slip out of Stalin's hands, and rival leaders were to exploit inevitable temporary difficulties. All such potential rivals had to be eliminated. Through blackmail and third-degree methods, many of Stalin's rivals were made to "confess," while others, notably some generals, but also some of the civilians, who would not "confess", were tried *in camera*, and the whole lot were shot or (in a few cases) deported. Mr. Deutscher—while condemning the cruelty of it all—justifies the "state reasons" that prompted the purges by imagining just how much trouble Stalin's rivals might have caused—maybe simply through weakness—if they had still been available, say, in the autumn of 1941, when anger and deep disillusionment, caused by the fearful initial reverses of the Red Army, were sweeping a large part of the country. Of course, Stalin cannot have had all that much prophetic foresight; he can scarcely have visualised 1941 as clearly as that; but all kinds of other situations might have arisen in which say, Bukharin or Zinoviev might have headed a movement against him. In this he was right. In reality, there seems to have been no gigantic conspiracy, as the "confessions" made out; for, apart from Kirov, none of the Stalinist leaders had been assassinated—a pretty poor show for a "conspiracy" of such vast dimensions; but it was clear, even from the isolated case of Kirov's murder, that the Old Bolsheviks were not contented, and were biding their time—and spreading disaffection in the meantime. What is more, the purges achieved another object which suited Stalin perfectly despite the inhumanity of it all: hundreds of thousands of "suspects" were removed from their jobs, and these were filled by younger people of the "Stalin generation", in whose minds Stalin had been built up as the man they could trust. All these multitudes of new officials had a vested interest in the

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Stalin regime, and when the war came they supported it wholeheartedly.

If there was, however, a real conspiracy at the time, it was that led by Marshal Tukhachevsky. This, according to Mr. Deutscher, was directed against Stalin personally; what Mr. Deutscher does not say is that the Tukhachevsky plot had very serious international implications: it seems that, in a moment of indiscretion in Prague, Tukhachevsky spilt the beans to Benes, who thereupon reported the facts to Stalin. It seems that Tukhachevsky feared an attack by Nazi Germany and thought that Russia would be beaten. He therefore favoured a Nazi-Soviet pact at a time when Stalin was still hoping to bring about collective security in alliance with the Western Powers.

Tukhachevsky's plot had little or no popular following, and did not shake Russia nearly as much as the purges did; but, as Mr. Deutscher points out, even the effect of these was much less disastrous on Russian life than is commonly believed abroad.

By 1937 Stalin had, of course, become thoroughly Europe-conscious, and was preparing for a war that was imminent.

But until 1934 Stalin was either not sufficiently interested in foreign affairs, or, even if he was, he did not understand what was happening. The Comintern was, apparently, allowed a fairly free hand in the early 30's, and whether what it did met with Stalin's full approval or not, the results were disastrous. The supreme example of the Comintern's folly was its handling of Germany; whereas Trotsky, as early as 1931, was—then already an exile in Turkey—stridently calling for a united front between the German communists and the German socialists—a united front which alone could prevent the advent of Hitler, the Comintern was continuing to treat the socialists as "the moderate wing of fascism". That the crass stupidity of this policy—the worst of all possible policies in the circumstances (even a communist putsch in 1932 would have been less dangerous)—was finally recognised by Stalin later when all the damage had been done may be seen from the haste with which he switched over, in 1934, to the Popular Front idea.

Altogether, in 1934, Stalin belatedly awoke to the deadly danger of Hitlerism and proceeded to look for Allies, now that it was no longer possible for Russia to go on in that "splendid isolation" which Stalin, at that time, would have preferred to any other course.

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While, in home affairs, Stalin displayed on nearly every occasion an amazing sureness of touch (so much so that even his most "criminal" ventures, such as the initial collectivisation drive and the purges "paid" in the long run) his foreign policy lacked the same grip and understanding, especially psychological understanding. He did not understand the Germans; he did not understand the French. Even in 1941 he still had illusions about a strong opposition to Hitler inside Germany, while the rapid collapse of France, on the strength of whose army he had the wildest illusions, came to him as a complete surprise—indeed as a profound shock, for it robbed Russia of three-quarters of the benefits Stalin had hoped to derive from his Pact with Hitler in 1939. Now, in 1940, not a weakened, but a strengthened Germany was facing him.

Mr. Deutscher's account of the Munich and post-Munich period contains nothing very new, and is based on familiar material—the various diplomatic records published in the last few years, and such authoritative books as Professor Namier's. He takes the justifiably cynical view that, if, up till 1938, Russia genuinely hoped to bring about a great anti-Hitler coalition in Europe, all sides behaved equally unscrupulously after Munich. Stalin knew that Chamberlain was still trying to divert Hitler to the East, and decided, in the spring of 1939, that he could play the same game, and go one better. The behaviour of the Western Powers—with their absurd mission to Moscow in the summer of 1939—was such that Stalin had no other choice than make his pact with Hitler—short of seeing the Germans invade Russia right after, or soon after, Poland. To Russia the risk of a clash with Germany was far greater in 1939 than in 1938, when she was apparently still fully prepared to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia—if France had fought, or even if Czechoslovakia alone had fought.

Needless to say, Stalin's "pro-Western" policy during the 1934-38 period had not been dictated by any superior anti-fascist virtues, but by a pure instinct of self-preservation, and so also, in the last analysis, was the Pact with Hitler, when all else had failed.

That it was an uneasy alliance is made abundantly clear by Mr. Deutscher, who does not, however, in telling the story of that period, stress sufficiently clearly the extreme uneasiness that was felt by large sections of the Russian population, and the sharp dislike and distrust of Germany. This dislike, mingled

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with foreboding, became particularly acute when Russian soldiers, back from Poland, proceeded to tell horror stories about the German "allies". A large part of the educated class, and also the more enlightened among the working-class were acutely embarrassed by this alliance with "cannibal" Hitler, and the general attitude to England became distinctly friendly after the fall of France—much friendlier than the line the Government and Stalin dared officially take. Even so, partly as a sop to public feeling, and partly because the pact with Hitler was obviously leading to no good, the press, by the end of 1940 (especially after Molotov's abortive visit to Berlin, when he in effect rejected the German offer to join in a share-out of the world), cautiously proceeded to play up British resistance.

In the early months of 1941, Stalin, perhaps for the first time in his life, was becoming rather desperate. He knew for certain that war was coming, but, in a manner that betrayed a curious misundertaking of Nazi Germany, he resorted to a policy of cold-footed opportunism in the desperate hope of gaining a few more weeks. Hence the expulsion of the Czech and Yugoslav embassies, the recognition of Rashid Ali, the Iraqi "quisling" in May 1941, and the public denunciation of Sir Stafford Cripps as a panic-monger and mischief-maker. But on June 22 the Germans invaded Russia—just as Cripps had prophesied.

Between 1939 and 1941 Russia reconquered her "old" territories in the West—Western Ukraine and Belorussia, Bessarabia, and the Baltic states, and although this again was done almost entirely for reasons of greater security, it sweetened, to many a patriotic Russian, the pill of the Pact with Germany. These people, however, also knew at heart that fear of Hitler, rather than a "back to the Tsarist borders" *mystique* lay behind these moves of the Red Army. The same was even more apparent in the case of the war against Finland.

In his chapters dealing with the war period, Mr. Deutscher is even more handicapped than in the other parts of his book by his apparent lack of a first-hand acquaintance with Russia, and by his incorrigible preference for official and semi-official documents to live human material, which would have explained to him more adequately just why the Russian people behaved in the manner they did, and just why they followed Stalin. One of his favourite sources is the book by a British general—one of the silliest and most ill-informed books written even

by generals. The live intonations of the immense human drama of the war in Russia are therefore totally lacking, and the figure of Stalin—who, during those years became extraordinarily vital and alive to all Russians—is presented in a dim and distorted way. Some casual remark to Harry Hopkins is magnified out of all proportion to its importance, while the critical day of October 17, when the people digging trenches outside Moscow learned with overwhelming relief that Stalin was still in the Kremlin, is passed over in silence. Similarly, Mr. Deutscher totally misread the effect on the Russians of what he calls Stalin's "uninspiring" speech of July 3. Some of his facts are wrong: thus, he uncritically accepts the German claim of having captured half a million Russian prisoners "on the Dnieper"; he says that "most of the boots of the infantry were Lend-Lease" (they were nothing of the sort); his misunderstanding of what happened at Stalingrad is clear from his statement that "when his generals could not agree whom to attack first, Von Paulus or Mannstein, he (Stalin) decided that Mannstein be attacked first". But, surely, Mannstein *was* attacking, in an effort to break through to Stalingrad, while Paulus was sitting tight inside Stalingrad; so there *was* no alternative to trying to stop Mannstein! And then, strangest of all, Mr. Deutscher in his scrupulously scholarly work proceeds to quote a crude propaganda play, written in 1947, on what Stalin and Churchill said to each other in 1942—and he calls this a "semi-official document"! Also, regarding the "betrayal" of the Warsaw insurgents by the Russians, he rightly says that the Russian army was driven back by the Germans; but then he adds that RAF planes were not allowed to help the insurgents because of Stalin's "rancour and spite". The real explanation is much more typically Russian: the Russians refused to let these planes land behind the Russian lines because their army in Eastern Poland was in full retreat, and they did not wish any foreign witnesses to be present. Moreover, they had no faith in the effectiveness of helping the Warsaw insurgents in this way, and if they later sent some planes over themselves, it was only as a belated and futile gesture of appeasement.

Back to his diplomatic documents and statesmen's memoirs on Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, and Mr. Deutscher is on more solid ground again—though it may not perhaps be best to look at Stalin mostly through the eyes of foreign statesmen. These do not see Stalin as the Russians see him.

But some points Mr. Deutscher makes are very telling: notably Stalin's perseverance in favour of a Big Three Peace—with its implication of "spheres of influence". He also demonstrates brilliantly the fact that Stalin's post-war plans put Russian security first, and the promotion of revolution in Europe last. "Communism fits Germany the way a saddle fits a cow", he told Mikolajczyk in 1944, and this belief he confirmed by doing everything to make Russia and communism unattractive to the Germans—dismantling of industries, Oder-Neisse Line, etc. He could also have made the Polish left, at any rate, more friendly to Russia by giving Lwow to Poland; but no; Russia's interests must be served first.

Naturally, in Stalin's view, there will always be a basic and long-term antagonism between capitalism and Soviet socialism, but this need not preclude a lengthy period of peace between the two, or at any rate, a *modus vivendi*. As Mr. Deutscher says: "In the reality of practical politics, the discontinuity of the revolutionary process matters as much as, if not more than, its continuity".

In practice, something has survived of the Three-Power (or at any rate, Two-Power) Peace of Teheran—though it is an uneasy peace. Socialism in one country has been succeeded by socialism in one sphere, and Mr. Deutscher is probably right in saying that, to Stalin, Eastern Europe, and no longer Western Europe is the *terra firma* of socialism, and that Russia can afford to abandon Western Europe—no longer, economically or politically, the centre of the world—to capitalism. Quite rightly he also stresses throughout his book Stalin's great preference for the East. To him, the West is more mysterious than the East. He feels more at home with a Chinese than with an Englishman or Frenchman—or even a Pole. But whether Stalin's "sphere of influence" is, on the strength of it, to extend far into Asia, and if so, what the *revolutionary*, as well as *nationalist* implications of this new development will be to Russia, Mr. Deutscher does not venture to prophesy. Does Stalin's unquestionable isolationism, where the West is concerned, no longer apply in Asia?

Since the war Russia has concentrated on building and re-building "socialism in one country"—now partly extended to "one sphere". The atom bomb has created acute xenophobia in Russia, and this has been a fruitful soil for that cultural isolationism which is infinitely more pronounced now than it

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ever was between 1917 and 1944. (For the pressing revival of "Soviet-consciousness" began, to be exact, in September 1944, just as the Russian troops were entering Rumania and Poland, and not in 1945, as Mr. Deutscher says.) This cultural isolationism is something for which Stalin is very largely responsible himself: as Mr. Deutscher rightly remarks, he believes in levelling up Asiatic Russia and levelling down European Russia—with the result that the general level becomes, from a European point of view, lamentably low. This partial-barbarisation of European Russia is hardest to condone, and one of the questions that inevitably arise is to what extent this policy will last only as long as Stalin does—and no longer. For on this policy there seems to be, deep down, some real disagreement in the Politbureau.

Not that the "masses" really care very much—even though they still prefer Chekhov to Fadeyev, and no doubt wonder why there are no Soviet Chekhovs. But, by and large, they are fairly contented, and Stalin's prestige—which was highest in 1945—is still high, thanks to the very efficient reconstruction that has gone on since the war and the rise in the general standard of living. Great schemes like the Forest Belts have stirred the people's imagination. People are conscious of the fact that in the Stalin era Russia has become, quantitatively, more educated, and more powerful than she has ever been in all her history, and they feel that the *khozain*—"the boss"—(for that is how he is popularly known—how different from the German attitude to Divine Hitler!) must have been right most of the time.

But there are times when the Russian people get worried, and begin to wonder whether "the boss" is not losing his grip and is not, internationally, going to run into serious trouble. Such a mood existed in Russia last spring, and Stalin, who continues to be very sensitive to his public opinion (in spite of all that is said to the contrary) hastened to raise the Berlin blockade and to create a *détente* in the West. The main object of Stalin's policy in any foreseeable future is to build "socialism in one zone" and to avoid war, not at any, but at almost any price. Only, where does China come in?

THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

By PROFESSOR W. Y. ELLIOTT

SINCE the responsibility which the outcome of the Second World War has thrust upon the United States forces upon it a reluctantly assumed leadership, the control of its foreign policy by Congress assumes a critical importance for the survival of a free world. The role of the Senate in treaty making was forced upon the attention of the world by the League controversy and Wilson's failure to secure American participation. The two-thirds rule for the ratification of treaties subsequently came in for a good deal of rather violent abuse and some efforts at change through constitutional amendment. The position of the House of Representatives, however, had never seemed to foreign observers to be of great importance until the Lend Lease Act showed that the power of the purse today is the major factor in controlling and limiting the foreign commitments of the United States.

The record of the Congress of the United States since that time, in supporting budgets about 50 per cent. of which really revolve around our foreign policy and some 10 per cent. of which on the average went into what were essentially gifts or very "fuzzy" loans to support European recovery, has been both unique and unexpected. The sweeping majorities by which the Administrations, first of Roosevelt, then of Truman, have won support for such a bold and generous fiscal support from Congress are the more astonishing in the light of the Republican Party control of both houses of Congress during the 80th Congress (1946-1948).

The primacy of a positive foreign policy is reflected not only in the organization of Congress but in its relation to party and to pressure groups and to public opinion in the United States. The changed nature of foreign policy is shown also in the extended range in which it affects most other major policies if only through the budget. This brings most questions today back to the President himself for a reconciliation of views where there is a serious difference between the major departments involved. For purposes of this study, primary emphasis may be placed on the committee structure and functioning of Congress to illustrate the changes that have taken place and to show some

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unresolved problems in the co-ordination of control over foreign commitments.

Roosevelt's long administration was marked by the emergence of a new type of White House executive office starting with six executive assistants sanctioned by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1936 and enacted into law in the next two years. For purposes of comparison, one should remember that the White House of Wilson operated with very little internal staff mechanism, except for Tumulty, the President's own secretary, and the ubiquitous Colonel House, whom many would compare to Harry Hopkins for his special and personal relations of influence with the President. It is true that the White House office expanded somewhat to handle the routine volume of mail and speeches, but Wilson relied upon the Cabinet without paralleling the British experience of setting up a Cabinet Secretariat or a personal staff for the President in its place.

The Roosevelt regime set up a peculiar arrangement for the co-ordination of all policy connected with the war mobilization and reconversion known as the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, which had extraordinary powers of issuing directives. In the original version of the Office of War Mobilization under former Chief Justice Byrnes (later Secretary of State), these powers of directive had rested upon executive orders and were intended to bring back together the authority which had originally been intended to rest in the War Production Board, but had gradually been sloughed off during the war to other agencies (Office of Price Administration, War Food Administrator, Office of War Mobilization, Office of Defence Transportation). Congress, however, took the extraordinary step of fixing a statutory base for these directive powers to other agencies concerned with the conduct of the war and with reconversion; so that the Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (the title fixed by the statute in 1945) emerged with a unique position of exercising statutory authority over the great departments of the government, under, it is true, the general direction of the President. In a way, Congress had insisted upon the creation of something like a military staff principle for the transition of the Government of the United States from war to peace and had even included the power for Director Byrnes to enforce the State Department's policies upon other agencies in the field particularly of foreign economic policy.

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This extraordinary and somewhat startling step did not get as wide attention as it perhaps deserved, partly because of the modest use of these powers made by a succession of Directors of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. In the space of little more than a year (1945-1946), there were four directors of this office. Director Byrnes became Secretary of State shortly after VE-Day. He was succeeded by Judge Vinson, who had previously been director of the Office of Economic Stabilization and a close associate of Byrnes in the co-ordination of the war effort. Judge Vinson shortly became Secretary of the Treasury, yielding the Office of the War Mobilization and Reconversion to the President's banking friend, John Snyder. Within a few months Judge Vinson had become Chief Justice of the United States and Mr. Snyder had become Secretary of the Treasury, leaving the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion during most of 1946 in the hands of John Steelman, formerly the President's assistant who had dealt chiefly with labour matters. In that form the Office functioned through 1946 and came to an end by the President's failure to ask for a renewal of its powers; though many of its functions remained somewhat unofficially grouped in the White House executive office.

During the greater part of its existence the OWMR had functioned as an appeal board and sounding agency for opinion through its public members, rather than as a true presidential staff. That is, it had settled inter-agency disputes (rather than preventing them), and it had done more "trouble-shooting" than staff anticipation. But it clearly established the pattern of having broad issues of policy settled at the level of the White House; just as during the war Admiral Leahy had presided over the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President's own personal and official adviser on strategic matters.

The implications of this experiment are simple but sweeping: few major policy issues in modern government affect only one department. What was true of the need for co-ordinating several departments in general policy applied also to foreign policy, especially in the postwar period where the broad scope of commitments involves the entire range of departmental structure and policies. The postwar period showed that this had been recognized through the creation of several cabinet committees to attempt the co-ordination of wartime policy that had been centred in the staff organization and in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

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The first of these is the National Security Council, created in response to Eberstadt's Report to Secretary Forrestal, with the British Committee of Imperial Defence as its obvious model. By the National Security Organization Act of 1946 this Council was established at the highest possible level, with the President as its chairman and a statutory membership that included the Secretary of State, the newly created Secretary of Defence, the Secretaries of Air, War and Navy, the civilian chairman of the National Security Resources Board (created by the same Act), and such other *ad hoc* members as the President might from time to time designate. The objective of the National Security Council was to bring to bear reciprocally the considerations of a strategic character that would support or limit foreign policy and, on the other hand, to acquaint the fighting services with the high policy objectives of the Department of State; and to reconcile these two major factors. It rapidly became apparent that the Secretary of the Treasury would be involved in a great many of these decisions and he became a frequent if not a regular member.

Like the Committee of Imperial Defence, the National Security Council functioned purely as an advisory body. But also like the Committee of Imperial Defence, since it advised the working head of the government, who was its titular chairman, its advice was likely to have directive powers. Action was indicated in response to its directives in some operating agency. A considerable effort was made not to relate its high level policy forming "advice" to subcommittees of an operating character, as, for example, SANACC (State-Army-Navy-Airforce Co-ordinating Committee), at the assistant secretary level. The past tense is used purposely here to describe the organization of this Council through 1948. Its future functioning must, of course, be a matter for presidential action and may involve the necessity of setting up some type of subcommittee structure or at least some means of linking the high policy advice of the National Security Council with operating committees at lower levels.

Two other cabinet level committees were set up by the same act: (1) the Central Intelligence Agency and its advisory board comprising the heads of the fighting services and the Department of State (technically subordinate to the National Security Council) and (2) the previously mentioned National Security Resources Board, whose chairman reported to the president

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directly. This Board had additional members from one or two other cabinet departments such as Commerce and Interior, because of their connections with the problems of war mobilization. The Commerce Department, for example, has the control of export and import licensing, and the Department of the Interior was directly concerned with natural resources and particularly with mineral resources and stockpiling. On many matters the Department of Agriculture also has to be brought in; for manpower and labour problems, the Labour Department; and so will the proposed Department of Welfare, if and when it is formed.

In addition to these Cabinet committees, the National Advisory Council on International Financial and Monetary Policy was created by the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 1945. Here again a statutory basis was given to an organ for the co-ordination of interdepartmental policy in a very important area of foreign economic activity. Its objective was to bring together the policies and operations of the representatives of the United States on the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the already existing Export-Import Bank, which was solely an agency of the United States Government. Its primary concern was to see that there was a rationalized policy in the making of foreign loans and in the participation of the United States in foreign financial and monetary affairs generally. Its chairman was to be the Secretary of the Treasury, and its ordinary members included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, with an ex-officio membership of the directors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development; as the United States members on these bodies.

One of the significant features of these Cabinet committees and boards was that they were set up without permanent staffs of their own. They used the device that was followed throughout most of the history of the Committee of Imperial Defence of having their staff members seconded from the major departments concerned. Unlike the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, there was no staff serving the agency alone and without other loyalties, a point that deserves particular attention and perhaps correction.

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Thus the major areas of the confluence of military and foreign policy, of financial and foreign policy, and of intelligence and foreign policy were in theory brought together at Cabinet level; though in the latter two instances there was no attempt to connect them directly to the White House executive office. The National Security Resources Board, whose function was to plan the mobilization for a future war, played a far less important role largely owing to the fact that its chairman seemed not to command the direct access to the President and because its functions were in the realm of future planning, rather than of current operations.

The catalogue of White House executive agencies for Cabinet co-ordination would be incomplete without mention of the Council of Economic Advisers. This odd device, which was created by statute in 1945, attached to the Presidential office three principal economic advisers with a chairman, as a council to deal with all the questions that would arise from the operation of the economy of the United States. The term "full employment," which was originally attached to the draft bills disappeared, but the obvious intention of maintaining the economic activity of the United States at its maximum level was maintained. Recent pronouncements of the Council's Chairman, Mr. Nourse, picked up by the press, though they were not made as public statements, and perhaps misconstrued to indicate that the budget of the United States could hardly bear the full impact of arms for Western Europe, as well as an extensive military budget and a budget for European recovery, without integration of the total commitments and some possible savings. In any case, they were seized upon by some members of Congress as an authoritative demand for a cut, either in the economic or military aid programmes or in the defence programmes or both. Was such a pronouncement made *for* the President? For the Council? Or as the Chairman's sole and personal view?

The relations of this statutory body to the Bureau of the Budget, which presumably had fulfilled such functions previously, and to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System were far from clear. Whether or not its members were merely advisers to the President or empowered to operate with some independence in their own pronouncements has equally not been clarified. Nor is it quite certain whether they speak as individuals or as a Council. In any case, here was still another statutory agency attached to the White House.

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This one has the apparent intention of resolving all the elements of economic policy, with obvious implications on questions of financing foreign policy programmes.

The Hoover Commission has taken due note of this state of affairs and has rather tentatively suggested that the President needs at least a staff secretary (not to be called a chief of staff and not to be empowered with directive authority, as was the Office of War Mobilization), who will serve to keep him informed as to the actions of these interdepartmental agencies and committees, as well as the operations of the ordinary agencies and departments of an already widely extended administration. Estimates differ as to the number of officials with direct and unmediated access to the President for policy control; but if the independent regulatory commissions are added, the picture is the somewhat alarming one of forty-four permanent agencies, nine regulatory commissions and twenty-one temporary or advisory bodies, a total of seventy-four.*

The Hoover Commission opposes the granting of "statutory authority over operating departments" to "any staff members or staff agencies of the President's office." It further opposes statutory limitations on the President in the reorganizing of his own office or on the transferring of functions and personnel from one part to another. The Commission feels that the President should have the control over the appointments of the heads of staff agencies in his own office *without confirmation by the Senate*, except in the case of the Civil Service Commission. It further feels that the Council of Economic Advisers should be replaced by an office of the Economic Adviser with a single head; and that the membership and assignment of any Cabinet committee set up to advise the President should be determined by the President, and not by statute.

The implications of these recommendations are clear. They show that Congress, in the judgement of the Hoover Commission, has invaded the power of the President to control his own advisers and his own staff by assigning both functions and offices, and by requiring Senate confirmation for too many appointments. In the field of foreign policy this right of confirmation is one of the additional methods of control that Congress may exercise beyond its power to ratify treaties through the Senate and to deny funds for foreign commitments.

* See Hoover Commission Reports, especially Appendix I to "General Management of the Executive Branch." (Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 1949.)

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Co-ordination of Control by Congress

The examination of the problem of top level control of foreign policy may seem to be over-weighted in the emphasis that has so far been placed on the executive and particularly on the White House staff. Its bearing on congressional control, however, is immediately evident if one considers that precisely the same needs for co-ordinating widely different interests that affect foreign policy have also appeared in the field of Congressional reorganization; though they have not been given the same degree of integration that has been achieved in the executive departments.

The Reorganization Act of 1947, which Congress passed to set its own house in order, clarified in some degree the question of jurisdiction among standing committees and strengthened and extended the range of legislative control of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. As a result, power was considerably divided and the only final integrating centre to be found was the entire House, either sitting as a committee of the whole, or in its formal legislative sessions.

The same primacy for foreign policy and the same division of the instruments for its operation and control which has been noted in the executive departments as between the Armed Services, the Treasury, the Agriculture Department, Interior, Commerce, and others, reflected itself in the committee jurisdiction and authorizations of the House. For example, the operations of occupation policy (vital to the success of all foreign policy), technically came under the Armed Services Committee of both Houses. The authorization of increased funds for the Export-Import Bank as well as the handling of matters affecting the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, or the National Advisory Council, fell primarily into the jurisdiction of the Banking and Currency Committee in the House. This power obviously affects the authorizing power of the Foreign Affairs Committee, previously mentioned, for foreign loans.

The Agriculture Committee was in a position to review policy with respect to the world's food supply and to impose conditions on foreign aid programmes in this area. The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee had control of telecommunications transportation, shipping, and many other matters vitally affecting the success of large areas of foreign policy. The Judiciary Committee had control over the extension

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and operation of export licensing, and the Ways and Means Committee dealt with trade agreements and the extension of the reciprocal trade agreements programme. Furthermore, the Committee on Executive Expenditures was vested by the Reorganization Act with power to authorize any executive reorganizations, including those affecting the foreign affairs departments of the government and in particular the Department of State. Jurisdiction over the Foreign Service, on the other hand, still remained with the Foreign Affairs Committee, leaving a separation that is somewhat puzzling to reconcile in terms of the Hoover Commission's recommendation for a merger of the State Department's ordinary services with the Foreign Service.

How could Congress integrate the control of foreign policy when so many committees had jurisdiction over important aspects of it? In point of fact, the Appropriations Committees became in many instances the arbiter of policy in areas where jurisdiction was unclear or incomplete or mixed. The rules Committee exercised also in the Eightieth Congress a strong pressure through its general power to refuse to report out a bill to the House, or to give it a rule that would invite wide latitude for floor amendment. After running the gauntlet of the House of Representatives through its committee structure, and after authorizing funds and legislating whatever provisions Congress attached to them, the final barrier to an act already passed was still further reviewed by the Appropriations Committee. The latter exercised the utmost freedom, not only by revising the authorized estimates in its actual appropriations, but also by inserting additional or sometimes contradictory legislative provisions.

The Appropriations Committee, therefore, deserves especial attention and some comparison with similar operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee. In part the increased power of the Appropriations Committee stems from the effort to get a responsible legislative budget. In terms of the Reorganization Act of 1947, this duty devolves upon the Congress and is exercised mainly through the Appropriations Committee. It is assumed that Congress in its ordinary operations of authorizing funds will have some structure laid out for it by the executives proposed budget. But it is the further assumption that the legislation itself will impose a balancing operation that will bring all the separate legislative

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authorizations into conformity with the total legislative budget limits as set up by the Appropriations Committee.

Undoubtedly some such operation by Congress is essential to responsible exercise of the power of the purse. If in a moment of enthusiasm the Military Affairs Committee secures consent of the House to an increase of the Air Force to 70 groups (as against the executive recommendation of between 40 and 50,) this not only has a bearing on our foreign policy in the most vital element of strategy. It goes further and affects the budgetary balance in a most serious and vital way. Someone has to reconcile these enthusiasms with a balanced budget. It is assumed that Congress can play Santa Claus, but that the Appropriations Committee will act like the traditional "Dutch Uncle," who is not so benevolent.

Obviously in the field of foreign policy this raises very grave issues. A programme like the E.C.A. once passed by Congress is assumed to carry, through its authorizations, a commitment on which foreign nations begin at once to make their plans. On the other hand, the commitment from the congressional point of view is not a binding one until the actual appropriations have been authorized by the Appropriations Committee of both Houses and final Congressional action has reached agreement on the result.

The rude shock of Mr. Taber's rather severe cuts in the E.C.A. programme, which would have totalled somewhere between 20 and 25 per cent. of the authorized sums, caused anguish abroad and in the State Department. Senator Vandenberg took the line that commitments had been given which could not be repudiated and was successful in the Conference Committees in having these cuts substantially rejected, so far as Europe was concerned. On the other hand, the Appropriations Committee cut in the China Aid Programme (Title 3 of the bill) remained and was supported by conference action. The Interim Aid Programme, as well as the previous post-UNRRA special aid to Italy, Austria and Trieste, had both been substantially cut by the Appropriations Committee and that action had been sustained by Congress.

This ultimate hurdle has led the Appropriations Committee to extend its functions from inquiry into the operations of the executive departments in the actual expenditure of funds into a new and expanded activity in the setting up of conditions for the exercise of the power of expending funds. In certain areas, occupation policy, for example, the most important formulation

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of policy has rested in the hands of the Appropriations Committee for this reason.

It has been assumed that the staff work in Congress by the newly created professional staffs and the use of a common pool of experts through the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress might tend to overcome at least disagreements on fact and to present all the committees of Congress with carefully screened and analysed information. There was even the hope that the staffs might, through communication with each other and common action, help to iron out some of the problems of inadequate knowledge on which decisions affecting foreign policy were frequently taken by the Appropriations Committees, for example, some progress has been made, in the brief period since the Act, in staff communication. A certain amount of really valuable joint effort by the staffs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate was brought to bear in the E.C.A. Act. But jealousy of committee jurisdiction and secrecy extends to the control of staff operations also. Aside from personal contacts, there is little to be hoped for in the way of systematic co-operation; and there is certainly no overall staff work for any committee of Congress that attempts to utilize the work of other committee staffs.

Secrecy particularly characterizes the work of the House Appropriations Committee. Some of this is perhaps necessary because of the importance of its decisions and their economic effects. But most of it seems to be rather the product of the jealously guarded prerogatives of the committee. It operates through sub-committees, some of which do not report to the main committee until the day or the day before action on the authorization is itself contemplated. In the House these sub-committees do not permit, in many cases, the presence of other members of the Appropriations Committee itself during their hearings, which are kept secret and are not made available even as printed hearings until action by Congress is imminent. Nor are members of other committees, for instance, the Foreign Affairs Committee, allowed to appear either before the sub-committees of the Appropriations Committee or the full committee, in order to urge their views in matters within their legislative committee jurisdiction or affecting their interests.

The Senate is somewhat differently organized in this respect. Three members of the Senate Legislative Committee,

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for example, the Foreign Relations Committee, are invited into considerations affecting their committee by the Senate Appropriations Committee. This appears to have a very beneficial effect on the information and policy aspects of the Senate Appropriations Committee's considerations.

In at least one major instance an effort has been made to supplement the control through scrutiny of the execution of foreign policy that was attempted by the Appropriations Committees. A joint committee of both Houses was created with seven members from each House—four of the majority and three of the minority party, as a rule, and with a division of these seven that would add three members of the foreign policy committees of each House to the four from the Appropriations Committees of each House. This committee was set up to act as a "watchdog" on the administration of the Economic Co-operation Act. Though its chairman was normally the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, this was primarily a matter of seniority and of agreement by members of the joint committee itself.

The Marshall Plan also brought forth for purposes of preliminary study an important Select Committee on Foreign Aid in the House, which contained representatives from the committees primarily concerned with this problem. Though its titular chairman was Congressman Eaton, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, its active operations were directed by the Vice-Chairman, Congressman Herter, of Massachusetts, member of the very important Rules Committee of the House.* The rest of its members had obviously been chosen by the Speaker and the Minority Leader with a view to getting important representation from the Banking and Currency Committee, from the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and from the Appropriations Committee, as well as from the Rules Committee. Many of its members were known to be hostile to foreign aid. It made an extensive field study, through subcommittees, of conditions in the countries of Western Europe and returned with a report which in general favoured the extension of foreign aid—though under machinery somewhat different from that later adopted.†

* Congressman Herter had introduced the Resolution which eventually created the Select Committee several months before the Marshall proposals were announced at Harvard University.

† See *Final Report of the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, 1948*, Eightieth Congress, especially Eighth Preliminary Report, pp. 597-610.

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The Congressional Reorganization (1946) Act had been on the whole distinctly unfavourable to the creation of select and special committees. It is obvious, however, that in the field of foreign affairs and in such matters as occupation policy particularly, no single committee of the House is likely to carry the wide support necessary for a programme affecting many committees of the Congress. Until the Second World War the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House rated rather low in the choice of members for committee assignments because it was not very much in the public eye and had not a great deal of business. There was a natural tendency to regard it, as the State Department had been regarded, as a spokesman for foreign interests. Its political prestige in the House was consequently rather low, in contrast with the always important Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. Though this condition has been radically altered by the great volume of foreign policy legislation of first-class and even supreme national significance which the Foreign Affairs Committee now has to handle legislatively, there is still a difficulty, through its sole leadership, in bringing together the other committees, whose interests also embrace major aspects of foreign policy, in the formulation of legislative policy on important bills.

The Herter Committee (Select Committee on Foreign Aid) was an effort to meet this problem, particularly when there was an opposition party in control of the House. A tendency toward select and special committees for study purposes may be natural. That conclusion seems to have been reached by Mr. George Galloway, whose remarkable work as the Chief of Staff for the Joint Committee on Legislative Reorganization had such great influence on the reorganization of Congress.

On the other hand, such study committees are far from achieving policy co-ordination or control. They help to prepare the way, but they do not make the final decisions. The Congress of the United States still remains without any very clear method of integrating the control of foreign policy in either house and certainly lacks any machinery for co-ordination in both houses, except in so far as party leadership may afford it.

The limits of a bipartisan foreign policy are becoming more apparent. On major policies affecting national security the lines may well hold. But on the extent of commitments and on very crucial issues, such as the policy of the United States

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toward China, the lines seem to be far less firm and may be expected at some time to give way. The military aid to China under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 was, in effect, forced on the Administration by the House.

The remarkable degree of support which the Administration was able to secure during the 80th Congress (controlled by the Republican Party) for foreign policy in its broad outlines has been due in a striking degree to the prestige and statesmanship of Senator Vandenberg in particular, and to only a smaller degree to some of his party associates such as Senator Lodge and Senator Bridges (then Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee). The same has been true of the role played in the House by Congressman Eaton, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and other stalwarts such as Congressman Vorys and Congressman Herter—even though the latter is actually not on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The attitude of most academic critics who suggest joint committees or joint sessions—for example, of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee—is just academic. There is not the remotest prospect that the small Senate Foreign Relations Committee will compromise its prestige or limit its questioning by any such arrangement, which would swamp its sessions by members of the House, who outnumber it by nearly three to one.

It is equally fatuous to complain about the irresponsibility of the bicameral system. Actually the Senate, under the conference committee method eliminates many very questionable measures that the House passes, secure in the knowledge that they will be eliminated in conference. Without adopting parliamentary responsibility, the American system seems to follow its own logic and yield legislative results better than could be expected, if one considers the many difficulties of structure. *It has at least the virtues of its defects, permitting through its debates and committee hearings an exploration of the issues of foreign policy in a far more effective manner than seems to be available to other democratic governments.* It perhaps pays the price for this more extensive legislative scrutiny by delay even at critical times, and by forcing on the Department of State the position of advocate for foreign governments, rather than the role performed by the Foreign Office in England. This may be the most serious aspect of minute congressional control of foreign policy: The psychological conditioning of the Department of

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State to a less responsible role in representing the United States to foreign countries and a tendency to take the easy line in negotiation through its long habit of advocate for foreign governments' points of view to a sceptical Congress.

Getting Congress and the President together is an old problem, never completely capable of solution under the system of separation of powers. Associating leading figures in Congress in the process of important negotiations helps. Closer liaison with leaders through presidential conferences helps. But so far no institutional pattern has developed, such as joint legislative-executive committees. Neither the Executive nor the Congress shows any enthusiasm—Congress because it is too much occupied with its own affairs (its constituency), and the President because he has too many cooks already for his broth. If any such development is to take place, it must be on the President's selection and initiative. He cannot be forced by Congress to put *their* choices inside his inner councils.

Montesquieu, in defending his conception of the separation of powers in the famous Eleventh Book of *The Spirit of the Laws*, concluded that stalemates would be prevented by the very necessity for action. The machinery for integrating and controlling foreign policy in the United States may seem, on this analysis, to be cumbersome, not always logical, and certainly one calculated to multiply the impact of special interests. The changes in the E.C.A. (1948) by the Foreign Assistance Act as amended in 1949 show the heavy hand of pressure groups, weighted by votes for farm interests, shipping and labour interests, press interests, *et al.*

But the striking fact is that so far the great policies of the Administration, involving the boldest and most radical changes in the history of the United States, have won sweeping support in Congress, possibly because that support had shown itself in the nation. Somehow the machinery works.

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By NINETTA S. JUCKER

Their finest hour, for the occupied peoples, came at the last, when all equivocations had been dropped, when the end was in sight but the means were still uncertain and the partisan struggle had entered its most passionate phase, a phase in which the religious motives of expiation and redemption were present, not wholly submerged by the more obvious secular aspirations towards liberty and political rehabilitation. In Italy during the last months of the occupation almost the entire population co-operated in aiding the partisans and succouring the many fugitives from German wrath. The truce between the various political parties engaged in the Resistance, the presence, side by side, of communists, socialists, liberals, and Christian Democrats, on the National Liberation Committees, the part played by the convents and the parish priests, and by the Vatican itself, in hiding the persecuted, combined to create an atmosphere of political *détente* and religious conciliation which seemed a promise of the peace to come. For the first time, in face of the horror of the persecutions, it was apparent how closely the Catholic concept of respect for the individual coincided with the principles of the Rights of Man, and the realisation seemed to many the foundation for the long delayed reconciliation between the Vatican and Italian liberalism. Speaking of this period later in the Constituent Assembly, the Action Party deputy, Piero Calamandrei, recalled how "at a certain moment in the years of our worst oppression, we realised that the only paper in which we could still find some trace of liberty, of our liberty, of the liberty common to all free men, was the *Osservatore Romano*". In 1944 one at least of the revolutionary postulates, fraternity, seemed to have been attained. The rest would follow on liberation.

As yet the accent is on liberty. It is presumed that the Church has learned from experience that religion has nothing to gain by compromising with the tyrant, but is best defended and fortified in a regime of liberty and respect for the human person. On their side, socialists, communists, and liberals renounce all vulgar anti-clericalism; but it is the lay school which has triumphed. The Action Party, under Parri, reaches

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its apotheosis. Mussolini himself, with the intuitive feeling for the spirit of the moment which had brought him successfully through so many self-contradictions, perceived that the National Liberation Committees which had arisen to combat him were in reality the natural successors to his epoch, and a few days before the end, in April 1945, he attempted to establish contact with them in order solemnly to transmit them his powers. On the surface the gesture appears mere desperate effrontery in the manner of the last convulsive improvisations of Napoleon at Fontainebleau. It acquires deeper significance, however, if we consider that the Republic of Salò, utterly cut off from responsible reality, represented in the fantasy of its protagonist a return to the road he might have followed had he kept to his original republican pre-Concordat positions, and that one, at least, of the leaders of the Liberation Committees had been with him at the start.

At the liberation of Rome the atmosphere of religious conciliation becomes fervid with emotional intensity. In the rush of popular enthusiasm to give thanks to the Pope for his protection of the city, red flags are seen in St. Peter's Square mingling with the white and yellow banners of the Papacy. The spectacular conversion to Catholicism of the chief Rabbi of Rome, in gratitude for the protection which the Church had offered to the persecuted Jews, intensifies the impression that the Vatican had joined issue on the side of liberty. Don Minzoni, the Catholic priest murdered by the fascists, is associated with Amendola, Gramsci, and Matteotti in the hagiarchy of anti-Fascist martyrs, and a square is named after him, adjoining the street dedicated to the Socialist Bruno Buozzi.

In such an atmosphere it was not difficult to convince, as many people were interested in convincing, the British and American occupying authorities that the Church was their natural ally and the bulwark of democracy in Italy. Cardinal Pacelli at the time of his election to the Papacy in 1939 was believed, both inside and outside Italy, to represent an anti-totalitarian trend, and there was considerable rejoicing among the enemies of fascism when the choice fell on him rather than on Cardinal Schuster who passed for a sympathiser with the regime. The encyclic *Summi Pontificatus* in which Pius XII soon after his accession condemned "statolatry" or "the conception which attributes unlimited authority to the State", and the broadcast Christmas message of 1942 couched in similar terms,

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appeared to afford corroborative evidence of Vatican hostility to the Fascist regime. A similar interpretation seems to have been put upon the correspondence between the Vatican and the German Government, which figures among the Nazi documents recently published in America by the State Department.

As far as Italy is concerned the situation of the Church under fascism and after the War has been brilliantly analysed by Professor A. C. Jemolo in the last chapters of his book, "Chiesa e Stato in Italia negli ultimi Cento Anni" (Einaudi, 1948). Professor Jemolo observes that it would not be difficult to build up a case supported by a mass of documentary evidence to prove that the Church did not, as it has been said, accept in silence the perverse and anti-Christian teachings of Fascism, but that at all times the true doctrine was taught and defended. But the value of such evidence can scarcely be appraised unless it be compared both in bulk and intensity with the anti-liberal polemics of the previous generation and the anti-communist dialectics of this. With regard to fascism only certain doctrines have been attacked by the Church, never the movement as a whole or the persons responsible.

The Allies had naturally no opportunities for weighing evidence and the notion of the Church as the defender of liberty (with reservations only as to one or two Cardinals, particularly in France) has penetrated to England, and, no doubt, even more efficaciously to the United States, encouraged by the films and the literature of the Resistance in which the almost traditional figure of the partisan priest is to be found in works both of Italian and Anglo-Saxon fabrication. The excellent work of post-war social salvage undertaken by the religious orders or on the personal initiative of individual priests, has seemed to confirm this idea. The redemption of the shoe-shine boys, the various "Villaggi del Fanciullo", democratically organised communities of homeless boys, are but a few of many instances. Almost every initiative of the communist and socialist parties in this respect has either been capped or forestalled by a similar Catholic institution.

The socialistic character of the Christian Democrat Party at this period, more especially in the northern industrial areas where the swing to the left was particularly marked, and the conciliatory attitude of the high Ecclesiastical authorities, are admirably illustrated by Cardinal Salotti in an article published in the Christian Democrat paper *Il Popolo* on August 17, 1944.

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"The chief social preoccupation of the Christian Democrat Party," writes the Cardinal, "is the defence of the rights of the poor, of those who possess little or nothing, of the exploited classes, who rally to our banner because they see in it the symbol of the struggle against all economic oppressions whether on the part of individuals, of groups, or of the State."

Catholic interest in the trades union movement and social insurance goes back in France and Belgium, and later in Italy, to the beginnings of industrialisation, and what might be called the counter social revolution has kept pace with, at times even anticipating the conquests of socialist reform. In Italy moreover, the corporative experiment of the Fascist period was no innovation of Mussolini's but an adaptation of the principle of the Catholic White Leagues. There was nothing, therefore, unprecedented or inherently self-contradictory in the reforming attitude assumed by the Church, and which to a certain extent convinced even the socialist and liberal leaders, anxious to consolidate the political and social emancipation of the Italians without probing too deeply beneath the surface. Of the traditionally anti-clerical Parties the communists alone, no doubt on account of the similarity of their methods to those of the Church, did not under-estimate the importance of the religious question. Togliatti himself, in the celebrated speech of "the outstretched hand" on July 9, 1944, invited the Catholic masses to co-operate in a programme of united action: "I repeat to-day in Rome, the capital of the Catholic world, this declaration: that we respect the Catholic faith, the traditional faith of the majority of the Italian people; we respect this faith and only ask the representatives and the pastors of the Catholic faith to respect in turn our faith, our symbols and our banners."

To suppose that the Vatican took sides for liberty, or either openly or covertly favoured the Allies in the struggle against the dictators, is profoundly to misunderstand its attitude to the business of Caesar. The issue today is obscured by the fact that the Catholic campaign against Communism coincides with the democratic defence of the liberal idea, but the coincidence is fortuitous, or rather the attitude of the Church in this matter is negative and not positive. Not for any abstract love of liberty, not even for the rights and dignity of the human person to whom a modicum of corporal freedom is necessary for the choice between good and evil, and who must never be the means to any end but his own salvation; not for these

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things does the Church oppose communism, but rather for the old, old reason that she can never tolerate the conception of the State "as an absolute and supreme entity exempt from criticism and control". The issue is essentially juridical, not ethical. Not Habeas Corpus, but a quite different principle is at stake, for we are back to the age-old controversy of the relationship of Church and State, a controversy which from time to time coincides with and runs temporarily parallel to the even older argument between the individual and the state. It was on account of the similarity between the fascist and the communist conception of the state that the Church turned at the last against Fascism in the various denunciations of "statolatry". The negative character of the Papal attitude appears clearly in the letter which the present Pope, then Secretary of State to the Vatican, addressed to the German ambassador to the Holy See, on April 30, 1937 (published by the State Department): "The Holy Father believes it his duty for the dignity and impartiality of the Supreme Pontificate, while he condemns the bolshevist system founded on deception and revolutions, not to remain blind to the errors which are insinuating themselves into other political movements and ideologies. The fact that these errors are to be found in the front line of the defensive policies of anti-bolshevist orientation does not constitute a justification for tolerating or ignoring them."

In the traditional view of the Vatican liberalism is the original vice, "the tree which has matured this poisonous fruit". Liberalism is the father of socialism of which bolshevism is the ultimate heir; thus Pius XI warns the faithful against the insidious attractions of "educative socialism". *Civiltà Cattolica*, the most authoritative Catholic review, rejoices in 1923 on the anniversary of the March on Rome, in "the lie given to the false ideologies and the methods of the old liberalism from which pullulate the new anti-clerical socialism, down to communism and the most tyrannical bolshevism". Even the faults of fascism, the violence and brutality of the early period, are attributed to the formation of its intellectual exponents in the anti-clerical liberal-socialist schools. In 1925, at the time of the anti-clerical outrages, *Civiltà Cattolica* makes this point, but at the same time upholds fascism as the "only government in a position to promote the public good and ward off at least the greater evil."

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The Church's fundamental antagonism to the liberal idea goes much deeper than the historic experiences of anti-clerical persecutions under the impulse of the French Revolution or the Italian Risorgimento. Today the original accusations of atheism and materialism, the free-thinking of our fathers and grandfathers of Darwinian inspiration, are generally allowed by the Church to be outworn (in 1944 she had even admitted this as regards communism), but liberalism presupposes a *natural* morality and transposes the ideal equality of humanity from the heavenly to the terrestrial sphere, whereas on earth, according to the Church, all is disparity; disparity which necessitates and justifies the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the principal of obedience, as elements of order. Liberalism, to the Church, is an arrogant and heretical doctrine which ignores the dogma of original sin, a dogma fundamental to the Catholic conception of the origin and purpose of the State. For this reason any apparent coincidence between the humanitarian aspects of Catholicism and liberalism can never be more than skin deep.

In theory, however, the Church has no preference as between despotic and constitutional government. All human institutions are fallible and the choice of the form of government is not the Church's province. The modern standpoint of the Vatican in this matter is based on the encyclic *Diuturnum* of Leo XIII which establishes that "saving always justice" the Church "does not forbid the nations to procure themselves that form of government which best suits their character and the institutions and customs of their fathers". There was none the less an inherent preference for authoritarian paternalist rule. All the more marked since early in the nineteenth century the Church perceived a nexus between the "modernised state" and Protestant reform. Outside Italy, however, the Papacy has upon occasion interpreted its standpoint in favour of democracy, as when Leo XIII in 1891 abjured the Catholic legitimists in France loyally to accept the Republic.

In Italy the Church's attitude is naturally conditioned by the necessarily anti-clerical character of the Risorgimento. The struggle for unification, during the course of which Cavour, Garibaldi, Victor Emmanuel II, and all the other principal royal persons concerned, were excommunicated, represented the literal fighting out of the old conflict between Church and state, ending in the apparent victory of the state. The con-

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stitution of Piedmont, Charles Albert's Statute of 1848, which at the unification was taken to cover the whole of the kingdom of Italy, carries as its first clause: "The Roman Catholic Apostolic religion is the sole religion of the state." According to the jurists this meant that the laws of the state were to be based not on general moral principles common to all the citizens, but on those principles only which are affirmed by the Catholic Church. In reality, however, the spirit of the times was so directly contrary to this interpretation of the constitution that, although the Statute remained unaltered, a mass of laws and dispositions gradually accumulated in contradiction to this article, and in fact, if not in theory, a regime of separatism between Church and state obtained in Italy very similar to that existing and acknowledged in France. Not only had the Church lost ground, but the Roman Question, the Pope's voluntary confinement in the Vatican, remained an open sore. Crude anti-clerical propaganda from the left, and unnecessary humiliations inflicted on the clergy by the early liberal legislation further embittered the Church's attitude towards democracy in Italy.

The geographical position of the Vatican, the protracted existence of the Papal States, and the lack of homogeneous national tradition in the Italian peninsula, all contributed to make this country the nursery from which the Church could choose the highly specialised elements it required for its directive functions. The Curia Romana which represents the higher ecclesiastical civil service, has long been composed almost entirely of Italian priests who have built up a tradition so powerful that no foreign element can disturb it. The conservation in Italy of the peculiar type of Catholic family from which the Church recruits this caste is a matter of vital importance to the Vatican. The Curia Romana is the organic centre of the Church which cannot live detached from its material surroundings. The city of Rome is choreographically indispensable to the Pope, and the Italian nation "recommended by nature to the particular affection of our heart". For this reason the Church can never willingly relax towards Italian Catholics the severity of her discipline, nor tolerate in Italy such lenience as she has allowed in countries of equal, or possibly more fervent, faith. The establishment here, with the introduction of democratic institutions, of what practically amounted to a lay state, was never accepted without reservations, and though

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obliged for the time being to bow to the storm, the Church never lost sight of the necessity of recovering, when opportunity occurred, the ground she had lost. Fascism with its "declared intention of restoring order, discipline, and the hierarchical concept of authority", appeared as the natural means to this end. Well aware of the anti-clerical origin of its leaders, the Church knew also that their intention "of restoring to honour the spiritual values and particularly the most important of these, the religious elevation and Catholic inspiration of the nation" was mere political opportunism, but she has always believed (and history has yet to prove that she is mistaken) in the ultimate efficacy of imposing outward forms.

The part played by the Vatican in supporting Fascism at the start has not been sufficiently observed either in Italy or abroad, and Professor Jemolo has the merit of recalling it to our attention, though a good deal of his evidence, like that of the psychiatrist in the law court, must be accepted on the grounds of probability, since it is not susceptible of absolute proof. Between the years 1923 and 1926 the Church in a hundred subtle ways withdrew its support from the Popular Party, the Christian Democrats of the day, who represented the last stand to save parliamentary government under Mussolini. Had Don Sturzo and those who stood with him received the support of the Church whose principles they were defending, instead of being discredited and ridiculed in the Catholic press, they might perhaps have succeeded in stemming the tide, and would at least have obliged Italian Catholicism sincerely to face the issue. The fundamental contradiction between the precepts of Christianity and fascist doctrine and methods is a problem which the Italian clergy never at any time appear to have put to their flocks. Did they fail to perceive it? From the very beginning *Civiltà Cattolica* had decided to forgive fascism the "errors" of some of its followers "which must not cause us to forget the efforts which are being made higher up to give a new direction to the relations between the civil power and the ecclesiastical authorities". "Better to live one day as a lion than a hundred years as a sheep" was none the less a curious maxim for the defender of a faith which has chosen the lamb as one of its most significant symbols. In 1931 Pius XI, in an encyclic, complains that the fascist method of education is "bringing up our youth to hatred violence, and irreverence". This is the nearest we are to get, either during

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the fascist period or afterwards, to recognition of the antithesis ; reproof, but never unequivocal denunciation. Some Catholics believe that at the last Pius XI realised that he had erred in his judgment of fascism and its men, and that on February 11, 1939, on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Lateran Pact, he had meant to make an important statement admitting his mistake in what was a purely temporal matter not covered by his infallibility. He died, however, on February 10.

The alliance between the Church and fascism may have disgusted the more spiritual among the faithful and alienated them from their respectful devotion to the hierarchy, but the Lateran Treaty and the Concordat, which were the tangible fruits of this union, represented politically a victory of incalculable significance for the Church, fully justifying in its consequences the importance which the Curia Romana attaches to juridical principles and forms. The two treaties, the one resolving the Roman Question with the erection of the Vatican state, the other defining the relations between the Church and the Italian state, represented an enormous stride towards the recovery of the positions which the Church had been obliged to cede during the previous century, and, even more important, a stepping stone from which she has since proceeded to the reconquest of further points of vantage.

In the Lateran Treaty the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion is once again proclaimed the sole religion of the state, which now, however, undertakes to revise its legislation in all matters of interest to the Church, with a view to reforming and integrating it in conformity with the directives contained in the Treaty and the Concordat. The important point is that henceforth wherever there is a possibility of alternative between the lay or liberal interpretation of the law and the enforcement of the clerical point of view, it is the latter which, in most cases, will prevail. Where the law is in doubt the magistracy will be on the side of the Church ; in administrative questions of taxation, precedents will be established of exemptions and privileges in favour of ecclesiastical interests ; in local government the recommendations of the clergy will carry weight, and they themselves will be found in municipal office from which under liberal and socialist legislation they had long been excluded. The law respecting the tolerated cults will be interpreted restrictively (the fascists had also noted the connexion between Protestantism and liberal thought, and kept a sharp

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eye on the Valdesian Church whose followers contributed conspicuously to the Fronde). Above all it is in the dispositions concerning marriage, annulment, etc., and in the organisation of the schools where compulsory religious instruction is restored, that the Church sets out to extend and consolidate her influence, always with the purpose of eventually making Italy effectively and not merely juridically a confessional State.

The reconquest of Italy by the process of reversing the moral values of the Risorgimento appears to have been accompanied by an accentuation of Jesuit influence in the directive counsels of the Church. Gabriele Pepe, who has been severely attacked both by the Government and the Vatican for his book, "La protesta laica" (Manduria, 1949) sees a great obstacle to political and social reform in this return to power of the Company of Jesus, which depends for its wealth and privileges on the maintenance of the old economic order, and whose interests are "for an Italy less than fascist, an Italy in which the liberal tradition is shattered and the wings of social progress broken".

It was not at first apparent that the fall of fascism had come too late to save the Risorgimento. In the period between the liberation and the election of the Constituent Assembly, the political exponents of Catholicism appeared moderate, liberal, and conciliatory. The true division of forces in the country was as yet unknown. The left was believed to be strong, but it was not realised that the spiritual force which had upheld the Resistance and which found its most articulate expression in the Action Party, would be incapable of animating any considerable section of the population in normal political conditions. Municipal, constituent, and parliamentary elections have since shown that the stern message of the Risorgimento is incomprehensible to the masses whose intellectual resistance is sapped by propaganda. The voting also showed that the Christian Democrat Party stood to gain an enormous electoral advantage by extending a protective wing over the extreme right, monarchist and fascist. And so the Italian Republic entered on its self-apologetic existence with an infinitesimal majority and immediately proceeded to efface itself still further by adopting its equivocal constitution, a constitution which has swallowed whole the Lateran Treaty and the Concordat (including the prayers for the royal family and the recognition of the fascist youth organisations), and bids fair to make them the guiding principle of Italian legislation.

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The incorporation of the Lateran Treaties in the constitution—there was never any question of denouncing them and making new terms with the Pope—appears to have been a test case set for the Christian Democrat Party by the Vatican (between 1945 and 1947 there had been a notable stiffening in the social policies of the Party). In his final peroration de Gaspari urged the Assembly to accept the integration on the grounds that the canonization of the Concordat would secure the loyalty of the higher clergy to the Republic. One wonders if they would otherwise have supported a monarchist attempt to submit the constitution to a referendum. Article 7 was eventually passed by 350 votes to 149. The most ardent support of total integration came from the ex-fascist press and such of its exponents as have managed to get themselves elected to the Assembly. There is some warm but not scorching protest from the Action Party and those ideologically nearest to it, but the speakers are inhibited by the fear of appearing anti-religious and intransigent, and their protest assumes the form of personal affirmations of conscientious objection rather than an appeal to the nation to save the Risorgimento. There is also a faint and somewhat toothless demur from the old (now aged) liberal school. Nenni supposes that the question can scarcely interest a true proletarian socialist, but at most might excite the "bourgeois of Voltairian formation". None the less he votes against it. The great surprise is the "betrayal" of the communists who vote for it *en bloc*. Italy is still wondering why. Was this a piece of super-Machiavellian finesse or simple miscalculation?

In the course of the debates there was much talk and promise of revising the more illiberal clauses, petty infringements of the Rights of Man which were to be removed as a matter of course. Two years ago it seemed vaguely scandalous that an apostate priest could not be given public employment by the state. Nothing more has been heard of these things. With the passing of the constitution the Vatican ceased all commerce with the left. The various literary and other feelers which had been put out in the directions of communism and socialism were withdrawn, and the instruments of these advances disavowed. The Christian Democrat Party is embarrassed by the change of directive but does its best to follow suit, compensating for the losses on the left by the extension of its "pacifying" action towards the two disgruntled parties on the right. Mean-

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while the two most important practical results of the passing of article 7 are the end to all hope of civil divorce being admitted in Italian legislation and the quashing of any return to secular education. Juridically it could mean a good deal more. "Modifications of the Treaties, accepted by both parties, do not require the revision of the constitution", could be interpreted as meaning that no modifications will be valid unless bilaterally accepted, which would make the Vatican virtually the arbiter of Italian legislation. Whatever interpretation is put upon this clause in practice, it is certain that the Italian state has accepted an equivocal position and that the Vatican has achieved in Italy advantages such as it has neither enjoyed nor claimed in any modern state hitherto.

Here is Progress

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POLITICAL RIGHTS OF CIVIL SERVANTS

By W. H. MORRIS JONES

It was unfortunate that the publication at the end of June of the Report of the Committee on the Political Activities of Civil Servants (Cmd. 7718) should have been somewhat overshadowed by the appearance at about the same time of the reports of the Royal Commissions on Population and the Press. The Report has not, of course, been neglected by the civil service associations, but there have been few signs of interest and expressions of opinion by the public. Yet to treat the subject as a purely domestic one to be settled between the Official and Staff Sides of the National Whitley Council is to overlook the outstanding constitutional and political issues involved.

These issues are as delicate and difficult as they are important and inescapable but they can perhaps be at least stated in simple terms: how is the right of the civil servant to take part along with his fellow-citizens in political activity to be balanced against the right of the citizen body as a whole to receive honest and impartial service from its administrators?

The problem, that is to say, is one of discovering a just balance. In that respect, of course, it is no different in kind from most other moral and political problems, certainly no different from other problems concerned with rights. Even those rights which are most firmly established in Western democracies remain in some measure conditional. My right to free speech is by the law of libel balanced against the right of my neighbour not to have his reputation damaged. The right to take part in political activity has only within the last generation been extended to all and even so remains restricted in some directions, one of the most significant being the particular case we are now considering. The distinction between states based on a political theory which indicates its respect for the individual by acknowledging his rights and states which submerge the person of the individual in that of the whole is important, but even in the former it is admitted that no individual right can be rightly claimed or recognised without regards for its effects on others.

If the general problem of rights is seen in this special way

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in liberal democracies, it is no less true that the particular right to take part in political activity has a peculiar significance for such states. Indeed, it may not be too much to say of states that it is by the way in which they regard this right that ye shall know them. A state which denies to Jews or reactionaries or paupers the right to have some voice in determining how they are to be governed has a difficult task to justify any claim to be democratic. It does not follow with any certainty from this that there rests upon those to whom the right is given a duty to exercise it. It is true that if we believe autocratic forms of rule to be dangerous, we have a duty to see that our democracy does not become an autocracy by default. Even so, to assert a duty to be 'politically active' appears to assume that the criteria of the city-state apply to our vast nation-units; but what may be natural and good among hundreds may not be so among millions. Man finds himself a political animal in that he is a citizen without willing to be so, but he does not have to be a politically active animal. Totalitarian parties seem to err in both directions: they deny the right to political activity to some and impose it as a duty on others. Liberal democracy tries to confer it on all and impose it on none.

The right to take part in political activity is, however, no less important for being only a right and not a duty. Not every man requires the right in order fully to develop and exercise his personality but there is no way of determining which man may require it and therefore no just basis for discrimination on grounds of needs. Not only is it impossible for a state which denies the right to know how far it is hampering the development of some of its members; it will also be ignorant of the loss it is inflicting on itself. The aim of democracy must be to make the unavoidable business of government as much like a conversation and as little like a lecture as possible. To that end it is desirable that no topics should be banned and no would-be speakers silenced.

This is the context in which the political activity of civil servants has to be considered. No special problem arises in totalitarian states; civil servants, so far from being discouraged from political activity, will tend to gain their places by virtue of political activity of the 'right' kind. What is required is not political neutrality but political reliability. One of Hitler's first Acts sought to secure that civil servants should be "fully identified with the State of the National Revolution"—a

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sentiment with which Mussolini, insisting on "good political conduct" among civil servants, must have found himself in complete accord. Nor, on this point at least, would Stalin's policy be very different.

The problem is not universal even among the democracies. The setting in the United States in particular has been quite different. The Civil Service Law of 1883 illustrates the attempt to move from reliability to neutrality: "no person in government employ is for that reason under any obligation to contribute to political funds or to assume political duties and he shall not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so". The emphasis is on the protection of the civil servant from the pressure of party. The observance of the law has been by no means general, especially at State and local government levels. The 'assessment' system has effectively ensured that about 2% of many a pay-packet went into the party funds and the obligation to assist in "getting out the vote" has been real and somewhat oppressive. Employees have found it safer to please the politicians than to insist on their legal rights to remain neutral. In 1907 the Civil Service Commission formulated the rule that "all persons in the competitive classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to express privately their opinions, shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns." This rule, though it did not, of course, apply to the non-competitive posts which remained under party control, was regarded by employees as a step towards freedom from party domination rather than as a move to curtail their political rights. Only in recent times has the issue taken what for us in Britain is the more familiar form of securing a balance between individual rights and administrative neutrality. The American public servant has been too preoccupied with escaping from an imposed obligation to take part in the 'right' kind of political activity to be able to concentrate on insisting on the right to take part in political activity of his own choice.

The difference between the United States and ourselves on this matter is, however, not one of kind but rather one of time. Having effectively disposed of political and personal patronage by the third quarter of the last century, we have been more consistently and clearly confronted with the conflict between the needs of neutrality and the citizen rights of the administrator. The question was put very well by the

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MacDonnell Commission in its report of 1914 (Cmd. 7338): "is it necessary or desirable in the public interest to place any restriction on the exercise of full rights of citizenship by citizens who are members of the civil service? Does any conflict arise between the desires and interests of the civil servant regarded as citizen and the duty of the civil servant regarded as such, and if so, to what degree should either claim prevail over the other?"

It is as well to follow the pattern of the Report by first stating briefly the present position. Parliamentary candidature is regulated partly by a series of enactments reflecting "Parliament's consistent policy to prevent members of the House of Commons from holding posts of the kind usually filled by civil servants", partly by disciplinary regulations of the Civil Service itself. An Order in Council of 1910 made applicable to all civil establishments the rule that a civil servant seeking a seat in the House of Commons should resign his office as soon as he issued an address to the electors or in any other way announced himself as a candidate. The Blanesburgh Report supported this restriction with the proviso that industrial employees in the Service Departments should be exempted, and the Servants of the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order, 1927, gave effect to this recommendation. The only other relaxations of the rule were those temporarily applied during the war and in particular during the 1945 election.

The position with regard to other forms of political activity is by no means so clearly defined. The only all-Service rule is "a general exhortation of long standing" to the effect that "civil servants are expected to maintain at all times a reserve in political matters and not put themselves forward prominently on one side or the other." This has been incorporated, sometimes with slight modifications, in Departmental Rules. In addition, in 1928 the Treasury instructed Departments to draw the attention of their staffs to the following extract from the report of a Board of Enquiry which investigated allegations about the conduct of certain civil servants: "There are spheres of activity legitimately open to the ordinary citizen in which the civil servant can play no part or only a limited part. He is not to indulge in political or party controversy, lest by so doing he should appear no longer the disinterested adviser of Ministers or able impartially to execute their policy. He is bound to maintain a proper reticence in discussing public

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affairs, and more particularly those with which his own Department is concerned." Finally, in 1946 this extract was included in the Handbook for the New Civil Servant which also states that "a civil servant must not take any part in political controversy." None of these restrictions apply to industrial civil servants. The extent to which they are known among non-industrials varies between Departments and so also does the way in which they are interpreted. A similar variation as between Departments is found on the particular question of participation in local government work. The Blanesburgh Committee was content to leave this matter to be determined by Department Heads and merely pointed out that it would be "unthinkable" for staff of the Ministry of Health to sit on local councils.

The present position is thus one of some restriction for the non-industrials and some freedom for the industrials. The Staff Side of the Whitley Council have long been dissatisfied with this position and it was as a result of their representations that the Chancellor, recognising "that there is a case for considering whether the present rules require modification", set up the Masterman Committee. Their Report, while recommending a relaxation in certain directions, in effect suggests by its attempt to define more closely what has hitherto been vague a tightening in others. Certainly the response of the Staff Side to the Government's initial acceptance of the Report has been sufficiently emphatic and critical to induce the Government to "look at the position again". The Chancellor's view that the subject was "difficult and controversial" has been endorsed by the Report and subsequent developments.

The two opposed viewpoints put to the Committee have been clearly summarised in the Report. The Staff Side took their stand on the importance of political rights both to the individual and to the political life of the country. On this ground they made three proposals. First, any civil servant should be permitted to stand as a candidate for election to Parliament and should be given facilities to nurse his constituency and contest the election. A successful candidate should be given for the period of his membership of the House of Commons special leave "without pay or reckonability for pension, but counting for increment and not to be regarded as breaking continuity of service." Second, political activities in general should be governed not by rules but solely by a convention

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"under which civil servants were expected to behave with discretion" and including an "understanding that an officer who by grossly negligent or wilful action or comment on a matter of party politics creates an intolerable position for his Department will be liable to disciplinary action." Third, any civil servant should be permitted to stand for election to a local council and, once elected, given facilities for the performance of his council duties. It should be "open to the Head of the Department to raise objection in certain exceptional circumstances where there was a special relationship between the officer's work and local authorities" and it would in any case "be expected that a civil servant would observe 'a proper reticence' over matters with which his Department was concerned."

Evidence from senior officials and from some other witnesses displayed much more concern with "the risk of creating a political Service." They held that "the overriding consideration must be to maintain both the existing reputation of the Service for political neutrality and public confidence in its freedom from all possibility of bias" and stated their belief that acceptance of the Staff Side proposals would destroy public and Ministerial confidence in the civil servants' impartiality and loyalty with "disastrous results to the Service and to the country."

The Committee begin their own arguments by stating the two principles between which they have tried to find a balance:—
 "(i) In a democratic society it is desirable for all citizens to have a voice in the affairs of the State and for as many as possible to play an active part in public life. (ii) The public interest demands the maintenance of political impartiality in the Civil Service and of confidence in that impartiality as an essential part of the structure of the Government in this country." But it is clear from an examination of the Report that they have set about the task of balancing these principles with almost the same sympathy for the latter which characterised the evidence of the senior officials. When the U.S. Supreme Court was recently called upon (in *United Public Workers v. Mitchell*, 1946) to pronounce on the constitutionality of the section of the Hatch Act which prohibits federal employees from taking an "active part in political management or political campaigns", it found itself placed in a not dissimilar position. Should it stand by the Constitution's recital of rights and refuse to consider any limitations except in clear cases of urgent public interest or

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should it be sensitive to the needs of Government and the State and allow the exercise of individual rights only when authority is satisfied that no public interest is endangered? Although the American setting is different, the divergence of opinion revealed is interesting. The majority decided (partly, no doubt, as a result of its present desire not to be considered 'obstructive') that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. It had clearly been judged desirable by Congress and the President, and since it did not "pass beyond the general existing conception of government power" the Court would not interfere. Mr. Justice Black dissented vigorously: "Laws which restrict the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment should be narrowly drawn to meet the evil aimed at and to affect only the minimum number necessary to prevent a grave and imminent danger to the public. I think the Constitution prohibits legislation which prevents millions of citizens from contributing their arguments, complaints and suggestions to the political debates which are the essence of our democracy." Mr. Justice Douglas also dissented in part from the Court decision. He felt that the problem ought to be solved by making a distinction between "the core of the civil service" occupying positions where "partisanship might colour or corrupt the processes of administration" and the rest. He advocated, in other words, that a line of demarcation be drawn above which political activity should be prohibited but below which it should be allowed.

The Masterman Committee can be said to have taken the last of these views. In doing so, it has followed the precedents of the MacDonnell Commission, 1914 and the Blanesburgh Committee, 1925. Any critical examination of its arguments and recommendations must consider whether such a line can and should be drawn and if so at what level this should be done.

Whether a line should be drawn depends firstly on whether there is a real difference between the position of the various grades of civil servants. At the extremes, there can be little doubt on this point. Industrial civil servants "do not differ from the industrial population of the country as a whole" and it would be "somewhat artificial to consider this large body of workers as forming part of the Civil Service in the sense in which the term is commonly accepted." Few people will quarrel with the Committee for completing the process begun by the tentative hints of the MacDonnell Commission

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and continued by the hesitant Blanesburgh Committee; they have recommended that all industrial employees (not those under the Service Departments only, as at present) be free to stand for Parliament without resigning and that reinstatement should be a right where absence of not more than five years has followed a period of ten years' service and should be sympathetically considered in other cases.

At the other end of the scale, there is perhaps equal agreement that a political Administrative Class is most undesirable. What is not beyond debate is whether it is necessary to legislate to secure this. The Staff Side appear to have considered that specific rules were unnecessary for any grades and the Association of First Division Civil Servants seem to have agreed with this view: "they wished the general position to remain much as at present so far as the Administrative Class is concerned, but they did not think that any regulations were required to ensure this result." This seems a reasonable view. The highest civil service already has a sufficiently strong sense of its special 'calling' and a sufficiently developed pride in its established loyalty to be able to dispense with rules designed to secure these qualities. Both by temperament and understanding as well as by training the Administrative Class is, in a phrase of Mr. Justice Douglas, "politically sterilised".

The difficulty, of course, arises at the intermediate levels. If there are grades whose political neutrality is vital but whose sense of responsibility is not sufficiently marked to be relied upon to secure this neutrality, then there is a case for imposing rules on such grades. This is what the Masterman Committee has done. In doing so, it has stressed as the main reason for its recommendation the importance it attached to political neutrality; at the same time, it has been courageous enough to point out the other consideration which is implicit in the recommendation, namely, that it does not feel able to place its trust in the civil servants' discretion. It argues that to trust the force of tradition is to overlook the fact that the tradition is the result of strictly enforced rules and that it would change if there were any modification of the position. Further, any relaxation of the rules "would be a shock to public opinion" and "a few bad cases would reduce public confidence in the Service as a whole." Finally, the Committee believe that to take disciplinary action against those who used their discretion unwisely would be difficult and unfair.

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These are certainly powerful arguments. Yet it is open to question whether the Committee have not been too cautious. They were clearly influenced by the evidence of the "senior officials" who have not been noted in the past for an especially liberal approach to civil service rights of other kinds (such as that of association) which have come in time to be recognised without the disastrous consequences once predicted. They have apparently been impressed by "the experience of those countries which are suffering from the consequences of taking a course different from our own"—without reckoning that the well-established tradition and *esprit de corps* of our own civil service are so far without parallel as to make it dangerous to draw lessons from foreign experience. Again, although they have, as already mentioned, stated the two principles which have to be balanced, they have placed a bias on political neutrality at the expense of political rights so that the latter are closely restricted in order that what is admittedly a small risk of injury to the former should be avoided. They have even sought to minimise the value of the right to express political ideas in public—a right "in practice relinquished by many"—by contrasting it with the "universally exercised" right to vote. Above all, they have paid surprisingly little attention to the probability that self-discipline would heighten rather than lower the sense of responsibility and discretion.

If, however, restrictions are to be imposed on some civil servants but not on others, where is the line to be drawn? It is to this difficult question that the Committee devoted much of its attention. Their final recommendation is that the only grades which can be placed "below the line" (i.e., to whom restrictions will not apply) are the Minor and Manipulative—subject to certain exceptions, notably Post Office Supervisory Manipulatives. This is the second point at which disagreement with the Committee's views might be expressed. On what grounds are those in the Clerical and Typing Grades to be treated in the same way as those in the Administrative? The Committee believe, firstly, that the effect on the service of attempting to make any distinction between any of the grades from Administrative to Typing would be harmful. It is pointed out that all grades work together "as part of a single organisation" and that any distinctions would be artificial because duties are less differentiated than in the past and "an avenue of promotion" runs through all grades. Secondly, the junior

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grades do not come into contact with the Minister but they do have dealings with the public and "public opinion is a sensitive barometer reacting sharply to any breaches of the traditional impartiality of the Civil Service." This is all the more important since the decisions taken—often by junior officials in regional and local offices—involve the exercise of a large measure of discretion in matters affecting the daily lives of every citizen.

If all grades from Administrative to Typing have to be placed "above the line", exactly what limitations are to be imposed on their political activities? The Report makes recommendations under five headings. First, the existing prohibition on Parliamentary candidature should remain. Second, the existing code covering other political activity of a party character in the national field should be made more explicit by detailing some of the forms of activity (e.g., holding party office, public speaking, publication and canvassing) which are not allowed. Third, public affairs of a non-party character (such as participation in outside conferences of professional and other similar bodies) should be treated differently; public comment by a civil servant on these matters should be free—provided that his own Department is not concerned and that he observes "a becoming moderation". (This is a welcome check to the very restrictive attitude expressed by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in an answer in the House on the 27th March, 1947: "I should regard as improper any public criticism by a civil servant of a policy for which a Minister whether of his own or some other Department is responsible.") Fourth, there should be no new prohibition relating to speeches on political matters at staff association conferences but "it should be understood that disciplinary action may follow if a delegate by his speeches creates a situation embarrassing for the Service." (This seems in conflict with the Committee's earlier argument that to take disciplinary action against those who used their discretion unwisely would be difficult and unfair.) Fifth, participation in local government should continue to be permitted at the discretion of the Head of the Department but those Departments which intend to grant the permission should work out a uniform policy and should insist on the acceptance by the civil servant concerned of a rule binding him to confine himself to local issues and to act with moderation. Even so, the Committee wish, in view of the increasing 'party' nature

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of local politics, that this policy be reviewed after five years. Finally, the Committee recommend that these rules be made generally known to all entrants to the Service.

It is clear that the outcome of the Committee's discussions is to reinforce and make explicit the "political sterilisation" of those grades placed "above the line". The Committee has obviously been afraid of the slippery slopes that lead to a political civil service and a spoils system; has it been equally afraid of the other slopes that lead to the justification of every curtailment of rights in the name of the "common good" or the "public interest"? Is there no way by which a political civil service can be avoided without the undesirable imposition of restrictions?

The Report correctly points out that the period between the two wars has seen an extension of administrative action in three senses: it has now a much closer association with the life of every citizen, it includes legislative and quasi-judicial functions and it involves considerable discretionary power in the hands of local officials of the central departments. All these point to the increased importance of political neutrality. At the same time, other changes—not all clearly noted by the Committee—have taken place which have an opposite bearing. In the first place, the number of persons concerned has increased considerably and is unlikely to decrease; those placed "above the line" by the Committee's recommendations number nearly half a million. Moreover, nationalisation brings new groups into public employment. This question was outside the scope of the Committee but it is clear that it will become somewhat anomalous if the civil service proper is carefully regulated as regards political activity while other public employees engaged on not dissimilar tasks observe a different code. This extension of public employment also renders less convincing than ever the argument that the denial of political rights is not serious because after all there is no compulsion on anyone to join the service. Secondly, the period has witnessed the growth and consolidation of civil service unionism and the development of the Whitley machinery. It is to be hoped that, in common with the rest of the trade union movement, civil service associations will assume greater responsibilities and display an interest in and concern for professional standards and improved methods of work. This trend will not be encouraged except by placing some trust in these associations. It is also difficult

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to see any more certain way by which these standards—of which political discretion is one of the most important—can be protected and improved.

It is unlikely that the last word on this subject has been said by the Masterman Committee. More important than the immediate hostile reception given to the Report by the Staff Side is the long-term difficulty that no solution to this thorny problem of "second-class citizenship" is likely to be attained except by means of "a law which we prescribe to ourselves"—that is, by a convention which the civil servants help to formulate and which they co-operate in enforcing where necessary. It is unfortunate that the Masterman Committee should have moved away from this goal instead of towards it.

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The *Comité Français des Sciences historiques* has published a volume of addresses and papers under the title *Actes du Congrès historique du Centenaire de la Révolution de 1848* (Presses Universitaires de France) which illustrates the European significance of the Revolution of 1848. Labrousse opens the work with a brilliant and suggestive comparative analysis of the economic, social, and political tendencies of the three revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848. This short paper offers to those who have not yet studied the same author's *La Crise de l'Économie française à la fin de l'Ancien Régime et au début de la Révolution* (Presses Universitaires) a fine introduction to the method of this school of French economic historians. Pierre Renouvin discusses with his accustomed ease and mastery *L'Idée des États-Unis d'Europe pendant la crise de 1848*, a subject which he has amplified in his admirable Zaharoff Lecture for 1949 which he gave in Oxford (*L'Idée de Fédération Européenne dans la Pensée politique du XIXe Siècle*, OUP, 1949). Paul Vaucher contributes an address on 1848 *en Angleterre*. The Editor of Élie Halévy remains faithful to his great master's vocation in explaining our strange insularity to France. Naturally not all the contributions to this volume are on the same level. Of Henri Sée's *Histoire économique de la France* (Armand Colin) the first volume is now available again. It treats French economic history from the Middle Ages to the *Ancien Régime*. This is an indispensable text-book. In contrast to the earlier German edition in Brodnitz's *Handbuch der Wirtschaftsgeschichte* its bibliographies are comprehensive and up to date. The same publishers have given us a posthumous work by Marc Bloch: *Apologie pour l'Histoire ou Métier d'Historien*. In these hundred pages a great historian reflects on the methods and problems of his calling. I do not think that I have read a more important book on the structure of history since Burckhardt's *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*. What a loss for France and to the social sciences that Bloch is no longer amongst us. One cannot but read with scorn and bitterness the three lines which the Editor, his friend Lucien Febvre, has put before the title page: "Né à Lyon, le 6 Juillet 1886, Marc Bloch est mort pour la France, fusillé par les Allemands, le 16 Juin 1944, dans un champ au Nord de Lyon." Perhaps younger historians and indeed all social scientists will benefit from the wisdom and depth of these posthumous notes.

Whereas the reader will find in Bloch's fragment all the wealth and living meaning of the historic process, another book: *L'Homme, Le Monde, L'Histoire* (Arthaud, Cahiers du Collège philosophique) to which R. Caillois and others have contributed, may show him the existentialist shortcomings of an interpretation of the historic world. Bloch, a great historian, is more philosophical than the philosophers themselves. Bloch mastered the concrete and individual meaning of historic situations, the philosophers talk of them only in empty generalisations.

The Third Series of the *Année Sociologique*, founded by Émile Durkheim, and comprising the years 1940 to 1948 (Presses Universitaires), is a welcome addition to the earlier volumes of this great editorial enterprise. Like its

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predecessors the volume is international in scope. It contains an original and fascinating study by Maurice Halbwachs on *Mémoire et Société* and penetrating reviews of some important French, English, German, and American publications in the fields of general sociology, social morphology, sociology of religion, and sociology of knowledge. The volume offers a valuable survey though the selection of the books reviewed is occasionally somewhat haphazard.

Another sociological study must be noted, Jules Monnerot's *Sociologie du Communisme* (Gallimard). Monnerot's previous books have already proved that he is one of the subtlest and most sensitive of the younger French sociologists. His new book gives the first adequate analysis of Marxist Communism as a secular religion. He centres his interpretation in Sorel's conception of myth, which he applies in a more constructive manner. This intriguing volume deserves patient study.

Lavergne's *Suffrage Universel et Autorité de L'Etat* (Presses Universitaires) and Cadart's *Régime Électoral et Régime Parlementaire en Grande-Bretagne* (Armand Colin) should be of special interest to the political scientist. M. Lavergne's book is more suggestive in its historical parts, whereas his doctrine of an "electoral pluralism" is less convincing. M. Cadart's study, the outcome of prolonged research in this country, is a balanced study of a subject about which even Englishmen have not always been too well informed.

In the series *Que sais-je?* (Presses Universitaires) two interesting volumes have been published recently: *Les Classes sociales* by André Joussain and *Géographie sociale du Monde* by Pierre George. Both volumes are complementary to each other; the former has a more general character, while the latter is more descriptive. Particularly those who still see in France a "Peasants' Republic" might read Professor George's book with considerable profit.

The student of political science and indeed also the historian should not overlook M. Louis André's critical edition of Richelieu's *Testament Politique* (Robert Laffont). We have waited too long for this definitive edition. M. André's introduction is a remarkable example of editorial interpretation.

George Pagès' *Naissance du Grand Siècle. La France de Henri IV à Louis XIV. 1598-1661* (Hachette) has been posthumously published. This volume is a valuable addition to M. André's edition of Richelieu's *Testament Politique*.

Mademoiselle Marie-Madeleine-Martin's essay on *La Formation Morale de la France: Histoire de L'Unité Française* (Gallimard) is a well-documented historical survey, particularly with regard to the earlier periods of French history. The later parts of the volume appear to be less original.

M. Jean Fourastié's book *Le Grand Espoir du XXe Siècle. Progrès technique, progrès économique, progrès social* (Presses Universitaires) will, I hope, find many readers in this country. The volume, introduced by M. André Siegfried, is another example of the synthetic tendency which is at work within the social sciences, in any case in France. It would be difficult to say whether this analysis of the socio-economic trends of our contemporary world is of greater relevance to the sociologist or to the economist, not to mention the politician.

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Fourastié breaks new ground, though he has clearly profited from Colin Clark's well-known books. He writes in the tradition of Comte and he has learnt a good deal from Marx whom he does not treat, as it is fashionable to-day, as a dead dog. He divides modern industrialised societies into three sectors: a primary sector with slow technical progress (agriculture), a secondary sector in which technical progress is supreme (industry), and a third sector (services) with little or no technical progress. Now it is the trend of modern societies, visible since 1830, that the third sector increases, whereas sectors one and two are about to reach their maximum intensity. However much the various industrial societies may vary among each other, the tendency towards a society in which *le tertiaire* is dominating cannot be challenged. "*La civilisation tertiaire*", writes M. Fourastié, "*restera longtemps fragile. L'appareil de production primaire et secondaire, dont la valeur financière sera faible, mais qui sera formidable dans sa masse matérielle, sera entre les mains d'un nombre relativement très faible de travailleurs indirects; déjà l'on voit une ou deux centaines de milliers d'ouvriers d'un secteur-clé menacer l'appareil économique d'une nation; dans la civilisation tertiaire, quelques centaines de techniciens seront maîtres du sort de millions d'hommes. Cela laisse prévoir la nécessité d'un État capable de faire respecter l'intérêt général. Inversement le moindre coincement dans le complexe appareil tertiaire, une négligence ou une erreur dans la tâche immense de coordination, de classement, de planification, entraînera de lourdes conséquences dans la production primaire ou secondaire.*" I am not sure whether M. Fourastié is not too optimistic with regard to the human and cultural consequences of this brave new world. "*La civilisation sera brillante; la moitié ou les trois quarts de la population bénéficiera d'un enseignement supérieur. Cette culture, la dispersion de l'habitat, l'initiative dans le travail même subalterne (sic!), la diversité des moyens de transports et des loisirs, favoriseront, en quelques générations, les tendances individualistes de l'homme.*" M. Fourastié envisages a future in which the housewife will read Colin Clark or Bergson, instead of *Gone with the Wind*. I am, in spite of all efforts, unable to visualize the picture of our future societies, but I doubt whether M. Fourastié's high hopes for a strengthening of "individual tendencies" are justified. Our transitory societies do not indicate such trends.

Perhaps man has changed since 1830. Perhaps paltry pleasures will replace true passions, perhaps our creative faculties will become weaker under the command of the few hundred technicians who determine our fate. But whether we agree or disagree with M. Fourastié's sociology, his terrifying book deserves the greatest attention.

Until M. Fourastié's few hundred technicians may direct us otherwise, we may still enjoy the two volumes edition of G. W. Leibniz' *Textes Inédits* (Presses Universitaires), published and annotated by Gaston Grua. Here one of mankind's greatest minds speaks to us with a voice whose intensity is undiminished in spite of more than two centuries. The texts of both volumes throw new light on Leibniz's universality and on the synthetic character of his philosophy. The manuscripts are edited from the Leibniz Archives at Hanover. The sections V and VIII-X, which contain important papers, letters, and fragments on ethical, social, and legal problems may be of special interest to readers of this journal.

J. P. MAYER.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE FREEDOM OF NECESSITY. ESSAYS. By J. D. BERNAL. Routledge. 1949. 18s.
SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SOCIALISM. By J. D. BERNAL AND M. CORNFORTH. Birch Books. 2s. 6d.

The first of these books is a reprint of some thirty essays written since 1928 on science, Marxism, and social problems, and now grouped under various headings, with a new introduction to each section. This volume provides an extensive Marxist commentary on current affairs, the subjects covered ranging from the general challenge of our time to special topics such as teaching, research, atomic energy, industry, art, etc.—all viewed in relation to science. The second consists of two new essays, Prof. Bernal on *Science against War*, a vigorous attack on the Marshall Plan, and Mr. Cornforth on *The Battle of Ideas in Science*, a study of the conflict between "bourgeois" and "socialist" science. In nearly every paragraph of both books the thought-structure is Hegelian, the philosophy Marxist, the main interest scientific, and the aim communist. As a result the monotony of orthodoxy is a little overpowering, and one feels relief on reaching the pages where Bernal the Marxist deals with Shaw the Irishman.

It is unnecessary at this stage to praise Prof. Bernal's intellectual power, dialectical brilliance, and wide knowledge, and there are more important issues at stake than those of personal merit. For it is now amply clear that we are here concerned, not with a mind still searching for the truth in human affairs, but with a person who has made himself the instrument of a fanaticism of thought and action, which is as relentless towards the truth (Lenin advised "cunning, evasion, concealment of truth"), as it is towards human beings, when either get in its way. There is lip-service of other values, e.g. "the fate of science depends on the preservation of liberty" (1938), "in science, where what we want to bring out is the danger of authority and the need to question everything" (1939), or "the majority of the people can be trusted; no superior elite groups can be" (1945), but unfortunately these sage thoughts do not flow into action, for in the interests of Marxist authority awkward facts are either neglected or unscientifically twisted (e.g. "the major beneficiaries" of U.S. production of goods "are a small group of capitalists"), just as ruthlessly as aberrant men and women are forced to conform in communist society.

No idealism of aim can excuse the deliberate selection and distortion of facts on the part of a polemical writer who claims to be a representative of science. We therefore prefer to assume that Lenin's advice has been neglected, and that the distortion of truth is the unconscious result of a passionately held conviction. There would be nothing surprising in that; intellectual blind spots always accompany absolute convictions. What is relatively new is the growth of such fanaticism within the scientific community: physicists and biologists who do not honour the unprejudiced search for truth in the human field are now claiming to speak with the authority of science. This is the more grave because it is happening at a time when scientific method is being systematically applied to human society.

These essays purport to express a single coherent attitude which must

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be accepted by all men of goodwill. But this attitude is made up of three components which, in spite of appearances, do not easily marry: first, a high valuation of *science*, somewhat distorted in the human realm by an attraction to theory at the cost of fact, the passion for ideas being here greater than the passion for truth; second, acceptance of *Marxism* as an adequate theory of contemporary society; and third, the persisting interpretation of *Soviet policy* as the unfailing expression of Marxism and of nothing else.

These are queer bed-fellows. Science is progressive, objective, and universal; Marxism is unchanging, dogmatic, and partisan; while Soviet policy is opportunist, messianic, and in many respects essentially Russian. The complete identification of these three elements, leading to the implicit suggestion that all good scientists must be Marxist and support Soviet policy, is spurious and exists only in communist propaganda and in the minds of its dupes. Perhaps the most embarrassing fact, scarcely mentioned in these books, for those who identify science—Marxism—Soviet policy, is that it is not in the U.S.S.R. but in the U.S.A. that belief in science flows most vigorously into action: the quality and quantity of research and the speed of its application are higher in the U.S.A. than in the U.S.S.R. and are still rising sharply, while in some fields its quality is now falling in the U.S.S.R.

One-sided actions have a way of provoking contrary results. Stalin's harshness has almost succeeded in uniting the western world; Professor Bernal's polemics may serve to stir bourgeois scientists to the defence of scientific objectivity. When Proudhon published his "*Philosophie de la Misère*" Marx wrote in answer "*Das Elend der Philosophie*". Likewise one reader of Bernal's book is left more convinced than ever of the *necessity of freedom*.

L. L. WHYTE.

THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS. By KARL RENNER. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by O. KAHN-FREUND. (Routledge & Kegan Paul. VIII and 307 pp. 25s.)

Books which discuss the socialist attitude towards law are still not easy of access, and for that reason alone we welcome the translation of one which is of outstanding quality. But it is a book that was originally written in 1904 and, when republished in 1928, seems to have been altered rather by the addition of sundry paragraphs than by a thorough revision. It is thus of little help for the understanding of contemporary Soviet ideas, and still contemplates a world in which the capitalist structure of society was much the same as it had been in Marx's day. In fact the chief interest of Renner's own work today is that it shows us the impact of Marxism on a mind that had been well schooled in the orthodox concepts of Romano-Continental law. His main thesis, as is well known, is that law is not purely a "superstructure" conditioned by the economic "substratum", but that the legal norm is capable of surviving changes in the economic structure and, itself unchanged, performing functions quite different from those for which it came into being. Ownership is still conceptually the same, though its function is quite different according as it is exercised over a spade by a peasant-proprietor or over a machine by a person who cannot possibly

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exploit his property without the "connected institution" of the labour contract. I suppose, in a sense, we all knew that. We know that a lawyer has often to "construe" a complex situation of real life, actual or contemplated, so that it is capable of expression in legal terms. A confused family situation which has been going on happily for years may, when it comes to a death or a quarrel, have to be separated out by co-ownership in fractions, life-interests, trusts and what-not, or a business man, who has quite clear ideas about how he wants certain affairs run, may set the corporation lawyer a pretty problem in the organisation of subsidiaries and so on. Dr. Kahn-Freund uses the simile of a child's bricks which remain the same, though they are used to build a number of different structures. I once used that of military drill. In battle or on manoeuvres a company commander can say "seize that hill" or "line that hedge", but on the barrack square he must achieve the results he desires by a selection from the limited number of commands known to the drill-book. Here Renner is clearly, so far as analysis is concerned, ahead of Marx, and the point is not without practical importance, for it allows us to use legal tools for whatever purpose we have in mind, without being bothered by people who insist that contract is the holy of holies, or that property is the invention of the Devil. Both are neutral concepts that can be put to purposes as diverse as those of a knife. One of Dr. Kahn-Freund's illuminating comments is that the joint-stock company, still believed by Renner to be "absolutely unequivocal", has become in more recent developments as neutral a tool as any of the older conceptions. However, though he recognises that norms do not change immediately with society, Renner believes that they do so ultimately, and his book is fundamentally an orthodox exposition of Marxist theory, as is shown by direct praise and frequent literal quotation. Marx is even held up as pre-eminent in legal understanding, although the author's original contribution is his analysis of Marxism in legal terms. Such orthodoxy does not lead to liveliness, and the book is in fact repetitive. Dr. Agnes Schwarzschild must have had a very hard task in translating its ponderosities, but she has been eminently successful. Dr. Kahn-Freund on the other hand has clearly enjoyed himself. In the Introduction he really tells us what the questions at issue are, and adds some comment; in the Notes he takes every advantage offered to him by a text written against the background of continental conditions half a century ago. He can thus point out, for instance, that the history of land-tenure in England falsifies for this country some of Renner's deductions about the uneconomic effect of landlordism, or again how, both in England and on the Continent, business development has made completely obsolete Renner's statement that the independence of industrial concerns can only be expressed in the legal form of absolute individual property. He records too, as one of the major miscalculations of the 19th century, the prognostication that the dispossessed bourgeois would become a proletarian, whereas in fact he commonly retained his middle-class mentality and succumbed to the lures of Fascism. Few lawyers could tread with Dr. Kahn-Freund's assurance in the field of sociology, but his technical knowledge of both English and foreign law is productive of matter no less interesting to the lawyer, for which his colleagues have every reason to be grateful.

H. F. JOLOWICZ.

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THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. By R. MACGREGOR DAWSON. (*University of Toronto Press.* 643 pp. 30s.)

WITHIN the last two years, Canadian scholarship has been enriched by two studies; first, Professor Brady's superb comparative work, *Democracy in the Dominions*, and now Professor Dawson's study of the Canadian central government. There can be little doubt that the *Government of Canada* is a signal contribution to the literature on Canadian political institutions. It poses the vital challenge of regional inequality to Canadian federalism with admirable clarity. It provides an invaluable summary of the Dominion-Provincial fiscal relations. It demonstrates the speciousness of the "written-unwritten" classification where convention permeates every phase of the constitution in practice. And it gives an excellent account of the manner in which British parliamentary practice and federalism influence and modify each other in the Dominion government. For any of these reasons, Professor Dawson's study must become a standard reference for students of federal and parliamentary government, no less than students of Canadian political institutions.

In arranging his material Professor Dawson has simply obeyed the compulsion of his subject. Clearly, no writer on Canadian government can wander far beyond the two dominating features of its political system. Federalism, on the one hand, and responsible government, on the other, provide a framework within which the order of material is more or less determined. Professor Dawson's study falls into seven parts; the first two describe the development and character of the dual constitutional system; and the remainder is given to a careful and detailed description of the parliamentary institutions of the central government.

Professor Dawson writes with considerable skill and authority. His discussion of the constitution, the distribution of powers, and the problem of Dominion-Provincial financial relations is illuminating. Almost to the present day federalism has suffered from its bondage to the jurists. Their legacy remains in a series of well known formal propositions. The federal constitution is written; hence it postulates judicial review. Its constitution can only be amended by a special process; hence it lacks the flexibility of normal legislative change. Its major characteristic is the co-ordinate and independent status of its units; hence it suffers from the weakness of divided sovereignty. The results are clear. Few, if any, examined the socio-economic implications of the federal system. What effect would economic inequality among the member states have on the working of federalism? Was it possible to speak of "co-ordinate" status where the wealth of some units mocked the poverty of others? Was it possible to speak of "independence" where each unit of government is inextricably involved in the social and economic policy of the central government? Professor Dawson's challenge to the formalist tradition is decisive. The "flexible-rigid" dogma is vigorously attacked. (Chap. IV). There is no *a priori* basis for the distribution of powers in the constitution. The criteria are essentially empirical (p. 96). His chapter on Dominion-Provincial financial relations is masterly. Who will dispute, "this world of Dominion-provincial finance has indeed, an air of grotesque unreality untrammelled by logic and the ordinary restrictions and meanings of words. . . ."? (p. 123).

Yet, it is clear, that no one can begin to understand federal government without entering this grotesque wonderland. In some respects it is unique; in others it is a remarkable example of the malaise which afflicts central-local relations in Great Britain. Who, after reading the reports of the Local Government Boundary Commission will fail to appreciate the striking parallel of Professor Dawson's comments, "the general relationship of power and finance is no longer in equilibrium. Provincial powers have outstripped the provincial facilities to pay for their proper exercise . . ." (p. 124)? Or when he points to the "alarming economic inequalities existing among the provinces themselves." Professor Dawson can be content that he has provided an extremely lucid introduction to this difficult field. On the institutions of the central government, Professor Dawson is equally interesting. His account of the provincial representation of the Canadian cabinet is most valuable (p. 210). Clearly the federalization of the cabinet has largely removed the fears that federalism and responsible government would destroy each other. Responsible government flourishes in the virtual extinction of the Senate; and federalism survives in the provincial representation in the Cabinet. Which of the "mendicant" states in Australia would not gladly echo Professor Dawson's view, "any province today would relinquish all its senators without the slightest compunction or regret, if by so doing it would be allowed to double its representation in the Cabinet" (p. 212)?

Often Professor Dawson's style scintillates. His analysis of the Senate is incisive and devastating. Both here and in his account of the constricting influence of the Privy Council on the constitution, there is an acute insight and poise quite unspoilt by the occasional vigour of his criticism. Yet Professor Dawson cannot go altogether unscathed. There are moments when one wishes he had looked beyond the provisions of the constitution and rejected the easy interpretation. In dealing with the powers of the Canadian courts to declare laws ultra vires he suggests that this power has never been as important in Canada as in the United States. Why? Professor Dawson believes it is due to the fact that there are fewer of "those limitations on the powers of government which are a conspicuous feature of the American constitution" (p. 85). Even if one accepts his questionable assumption, how can one seriously argue that the remarkable influence of the Supreme Court in the United States has been simply due to the number of express constitutional restraints on the Federal Government? Is nothing to be said of the relative significance of their two economies; or the intensity of the power conflict between government and "Big Business" in the United States? Does Professor Dawson really suggest that the Supreme Court would have figured less prominently in the conflict in the absence of the 5th and 14th amendments? Surely this is a slight on "Big Business" and the ingenuity of the American Bar. There are other blemishes. His treatment of the personnel, functions, and organization of the Cabinet is excellent; but he omits any reference to the impact of federalism on ministerial responsibility. His description of party organization is competent; yet his analysis of party policy is quite uninspired. One hesitates, however, to mention the lack of a bibliography in a text, which is, in every way, a model in the use of footnotes.

S. R. DAVIS.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS 1834-1945. By V. D. LIPMAN. (Blackwell. 506 pp. 25s.)

REGIONALISM. By PETER SELF. (Fabian Publications and Allen & Unwin. 97 pp. 3s. 6d.)

These two books so contrasted in size, appearance, and price in fact combine well together. Mr. Lipman provides a solid factual introduction to the problem of local government reform, to the solution of which Mr. Self makes an original and stimulating contribution.

How has the present situation arisen? What attempts have been made to bring the structure up to date? What alternatives now present themselves? Too many histories of local government content themselves with an account of the formal outline. Mr. Lipman shows how the different stages of legislation affected particular places and provides an invaluable description of what actually happened. His account of the design of the poor law unions—really the only attempt to work out a rational system of local government areas—is particularly interesting.

Although the book is concerned primarily with structure and areas, it provides interesting material over a wider field. There is an excellent bibliography, which however ought to have included the valuable contributions of Councillor F. Blackburn. The book is a mine of information in which anyone should quarry who wants to learn more of how we got our present system. No practitioner for example can fail to be moved and to feel a continuity of tradition on learning that the Local Government Board in 1880 "shared the opinion of the auditors that a considerable outlay on sherry, early salmon, pale ale and the like could not legally be borne by funds raised by compulsory taxation". These auditors, these government departments, they never had any soul.

Most of the book is taken up with the present structure and its future. It has a very useful summary compiled from a number of sources of what is known of social groupings in the population and the area requirements of local services. Many people talk about the need to base local authority areas on social and economic realities, fewer pause to ask themselves what these realities are. It is interesting to see how geographers, physical planners and administrators with different approaches have produced four levels of area which more or less correspond one to another and suggest that something like them is to be found "in the real geographical and social structure of the country".

At *Regional Level* there are from 10 to 15 areas; at *County Level* there is more variation, depending largely on the treatment given to the large conurbations and the areas may be anything from 40 to 100; at *District or Community Level* about 500 areas; and at the bottom *Neighbourhood Level* something rather larger than the rural parish and smaller than the town. It is clear that there is great need for more research and collation of research into the shape and constitution of these levels but there could be no better introduction to the detailed local study that is needed than Part III of Mr. Lipman's book. I think indeed it would have been wiser for the author to have published this part by itself. The size and price of the volume may prevent it getting into places where it is badly needed.

Mr. Self's *Regionalism* is a report to the Fabian Society and in form a

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constructive criticism of the proposals of the Local Government Boundary Commission. His main objections to these proposals are that they limit the size of the major authorities too rigidly; that their treatment of the great conurbations is inadequate; that in part because some of the proposed major authorities are too small, the area left for those services in which the "most purpose" minor authorities were autonomous would be inadequate; and that too little attention is paid to the areas and functions of the minor authorities.

Although Mr. Self would like to see some bigger major authorities his regionalism remains at *County Level*. The organisation at *Regional Level* in Mr. Lipman's sense he would regard as beyond the competence of local government. Nevertheless the question remains whether some kind of authority is not required there. Mr. Self dislikes "*ad hoc* regionalism" as found in the hospital service and in the nationalised utilities. He would like to see some of the functions lost to the central government brought back to the new major authorities. He would like "to shed the load at the centre and to pick it up at an appropriate point midway between Whitehall and Much-Binding Town Hall". A substantial decentralisation is perhaps as important as co-ordination of local services. I only wonder whether the two movements downwards and upwards are not more likely to meet at a level higher than Mr. Self's major authorities.

He is fair to the case for indirect election of major authorities though on balance he is against it. He comes down in favour of a body part nominated and part elected, rather like the Scottish county council, as the most purpose boroughs and county districts are like the large and small burghs.

It is a painful epilogue to these two valuable books, that the Boundary Commission to which both look hopefully should have been abolished. The Government has looked these difficult problems in the face and walked resolutely around them. So long as it was determined not to do anything about them, it was perhaps the most merciful thing to liquidate the Commission. As Mr. Self says, "the issues of policy at stake are far too important to be settled elsewhere than in Parliament. It is now up to Government and Parliament to pronounce their decision". Well they have and what a decision!

JAMES E. MACCOLL.

BRITISH WAR ECONOMY. By W. K. HANCOCK AND M. M. GOWING. Published by H.M. Stationery Office. 583 pp. 21s.

This book, entitled *British War Economy* is the first of a planned series of 'civil histories' of the war period. The scheme of the histories as authorised by the War Cabinet in 1942 contemplated that they should be written by qualified historians and economists, who would enjoy freedom of access to all the necessary material. Much of this reposes in the secret archives of state departments, and the door is now opened for the first time to the background of decisions, of which the complexity could hitherto only be imagined. The present volume has been written by Professor W. K. Hancock and Mr. M. M. Gowing, who have also had the opportunity of

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discussions with men who may have been the authors of the documents under study or had memories of circumstances themselves unrecorded in the official papers. In the result the reader is presented with a fascinating survey and informed interpretation of the progress of mobilisation in the civilian sphere, arrived at by the skill of the trained scholar, illuminated by the criticism of the professional student, and set forth, with a lucidity and logical sequence that give the book the effect of a broadening stream of national effort, gathering power in its course to victory.

British War Economy is one of the three "synoptic volumes", the publication of which was first authorised in the Civil Series under the general editorship of Professor Hancock. The other two books in this group are *Problems of Social Policy* and the *Statistical Digest of the War*. *British War Economy* merits the term 'synoptic', in that it reviews comprehensively the impact of war on all the fields of civil life, disentangles the different threads (for example those that bound together the size of the armed forces, the volume of munitions manufacture and the compression of civilian existence) and shows how the conflicting claims were resolved through reassessment and compromise by those most competent to judge not what the national interest ideally might require but what the country, constituted as it was, could by straining every nerve contrive to perform.

In war the fighting services, Navy, Army, Air, form the spearhead of attack. But behind them stand, embattled in their own way, the hosts of men and women engaged in munitions, transport, building, coal mines, factories, and the large though diminished apparatus maintaining with extending degrees of austerity the constricted needs of civilian life. All these subjects fall within the scope of *British War Economy*, which is a vivid history of Britain in war time. This history evolved under the orders of the War Cabinet and its organs, working on the appreciations of the emergent problems submitted by the great departments of state.

Despite the general anonymity, in which the themes of the book are purposely developed, certain familiar personalities break through the veil. The book illustrates the decisive will of the Prime Minister in cutting Gordian knots, the courage of the Minister of Labour in conscribing the last drops of man and woman-power and the wisdom of the Lord President, whose Committee was almost a second Cabinet, pronouncing Solomonian judgments on an endless succession of vital issues. The story of these high officers of state along with many in less exalted offices and the officials who served them can be traced through the various chapters of this arresting volume. Let us note as an example the Prime Minister's decision, imposing in 1941 a 'ceiling' on the demand of the Army for men, which is described as "a landmark of man-power history". As the authors comment "The bounds had been fixed in relation not merely to strategic necessities but also to man-power resources as a whole and to the production of equipment. Moreover, the urge to husband well its resources had been implanted in the Army". It is right to add also that despite his supreme responsibilities as Minister of Defence the Prime Minister never forgot the claims of the civil population to a tolerable standard of existence. In the peculiarly difficult field of labour mobilisation the Minister was invested in 1940 "with powers undreamt of in the philosophy of any previous British Minister. . . . Into his hands had been given the unrestricted powers

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of industrial conscription". The exercise of these powers with the help of continuous man-power budgetting permits the judgment that "No other war-making country acquired the same skill in co-ordination". The record of the Lord President and his Committee is a tale in itself. Here it must suffice to say that hardly any major question in the economic field escaped their attention and the authors emphasise the preeminent importance of their achievement.

It would be instructive to follow the course of certain leading issues such as shipping, finance, munitions, food and such like which appear in different avatars in the changing phases of the war. The temptation must be resisted. But the clear division of the book into sections dominated by some governing factor such as the initial Anglo-French combination, Dunkirk, Pearl Harbour and Normandy provides the order necessary for the unfolding of its vast theme. Much valuable help is provided by the inclusion of some statistical summaries, and the excellence of the index facilitates the use of the book for reference purposes. For future editions it might perhaps be useful if each chapter, packed as it is with matter, could be preceded with a brief summary of its main contents.

The shortcomings and frustrations of the early war months and the failure to achieve the maximum possible intensity of effort stand out conspicuously. The authors remark that "before the fall of France the British Government was not achieving this maximum". Despite the warnings of the Treasury on inflation there was no effective wages policy. In 1940 the Minister of Labour (Mr. Bevin) actually proposed the stabilisation of wages with periodical reviews. For various reasons the proposal proved abortive, but it suggests the question, what might have been done if, in September, 1939, a National Government could have been formed on the failure of appeasement?

The installation of Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister in succession to Mr. Neville Chamberlain was in truth the replacement of the umbrella by the sword. "A united Government and people made victory their watchword". There were many disappointments on the road, but at the darkest moments dramatic events such as Hitler's assault on Russia and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour changed the face of the future. Indeed, one of the most engrossing topics that may be followed from this book is the evolution of relations with the United States from the Cash and Carry phase to Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid. The eventual full co-operation of the British and American democracies was the indispensable condition of victory, both in the military and the financial field. It must be hoped that a book on financial policy will in due course appear in the Civil Series, though Professor Hancock states that "there is no certainty that every history that has been planned will be brought to publication". As the present financial troubles show, the story of war finance has not been closed by the war. Its influence will endure for many years. Not the least of the many virtues of *British War Economy* is that it will stand as a permanent and indispensable guide, by which the problems of the present may be brought into relation with their origins in the past, when the country, strained almost to breaking point, worked its way through tragedy to triumph.

CECIL KISCH.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EUROPE IN 1948. (*United Nations & H.M. Stationery Office.* 288 pp. 12s. 6d.)

YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1947. (*United Nations & H.M. Stationery Office.* 581 pp. 30s.)

These two books show the extremely valuable contribution which the United Nations is making to our knowledge of international conditions in widely differing fields. The expert could desire nothing better than this harvest of facts. The first is a successor to *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe* which was published in 1948, and has again been prepared by Mr. Kaldor and Mr. Lary. It is full of facts, practically unobtainable elsewhere, and admirably presented, and the comment or interpretation, where offered, is always illuminating. The survey necessarily consists largely of comparative statistics, for instance statistics showing the changes in productivity or the movements of prices, wages, and currency circulation in the various countries. It contains in all nine chapters and 60 pages of appendices. The first eight chapters deal with progress in production, progress towards internal equilibrium, capital formation, the general pattern of trade, prices, balance of payments, intra-European trade and payments, and progress in planning. Chapter 9 deals with Problems & Prospects and is of great interest. It begins with an account of the remarkable progress in economic recovery during the year 1948 in Europe. For instance, industrial production rose by 16% and agricultural production by 12%; the productivity of labour rose by about 9%; the volume of overseas exports rose by 30%, while imports were reduced by 6%; imports from the United States were reduced by 30%. This recovery was, of course, made possible by financial assistance by the USA which enabled European countries to obtain essential supplies of raw materials from abroad. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an extremely valuable discussion of the prospects of the immediate future and the two vital problems: the future movements in Europe's terms of trade and the menacing question of the adjustments in the United States balance of payments "which must occur concurrently with the elimination of Europe's balance of payments deficit."

The Year Book on Human Rights is the second to be produced by UNO's Economic and Social Council. The first contained the constitutional provisions, legislative texts, and statements on law and usage concerning human rights in the various countries of the world up to the end of 1946. The new volume differs from the 1946 Yearbook. It is divided into three parts. Part I contains all constitutional provisions and legislative texts concerning human rights enacted in 1947. Part II contains the provisions of treaties or agreements concerning human rights concluded between states in 1947. Part III deals with the activities of UNO in respect to human rights, not merely for the year 1947, but for the whole period from the adoption of the Charter in 1945 to the end of 1947. Perhaps the most interesting material is to be found in the documentary annex to Part III which runs to nearly 120 pages. It contains the text of various drafts of an International Bill of Human Rights which have been considered by the Commission on Human Rights and its Drafting Committee.

LEONARD WOOLF.

Just Published HUMAN RIGHTS

Prepared by UNESCO
with an introduction by
JACQUES MARITAIN

Opinions contributed towards
the drawing up of the Decla-
ration of Human Rights by
E. H. Carr, H. J. Laski, Croce,
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THE GOVERNMENT AND MISGOVERNMENT OF LONDON. By WILLIAM A. ROBSON. (*Allen & Unwin*. 304 pp. 15s.)

This is a new edition of Dr. Robson's profound analysis of the problems of London government. It has been brought up to date with regard to local government, finance, election returns and civil aerodromes. Chapter 13 of Part III, which deals with town planning has been revised and enlarged in the light of the report of the Barlow Commission. In an epilogue, which has been added, Dr. Robson reviews all the main events since 1939 which affect the metropolis in regard to planning and local government.

The first edition was immediately recognised as a book of first rate importance, a political document of unusual force, a devastating analysis of the muddle, the confusion, the conflicting interests, and the multiplicity of authorities which then passed—and to some extent still pass—for government in London to-day. Dr. Robson's thesis is clear cut—that London is a region and requires a regional administration: that in no other way can the interests and needs of the ten million people who inhabit it be properly cared for. His book is an overwhelming proof of the validity of the central idea, and yet towards the end one detects a note almost of despair in his observation—"The idea that regional planning requires administrative institutions corresponding to the area to be planned and developed has not penetrated the minds of Whitehall."

For myself, I have no doubt that Dr. Robson will win in the end. Town planning in the United Kingdom has made a very slow and tedious progress from the parochial and the negative to the national and positive. In spite of the first rate legislation produced by Mr. Silkin it would be folly to pretend that we have yet reached the final goal. Some progress, nevertheless, falls to be recorded. Before the war there were in the Greater London region one hundred and forty three separate planning authorities and twenty three joint planning authorities. The combination of so many authorities with the word "planning" would seem to offer the ingredients of a fair working definition of "chaos". Since the 1947 Act the eight county councils, together with the county boroughs of Croydon, East Ham and West Ham comprise the local planning authorities for the whole metropolitan region. That is indeed, as they say, a step in the right direction. But must our approach to the problem always be so timorous? Is it because there is a feeling, profound and fundamentally right, against centralisation, against an all-powerful bureaucracy, a strong instinct and sentiment which says that we must have the maximum control over our own affairs? If that is the reason, and it may well be, then at least we need not quarrel with the instinct. When it carries the corollary that a regional administration is necessarily undemocratic it changes, however, from a force for good to a force making for the many evils which Dr. Robson so well describes.

Local authorities in the Greater London area would do well to study what is in fact happening. They should realise that one by one their powers are being taken from them and that in the last few years successively their powers with regard to water, police, fire brigade, the Port of London, and hospitals, have all been taken away from them and their authority vested in *ad hoc* non-elected bodies. This surely is the antithesis of democracy

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and an attempt to deal not with the core of the problem but with major manifestations of the problem itself. Clearly it ~~would be~~ ridiculous for the multiplicity of local authorities in London to attempt to deal with London transport, but are the problems of London transport best dealt with by a regional board which has no connection with the local authorities and has no connection either with any of the other major fields of activity, whether industrial or residential, which London transport seeks to serve? It was, of course, the late Mr. Frank Pick who put forward the view to the Barlow Commission that London must expand to a population of twelve million people in order that London Transport might pay its maximum permitted dividend. That is as good an example as one will find in history of the way in which, even the most brilliant man—and in many respects Frank Pick was a genius—will give calm expression to a myopic, one-eyed view when, by the very nature of his responsibilities he is obliged to look at a problem from one particular angle. It is a truism that the local authorities are losing their authority. Their gas undertakings have been taken over by the state: their electricity undertakings have been taken over by the state: more and more they are being put into the position of the mere administrative agents of organisations to which they are responsible but which themselves are responsible only in the most oblique way to the citizens at large.

It is here perhaps that Dr. Robson's argument is particularly compelling. If he can show, and he does in fact show, that a regional administration will preserve and extend democratic responsibility and control, it may not be long before his point of view finds general and governmental acceptance. Up to the moment the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the national governments of every colour have simply stuffed the issue. The Labour Party in its last pronouncement on the subject relied on "a general measure of agreement among the existing local authorities", to provide a satisfactory solution. The Coalition Government, even when it pretended to deal in a White Paper with the problems of local government in England and Wales, simply by-passed the exceptional difficulties of the metropolis. The committee appointed in 1945, under the chairmanship of Lord Reading to examine and review the number, size and boundaries of the metropolitan boroughs and the distribution of functions between them, the City Corporation and the London County Council, was abolished a year later by the Minister of Health on the ground that the problems of the County area could not be divorced from the problems of the Greater London area. That was to underline the obvious, but why it should have taken fifteen months to make this shattering discovery, history does not disclose. The tendency to ignore the problem is also revealed in the history of the two advisory committees both under the chairmanship of Mr. Clement Davies, M.P., one to examine the Abercrombie plan in detail and the other to advise the Minister of Town and Country Planning on "the appropriate machinery for securing concerted action in the implementation of a regional plan for London as a whole". Of this second committee Dr. Robson was himself a member. The committee on the Abercrombie plan produced a report which in many important respects fell dismally short of the standards which Sir Patrick Abercrombie had himself imposed. The second committee sat for two years without reaching agreement: the committee

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divided itself into two groups, one of which was in favour of securing effective machinery for planning the metropolitan region as a whole, while the other was determined to preserve the powers of the local planning authorities. Here the official view was most disturbing. Representatives of the Board of Trade, the Ministries of Health, Fuel and Power, Transport and other departments of the Central Government, were all sublimely confident of their ability to administer, without any extraneous aid, all those planning features which called for regional action. The fact that, with the single exception of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, not one department possessed a regional organisation even remotely corresponding with the area of the Greater London plan did not ruffle their composure, and indeed was regarded by them as scarcely relevant.

"The notion that the planning of the metropolis should be entrusted to a democratic body, responsive and responsible to the wishes of the nine or ten million inhabitants of Greater London, is entirely foreign to the Departmental outlook. In Whitehall to-day, regionalism means administration by officials of the central Departments stationed in the various regions into which the county is divided for central governmental purposes. There is no understanding of any other kind of regionalism, and no recognition of the need for decentralisation on democratic lines. The immense congestion of work in most government Departments at the present time makes their failure to perceive the necessity for democratic regional decentralisation a serious matter: for it is abundantly clear that unless the central Departments are prepared to shed a great many of their present functions they will be utterly unable to discharge the heavy tasks required of them during the coming years."

It is in town planning that the need for a regional government for London is most clearly apparent. The first plan for the City of London was dismissed by a Conservative Minister of Town and Country Planning, Mr. W. S. Morrison, who suggested to the City Fathers that they should try again "under the guidance of some person or persons of admitted competence and authority"—surely the most devastating rebuke which the City Corporation has received in its long history. Fortified by this incident, a Labour Minister of Town and Country Planning, Mr. Lewis Silkin, took the power to plan out of the hands of the City entirely and vested it in the County Council. Nevertheless the three main areas of the region, the City, the London County Council, and the regions outside the County area (2,600 square miles) have all been the subject of a separate survey and analysis. Such an approach obviously fails even when two of the surveys are prepared, at least in part, by the great master planner of our time, Sir Patrick Abercrombie.

Do we mean business about decentralisation, or not? If we do, then we should note that the decentralisation envisaged in the Abercrombie plan in the County area did not exceed the rate of decentralisation of population which was taking place without any planning at all in the decade before the war. Abercrombie contemplated that 500,000 people would leave the county area: between 1931 and 1937 348,000 left the county. Are we really determined to give ordinary families light, space, and air? The plans for Hackney, Shoreditch and Bethnal Green do not reduce the densities at all, and the multi-story flats which are envisaged for these

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areas may serve the nation ill, as that kind of building has always acted as a check on reproduction. The Greater London plan envisages that 400,000 people will be dispersed into planned new towns, existing towns, and dormitory suburbs. For the new towns—the most imaginative and dynamic part of the scheme—the Minister has already appointed a number of corporations, but it must be confessed that, while this scheme was not lacking in vision, progress in the actual building and development of the towns is pitifully slow, almost non-existent, and what started as a great imaginative movement is in danger of degenerating into sterility and frustration.

Inherent in any plan for the London region, good or bad, is the idea of some control of the location of industry. Yet in the Greater London plan the best that can be suggested is an *ad hoc* body with no democratic roots, politically irresponsible, to control not only the location of the industries, but to buy and sell land, to create housing estates and trading estates, to construct roads and carry out public works, to act as regional public cleansing department, regional transport authority, and much else. This of course is to disregard public opinion altogether and yet the only organisation to-day which is even concerned with all these functions is not any elected body, but an interdepartmental committee of officials from the Ministries of Health, Transport, Labour, Agriculture, Education, Fuel and Power, and Works, together with a representative of the Board of Trade, and all sitting under the chairmanship of an official of the Ministry of Town and Country planning.

Those who read Dr. Robson's book will fully appreciate that he is careful at all times to emphasise the relationship of ends and means. It would, I imagine, be accepted by all who are interested in this problem, whether at the local government or at the national government levels, that all their work is and must be directed towards securing a better, happier, healthier, and more convenient life for the millions who make up the metropolitan population. We must at least face the question whether these millions are to have some say in the matter for themselves or whether "they" are to plan for "them". The local government is confused, overlapping, constricted, indeterminate. The central government machinery is groaning and creaking under a weight of responsibility which it manifestly cannot carry. Regional government—and this applies not only to London with which Dr. Robson is here concerned, but to Scotland, to Wales, and to the territorial regions of England—directly elected by the people and responsible to the people, is the only solution.

The Government and Misgovernment of London will remain, until Dr. Robson's solution is accepted, the best statement of a formidable thesis: until his solution is realised, his book will remain the best picture of the present chaos which, in an age which prides itself on planning, we have the effrontery to tolerate.

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