

**JOURNAL
OF
INDIAN HISTORY**

201

(Published three times a year)

EDITOR

Rājasēvāsakta

Dewan Bahadur **S. KRISHNASVAMI AYYANGAR, M.A., Hony. Ph.D.**

*Honorary Correspondent, Archaeological Survey of India,
Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.*

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Rao Bahadur **C. S. SRINIVASACHARYAR, M.A.**

Professor, Annamalai University.

V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR, M.A., Dip. Ec.,

Lecturer, Dept. of Ind. Hist. & Arch., University of Madras

G. S. PRESS, MADRAS

JL
 1200, N22
 N44 23.2



CONTENTS

	PAGE
MAHARAJA DALIP SINGH AFTER DEPOSITION—By K. S. Thapar, B.A., (Hons.), B. Litt (Oxon), M.A. (Pb.) ..	75
ALEXANDER, BURNES' MISSION TO KABUL—By E. R. Kapadia, M.A. (Delhi), M.A. (London) ..	94
CITERIOR INDIA OF RUFINUS, CIRCA 400 A.D.—By T. K. Joseph, B.A., L.T. ..	110
ORIGIN OF SIKH MILITARISM—By Anil Chandra Banerjee, M.A., P.R.S. ..	116
"THE GOSAIN BROTHERS"—By P. N. Bhalla, M.A. ..	128
JAINS AT THE COURT OF AKBAR—By R. Krishnamurthi ..	137
EDITORIAL ..	144
REVIEWS—India and Democracy; The Bhagavad Gita and Modern Scholarship; Early History of the Vaishnava Faith and movement in Bengal, from Sanskrit and Bengali Sources; Studies in Later Mughal History of the Punjab 1707-1793; History of the Sikhs; (1) The Eastern Frontier of British India pp. 413 (1943); (2) Annexation of Burma pp. 338 (1944); History of India; War in Ancient India ..	150
OUR EXCHANGES ..	161

161
 75
 86



Journal of Indian History

Maharaja Dalip Singh after Deposition

Conversion, Marriage and Exile

Social Success and Political Failure

By

K. S. THAPAR, B.A. (HONS.), B. LITT (OXON), M.A. (PB.),

*Barrister-at-Law, Department of History,
Government College, Lahore*

After the Treaty of 1849 had been signed, Maharaja Dalip Singh, then only 11 years old, was put under the charge of Sir John Login and sent to Fatehgarh under a strong escort. He continued to live under the same guardians during all his stay at Fatehgarh and also for a few years in England.

At Fatehgarh we find Dalip Singh, a child of twelve, placed in peculiar surroundings. He has been removed from Lahore and all the associations of his childhood. His mother had been removed from him a year earlier, and his Sikh Ministers and relations are no longer with him. Here he is under the care of Sir John and Lady Login who are very kind to him and show him that love and consideration which he had never received from his brothers or uncle. If we examine the names of his entourage we come across very few Sikh attendants that had accompanied him from Lahore. We find no Sikh priest or Granthi and only one Brahmin Parohit, His favourite Mohammadan attendant Meean Keemah also soon asked to be allowed to return to Lahore. A young Brahmin named Bhajan Lal was procured in his place. This young man had been educated in the American Mission Schools. In this impressionable age Dalip Singh was left in such surroundings and with these people about him. He saw Sir John Login at his family prayers every morning and evening and himself yearned for the same sort of prayer. He had a religious mind and was so much impressed by the scene he witnessed every day that he requested Sir John

Login to instruct his (Dalip Singh's) priest also to come at fixed hours. Dalip Singh had this craving within him and being of a tender age was easily susceptible to any direct or indirect influence under which he came. His conversion was a result of these circumstances under which he was placed. He was barely twelve years of age, when he expressed his desire to embrace Christianity. The Government acceded to this request with apparent reluctance. Sir John Login was on leave when Dalip Singh definitely made up his mind to become a Christian. Captain J. Campbell, temporary Governor, in his official despatch sent to Lord Dalhousie, dated the 20th of December, 1850 says, "On Sunday, the 8th instant, His Highness the Maharaja communicated to me through Master Thomas Scot, his desire to embrace the Christian religion....". On the 9th of December a letter was sent to Sir John Login at Calcutta. His reply came on the 20th December, asking the Maharaja not to be hasty. "I have arrived at the conclusion", continues Campbell in his despatch, "that he is more deeply impressed with the subject than his years would seem to render likely." Lord Dalhousie, though highly pleased at the prospect, was afraid that it might be deemed to have been brought about by putting undue influence on Dalip Singh. As he says in one of his private letters, "My little friend has taken us all aback lately by declaring his intention to become a Christian. The Pandit, he says, tells him humbug.... he has had the Bible read to him and he believes the Sahibs' religion." In the same letter he says, "The house-hold of course are in grand state. *Politically we could desire nothing better, for it destroys his possible influence for ever.* But I should have been glad, if it had been deferred, since, at present it may be represented to have been brought about by tampering with the mind of a child."¹ This was Lord Dalhousie's policy throughout the affair. He was anxious that no impression of unfairness should be given and tried not to give any chance to the clamorous section to make capital out of some lack of vigilance in the matter. Writing on the 16th of May, 1850 Login says, "Lord Dalhousie is afraid if he were asked to recommend a tutor that it might imply an interference in the boy's religious faith." Even after the ceremony his attempts were to give it as little publication as possible and the ceremony itself was made very modest.

When the official despatch of Campbell, referred to above, reached Dalhousie he asked for information regarding the follow-

1. Private Letters of Lord Dalhousie, dated 3rd March 1851.

ing points: Where was the Bible procured from? Who introduced this subject to the Maharaja's mind? and whether anybody had been talking to him upon it or had engaged him in any question regarding it. At this Sir John Login instituted an enquiry and prepared a report which was submitted to the Governor-General. Evidence in writing was taken of the Maharaja's retinue, the Dewan Ajodhya Parshad, Fakeer Zehoor-ud-Din, the Prohit Golab Rai, the family priest of the Maharajas of Lahore, and Sardar Boor Singh, that no improper influence had been in their estimation made use of to make him change his belief in the religion of his people. Lady Login's version of the affair is this:²—

"This young man (Bhajun Lal) never—the—less was the only creature in his entourage who had any inkling that Dalip Singh was turning his inquiries in the direction of the Christian faith and he was sceptical with regard to many of the 'pious stories' in the Shastras e.g., that of the virtuous Rajah who distributed daily in alms ten thousand cows before he broke his fast, and yet came short of eternal salvation because his servants, unknown to him, had placed amongst the daily tale of cows one that had already been numbered in the charitable dole.


"But although he used to make Bhajun Lal read the Bible to him and discuss it together, it was, as the young Brahmin quaintly put it 'sometimes Bible, sometimes a few conjuring tricks of which he was very fond, sometimes games in 'Boys own book' and all he did he did of his wilful will. It was plain that neither Bhajun Lal who never had the courage to sacrifice his worldly prospects by embracing Christianity, though evidently convinced of its truth—nor any European had exerted their influence over the Maharaja in order to turn his mind in that direction."

This is, we might say, the official version of the story.

After hearing all, Lord Dalhousie, we are told, expressed himself as entirely satisfied that no improper influence had either directly or indirectly been used by Login or any other English gentleman connected with His Highness's establishment.

Lady Login deplores the fact that 'very little effort was made by his own people to instruct him in the Sikh religion.' "And His Highness left Punjab", so runs John Login's memoranda, "without

2. As given in her Recollections, p. 95.



It was described by Lord Dalhousie as a "*great event in history and in every way gratifying.*"⁹ The following letter shows Lord Dalhousie's satisfaction on this occasion. "A strange and interesting event has now to be recorded in the history of India, for it is well worthy of a place there....I mean the baptism of Maharaja Dalip Singh....This is the first Indian Prince of the many who have succumbed to our power or have acknowledged it, that has adopted the faith of the stranger. Who shall say to what it may lead? God prosper the seed and multiply it! I have never from the hour in which I signed the decree had one moment's hesitation or doubt to the justice or necessity of my act in dethroning the boy. If I had had such a doubt, the sight of the blessed result for him to which that act has led, would now have thoroughly consoled me for what I did then. As it is, my mind is doubly content as to what he lost, immeasurably content as to the gain he has found in his loss. He is wild to go to England....etc."¹⁰

It was with some effort on the part of Lord Dalhousie that permission was obtained from the Court of Directors for the Maharaja's visit to England. "Touching Dalip Singh and his Christianity," says Dalhousie, "I do not know what under-currents there might be, but officially they (Directors) have said and done all I could wish."¹¹ When Dalip Singh left for England Dalhousie presented him as a parting gift a copy of Nisbet's Bible with this letter: "...I should ask you, therefore, to accept from me the volume which I should offer to my own child, as the best of all gifts, since in it alone is to be found the secret of real happiness either in this world or in that which is to come."¹²

The Maharaja left for England on the 19th of April 1854. He stopped for a while in Egypt. At Malta and Gibraltar a full salute of 21 guns was fired in his honour, and in England he was given precedence after the Royal Family. He made a very good impression in England and soon became a friend of the Royal Family. "It is very good," writes Dalhousie in one of his letters, "for the Maharaja has seen the Royal Family under such an aspect as you describe, at Osborne. But I am a little afraid that this exceeding distinction will not be for his future comfort. If he is to live and

die in England, good and well, but if he is to return to India, he is not likely to be rendered more contented with his position there by being so highly treated in England, and after breakfasting with Queens and Princesses, I doubt his much liking the necessity of leaving his shoes at the door of the Governor-General's room when he is admitted to visit him which he will certainly be again required to do."¹³

Maharaja Dalip Singh's later life reminds one of that famous novel of Mr. W. L. George called "The Making of an Englishman." Mr. George, in his book presents an interesting picture of a French youth trying to become an Englishman. With what material the author has at hand, of a person with all the qualities, virtues and weaknesses of a Frenchman, he sets out to manufacture a new product. Does he succeed? After several years of futile life in London, finding his temperament incapable of coping with the complexities of the English character, the hero flies back to France, cursing the English people and swearing he would never return. Had the story ended here it would have been at once more natural, more correct, and altogether more convincing than what it is rendered by the succeeding chapters. But Mr. George brings his hero back to England, a successful business man, very much more sober than he was previously, who marries an English girl from the upper middle class, has a few children, settles down in that country, and, we guess, lives happily ever after. The anticlimax, though instructive in its own way, renders the story unreal. Otherwise, transplanted from the world of fiction to everyday life, the story in the book is a very natural one. And it is not a rare occurrence either. Many ambitious admirers of the English character try to imbibe the training and discipline of an Englishman, but they invariably give up.

Such a character was the Maharaja Dalip Singh whose personal charm was such that all his English friends liked him and wanted him to become one of themselves. In the process of complete anglicising of Dalip Singh his conversion to Christianity was the first step. That had been achieved by Login.

Dalip Singh next came in contact with Queen Victoria who liked him so much that she looked upon him as a son and intended to make him English in all save name.¹⁴

9. Sir John Login and Dalip Singh, p. 307.

10. Private letters of Lord Dalhousie, dated 3rd March 1853.

11. Private Letters of Lord Dalhousie, dated 18th March 1853.

12. Private letters of Lord Dalhousie, dated 3rd March, 1853.

13. Ibid.

14. Lady Login's Recollections.

In England he lived the life of a country gentleman. He was extremely fond of hawking, hunting and shooting. Sir John and Lady Login were with him in England. With them, in December 1856, he went round a tour of France and Italy.¹⁵ Because he was given a distinguished place in society, he had to live up to it. This necessarily entailed expense and was responsible for a good deal of trouble later.

Just as the Maharaja came of age he felt more and more concerned about his mother. She had by now escaped from her confinement in Benares and was living, a virtual prisoner, in the court of Nepal. A private letter from Sir John Kaye at the India Office, informed Login in November 1856 that the Viceroy had received a letter intercepted by Jung Bahadar, from the Maharaja to his mother, suggesting that she should come to England. It was easily proved to be a forgery because Dalip Singh had shown no desire so far to communicate with her.¹⁶ But just at this time, he had sent a letter to his mother at Khatmandoo through Pandit Nehemiah Goreh. The Pandit did not himself go to see her but sent the letter through a native banker. The Governor-General came to know of it and ordered the Pandit to communicate with the Rani only through the British Resident.

Then Dalip Singh made up his mind to come personally over to India and see his mother. He reached Calcutta in February 1861 and stayed at 'Spencer's Hotel'. In a letter to Sir John Login about this time he says, "My mother has decided she will not separate from me any more, and, as she is refused permission to go to the hills, I must give up that intention, and, I suppose, we shall return to England as soon as I can get passage."¹⁷

There were however, other matters that hastened his return to England. Sikh troops returning from the Chinese War made an

15. When Dalip Singh ultimately fell out with the Government he showed great dissatisfaction at the arrangements that had been made for his education, which, he then considered were very inadequate. He expressed this to his friends on the continent. C. Bertie Marriot, who had an interview with him in Paris and later wrote a book, obviously prompted by Dalip Singh, records very reproachfully "Le Gouvernement Anglais refusa d'envoyer le jeune Maharaja a lycee au a l'Universite." Maharaja Dalip Singh et l'Angleterre, p. 19 footnote.

16. Recollections of Lady Login, p. 27.

17. Recollections of Lady Login, p. 200.

enthusiastic demonstration outside the hotel of the son of Ranjit Singh. The Governor-General, Lord Canning, requested the Maharaja to give up his proposed trip up-country and return to England.

His financial troubles had already started, and on his return to England there began that quarrel with the British Government which was to have almost a tragic end.

On account of his financial troubles, and feeling that he could not maintain the position he had won in Society, he contemplated leaving England to live in India all his life. At another time he expressed a desire to give up his pension and estate in England in return for a Jagir in Dehra Dun. On yet another occasion he thought of sending away his mother to India. By this time however, he was coming more and more under her influence. The Government's point of view was very neatly expressed by Sir John Lawrence... lately a member of the India Council... in a letter he wrote to Sir John Login in June 1862. "There can be no doubt whatever that the Maharanee is better out of India than in it. There she is sure to do mischief; here, I admit, she will be equally the evil genius of the Maharaja. It is for the Secretary of State for India to decide which interest is of paramount importance."

But all the fuss was useless. Before anything could be finally settled the Rani had departed on her final journey. Here, on the 1st of August, 1863, in the country of the people she had hated all her life, died the proud Rani of the Punjab. With her departed the intrigues and machinations against the British Government and the evil influence which she was supposed to be again casting on the young Prince.

Little did she dream that before undergoing the proper burning ceremony, her body would lie for six months in an unconsecrated vault in Kensal Green Cemetery. The next winter, the Maharani's body was landed at Bombay, and underwent the Hindoo Ceremonial burning, the ashes being conveyed to the river Narbuddah. The Maharaja went out personally to India to perform these rites, but he did not stay there for long.

On his return journey he was married at Alexandria in Egypt. Here, if ever, is it true that 'the funeral baked meats, did coldly furnish forth the wedding table.' The courtship was carried out and the nuptial-knot tied in the middle of a funeral voyage. Dalip Singh had set out from England with the dead body of his mother,

He returned a few months later, a married man with a young wife by his side.

Indeed the Maharaja had been for sometime in quite a disturbed state of mind. He was on the look-out for a help-mate in his anxieties and troubles. The Queen's project of his alliance with Princess Gourama of Coorg failed, as he realised she was not calculated to make him happy.¹⁸ For sometime he had a fancy for a distant relation of Login. But this thought was discouraged by the Logins for whom 'the happiness and comfort of the girl was of prior consideration.'¹⁹

Dalip Singh now decided not to marry a woman of society. Hence, on his way out to India with his mother's body, he visited 'the American Missionary School' at Cairo and asked the missionaries if they could provide him with 'such an article as he called a good Christian wife.'²⁰ The girl that he chose was of a semi-oriental birth. "She is not," describes Lady Levin "the wonderful beauty that my son supposed, but she is remarkably nice looking with very fine eyes and a sweet expression. In that respect she is better looking than Gouramma and a size larger. She looked simple and quiet, and rather dignified."^{20a} Such is the description of Dalip Singh's wife, Bamba. "She looks as if she had a perfect temper, and seems a simple minded girl above marrying for rank, and her ready submission, if it does not last too long, will make them happy together."

The couple lived very happily in England. In July 1866 a son (Prince Victor Dalip Singh) was born to them. About two years later they had another child (Fredrik Dalip Singh). In the

18. He got this impression because of the way the young Princess behaved in a party in Rome where the Maharaja was also present. A sister of hers later married Jung Bahadur of Nepal. If Dalip Singh had been married to Princess Gouramma and thus been related to Jung Bahadur these might have been greater complications about his affairs later. Jung Bahadur was not very well disposed towards the British. Col. Ramsay, Resident of Khatmandoo has expressed an opinion that but for the influence of the British Resident at his court and his own visit to England where he was very well received, Jung Bahadur might have joined the mutiny against the British. With such a strong supporter amongst the princes of India we may easily expect that Dalip Singh, could have been more troublesome.

19. 'Sir John Login and Dalip Singh'.

20. 'Recollections of Lady Login'.

20-a. Ibid, p. 239.

children could be seen the happy blending of the qualities of their parents. They inherited their love for the medieval from their mother. The Maharani spent many happy hours with her children in picture galleries and exhibitions, which enabled them to develop their natural tendencies and inborn love of the beautiful.²¹ From their father, they inherited their love for sport. Dalip Singh was famous in society for his marksmanship and his company in various shooting parties was eagerly coveted.

At court the young Maharani was given the welcome befitting a foreign princess. She did not know English when she came over but with the aptitude typical to Germans, she soon learnt the language. She very creditably performed her duties in society as the wife of a man who held almost an enviable position. Dalip Singh was a leading figure in social circles. In the country he lived like an English nobleman and according to all reports, no English nobleman played that role with greater success, whether he be regarded as landlord, a patron or a host. At court he was not only received as a Royal prince but treated invariably by Her Majesty with marked attention and consideration. He was a personal friend of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and of the rest of the Royal Family while Queen Victoria actually took the interest of a mother in him.

In May 1875 the Maharaja was elected a member of Carlton Club, and it was announced that he was going to contest the borough of Whitby at the ensuing general election. Knowing how deep seated in the breasts of Indian princes is that traditional pride which, in many cases, is carried to such an extreme as altogether to militate against the discharge of some of the most imperative duties they owe to their subjects, it was in the highest degree honourable to the Maharaja that he did not allow any such littleness to influence him. He had, obviously, profited by his residence in England, for it is clear he could not gain dignity, social status, or any other personal advantage by entering public life in the sphere which he now chose. His only motive could be a desire to serve his Country. Though the announcement caused some surprise in the political circles, it was very favourably received. The "Times of India" hailed the news with the highest satisfaction and wished the Maharaja every success in his contest with the

21. Princess Bamba in her preface to 'Portraits in Norfolk Houses' edited by Edmund Furrer.

Gladstonian candidate, if there was to be a fight at all. "The native Indian public" it declared "may well sink the questions of dignity which are not raised by the prince whom they personally affect. It should be worth a good deal for the Indian people to obtain a representative so eminently qualified to give a valuable and sound opinion on questions affecting their religion, laws, feelings and prejudices."²² At the same time it expressed an opinion that if the English Government approved of His Highness's desire to take part and assist in the public business of the country, looking to the circumstances under which he resided in England, Mr. Gladstone might have moved Her Majesty to confer upon him an English Peerage. There was, doubtless, no precedent for such an exercise of the Royal prerogative; but even so, there was also no precedent for the position of Maharaja Dalip Singh, once a King of the Punjab, deposed while a minor, for faults committed by his subjects under a regency which neither he nor the British could control—and since, a British subject. The position which he already held in society could not be rendered more anomalous by a seat in the House of Peers.

The intention of the Maharaja to contest a seat in the House of Commons was not encouraged by the Queen. As soon as Dalip Singh, who would not move a finger against the wishes of the sovereign, learnt this, he made up his mind. All idea of listening to solicitations to stand for a Borough was at an end.²³ Nevertheless it was considered advisable that the report should not be formally contradicted but that Dalip Singh should withdraw quietly from holding any conversation at the clubs or elsewhere having references to any such intention.

Queen Victoria had other intentions about Dalip Singh's desire to enter politics. If the Maharaja did wish to take part in public life she was strongly of opinion, that a seat in the House of Lords would be far more suitable.²⁴

When however, she mentioned this subject to Gladstone, the latter though favouring the idea pointed out an obstacle. The original intention of Dalip Singh, in order to get into the House of

22. 'Times of India', Bombay, 6th May 1873.

23. Colonel Oliphant attorney of the Maharaja to Major-General Sir Thomas Biddulph, 12th July 1873.

24. Sir Thomas Biddulph to Colonel Oliphant, dated at Balmoral, 13th September 1873.

Commons was to contest the constituency of Whitby. Now, the Gladstonian candidate for that constituency was none other than the Prime Minister's own son. Naturally he feared that a recommendation on his part for a grant of Peerage to the Maharaja 'might be construed by the opposition into an unworthy manoeuvre by him to get rid of his son's opponent.'²⁵ The position is fairly summarised by Gladstone himself in a private letter to Sir Thomas Biddulph, dated August 29th, 1873. He writes:—

"The Queen conversed with me sometime ago about the Maharaja and a Peerage. I expressed in principle a favourable view of the proposition to give him a Peerage.

"But I told Her Majesty a rumour had reached me that he intended to oppose my son at Whitby.

"I scarcely believed it would be true but I pointed out the difficulty which would arise if it could be said that I had advised the grant of a Peerage to the Maharaja in order to get rid of opposition at Whitby.

"I am afraid there is here something like a real if only temporary impediment.

"Since that time I have heard nothing to confirm the rumour, but also nothing to disperse it."²⁶

This however, was not such a serious obstacle and Sir Thomas Biddulph wrote to Colonel Oliphant that if the Maharaja had entirely abandoned all thought of Whitby, and the question of standing for it or for any other place was no longer entertained by him, or by others, (for it would have been nearly as prejudicial to Mr. Gladstone if the inhabitants of Whitby still expected the Maharaja to be a candidate as if he had intended himself to be one); that in that case, of course supposing that a Peerage could be acceptable to the Maharaja Mr. Gladstone would recommend the Queen to confer one. "Pray consider this matter well over", he added, "and if you think fit, place this letter in the Maharaja's hands."²⁷ The proposal actually made to Dalip Singh was not in a direct form; the Peerage being offered not for the Maharaja himself but on behalf of his two sons. How the original proposal was

25. *Ibid.*

26. W. E. Gladstone to Sir Thomas Biddulph 29th August 1873.

27. Sir Thomas Biddulph to Col. Oliphant, dated 13th September 1873.

so modified is obscure. Gladstone's party was defeated at the polls and Disraeli came to power with Duke of Argyll as Secretary for India. The Conservatives had been no party to the correspondence with Dalip Singh concerning a Peerage and were under no obligation to make any offer. The offer that was made must have been done at the instance of the Queen herself. The following letter of Rev. Osborne Jay describes the matter fully:

"Before I was ordained in 1880, I was acting for a time as Private Secretary to Lord Grenville at the Foreign Office, and was asked by the Maharaja to attend him at Elvedon at an interview with the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary for India.

"Queen Victoria has always intended to make Dalip Singh English in all save name. She sent the Duke, therefore, on a special mission.

"It was this, to offer Peerage for both Princes; a Marquisate for Victor, and an Earldom (or at least a Viscountcy) for Freddie.

"His Grace's letter outlining the proposal had been sent to me beforehand by the Prince.

"When, however, the formal interview took place in the great library at Elvedon, a noble apartment decorated with gold Indian shawls upon the walls, the Duke conveyed the Queen's offer and the Maharaja immediately declined it.

"I thank Her Majesty' he said, 'most heartily and humbly convey to her my esteem, affection and admiration. Beyond that I cannot go. I claim myself to be royal; I am not English, and neither I nor my children will ever become so. Such titles—though kindly offered—we do not need and cannot assume. We love the English and especially their Monarch, but we must remain Sikhs.'

"He walked across to a table and opened a drawer. 'This he said drawing out some paper', is the design for my coat-of-arms, drawn up by the Prince Consort and initialled by the Queen. I use them out of courtesy to Her Majesty, but I will not register them at the College of Arms, I am not English.

"The Duke said to me afterwards he had never seen truer dignity or more real independence of spirit. I have reason for

believing that the Queen, when told of all this, shared his opinion."²⁸

This incident looks curious when we realize that the one ambition of Dalip Singh was to found an English family. But the matter rests there and we hear no more about it.

What had happened to that dream and that deliberate desire to be converted into an Englishman? Obviously Dalip Singh realised the incompatibility of his life with the outlook of the English. It would not be too much to say that his financial position and the treatment he received at the hands of the Government ultimately assured him that, neither was there a genuine desire to assimilate him nor was it worth while, from his point of view, to mould his thoughts and wishes to suit the interests of the English and forego all his rights and claims, as he was being required to do, for the sake of the doubtful privilege of being considered an Englishman. In order to understand Dalip Singh's mind, it is necessary to have a full account of his relations with the Government. For reasons of space, however, we can only give a brief summary here.

Dalip Singh asserts that he never realised the true nature of his relations with the Government till after the death of his officially appointed guardian, Sir John Login. Lady Login deploras that after Sir John's death, Dalip Singh fell into bad hands. It is a fact that Login brought up his pupil in a way that he should feel contented with the position he was in. Login meant well and we might applaud his sagacity and forethought if we grant the maxim that 'ignorance is bliss'. For Sir John educated the Maharaja in the distorted version of official history. He even made Dalip Singh believe in the lies and fables that had been circulated in England regarding the alleged illegitimacy of Dalip Singh's birth, thus trying to make him look upon his past as something not altogether to be proud of, and the distinction granted to him in England as a gracious concession for which he ought to be thankful. After Sir John's death Dalip Singh read history in a different light, and gradually awakened to a sense that he had been swindled out of his kingdom by his guardian, and that he had been

28. Letter of Rev. Osborne Jay. Quoted in the preface to 'Portraits in Norfolk Houses' by the late Prince Frederick Dalip Singh, edited by the Rev. Edmund Furrer.

compelled to lay his signatures to a very unfair 'agreement' while he was only eleven years old. He might not have grumbled even then had his rights under what he called 'the iniquitous Treaty of Annexation' been rightly secured to him. But he saw time after time that the terms of that treaty were violated by the British Government, who chose to interpret them as best suited their purpose. He saw that though by treaty only the 'property of state' had been confiscated, his claim to his private ancestral lands even was not recognised. Even his jewels and other household effects that were found in the palace at Lahore had been sold by the British in a number of public auctions—a proceeding as shabby as it was unjust. It could hardly have created a better impression on the people of the Punjab when they saw the household articles of their revered Ranjit being sold like the property of a bankrupt. For Dalip Singh, however, it was a very unkind cut, since the property so auctioned contained some articles of intimate nature like miniature portrait of his father or swords and rifles made specially for the use of himself and his brothers.²⁹

Those, however, were matters of the past, and Dalip Singh would have been satisfied had he been offered a slight compensation for them. More annoying to him was the violation of that article in the treaty which granted him an annual pension. Under the Treaty 'not less than four or more than five' lakhs of rupees annually were to be set aside for the support of himself and his servants. Of course, the Government was entitled to apportion that sum as they pleased, but the Maharaja expected that all lapses of pensions under this fund would revert to him. This appears to have been the opinion also of others who signed the treaty. On the other hand, he was told that the grant was made for life, not for his life, and as the holder died it would revert to the Government. Naturally he asked what the phrase 'not less than four lakhs per annum' meant. The Government also lent him money, partly at 4 and partly at 5 per cent, and encouraged him to buy landed estate in England which could hardly bring in 3 per cent. 'While the payment of interest thus reduced his annual stipend, he felt he was paying interest to a Government whom he really believed to be indebted to him.'

29. Vide sale Catalogue of goods, etc., auctioned at Lahore, 1850, Reprinted London 1884, British Museum.

Nevertheless, he continued to play his part in the social life of the country as best as he could. In 1882 he was appointed a Justice of the Peace in the County of Suffolk, but that was the last feather in his cap, and soon after he divested himself of all these empty honours. His troubles and anxieties grew as his children were getting older and in 1882 he was reduced more or less to utter penury, as he says, he "was compelled to take out a Game Dealer's License and sell live animals and pheasant eggs in order to add to his income."³⁰ The following year he compiled a statement of his case and circulated it to the Members of Parliament. But for a few half-hearted questions by some Members in Parliament, Dalip Singh received no help from that quarter. Having failed to evoke sympathy in Parliament, Dalip Singh tried to lay his case before the English public through the medium of the 'Times', but with no better result. Finding his case in Parliament ignored while his appeal to the public had no effect, Dalip Singh was convinced that there was no desire in England to do him justice. He looked back at his social life in England. All his friends and companions were meant to be companions of fun and frivolity alone. He had gained their admiration and their friendship in the days of his glory when he was, next to royalty, the foremost figure of Court. His connections in England were all formed on an impersonal basis. He was still welcome at hunting parties because he was a good shot, he was invited to teas where one talked of the weather, or to spend week-ends where the beauty of the countryside and its flowers was the topic of conversation. His troubles and worries were his own affair.

His disappointment was great, as he felt, that, to him even that impartial justice for which England was famous had not been granted.³¹ He could complain to and put his pleas only before those people against whom his claim was. He repeatedly proposed, that, if owing to his peculiar position and the extraordinary circumstances of his case he was not allowed to seek redress in the ordinary tribunals of the country, his case might be put before arbitrators unconnected with the India Office. If these arbitrators were to decide against him he would at least acquit Her Majesty's Government of arbitrary action. He wrote personal letters to the

30. Petition of Maharaja Dalip Singh, Punjab Govt. Records.

31. Maharaja Dalip Singh to Queen Victoria personal letter. Lady Login's Recollections.

Queen on this subject. The Queen, however, could only sympathise, she could not set the grievance right, however much she might have wanted to. The subject was again referred to the India Office, who as before, chose to consider the matter closed. There could be no appeal. It was an 'Act of State'.

No wonder that after this last supreme effort at reconciliation had failed, Dalip Singh decided to leave the home of his adoption and go back to the home of his birth. In 1883 he sold his jewels to raise funds for the purpose, and in a visit to Lady Login announced his intention to go to India and leave 'England and her deceitful bureaucrats' for good. He said he intended to resume Indian life and be done with 'England and her hypocrisies for ever.' The Government, it seems, did not think Dalip Singh was serious about this matter. But when he finally made up his mind in 1886, and his boat was about to sail for Southampton, he received a visit from Col. Sir Owen Burne on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, and was offered a bribe of £50,000 if he should stay in England. This he declined, saying he would not accept even £50,000 and give a receipt in full.³² The offer, however, was another manifestation to him of the fact that the Government was conscious of its weak position in the case. However, if the Government in England were afraid of public reproach, the Government of India possesses extraordinary powers of which Dalip Singh had been warned by the Under-Secretary of State for India.³³ By virtue of these extraordinary powers, as soon as Dalip Singh came within the jurisdiction of the Government of India, he was arrested at Aden by the orders of Lord Dufferin and refused permission to proceed further.

Opinions will differ as to the Government of India's attitude towards Dalip Singh. General feeling at the time seems to have been that the Government acted more harshly than was necessary. Commenting on it Col. G. B. Malleon wrote in the "Asiatic Review" that the Dalip Singh incident would seem to show that England did not have a very happy way of dealing with personages who were objects of some political solicitude to them, and who had taken umbrage at the treatment they had received. As an

exile in Russia and a pensioner of the Czar, Dalip Singh could always be brought forward as a living instance of British harshness. Col. Malleon was of the opinion that nothing could have enhanced the little political importance possessed by Dalip Singh more than the step taken by the Government in forbidding his visit to India after the authorities in England had expressed indifference as to his journey. If the visit was dangerous, he argued, the safe plan was to have let the Maharaja continue his trip, so that the dangers might be revealed and that the author should take the consequence of his proceedings. If it was not attached with danger the proper course to pursue was to show complete indifference to the proceedings of an erratic individual.³⁴ "The Times of India" also opined that the Government was in error in attaching the importance they did to the effect of Dalip Singh's presence on Indian soil.³⁵

The arrest of Dalip Singh however proved to be the last straw on his back. The indignity was more than he could stand. He threw in the face of the Government the pension he had hitherto drawn, forsook Christianity, reembraced the religion of his childhood, abjured his allegiance and retired to the continent of Europe, seeking shelter at French and Russian courts as a political protege.

32. Maharaja Dalip Singh to 'Times of India', 1886.

33. Reply to a question of Mr. Hanbury by Mr. Howard, Under-Secretary of State for India.

34. Asiatic Review, Volume V, 1888.

35. The 'Times of India', Bombay, 30th June 1886.

Alexander Burnes' Mission to Kabul

By

E. R. KAPADIA, M.A. (DELHI), M.A. (LONDON),
Lecturer in History, St. Stephen's College,
Delhi.

The last word on Captain Burnes' Mission to Kabul (September 1837—April 1838) has not been said. Before 1851 the public had hardly any authentic information on his mission and on events immediately preceding the First Afghan War. The authorities at London had mutilated Burnes's dispatches from Kabul for their own purposes.¹ They wanted to justify their policy of invading Afghanistan—an invasion which led to a disaster unparalleled in the history of the British in India. To do that they garbled—and I must say that they did it most skilfully—the dispatches of Burnes in such a way that they contrived to show that Dost Muhammad and the other Barakzai Sirdars had acted as eager and determined foes of the British Government. Everything in Burnes's public letters which put Dost Muhammad's conduct in a favourable light or which showed any desire on his part to cultivate English friendship was suppressed.² This was done in order to justify the later conduct of the British Government towards him.

This dishonesty was exposed by Sir John William Kaye who in 1851 published his *History of the War in Afghanistan*.³ In this he gave an account of Burnes's Mission to Kabul, which came to be regarded as final and authoritative. But Kaye had written it under the stress of strong emotions roused by the shameless garbling of the historical dispatches; there was a strong desire in him to undo the wrong done to the dead man's memory, to please and satisfy his aged parents who had been trying for years to correct the impressions created by the Government's action. So that in exposing the dishonesty, Kaye, in his generous indignation,

tributed all sorts of virtues to Dost Muhammad and failed to point out the deficiencies of Burnes.

Now that it is possible to take a calmer and more detached view of the whole situation I shall try to show that Burnes was more responsible for the failure of his mission than either Lord Auckland or the unfavourable circumstances. Burnes was vain, immoral, a bad diplomat, neither judicious nor cautious, in short no match to Dost Muhammad in diplomacy.⁴ And Dost Muhammad, though by no means as hostile to the British Government as the garbled dispatches represented him to be, was certainly determined to take advantage of the English fears of Russia—fears unduly magnified by Burnes's ridiculous behaviour at the arrival of the Russian Agent at Kabul.⁵ He, therefore, demanded that Ranjit Singh should be asked to cede Peshawar before he would undertake to give up dealings with Persia and Russia, and ally himself with the British. This demand could not be accepted by the Indian Government.

I need not spend much time in describing the events leading to the dispatch of Burnes to Kabul on a so-called commercial mission. The chief motive was the dread of Russian influence in Central Asia. Persia under Russian influence was marching on Herat, wanting to recover the provinces which once had belonged to the empire of Nadir Shah. The British statesman feared for the safety of India. This fantastic fear—that it was fantastic in 1836 will be apparent if we study large scale maps—had gripped the English Foreign Office then in charge of Lord Palmerston. On June 25, 1836, Lord Palmerston wrote a dispatch, the product of his imaginary fears, which became the foundation of Burnes's mission to Kabul.⁶ This dispatch pointed out the need of raising "a timely barrier against the impending encroachments of Russian influence." Lord Auckland was to select his own mode of action and he

4. Burnes was a well-known geographer, traveller and explorer, but was a poor diplomat. The reception in London after his first visit to Kabul and Persia in 1832 was of the most flattering character and this had turned his head.

5. Read the account of his behaviour in Masson—*Journeys*, Vol. III, p. 463.

6. The dispatch may be read in full in Sir Auckland Colvin's book called *John Russell Colvin* p. 87.

1. Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XL.

2. See Kaye—*History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, pp. 202-4.

3. In 1859 long after the exposure an ungarbled edition of Burnes's letters was published, see Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV.

selected Burnes and sent him to Kabul, nominally on a commercial mission, but really to find out the extent of Persian influence in Kabul.⁷

When the British Government had at last decided to send a mission to Kabul, Dost Muhammad was very eager to receive it. He was eager for British alliance in order to protect himself from any attack by Persia under Russian influence, to guard himself against the Sikhs and to recover Peshawar from them. In fact ever since 1832, when Burnes had made his journey to Persia through Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad had been eager for British alliance. But at that time the British Government was not much interested in the affairs of Afghanistan, and Dost Muhammad was informed in general terms of the British Government's desire to cultivate a close friendship with the Afghans.⁸ The prospects of a mission from India, a quarter from which he had so far not received more than a polite letter, aroused great hopes in Dost Muhammad.

But before Captain Burnes reached Kabul, the Amir, Dost Muhammad, had to fight another unsuccessful battle for the recovery of Peshawar from the Sikhs (May 1837). The first attempt had been made in May 1835, a year after its annexation by the Sikhs (May 1834). It is necessary to mention these Afghan-Sikhs Wars over Peshawar, for it was partly on the rock of the irreconcilable hostility of the Sikh and Afghan that Burnes's mission to Kabul foundered. The war of 1837 is specially important for it was only after this war that Lord Auckland decided that the British Government must induce the Afghans and the Sikhs, through Burnes at Kabul and Wade at Ludhiana, to negotiate a peace honourable to both the parties. Till then they had refused to mediate, and had treated the Afghan-Sikh dispute as no concern of theirs.⁹

That was a proper attitude to take when the British Government had desired to avoid all intimate connection with a ruler

so remote. But this attitude ought to have been changed when it itself desired, in its own interests, an intimate alliance with the ruler of Kabul and was even sending an agent which it had so far refused to do. The British Government ought to have known from different letters it had received from Dost Muhammad that he attached the greatest importance to Peshawar, and that if the British Government asked for any favours from him, it must in its turn be willing to tackle the Peshawar question. Burnes realised what Lord Auckland had not, and in May 1837 he asked for political instructions.¹⁰ But Lord Auckland had yet no idea of utilising Burnes's mission further than for privately collecting information on Persian intrigues in Afghanistan and on the measures adopted by Russia with the object of extending her influence in Central Asia.¹¹ And so Burnes continued his journey to Kabul without any political instructions. The Government of India's policy at this time was to treat the Afghan-Sikh dispute as if it concerned the Sikhs and Afghans only, and to enter into negotiations with Dost Muhammad independently of the Peshawar question. But, as far as the Amir was concerned he was not prepared to discuss any commercial or political matters with the British Government independently of his dispute with the Sikhs, the age-long allies of the English. Lord Auckland ought to have realised early, which Burnes to his credit had done, that the two questions were inseparable, and that if he (Burnes) was authorised to enter into commercial discussions with Dost Muhammad he must at the same time be authorized to discuss the question of Peshawar and be given explicit instructions on the point.

Lord Auckland decided to invest Burnes with diplomatic powers only after the battle of Jamrud, the arrival of a Persian envoy at Kandahar and Dost Muhammad's receipt of a letter from Count Simonich, the Russian Agent at Teheran,¹² which had made the situation serious from the British point of view. Before Auckland's letter reached Burnes, the latter had reached Kabul and started political discussions with Dost Muhammad without any definite political instructions. Burnes was clearly guilty of

7. Kaye—History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. I, p. 182.

8. See Chapter V of my Mss. called the "The Diplomatic career of Sir Claude Wade: a study of British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans", which will be published shortly. Wade was British Agent at Ludhiana from 1823-1840.

9. See Cunningham—History of the Sikhs, p. 209.

10. Masson Papers-633, Mss. European, E. 161, No. 3; Burnes to Colvin, 12th May, 1837, f. 26.

11. Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, p. 14. Govt. to Burnes, 15th May, 1837.

12. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, Burnes to Govt. 1st Aug. 1837.

exceeding his authority, all the more so when, according to his own letter to Masson,¹³ he knew that Lord Auckland had intended to act only after he had reported from Kabul.¹⁴ Hence, when we are dealing with Burnes' mission to Kabul, we should constantly bear in mind that Burnes was a month in advance of his instructions. The unfortunate result of this fact was that the Government of India's policy was not put into operation until it was too late, and even then only partially. Not having any political instructions, Burnes entered into negotiations on the basis of his own ideas, which as I shall show, were quite different to those accepted by Lord Auckland.¹⁵ In view of the difficult circumstances, Burnes's ideas were not so sound. Burnes would not wait till instructions arrived from India because he was vain, ambitious and eager to settle the delicate questions himself,¹⁶ and also because he suffered excessively from *Russophobia*¹⁷ and believed that the arrival of letters from Russia had created such a dangerous situation that it was not advisable to wait and that he should do something at once to counteract Russian influence.

Now let us see what were the views of Burnes and of Lord Auckland on Afghan politics. Burnes was in favour of consolidating the Afghan Empire under Dost Muhammad. He said: "We should consolidate Afghan power west of the Indus, and have a King, and not a collection of chiefs. *Divide et impera* is a temporising creed at any time; and if the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance to Persia,...."¹⁸ He recommended that Dost Muhammad should be helped to take Kandahar and Herat, and Peshawar should be promised to him on the death of Ranjit Singh by a secret treaty.¹⁹

13. An English news-writer at Kabul, and a deserter from the army.

14. Masson—*Journeys*, Vol. III, pp. 443-4; dated 4th Sept. 1837.

15. Lord Auckland's ideas were those of Captain Claude Wade, the Governor-General's Political Agent at Ludhiana, in charge of British relations with the Punjab and Afghanistan. For political career of Wade (Sir Claude Wade) the reader is asked to wait for the publication of my book.

16. Kaye—*History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 188, note.

17. Masson—*Journeys*, Vol. III, p. 437.

18. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 251; Burnes to Govt. 2nd June, 1838.

19. Masson Papers, 633, Mss. Eur. E. 161, No. 3, Burnes to Colvin, 12th May, 1837. These recommendations being in favour of Dost Muhammad were omitted from the Blue Book published in 1839.

The views that were acceptable to Lord Auckland were quite contrary to those held by Burnes. They were the views of Captain Claude Wade, the Political Agent at Ludhiana and in charge of British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans. Auckland came to believe with Wade that the disunion of the Afghan chiefs was an element of security to the British;²⁰ hence his policy was to maintain the existing nearly even balance of the three Afghan powers,²¹ and not to consolidate Afghanistan under Dost Muhammad. He was also eager to remain on good terms with the Sikhs, and hence was not willing to put any pressure on Ranjit Singh to surrender Peshawar.²² He considered it inadvisable to provoke Ranjit Singh in an attempt to conciliate an inferior power like that of Dost Muhammad.

Such in brief were the views of Lord Auckland and of Wade on Afghan politics. These views mean that if Dost Muhammad insisted on making the cession of Peshawar *sine qua non* of his alliance with the British Government, no alliance could be made with him. And Wade knew that Dost Muhammad, being very eager to recover Peshawar, would try to take advantage of the British fears of Russia and make the cession of Peshawar a necessary condition of his alliance. Hence the policy he recommended for adoption was as follows. The British Government should promise Dost Muhammad security in his existing dominions and offer him its good offices for the establishment of peace with Ranjit Singh. But—and this was a very important point with Wade—the exercise of British mediation with the Sikhs was to depend entirely upon his relinquishing all intercourse with Russia and Persia. To prevent the Amir from taking advantage of the expected arrival of the Persian and Russian envoys, Wade suggested that Burnes should be instructed not to enter into any negotiations with him till he had first given up all connection with Russia and Persia. And if Dost Muhammad made any attempt to play off one power against the others, Burnes should bring him to a just sense of his situation by placing his dangers before him.

20. Kaye—*Op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 305-7. In those days British feared the Afghans; Zaman Shah's invasions were still fresh in mind.

21. British Museum, Additional Mss. 37691, f. 13, verso, Auckland to McNeill, 10th June, 1837.

22. Secret letters from India and Bengal, Vol. 23, p. 335, 21st February, 1838.

in a true light and making little of the British fears of Russia. He should be informed that, if he persisted in seeking the Persian alliance, the Sikhs and Shah Shuja would be free to march on Kabul.²³

This policy was accepted by Lord Auckland as is shown from his dispatch of 11th September, 1837,²⁴ to Burnes. This policy, I think, would have very likely brought Burnes' mission to a successful issue, for Dost Muhammad was extremely anxious to receive the British Mission, as is shown by Jabbar Khan's suggestion to Masson.²⁵ It is equally clear that he feared the Sikhs and Shah Shuja, especially if they were to have the open support of the British Government in their attack on Afghanistan. Even his main reason for overtures to Persia and Russia was only to intimidate the English into the surrender of Peshawar. He knew that no power could avail him except the English, and hence he never believed that Russia or Persia could help him to recover Peshawar, which was his great ambition to possess. If Burnes had refused to talk on any topic and had threatened to leave Kabul, unless a guarantee was forthcoming from Dost Muhammad of his willingness to have nothing to do with Persia and Russia; or had he threatened him (Amir) with helping the Sikhs and Shah Shuja in an invasion of Kaul, in case he persisted in playing off England against Russia, British mission would have been in a much stronger position at Kabul. Since it was not possible to purchase Dost Muhammad's alliance by concession and conciliation without alienating Ranjit Singh it was necessary to intimidate him.

This method of intimidating Dost Muhammad into identifying his policy with the British Government was not carried out by Burnes; firstly, because he was in advance of his instructions; secondly, because he suffered from *Russophobia* and allowed Dost Muhammad to take advantage of the British fears of Russia, and lastly, because he was an incompetent diplomat.

The Government of India's dispatch of 11th September, 1837, which invested Burnes with diplomatic powers and which gave

23. India Political Consultations, 11th September, 1837, 40; Wade to Govt. 25th August, 1837.

24. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, pp. 28-9.

25. Masson—*Journeys*, Vol. 3, p. 425-6; The Nawab Jabbar Khan told Masson that the best way to bring the Amir to the necessity of being a suppliant was to delay Burnes's arrival at Kabul.

him instructions as to the policy he was to adopt, did not reach him till 21st October. But long before that Burnes, who had reached Kabul on 20th September, had started political discussions with Dost Muhammad on the basis of his own ideas. Thus the Government's policy of not negotiating with the Amir till he had given a formal pledge of relinquishing all connections with Persia and Russia could not, at all, receive effect. Then, instead of playing upon the fears of Dost Muhammad, and keeping him in his proper place by hinting that, if he persisted in his intrigues with the enemies of Britain, the Sikhs would be free to march on Kabul, Burnes allowed the astute Dost Muhammad to act upon the English fears of Russia. This is clearly shown by his own dispatch of 5th October, 1837.²⁶

Burnes, suffering from *Russophobia*, was easily outmanoeuvred, and informed the Amir—though he had no business to do so and no grounds for his belief—that Ranjit Singh intended to make some change in the management of Peshawar and might be induced to restore it to Sultan Muhammad Khan.²⁷ Now this belief of Burnes that Ranjit Singh intended to give up Peshawar was just his impression, his fancy, which had no foundation in fact. As early as 3rd June, 1837, Wade had informed Burnes that though it would be very advisable for Ranjit Singh to give up Peshawar to Sultan Muhammad Khan such an event was not of probable occurrence.²⁸ Wade knew that the Singh sirdars were strongly opposed to a step which could be ascribed to a fear of the Afghans. But Burnes was neither willing to accept the opinions of Wade nor use the information which the latter supplied him concerning the Sikh Government, though Wade knew the Sikh court more intimately than Burnes. There was considerable ill-feeling and jealousy between the two. There is now no doubt that Wade was right, that Ranjit Singh never intended to give up Peshawar. The principle of holding fast whatever he had once obtained was strongly implanted in him; he knew that the occupation of Peshawar was a drain on his finances, but he did not cling to it the less tenaciously. He would not have given it up except under threat

26. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, pp. 30-4.

27. Idem, Burnes to Govt. 5th Oct. 1837, p. 32. Sultan Muhammad was Dost Muhammad's half-brother and it was from him that Ranjit Singh had captured Peshawar.

28. India Political Consultations, 26th June, 1837, No. 45.

of war from the English, who were not so foolish as to risk war with the disciplined Sikh army in order that Dost Muhammad might have Peshawar. And yet Burnes said that the Maharaja was thinking of relaxing his hold on Peshawar.

When Burnes said that the Maharaja intended to make some change in the arrangements for the control of Peshawar, Dost Muhammad seized the opportunity and proposed to hold the city himself tributary to Lahore, even agreeing to send his son to ask the Maharaja's forgiveness.²⁹ Burnes not only agreed to forward the proposition to the Governor-General, but, according to Masson, even encouraged the Amir to hope that his terms for holding Peshawar would be accepted by the British Government.³⁰ There is no doubt that Burnes thought Dost Muhammad's terms very reasonable, moderate, even humiliating to himself, and approved of them.³¹ But he did not for a moment consider how the proposals which he had agreed to forward would affect Ranjit Singh's interests, and, whether it was necessary to ascertain his wishes before giving any false hopes to the Amir. Throughout his negotiations at Kabul one factor is apparent that Burnes totally failed to take the Sikh power into consideration. He never fully considered how his proposals to conciliate Dost Muhammad would affect the British alliance with Ranjit Singh. He failed to comprehend the situation as a whole and only concerned himself with one side of the problem, viz., how somehow or the other, to conciliate Dost Muhammad and secure his alliance against Russia and Persia. Left to himself he would no doubt, as Kaye thinks,³² have conciliated Dost Muhammad, but at the cost of alienating or fighting Ranjit Singh. He considered it a great honour for Ranjit Singh to have Dost Muhammad as his tributary as it is apparent from his statement: "there was surely nothing in them (the proposals of the Amir to hold Peshawar) contrary to the dignity of His Highness; an independent chief offers to pay allegiance and regular tribute and to send a son to sue for forgiveness."³³ But Burnes failed to realise that, though it might

29. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV; Burnes to Govt. 5th October, 1837, p. 33.

30. Masson—*Journeys*, Vol. 3, p. 456 and 459.

31. See Burnes's letter of 30th October, 1837, to a private friend—Kaye op. cit. Vol. I, p. 185-6.

32. History of the war in Afghanistan, Vol. I, p. 312.

33. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, p. 91; Burnes to Govt. 27th December, 1837.

not be contrary to the dignity of the Maharaja to have Dost Muhammad as his tributary (but only for Peshawar), it was not in his interest to increase the Afghan power on his frontier specially when he ruled over a large number of Muslims and had possessed himself of provinces which once had belonged to the Afghans.

Burnes's correspondence had to pass through Wade's office, and Wade took this opportunity to express his opinion freely on Burnes's proposals. He refused to communicate Dost Muhammad's terms to Ranjit Singh. Firstly, because he believed that Ranjit Singh would not be willing to give Peshawar to one whose power "he will be less able to control than he is at present, from the additional strength which the Amir seeks to acquire."³⁴ Secondly, because Burnes, at the time of transmission of Dost Muhammad's propositions, was not possessed of Government's instructions of 11th September, 1837, which declared the relinquishment by Dost Muhammad of all alliance with the powers west of the Indus as the indispensable preliminary condition of the British adjustment of his quarrel with the Sikhs. The third reason was that the giving of Peshawar to Dost Muhammad would not have been compatible with the accepted policy of preserving the existing division and balance of authority in Afghanistan. Any increase in Dost Muhammad's power, which would be the result of acquiring Peshawar, would at once induce him to take Kandahar and Herat. The execution of such a design would make Afghanistan too powerful for British comfort. The British had not forgotten the threatened invasions of India by Zaman Shah, forty years before, which had then filled them with anxiety and alarm.

The Government of India agreed with Wade that Ranjit Singh would not be willing to surrender Peshawar on the terms proposed by the Amir; it approved of his resolution not to enter into any negotiations until assured that Dost Muhammad had relinquished all connection with Persia.³⁵ And Burnes who was ever keen on consolidating Dost Muhammad's power, was reminded [Governor-General's letter, 2nd December, 1837] that the un-

34. India Political Consultation, 27th December, 1837, 9; Wade to Govt., 7th November, 1837.

35. Ind. Pol. Cons. 27th December, 1837, 15, Govt. to Wade, 25th November, 1837. A copy of this letter was sent to Burnes.

doubted policy of the British Government was to preserve unimpaired the existing balance of power in Afghanistan and to refrain from being a party to an arrangement which would give to any one chief an undue preponderance.³⁶ Dost Muhammad should give up his ambition to recover Peshawar, and in the precarious position in which he was placed, he should gratefully accept British good offices for the peace and security of his remaining territory.³⁷

But Dost Muhammad had different opinions of his position and power; he believed his alliance was of such great importance to the British Government in order to ward off Russian menace that he could put his own price upon it. He felt his opinion to be more justified when in December, 1837, a Russian Agent, named Vitkevich, reached Kabul with a letter from the Czar. His arrival completely overpowered Burnes, who abandoned himself to despair. Masson, who was with him, says that the English envoy "bound his head with wet towels and handkerchiefs, and took to smelling bottles," and remarks that it was humiliating to witness such an exhibition, and the ridicule to which it gave rise.³⁸ There might be some exaggeration in this statement, but that Burnes was greatly alarmed is true as is shown by the tone of his letter of 23rd December, written immediately after the arrival of the Russian Agent. Such disconcertion must have increased Dost Muhammad's determination to profit by English fears and obtain his own terms. In his letter of 23rd December, Burnes pressed on his Government the necessity of an immediate adjustment of the Peshawar dispute with the Sikhs. He believed that it would not be asking too much of Ranjit Singh to act with promptitude in the adjustment of a matter which, "while it hangs over, brings intrigues to our door, and if not checked may shortly bring enemies instead of messengers."³⁹ Burnes at the same time recommended help to Dost Muhammad for the defence of his territory and the consolidation and extension of his power.⁴⁰

36. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, Govt. of Burnes, 2nd December, 1837, p. 65.

37. Idem; also Govt. to Burnes, 27th December, 1837, p. 98.

38. Masson—*Journeys*, Vol. 3, p. 463.

39. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV; Burnes to Govt. 23rd December, 1837, p. 91.

40. Idem.

Lord Auckland was not frightened by Russia and did not believe that it could do much harm to the Indian Empire⁴¹ and therefore he was not to be frightened into making doubtful concessions. Wade advised him not to help Dost Muhammad which might not only rouse the jealousy of the Sikhs but also enable the Amir to overthrow his neighbours. The British Government must not be a party to a change in the political condition of the ruler of Kabul, "which while it tend to increase his power would diminish our means of restraining him."⁴² Lord Auckland followed Wade's advice and informed Burnes that there was no need to consolidate Dost Muhammad's power as the existing division of power was decidedly the most beneficial for British interests. At the same time, the Amir was informed that he should make overtures of peace to Ranjit Singh without insisting on the recovery of Peshawar, for the British Government was not prepared to press Ranjit Singh to give it up. The British Government in endeavouring to induce the Maharaja to refrain from prosecuting further hostilities against the Kabul territories, had made the utmost demand "which our interest and long-established friendship admit, upon the consideration which that powerful chief is willing to show to our wishes."⁴³

While the above letter was on its way to Kabul, Burnes had received Lord Auckland's letter of 2nd December, 1837, in the third week of January. According to the instructions given in that letter Burnes advised the Amir to waive his claims to Peshawar and be content with whatever arrangement Ranjit Singh might make with Sultan Muhammad Khan. The Amir replied that it would be less injurious to him to leave Peshawar directly under hands of the Sikhs than in the hands of his half-brother,⁴⁴ who was his enemy and was trying to arrange a combination with Shah Shuja and the Kandahar chiefs against him. Dost Muhammad's brother, Jabbar Khan, then proposed a compromise, suggesting

41. Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 483. This belief was also due to Wade's influence—See Wade's letter of 3rd June, 1837, to Burnes: Ind. Pol. Cons. 26th June, 1837, 45, also Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, p. 199, Wade to Govt., 21st March, 1838.

42. Ind. Pol. Cons. 14th February, 1838, 56; Wade to Govt., 13th January, 1838.

43. Parl. Papers, 1859 (2), XXV; Govt. to Burnes, 20th January, 1838, p. 113.

44. Idem; Burnes to Govt., 26th January, 1839, p. 121.

that Peshawar be delivered conjointly to the Amir and Sultan Muhammad. The Amir observed that such an arrangement would remove his fears.⁴⁵ It is not easy to discern the force of Dost Muhammad's argument that he was in less danger from the Maharaja than Sultan Muhammad. Why should the security which he had enjoyed from 1824 to 1833, when Peshawar was in the hands of Sultan Muhammad Khan (and it might be pointed out that the enmity between the brothers was not of recent date, but went back to 1823) be diminished by the retrocession of the same place to the same party; and the more so if Peshawar was restored to Sultan Muhammad on condition of his remaining at peace with Dost Muhammad? If Dost Muhammad had desired only security from his half-brother and the Sikhs, that security was assured him in his remaining possessions in return for identifying his policy with that of the British Government, and relinquishing all connection with the powers to the westward. But Dost Muhammad did not want security dependent on the guarantee of a third power; he wanted to provide for his security by consolidating his dominions and for that some control over Peshawar, he believed, was necessary.

But the British policy, as I have explained, was neither to let Dost Muhammad consolidate his dominions, nor to put any pressure on Ranjit Singh to give up Peshawar, Lord Auckland having only a year ago checked Ranjit Singh's progress in the direction of Sind. Such being the case no attempt was made to settle the Peshawar question on the basis of the new proposal made by Jabbar Khan.⁴⁶ Lord Auckland informed Burnes that the British Government did not intend to press any scheme for the relinquishment of Peshawar on Ranjit Singh; that must depend upon the pleasure of the Maharaja whose right to that place could not be questioned.⁴⁷ Dost Muhammad was asked to rest satisfied with an arrangement which would leave him in the enjoyment of his existing possessions "under the assurance of the continued exercise of our good offices for his security from further attack, the Sikh remaining, as at present, in the immediate

45. *Idem*; Burnes to Govt., 26th January, 1839, p. 123.

46. Kaye was doubtful whether any attempt was made to bring about a settlement of the Peshawar question on the basis of this proposal—*op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 201, note.

47. *Parl. Papers*, 1859 (2), XXV, Govt. to Burnes, 7th March, 1838, p. 174.

occupation and management of the Peshawar territory."⁴⁸ If he insisted on having some share in the management of Peshawar, without which no amicable understanding would be acceptable to him, no settlement could be made and Burnes might leave Kabul.

However, before this letter of 7th March, 1838, reached Kabul, Burnes had put an end to his negotiations with the Amir and had decided to leave the Afghan capital. On 21st February, he had received the Governor-General's letter of 20th January which said that Peshawar must be left to the Sikh. No adjustment was possible when the British Government called upon the Amir to give up all connections with Persia and Russia and promised in return only security from further Sikh aggressions. The Amir considered that the British Government was offering too little in return for too much; he must at least have Peshawar.

Burnes left Kabul on 26th April, 1838.⁴⁹ Even before his departure Vitkevich, the Russian Agent, was publicly sent for and paraded through the streets of Kabul. Dost Muhammad had decided to throw himself into the arms of Russia and Persia. There is no doubt, as Kaye was at great pains to prove, that till 21st February, 1838, the Russian mission made little progress at Kabul.⁵⁰ Dost Muhammad would have preferred the English alliance to any Russian or Persian alliance, for he wanted to recover Peshawar and knew that only the English could help him. But if Peshawar was not to be given to him he did not want the English friendship either.⁵¹ And I have conclusively proved that Peshawar could not have been promised to him.

If Dost Muhammad could not be conciliated by the promise of Peshawar, in what other way could he have been induced to

48. *Parl. Papers*, 1859 (2), XXV, Govt. to Burnes, 7th March, 1838, p. 174.

49. He stayed in Kabul for extra month and a half after the termination of negotiations because he was waiting for the return from Kunduz of Dr. Lord and Lieut. Wood.

50. See Kaye—*op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 195-9 and 204.

51. That does not mean that Dost Muhammad had any "avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India", as Auckland unjustly charged him with in his *Simla Manifesto* of 1st October, 1838, (see Kaye—*op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 369-74) which was issued in order to justify the extreme and unnecessary step of invading Afghanistan. He only wanted Peshawar which was a natural object of his ambition, but which the English could not give him.

identify his policy with that of the British Government? The only other way was to intimidate him into being an ally of the English, without insisting on the recovery of Peshawar and remaining satisfied with the promise of the British to check further Sikh aggressions. That was Auckland's and Wade's policy, but Burnes failed to carry it out. He entered into political discussions with Dost Muhammad without waiting for political instructions. Then by his lack of diplomatic reserve he laid open to the Amir British fears of Russia and Persia and the importance attached to the establishment of the British influence at Kabul. Such a diplomacy led Dost Muhammad to believe that it was in his power, by coquetting with the Russian Agent, to intimidate the English into assisting him to recover Peshawar. He committed an error and by allying himself with Russia and Persia took that fatal step against which Wade had warned him as early as 1835. Wade had written to Masson: "if they (Afghans) reflect on their relative situation to the British Government, they *must* see that such a step (of seeking the support of a rival power) *might* prove more destructive of their independence than *any* which they could possibly take."⁵² And it nearly proved fatal to Dost Muhammad.

If Dost Muhammad failed to achieve his object the British also failed, and their failure was more tragic as it led to a bloody and costly war which ended in the most terrible disaster that ever happened to the Company's arms in India. They failed to threaten Dost Muhammad into submission and to bring him to make a proper estimate of his situation both as regards the Sikhs and the British Government.

Before I end this article I must say one thing more. If Lord Auckland's silent acquiescence in the garbling of Burnes's dispatches, submitted to Parliament, was dishonest, Kaye's account of Burnes's mission is unfair to Lord Auckland. Kaye seems to lay the whole blame on Lord Auckland and his advisors for the failure of the mission.⁵³ He accuses Lord Auckland of offering Dost Muhammad nothing substantial; but he ought to have realised that Peshawar, which the Amir wanted, was not his to give. Lord Auckland was in a very difficult position and when

he had chosen an incompetent diplomat like Burnes to conduct negotiations he was bound to fail,⁵⁴ and we are not astonished that he did. Lord Auckland is no doubt also to be blamed for the failure of the mission. He failed to realise early that there was an inseparable connection between the Afghan-Sikh dispute, and, the British Government's anxiety to establish an influence in Afghanistan. He ought to have realised this connection before Burnes had left for Kabul or even while he was at some distance from his destination and should have given him definite instruction as to how he was to settle the Afghan-Sikh dispute. Failure to do so led to the conduct of the mission on ideas quite different to those held by the Government of India.

52. Masson—*Journeys in Afghanistan*, Vol. III, p. 332

53. Kaye—*op. cit.* pp. 308-12.

Citerior India of Rufinus, Circa 400 A.D.

By

T. K. JOSEPH, B.A., L.T.,
Trivandrum

I. Is Citerior India Bombay-Gujarat?

In his article entitled 'The Apostles of Kalyana', appearing in the current number of *J. I. H.* (Aug. & Dec., 1943), Rev. Fr. A. C. Perumālil, S.J., of Travancore, says (on pp. 74-75) that "Citerior India" allotted to St. Bartholomew of the first century A.D. in the *Ecclesiastical History of Rufinus* (345-410 A.D.) is neither Eastern Ethiopia (or the Somali Coast) nor Arabia Felix, but the Bombay-Gujarat region of India proper.

II. Citerior India probably Arabia Felix

But Rufinus's statements about St. Bartholomew and St. Frumentius (the historian's contemporary) considered in the light of the history of the Axumite (Ethiopian) Kingdom and Arabia in the days of Rufinus and Frumentius (4th-5th cent. A.D.), have led me to the conclusion that Rufinus's Citerior India is Arabia Felix (South Arabia). It may be pointed out that Fr. Perumālil has ignored the history of the above two regions.

III. Extracts from Rufinus

For convenience of reference relevant extracts from Rufinus's contemporary account are given below (from Book I, Ch. 9). *Vide* also page 74 of Fr. Perumālil's article.

"Parthia fell to Thomas; to Matthew fell Ethiopia; and the Citerior India adherent to it is said to have fallen to Bartholomew. Placed between this and Parthia, but far to the interior, lies Ulterior India."

"A certain Meropius, too, a philosopher of Tyre, desired to go to (Ulterior) India, taking with him two boys" (Frumentius and Edesius).

"While the philosopher (and the boys) began to return (from Ulterior India).....the ship in which he was sailing put in at a certain port."

By "the barbarians in those parts" "the boys.....were brought to the King."

Years elapsed, and "Frumentius, while holding the Government of the country.....displayed the greatest interest to sow there the seeds of the Christian faith."

Then "they returned to our shores. Edesius hastened to Tyre to see his parents and relatives; but Frumentius went to Alexandria."

There "Athanasius ordained him," and "bade him return whence he had come."

"On Frumentius' return to India as bishop....an innumerable number of barbarians were converted to the faith."

"We know these things as they are done, not from popular rumour, but from the lips of Edesius himself afterwards a priest of Tyre, who had formerly been the companion of Frumentius." (The portions in brackets are mine).

According to Murray's Dictionary of Christian Biography, 1911, Rufinus the historian met the priest Edesius at Tyre.

IV. *Latin Adhaerens=Greek sunēmnenē*

Rufinus seems to be the only known ancient writer who has used the terms Citerior India and Ulterior India. He says, as shown above, that Citerior India is "adherent to" (*adhaerens*) Ethiopia: "Ethiopia, eique adhaerens Citerior India Bartholomaeo dicitur sorte decreta."

A

1. What did Rufinus mean by "adhaerens"? Fr. Perumālil says (on p. 74) that the author must have used the word in the sense of 'extending towards,' and that the meanings 'clinging to' and 'near' "do not explain the text of Rufinus." On p. 75 Fr. Perumālil gives 'projecting much in the direction of' as a paraphrase of 'extending towards.'

2. Could Fr. Perumālil please quote other instances from Rufinus, in which the author has used *adhaerens* and other words

from the same root in the sense of extending towards, or projecting much in the direction of?

B

1. It has to be noted that none of the five Latin dictionaries consulted by me and four of my friends, give extending towards as one of the meanings of *adhaerens*. For instance, Ainsworth's Latin-English Dictionary (London, 1845) gives *adhaereo*, *adhaerere* the meanings "to stick to, to adhere, or keep close to," and John T. White's Latin-English Dictionary (1926) gives "to stick, or cleave to, to hang to, to cling to, embrace closely." Cassell's Dictionary has "to hang to, stick to, cleave to, adhere; to border on, to be near; to keep close to a person, to be always at the side of." The recent Clarendon Press Dictionary agrees.

2. If there is any dictionary, ancient or modern, that gives 'extending towards' as one of the meanings of *adhaerens*, let that be cited.

C

1. Extracts from some Latin authors of the first four centuries are given below:—

- (a) "Vincis modica silva adhaerebat" (=a little forest was *adherent* to the vineyards).—C. Tacitus, 1st cent. to 134 A.D.)
- (b) "Humerum adhaeret" (=put something to the shoulder).—Tertullian, 160-245 A.D.
- (c) "Adhaereat lingua mea gutteri meo" (=let my tongue *cleave* to my palate).—St. Jerome, 342-420 A.D.

2. If there are Latin authors of the first four centuries, who have, on the other hand, used *adhaereo* in the sense of to extend towards, they had better be cited.

D

1. The church historian Socrates (5th cent.) who, about a hundred years after Rufinus, reproduced in Greek the latter's Latin text, translates *adhaerens* by the Greek word *sunēmmenē*, which means abiding in, abiding near, standing near, cleaving to, and not extending towards as Fr. Perumilil translates *adhaerens* fifteen centuries after Rufinus.

2. A Latin translation of Socrates renders the sentence containing *sunēmmenē* thus:—"India quae Aethiopiae confinis est," i.e., "the India which is bordering on Ethiopia," and not extending towards Ethiopia.

V. Axumite and Arabian History

Rejecting the meaning 'extending towards', we find South Arabia as the land geographically 'near' Ethiopia, and (though separated by the narrow Red Sea) *politically* "adherent to" Ethiopia in the days of Rufinus, Edesius, and Frumentius, up to about 378 A.D.

"To the Axumite King Aeizanes", says Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, s.v. 'Axumite Kingdom', "the emperor Constantius addressed a letter in A.D. 356". (This letter, we know, demanded that Frumentius the Bishop of Axum be sent to that Roman emperor). The Encyclopedia continues: "Aeizanes and his successors style themselves" (as seen from inscriptions) "Kings of the Axumites, Homerites, Raidan, the Ethiopians, the Sabaeans, Silee, Tiemo, the Bugaites, and Kasu. This style implies considerable conquests in South Arabia, which, however, must have been lost to the Axumites by A.D. 378".

The article on Arabia in the same work says: "The Abyssinians who had migrated from Arabia to the opposite coast of Africa began to flow back to the south of Arabia, and in the fourth century they became strong enough to overturn the Himyarite kings and establish a dynasty of their own".

As Frumentius was for several years Bishop of Axum in Ethiopia he must have been aware of the above fact, viz., that in his days South Arabia formed part of the Axumite kingdom. His younger brother Edesius too who had lived in Axum with Frumentius, must have known that fact and told Rufinus about it while narrating (in Tyre) his and his brother's adventures and work in those regions. Hence we find Rufinus using the word *adhaerens* in his reproduction of Edesius's oral account, and not the Latin word or words for "extending towards", or "projecting much in the direction of".

VI. Was Arabia called India?

From the above discussion in the light of history it can be inferred that South Arabia (Arabia Felix) was Rufinus's Citerior India. His Ulterior India will then be the rest of Arabia (to the

west of Parthia so called). But Fr. Perumalil is of the opinion that "the India of the early Greeks and Romans... is the one and only India which is bounded on the West by the River Indus, on the North by the Himalayas, on the East by the mouth of the Ganges, and on the remaining side by the Indian Ocean".

In the Bibliography appended to his article on 'The India of the Early Greeks and Romans' in *JBORS*, 1942, Part IV, Fr. Perumalil says, against No. 44, that Rufinus has used "India" 4 times in his history. This number (4) is not correct. For we find India used as many as 6 (six) times even in his short account of Frumentius (from which extracts were given in section III, ante), thus:—

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Citerior India adherent to. | 4. to go to India. |
| 2. into Ulterior India. | 5. return to India. |
| 3. lies Ulterior India. | 6. the parts of India. |

In none of these six instances does Rufinus give any clear indication that by *India* he meant our India—"the India of the Brahmins". On the contrary it may be inferred, as shown already, that the Citerior and Ulterior Indias mentioned by him are two parts of Arabia.

VII. Who called Arabia India?

Did Rufinus himself call those two parts of Arabia Citerior India and Ulterior India? We cannot say for certain. Perhaps Edesius the Phoenician referred to those two parts under the names Citerior India and Ulterior India in giving Rufinus his *viva voce* account of himself and Frumentius, and Rufinus merely recorded Edesius's terms Citerior and Ulterior India. We have yet to study ancient Phoenician and other non-Latin and non-Greek records to find other instances of the use of the terms Citerior India and Ulterior India for parts of Arabia.

VIII. The Two Brothers' Journeys

According to the above interpretation of Rufinus's (or Edesius's) Citerior India and Ulterior India, the itinerary of Frumentius and Edesius will be briefly as follows:—

1. They started from Tyre in Phoenicia.
2. Reached some part of Arabia (let us call it 'Ulterior Arabia') north of Arabia Felix (South Arabia) and sojourned there for some time.

3. From the sea coast of Ulterior Arabia they boarded a ship to return to Tyre by way of the Red Sea.

4. "While they began to return", i.e. after a few hours, the ship put in at a certain port in Ulterior Arabia itself to take in water.

5. The two brothers were captured at that port, and taken by ship across the Red Sea to the king of Ethiopia and some parts of Arabia, residing in Axum the capital.

6. The brothers lived in Axum and sowed "the first seeds of faith" in Ulterior Arabia (and Ethiopia) and then returned home.

7. Frumentius stopped short at Alexandria, and returned to Axum as Bishop, and continued "sowing the seeds of faith", but was later on replaced by another Bishop sent by the Roman emperor Constantius. (See section V, para 2).

8. Edesius went straight to Tyre, where the historian Rufinus met him and obtained "from the lips of Edesius himself" an account of his and his brother's journeys to Ulterior Arabia and Ethiopia, and of the work of sowing the first seeds of faith in Ulterior Arabia, i.e., the portion of Arabia north of Arabia Felix (S. Arabia).

Origin of Sikh Militarism

By

ANIL CHANDRA BANERJEE, M.A., P.R.S.

Lecturer in History, Calcutta University.

According to Sikh tradition, Guru Hargobind's birth was due to the kindly intercession of Bhai Budha, an old Sikh of Guru Nanak's time. Entertained by Guru Arjan's wife, Bhai Budha said, "As thou hast given me food to my heart's content, so shalt thou have a son to thy heart's content. He shall be very handsome and brave, possess spiritual and temporal power, become a mighty hunter, ride on royal steeds, wear two swords, be puissant in battle, and trample on the Mughals".¹ Probably this prophecy about the character and achievements of Hargobind had been put into the mouth of Bhai Budha by a later chronicler.² It is almost certain that a Guru engaged in hunting and fighting was not likely to capture the imagination of a saintly Sikh steeped in Guru Nanak's tradition. Indeed, we are told that, when Bhai Budha saw young Hargobind in military dress, he mildly remonstrated with him. The Guru replied, "...it is in fulfilment of thy blessing I wear two swords as emblems of spiritual and temporal authority. In the Guru's house religion and worldly enjoyment shall be combined—the cauldron to supply the poor and needy and the scimitar to smite oppressors".³ Another anecdote recorded by Macauliffe shows that this ideal of combining religion and worldly enjoyment did not appeal to many Sikhs younger and less religious-minded than Bhai Budha. After Hargobind's accession some masands⁴ represented to the Guru's mother: "...The Guru girdeth on his arms, but for faqirs to lord it over men is a course that involveth peril. The preceding five Gurus never handled

arms. If Jahangir hear of our Guru's doings he will be angry; and where shall we hide ourselves"? Although the Guru's mother reminded the masands of Bhai Budha's prophecy and showed a courageous face, she addressed her son as follows: "My son, we have no treasure, no state revenue, no landed property, no army. If thou walk in the way of thy father and grand-father, thou shalt be happy". The Guru replied that God was his guardian.⁵

What strikes us as very strange and almost inexplicable is that a boy, who was only eleven years of age,⁶ should have pursued so novel a policy in the face of so general an opposition. At the time of his installation ceremony he declared, "My seli⁷ shall be a sword-belt, and I shall wear my turban with a royal aigrette". He then sent for his arms, and arrayed himself in martial style, so that his splendour shone like the sun.⁸ Where did the boy find his inspiration? Just before his death Guru Arjan had observed to the Sikhs assembled near him on the bank of the Ravi, "...Go to my son the holy Har Gobind, and give him from me ample consolation....Let him sit fully armed on his throne, and maintain an army to the best of his ability....Let him....in all respects, except the wearing of arms hereby enjoined, adopt the practices of the preceeding Gurus....".⁹ It is very doubtful whether these words fell from the dying Guru's mouth at that critical moment. When Hargobind replied to the remonstrances of Bhai Budha and his mother, he told them that he was fulfilling Bhai Budha's prophecy; he did not even refer to his father's last testament. When his mother remonstrated with the masands, she also referred to Bhai Budha's prophecy, but not to her husband's command. When she remonstrated with her son, she asked him to 'walk in the way of thy father and grand-father'.¹⁰ She would not have uttered these words if she had been aware of Guru Arjan's last desire. It appears, therefore, that Bhai Budha's prophecy and Arjan's command belong to the same class, both being put into the chronicles by later writers anxious to explain the sudden transition to militarism.

1. Macauliffe, Vol. III, pp. 29-36.

2. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 200.

3. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, p. 4.

4. According to Sikh tradition, the masands had become very corrupt and dishonest, and they now trembled for their misdeeds. We need not presume, however, that their dread of a contest with the Mughals was due to their fear of punishment for corruption.

5. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, p. 3.

6. Hargobind was born in 1595, and Arjan lost his life in 1606.

7. A woollen cord worn as a necklace or twisted round the head by the former Gurus.

8. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, p. 2.

9. Macauliffe, Vol. III, p. 99.

10. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, pp. 3-4.

The transition to militarism was certainly sudden. Trumpp says that Arjan was 'the first Guru who meddled with politics',¹¹ and this view has been accepted by some modern writers.¹² Although Mohsin Fani may be quoted in favour of this theory,¹³ it is not acceptable to the modern Sikhs, who argue that the Gurus maintained a praiseworthy balance between asceticism and prosperity.¹⁴ The author of *Evolution of the Khalsa* has tried to reconcile history and tradition by observing that, although "the Sikh might not as yet have been conscious of his political destiny and the motive force behind the movement might still have been purely religious", yet "looked at from the point of view of the established state the new community was already reaching a position when it could no longer be treated with indifference."¹⁵

If we accept Dr. Banerjee's conclusion, it follows that till the last days of Guru Arjan the motive force behind Sikhism was purely religious. Cunningham seems to hold the same view, for he observes, "Arjoon became famous among pious devotees, and his biographers dwell on the numbers of saints and holy men who were edified by his instructions."¹⁶ We are thus compelled to conclude that militarism originated after Arjan's death, and if we are to believe the Sikh chronicles, it originated *immediately after* that tragedy, and the originator was a boy eleven years of age, who quietly set aside the legitimate misgivings of all around him, including his mother and the saint to whose kindly intercession his birth was due, and sat fully armed on his throne. He did not take time to think over the problem; he sat fully armed on the throne as soon as he heard the news of his father's death. It is clear that this conclusion is almost absurd. The Sikh chronicles have either suppressed some incidents in Guru Arjan's career, or given us a garbled version of the early career of Hargobind.

It is not quite unlikely that we should come across germs of militarism in the later years of Arjan's life. Although no direct evidence in favour of this surmise is at present available, there is

some amount of indirect evidence which deserves scrutiny. When Hargobind sat fully armed on his throne he undoubtedly set a new ideal before the Sikhs, an ideal that ran counter to the Sikh tradition established by Nanak and closely followed by his four successors. Strangely enough, the mild opposition which came from the masands as well as from Ganga, the Guru's mother, was based, not on tradition, but on expediency. They were not surprised to find the young Guru violating the old tradition; they merely referred to the military and financial weakness of the Sikhs in comparison with the strength of the Mughal Empire. No doubt the masands said, "The preceding five Gurus never handled arms"; but this statement is immediately followed by the words, "If Jahangir hear of our Guru's doings he will be angry; and where shall we hide ourselves"? Apparently the masands did not consider militarisation as incompatible with their faith; they objected to it because Jahangir was too strong an antagonist. The Guru's mother took the same position, for she said, "My son, we have no treasure, no state revenue, no landed property, no army".¹⁷

Apparently the Sikhs of 1606 had already familiarised themselves with the possibility of militarism. No one but Guru Arjan could have turned their attention in that direction. We do not suggest that the fifth Guru actually collected troops or took part in bloody contests; but he certainly gave the Sikhs a new organization and possibly a new orientation of outlook. He was the *Sachcha Padshah*, his seat a *takht* or throne, and the assembly of his followers a *darbar* or court. These terms may have been used in the time of the earlier Gurus,¹⁸ but in Arjan's time they probably assumed a new significance. The Sikh chronicles contain indirect references to this slow and almost imperceptible, but none the less real and revolutionary, transformation. Prithia's jealous wife observed to her husband about Arjan, "The Emperor and kings bow before him. Wealth ever cometh to him...."¹⁹ Chandu Shah's agents were astonished at the Guru's regal state and retinue.²⁰ Mohsin Fani heard from the Sikhs that the Guru "was in former times the Raja called Janak and united the dignity of a king to that of a saint".²¹ Dr. Banerjee rightly observes,

11. *Adi Granth*, Introduction p. [xxx].

12. Narang, *Transformation of Sikhism*, p. 37. Latif, *History of the Punjab*, p. 253.

13. *Dabistan*, Eng. trans., Vol. II, p. 270.

14. *The Gurdwara Reform Movement and the Sikh Awakening*, p. 18.

15. Vol. I, p. 265.

16. *History of the Sikhs*, Chap. III.

17. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, p. 3.

18. *The Gurdwara Reform Movement and the Sikh Awakening*, p. 20.

19. Macauliffe, Vol. III, p. 28.

20. Macauliffe, Vol. III, p. 72.

21. *Dabistan*, Eng. trans., Vol. II, p. 268.

"... apart from its spiritual aspects the Guruship was also becoming a symbol of material power.... the Sikhs had begun to regard their Guru not only as a spiritual but also as a temporal ruler".²² Even modern Sikhs seem to accept this position when they praise the Gurus for *Raj Yog* or balance between asceticism and prosperity.²³ *Raj Yog* certainly implies *Raj*.

Guru Arjan was a remarkably pious man, and he may not have been fully conscious of this slowly developing tendency towards temporal greatness.²⁴ But it was natural and inevitable. Sikhism is a religion of householders; it has never favoured asceticism.²⁵ So long as the number of the Sikhs was small, and each of them had the opportunity of coming into personal contact with the Gurus, the lesson taught by Nanak was a living reality to the community as a whole. The Sikh then lived a life of devotion and service. When the numbers of the Sikhs increased,²⁶ there was a natural lowering of the standard. Many converts entering into the fold must have been temperamentally incapable of absorbing the lessons taught by the Gurus. The distance between the Guru and the disciples must have widened due to the increase in the number of the latter, and this factor probably contributed something to the weakening of religious zeal in the Sikh community. A typical illustration may be found in the quick degeneration of the masands. They were strictly forbidden to appropriate for their own maintenance any portion of the offerings collected by them, and they were expected to earn their living by

22. *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 263.

23. *The Gurdwara Reform Movement and the Sikh Awakening*, p. 19.

24. The author of the *Panth Prakash* gives us a significant popular tradition: "It is said that the power and pelf of the world kept, as it were, at a distance of twelve miles from Nanak and six miles from Angad. It knocked at the door of Amar Das and fell at the feet of Guru Ram Das, while in Arjun's time it got admission into the house." "The fable very beautifully describes the gradual growth of the social and political power of the Sikhs." (Narang, *Transformation of Sikhism*, p. 37, note 1).

25. Macauliffe, Vol. II, pp. 37, 90, 193, 214.

26. Mohsin Fani says, "the number of these sectaries increased everywhere, so that in the time of Guru Arjunmal it became very considerable, and at last there was no place in any country where Sikhs were not to be found." (*Dabistan*, Eng. trans., Vol. II, p. 270). In his *War*, XI, 14-31, Bai Gurdas gives a list of the more important *Sangats* which includes Lahore, Kabul, Kashmir, Delhi, Agra and Dacca. The masand system introduced by Guru Arjan was intended to mould these distant centres of the faith into a closely knit system.

engaging themselves in some sort of remunerative occupation.²⁷ Macauliffe says that by the time of Hargobind's accession they had become very corrupt and dishonest.²⁸ If corruption had entered into these direct agents of Guru Arjan so soon after the introduction of the masand system, we may easily believe that corruption, in the shape of greed for money and lust for power, had taken hold of many Sikhs by that time.

The ground was thus prepared for a new development: the Sikhs were ready, perhaps anxious, to make the dominion of their *Sachcha Padshah* a reality. The acquisition of military strength was the primary necessity. There is no evidence to show that Guru Arjan had felt the urge to militarise the Panth. There is enough evidence to show that his son took the first step in that direction. Two important questions, however, must be answered before we can assess the value of Hargobind's contribution to the growth of the Panth. The first question is: Did he aim at the seizure of power, or at defending his disciples against Mughal persecution? The second question is: At what stage of his career did he sit fully armed on his throne?

We propose to take up the second question before we discuss the first. In a very interesting article published in the *Indian Antiquary*²⁹ Dr. Banerjee, author of *Evolution of the Khalsa*, deals with some aspects of the career of Guru Hargobind. He concludes that Hargobind was imprisoned by Jahangir about 1607 and released in 1619. If we accept Macauliffe's view³⁰ that the Guru's son Ani Rai was born in 1618, we must conclude that the Guru was released about 1616. It is clear, however, that, whatever the date of release may be, he was imprisoned about 1607, for Dr. Banerjee shows that the delay in his marriage with Nanaki was due to the fact that "after his accession Hargobind had very little time to think of his marriage".

The imprisonment, according to Mohsin Fani, was due to the following reasons: "He had many difficulties to contend with; one of them was that he adopted the style of a soldier, and wore a sword contrary to the custom of his father, maintained a retinue,

27. *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 260.

28. Vol. IV, p. 3.

29. Vol. LV, 1926, pp. 45-50, 66-71, 101-102.

30. Vol. IV, p. 67.

and began to follow the chase. The emperor in order to extort from him the balance of the fine which had been imposed on Arjan Mal, sent him to Gwalior".³¹ Mohsin Fani obviously places militarisation before imprisonment. If we are right in assuming that Hargobind was imprisoned in 1607, we must recognise that Mohsin Fani agrees with the Sikh chroniclers in saying that Hargobind 'adopted the style of a soldier, and wore a sword' immediately after his accession. We are thus compelled to revert to the old difficulty. How could a boy of eleven or twelve initiate such a revolution 'contrary to the custom of his father'?

Mohsin Fani appears to have been a personal friend of Guru Hargobind. It is, therefore, difficult to reject his testimony with regard to the sixth Guru's career. But Cunningham characterises him as 'a garrulous and somewhat credulous Mahomedan'. We must remember that his book was written some years after Hargobind's death, i.e., nearly half a century after the beginning of the Guru's imprisonment. Is it very unreasonable to suppose that in his old age Mohsin Fani's memory played him false, so that he transferred later episodes of Hargobind's career to his early life?

A close study of Mohsin Fani's passage quoted above shows that there is no necessary connection between the two sentences. We may very well read them separately and say that the Guru's imprisonment was due solely to the Emperor's desire³² to realise the balance of the fine previously imposed upon Guru Arjan. We may agree with Dr. Banerjee when he says, "The object of the emperor seems to have been to keep the young Guru as a hostage to ensure the orderliness of his followers and possibly also to realise the fine imposed on his father". There is no evidence to show that the Sikhs had become disorderly in 1607, but the Emperor may have apprehended troubles after Arjan's death. It is unnecessary to assume that nothing but the sudden militarisation of the Sikhs in 1606 could cause uneasiness in the Emperor's mind.

According to the chronological scheme prepared by Dr. Banerjee, Hargobind entered into the service of Jahangir in 1619

31. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, pp. 21-22. Troyer's translation (*Dabistan*, Vol. II, pp. 274) is wrong.

32. This desire may very well have been due to the malicious instigation of Chandu Shah, as the Sikh chroniclers say.

or 1620, i.e., immediately or soon after his release, and continued in his employ till the latter's death in 1627. Mohsin Fani says that the Guru served the imperial government in the humble capacity of a Faujdar's assistant.³³ Some Sikh chronicles,³⁴ however, claim that the Guru was appointed a sort of supervisor over the Punjab officials with a command of 700 horse, 1000 foot and 7 guns, as a reward for his services against Raja Tarachand of Nalgarh, whom he had subdued and brought to the Emperor. Dr. Banerjee shows convincing reasons for rejecting the Sikh version of the Guru's official position, but he observes that the Guru may have been put in charge of a minor command and sent against one of the rebellious Hill Rajas in the Kangra region. For such a command previous military experience was not in those days an essential pre-requisite. It is not unlikely that Hargobind's success in this enterprise led, not only to his appointment as a Faujdar's assistant, but also to the grant of some military rank in his favour. He may not have received charge of 700 horse, 1000 foot and 7 guns; he may have been allowed to raise some troops and keep them under his control. It is probable that the collection of troops by the Guru³⁵ should be referred to this stage of his career. He had tasted the wild joy of war in the imperial campaign against the Hill Rajas. He was a young man of 25 or so. He was surrounded by disciples anxious to win temporal prizes which had not been coveted by the early Sikhs. It was natural for the Guru to take a plunge into the unknown.

This assumption gives us a reasonable explanation of Hargobind's struggle against Shah Jahan. If we believe that he assumed the style of a soldier in 1606, we must admit that his military ardour remained cool and ineffective for more than eight years,³⁶ i.e., from his release in 1619 to Jahangir's death in 1627. Nay, more; he accepted service under the Mughal government, and rendered loyal service to the man who had killed his father and kept him in confinement for twelve years. Dr. Banerjee says, "His service under the Government served him as a cloak and he began

33. *Dabistan*, Eng. trans., Vol. II, p. 274.

34. *Panth Prakash*, p. 107, and *Itihas Guru Khalsa*, p. 128, cited in Dr. Banerjee's article.

35. See Macauliffe, Vol. IV, pp. 4, 5, 52, 76, and *Dabistan*, Eng. trans., Vol. II, p. 277.

36. The period may be longer than eight years, for we do not know the date of his first encounter with Shah Jahan's troops.

to increase his military resources". This explanation attributes to the Guru a deliberate design, but it is hardly consistent with Dr. Banerjee's statement that Hargobind was 'leading a disorderly life'. Moreover, it is significant that the complaint of the Sikhs who requested Bhai Gurdas to remonstrate with Hargobind on his general conduct refers, not to the period immediately after his accession, but to the post-imprisonment period. Does it not allow us to infer that the Guru's conduct during the pre-imprisonment period was not objectionable from the traditional point of view? The following *pauri* composed by Bhai Gurdas narrates the deviations of Guru Hargobind from the tradition established by his predecessors:

"People say the former Gurus used to sit in the temple; the present Guru remaineth not in one place.

The former Emperors used to visit the former Gurus; the present Guru was sent into the fortress by the Emperor.

In former times the Guru's darbar could contain the sect; the present Guru leadeth a roving life and feareth nobody.

The former Gurus, sitting on their thrones, used to console the Sikhs; the present Guru keepeth dogs and hunteth.

The former Gurus used to compose hymns, listen to them, and sing them; the present Guru composeth not hymns, nor listeneth to them, nor singeth them.

He keepeth not his Sikh followers with him, but taketh enemies of his faith and wicked persons as his guides and familiars".³⁷

Bhai Gurdas does not dispute the truth of the people's allegations. In another connection he indirectly describes the Guru as a 'play-actor.' He suffered punishment for this objectionable remark.³⁸ A man who appeared in this light to his devoted disciples was hardly a shrewd and secretive statesman collecting troops under the cloak of his official position. He was more probably a bold adventurer, intoxicated with the wild joy of battle and chase, and more fond of enterprising and rough 'enemies of his faith and wicked persons' than of mild, hymn-singing Sikhs.

37. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, pp. 76-77.

38. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, pp. 135-137.

The causes of Hargobind's troubles with the Mughals—the abduction of Kaulan, the seizure of the coveted horse, and the quarrel about a bird—do not reveal any deep-seated design on the Guru's part. The Guru's military exploits, as narrated in the Sikh chronicles,³⁹ leave the impression that they relate to the career of a somewhat careless and exuberant adventurer, not to that of a capable politico-military leader who prepares his plan of campaign before rushing out to the foray. It may also be of some significance that his adventures⁴⁰ ended with the battle of Kartarpur which is said to have been fought in 1634. The Guru was then about forty years of age; the period of irresponsible enthusiasm was over.

If our readers accept the view which we have tried to explain above, the answer to our second question, viz., Hargobind's motive, will not be far to seek. He did not seek to avenge his father's death. He served the Emperor who had killed his father, and when he raised his arms against his successor, trifles like the possession of a hunted bird supplied the motive. It should also be noted that during the last eleven years (1634-1645) of his life he made no attempt to fight against the Mughals. It is difficult to explain his silence during this long period, if we picture him as a man crying for revenge. He was not too old for fighting; he was not troubled by any difficulty within the Sikh church (like Prithia's rivalry with Arjan). Nor is it permissible to suppose that his aim was to defend his disciples against Mughal persecution. Jahangir persecuted the Gurus, but he left the Sikh community alone. Hargobind himself was a victim of his persecution, but the adoption of a conciliatory attitude by the Guru after his release, and the continuation of that attitude up to at least Jahangir's death, prove quite conclusively that militarisation of the Panth was not required by the necessity of self-defence. There was no persecution during that period, and no dread of persecution as long as the Guru remained in Jahangir's service. Moreover, an experienced man like Hargobind, who enjoyed a unique opportunity of coming into close contact with the Emperor and his vast military organisation, must have realised the impossibility of defending himself and his community if the Emperor really

39. Macauliffe, Vol. IV, pp. 38-48, 82-93, 179-186, 190-193, 198-212, 263.

40. Except, perhaps, the expedition to Nanakmata (which Macauliffe, however, places before Hargobind's first open breach with the Mughals) and the doubtful alliance with Raja Tarachand against the Nawab of Rupar.

wanted to crush them. This point is equally applicable against the presumption that the Guru wanted to seize political power and created a military force for that purpose.

Must we say, then, that Hargobind's adoption of the style of a soldier was nothing more than an aimless venture? In a sense it was so. As a young member of Jahangir's retinue he came into close contact with the Mughal army, and the exciting prospect of a soldierly life allured him. He found a favourable atmosphere within the Sikh community, many members of which, as we have explained above, were more interested in wealth and power than in the salvation-giving hymns. These Sikhs—call them the degenerated Sikhs of the new school if you will—were reinforced by many adventurers, including Pathans like Painsa Khan, who found in the Guru's prestige and influence a covetable rallying point. Trumpp says, "As the Guru's expeditions were nearly always directed against the Muhammadans and the extortionate provincial authorities, we need not wonder that his popularity fast increased with the ill-treated Hindu rural population; every fugitive or oppressed man took refuge in his camp, where he was sure to be welcomed without being much troubled about religion, and the charms of a vagrant life and the hope of booty attracted numbers of warlike Jats, who willingly acknowledged him as their Guru, the more so as he allowed his followers to eat all kinds of flesh, that of the cow excepted".⁴¹ This description of Hargobind's system is quite in conformity with the information available from some Sikh chronicles⁴² about Guru Teg Bahadur. "According to them", says Trumpp, "the Guru appears by no means as a harmless spiritual instructor, but riding at the front of well-armed disciples, who, if not willingly provided, levied contributions on the Zamindars and the inhabitants of the villages through which they passed, and made predatory incursions on the Muhammadan population. The Guru had not only a strong band of Sikhs with him; but he engaged also some rural clans to enter his service, promising them that he would pay them handsomely and put them in the way of obtaining booty".⁴³ Probably Teg Bahadur had more spiritual interest than Hargobind: while the former composed many hymns, the latter composed none. This, in addition to the

lapse of time and the consequent familiarity with the military tradition, probably saved Teg Bahadur from the censure which the old-fashioned Sikhs passed upon Hargobind through the mouth of Bhai Gurdas, an eminent representative of that spiritualism which was being gradually eroded by the flowing stream of Time. As Guru Har Rai once said, "the vessel which Baba Nanak had constructed for the salvation of the world had almost foundered".⁴⁴

41. *Adi Granth*, Introduction, p. lxxxiv.

42. Attar Singh, *Travels of Guru Teg Bahadur and Guru Gobind Singh*.

43. *Adi Granth*, Introduction, pp. lxxviii-lxxix.

44. Macauliffe, Vol. V, p 151.

"The Gosain Brothers"

By

P. N. BHALLA, M.A.,

Lecturer in History, Government College, Ajmer.

Himmat Bahadur and Umraogir, the two Gosain brothers played an important part in the history of Northern India in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Anarchy and political upheavals held out great opportunities to them. They were guided by the sole consideration of carving out a jagir for themselves, and in order to realise that object they changed their loyalties as frequently as the occasion demanded.

Very little is known about their antecedents. It is said that when quite young their widowed mother sold them to Rajindergir Gosain, the Naga chieftain, who held the village of Moth in Jhansi district. In 1750 Rajindergir entered the service of Nawab Safdar Jang and both the brothers accompanied him. After his death in 1752 the Nawab appointed Umraogir as Commander of the Naga troops. For the next twenty-three years both the brothers continued to serve in the Vazir's forces, although once they deserted to Jawahir Singh, the Jat ruler. They were held in high honour by the Nawab Vazir Shuja-ud-Dawla, and commanded one thousand horse. They took part in the battle of Buxar (1764). The reappearance of the Marathas in the Doab in 1769 alarmed the Vazir and he sent Umraogir to their camp with the object of getting first hand information about their movements.¹ In 1771 when the Maratha danger increased still further, the Nawab posted both the brothers to guard the frontier town of Cawnpore.² During the year 1772-73 the Nawab Vazir embarked upon the Rohilla campaign and the conquered territory was placed under the charge of the Gosains. Nawab Asaf-ud-Dawla on his accession in 1775 conferred fresh honours upon them. Umraogir was given a jagir of one lakh of rupees a year, while Himmat Bahadur was

confirmed in the Niyabat of the Doab for 48 lakhs of rupees instead of 52 lakhs at which it was formerly farmed.³

(2)

Finding that the Lucknow Government was getting weaker day by day, the Gosains thought of setting up an independent government in the Doab. Their treasonable designs alarmed the Nawab Vazir and he applied for British help. The Gosains took advantage of the ill-feeling that existed between the Nawab Vazir and Mirza Najaf Khan, the Minister of Shah Alam, and deserted to the latter in the year 1776. They joined Najaf Khan's forces with their six or seven thousand followers. Himmat Bahadur rose high in Najaf Khan's favour. He took part in the siege of Dig and acted as the agent of the Delhi Government in conducting negotiations with the Marathas, who were at that time hard pressed by the English and needed Mughal help badly.⁴

In April 1782 Mirza Najaf Khan died and Delhi henceforward became a scene of chronic revolutions. But Himmat continued to occupy a dominant place in the affairs of the Empire. He became the right-hand man of Mirza Shafi and plotted on his behalf with Sindhia in order to get the help of the latter to crush Muhammad Beg Hamadani, the Governor of Agra, who was aiming at setting up an independent Government. Through the mediation of Himmat Bahadur a conference took place between Mirza Shafi and Sindhia on the river Chambal in the last week of June, 1783.⁵ But in October 1783 Mirza Shafi was assassinated by Afrasiab Khan and Muhammad Beg Hamadani. Afrasiab Khan became the Mir Bakshi of the Empire and Himmat Bahadur passed into his service.

The Delhi Government was very weak. Afrasiab Khan too sought for Sindhia's help. Himmat Bahadur seems to have been a partisan of Sindhia and almost all the negotiations were carried through him. He made every effort to bring Afrasiab Khan to Sindhia's camp and arrange the interview between them.⁶ The intended interview did not take place for Afrasiab Khan was

1. Select Committee Proceedings; 25 Sept. 1770; pp. 684-5.

2. Select Committee Proceedings; 18 July 1771; pp. 246-47.

3. Secret Proceedings; OC. 20th Ap. 1775; No. 3.

4. Cal. of Persian Correspondence (CPC); Vol. V; p. 276 and p. 321.

5. See Browne's Correspondence; p. 83-84; No. 18.

6. C.P.C.; Vol. vii; No. 109 (Nos. 65-69).

assassinated on 2nd November, 1784. This again threw the affairs of the State into great confusion. The parties at Delhi plotted and counter-plotted with Sindhia. Major Browne, the British envoy in Delhi, worked for the restoration of Majid-ud-Dawla. Khadija Begam, the sister of Najif Khan, desired to marry her daughter to Prince Sulaiman and secure his appointment as Mir Bakshi. But Himmat Bahadur plotted to appoint Khadim Husain Khan, son of the late Afrasiab Khan, and at that time only six years old, as the successor of his father.⁷ His object in doing so was to get the management of everything into his own hand during the child's minority. Sindhia was led to adopt this step by promises of money, for the private treasure of the late Afrasiab Khan was huge and was closely guarded by Himmat Bahadur and Narayan Deo.

During the year 1784 the British Ambassador Major Browne was at Delhi. He witnessed all these political upheavals and has preserved a vivid account of them in his letters to Warren Hastings, the Governor-General. He closely watched the activities of Himmat Bahadur and especially deputed two persons from whom he received twice a day an account of all his proceedings.⁸ He sent to the Governor-General the copies of a number of letters said to have been written by Himmat Bahadur to Afrasiab Khan and Sindhia. The authenticity of these letters is doubtful for Warren Hastings, while recapitulating their contents remarked "There is an acrimony in the style of these letters that seems more calculated to irritate us than to persuade those to whom they are addressed and when we consider that they have been produced to Major Browne by persons who are strongly interested in effecting a misunderstanding between us and the Marathas, we cannot help doubting their authenticity...."⁹

(3).

When after Afrasiab's death Sindhia came to the helm of affairs at Delhi, Himmat Bahadur rose high in his favour. Sindhia's main motive in showing favour to Himmat Bahadur was that from his influence over the relatives of the late Mir Bakshi, Afrasiab Khan, he might be of service to him in acquiring the possession of his treasures. Moreover the Raja's knowledge of the country

was of great help to Sindhia in making fresh conquests. Sindhia was largely indebted to him for the peaceful acquisition of the Fort of Dig. He employed him in carrying on negotiations with the Sikh Chiefs.

But the signs of friction between these two ambitious Chiefs soon became visible. Sindhia's failure to recover Afrasiab Khan's wealth infuriated him. Himmat Bahadur's failure to secure the surrender of the Fort of Agra further lowered his prestige in the eyes of his master. Early in 1786 Raja Narayan Das, the partisan of Himmat was put into prison for the misappropriation of Afrasiab's property. His imprisonment alarmed and frightened Himmat Bahadur. The fear that he might be called to account began to haunt his mind. He was asked to take one month's pay in advance and retire to Vrindavan. Sindhia also sent Kesho Pandit with some force to drive Umraogir out of the places that he had lately occupied. Umraogir assassinated the said Pandit and this worsened relations. Himmat Bahadur fully knew that his fall was only a matter of time. Taking advantage of the absence of Sindhia and especially his pre-occupation in the affairs of Jaipur State, Himmat Bahadur fled away from the Maratha Camp at Muttra and crossed the river Jumna. Henceforward the Gosains became bitter enemies of Sindhia and were the greatest source of trouble and worry to him for the rest of his life.

Popular opinion connected Himmat Bahadur's flight with the disagreement of Anderson¹⁰ with Sindhia. We do not know for certain as to what part Anderson played in bringing about the flight of the Gosain Chief. In his letter to the Governor-General Anderson positively states that he had no hand in Himmat Bahadur's flight and that he left Sindhia's camp and retired to Agra only because of the disagreement that arose between him and the Maratha Chief regarding the treatment of certain servants.¹¹ As a proof of his innocence Anderson mentions the fact that after his flight Himmat Bahadur corresponded with him, but as a faithful friend he passed on all these letters to Sindhia. It is true that after his flight Himmat Bahadur made every effort to seek an interview with Mr. Anderson, but the intended meeting does not seem to have taken place.¹²

7. C.P.C.; Vol. vi; p. 426. TR. 22; pp. 384-91; No. 91.

8. See Browne's correspondence; pp. 607-8.

9. Secret Proceedings; 11 May 1784; p. 228.

10. Anderson was British Resident in Sindhia's camp.

11. See Secret Proceedings; 29 March 1786; pp. 1064-66 and pp. 1076-77.

12. See Secret Proceedings; 5 April 1786; pp. 1276-77.

(4)

After their flight from Sindhia's camp the Gosains took refuge in the territory of the Nawab Vazir of Oudh. Sindhia wrote to the English asking them to hand over Himmat Bahadur to him on the ground of the fugitive being a tributary of the Maratha Empire as well as for his being a servant of the Mughal Emperor. But the English Government turned a deaf ear to Sindhia's request. At the same time the Governor-General made it clear to the British officers in the Vazir's court that they were to use their utmost endeavours to prevent any intercourse between the Vazir and Himmat Bahadur, the latter under no circumstances was to be allowed to proceed to Lucknow. The Gosains were to be allotted a place of residence in some outlying district of Oudh and were to receive no encouragement whatsoever from either the Vazir or the English in their treasonable designs against Sindhia. Such were the main threads that guided the attitude of the English towards the Gosains during their stay in the Vazir's territory.¹³

The Gosains took advantage of the weakness of the Vazir's Government and lost no opportunity in harming Sindhia. Their family and other effects were protected by Almas Ali, the Oudh Governor of Etawa, who was not on good terms with the Vazir and was a strong partisan of the Gosains. They tried to recover their *jaidad*, particularly the town of Firozabad. Accordingly the Fort of Firozabad was besieged in 1787. The collapse of Sindhia's authority in the Daob, and his defeat at Lalsot still further emboldened the Gosains. Sindhia defeated Umraogir in a battle against Ismail Beg, and carried him away as prisoner in April 1788. But when his position became still more precarious he tried to conciliate the Gosains and released Umraogir on 18th May, 1788. Himmat Bahadur had in the meantime fled away from the Vazir's territory and joined the Emperor Shah Alam.

The activities of the Gosains during the year 1787 had alarmed Sindhia, the Vazir and the English Government. Sindhia protested against the asylum granted to them and the Governor-General impressed upon the Nawab Vazir the necessity of issuing a proclamation declaring that the Gosains have forfeited their protection. The Vazir accordingly issued a proclamation¹⁴ on 9th

13. See Secret and Pol. Dept. Consultations, 24 Jan. 1787; No. 14.

14. See Original Receipt, 460, CPC; vii; p. 420.

September, 1787 ordering the arrest of the Gosains. The said proclamation remained ineffective mainly because it was not backed by force.

The year 1788 was very critical for the Delhi Empire. In January, 1788 Shah Alam left Delhi in order to conquer the lost possessions of the Crown from the local Chiefs. The ruler of Jaipur submitted to the Emperor through the mediation of Himmat Bahadur. Next the Emperor attacked Najaf Quli Khan, who was in possession of Goculgarh. Himmat played an important part in the siege of the town and secured the defeat of the Chief. In the meantime the Rohillas attacked Delhi and struck a serious blow to the Mughal Empire. On 31st July, 1788 Shah Alam was deposed. Himmat Bahadur fought on behalf of the Emperor and defended the capital but he had to yield to the superior forces of the Rohillas.

(5)

Early in the year 1789 Sindhia tried to imprison Himmat Bahadur under the pretence of the latter's having employed the magical art to take away his life. He also wished that the family and effects of Himmat Bahadur be sent out of the Vazir's dominion and handed over to him. But in both these objects he failed. Himmat Bahadur's family was driven out of the Vazir's territory but not handed over to Sindhia. Himmat Bahadur on his part took advantage of the rivalry that existed between Sindhia and Ali Bahadur¹⁵ and sought the protection of the latter. He rose high in Ali Bahadur's favour. He served his new master right down to the latter's death in 1802. The Maratha conquest of Bundelkhand was mainly due to him. In view of his services Ali Bahadur assigned him large revenues. It is said that he enjoyed a *jaidad* amounting to 13 lakhs of rupees.

Ali Bahadur died on 24th September 1802 in his camp before the fort of Kalinjar. He left two sons. Zulfikar Ali Khan who was a minor and was on the spot, and Shamsheer Bahadur, who was grown up, but was away in Poona. Himmat Bahadur and Ghani Bahadur feared that the accession of Shamsheer Bahadur to the masnad would deprive them of all power. So they plotted to place Zulfikar Ali on the masnad.¹⁶ In this attempt they were defeated

15. Ali Bahadur was the Peshwa's grandson. Had been sent by the Poona Govt. to aid in the settlement of Bundelkhand.

16. See Political Proceedings; OC. 16 Sept. 1802; No. 28 (Enclosure).

because Shamsher Bahadur was too quick in asserting his claims. He left Poona, reached Kalinjar and occupied the masnid. This offended Himmat Bahadur and Ghani Bahadur and they began to negotiate with the English for the transference of Bundelkhand into the hands of the Company.

(6)

On 31st December, 1802 the English concluded the Treaty of Bassein with the Peshwa Baji Rao II. According to the sixth article of the supplement to the Treaty of Bassein the Peshwa agreed to cede in perpetuity to the Company, from the provinces of Bundelkhand, territory yielding an annual revenue of Rs. 3,616,000.¹⁷ So the English took the first opportunity to take advantage of the internal condition of Bundelkhand and ally themselves with one of the parties. Himmat Bahadur's invitation and offer of help was much welcomed.

The alliance between Himmat Bahadur and the English was negotiated by Col. John Meisselback and Mr. Mercer respectively. An agreement was concluded on 4th September, 1803. According to it Himmat Bahadur was to help the English in the conquest of Bundelkhand, and the English in their turn promised him a *jaidad* of 20 lakhs of rupees and agreed to secure the release of his brother Umraogir who had been confined on account of a conspiracy against the Govt. of the Nawab Vazir.¹⁸

Accordingly in September, 1803 when the British forces under Col. Powell crossed the river Jumna, Himmat Bahadur joined them together with his 4000 horse and 8000 foot. He was received with a salute of thirteen guns.¹⁹ His military strength, his influence over the local Chiefs and his knowledge of the country contributed largely to the success of the British. The letters of Mr. Ahmuty, the Collector of Allahabad, and Mr. Baillie, the Agent to the Commander-in-Chief, bear witness to his services.²⁰

17. See Aitchison; Vol. vii; p. 59.

18. See Secret Proceedings; OC. 3 March 1804; No. 11.

19. See Secret Proceedings; OC. 3 March 1804; No. 17.

20. See Secret Proceedings; OC. 3 March 1804; No. 19 and No. 176 and Secret Proceedings; OC. 9 Aug. 1804; No. 241.

(7)

Himmat Bahadur died on 3rd June, 1804 at Kanwaruh, near Bandah, at the ripe old age of seventy.²¹ His tomb lies two miles away from Bandah. After his death the *jaidad* granted to him was not renewed to Raja Narindergir, his son and successor, on the plea that the *jaidad* granted to Himmat Bahadur was personal and not hereditary. Anyhow in view of the services of Himmat Bahadur, Raja Narindergir was granted an assignment in Bundelkhand which was exchanged for a territory in Cawnpore district, in parganah Sikandra, by the grant dated the 1st March, 1806.²² Umraogir, whose release the English secured in September, 1803, was granted a pension of Rs. 1000 per mensem. He died on 12th January, 1809.

Such was the end of the Gosain brothers. They were very ambitious and aspiring, and the circumstances of their career remind us that they were typical free-lances. The period of their life covers a period when the affairs of India were in melting pot and vast opportunities were held out to ambitious men like them. They were well-known for their diplomatic talents and were often employed on diplomatic missions on behalf of the Nawab Vazir, Najaf Khan, Sindhia or the Emperor. They were also noted for their love of intrigue. Major Browne the British Ambassador in one of his letters to the Governor-General remarks that, "He (Himmat) is cunning... men are not hard to deceive, but I should think deception a virtue in this case".²³ So afraid was he of Himmat Bahadur that he deputed two men to watch his activities and movements. Sindhia throughout his career repented over the dismissal of the Gosains and most of his troubles were due to their intrigues and double-dealings.

The Gosains were notorious for their lack of loyalty or fidelity. But still so high was the esteem in which their capacity and resourcefulness were held that their services were greatly in demand. Their knowledge of the country between the Ganges and the Jumna and the influence they commanded over the local chiefs were always an asset for an army that was allied with them.

21. See Secret Proceedings; OC. 21 June 1804; No. 232.

22. See J.A.S.B. 1871 p. 137.

23. Browne's Correspondence; p. 402.

They helped the Nawab Vazir, Najaf Khan and Sindhia, respectively, in their conquests in the Doab. The British conquest of Bundelkhand was also mainly due to their exertions.

The Gosains maintained a well-equipped *Risalah* or Cavalry. It was generally composed of men who were related to them. The English considered Himmat Bahadur's *Risalah* greatly superior in equipment to the cavalry generally maintained by the princes of India. Besides the Cavalry, Himmat Bahadur's troops consisted of three battalions of infantry (about 1500 foot) disciplined and armed in the European manner under the command of Col. Meisselback,²⁴ a Danish soldier. These battalions were of great help to the British during the Bundelkhand campaign. There was a considerable number of irregular infantry as well carrying matchlocks. For the maintenance of so huge a military establishment, Himmat Bahadur was granted a big *jaidad* by his successive masters.

Jains at the Court of Akbar

By

R. KRISHNAMURTHI.

In the chapter on Jains in "Din-i-Ilahi", Mr. Roychoudhury has dismissed the relationship of Akbar with that community with scant attention. This is due to the fact that he has been ignorant of the numerous works in Sanskrit that give us a remarkably full idea of the subject. He has also been led into some errors of generalisation as well as of detail.

He starts by saying that during the early Muslim period the Muslims did not come into clash with Jainism. This is not so. There is plenty of evidence to show that the Muslim rulers contacted the Jains from the early Muslim rule in India¹ and the absence of mention of the Jains in the Muslim histories is due to the simple fact that the Muslims put down the Jains also as Hindus. Even during the time of Akbar and the later Mughals, the Muslim historians often mean Jains when they write Hindus.

Akbar's contact with the learned among the Jains did not begin in 1582 as Mr. Roychoudhury states but much earlier, i.e., a few years prior to 1568, and the close contact continued certainly till the death of Akbar and there is no ground to say that "we do not hear much of the Jains after the death of Hiravijaya Suri in 1592". The first Jain, so far as we know at present, to influence Akbar and gain his intelligent patronage was Padmasundara.² His work "Akbarshahisringaradharpana", written under the direct patronage of the Emperor, makes it clear that Akbar's interest in learned pundits of other faiths and his discussions on religious

1. Vide *Itihask Jain Kavya Sangraha* by Agarchand and Bhanwarlal Nahta.

2. *Akbarshahisringaradharpana* by Padmasundara, MS of Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner, dated V.S. 1626 (1569 A.D.). Mr. Dasrath Sharma has fixed the date of the work as about 1560 A.D.

24. For a short biographical sketch of Meisselback see *Calcutta Gazette*, 28 Oct. 1819.

matters with them date back to his youth and the early years of his reign.³

Padmasundara was the pupil of Padmameru and belonged to Nagpuria Tapagaccha⁴ and was honoured by Akbar with various gifts on his success in literary contests.⁵ About the year 1568 A.D. a debate was held in Akbar's court between Buddhisagara of Nagpuria Tapagaccha and Sadhukirti of Kharataragaccha on the subject of a Jaina religious ceremony called "Paushada", in which Sadhukirti won and was conferred by Akbar the title of "Vādindra".⁶ Padmasundara was alive then and did not take part in the contest. He died in a short time and although it is likely that the imperial contact with the Jains did not cease with his death, there is no mention of important Jains at the imperial court till the advent of Hiravijaya Suri.

Hiravijaya Suri (Harji Sur of Ain) was born at Palanpur and by his learning and piety soon rose to be the leader of the Tapagaccha section of Jain ascetics. According to the wishes of Akbar communicated through Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan, Governor of Gujarat, Hiravijaya Suri went to the court at Fatehpur on 18th June, 1582 A.D.⁷ On arrival a discussion took place between the Suri and Abul Fazl in which the Suri propounded the doctrines of Karma and an impersonal God.⁸ The Suri defining true religion said that the foundation of a faith should be compassion.⁹ Akbar made mention of Padmasundara, his "dear friend" whose scriptures he had preserved in his palace and these he offered to the Suri

3. This corroborates the view of Abul Fazl that Akbar even during the years when he did not take much interest in the affairs of the kingdom, till 1560, he was showing the religious bent of mind which later became one of his most pronounced characteristics. A further corroboration is to be found in the saying of Akbar: "On the completion of my twentieth year (1562) I experienced an internal bitterness, and from the lack of spiritual provision for my last journey my soul was seized with exceeding sorrow".—Ain III p. 386.

4. According to *Paṭṭāvalī*, Vide "Anekant", Ed. in Hindi, Vol. IV, p. 470 ff.

5. Ibid.: Also *Bhanuchandracharita* Ed. by Mohanlal Dilichand Desai p. 12.

6. *Bhanuchandracharita* p. 14. *Itihasik Jain Kavya Sangraha* p. 140 ff.

7. *Sureshwar and Samrat* p. 105.

8. Ibid. p. 110.

9. *Bhanuchandracharita* p. 9.

as a gift.¹⁰ Pressed by the Emperor to receive something from him, the Suri requested that all the caged birds and prisoners may be set at liberty and the slaughter of animals during the eight Jaina holidays (*Paryūshaṇa*) may be enforced at Agra. The Emperor granted the request for that year. The next year, 1583 he influenced the Emperor to enforce the order in the whole empire for all time.¹¹

In June 1584 the title of Jagadguru (World Preceptor) was conferred upon Hiravijaya Suri. On this occasion caged birds on the banks of "Babar" were ordered to be released. The Suri left for Gujarat in 1586 (not in 1584 as mentioned by Mr. Roychaudhury). Arriving in 1582 he spent four monsoons at the capital and neighbourhood. During his stay not only did he impart a knowledge of Jainism to the Emperor but he also got various concessions to their faith in the form of farmans to promote non-killing. Fishing in the lake of "Dabar" was prohibited. The Emperor is said to have taken a vow to refrain from hunting¹² (but hunting was not stopped by Akbar, as stated by Mr. Roychaudhury) and expressed a desire to leave off meat-eating for ever as it had become repulsive.

When Hiravijaya took his departure, Santichandra was left in his place at the court where the latter stayed till 1587.¹³ Mr. Roychaudhury seems to have been ignorant of Santichandra having immediately followed Hiravijaya at the court, as he says that after the Suri's departure, Bhanuchandra remained at court and at another place confuses Santichandra with Siddichandra who are two quite different persons.

10. *Hirasaubhagya Kavya*, Ch. 14, Verses 91 ff.

11. The farman was made in six copies and sent to six different parts of the Empire—Vide *Kṛpa Rasa Kosa*, Introduction, p. 19; also farman, *Bhanuchandracharita*, Appendix I, p. 77.

12. Perhaps only on certain days. *Bhanuchandracharita*, Introduction p. 7; *Hirasaubhagya Kavya*, Chapter 14, Lines 199 ff quoted in *Kṛpa Rasa Kosa*.

13. Mr. Roychaudhury says, "We do not hear much of the Jains after the death of Hiravijaya Suri in 1592" (*Din-i-Ilahi* p. 162). He seems to have been curiously ignorant of the fact that important Jains lived in the court of Akbar till the very end and continued to reside in the time of Jahangir. Bhanuchandra and Siddichandra remained near Akbar till his death and later.

To resume our narrative, Santichandra wrote a panegyric on the Emperor ('Krpā Rasa Kośa') and when leaving for Gujarat took with him farmans prohibiting the slaughter of animals and proclaiming the abolition of the Jazya and Pilgrim tax in Gujarat.¹⁴ The forbidden days were extended so as to comprise six months of the year.¹⁵

Santichandra left Bhanuchandra at the court. He and his pupil Siddichandra¹⁶ remained to influence Akbar for the rest of his life. Bhanuchandra accompanied the Emperor to Kashmir and persuaded him to issue a farman abolishing the tax which was then levied on Jaina pilgrims to Satrunjaya.¹⁷ The bill was granted to Hiravijaya Suri as the head of the Svetambara Jains; he received the farman in 1592 with a request to send his pupil Vijayasena Suri. The latter accordingly reached Lahore in 1593 and distinguished himself in many debates with Brahmans and successfully refuted the idea of certain Brahmans that the Jains did not believe in God. Some of the fruits of Vijayasena's influence were in the farmans prohibiting the slaughter of cows, bulls and buffaloes, repealing the law of confiscation of the property of the deceased and the capture of prisoners as hostages.¹⁸ The Emperor was so struck by the learning and saintliness of Vijayasena¹⁹ that he conferred on him the title of "Savai Hiravijaya Suri" (in a way superior even to Hiravijaya Suri) and had the title of Upadyaya conferred upon Bhanuchandra by Hiravijaya Suri. Vijayasena was instrumental for the order prohibiting fishing in the Indus and the waters of Cutch for four months.²⁰ Abul Fazl studied

14. Sureshwar and Samrat p. 140.

15. Hirasubhagya Kavya 14th Ch. Lines 273 ff.: Badaoni (Blochmann) p. 321 (1583 A.D.). Seems only to have been meant for Surat sarkar as inferred from later farman, Bhanuchandracharita, Introduction-Appendix p. 82.

16. Mr. Roychaudhury errs when he says "This Siddichandra is possibly the Santichandra of Rev. Heras".—(p. 161).

17. Vijayaprashastisar by Muni Vidyavijaya p. 47.

18. Vide farman, dated 1601, Bhanuchandracharita, Introduction-Appendix p. 80.

19. After a debate on the Sun and the Ganges with the Brahmans, Suresh and Samrat p. 164 ff.

20. Ibid. p. 165. A farman of 1601 (Ibid. 379) makes mention of a previous one regarding non-killing on certain days (about six months in the year), and the desirability of abstention from eating meat even on other days and impresses upon all the officials to observe the order scrupulously. Vide also farman 1604 (Krpā Rasa Kosa p. 33) given to Jina Singh and

under Bhanuchandra "Ṣaḍdarshana Samuccaya".²¹ It was Bhanuchandra who composed a set of 1000 names of the Sun for Akbar and recited it with him every morning.²² When the Jam of Cutch was defeated by Aziz Koka, Bhanuchandra influenced Akbar to order the release of all prisoners of war.²³ The influence of the Jains reached such proportions as to invite the jealousy of the chief Brahmans of the court. Together with Bhanuchandra his pupil Siddichandra was also much respected by Akbar. An extremely handsome man and endowed with amazing knowledge he was given the title of "Khus faham" by the Emperor,²⁴ allowed to visit the harem, and studied Persian by suggestion of Akbar. On the death of Hiravijaya Suri, Bhanuchandra secured from Akbar a grant to the Jaina community of a piece of land for the construction of a stupa in memory of the monk. Both Bhanuchandra and his pupil were associated with the education of the Emperor's sons and grandsons respectively,²⁵ and accompanied the Emperor to the Deccan. Both remained at court till Akbar's death wielding great influence, and were instrumental in securing rights to build temples in various cities and in enforcing farmans granted but not observed at times by local officials.

So much for the Jaina Svetambara Tapagaccha. While the predominant Jain influence on Akbar seems to have been from this sect, the Kharataragaccha was not unrepresented at the court.

Man Singh prohibiting slaughter on eight days in the Subah of Multan, referring therein to Hiravijaya and Jinachandra Suri and prohibiting slaughter during the twelve days including Paryusana and eight days from Asada Sukla. Vide also Yugapradhan Jinachandrasuri by Agarchand and Bhanwarlal Nahta, p. 91. Vide also inscription dated 1597 A.D. at temple at Patan which enumerates these results of Jinachandra's influence on Akbar: Photograph of inscription with Mr. Bhanwarlal Nahta, Bikaner.

21. A treatise expounding the six systems of Philosophy.

22. Bhanuchandracharita p. 29. Jain respect for the Sun, Vide Suresh and Samrat p. 163 ff.

23. Bhanuchandracharita p. 29.

24. Mr. Roychaudhury is puzzled about the statement in the Lekha-Likhan-paddhati where it is mentioned that Jahangir (and not Akbar) is said to have conferred the title of "Ghus Faham" on Siddichandra and also the title of Nadir-i-Zaman on him. The fact is that Akbar did confer the title of "Khus Faham" on Siddichandra and later Jahangir also conferred the same title as well as the titles of Nadir-i-Zaman and Jahangir Pasand (Favourite of Jahangir) on Siddichandra as indicated by his prose works.—Vide Bhanuchandracharita p. 65.

25. Ibid. p. 42 ff.

Smith was largely unaware of Akbar's connection with this sect and so has been Mr. Roychoudhury.

In 1591 hearing of a great Jaina teacher Jinachandra Suri presumably through Mantri Karamchand, a lay member of the Kharataragaccha, Akbar who was then at Lahore invited the holy man to the capital. Reaching Lahore in 1592,²⁶ he gained the respect of the Emperor. In the same year he requested his patron to protect all Jaina temples, on hearing that the temples near Dwaraka were demolished by Naurang Khan.²⁷ A farman was issued granting Satrunjaya and other Jaina places to Karamchand.²⁸ His disciple Man Singh with others accompanied the Emperor to Kashmir where fishing was prohibited in all the lakes of Kashmir.²⁹ Akbar conferred the title of Yugapradhan on Jinachandra and the title of Acharya to Jinasimha Suri. At the instance of the Suri fishing and animal slaughter were prohibited in Cambay for one year and in Lahore animal slaughter for the same period.³⁰ Other monks of the Kharataragaccha who are known to have had intercourse with Akbar were Harsasara and Jayasoma who secured a victory at a debate conducted at the court of Akbar.

Mr. Roychoudhury has been ignorant of the above relations of the Kharataragaccha Jains with Akbar. Following Smith he says "In 1590³¹ one Siddichandra visited Akbar at Lahore and was honoured with a title. He was placed in charge of the holy places of the Jains in the empire. The tax on pilgrims to the Satrunjaya hills was abolished in the same year".³² Smith seems to have made a mistake and somehow mixed up Siddichandra with Jinachandra Suri about whom he knew nothing. While it is true that Siddichandra the pupil of Bhanuchandra had been with Akbar since at least a few years prior to Hiravijaya's death, no other Siddichandra visited Akbar and received an honorary title and was granted the control of the holy places of his faith.

26. Karamchandravamsothkirthan (Hindi translation) p. 85.

27. Yugapradhan Jinachandrasuri p. 89 ff.

28. Ibid. 280 ff where a translation of the original farman now in Brahad Jnana Bhandparastha, Big Upasraya, Bikaner, is given

29. Ibid. p. 98.

30. Yugapradhan Jinachandrasuri p. 102; Karamchandravamsothkirthan p. 85.

31. Wrongly quoted, as Smith states the year 1593.

32. Smith p. 167; Roychoudhury p. 161 ff.

Editorial

The Asiatic Review publishes an interesting discussion following a paper presented to the Society on 26 October 1943 by Prof. Coupland on the possibilities of an Indian Settlement. Prof. Coupland considers there are two problems which come for settlement; first the Hindu-Muslim problem and the next the problem of the Indian States. He is concerned for the time with the first. He starts with the provincial constitution naturally, and is definitely of opinion that the party Government, as adumbrated in the Constitution of 1935, has definitely failed concluding that Parliamentary Government of that pattern has proved unsuitable to India in the absence of a well recognised party system established in the country. He feels that the alternative of a coalition government is the only possibility and would recommend one on the model of the Swiss Constitution. This provides for the representation of all the major cantons of Switzerland in the federal executive. For India he would substitute *major parties* instead of major cantons. The federal executive thus elected at the outset for a term remains in office during the whole term. That is so far as the Provincial Governments are concerned. The Governments change periodically, and, along with the changing legislature, the Executive bodies also change periodically.

In regard to the central administration he finds the problem more difficult. According to the ideas of Mr. Jinnah representing the Muslim League the homelands of the Mussalmans must constitute independent states as it were. This naturally would mean splitting of India into two, a Hindu India and a Muslim India. Prof. Coupland next considers whether this breaking up is inevitable. He thinks, from his own study of the matter, that, in order to win back the Muslims to the idea of a United India, the Central Government must have minimum authority, i.e., the Central Government should be vested with the least possible authority and control over the component parts. He admits that the circumstances of India demanded a strong centre as has already been too well demonstrated. Nevertheless he would make the concession to the Muslim demand and make what he calls a minimal centre with functions confined to (1) foreign affairs and defence, (2) tariffs, (3) currency and, as eminently desirable (4) communications. These are matters in which there is not likely to be conflict of interests. He thinks that if the Muslim sentiment is to be fully satisfied, even this minimal centre is not enough as they claim independent nationhood for Muslim India and would be satisfied with nothing less than the recognition of that, and of the Muslims being put on a footing of equality with the Hindus. If such a claim is admissible and should be admitted, he would provide regional arrangements dividing India into four regions almost exclusively for the purpose of constituting this Central Government. He would constitute therefore four regions for India, The Indus and the Ganges Valleys, the Deccan and the Delta Country of the South; two of these have a Muslim majority and the other two, a Hindu Majority. This the Professor thinks, would meet the Muslim Idea although it falls short of the Pakistan that is actually demanded. With such an arrangement, he believes the Muslims

would be agreeable to share the central authority with the Hindus, that central authority having but minimal powers. The Central Government would be a comparatively small affair, and its legislature may even be reduced to a single house of legislature. He would allow however that the economic regions for this kind of a regionalism may not be good enough all round. He would therefore allow dominantly Muslim areas to have this regionalism while dominantly Hindu areas might get on without this notion of regionalism. The adoption of this regionalism might even induce Indian States to join the regions where economic similarities recommended such a union. It would mean therefore that India would be divided into a smaller number of regions, in fact four, leaving but a minimal centre. There was an interesting discussion that followed in which distinguished administrators and others took part. Prof. Earnest Barker, who presided took care to point out that democracy is not synonymous with the rule of a majority as such; rather it was the common will as negotiated and agreed between a majority and a minority after due discussion. In effect it would mean rule by consent, the voting majority on any question being a record of the decree of that consent obtained as a result of the discussion. In actual practice, as is pointed out in the course of the discussion, the Congress Government showed clearly the supremacy of the arithmetical majority reducing democracy to the 'mob-rule' or tyranny of the majority as Aristotle called it.

Prof. Barker went further in the discussion and pointed out that other methods are possible for the Government of India than either the Cabinet method of Great Britain, or the Federal method, and made the important suggestion that the religio-social communities of India should be encouraged extra-politically to assume the status of corporate bodies in regard to matters of religion, education and social customs. In fact he asked, "Was it not wild dream that the religio-social communities of India might find some satisfaction extra politically, that is, in the autonomous management of their community concerns of religion, education and and social observances?" That is in regard to the provinces. But in regard to the Centre he is rather inclined towards the suggestion of regionalisation, and suggested deep consideration of the 'felicitous suggestion' as he called it. The Secretary of State for India who joined in the discussion was content to point out that the peculiar type of constitution of Great Britain and the Dominions was not the only one, and suggested the exploration of alternative possibilities., Lord Hailey agreeing with Prof. Coupland in regard to the causes that brought about the situation in India doubted whether it was right that the Indians should be under the belief that England had determined to divest herself of all responsibilities for India and hand them over to the Indians themselves which was really responsible for the impasse. He did not quite appreciate the regional arrangements suggested as it seemed to him too artificial. He disapproved of a weak Centre that Prof. Coupland's scheme would imply. Sir Alfred Watson did not feel persuaded that the conditions of regionalisation, as it seemed to him were not against all human nature. "He was loth to give the minority representing only one-sixth of the population, an equal vote with the other five-sixths, and enable the actual minority to determine the policy." He explained that such a reversal of democratic practice would be unacceptable anywhere. He certainly objected to the weakening of the

Centre which this would imply and pointed out that such a weak Centre in India would be a menace to the World. Like Lord Hailey he thought that responsibility for the future of India was not intended to be wholly Indian and pointed out that the introduction of communal representation by the British Government clamped upon India a form of Government in which there could not be an alteration of parties in power such as there was in Britain. 'Until India accepted this democratic notion of parties not divided by religions or race but by function,' he said, 'we must continue to have very large responsibility' He would leave it to a future generation to find some solution for the problem of representation other than that based on communal antagonism.

Sir Robert Reid raised the question of the backward tribes in India, referring particularly to those in Assam and recommended frankly that these be left out altogether as they were not of India in religion, culture or appearance, and should not be attached to any particular province in their politically backward condition. They were found primarily in North-Eastern India which has an important role to play in the future. In any treatment recommended for these tribes, he wanted that this aspect of the question should be borne in mind.

Sir Frederic Sykes who took the Chair when Prof. Barker vacated it, took care to point out that the regional arrangement proposed had no regard to the population for the regions concerned, nor did it pay any attention to the Indian States. He further pointed out that nothing was said in the scheme regarding the important minority communities like the Sikhs, if they object strongly to the weakening of the Centre, and concluded by saying that the making of the constitution was a task which the Indians themselves should attempt, Prof. Coupland's suggestions being valuable as aid thereto.

The discussion on Indian constitutional changes was taken up on a subsequent day (January 18, 1944), Lord Erskine leading the discussion. Lord Erskine made it clear at the outset that he was not one of those who disclaim parliamentary responsibility for the future of India, and started with the idea, stated time and again that the Amery-Cripps proposals stand. The first essential to political progress in India, according to him, is the discovery of a method of constitutional progress acceptable alike to the Muslim community and the Hindu majority. He is of opinion that the safeguards provided in the Act of 1935 should ordinarily be enough. He assured his audience that the special powers provided in the Act were not suspended nor abrogated. He is not hopeful that the analogy of foreign constitutions would help the solution of the problem in India, and, that for a very considerable time, the continuance of an official functionary like the Viceroy would be necessary. He is definitely of opinion that in any possible arrangement the Provinces might continue to administer as here-to-fore while the Central Government that may be possible would be necessarily weak. The alternative would be, according to him, the division of India into several separate and quite independent states. This he rules out because in spite of differences there is a clearly prevalent and widespread feeling that the unity of India must be maintained. He doubts whether those that advocate separation realise the immensity of the problem, and would ascribe all the present trouble to the introduction of democracy, 'which works by counting heads.'

He points out 95 millions of Muhammadans looking askance at 255 millions of Hindus, he points out further that other sections of the population entertain similar fears. He doubts whether the regional plan of Prof. Coupland will succeed and is doubtful whether a division of the country into more fully autonomous provinces would satisfy the Muslim demand. He hopes however that if the Centre is limited strictly in respect of its power, it may be acceptable. He would quote the analogy of the Roman Empire in the centuries following the Christian Era as an illuminating historical example. In the discussion which followed Mr. Godfrey Nicholson who took the Chair, regarded this as the most important question. He would recommend the continuance even of the deadlock till the Indians themselves could produce a constitution of their own making.

Sir John Hubback felt that Prof. Coupland's work laid too much stress upon the Hindu-Muslim problem to the neglect of the states. He thought the problem of the states is about as urgent, if not more, than the Hindu-Muslim problem. In regard to the backward tribes, he thought Prof. Coupland's treatment was hardly satisfactory in the interests of the 25 millions. According to him they ought to be a charge upon the Centre.

A. K. Pillai who followed in the discussion took the future of India to be a number of autonomous states with a Central Government of a confederal type.

Sir Henry Craik confined his remarks more or less to the states. He pointed out at the outset that owing to the Congress attacks the states would be disinclined to join an All India Union and would much prefer a separate dominion of their own, rather than introducing the clash of the democratic and autocratic idealogies. There is a further difficulty of an economic character which made a states dominion impossible. The attainment of the status of a dominion would annul all treaty rights between the states and the Crown. If British protection is to continue, the maintenance of a British force would be necessary and that is not likely to be acceptable either to India or to Britain. Prof. Coupland's suggestion therefore was to the states being united with British India under guarantees for territorial integrity and continuance of the Governments. Sir Henry thought however that that arrangement is not likely to prove satisfactory and that the Princes would have to agree to far reaching changes in their status. If somehow or other they are brought into the general Indian polity the British Government will have to be continued as a Central protecting power.

Mr. Tudor Owen who followed in the discussion recommended a constitutional form of Government for the states leaving the big cities outside the dominions and would have such global force that may be established for the world order, for the future control over these.

Mr. Jayadeva following pointed out that Professor Coupland's division would not satisfy India which aspires to a political unification, economic development of the country, harmonious development of industry and cultural development.

Mr. J. P. Brander considered the Coupland scheme an academic one. He thought that the Hindus would not agree to Pakistan, and people realised from

recent events that an undivided India and a strong Central Government alike essential. He felt even Dominion Status would be an impossible ideal. He came to the conclusion that Western Parliamentary democracy could not work in India. On the analogy of Russia and China, he would consider a strong executive Government would be found necessary for India, and that can be furnished only by the British Government.

Admiral Sir Fitz Herbert pointed out that the effort at solving the inter communal problem a failure. The attempt to solve the problem would have to be from the point of view of the position which India was likely to hold in the Post-War world. The second point of importance would be the defence of the country. If the problem is attacked from the point of view of these two, a final solution would be possible. In summing up the discussion Lord Erskine found that no solution seemed possible for the present, but continued exploration might result in a satisfactory solution being found.

This discussion in the East India Association on Prof. Coupland's suggestions throws into relief the difficulties of the problem. The first question which calls for attention is whether in the post-war world the Centre could be weakened with a view to the position and influence which India is bound to exercise. A strong, and as far as may be a united Centre is of the essence of the situation. Even in the Hindu days when the States of India were almost independent, the arrangement generally was that complete autonomy was given to the subordinate States and Provinces in respect of the most part of the civil and internal administration. Nevertheless the Central Government had important functions, and had to be maintained in power to discharge those functions which necessarily were those of external defence, foreign relations, commerce and communications in the interior, the preservation of peace in the interior as far as it was possible in those days to ensure orderly progress of the various parts. The need for a strong Centre certainly is not less now, nor is it likely to be in the post-war world. In fact a strong Centre would seem to be of the essence of the situation. The next point of importance, in fact the most essential fact of importance, is whether a division in any form at all is called for. If the Muslim minority, a large and important minority as it is, should be given the right of self determination what is it that prevents other important minorities which may perhaps be less numerous, but certainly not less important, should be given a similar consideration; and this would become the more urgent as these comparatively small minorities would become far greater minorities in any one of the regions of Prof. Coupland, or of the divided India of Pakistan. So far there has not been shown any important consideration other than religion to call for this kind of a division. In the actual condition of India, where at least in Hindu India the social organisation is based, if we might say so, on religion, arrangements will have to be made to safeguard the really vital religious interests of the minorities, the bigger ones as well as the smaller, and the proper method of attack in an effort to settle this problem, is to make efficient provision for safeguarding the religious interests of the minorities all of them and allow considerable amount of freedom of conscience in respect of various matters. From the point of view of secular interest it has not been shown that there could be any difference between Muslims and the other communities in India.. Any

division of India on the basis of religion would cut it up into too many pieces to pull its weight in international world politics. On that single ground any attempt at division should be deprecated.

One other important matter is whether India can by her own resources alone provide for her defence on land, sea and air. The discussion we have reviewed above brought it out clearly that India should maintain her association with the British Commonwealth, it may be in a revised form. If so, the "Quit India" notion would be putting the cart before the horse. There is further the economic position of India. To assure a sound economic position, outside association would be quite as important as internal reorganisation such as agricultural and economic reconstruction.

On the whole we may congratulate the East India Association on having brought about such a valuable discussion on the Coupland Report.* All points raised in the course of the discussion deserve the most anxious consideration of all those interested in the welfare of India, present and future.

*Prof. Coupland's Report on the Indian Problem. 3 volumes. Published by the Oxford University Press. Vol. I, Indian Problem—1833-1935. Vol. II, Indian Politics—1936-1942. Vol. III, Future of India.

Reviews

INDIA AND DEMOCRACY, by Sir George Schuster and Guy Wint. Messrs. MacMillan & Co.

This is an important work bearing upon a topic of the utmost importance at the present moment. As its name indicates, the work deals with "the question of a democratic Government for India and the prospects that lay before the country in the post-war world for which India should, like other countries, prepare herself even while deeply engaged in her war efforts. The book falls broadly into two parts—part I by Guy Wint and part II by Sir George Schuster. The first part is a survey of India's past, both political and social in two parts. It passes rapidly and very cursorily in review the political and social background before the British contact with India. This is followed immediately by the influence that the British connection exercised over both the political and social constitution of the country bringing the account down to the date of the Act of 1935. Notwithstanding the serious study of the problems connected with the question made by the author, we can hardly resist making the remark that the study of India, particularly Hindu India, is cursory and the views expressed therein cannot be regarded as anything but the result of a mere superficial observation. We might mention as a mere instance that it is broadly stated that these purely Indian administrations had a very narrow outlook and hardly did anything of a permanently beneficial character for the welfare of the country. It would be useless to cavil where the book devotes less than 80 pages to the survey; but this remark is too important a statement to be passed over. To mention merely an instance, of beneficial constructive works, we have only to mention a few irrigation works which would compare with the modern magnificent works of a similar character, and could not but have had the same idea of lasting benefit to the generations yet to come when these were actually constructed. The Lake of Girnar of Asoka and the Anicut of Karikāla Chola on the Kaveri which presented, according to competent authority, the idea of controlling waters at the head of the Delta, and distribute it for the benefit of agriculture. The construction of the great irrigation tank, the so called Bhojpur Lake by King Bhoja, with a water spread of 250 miles, as calculated by the Royal Engineers who surveyed the region for the purposes of the construction of the G.I.P. Railway, and the almost simultaneous construction of an irrigation tank on the borders of the Tanjore and South Arcot Districts, the bund of which extended over a length of 16 miles. Many other instances could be quoted, some perhaps even during the period of Muhammadan rule, to rebut this general statement. This need not mean that the British Administration was not responsible for achievements of great benefit to the people. When Mr. Guy Wint passes on to the more modern aspect of the question he presents an account which may be regarded as eminently fair. Even where he discusses the influence of a personality like Mahatma Gandhi, he presents a conspectus of events that led to the Act of 1935 and the working of the Act during the years following. On the whole he presents the case fairly even in describing the failure of that Act and the causes that actually brought it about.

After this preliminary survey, begins the really more important part of the work, that of Sir George Schuster. Sir George surveys the problem from the vantage point of one who occupied the position of administrative responsibility and helped in the carrying on of the Government of India during the critical period. He presents on the whole an arresting account of the problems that confront India laying emphasis on a wide national service which in India has to be essentially rural and agricultural not withstanding the vast expansion and improvement on the industrial side of it. He views the position of India as a country which has to take its place among the nations of world in postwar times. In his own words, 'it is not that India should set any limit to her ambitions for attaining industrial greatness, but rather that industrial greatness must be balanced by agricultural progress, and that artificial encouragement to advance in the industrial field must be regulated as part of a comprehensive plan'. On that basis he writes his account and presents on the whole a very fair and impartial review of the position bringing into consideration all the elements of the complex problem of India, religious and communal differences, the position of the Indian States, India's standing among the nations of the world involving problems of international relations, defence, etc. He brings out the salient features of his conclusions in a chapter at the end of the book where he presents the whole in a dialogue between an imaginary Indian reader and himself. He sums up the whole in the following terms:

'My main conclusions are four. First Parliamentary democracy of the Westminster pattern will not suit India and you will have to work out a system of your own. Secondly, there can be no true democracy of any form except on a foundation of better universal education than exists at present in India, nor indeed, without this can there be any real social and material improvement. Thirdly, the communal question can only be settled in the course of working together on practical tasks. Therefore the essential thing is to find a basis on which Indians can, with adequate freedom and responsibility, get started to work on the practical tasks of administration and government. In order to get such a start in conditions which all sides will accept, I believe that the presence of some impartial arbitral authority may provide the key to the whole problem. I believe that in the long run this can be best secured by developing the functions of the British Crown. Fourthly, India will not be able for some time to stand alone in the world. She will not have the necessary political strength and unity, nor, which is of much more practical importance, will she have the necessary strength to defend herself, fighting forces adequately trained and commanded, as well as manufacturing capacity capable of equipping those forces. Her best chance of obtaining freedom and security to develop her own destiny on her own lines lies in remaining a member of the British group'.

We commend the book as a very important contribution to the study of the subject by all who are interested in the problems of the day however different may be the views actually held by them.

THE BHAGAVAD GITA AND MODERN SCHOLARSHIP By Mr. S. C. Roy.
M.A. (Lond.), I.E.S. Messrs. Luzac & Co., London, Publishers.

This is part I of presumably four parts intended ultimately to give a right interpretation apparently of the Bhagavad Gita by the author. The volume before us is a preliminary study of work already done on the Bhagavad Gita. The Bhagavad Gita has received a very considerable amount of attention in recent times and several scholars of eminence have studied the problem and several important publications have been made available. A work like the Gita accepted as a work of canonical authority by all sects of Hindus and consisting of a little more than 700 *ślokas*, and forming a part of the Mahābhārata challenges enquiry. This naturally takes the form whether the work is an integral part of the Mahābhārata challenges enquiry. This naturally takes the form whether the work is an integral part of the Mahābhārata; whether it had been written by the author of the Mahābhārata; whether it was a single author that wrote the Mahābhārata if the Mahābhārata is composed of various parts put together by one author, or having been written on a smaller compass, had received additions from time to time. If so, whether the Gita is one such addition. Such are the questions that naturally arise and have actually been asked and answered. As a preliminary enquiry, an examination was made whether the Gita by itself is a work of one hand or whether it has suffered interpolations. This last question of interpolation has received considerable attention. The German Savant Richard Garbe made an elaborate enquiry and even that has been considerably improved by a disciple of his, Prof. Otto in the Original Gita, a work of learning and value quite recently. This author has, by his investigation, reduced the original Gita to a comparatively small treatise of but 122 *ślokas* as the genuine Gita, the rest of it being interpolations. This raised the one important question as to the validity of an enquiry like this, and the method pursued as to what is the genuine text of the author and what are interpolations. Unfortunately in an enquiry like this it often happens that the enquirer tries to read his own thoughts into the work and his sense of what is proper and what is not, a great deal depends upon his judgment. Such an enquiry easily reduces itself to the doctrinaire method of judging certain parts as fit and proper, and the others as interpolations which sometimes looks quite arbitrary, from the point of view of an integral notion of the Gita. One particular detail of this enquiry, which leads to a number of similar wrong details, is in the interpretation of certain expressions occurring in the Gita as representing certain well-known text books on the subject of more modern composition; the familiar terms *śāstra* and *yoga* have been taken to represent ideas incorporated in the classical text books of the name which clearly belong to a later period. Making an elaborate enquiry in full detail, Mr. Roy arrives at the conclusion that the Gita is, except for trifling details, one integral and is more an *upanishad* than an episode of the epic Mahābhārata. There is some warrant for this as there is some authority for Krishna being regarded as an *upanishad* teacher of the Pāṇcharāta school. Taking the Bhagavad Gita to be such, Mr. Roy comes to the conclusion that the Mahābhārata, as it has come down to us, is a vast work which had undergone revisions from time to time and additions, the Bhagavad Gita being one such addition at a particular stage of these revisions.

Then he launches into the enquiry concerning the character of the Mahābhārata and its composition. This naturally is a vast enquiry and leads to much discussion regarding the various parts and possible interpolations among which this author would lay emphasis upon what he calls the Vaishnava revision. This, according to the author, is responsible for the introduction of the *upanishadic* Gita into the Mahābhārata, the Gita itself undergoing incidentally a Vaishnava revision likewise, a revision which transformed an *upanishadic* *vēdāntic* handbook into a Vaishnava manual of the Pāṇcharātrins. This only makes the interpolation theory sectarian in point of character; whether it would bear that interpretation and whether it is demonstrable it is a general handbook of *vēdāntic* thought, *vēdāntic* meaning perhaps *advaitic* having been transformed by clever interpolation into a Vaishnava manual.

This naturally leads to an enquiry into the possible relationship of the Bhagavad Gita to the *Mokshadharma* of the Mahābhārata which contains the *Nārāyaṇīya*, the orthodox text book of the Pāṇcharātrins. Mr. Roy regards this *Nārāyaṇīya* as a separate treatise incorporated into the Mahābhārata as the *Upanishad* Gita itself and various other important treatises. He attempts to demonstrate that the *Nārāyaṇīya* is later than the Gita and must have been included in the Mahābhārata either simultaneously or separately. He does not appear to make any reference to the *Ēkāyana Śākhā* of the Veda which the Pancharātrins claim as older than even the Rig Veda itself, and on the authority of which has been based the Pancharatra itself. No doubt this *Ēkāyana Śākhā* is now believed to be lost although there are references to it in the older *upanishads* themselves, such as, for instance, *Chandokya*. This remains to be tackled before Mr. Roy's conclusion could be accepted as anything final.

The work under review gives evidence of an elaborate and detailed study of the whole mass of literature bearing upon these important questions, and gives evidence of immense reading and critical faculty of a high order. We shall await the publication of the further parts of this important work with very great expectancy.

EARLY HISTORY OF THE VAISHNAVA FAITH AND MOVEMENT IN BENGAL, FROM SANSKRIT AND BENGALI SOURCES. By Sri S. K. De, Professor and Head of the Department of the Sanskrit Dept., Dacca University, Dacca. Publishers: The General Printers and Publishers Ltd., Calcutta.

A history of the Vaishnava movement on a comprehensive scale has been the desideratum for some considerable time though very important contributions to the study of the subject have been made from time to time within recent years. The history to be complete and satisfactory has perhaps to go back to the earliest times to find the roots of *bhakti* and the *Bhāgavata* doctrines and trace the development of this school of religious belief and practices from thence onwards to the present time when it is a living faith with various forms prevailing all over the Indian continent. In its later development it has branched off into various schools mostly according to localities, each of which having its own peculiarities of features

developed under varying conditions. One such major movement is the Vaishnavism of the Bengal school, or as it is sometimes called the Chaitanya movement, another important school similar to this would be the Gujarati school of Vallabhacharya on which there has just been brought out an important treatise awaiting review. The Vaishnava faith as such goes back to the days of the vedic and pre-vedic, evidences have recently been found of the Vaishnava cult in the Indus Valley civilisation going back perhaps to times anterior. From these small beginnings, the religion, Vaishnavism, has been growing from time to time till in the centuries on either side of the Christian Era some kind of a special stimulation has been given to it, and we find the efflorescence of the faith all over the continent. It seems to have had a congenial home in South India and developed there into its full measure during the first millennium after Christ, and received the hallmark of a systematic religion in the hands of Ramanuja. It seems to have been propagated thence onwards, moved into the Maharashtra country, thence northwards to Central India and the United Provinces where it found a second home, and thence spread in various forms eastward, westward and north-westward into various reforming religions of Modern India. This vast movement has to be traced in all details in any history of the Vaishnava movement as such, and this in summary is clearly indicated in the preliminary chapter of the Padma Purana which could be taken to indicate the correct order of progress of the Vaishnava movement. In this work, a comprehensive treatise on the important movement in Bengal, we find the fullness of treatment naturally to be expected from the vast learning and careful scholarship of the author. He traces the Bengal Movement certainly to the school of Brindaban and goes back to its earlier affiliations. He seems to find that he could not trace the Bengal Vaishnavism to anything anterior to the Śrīmad Bhāgavata and is content to take that as the ulterior limit. He does not attempt to trace any connection between the Bengal movement with that either of South India or of the Maharashtra. The Bengal Vaishnava Movement as such, it would be regarded as unconnected with the Southern Vaishnava Movement or of that in Maharashtra. The tracing of any such connection would be possible only by a deep and intimate study of details of this movement which, for various obvious reasons, may not yet be altogether possible. Such comparative study would become possible by a detailed study of these separate movements and then a comparative study to estimate the influence of one school upon another. There is a considerable amount of prejudice, naturally as it may appear, to acknowledge indebtedness to the Southern school in particular. It seems however possible to trace the influence of the South both in the Vaishnavism of the Brindaban school and in its further developments in the north. The indebtedness of the South to the northern school of Vaishnavism in its early stages is complete and provable almost on textual authority which takes us back to the beginning of the Christian Era. To this vast study Dr. De's book does make an important contribution giving us a fully detailed history of Bengal Vaishnavism exploiting the sources in Sanskrit and Bengali more or less fully. We commend the work to all serious students of the History of Vaishnavism as a whole.

STUDIES IN LATER MUGHAL HISTORY OF THE PUNJAB 1707-1793.

By Hari Ram Gupta, M.A., Ph.D. With a foreword by Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan. (The Minerva Book Shop, Lahore 1944).

As Sir S. A. Khan has pointed out, few historians have attempted the detailed history of the Punjab in the eighteenth century, and particularly about its middle. Dr. Gupta can therefore be regarded as one of the pioneers to plough this field. With his usual thoroughness and detailed equipment as to sources analytically sifted, he traces the main stages in the dissolution of Mughal rule in the Punjab and explains the factors that brought it about. That enabled the Sikhs to revive their power after the quarter of a century of extreme depression in their fortunes following the death of Banda. The story of Adina Beg Khan who became a man of mark is striking, as that of a person who could float on the surface of anarchical politics and even succeed. Thus he became independent both of the Emperor and the Governor of Lahore in those stormy days and contrived with the help of the Marathas and the Sikhs to expel the Afghans from the Punjab in 1758, shortly before he died. His record as an administrator was good in an age of administrative confusion and political anarchy. In diplomacy and statesmanship he was much above the average. He was the chief instrument in the fall of the capable Mughlani Begam, whose career as the ruler of her husband's heritage might have been easily more successful, with a little more care and self-restraint on her part.

The invasions of Ahmad Shah Durrani are next detailed and followed by an account of Timur Shah's campaigns in the Punjab down to his death in the middle of 1793. An account is also given of the resources and extent of the Durrani empire and of the character of its administration. A note is given about the effect on the Indian dress and produced by the Durrani rule in the Punjab and the Afghan contact with the Indians. At the end there is a descriptive account of the invader's road from Kabul to Delhi which was marked by pillars fixed at regular intervals. The appendix matter is interesting as showing the quick recovery of the Sikh power and its assertion of sovereign right even immediately after the disaster of Panipat. The bibliographical notes on the sources are fairly exhaustive. It is impossible to give a more detailed analysis of this able survey of the most complicated politics of a province which was the battle ground of Mughal and Maratha, Sikh and Afghan, for a number of critical years.

C. S. S.

HISTORY OF THE SIKHS By Hari Ram Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., Vol. II—Cis-Sutlej Sikhs 1769-1799 pp. XIX & 320—with a Forward by Sir Jogendra Singh. Vol. III—Trans-Sutlej Sikhs 1769-1799 pp. X & 183. (The Minerva Book Shop, Lahore). 1944.

Dr. Gupta has established a secure reputation as a researcher, well-versed in the history of Northern India in the 18th and 19th centuries. The first volume of his History of the Sikhs (1739-68) was in the words of Sir J. N. Sarkar, useful in building up on a granite foundation one period of Punjab History, including that of the Delhi Empire. Though not a Sikh himself, he brought out in shining colours the heroes and patriots of the Sikh

community in the pre-Ranjit Singh epoch, and he also gave us therein an instructive picture of Sikh life and character which had been moulded by factors of political oppression and a bitter struggle for survival

Thus, Dr. Gupta says that the story of the progress of the Sikhs of the Cis-Sutlej country, from 1769 onwards until the close of that century is one of their almost annual blundering raids into the Upper Gangetic Doab, which, however, though full of sad relics, have not been wholly unprofitable. With a little more vision and a little more statesmanship, the Sikhs could easily have become masters of Northern India. After a survey of the political condition of India, comprehending even states of the distant south like Hyderabad, the Carnatic and Mysore, our author finds a life of complete selfish isolation marking all the states of the time, with no personal bond between the ruler and the ruled, and justifying the remark made by Jean Law that "so far as I can see there is nothing that you could call Government between Patna and Delhi." The Cis-Sutlej Sikhs themselves were torn by mutual rivalry and jealousy and their army consequently came to be split up into a miscellaneous collection of independent feudal contingents, based upon a chain of dependency of land-holding reaching down to the individual horseman. The enterprising expeditions indulged in by the Sikh Chiefs formed in one sense a transition to the evolution of their territorial chiefships. Their relations with Zabita Khan Rohilla in the years 1775-79 form a very intriguing and complicated tissue of political fraud and changing military alliances. Abdul Ahad Khan contributed a good deal to the intervention of the Sikhs in the affairs of Delhi and the Doab. The career of Amar Singh of Patiala is illustrative of the way in which a resourceful Sikh Sirdar built up his position and could take advantage of the political situation. Najaf Khan had to repeat in 1781 what the Sayyid brothers had done to the Marathas 62 years before and to accept the sovereignty of the Sikhs over the country to the west of the Jumna and their right of levying blackmail called *Rakhi*, (being two annas in the rupee of the standard land revenue) in the Mughal territories in the Upper Gangetic Doab. The importance of this recognition and its consequences are clearly brought out by Dr. Gupta. The further open encroachment of the Sikhs and their increasing interference in Delhi politics alarmed the British Government and Warren Hastings minuted, on the 22nd April 1784, on the need of forming an alliance with the Emperor against the Sikhs, as an additional security against their invasions near the Frontiers of Oudh. Hingne, the Maratha Agent at Delhi, feared the consequences that might result from this new plan and Hastings had finally to give up the idea of setting up a pro-English party in Delhi. Mahadji Sindia's treaty with the Sikhs concluded in May 1785, though on a provisional basis, had a fitful career and finally broke off, owing to the inherent difficulties of the situation. On the whole, Sindia's policy towards the Sikhs should be said to have been a failure. He appreciated the fighting capacity of the Sikhs and the value of an active co-operation with them. But they were most intractable and not at all amenable to reason. They also lacked political vision and a sense of diplomatic values; and the result was that the Sindia failed to keep them in check and his Agents were unable to prevent their inroads. In the years after his death their depredations became more marked and their clash with Thomas and Perron and final submission to Shah Zaman closed an epoch, but did not indicate any definite settlement.

Dr. Gupta takes up in the third volume the story of the Trans-Sutlej Sikhs in the same years. He traces the career of expansion of the Sikh power from the Doabs of the Central Punjab into the surrounding plains on all sides and thence on into the regions of Kangra and Jamna. Their conflict with Shah Zaman in the fateful years 1793-99 are delineated at great length. The significance of Ranjit Singh's occupation of Lahore was two-fold. It meant the beginning of the process of the extinction of independent Sikh chiefs and the establishment of a definite united monarchy. A chapter is devoted to the nature and character of Sikh administration, with particular attention to land tenure and revenue and the administration of justice, regarding both of which a considerable improvement was effected on the previous condition. It is however to be noted that fear of the growing Sikh power diverted trade from Afghanistan and beyond, from the Punjab to Northern Rajputana. The picture of the social economic life of the people is interesting but does not call for any particular remark, except that the country was on the whole well-governed and the condition of the cultivators and other classes of the people was very much better at this time than it was subsequently under Ranjit Singh and his followers. The documentation and illustrative maps are very useful and the index is clear and very explanatory.

C. S. S.

1. THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF BRITISH INDIA pp. 413 (1943.) 2 ANNEXATION OF BURMA pp. 338 (1944). By Anil Chandra Banerjee, M.A., (Published by A. Mukerjee & Bros, 2, College Square, Calcutta).

Dr. A. C. Banerjee has become a well-known figure among workers in the field of Modern Indian History and his recent publication of a biography of Peshva Madhava Rao I has been generally acclaimed as a lucid and correct exposition of a complicated subject of study. The first of the two books under review takes up the history of the policy pursued by the British Government towards Assam and Burma in the past. Since with Japan's entry into the great war, Burma and the threat to India from its side have brought into prominence the importance of the Eastern Frontier both from the political and from the military point of view.

The observations of Captain Welsh, who was sent to Assam in the time of Lord Cornwallis, show us that he exceeded the authority delegated to him by Government, but claimed to be excused for having done so in the special circumstances of the prevailing conditions in Assam. The prohibition of any interference in Assamese politics, ordered by Sir John Shore, like Cornwallis's uncertain attitude was due to the other pre-occupations of the Calcutta Government then.

Anglo-Burmese relations were radically changed by the Burmese conquest of Arakan and by the consequent migration of the Mags into Bengal. The pacific Government of Shore was not prepared to precipitate any outbreak of war owing to the apparently aggressive attitude displayed by the Burmese. The different commercial missions to Burma, beginning with that of Captain Symes, whose report is a very useful and instructive source, are detailed in a chapter which concludes with the opinion that Captain Cox

gave as to the necessity of a solid alliance with Burma, which otherwise was in a fair way to come under the influence of the French. Wellesley could not bring about any definite understanding and Burmese highhandedness continued as before to be exhibited in a very unreasoning manner. The question of the Arakan refugees and the increasing troubles with Assam are outlined in the succeeding chapters and the complicated nature of British relations with Cachar and with reference to the Arakan boundary, the final rupture with the Burmese Government, the operations of the war of 1824-26 and the contents and significance of the treaties that ended the war, form the narrative of the rest of the book. Dr. Banerjee is inclined to exonerate Amherst from the blame that was directed against him for his failure in the vigorous conduct of the operations of the invading army. The treaties of 1826 which are given in the appendix matter show a considerable amount of restraint on the part of the British. Amherst himself was first unwilling to annex Arakan and the amount of indemnity was recommended for a reduction by General Campbell. One-third of Assam was brought directly under British rule in order that the required revenue for the maintenance of a garrison might be assured. The commercial treaty provided for in the treaty of Yandabo was the real basis from which further complications were to proceed and drag the Burmese again into war.

The second book, *Annexation of Burma* surveys the events leading to the annexation of Arkan and Tenasserim in 1826 and the miserable fortunes experienced by the British Residency in Burma, followed by the declaration of war in 1852 and the annexation of Lower Burma,—the whole narrative of the war and its operations being very full and elaborate. Col. Phayre, who carried out the annexation, makes it clear in his *journal* that he was perfectly justified in claiming that his failure to secure a treaty was not due to any of his own faults. The later treaties of commerce secured by Phayre and by Fytche are interesting preliminaries to the ruin of king Mindon's kingdom and to the loss of its independence. The reign of Thibaw ending in the Third Burmese War and the annexation of Upper Burma form a most distressing chapter; and we learn that the annexation which had not been finally decided on by the Government of India when they despatched their army to occupy Mandalay, was forced upon them by the Secretary of State acting under the pressure of British commercial interests. The suppression of dacoity and the other good work at reorganisation done in Burma by the British require to be narrated in a subsequent volume and this suggestion we commend to our scholarly and industrious author.

C. S. S.

HISTORY OF INDIA. By Narendra Krishna Sinha, M.A., Ph.D., and Anil Chandra Banerjee, M.A. (Published by A. Mukerjee & Bros, College Square, Calcutta). Pages 882. First Edition, April 1944. Price Rs. 12/8/-.

This book is intended for the use of College students, particularly of the Intermediate and B.A. Pass stages. It has got the merit of having been written on a unified plan and of embodying, in a continuous and simple narrative, all the fruits of the latest researches done in the main fields of Indian historical inquiry. It contains the usual introductory matter of the

geographical and racial factors that underlie the evolution of our history; herein it stresses the concept of the fundamental unity of India underlying the physical and other diversity that prevails. The sources of information are explained in their principal categories and, happily, have not been made heavy. The features and affinities of the Indus civilisation and the various stages of the evolution of Indo-Aryan culture and history follow a definite line of treatment marked by continuity and precise expression. The dynastic history of Northern India, interspersed with notices of the cultural condition of the land, is fairly full. South India and the Deccan in the first millennium A.D. are however compressed in about 16 pages and the later dynasties and their fortunes down to the thirteenth century get equally compressed. The estimate of various rulers of the Muhammadan dynasties that ruled in the land is fairly satisfactory. The characteristic features of Turkish administration, of Indo-Muslim Art and of the Bhakti cult of the times, the rule of the Mughal and Suri dynasties, the estimate of the Maratha State in its political and cultural significance for India and the emergence of settled British rule from out of the confusion of the eighteenth century, are all well proportioned, alike from the points of view of sequence, clarity of outline and mutual interaction. Perhaps the reader may feel that there has been an undue compression into very short compass of the history of the 19th and 20th centuries and the consequent fore-shortening of modern tendencies in our history. But this is, to a certain extent, inevitable in a work which deals with the entire range of Indian History from the pre-historic past. The maps are fairly clear. The typography is good, but a proper index and perhaps short notes on the value of source material indicated at the end of chapters would have constituted welcome additions that are bound to enhance the usefulness of the book to the more serious student.

C. S. S.

WAR IN ANCIENT INDIA by V. R. Ramchandra Dikshitar, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., pp. xv 416.

The gloomy present naturally turns our mind to the dark past and it is in the fitness of things that during the world holocaust an able indologist should choose to examine the military methods and ethics of ancient India. The primitive man was as eager to win by his personal prowess what he coveted most, wealth, honour and an attractive mate, as his more civilised descendant of today. With the evolution of society his aggressive instincts were not suppressed but sublimated and diverted to the services of the State. In India the war-like profession formed the close preserve of a select caste, but otherwise there was little difference between the war-lords of the ancient and medieval times and the *fyehrrers* and *duces* of this disillusioned age. Even in those unsophisticated days the stage was set by clever diplomacy, the "issues were clouded by skilful propaganda, behind the fighting forces were ranged the state-controlled war industries and the strategy of the fighting generals was reinforced by the more subtle manipulations of the financier. Of the traditional fourfold forces, elephantry has indeed become an anachronism to-day, but the chariotry has more than returned to its own in the form of armoured cars. The brain dominated as

ver over the brawn, but the arena was limited and the peculiar social and political institutions banned the idea and ideology of a total war. The civilian population escaped much of the horrors of modern wars mainly because the military apparatus was less efficient and partly because the ethics of those days were somewhat different. Not that the ethical principles always governed military conduct, for Arjuna did not hesitate to hurt the uncharioted Karna and "Kuta Yuddha" or unfair fighting was not unknown. Parashu Rama essayed total extermination of the entire fighting community, not once, but twentyone times. But while public opinion did not approve of unequal, unfair and ruthless fighting in those primitive times, every thing is considered fair in war to-day.

There are few works on exclusively military matters in Sanskrit and Pali literature but Mr. Dikshitar has made an exhaustive study of all the extent sources, literary, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological. The result has been an extremely readable volume on a little known subject. The parallelism of the south and north Indian Canons to which he draws our attention is of special interest, but one would like to know where the main inspiration came from. We also wish that it had been possible for the learned author to trace the evolution of the various institutions, tactics and strategies he describes and to give us a chronological account rather than a narrative without any reference to chronology. But that is probably too much to expect at the present stage of our knowledge.

There are a few printing errors and one or two lapses of a different category. It is doubtful whether Shankaracharya in his famous verses entitled "Mohamudgara" compares "moha" to a mudgara (page 114) and the "animals whose horns were used" for making armours could not possibly include tortoise and elephant (page 126) though the shell of the one and the hide of the other conceivably furnished suitable materials for that purpose.

As one lays down the volume one is apt to enquire—"How much moral progress has been achieved by homo sapiens during the last two thousand years though magic has receded to the back-ground and science has made gigantic strides."

S. N. S.

Our Exchanges

- Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*
Park Street, Calcutta.
- The Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute*, Deccan
Gymkhana P.O., Poona.
- Bharat Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala*, Poona City.
- Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London Uni-
versity, London, Longmans, Green & Co., London.
- Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London Institution,
Finsbury Circus, London.
- The Calcutta Review*, 3, Senate House, Calcutta.
- The Hindustan Review*, Patna Junction, E. I. Ry.
- The Indian Historical Quarterly*, 96, Amherst Street, Calcutta.
- Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Patna.
- Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*,
Bombay.
- Journal of the Bombay Historical Society*, Exchange Build-
ing, Sprott Road, Bombay.
- Nagari Pracharini Sabha*, Benares.
- The Political Science Quarterly*, Columbia University, New
York.
- Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*,
Andhra Historical Society, Rajahmundry.
- Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, Daly Hall, Cenotaph
Road, Bangalore.
- The Modern Review*, 91, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta.
- The Vedic Magazine and Gurukula Samachar*, Gurudatta
Bhavana, Lahore.
- The Ceylon University Journal*, University of Ceylon, Colombo.
- The Indian Review*, Esplanade, Madras.
- The Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, Oriental Institute, Baroda.
- The Superintendent, Government Museum*, Madras.
- The Federated India*, Esplanade, Madras.
- The Superintendent of Archaeology*, Gwalior State, Gwalior.
- Journal of the Bombay University*, Senate House, Bombay.
- Muslim University Journal*, Muslim University, Aligarh.
- The Karnatak Historical Research Society*, Dharwar.
- The Punjab University Journal*, Lahore.
- The U. P. Historical Society*, Lucknow.

Indian Culture, The Indian Research Institute, 170, Manicktola St., Calcutta.

Karnataka Sahitya Parishat, Sri Krishnarajendra Parishat Buildings, Hardinge Road, Chamrajpet, Bangalore City.

Man in India, Ranchi.

The Journal of the Greater India Society, 21, Badurbagan Row, P.O., Amherst St., Calcutta.

Brahmavidya; The Adyar Library Bulletin, Adyar.

The Journal of the Benares Hindu University, Benares Hindu University, P.O.

Indiana, Gandhigraha, Benares City.

Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute, Poona 6.

The Poona Orientalist, 15, Shukrawar, Poona 2.

Journal of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute, Tirupati.



WORKS BY V. R. R. DIKSHITAR, UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

1. War in Ancient India, Macmillan & Co., Rs. 15.
2. Silappadikaram, Oxford University Press, Rs. 18.
3. Hindu Administrative Institutions, Rs. 6.
4. The Mauryan Polity, Rs. 6.
5. Studies in Tamil literature and History, Rs. 5.
6. Some aspects of the Vayu Purana, Re. 1.
7. The Matsya Purana, a study, Re. 1.
8. The Lalita Cult, Rs. 3.
9. Kulottunga Chola III (in Tamil) Rs. 2.
10. Bharadvaja Siksha (Published by the Bhandarkar Institute) Rs. 3.
11. The Mauryan Polity (Minerva Series) As. 6.

DR. S. KRISHNASWAMI AYYANGAR COMMEMORATION VOLUME

This work consists of 70 papers by various scholars on different topics of interest and contains articles of great value to the research scholar and of interest to the general reader. Price Rs. 10.

G. S. PRESS, Narasingapuram Street Mount Road, MADRAS.

JOURNAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY

Published five times a year with original articles and abstracts of theses of Research Work done by the students and teachers of the Bombay University, in the following subjects:

- No. 1. History, Economics & Sociology (July)
- No. 2. Arts and Law (September)
- No. 3. Physical Sciences, including Mathematics (Novr.)
- No. 4. History, Economics & Sociology (January)
- No. 5. Biological Sciences, including Medicine (March)

Rates of Subscription

Annual subscription for Five Issues	..	Rs. 12
" " Nos. 1 & 4	..	Rs. 5
" " Nos. 3 & 5	..	Rs. 5
Number Two or a Single Copy	..	Rs. 3

For all kinds of University News

Subscribe to the

BOMBAY UNIVERSITY BULLETIN,

Annual Subscription: Rupee One, Post Free.

For advertisement rates and further particulars please write to:—

THE MANAGER,

Journal of the University of Bombay,

University of Bombay, Fort, Bombay.

BOOKS BY PROF. ANIL CHANDRA BANERJEE.

Calcutta University.

1. PESHWA MADHAV RAO I.

History of the Marathas, 1761-72, based on Marathi, English, Portuguese, and Persian sources. Price Rs. 6, only.

2. RAJPUT STUDIES.

A collection of papers dealing with some important incidents and commanding personalities of Rajput History, based on inscriptions, coins, medieval Rajasthani chronicles, and unpublished British records. Price Rs. 7 only.

3. THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF BRITISH INDIA.

A detailed and authentic study of British relations with Burma and Assam (1792-1826), based on unpublished British records and Burmese and Assamese chronicles. Price Rs. 8, only.

4. ANNEXATION OF BURMA.

A detailed and authentic study of British relations with Burma (1826-86), based on unpublished documents and Burmese chronicles. Price Rs. 7 only.

A. MUKHERJEE & BROS.

2, College Square, Calcutta.

**THE ADYAR LIBRARY
BRAHMAVIDYA
THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN**

APPEARING FOUR TIMES A YEAR.

Director : Dr. G. Srinivasa Murthi, B.A., B.L., M.B. & C.M.,
Vaidyaratna.

Editor : PROF. C. KUNHAN RAJA, M.A., D.PHIL. (OXON.)

Rates of Subscription :

Life Subscription Rs. 100		
	or	\$ 50
	or	£ 10
	Per Annum	Single Copy
India & Ceylon	.. Rs. 6	Rs. 2-8
U. S. A.	.. \$ 3	\$ 1.25
British Empire	.. Sh. 12	Sh. 5.
Other Countries	.. Rs. 9	Rs. 3-8

All Communications to be addressed to :

THE DIRECTOR,
Adyar Library,
Adyar, Madras, S., India.